From the Destruction of Memory
to the Destruction of People

Social Movements and their Impact on Memory, Legitimacy and Mass Violence: A Comparative Study of the West German Student Movement and the Serbian "Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution."

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Abstract

Challenges to the legitimacy of established collective memory can prove so inflammatory that mass violence, ethnic cleansing and even genocide have followed in their wake. However, if few doubt that the ethno-nationalist memory wars during the 1980s collapse of Yugoslavia contributed to the real wars and ethnic cleansing witnessed in the 1990s, no previous research has been able to explain why this is so. This paper pinpoints the determinant variable and causal link between attacks on memory and subsequent mass violence (or a lack thereof). It uses a theoretical model that ties together memory, legitimacy and power to compare the cases of West Germany’s 1968 student movement and Serbia’s 1986-1989 anti-bureaucratic revolution before establishing that the level of prior state repression is one factor that determines whether memory challenges will turn violent. The paper recommends further theory building over the permeable boundary that separates state and civil society, particularly in terms of how accessible state functions are to those social movements that seek to challenge and delegitimise memory.
Introduction

While very few would doubt that memory mattered and exercised power in the Yugoslav wars, even fewer would be able to explain precisely how it mattered.

——Jan-Werner Müller, Memory and Power in Post-War Europe

Mnemonic contests that feature attempts to not so much rewrite as overwrite history can be viewed as challenges to the legitimacy of a dominant memory regime. Such tactics were effectively implemented both consciously and inadvertently through the radical anti-authoritarianism of the West German student movement synonymous with 1968, and the similarly radical combined socialism and Serbian nationalism embodied by the anti-bureaucratic movement of the late 1980s. These as well as other cases were to have a profound impact on the future direction of collective memory in their respective countries and previous research has pointed towards a process that links such memory wars with real wars. But even if actors’ motives and perceptions may have stemmed from a rejection of accepted memory, it is unclear whether their intentions correlate with the outcomes in their respective contexts (Bude 1995, 290). Above all, little has so far been offered to explain why, in some cases, challenges to memory have descended into mass violence—tantamount at times to genocide—whereas, in other cases, similar challenges have instead provoked a relatively peaceful reassessment and adjustment of collective memory. Unlike the impact and legacy of the divisive and radicalised Serbian nationalism that escalated during the 1980s and beyond, there was no massive violence in the wake of what, beyond differences in ideological bent, were remarkably similar uprisings and challenges to legitimacy little over a decade earlier in West Germany. But, as demonstrated by these two similar cases with vastly divergent outcomes, what is it that explains why some memory challenges result in mass violence but others don’t?

Research Problem and Hypothesis

Although this paper takes up two empirical cases, the theory, line of reasoning as well as findings contained within it are likely to be applicable elsewhere. By moving beyond the assumption that there is a causal relationship between legitimacy challenges involving collective memory and subsequent mass violence, this paper seeks to answer why this is so in some cases, and not so in others. Essentially, what is it that determines whether challenges to the legitimacy of established memory—be these in the form of national, ethnic, class or other narratives—catalyse mass violence or instead remain relatively peaceful in nature?
The hypothesis at the heart of this paper suggests that legitimacy contests from social movements that heavily challenge collective memories are likely to result in mass violence when memory has been or still is subject to repression and sanctioning, usually by the state, and especially following the demise of such a state. However, where collective memories have been and continue to be subject to free and open debate, such legitimacy contests are likely to be resolved peacefully.

Disposition

The theoretical section of this paper starts off by examining previous research on the role of memory in ethics, considering advocates both for and against remembering. The ethics discussion then progresses into an overview of relevant political terminology, particularly the role of non-state actors and the state-civil society dichotomy, before bridging a gap in previous research between the ethics and politics of memory. With the discussion of memory, ethics and power now complete, the theoretical model used to frame the cases in this paper as well as the methodological approach undertaken in the empirical section of the paper are introduced. Two case studies are then examined: West Germany from 1945-1949 and 1949-1968, and the West German student movement that reached its peak in 1968; then Yugoslavia from 1945-1980 and 1980-1989, and the Serb nationalist anti-bureaucratic revolution of the late 1980s. Following the case studies, we return to the theoretical model to provide a theoretically-informed analysis of the cases and an assessment of this paper’s hypothesis before concluding with final observations and suggestions for future study.
Theory and Method

Theoretical Overview

The theoretical section of this paper consists of three major parts: a discussion of previous research on the ethics of memory, a transition from ethics to politics, and the introduction of a model that connects memory to power. In the first part, an overview of previous research on the ethics of memory is followed by what can be categorised as three divergent ethical arguments over the nature of collective memory that, in straightforward terms, essentially view it as either good, bad or benign. In the second part, using the ethics discussion as a platform, the paper turns to more recent work on the politics of memory and the political relationship between state and civil society, focusing in particular on the murky boundaries between memory and power. The third part introduces an adaptation of perhaps the first theoretical model produced so far in this field, a model which influences the structuring of the case studies as well as the analysis applied to the cases afterwards. That substantial print is devoted to exploring the nature of collective memory from an ethical angle is done in order to lay the groundwork; both to understand the phenomenon at the heart of this paper’s analysis and in order to better establish the connection between collective memory and legitimacy. Since the ethics of a concept influence its legitimacy, it follows that, in order to explore memory as a function of power, we must first understand its significance by getting to the root of what we mean by memory and what we mean by its ethics.

Ethics and the Advocates and Detractors of Collective Memory

Much has been written on the ethics of memory and its role as a moral tool in what can loosely be described as the *Never Again!* post-genocidal struggle to remember, of obligated memory of past atrocities on the “ethico-political level” (Ricœur 2004, 86) which has arguably entered a position of orthodoxy in modern society, particularly when put in contrast with what is deemed by some to be the inherent evil of either forgetting or manipulating the past in the wake of genocidal violence. And if the traditional role of religion has been to act as an authoritative vessel for morality, then it comes as no surprise that scripture is frequently cited by many of the scholars involved in the ethical discourse that follows, with references to the Book of Deuteronomy being particularly prominent.

Emphasising the moral jeopardy of failing to remember, philosopher Avishai Margalit (2002, 21) cites the concept of “blotting out the name” of victims of genocide to argue that such a
deed represents nothing less than their *double murder*; first by those responsible for their physical extinction, then by those in the future who, by failing in their moral duty of remembrance, are complicit in killing their memory. To forget a name is to forget the victim, it is argued, and ultimately pays credence to Hitler’s notorious conviction that any genocidal violence occurring in the wake of the invasion of Poland would in due course be forgotten since “who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?”¹ This, in essence, represents the first of the three ethical angles presented; namely that, for a number of reasons, remembering is a good thing and we therefore have a moral obligation to remember.

Political scientist David Rieff also refers to Deuteronomy but, unlike Margalit, presents an opposing position centred around the premise that remembrance is, at best, an act of futility and, at worst, dangerously reckless. Thus not all are convinced of the ethical merits of remembrance, with Rieff arguably going the farthest by flipping the *Never Again!* concept of remembrance as a “good thing” entirely on its head. With a nod to the Buddhist concept of impermanence, Rieff questions the point of even remembering at all, since “the historical importance of an event in its own time and in the decades that follow offers no guarantee that it will be remembered in the next century, let alone for many centuries after” (2016, 17). Furthermore, “every society without a single exception has proven to be every bit as mortal as individual human beings. To try to think otherwise is a fool’s errand” (ibid., 7). Let alone worrying, as some of the more moderate sceptics do, about whether our memories have been influenced and manipulated by the powers-that-be at the time of the event and thereafter, the argument goes that one shouldn’t even bother to remember in the first place. On a more sinister note, another of Rieff’s objections to remembrance is that “at best, it is a consolation or an ego boost, while at worst it is a wallowing, no matter whether in past triumphs or past injuries and traumas” (ibid., 109). Thus, this second argument challenges the widely-held assumption that remembering is “good”, arguing instead that, at its worst, it can act as a catalyst to genocidal violence.

A third approach stands out from the ethics stand-off as provided by Margalit and Rieff. What if, as historian Timothy Garton Ash argues, memory is not intrinsically good or bad *per se* but instead, like a kitchen knife that can both chop onions and kill a person, a tool capable of both benign and violent applications depending on how it is used? He thus examines collective memory as a litmus test for freedom of expression and as a commodity to enhance understanding in the

¹ Attributed to his Obersalzberg speech to *Wehrmacht* commanders made on 22 August 1939 in which he laid out plans for the invasion of Poland—including “the physical destruction of the enemy”. Often incorrectly interpreted as prescient of future Holocaust plans and the destruction of the Jews.
context of diversity (2016, 78). This suggestion, that collective memory is essentially a mirror of its users’ motives, provides the third argument presented here on the ethics of memory.

When Memory Turns into a Mess

Before delving further, it is worth clarifying the memory problem on a broader level by taking a step back to both define what we mean by memory in the collective sense and also to spend a moment exploring some examples of memory gone astray in the context of genocide; i.e. where the boundaries separating memory from myth have been breached. A clear differentiation of the memory of the collective versus the individual is offered in the following explanation:

Quite simply, the world does not have memories; nor do nations; nor do groups of people. Individuals remember, full stop. Yet in the early twenty-first century, collective memory is often spoken of as if it were indeed on a par with individual, which is to say genuine, memory, and not infrequently, though almost never explicitly, as if it morally outranked it.

(Rieff 2016, 54)

From a historiographical perspective, the Holocaust arguably stands out from the rest in terms of what has become a chaotic mélange of fact, memory and myth. In Selling the Holocaust (1999), historian Tim Cole presents a critique of what have emerged as some of the Holocaust’s most ubiquitous figures and sites and, in so doing, highlights the uneasy and growing divergence between the genocide of the Jews as a factual collection of historical events—and the “Holocaust” as popular culture, mythology, kitsch and “memory”. The original experience of the Holocaust, Cole suggests, has been lost and this has had a detrimental effect on its memory with implications for the future: “Distortions created by the Holocaust industry feed the Holocaust-deniers, because it is so easy to demonstrate that the prevailing discourse about the Holocaust is, in fact, false or misleading” (ibid., xvii). Cole thus sees a need for a more accurate, sober and, above all, honest memory of the Holocaust as being crucial in the battle against the deniers.

The meddling of the Holocaust memory is demonstrated powerfully in the jarring exploitation of Anne Frank’s diary, how the distorted feel-good undertones of her teenage “in spite of everything I still believe that people are really good at heart” correlates with the feel-good happy ending

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2 For the sake of clarity, terms used in this paper such as memory, collective memory, national narrative can be regarded as synonymous.

3 In his critique, Cole covers the persons of Anne Frank, Adolf Eichmann and Oskar Schindler; and the places of Auschwitz, Yad Vashem and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
narrative presented at the end of *Schindler’s List*: thanks to the compassion of their Gentile saviour, the *Schindlerjoden* survive, go forth, multiply and eventually lay stones on the grave of their heroic saviour in the Promised Land. The message presented is a blend of messianic Zionism. The absurdity of such representations is that they unintentionally serve to override as well as draw attention away from the stark fact that the Holocaust was indisputably the antithesis of survival, and its memory should respect this unpleasant and awkward truth. And it is this confusion that forms the centrepiece of his cautionary thesis. Cole may have been more interested in demonstrating the various ways in which the Holocaust has been exploited for above all pecuniary gain, but Rieff’s accusation is altogether more sinister:

The takeover of history by memory is also the takeover of history by politics. The result in practice, if not necessarily in theory, has taken us far from Margalit’s world of ethical obligations and moral minima. Instead, we have entered a world in which the essential function of collective memory is one of legitimizing a particular world-view and political and social agenda, and delegitimizing those of one’s ideological opponents.

(Rieff 2016, 63)

Clearly memory can be manipulated to suit a variety of causes. The prospect of capital gain, of profit, might have been one of the more significant motives behind the distorted representations highlighted by Cole but there are other reasons to manipulate history. Politics—that is to say, the struggle for power—also ranks high: by handing out party propaganda outside cinemas screening *Braveheart* when it was originally released in 1995, the Scottish National Party exploited a distorted and nationalised mythology of William Wallace to shill their political cause (Rieff 2016, 114). The French ultra-right party, the Front National, have similarly manipulated the memory of Joan of Arc into a symbol of Gallic nationalism (ibid., 115). And, as will be discussed later, it is no coincidence that, in his 1989 *Gazimestan* speech, Slobodan Milošević exploited the six-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo for political purposes. Thus, although the fairy-tale kitsch of exploitation as criticised in Cole’s work may be harmful in a more indirect manner, other instances are more disturbing: “Remembrance has [also] provided the toxic adhesive that was needed to cement old grudges and conflicting martyrlogies, as it did in Northern Ireland and in the Balkans for generations, if not for centuries” (Rieff 2016, 87). But the question remains: should we remember or should we forget?

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4 Considering how kilts didn’t appear until centuries after Wallace’s death, Tim Cole would presumably have treated *Braveheart* with as much contempt as *Schindler’s List*. The film was also re-screened on the seven hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn which, by coincidence or otherwise, happened to take place just before the Scottish independence referendum (Financial Times 2014).
Margalit opens *The Ethics of Memory* (2002, 7) by exploring whether or not we are “obliged to remember people and events from the past,” maintaining that this obligation to remember “comes from the effort of radical evil forces to undermine morality itself by, among other means, rewriting the past and controlling collective memory” (ibid., 83). Take the example given of the etymology and function of Yad Vashem, Israel’s Holocaust memorial and museum in Jerusalem. Its name is derived from a verse in Isaiah 56:5 in which God promises that “even unto them [pious eunuchs deprived of offspring] will I give in mine house and within my walls a place and a name [Yad Vashem] better than of sons and of daughters: I will give them an everlasting name, that shall not be cut off” (ibid., 22). Margalit’s interpretation of Yad Vashem’s role is that it serves as a guarantor to remembering the otherwise forgotten names of faceless Holocaust victims who would have been cut off into oblivion. He argues that this is done because we as humans have a strong desire for immortality—a desire intimately intertwined with “a horror of extinction and utter oblivion. The human project of memory, i.e., commemoration, is basically a religious project to secure some form of immortality” (ibid., 25). This is the essence of *Never Again!* for Margalit, a standpoint at odds with Rieff’s assertion that our generation, including the era and society we live in, will likely be forgotten in a surprisingly short period of time—an inevitability that no level of human resistance will ever succeed in overturning. As a Zionist symbol of Jewish self-expression, Yad Vashem might be regarded by some as a triumphant antithesis of sorts to the National Socialist hope that the Jews and their memory would, following their successful and total genocide, perish into oblivion. Yad Vashem in other words serves as a preventive measure against the Nazis’ intended double murder, a likely reference to the Biblical expression of blotting out the name, “both killing the man and destroying the memory of him. There is no doctrine of the immortality of the soul in the Hebrew Bible, but there is, I believe, a distinct idea of the survival of the name as the predominant vehicle for carrying the memory of the dead” (ibid., 21). Distilled further, it is adequate to suggest that we are obliged to remember because, well, how would it feel if people didn’t remember us? And, as

5 Deut. 29:20
6 This in itself is a manifestation of the Golden Rule of treating others as one would wish to be treated—a concept enshrined in the majority of the world’s faiths.
Margalit assumes that nobody would wish for their posthumous memory to fade into oblivion, he tailors his argument for the obligation of remembrance accordingly.

Alas, he argues, the problem here is that we are too busy living our lives to be able to remember the past properly. When we do make efforts to remember, we tend only to remember our own. There is little energy left over to remember others who we may not care as much about—or, indeed, not care for at all. And here Margalit intercedes with the counterargument that it is precisely because we do not care that we need a nudge in the right direction: “We need morality to overcome our natural indifference to others. Indeed, we need morality not so much to counter evil as to counter indifference” (ibid., 33). With a nod to Arendt’s central thesis on Eichmann (1963), the suggestion is made that “evil, like caring, is a scarce commodity. There is not so much banality of evil as banality of indifference. Yet one has to admit that the combination of evil and indifference is lethal, like the combination of poison and water. In one sense the claim about the banality of evil refers to this combination” (Margalit 2002, 33). This statement suggests that, by active remembrance which we are morally obliged to enact, we can remove one of the necessary ingredients for genocidal violence: indifference.

Unknowingly pointing at the lacuna that this paper aims to resolve, Margalit accepts that the politics of actually constructing a shared moral memory is immeasurably difficult, that any institutions set up to promote such memorialising are likely to be soulless and that, considering how poor humanity is at communication, it is foolish to expect us to be able to behave as a “community of commemoration” (ibid., 79). He also raises the problem of biased salience, that some events overshadow others due to “our” proximity to them. It is for this reason, he argues, that “our memory of Kosovo overshadows our memory of Rwanda. Moreover, because they are likely to be better remembered, the atrocities of Europe will come to be perceived as morally more significant than atrocities elsewhere. As such, they claim false moral superiority” (ibid., 80) which defeats the entire purpose of collective memory as envisioned by Margalit since it is precisely this unbroken and self-defeating one-upmanship tainted by perpetual interethnic grudges that are, as he readily acknowledges, part of what needs to be overcome:

We are all familiar with people who care greatly about “their” people and who are ready to make real sacrifices for them but who have utter disregard for those outside the tribe. Unselfish idealism is sometimes responsible for unspeakable cruelty to others.

(Margalit 2002, 35)
The issue of how to deal with prior wrongs committed against one’s own people brings us to a discussion on the ethics of forgiveness—above all whether it is best to forgive and forget, or instead to forgive and remember. Noting that, although “our concepts of sin, forgiveness, and forgetting are rooted in religious picture,” (ibid., 184) he is keen to emphasise the caveat that his “ethics and morality are humanistic, not religious. This means that the sources of their justification lie in humans, and not in any ‘higher’ beings” (ibid., 183). He itemises various arguments for the merits of forgiveness: as an attitude and duty to overcome anger and vengefulness, as a divine gift whereby forgiving others results in one’s own wrongs being forgiven by God, as an exhorted moral religious duty rather than an act of loving kindness, and as a means of wiping the slate clean (ibid., 192-197). This is an ethical stance that is hard to swallow for some, not least by those who have survived genocide. Primo Levi famously struggled to forgive the Germans, arguing that even survivors are not true witnesses. For him, the only true witnesses, the only people in a position to forgive, were the “sommersi: the drowned, the submerged, the annihilated” (1989, ix). In any case, if Margalit suggests that forgiveness whilst remembering the deed is the best way forward, others instead advocate the practice of collective forgiving and forgetting.

Second Ethical Argument: In Praise of Forgetting

No one remembers the former generations, and even those yet to come will not be remembered by those who follow them.

——Eccles. 1:11

In what at times feels like a step-by-step rebuttal of Margalit’s position, Rieff argues that the modern approach to remembrance has entered the realms of political correctness and offers up a challenge to what he perceives as a contemporary general consensus that collective memory is almost by default a good thing: “What if they are wrong? What if, over the long term, forgetfulness is inevitable, while even in the comparatively short term the memory of an instance of radical evil, up to and including the Shoah itself, does nothing to protect society from future instances of it?” (2016, 56). He challenges what he fears “has become the conventional wisdom today, and the conviction that memory is a species of morality [that] now stands as one of the more unassailable pieties of our age” (ibid., 58).

7 Matt. 6:14-15
This is at the heart of Rieff’s reasoning, his central message and, indeed, the origin of his other arguments against remembrance as practiced today. He offers a compelling demonstration of why, rather than remembering, there are many cases where the collective act of forgetting actually serves to better safeguard us from future violence. Rieff opens his critique with the stoical point that remembering is ultimately futile since, in the end, everything is impermanent. He continues by suggesting that even if this wasn’t the case, whereas history sometimes serves as a function of politics, collective memory always does. So, no matter how hard we try, attempts at righteous commemoration will always be tainted. Another of Rieff’s complaints is that such memories are only ever capable of being unambiguous when there is a decisive victor. Where there is no clear victor, he argues, both sides will go on to sustain incompatible memories. Furthermore, and disputing the position of Timothy Garton Ash’s views on freedom of expression, Rieff also considers the inability to forget rather childish, deeming stubborn remembrance both self-serving and a cause of war (ibid., 36).

Departing from a discussion on the cultural legacy of the American Civil War, Rieff describes the importance of the manner in which violence ends in determining its impact on future remembrance:

After all, when a war ends with a crushing victory by one side, as [the American Civil War] certainly did, the victory confers the power unilaterally to shape the collective memory of the conflict—a power that the victors nearly always exercise, as the American, British, French, and Russian occupiers did in post-World War II Germany and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front did in post-genocide Rwanda. Historically, it is only when there is no clear winner that both sides may be able to sustain their own incompatible memories. An example of this is the Bosnia-Herzegovina that came into being after the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 brought the war to an end.

(Rieff 2016, 12)

This observation, comparing as it does the legacies of post-war and post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, is of particular relevance to the cases taken up in this paper. Citing sentiments that the culture of memory in the Federal Republic of Germany is one of its great moral, political and societal achievements (Möller 1996), Rieff sets forth a scale of harmonious memory defined by the decisiveness of victory in prior battles. At the other end of this scale, the ambiguous and, he argues, unfair negotiations of the 1995 Dayton Agreement gave rise to unharmonious and incompatible memory cultures which serve to “explain” why peace is ostensibly still so fragile in the region.

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8 This observation overlaps with the impact of the mnemonic warrior category of mnemonic actor which features in Bernhard and Kubik’s (2014) model over the politics of memory introduced later in this section.
Rieff also challenges the viewpoint that collective memories are important because, as others have argued, remembering is the “grown-up” thing to do:

The Oxford historian Timothy Garton Ash once asserted confidently in an interview that just as “a person without a memory is a child,” so “a national or any political community without memory is likely to be childish.” But it is anything but self-evident that this is true. Empirically there is much to support the contrary argument: in many parts of the world it is not the relinquishing but the holding on to memories that seems to make societies childish. And in societies in which there is a real risk of fragmentation or worse, invoking certain memories can sometimes resemble nothing so much as the proverbial yelling of “Fire!” in a crowded theatre.

(Rieff 2016, 36)

In a sense, the point being made here is similar to the Christian doctrine of offering one’s cheek, of refraining from acts of retribution committed out of feelings of resentment or a perceived need for revenge; a riposte to its predecessor the Mosaic eye-for-an-eye. His reasoning overlaps to some degree with Margalit’s discussion on the ethics of forgiveness, where “two religious models of sin and forgiveness still permeate the concept of forgiveness in present-day humanistic morality: forgiveness as blotting out the sin, and forgiveness as covering it up. Blotting out a sin means forgetting it absolutely. Covering it up means disregarding it without forgetting it” (Margalit 2002, 188). Yet Rieff, unlike Margalit who decides that “forgiveness is based on disregarding the sin rather than forgetting it” (ibid., 197) would, in most cases, have advocated for blotting out the wrongs of the past committed against the self or one’s group—of moving on.

The disagreement here, over whether being able to forgive and forget is a sign of civilised society, is worth examining in more detail. What is essentially being discussed is whether the collective approach of responding to past suffering with a shrug is a good or a bad thing. Rieff cites the late Nicholas Winton9 on this matter: “What good does concentrating on the past do us? Who has ever learned anything by concentrating on the past?” (2016, 57). The issue isn’t that Rieff is necessarily entirely wrong on the issue of relinquishing memories as a sign of collective maturity. There are cases that, at least from an outsider’s perspective, might warrant bemusement—the evocative narrative of “Masada will never fall again!” indoctrinated into Israeli conscripts two millennia after the event, or perceived collective Serb wallowing over the defeat of 1389 being some of them. But theory benefits from parameters and limitations, especially if it is to be applied to and tested on empirical cases, yet no workable model as such is apparent from the ethics discussion so far.

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9 Organiser of the Kindertransport rescue of hundreds of unaccompanied Jewish refugee children.
Another approach to the ethics debate takes up the right of communities—whether they consist of victims, oppressors, the ancestors of such, or otherwise—to form their own collective memories as an intrinsic component of free speech. What role does memory play in the rights of individuals and groups as an aspect of such free expression? After all, most states have signed international treaties guaranteeing freedom of expression and promise similar guarantees in their constitutions. Yet what is less clear is why they have done so. In a preamble before setting out his ten principles for free speech, Garton Ash attempts first to explain why speech should be free before moving on to discuss the following tongue twister: “How free should speech be? How should free speech be?” (2016, 79). As a self-proclaimed liberal internationalist (ibid., 138), an aspiration towards universalism underpins his thinking. Four main answers stemming from the Western intellectual tradition are given to answer the why of freedom of speech: as essential for the actualisation of the self, in our striving for the truth, as a check against abusive government, and to help in the acceptance of diversity (ibid., 73).

In considering speech’s role on the self, the ability to express oneself with speech is what sets humanity apart from other animals or, for the time being at least, computers and other forms of artificial intelligence. It thus follows that, being intrinsic to our humanity, anything that limits our speech also impedes our ability to reach full individual humanity: an aspect that Abraham Maslow would have described as self-actualisation in his hierarchy of needs. This is at the core of the Zulu epigram above, namely that a person is only a person through other persons; thus, we are entitled to freedom of expression because that is what makes us who we are.

When we consider the rather more complex second reason, namely speech’s role in establishing the truth which, of the four, is perhaps of most relevance to this paper’s study on challenges to the legitimacy of memory, the most obvious argument is that it serves as an antidote against totalitarian lies. But, as John Stuart Mill’s take on truth in good societies demonstrates, it also plays a role in guarding against complacency: “Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post as soon as there is no enemy in the field” (Mill, 2006). What Mill was emphasising here was that there should be no repression or restriction of the free expression of opinions; no matter how unpopular, untrue or what we might today regard as “not politically correct” they are. The logic behind such a stance is simple: things tend to get sloppy if truths are taken for granted and left
unchallenged. This has far-reaching implications on e.g. whether there is justification or not for criminalising, as a number of European countries have already done, deniers of the Holocaust or other genocides. Take Holocaust denier David Irving, who lost his 1996 libel suit against Deborah Lipstadt in the United Kingdom. The case involved the rigorous and objective examination of evidence to establish whether or not Lipstadt had been correct in amongst other things accusing Irving of Holocaust denial and falsifying history. And this was to have a profound impact: “The publicity generated by the [libel] trial catapulted Lipstadt to international fame, alerted people to Irving as a Holocaust denier (which even professional historians doubted he was), and utterly destroyed his reputation as a genuine historian” (Evans 2001, 266). A decade later on and in contrast to the consequences of the libel trial, Irving was convicted and imprisoned for crimes against the Austrian Verbotsgesetz law.\footnote{Prohibition Statute, specifically a law prohibiting activities deemed as encouraging National Socialism.} Yet his libel foe Lipstadt expressed dismay upon hearing of his conviction: “I am not happy when censorship wins, and I don't believe in winning battles via censorship... The way of fighting Holocaust deniers is with history and with truth” (BBC 2006). Rather than damaging his reputation and financially ruining him as the libel loss had done, his conviction arguably gave him a platform as a martyr. Garton Ash echoes Lipstadt’s unease over this reinvention of the man, arguing that litigating genocide denial often results in the opposite of the intended effect, entrenching and reinforcing perceptions of martyrdom and repression of “free thinkers” (2016, 158).

In terms of ensuring that government remains accountable to its citizens, freedom of expression becomes a matter of reciprocity. On the one hand, citizens are entitled to have their voices heard by those assigned by society to represent them. On the other hand, the corresponding role of freedom of information—the right to know—becomes significant since, by being subject to scrutiny, public bodies remain accountable to those humans they exist to serve. Clearly, a thriving and free press is essential in this aspect; auditing the behaviour of government on behalf of or in lieu of individuals incapable of achieving the same oversight on their own.

Finally, Garton Ash discusses the value of free expression in terms of its impact on diversity. Although somewhat idealistic, his thinking is reflected by other scholars; a fundamental element of coexisting with people who may not live in the same manner as ourselves, as a test of “our ability to live in a society that is necessarily defined by conflict and controversy; it trains us in the art of tolerance and steels us for its vicissitudes” (Bollinger 2010, 48). “We will not all choose to live our lives in the same way. We will not all agree. As Kant observed, human society would be
stagnant and bovine if we did. […] But we can learn, by practice, how to live with irreducible
difference and not come to blows. At best, we will agree on how we disagree” (Garton Ash 2016,
78).

It is now that Free Speech starts to address the issue of collective memory within repressive
regimes which, unsurprisingly, are characterised by restricted freedom of expression, an issue of
particular relevance since both cases in this paper demonstrated repressive tendencies. Garton Ash
invites us to consider first the inherent paternalism of “many authoritarian regimes, and all
totalitarian ones” (ibid., 86) as well as reminding us of the Kantian take on Enlightenment as a
demonstration of our emergence from self-imposed immaturity: “Kant contrasts enlightened
maturity with the Vormünder, those who paternalistically control and presume to speak for others”
(ibid., 82). He then asks us to consider “the approach of states identified with a single dominant
religion or code of morality, found in its strongest form in theocracies [that are] also moralistic. It
says: you may not express that, or see or hear that expressed, because it is contrary to true morality,
as defined by our interpretation of sharia law, or the Bible, or a little green or red book, or whatever
the acknowledged source of public morality may be” (ibid., 86).

Garton Ash offers ten principles for free speech. Most are outside of the scope of this stu-
dy but two of the ten are of interest, and it is worth briefly discussing these: knowledge, not allowing	aboo against and seizing every chance for the spread of knowledge, and violence, neither making
threats of violence nor accepting violent intimidation. We have in fact already indirectly covered
the role of knowledge in free speech, with its emphasis of not allowing taboo against knowledge,
when we examined the David Irving case, particularly the rights and wrongs of litigating or
criminalising genocide denial or relativism. We saw how opening up his commentary to extensive
and public scrutiny was colossally more effective than attempts to punish him through the criminal
justice system. Indeed, the trials and tribulations of David Irving demonstrated how the legislation
of history is dangerous territory. At best, fraudsters and haters are rendered martyrs for challenging
the status quo. At worst, the actual truth-tellers are persecuted.

The impact of violence, either real or threatened, can be neatly expressed using the example
of the Assassin’s Veto,¹¹ best explained as “if you say that, we will kill you” which represents the
most extreme threat to free speech (ibid., 129). Although there are some isolated cases where the
state is justified in intervening to restrict freedom of expression, it is crucial to determine where to
draw the line; in other words to determine whether or not such intervention is justified. The

¹¹ Interestingly, when coining the term, Garton Ash drew inspiration from Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s (1992)
Assassins of Memory, a collection of essays dealing specifically with Holocaust denial.
Brandenburg Test\(^{12}\) is introduced, a litmus test of sorts of incitement to violence in which three criteria must be fulfilled in order to justify intervention: violence must be *intended, likely* and *imminent* (ibid., 132). Context is therefore absolutely crucial and here we are pointed towards a set of five guidelines set forth by Susan Benesch (2012, 11) for determining the threshold beyond which hate speech becomes dangerous speech: “One can estimate the likelihood that speech will spark violence in any given situation using just these five criteria: the speaker, the audience, the speech itself, the social and historical context, and the means of dissemination.” There is, for example, an enormous difference between a frustrated traveller who, angry at his flight being cancelled on account of bad weather, jokingly threatens to blow up an airport on Twitter, and the fever-pitch calls from *Radio Télérision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM) for a final war to exterminate the Tutsi “cockroaches” (Garton Ash 2016, 135). Furthermore, there is evidence that, as per the RTLM case, “a constant drip-drip of dehumanising abuse of a particular group of human beings can eventually incline people to violence against that group” (ibid., 133). Similarly, when considering the Balkan atrocities of the 1990s, Garton Ash brings up the role of television and concludes with the following hypothetical: “Imagine how Americans would have behaved […] if all three major US television news channels had been taken over for five years by the Ku Klux Klan” (ibid., 133).

Echoing this paper’s research problem, the issue raised here by Garton Ash is in empirically determining causality: the link between hate speech and actual acts of violence, “between something said and something done” (ibid., 150). In his discussion featured later on which covers the relationship between memory and power, political scientist Jan-Werner Müller turned to the former Yugoslavia to illustrate this problematic missing link in prior theory with a useful example: “While very few would doubt that memory mattered and exercised power in the Yugoslav wars, even fewer would be able to explain precisely how it mattered” (2002, 2; italics added). Indeed, an increase in freedom of speech may in fact lead to an increase in hate speech since, as demonstrated in the Yugoslav context, “the democratization process opened up for reinterpretation not only the Yugoslav socialist revolution. Freedom of speech was frequently also misused by those interested in trivialising ‘the other’s’ suffering or exploiting their own for political purposes” (Dulić 2004, 86-87).

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\(^{12}\) This test came about after *Brandenburg v. Ohio* of 1969. Its requirement of “imminent lawless action” refined the older benchmark of a “clear and present danger”. It continues almost half a century later to define the limits of freedom of expression as “the lynchpin of the modern doctrine of free speech, which seeks to give special protection to politically relevant speech and to distinguish speech from action” (Hall and Ely Jr 2009).
By examining conflicting opinions on its role, we have so far been able to develop an understanding of why memory matters. But to explain how it matters, to have any chance of bringing about a workable framework, and to understand how it can pre-empt genocidal violence, we need to go beyond the ethical discussion to discuss memory as an aspect of political science, explore its role as a function of power, and examine the underlying processes that link memory to power.

**Moving from Ethics to Politics**

Although the nature of genocide studies is interdisciplinary, this paper falls within the realms of political science, relying in particular on comparative politics. Moving away from ethics to explore the politics of memory and aware that the theoretical transition between ethics and politics has never been neatly made before, what follows is an attempt to fill the gap. First, the views of Müller on the nexus between memory and power are presented. This is followed by a discussion of what has come to be known as the state-civil society dichotomy, and its relevance within the politics of memory. And it is from this transition from ethics to politics that a model originally used on post-communist memory regimes is introduced for the purposes of this study.

By examining the arguments for and against remembrance, we have witnessed the ancient heritage of the ethics of memory as a field: it was, after all, a Biblical topic of interest. Yet the politics of memory has only come to prominence in the past couple of decades and only then as a divergent off-shoot from history, sociology or cultural studies. Furthermore, it wasn’t until fairly recently that political science has started to publish works on memory (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 7). This overview of the state of the art can be summarised as follows:

> Within political science the study of memory has not been totally neglected, but the existing works focus predominantly on questions of historical and transitional justice and tend to have more of a normative focus. […] Mainstream comparative politics has been slower to explore the role of memory in political competition among others.

(Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 2)

**Identifying the Nexus between Memory and Power**

Writing fifteen years ago, Müller lamented the fact that “for all the present obsession with ‘memory thinking’ there have been almost no studies on the nexus between memory and political power” (2002, 2) and that “while it has become commonplace to stress the imaginary quality of the nation, tradition, and implicitly, memory, that is their sheer ‘constructedness’, just how these imaginations
and constructions come to have real political consequences is far from obvious” (ibid., 2). Yet Müller was arguably a pioneer in his field by attempting to join the dots between, as he put it, the memory-power nexus which, certainly when he was writing, “remains curiously unexamined” (ibid., 2). Although Müller theorised in more general geographic terms, of relevance to the Yugoslav case is his observation that “after the collapse of communism, memories of the Second World War were ‘unfrozen’ on both sides of the former Iron Curtain” (ibid., 6) and that “in central and eastern Europe, memory has of course returned, with a vengeance that the West has been spared” (ibid., 9). Essentially, the Cold War had served to “freeze” the memory of the Second World War until, as he put it, “the return of history” (ibid., 11). Müller was similarly perplexed by the why behind the unanswered causality that determined what it was that made “memory wars turn into real wars” (ibid., 17). What he did identify was a link between memory and power in terms of their relationship with legitimacy.

Müller made the argument that “policies are legitimated through appeals to the collective or national memory for social consumption both at home and abroad” (ibid., 26) before suggesting that “it is not so much that memory is the independent variable determining political culture and ultimately policies, but that memory to some extent is political culture” (ibid., 26). There was also recognition that policymakers themselves rely on memory and historical analogies to decide policy. Bravely delving into the domain of international relations, he dismisses, for example, the neorealist angle as an “outlook [that] would in all likelihood simply dismiss the invocation of memories as pure ‘window-dressing’ for ‘hard' interests” (ibid., 28) although modulating his argument by conceding that “it would be equally wrong to see a focus on memory as necessarily opposed to neorealism or neoliberalism” (ibid., 29). His develops his point by arguing that:

States react to shifts in the balance of power and the evolution of international institutions in ways which have been shaped by political culture—and memory in particular. While precise causal chains will always be difficult to establish, one can add memory as a factor in historical and political analysis.

(Müller 2002, 30)

In terms of the link between memory challenges and subsequent mass violence, this has hard implications for the research questions driving this paper. Agreeing with the approach of “find out – record – reflect – but then move on” as proposed by Garton Ash, one of Müller’s main points was that previously tried and tested approaches weren’t necessarily the best way forward: “standard liberal answers to ‘difficult memories’ might not work” (ibid., 32). Furthermore, he refutes the idea
that “‘counter-memory’, the recovery and recognition of the memories of oppressed groups, is automatically liberating, or that such ‘counter-memory’ should have legitimacy *per se*” (ibid., 32). Similarly, Müller argues that we cannot count on a “shared truth” necessarily leading to reconciliation. Instead, “contested, conflicting, competing memories are an inevitable legacy of transitions to democracy” (ibid., 33) and, instead of trying to swim upstream against the inevitable, Müller suggests that:

Rather than aiming for some elusive thick social consensus in which one narrative of the past is enthroned, arguing about the past within democratic parameters and on the basis of what has been called an “economy of moral disagreement” might itself be a means of fostering social cohesion.

(Müller 2002, 33)

Yet there is an issue: most of the discussion is related to or otherwise tends to focus on the state’s role in shaping or reshaping memory. This is despite the tacit acknowledgement of the importance of determining which actors—state, non-state, or otherwise—are the key influencers: “It is crucial to identify the actual social carriers of memory, and explain how they related memory to policies” (ibid., 29-30). Furthermore, “memory can be either repressed or de-politicised, that is, expressed in civil society, but shorn of its claims on political resources and state power” (ibid., 32). Müller also goes on to suggest that “this is essentially the story of Tito’s repression of memory in Yugoslavia, the subsequent ‘privatisation’ and ‘proliferation’ of memories, and their final unleashing on a ‘battlefield of memories’” (ibid., 32). There are thus hints of the role played by non-state political actors but, considering their significance as Müller describes above, what is now needed is a theoretical incorporation of such a role; above all those emerging from the realms of civil society. We now take a step back from memory to consider how power might be wielded by those outside of the traditional state structures of executive, legislative and judiciary.

*The State-Civil Society Dichotomy*

Although studies into the dynamic interaction between state and society have long been a topic of interest within political science, Joel Migdal broke new ground with his focus on state-society relations and state capabilities in the developing world, neatly coined in terms of “the effects of society on state and state on society” (1988, 256). The concept was further refined with the introduction of the state-civil society dichotomy as described by political scientists Björn
Beckman and Anders Sjögren, an approach which is applicable to the cases in this study since both feature two civil society actors in the form of social movements challenging the legitimacy of memory as presented and controlled by the state. In the study of power, it is reasonable to think first and foremost of entities such as political parties and the governments and parliaments (or lack of) that they form as the heaviest influence on state-building. Yet they seldom hold a monopoly on power. Some argue that they are given too much attention to the detriment of other influencers, that “there is an excessive fixation with elections, parties, and elites, not necessarily in academia, but in the media, especially when reporting from distant societies. The focus is too often on the drama, the hopes, and disappointments at that level, while too little attention is paid to the longer-term advances and setbacks at the level of popular organisations” (Beckman and Sjögren 2001, 1).

Although civil society was already a topic of interest for the likes of Locke, Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Marx, it fell into oblivion for half a century and was only brought back as a theoretical concept in the 1980s (Sjögren 2001, 23-29). Some explanations for this include its linkage with “crises of statist ideologies and solutions, East (state socialism), West (welfarism) and South (developmentalism)” (ibid., 29-30). The level of influence wielded by civil society may be intimately dependent on the nature of the state—ranging from open and democratic to closed and autocratic—but it is a pervasive factor. Noting that “the capacity of governments to establish and reproduce themselves [...] in a democratically responsible and responsive manner is crucially influenced by developments at the level of popular organisations,” Beckman and Sjögren argue that “also those who give priority to national democratic institutions, in a conventional sense, need to pay close attention to the way these are rooted in wider society” (2001, 1-2). Crucially, this perspective cannot be limited to democratic regimes since “politics at the level of civil society may directly or indirectly contribute to the opening up of the state and national political institutions to all sections of the population” (ibid., 2). Put simply, civil society and the non-governmental organisations and social movements contained in its realm are always influential to a state, although their level of influence will also be a mirror of the level of repression present in their physical and temporal area of operation. It can, however, be argued that the terminology of “state-civil society dichotomy” overly reifies two mutually exclusive political macro-entities which results in a

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13 It is by happy coincidence that I find myself referring to Björn Beckman’s work on civil society in this paper. He tutored me as an undergraduate, supervising my 2003 bachelor paper on Ugandan civil society.

14 Usually but not necessarily originating from the state: “While the state may appear as the most obvious wielder of authoritarian power some contributions are equally concerned with other institutions of domination and oppression including labour and property relations, gender, race, and religion” (Beckman and Sjögren 2001, 4).
confusing methodological bias leading to analytical confusion (Sjögren 2001, 38). Therefore, “state-society relations need to be understood in a more integrated way in order to break with the state vs. civil society ideal type” (Beckman and Sjögren 2001, 4). This is certainly a relevant point but, for the purposes of this study, it is adequate to bear in mind that struggles over power and associated commodities such as legitimacy and memory are more complex than a two-way battle.

Contemporary civil society discourse has important implications for this study if only for the fact that the social movements featured in the cases represent textbook typologies of a civil society actor. However, the involvement of figures with state influence demonstrated above all by Milošević’s *modus operandi* makes the Serbian case somewhat murkier. The phenomenon is linked to keywords such as empowerment, democratization and participation and, at least in the 1980s, “it was believed that social groups, viewpoints and institutions that were either previously excluded from policy making processes, or enjoyed limited spaces to influence the activities of the public domain, would gain voice, legality, strength and autonomy from the repressive grip of the state” (Bangura 2001, 251). With its imagery of “good” citizens rolling back the excesses of “bad” states, such a point of view also highlights what some regard as the political bias of the state-civil society dichotomy; a perspective deeply troubling to Beckman’s Marxist rationale which is evidenced by his accusation that “the ‘liberation of civil society’ from the suffocating grip of the state has become part of the hegemonic [neoliberal] ideological project of our time” (2001, 51).

But, despite its flaws, the concept of the state-civil society dichotomy draws attention to the fact that the dynamics behind access to and use of power are more complex and intricate than may at first be assumed. Moreover, rather than attributing this dichotomy as a negative phenomenon between two mutually exclusive vessels of power, it is worth emphasising the symbiotic nature of the relationship. After all, the absence of the state makes rights of any sort impossible to sustain since “another plurality is between order and freedom: each depends upon the other, although each is different from the other. The claim that order is freedom or that freedom is order ends in tyranny. The claim that freedom is the lack of order must end in anarchy—which is nothing more than tyranny of a special kind” (Snyder 2015, 340-341).

*The Bernhard-Kubik Model*

In *Twenty Years After Communism*, political scientists Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik attempt to demonstrate, through an exhaustive study, that “an important part of the foundation of new political regimes, identities, and principles of political legitimacy comes from looking back to the past”
(2014, 1). They first lay out a novel theoretical framework for memory and politics before inviting the scholars responsible for subsequent case chapters to execute theoretically-informed studies which strictly adhere to their model. Measures are taken to ensure uniformity and consistency across the studies and their analysis and conclusions demonstrate that they succeed in doing so. The book is ambitious, not simply because it offers an original and provable model for arguably the first time in the field, but also in terms of the breadth of empirical work offered: seventeen in-depth case studies comparing the treatment of memory in post-communist regimes twenty years after 1989/1991.

What follows is an overview of Bernhard and Kubik’s own discussion of the politics of memory. Their model as used in the post-communist cases is introduced before a minor adaptation is suggested to make it compatible with the case studies featured in this paper. Such adaptations require justification and I will thus argue why the application of their model needn’t strictly be limited to post-communist cases. Just as they reach the conclusion that different factors determine the outcome of challenges to memory, a similar argument can be made for the same being true even in cases that have not been subjected to state repression at the hands of communist regimes.

Bernhard and Kubik concentrate on two major variables—one independent and the other dependent—in their study, namely “the types of mnemonic actors and the type of memory regime that emerges as a result of their interaction (dominated either by coexistence or conflict). We suggest that there are four ideal-types of such actors (individuals, parties, organisations, etc.): mnemonic warriors, mnemonic pluralists, mnemonic abnegators, and mnemonic prospectives” (ibid., 11). Describing and categorising these ideal-types involves asking five questions: who they see as the participants in memory politics, what their predominant vision of collective memory is, when the events to be remembered took place, how the mnemonic contest is being carried out, and why it is worthwhile or not worthwhile to engage in mnemonic struggle (ibid., 12).

**Mnemonic Actors**

We can understand mnemonic warriors as regarding other participants in terms of an “us versus them” mentality where memory is non-negotiable since there is only one “true” vision of the past. They focus on a single mythical past whereby wrongs of the past are part of the tissue of present politics and have a strategy of non-negotiation and avoiding compromise: they aim to defeat, deny power to or otherwise delegitimise alternative visions of the past. Mnemonic warriors are fundamentalists, believing that their “true” vision of the past legitimises their claim to power (ibid.,
Mnemonic pluralists, on the other hand, believe in an “us and them” approach where negotiation on memory issues can take place provided there is agreement on the fundamentals of mnemonic politics. They tend to focus on multiple pasts where different interpretations of the past are allowed to exist. In contesting memory, they practice respect and toleration for alternative views of the past on the basis of a common understanding of the fundamentals. They are ready to negotiate or disagree. Mnemonic pluralists are exactly that: pluralists who believe that several visions of the past are acceptable. Their claim to power rests on the effort to institutionalise a frame for their coexistence (ibid., 13). Mnemonic abnegators, on the other hand, don’t dwell on the past, unlike the rest, and hence devote little energy to memory in their politics. With such an attitude of the past being unimportant, that there is no time like the present, they avoid mnemonic contests and deem them to be a waste of time. Mnemonic abnegators are pragmatists. For them, propagating a predominant vision of the past is not as worthwhile as responding to present-day problems (ibid., 14). Finally, mnemonic prospectives see themselves and others as part of an expansive and exhaustive “us” where the riddle of history has been solved and both the past and the future are known. For them, there is an inevitable or desirable end state and it is this future event that will be remembered. They focus political energy on building a “brighter” future and challenge competing visions of the past in the name of the correct, revolutionary interpretation. The hallmark of mnemonic prospectives is utopianism: an idealised future is attainable provided that action is taken in the present (ibid., 14).

Memory Regimes

Moving on from mnemonic actors to discuss memory regimes, these can be described as “a set of cultural and institutional practices that are designed to publicly commemorate and/or remember a single event, a relatively clearly delineated and interrelated set of events, or a distinguishable past process” (ibid., 15). They are regarded by Bernhard and Kubik as more malleable, particularly in younger political regimes, and five major reasons for such fluidity are given. First, actors can come and go, and this clearly has an impact on a memory regime’s constellation of power. Second, the salience or perceived importance of memory issues can change over time, waxing and waning through the passage of time and anniversaries, or other shocks such as “traumatic events, the realignment of foreign policy, or revelations from professional historical debates” (ibid., 16). Third, actors unhappy with the surrounding status quo of collective memory may produce new interpretations of the past in an attempt to produce more politically beneficial results. This usually
provokes a mnemonic conflict which forces other actors to define or redefine their own positions. Such a course of events “leads to the reconfiguration of the existing memory regime or the emergence of a new one, and as a consequence causes a shift in the memory field” (ibid., 16).

Fourth, how important memory is may vary depending on who holds power at a given moment. Fifth, memory of a specific issue may slip down the list of priorities when other matters such as war or economic crisis become more pressing. It is also emphasised that, in any attempts at analysis, “it is essential not to think of the field of collective memory as set in stone, but to begin analysis by considering its state at a given moment in time” (ibid., 16; italics added). A point of clarification is required here: talking about a memory regime involves focusing on an organised way of remembering a specific issue, event, or process, and doing so at a given moment or period. A collection of memory regimes (i.e. the organised way of remembering all salient issues in a given country in a given period) can be referred to as the field of memory.

Three general types of memory regime are identified in the discourse: fractured, pillarised, and unified. Crucially, any memory regime involving at least one mnemonic warrior (i.e. actors with an “us and them” view of participation and a mentality that they are the guardians of the “true” version of the past) will always be fractured. All memory regimes without warriors will, in contrast, be either pillarised or unified depending on the balance between abnegators and pluralists. The key difference between these last two categories is that pillarised regimes are characterised by tolerated differences of opinion between actors over how they interpret the past whereas unified regimes have reached agreement across all actors on how they interpret the past which results in a general lack of conflict (ibid., 17). It should be abundantly clear from this categorisation of memory regimes that it is the mnemonic warriors who hold an advantage in setting the agenda “since they confront not only other warriors, but also pluralists, abnegators, and prospectives” (ibid., 18). Tellingly and with implications for this paper’s study, Bernhard and Kubik argue that mnemonic contests in democratic countries are difficult to settle and often produce unintended consequences which may even be harmful to their instigators. They give the example of a group of pluralists attempting to form a pillarised regime which is thwarted by the fundamentalism of mnemonic warriors seeking to establish their own hegemonic memory regime, a course of action which will inevitably lead to a fractured memory regime. However, what they also acknowledge is that the relative power of each of the actors is also crucial (ibid., 18).
**Constraints and Choices Faced by Mnemonic Actors**

This section has so far offered an overview of Bernhard and Kubik’s mnemonic actors and memory regimes. The framework will now be developed by expanding on the factors that influence the choices made by mnemonic actors and how these influence eventual memory regimes. Bernhard and Kubik explore previous conceptual work on memory practices before arriving at their own analytical scheme whereby, as we touched on above, “political actors engaging in mnemonic politics have strategic choices and face (historical) constraints in two dimensions: cultural and structural/institutional” (ibid., 19). It is this combination of factors—structural and cultural constraints as well as the cultural choices made by actors—that ultimately determines the type of memory regime. Bernhard and Kubik argue that the most important decision that mnemonic actors make is with regard to their stance or strategy on a given issue and that, although it is impossible to know all the factors that influence a given political actor, it is possible to theorise that there are three sets of factors that influence actors’ decisions. First, there are the cultural constraints imposed by the meanings, values and identities in the discourses actors know and consider using. Second, the cultural choices that actors make within these constraints. Third, the structural-institutional constraints of the political field in which they act (ibid., 12).

Turning first to constraints, it is simplest to regard structural constraints as dependent on the relative power held by an actor compared to others in the system. Bernhard and Kubik choose to limit their cases to post-communist nations and their descriptions at times reflect this. They argue, for example, that “there was no single state socialism but rather states socialisms” (ibid., 20) and this would at first glance appear to have consequences for any study that incorporates non-communist cases. Yet I contend that their decision to sidestep discussions on classifying the various types and to instead settle for the two categories of liberalised and hard-line works equally well outside of the seemingly arbitrary boundaries of communism/post-communism. Indeed, e-mail correspondence with both Bernhard and Kubik appears to have confirmed that this makes sense:

I take your question on the adaptability of the model as the motivation for your email. […] Yes, we think it is adaptable beyond the post-communist context.

(Michael Bernhard, 5 April 2017)

Our model should work for any situation in which one observes a contest over the formation of public/collective memory (on some issue) in a sufficiently democratic setting. It is actually designed for non-communist or non-authoritarian regimes, as there must be some protected (say, by the rule of law) space for mnemonic contests.

(Jan Kubik, 5 April 2017)
With this in mind, there are three notable observations to be made regarding the nature of regimes both before and after challenges to memory regimes. First, they argue that “liberalised regimes were sufficiently ‘relaxed’ to allow a modicum of political competition [and] countries with such reformist histories are more likely to produce post-breakthrough political actors who have greater experience in political competition and symbolic manipulation” (ibid., 21). Second, they argue that a strong left-right political landscape seems to encourage mnemonic warfare. Third, they argue that the mode of extrication—be it a state of rupture or reform—from the old (in their cases, communist) regime has an impact and part of their study in fact investigates whether this in itself “contributes to the establishment and subsequent evolution of the memory regime” (ibid., 21). I argue again that, as above, there is no need to limit these observations to communist or post-communist cases. An interesting hypothesis is offered here:

It seems that the more violent the break with the past, the easier it is to break decisively with the legitimating historical myths of the previous regime and propose new variants of collective memory. In negotiated extrication […] those actors who negotiated with incumbents (challengers-negotiators) are vulnerable to political attacks by memory warriors who abstained from negotiating (former oppositional recalcitrants) and often challenge the legitimacy of negotiation and a new political order based on it.

(Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 21)

Turning now to cultural constraints, these prove somewhat harder to conceptualise. We do not mysteriously inherit these. Instead, there are “several official systems of social communication and education that deliberately manufacture and disseminate sets of ‘official’ narratives about the national past and equally powerful sets of ‘unofficial’ narratives generated and reproduced within personal networks” (ibid., 22). The personal networks that host such unofficial narratives can occur on any number of levels; from the most basic collective of individuals that comprise a typical family, to sports or social clubs, all the way to the comparably monolithic social movements featured in the case studies. A country’s official and unofficial (or “popular”) memories hence consist of a vast swathe of narratives, “transmitted in many different media, from school textbooks, films, theatre performances, musical compositions […], and monuments, to […] public ceremonies that are designed to commemorate ‘important’ past events” (ibid., 22). A number of examples are given to illustrate the intangible notion of “points of concern” within a group as markers of social identity and belonging. For example, “a Pole may not believe in the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary to be a Pole; but one must know who she is and have at least a rudimentary knowledge of some narratives about her […] to be recognised by others as a ‘legitimate’ member of the nation”
Similarly, woe betide the BBC newsreader or, indeed, any major British political figure who refuses to wear a poppy\(^\text{15}\) on their lapel every November.

One final observation on cultural constraints is that, during a regime change, a political actor’s baggage can have an impact on their room for manoeuvre. For example, “authoritarian incumbents have a difficult time recasting themselves as defenders of human rights, and communist successor parties are hard pressed to justify themselves as libertarian defenders of private property” (ibid., 23-24). Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, “the way in which different ethnic and religious groups have fared […] will strongly affect the way in which that past is remembered. This is particularly acute in those countries for whom the fall of communism led to the attainment of independence, such as the former Yugoslavia and the Baltic States” (ibid., 24).

The above structural and cultural constraints may influence, indeed limit, an actor’s room for manoeuvre yet there are still choices within such boundaries and these may have political consequences, particularly in terms of their impact on an actor’s legitimacy (ibid., 25). Relevant for this study is the observation that “if narratives of victimhood are salient in a ‘national culture’ and are central (elemental) to the ‘national story,’ any actor who wants to be ‘taken seriously’ is ill advised to ignore their existence” (ibid., 25). However, Bernhard and Kubik caution that “there is a choice. A mnemonic entrepreneur can contribute to increasing the centrality or marginality of such narratives, a decision driven either by strategic calculations or principled commitment to a version of the nation’s history. Either way, the decision has political consequences and cultural repercussions for all actors involved in the public life of a given group (nation)” (ibid., 25). And thus we are introduced to the novel concept of the mnemonic entrepreneur who, regardless of whether they are an individual or a collective, is somehow aware of their constraints and choices but engages in political realism to advance objectives. A useful illustration here is in the choice of political flavour chosen by the successors of previously ruling parties, the argument being that ex-communist parties face a choice between neo-communism, social democracy or behaving as “parties of power” with either a nationalist, power for the sake of power, or statist approach (ibid., 26).

Bernhard and Kubik conclude their theoretical model with a discussion of the “implications of different memory regimes for the quality of democracy” (ibid., 29) which can arguably be extended to imply peaceful, non-violent societies. One particular paragraph is especially powerful,

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\(^{15}\) Sold by the Royal British Legion in the weeks leading up to Remembrance Sunday.
overlapping strongly with this paper’s hypothesis dealing with the causal relationship between memory and violence:

Fractured, pillarized, and unified memory regimes have different ramifications for the quality of democracy. Unified memory regimes are most likely to exist in democracies in the long term only on the basis of a broad cultural consensus that is nonetheless hard to achieve and once attained very prone to breakdowns. Under such conditions, issues of public memory become depoliticized until a political and/or mnemonic actor sees an advantage in challenging the mnemonic consensus. In the short term, unified memory regimes are likely to emerge only under specific sets of conditions in which actors face strong inhibitions about raising issues of the recent past. If actors see no political advantage in political competition from politicizing memory issues, then a universal stance of abnegation is possible.

(Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 28-29)

Five consequences of the fracturing of memory are given. First, differences between pillarised, unified and fractured memory regimes and fields will have implications for the national discursive field where “battles over the past will be directly related to the contests over which actors are legitimate and thus who has the right to frame institutions” (ibid., 29). Second, the same differences between pillarised/unified and fractured memory regimes and fields will have implications for the stability of the party system where campaigns that challenge the legitimacy of opponents are likely to be more volatile with the inclusion of memory. Third, fractured memory regimes complicate issues of governability. A highly politicised mnemonic cleavage along the traditional left-right political landscape may result in questions becoming non-negotiable when they otherwise could have been articulated in terms of different interpretations of the past. Furthermore, differences of opinion on memory between potential political partners may have an impact on their ability to cooperate. Fourth, more fractured memory regimes result in more contentious civil societies; with more intense or even violent forms of collective action such as vandalism or riots becoming more common. Fifth, fractured memory regimes result in a lowering of interpersonal trust which has the knock-on effect of impairing both cultural and social capital.

To briefly summarise Bernhard and Kubik’s model, mnemonic actors (be they fundamentalist warriors, tolerant pluralists, pragmatist abnegators or utopianist prospectives) face both structural constraints (such as the type of political regime they operate in and the nature of the traditional left-right political landscape) as well as cultural constraints (such as the issue of ethnicity or religion and also the somewhat ethereal “national sense of identity”). These constraints in turn influence the cultural choices that these actors can make (such as their political flavour if they happen to have transitioned from communism to post-communism).
Theoretical Counterarguments

Before proceeding to an overview of the methodology used in this paper and in the interest of academic honesty, there is a warning flag from other work, particularly on ethnic violence, that has implications for this paper. Perhaps there is an easier way of explaining away the discrepancy lifted in this paper between, on the one hand, a forced but peaceful reassessment of memory and, on the other hand, non-negotiable memory wars that were consummated by ethnic cleansing and episodes of genocidal violence. Such a standpoint questions the very validity of this paper’s intended area of study, and there are two positions to support such a counterargument.

In *The Dark Side of Democracy* (2005), sociologist Michael Mann brings up one point in a long list of hypotheses that is relevant to this study. It deals with the idea that there is some sort of ethnic common denominator and that much boils down to ethnic diversity; that the more heterogeneous a country is, the more likely that genocidal violence will occur. One can therefore shrug off as somehow inevitable that Srebrenica happened following Yugoslavia’s collapse whereas the relatively homogenous West Germany prevailed peacefully in comparison. Yet there are problems with this line of thinking. If the ethnic diversity of Yugoslavia “explains” the violence following the collapse of communism, then what about the even more ethnically diverse Russia? The demise of the USSR was arguably even more fraught yet the state that rose from its ashes managed to avoid descending into ethnic slaughter. Without disagreeing with Mann’s observations, it therefore seems that this is not the only explanatory factor at play—and this study demonstrates it.

I stop short of dismissing Mann’s observations as truisms as there is evidence to back up his claims. And, to his credit, Mann includes a chapter dealing with two counterfactual cases—India and Indonesia, both profoundly multi-ethnic nations—to demonstrate exceptions to his own rules. He also concedes that “all [of the cases featured in his book] involved old ethnic tensions and conflict—as in India and Indonesia. Yet murderous cleansing\(^\text{16}\) seems to need additional causes beyond those embedded in mere intercommunal ethnic or religious violence” (ibid., 500) which seems to corroborate the point made above that simply explaining away violence as the inevitable result of ethnic diversity is wholly inadequate, a view shared by other scholars, e.g. Biondich (2011) and Gagnon (2004). Certainly in the Yugoslav case, “the descent into war was conditioned by the confluence of several factors, none of which had anything to do with ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’” (Biondich 2011, 195).

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\(^{16}\) Mann is specifically interested in murderous ethnic cleansing rather than acts of genocide *per se.*
Methodology

The empirical section of this paper features a case study between two social movements in West Germany and Serbia. As such, it is qualitative in nature and steers clear of employing statistical methods. The strengths of such methodology over a more quantitative approach are numerous. First, there is the enhanced conceptual validity within political science associated with studying variables such as “democracy, power, political culture, state strength” (George and Bennett 2005, 19) which are otherwise notoriously difficult to measure. Second, as a driving factor behind deriving new hypotheses where, if research answers are entirely different or unexpected, they may pave the way for new theory development. Third, as a powerful method of studying causal mechanisms in detail. And fourth, case studies provide a means of studying complex causal relations where, for example, there are an abundance of factors at play (ibid., 19-22).

As a study of two social movements and their impact on memory norms and subsequent violent conflict (or lack of), the methodology featured in this paper is best characterised as a qualitative few-country study within the field of comparative politics. There is a straightforward argument to be made here against opting for a single-country study since “a study of social mobilisation under authoritarian rule can make inferences relevant to social mobilisation in other countries under similar conditions of authoritarian rule [but] on the other hand, a study of social movement activity under democratic rule cannot make inferences about such activity under authoritarian rule” (Landman 2003, 238). Considering the fact that this paper attempts to explore how two social movements challenge memory regimes as part of a wider legitimacy challenge against existing powers, it is clear that a single-country study would be unable to deliver this.

But what is there to prevent this study being opened up to even more cases than the two featured here? Again, the argument against doing so is fairly straightforward since, by restricting the number of cases featured, it employs concepts and variables that may be more sensitive to the political contexts under investigation (ibid., 228). We are essentially concerned with the political impact on memory that these social movements have as well as favourable political conditions such as “the changing political opportunities that allow for the emergence, shape and impact of movements, the differences between the so-called ‘new’ and ‘old’ social movements, as well as the different strategies they employ. The changing political opportunities include the level of repression in a political system, the variable provision of individual rights, and different sets of elite alignments” (ibid., 229).

There are a number of differences between the two cases that go beyond the variable boundaries of concern in the paper. Therefore there is a need to justify why the choice of cases
makes sense and why this study is worthwhile and relevant. The memory wars triggered by the anti-bureaucratic revolution may have contributed to the bloodshed and atrocities of the 1990s, whereas no similar or nationalised mass violence occurred following the insurgent behaviour of the West German student movement. Yet it is worth remembering that following its historical and political apogee in 1968, parts of the student movement served as an incubatory springboard for the sporadic lethality of the Baader-Meinhof Group and other splinters of the Red Army Faction (RAF) that followed. Put hypothetically, could the West German student movement and, for that matter, the RAF as a political entity that emerged from it, have gone on to commit mass violence had the circumstances been different? It is of course impossible to examine events that never happened. But, as Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men\(^\text{17}\) so horribly demonstrates, “within virtually every social collective, the peer group exerts tremendous pressures on behavior and sets moral norms” (2001, 189). Thus, if it is reasonable to suggest that this equally applies to the students of 1968, what was it that prevented their memory battle from erupting into, say, the mass revenge killing of former Nazis? And, in contrast, could the atrocities of the 1990s have been prevented or impeded had the Serbian movement been less successful in delegitimising the dominant historical narrative of “Brotherhood and Unity”? Attempting to answer why the West German student movement arguably contributed to a peaceful reappraisal of West German collective memory whereas the Serbian revolution instead served as a detonation cord to memory, is at the heart of this paper.

**Independent and Dependent Variables**

This few-country study follows the established process of attempting to explain, using a quasi-experimental approach typical of comparative politics, which independent variables \(X\) have a causal influence on the dependent variable \(Y\) of either a peaceful or violent outcome to challenges to established memory. These \(X\) values are derived directly from the adapted Bernhard-Kubik model and include the nature of mnemonic actors, their cultural choices and the structural and cultural constraints facing them. By so doing, it is possible to establish what the most likely causes of the phenomenon under investigation are and, ultimately, ensure that such an answer is valid, reliable and generalizable (Caramani 2008, 64). To give a more direct example, two major independent variables that appear to be identical in both cases are the typology of the social movements as

\(^{17}\) Chronicling Reserve Police Battalion 101 consisting of ordinary, middle-aged German reserve policemen. Despite the vast majority never having fired a single shot at a human being before, they went on to murder tens of thousands of Jews.
mnemonic actors, and the typology of the mnemonic regime that existed in the late 1960s in West Germany and the late 1980s in Serbia respectively.

In determining the style of comparison employed, I have taken into account the fact that the cases consist predominantly of major similarities but result in vastly divergent outcomes. In his *A System of Logic* (1856), John Stuart Mill introduced the idea that there are two “methods of difference” that apply in all comparative cases. The key principle is that, if there is variance between $X$ and $Y$ in cases, then the cases themselves should be similar: this is the method of difference. Conversely, where $X$ and $Y$ values remain constant between cases, there must be variance elsewhere: the method of agreement. Applied to this paper, there is substantial contextual similarity in the two cases featured (particularly concerning mnemonic regimes and political governance in the temporal landscape of West Germany in the late 1960s and Serbia in the late 1980s). Thus it follows that the explanatory factor for their divergent outcomes (as demonstrated by the dependent variables $Y$ of either the peaceful evolution of memory or the explosive rupture of memory into actual mass violence) must be due to a difference in at least one of the independent variables $X$. If, however, all $X$ values remain constant in both cases, this indicates that there must be another causal explanation outside of the $X \rightarrow Y$ relationship to explain the cases’ divergent outcomes. In short, the comparative method allows for an empirical test of the hypothesised relationships among variables offered in this paper and, by doing so, allows us to confirm or disprove theoretical relationships among variables.

Each case is split into two major parts dealing with their historical and political backgrounds followed by an examination of the social movements themselves. I first provide an overview of the political context and, for both cases, split these into two temporal and contextual frames for the sake of coherence. For West Germany, this covers the periods of 1945-1949 and 1949-1968; in other words, the post-war interregnum coinciding with the Allied occupation and then the onset of the Adenauer era up to and beyond the emergence of the student movement. For Serbia, this covers the periods of 1945-1980 and 1980-1989; Yugoslavia under Tito until his death, and the gradual demise of Yugoslavia up to and including the emergence of the anti-bureaucratic revolution. In selecting and incorporating previous research, I try to place particular emphasis on the field of memory that permeated those societies, and the mnemonic actors active during these particular temporal frames. By means of discourse analysis, the social movements themselves are examined in further detail, with attention paid specifically to any evidence that sheds light on the following three factors connected to the Bernhard-Kubik model: confirmation that both social movements are examples of mnemonic warriors, and thus that the theoretical assumption made earlier is correct; evidence of the
structural and cultural constraints faced by both social movements; and evidence of the cultural choices available to both social movements.
**West Germany**

We are forced to conclude that it was only in 1968 that the Federal Republic became a Western, liberal country.

——Heinz Bude, *The Kriegskinder and 1968*

*The Interregnum, 1945-1949*

During the Allied occupation that followed on from German’s capitulation, what distinguished German political leaders who emerged in the Western occupation zones from their communist counterparts in the East was a belief in liberal democracy as an absolute necessity to prevent another German dictatorship (Herf 1997, 201). Yet this posed a dilemma for pursuing justice—particularly the establishment of a just memory of the Nazi era—since, “for the democrats of the West, their own ideology and experience of the Nazi era were at cross-purposes as they sought to establish rule by and for a people who had fought for Nazism to the bitter end” (ibid., 201; italics added). This fundamental conflict of interests was to some degree held at bay during the immediate post-war years due to the denazification and extensive trials imposed on the nation by Western victors; an approach adopted by the United States characterised by paternalist rehabilitation, of a strict parent harshly punishing the miscreant child for their own good. The initial key impetus for denazification was a directive\(^{18}\) from President Truman which, between 1945 and 1947, provided the general terms of reference for American occupation policies in Germany. In the directive, it was made clear that Germany was to be occupied not for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated nation: “The occupation was meant to ensure that Germany would not threaten world peace again. Democracy would be the eventual result of denazification. The policy was not intended to be popular” (ibid., 202).

Indeed it wasn’t. The Allies with America at the helm weren’t at that stage interested in winning a popularity contest and Truman’s directive proved “profoundly unpopular with significant sections of the German people. On May 8, 1945, 8 million Germans were members of the Nazi party. They and their friends and families would constitute a formidable voting bloc opposed to any serious efforts at post-war judicial reckoning or frank public memory” (ibid., 202-203). Yet the tension that arose from the incompatibility of democracy on the one hand and memory and justice on the other was implicitly grasped by the Western Allies: “One could have either democracy or

\(^{18}\) Specifically, directive JCS 1067.
justice but, certainly in these early days, not both” (ibid., 203). And thus the Allies opted in favour of justice and memory—at least during their interregnum—regarding a democracy “by and for Germans” as neither necessary nor desirable, at least not in the very near future. And, at the dawn of the Federal Republic, German political leaders were acutely aware of the choice that confronted them: support denazification and, by antagonising a significant bloc of voters, suffer the consequences, or instead keep quiet and win elections. This was no novel political dilemma but rather an example of a pragmatic moral jeopardy where, in this instance and put simply, “silence won votes” (ibid., 203).

**Adenauer and Beyond, 1949-1968**

Konrad Adenauer had articulated his views on memory and politics as early as 1946, arguing that “in order to avoid a renewal of German nationalism and Nazism, economic recovery and political democratization must take priority over a judicial confrontation with the crimes of the Nazi past. Adenauer strongly supported measures that were far less threatening to the voters, namely, restitution for Jewish survivors and good relations with the state of Israel. In opposing both a thoroughgoing purge of the West German establishment and further trials and punishment of those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, he effectively represented the wishes of at least some of his electoral constituents” (ibid., 209).

Yet, before writing off Adenauer as populist to the point of amoral, it is important to defend his anti-Nazi credentials. Although his opposition to the Third Reich didn’t extend to risking his life, both he and his wife were nonetheless subject to scrutiny by the Gestapo and “although many suffered far more than he, his life under the Third Reich was difficult [and] the shock of his own arrest and his wife’s death stemming from her suicide attempts [influenced, no doubt, by her incarceration in a Gestapo prison] certainly deepened his hatred for the Nazis” (ibid., 210-211). Yet Adenauer’s first speech after the war, as mayor of Cologne, nonetheless favoured the German victimhood angle. The fact that he concentrated on “the suffering of the people of Cologne, and his decision to emphasise that neither he nor his audience was guilty of bringing this disaster upon themselves, did not make a favourable impression on the British occupation officials” (ibid., 212-213). As early as 1946, Adenauer was pleading to fellow Christian Democrats that denazification was lasting far too long, arguing that leading Nazis were being left alone while their underlings were being led to the gallows (ibid., 223). His position was that “democracy in post-Nazi Germany required that former Nazi Party members [deemed to be ‘benign’ according to interpretation] be
reintegrated rather than treated like ‘second-class persons’” (ibid., 223) and that, ultimately, “denazification was the cause of post-war nationalism. Forcing the Germans to face the Nazi past would only make things worse” (ibid., 224). Hence, weeding out the Nazis was not in the young nation’s best interests.

In his examination of the 1958 Ulm Einsatzkommando trial, historian Patrick Tobin points to two core features of 1950s West Germany—political programs of reintegration for former Nazis and a widespread German narrative of victimisation—before highlighting that “the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in many ways signalled the end of the Allied era of Nazi prosecutions” (2011, 685). In his first Regierungserklärung delivered in September 1949, Adenauer continued to stress the great harm and unhappiness caused by concentrating on Nazi small fry, that Germans should not be divided into “two classes … those without political blemishes and those with such [die politisch Einwandfrei und die Nichteinwandfreien]” (Herf 1997, 271). Thus, during the founding years of the Federal Republic, the relationship between memory and democracy was to be contested by two opposing political camps. Representing the democratic right, Konrad Adenauer’s “implicit argument was that the establishment of a functioning democracy required less memory and justice for the crimes of the Nazi era and more ‘integration’ of those who had gone astray” (ibid., 267). This was in stark contrast to the democratic left who, under Kurt Schumacher, a man who had spent over a decade in concentration camps including Dachau, “took the opposite view, namely, that a new democracy must be accompanied by a settling of accounts and bringing the guilty to justice in German courts. Both Adenauer and Schumacher had a bleak view of the German past. Yet Adenauer sought support from conservative voters who were, in fact, likely to be more compromised by past association with Nazism than was the case with Schumacher's electoral base. Not surprisingly, ‘integration’ was the key word for the CDU, while ‘justice’ was just as important for leaders of the democratic left” (ibid., 267).

The greatest formal resistance to Adenauer’s policy of looking the other way thus came from the Social Democratic opposition, with Schumacher arguing that Adenauer’s approach to Western integration made it possible for “compromised elites of the Nazi era to regain power and respectability in the Federal Republic” (ibid., 268). This political contest over memory—with the democratic left concerned that a clear memory of and punishment for Nazi crimes was being abandoned in favour of Western integration—was to signify an enduring political fissure between

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19 Speech at the opening of parliament.
left and right in West German politics (ibid., 268). Therefore, during at least the first decade of Adenauer’s reign, democracy and memory were mutually incompatible concepts.

If social movement theorists have suggested that movements only emerge when political conditions allow a minority to take on the role of spokesman for society as a whole, then what made 1968 such fertile ground was that the early 1960s had been characterised by a political block on reform which extended to memory (Bude 1995, 298-299). And, under such circumstances, it therefore wouldn’t be until the end of the 1960s that a reversal of this connection was made when, finally, “daring more democracy eventually came to entail more, not less, national political discussion of the Holocaust and other crimes of the Nazi era” (ibid., 268).

**Emergence of the Student Movement, 1968**

Perhaps the clearest way of understanding “1968” from the perspective of the students behind the movement is to view it as synonymous with an anti-authoritarian revolt that came about from the synthesis of forms of political and cultural radicalism (Brown 2014, 99). At times, however, this anti-authoritarianism ironically manifested itself alongside a sometimes uncritical embrace of authoritarian figures such as Mao and Lenin (ibid., 105). That the movement was so firmly entrenched on the left was no coincidence since, for the young people involved in the movement, the Holocaust itself was seen to be a consequence of the ultimate failure of bourgeois society (Dwork and Pelt 2002, 384). The oldest in the movement had childhood memories of the war whereas others had no memories at all. Yet they “had grown up knowing that their mothers and fathers were responsible, directly or indirectly, for the most horrific crimes of the twentieth century. This, perhaps, was the root of the strange mixture of guilt and moral superiority that was to characterise their generation” (Kundnani 2009, 10). The movement as an entirety and later the New Left that emerged from it consisted of the “second generation” confronting their parents’ suppression of German guilt in the immediate post-war period which was “very much a West German awakening as to their collective guilt for the atrocities committed in the Second World War—the Germans-as-perpetrators debate” (Peterson 2012, 368). And, as a consequence, the memorial legitimacy of the “Germans-as-victims” standpoint which had been adopted from at least the 1950s was pushed into the background (ibid., 368).

There is academic disagreement over the magnitude of the movement. Most deem it to be large, that “another essential part of the background to the growth and impact of the student movement was the practical and direct pressure exerted by the very large numbers of youngsters
coming up through the system” (Bute 1995, 298). Yet others dispute its magnitude, with Kundnani arguing that “what became known as the ‘1968 generation’ or just the ‘Achtundsechziger’ was actually a tiny group of people, mostly born in the decade between 1938 and 1948” (2009, 11).

Of course 1968 was not restricted to Germany and the students’ activism did not happen in isolation but instead formed part of the international wave of student unrest sweeping the globe over issues such as university reform; and—as exemplified most strongly by their opposition to the Vietnam War—pacifism, humanitarianism and international revolutionary solidarity (Peterson 2012, 369). On these topics, there was demonstrable similarity and overlap with other movements abroad. But each country had its own flavour: French republicanism, for example, connected 1968 to 1789 and the British movement became a part of the “Swinging London” emphasis on unfettered and eccentric liberalism (Bude 1995, 292). It isn’t difficult to anticipate how the West German movement would be characterised: “What distinguished the West German student movements from their international counterparts was the legacy and memory of the Third Reich. The issues that underlined student protests in West Germany were the lessons of the Nazi past, the meaning of democracy in West Germany, and the overriding question of German guilt” (Peterson 2012, 369).

What was to become “1968” in fact rose in prominence over the space of roughly a decade and in a political climate that “despite the transition from dictatorship to democracy [was] deeply authoritarian. In the fifties and early sixties it remained strictly hierarchical, corporal punishment was still common in schools and it was still technically against the law to rent a room or apartment to an unmarried couple under the age of 21. The post-war generation already had a sense that Adenauer’s post-war West Germany had been built on a lie” (Kundnani 2009, 15). Yet to start with, the movement was arguably more moral than political in nature (ibid., 11). Major milestones during this rise include the violent 1962 Munich Schwabinger Krawalle20 in response to police harassment of street musicians as well as the similarly violent 1964 protests against the state’s acquiescence regarding the visit of Congolese dictator Moïse Tshombe to a number of West German cities (Brown 2014, 99-100). These protests symbolised the emergence of “new actors, new theoretical models, and a new level of combativeness” (ibid., 100) which paved the way for much of what was to follow:

The rise of mass protest around issues of university reform, the Vietnam War, and the dominance of the Springer press; the birth of an idiosyncratic, highly politicized, Situationist-inspired German version of the Anglo-American counterculture in the form of West Berlin’s notorious Kommune I (Commune I); increasing radicalization in the face of state violence—above all the

20 “Schwabing Riots”
murder of a student during protests against the visit to West Berlin of the Shah of Iran in June 1967—leading to violent rhetoric and sometimes actual violence on the part of left-wing activists; the politicization of the arts and popular culture, entailing heated debates about the political potential and responsibility of literature, the theatre, and so forth; the growth of alternative media, left-wing publishing houses, bookstores, and distribution networks; the creation of a self-organized left-wing social infrastructure, ranging from independent youth centers to left-wing kindergartens; the politicization of sexuality in the form of the Wilhelm Reich-inspired Sex-Pol movement; the establishment after 1968 of Marxist–Leninist and Maoist “parties” (the so-called K-Gruppen) aimed at linking student rebellion more firmly with the working class; and the development of left-wing women’s and homosexual rights groups, preparatory to the founding of full-fledged women’s and gay rights movements on Anglo-American (or other European, principally French) models.

(Brown 2014, 100-1)

This exhaustive list of social engagement demonstrates the breadth and scope of the movement’s impact. Furthermore, political involvement from student organisations such as the Socialist German Student League (SDS) and the Liberal German Student League (LSD) demonstrated a new involvement of students in West German domestic and foreign policy, with the SDS assuming a flagship role within the so-called “extra-parliamentary opposition” (Ausserrparlamentarische Opposition, APO), an informal coalition of organisations contesting what they regarded as the authoritarian political culture of the Federal Republic in the 1960s (ibid., 100). Two state policies—one foreign and the other domestic—especially stand out for their alleged Nazi links. First, anti-Vietnam protests in particular allowed those on the fringes of the left to set the tone, using the war as “the ultimate proof of the moral bankruptcy of the capitalist powers” (Peterson 2012, 369) and inflaming accusations that the support given Americans by West Germany was yet more evidence that the Bundesrepublik was still a fascist state (ibid., 369). Second, heavy criticism was directed against the classic Humboldtian21 style of German higher education which, it was argued, “proved itself vulnerable to the Nazi co-optation of German universities in the pre-war era” (ibid., 369). Instead, the students demanded a radical rethink of the very essence of higher education:

Another model of higher education which emphasized a critical political participation and which called for academic engagement with political and social issues. The introduction of a critical political tradition, the students argued, would make universities better equipped to ward off Nazi tendencies which they argued still permeated the universities during the post-war period and thus to defend democracy from the threat of totalitarianism again gripping the country.

(Peterson 2012, 369)

21 The Humboldt school of thought encouraged a contemplative approach to knowledge and research, arguing that it was worthwhile for its own sake and that such a pursuit needed no further justification.
Another catalysing factor was the litany of proposals from Adenauer’s CDU during the 1960s for new *Notstandsgesetze* emergency laws that similarly prompted protests amid fears for the future survival of West German democracy. These proposals, had they passed into law, would have given the government *carte blanche* to suspend civil liberties in the event of a national disaster, invasion, or general strike. They were starkly reminiscent of events from 1933 where Hitler had consolidated power through democratic processes by invoking similar emergency laws in similar times of crisis (ibid., 369-70). Student groups began organising their opposition around 1965 and, in parliament, the SPD led the opposition, supported by the German Trade Union Federation. However, the 1966 formation of a Grand Coalition incorporating both the CDU and SPD further roused student protests since, with the creation of this government, there was now no parliamentary opposition to speak of. With the SPD now firmly a part of government, there was no longer a suitable parliamentary mechanism to scrutinise the implementation of the emergency laws (ibid., 370). Furthermore, the appointment of former Nazis in this new coalition government—particularly Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauß and Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger—further exacerbated fears that West Germany was on the brink of a Nazi takeover (ibid., 370).

West Berlin was in many ways the epicentre of activity if only because “in no other West German town did the war’s scars linger as long as in West Berlin, the town of the ‘front line’” (Bude 1995, 296). And it was here on 2 June 1967 that student Benno Ohnesorg was shot and killed by a plain-clothes police officer during a demonstration against the visit of the Shah of Iran. The SDS which, by that time, had become the hub of the city’s student movement, described the killing as “the first political murder of the post-war period” before adding that there was now an “undeclared state of emergency in West Germany” (Kundnani 2009, 16). The perception from the student leaders was that:

Parliamentary democracy in West Germany was a mere façade: behind it was a system that was on the verge of becoming fascist. The continuities between the Federal Republic and Nazism were thus no longer simply a matter of the biographies of individuals: they were structural. “The post-fascist state in the Federal Republic of Germany has become a pre-fascist one,” the SDS declared in a written statement a few days after Ohnesorg’s death. The conspiracy of silence about the past, the continuities between the Nazi state and the Federal Republic, and finally the brutality of the state in its response to the protest movement all seemed to point in one direction: Nazism has not been defeated in 1945; rather, it had metamorphosed into a new, insidious form.

(Kundnani 2009, 16-17)

The endemic distrust of the *Achtundsechzig* generation towards the perceived residual fascism of West German state power was in itself symptomatic and indicative of a wider generational unease characterised by the younger generation’s distrust of their elders. Summed up by “*Was hast Du*
“denn im Krieg gemacht, Pappi?” it denoted the onset of a period where students “rigorously challenged their grandparents’ and parents’ ‘amnesia’ regarding Germany’s Nazi past and the horrors of the Holocaust” (Peterson 2012, 372). And, in the patriarchal society of 1960s West Germany, it is evident that the struggles of the student movement against the Väterstaat were, in myriad ways, manifestations of the raw, human, basic, fundamental Oedipal challenges of sons against their own Väter (ibid., 372-373). Bude notes how, even in childhood, the students knew that their fathers were flawed, how “the man who returned was not the same as before the war. In the child’s eyes the father had thus lost his position in the family: he might shout and rage all he could, but all he did was to add new proof to the secret judgement of the mother” (1995, 303). Since, for the Kriegskinder who made up the student movement, their parents’ history was a burden which threatened to erase their own history, there was a core of utopianism driving them, exemplified by a “belief that education and the critical unveiling of the past, the programme of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, would allow people to finally found a ‘true’ society” (Peterson 2012, 379).

Almost half a century later, the legacy of 1968 remains ambiguous and its impact continues to be debated: “The Achtundsechziger were both blamed for, and given credit for, almost every change, real or perceived, that had taken place in Germany since the sixties. Some said the student movement had made Germany more liberal, even though it had in many ways been anti-liberal. Some of the Achtundsechziger insisted they had deepened democracy in Germany, while others insisted they themselves had been essentially anti-democratic. […] Perhaps the only thing one could say unequivocally about the 1968 generation was that it had, for better or worse, broken taboos” (Kundnani 2009, 307; italics added).

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22 “What did you do in the war, daddy?”

23 As Peterson notes, there was little mention of antagonistic debates between daughters and mothers, figurative or otherwise, which is symptomatic of the gender bias of the period. The Nazi roles of women were evidently not of interest.
Serbia

Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. — Milošević’s speech at Gazimestan, 1989

Tito’s Yugoslavia, 1945-1980

Following the Second World War and the devastation wreaked on Yugoslavia by the Axis invasion, its peoples were faced with rebuilding society in the wake of occupation and fratricidal warfare. The narrative of Tito’s communist Partisans and their war of liberation was pushed to the forefront of Yugoslav public consciousness, a move which saw national symbolism being replaced with a combination of “Brotherhood and Unity” as well as Tito’s own personality cult (MacDonald 2002, 183). Yet, in this Yugoslavia, the Partisan transcendence of nationalist memory in the public domain didn’t succeed in erasing the “ethnic hatreds [that] seemingly smouldered below the surface, manifesting themselves in bizarre and often contradictory ways” (ibid., 183) and furthermore “Yugoslav communists promoted the interest of their respective national groups a great deal more than is usually imagined” (Ramet 2002, xiii). Serbian and Croatian nationalist interpretations of the Yugoslav period regard it as an era in which national identity was suppressed under a barrage of communist propaganda where, for Serbs, Tito was “little more than an ethnic Croat with a grudge against Yugoslavia’s largest and most powerful nation” and, for Croats, “Bleiburg24 maintained that the foundations of Tito’s Yugoslavia were constructed on the genocide of Croatian soldiers” (MacDonald 2002, 183).

There is much to criticise regarding Tito’s authoritarian rule and a personality cult that “relied on a corrupt base of power, and a personality cult of messianic proportions. The country was burdened by overcentralisation, massive foreign debt, and a powerful secret police that cracked down on any internal dissent” (ibid., 184). Furthermore, “many saw communism as an artificially imposed Russian system, forced on the people by Tito and Stalin—an attempt to destroy indigenous nationalisms. One might even add that, in the Partisans’ expulsion of Yugoslavia’s German minorities after 1945, they were promoting the ideals of ethnic cleansing that would become a key

24 The mass killing of soldiers of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) at the hands of the Partisans. The exact number of dead is heavily contested. MacDonald uses Bleiburg / Croat victimhood along with Jasenovac / Serb victimhood to describe a “numbers game” whereby the death toll of one’s own people is exaggerated at the same time as atrocities committed against the other heavily downplayed (2003, 160-170). Impartial historians tend to allocate much lower numbers of dead for Bleiburg (e.g. Dulić 2004, 88; MacDonald 2002, 170).
facet of nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina five decades later” (ibid., 184). However, Tito’s record isn’t entirely negative. After all, “Yugoslavia was arguably the freest country in Eastern Europe, the most open to the West, and certainly one of the richest and most cosmopolitan in the Balkans. While most of the wealth was concentrated in Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia’s economy did come close to rivalling that of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. Additionally, Tito was genuinely popular with his people, despite his egomania and corruption (or perhaps in part because of them). In many ways, he held the country together, and was more successful as a leader than his other Balkan counterparts—Nikolai Ceausescu, Todor Zhivkov, and Enver Hoxha” (ibid., 184-5; italics added). Yugoslavia enjoyed a generally high standard of living which extended to the freedom to travel and work abroad. This also demonstrates why, in contrast to other attempts to bring about post-communism in countries such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Republics, no serious attempt was ever made to fully dismantle communism as a system of government, to criticise the legacy of communism, or indeed to attack its endemic corruption, rising foreign debts or similar alarm bells (ibid., 185). Even if it is true that “the communists held both political power and an ideological hegemony in the public domain until Tito’s death in 1980” (Gerner and Karlsson 2005, 254) then, conscious of the potency of continuing with this legacy, “both Tudjman and Milošević appreciated the extent of the power a communist dictator could enjoy, and they were not about to relinquish the many advantages that leadership afforded in the old system” (MacDonald 2002, 185).

Much of the political axis of conflict for Yugoslavia centred on the future of the country’s socialist political and economic system. Both in the decades prior to and after Tito’s death, there was a tug-of-war between conservatives and reformists. “Conservatives wanted to hew to an authoritarian, orthodox, Marxist-Leninist line, keep a strong party hand on the economy, minimize reliance on market forces and material incentives, and maintain a centralized political system. Reformers, however, wanted to democratize the party at the micro level, to rely more on market forces in order to rationalize the economy, and to loosen party control and decentralize the country; in short, they sought to move away from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and to construct a democratic socialism and a more efficient economic system” (Gagnon 2004, 52). This political conflict between conservatives and reformists came into the open in the early 1960s as it became more and more apparent that Yugoslavia’s economic system was becoming increasingly dysfunctional (ibid., 54). The subsequent reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s were arguably a result of the “pressures for radical changes in the structures of power—within the League of Communists especially—that was being pushed by reformists, with Tito’s backing” (ibid., 59). Yet, significantly,
“having lost the political fight […] and in the face of the strong popularity of the young reformist leaders and Tito’s support for them, conservatives sought to prevent these changes by using images of threats to Serbs and Serbia, not in order to mobilize the population—which after all was not the main politically relevant audience in the existing political system—but in order to portray the reforms as an extremely dangerous loosening of party control. The conservative portrayal of Yugoslav society as on the brink of nationalist violence and separatism was an attempt to convince Tito—the most important politically relevant audience—to end the reforms and to purge the reformists. In this, they were successful” (ibid., 59; italics added). Thus, a dichotomy between political and economic reform versus nationalism was already emerging a decade prior to Tito’s death.

Serbia in the Early Yugoslav Crisis, 1980-86

The debate over reform broke out in force after Tito’s death in May 1980. Since ending prior reforms in the late 1960s, Yugoslavia’s economic situation had worsened, exacerbated by massive international borrowing and an increasing bureaucratisation of the system (ibid., 60). In what can be regarded as “round two” of the reform debates, reformists’ proposals were now much more radical than previously and, crucially, their audience now proved much more receptive. And Serbia was to be the decisive arena for the future of Yugoslavia (ibid., 61). Its economy was split between the underdeveloped south and more developed north around Belgrade as well as other cities in central Serbia. Although Serbia’s party leadership was dominated by reformists, there was a strong cadre of conservatives who felt threatened by reform. Their response to growing reformist influence was threefold. First, they re-emphasised orthodox Marxist themes “in an attempt to delegitimise liberal trends at the lower levels of the party” (ibid., 63). Second, they repeated their prior strategy of the early 1970s whereby they attempted to “defeat the reformists in the leadership by shifting the focus of attention away from reforms, toward images of the threat of nationalism and, in particular, Albanian nationalism as well as the alleged ‘genocide’ against Serbs in the province of Kosovo” (ibid., 63). Third, the conservatives “portrayed Serbia as the victim of Tito’s Yugoslavia, setting the stage for an attack on the autonomy of other republics” (ibid., 63).

A British UN General who served in Bosnia-Herzegovina conceded that “for over 40 years [Tito] had maintained order by the use of oppressive state machinery and by the careful distribution of power between the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims. When he died, however, the forces of nationalism that Tito had successfully held at bay were unleashed” (Rose 1998, 4). The violence
was supposedly already there, simmering in the saucepan with Tito personifying the lid that kept it from boiling over. Yet there was much more to the unravelling of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina than a sweeping and fatalist statement which regarded as inevitable the violence that followed Tito’s demise. For a start, the key difference between any criticism of communism from former Yugoslav states versus elsewhere was that “while Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia saw communism as a crime committed against all citizens, Serbian and Croatian nationalists painted federal communism as the root of their problems, an evil that was selectively deployed against specific national groups, not against the country as a whole” (MacDonald 2002, 185). Thus, “when Serbian and Croatian nationalists criticised the Tito era, the national question loomed large, out of proportion with more important issues. Yugoslavia was condemned because it inhibited nationalism, because it allowed ‘enemy’ national groups to gain power and control events. Tito was not condemned for being dictatorial or corrupt, but rather, for being controlled by either the Serbs or the Croats – for giving away too much of one’s own nation’s historic possessions to another national group” (ibid., 185).

Although the “conservatives were not very successful in the political debates over reform at the leadership level, at the local level in Serbia they imposed an orthodox ideological line, while at the same time raising the issue of threats to Serbs” (Gagnon 2004, 63). And the most visible display of this double doctrine of hard-line politics combined with nationalist victimhood was to come from the Belgrade party organisation which since 1984 had been headed by none other than Slobodan Milošević. Almost immediately after assuming office, he had launched a campaign “urging vigilance against the dangerous increase in anti-Yugoslav propaganda” (ibid., 63). Simultaneously, “a national campaign began among Belgrade party members and ‘leftist’ intellectuals, including Milošević’s sociologist wife Mirjana Marković, who sought to defend ‘the national dignity of Serbia’ and to ‘protect its interests in Yugoslavia’” (ibid., 63).

From a cultural perspective, Serbian writers had “generally supported the communist regime of Yugoslavia [and] while Tito was alive, there seemed to be a high level of support for the regime and its policies” (MacDonald 2002, 186). The turning point was to come in 1986, by which time even the cultural elite were getting cold feet: “Serbian writers had turned against the system, as Yugoslavia began to fall apart. Danko Popović’s celebrated Knjiga o Milutinu (The Book About Milutin) became an instant best-seller in 1986, promoting the thesis that Serbs had made a ‘fatal error’ in liberating their Slavic ‘brothers’ during the Second World War, and then another in once more engaging in political union with them. Milutin’s sayings were printed on placards during nationalist demonstrations; even group recitation during public gatherings was not unknown.
Dobrica Ćosić’s work reflected similar themes: that Tito’s Yugoslavia had reduced Serbia to a mere communist province without history, culture, or national identity. In *The Sinner and The Outcast*, Ćosić derided the federal system for suppressing Serbian identity and nationalism” (ibid., 186). There was also the view that Serbs had been economically exploited, with “the Memorandum claiming that the communists had reduced the economic potential of Serbia in favour of Slovenia and Croatia. Serbia was forced to support undeveloped regions, while selling its natural resources at subsidised prices to the developed republics” (ibid., 187). This viewpoint was particularly divisive since it punched both above and below. Serbia was seen to have been simultaneously exploited, both by the richer republics of Croatia and Slovenia, and by poorer republics, such as Kosovo and Macedonia. Yet in reality Serbia’s poverty was an indirect result of much larger problems such as massive foreign debts, the corruption and the wholesale neglect of the economy by Tito and his “Club of 1941” Partisan clique (ibid., 187). Ultimately, the demonization of at least parts of the communist period was important in order to justify why Yugoslavia had to be abandoned.

*Emergence of the Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution, 1986-1989*

Whereas the German narrative of 1968 is familiar to many even outside of the country, Serbia’s anti-bureaucratic revolution hasn’t risen to the same level of prominence abroad, with academic work on the anti-bureaucratic revolution remaining incomplete and tending to emphasise manipulation at the hands of elites (Grdešić 2016, 774). Unsurprisingly, Milošević takes centre stage in previous research, accused of being an enabler who took a near-bankrupt Yugoslavia down a slippery path to interethnic war and ethnic cleansing (Ramet 2002, 7). But it is unclear whether this is entirely justified: “It is easy to agree that, in pursuing political power, Milošević and the circle around him were manipulative and Machiavellian. However, we must follow this up by asking the key question of why the manipulation was so successful?” (Grdešić 2016, 774). Grdešić also notes that, although elites were important, singularly focusing on them obscures the impact of wider cultural forces, suggesting that “elites may wish to create this or that outcome, but they must work with the cultural material that is in front of them” (ibid., 774-775).

There is a political irony to the revolution’s name since, rather than being opposed to bureaucracy, it in fact “espoused a type of bureaucratic nationalism directed against the Yugoslav federation” (Biondich 2011, 186). Yet by any standards, the revolution was to have a profound impact, succinctly illustrated by the following observation:
Serbia’s “anti-bureaucratic revolution” was one of the key events of Yugoslavia’s terminal crisis. This wave of popular mobilization, which took place primarily in Serbia in the summer and fall of 1988, sharpened the country’s political crisis, gave momentum to Serbian nationalism, and increased the power of Serbia’s leader Slobodan Milošević. While the anti-bureaucratic revolution may not have been single-handedly responsible for the dissolution of the Yugoslav state or the outbreak of war, it was certainly one of the main links in the chain of events that eventually led to the tragic outcomes of the 1990s.

(Grdešić 2016, 774)

Central to understanding the revolution is to consider whether it was genuinely grassroots—in other words, whether Milošević genuinely enjoyed the support of a bottom-up base without too much prodding—or whether instead Milošević cynically manipulated the revolution for political gain. Grdešić argues that there is more to it than whether the movement was self-propelled or otherwise, suggesting that “the appropriate question is not, ‘Was there manipulation?’—there certainly was—but rather, ‘Why did it work?’ This question becomes even more relevant in light of the outcome of Milošević’s manipulation: a hybridization of Serbian nationalism and Leninist socialism under the umbrella of anti-bureaucratic populism” (2016, 774). Yet could the anti-bureaucratic revolution have taken another course?

Given his popularity in 1988, Milošević could have chosen not to “play the national card.” Thinking counterfactually, he could have chosen to “play the liberal card.” Yet, that this option was never seriously considered, and that it sounds so unusual now, show that nationalism came much easier to a communist apparatchik like Milošević. And furthermore, it suggests a calculation that nationalism would be more popular with the public than possible alternatives, a calculation that proved to be correct. Nationalism came more naturally to both Milošević and the Serbian public.

(Grdešić 2016, 798)

There is evidence to suggest that the popular mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, for example, actually predated Milošević’s rise to power and that “despite interaction, and sometimes cooperation, with the authorities the movement remained an autonomous political factor” (Vladisavljević 2002, 771). Yet much more suggests that the revolution was a carefully orchestrated top-down venture. Gagnon is unambiguous in his assessment of the anti-bureaucratic revolution, suggesting that “the mass meetings were stage-managed and meant explicitly to discredit party leaderships by accusing them of being self-serving bureaucrats out for themselves and not dealing with—or in fact abetting—the ‘genocide’ against Serbs in Kosovo” (2004, 74). Essentially, “the anti-bureaucratic revolution was about maintaining structures of power in Serbia and in Yugoslavia as a whole through authoritarian means [and therefore] such concerns did not stop the Serb conservatives from threatening to export it to Bosnia-Herzegovina and from pursuing other policies meant to destabilise the republic” (ibid.,
What Gagnon also argues is that Milošević was keen to “ethnicise” the political positions of conservatives and reformists, labelling them as either pro-Serb or anti-Serb respectively, and this ethnification later came to be imposed on the SKBH25 (ibid., 75).

The charge list against the anti-bureaucratic revolution as an instrument of power becomes particularly convincing when one considers a 1991 interview in Bosnian youth magazine Naši Dani (Our Days) with Miroslav Šolević who, beyond being a former party secretary, held the dubious accolade of “commander of the anti-bureaucratic revolution” and whose organisation of mass demonstrations in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina contributed to the fall of reformists and other opponents of Milošević (ibid., 75). In the interview, Šolević described how “the Serbian party leadership reached an agreement with the Bosnian leadership on voting … that they would support the Serbian positions and in return we would refrain from holding the ‘miting’26 in Jajce … We immediately withdrew” (ibid., 75-76). Gagnon argues that “the mere threat of exporting the ‘mitinzi’ to Bosnia seemed enough to ensure the votes of the SKBH” (ibid., 76).

The anti-bureaucratic revolution promoted an amalgamated political regime based on two strands: Serb nationalism, which was on the rise, and hard-line Leninist socialism which, unlike similar protest movements in Eastern Europe, still enjoyed popularity. Not surprisingly, such an ideology with its incorporation of both nationalism and socialism tends to draw one’s mind to the Third Reich or, at the very least, fascist power structures (Grdešić 2016, 775) and that these two radical strands were brought together was due to what can be described as three elective affinities. First, using “bureaucracy” as a scapegoat could unite and mobilise both nationalist and socialist sympathies. It allowed for a targeting of “either a parasitic elite living at the expense of the working class or as a national bureaucracy determined to divide the people according to ethnic lines” (ibid., 779). Second, it conveniently allowed for the repression or persecution of “enemies” along both class and ethnic lines, as well as encouraging conspiracy theories. Third, its anti-intellectual nature opened up an emphasis on the search for “the truth” whilst simultaneously shunning discussion or compromise, with “action preferred to words” (ibid., 775). Ironically, there were plenty of Serb nationalist intellectuals involved: “Above all, the intelligentsia are normally supposed to be swayed by the strength of arguments, not the argument of strength. None of these exceptional values was present in the Yugoslav intelligentsia as the crisis approached” (Crnobrnja 1996, 116).

Each of these three proved useful to both Serbian nationalist discourse and the Yugoslav version of Leninist socialism. And, conversely, it impeded other more democratic or tolerant

25 League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina
26 Meeting or rally. The protests were termed Mitinzi istine (“Rallies of Truth”) by their proponents.

51
political ideologies from getting a foot in the door since “the weak and nascent liberalism present was not organized around these three elements, and it therefore could not combine with either nationalism or socialism and failed to resonate with the wider Yugoslav public” (Grdešić 2016, 775).

Amid intense ethnic tension between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo as well as between the Yugoslav republics, one of the most evocative snapshots of this period centred around the six hundredth anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. And, as “evocative” denotes provoking memory, it would be strange not to examine Gazimestan, Milošević’s St Vitus Day27 speech on the site of the battle which has since come to serve as the strongest symbolic marker of the nascent nationalism at play; a milestone of sorts for what was to follow in the wake of the anti-bureaucratic revolution. One of the few speeches to have received any significant international attention, invoking utopian memories of a glorious Serbia, it has come to be regarded by most as a call to arms. One paragraph of the speech is lifted to demonstrate this supposed banging of drums:

Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without resolve, bravery and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here in the Field of Kosovo in the days past.

(Auerswald et al. 2000, 33-34)

Yet the paragraph above tends to be the only part of the speech ever cited in literature. What commentators have strikingly ignored is that Milošević continued by clarifying that

Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the twenty-first century.

(Auerswald et al. 2000, 33-34)

Thus what is remarkable about the speech at Gazimestan is that, far from being rabidly nationalist or inciting ethnic violence, its content was in fact surprisingly mild. True, from the peonies that symbolised the flowing blood of Saint Lazar to the Cyrillic letter C painted28 on each corner of an Orthodox cross, the stage was certainly filled with Serb symbolism intended to ignite memory. But

27 Serbian national and religious holiday known in Serbia as Видовдан (Vivodan), memorial day of Saint Prince Lazar who fell during the Battle of Kosovo. Of major significance as a part of Serb ethnic and national identity.
28 Сами Слога Србија Спасава (Only Unity Saves the Serbs)
to suggest that the speech was Hitlerian in nature is to miss the mark by some measure. Instead, an argument can be made that Milošević’s principle concern at that time, and probably at the forefront of many Serbian minds, was actually over Serbia’s future prosperity (Clark 2008, 91).

But if the Gazimestan speech proves to be somewhat of a damp squib in the annals of Yugoslav history, then the case of the Rakovica strikers’ role in the revolution provides compelling evidence that the unlikely alliance of nationalism and socialism could indeed be compatible. From an industrial suburb of Belgrade, the workers of “Red Rakovica” went on strike in October 1988 and began protesting on the doorstep of the Federal Assembly. The Večernje novosti (Evening News) tabloid newspaper considered them at the time to be “the most conscious part of the working class of this country” (Grdešić 2016, 785). And it follows that these workers, with slogans such as “Long live the working class!” and “Down with the bureaucracy!” were arguably the one segment of the working class that should have cared above all about proletarian concerns whilst remaining resistant to nationalist flirtation (ibid., 785). Yet there were signs of nationalist sympathies, particularly anti-intellectual ambitions of spreading “the truth” to comrades in other countries about the destabilising impact of Albanian activities in Kosovo (ibid., 785-786). On arriving at the Federal Assembly, the Rakovica workers “demanded that Milošević address them. If a manipulation occurred, the workers willingly walked into it. But it seems a stretch to view the interaction between Milošević and the workers as a manipulation, intended to turn the workers toward nationalism. His speech had the more immediate goal of calming them down so that they could be persuaded to return to Rakovica, which they did. There was little nationalism in the speech and his references to Kosovo were mostly platitudes” (ibid., 786).

What this episode demonstrated was not just that Milošević was prepared to enter the frame as a populist leader but that the workers wanted such a leader. At the same time, despite the deep red hue of their politics, despite the reasonable assumption that the solidarity of Yugoslav workers was of primary importance to them, they were remarkably open to nationalism even before their encounter with him. Thus Grdešić is right to challenge the common perception that the protesters “came as workers and left as Serbs” (ibid., 786). He also discounts prior tendencies towards an elite-centric explanatory approach that regarded “the Yugoslav people [as having] the ‘right’ instincts—they were pro-democratic and pro-Yugoslav—but they succumbed to nationalism because elites manipulated them” (ibid., 798). Yet the fact remains that “without Milošević, the pace and the course of the Yugoslav crisis might have been different” (Ramet 2002, 7).
Analysis

Case Analysis Using the Bernhard-Kubik Model

To briefly recap the most significant features of the model, mnemonic actors face both structural as well as cultural constraints that in turn influence the cultural choices available to them. The nature of such actors can have an impact on the memory regime they operate in and influence, and this can have subsequent ramifications for the wider national discursive field. Mnemonic warriors are described as tending “to draw a sharp line between themselves (the proprietors of the ‘true’ vision of the past) and other actors who cultivate ‘wrong’ or ‘false’ versions of history. They usually believe that the historical truth is attainable and that once it is attained it needs to become the foundation of social and political life” (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 9).

What is abundantly clear from the cases is that both the West German student movement and the Serbian anti-bureaucratic revolution can convincingly be typified as mnemonic warriors. In West Germany, the students demonstrated an absolute conviction that it was down to them to organise resistance against the perceived continuation of Nazism embodied by the Federal Republic (Kundnani 2009, 17). In Serbia, the anti-intellectual double doctrine of Serbian nationalist victimhood and hard-line socialism was characterised by non-negotiation and intolerance of other perspectives. With “bureaucracy” emerging as a scapegoat for anything that didn’t conform to this doctrine, those deemed to belong to it became vulnerable to targeting along class and ethnic lines. The following description applies extremely well to both cases:

So, for [mnemonic warriors] the contest in the field of memory politics is between “us”—the guardians of the truth—and “them”—the obfuscators, perpetuators of “falsehoods,” or the opportunists who do not know or care about the “proper” shape of collective memory. The content of collective memory appears to warriors as largely non-negotiable; the only problem is how to make others accept their “true” vision of the past.

(Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 9)

Determining the nature of memory regimes present in West Germany and Serbia is similarly straightforward since the model dictates that the presence of even one mnemonic warrior means that a memory regime must be typified as fractured. There are, however, five factors that could influence memory regimes beyond their classification. First, there is the idea that, since actors come and go, memory challenges can similarly vary in salience. In West Germany, it is true that the 1968 generation had to literally grow up and reach adulthood before emerging onto the memory field. In Yugoslavia, Tito’s respected presence and leveraged position as an arbiter of memory made it
unfeasible to challenge memory until at least after his demise. Second, and arguably related to the first point, is that the salience of memory issues can change over time. The Nazi legacy only rose up the agenda because the 1968 generation attributed greater salience to it than their elders had in the decades before. And the ethnic atrocities of the Second World War were only publicly “unfrozen” when the Yugoslav state started to unravel, thus allowing the re-emergence of memories of nationalist victimhood. Third, actors unhappy with the memory regime can produce new interpretations which provoke mnemonic conflict, in turn forcing other actors to redefine their own positions. This leads to the reconfiguration of the existing memory regime or the emergence of a new one and, as a consequence, causes a shift in the memory field. The movements in both cases rose to such prominence that simply ignoring their challenges was not an option since they represented a threat to the very legitimacy of those West German “Nazis” and Yugoslav “bureaucrats” holding formal power. Fourth, and following on from the previous factor, how important memory is varies depending on who holds power at a given moment. The pillarised memory regime of West Germany was previously heavily influenced by Adenauer’s policy of mnemonic abnegation yet successfully fractured by the emergence of the mnemonic warrior students. And the (artificially) unified memory regime of Tito’s Yugoslavia was similarly fractured by the emergence of the anti-bureaucratic mnemonic warriors. Fifth, memories may slip down the list of priorities when other matters such as war or economic crisis become more pressing. This is ambiguous in the case of West Germany but for Serbia it seems that, instead of slipping down the list, the crisis of the 1980s in fact prompted nationalist memories to rise up the agenda.

Having demonstrated the major similarities present in both cases—that both featured mnemonic warriors fracturing established memory regimes by challenging the legitimacy of contemporary narratives—it remains to be seen whether the same is true for the structural and cultural constraints faced by these actors as well as the cultural choices available to them. In terms of structural constraints, Bernhard and Kubik point to three factors: the nature of the state, the mode of extraction from antecedent regimes and the salience of left-right cleavages in the political landscape (2014, 20-22). Thus, West Germany can be characterised as generally democratic but, as Kundnani (2009) argues, with some authoritarian tendencies. Although the overall intent of the student movement was to force a rupture of the political status quo, the regime that followed can be characterised as reformed: there was to be no revolution. Although left-right cleavages were generally benign and democratic within West German parliamentary democracy, on the outside there was room for an active and radical left in which the student movement played a significant role. For Serbia, the regime of the 1980s was characterised by a growing division between hard-line
conservatives and reformists. The dominant mode of extraction at play in the late 1980s was certainly of *rupture*, with the anti-bureaucratic movement delegitimising the “bureaucracy” of the political status quo along both ethnic and class lines. In terms of left-right cleavages, the combination of Serbian nationalism and Leninist socialism make for a confusing analysis, at least in the traditional sense of “left” and “right” in politics. Yet there was clearly broad room for manoeuvre.

Cultural constraints are the set of historical-cultural factors that shape how mnemonic actors understand the world around them and constrain their strategic choices. This is somewhat akin to the idea of a “national character” or “collective consciousness” yet one that is constantly subject to change (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 23). And in this category, the cases show similarities over the loosening up of prior constraints. Unburdened by their parents’ skeletons in the closet, the West German students were at the vanguard of rejecting the cultural and structural constraints—above all taboos—that had characterised post-war society. In Yugoslavia, rather than the growing of age of a generation, it was instead the death of an iron-fisted “benevolent dictator” that loosened up prior constraints. Until these critical shifts, the dominant memory regimes of the West German narrative of “victimhood” and the Yugoslavian embrace of “brotherhood and unity” could operate unfettered.

*The Boundary Between State and Civil Society*

The above analysis demonstrates that the model has proven to be exceptionally strong at explaining the processes involved in the cases to a high degree, providing a test of variation between the independent variables at play. But there is one other aspect that has so far been overlooked. Having already determined that both movements were examples of non-state actors, it is prudent to consider the level of proximity to the state, i.e. to the dominant force determining and legitimising memory at the time. The students of 1968 certainly became increasingly organised and institutionalised over time but, in the spirit of “anti-establishmentism”, remained firmly rooted inside civil society and outside of the state. Furthermore, considering their youth, they generally had little practical experience or any meaningful networks within the state. Serbia is strikingly different. On the one hand, Milošević as a figurehead for the anti-bureaucratic revolution had a CV showcasing over two decades of service in state entities such as Technogas and Beogradska Banka before emerging from the Belgrade League of Communists into the public gaze. On the other hand, the grassroots of the movement, overrepresented by working-class Serbs, tended unsurprisingly to be public sector workers—but they were hardly wielders of state power in any political sense. It is enough to remark
that, whereas the West German students were unmistakeably outside of the state, actors within the upper echelons of the anti-bureaucratic movement could be both outside, in close proximity to or sometimes firmly inside the state, depending on political pragmatism and other circumstances.
Conclusion

This paper has attempted to explain why some legitimacy contests from political actors that heavily challenge collective memory are likely to result in mass violence whereas others don’t. Its original hypothesis suggested that the determinant factor was whether or not memory had been or still was subject to repression and sanctioning, usually by the state, and especially following the demise of such a state.

The students of 1968 evidently didn’t perceive the Federal Republic as a pluralist democracy. Furthermore, there were glimpses of authoritarian behaviour such as the unjustified police killing of Benno Ohnesorg. But the fact that individual police officers in democracies sometimes commit errors or worse does not mean that the state they represent is abusive by default. Above all, the crucial point is that West Germany was by any objective standards a pluralist democracy with substantial openness. It may have been awkward to bring up the legacy of National Socialism and the wartime activities of parents around the dinner table, but the consequence of such action was not direct state repression. Yugoslavia is more ambiguous, certainly in the 1980s Serbian context. One could argue that the reason West German society managed to politically recover—to such an extent that mass violence was popularly perceived as close to unthinkable—is in no small part due to its democratic nature demonstrated in part by the state’s greater willingness to tolerate freedom of expression by considering and, in some cases, adapting memory to include views that previously deviated from the general consensus. In contrast to the success of West Germany, one major factor behind the ethnic violence following the breakup of Yugoslavia and, above all, the violence escalating at times to incidents of genocidal violence, was the repressive nature of Tito’s regime where there was little room for non-violent dissent on issues of memory, for voicing unpopular points of view, or for ethno-nationalist challenges to the established and state-sanctioned narrative of Partisan victimhood.

Tension, disagreement and conflict are best regarded as inevitabilities of human coexistence, and it is above all the nature of the state that determines the red line between memory wars harmlessly spilling over or violently exploding. This single independent variable—the democracy of post-war West Germany versus the authoritarianism of Yugoslavia—demonstrates that the hypothesis offered at the start of this paper is at least partially correct. But the Bernhard-Kubik model has thrown up a further unanticipated difference worthy of considering; namely causality between the extent to which a mnemonic warrior penetrates the mechanisms of the state, and subsequent mass violence. Whereas the West German students remained firmly within the
boundaries of civil society with negligible access to state functions, the upper echelons of the Serbian anti-bureaucrats were active on both sides of the fence. Thus, one angle for future theory building is to explore whether the permeability of the boundary between state and civil society—in a sense the degree of political osmosis between the two—has an impact. Perhaps it is the case that mass violence is incipient when mnemonic warriors are able to penetrate the state, either because the previous state has collapsed or because the mnemonic warrior has otherwise managed to gain control of state functions. A point of departure for future work could seek to determine the following: that there is little risk that memory wars instigated by mnemonic warriors will spill over into real wars unless mnemonic warriors are able to gain access to real power—especially the power of the state. Within comparative politics and certainly within genocide studies, this line of attack is still new and untested. And since it is clear that the ethics debate over recent years seems to have missed the point, it is time to go beyond ethics and seek real answers from the realms of political science and sociology to explain the causal link between memory and mass violence.
Bibliography


