‘The changing winds of aid’
An exploration of aid disbursements to Muslim countries

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Abstract

There have been many deadly terrorist attacks which have taken place in the 21st Century. At the turn of the century the world was transfixed as two planes were hijacked and flown into the ‘Twin Towers.’ Many recent attacks have been carried out by Islamic Fundamentalist groups. In 2015, Boko Haram, the Taliban, Daesh and Al-Qaeda were responsible for 74% of all terrorist attacks which took place across the globe. It is widely recognised that aid is used to promote donor interests in areas such as curbing terrorism. This thesis is focused on identifying whether terrorist attacks which have been carried out by Islamic Fundamentalist groups has increased the amount of aid to Muslim countries. The research identifies that in the earliest parts of the 21st century Iraq and Afghanistan received large proportions of aid due to the ‘War on Terror.’ From 2010 onwards this trend shifts and other countries that have large Muslim populations have increasingly received vast proportions of aid. This trend has been attributed to the changing context and concerns such as the War in Syria and the migration crisis. The research also looks at whether isolated terrorist incidents influence aid allocations. I have examined trends related to UK aid before and after the 7/7 bombings. The evidence shows that countries which are defined by the US Department of State as ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ and ‘terrorist safe havens’ have received more aid after the 9/11 hijackings and then after the 7/7 bombings.

Key words: aid allocations, Muslim countries, Islamic Fundamentalism, terrorism
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1. Introduction

There have been many deadly terrorist attacks which have been claimed by certain Islamic fundamentalist groups on western targets over the past century. These attacks include, for example, where four airplanes were hijacked by terrorists in America in September 2001 and flown into various high profile targets such as the World Trade Centre (BBC, 2017). Nearly 3,000 people were killed because of the attacks and the event led to the war in Afghanistan and subsequently to “The War on Terror”. It was widely assumed that Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden were behind the attacks. In July 2005, four suicide bombers detonated devises in locations across London such as on the London Underground and a bus (World Terrorism Database, 2016). The attacks killed 56 people and wounded 784. The attacks were subsequently claimed by the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe. The attacks are still considered to be the worst terrorist attacks ever carried out by an Islamic Fundamentalist group on British soil (BBC, 2015). Since 2015, the frequency of attacks by Islamic Fundamentalist groups in Europe appears to have intensified as there has been a spate of attacks across the region. For example, in January 2015 an armed attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices took place which resulted in twelve deaths including eight journalists, two police officers, a caretaker and a visitor (BBC, 2015). In the following year, an attacker ploughed a lorry into people celebrating Bastille Day in Nice which killed dozens of people (BBC, 2016).

Many of the western countries which have been targeted since 9/11 are the largest contributors of humanitarian assistance to developing countries. For example, in 2014 the US and the UK distributed the most overseas development assistance of all countries, contributing $6bn and $2.3bn respectively (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2015, p.31). Research indicates that aid is used as a foreign policy tool and a way for donors to further their own interests. This contention is supported by McKinlay and Little who sought to test the contention that foreign aid policy in the UK between 1960 and 1970 was used to protect and promote UK interests (1978, p.314 - 317). The variables associated with UK interest model were ‘commitment’ and ‘dependency’ to the UK. Commitment was related to reducing likelihood of invasion and maintaining ‘sphere of influence.’ Dependency was related to maintaining control through an asymmetric power relationship which ensured high costs for the recipient if the UK were to withdraw funding. The outcomes indicated that the UK was mostly influenced by promoting their own interests. The most important variable in
explaining the aid allocation was an attempt to maintain a sphere of interest (McKinlay and Little, 1978, p.321 - 329). Other significant variables included trade shares, a colonial legacy and security ties.

Other researchers have developed this argument and have suggested that overseas development assistance has been used as a tool to curb terrorism. Azam and Thelan carried out research into whether foreign aid and military interventions decreased the frequency of terrorist attacks (2010, p.239 - 249). They looked at transnational terrorist attacks occurring between 1990 and 2004. Their statistical test found that foreign aid was significant, meaning that aid appeared to reduce the levels of terrorism (Azam and Thelan, 2010, p.249 - 250). They attempted to explain this outcome, suggesting that aid was used as a reward for governments who were actively engaged in tackling terrorism. Another important finding was that higher levels of education were significant. They explain that governments with higher levels of education are more likely to be able to implement effective counterterrorism measures. The comparative effectiveness of aid to military intervention is demonstrated by their last finding. They found that military intervention, seemingly motivated by geo-political interests, increased the frequency of terrorist attacks. They found that deployment of troops to areas near to oil wells or within oil exporting countries increased the number of attacks - 20% more troops were deployed to oil exporting countries and were likely to produce twice as many attacks. Nevertheless, and conversely, military intervention into states without overt geo-political motivations is likely to reduce terrorist attacks.

My research is focused on understanding whether the attacks which have been carried out by Islamic Fundamentalist groups have influenced the amount of aid which has been distributed to Muslim countries. There is a lack of clarity from existing literature, which I will cover below, on whether Muslim countries receive more aid than non-Muslim countries. It would seem logical that specific Muslim countries which are considered to be related to terrorism would receive more aid, if we are to accept the ‘donor interest’ model. However, there are several counter-arguments to this model, such as the difficulty of disseminating funds in war zones and aid generally being distributed by donors to countries who hold similar values. I am, therefore, keen to examine whether Muslim countries have received more aid and whether countries with higher proportions of Muslim populations receive more aid. In addition, I am keen to hone in on one donor to examine whether a prolific terrorist attack which has taken place on home-soil has influenced the way that they have allocated aid. For
this section of the analysis, I will focus on the 7/7 bombing in London as a decade has passed since this attack and so it is possible to observe long-term trends before and after the incident.

2. Research question

Prior research has shown that aid has been allocated, at least in part, by motivations other than recipient need. In addition, studies have indicated that aid has been used to curb terrorism. For example, aid may be allocated to a government as a retribution for robust counterterrorism policies. There is limited literature specifically related to aid allocations to Muslim countries. Of the existing literature, there is a lack of unity around whether countries with large Muslim populations receive more or less aid. Some research indicates that Muslim countries receive more funding for strategic reasons such as a desire for the donor to secure assets such as oil. However, other research indicates that Muslim majority countries receive less aid funding for various reasons such as a lack of alignment with the values of the donor country.

There are many recent high-profile terrorist incidents that have been carried out and ‘claimed’ by Muslim Fundamentalist groups. Some of these attacks have taken place in countries which are among the highest donors of aid. In January 2015, for example, a series of attacks took place in France (BBC, 2015). The attacks started when two gunmen stormed the building of the satirical magazine called Charlie Hebdo (World Terrorism Database, 2016). The gunmen killed 11 journalists and security staff and injured another 11. The attacks were claimed by the group Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The group claimed that the attack was carried out in retaliation to Charlie Hebdo continually publishing images of the Prophet Mohammad.

In 2015, France was the fifth highest bilateral donor of international aid and disbursed $9.23 billion (OECD). I am interested to know how this attack would have affected France ‘said allocation to Muslim countries. More broadly, I am curious to know how the many attacks may have influenced aggregate bilateral donor aid allocations. I have chosen to focus my research from 2005 – 2015. I have selected this period because there are several high-profile attacks carried out by Muslim Fundamentalist groups on donor countries. Also, I am assuming that it would be possible to observe aid related trends over a decade long period.
My research question is: ‘does the Islamic Fundamentalist terrorism which has taken place from 2005 - 2015 affect the amount of aid which has been distributed to Muslim majority countries.’

3. Hypotheses

My hypotheses assume that bilateral donors will continue to allocate aid, in part, based on reasons other than recipient need. This is because it would seem logical that donors would continue in the same regard as other research has suggested. It follows that this pattern of allocation will continue across these dates due to political contextual reasons. For example, during this period there was significant media coverage of the ‘migration crisis’ (BBC, 2016). This is where hundreds of thousands of migrants, predominantly from Muslim majority countries in the Middle East and North Africa, migrated to western countries, many of which are the highest aid donors. Also, during this period some donor countries experienced terrorist attacks which were links to Fundamentalist Muslim groups. My hypotheses support the prior research that has concluded that aid is positively correlated with terrorism. I believe that certain countries with large Muslim populations are likely to receive more aid for strategic reasons such as curbing terrorism. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are focused on examining whether my belief is accurate.

To examine hypothesis 3, I shall focus on trends related to British foreign aid. In July 2005, four suicide bombers detonated devices in locations across London such as on the London Underground and a bus (WTD, 2016). The attacks killed 56 people and wounded 784. The attacks were subsequently claimed by the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe. The British government is likely to have made significant changes following the attacks due to strategic reasons, such as providing more support to other governments to implement counterterrorism measures and domestic pressure to take decisive action to tackle terrorism. This means that there would likely have been changes to their aid allocations during this period. I am therefore interested to know how these attacks have affected the way in which Britain has allocated aid. I have decided to observe trends from 1995 – 2015 so that I can identify whether this isolate incident has impacted upon longer-term patterns of allocation.

Another mass casualty terrorist incident that has taken place over this period was the attacks in Paris in November 2015 (BBC, 2015). The attacks in France resulted in 95 people being killed and 101 wounded. The attacks were claimed by the Muslim Fundamentalist group
called Daesh. The group is attempting to set up an Islamic state governed by Sharia Law (BBC, 2015). It is not possible for me to examine trends related to the Paris attacks due to the short amount of time which has elapsed since the attack, making it more difficult to observe longer-term trends. Moreover, there is limited aid related data which has been produced for 2016, which would hinder the data analysis process.

Hypothesis 1: From 2005 – 2015 certain Muslim countries have received, on average, 25% more aid from donors.

Hypothesis 2: From 2005 – 2015 certain countries with higher proportions of Muslim populations receive, on average, more aid.

Hypothesis 3: The United Kingdom has allocated more aid to certain Muslim countries following the London bombings which took place in 2007.

4. Literature Review

4.1 The politics of aid

4.1.1. Donor interests Vs recipient need

There is a plethora of research which examines the motivations of bilateral foreign aid. The act of one state providing aid to another would seem to be a true act of altruism. This is because a donor country is providing money to another state, when it could be used to further the interests of its own people. However, there is a significant body of research which challenges the assumption that aid is motivated by a selfless desire to improve the conditions of a foreign population. Most research related to this topic is focused on the donor interest vs. recipient need model. Supporters of the donor interest model argue that aid allocations are motivated by personal objectives of a donor. These objectives may include, for example, a wish to invest in a country with significant trade ties or where there is a colonial legacy. Advocates of the recipient need model, on the other hand, support ideas such as that aid is allocated to the poorest countries that require financial support to sustain itself and ensure the survival of its population.
Maizels and Nissanke sought to examine the motivations of donors by examining data for 79 recipient countries from 1969 - 1970 and 1978 – 1980 (1984, p.880 - 881). Three variables were tested for statistical significance related to recipient need- GDP per capita, growth rates in GDP and balance of payments to current accounts (1984, p.882 - 886). The results were not statistically significant indicating that aid was not based on recipient need during these periods. Three other variables were tested to establish whether donor aid allocations were based on personal objectives - political and security interests, investment interests and trade interests (1984, p.884 - 886). The research identified that political and strategic interests, particularly related to arms transfers, were significantly correlated donor motivations for aid disbursements. Trade interests were also positively linked, particularly in relation to exporting strategic materials. Another important observation outlined by Maizels and Nissanke was that aid appears to favor countries that have robust infrastructures in which aid can be used more efficiently.

Maizels and Nissanke’s finding relates to a wider body of research related to ‘aid effectiveness.’ Advocates of ‘aid effectiveness’ say that aid should be funneled to countries where it can have most impact such as countries where there is good governance, effective policies that promote anti-corruption and political rights (Park and Lee, 2015, p.180 - 189). Park and Lee used a similar approach as Maizels and Nissanke, although included aid effectiveness as a possible factor associated with allocations. They focused on Korean foreign aid allocations from 1988 - 2008. The results associated with aid effectiveness were varied (Park and Lee, 2015, p.192 - 195). For example, low levels of corruption were not associated with allocations. However, from 1988 – 1998, limited political rights reduced the likelihood of a recipient receiving aid although after 1998 this finding losses its significance. The research outcomes also indicated that recipient need and donor interests were important factors related to allocations. GDP per capita variable was significant. This is an indicator of recipient need because it shows that there is some correlation between the poorest countries and the level of aid disbursements. From 1989 - 2001, political and export interests significantly affected allocations. From 2002 until 2008, political interests became less of an influencing factor and foreign direct investment became a significant variable associated with allocations.

The motivations of donors to invest in fragile states is explored by Chauvet (2003, p.35 - 47). She carried an analysis into donor’s attitudes towards allocating aid to countries
experiencing socio-political instability. The research involved looking at trends in 28 countries that had experienced social instability, such as strikes and demonstrations. It also involved examining data for 51 countries that had experienced elite instability, such as a coup d’état and violent or armed instability, such as civil war. There are two main trends which provide support to the contention that aid is based on donor interests. Firstly, for middle income non-oil exporting countries, donors were more likely to provide aid to elite and violent instability and less likely to provide aid to social instability. They suggest that this trend can be explained by a need for donors to safeguard their economic interests in each country. Whilst social instability may slow the economic environment, elite and violent instability could devastate the economic environment. Secondly, for low income oil exporting countries, bilateral donors were more likely to give aid to countries experiencing social and elite instability and less likely to allocate aid to countries experiencing violent instability. They explain that donors are more willing to invest in countries where their donations will be most effective - both elite and social forms of instability are less destructive than violent forms. This outcome provides support to the aid effectiveness argument previously outlined.

The recipient need, donor interest argument was also examined by Gounder (1994, p.99 & 110). Gounder sought to challenge previous literature which had focused on donor interests as the primary motivator of aid allocations. Looking at Australian foreign aid allocations from the 1970s until the early 1990s, she found that aid appeared to be motivated by both recipient needs and donor interests (Gounder, 1994, p.105 - 109). GDP per capita appeared to be significant explanatory factor associated with aid allocations. However, she also found that political and strategic interests appeared to motivate allocations.

4.1.2. Aid allocations in the pursuit of tackling terrorism

Some theorists support the contention that aid can be used to tackle security threats, particularly related to terrorism. Bezeera and Braithwaite sought to understand whether political violence was a motivating factor for donors when allocating aid (2016, p. 337 - 339). They analysed bilateral aid commitments from 1989 - 2008 in 22 sub-Saharan African countries. The results indicated that countries that had recently experienced terrorism and civil conflict were more likely to receive aid (Bezeera and Braithwaite, 2016, p.343 - 349). They identified that, on average, countries received a 71% increase in aid in the year following a terrorist incident and a 35% increase in aid in the year following civil conflict.
New aid commitments were being made up to six years after a terrorist incident and up to eight years after the end of a civil conflict. The trends related to their research were, however, reversed in cases of extreme political violence. The analysis showed that donations began to decline after 150 casualties from a terrorist incident and 4000 casualties from civil conflict over the past year. This indicates that donors reach a threshold in which they are content to supply funds.

These results are supported by Lis who conducted research into impact of terrorism and conflict on foreign aid allocations by bilateral and multilateral donors (2014, p.655 - 667). He analysed data from 186 countries from 1973 - 2007. He identified that multilateral donors were less likely to provide aid to countries experiencing armed conflicts and terrorism. He explains this outcome through the contention that multilateral donors are more likely to be concerned with the ‘quality’ of governments and policies of receiving states when allocating budgets. Violent instability increases risk of poor policies and misappropriation of funding which hampers economic growth. Bilateral donors, on the other hand, were more likely to support states experiencing terrorism and armed conflict. The anomaly amidst his research was that bilateral donors were less likely to support countries where 50% or more of the population are Muslim and have low levels of civil liberties. His results indicated that bilateral donors are motivated by geopolitical and economic interests.

Boutton examined US aid allocations to understand how aid has been used during the Cold War and post 9/11 periods (2013, p.1145 - 1168). He identified that US aid was provided to allies to challenge Soviet related insurgent security threats during the Cold War period. After 9/11, governmental rhetoric reinforced the message that US aid was being used to protect the interests of its allies. However, Boutton’s research indicated that there was no correlation between terrorist activity against allies and allocation of aid budget to these countries, thus challenging the public messaging. He found a strong negative correlation between attacks against US interests and the allocation of aid to the country that were supporting or harboring the terrorist group. This suggests that countries that have some association with a terrorist group which have carried out an attack against US interests were more likely to receive less aid from the US.

Aronson’s research on US aid disbursements to Kenya seeks to explore whether aid has used as a way of tackling terrorism in the region (2011, p.120 - 125). The US saw Kenya as a key
strategic partner in the War on Terror as it possessed the characteristics that were considered to promote Islam radicalisation such as poverty and high levels of youth unemployment and radical Islam. He compared data from the War on Terror period with the 1998 bombings on the US Embassy in Nairobi. His analysis showed that aid funding to Kenya marginally increased following the 1998 bombings whereas aid to Kenya following 9/11 massively increased. For example, the foreign military financing programme, which was directed towards counterterrorism efforts, increased 15 times its previous value after 2001.

Dreher and Fuchs carried out a broader analysis of the post-9/11 period to include the allocations of 22 donors and 140 recipients (2011, p.339 - 342). Their research outcomes indicated that after 9/11 more countries received aid, albeit lower levels of aid, compared to the interwar period (Dreher and Fuchs, 2011, p. 350 - 359). The interwar period refers to the phase in between the Cold War and the ‘War on Terror.’ Countries with ties, which pre-date the War on Terror, were more likely to receive higher proportions of aid. They found that countries that already receive aid, and were host to terrorist groups, were more likely to receive more aid when terrorist incidents occur - an increase of 7.1% increase in aid per incident. Countries which were perceived by donors as ‘friendly’ were more likely to receive aid - aid to autocratic countries reduced by 2% per attack and increased by 1.5% per attack to democratic countries. They found that the US was the only county to increase the amount of aid to countries that host terrorist groups. The results showed that France, Italy and Sweden reduced the amount of aid to these countries.

4.1.3. Effectiveness of aid in tackling terrorism

The research indicates that bilateral donors were providing funding to curb terrorism. Aid allocations can often be influenced by a number of factors such as domestic opinion. Domestic opinion can play an influential role in the policies of a government. This is seen through the war in Vietnam where US domestic opinion through the antiwar movement influenced the government’s decision to withdraw from the conflict (Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, 2017). The notion that multiple factors play a role in aid allocation may suggest that aid may not be allocated in the most effective way. I am therefore keen to explore whether aid, intended for tackling terrorism, is effective.
The effectiveness of aid in reducing terrorism is explored by Ekey (2008, p.13 - 14). She sought to understand whether there was a correlation between the number of refugees in a country and the likelihood and frequency of terrorist attacks. She identified that the number of refugees increased the activities of terrorist groups in a host country (Ekey, 2008, p.25 - 28). However, she also found that the provision of US aid in 2005 was positively correlated with a reduction in incidence of terrorist attacks, outside of the Middle East region. She concluded that, although the number of refugees in a host country can increase terrorist activities, this link is weakened when aid is allocated to the refugee populations.

Young and Findlay sought to understand whether there were differences between the effectiveness of aid in various sectors in tackling terrorism (2011, p.365 - 371). They explored data from 147 countries across 1973 and 2004. Young and Findlay identified that aggregated aid, i.e. all sectors together, appeared to reduce the number of terrorist incidences overall (2011, p.373 - 378). When separating the various sectors, they found that education and governance aid appeared to be particularly effective in reducing the number of terrorist attacks. They also found that conflict aid (32%), health aid (39%) and civil society aid (40%) also significantly reduced the number of terrorist events. Conversely, ‘general budget aid’ appeared to be ineffective in tackling terrorism and agricultural aid was marginally effective.

The findings related to the education and health sectors are supported by research carried out by Azam et al and Cassidy. Azam and Thelen looked at whether the provision of aid and higher levels education among the population negatively influenced the number of terrorist attacks within a recipient country (2008, p.375 - 397). This approach challenged prior research which indicated that orchestrators of terrorist attacks were more likely to be from higher strata’s in society and come from relatively wealthy and educated backgrounds. They used a sample of 24 aid donors and 176 countries with the highest ODA per capita. They found that higher levels of aid and graduation of secondary school education reduced the amount of terrorist attacks within the country receiving aid. They provided a possible explanation of the results which is that foreign aid was being used as an indirect mechanism to repay or reward recipient governments for strong counter-terrorism policies. This is because counter-terrorism efforts can be costly and so a donor with invested interests can use aid as retribution to the recipient. Moreover, higher education is required to understand how to implement these policies. Cassidy analysed the relationship between aid allocations to the education and healthcare sectors and the supply of terrorist attacks (2010, p.74 – 80).
results indicated that enrollment in secondary school was significantly negatively correlated with the supply of terrorism attacks (Cassidy, 2010, p.80 – 85). In addition, an increase in life expectancy, i.e. improved healthcare, also has a negative effect on the supply of terrorism. He suggested that education would increase the life prospects of an individual, such as an increase in GDP and ability to identify with others, which would thereby increase the opportunity costs of engaging in terrorism.

There may be some circumstance where aid, which is intended to be used to tackle terrorism, is ineffective. Boutton discussed two instances of where aid is inherently ineffectual, when a state is engaged in an interstate rivalry and personalistic regimes.

Boutton examined data related to 603 violent non-state groups and 80,000 attacks to establish whether aid is ineffective when it is allocated to states which are engaged in an interstate rivalry (2014, p.745 - 751). Terrorist groups that operate in states which are receiving US military aid, and are engaged in an interstate rivalry, are less likely to fail than states where there is no rivalry. Moreover, there were more attacks carried out by the groups against US interests in states that were engaged in interstate rivalries. Boutton sought to explain his findings through using an example of Pakistan (2012, p.741 - 745). Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has sought to reach parity with India. Some observers have suggested that US military aid, meant for counterterrorism efforts, has been misappropriated and used for nuclear and arms buildup in anticipation of a conflict with India. Pakistan requires this aid to ensure the continuation of its defensive measures. Boutton argues that states engaged in an interstate conflict tolerate and sometimes even encourage terrorism within their country to secure future aid (which is to be misappropriated). This aid will be ‘fungible’ and used to increase to promote state security related to the interstate conflict.

Boutton considered that personalistic regimes have an invested interested in prolonging and even exacerbating terrorist activity (2016, p.3 - 10). Unlike other forms of governance, a leader of a personalistic regime needs support and loyalty of a small group of elites to remain in office. To secure this loyalty, leaders distribute ‘rent’ amongst the elites and political rivals. If the source of rent were to be cut-off, there would be no incentive for the elites and political rivals to continue support of the regime. The personalistic leader is, therefore, motivated to ensure the continuation of the rents to secure the security of their regime. He analysed 603 internally hosted non-state actors from 1968 – 2006 (2016, p.9 - 15). Higher
levels of aid over five years in personalistic regimes were correlated with a significant decrease in likelihood of group failure in personalistic regimes. In non-personalistic regimes, the likelihood of group failure increases slightly. Leaders of personalistic regimes are likely to be preoccupied with cultivating the threat of terrorism in their state to ensure continued US aid assistance. He hypothesised that personalist regimes are likely to experience more terrorism in a year as US aid increases. He used data from the Global Terrorism database and looked at attacks from between 1970 and 2012. The results from his ‘anti-US attacks’ model indicated that personalistic regimes cultivate attacks on US interests.

In both cases donors are often unable to challenge the misappropriation of aid for several reasons (Boutton, 2014, p.745 – 751). Firstly, non-compliance with counterterrorism measures is not easy to observe as it is subtle. Secondly, there are often domestic pressures to retain military aid to non-compliant states. Military interventions are far costlier and so aid, in whatever capacity, is preferable.

4.1.4. Trends and challenges related to aid allocations to Muslim countries

In 2015, three Muslim majority countries received the largest proportions of aid – Syria, occupied Palestinian territories and Sudan (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2015, p.50). Despite these statistics, I am keen to explore whether other Muslim majority countries have been positively or negatively affected by aid allocations. I am concerned that some Muslim countries may have been negatively affected for several reasons. For example, OECD countries are amongst the highest contributors of aid. Amongst the OECD donors, France has the highest Muslim population at 7.5% (Pew Research Centre, 2016). It is reasonable to believe that donors are likely to allocate funds to countries with a similar culture and values. Therefore, the lack of alignment amongst religious beliefs, coupled with the growing phenomena of Islamophobia amongst some countries may lead to some potential recipients being disadvantaged (Shahid-Ahmed, 2017).

Metcalfe-Hough et al examined some of the operational challenges associated with Muslim aid organisations and delivering assistance to Muslim majority countries experiencing terrorism and conflict (2015, p.1 - 12). They carried out semi-structured interviews with 40 British international aid organisations (INGOs). Some INGOs highlighted challenges associated with accessing financial services. This is due to concerns amongst banking
organisations around whether the funds are being used to fund terrorist activity. One example is where the bank USB blocked its customers from donating to the internationally recognised charity Islamic Relief in 2012. Another key finding was that a small number of organisations which have links to illegal activity are impacting upon the ability of other organisations to operate, raise funds and engage with partners. For example, Al Fatiha Global is currently being investigated by the charity Commission for links between the charity and individuals that are engaging in illegal activity in Syria.

Despite these operational challenges, other research indicates that Muslim majority countries have received more aid in recent years. Hasal sought to understand whether the US foreign aid budget had been affected by the ‘War on Terror’ (2010, p.79). He created a statistical model examining the US aid allocation to 144 countries over two separate periods - 1997 until 2001 and 2002 until 2006 (Hasal, 2010, p. 86 - 91). He identified that the aid allocations had been significant influenced by the War on Terror in certain areas. In the latter period, countries which share a border with Iraq and Afghanistan and countries which were home to targets of foreign terrorist organisations were statistically significant. He also examined whether the aid allocation to Muslim countries had changed during this period (Hasal, 2010, p.92). He identified that member states of the Organisation of Islamic Conferences received 25% more aid. In addition, he found that the greater a Muslim population in a country, the more aid which was received - 0.006% increase for each 1% increase in Muslim population.

These findings were supported by Loud et al who analysed the allocations of European donors from between 1980 and 2000 (p.11 – 14). They found that, on average, Muslim countries received 35% more aid than non-Muslim countries. They speculated that European donors were providing large sums of money to Muslim countries for strategic purposes (Loud, p. 2 – 11). They suggested several strategic reasons for the allocations such as a desire to secure low prices for oil, curb flows of Muslim migrants to European countries and reduce the threat of terrorism. They also carried out a more focused analysis on the strategic motivations of donors to provide aid (Loud, p.1 – 15).

Loud et al sought to glean whether governments considered the priorities of voters over their own strategic interests in the process of allocating aid to Muslim majority countries. He considered that voters would be more likely to support aid for the purposes of curbing flows of migration and tackling terrorism. He also proposed that governments would be motivated
to provide aid for strategic concerns such as maintaining alliances and securing access to oil. His results suggested that strategic concerns significantly influenced allocations to recipients. However, curbing terrorism appeared to be an important secondary motivating factor in the allocation process (Loud, p.15 – 17). For example, recipients that share strategic alliances with the donor received on average 61.1% more aid; recipients received an increase of 11.2% in aid following each terrorist attack.

4.2 Terminology related to terrorism

The term for ‘terrorism’ was first used by France in the 18th Century and during the ‘Reign of Terror’ (Moten, 2010, p.36). The Reign of Terror was a period during the French Revolution where suspected enemies of the state were executed (The Columbia Encyclopaedia, 2017). The word ‘terrorism’ is now embedded in our vocabulary; however, there is no broadly accepted definition for the term. Moten refers to a study which was carried out by Schmid and Jongman in the 1980s (2010, p.36 - 39). According to their research, there were 109 different definitions for the word in the 1980s and this figure has since at least doubled. Moten pessimistically proclaims that it is unlikely that we will agree on a definition soon. He outlines his reasoning which is that ‘definitions are coloured by political ideology, location, and perspective. The term has been used selectively and attached as a label to those groups whose political objectives one finds objectionable.’ Despite his pessimism, he outlines that international definitions mostly concede in one area which is that terrorism relates to violence and the threat of violence.

The plethora of challenges which are associated with defining terrorism were explored by Locatelli (2014, p.4 - 7). The term is used for varying effect in a variety of arenas. For example, a media outlet might focus on violence in its definition to raise awareness of a concern. He contends that scholars are likely to be influenced by context when developing terminology related to terrorism. For example, he suggests that concepts were influenced by anti-colonial guerrilla activity in the 1940s and 1950s. This means that the elements which comprise the terminology are likely to change dependent on the contextual environment. Moreover, definitions of terrorism and terrorist groups are based on value judgements. This is because we all perceive terrorist actions and groups differently and are influenced by our culture, beliefs, values and background. For example, one individual may define an individual carrying out a suicide bomb a terrorist, another may perceived this individual to be
a freedom fighter.

What is the purpose of defining terrorism? Saul argues that defining terrorism helps to delineate unacceptable behaviour in the international arena (2008, p.67 – 68). He outlines that ‘terrorism seriously undermines fundamental human rights, jeopardizes the State and peaceful politics, and threatens international peace and security’ (Saul, 2008). Defining and criminalising terrorism can contribute towards upholding these rights and ideals. International actors are more obligated to cooperate such as to ensure that ‘terrorists’ do not qualify for refugee status. Fletcher, on the other hand, argues that the definition serves many different functions such as stigmatising certain organisations (2006, p.897 – 900). One way that this is achieved is through condemning the financing of these organisations as illegal. The UN General Assembly Resolution Against Financing of Terrorism emphasises the financing aspect of an attack ‘to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from any act.’ Another function of the definition is to justify extra judicial killings, so-called ‘targeted assassinations.’ Terrorism can be perceived as occupying the space in between a crime and traditional warfare. It is expected that if an individual commits a crime they should be arrested and brought to trial. The Law of War dictates that if a group engages in armed conflict, the military of the state can use force to quash the rebellion. The ill-defined nature of the term can be exploited as actions can be determined as act of war. This means that individuals and states are able to justify targeted assassinations.

Fletcher argues that it is not possible to create a definition related to ‘terrorism’ (2006, p.901 – 911). Defining a term means coming up with a rigid description which would invariably produce counter examples. Instead he advocates looking at terrorism as a concept with eight related variables. The variables should be perceived as overlapping criteria which may or may not all be present in every act of terrorism. The variables are: 1. The presence of violence such as a violent attack. 2. The ‘required intention.’ The 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1566 provides a definition for this variable - ‘to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.’ 3. The ‘right’ type of victim such as a civilian. 4. The ‘right’ type of wrongdoer such as a fighter outside of military command. 5. A ‘Just cause.’ Perpetrators usually consider that their actions are justified by a cause. 6. Acting on behalf of an organisation. This is important because people are more fearful of actors who are part of an organisation. This is because an
organisation implies that there are other likeminded individuals ready to commit similar atrocities. 7. An element of theatre. Dramatic events which are theatrical capture the attention of an audience, thus allowing a group to communicate the threat of terrorism. 8. A perception that the person has died without any guilt or remorse. The attacker believes that they are doing the right thing. A religiously motivated attack, for example, could be perceived by the attacker as ‘divinely ordained.’

Locatelli attempted to create his own definition of terrorism using a ‘two step’ approach. The first step involved developing a ‘background concept’ through exploring the various meanings associated with the concept (2014, p.5 – 11). The second step involved developing a ‘systemised concept’ through defining the essential characteristics of the concept. The first related to the nature of actors – state terrorism, state sponsored terrorism and terrorism perpetrated by private actors. The second related to the ‘ultimate goal’ – regime change, policy change, territorial change, social control, status quo maintenance. The third related to the type of actor. Examples of this variable include ‘lone wolf’ actors, transnational network and governmental agencies. He defined terrorism as: ‘terrorism is a peculiar form of political violence based on an indirect approach. It implies a patent breach of accepted rules and enjoys a tactical advantage over defence.’

There have been two attempts at creating an internationally recognised counter-terrorism convention. The first was initiated by the League of Nations (World Digital Library, 2017). In 1934 King Alexander I of Yugoslavia was executed by Croatian and Macedonian separatists in France. Following the attack, the French government suggested that the League should develop a convention on terrorism. In 1937, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism was adopted by 24 member states. Acts of terrorism were defined by article 1 as ‘criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.’ However, the convention was never ratified due to internal disputes related to the articles on extradition.

Whilst the international community were not able to ratify the 1937 convention, they were able to agree on certain offences which are categorised as activities of terrorism (Giola, 2006, p.4 – 6). This ‘sectoral approach’ has identified activities and created treaties to deal with the various acts of terrorism. The Civil Aviation Organisation led the way in creation of the
treaties. In the 1960s aviation security became an increasing concern to the international community. The first of a series of conventions were the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. The UN has subsequently ratified three conventions using this sectoral approach including the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.

The second attempt to define terrorism as an international community is the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (Livemint, 2016). The Convention would provide a common language on, for example, prosecution and extradition of terrorism. In 1996 the UN General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee as part of resolution 51/210 with a mandate that included ‘developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism’ (Ad Hoc and Special Committees, 2017). This was updated in December 2016 to include the mandate of finalising a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. Despite this progress, a finalised version of the UN convention is being hampered by disputes over terminology related to terrorism (Livemint, 2016). Livemint (2016) claims that the blocs which are stunting this progress are the US, the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and the Latin American countries due to a desire to protect strategic interests.

A number of countries have developed their own definitions of terrorism. For example, in the year 2000 the British government enshrined in law the Terrorism Act. The aims of the Act are outlined as ‘to make provision about terrorism; and to make temporary provision for Northern Ireland about the prosecution and punishment of certain offences, the preservation of peace and the maintenance of order’ (United Kingdom: The Terrorism Act 2000). The Law evolved from a recommendation by Lord Lloyd of Berwick to reform the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (Guardian Online, 2009). The act was a temporary measure to curb terrorism in Northern Ireland. His recommendations were to create a permanent act following the IRA ceasefire. One example of use of the law is the case of Muhammad Rabbani who was charged under the law in May 2017 for failing to hand over the passwords to his laptops to authorities (The Telegraph, 2017). Rabbani is a journalist and claimed that he was travelling to a Gulf State to investigate cases of torture supposedly implicating the US.
4.3 Recent trends related to terrorism

Terrorism related trends and information was most recently reported in the 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2016). GTI is produced by the Institute for Economic and Peace and is composed of data from the Global Terrorism Database. The Index analyses trends associated with terrorism in 162 countries. The scoring system assesses countries against four areas and uses a weighted score system to reflect the lingering effects of the incident over time: number of terrorist incidences (score = 1), number of fatalities caused by terrorist incident (score = 3), number of injuries caused by an incident (score = 0.5), levels of property damage because of a terrorist incident (score = 2). The GTI score is created by multiplying the weighting of an incident by the frequency of an incident. In 2015, Iraq (9.96), Afghanistan (9.444), Nigeria (9.314), Pakistan (8.613) and Syria (8.587) were reported as having the highest levels of terrorism (Global Terrorism Index, 2016, p.9 - 11). Kuwait was reported as having the lowest levels of terrorism with a score of 0.019 and 39 countries were reported as having no terrorism.

The Index reports 2014 as the deadliest year in the past 16 years as 93 countries experienced an attack and 32,765 people were killed (2016, p.35). The majority of attacks from 2000 – 2015 have taken place in developing countries as 57% of all deaths have occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria (GTI, 2016, p.36). Iraq has experienced the most deaths during this period comprising 30% of the total figure. The United States features in the top 10 countries, however, this mostly relates to 9/11 which represents 97% of US terrorism related deaths since 2000.

A specific examination of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states to relate to the wider research as the group includes 28 countries which were the highest donors of net official development assistance in 2015. The OECD gathers and analyses data to support governments in making effective policies to tackle poverty and promote prosperity (OECD, 2017). The OECD is comprised of 35 countries which are focused on promoting democracy and a liberal market economy. The GTI outlines that 2015 was the worst year for terrorism for OECD member states (2016, p.40 - 45). In 2015, 21 countries out of the 34 member states experienced an attack and was the first time since 2004 that there were more than 150 deaths. Half of all deaths were because of attacks which were directed or inspired by Daesh. These attacks include, for example, the attack on
an Orlando nightclub in June 2016 where a gunman stormed the building and killed 49 individuals (BBC, 2016). The perpetrator had previously claimed ties to Daesh and the group subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack. Since the new millennia, 10 out of the 20 deadliest terrorist attacks in OECD member states took place in 2015 and 2016. In addition, 80% of the perpetrators held some association with Daesh. The Index provides some detail on some of the traits associated with the perpetrators of terrorism in OECD countries (2016, p.45). The perpetrators tend to be lone males who are motivated by ideology and recruited into domestic terrorist groups by friends of family. The perpetrators tend to have higher levels of education although with lower incomes.

4.4 Overview of Islam

The term ‘Islam’ means ‘surrendering to the will of God’ (Bearman, et al, 2012). Muslims are followers of the religion of Islam (BBC, 2009). Muslims believe that there is one god, whom is referred to as Allah in the Arabic language. They also believe in ‘angels, heaven, hell and the day of judgement’ (Eposito, 2002, p.4). The main holy text is the Qur’an which is considered to be the word of god and of which Muslims base their laws. Other holy books include the Sunnah which is practical information about Mohammad’s life and the Haddith which relates to his messages. Muslims follow The Five Pillars of Islam (BBC, 2009). The ‘pillars’ are five obligations which, according to Islam, all Muslims should fulfil: declaration of faith, praying five times a day, giving money to charity, fasting and a pilgrimage to Mecca. Muslims follow Islamic laws which are rules on how to live life according to the will of god (Eposito, 2002, p.139). They are guidelines on how a human being should interact with god, and how they should interact with other human beings. The laws provide advice on appropriate behaviour and on all areas of life such as marriage, divorce and religious rituals.

Pew Research Centre outline that in 2010 there were 1.6 billion Muslims around the world, comprising 23% of the world’s population (Lipka, 2017). In 2009, the Pew Research Centre reported that 10-13% of the world’s Muslim population were Shia Muslims and 87-90% was Sunni Muslims (2009). They also highlighted that the majority of Shia Muslims reside in Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq (68% - 80%) (Lipka, 2017). Islam is the second largest religion. It is also the fastest growing religion and is expected to overtake Christianity by the end of this Century. The Centre have identified through recent research that the largest proportion of the world’s Muslim population (62%) currently reside in the Asia Pacific
region. Islam originated in the Middle East and North Africa, although only 20% of the world’s Muslim population currently live in the region.

### 4.5 Origins of Islam

Muslims believe that God sent prophets such as Jesus, Moses and Mohammad to earth to teach people ‘how to how to live according to His law.’ God sent messages, which are referred to as ‘revelations,’ to Moses and Jesus (Eposito, 2002, p.7). These revelations are recorded in the Torah and the Gospel. They consider that Mohammad was the last Prophet sent to earth by god. Muhammad was born in modern day Saudi Arabia in 570 (BBC, 2011). In 610, Mohammad was meditating in a cave when he was visited by angel Jibreel. When Jibreel stated the name Allah, Mohammad began speaking words which he later considered to be the word of god. Mohammad considered himself to have been sent as a messenger of god. Mohammad continued to receive ‘divine messages’ and over a 23-year period god revealed the Qur’an to him (BBC, 2011). In the years following the initial revelation, Mohammad grew in popularity as a leader (BBC, 2011). This threatened the leaders of Mecca and so in 622 Mohammad led his followers from Mecca to Medina. After ten years, the number of followers had grown so significantly that he returned to Mecca and overthrew the existing leadership.

Mohammad died in 632 and did not appoint a successor (Harney, 2016). There were differing opinions on who should lead the faith as some thought that the leader should be selected by consensus and others believed that his responsibilities should be passed to a descendent. Abu Bakr, a close friend of Mohammad, was chosen to succeed Mohammad (BBC, 2009). Supporters of Abu Bakr considered that a Caliph should be selected based on politics rather than blood lines. However, a small group of individuals including some senior companions disagreed with this view. They considered that politics and bloodlines should dictate the rightful successor. They believe that Mohammad’s cousin called Ali should be ‘the sole interpreter of his legacy.’ Abu Bakr was murdered in 634 and was succeeded by three Caliphs’: Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthmanibn al-Affan, Ali ibn Abi Talib (Harney, 2016) (Esposito, 2003, p.267). The last of the four Caliphs’ was murdered and Ali was made Caliph (Harney, 2016). Ali’s followers, Talha and al-Zubayr, deserted him and joined forces with his predecessors widow to start a rebellion (Holt et al, 1977, p.68 – 72). This started squabbles about who should be the rightful Caliph as some believed that Mu'awiya should rule and
resulted in a civil war. However, Ali was subsequently murdered in 661 in the mosque of Kufa. Ali’s son called al-Hasan was persuaded to abdicate his right as leader and Mu'awiya was pronounced as Caliph. The following dynasties and Caliphates were The Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba in Islamic Spain (756-929-1031), Abbasid Caliphate(750-1258), The Fatimid Caliphate (909-1171),The Ayyubid dynasty (1171-1260), The Mamluk Caliphate (Bahri dynasty then succeeded by Burji dynasty) (1250–1517) and finally The Ottoman Caliphate (1299 –1923) (Art of the Islamic World, 2017). Those who considered that Ali was the rightful ruler became known as Shiites. Those who consider that Abu Bakr was the Prophet’s successor are known as Sunni’s. In Sunni Islam the first four Caliphs are considered to be the ‘rightly guided Caliphs’ (Esposito, 2003, p.267). They saw this period as the golden age in which the Caliph’s were greatly influenced by Mohammad’s practices.

4.6 Islamic Fundamentalism

Islamic Fundamentalism emerged out of the desire to preserve the sanctity of the Islamic faith by returning to what is considered to be the ‘fundamentals’ of the religion (Guidere, 2012, p.1). Islamic Fundamentalists seek to go back to the same way of life as the ancient Islamic societies. This desire to go ‘back to basics’ has grown out of a concern that modern life is damaging the purity of Islam. The Dictionary of Contemporary World History (2016) describes Islamic Fundamentalism as an ‘Islamic revivalist movement which profess strict adherence to the Quran and Islamic law, the Sharia.’ The movement emerged in the 18th Century due concerns that Islam was being degraded due to western influences over states in Middle East and North Africa (Guidere, 2012, p.2 - 3). Fundamentalists aspire to set up a Caliphate which is an Islamic government that implements Sharia law (Islamic law) (Guidere, 2012, p.5).

Wahhabism is an Islamic Fundamentalist movement that emerged in the 16th Century. The founder of Wahhabism was Ibn Abdul-Wahhab. Abdul-Wahhab visited Mecca, Medina, and najaf in the early 1700s and observed that ‘Muslims in Arabia were lapsing back into tribal customs and superstitions and calling it Islam’ (Aboul-Enein, 2011, p.112-113). He claimed that they deserved to be killed as they had regressed into ‘jahiliyya’ which is ‘the state of barbarism and ignorance’ (Sageman, 2011, p.8). Because of these observations, he sought to ‘purify’ the religion in Arabia. Abdul-Wahh and Muhammad ibn Saud, a lead of a tribal confederacy, created an alliance to pursue this desire. The Wahhabi-Saudi alliance dominated
the central Arab region from 1744 until 1818. They waged war on Muslims who had fallen into jahiliyya, carrying out massacres on citizens of the Holy Cities. The alliance was defeated by the Ottoman Empire, however, in 1925 they reclaimed the land and established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Western states encouraged the expansion of Islamic Fundamentalist groups in the 20th Century. Ties between the newly founded Saudi Arabia and the US grew in the 1930s (Schett, 2012). Saudi Arabia created an agreement with the California Arabian Standard Oil Company in 1932. The expansion of Saudi economic ties enabled their economy to blossom and allow the funding of religious groups worldwide, promoting the spread of extreme versions of Islam. Saudi elites reaped the gains of the newfound prosperity although remained connected to wahhabist principles. The United States accepted the spread of radicalism due to their interests in Saudi oil. They welcomed the spread of Islam as a way of mitigating threats to America’s geopolitical agenda. During the Cold War governments, such as the United States, initiated covert and overt campaigns to build capacity of Islamic Fundamentalism to help prevent Soviet expansion (Dreyfuss, 2006, p.1 - 4). For example, the CIA launched a covert military-intelligence operation in Afghanistan which involved the creation of ‘Islamic Brigades’ (Chossudovsky, 2017). President Carter signed a declaration which committed to provide secret aid to opposition groups to a Soviet regime in Kabul. The US hoped that a growth in Islamic Fundamentalism would trigger an invasion from the Soviets. The Soviets subsequently invaded which led to a civil war which lasted for 25 years. Covert US support to the Mujahedeen continued throughout the 1980s with the intention of the Afghanis defeating the Soviets. They provided assistance including, but not limited to, 65,000 tons of arms annually by 1987.

A pivotal moment for the Islamic Fundamentalist movement occurred in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution. The seeds of the revolution were sown by the western monopoly of Iranian oil. In the early 20th Century Iranian oil was owned by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Panah, 2007, p.16 - 32). After Mohammad Reza abdicated from the throne in the early 1940s, a nationalist movement emerged out of resentment of the monopolisation and called for the nationalisation of oil and its revenues. The Mossadeq government was receptive of the potential changes to the oil industry. The US was particularly concerned about protecting potential future US owned oil and the possible spread of communism. Therefore, the CIA and British intelligence engineered a coup d’état which removed the
existing Mossadeq government and reinstated the Shah. National frustrations grew throughout the 1960s and 1970s due to a number of reasons such as land reforms and extreme poverty. Moreover, the Iranian people considered the Pahlavi state to be the puppet of western countries. Islamic activism grew in the 1960s due to this resentment and global ideologies such as Marxism. Ayatollah Khomeini, who was an exiled professor of philosophy, propagated messages that Islam was intrinsically tied with activism. He believed that society’s problems would be solved by a return to the fundamentals of the religion and promoted the idea of rule by the leading religious jurisprudent (faqih). His ideas of independence and freedom from the imperialist powers appealed to the masses. A coalition of people from different classes emerged in opposition to the existing regime and led to the Iranian revolution. Protests erupted in 1978 as a result of governmental criticism against Khomeini (Afary, 2017). The government reacted with violence and many of the protesters were killed. From exile in Iraq, Khomeini called for the abdication for the Shah. In 1979, due to growing unrest and hostility the Shah fled to Iran. Khomeini returned from exile and was appointed leader following the national election in May and declared Iran to be an Islamic State.

Nowadays, there are many different Islamic Fundamentalist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Daesh. The Dictionary of Contemporary World History (2016) outlines the commonalities between the groups which are: ‘a call for more traditional gender roles, traditional dress, and the introduction of Islamic law as superior to a secular legal code.’

4.7 Islamic Fundamentalism and terrorism

The majority of recent terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by Islamic Fundamentalist groups. The Global Terrorism Index reported that four Islamic Fundamentalist groups are responsible for 74% of all deaths from terrorism (2016, p.49 - 50). Boko Haram, the Taliban, Daesh and Al-Qaeda were culpable for 17,471 people in 2015. The deadliest group were Daesh which were responsible for 6,141 people. A noteworthy trend related to this research is that conflict in Afghanistan has increased since the withdrawal of troops in 2013. There has since been a 29% increase in the number of deaths from attacks carried out by the Taliban. Some theorists have speculated on the motivations of individuals to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terror.
Pape argues that suicide attackers are motivated to commit attacks due to a sense of nationalism (2005, p.27 - 30). He claims that individual attacks are part of a cluster which are aimed at a political goal. Pape argues that the pattern of attacks indicate that perpetrators are motivated by the desire to force states that have military forces stationed in the country that they consider to be their homeland to withdraw. He also argues that groups see democracies as more easily open to coercion than other types of political system. Groups are therefore looking to capitalise on this vulnerability to force western military forces to leave. Conversely, Benjamin et al argue that the 9/11 attacks were purely motivated by religious devotion (2002, p.40 – 41). They challenged the assumption that the attacks were strategically or politically motivated. They say that the attackers believed that they were carrying out the ‘will of god’ and that the mass killings were ‘an act of redemption’ to ‘restore to the universe a moral order which has been corrupted by the enemies of Islam and their Muslim collaborators.’

Atran argues that small group dynamics can influence whether an individual will commit an act of terrorism (2006, p.141 – 144). Psychological research has focused on individual personalities determining whether a person will engage in such an attack. However, small-groups can influence individuals that might not otherwise be inclined to commit an act of terrorism. Research indicates that Jihadi cells tend to comprise of around eight likeminded individuals who are spontaneously formed and self-mobilising. Each small-group is different in character and generally requires input from a broader Jihadi community which is primarily derived from the internet. One specific example of this is from the early 2000’s when a small group of Moroccan descendants and emigrants were disgruntled with the moderate teachings at the Takoua Mosque in Madrid (Atran, 2006, p.133 – 134). The group called themselves the Al Haraka Salafiya (The Salafi Movement). The Global Islamic Media Front circulated a call for “two or three attacks … to exploit the coming general elections in Spain in March 2004.” Motivated by the call for an attack, the group subsequently carried out the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Atran sought to understand the motivations of a ‘would-be’ suicide bomber (2006, p.138 - 139). He interviewed emir of JI, Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, in Jakarta’s Cipinang prison in August 2005. He found that the would-be attackers were ‘inspired by love of one’s group and by rage at those who would humiliate it.’ He argues that the notion of humiliation can be most prominent in Arab societies due to the cultural importance of ‘honour.’
Islamic Fundamentalist groups can potentially capitalise on resentment felt by displaced migrants which are forced, for example, to move to western countries. It is exceptionally difficult to gain citizenship in countries which are part of under the Gulf Cooperation Council. Harrison (2014) argues that these states are unlikely to lift their strict rules for several reasons. Firstly, the countries have a high GNI per capita which has allowed the ruling families to improve living standards for the population such as subsidies to sectors such as education, healthcare and energy. An increase in the population would increase the number of people which are receiving the benefits, making it potentially unsustainable. Secondly, there is resistance from the populations in the GCC countries. This is due to a concern that outsiders would dilute their culture and traditions. Moreover, it would impact upon the high quality of services that they receive by the existing leadership. ISIS is reportedly printing a passport of the so-called “caliphate” (Al Arabiya News, 2014). It was reported in 2014 that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called upon skilled individuals to join the so-called Islamic State. He outlined that “Those who can immigrate to the Islamic State should immigrate, as immigration to the house of Islam is a duty” and “your brothers in all the world are waiting to be rescued by them.” These sentiments promote the idea that the group will welcome likeminded Muslims with open arms. It is therefore possible that the resentment that some Muslims may face because of the lack of access to GCC countries could encourage them to join a group which is welcoming them with open arms.

Terrorist groups can also be influenced by Islamic ideologies. The European Parliament, for example, described Wahhabism as the main source of global terrorism in 2013 (Armstrong, 2014). Wahhabism is a form of Salafism (Aboul-Enein, 2011, p.114 – 155). Salafism is based on the premise of returning to the fundamentals of the religion because ‘Islam became decadent because it strayed from its righteous path’ (Sageman, p.4). Advocates of this approach want to see a return to the practices of the Prophet Mohammad and an elimination of any modern influences which are perceived to be impure. Many followers of Wahhabism consider it to be ‘the only path of true Islam’ (Cline, 2016). Violent Wahhabists justify violence against western countries and other Muslims due to the term jahiliyya which means to slander any society which they deem to be impure.
5. Methodology

I decided to use a quantitative approach to carrying out my research. This is because of the benefits which emergence from analysing vast amounts of information (Adolphus, 2017). My research is likely to be reliable as the same results would likely arise if I were to repeat the investigation. The main challenge to this approach is that I am not able to peruse the detail surrounding the research outcomes. A qualitative analysis involving interviews, for example, would allow the researcher to explore the detail around the research outcomes. However, this approach would unlikely be reliable as researchers are often limited in the amount of people that they can interview as part of their research.

I acknowledge that my research involves a researcher bias (Squrell, p.83). This is where an individual is influenced by how they perceive the world based on their background, values and beliefs. Thus, my experiences may have influenced my hypotheses and research question. This is because I have experienced living in Europe at a time where the media has highlighted Islamic Fundamentalist terrorism as a concern. I have, however, carried out my analysis in a largely ‘value free’ way. This is because I have gathered raw information from data sources and have followed the outcomes based on the data. One caveat to this is that I am using data sources which are created by western organisations such as the OECD database.

My hypotheses are focused on understanding whether there is a ‘causal relationship’ between variables. A variable is defined as ‘any characteristics, number, or quantity that can be measured or counted’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics). A causal relationship is where one variable causes an outcome in another (Lynch, 2013, p.143 – 144). If there is a relationship between the variables we would expect to see the ‘independent variable’ causing an effect on the ‘dependent variable.’ The dependent variable is the variable which is being tested and the independent variable(s) are the variable which is being used to test where there is an effect on the dependent variable (Helmenstine, 2017).

5.1 Aid allocations and recipient need

As a starting point for my research, I wanted to examine whether it can be said that aid has been allocated to recipients from 2005 – 2015 based on factors other than recipient need. This
will create a baseline for my research and allow me to better predict whether aid allocations to Muslim countries are based on political interests. In addition, there is conflicting and limited recent research around whether aid allocations are based on donor interests or recipient need.

My dependent variable is the average aid disbursement from 2005 – 2015. I have gathered data from the official development assistance: disbursements dataset (OECD, 2017) which has been produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The dataset presents information on aid disbursements which is comprised of overseas development assistance (ODA) loans, grants, debt relief and capital subscriptions. My data is comprised of total net ODA (current prices) allocations. To streamline the large dataset, I have taken an average over the 2005 – 2015 periods for each country.

My independent variables are Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and the human development index (HDI) score. GNI measures the total income of a country and incorporates income earned by residents and businesses of the country, irrespective of where the money has been produced (Amadeo, 2016). GNI includes, for example, the amount of money which is sent back the recipient country from family members that have emigrated; this is because this money can help to bolster the economy of the recipient state. Unlike GDP, GNI does not account for the money earned by foreigners and foreign businesses. GNI per capita is the total amount of GNI divided by the number of individuals within the country. Using GNI per capita as a measure of development has some shortcomings. For example, this approach does not represent the distribution of wealth across different individuals within a country. However, the World Bank outlines that GNI correlates with other non-monetary indicators related to quality of life such as life expectancy at birth (World Bank, 2017). I have used the World Bank’s Atlas method instead of simple exchange rates to identify GNI. This method converts local currencies into US dollars (USD) and uses an average over a three-year period (World Bank, 2017). This method is intended to reduce the fluctuations in exchange rates when comparing the national incomes of various countries. I have decided to use total net ODA (current prices) as a measure of bilateral aid disbursements.

The HDI (UNDP, 2017) is produced by the United Nations Development Programme to identify the varying degrees of development in 188 countries. The data is gathered and analysed by the UN Human Development Report Office, supported by the World Bank. The
Index focuses on three main areas which are considered by the UN to be essential for human development: to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2017). In comparison to GNI per capita as a measure of development, HDI has a much broader remit and focuses on both economics such as GNI and the capabilities of a population including years of schooling. However, there are some limitations as the Index does not incorporate some critical factors associated with human development. It does not assess, for example, inequalities faced by certain groups such as ethnic minorities.

The average GNI per capita has been analysed for 144 countries. 35 countries have been omitted from the original dataset. These include 32 countries which have not received any aid over this period and three countries for which there is no information on GNI per capita for three countries – North Korea, Somalia and the Turks and Caicos Islands. The HDI has been analysed for 140 countries. The same dataset for GNI per capita has been used, however, the UN has not produced a HDI index for four countries across 2005 and 2015 - Kosovo, Tuvalu, Nauru and the Marshall Islands. Therefore, these countries have been omitted from the HDI analysis.

I shall focus on 20 countries that, on average, receive the highest aid allocation. I would expect the average GNI per capita over the 2005 - 2015 period to be the same or less than the low-income countries which is $484.21. I would expect the score to be significantly less than the averages for the world ($9,399.92), lower middle income countries ($3,317.87), low and middle income countries ($3,625.78) and middle income countries ($4,524.167) as defined by the World Bank dataset (2017).

I shall use a similar approach to explore whether there is a relationship between aid and human development. The UNDP dataset separates the countries into subsets which they have defined as ‘least developed countries’ or ‘developing countries,’ for example. The data for these aggregate subsets is only available from 2010 – 2015 (UNDP, 2017). My data is comprised of an average over this period. I would expect the average HDI score to be close to the average for the ‘least developed countries’ which is 0.5. I would expect the scores to be significantly less than the world average which is 0.71 and marginally less than the average for developing countries which is 0.66.
I shall also explore whether there is a relationship between the dependent and independent variables by carrying out an analysis of the correlation coefficient. I shall take the average aid disbursements and compare them with GNI per capita and HDI score for each country over the period. Correlation coefficients are measured on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 outlines that there no relationship and 1 relates to a perfect relationship (Rumsey, 2017). A coefficient which is close to -0.3 would represent a weak negative relationship. This would indicate that the relationship between aid allocations based on recipient need is weak and that there are other factors that are influencing allocations. I shall visually present this data by using scatter graphs.

5.2 Hypothesis 1

For the purposes of examining hypotheses 1, I shall use the same dependent variable and dataset as my initial investigation into the relationship between aid disbursements and GNI per capita. The variable is foreign aid disbursements. This is my dependent variable because I am keen to observe whether countries higher proportions of Muslim populations causes an effect on the amount of aid which is distributed.

The data on aid disbursements has been taken from the OECD official development assistance, disbursements dataset. The dataset provides data on aid distribution to 178 countries from 1960 - 2016. I have selected this particular database because the information extensive, particularly in comparison to other similar datasets. Through a review of the available datasets I identified that some potentially useful information had been omitted. For example, on some datasets Afghanistan does not appear across a significant proportion of time, which I can only assume is partly due to the challenges of collecting data during conflict. I considered that it was important to include information on Afghanistan as it would potentially skew the data due to a high Muslim population and large amounts of aid distributed. The OECD dataset is also incomplete and there is missing information for certain countries during various time periods. However, the database has grown in information since 1960 and the period in which my analysis relates to is comparatively extensive.
I have removed information for 32 countries because they did not receive any aid from 2005 – 2015. These are countries which would have received aid in an earlier period and so still appear as part of the wider dataset. It is therefore pointless including them in the final dataset because the information would not yield any usable information. My dataset has therefore been simplified to include 147 countries which have received aid from 2005 - 2015. There is no available data for South Sudan from 2005 – 2010 because it broke away from Sudan and became its own country in 2011. I have included Sudan for the entire period and South Sudan from 2011. When analysing the data I have been mindful that the information gathered for Sudan prior to 2010 would have been influenced by the citizens who nowadays comprise South Sudan.

My independent variables are related to countries with high Muslim populations. My first hypothesis is a broad analysis of whether countries with higher Muslim populations have influenced aid allocations. I have separated my dataset into two categories where the proportion of Muslim population is either greater or less than 50%. I appreciate that this is a crude measure of a Muslim majority population particularly as some populations will be close to the 50% mark. However, I initially wanted to review whether there are any observable broad differences between the groups.

To determine the categories, I have used the raw data produced by the Pew Research Centre on the percentage proportions of Muslim populations (Pew, 2017). The Centre publishes information on trends and issues through conducting social science research. They also produce data on the proportion of religious populations in each country every several years (Pew, 2011). I have gathered statistics on the proportion of Muslim population for all aid recipients over the decade long period. I have used the dataset which was produced by the Centre in 2010. My rationale is that it is not possible to find data for each year as there’s limited information and a lack of uniformity in relation to when a country may gather data on this statistic through censuses. It therefore seems logical to take the information from the mid-point in the range of dates being examined. However, data for Sudan and South Sudan have been selected from the 2012 dataset (Pew, 2012).

The first analysis is aimed at understanding whether there are any differences between the amount of aid received between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. My first independent variable is where 50% or more of the population are Muslim. 42 countries were identified as
part of this category. My second independent variable is countries where the population is less than 50% Muslim. 105 countries were identified as part of this category. It is interesting to note that significantly more countries categorised as non-Muslim received aid. The proportions either challenge my hypothesis because Muslim countries receive less aid, or non-Muslim countries receive lots of small aid allocations. To fairly compare the two groups I have taken the mean for both groups for all years. This involves dividing the total amount of aid for both groups and dividing by the number of countries. A review of the means will allow me to see whether there is a noticeable difference in the average amount of aid received by both groups and whether any differences have changed throughout the time period. I have also taken the standard deviation for all means which will help to address the challenge related to outliers. A high standard deviation from the mean represents a large variation in the data (Rumsey, 2017, 2). This will allow me to see whether there is a significant variation in the data. For example, a high standard deviation could mean that a small number of countries are receiving significantly large sums of aid. I have used a graph to visually present the means so that trends can easily be observed. I have also created a table, showing the means and standard deviations in order to outline the data which will be discussed in the results section.

The second analysis is aimed at providing more insight into the analysis in part 1 by understanding whether certain outliers have skewed the data, and whether this is true for all years. This analysis involves comparing the dependent variable against the two independent variables and a third which relates to the data for Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to the political context which involved the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, I predict that more aid would have been distributed to these countries. Based on the analysis in the literature review which highlights that aid is distributed to areas where there is terrorism and natural resources, it would seem plausible that these countries would receive more aid. I have therefore removed Iraq and Afghanistan from the Muslim majority variable. The variable is referred to as MuslimNoI&E. To observe whether there are any notable differences between the baseline Muslim country variable and MuslimNoI&E, I will compare the means and standard deviations for all years. If my predictions are accurate, I would expect that the means and standard deviations for the MuslimNoI&E to be significantly lower. This is because it would indicate that it is Iraq and Afghanistan which is inflating the figures related to the amount of aid disbursed to Muslim countries. This is critical because it would mean that the aid received by Muslim and non-Muslim countries is more comparable if these outliers are removed.

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5.3 Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 is aimed at understanding whether the proportion of the Muslim population in a country influences the amount of aid received. This analysis is more specific than the exploration of hypothesis one because it looks at the specific percentage of Muslim population in each country. The exploration of hypothesis two should, hopefully, support the outcomes observed in the analysis of hypothesis 1. This would bolster the overall argument which is that Muslim populations receive more aid overall.

I decided to use the same datasets as hypothesis one. This is to reduce any significant outliers which another dataset may produce. My dependent variable is comprised of 147 countries which have received aid from 2005 - 2015. The data on aid disbursements has been collected from the OECD official development assistance, disbursements dataset. My independent variable is the percentage of Muslim population in each of the 147 countries. I have used the raw data which has been produced by the Pew Research Centre on the percentage proportions of Muslim populations (Pew, 2017). In the same regard to hypothesis 1, data for South Sudan has been included from 2011.

To understand whether countries with higher percentages of Muslim populations generally receive more aid I needed to identify if there is a correlation between the two variables. I therefore needed to find out whether there is a positively or negative correlation between the variables and about the strength of the association. The direction of the relationship is indicative of whether my hypothesis is true or false as a positive relationship would indicate that my hypothesis is true. I also wanted to observe the strength of the relationship. A strong relationship would provide clarity and definition in whether we could accept or reject the hypothesis, depending on the direction of the correlation. I have used scatter graphs for each year as they visually show the direction of the correlation and indicate the strength of the association. I have added a trend line so that it easier to observe whether the relationship is either positive or negative. To analyse the strength of the correlation, I have calculated the correlation coefficient for each year by using the data analysis function on Excel. Rumsey explains that correlation coefficients are on a scale from -1 to +1 (2017). For example, a score of +1 would represent a strong positive relationship and a score of 0 would indicate that there is no relationship. Therefore; a strong positive correlation with a correlation coefficient close to +1 would indicate that my hypothesis is true.
5.4 Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 is aimed at understanding whether the 7/7 bombings have affected UK aid allocations to Muslim countries. I have specifically chosen this attack because it is at the beginning of the period being observed this means that it is possible to observe trends over significant periods, before and after the attacks. I will look at data from 1995 until 2015. This period will allow me to observe trends before and after the attacks took place. The UK follows the UN best practice around aid expenditure by committing 0.7% of its GNI to aid (OECD, 2016). In 2015, the UK was the second highest donor behind the United States, committing $18,700 million. It is likely, therefore, that the UK would affect the overall landscape of aid allocations. Large amounts of aid allocated by the UK to Muslim countries would likely skew the overall results. In addition, the UK is part of the EU, the OECD and is close allies with the United States. The UK and the US held a particularly close relationship when President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair were in power and during the ‘War on Terror’. They were close allies and politically supported each other during the ‘War on Terror’ (MacAskill, 2010). It’s is possible that the UK could have influenced its allies to also commit more aid to certain Muslim countries. Moreover, many of the other highest donors are from EU countries. Due to the geographical proximity to the UK, it is likely that this attack would have affected counter terrorism policies in other countries in Europe. This is because states may have feared an attack taking place in their country. I therefore consider that it would be possible to make inferences about aid allocations by other western donors due to their relationships with the UK.

I am hypothesizing that the attacks would have led to an increase in the amount of aid. This is based on the outcomes of prior literature which outlines that aid has been used to tackle terrorism. As I am assuming that other variables will affect aid, my dependent variable is UK aid disbursements. I have gathered data from an OECD database on Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions (OECD). The database provides information on bilateral aid disbursements from donors from 1960 – 2016. I have used this database because it provides accurate aid information on the UK for period which is being examined. I have analysed total net disbursements using USD (millions) in current prices. I have refined the dataset to include UK bilateral disbursements from 1995 - 2015. The dataset includes information for organisations as well as individual countries. I have omitted organisations and multilateral recipients such as the African Development Fund and the UN Development
Programme because an analysis of these organizations would not yield any useful results. In addition, I have eliminated 18 countries from the raw dataset because they have not received any UK aid over this period. I have analysed data for 163 countries over this period.

In comparison to the dataset used for hypothesis 1 and 2, the UK aid disbursement incorporates 146 of the same countries. Micronesia is excluded from the new dataset and there are 17 other countries included. This is an interesting initial finding which potentially indicates the geographical and strategic importance of certain recipients. It is possible, for example, that Australia would have provided aid to Micronesia due to its close geographical proximity. The inclusion of 17 other countries is also interesting because it implies that the UK was interested in supporting other countries prior to 2005. For example, in 1995 and 1996 Hong Kong received UK aid. Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997 (Reuters, 2007). It is likely, therefore that Hong Kong received aid due to its strategic importance to the British. This seems particularly true because Hong Kong did not receive any British aid after this period. The contention that the UK was allocating aid based on colonial legacies seems to have some credence as many of the other countries were former colonies and British Overseas Territories such as Singapore, Montserrat, St Helena, Brunei, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. It is also interesting that these countries did not receive aid after 2005 which potentially shows a shift in UK priorities to other interests after this period.

Akin to hypothesis 1, I have included Muslim and non-Muslim countries as independent variables. I have used the same information to identify the proportions of Muslim populations for the UK aid recipients by using the information from the Pew Research Centre (Pew, 2011). I have used the percentages identified by the Centre in 2010 and the percentage for South Sudan from 2011. I have used data which was produced by the Centre in 2010 because there is available information for all 146 countries and the information provides continuity from hypotheses 1 and 2. Similarly to hypothesis 1, I have separated the countries into two categories where countries with 50% or more were identified as Muslim and countries with 49% and less were identified as non-Muslim. To reiterate that this is a blunt way of determining the religious populations in a country, however, it should provide some indication of whether the hypothesis is true or false. I identified that there were 40 Muslim countries and 120 non-Muslim countries receiving aid through this period.
I am specifically interested in finding out whether certain Muslim countries which were perceived by the UK as a threat received more aid. As previously eluded, the UK and the US were close allies particularly during the ‘War on Terror.’ The ‘War on Terror’ was a US military campaign during the Bush administration and included the Afghanistan War and the War in Iraq (Amadeo, 2017). The War on Terror was initiated as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This allegiance means that the countries were likely influenced by each other in certain areas. I believe that the UK would have been influenced by the US in relation to the countries which they perceived to be a threat. This is particularly likely to be true for the period after 9/11.

I have decided to create variable which includes certain Muslim countries which the US perceives to be a threat to see if they influence aid allocations. My third independent variable for hypothesis 3 is countries which have been defined by the US Department of State (2017) as ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ and ‘terrorist safe havens.’ Due to the availability of data I have used information for the ‘terrorist safe havens’ from 2005 – 2015 however, the countries defined as ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ cover the 1995 – 2015 period. The Department (2017) defines state sponsors of terrorism as having ‘repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.’ The countries which are currently listed by the United States Department of State (2017) are currently Iran, Sudan and Syria. Other countries which were included on the list from 1995 - 2015 are Cuba, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. I have removed Cuba and North Korea from the list of countries as are not Muslim majority population countries. Since 2005, the US Department of State (2017) has published information on so called ‘terrorist safe havens.’ The Department (2017) refer to these countries as ‘ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.’ There are several countries which routinely appear as terrorist safe havens from 2005 – 2015 including Somalia, Mali, the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral, Philippines, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Columbia and Venezuela. Mauritania was included only in the 2005 report. There are several regions which appear as safe havens including The Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) and The Trans-Sahara. I have decided not to include regions as they are more difficult to quantify. I removed the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral due to a lack of data and Philippines, Columbia and Venezuela as they are not Muslim majority populations. Although Libya and Iraq appear as part of both groups, I shall only include the data for these countries.
once. My variable related to ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ and ‘terrorist safe havens’ shall be called SSoT/TSH. There were 13 countries which were identified as part of this variable.

I am also interested in looking at the trends for Muslim countries where ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ and ‘terrorist safe havens’ have been removed. This will allow me to draw comparisons between the baseline Muslim country variable and SSoT/TSH. My fourth independent variable will be Muslim countries without the SSoT/TSH countries and shall be called No-SSoT/TSH. I identified 30 countries that comprise this variable.

I wanted to observe whether there are any broad differences between the four independent variables. I therefore decided to compare the means and standard deviations for all years. A comparison of the means should allow me to observe whether there are any stark differences between the groups. The standard deviation will allow me to understand the levels of variance among the means. I have created a line graph to visually represent the data and also a table to demonstrate the exact results. My prediction is that the SSoT/TSH should have a much higher mean than the Muslim baseline and No-SSoT/TSH variables. I would expect the standard deviation to be relatively low because I think that most countries among this group will have received large amounts of aid.

6. Results

6.1 Aid allocations and recipient need

The findings for the top 20 aid recipients are somewhat conflicting. Only 20% of countries with the lowest GNI per capita received the most aid. 70% of the countries held a GNI per capita in between low income and lower middle income countries. Iraq and Turkey were identified as anomalies due to their relatively high GNI per capita. The aid received by Iraq can perhaps be attributed reasons associated with recipient need, to support the population during the conflict in this period. However, the reason for the high distribution of aid to Turkey is not easily identifiable without further investigation; this is outside the scope of this paper. The HDI score results were marginally different – 40% of the countries held a score which was equal to or less than the average of the ‘least developed countries’ and the remaining 70% held a HDI score which was in between the averages for ‘least developed countries’ and ‘developing countries’. OpT and Egypt held score which were marginally
higher than developing countries. The disbursement of aid to these countries can perhaps be explained by reasons associated to recipient need such as providing aid to the OpT population as a result of the conflict. I have speculated on the motivations for aid to Iraq and OpT, however, this analysis is not robust and is outside of the remit of this investigation. Broadly, the results indicate that the poorest countries have not received the highest proportions of aid.

Correlation between both GNI per capita and HDI with aid disbursements indicates a weak relationship. Graph A visually demonstrates a weak negative linear relationship between GNI per capita and aid disbursements. This observation is supported by the correlation coefficient which is -0.337410630258712. Graph B shows the relationship between aid disbursements and HDI score. Graph B shows a weak negative linear relationship between the two variables. The relationship for HDI is weaker than GNI per capita, identified by the correlation coefficient, which is -0.323432929647567. A summary of the mean and correlation coefficient can be seen in table A.

The negative linear relationship between the two variables indicates that aid is broadly allocated based on recipient need. However, this relationship is weak which suggests that there are other variables which influence aid distribution, other than recipient need.

6.2 Hypothesis 1

Graph C visually shows that Muslim countries, on average, received more aid than non-Muslim countries across all years. This observation is support by the data presented in Table B. Muslim countries receive, on average, 44% more aid than non-Muslim countries. From 2005 – 2015 Muslim countries have received at least 30% more aid than non-Muslim countries. The percentage difference between the two groups peaked in 2005 (59.36%). The data then follows a steep downwards trajectory until 2010 (30.93%), before growing at a slower rate from 2011. As Muslim countries have received 25% more aid than non-Muslim countries across all years, hypothesis 1 can be accepted.

The average standard deviation from the mean for Muslim countries (1501.20) is significantly higher than non-Muslim countries (810.79). The high standard deviation means that there is relatively greater variation in the amount of aid which is distribution to Muslim countries. The data implies that there is a much higher concentration of aid being distributed
to certain countries. Through surveying the data for the averages for all years, I have identified that significantly high sums are being distributed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq has received, on average, $5692.55 million across all years and Afghanistan has received, on average $5110.76 million across all years. In comparison to the mean across all years for Muslim countries, Iraq receives on average 83.85% more aid and Afghanistan receives on average 82.01% more aid. This is suggestive that outlier countries are skewing the data including the mean and standard deviation.

To test this theory, I have created a Muslim majority dataset which omits Iraq and Afghanistan. Graph D visually shows the difference between the means across all years for non-Muslim countries, Muslim countries and MuslimNoI&E. Across the decade long period, the graph shows an increasing disparity between non-Muslim countries and MuslimNoI&E. It also shows that the aid distribution to Muslim countries and MuslimNoI&E becomes increasingly aligned between 2010 and 2015.

These observations are supported by the data in Table C. In 2005, MuslimNoI&E receive 123.97% less aid than Muslim countries and 8.99% more aid than non-Muslim countries. This trend is reversed in 2015 where MuslimNoI&E received 10.37% less aid than Muslim countries and 41.19% more aid than non-Muslim countries. The average percentage difference between MuslimNoI&E and non-Muslim countries across all years is 26.12% meaning that we can reject hypothesis 1. From 2005 – 2012, the percentage difference between the two groups is significantly less than 25%. However, from 2013 onwards Muslim countries received at least 25% more aid. Hypothesis 1 could, therefore, be accepted for the later period but not overall.

Finally, across all years, the standard deviation for MuslimNoI&E is 827.55 less than the standard deviation for Muslim countries. The significantly lower figure suggests that there is less variation in the amount of aid that is disbursed to those recipients. However, the standard deviation shows a significant upwards trajectory across the decade long period for MuslimNoI&E meaning that variation in the amount of aid is increasing. The Muslim standard deviation in 2005 is 3351 which reduced to 1161 in 2012. The difference between the Muslim standard deviation and the MuslimNoI&E greatly reduced. The figure in 2005 was 2798 and the figure in 2015 was 88, meaning a 2710 reduction in the difference between the deviations. This likely implies that large sums of aid are increasingly being filtered to a
small number of other Muslim countries. Combined with the noteworthy downwards trend in the standard deviation of Muslim countries, it suggests that Iraq and Afghanistan are increasingly receiving less of the disproportionately large sums of aid.

6.3 Hypothesis 2

Across all years, the graphs (E) show that there is a weak uphill linear relationship between the amount of aid received and the proportion of the population which is Muslim. The graph related to 2005 shows a particularly weak relationship, however, this relationship appears to grow in strength each year. This indicates that countries with a higher proportion of Muslim population receive marginally more aid than countries with a lower proportion of Muslim population. Across all years, the data points appear to be concentrated around 0 – 10% and 90 – 100%. This indicates that more aid is distributed to countries were extremely low or high proportions of Muslim populations. The data points become more disbursed throughout the years which indicate that countries with moderate proportions of Muslim populations are increasingly receiving more and higher amounts of aid. The observation related to strength and direction of the linear relation is supported by the correlation coefficient. The coefficients follow an upwards trajectory which peaks in 2014 at 0.31. This is relatively high to the lowest coefficient in 2005 which is 0.19. The correlation coefficients indicate that countries with higher proportions of Muslim populations are increasingly receiving higher proportions of aid. I have chosen not to conduct a regression analysis as the correlation has shown that my data does not fulfill the prerequisite requirements of this test which are a linear pattern and a moderate to strong correlation (-0.5 or +0.5 or higher)(Rumsey, 2017).

6.4 Hypothesis 3

6.4.1. Part A

Graph F shows that aid has increased for both Muslim and non-Muslim countries from 1995 – 2015. Table D supports this observation as Muslim countries received 91% more aid in 2015 than in 1995 and non-Muslim countries received 76% more aid in 2015 than in 1995. The graph shows that a comparatively high amount of aid was received by both groups in 2005. However, this rapidly drops in 2007. In 2007, Muslim countries received 43% less aid than in 2005 and non-Muslim countries received 22% less aid in 2007 compared to 2005.
Prior to 2003, non-Muslim countries received more aid than Muslim countries. In 2000, non-Muslim countries received 82% more aid than Muslim countries. This sharply contrasts with 2015 where Muslim countries receive 51% more aid than non-Muslim countries. After 2010, the difference in the amount of aid received by both groups significantly diverges. In 2010, the difference in the amount of aid received was 3%. This significantly differs to the 2015 level where Muslim countries receive 51% more aid.

Throughout the period, non-Muslim countries have a relatively low standard deviation from the mean. Muslim countries have a much higher standard deviation from 1995 - 2015. The difference between the two standard deviations does not appear to be significant until 2005. For example, the difference in standard deviations was at its lowest at 8.23 in 1999 and at its highest at 200.40 in 2005. After 2005, the difference between the standard deviations remains high albeit not at the 2005 levels. For example, the next highest standard deviation was in 2015 at 133.92. This suggests that some Muslim countries are receiving a comparatively significant amount of aid.

Overall there appeared to be very little difference in how aid was allocated prior to 2004/2005. The results indicate that 2005 was a turning point as a significant amount of aid was allocated to a small number of countries. Broadly, after 2005 more aid was allocated to Muslim countries. It appears that this aid has been filtered to a small number of Muslim countries. However, it seems that greater amount of aid was distributed to slightly more Muslim countries after 2005.

6.4.1 Part B

Graph G shows that from 1995 – 2001, there were marginal differences in the amount of aid which was disbursed to all countries. The differences began to diverge after 2001 and became pronounced from 2005 onwards. Throughout all years, aid allocated to no-SSoT/TSH countries remained comparatively low and constant. There was an increase in aid after 2010, however, this growth is marginal in comparison to the other variables.

As described in part 3.a, there was a noteworthy increase in aid to both Muslim and non-Muslim countries in 2005. SSoT/TSH countries followed the same trend although received comparatively vast amounts of aid. For example, SSoT/TSH countries received 64% more
aid than the baseline variable for Muslim countries. An examination of the raw data for the SSoT/TSH countries shows that aid allocations to Iraq are skewing the data. This is also shown by the standard deviation of 361.46 which is 323.38 higher than no-SSoT/TSH countries. The UK disseminated $1317.52 to Iraq in 2005. The next highest recipient of aid was Afghanistan with $219.92. There were only four countries that received more than £20 million and both Libya and Mauritania received 0. This indicates that some countries, such as Libya and Mauritania, are tempering the results of other countries. If we were to include a variable comprised of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan the results would be even more pronounced. No-SSoT/TSH countries did not follow the same trend for 2005. The aid received continued to remain constant and relatively low and, in fact, the countries received marginally less aid in 2005 than in the proceeding and following years. During this year, no-SSoT/TSH countries received 91% less aid than SSoT/TSH countries.

SSoT/TSH countries continued to follow the same trend as the baseline Muslim countries variable after 2005, albeit with significantly more pronounced results. Iraq continued to skew the data, for example, there was a 95% drop in aid received in 2007 in comparison to the 2005 levels. Another noteworthy peak in aid occurred in 2008. The raw data shows that Iraq is still significant, however, Pakistan and Afghanistan are receiving increasingly high amounts of aid in comparison to the 2005 levels. For example, Afghanistan has received 32% more aid in 2008 than in 2005. This finding is supported by the standard deviation which has nearly halved from the 2005 levels at 192.15.

From 2010, all variables show an upwards trajectory. This upwards trend is particularly steep for SSoT/TSH countries. SSoT/TSH countries received the most aid across all years in 2015. The difference in aid received in this year compared to the Muslim baseline variable was 57%. During this year, vast amounts of aid were filtered to certain countries such as Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These countries received 54% of the aid which was allocated by the UK to SSoT/TSH countries. Iraq received a relatively low amount of aid particularly compared to the 2005 and 2008 – there was a 94% reduction in aid from 2005 – 2015. These findings are also supported by the standard deviation as it is significantly lower than the 2005 levels, indicating that more countries are receiving higher amounts of aid. This is demonstrated by the contention that eight countries received more than $20 million in 2015. However, the standard deviation remains relatively high which indicates that certain countries are receiving higher proportions of aid.
7. Summary and discussion of outcomes

The results of the analysis related to aid allocations and GNI per capita indicate that aid is not allocated entirely based on recipient need. This is evidenced by the contention that only 20% of the top 20 highest aid recipients are in the lowest GNI per capita range. This is supported by a further analysis between aid and HDI as 40% of the top 20 aid recipients held a score which was equal to or less than the average for least developed countries. Moreover, the correlation coefficients which compared aid with GNI per capita and HDI indicated a weak positive relationship. This outcome suggested that aid is somewhat based on recipient need although this relationship was very weak (r = 0.32). These outcomes provided a solid basis for the subsequent analysis. This is because we can assume that aid allocations are based on factors other than need. The literature reviewed on this topic broadly supports this outcome. The literature indicates that recipient need does influence allocations. However, other factors such as strategic reasons influence disbursements.

There are several reasons why aid may be loosely allocated based on recipient need. For example, donors may allocate aid to countries where they will likely see the most impact. Most donor countries are democracies whose governments are only likely to be in power for a relatively short period of time. This means that they are more likely to want to invest in projects that have a perceived immediate benefit to demonstrate effectiveness and value for money to domestic audiences. It is likely to be more difficult to show immediate benefits in the poorest countries for many reasons such as a lack of infrastructure. A project focused on reducing maternal mortality rates, for example, is less likely to have an impact in an extremely poor country where there are few medical facilities. My results support this explanation as countries with higher GNI per capita than the average for countries with the lowest GNI per capita have received aid.

The analysis as part of hypothesis 1 shows that Muslim countries have received more aid shown by the average difference across all years which is 44%. It also showed that there was a much higher variation in the amount of aid received for Muslim countries. A further analysis of the data using the MuslimNoI&E variable showed that significantly high aid allocations to Iraq and Afghanistan were skewing the dataset. This observation was particularly prominent from 2005 – 2010. After 2010, the variables appeared to diverge and there was far less difference between the amount of aid received by the Muslim baseline
variable and MuslimNoI&E. The variable showed that the amount of aid received by MuslimNoI&E and non-Muslim countries was marginal until 2012. For example, in 2005, MuslimNoI&E receive 123.97% less aid than Muslim countries and 8.99% more aid than non-Muslim countries. In 2015 MuslimNoI&E received 10.37% less aid than Muslim countries and 41.19% more aid than non-Muslim countries. This observation is interesting because it implies that something shifted in 2012, where other Muslim countries were receiving disproportionately high amounts of aid. This idea is supported by the analysis of the standard deviations from the mean. The analysis shows that the standard deviations for Muslim countries broadly reduced over the decade long period. In addition, the difference between Muslim standard deviations and MuslimNoI&E dramatically reduced. These observations combined show that Iraq and Afghanistan are receiving less of the disproportionately high amounts of and that other Muslim countries which are receiving disproportionately high amounts of aid. These results can be explained by a broad analysis of the political landscape before and after 2012.

In 2001 the Bush administration announced the launch of a military campaign called the ‘War on Terror’ (WoT)(Amadeo, 2017). The WoT was initiated as a result of the 9/11 attacks which had been carried out by Al-Qaeda and was intended to eliminate the group and other terrorist groups. The WoT involved military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. By 2006 the military spending on the war had more than quadrupled. Military spending on the WoT peaked in 2008 at $235.6 billion. The following year President Obama took up office which changed the direction of the war. Despite sending 17,000 more troops into Afghanistan in 2009, in the same year he announced the gradual withdrawal of troops from Iraq. In 2011, Osama bin Laden, who was considered to be behind the 9/11 attacks, was assassinated. In the same year Obama announced that US to troops would begin to withdraw from Afghanistan. In the following years, military spending on the war dramatically declined. In 2012 the US spent $115.1 billion on the war and in 2016 they spent $58.6 billion.

There have been a number of other noteworthy events which have occurred since 2012 which have captured the attention of the world’s population. They have resulted in the need for western governments to commit monetary support.

In 2011 a violent conflict broke out in Syria between governmental forces and citizen opposition (BBC, 2016). The conflict initially emerged as a result of the security forces firing
on citizens who were protesting about the torture of some teenagers. This led to outcry amongst swathes of the population and a call for President Assad to resign. The government used force to quash the protest and the citizens retaliated to defend themselves with arms. The initial conflict developed into a wide scale civil war between the government and opposition. The BBC reported that ‘by June 2013, the UN said 90,000 people had been killed in the conflict. By August 2015, that figure had climbed to 250,000, according to activists and the UN’ (2016). Various international actors have played roles in intervening in the conflict. For example, in 2015 Russia launched a unilateral military campaign targeting rebels.

In 2014 the Islamic Fundamentalist group called Islamic State seized land in Iraq and Syria (BBC, 2015). The group was focused on setting up an Islamic State which is governed by Sharia Law and led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group subscribe to an extreme version of Sunni Islam. They believe that anyone outside of their group is an unbeliever who is seeking to eliminate Islam. They use this justification to carry out brutal atrocities such as beheadings, crucifixions and executions. The US and its allies are committed to eliminating the group. In 2014 the US announced that they would be leading a coalition to defeat ISIS (US Department of State, 2017). The US led coalition has carried out a military campaign which included air strikes on ISIS targets. The US Department of State outlined that humanitarian aid was a crucial element to the coalition to provide to those in need and promote stability.

In 2015 millions of migrants and refugees travelled to Europe seeking asylum (BBC, 2016). A large number of these migrants were feeling from conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The European states struggled to cope with the number of migrants which were travelling to their countries. There were also disagreements amongst states around how the ‘migration crisis’ should be managed and which countries should accept migrants. Some countries accepted disproportionately large sums of migrants. For example, Germany received the most asylum applications in 2015 at 476,000. The crisis had a financial cost to the states. It is reported that the wave of migration cost Germany 21.7 billion Euros in 2016 (Hale, 2017). Hale reported that this included ‘€7.1 billion spent on foreign aid, €1.4 billion on migrants’ reception, registration, and accommodation, and €2.1 billion on integration services.’
Through an exploration of the political context prior to 2012, we can see that Afghanistan and Iraq were a priority to states amidst the War on Terror. After President Obama took office, the focus shifted away from full scale military intervention and emphasised a desire to withdraw. After 2012, there were a number of other significant events which captured the attention of the world’s population. These events resulted in the need for governments to invest money to tackle the various issues. The issues outlined above relate to countries where the majority of the populations are Muslim. Although migrants were coming from a variety of countries during the migration crisis, the majority derived from Muslim majority countries. I believe, therefore, that my data can be explained by the contention that after 2012 emphasis, and as corollary governmental budgets, moved away from supporting the War on Terror to other events which involved Muslim majority countries.

The results emanating from the exploration of hypothesis 2 indicate that higher proportions of Muslim populations appear to receive more aid in 2015 than in 2005. I have carried out an analysis of the top 20 aid recipients in 2005 and 2015 to identify differences which could provide at least some clarity to these findings. There were six different countries across the period which appears to account for the trend related to higher Muslim populations receiving more aid in 2015. Apart from Kenya, these 6 countries have Muslim populations which are greater than 90%. Conversely, aside from Indonesia, the countries in 2005 do not have Muslim populations which are greater than 10%. There were some notable differences. Syria was the highest aid recipient in 2015 and was one of the lowest recipients in 2005. Syria has a high Muslim population at 92.8%. The relatively large amount of aid to Syria in 2015 can be attributed to the War in Syria. It is likely that donors are providing aid to Syria to help alleviate the poverty among a population who are experiencing conflict. However, it is also likely that donors are providing aid due to several strategic concerns. As mentioned, Daesh are operating in Syria and are attempting to capture territory. The establishment of an Islamic State would be problematic for western donors as it is likely that the State would not engage in trade ties and would hinder access to oil. Moreover, a major concern for European state in particular during this period was the migration crisis. The ongoing conflict in Syria would prolong the crisis due to the flow of migrants coming from Syria. This raises domestic concerns around how a population would cope with the influx of refugees and regional concerns around which countries should accept more refugees. It is likely therefore that donors are providing aid to Syria to address these concerns. Another trend is that China was the tenth highest recipient of foreign aid in 2005 but did not receive any aid in 2015. China
has transformed itself from aid recipient to aid donor during this period (Wilson, 2015). China experienced some financial challenges in the 20th Century which led to wide scale poverty. China carried out reforms and increasingly liberalized its economy which led to massive economic growth, particularly in the 21st Century. China is nowadays the second largest world economy. It is likely, therefore, that this accounts for the trends related to the aid allocations. It is possible that China received lots of aid in 2005 because the donors could foresee that aid would bolster and thereby liberalise China’s economy, making it a valuable trading partner.

Through an analysis of the data related to hypothesis 3a, there appears to be some noteworthy stages in the allocation of UK aid to Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The first involves the same amount of aid broadly allocated to Muslim countries than to non-Muslim countries from 1995 – 2003. The second is a spike in aid to Muslim and non-Muslim countries in 2005 which fell in 2006/2007. The third is a spike in aid to Muslim countries in 2008. The fourth is the divergence of aid to Muslim and non-Muslim countries after 2010.

Brown et al argues that UK aid expenditure in the 1990s was focused on relatively stable countries where aid was presumed to be more effective (2016, p.48 – 50). He also argues that that after this period the focus moved to conflict affected states in sub-Saharan Africa and then Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11. Among other reasons, he attributes this shift to a growth in the belief that security threats were interdependent. He also explains that the military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan can explain the disproportionately large investments compared to other conflict affected states. In 2005 the Labor government accelerated withdrawals from certain middle income countries such as Croatia, Honduras and Peru. They also reduced spending in countries such as Albania, China and Jamaica. This was intended to offset challenge that they might face in light of the 2000 International Development Act which enshrines in law the desire to reduce poverty. The trend towards supporting conflict affected states was further strengthened by the 2010 Comprehensive Spending review which committed an increase in funding from 22% in 2010 to 30% by 2014/15. In the same year DFID’s bilateral aid review focused on security threats as a motivating factor around aid as it suggested further funding to countries such as Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. The review also suggested a reduction in the number of countries that receive aid. The BAR also reduced the importance of Iraq which related to the withdrawal of troops. Since this period, aid allocation has been focused on influential regional powers such as Nigeria and Ethiopia and Tanzania.
Aid has also continued to be allocated to countries which are perceived as a threat to UK security such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. The focus on security related concerns is enshrined in DFID’s 2015 departmental plan (DFID, 2016). The plan outlines that DFID has four main objectives and the first of which is to strengthen global peace, security and governance. This is further reiterated by the vision: ‘Our aid budget is spent on tackling the great global challenges – from the root causes of mass migration and disease, to the threat of terrorism and global climate change – all of which also directly threaten British interests.

The Institute for Fiscal Studies reported that the UK has met the commitment of spending its £7.4 billion in 2005 to £13.6 billion in 2016 (in 2016 terms). There appears to have been a shift in the UK aid strategy. The 2015 strategy focuses on UK national interests which has manifested in more than ¼ of the aid budget being spent by other government departments. For example, in 2015/16 £1.5 billion of its £11.1 billion allocation was transferred to other entities such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and the Department of Business Innovation and Skills (DFID, 2017). The focus on UK interests is clear when considering the mandate which is to 'lead the UK’s work to end extreme poverty. We are tackling the global challenges of our time including poverty and disease, mass migration, insecurity and conflict. Our work is building a safer, healthier, more prosperous world for people in developing countries and in the UK too' (DFID, 2017). The mandate establishes that aid should be based on recipient need in order to eradicate poverty. However, the mandate implies that national interests are also important such as increasing security broadly and prosperity for the UK.

Another possible explanation of the aid allocations is that the UK was interested in maintaining ties to former colonies in the 1990s. Throughout the majority of this period, non-Muslim countries received more aid. This indicates that other non-Muslim countries were of strategic interest to the UK. A review of the top non-Muslim aid recipients during the 90s shows that large sums of money were distributed to former colonies such as India, Zambia and Uganda. This tend also appears to be true for Muslim countries as the highest aid recipients in the 1990s were former British colonies such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and
Indonesia. Providing money to former colonies period may have been one way of maintaining influence in these countries.

The results from hypothesis B indicate that SSoT/TSH countries did not affect aid allocations prior to 2001. This is because these countries received broadly the same amount of aid as non-Muslim countries. Prior research indicates that aid allocations were directed to countries that were at risk of being influenced by communism during the Cold War. The research indicates that there are no clear factors influencing aid allocations during the 90s as the amount of aid received by Muslim and non-Muslim countries is comparable and the amount of aid received is relatively low. This trend appears to shift after 2001 as after this period SSoT/TSH countries have continued to receive more aid. This is an unsurprising finding as the 9/11 attacks took place in 2001. President Bush delivered a speech in September 2001 which announced the ‘War on Terror’ and committed to destroy all terrorist groups (Amadeo, 2017. In the following year, Bush named North Korea, Iraq and Iran as the ‘axis of evil’ (The Economist, 2002). He claimed that they were developing weapon of mass destruction and the US by any means would disarm them.

There was a noteworthy spike in foreign aid to these countries in 2005 and 2006. Booth attributed this spike in UK aid to debt relief initiatives (2013, p.2). For example, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was set up by the IMF and World Bank in 1996 to reduce the debts of the poorest, most indebted countries (Allen et al, 2006, p.1-2). In 2005 the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative was launched to further reduce the debts of HIPC’s and boost progress of countries towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals in 2015. In line with the initiative the UK wrote off debts for heavily indebted countries in 2005 and 2006 (HIPCCBP, 2009).

Following this period, and as expected, the amount of aid followed a downward trajectory to 2007. Another noteworthy spike in UK foreign aid appears in 2008. Unlike the 2005/2006 spike, this only related to the SSoT/TSH countries. One possible explanation of these results is that the UK were up-scaling their aid to countries which they considered to be a threat following the 7/7 bombings. The data appears as if the 2008 allocation was almost a knee jerk reaction as the aid allocations to these countries dips after 2008. Akin to the analysis of hypothesis 3, aid to SSoT/TSH countries increases after 2010. The analysis of these particular countries show that this trend specifically related to these countries because there are broadly
no changes to the stagnant trends related to the no-SSoT/TSH countries. Therefore, this would indicate that the contextual environment related to Muslim countries is likely to have influenced aid allocations.

8. Conclusion

It would seem that recipient need is not the only factor which has determined the allocation of aid. Strategic factors seem to play an influential role in the allocation of aid. The results of this investigation seem to indicate that security concerns such as terrorism are influencing aid allocations. This is because research has indicated that aid can be useful in tackling terrorism in several ways such as providing retribution to governments that implement robust counterterrorism policies and growing the educational capital of the population. This is exemplified in the exploration of aid allocations to Iraq and Afghanistan where significantly large amounts of aid were allocated prior to 2010. These countries were particularly seen to be a threat due to 9/11 and the propagation of this threat through the ‘War on Terror.’ After this period, it appears that other Muslim countries have increased in importance in terms of allocations. An exploration of British aid allocations has indicated that that other security concerns have influenced aid allocations. The relatively high amounts of aid to Muslim countries after 2010 can be attributed to the contextual environment such as the migration crisis, War in Syria and threats associated with Daesh. It would also seem that isolated terrorist incidents may also impact upon aid allocations for example the large amounts of aid disbursed by the UK in the year after 7/7 could be accounted for by an attempt to curb terrorism in countries which are perceived to be a threat by the UK and its allies.
9. Bibliography


Livemint. (2016) ‘What is the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism?, Livemint. Available at:


National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (Accessed 02 May 2017)


Graphs

A

The relationship between donor aid allocations and the GNI per capita of recipient countries

\[ y = -0.0785x + 944.54 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.11385 \]

B

The relationship between donor aid allocations and human development index scores

\[ y = -2243.7x + 2029.1 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.10461 \]
Comparison of the average aid received by either Muslim majority or non-Muslim majority countries

Comparison of the average aid received by either Muslim majority or non-Muslim majority and MuslimNoI&A countries
A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2005 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim in a recipient country.

A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2006 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim in a recipient country.
A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2007 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim in a recipient country.

A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2008 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim.
A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2009 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim.

A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2010 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim.
A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2011 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim.

A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2012 and the proportion of Muslim population.
A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2013 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim

A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2014 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim
A graph to show the relationship between the amount of aid received in 2015 and the proportion of the population which is Muslim.

Comparison of the average aid distributed by the UK to either Muslim majority or non-Muslim majority countries.
Comparison of the average aid distributed to Muslim countries, non-Muslim countries, SSoT/TSH and no-SSoT/TSH
### Tables

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