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Political Ideas and Behaviour of Armed Groups

*A comparative analysis of armed groups' ideology and repertoires of sexual
violence during the conflict in Darfur 2003-2006*



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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to study under what conditions armed groups practice different repertoires of sexual violence, by studying ideology's influence on behaviour. This will be explored through a structured focused comparison of three armed groups active in the conflict in Darfur 2003-2006, the Janjaweed, Sudan's Liberation Army/Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement. The theory suggest that a strong implemented ideology will lead to control over behaviour and values, hence sexual violence will be practice in line with organizational objectives and ideas, either instrumental or not practiced at all. Consequently, a weak ideological framework will lead to variation in socialization processes and an opportunistic repertoire. The findings correlate as expected by the hypothesis, while data constraints call for caution. The results suggests a broadening of the theoretical framework as well as further studies on the suggested causal mechanism, combatant socialization, to examine how, and under what circumstances, behaviours are spread as a social practice among combatants.

Key words: Darfur, Sudan, Sexual violence, Wartime rape, Ideology, Janjaweed, JEM, SLM/A

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List of Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
AW	Abdel Wahid (Faction)
GoS	Government of Sudan
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MM	Minni Minnawi (faction)
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
SLM/A	Sudan's Liberation Movement / Army
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UN	United Nations

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Introduction

Sexual violence has been recognized as a serious human rights violation, an international crime and a threat to peace and security, for instance, through UN Security Council resolution 1820, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The right to use military force in self-defence is enshrined in the UN Charters article 51, while the use of lethal violence in conflict is guided by principles of international humanitarian law. Sexual violence however, cannot be justified under any circumstances. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina sexual violence has been so widespread, systematic and intentional that it has been labelled a weapon of war. But often, sexual violence has been a hidden shame and seen as unfortunate side effect of war. The crimes of rape, sexual mutilation and torture, forced marriage and slavery etc. have been defined within the legal framework (ICC Elements of crimes 2000). Nevertheless, variation in patterns and prevalence and the conditions under which conflict-related sexual violence occurs, or not, need to be studied further, in order to develop responses and preventative measures. This study aims to contribute to this knowledge through the following research question:

Under what conditions does ideology influence armed groups repertoire of sexual violence?

Previous research shows that not all parties to a conflict perpetrate sexual violence to the same extent. In some cases sexual violence is targeted, while in other cases it is indiscriminate (Skjelbaek 2001; Leiby 2009; Sharlach 2000; Farr 2009). Many scholars discern between the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and opportunistic explanations, such as lack of accountability and impunity, but also sexual violence as a social practice or behaviour. Some scholars have studied variation in patterns of sexual violence (Cohen & Nordås; Leiby 2009; Farr 2009; Wood 2009), while others have focused on different level explanations, from individual and primary group level, to organizational level (Cohen 2013; Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2009; Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2012; Davies & True, 2015; Sjoberg 2014, 2016). Hoover Green's (2016) quantitative study suggests that groups with institutionalized political education might commit less sexual violence than others. Wood and Sanín (2014) further argue that ideology has an important influence on armed group's behaviour. Building on those arguments, this study aims to contribute the field theoretically by exploring how ideology can

be studied as a factor for influencing armed groups' behaviour, and empirically by employing this framework in a comparative case study.

The theoretical approach argues that ideas matter when it comes to armed groups decision to fight. They therefore influence leadership decisions about tactics in combat, as well as negotiation. Furthermore, a strong ideology will influence the socialization process in sub-units. Behaviour of combatants will therefore be consistent across units, and reflect the ideological framework. Hence, in groups with strong ideology, sexual violence will either be used for instrumental purposes, such as intimidation or ethnic cleansing, or there will be *no practice* of sexual violence in an armed group. Consequently, if an armed group has a weak or inconsistent ideological framework, the behaviour of its cadre is expected to vary and the pattern of sexual violence will be opportunistic.

In order to test the hypothesized relationship between ideology and repertoire of sexual violence, a structured focused comparison is conducted across three armed groups active during the conflict in Darfur 2003-2006: Janjaweed, Sudan's Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

The findings on the relevant variables correlate as hypothesized, while data constraints and limitations of the study calls for caution. However, I argue that ideology should be considered when studying armed groups patterns of violence, while more in-depth studies should be conducted on the socialization process, to explore how ideology and other structural factors, including organizational characters are intertwined, as ideology in itself does not seem sufficient to explain all variation.

In the next section relevant previous research on sexual violence will be reviewed and the research gap specified. In the third section the variables will be conceptualized and their relationship will be outlined in the theoretical framework of this study. Subsequently the research design with method and case selection process will be presented, as well as operationalization of the variables. The fifth section contains the analysis of each case separately starting with Janjaweed, followed by SLM/A and JEM. A comparative analysis will follow in the next section, together with discussion on additional findings and theoretical explanations, as well as evaluation of the design and limitation of the study. The last section will present and summarize the conclusion.

Previous Research

During the last two decades many important studies on sexual violence in conflict have been published. Nonetheless, there is still much we do not know, partly due to limitations in reporting, access and reliability of data, as is also the case for this study. This section will start by outlining relevant literature on observable patterns of sexual violence, departing in the weapon of war literature that came about after the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990's. Then, arguments from a growing body of research focusing on different approaches towards explaining the variation will be presented. These are contextual factors, affecting military culture, as well as organization. Last, I will explain how previous research motivates the approach explored in this study.

Weapon of War

During the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, sexual violence was widespread, systematic and with a clear intent tied to actors' organizational goals, making it was unmistakably strategic. Thus motivating scholars to investigate and conceptualize rape as a weapon of war, when it is committed against civilians with a political, military or strategic aim, rather than simply an unfortunate by-product of war.

In Rwanda rape was used as a method to intentionally spread HIV, shatter lives and create deep trauma in the wider society (Sharlach 2000). Even deceased bodies of men, women and children bore signs of extremely violent sexual assaults and mutilation, (Lt. Gen (Ret.) Roméo Dallaire). Consequently, sexual violence was not only an option to killing; it was an intrinsic part of how this extremely violent genocide was carried out. The instrumental use of sexual violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been described by scholars as planned, conducted and systematically carried out with the purpose of reaching strategic aims; the cleansing and destruction of a particular ethnic group (Sharlach 2000; Allen 1996; Seifert 1994; Stiglmeier 1994; Farr 2009; Salzman 1998). Serbian forces established facilities where raped women were kept past the point of termination of a pregnancy, in order to dilute and destroy the victims' bloodline. These are sometimes referred to as "rape camps" in the literature (Sharlach 2000; Skjelbaek 2001; Farr 2009). Rape has also been used instrumentally to expel an "unwanted" population with a shared ethnic, religious or political identity from a particular area, as seen in Kashmir where Muslim population was driven out of the area by the threat of rape (Skjelbaek, 2001).

In order for sexual violence to be strategic there needs to be an element of targeting

involved. Scholars have conceptually divided targeting into three main types: indiscriminate, selective and collective (Wood 2014; Sjoberg 2016, 19-22; Leiby 2009). Leiby (2009) found that *indiscriminate* targeting of civilian population can be used to spread fear and terror, to dissuade potential recruits to the opposition, or to generally deter support. Women might be *selectively* targeted if they are perceived to fight for, or in any way support, opponents, i.e. targeting family members of opposition (Leiby 2009; Skjelbaek 2001). Targeting of men and women of particular ethnic, religious or political identity can be aimed at an entire group, thus a form of *collective* targeting (Skjelbaek 2001; Sjoberg 2014, 72-79).

For sexual violence to have an instrumental function there needs to be a purpose or a policy behind it, it can be either ordered or a “silent” policy tool. The Islamic state / Daesh is a current example with a developed framework in place, as seen in their released pamphlets and implemented rules for sexual slavery (AI 2014). Forced marriages, as committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, are also clearly strategic, since it is institutionalized and controlled within the armed groups (Wood 2014; Baines 2014).

More recently scholars have shown that states are more likely than rebel groups to commit sexual violence, and most actors do not perpetrate high levels of sexual violence (Cohen & Nordås 2014, 2015; Leiby 2009). Consequently, actors using sexual violence as a “weapon of war” might be considered as “extreme” cases. Farr (2009) studied patterns of extreme sexual violence in 27 different conflicts. She determined four general patterns combining five descriptive characteristics: prevalence, primary perpetrators, location, victim targeting and forced conflict-related labour. Farr’s finding matches those by Leiby (2009) and Wood (2014), that even within the same conflict, or during the same attack, the purpose behind sexual violence may vary widely. A study on DRC by Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2009) demonstrates how perpetrators differentiate between “lust rapes” and “evil rapes”. Lust rapes are described as motivated by sexual drive and lack of normal civilian contacts, while evil rape, are committed to humiliate and degrade people: to destroy “the human dignity of a person” (Eriksson Baaz & Stern 2009, 2010, 2012). This supports Woods (2014) call for some caution before calling sexual violence a “weapon” simply because it happens at a large scale, as it disregards other distinct mechanisms that affect the incidence of rape.

Opportunism and Military Culture

The weapon of war conceptualization spearheaded much of the early research on wartime rape, as well as put sexual violence on the international political agenda in the context of

peace and security. However, there was a recognised need to widen the understanding and the scope of studies on wartime rap. Scholars therefore looked at opportunity costs and conditional factors, such as high impunity and misogynist social norms, which makes sexual violence encouraged, accepted or tolerated by peers and superiors. This opportunistic type of violence might be viewed as a social practice, it might also co-occur with strategic sexual violence (Leiby 2009; Wood 2014). Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2010) found that soldiers in Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) more likely committed sexual violence due to lack of control and discipline, combined with a culture of tolerance and normalization of sexual violence.

Sexual violence and misogyny might be tolerated or even encourage in militarized organizations as a result of social constructions of hyper-masculine identities. Hyper-masculine culture premieres virile and aggressive behaviours and physically superior attributes in individuals and groups, and simultaneously devalues qualities considered feminine (Whitworth 2007; Sjoberg 2014; Maxwell 2009). The social process of creating in-group identity is then guided by social practices and discourse which positions the own group, ethnic or other, as superior and simultaneously identifies the out-groups as possible threats. Practices frequently include denigration, objectification and sexualizing of women, which might make it easier for individuals to exercise violence, to dehumanize, kill and rape (Whitworth 2007; Sjoberg 2014). However, group cohesion is not necessarily harmful. It is actually important in order to motivate soldiers to fight; they more likely fight for their fellow soldiers rather than for patriotism or a cause (Potts & Hayden 2001, 67; Wood 2009).

Since group identity and culture does not need to be imbued with racist or misogynist values scholars have applied different approaches to investigate this variation. Davies and True (2015) argue that a gendered approach is crucial, since gender inequality does not exist in a vacuum; it is constructed and reproduced in social contexts. We might therefore understand why a majority of victims are female, and perpetrators mostly male (Davies & True 2015). In their study gender inequality in a country seems to correlate with instances of widespread sexual and gender based violence in conflicts. Nevertheless, if gender inequality was a sufficient condition we would not observe cases where there are virtually no instances of sexual violence since gender inequality exist in all societies, as do sexual violence and assaults, which makes it pertinent to examine when and how the variation can be tied to conflict dynamic and actors (Davies & True 2015; Wood 2015).

The social constructions of masculine and feminine identities are imbued with power differences that intertwine with other socio-cultural identities. Sjoberg (2014) provides a

structural approach to sexual violence, explaining that gendered roles of men and women are hierarchical as the masculine is systematically premised over the feminine. Thus, gender is an organizational principle for all social and political relationships. Sexual violence is an act to establish dominance, or a relative higher position of power, over the victim. This “feminization” is therefore intended to reduce legitimacy, status and value of the victim, or the group, in case of collective targeting (Skjelbaek 2001; Sjoberg 2016 & 2014, 72-79). A gendered perspective also provides an understanding of incidence of male victims and female perpetrators, because it is not about the sex of the victim or perpetrator, it is about power and the act of rendering a person, or their group, subordinate (Sjoberg 2016 & 2014). However, gender inequality won’t explain cases where only one of two parties to a conflict engages in sexual violence (Cohen 2013).

Organizational Characteristics

Leiby (2009) argues that when command and control are strong within an organisation, the leadership would be aware of, and consequently responsible for, acts of sexual violence committed by their cadre, whether opportunistic, tactical or both. Leiby (2009) further explains that due to the extent of the sexual violence in Guatemala and Peru, combined with well-functioning command structure, leadership could not claim plausible deniability. In a study of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Wood (2009) found that their cadre committed considerable violence against civilians, but no sexual violence. Wood attributed this to good organizational control, which meant that they could effectively enforce leadership decision to prohibit sexual violence. Thus, a strong hierarchy and effective control, together with leadership’s condemnation of sexual violence, explains this variation (Wood, 2009). Other variation might also be explained by non-state groups cooperation with civilians and intense ideological training, which might make up for a complicated command structure (Wood 2009).

Several factors might influence a rebel group’s decision to prohibit sexual violence. For instance a negative impact on legitimacy, relationship to the population or based on normative or ideological considerations (Wood 2009). Hoover Green (2016) suggests that institutionalized political education, and groups with a strong ideological base, commit less sexual violence than others. The aim of such education is to solve the principle-agent problem she calls “the commander dilemma”, which means the problem of making soldiers commit violence while simultaneously controlling it. She uses communist rebel groups as a proxy and

finds that the quantitative evidence supports her hypothesis. Experience of combat and exposure likely affects a soldier's threshold for violence in general, which might also help explain why people who never committed sexual violence before a conflict suddenly do so (Hoover Green 2016). In a study of pro-government militias, Cohen and Nordås (2015) finds that ideologically based groups do not use more, or less, sexual violence than non-ideologically based ones. They also found that groups receiving formalized training by state forces commit more sexual violence, compared to groups, which do not (Nordås & Cohen 2015).

Cohen (2013a) suggests that armed groups might practice sexual violence, especially gang rapes, as a form of "socialization" in order to increase internal cohesion in armed groups. This high risk, aggressive and humiliating practice allows perpetrators to socialize, form bonds and assert status "with-in" their group. This would then be more common in groups with low cohesion, for instance group which practice forced recruitment. Individuals, who are faced with the choice of participation in sexual violence, or being left out of the group, would often participate in this context (Cohen 2013a & 2013b; Sjoberg 2016). Subsequently, peer pressure and socialization are seen as powerful influences on men choice to commit wartime rape. Presumably, this holds true for female fighters committing sexual violence as well, since they would not want to be part of the "out-group" (Cohen 2013b; Sjoberg 2016). Other studies on military culture and women indicate that when women are "added" to military units, they will not have a mitigating effect on the masculine militarized environment, which sometimes was assumed, they are just as likely to conform to the group culture (Jennings 2008; Simic 2010; Dharmapuri 2011; Mazurana 2002; Sjoberg 2016).

The Research Gap

Looking into recent studies, a promising avenue of research would be to study both how and when socialization among combatants takes place, and what factors influences this process, thus potentially explaining variation in values and behaviour. Since the socialization process itself is an abstract concept, one might start by looking at various factors. Hoover Green (2016) found that Marxist groups, assumed to socialize their ideas through political education and training programs, used less sexual violence than others. Cohen and Nordås (2015) found no difference between ideologically driven and other groups in their sample of pro-government militias. In Farr's (2009) study, she found that ideologically motivated groups were least likely to commit rapes, even when the state used sexual violence in a targeting

strategy; hence all sides in a conflict did not always practice it. Wood (2009) suggests that ideological training might make up for complicated, or unclear, command structures in some armed groups. I have chosen to look closer at ideology's influence on the socialization process, and subsequently the behaviour of armed groups.

Moreover, research on sexual violence in armed conflict is increasingly starting to discern between different specific acts of sexual violence, such as gang rape, sexual slavery, sexual mutilation, sexual torture and forced pregnancies (Cohen 2013a; Cohen & Nordås 2008; Wood 2009). Thus, it would be relevant to look at a combination of armed groups characteristics in relation to disaggregated forms of sexual violence, in order to contribute to this field. This analytical approach to differentiate between repertoires of sexual violence has also been suggested by Hoover Green (2016).

In sum, to contribute to this growing body of research I intend to look further into the conditions under which ideology might influence armed groups' repertoire of sexual violence.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework in this study aims to explain under what conditions armed groups practice different types and frequency of sexual violence, in this study referred to as “repertoires”. First I will shortly conceptualize the variation in the outcome of interest, building on previous research. Subsequently, I will outline how and why ideology is important for understanding armed groups internal life. Also, characteristics of an ideologically driven organization and how ideology can be identified will be defined for the purpose of this study. Last, I will outline the causal chain and present a hypothesis.

Disaggregating Sexual Violence

Following Hoover Green (2016) I define repertoire of violence as types of violence against non-combatants regularly employed by an armed group, and their relative proportions. Repertoire of sexual violence then specifically refers to the variation and prevalence among particular acts, e.g. rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization/abortion, sexual mutilation, and sexual torture. These are also the seven categories used in the sexual violence in armed conflict data set (SVAC Cohen & Nordås 2016; Wood 2009). Forced marriage would be seen as a form of sexual slavery, but with an even clearer strategic purpose, as a group undeniably would have some sort of rules regarding this practice (Wood 2014; Baines 2014). For the purpose of this study I will discern between three different repertoires, or outcomes. I will use the categories of *instrumental*, *opportunistic* and *no practice* of sexual violence.

The definition of *instrumental* sexual violence demands that there is either a policy or a directive from higher command in place, or that the sexual violence clearly reflects the purpose or objective, as a “silent policy”. Hence, in order to ensure that an armed groups practices and behaviours are in line with the constituency’s norms, objectives, and plan of action. They need to be prescribed in a way that it can either serve the objective, or at least not conflict with overall goals or strategy. For instance, an instrumental use directed towards and out-group might be to terrorize or punish a population to force them to provide support or to expel a group of civilians from an area, sexual violence might then be considered as tactically employed to enhance operational effectiveness. These instances of sexual violence will occur in connection to violent attacks on civilians and be either communicated by the perpetrator or widely perceived as targeted sexual violence.

An organization might also control reproduction by means of forced abortions, sterilizations or pregnancies, even within their own group. Sexual torture as performed by representatives of the group on prisoners or opponents could also, when performed in these circumstances, be considered as institutionalized sexual violence.

Opportunistic sexual violence would often be tied to the overall level of violence, which in theory means that when soldiers that are underpaid, or not paid at all, they are more likely to resort to looting and robbing to support themselves, which often also provides an opportunity to rape. Paradoxically, soldiers visiting nearby towns after receiving salary might commit rapes under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Crimes in this category would most likely happen in fields, when women collect firewood, water or evacuate an area, unless targeting can be shown or inferred by other evidence.

There is a point to be made here though about opportunism, the theory does not suggest that all soldiers would rape given the opportunity, rather that it would occur at different scale due to other variation in socialization processes, such as forced recruitment or other “makings of a soldier”; obedience, dehumanization, hazing rituals, conformity to the group, misogyny, combat exposure etc. (Cohen 2013a; Wood 2009; Hoover Green 2016; Whitworth 2007). The socialization process might also be steered by other pre-existing identities and values, accounting for within-organizational variation. These acts of sexual violence can still constitute a war crime due to command responsibility, i.e. large-scale sexual violence would certainly be noticed by leaders, whether they have the means to control it or not, which means they lack plausible deniability and are responsible for actions of their troops (Leiby 2009).

Since most actors do not practice sexual violence (Cohen & Nordås 2014, 2015; Leiby 2009), there is a theoretical need for a third category: *no practice* of sexual violence. When sexual violence is not motivated or in line with organizational objectives, it might become a liability to the organization. Leadership might even forbid sexual violence directly in their policies. “No practice” does not mean that individuals within groups will never commit rape; it means that it is not a generally tolerated or accepted behaviour.

Conceptualization of “Repertoires of sexual violence”		
Instrumental	Opportunistic	No Practice
<p>- In line with organizational objectives (to enhance operational effect/ or by institutionalizing the practice).</p> <p>- Element of targeting and intent.</p>	<p>- No connection to organizational goals.</p> <p>- Variation between units, (not present in all attacks).</p> <p>- In connection to looting, stealing, general indiscipline, during leisure time (alcohol or drug involved).</p>	<p>- Rape would conflict with stated goals.</p> <p>- There is no indication of allowance or general tolerance.</p> <p>- No reports (or very few) of the particular actor.</p>

Table 1: Conceptualization of “Repertoires of sexual violence”

Ideology in Armed Groups

In order to measure the ideological implementation in an armed group relevant to this study I will first outline how, and why, ideology is expected to influence armed actors’ behaviour. Subsequently, I also will describe observable elements of an ideological “framework” to make the theory more tangible.

The theory is mainly based on the work of Wood and Sanín (2014) who argue that previous research on armed groups and violence has failed to recognize that “organized violence is about ideas as well as power”. Hence, rebellions often form around a collective interest, or public good, reflected in organizational goal or purpose. Groups will therefore dedicate both time and resources to develop, discuss and spread these ideas. They fight for ideas and use them to motivate decisions, creation and implementation of rules (Wood & Sanín 2014). To understand armed groups’ motivations and behaviour there is a need to analyse cohesion, discipline and identity. Hence, in an ideologically driven group, we need to consider how and why ideology influences the socialization process between combatants (Wood & Sanín 2014).

Depending on method, socialization of ideas might begin at recruitment, as ideology might motivate people to join. Generally research tends to assume that the same type of incentives can motivate individuals and groups in similar ways (Wood & Sanín 2014). For instance Weinstein (2005) studied variation in violence among rebel groups by looking at

what type of initial endowment a rebel group can offer its recruits, economic or social. He argues that this will affect groups' behaviour by attracting fighters with different motivations. Rebel groups with a strong resource base who can provide economic incentives risk attracting opportunistic recruits, while socially motivated recruits might be more prone to make long-term commitments (Weinstein 2005). Although ideology can be considered as a social incentive, this approach fails to consider the potential of the socialization process (Wood & Sanín 2014; Wood 2009).

If ideology guides the socialization process, we might expect that values and behaviours are not formed spontaneously, rather they are guided by the particular set of ideas, which are more or less systematically embedded in the armed group (Wood & Sanín 2014). According to Wood & Sanín (2014), ideology has two main functions within armed groups. First, ideology has an instrumental value as it helps socialize members with different motivational backgrounds around a particular set of values and ideas. Some recruits might have joined because they are committed to the ideology, other might become committed to the ideology through socialization. This likely leads to stronger group cohesion and convinces recruits to identify with the group, thus motivating fighters to engage in high-risk events, such as combat. Ideology can raise active support among civilians or other actors, by incentivising people who would benefit from any gained public goods regardless of active participation (Wood & Sanín 2014).

The second function of ideology is that it prescribes certain normative standards, which its members will mostly adhere to, either because they are committed to the ideology or because they are required to. Wood and Sanín (2014) argues that this can explain why some groups will show restraint in violence, even when it could benefit them strategically. Sexual violence might be detrimental to armed groups' objectives, especially when an armed group relies on logistic or other support from civilians or when they plan to govern a population after conflict. Similarly an organization might risk losing international support and legitimacy, making sexual violence a very costly practice (Wood 2009).

To strengthen the prioritization and understanding of common goals, ideologically driven organizations can set up different forms of institutions or strategies, such as a political wing or implementation of a political education program (Wood & Sanín 2014; Hoover Green 2016). Combatant socialization would enforce norms and rules by continuously reproducing them through discourse and social practice. Measured in time, combatants will spend far more time socializing, training or having leisure time together than they would actually spend in violent confrontations or battles. Therefore, the causal mechanism suggested by this study is

that a strong ideology would likely influence the socialization process. Subsequently, if an ideologically driven armed group practices sexual violence, it will likely occur in line with the objectives, the norms of their constituency or their plan of action to achieve their goals. The socialization process is key to understanding how a group's repertoire of sexual violence develops. For instance, opportunistic type explanations of sexual violence does not sufficiently account for why rape transforms into a "group activity" more frequently in some cases compared to others. The importance, and process, of socializations as outlined by Cohen (2013a) provides very clear plausible explanation, considering how important fostering camaraderie is among combatants (Potts & Hayden 2001:67; Armistead-Jehle et al. 2011; Wood 2009). For this reason, I suggest that when the socialization process is heavily influence by ideology, group cohesion would be high and practices of sexual violence will likely align with objectives and norms of their constituency and/or program of action. If sexual violence would have a negative effect on their goal, an ideologically driven organisation would consequently not tolerate such behaviour.

The Elements of Ideology

For the purpose of research on political violence, Wood and Sanín (2014) outline some traits that can be used to define and study ideology. First, ideology consists of a set of political ideas, which will be more or less systematic. These ideas will be formed to identify and represent a particular social group as its constituency. The aims and objectives will thus be constructed to reflect the group's grievances and interests. Their interests could be anything from collective self-defence, political change or any other common goods. There will be a plan or program in place that at least loosely identifies what actions needs to be taken to reach the stated goals, in some case these actions are implemented through strategies or institutions (Wood & Sanín 2014).

Ideology can be expressed and exercised through different framework, and to varying extent (Wood & Sanín 2014). Political ideologies are not necessarily mutually exclusive and might also interact (Wood & Thomas 2017). For the purpose of this study, evaluating and labelling political thoughts is not as important as linking ideas and values to groups' behaviour. However, there are some broader more common types of ideologies, which might be identified. Among these are leftist ideologies, like Marxism. These organizations tend to adopt similar institutions, structures and social norms, also, many of which do not practice sexual violence (Hoover Green 2016;). There are also many examples of Islamist rebel organizations, which seek to organize society and establish structures in

accordance strict, or fundamentalist, interpretations of Islamic law (Wood & Thomas 2017). Wood and Thomas 2017 argue that nationalist movements can exhibit ideological traits, seeking public goods on behalf of an ethnic or national community, although, they often lack comprehensive ideas about important political issues, such as justice, resources or structure of society. They might also overlap with other ideologies. An organization might be considered to have no ideology when they are inconsistent in their political ideas with no clear leadership approach or commitment to ideology (Wood & Thomas 2017).

It is not expected that more ideological groups will be less violent, rather it is expected that more ideological groups mandate particular practices, tactics and strategies. The choice of ideology, however selected, carries with it political connotations that are costly to change. Nevertheless, a group might still exhibit inconsistencies between behaviour and its ideological rhetoric (Wood & Sanín 2014).

Conceptualizing “Ideology”	
Strong / implemented	Weak / no ideology
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stated ideology (i.e. By leadership or others) - Systematic set of ideas (i.e. Manifesto) - Objectives (answers “what?”) - Identifies a constituency (answers “for who?”) - Program of action (answers “How?”) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unclear ideology / message by leadership - Weak commitment to ideas / manifesto - Inconsistent ideas / objectives - Unclear about who they communicate with/for - Unclear about “how”

Table 2: Conceptualization of Ideology

Hypotheses

The causal story central to this theory is that ideologically driven groups are more likely to practice sexual violence in line with the objectives and norms of their constituency and their program of action, and in doing so also exercising control over their troops behaviour. Hence, if sexual violence negatively affect organizational goals or is not tolerated by integral norms, it will not be a prevalent behaviour. Conversely if sexual violence can be tolerated, motivated or deemed to increase operational effect in an armed group, they will practice it purposefully.

Thus, in order to maintain control over norms and behaviour of their cadre to ensure realization of their objectives, they will influence and control its repertoire of violence, including sexual violence. The content of the ideological framework is expected to only matter in cases where ideology is implemented and adhered to throughout the ranks if this theory holds true.

An armed group’s framework might for example encourage tactical uses or mandate particular institutions for practicing sexual violence, while in other cases implicitly or explicitly strictly prohibit sexual violence. This relationship can be expressed and hypothesized as follows:

H1: If an armed group effectively implements an ideology, their repertoire of sexual violence will mainly align with, or be prescribed by, their ideological framework.




Figure 1: Causal chain of Hypothesis 1

H2: If an armed group has a weak ideology, their repertoire of sexual violence will be opportunistic and vary widely.




Figure 2: Causal chain of Hypothesis 2

Research Design

Few studies have explored the link between ideology and sexual violence and most of them have been quantitative (Cohen & Nordås 2015; Hoover Green 2016). A qualitative comparison would therefore contribute to a broader knowledge on the topic. Theory development is also a secondary purpose to a qualitative study, which means there is an opportunity to evaluate and expand the theory to encourage further research. Since I do not expect to directly observe the causal mechanism, a structured focused comparative analysis of observable indicators will be used in order to determine if the expected correlation is present. For the purpose of this study the independent variable is ideology, and the dependent variable is repertoire of sexual violence.

This section will start with a description of the method, followed by case selection and the operationalization of the theoretical framework. Last I present the time frame and data collection strategy and discuss implications of reporting issues.

Method of Structured Focused Comparison

To allow for systematic comparison of the cases in order to determine if there is any support for the hypotheses, the method of *structured focused comparison* is used. The method is based on the framework developed by George and Bennett (2005, 67-88). The study will be conducted by developing a set of questions related to the independent and dependent variables. The questions will be grounded in theory and designed to meet the purpose of the study, making sure the study remains *focused*. The same questions will then be applied to all cases, thus the *structured* nature of the study allow for strict comparison (George & Bennett 2005, 67-88). This method is designed to keep the focus of the study on the relevant variables, which means that this study will not investigate all aspect of the selected cases (George & Bennett 2005, 67-88). Questions related to the mechanism will also be constructed and applied, although the mechanism itself cannot be observed, since socialization process is an abstract concept, indicators will be based on assumptions about the how process likely takes place. The systematic construction of the study will yield findings on the relevant variables in the different cases, which will subsequently be compared and analysed (George & Bennett 2005, 67-88). The method chosen is also selected because it is suitable for a study that relies on secondary sources: since there are time, security and ethical considerations, which do not allow for collecting primary data for this study.

Case Selection

To increase reliability of my results I will select cases that are similar in all relevant aspects, except on the variable of interest, also known as a “most similar case design” (George & Bennett 2005, 81-86). I will narrow the scope of this study to non-state armed groups assumed to have quite similar organizational structures, hence excluding terrorist organizations.¹ Since the level of conflict related sexual violence might co-occur with other forms of violence, and personnel continuity might affect the socialisation process, conflict intensity will be controlled for as well as duration. Groups’ values are expected to intensify over time through continuous socialization of political ideas, influencing their repertoire of violence. Gender equality, like values and political ideas, is assumed to have an effect when it is part of the group’s ideological framework, based on the theory. Non-state armed actors are seen as a particular and separate unit of analysis, with a different social life and organizational characters from the state, even if they are a pro-government.

To observe variation on my independent variable, ideology, I selected cases based on the three possible outcomes: *instrumental*, *opportunistic* or *no practices* of sexual violence. Case selection was based on initial estimations about groups’ repertoire of sexual violence, although the study will likely reveal that variation is more complex. Thus, motivating a qualitative approach to explore nuances. I excluded cases that might be considered as extreme, outliers or clear terrorist-organizations, as these cases might too severely affect generalizability of any findings.² Cases within the Democratic Republic of Congo were also excluded, since the number and nature of actors, and the reporting of violence, are hard to discern for the purpose of researching this subject.

I selected Janjaweed, JEM and SLM/A due to initial estimations about the variation on the dependent variable. I used the Sexual Violence Armed Conflict Dataset (SVAC Cohen & Nordås 2014/2016) to find cases. Selection based on this data-set also provided an initial estimation on availability of information, due to their column of additional information, which is necessary to consider for a study that relies exclusively on secondary sources. After looking at a combination of indicators for instrumental sexual violence, the Janjaweed in Sudan was selected to represent an *instrumental* outcome. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was chosen because the prevalence of sexual violence committed by this group mainly *opportunistic*, based on entries on timing, location and circumstances in the data-set. Last, I

¹ See example studies on groups organization, structure and violence: Heger et. al, 2012; Kilberg, 2012.

² These were the Islamic State, Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army, also, the genocides of Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

selected the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) where sexual violence had no apparent pattern and low prevalence in the data set. By selecting cases in the same time and place, with the matching geography, national culture, history and technology development, comparability is very high. Although, the Janjaweed is described as a pro-government militia, it was chosen because it is a non-state actor indicated to have commonly perpetrated instrumental sexual violence, presumably a rare repertoire.

Operationalization the Theoretical Framework

Repertoire of sexual violence will be operationalized with regards to contextual factors as well as the frequency, or relative proportion. Indicators will be developed to evaluate whether the pattern is considered as instrumental, opportunistic or no practice of sexual violence. Indicators for ideology will be developed to determine presence and strength of the theoretical elements of ideology and for events that are expected to influence the combatant socialization. I will first outline the indicators and research questions related to my dependent variable, repertoire of sexual violence, followed indicators and questions for ideology, my independent variable.

Indicators for the Dependent Variable

Events of conflict related sexual violence are questioned with regards to location, timing, intent, form, and targeting in order to estimate the variation in repertoire between groups. For example, sexual torture and rape are deemed instrumental when the event include a form of targeting or purpose, while they are considered opportunistic when there is no apparent intent, orders or clearly strategic timing involved. Although opportunistic forms of sexual violence likely occurs in groups who use instrumental violence, because cadre is desensitized to sexual violence and women might be routinely devalued. It is the instrumental forms that may be tied to ideology. By proxy sexual violence, have not been discussed before, but it means that a person have been forced to commit an act of sexual violence, against a family member or someone of the same sex for example, this is deemed instrumental because it often serves a purpose, i.e. torture or humiliation. Forced marriage is also always viewed as instrumental as it will always entail some set of formal or social rules within a group.³

³ For a more detailed definition of the crimes used as indicators, i.e. rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, sexual torture, see International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). Article 8 (2)(e).)

Indicators for the Dependent variable Sexual Violence:	
Instrumental	
Targeting	Victims will overtly belong to an identifiable group: “enemy collaborators” religion, ethnicity, age, nationality, or other characteristics Victim perception of targeting
Location	Inside own camp In seized villages/ “enemy villages” Detention “Public” spaces
Timing	During attacks In controlled territory Interrogation Political events
Intent	Ordered, formalized or institutionalized Hate speech about women of “other” group Terrorizing population Genocide
Form	Forced marriage Sexual torture Forced pregnancy/sterilization/abortion Mass rape / rape / gang rape Sexual slavery/forced prostitution By proxy
Opportunistic	
Targeting	Random/Victim variation
Location	Collecting firewood/water/errands In fields Checkpoints Close to camp Accidental encountering, roads “Private” spaces
Timing	“Leisure time” (including under alcohol intake) Looting & pillaging House searches
Intent	No
Form	Rape Gang rape Sexual torture/mutilation
No Practice	
Targeting	No
Location	No significance
Timing	No reports in connection with attacks
Intent	Very few or no reports connecting events to identified members of the armed group
Form	Rape, single perpetrator

Table 3: Indicators for the Dependent Variable

Indicators for the Independent Variable

In order to operationalize ideology the theoretical framework has been broken down into observable characteristics. The evaluation of a group's implementation, or strength, of ideology will be based on high or low prevalence of the four theoretical parts, or concepts, of ideology, as well as leadership message: systematic set of ideas, identified constituency, objective, and a program/plan of action.

Indicators for socialization of ideology will also be assessed according to if there are any particular means of spreading ideas, such as political study groups, education/programs, meetings or "rallies", pamphlets, own newspapers or written media. Recruitment will also be discussed, since the theory suggests that the recruitment process might have different implication for the socialization process. This study aims to remain focused on creation, presentation and enactment of ideology.

Many indicators for ideology refer to various speech acts or distribution of ideas, images and knowledge. Although a discourse analysis will not be used, since that method is designed to apply to primary sources, interpretation and descriptions of discourse and practice will be used as indicators. Discourse refers to the way messages are constructed and interpreted; it is what gives meaning to language, text or other communication in a specific context and for a particular audience (Fairclough 2010). Messages, and how they are spread and adapted, are therefore important indicators for a study on ideology. Discourse also refers to how these ideas are interpreted in particular social contexts, depending on time and space. This context and the internal values, hierarchies and relationships is referred to as a social practice, hence, how behaviour and values are acted out and manifested in social relationships and activities in different environments (Fairclough 2010). Consequently, some emphasis is put on leadership views, because their message is assumed to be interpreted by the constituency in a more powerful way. Ideology would be considered as socialized into groups when members know them, reproduce and are normatively committed to them.

The socialization process might take place both during formal organized events, such as political training and education, but it is also assumed to happen informally between combatants. However, if and when socialization takes place cannot be observed through secondary sources, only assumed. Socialization among combatants will likely also happen during "regular" combat training events, but this will not be an indicator for the purpose of assessing implementation of ideology, unless political education is specified as part of a training program. Strength and weakness will be analysed according to the conceptualization specified in the theoretical framework.

Indicators for the Independent variable:		
Definition	Research Question	Indicators
Specifying ideology	What is the leadership message about ideology? Are others labelling the group's ideology?	The group leader vision of Ideology Scholars, NGOs
Systematic set of ideas	Are they consistent in their political ideas?	Do the core ideas remain over time? Consistent ideas? (Manifesto?)
Objective	What is their goal(s)? Is the objectives connected to a constituency?	Stated/made clear Organization of society Ideas about power and resource distribution Desired political system
Identifying a constituency	Who are they speaking for? Who are they speaking to?	Identifies group connected to goals Communicates messages to a particular group outside and/or inside the organization
Program of action	Does the group specify how and/or with what means they will reach goals?	Violence mentioned/motivated in relation to goals Specified steps in the plan Institutions
Socializing ideas	Are they employing particular means of socializing ideology? How are ideas spread and adapted? Is ideology part of their recruitment strategy?	Political study groups, education/programs Meetings or "rallies" Pamphlets, newspapers or written media Radio Speech acts by leaders How they recruit

Table 4: Indicators for the Independent Variable

Timeframe and data collections

Darfur was considered a good choice for a case study because of the timing of the conflict. It was recent enough to expect availability of research and reports online, while time has passed and allowed scholars to study the actors and the conflict, thus increasing availability of printed sources.

I restricted my search for information on the dependent variable, sexual violence, to the time period 2003-2006. The years 2003-2005 was the period when violence peaked in the Darfur conflict, and when all three armed groups were active at the same time. The four-year

period is broad enough to record variation in the groups' patterns of violence and to include lagged reporting. Also, it captures the immediate time after the Abuja Peace agreement in May 2006.

When collecting empirical material for my dependent variable I looked at the three main sources used for the SVAC dataset since they are considered reliable and credible sources of information; Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and US state department. After consulting these report I also looked at other sources cited within them, such as Médecins Sans Frontières and UN reports, all available for the UN mission to Sudan, the years 2004-2006. However, observation included in the extended search did not yield any additional findings. I applied search words to the texts derived from the forms of sexual violence included in my theoretical framework for sexual violence. These were based on the different forms explained earlier and adopted from the data-set; rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization/abortion, sexual mutilation, and sexual torture (SVAC Cohen & Nordås 2016; Wood 2009). I also used search terms such as JEM; Justice and equality movement; SLM/A; SLA; SLM; Janjaweed; Janjawid. To be able to find information on attacks where no sexual violence was reported, to establish whether there was a pattern of violence against civilians where incidence of rape was low.

For information regarding my independent variable, ideology, I searched the library and online database for sources relating to the conflict in Darfur and the actors. This was not as restricted in time; rather restricted to the actors related to the conflict. Books were mainly written by scholars and journalist researching Sudan, for instance sources by experts Julie Flint and Alexander De Waal was often cited by others, and also used in frequently this thesis. Another, particularly interesting book was written by a scholar and senior member and advisor to JEM, providing an unusual inside view, yet reliability is obviously questionable since there is a risk of exaggerating positive aspects and hiding negative.

In this study I have chosen to not look at news coverage, both because NGO reports are deemed more reliable and more likely to verify their findings. Also, due to restrictions and perception of media and press (AI Aug 2004; AI Feb 2003), making it unlikely that official news in English would affect fighter's perception of their own movement's ideology.

Reporting and Data Constraints

Underreporting of crimes of sexual violence is a huge problem in Sudan, both due to intense social stigma, lack of access to functioning reporting mechanisms and a problematic legal

system, which demand witnesses. Victims also face the risk of being arrested, tried and punished for crimes of adultery, or pregnancy outside the marriage (AI 2003, 36; AI Feb 2004, 18-19; US Department of State 2004 & 2007; UN April & Feb 2005; HRW world report 2006, 142).

In 2004, Amnesty International visited refugee camps in Chad, as they were not granted visas to Sudan. They noted that very few women made the journey into Chad, and most avoid speaking of sexual violence. Many victims were believed to have stayed behind in Sudan, due to fear of social stigma and rejection by their families. AI researchers collected testimonies from 250 victims; none of these crimes were committed by the SLM/A or JEM (AI July 2004). They considered the possibilities that they either did not meet with those victims, due to restricted access, which might indicate that there was a low incidence. Also, that reporting could have been skewed due to civilians' loyalty to rebel groups (AI Feb & July 2004). When AI asked the government to provide information about human rights abuses committed by the SLM/A and the JEM, there were no specified cases of sexual violence provided (AI Feb, 2004, 25). Similarly, the UN's Commission of Inquiry investigated human rights violations by rebels and found no cases of sexual violence. They were told about a few cases, but were unable to verify the information (UN Feb 2005, 101). There are also political reasons why the government would not want reports of mass rape against civilians by Sudanese forces and Janjaweed made public, hence they were not inclined to grant visas for researchers (Cockett 2016, 248-249). Hastrup notes that it would not have been possible to conduct an interview study with IDPs inside camps in Sudan, as camps are monitored (Hastrup 2012). Reporting might be further skewed if the police refuse to take reports about crimes committed against particular ethnic groups in an area (Hastrup 2012, 100).

Although it is assumed that only a fraction of witnesses' and testimonies have been heard, it is all too clear that sexual violence was widespread and systematic in Darfur during the conflict (AI July 2004, 4; HRW May 2004, 33).

Examining the Cases

I will start this section with a brief overview, to provide some context. I will commence the analysis with a presentation of findings on each case, starting with Janjaweed, followed by SLM/A and JEM. Cases will be presented in a common structure, starting with a brief introduction, followed by presentation of findings and analysis of the dependent variable, actors' repertoire of sexual violence. Thereafter, I will present findings on the theoretical elements of ideology, the independent variable, in the following order; Ideology and leadership; Systematic set of ideas; Objective and Constituency; Program of action; Socialization.

Brief Overview

Darfur is a region in western Sudan, meaning "Home of the Furs". Fur is the largest tribal group in the area, which together with the Zaghawa and the Masalit were the major components of the The Sudan Liberation Movement Army (SLM/A), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (Flint & De Waal 2005; Brosché 2008). These rebel groups emerged in Darfur around 2001-2003 and decided to take up arms against the Government of Sudan (GoS), in response to marginalization and violence perpetrated by the Janjaweed, on behalf of the Government (Flint & De Waal 2005; Brosché 2008). Although Janjaweed militias had been active longer in the region, the government started relying on them in the mid 1990's. Janjaweed then received a substantial upgrade and support when the rebellion started (Flint & De Waal 2005, 101-103, 33-63; Haggar 2007, 114). JEM and SLM/A conducted some operations together, but did not fully view themselves as allies (Flint & De Waal 2005, 99). In May 2006 a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Abuja Agreement, was signed between the GoS and the Minni Minnawi faction of the SLM/A (MM), while the SLM/A (AW) and JEM refused the agreement.

Janjaweed

According to scholars, the origins of the Janjaweed organization active in the Darfur conflict can be seen as a result of local politics, and traced to earlier mobilisation of Chadian Arabs under Libyan sponsorship in the 1970s and 1980s, and agreements between local Arab tribal leaders. In the 1990's the government of Sudan (GoS) seized an opportunity to utilize the aggressive and frustrated Janjaweed in their anti-insurgent campaign, as the GoS were

somewhat short on troops (Flint & De Waal 2005, 52-65). Many Janjaweed fighters in Darfur were eventually integrated in the governments Popular Defence Force (PDF), a kind of paramilitary force; there seem to have been some confusion between the two in some witness testimonies (Hagggar 2007, 128; Flint & De Waal 2005, 33-65; Hastrup 2012, 115; AI July 2004).

The meaning of “Janjaweed” is debated, some say it was used for Arab militias already in the 1980s. Others say that it emerged when the Darfurian militias started attacking villages. The group preferred “fursan”, meaning “horsemen” as Janjaweed is believed to have derogative meaning, while some victims used “Devils on horsebacks” (Hagggar, 2007, 127; Flint & De Waal 2005, 38, 55; Hastrup 2012, 100; Cockett 2016, 188)

Despite official denial, strong ties with the government were obvious (Broshé 2008, 40-41; Flint & De Waal, 2005).

Repertoire of Sexual Violence

There are many common behavioural patterns and violent acts practiced by the Janjaweed during the conflict. Overall they have been found to practice rapes, mass rapes, sexual slavery, gang rapes frequently, and there have been reported cases sexual mutilation and torture. They have been suspected of forced pregnancies and there are some reported cases of sexual violence against men and boys. Many incidents describe racist derogative slurs and language being used in connection to attacks.

Janjaweed frequently committed rapes during attacks, including gang rapes, in many cases publicly, and in front of family members (UN Feb 2005, 93-100; AI July 2004; AI Nov 2004, 30; US Department of State 2007: Flint & De Waal 2005, 36, 104; HRW May 2004, 33 & April 2004, 30). There were also reports, during and after attacks, of other forms of cruel and inhumane treatment against both adults and children, such as burning alive, beatings and torture (UN Feb 2005, 93-100; Flint & De Waal, 2005, 107-109).

Janjaweed mostly committed these crimes even if state military were sometimes present, according to witnesses (UN Feb 2005, 93-100; AI July 2004; Flint & De Waal, 2005, 101-110). Collaborative attacks would follow a common pattern. The Sudanese air force would bomb a village from aircrafts during the night. Attack helicopters would follow and shoot indiscriminately at civilians. At dawn the Janjaweed would arrive on camels, sometimes accompanied by government forces, they would set fire to everything, kill and rape everyone they could find and loot anything of value (Cockett 2016).

According to the UN there was a clear gendered pattern during attacks by the Janjaweed; men were targeted and killed while women and girls were often subjected to sexual violence (UN Feb 2005, 71-80, 93-100; Flint & De Waal, 2005, 64-65; HRW Jan 2005, 16-17). The broader pattern of violence during attacks on villages also included summary killings, stolen cattle, looting and burning of supplies and homes, as a “scorched earth” policy (UN Jan 2005, 35; UN Feb 2005, 93-100; Flint & De Waal 2005, 64-65, 107). During occupation of villages women and girls, sometimes very young, were separated from the men and taken away in turns to be gang raped for long periods of time (UN Feb 2005, 93-100; HRW Jan 2005, 16-17).

There were also some reported incidents of sexual torture and mutilation committed against men and boys, sometimes with the intent of collecting information (AI July 2004, 19; Flint & De Waal 2005, 107-109). Some women were subjected to mutilation of genitals and breast during and after attacks. This was perceived as punishment or retaliation for supporters of SLM/A (HRW April 2004, 29 & April 2005, 4-5).

In addition to the sexual violence during attacks, Janjaweed occasionally abducted women and girls and held them as sex slaves at camps and hideouts for days, even months. In one location Janjaweed held almost 100 women at the same time, according to a witness (UN Feb 2005, 93-100; HRW April 2004, 29). During captivity rapes were sometimes committed in front of other Janjaweed and the fellow women for added humiliation (UN Feb 2005, 93-100). Sometimes women held as prisoners and were tortured to prevent them from escaping. Both to create fear of running, but it could also more directly to physically prevent escapes, for instance by breaking women’s limbs or binding them overnight (UN Feb 2005, 93-100; AI July 2004).

Gang rapes occurred very frequently according to victims and witnesses (UN Feb 2005, 93-100; Flint & De Waal, 2005, 36; HRW April 2005, 5-6). Reports in one case included statements about how women had been branded following sexual violence and gang rapes in a brutal attack in Tawila in February 2004, apparently in an effort to permanently stigmatize them (AI Nov 2004; HRW April 2004, 30). Since gang rapes have theorized to occur both in *opportunistic* and *instrumental* type of patterns, the context decide how they are interpreted. In most cases found in the reports, there is a clear contextual significance, as outlined above, that make the gang rapes connected to an *instrumental* repertoire. Interestingly enough, one witness describes to AI (Nov 2004, 11) how the Janjaweed are “happy” when they rape, that they sing and tell victims that it is happening to them because they are “just slaves”. The display of hatred connected to an out-group might imply that there

is significant in-group identification among the fighters. This could suggest that gang rape as a “social activity” reinforces or creates cohesion as suggested by Cohen (2013a), but also that cohesion does not necessarily have to be low for gang rapes to be a prevalent practice. Gang rapes might occur with higher frequency because the in-group has a very narrow scope of inclusiveness in combination with repeated portrayal of the out-group as severely dehumanized, inferior or evil. Consequently, many non-Arabs who were employed by the Janjaweed quit when violence against civilian non-Arabs increased. Suggesting that they might not have been perceived as, or felt like, part of the “actual” in-group and thus not have taken part in abuses to the same extent. Thus the majority of the Janjaweed, who committed abuses, likely had high group cohesion. This might be an interesting and contrasting finding about gang rape and social cohesion, as Cohen (2013a) previously has argued that the form is more prevalent in groups with low cohesion.

Janjaweed sometimes expressed racially motivated statement and slurs, while targeting women who were perceived to belong to African tribes, and the same tribal groups as the rebels, i.e. Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa (UN Feb 2005, 139; US Department of State 2004 & 2007; HRW April 2005, 5; HRW world report 2006, 140). Perpetrators sometimes referred to women as “slaves”, “blacks” and women of the *Torabora*⁴. Victims were told that their husbands and sons would be killed, that they were “taken as wives”, raped or mutilated because they were black, or Africans (UN Feb 2005, 93-100, 139; AI July 2004, 23; HRW April 2004, 29; HRW August 2004, 17).

The violent campaign was perceived as overtly racist, according to a testimony, the government was perceived to want to put Arabs in the villages (HRW May 2004, 10). Similarly, others have suspected the Janjaweed of making of “Arab babies” as a policy instrument targeting the fabric of society (Flint and De Waal 2005, 107-109). Amnesty International suspected that confinement of women, as sex slaves, had a secondary intention of ensuring that women became pregnant, but no evidence to supports this (AI July 2004, 12).

A Sudanese soldier describes that soldiers were ordered to kill everyone, and to destroy everything, when attacking a village (Cockett 2016, 187-188). They were even ordered to poison the wells, to ensure that potential survivors eventually die. The soldier described how the violence was intended to clear the population out of the area and that raping was a compulsory and ordered activity. The soldier explained how the Janjaweed

⁴ *Tora bora* is a reference to rebels groups in Afghanistan hiding in the Tora Bora Mountains and was used as degrading nickname for the rebel groups as they hid in the caves in Jebel Marra, but there is no suggestion of a connection to al Qaeda (HRW November 2004, 26-27).

would shout, “Kill the slaves!” and “Kill the blacks!” during attacks. He also claimed that the Janjaweed intended to impregnate women with children “of their colour” (Cockett 2016, 187-189). When rapes resulted in pregnancy the victims often experienced intense social stigma as well as physical and emotional trauma (UN Feb 2005, 93-100; AI July 2004). AI (July 2004, 12) reported a testimony of a witness to the murder of a pregnant woman, who was killed by Janjaweed because she carried “the child of an enemy”.

The repertoire of Janjaweed, matches the indicators for the *instrumental* outcome conceptualized in the theory, i.e. targeting of “enemy collaborators” and people perceived as “Africans” intended to destroy society and clear people out of an area. Location and timing is often connected to attack and in their own camps. However, they also practiced various forms that initially seemed *opportunistic*. For instance, the road to refuge was very dangerous for women, as Janjaweed soldiers were known to rape non-Arab women in checkpoints, roadblocks or in fields (UN Feb 2005; AI July 2004; HRW May 2004, 34). Some actually likened the IDP camps in Sudan to “prisons”, as they are controlled and patrolled by GoS and anyone leaving risked being subjected to violence by Janjaweed, or other criminal elements. Men were often killed, while women collecting firewood or water, or attending the market were at high risk of rape. Non-Arabs were reportedly targeted to stop them from leaving the camps, which restricted IDP’s freedom of movement (UN Feb 2005, 93-101; HRW May 2004, 34- 42 & July 2004, 9; HRW April 2004; HRW Feb 2006, 14; AI July 2004). According to the charges against President Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir by the ICC in 2008, people inside IDP camps were subjected to a “slow death” from malnutrition, rape etc. (Mamdani 2009, 271). Even if the timing and incidents found are usually considered as *opportunistic*, the suspected element of intent would suggest that at least some of the sexual violence surrounding IDP camps and on roads committed by Janjaweed might have a tactical purpose, thus also being *instrumental*.

Due to the widespread and systematic nature of the sexual violence, leadership both within the Janjaweed and the government could not plausibly deny it, whether it was ordered, or not. There were also reports of local Janjaweed leaders being present during attacks where multiple rapes were committed (UN Feb 2005, 35). Numerous witnesses, including former GoS soldiers, described that the leader Musa Hilal was present in several attacks where rapes and other crimes were committed (HRW Dec 2005, 88). This implies the strategy of the Janjaweed might have indeed included sexual violence, as a weapon of war, since the violence seemingly corresponds well with their racist ideology as will be outlined in the next section.

Ideology

According to scholars, the ideology of the Janjaweed is heavily rooted in the Arab supremacy organization *Tajamu al Arabi*, which translates “Arab Gathering” or “Arab Congress” (Haggar 2007, 114; Flint & De Waal, 2005, 33-63; Hastrup 2012, 98-99). The Arab Gathering made themselves known in 1987 by publishing an open letter in an independent newspaper, making political demands as well as supremacist claims about power distribution and representation (Flint & De Waal 2005, 52). The Janjaweed can be seen as the tool for the organization to enact its policy of creating an “Arab belt” (Haggar 2007, 114; Flint & De Waal, 2005, 33-63; Hastrup 2012, 98-99). Haggar (2007, 114) as well as Flint and De Waal (2005, 40-60) further confirms this through their uncovering of internal documents from the Arab Gathering referring to the plans, policy and connection to the Janjaweed (Natsios 2012, 125). Natsios (2012, 126) also agrees that the Arab Gathering eventually organized and led the Janjaweed in the Darfur conflict. Similarly, statements collected by Hastrup (2012, 78-101) point to the Janjaweed being viewed an extended tool for Arab Gathering policy. The most prominent leader of the Janjaweed was Musa Hilal, who was also at that time the leader of the Arab Gathering (Flint & De Waal 2005, 38).

Systematic set of ideas

According to Haggar (2007, 130-139) two documents in particular illustrates the ideology and agenda of the Janjaweed. The first document is a manifesto referred to as the “Qoresh 2”, which is a newer edition of “Qoresh 1”, the manifesto of the Arab Gathering from the late 1980’s. This was the “basic” battle plan for Janjaweed, according to Flint and De Waal (2005, 33-63). “Qoresh 2” re-states commitment to the earlier ideas and develops the aims and strategies in greater detail (Haggar 2007, 130-139; Flint & De Waal 2005, 53).

The second document is a report of the Coordination Council of the Arab Gathering from November 2003. The report summarizes meetings, held by their political committee, with different Arab leaders throughout the region, and unveils the ideological framework and coordination plan according to Haggar (2007, 130-139). The development of the Qoresh manifesto indicates a consistency in their ideological framework as core ideas remained and was developed over time, rather than changed. Although the notion of Arab superiority had existed in the region for centuries, it was first in the early 1980’s that this idea was developed into an ideology with a militaristic agenda, as proclaimed by the Arab Gathering in Darfur (Flint & De Waal 2005, 51).

Objective and constituency

The core idea and intent by the Arab congress, as stated in their report from 2003's meetings, is to pursue the idea of "Arab unity" with strength and clarity. Core ideas must also be spread throughout Sudan, and the name "Darfur" must be changed (since it means the home of the "Fur"), among other things (Haggar 2007, 133-134; Flint & De Waal 2005, 51). Although the "Qoresh 2" mostly contains elaborate racist claims, it also outlines the agenda for taking power (Flint & De Waal 2005, 52). In a secret directive issued by Hilal's headquarter in August 2004, obtained by Flint and De Waal (2005, 38-39), the objective of the Arab congress is to "change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes".

Resources should be distributed primarily among their constituency. For instance, they note that pastures are to be secured, as many Arab tribes are herders. They mention that the "petroleum issue" should not be raised before extraction, according to the "Qoresh 2" (Haggar 2007, 130-139). Leaving the issue of oil and revenue distribution to a time when their other objectives have been fulfilled. This seems like a tactical decision, rather than something put aside for later by chance. The Arab Gathering report states that there shall be an insurance of equitable sharing of resources under the expected peace agreement, but not what that specifically entails according to Haggar (2007, 134). The Arab Gathering called for a political system with decentralization of power and regional administrative reform. Furthermore, Arab tribes should hold 50 per cent of all governmental positions in the region (Flint & De Waal 2005, 52). Seemingly, they connect their overall goals directly to their constituency of Arab tribes in many ways, common goods as well as distribution of resources and power. Arab Gathering meeting report states that unification success will be achieved within the context of "religion, *Shari'a*, and Islamic goodness" (Haggar 2007, 133-134). Thus indicating that they might not be seeking a secular society, although it is not clear.

The Arab Gathering clearly distinguished Arab tribes as their audience. In their first public statement they explained that Arabs should hold power due to them being socially, politically and economically "predominant" (Flint & De Waal 2005, 52). In their agenda, among other things, they also listed election preparations, securing of land, pastures. Also, empowerment for their constituency in the wider region, which they refer to as Qoreshians and all nomads, in the "Qoresh 2" (Haggar 2007, 130-139; Flint & De Waal 2005, 52-63). In this document they also identify that the current ruling elites, Jaaliyeen, Shaigiyya and Danagla, are obstacles to their objectives, as they are "half-caste" race and culture, mixed with Nubian-Egyptian, pretending to be Arabs (Haggar 2007, 130-139; Flint & De Waal

2005, 52-63). Which again emphasizes their racist ideology and states who benefits, and not from their policy. It also refers to groups outside their own as obstacles to reaching collective goals (Hagggar 2007, 130-139). This implies a clear identification of the “in-group” as well as the “out-group” based on their broader policy and agenda.

Program of action

The “Qoresh 2” divides internal and external actions to be taken in order to reach objectives. One of these actions is to continue pretending to cooperate with “present authorities” and secretly infiltrate all government institutions (Hagggar 2007, 130-139; Flint & De Waal 2005, 53). They also have ideas of which groups to coordinate with, whom to invite to join the “peace forces” and what non-Arabs to collaborate with for tactical advantages (Flint & De Waal 2005, 53; Hagggar 2007, 130-139). They also state the need to avoid and eradicate internal conflicts (Hagggar 2007, 130-139), which indicate some internal of division along tribal lines. In the meeting report, several recommendations are made, and agreed upon with local leader and politicians, regarding the implementation of Arab unity in the country, for instance, to spread the ideas among university students and the “comprehension and organization of executive political work” as well as “strict secrecy” (Hagggar 2007, 135). The internal steps in the plan described in “Qoresh 2” include the establishment of economic institutions and to educate and prepare skilled people in different sectors, including economic, political and security (Hagggar 2007, 130-139).

The “Qoresh 2” prohibits mentioning “the state of Baggara” (which is an Arabic people considered legitimate owners of the land) and “take care” about positive information (Hagggar 2007, 139; Flint & De Waal 2005, 53). In the early stages of their campaign the Arab Gathering secretly distributed leaflets, cassettes etc. spreading the message that Arabs should take over governance. Speakers would urge the population to prepare to use force if necessary (Flint & De Waal 2005, 51). Which indicates that although it might not have been written down, they implicitly prepared for, and tolerated, violence early on. Later, the organization of Arab militias into the fighting force, Janjaweed, suggests that violence was indeed one of their “methods”.

The timeline specified in the “Qoresh 2” sets 2020 as the time when collective goals must be reached, and explains that the present phase involves all six regions of western Sudan (Hagggar 2007, 130-139; Flint & De Waal 2005, 52-65). Thus, suggesting that phases are outlined, time bound and followed up on. It also states re-commitment to plans, program and methods (Hagggar 2007, 130-139; Flint & De Waal 2005, 52-63).

Assuming that “present authorities” refers to the GoS, I would argue that this supports the need to study pro-government militias ideology and agendas as separate from the government, even if they appear to collaborate and conduct operations together. Haggar (2007) further argues that *Janjaweedism* was spread to the extent that it could even be considered to have affected government policy and actions. This was achieved through an infiltration policy and the gradual integration of many Janjaweed into the armed forces and other security institutions. Hence, making it impossible for the GoS to disarm the Janjaweed without in fact surrendering all control of Darfur (Haggar 2007, 139). This is an interesting interpretation of the government and the Janjaweed’s relationship, and although I found no more evidence to support Haggar’s suggestion, it indicates that the Janjaweed ideology was strongly implemented.

Spreading ideas and recruitment

Flint and De Waal (2005, 51) explained how the Arab Gathering was using pamphlets, cassettes and speakers etc. in the beginning of their campaign, but later on I found no discussion or indicators on this. Among the leadership the extensive meetings of the Coordination Council of the Arab Gathering described in the report from 2003 can be seen as means of spreading and adapting ideas to meet requirement from the broader constituency. In the “Qoresh 2” one internal point of action is to join the army and security forces with “great consciousness” (Haggar 2007, 130-139). What this means is not specified, but it could suggest that they were looking for dedicated fighters rather than “opportunists”. In the late 1990’s the government and Janjaweed recruited volunteers on an ethnic basis, despite the understanding that ethnic mobilisation would have dire long-term consequences (Flint & De Waal 2005, 102).

Around 2001, following the initial mobilisation of the SLM/A, Janjaweed expanded their recruitment into other countries. The government then sponsored and facilitated the training of new recruits (Flint & De Waal 2005, 64-65; Mamdani 2009, 256; Cockett 2016, 190-191). New recruits, although paid monthly, were told that they could keep all loot except cash and heavy weapons, also that all civilians from the same tribal groups as the rebels were to be considered as targets (Flint & De Waal 2005, 40). Mamdani (2009, 257-259) argues that Janjaweed soldiers relied solely on looting and robbery, and many opted to leave the Janjaweed and join the PDF in order to get paid, while continuing to loot and rob for supplementary income. Consequently, there seems to be disagreement on whether or not Janjaweed recruits got paid. Human Rights Watch (April 2004, 24) was told by trusted

sources that recruit received an initial fee of about 100-400 U.S. dollars, plus a guarantee for continued family support after a death in battle. They also received a monthly pay, exceeding that of government soldiers as well as supplies of sugar, oil, arms, uniforms, communication equipment's and government ID cards, according to documents captured by SLM/A in December 2003 (HRW April 2004, 24).

In testimonies Janjaweed soldiers listed money and the promise of loot as strong motivations for participating in brutal attacks (Cockett 2016, 190). The initial training apparently went on for about a month, the recruits were given salary, weapons and a horse. They were taught to believe that the killing was "right and just", according to a defector (Cockett 2016, 190-191). Economic incentives were likely prevalent in recruitment, in combination with ethnic selection. They also had units with non-Arabs, which were often selected to engage directly with rebels rather than participate in attacks on civilians. Due to increased abuses, more and more non-Arabs defected from the Janjaweed forces, and some joined the rebellion instead (Flint 2007, 150-155).

Musa Hilal, apparently also had supplementary ways of filling his ranks, such as having the government release men from prison to join the Janjaweed (Flint & De Waal 2005, 104). During an attack in Tawila, Musa Hilal supposedly gave Arab people the option of joining the movement instead of being killed (Flint & De Waal 2005, 38). Eyewitnesses further place Hilal at the scene of brutal attacks, where rape, killing and torture were committed. Hilal is also described as a key recruiter and coordinator (HRW Dec 2005, 88).

Mamdani (2009, 256) argues that Janjaweed were more like unorganized criminal gangs and bandits, with own resources and autonomy of command. Also, that they were not in fact an ideologically driven force, or the armed wing of an ideologically motivated movement, rather opportunists founded bandit type of gangs who changed alliances as the conditions changed. He builds this argument emphasizing the economic incentives, motivating fighters to change allegiance from Janjaweed to the PDF, which relies on an old conscript kind of system (Mamdani 2009, 257-259). The PDF was created in the late 1980's to be an Islamist force for the new government following a coup in 1989. The training of PDF was supposedly more ideological and religious than anything else, which is a major difference to the regular GoS forces according to Mamdani (2009, 257-259).

Eventually, the government started to recruit Janjaweed fighters as Sudanese commanders realized that Darfurian soldiers were unreliable, due to their connection to the civilian population (Natsios 2012, 141-143). Janjaweed however were considered difficult to

train, undisciplined and most were illiterate. Another reason to recruit them might have been to exercise better control over them (Natsios 2012, 141-143).

There seems to be no clear strategy of socializing ideas, although such training was anticipated by the theory to even out differences in motivations or incentives for individuals to join. An interesting finding though, is the fluidity and overlap between the Janjaweed, PDF and GoS soldiers as they apparently both train together and fight together, and all three components seems to have perpetrated sexual violence (AI July 2004). There was also some interesting cross-recruitment, as many Janjaweed were sequentially incorporated in the PDF and regular army (AI July 2004). They were often co-located as the Janjaweed and the Sudanese army share several camps, and there are numerous reports of coordinated attacks on civilians launched from these sites (HRW World Report 2005, 168). These findings support that behaviours are socialized between combatants and spread through shared social practices and spaces, even if there are no strategies to do so in a strict manner. As is also argued by Cohen and Nordås (2015) who found in a previous study that militias that are trained by government forces are more prone to commit sexual violence. When and how certain behaviours arise, might still be an issue of ideological foundation, although there is no evidence of active political education in this case to support this. Ideas about gender and gender roles are not discussed in any of the literature reviewed for the purpose of this study. Nonetheless, the overtly racist agenda and ideology of the Janjaweed leadership corresponds to the racial slurs and continuous dehumanization of rape victims.

In sum, the Janjaweed have been found to practice an *instrumental* repertoire of sexual violence, while their ideology had many of the *stronger* characteristics from the theoretical conceptualization. The findings on this group seemingly support the hypothesized relationship. Even if the suggested indicators for the causal mechanism could not be found, other implications about rape as a social practice was suggested, which might help further theory development.

Sudan's Liberation Movement / Army

In 2000, representatives of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit groups recognised that they faced many of the same struggles, agreeing eventually that the GoS was the common enemy, and started to organize. They carried out a first attack in February 2003, shortly before they officially adopted the name of SLM/A (Brosché 2008, 11; Flint & De Waal 2005).

Repertoire of Sexual Violence

From the beginning in 2003, there were generally very few reported instances of conflict related sexual violence committed by any of the rebel forces (UN Feb 2005, 93; AI Feb 2004, 25). However, Amnesty collected testimonies in an IDP camp where people from nomadic groups specifically pointed out SLM/A fighters as perpetrators of both rapes and killings, although context is not specified (AI Nov 2004, 37). The UN also received reports of very few incidents. One report describes a case from November 2004 where five girls were abducted during a hijacking and held for three days, during which they were reported to have been subjected to sexual violence (UN Feb 2005, 101). Human rights watch (Nov 2004, 33-34) received reports of an incident where fighters from SLM/A raped eight unmarried women in June 2004 near a town, although they could not verify it (HRW Nov 2004, 33-34).

Although incidence of rape was low, there were several reports of abductions and in some cases killings of civilians in retaliatory attacks on villages and, committed by rebel groups where sexual violence is not mentioned. In one case, rebels from SLM/A stopped some commercial buses and detained and abused Arab passengers. Attacks and abductions of humanitarian workers and convoys are also reported, but incidents did not include any sexual violence (AI Nov 2004, 37; AI 2006, 242; US Department of State 2005; UN Sep 2005, 1; UN June 2005, 2; HRW Nov 2004, 32-34). SLM/A attacked policemen and customs offices, buildings and supplies, while sometimes carefully avoiding civilian casualties (US Department of State 2004 & 2005; UN Feb 2005, 74-75; HRW Nov 2004, 37). Vehicles were sometimes attacked at illegal SLM/A checkpoints, civilians were abducted and cattle stolen (HRW Nov 2004, 32-36).

Although abductions of civilians declined in September 2005 according to the UN (Sep 2005), some “elements” of the SLM/A committed violent acts, including looting and extortion. The SLM/A conducted violent attacks on villages, sometimes driven by retaliation, and killed civilians (UN Dec 2004, 3; HRW Nov 2004, 32-34). The UN was especially concerned with the number of attacks on humanitarian workers and supplies, many attributed to SLM/A (UN April 2005 & Jan 2005, 10 & Dec 2004).

Although reported incidence of rape was low, SLM/A fighters were implicated in some very serious cases. Similarly, the general violence against civilians varied widely, and the UN implied that some “elements” are more violent than others. Thus, indicating variation across sub-units. Due to the low number of reports it is hard to definitely identify their repertoire is. There is no indication of instrumental use, as the reported cases are connected to hijackings and near towns, not to attacks or inferred targeting. The cases mentioned where

several victims were raped at the same time, and when victims were abducted, would be considered as *opportunistic*. Furthermore, it would have taken all perpetrators consent or agreement to execute, indicating a level of acceptance in the implicated sub-unit, hence there was internal tolerance and social acceptance, while the sexual violence served no organizational purpose. This conclusion is also supported by the lack of witness testimonies mentioning connection to attacks or conflict dynamics. Since the information available is too unclear, there is also a possibility that there is *no practice*. However, underreporting is deemed more likely.

After the break-up and the Abuja agreement

Following the so-called “Haskanita conference” in November 2005, the movement split into factions, the major ones were SLM/A AW (Abdul Wahid) and SLM/A MM (Minni Minnawi) (Brosché 2008, 28-31). In May 2006 the leader of one breakout faction, Minnawi, signed the Abuja Peace agreement, which the other faction and JEM declined. Minnawi gained a position in the government and his fighters joined with the government forces, against the insurgency (Flint 2007, 140-150; Brosché 2008, 28-31). After the split, and the subsequent signing of the peace agreement abuses by rebel forces increased, most violence was attributed to SLM/A MM.

After the break-up the MM faction and the AW faction fought each other frequently, apparently in order to gain and control of territory. According to the HRW (World report 2007, 160) both groups were responsible for killings, torture and rape of civilians “perceived to be supporters of the other faction”. The UN further accused the Minnawi faction to cause increased displacement. AI also claims that the Minnawi faction were killing and raping civilians. Some were seen more or less as bandits, committing murder, robbery, rape and abusing alcohol. Minnawi’s troops supposedly entered IDP camps to loot and threaten civilians (Flint 2007, 154, 170-172). By March 2006 people were referring to the Minnawi faction as “Janjaweed 2” because the frequency of raping and killing (De Waal 2007, 159; Flint 2007, 170-172; Brosché 2008, 49).

Amnesty International (2006) reported that between 4 and 8 July, close to 200 people were killed or injured, and 39 women were raped, in targeted attacks against civilians. Attackers were members of the Minnawi faction, supported by GoS forces and Janjaweed. Following the agreement, the MM faction continuously attacked bases of other SLM/A factions and civilians; those who refused to signed the agreement (AI 2006; Flint 2007, 150-170; Brosché 2008, 49). The SLM/A MM was also reported to have clashed with JEM (AI

2007). In September 2006, four IDP Masalit women collecting grass were reportedly surrounded by SLM/A MM armed men. They were beaten and gang raped, and their donkeys were stolen (US Department of State 2007).

The *opportunistic* sexual violence seems to have increased, especially by the SLM/A MM faction. There are also some interesting indicators on *instrumental* use, specifically the targeting of those who are perceived to oppose the peace agreement. This development co-occurred with the leadership's decision to join the GoS side. Consequently, fighting together with forces that routinely commit sexual violence might have affected the norms within the MM faction, by silently sanctioning a behaviour that was not as widely tolerated before.

Ideology

Abdel Wahid Mohamed al Nur of the Fur tribal group was the original leader, or chairman of the SLM/A, and his leadership was apparently chaotic (Flint 2007, 140-150, 163-164; Hastrup 2012, 103; Natsios 2012, 146-148). Joining different tribal groups under one umbrella would have been a challenge regardless of leadership, but impossible under Wahid, who is described as erratic, disorganized and isolated in his decision-making (Flint 2007, 140-150, 163-164). He has also been described as a man who “lacks vision” (Brosché 2008, 26).

The three main tribal groups each had a representative among the leadership. Wahid as the chairman, chosen by the Fur, and Abdalla Abaker, the Zaghawa who was elected chief of staff, both agreed that the enemy was the GoS, not the Arabs. A Masalit was to be appointed as deputy chairman, but this did not actually happen until three years later when Khamis Abakir filled the position (Flint 2007, 140-150; Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). The SLM/A lacked proper organizational structure from the beginning, which made command and control impossible to maintain, as the SLM/A continues to be divided along tribal lines. The leadership never managed, or tried, to reconcile this (Flint 2007, 150-172). There were divisions at the top combined with constantly shifting allegiances at lower levels (Flint 2007, 140-150; Natsios 2012, 146-148; Brosché 2008, 35-36).

As a young man Wahid was active in a conservative Islamic order, but as an adult he is said to have rejected ideology, believing that citizenship rather than ideology, must be the foundation of a country (Flint 2007, 143-144). The SLM/A did not have very good access to resources and external support (Flint 2007, 140-150). However, Wahid had a relationship to the SPLA and its leader, Johan Garang. Deeper links with the SPLA were persistently denied, but according to Flint & De Waal (2005, 81), Garang was the one who convinced Wahid to

create and publish a political manifesto because otherwise the government would call them “thieves and robbers”, also to announce themselves as a political movement rather than anti-Arab militia (Flint & De Waal 2005, 81; Mamdani 2009, 250).

Wahid eventually published a manifesto, much resembling SPLA’s ideology and likely co-authored by SPLA senior members (Flint 2007, 163; Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88; Mamdani 2009, 250; UN Jan 2005). Building on SPLA’s Johan Garang’s ideas, the manifesto called for “New Sudan” and ethnic inclusiveness. Garang wanted assurance that Wahid’s movement did not have separatist intentions, which supposedly inspired the change from the original name “Darfur liberation front” (Mamdani 2009, 269). The influence of Garang and the SPLA was not widely appreciated in the movement, especially among some Zaghawa commanders who accused the SPLA of exacerbating the tribal divide within SLM/A to be able to exert control over it (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88).

Minni Arkoy Minnawi started out as the secretary to the first chief of staff, Abaker, who was killed in 2004. Minnawi tried to raise his own position within the movement from the very beginning. In November 2005 he held a conference, with a small non-representative group of SLM/A members from his own Zaghawa tribe. He was elected “chairman” of the SLM/A, causing a split with the larger movement (Flint 2007, 140-150). Wahid was supposedly unaware of his own fragile position up until Minnawi’s coup (Flint 2007, 140-150). Flint does not attribute any statements of “political vision” to Minnawi, who seemed to despise intellectuals and politicians alike and be obsessed with rooting out “enemies from within” (Flint 2007, 155-172). Minnawi wished to portray himself as a “revolutionary” leader, but did not present much of a political agenda and mostly relied on his relatives for advice (Flint 2007, 140-157). Minnawi’s appointment to the government in 2006 was very unpopular, although he was apparently never popular to begin with (Flint 2007, 140-156; Hastrup 2012, 66). Nonetheless, his appointment might be attributed to his faction’s military strength, international backing and his own ruthlessness (Flint 2007, 140-150). Flint (2007, 171) suggests that perhaps Minnawi signed the Darfur Peace Agreement because he made a simple calculation of force. The agreement was seen as flawed since it did neither address the root causes nor fair division of political power. Signing it can be seen as an indicator that Minnawis political agenda was not very consistent (Brosché 2008, 28-29).

In an interview years later, Wahid described how mobilization was a response to the Islamism of Khartoum and the regime (Hastrup 2012, 111-115). This statement illustrates how resistance came first, and ideology second, for the SLM/A (Flint 2007, 160; Hastrup 2012, 111-115). Khamis Abakir, the Masalit leader, is not described as well versed in the art

of politics or political ideas either, rather as a firm believer in justice with no alternatives left but to fight (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88).

Although ideology does not necessarily need to be original the leadership should at least promulgate it. Based on these observations the leadership message is unclear, and focusing on resistance rather than political change. And the shift in allegiance represented by Minnawis signing of the Abuja Agreement, can also be considered as an indicator of weak commitment. The adoption of a manifesto and a political agenda might be viewed as an act of convenience rather than conviction, according to Flint and De Waal (2005, 66-88).

Systematic set of ideas

In the 1990's, before they became SLM/A and published their manifesto, Wahid and his colleagues started raising funds and support among the Furs in Darfur under the auspices of "area defence" against the Janjaweed. Apparently, he kept his intent of fighting the government secret, as well as the subsequent mobilisation (Flint 2007, 140-150).

Later, in peace talks, the factions wanted to present a unified front to the international community and the GoS, while they suffered from violent internal conflicts. In 2004 many young rebels died in a very violent clash between Zaghawa and Fur (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). Internal critics argued that the leadership divide was "confusing the movements political message" and that they should declare two or more movements, which subsequently happened (Flint & De Waal 2005, 87). The UN (May 2005) also felt that the internal divisions, in all rebel groups at the time, affected their ability to participate the political process in a coherent and consistent manner

Following the Darfur Peace agreement in 2006 a new group within the SLM/A, calling themselves "The group of nineteen" or G-19, emerged with the purpose of reuniting the rebel movement. They opposed the abusive behaviour of Minnawi and the peace agreement. They became the strongest ground force, in an alliance with JEM and another rebel group of Arab Darfurians, Popular Forces Army, as they recognized a need for inclusiveness (Flint 2007, 166-67). However, they failed to establish political and military structures, and soon found their forces targeted by Minnawi and GoS forces. However, they were joined by some more commanders and subsequently changed their name to SLA-Unity (Flint 2007, 168-169).

The official political message of the movement has seemingly changed over time. It started out as self defence, continued with a manifesto adopted based on SPLA's ideology and then split into movements with very different stances and allegiances. Together with the

apparent failure of the Abuja agreement, that Minnawi signed and after which Wahid left the country, their core ideas did not seem to remain very stable over time or to be particularly consistent, despite the existence of a written manifesto.

Objective and constituency

The collaborative efforts between the Fur and the Zaghawa had struggles already in 2002, as there were disagreements on whether government forces or to the Arab militias were the enemy (Flint 2007, 140-150). The alliance was not self-evident, as the Arab Gathering originally identified the Zaghawas as a potential constituency. Zaghawas on the other hand had a history of clashing with both Arab groups and Furs (Flint & De Waal 2005, 73). The Zaghawas initially felt that the Arabic militias were the problem, as they competed for water resources, and mobilized for self-defence reasons (Flint 2007, 140-150; Flint & De Waal 2005, 73). Following attacks by the army, keeping them from the wells, they shifted focus to the government (Flint 2007, 140-150). According to Mamdani (2009, 251) the government focus might have been tactical, supposedly inspired by Garang (Mamdani 2009, 251).

Although the group reportedly opposed marginalization, real proposals for how they intended to change this, and organize society, took a long time in the making, as the movement started from a pure resistance stance (Flint 2007, 160-170). The subsequent manifesto states for example that “religion belongs to the individual” and that Arab tribes are an integral part of society in Darfur who also has been marginalized by Khartoum (Flint 2007, 160-170; Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). Similarly to the ideas of SPLA the manifesto also calls for equitable distribution of power and wealth (Flint 2007, 160-170; Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). In a press release in 2003 the SLM/A also stated that they fought for a secular and decentralised state (Flint 2007, 160-170; Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88; Idris 2013,106-107). Broadly, the political agenda of SLM/A was to create a secular liberal democratic, and united Sudan (Hastrup 2012, 111-115; Idris 2013,106-107).

The primary members of SLM/A, were the Zaghawa, Fur and smaller elements of Masalit, which respectively had representatives in the leadership of the SLM/A (Flint 2007, 140-150; Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). In a press release 2003 following a series of attacks again GoS target, SLM/A leadership announced that they were fighting to protect farmers from attacks, inequality and underdevelopment. Although farmers traditionally have been members of African tribal groups mostly, it is not quite the whole picture (Flint & De Waal 2005; Flint 2007). SLM/A therefore strived for inclusiveness, realising that Arab tribal groups were also an integral part of society (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). The SLM/A stated that

they want unity and acknowledgement of all peoples right to self-determination and the diversity of the country. SLM/A wanted to build a better country by addressing unequal distribution of resources and marginalization (Idris 2013, 106-107).

Despite the formulation of clear political goals there seems to have been lack in the communication of those to the wider populations. Hastrup (2012, 105-106, 115-124) interviewed refugees in Chad and found that they were not aware of the rebel group's goals and there was no active contact and recruitment going on at that time. Brosché (2008, 26) found that former SLM/A fighters perceived that Wahid would only focused on communicating with IDP's, and not at all on the fighters. Leadership seemingly focused on their respective tribal groups, for instance a cultural centre for Furs was set up in Khartoum, apparently a front for fundraising and political activity (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). Both Wahid and Minnawi spent much time in new headquarters abroad in 2004, seeking international assistance and support, while disregarding their commanders' actions and abuses on the ground (Flint 2007, 150-155; Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). There was not much effort put into communicating progress, activities or agendas to the Darfurian population, or even to their own cadre (Flint 2007, 160-170).

Program of action

Due to the oppressive policies of the GoS and lack of freedom of expression the leadership of SLM/A saw no other option but armed struggle. This was the means to achieve their goals as "Khartoum only talks to those who have arms"⁵ (AI Aug 2004; Flint 2007, 160-170; Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). Interestingly, many actions taken by Zaghawa commanders were made under false pretence, according to Flint (2007, 152). She describes how Zaghawa commanders claimed to do one thing, and then secretly did another, such as moving forces or the construction of an airstrip. The group received support from some SPLA officers with the purpose of training their recruits, but instead the SPLA officers served as advisors on military operations, and were reportedly very concerned with the cross-tribal tensions and indiscipline within the SLM/A ranks (Flint 2007, 152).

Just six months after the Zaghawa and Fur had joined forces, they experienced vast problems controlling the violence among by their troops; some elements reportedly looted and abused civilians (Flint 2007, 140-150). The movement grew very fast in the beginning, resulting in lack of logistics, supplies and command and control systems, as they were not

⁵ Abdel Wahed Mohamed Nur, President of the SLM/A, during a public meeting in Berlin, 16 June 2004. Quoted in: AI Aug 2004.

dimensioned to match the needs. This likely exacerbated problems with discipline, and some rebels resorted to pillaging (Flint 2007, 150-155). According to Flint (2007, 150-155) the SLM/A commanders did not make much efforts to enforce discipline, and due to deep divisions and subdivision within the movements leadership they were likely unable (Flint 2007, 140-150; Natsios 2012, 146-148; Brosché 2008, 35-36). Commanders would eventually operate and act as they preferred in their respective areas, while Wahid and Minnawi fought each other for power (Flint 2007, 140-150; Natsios 2012, 146-148). Alcohol abuse further aggravated the problems and fighters would commit abuses under the influence, including rape. According to Flint (2007, 150-155) this especially applied to Minnawi's men. Some Zaghawa forces tried to impose taxes over locals and assert domination over Fur areas, they killed and raped many Fur civilians before they were eventually defeated (Flint 2007, 150-155).

Many deserted the movement in early 2005, due to poor leadership, rogue commanders and increasingly abusive behaviour by fellow soldiers (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). Bad behaviour and indiscipline likely occurred in some parts and sub-units of the movement, while in other parts it was not acceptable, and many soldiers did not want to take part in abuses. Consequently, this violence seems highly opportunistic and unregulated; there is no evidence that these types are prescribed by the organization. Flint (2007, 155-172) explains that the Zaghawa forces leader Minnawi was a firm believer in violence as the solution to everything, and instilled this sense in his commanders too. An encouraging attitude towards violence in general would unlikely alleviate problems with abusive troops and commanders.

There seem to have been no apparent steps in their plan. According to Hastrup (2012, 111-115) the perception of some locals living under SLM/A control was that anything considered outside the SLM/A agenda, would be considered "government", and might be attacked. The SLM/A's methods and rationale for their actions might be a consequence of the *ad hoc* nature of the rebellion (Hastrup 2012, 111-115). Even if they wanted to be seen as a legitimate political movement, SLM/A lacked any structure for debating and deciding on political issues (Flint 2007, 160-170; Brosché 2008, 35-36). The chairman Wahid also lacked the ability to capitalize on opportunities, and to build institutions from where a political agenda could have been enacted if their ideas had been more consistent (Flint 2007, 163; Brosché 2008, 35-36; Flint & De Waal 2005, 90; Tom, 2013).

Spreading ideas and recruitment

When the Janjaweed increased their abuses against civilians, many non-Arabs defected and joined the rebellion instead (Flint 2007, 150-155; Flint & De Waal 2005, 33-65). Many non-Arab government forces and police also defected to join SLM/A, following many year of discrimination. This happened especially after attacks on villages and civilians from their own groups (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). Consequently, the movement grew very rapidly at a very early stage, and many recruits were driven by revenge (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). The order of prioritization in the movement, resistance before ideology, might also reflect recruits joining: revenge rather than political change.

There is no indication that ideological reasons were invoked for the recruitment, although it seems mostly voluntary. Frustration over injustice and need for revenge seem to be a common reasons to join. Due to the division of camps within the movement people would join their own tribal group (Flint & De Waal 2005, 66-88). This also suggests that volunteering happened based on previous group attachments, rather than ideological or even economic incentives. Part of the group identity might be formed before socialization in camps, as suggested by the theory. Ideas, values and of out-group and in-group identities would be based on previously existing constructions, since there seem to be a lack strong ideology to even out differences in individual motivations, resulting in variation and inconsistent behaviour, ideas and norms across sub-units. For the SLM/A mobilisation came first, and ideology was developed later (Hastrup 2012, 111-115; Flint 2007, 160). Socialization would theoretically commence as soon as new recruits join, and continue and progress over time. If ideology were to be socialized into groups it would have taken an effort, given the pre-existing differences between the tribal groups, and there are no indication of any such efforts. Later on, there is also evidence of brutal forced recruitment of thousands of men and boys from UN supervised camps march in 2006 (HRW World Report 2007, 100). This corresponds to the general increase in violence and abuses, as well as sexual violence against civilian leading up to and following the peace agreement.

Fighters in the AW faction eventually resorted to loot to sustain themselves as Wahid moved to Paris and refused to take part in negotiations following the agreement, which arguably questions his commitment to the struggle for peace in Darfur (Brosché 2008, 44; Hastrup 2012, 111-115; Natsios 2012, 146-148).

To summarize the findings on SLM/A they were found to practice *opportunistic* sexual violence, but lack of information makes this result less reliable. Interestingly enough, some MM elements might have practiced *instrumental* sexual violence as well following the

peace agreement. Their ideology is seemingly *weaker* due to the inconsistent leadership message and lack of commitment to ideas, together with changes in objectives and constituency over time.

Justice and Equality Movement

In the mid 90's, a few members of the Government decided to investigate power imbalance and marginalisation in the country. This resulted in a document called "The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan", which was subsequently distributed secretly in Khartoum in May 2000 (Flint 2007, 150-155; Flint & De Waal 2005, 92-96; Brosché 2008, 12; Hastrup 2012, 115-120). The "Black Book" further identifies, and opposes, Sudan's ruling system based in the hegemony of a few ruling elite Arab groups, Jaaliyeen, Shaigiyya and Danagla (Flint 2007, 150-155; Hastrup 2012, 115-120; Natsios 2012, 125). The publishing group called themselves the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) since 2001, but emerged publicly first after the SLM/A (Flint 2007, 150-155; Flint & De Waal 2005, 92-96; Brosché 2008, 12).

Repertoire of Sexual Violence

The few reported instances of rape committed by rebel forces do not mention any incidents when JEM has been specifically identified as perpetrators (UN Feb 2005,93). The SVAC data-set, which I based my case selection on, coded JEM as "low prevalence" (1 out of 3), which according to the data sheet was based on US Department of state human rights reports (Cohen & Nordås 2016). However, looking into the US Department of states human rights report, it states that "rebel groups", including SLM/A and JEM were responsible for abuses, including looting, killings and rapes, but there are no specification of what groups committed which specific crimes (US Department of State 2004 & 2005 & 2006 & 2007). For my analysis the distinction between which groups loots, kills and commits rape is in focus, making this unspecified finding unreliable.

In other reports, JEM fighters were described committing attacks on humanitarian convoys, unlawful killings and abductions, but no specific mention of sexual violence (AI 2005, 237; UN June 2005, 2, UN Jan 2005, 10; HRW World Report 2006). There was also reported lootings, and even torture of detained persons (AI 2004 81; AI Feb 2004, 25; UN May 2005). JEM conducted attacks on villages, where civilians were killed, and against police, administrative building and militias (UN Dec 2004, 3, April, May & June 2005; HRW

April 2004, 36). The UN received reports that JEM conducted attacks against government forces in urban areas. UN recorded a number of civilian casualties, but there is no mention of sexual violence (UN Feb 2005, 74-75). Both JEM and SLM/A reportedly attacked police, militia and captured commercial and NGO vehicles. The scale suggests that leadership would have sanctioned this violence according to the UN (May 2005). They also intimidated humanitarian workers, restricted freedom of movement, stole cattle and carried out abductions (UN May 2005; HRW World Report 2006).

The reports, which have been used in order to gather the most credible information accessible from online sources, have not reference any specific case of sexual violence involving JEM fighters. This does not mean that none have occurred at all; it might be the result of general and specific reporting issues. Also, none of the books used for information on the independent variable mentioned cases where JEM were implicated as perpetrators of sexual violence. Based on these observations it seems like JEM fighters were *not practising* sexual violence related to the conflict.

Ideology

The leader of the movement, Dr Khalil Ibrahim, had previously served in various positions within the government, including minister positions (Flint 2007, 140-150; Brosché 2008, 12; Hastrup 2012, 115-120; Mamdani 2009, 251). Although JEM eventually had to confront some internal splits, they benefitted from clear structures, politically experienced leadership and a disciplined organization (Flint 2007, 140-150; Flint & De Waal 2005, 92-96; UN May 2005). According to Tom (2013, 9, 41), a scholar and a senior member of JEM, the group also had very skilled and experienced commanders in their ranks. The structure of the organization was similar to that of a European army, and Sudanese military due to the colonial British roots (Tom 2013, 20-21). JEM supposedly had better access to resources than SLM/A, since many prominent members previously held government positions (Flint 2007, 140-150). Since SLM/A was stronger militarily JEM sought to cooperate early on and they conducted some military operations together. However, SLM/A did not want to deepen those ties due to JEM's Islamist roots (Flint 2007, 150-159; Nathan 2007, 256). The relationship further cooled when civilians started to complain about SLM/A forces behaviour (Flint 2007, 150-159).

In an interview in 2008, Ibrahim explained how he envisioned a new United Regions of Sudan. Ibrahim also implied the possibility of religion being a regional concern, meaning

that there is the possibility of a northern region governed by *Shari'a*. His views and visions very much echoed what was stated in the Black book, according to Hastrup (2012, 115-120).

Systematic set of ideas

The Black book is the basic document illustrating the ideological foundation of JEM. It contains their view of society, outlining the political and economic marginalization in Sudan (Flint 2007, 150-155; Flint & De Waal, 2005, 92-96; Brosché, 2008, 12). One year after JEM announced its position as a political movement, they published part two of the Black book where they outlined their political agenda, which included fighting marginalization in some areas of Sudan and a wider national agenda for political change (Flint & De Waal 2005, 92-96). They called for justice, equality and other public goods, such as access to basic services for all Sudanese and human and economic development, without discrimination. They also wanted to see a constitutional reform to ensure all regions participation in ruling the country as well a rotating presidency and a “Unified Sudan” (Flint & De Waal 2005, 92-96).

Objectives and constituency

JEM leaders insisted that connection to the political party the National Islamist Front was in the past (Flint & De Waal 2005, 89). Other perceives their ideology as heavily influenced by political Islam (Hastrup 2012, 111-120; UN Jan 2005). Some doubted that Ibrahim had abandoned his Islamist conviction, especially the SLM/A (Hastrup 2012, 115-120). Also, JEM did not clearly seek a secular system like SLM/A. JEM believed that Muslims have the right to be governed by Islamic principle, including *Shari'a*, while non-Muslims should not be subjected to Islamic law. But they have remained somewhat unclear on this point (Flint 2007, 160-170; Flint & De Waal 2005, 92-96; Idris 2013, 107-108). According to Ibrahim it was not in their interest to implement *Shari'a* law (Idris 2013, 107-108). According to the Black book, JEM sought to change the political system of Sudan into a decentralized federal state with freedom of religion and political thoughts. They also wanted to ensure equitable division of power and wealth (Flint 2007,150-155.)

JEM sought to establish rule of law and called for political pluralism and an independent judiciary system (Flint 2007, 160-170; Flint & De Waal 2005, 92-96). Although many of the movement’s leaders believed that Islamic values would benefit the country, what united them from across the political spectrum was the resentment with the marginalization of some regions, like Darfur (Flint & De Waal 2005, 89). When institutionalizing and codifying their internal structure JEM made a gesture to distance themselves from their Islamist roots.

They changed the customary oath taken by members of the committees, so they commit themselves to “conscience and cause“ instead of “conscience and religion” (Flint & De Waal 2005, 90).

JEM called for a federal and democratic system built on the principle of separation of powers and suggested that six self-governing region would be created, and that the Capital, Khartoum, would have a special seventh region status (Idris 2013, 107-108; Flint 2007, 160-170). They had no independence goals (Idris 2013, 107-108), but they have been criticized for not really addressing the question of inclusive citizenship and diversity, which some say was at the core of the political crisis in Sudan (Idris 2013, 107-108). Considering this critique and the unclear message about secularity and Islam, they seem somewhat inconsistent in their political message, even if their core documented ideas remained and developed over time. According to Tom (2013, 2), their political program had a clear national dimension, even if the group are usually connected to the conflict Darfur. JEM saw national reform and nationally oriented goals as a means to solving the local problems in Darfur (Flint & De Waal 2005, 92-96). There is no clear message about which their constituency are, but most likely they are all people in Sudan. There was no indication of them recruiting or spreading their political messages among the population, according to refugees in Chadian camps (Hastrup 2012, 115-124).

Program of action

According to a later interview with Ibrahim, he thought that peace must come first, and then the armed movement will transform itself into a legitimate political party. He argues that there is no peaceful solution even if it is desirable, as “People are compelled to fight” (Hastrup 2012, 115-120). Tom (2013, 5-7) is an academic anthropologist and also a member and advisor of JEM. He argues that JEM fighters were well trained, fed and disciplined, and has never been know to target unarmed civilians or burned down villages during their military campaign. JEM’s policies apparently included the treatment of war prisoners and non-combatants in accordance with international law (Tom 2013, 32-37). Tom (2013, 29) further described how JEM consciously avoided organizing its military along ethnic lines, in order to avoid the “ethnicisation” it was opposing. In 2005 JEM created strong institutional structures, including a legislative committee, an executive board and general congress (Flint & De Waal 2005, 90; Tom 2013).

Spreading ideas and recruitment

Mansour Arbab, a JEM commander, explained in an interview how they would re-train recruits, even if they have previous military training from GoS force or the SPLA. The reason was to ensure that their recruits have commitment to the “cause” and that they form bonds with their comrades (Tom 2013, 179). Furthermore, JEM lacked capacity to keep fighters against their will, and took no measures to do so since they relied heavily on volunteers, according to Tom (2013, 30). To avoid government spies, volunteers were vetted and put through security tests. Tom (2013, 30-33) believes that this recruitment strategy worked due to the military success of the organization, and that recruits will fight for revenge as well as their ideas. Hastrup’s (2012, 104-105, 124) found that at least some of JEM’s success in mobilisation was not due to political ideas, rather the possibility people saw of getting their cattle and land back after a potential peace agreement (Hastrup 2012, 105-106). According to Tom (2013, 199) JEM relied on a good relationship with locals in order to gather intelligence. Fighters would receive salary and pay for goods instead of looting, possibly to maintain the good relations (Tom 2013, 199).

Ideology does not seem as an active part of recruitment, but it is suggested that recruits undergo training on the policy, values and ideas of the movement, including treatment of civilians. If this were indeed the case it would be considered as supporting the hypothesis. In the Black book⁶ gender is mentioned in the section on defining the state and its authority, as a base for non-discrimination, but not elaborated on. JEM are somewhat unclear about certain things in their political message, but not seemingly inconsistent. They appear strongly committed as ideas remain and develop over time. They established structures to further their agenda and function politically. In sum, JEM had *stronger* ideology, but the theory is not a perfect fit, a moderate category might be added to the theory in the future if one wants to apply a measure to compare. But since it is not a dichotomous variable JEM will likely be found at the stronger end of the scale, while most likely *not practicing* any sexual violence.

⁶ English translation available at <http://www.sudanjem.com/category/english/>

Comparative Analysis

In this section I will continue the analysis and evaluation of the theoretical framework by comparing cases. First, the findings of the specified variables will be compared between the cases. Second, alternative explanation and additional observations will be discussed. Finally, the implications of the research design and its limitations will be considered.

Between Case Comparison

Observations in the material reviewed for this study suggests that all three hypothesized outcomes, or variation, are represented in the case selection, although to different degree of certainty due to lack of information. The Janjaweed displays the clearest repertoire of sexual violence, as their pattern show significant result on indicators for location, timing, intent, form and targeting, thus being considered as *instrumental* according to the theory. An interesting finding indicated that forms of sexual violence theorized to coincide with an opportunistic repertoire, sometimes might have included elements of targeting or intent. For instance encountering's during firewood collection, errands or in fields, as well as checkpoints and close to IDP camp, intended to restrict people's freedom of movement.

JEM's repertoire of sexual violence corresponds to the *no practice* outcome conceptualized in the theory, as no specific reports of JEM fighters engaging in sexual violence were found. SLM/As repertoire on the other hand is the least clear, as underreporting is likely and parts on the movement might have developed and changed their repertoire over time. Based on the few reported incident found they seemingly displayed an *opportunistic* repertoire as there was reported violence against civilians where sexual violence was not perpetrated, and cases were women were abducted or gang raped in connection to robbery and accidental encountering along a road. After Minnawi signed the peace agreement his forces seemingly developed their repertoire of sexual violence further. Minnawi forces were also portrayed as more abusive and undisciplined before, although this is not substantially supported.

Minnawi signed the agreement and the SLM/A MM started operating together with GoS and Janjaweed. Supposedly, Minnawis forces started to conduct operations where "opponents of the peace agreement" were targeted by both lethal and sexual violence, which would be considered as *instrumental* use. Coincidentally, they also started conducting operations together with government and Janjaweed forces. There was no noted shift in political stance, although unclear if Minnawi ever had embraced the existing agenda put

forward by Wahid. It appeared as a tactical, or convenient, move on Minnawis behalf. The behaviours by Minnawis troops following the agreements supports the idea of socialization as a causal mechanism, as troops in theory could have adopted the abusive behaviours, and even the targeting pattern, following association with GoS and Janjaweed troops. This is arguably in line with Nordås and Cohen (2015) finding, that militias that received formalized training by state forces committed sexual violence to similar extent as them, and more so than militias who received no training. Assuming that training in their quantitative study did not include sexual violence as a weapon, it is more likely that behaviours are spread through social practices and discourse in shared spaces. In this case, discourse would presumably include some misogynist language, which can be translated into “locker room talk” for clarity’s sake, i.e. continuous devaluation of women. Although, there is no indication that Minnawi forces adopted the racist ideology of the Janjaweed, the Arab Gathering had initially identified the Zaghawa tribal group as a potential constituency, and they had previous clashed with Fur. It would be interesting to further explore this particular faction, its shift in loyalties as well as behaviour, to trace this process.

Although, Wahid adopted a clear manifesto on behalf of the SLM/A, containing ideas about society, power and resource distribution, he also argued that mobilization and resistance comes first, and that citizenship should come before ideology. It is not all that clear what he meant by this, and it is also suggested that he only adopted the manifest as a political move, inspired by Garang, to gain legitimacy. Their unclear and divided message by leadership, weak commitment and inconsistent ideas, due to the *ad hoc* nature of their ideology and that fractionalization of the movement. Thus, their ideology is perceived as rather *weak* based on the theoretical framework.

According to Cockett (2016, 237-238) both JEM & SLM/A “failed” to develop into credible political groups, and the main difference is personal rather than ideological. However, JEM started out as a political organization before mobilizing, although they were arguably unclear about are seeking a secular system or not. This might of course be intentional, and perhaps of lesser importance than the fact that their core framework remained over time, as seen in the development of the Black book into a second edition. Similar to JEM, the Arab Gathering built on established ideas, from Qoresh 1, by creating a second developed version. This indicates that the core ideas remained over time in both groups. This implies that the theoretical framework might gain form focusing more on consistency rather than clarity of political messages when assessing strength of ideology. Mamdani (2009, 251) also suggest that since JEM had Arab members, and a policy of mixing tribal groups, they are

ideologically cohesive rather than ethnically. This is also a main difference between the Janjaweed and JEM, which seemingly had the *strongest* ideologies. One sought to avoid ethnic divides, while the other had supremacist objectives and recruitment strategies.

Both SLM/A and JEM recruited fighters driven by revenge. It is suggested that JEM implemented ideological training of recruits, but this is not substantially supported. If accurate, this would support the theoretical argument that such training can “even out” individual fighters motivations for joining, e.g. economic or social incentives. There were no further findings about ideological education or purposeful socialization in any of the groups. Based on Cohens (2013a) argument that gang-rape function as a tool for combatant socialization, the high rate of gang rape perpetrated by the Janjaweed in combination with ethnic slurs and racist hate speech could be seen as a manifestation of their supremacist ideology. Thus, reinforcing those ideas and values through socialization. The reports of Janjaweed singing and enjoying themselves while committing rape might also support this argument.

Alternative Explanations

In a study on when wartime rape is rare, Wood (2009) uses ability to impose tax and to punish troops as indicators of organizational strength, and found that a strong organization together with a policy against sexual violence might prevent rape by an armed group. Although her indicators were not examined in this study, organizational strength might have explanatory values, based on the findings. SLM/A lacked the ability to exercise full control over troop behaviours and were divided along tribal lines, while JEM had clear organizational structures and a policy of no ethnic division. In terms of capacity JEM seemingly had better access to resources and a politically experienced leadership. The size and rapid growth of SLM/A likely contributed to the lack of command and control. At the end of 2003, the SLM/A were estimated to have had about 6-7000 troops, while JEM had fewer than 1000 (Flint 2007, 140-150). JEM also had a different style of warfare from SLM/A, to make up for their lower numbers (Flint 2007, 140-150). Thus, differences in organizational strength might help explain the difference between their practices of sexual violence. SLM/A had a weak organizational capacity and their repertoire of sexual violence was likely opportunistic, while JEM seemingly had strong command structure and practiced no sexual violence, although there is no evidence of an explicit policy. Thomas and Wood (2017) suggests that groups with leftist ideologies might practice more gender equality in general since equality is an integral

part of their framework. This argument was based on their findings on women's inclusion, and roles, in groups with various ideologies.

Strength of ideology might also be conditioned by the strength of an organization. Actors might only be able to implement an ideology, as well as a policy on sexual violence, if they have a strong and clear command structure.

The command structures of Janjaweed were somewhat unclear (HRW April 2004, 24), and the systematic and instrumental use of rape perpetrated by the Janjaweed clearly differs from the SLM/A. Although Janjaweed lacked political education programs, ideas might have been sufficiently socialized informally among their cadres despite unclear structures, which could explain this difference, as Wood (2009) argue that ideological training might make up for a complicated command structure. Conversely, choice of organizational structure might be dependent on ideology. For future studies, a combination of ideological and organizational factors might generate some further knowledge.

JEM relied on local population for information and support, which might also explain why their troops were less prone to practice sexual violence. However, if they implemented training on the law of armed conflict in their ranks, one might argue that ideology influences not only troop behaviour, but also strategy and tactical appearance in general. For instance relying on local population for support, and perhaps hoping for votes in a future election, might be seen as an ideological decision. However, this might only hold true if "ideology comes first", as in the case of JEM and Janjaweed, while SLM/A mobilized around an idea of resistance before adopting a political framework. For the SLM/A their early tactics might have formed only based on access to resources and support. Consequently, even if ideological training even out the effect of recruitment strategies, Weinstein's (2005) argument that recruitment strategy effect behaviours holds, but recruitment strategies might still be investigated in the light of ideology or absence thereof. Revenge driven recruits, as well as recruitment along ethnic lines might also have different effects on commitment and behaviour, which might interact with other incentives, such as economic.

Another main difference in ideology between Janjaweed and the rebel groups is the strong ethno-nationalist ideas. As argued in the theoretical framework, cases where instrumental sexual violence is applied are rare and there is an argument to be made that not only are states more prone than non-state actors to commit sexual violence, as found by Cohen & Nordås (2015), perhaps any organization with ethno-nationalist ideologies are more likely as well.

Additional Observations

A rebel groups decision to actively to recruit women might influence whether sexual violence is tolerated, according to Wood (2009), who suggests that leadership might fear a decline in female recruits if sexual violence is practiced. In a study about women's participation in rebellion the authors found differences in gender hierarchies and divisions of labour based in ideological frameworks, which correlated with women's roles and participation (Wood & Thomas 2017). Groups with Marxist ideologies were more prone to integrate female fighters, while Islamist groups were the least inclined to do so (Wood & Thomas 2017). In this study however, there was no evidence of gender equality being included in the framework of any of the groups. Female roles, or lack thereof, in these organizations were not discussed in the literature. It was also outside the scope of this study since previous research has shown that women are likely to conform to norms in the primary group, just as men, thus also participating in acts of sexual violence if it is prevalent. Nonetheless, in a report from Amnesty International (July 2004) testimonies referred to the presence of Hakama during Janjaweed attacks. "The term "Hakama" refers in Darfur to female traditional singers whose function is to praise male fighters by singing and ululating" (AI July 2004, 14). Apparently, the Hakama functioned as communicators during attacks. They also participated in verbal abuse and harassment, sometimes while women were being raped, which supports previous claims that women conform to the dominant norm. Differences in ideas about gender in ideological frameworks likely have an effect on equality, and women's roles, but none of the groups were found to have had an active gender policy according to the reviewed sources. Janjaweed might have had particular roles assigned for women, although there is no other evidence to support this. Thus, indicating that the variation of sexual violence, as seen in this case, is unlikely explained solely based on different ideas about gender.

Although Cohen and Nordås (2015) found no significant result for ideology's impact on pro government militia's propensity to commit sexual violence, recruitment of child soldiers, used as a proxy for forced recruitment, had a substantial impact. The correlation between recruitment of child soldiers and sexual violence was also observed in Farr's (2009) study. I found in Darfur that "As many as 20,000 children may serve in militias supported by the government of Sudan" (HRW World report 2004, 225). Janjaweed recruited mainly teen and pre teen unemployed youths (Mamdani 2009, 256). This is in line with what previous research has shown. JEM and SLM/A also had underage boys in their ranks, while it appeared that they were not forcibly recruiting children (HRW Nov 2004, 38; HRW World Report 2006). A spokesperson for SLM/A explained that orphaned girls were put into informal foster

families at their request. Some boys could not be accommodated and were sent to refugee camps, although many of them later returned (HRW Nov 2004, 38). Although forced recruitment might still be connected to higher frequency of sexual violence, this finding questions whether presence of child soldiers is a suitable proxy variable. Another finding from previous research is also supported in this study; not all sides in a conflict will perpetrate violence (Leiby 2009; Cohen & Nordås 2013).

Evaluating the Research Design

The accumulative nature of research in social science demands it remain reflective, thus recognizing a need to critically evaluate limitations and potential bias in studies. The explanatory powers of the framework for this study depends on theoretical limitations, as well as bias embedded in the chosen method and the sources reviewed.

The qualitative approach in this study is by its nature limited in terms of representation. For instance, the trade off when selecting cases in the same conflict could have a negative effect on theory development, due to the lack of variation between the groups, i.e. no leftist oriented groups were included in the study. This limitation had a negative impact on generalizability of results, which could also have been mitigated by including more cases from diverse context, i.e. other regions. Although, the strength of this limited approach is arguably that that many context bound factors, that might serve as alternative explanations or affect the variables, could be held constant.

The method is weaker when it comes to the issue of identifying and investigating the casual mechanism. But with regards to ethical considerations as well as general limitation in access and time, it was not considered possible within the scope of this thesis. Consequently, adherence and normative commitment by individuals to ideology cannot be determined through secondary source analysis, which is arguably a weakness in this approach. There is also a chance of multiple causal explanations to explain the outcome and correlation between the variables observed in the empirical material (George and Bennett 2005, 157). The recommendation is therefore to further explore the casual story in future studies.

An effect of case selection was that one pro-government militia was selected along with two rebel groups; this was done for two main reasons. First, this was done because there were a limited number of cases to choose from, which could be assumed to have an *instrumental* repertoire. Second, it was deemed more important to control for other variables by selecting cases within the same conflict. Comparable cases with the expected variation

were very limited, and although the study found variation in the actors' repertoires of sexual violence, the initial estimations based on the SVAC dataset were inaccurate. JEM was expected to practice *opportunistic* violence based on the dataset, but practiced none, while SLM/A were expected to practice *no sexual violence*, but incidents found were deemed *opportunistic* in type.

Since the government of Sudan effectively restricted people's civil and political rights, such as the right to assembly and freedom of expression, it was hard for people to express views and political ideas (AI 2003; Feb & 2004). News was not expected to have had a strong effect on combatants view on ideas within their own groups. Also, any news that might have influence on combatants or group member would have likely been in another language than English, which made it impossible to conduct discourse analysis. Thus relying on secondary sources for such interpretations, which is arguably a weakness. As discussed in the research design, problems with reporting of sexual violence are also a problem inherent in this type of studies, particularly on this subject. However, this should not be a reason to avoid studying conditions under which sexual violence occurs, rather it demands more studies to accumulate better and more reliable knowledge.

Theoretical Limitations

The approach in this thesis has sought to balance a deductive and inductive approach by testing a theory based hypothesis on a case study, while also seeking to evaluate and improve the theoretical assumptions underpinning the theory. This was done by exploring a way of operationalizing ideology in order to capture its function in armed groups and by conceptualizing different repertoires of sexual violence

With regards to ideology, the findings suggest that stability over time and leadership determination might be the most important indicators when strength is assessed. The testing of the theory was limited in the sense that none of the cases had a prevalent policy on gender tied to their ideological framework. Lack of gender awareness is not likely limited to non-state armed actors and most actors probably do not have an explicit policy. Thus, it might be a recurrent problem in similar studies, unless they express clear ideas and focus at least on equality in their framework as Marxist ideologies do (Thomas & Wood 2017). The study and the theory were also limited in the sense that it did not allow for testing on religious or purely nationalist movements ideas or behaviour. However, Janjaweed can be seen as an actor with a

primarily ethno-nationalist agenda, which could account for it being somewhat of an extreme case.

The theory also tests how different forms of sexual violence could be interpreted as different repertoires, based on previous research. In future more in-depth studies those assumptions might be explored in a more reliable and precise manner by focusing on just one form, like by-proxy sexual violence, which was not found in these cases.

The direction of the relationship between ideology and repertoire of sexual violence suggested in this thesis is fairly intuitive. It would be highly costly in terms on legitimacy and credibility for a group to change their overall ideology, and unlikely that they would do so only match a certain repertoire of sexual violence. There might also be important intervening variables, such as siding with the government, which was not controlled for in this study. Future studies might consider how a combination of armed groups characteristics interplay in groups which exhibit different repertoires of sexual violence. Such as organizational structure, strength of command and control, gender roles and values, recruitment mechanism, battle strategy and tactics as well as ideology, both in terms of strength and content.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to explore under what condition non-state armed groups practice different repertoires of sexual violence by exploring the effect of ideology. Ideology refers to a set of ideas, or beliefs, which identifies a set of political or social objectives on behalf of a recognized constituency, and proposes a plan or program of action for reaching those objectives. “Repertoire of violence” refers to different types of violence against non-combatants regularly employed by an armed group, and their relative proportions. “Sexual violence” is a broader category of violence with variation in particular acts, such as forced marriages, sexual slavery, sexual torture, rape, gang rape and sexual mutilation. Groups with strong ideology were expected to exhibit a repertoire of sexual violence matching their organizational objectives and values, thus either *instrumental* or *no practice*. Conversely groups with weak or no ideology were expected to practice *opportunistic* sexual violence. This was tested on three cases in the Darfur conflict, the Janjaweed, SLM/A and JEM. The suggested casual mechanism states that ideas, as well as norms and values are socialized into groups in both formal and informal settings. A strong ideological framework, supported by leadership message, can either guide this or it might happen spontaneously and inconsistently across sub-units.

The two cases with the *strongest* ideology, whose leadership constantly and credibly committed to the ideas, were Janjaweed and JEM. Janjaweed routinely practiced *instrumental* forms of sexual violence with racist overtones and targeting, clearly reflecting their supremacist ideological framework. JEM on the other hand *practiced no* sexual violence. There was no evidence on a particular policy prohibiting sexual violence, and while “equality” is part of their name, there is no real inference made about their actual internal norms and values. This calls for clarification, in future studies better designed to probe the causal mechanism. The SLM/A appeared to have a *weak* ideology, due to time order when it was introduced but also due to the lack of commitment and credibility from the leadership. As predicted by the theory the instance of sexual violence reported by this group inferred an *opportunistic* pattern. Interestingly enough there was some indication that this pattern evolved in a break-out faction of the group. When the Minnawi faction started to conduct operations together with Janjaweed and government forces, witnesses described use of increased violence, including sexual violence to target people and groups who opposed the Abuja peace agreement. If behaviours spread as a social practice between combatants it would explain why we see the blurring of lines between behaviours of the PDF, Janjaweed, Government

soldiers and eventually even the SLM/A MM faction. Co-location and joint training might therefore be an important avenue for further research evaluating combatant socialization in armed groups, both state and non-state. Another recommendation for future studies is to analyse how ideology is intertwined with gender, organizational strength, recruitment strategy, resource base and overall strategy in relation to the population, when analysing armed groups' behaviour. Thus widening the theoretical framework and looking at different combinations of armed group characteristics, to best advice policy makers on what interventions to prioritize when taking measure to prevent or respond to instances of conflict related sexual and gender based violence.

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