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# Unequal and Violent: Post-conflict Contexts for Women

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*A study on the consequences of fragmentation of the women's movement  
during peace processes*

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Previous research has not fully addressed the causal processes embedded in participation of women's groups in peace processes, and the potential outcomes achieved by their participation. This thesis seeks to contribute to this topic by analyzing the research question under what conditions do peace processes contribute to unequal and dangerous societies for women? And the theorized relationship is that 'the presence of fragmentation of the women's movement during peace negotiations tends to result in higher prevalence of inequality and violence against women in post-conflict societies', because fragmentation will contribute to upholding patriarchal norms that facilitate violence towards women through portraying men as top-dogs and women as under-dogs. Structured Focused Comparison is the method used, and questionnaires are developed for fragmentation and post-conflict inequality and violence against women. Two cases are studied and compared: Guatemala and Chiapas in Mexico. The findings show very little support for the hypothesis, although the results are inconclusive.

**Keywords:** Women's groups, peace processes, fragmentation, patriarchal norms, post-conflict inequality and violence

## Contents

List of abbreviations .....	4
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES .....	5
1. Introduction.....	6
2. Previous Research on Fragmentation.....	9
2.1 Defining fragmentation in terms of bargaining theory: .....	9
2.2 Assessing prevalence of fragmentation .....	11
2.3 Fragmentation of social movement organizations .....	11
2.4 Women’s inclusion in peace processes.....	12
2.5 Defining widespread inequality and violence for women .....	14
2.6 The research gap .....	14
3. Theoretical Framework.....	16
3.1 Patriarchal norms as structural violence .....	17
3.2 Widespread inequality and violence against women .....	19
3.3 Fragmentation of the women’s movement in peace processes.....	20
3.4 Constructing hypothesis.....	21
4. Research Design.....	23
4.1 Research strategy .....	23
4.2 Method of structured focused comparison.....	24
4.3 Case selection.....	25
4.4 Guatemala and Mexico (Chiapas) as case studies .....	27
4.5 Background of the women’s movement in Guatemala.....	28
4.6 Background of the women’s movement in Chiapas .....	28
4.7 Justifying case selection.....	29
4.8 Operationalization of the theoretical framework .....	30
4.9 Operationalization of the dependent variable .....	34
4.10 Time Frame and Data Collection.....	37
4.12. Case 1 – Guatemala – Assessing prevalence of fragmentation in the women’s movement during the peace process (IV) .....	40
4.13. Case 1 – Guatemala – Assessing widespread inequality and violence against women (DV) .....	43
4.14. Case 2 – Chiapas (Mexico) – Assessing prevalence of fragmentation in the women’s movement during the peace process (IV) .....	50
4.15. Case 2 – Chiapas (Mexico) – Assessing widespread inequality and violence against women (DV) .....	53

4.16 Comparative Analysis.....	59
4.17 Case-by-case analysis – connecting fragmentation of the women’s movement with the prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict countries .....	60
4.18 Between case comparison – implication to the theory tested .....	63
4.19 Implications for the hypothesis.....	64
4.20 Implications for the causal story.....	65
5. Broadening the analysis – alternative explanations and additional observations.....	67
5.1 Limitations and biases of the study.....	69
6. Conclusion .....	73
7. References.....	75

## **List of abbreviations**

**ACS** – Assembly of Civil Society

**AI Report** – Amnesty International Annual and Periodic Special Reports

**CEDAW** – The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women

**CONAI** – National Intermediation Commission

**DV** – Dependent Variable

**EZLN** – *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*/ Zapatista Army of National Liberation

**GAM** – Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo/Mutual Support Group

**HRW** – Human Rights Watch Annual and Periodic Special Reports

**IV** – Independent Variable

**NGO** – Non-Governmental Organization

**SMO** – Social Movement Organization

**SVAC** – Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict

**UCDP** – Uppsala Conflict Data Program

**UN** – United Nations

**UN Women** – The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

**URNG** – Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca/Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit

**USD Report** – US State Department Annual Reports

## LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1. Hypothesis.	22
Table 1. Influence of women in peace processes and the outcomes and implementation of such processes	26
Table 2. Operationalization independent variable: Fragmentation of the women movement in peace processes	33
Table 3. Measurements for prevalence of dependent variable (DV)	35
Table 4. Operationalization dependent variable: Widespread inequality and danger for women (DV)	37
Table 5. Presentation data for cases – Fragmentation of the women movement in peace processes (IV)	42
Table 6. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	45
Table 7. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	46
Table 8. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	47
Table 9. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	48
Table 10. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	49
Table 11. Presentation data for cases – Fragmentation of the women movement in peace processes (IV)	53
Table 12. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	55
Table 13. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	56
Table 14. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	57
Table 15. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	58
Table 16. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)	59
Table 17. Summarizing key theoretical implications	65

## 1. Introduction

The variation in levels of equality and violence against women in post-conflict contexts is puzzling; some examples of post-conflict scenarios show a complete absence of violence and inequality against women, while others show widespread levels of inequalities and high levels of violence. This is the puzzle this thesis aims to address. Previous research has focused on the positive impacts of inclusion of women in peace processes in the post-conflict context, and has emphasized the importance of having negotiations including various groups representing different interests (O'Reilly, Súilleabháin and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016). However, the causal processes determining whether a positive impact is achieved or not has not yet fully been addressed. By simply including women, an influence on the outcome of the peace negotiations is not guaranteed, since outcomes are related to which issues that have been discussed, by who and how. Cohesion and unity in (women) groups tend to be success factors in aiming to achieve goals and being able to impact during negotiations (Kriesi and Dyvendak 1995; Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Lee 2012). In an attempt to detect the causal processes involved in inclusion of women in peace processes, and to contribute to an under-researched field, this thesis explores the issue from the other side of the coin, namely whether fragmentation of the women's movement during the peace process causes negative effects for the post-conflict context. This thesis seeks to contribute to this topic by analyzing the research question *under what conditions do peace processes contribute to unequal and dangerous societies for women?*

I argue that fragmentation of the women's movement during the peace process contribute to unequal and dangerous societies for women, because fragmentation will contribute to upholding patriarchal norms; a dynamic that privileges men over women; entailing a lack of accountability for harms against women, and contributing to the overall inequality and danger in the post-conflict society. Moreover, the thesis develops its hypothesis from the acknowledgement of the importance of fragmentation of women's movements as a factor triggering widespread inequality and violence towards women. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that various groups within the women's movement are more likely to push for identity issues such as gender equality

and security for women (Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995), than groups that are not from the women's movement. This theoretical premise leads to a concrete expectation and hypothesis that *the presence of fragmentation of women's groups during peace negotiations tends to result in higher levels widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict societies*. Additionally, I argue that in order for violence and inequality against women to be more widespread, the women's movement needs to experience fragmentation along two lines, which means that the independent variable has two dimensions; commitment problems and information problems.

Variation in fragmentation within movements has been used to explain everything from self-determination movements, which typically organize around ethnic and nationalist issues to ideological and class movements. The common denominator when fragmentation is present within various movements is that it undermines the movement's capacity to act collectively in the pursuit of a common aim. This can be particularly harmful for movements that seek to push for societal change during situations of real transformation in society, such as peace negotiations. Previous research has not applied the theory of actor fragmentation on women's movements during peace processes, which is a gap this thesis aims to address. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the logic of actor fragmentation within the women's movement and how it can lead to widespread inequality and danger for women in post-conflict countries. It is important decipher the causal processes embedded in creating positive peace, since this information is important for mediators, governments, and policy makers who need to be aware of the consequences and outcomes of certain choices during the peace process, in order to be able to make the peace negotiations as fruitful as possible.

A qualitative comparative study of two cases; Guatemala and Chiapas, in Mexico, is conducted in order to address the issue of the consequences of fragmentation of the women's movement during the peace process on the post-conflict levels of violence and inequality against women. Both cases had high levels of female participation in peace negotiation processes; Guatemala 1989-1999, and Chiapas, in Mexico 1994-1997, and they share a similar past which makes them suitable for comparison. The method of Structured Focused Comparison is used for collecting data, and questionnaires are developed to measure the independent variable and the dependent

variable. The level of fragmentation is evaluated in regards to its two dimensions; commitment problems and information problems, and estimations are made related to the whole negotiation process in each case. The dependent variable is measured each successive year, up until five years after the negotiations ended. The material used for data collection is mainly secondary sources; UN reports, government reports, and accounts from people who participated in the peace processes.

The findings show very little support for the suggested hypothesis, although the evidence is inconclusive. The women's movement was fragmented in Guatemala, but not in Chiapas, Mexico, although both cases showed high prevalence of lethal and non-lethal violence against women in the post-conflict context. No direct causal link is observed between fragmentation of the women's movement in the peace process and widespread inequalities and violence against women in the post-conflict context.

The next section offers an overview of relevant previous research, along with definitions of the independent and the dependent variable. Following is the presentation of the theoretical framework, where patriarchal norms are described in terms of structural violence. In the next section, research design, are the research strategy, method, case selection, along with a discussion of the sources used, is outlined. Thereafter, the material related to the first case, Guatemala, is introduced, first in regards to the independent variable, and then the dependent variable. Following is the same structure for the second case, Chiapas in Mexico. When material related to both cases has been presented, a comparative analysis is put forward, followed by a case by case analysis. Thereafter are implications for the theory, alternative explanations and additional observations, along with potential biases and limitations of the study. The thesis concludes with summarizing, and putting forward suggestions for future research.

## **2. Previous Research on Fragmentation**

This section introduces previous research contributing to addressing the research question; *under what conditions do peace processes contribute to unequal and dangerous societies for women?* Previous research from Cunningham (2013) and Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Lee (2012) has focused on fragmentation in terms of opposition movements seeking regime change or secession when engaging in negotiations with the state as a factor that could lead to a resurgence in violence. Previous research does not assess the causal links between fragmentation of social movement organizations, such as the women's movement; seeking structural changes during peace processes; and whether these contribute to higher levels of post-conflict violence against women and inequality. This thesis seeks to make both an empirical and a theoretical contribution in explaining fragmentation of the women's movements during peace processes and how this can lead to violent and unequal post-conflict contexts.

Five main ideas are reviewed before introducing and motivating the research gap this thesis aims to address, particularly research relating to: defining fragmentation in terms of bargaining theory, assessing prevalence of fragmentation; fragmentation of social movement organizations, such as the women's movement; and women's inclusion in peace processes. Additionally, the phenomenon of interest is defined; unequal and dangerous societies for women. Thereafter, a possible causal link is introduced, between fragmentation of women's movements during peace processes, and its impact on the prevalence of inequality and violence against women in post-conflict countries.

### **2.1 Defining fragmentation in terms of bargaining theory:**

Cunningham's (2013) definition of fragmentation focuses on internal divisions within opposition movements that seek either regime change or secession. This notion of bargaining theory states that when internal divisions are present within a movement, this affects the movement's bargaining power because the state is unable to determine their preferences and their capabilities (Cunningham 2013, 663). This can also prove problematic for opposition movements who wish to settle for a specific issue but cannot because of internally driven divisions. As Cunningham

(2013) elaborates, this level of uncertainty is also present in opposition movements in terms of leadership; the lack of an uncontested leader creates a situation of uncertainty in terms of commitments about the future behavior of all factions (Cunningham 2013, 664). Information problems and commitment problems are now further explained:

a. Information problems

If fragmentation is prevalent in opposition movements, multiple factions could provide different information about what the population they represent wants, hence providing the state with competing views of the movement's reversion point. Factions within a movement often have different ideals; meaning it is extremely difficult for states to discern what opposition movements would settle for. If there are more internal groups within a movement, this makes it even harder for the state to determine the movement's preferences and capabilities because each group has an incentive to misrepresent its preferences and capabilities in order to reach preferred concessions.

b. Commitment problems

In terms of credibility, it is challenging for opposition groups within a movement to keep more extreme factions in line because these can act independently from the movement as a whole. Cunningham (2013, 664) provides an example of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its questionable ability to exercise authority over other, more-extreme-factions, such as Hamas, even though the PLO is recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian cause in the international arena.

Hence, according to Cunningham (2013), fragmentation of opposition groups and of leaders creates information problems that both increase uncertainty about what the movement would settle for and aggravate commitment problems for opposition factions (Cunningham 2013, 664).

## **2.2 Assessing prevalence of fragmentation**

Within the literature, different approaches have been employed to explain the prevalence of fragmentation within opposition movements. Authors such as Lawrence (2010) and Cunningham (2011) look at the number of organizations competing for dominance in the overall movement representing the group; if there are more groups this means that there is an increase in fragmentation. A different approach by Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Lee (2012, 267) takes into account the level of institutionalization among organizations within a movement as a sign of lower or higher levels of fragmentation. Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Lee (2012, 268) believe that in order to better conceptualize the multidimensionality of fragmentation within movements, a scale ranging from unified to fragmented has to be considered, and in order to measure this scale three factors has to be considered: the number of organizations within the movement, the institutional coordination among them, and the distribution of power across organizations within the movement. Regarding the third factor Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Lee (2012, 271) highlight: “power is dispersed across multiple factions within the group. Conversely, where a group with numerous organizations is dominated by one powerful organization, the consequences of being internally divided are diminished, as weaker organizations have a limited ability to influence either other factions or the larger dispute”. These three factors can help explain the prevalence of fragmentation, be it non-state actors or self-determination movements.

## **2.3 Fragmentation of social movement organizations**

Previous research on fragmentation by Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Lee (2012) and Cunningham (2013) has sought to explain how variation in fragmentation affects conflict processes and how it constrains non-state factions in either deciding to negotiate with the state or pursue violence. This conception of fragmentation is not limited to non-state groups within movements; social movement organizations also have goals veered towards changes at the macro level, rather than focusing solely on local conditions, therefore they also engage with the state to negotiate change. According to Zald and McCarthy (1979, 2) “a social movement organization is a complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement these goals”. Bakke, Gallagher

Cunningham and Lee (2012, 266) mention that fragmentation of SMO's has focused on organizations, networks and individuals sharing a central identity but have shaky alliances and divergent interests. "This focus includes movements comprised of organizations mobilizing on the basis of ethnic, tribal, clan, linguistic, or national identities..." (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Lee 2012, 266). Given that identity is a common theme holding movements together, they are more susceptible to fragmentation if alliances and interests change.

One example of a social movement organization is the women's movement. According to Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995, 84), the women's movement is subcultural, which means that its actions are predominantly based on collective identities that are constituted and reproduced in within-group interactions. Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995, 84) mention that these within-group interactions can change over time; subcultural movements can become more externally-oriented when they want to push for changes. Given that subcultural movements require unity within the group to preserve their identity, they are less influenced by external factors unless they are repressed, in which case it becomes costlier to collectively push for action (Kriesi and Duyvendak 1995, 85). This means two things: in order to mobilize, subcultural movements need to engage in systems that will not repress their views, such as arenas open for negotiations, and second, given that their actions are based on within-group identities, the group needs to act in unison in order to be strong.

## **2.4 Women's inclusion in peace processes**

The UN Report on *Women, Peace and Security* (United Nations 2002, 54) mentions that: "women and girls in conflict areas are aware of the potential for transformation and reform in periods of peacemaking and often work intensively to be a part of this process". Given that peace processes allow for times of conflict transformation, it also provides women with an opportunity to become better organized. O'Reilly, Súilleabháin and Paffenholz (2015, 10) in "Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes", mention that this level of organization can take different forms, they can participate either as armed groups, political parties, religious groups, individual negotiators, witnesses, signatories or as distinct movements. Their

participation during negotiation processes can also take different forms, Paffenholz et al. (2016, 14) define seven modalities of inclusion; direct representation at the negotiation table, observer status, consultations, inclusive commissions, high-level problem-solving workshops, public decision-making and mass action.

The “Broadening Participation Project” performed an in-depth qualitative study of forty cases to assess inclusion of women in peace processes and the impact they have in the quality and sustainability of political agreements, this study concluded that when women groups has strong influence over the negotiation process, peace agreements were almost always reached (O’Reilly, Súilleabháin and Paffenholz 2015, 10-11). The study also mentioned that if they managed to exert a strong influence, they were able to bring a greater number of issues to the table. Examples include, “addressing the root causes of the conflict as seen in Kenya and Burundi, and [...] transforming power relations in society, as seen in Egypt and Yemen.” (O’Reilly, Súilleabháin and Paffenholz 2015, 11) As well as addressing women’s rights issues and gender-specific provisions, such as “peace agreement provisions on freedom of marriage and the right to choose one’s partner...” (O’Reilly, Súilleabháin and Paffenholz 2015, 11) that was pushed forward in the Burundian peace process.

An important element that must be taken into consideration is that since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in the year 2000, “[...] there has been an appreciable rise in the number of references to women in the text of peace agreements” (UN Women 2015, 44). Resolution 1325 changed the dynamics of women’s involvement in peace and security issues. Prior to 2000, only 11 per cent of peace agreements made any references to women or gender, post-2000, that percentage has risen to 27 per cent (UN Women 2015, 44). As a result of UN involvement in peace agreements, “of the six agreements emerging from negotiations or national dialogues supported by the UN in 2014, four (67 per cent) contained references relevant to women, peace and security” (UN Women 2015, 45). These statistics lend credibility to the argument that women’s participation and their opportunity to influence peace negotiations is slowly having a positive effect in post-conflict scenarios. Even though a rise in engagement may signal positive change, there is a caveat; consultations with women’s organizations and gender experts in

mediation teams has sometimes been symbolic, lacking thorough preparation, representativeness, and follow-up (UN Women 2015, 45).

## **2.5 Defining widespread inequality and violence for women**

Originally defined as the misogynous killing of women by men by Radford and Russell (1992), the UN Human Rights Council report on violence against women would then go on to adopt Diana Russell and Roberta Hanes' definition of femicide as "all forms of sexist killings with a view to capturing the socially constructed and perceived rights to do so" (United Nations General Assembly 2014, 4). This definition, as mentioned by Corradi et al. (2016, 979), emerged from extensive advocacy and research on the concept of femicide in different fields of study; sociology, feminist studies, criminology, human rights and studies in colonialism. Several characteristics of femicide have been identified as central to this thesis. First, widespread inequality and danger, of which femicide is emblematic, must be commonplace or numerous. Second, femicide is a manifestation as well as embodiment of gender based violence; "all forms of violence with a specific gender orientation, which results or could result in death, physical, sexual or psychological damage or suffering to women" (Blanco and Hayes 2007, 53). This means that it is both lethal and non-lethal. This study focuses on both aspects: lethal violence as femicide and non-lethal violence as physical, psychological and sexual abuse, which signifies the danger and inequality women feel in terms of their physical security. Third, as stated by the Inter-American Convention and the UN Declaration, these physical harms take place in the private and public spheres and involve intimate perpetrators, such as a spouse or partner as the perpetrator, as well as anonymous predators (Blanco and Hayes 2007, 54). This study defines widespread inequality and danger to women and girls as (1) frequent and highly prevalent; (2) it is mainly lethal (leading to death), and physical, psychological and sexual in nature (non-lethal); and (3) it takes place in the private and public spheres, by a range of perpetrators.

## **2.6 The research gap**

Previous research has contributed to the main issue of this thesis: defining fragmentation in terms of bargaining theory; assessing the prevalence of fragmentation within movements;

fragmentation of social movement organizations; assessing women's participation in peace processes, and by defining the phenomenon of interest: widespread inequality and violence for women. Previous research does not assess the link between fragmentation of movements that seek structural changes during peace processes and subsequent levels of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict countries. This thesis argues that fragmentation applies to strong subcultural movements, such as the women's movement as well, because studies demonstrate that where there was a strong participation of women pursuing a common goal, they were more likely to bring about changes in post-conflict societies, such as women's rights issues and gender-specific ideas in post-conflict societies. This means that if SMO's such as the women's movement is susceptible to fragmentation, it may affect their ability to push for issues that are important to them during negotiations, thus potentially reinforcing patriarchal asymmetries of men as top-dogs and women as under-dogs, and subsequently bringing about inequality and violence in post-conflict countries. This will be further discussed in the theoretical framework.

### 3. Theoretical Framework

Having presented the insights of previous research, this section lays out the theoretical framework through which the research question “*under what conditions do peace processes contribute to unequal and dangerous societies for women?*” will be approached. I will proceed from outlining the adopted approach to fragmentation of the women’s movement in peace processes and how this relegates women’s issues and upholds patriarchal norms, ultimately creating a situation of inequality and violence in post-conflict societies. Lastly, I will present the hypothesis. A theory is a “reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to a research question, including a statement about why the proposed answer is correct.” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 19) I seek to explain *the conditions that contribute to widespread inequality and danger for women* in the context of post-conflict societies. The scope of exploration is limited to countries or societies that have undergone conflict and where some negotiated settlement involving women has led to the cessation of armed violence. The contention is that some peace processes, whereby actors in a conflict negotiate the terms of settlement and rebuilding the society, are more likely to serve as precursors for equal and secure peace for both genders. However, in some processes, this may not be so. The thesis assumes that women’s involvement in peace processes has some effect on the quality of the outcome of the negotiations, and whether or not talks generate inequality and violence.

The first concept of interest is widespread inequality and violence for women. This is the dependent variable (DV) or outcome of interest. Widespread inequality and violence against women is probabilistically determined by strong patriarchal norms. The conditions that produce such norms – within a conflict – to – peace transition – are multiple. However, it is reasonable to assume that events and sub-processes during the negotiations create both information and commitment problems between women groups within a movement, and with other actors, who are usually male, and thus fail to address patriarchal norms. Subsequently, gender hierarchies remain intact or strengthened in some peace processes, resulting in gender inequality. I assume that one important factor during negotiations is the quality and power of women’s groups within women’s movements, and if they are able to influence the negotiations. The thesis proposes that fragmentation of women’s movements in peace processes will uphold patriarchal norms, which

are often embodied in terms of male and masculine issues as top-dog, and female issues and interests as under-dog. The ‘top-dog/under-dog’ dynamic privileges men over women, and this entails a lack of accountability for harms against females, and contributes to the overall inequality and danger in the post-conflict society. A causal relationship is mapped below:

Fragmentation of women’s movements during peace processes → upholding patriarchal norms of male and masculine issues as top dog and female issues as under-dog → Widespread levels of inequality and violence against women

### **3.1 Patriarchal norms as structural violence**

Macro – level studies demonstrate that more gender equal societies are more peaceful but this is hindered by values or norms that can make societies more violent, such as patriarchal values (Brownmiller, 1975; Caputi, 1989; Dobash & Dobash, 1979). Patriarchal norms put women in vulnerable positions within intimate relationships, families, groups, communities, and society at large. “Manifestations of patriarchy in such things as laws and organizations structures, as well as role expectations related to mothers in the home and fathers in the workplace, all have patriarchal roots.” (Ozaki and Otis 2016, 3) As explained by Hunnicutt (2009, 557), these social arrangements are hierarchical, and manifest in the domination of women, as a group, by men’s groups both structurally and ideologically. If these asymmetries in hierarchy become more pervasive throughout society, violence against women becomes structural, because the dominant group exploits the other. That is why sociologists such as Galtung (1975, 79) refer to this as a topdog – underdog relationship; a difference in ranks in terms of power.

According to Hunnicutt (2009, 554), theories on patriarchy retain gender as a central organizing feature; it is these social contexts of domination rather than the individual men that drive patriarchal norms. It is important to note that Connell (1995, 77) mentions that when conditions for patriarchy change in society, the bases for the dominance of a particular masculine model

erode. Therefore, I would expect, as Caprioli (2000) states, that if states exhibit higher levels of gender equality, they will also exhibit lower levels of violence to settle disputes.

In line with the definition provided above, patriarchal norms make societies more unequal and hence, more violent, because they are based on hierarchy; domination of the man over the woman. Persisting social contexts of hierarchical domination make the upholding of these norms possible. Blumberg (1984, 68) states that since women are responsible for the conception of all babies, this affects their autonomy, freedom, and opportunities in other spheres of life, at both macro- and micro levels. Viewing gender relations through a reproductive lens forms the basis for society from the individual level; male provider and woman care-giver; all the way to the macro level where state institutions are seen as arenas for gendered relations as well. For example, Connell (1995, 73) argues that in state institutions, most office holders are men because gender configurations have benefitted recruitment mechanisms and systems of control; policymaking and other practical routines that benefit the provider, in this case, the man. The Women's Liberation Movement in the western world shared this argument of structural hierarchy; entrenched ideologies that pushed women into the home and men's control over governments, corporations, media, incomes, among other institutions. (Connell 1995. 41).

Given the strong internal orientation of subcultural movements, such as women's movements, fragmentation during peace negotiations makes it costlier to pursue collective action for identity issues, and repression, in the form of micro and macro-level patriarchal norms, will be further enforced because men are already seen as occupying many of the positions in power that could bring about changes in society.

Having provided this overview of the thesis' central theoretical proposition, the next parts of this section will present and discuss in greater detail each of the main components: 1) Widespread inequality and danger for women and girls, the dependent variable or outcome of interest; and 2) fragmentation of the women movement in peace processes, the main independent variable or explanatory factor.

### 3.2 Widespread inequality and violence against women

Femicide is a term that lacks a clear definition. Bloom (2008, 147) argues that it is challenging to operationalize femicide because it is hard to capture motivations that lead to the killing of a woman simply because she is a woman; many times, if murder is reported in criminal statistics it may be impossible to tell why or how it took place. Employing this variable as the outcome of fragmentation is noteworthy because the culmination of extreme violence resulting in the death of a woman has serious implications for peaceful and equal societies. I focus on femicide by marking its distinction in the public and private spheres because as Blumberg (1984, 979) mentions, the basic underpinning is that male dominated societies are oppressive and lethal to women and violence is a tool that is used by men to keep women under control. Lethal violence can permeate all aspects of life; therefore, I differentiate between the macro-level (the public sphere) and the micro-level (the private sphere).

In the *private sphere* femicide is identified as intimate-partner related: “widespread patriarchal gender relations within couples determine dynamics of violence, which have similar characteristics in many countries; violence for which more solid data is available [...] These dynamics terminate with death of the woman, often after protracted domestic violence or abuse” (Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development 2015, 89). It is important to note that a recent study affirms that 35% of all instances of femicide are intimate partner-related while estimates also demonstrate that only 5% of all murders of men are committed by an intimate partner (WHO 2012, 2). This skewed effect in society demonstrates that there is a clear intent in killing women as a result of their gender, rather than as a result of other factors.

In the *public sphere*, I define femicide as a killer, or set of killers, unknown to the victim, and with evidence of extreme violence in women’s bodies such as mutilation, torture and sexual assault before death (WHO 2012, 7,10).

Even though the focus on femicide allows observing how violence against women can become lethal, violence against women can also be non-lethal, such as physical, psychological and/or

sexual. These acts of non-lethal violence are also rooted in established societal norms such as patriarchy. For example, in the Inter-American Convention, the only legally binding instrument that addresses the issue of violence against women in the Americas, specifically mentions these three acts; physical, sexual or psychological damage as factors that could result in death of a woman in both the public and private spheres (Chin, Dandurand and Obando 2001, 1). As Weil (2016, 1129) mentions, “femicide cannot be studied per se, but must be linked to other social phenomena”. By linking femicide to other potential factors that could lead to death, such as the non-lethal factors stated above, I can fill gaps and identify observable indicators for the concept of femicide in a way that can be measured.

### **3.3 Fragmentation of the women’s movement in peace processes**

In this thesis, fragmentation was defined as internal divisions within movements, and by this, I mean bargaining failure: information problems and an inability to make credible commitments (Cunningham 2013, 663). As with all subcultural movements, the women’s movement agenda is based on one collective identity. As mentioned by Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Seymour (2012, 266-267), these are the interactions between organizations mobilizing collectively in pursuit of diverse interests but sharing particularities that only belong to that group. Hence, the focus of this thesis rests on the involvement of women’s organizations, who belong to one collective identity movement, in peace negotiations.

Peace processes are unpredictable and complex, and the inclusion of women has taken many forms, but their inclusion is seen as an opportunity to resolving conflict and creating a sense of lasting peace. During peace processes, it is impossible to assess all of the models of inclusion in which women may or may not have an impact, but researchers argue that a focus on the model that can promote wider social and institutional reforms for women, that is, the model focusing on participation at the negotiation table, can have a longer-lasting impact. As mentioned by O’Reilly et al. (2015, 14) “this option constitutes the most direct form of participation and provides the opportunity for women to directly influence the talks—which in turn shape the structure of other fora in the peace process, the roadmap for a postconflict society, and women’s

participation in public life thereafter.” Representation at the negotiation table can take two forms: women inclusion within primary delegations or women inclusion as part of their own delegations. However, this does not necessarily mean the concerns of women’s movements will be addressed, “for example, between 2001 and 2003, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue brought together the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the country’s armed groups, the unarmed opposition, and civil society—including women’s groups—to ensure a broad societal mandate for the negotiations. But the different groups did not have an equal say in the negotiations.” (O’Reilly et al. 2015, 15) Even as individual women leaders, with a seat at the table, it may also be difficult to articulate a different narrative than that of men: “In Indonesia’s Aceh conflict [...] Shadia Marhaban—the sole woman representing the Free Aceh Movement in the 2005 peace talks—later cast doubt on her influence as a woman [...]” (O’Reilly, 14) It is challenging for individual women to push for an agenda of their own when men display the dominant narrative during negotiations.

What I infer from this is twofold: given the importance of pushing for a framework of issues that is based on identity issues, if women are participating in peace processes, they are better positioned to making long-lasting changes if they are united in pursuing a common agenda and if women’s groups in the negotiations have the support of other women’s groups. Therefore, women movement fragmentation is defined through two intertwined factors: (1) how internally divided they are at pursuing a common agenda (commitment problems); and, (2) the lack of coordination between different organizations (members and leaders of these organizations; information problems) within the movement. If fragmentation, through these two factors, is present, it becomes costlier to pursue collective action and creates a bargaining problem with the other actors, who, for the most part, are men.

### **3.4 Constructing hypothesis**

To clarify, the theoretical claim states that given the strong internal orientation of subcultural movements, such as the women’s movement, fragmentation as both commitment and information problems during peace negotiations makes it costlier to pursue collective action for identity issues that are important to them, and repression, in the form of micro and macro-level

patriarchal norms, will be further enforced because men are already seen as occupying many of the positions in power that could bring about change. This will ultimately lead to widespread inequality and violence in post-conflict countries. This leads to my concrete expectation and hypothesis:

Hypothesis: Presence of *fragmentation of the women's movement participating in peace negotiations tends to result in higher prevalence of inequality and violence against women in post-conflict societies.*




Figure 1. Hypothesis.

I do not disregard the argument raised by Paffenholz et al. (2016, 18), that in general, women are mostly included in peace processes simply to overcome lack of legitimacy or to ensure buy-in of public support for the peace process; but assuming that women participation is quite prominent, fragmentation of women groups belong to a movement during peace negotiations is a factor that could reinforce the notion of male domination, and hence reinforce their position of power over women. I expect that this patriarchal notion of top-dog and under-dog will simply persist, creating post-conflict societies with widespread inequality and violence towards women.

## 4. Research Design

In the previous sections I introduced the concepts, previous theories and the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework seeks to explore and examine *the causes that contribute to widespread inequality and danger for women* in the context of post-conflict societies. In addition to defining and presenting characteristics for the concept of interest, *widespread inequality and danger for women* as lethal (femicide) and non-lethal (physical, psychological and sexual), it proposed fragmentation of the women's movement as the explanatory factor: (1) how internally divided they are at pursuing a common agenda (commitment problems); and, (2) the lack of coordination between different organizations (members and leaders of these organizations; information problems) within the movement. This framework will guide the collection and analysis of the empirical material.

The main empirical contribution is a comparison of two women's movements involved in peace negotiation processes in Latin America in the 1990's, Guatemala and Chiapas (Mexico). This is a qualitative study which examines the interaction of the explanatory factor and its relationship to *widespread inequality and danger for women*. The comparison of the women's movements is carried out in a structured focused comparison of the most similar cases of fragmentation of the women's movement.

This section begins with an introduction of the research strategy. As a follow-up, I discuss the research design for the methods, the rationale for the selection of the cases, a clarification on the operationalization of the research topic, data collection, time frame and structure of the analysis. I will also discuss the limitations of the method and its sources.

### 4.1 Research strategy

The purpose of this thesis is to identify a research strategy that would lead to relevant empirical material and analysis and answer the key research question presented above. To build on this strategy I focus on theory-building, since previous research by Lawrence (2010), Cunningham (2011, 2013) and Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Lee (2012) on actor fragmentation has

focused mostly on maintaining the peace between warring factions. Thus, leaving unexplored the causal story between women's movement fragmentation to the upholding of patriarchal norms, ultimately resulting in dangerous and unequal post-conflict environments for women. Therefore, for this thesis I must ask myself a series of questions that can link the empirical material to the causal path and ultimately explain why I would expect these societies to act the way they do towards women.

#### **4.2 Method of structured focused comparison**

I employ the method of structured focused comparison to test the theoretical argument on fragmentation of women's organizations and how this leads to the upholding of patriarchal norms and ultimately unequal and violent societies for women. "The method is structured in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible." (George and Bennett 2005, 67). George and Bennett (2005, 67) argue that the method is also focused because it deals only with certain aspects of the two cases that are going to be examined. The focus of this study will be on the explanatory factor, fragmentation (coordination and commitment problems), that makes it costlier for women organizations to pursue collective action, thus relegating their identity issues (under-dog) to patriarchal norms (top-dog), and on the observable implications of lethal and non-lethal violence in both the public and the private spheres.

The reason for a qualitative comparison of two cases for this theory-building paper is considered pertinent because a clear causal story is both novel and relevant; linking movement fragmentation to lethal and non-lethal violence against women in post-conflict countries. Assessing fragmentation of the women's movement during peace negotiations as the explanatory variable is the following: I can observe the fragmentation of their participation as part of the conflict parties or as part of an independent delegation and how this has an effect on the influence they can exert over the other actors, who are mostly men. It is also appropriate to study qualitatively rather than quantitatively because the independent variable cannot be measured by only establishing a dichotomous or ordinal rule, it requires a more in-depth analysis of what it

means to be ‘fragmented’. The same can be said for the operationalization of the dependent variable, given that femicide, as lethal, and non-lethal (physical, psychological and sexual) violence, is measured differently in each country and is often linked to political decisions and human construct. As Weil mentions, “the fact that the vast majority of countries do not have official statistics on femicide, as opposed to homicide or other forms of murder, is testimony to its invisibility.” (Weil 2016, 1131) Therefore I hope that the type of measurement employed will reflect a method that is applicable to other cases as well.

### **4.3 Case selection**

#### The most similar case design

Given that we want to assess presence of fragmentation, the case selection is done on the basis of the quality and quantity of women’s groups participation in peace negotiations, and the scope of exploration is limited to countries or societies that have undergone conflict and where some negotiated settlement has led to the cessation of armed violence. This selection rule is necessary for a small n-case study design such as this because random sampling includes a high risk of selecting cases that are not representative or theoretically interesting to study (Gerring 2006, 87). Since the objective of this thesis is theory building, basically an argument that points towards information and commitment problems as factors that explain fragmentation of women’s groups during peace negotiations, King et al. (1994, 168-172) mention that selecting cases based on the variation in the independent variable mitigates problems related to the potential selection bias. But along with this, I must also control for possible variable bias. As King et al. (1994, 168-172) also mention, this means that I must control for a variable or variables, other than the one being observed, that might explain the causal story and the value of the outcome.

In order to address this, I will employ Mill’s method of difference. The most similar case design compares multiple cases that are selected because they are ideally similar in all aspects except for the variables of interest that could be seen as possible causes (Powner 2015, 124). What this means is that this research design will allow us to take into account only the chosen explanatory

variable that might explain the presence of widespread inequality and danger for women (DV), thus mitigating the effects of both selection and variable bias.

Since I am looking specifically at women movement fragmentation in negotiation processes, and the influence this may have in post-conflict societies, I focus on the population of cases during the 1990's and in the 2000's that have involved women's groups in negotiation processes. Given that assessments on the quality of women's groups involvement in peace negotiations –or lack thereof- is still minimal, the population of cases over which the theory applies should address those cases that have a strong involvement of women's groups, this will allow us to measure fragmentation in the stage were women may have the largest potential impact: participation at the negotiation table.

**Table 1. Influence of women in peace processes and the outcomes and implementation of such processes**

Influence of Women in the process	Agreement reached/ No implementation	Agreement reached/ Partial implementation	Agreement reached/ Implemented	Agreement reached/ Ongoing Implementation
None to weak	<b>Rwanda</b> (1992 – 1993) Turkey Armenia (2008 – 2011) Israel Palestine Geneva process (2003 – 2013)	<b>IP – Oslo</b> (1991 – 1995) <b>Mali</b> (1990 – 1992)	<b>Tajikistan</b> (1993 – 2000)	Kyrgyzstan (2013 – present)
Moderate	<b>Eritrea</b> (1993 – 1997) <b>Somalia I</b> (1992 – 1994) <b>Somalia II</b> (2001 - 2005) Darfur (2009 – 2013) Somalia III (1999 – 2001) Togo (1990 – 2006)	Solomon Island (2000 – 2014) Macedonia (2001 – 2013) Nepal (2005 – 2012)	Afghanistan (2001 – 2005) Benin (1990 – 2001) <b>El Salvador</b> (1990 – 1994)	
Strong		<b>Guatemala</b> (1989 – 1999) <b>Mexico (Chiapas)</b> (1994 – 1997) Burundi (1996 – 2013) <b>Northern Mali</b>	DR Congo (1999 – 2003) Kenya (2008 – 2013) Liberia (2003 – 2011) N. Ireland (2001 – 2013)	Yemen (2011 – 2014)

		(1990 – 1996)	PNG (1997 – 2005) <b>Somaliland</b> (1991 – 1994) <b>South Africa</b> (1990 – 1997)	
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*\*Bolded cases were completed before the passage of Resolution 1325*

(Table extracted from UN Women 2015, 42)

Given that I am interested in analyzing the impact of fragmentation of women’s groups as part of the women’s movement in the negotiation table, I will focus on two cases under the ‘strong influence’ during peace processes. Strong influence is defined by Paffenholz et al. (2016, 16) as: “bringing several significant issues onto the agenda and proposals for an agreement, or strongly pushing for negotiations to begin or for an agreement to be signed.” This will allow us to assess the impact of fragmentation on women’s groups during peace negotiations and if it results in unequal and dangerous societies for women in post-conflict societies.

#### **4.4 Guatemala and Mexico (Chiapas) as case studies**

The Guatemalan peace process (1989 – 1999) and the Chiapas peace process (1994 – 1997) provide appropriate cases to study, since they involved strong participation of women during the negotiation processes as a result of conflict between guerrilla forces and the state, as well as sharing many other contextual conditions.

Both conflicts differed in length, the Guatemalan conflict lasted for 35 years, nevertheless, the most intense period of fighting during the conflict took place during 1980 – 83. According to Colletta and Cullen (2000, 56), the conflict resulted in nearly 180,000 deaths, internal displacement of over 1 million people and the exodus of 100,000 refugees to neighboring countries. The conflict in Chiapas, Mexico experienced a mere twelve days of intense conflict that resulted in 155 deaths, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (“UCDP: Government of Mexico—EZLN”). Disparities in terms of battle-related deaths are quite large, nevertheless, both conflicts emerged as a result of decades of marginalization, repression, and ethnic discrimination against indigenous people, and the perpetrators for much of the one-sided

violence in both conflicts included state forces. It is also important to note that both cases have significant indigenous populations, representing 40 percent of the population in Guatemala (INE 2011, 8) and 27.9 percent in the state of Chiapas, the third highest in all of Mexico (INEGI 2015, 62).

#### **4.5 Background of the women's movement in Guatemala**

In Guatemala, “Unions and opposition parties, along with peasant and other grassroots groups, had been forbidden since 1954.” (Durham and Gurd 2005, 44) Given that opposition parties had been banned by successive military leaders in charge of the country, social organizations played the role of the opposition, denouncing injustices carried out by military regimes. Dispersed efforts were made to organize women both in revolutionary and conservative movements. Destrooper (2014, 10) gives the example of the Anticommunist Women of Guatemala created in 1968 and that of the Catholic Women in 1966, as well as the Mutual Support Group, GAM, by the revolutionary organizations. Women's role during the conflict was seen in terms of practicality, “[...]to foster support for the revolution more efficiently.” (Destrooper 2014, 10) This level of support from women groups did not imply greater equality or the promotion of gender issues, but it did generate mobilization and awareness during the negotiation process.

#### **4.6 Background of the women's movement in Chiapas**

Prior to the short-lived conflict, women activism in Chiapas emerged as a result of peasant and indigenous struggles that had been taken place for the past decades against a repressive government. It was not until 1970's that many women became involved in marches, sit-downs, and meetings that demanded for fairer distribution of land and other cultural demands (Speed, Castillo and Stephen 2006, 59). The Catholic Church also promoted workshops that led women to question current gender inequalities in their own communities, thus bringing these issues to light (Speed, Castillo and Stephen 2006, 59). As a result of these efforts, Chiapas saw the emergence of groups specifically targeting women and gender issues; examples include the Diocesan Council of Women and other NGO's working in rural areas (Speed, Castillo and

Stephen 2006, 61). “But it was the Zapatista National Liberation Army [...] that first provided a public forum for indigenous women.” (Speed, Castillo and Stephen 2006, 63) This is important because once the uprising began in 1994, women began to voice their concerns during the negotiation process.

#### **4.7 Justifying case selection**

Both cases, Guatemala and Chiapas (Mexico) are not identical and this leads to potential problems in terms of comparison. The main difference between both cases is that prior to negotiations, women groups in Guatemala served interests for both social and conservative causes, irrespective of the conflict parties. If they were involved with guerrilla organizations, these organizations did not pay specific attention to women’s issues. But after 1986, when military rule returned to civilian rule, women’s groups began to proliferate. Destrooper (2014, 47) mentions this more clearly, when women participated in guerrilla movements, it was seen more generally as a struggle against the state, not as a process of emancipation for women’s issues. But they also gained useful skills through mobilization that allowed them to address these issues once the conflict simmered down. In Chiapas, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), the main guerrilla group confronting the state, provided a forum for women’s participation prior to negotiations given that their cause was quite popular and found support in pockets of rural and indigenous peoples all over Mexico (Manaut, Selee and Arnson 2006, 134). However, I argue that these variations in terms of women’s mobilization prior to the conflict does not prevent comparison; both cases included strong influence of women’s participation in the peace processes, and I would expect that if in one of the cases, violence and inequality against women was highly widespread even though fragmentation was not present, it would contradict my hypothesis.

#### **Internal validity and external validity of the case selection**

Now I discuss internal validity and external validity in the case selection. Literature by Gerring (2006) and George and Bennett (2005) speak of a trade-off between internal and external validity; cases are said to have high internal validity if the indicators used to measure a concept

capture the value of that concept similarly for all cases. I argue that my cases have high internal validity given that they both derive from similar backgrounds, such as peace processes with high women participation in Latin American contexts. Also, aside from limitations with identifying the indicator for collective identity (which I mention further on), which is more subjective, the risk of incorrectly interpreting the other indicators for fragmentation is unlikely. Gerring (2006, 43) defines external validity as the ability to reproduce and generalize findings. Can the indicators for my two cases, Guatemala and Chiapas (Mexico) produce similar findings if I, or anyone else, were to replicate them in a different context or with different cases? Given that I am looking at cases with high women participation in peace processes, there is a limited pool of cases that can be studied, nevertheless, more countries in the twenty-first century see the importance of including women and women groups in peace processes, therefore, the number of cases and studies will increase in the future. As a result, if the theoretical argument holds, the results should be comparable to other contexts in any future research involving women groups in peace processes.

#### **4.8 Operationalization of the theoretical framework**

##### Operationalization of the independent variable

In this thesis, the independent variable, fragmentation of the women's movement, was defined as internal divisions within movements, and by this, I mean the lack of a bargaining framework: inability to make credible commitments and information problems during peace negotiations. Questions are asked on the basis of these two concepts of fragmentation. Indicators to assess the first concept, commitment problems, are assessed on the basis of a dichotomy: presence or absence of women groups independent from the conflict parties or as part of the conflict parties, and by the presence or absence of a collective identity during the peace process. The indicators stem from the assumption that if women groups lack a clear identity as part of either a movement separate from the conflict parties or as part of either conflict party during peace negotiations, they will not appear to be credibly committed to causes that promote gender issues with other actors who for the most part are men. The second concept, information problems, requires a more in-depth analysis, I will assess whether women's groups did in fact participate in direct

negotiations or if they participated in a different modality of inclusion, and if their involvement in that modality was as a group or as individual members. Given that informational asymmetries exist between leaders and their groups, if leaders are not present or if there are many groups, the ability to make strategic choices and the uncertainty in the delivery of information may harm their bargaining power among other women's groups within the women's movement.

Given that this is a qualitative thesis, framing fragmentation this way will allow me to assess the presence of fragmentation in more detail.

In order to assess presence of fragmentation during peace negotiations, a set of questions and indicators (see Table 2) are developed. For the first concept, commitment problems, Question 1 and 2 assess participation of women groups as either part of the conflict parties or separate from them. Question 3 will then assess whether women groups present as part of the conflict parties or as a separate movement, shared a common identity.

1. *Were women groups present during the negotiation process, separate from the conflict parties?*
2. *Were women groups present as part of the conflict parties during the negotiation process?*
3. *Did women groups rally under a collective issue during the negotiation process?*

The indicator for question 1 looks at the number of organizations present during peace negotiations but assessing their involvement as separate from the conflict parties. On the basis of that factor, I mention whether they were present or not. Question 2 assesses the involvement of women organizations but under the umbrella of one of the conflict parties. This does not necessarily mean that they belong to a conflict party, it means that they were invited to provide advice to them. Question 3 assesses the mobilization of women's groups behind a common identity, thus pursuing a particular interest. If more than one interest was identified, collective identity was coded as absent. It is important to remember that if subcultural movements rally under one common issue, they are more likely to pursue a common agenda. The indicators for these questions are seen as necessary to grasp the level of commitment of women's groups to the movement itself.

The second concept for fragmentation assesses information problems. Unlike the first set of questions (1 – 3), the following questions require a more in-depth analysis. Question 4 assesses the models of inclusion of women groups; if women were not directly involved during the negotiations, I can logically assume that they participated in one of the other models as stated by O'Reilly, Sülleabháin and Paffenholz (2015) seven models of inclusion<sup>1</sup>. Questions 5 and 6 logically follow from question 4 by asking whether this participation included various groups (question 5) or if that participation was an individual endeavor.

4. *What model(s) of inclusion did women groups take part in during the negotiation process?*
5. *How many women's groups are estimated to have participated during the negotiation process?*
6. *How many women leaders, representing the women's movement, were present during the negotiation process?*

An indicator assessing models of inclusion of women groups during negotiation processes (question 4) has implications for the efficiency of a formula, given that it proves that the parties are being serious in terms of negotiations. When referring to the women's movement, overcoming information problems can resolve incompatibilities between women's groups but I will analyze whether is more efficient when it is carried out during direct negotiations, as opposed to other models of inclusion. Once this is stated, the indicator for question 5 will address the number of women's groups present; a higher number indicates a greater number of incompatibilities present between groups within the movement, while the indicator for question 6 will assess the number of women leaders present during the negotiations. The concentration of power in the hands of one women may indicate more societal support or legitimacy for her message, therefore I will assess if the presence of one or more women leaders created information problems that increased fragmentation.

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<sup>1</sup> Check O'Reilly, Sülleabháin and Paffenholz 2015, 14

**Table 2. Operationalization independent variable: Fragmentation of the women movement in peace processes**

	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Measurements</b>	<b>Questions to ask each case based on the indicators</b>
Commitment problems	1. Presence or absence of women groups, separate from the conflict parties, during the peace process.	Reports indicating participation of women's groups in the peace process, independently from the conflict actors.	Were women groups present during the negotiation process, separate from the conflict parties?
	2. Presence or absence of women groups, as part of the conflict parties, during the peace process.	Reports indicating participation of women's groups in the peace process, as part of the conflict parties.	Were women groups present as part of the conflict parties during the negotiation process?
	3. Presence or absence of a collective identity in the peace process.	Reports indicating whether women's groups pushed for a common issue or if they addressed many issues.	Did women groups rally under a collective issue during the negotiation process?
Information Problems	4. Type(s) of participation of women's groups during peace negotiations.	Direct participation at the negotiation table/ observer status/ consultations/ inclusive commissions/ problem-solving workshops/ public decision-making/ mass action	What model(s) of inclusion did women groups take part in during the negotiation process?
	5. Number of women's groups present during the peace process.	Reports indicating the number of groups represented during the peace process.	How many women's groups are estimated to have participated in the negotiation process?
	6. Number of individual women present during the negotiation	Reports on women leaders who had an influence over the negotiation process	How many women leaders, representing the women's movement, were

	process.		present during the negotiation process?
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**4.9 Operationalization of the dependent variable**

The dependent variable, *widespread inequality and violence against women*, is best explained as a variable of scale. Given that femicide is hard to measure, Weil (2016, 1130) mentions that methodological ways of measuring femicide do exist, such as focusing on women who experience extreme acts of violence. For this reason, and as previously mentioned, the focus on femicide allows us to observe how violence against women can be both lethal (leading to death) and also non-lethal, such as physical, psychological and/or sexual. It will be argued that ‘prevalence’ will be employed as the scale in order to measure the indicators for both lethal and non-lethal violence against women. In the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Coding Manual, “The prevalence measure gives an estimate of the relative magnitude of reported sexual violence perpetrated by an actor in a particular year.” (Cohen and Nordås 2013, 10). For this thesis, however, five indicators for the DV, *widespread inequality and danger for women*, will be coded by levels of ‘prevalence’ to estimate the magnitude of these reported acts. An ordinal scale is adopted in order to code for ‘prevalence’, this scale is adapted from Cohen & Nordås (2013, 10). Assessing ‘prevalence’ requires us to focus on two important questions: does measuring ‘prevalence’ have the same meaning across cases? And in terms of external validity; could the indicators be used to measure the DV elsewhere as well?

In order to measure whether levels of gender inequality and violence against women in post-conflict societies was higher in one case, as opposed to the other, I need to measure how widespread it was. A case is considered to demonstrate higher levels (i.e., widespread levels) if ‘prevalence’ is coded as 3 (massive/widespread); a case is considered to show moderate levels if ‘prevalence’ is coded as 2 (several/many); a case is considered to show low levels if ‘prevalence’ is coded as 1 (some), and if it is not prevalent or present at all, it is coded as 0 (none). It is important to keep in mind that other than “massive”, “several/many”, “some” and “none” for coding prevalence scores are used as well, these are further described below.

<b>Table 3. Measurements for prevalence of dependent variable (DV)**</b>
<p>Prevalence = 3 (Massive)</p> <p>“Massive” may also refer to innumerable, systematic, widescale, widespread</p> <p>Reports of 1.000 or more incidents of any indicator (1. Intimate partner killings, 2. Female homicides in the public sphere, 3. Physical harm, 4. Psychological abuse, 5. Sexual violence)</p>
<p>Prevalence = 2 (Several/Many)</p> <p>“Several/Many” may also refer to: often, regularly, frequently, a lot, numerous instances, recurring, a pattern, a common pattern, periodically, persisting, major, number of occasions</p> <p>Reports of 25-999 incidents of any indicator (1. Intimate partner killings, 2. Female homicides in the public sphere, 3. Physical harm, 4. Psychological abuse, 5. Sexual violence)</p>
<p>Prevalence = 1 (some)</p> <p>“Some” may also refer to: isolated reports, there continued to be reports, effort(s)</p> <p>Reports of less than 25 incidents of any indicator (1. Intimate partner killings, 2. Female homicides in the public sphere, 3. Physical harm, 4. Psychological abuse, 5. Sexual violence)</p>
<p>Prevalence = 0 (none)</p> <p>“None” indicates there is no mention of prevalence for any indicator (1. Intimate partner killings, 2. Female homicides in the public sphere, 3. Physical harm, 4. Psychological abuse, 5. Sexual violence)</p>

\*\*Table adopted and adapted from Cohen, and Nordås (2013, 10)

In order to assess higher prevalence of gender inequality and violence against women, a set of research questions and indicators (see Table 4) are developed. Questions 1 and 2 assess lethal violence in both the private sphere (intimate partner killings) and in the public sphere (female homicides). Questions 3, 4 and 5 assess other acts of violence that can lead to death, such as physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence.

1. *Are intimate partner killings prevalent?*
2. *Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?*
3. *Is physical harm against women prevalent?*
4. *Is psychological abuse prevalent?*
5. *Is sexual violence prevalent?*

The indicator for the prevalence of intimate partner killings (question 1) includes using keywords in human rights reports<sup>2</sup> that explicitly address the killing of a woman or female by her male intimate partner. If there is no explicit mention of death of a woman as a result of an intimate

<sup>2</sup> Reports used for this thesis will be further described in the Time Frame and Data Collection section

partner, the female homicide is coded for the second indicator, female homicides (question 2). This is done in order to prevent omitting an instance, in the reports, that refers to the death of a woman. The indicator for the prevalence of female homicides in the public sphere (question 2) includes using keywords in the same reports that explicitly address “any killings of women or girls, irrespective of the circumstances of the killing.” (WHO 2012 as seen in Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development 2015, 89) This will allow for greater comparability between the cases. Nevertheless, as stated by the Secretariat of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2015, 89), in order to avoid focusing solely on homicide and women as its victims, I must also place femicide on the continuum of gender-based violence. Therefore, addressing other aspects of violence that can lead to death. Indicators for the prevalence of other forms of violence, such as physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence (questions 3, 4 and 5) seek to address this gap.

In line with the theoretical argument, if fragmentation is present, it is expected that patriarchal norms would persist, and if these patriarchal notions of dominance and power of men over women are seen as factors that could lead to violence and inequality towards women, these five indicators should be widespread in post-conflict societies.

As a final point, in order to assess levels of widespread inequality and violence towards women, data is presented for a consecutive period of five years after the end of peace negotiations for both cases. This measure increases comparability and generalizability between Guatemala and Chiapas (Mexico), and can tell us if levels of violence and inequality have increased, remained static or have reversed. It is important to note that higher levels do not imply that the problem has become more widespread, as it might also signify that reporting has become more common. In terms of validity, the indicators for questions 1 and 2 (intimate partner killings and female homicides) can be said to capture the culmination of extreme levels of violence and inequality, resulting in death at the societal level. The indicators for questions 3-5 are weaker given that they reflect more general trends of violence that can be said to be attributed to individuals, rather than social conditions. Nevertheless, since I am measuring prevalence rather than specific data for these indicators, it is easier to generalize the findings across cases.

<b>Table 4. Operationalization dependent variable: Widespread inequality and danger for women (DV)</b>		
<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Measurements</b>	<b>Questions to ask each case based on the indicators</b>
1. Prevalence of intimate partner killings	Refer to separate Table 3	Are intimate partner killings prevalent?
2. Prevalence of female homicides in the public sphere	Refer to separate Table 3	Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?
3. Prevalence of physical harm	Refer to separate Table 3	Is physical harm against women prevalent?
4. Prevalence of psychological abuse	Refer to separate Table 3	Is psychological abuse prevalent?
5. Prevalence of sexual violence	Refer to separate Table 3	Is sexual violence prevalent?

#### **4.10 Time Frame and Data Collection**

I must guarantee a systematic comparison of the two cases, therefore I establish a clear time frame to measure the variables across Guatemala and Chiapas (Mexico). The period of negotiations between the conflict parties and other actors, such as the women's movement, serves as the starting point to observe if fragmentation took place in both cases. To measure the DV, I assess the five years' post-negotiations; it is here where I will observe prevalence of widespread violence and inequality for women.

The measurement point for the independent variable differs for each case, nevertheless, for both cases I measure fragmentation of women groups during the negotiation phase of the peace process, given that I want to assess whether fragmentation during direct negotiations has an effect on the dependent variable. Widespread levels of inequality and violence for women will be measured through observable implications of 'prevalence' during 5 consecutive years after the period of negotiations. Measuring 'prevalence' this way stems from the necessity to observe variation across time. If I were to assess the DV only through measuring 'prevalence' one year

after the end of the negotiations, it would fail to take into account the sustainability of peace and other factors discussed during negotiations. This can also be said for the opposite, if SMO's, such as the women's movement, is ineffective in pushing for a framework of interests that are important to them, the lack of rehabilitation of different levels of society; community, household, civil society and government; may reinforce inequality and violence towards women in post-conflict societies over time (Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens 2002, 332). Therefore, I perceive the post-conflict, five-year period, to be sufficiently adequate to grasp the possible correlation between fragmentation during peace negotiations and widespread inequality and violence for women in post-conflict era.

For the independent variable, data for the analysis has been collected through secondary sources. Reports and accounts from non-governmental organizations (NGO), the UN System (through UN Women), local and international universities, and analyses from persons involved in the peace negotiations, in both English and Spanish languages, provide material to assess the participation of women during peace processes. Given that it is challenging to assess the participation of individuals and organizations at different points in time during peace processes, I provide approximations for the negotiations as a single point in time. Verified empirical material on the full list of participants for both cases are scarce, therefore it is important to note that I may be engaging in source bias by relying on only a handful of sources.

In order to assess levels of prevalence of inequality and violence against women for the dependent variable, I code for 'prevalent' acts of intimate partner killings, female homicides in the in the public sphere, physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence against women. The data collection relies on the three most commonly used sources in human rights literature, as mentioned by the SVAC Codebook: the US State Department Annual reports; Amnesty International annual and periodic special reports; and the Human Rights Watch annual and periodic special reports. These sources typically publish reports covering both countries and years in the study. Reasons for using this as opposed to other coding sources such as the Womanstats Project which provides a more comprehensive compilation of variables for women's issues, or Factiva, which provides personal accounts from news reports for both cases, is that both sources lack yearly information, specifically for the time periods being assessed:

Guatemala, 2000-2004, and Chiapas (Mexico), 1998 – 2002. The reports are also limited in the sense that the accounts and the information described present situational contexts for the country's as a whole, it rarely disaggregates below the national level. This may over-emphasize the results provided for Chiapas (Mexico), but I justify this data-collection method for two reasons: firstly, it was not until 2003 that the Mexican government, through the National Institute of Women, released its first national survey on violence against women and relationship dynamics in the home<sup>3</sup>. Secondly, given that the conflict with Chiapas was the only major conflict throughout Mexico during the decades of the 1990's and early 2000's, the three reports discuss most of their findings in regards to this conflict. As a final point, in order to tackle source bias, I triangulate similarities in wording used among all three sources for each specific year.

#### **4.11 Structure of the Analysis**

The empirical analysis of this thesis is divided into three separate sections. The first two parts of the analysis focus on the empirical cases, presenting the findings concerning both fragmentation of the women's movement during peace negotiations (IV) and findings concerning widespread inequality and violence during post-conflict (DV). The developed questions and indicators present the findings on the variables of interest for the two cases. Additionally, tables presenting the findings and the sources used for these findings are included. After presenting the empirical findings on the individual cases, I perform a comparison of the connections between the values of both fragmentation and prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women. The following discussion on the relationship between the empirics and the theory will reveal whether the data supports –or does not support—my theory.

To end this section, Section 5 examines alternative explanations to my theory that could potentially describe the observed outcome of interest: widespread inequality and violence against women. The last part of the analysis, section 5.1, posits theoretical, methodological, and empirical limitations of this thesis. Once I have developed this thorough analysis, the thesis ends

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<sup>3</sup> For more information, see reports in the following link:  
<http://estadistica.inmujeres.gob.mx/formas/publicaciones.php?menu1=4&IDTema=4&pag=2>

with the conclusion; summarizing the main findings; and if my thesis has contributed to the general field.

#### **4.12. Case 1 – Guatemala – Assessing prevalence of fragmentation in the women’s movement during the peace process (IV)**

Brief background on the inclusion of the women’s movement during the peace process

As I previously mentioned, the mobilization of women’s groups proved key during the Guatemalan peace process. “With UN support, in 1991 the government began negotiations with the guerrilla group, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity [URNG, in Spanish], which led to a permanent cease-fire in 1996.” (Zelizer 2013, 116 Location 3144) This was a result of earlier discussions in 1991 that resulted in an 11-point negotiation agenda incorporating recommendations from consultations between the two main parties that failed to involve civil society representatives. As mentioned by Enrique Alvarez (2002, 49), increasing international and UN pressure forced both parties to resume stalled talks in 1994, thus including input from civil society organizations, such as the women’s movement, to address five main topics: the role of civil society and the army in a democratic society; identity and the rights of indigenous people; constitutional reform and the electoral system; resettling refugees and IDPs; and socio-economic and agrarian reform. This provides a backdrop to the participation and the role that women would take during the peace process.

Presentation of main results

To assess fragmentation in terms commitment problems and information problems, I divide the results into two. The first three questions assess fragmentation in terms of commitment problems within the women’s movement, subsequently the next three assess fragmentation in terms of information problems. During the peace process, women groups were present during the negotiation process, separate from the conflict parties. In 1994, the Assembly of Civil Society (ACS) was formed, bringing women organizations into the fora to pursue an agenda that

prioritized the promotion of “equality and improving the status of women in the framework of political solutions to the conflict.” (Alvarez 2002, 51) Even though women groups represented a wider movement in the ACS, they were notably absent as part of either conflict party. By this I mean that no women’s groups were directly represented by the conflict actors. “In Guatemala’s 1996 peace accord [...] Luz Mendez was the sole woman in the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity’s delegation.” (O’Reilly, Súilleabháin and Paffenholz 2015, 14). On the side of the government, Raquel Zelaya, a member of the private sector, was the only woman delegate in a panel comprising 4 members (Chang et al. 2015, 57). As a final point, in order to assess commitment problems, I ask whether women groups rallied under a collective issue during the negotiation process. “The priority of the women’s sector was promoting equality and improving the status of women in the framework of political solutions to the conflict.” (Enrique Alvarez 2002, 51). Nevertheless, the women’s movement did not rally under a collective identity during this time, given that they could only provide guidance on the five major issues set by Guatemala’s Civil Society Assembly. These topics, as mentioned by Alvarez (2002, 37) were: the role of civil society and the army in a democratic society; identity and the rights of indigenous people; constitutional reform and electoral system; resettling refugees and IDPs; and socio-economic and agrarian reform. At the same time, “each sector presented its position on a specific theme and the issues were debated until they were able to prepare a consensus paper.” (Mckeen 2004, 4). Given the vastness of the issues being discussed, all parties had to reach a consensus on the main points that were to be delivered to the main parties, a situation that could enhance fragmentation of the women’s movement.

The following three questions address fragmentation in terms of information problems. During the peace process, the women’s movement took part in one modality of inclusion. This modality of inclusion was in ‘consultations’. Official consultations are “often chosen when the official negotiation process design is exclusive, and negotiators and mediators recognize that public support is needed at a certain point in time.” (Paffenholz et al. 2016, 31)

These consultations were officially endorsed by the conflict parties but given that they work in parallel to the main negotiations, they did not have decision-making power, they could only provide advice to the parties. This was the case in Guatemala, where the Assembly of Civil Society allowed different sectors in society, such as the women’s movement, “to debate possible solutions to a range of substantive conflict issues.” (Mckeen 2004, 4) Given that consultations

were the main vehicle for participation during the talks, the women’s movement comprised many organizations in the ACS. According to Chang et al. (2015, 62), the women’s movement comprised 32 organizations, representing rural and urban women, academics, students, feminists, trade unions, indigenous groups and human rights activists. The final question addressing information problems looks at the number of women leaders, representing the women’s movement, that were present during the negotiation process. It was previously mentioned that the sole women representatives during the talks were delegates representing the conflict parties, Luz Mendez and Raquel Zelaya, therefore the women’s movement was not directly represented as a separate women’s delegation during the negotiations.

<b>Table 5. Presentation data for cases – Fragmentation of the women movement in peace processes (IV)</b>		
<b>Questions</b>	<b>Guatemala</b>	<b>Mexico (Chiapas)</b>
Q1: Were women groups present during the negotiation process, separately from the conflict parties?	Present	Absent
Q2: Were women groups present as part of the conflict parties during the negotiation process?	Absent	Present
Q3: Did women groups rally under a collective issue during the negotiation process?	No	Yes
Q4: What model(s) of inclusion do women groups take part in during the negotiation process?	Consultative	Direct negotiations and public and unofficial consultations
Q5: How many women’s groups are estimated to have participated in the negotiation	32	±100

process?		
Q6: How many women leaders, representing the women's movement, were present during the negotiation process?	0	0

**4.13. Case 1 – Guatemala – Assessing widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)**

During the period under analysis, 2000 – 2004, I have sought to assess the prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in Guatemala for each individual year. Triangulating the results has provided us with insight into whether there has been an increase, a decrease or if it has remained the same throughout the entire period. Given that the peace agreement was signed in 1996, the time period analyzed might provide us with an indication of the effects of the negotiations, and if the presence of fragmentation in the women's movement is correlated with higher instances of widespread inequality and violence against women in the post-conflict period. The questions being addressed pertain to three reports used to analyze the indicators for the DV as explained in the research design section, those reports are the same one's used in the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Dataset Codebook by Cohen and Nordås (2013): the US State Department Annual reports (hereinafter referred to as USD reports), Amnesty International annual and periodic special reports (hereinafter referred to as AI reports) ; and the Human Rights Watch annual and periodic special reports (hereinafter referred to as HRW reports).

In the year 2000, questions one and two assess the prevalence of intimate partner killings in the private sphere and female homicides in the public sphere. No indications are given that either one was prevalent at all during the time period. One exception is the USD report where a prevalence measurement of some ('1') is given for female homicides in the public sphere. This means that reports of less than 25 incidents were recorded. Questions three, four and five assess prevalence of physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence, in that order. The USD

report indicates that there was a prevalence measurement of some or several ('2') for all three incidents, this means that there were 25-999 incidents recorded during that time. The AI report gives no indication of prevalence for any of the three indicators, while the HRW report indicates a prevalence of some ('1') for incidents of sexual violence and none for the other two indicators.

In the year 2001, the prevalence for intimate partner killings and female homicides in the public sphere was none ('0'), for all three reports. Interestingly, physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence had a massive (3) prevalence, which indicates massive or widespread instances of all three indicators. A prevalence of '3' indicates that there were reports of one-thousand or more incidents of these indicators. This was reported for the USD report. The HRW report indicated some ('1') prevalence of both physical harm and psychological abuse for this year as well. The AI report, however, reported none ('0') for all indicators.

In 2002, none of the reports gave indications of prevalence for intimate partner killings or female homicides. For the USD report, there is a reduction for the indicators physical harm and psychological abuse from one year prior; both instances reported several or many ('2'). Nevertheless, sexual violence was still massive or widespread ('3'). There was some ('1') prevalence of physical harm and psychological abuse in the HRW report and an increase from none ('0') to several or many ('2') instances of sexual abuse from one year prior. The AI report indicated a prevalence of '0' for all indicators.

In 2003, I begin to see indications of female homicide prevalence in the public sphere; both the USD and AI reports indicate several or many ('2') instances. Albeit all three continue reporting a lack of prevalence of intimate partner killings ('0'). Once again, as in 2001, the prevalence of physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence is massive in the USD report. The AI report indicates a prevalence of several or many ('2') incidents of sexual violence but a prevalence of ('0') or none, for the other indicators. One thing to note is that for this year, the HRW report indicates no prevalence for any of the indicators.

In the final year of the five-year period, 2004, once again, all three reports indicated a prevalence of ('0') or none, for intimate partner killings. Female homicides in the public sphere was once

again given a prevalence level of ‘2’; several or many; in both the USD and the AI reports. The HRW gave a prevalence of ‘0’ for this indicator. Physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence was massive or widespread (‘3’) in the USD report. The AI report gave a prevalence of ‘0’ or none, for all three of the questions on prevalence of physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence, while the HRW indicated a prevalence of some (‘1’) physical harm and sexual violence and none (‘0’) for psychological abuse.

<b>Table 6. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)</b>			
<b>Questions for year 2000</b>			
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>4</sup>	None <sup>5</sup>	None <sup>6</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	Some <sup>7</sup>	None <sup>8</sup>	None <sup>9</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Several/Many <sup>10</sup>	None <sup>11</sup>	None <sup>12</sup>
Q4: Is psychological	Several/Many <sup>13</sup>	None <sup>14</sup>	None <sup>15</sup>

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Guatemala

<sup>5</sup> Amnesty International Report 2001 –Guatemala

<sup>6</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Guatemala

<sup>8</sup> Amnesty International Report 2001 –Guatemala

<sup>9</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Guatemala

<sup>11</sup> Amnesty International Report 2001 –Guatemala

<sup>12</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Guatemala

<sup>14</sup> Amnesty International Report 2001 –Guatemala

abuse prevalent?			
Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Several/Many <sup>16</sup>	None <sup>17</sup>	Some <sup>18</sup>

<b>Table 7. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)</b>			
<b>Questions for year</b>			
<b>2001</b>			
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>19</sup>	None <sup>20</sup>	None <sup>21</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	None <sup>22</sup>	None <sup>23</sup>	None <sup>24</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Massive <sup>25</sup>	None <sup>26</sup>	Some <sup>27</sup>
Q4: Is psychological	Massive <sup>28</sup>	None <sup>29</sup>	Some <sup>30</sup>

<sup>15</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Guatemala

<sup>17</sup> Amnesty International Report 2001 –Guatemala

<sup>18</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Guatemala

<sup>20</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Guatemala

<sup>21</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico.” Human Rights Watch

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Guatemala

<sup>23</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Guatemala

<sup>24</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico.” Human Rights Watch

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Guatemala

<sup>26</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Guatemala

<sup>27</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico.” Human Rights Watch

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Guatemala

<sup>29</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Guatemala

abuse prevalent?			
Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Massive <sup>31</sup>	None <sup>32</sup>	None <sup>33</sup>

**Table 8. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)**

<b>Questions for year 2002</b>			
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>34</sup>	None <sup>35</sup>	None <sup>36</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	None <sup>37</sup>	None <sup>38</sup>	None <sup>39</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Several/Many <sup>40</sup>	None <sup>41</sup>	Some <sup>42</sup>
Q4: Is psychological abuse prevalent?	Several/Many <sup>43</sup>	None <sup>44</sup>	Some <sup>45</sup>

<sup>30</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico.” Human Rights Watch

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Guatemala

<sup>32</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Guatemala

<sup>33</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico.” Human Rights Watch

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Guatemala

<sup>35</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Guatemala

<sup>36</sup> World Report 2003 – Guatemala

<sup>37</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Guatemala

<sup>38</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Guatemala

<sup>39</sup> World Report 2003 – Guatemala

<sup>40</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Guatemala

<sup>41</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Guatemala

<sup>42</sup> World Report 2003 – Guatemala

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Guatemala

<sup>44</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Guatemala

<sup>45</sup> World Report 2003 – Guatemala

Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Massive <sup>46</sup>	None <sup>47</sup>	Several/Many <sup>48</sup>
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**Table 9. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)**

Questions for year 2003			
Source	State	AI	HRW
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>49</sup>	None <sup>50</sup>	None <sup>51</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	Several/Many <sup>52</sup>	Several/Many <sup>53</sup>	None <sup>54</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Massive <sup>55</sup>	None <sup>56</sup>	None <sup>57</sup>
Q4: Is psychological abuse prevalent?	Massive <sup>58</sup>	None <sup>59</sup>	None <sup>60</sup>
Q5: Is sexual violence	Massive <sup>61</sup>	Several/Many <sup>62</sup>	None <sup>63</sup>

<sup>46</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Guatemala

<sup>47</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Guatemala

<sup>48</sup> World Report 2003 – Guatemala

<sup>49</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003

<sup>50</sup> Amnesty International Report 2004 –Guatemala

<sup>51</sup> World Report 2004 – In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status

<sup>52</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003

<sup>53</sup> Amnesty International Report 2004 –Guatemala

<sup>54</sup> World Report 2004 – In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status

<sup>55</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003

<sup>56</sup> Amnesty International Report 2004 –Guatemala

<sup>57</sup> World Report 2004 – In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status

<sup>58</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003

<sup>59</sup> Amnesty International Report 2004 –Guatemala

<sup>60</sup> World Report 2004 – In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status

<sup>61</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003

<sup>62</sup> Amnesty International Report 2004 –Guatemala

prevalent?			
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<b>Table 10. Presentation data for Guatemala - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)</b>			
<b>Questions for year 2004</b>			
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>64</sup>	None <sup>65</sup>	None <sup>66</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	Several/Many <sup>67</sup>	Several/Many <sup>68</sup>	None <sup>69</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Massive <sup>70</sup>	None <sup>71</sup>	Some <sup>72</sup>
Q4: Is psychological abuse prevalent?	Massive <sup>73</sup>	None <sup>74</sup>	None <sup>75</sup>
Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Massive <sup>76</sup>	None <sup>77</sup>	Some <sup>78</sup>

<sup>63</sup> World Report 2004 – In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status

<sup>64</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 – Guatemala

<sup>65</sup> Amnesty International Report 2005 –Guatemala

<sup>66</sup> World Report 2005 – Guatemala

<sup>67</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 – Guatemala

<sup>68</sup> Amnesty International Report 2005 –Guatemala

<sup>69</sup> World Report 2005 – Guatemala

<sup>70</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 – Guatemala

<sup>71</sup> Amnesty International Report 2005 –Guatemala

<sup>72</sup> World Report 2005 – Guatemala

<sup>73</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 – Guatemala

<sup>74</sup> Amnesty International Report 2005 –Guatemala

<sup>75</sup> World Report 2005 – Guatemala

<sup>76</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004 – Guatemala

<sup>77</sup> Amnesty International Report 2005 –Guatemala

<sup>78</sup> World Report 2005 – Guatemala

#### **4.14. Case 2 – Chiapas (Mexico) – Assessing prevalence of fragmentation in the women’s movement during the peace process (IV)**

As mentioned by Speed et al. (2006, 61), women in Chiapas had addressed gender issues with help from the Catholic church in their communities since the 1970’s. But it was not until the 1980’s that women began to organize exclusively in groups as a result of the inequality and discrimination that they faced in their daily lives (Servicio Internacional para la Paz 2016, 22). The uprising of the Zapatista movement in 1994 opened a window of opportunity for women to reaffirm their rights, thus publishing the Revolutionary Women’s Law (LRM, in Spanish) which addressed equal rights for women in home environments and in the community. This “law” compiled ten demands made by women which they presented to the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN, in Spanish) during the negotiations (Servicio Internacional para la Paz 2016, 33).

Women also participated as part of civil society organizations during the peace negotiations (1994-1997), for example, during the 1994 talks, a State Convention of Chiapan Women took place, in which multiple organizations comprising social and non-governmental organizations discussed women’s rights as an integral component necessary for societal transformation (Servicio Internacional para la Paz 2016, 41-42). These two articulations of women strength would guide women’s participation during the negotiations between the EZLN and the Mexican government.

#### **Presentation of main results**

To assess fragmentation in terms of bargaining theory, the results are divided into two. The first three questions assess fragmentation in terms of commitment problems within the women’s movement, subsequently the next three assess fragmentation in terms of information problems.

In terms of commitment problems, the first question asks whether women groups were present during the negotiation process, separate from the conflict parties. During the negotiation phase of the peace process, the women's movement was present, as separate, from the conflict parties, in both public consultations and in unofficial consultations (Paffenholz et al. 2016, 23). As stated by Paffenholz et al. (2016, 27), public and unofficial consultations are linked to the possibility that recommendations will be added to the negotiation agenda, boosting the legitimacy of the process by giving ownership to the people and furthering its sustainability. Further information regarding the women's movement participation will be described in question four.

Question two assesses whether women's groups were present as part of the conflict parties during the negotiation process. As was mentioned previously, the women's movement took part in public consultations and in unofficial consultations. Nonetheless, women's groups or delegations also participated "as part of the approximately 100 intellectual, activists and representatives of indigenous organizations advising the EZLN." (Paffenholz et al. 2016, 23) It is important to note that the EZLN was an old movement with more than 10 years of organizational development in Chiapas, they sought to help assure equal rights among ladinos and indigenous peoples. Amongst the indigenous class, women fought hard during this time to gain equality within the struggle, and with "The Revolutionary Women's Law, which EZLN passed in 1993, ensured that women were almost equal in the movement, which was unique." (Romo and Smeets 2015, 5) This allowed women groups to advise one of the conflict parties, in this case the EZLN, given that there was a history of women's influence over decision-making within the guerrilla group. Question three asks us if women groups rallied under a collective issue during the negotiation process. As mentioned Romo and Smeets (2015, 6), the San Andres Dialogues, the negotiation phase between the EZLN and the national government, secured inclusion through a broad agenda, this means that even though the peace process was local (i.e. in Chiapas), it took on national relevance due to the issues being discussed. The four issues included: indigenous rights, development, political reforms and women's rights. Given that women's rights were one of the main issues being discussed that would eventually lead to the EZLN's disarmament, women rallied collectively to address women's rights during the peace process.

Questions four through six address fragmentation in terms of information problems. I need to assess levels of coordination within the movement to ascertain if fragmentation was present as a result of information problems. Question four assesses models of inclusion in which women

groups took part; these models were described above as public consultations and unofficial consultations, as well as direct participation as a separate women’s delegation that advised the EZLN guerrilla group. As part of official and unofficial consultations, “this consultative forum invited 178 indigenous organizations, with many women delegates among these, to advise the EZLN negotiators.” (Paffenholz et al. 2016, 23) It was also one of the few instances where consultations had binding implications, that the parties had to follow (Romo and Smeets 2015, 6). Given that secondary research does not provide a real estimate on the number of women’s groups participating in the negotiation process, I make a general assumption for question five that many women’s groups were involved amongst the 100 indigenous organizations advising the EZLN, as mentioned in question two. As a final point I assess whether women leaders, representing the women’s movement, were present during the negotiations. As was the case in Guatemala, women leaders in Chiapas were present but they either represented the mediation team or the conflict parties, they did not represent a separate women’s movement. For example, the National Intermediation Commission (CONAI, in Spanish), body responsible for mediating the conflict, included an intellectual woman called Concepción Calvillo (Gall 2001, 192) while the EZLN included the advisors from the women’s delegations mentioned previously.

<b>Table 11. Presentation data for cases – Fragmentation of the women movement in peace processes (IV)</b>		
<b>Questions</b>	<b>Guatemala</b>	<b>Mexico (Chiapas)</b>
Q1: Were women groups present during the negotiation process, separately from the conflict parties?	Present	Absent
Q2: Were women groups present as part of the conflict parties during the negotiation process?	Absent	Present
Q3: Did women groups rally	No	Yes

under a collective issue during the negotiation process?		
Q4: What model(s) of inclusion do women groups take part in during the negotiation process?	Consultative	Direct participation and public and unofficial consultations
Q5: How many women's groups are estimated to have participated in the negotiation process?	32	±100
Q6: How many women leaders, representing the women's movement, were present during the negotiation process?	0	0

#### **4.15. Case 2 – Chiapas (Mexico) – Assessing widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)**

During the period under analysis (1998 – 2002), I have sought to assess the prevalence of inequality and violence for women in Chiapas (Mexico) for each individual year. Triangulating the results has provided us with insight into whether there has been an increase, a decrease or if it has remained the same throughout the entire period; it also allows us to perform a generalizable comparison between the two cases. Given that the peace agreement was signed in 1997, the time period analyzed might provide us with an indication of the effects of the negotiations, and if the presence of fragmentation in the women's movement is correlated with higher instances of widespread inequality and violence against women in the post-conflict period.

In 1998, question one assesses prevalence of intimate partner killings; an indication of extreme violence in the private sphere. Neither one of the reports has indicators for this source, therefore prevalence is stated as none ('0'). Prevalence of female homicides in the public sphere, question 2, has no indications of prevalence for any of the reports either. The following three questions

assessing prevalence of widespread inequality and violence; physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence; on the other hand, show massive ('3') prevalence in the USD report. This is not readily apparent in the AI and the HRW reports that show a prevalence of none ('0') for these indicators. One exception is prevalence of psychological abuse where the HRW report indicates that there were some ('1') instances of psychological abuse in their yearly report.

In 1999, all of the measurements for the USD report indicate the same results as those presented in 1998. The AI report for this year does not vary as well, indicating a prevalence of none ('0') for all the measurements. The HRW report indicates no prevalence ('0') for the first four questions, additionally, prevalence of psychological abuse went from some instances ('1') in 1998 to none ('0') in 1999. Question 5 assessing prevalence of sexual violence increased from none ('0') to some ('1') instances as well, for this report.

In 2000, the USD report presents the same results for all the indicators for the five questions as those presented in 1999 and 1998. The AI report also presents the same results as the previous year, with no prevalence ('0') for any of the indicators. For the HRW report, once again, there is no prevalence ('0') for any of the indicators, with the exception of psychological abuse, which has become massive or widespread ('3').

In 2001, once again, no prevalence ('0') was measured for the first two questions on lethal violence; massive or widespread ('3') levels remained for the final three questions on non-lethal violence. The AI report reported no instances of prevalence for any of the indicators as well ('0'). In the HRW report, the only source that indicated any prevalence was psychological abuse, where the prevalence was some ('1') instances of widespread inequality and violence.

For the final year of measurements, 2002, intimate partner killings indicated no prevalence ('0') for any of the reports. This is also the case for female homicides in the public sphere, with the exception of the USD report which records some ('1') prevalence for the first time. Once again, for physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence, prevalence levels are massive or widespread ('3') for the USD report, whilst prevalence levels are none ('0') for all three non-lethal indicators in the HRW report. The AI report makes mention of some ('1') prevalence of

sexual violence but physical harm and psychological abuse are once again, not present at all ('0').

<b>Table 12. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)</b>				
<b>Questions for year 1998</b>				
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>	<b>Factiva</b>
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>79</sup>	None <sup>80</sup>	None <sup>81</sup>	
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	None <sup>82</sup>	None <sup>83</sup>	None <sup>84</sup>	
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Massive <sup>85</sup>	None <sup>86</sup>	None <sup>87</sup>	
Q4: Is psychological abuse prevalent?	Massive <sup>88</sup>	None <sup>89</sup>	Some <sup>90</sup>	
Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Massive <sup>91</sup>	None <sup>92</sup>	None <sup>93</sup>	

<sup>79</sup> U. S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998—Mexico

<sup>80</sup> Amnesty International Report 1999 – Mexico

<sup>81</sup> World Report 1999 – Women's Human Rights

<sup>82</sup> U. S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998—Mexico

<sup>83</sup> Amnesty International Report 1999 – Mexico

<sup>84</sup> World Report 1999 – Women's Human Rights

<sup>85</sup> U. S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998—Mexico

<sup>86</sup> Amnesty International Report 1999 – Mexico

<sup>87</sup> World Report 1999 – Women's Human Rights

<sup>88</sup> U. S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998—Mexico

<sup>89</sup> Amnesty International Report 1999 – Mexico

<sup>90</sup> World Report 1999 – Women's Human Rights

<sup>91</sup> U. S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998—Mexico

<sup>92</sup> Amnesty International Report 1999 – Mexico

<sup>93</sup> World Report 1999 – Women's Human Rights

<b>Table 13. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)</b>			
<b>Questions for year 1999</b>			
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>94</sup>	None <sup>95</sup>	None <sup>96</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	None <sup>97</sup>	None <sup>98</sup>	None <sup>99</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Massive <sup>100</sup>	None <sup>101</sup>	None <sup>102</sup>
Q4: Is psychological abuse prevalent?	Massive <sup>103</sup>	None <sup>104</sup>	None <sup>105</sup>
Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Massive <sup>106</sup>	None <sup>107</sup>	Some <sup>108</sup>

**Table 14. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence**

<sup>94</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Mexico

<sup>95</sup> Amnesty International Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>96</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>97</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Mexico

<sup>98</sup> Amnesty International Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>99</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>100</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Mexico

<sup>101</sup> Amnesty International Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>102</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>103</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Mexico

<sup>104</sup> Amnesty International Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>105</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>106</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1999 – Mexico

<sup>107</sup> Amnesty International Report 2000 – Mexico

<sup>108</sup> World Report 2000 – Mexico

<b>against women (DV)</b>			
<b>Questions for year</b>			
<b>2000</b>			
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>109</sup>	None <sup>110</sup>	None <sup>111</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	None <sup>112</sup>	None <sup>113</sup>	None <sup>114</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Massive <sup>115</sup>	None <sup>116</sup>	None <sup>117</sup>
Q4: Is psychological abuse prevalent?	Massive <sup>118</sup>	None <sup>119</sup>	Massive <sup>120</sup>
Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Massive <sup>121</sup>	None <sup>122</sup>	None <sup>123</sup>

<b>Table 15. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)</b>	
<b>Questions for year</b>	

<sup>109</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Mexico

<sup>110</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>111</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>112</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Mexico

<sup>113</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>114</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>115</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Mexico

<sup>116</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>117</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>118</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Mexico

<sup>119</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>120</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>121</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000 – Mexico

<sup>122</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>123</sup> World Report 2001 – Women’s Human Rights

<b>2001</b>			
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>
Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>124</sup>	None <sup>125</sup>	None <sup>126</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	None <sup>127</sup>	None <sup>128</sup>	None <sup>129</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Massive <sup>130</sup>	None <sup>131</sup>	None <sup>132</sup>
Q4: Is psychological abuse prevalent?	Massive <sup>133</sup>	None <sup>134</sup>	Some <sup>135</sup>
Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Massive <sup>136</sup>	None <sup>137</sup>	None <sup>138</sup>

<b>Table 16. Presentation data for Chiapas (Mexico) - Widespread inequality and violence against women (DV)</b>			
<b>Questions for year</b>			
<b>2002</b>			
<b>Source</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>AI</b>	<b>HRW</b>

<sup>124</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Mexico

<sup>125</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>126</sup> World Report 2002 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>127</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Mexico

<sup>128</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>129</sup> World Report 2002 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>130</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Mexico

<sup>131</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>132</sup> World Report 2002 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>133</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Mexico

<sup>134</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>135</sup> World Report 2002 – Women’s Human Rights

<sup>136</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2001 – Mexico

<sup>137</sup> Amnesty International Report 2002 –Mexico

<sup>138</sup> World Report 2002 – Women’s Human Rights

Q1: Are intimate partner killings prevalent?	None <sup>139</sup>	None <sup>140</sup>	None <sup>141</sup>
Q2: Are female homicides prevalent in the public sphere?	Some <sup>142</sup>	None <sup>143</sup>	None <sup>144</sup>
Q3: Is physical harm against women prevalent?	Massive <sup>145</sup>	None <sup>146</sup>	None <sup>147</sup>
Q4: Is psychological abuse prevalent?	Massive <sup>148</sup>	None <sup>149</sup>	None <sup>150</sup>
Q5: Is sexual violence prevalent?	Massive <sup>151</sup>	Some <sup>152</sup>	None <sup>153</sup>

#### 4.16 Comparative Analysis

Having presented the empirical findings regarding the variables of interest of the two case studies, this section will now address the comparative analysis. The empirical findings suggest little to no support for the hypothesis: fragmentation of the women’s movement during peace negotiations is not correlated with higher prevalence of inequality and violence against women in

<sup>139</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002

<sup>140</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Mexico

<sup>141</sup> World Report 2003 – Mexico

<sup>142</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002

<sup>143</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Mexico

<sup>144</sup> World Report 2003 – Mexico

<sup>145</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002

<sup>146</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Mexico

<sup>147</sup> World Report 2003 – Mexico

<sup>148</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002

<sup>149</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Mexico

<sup>150</sup> World Report 2003 – Mexico

<sup>151</sup> U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002

<sup>152</sup> Amnesty International Report 2003 –Mexico

<sup>153</sup> World Report 2003 – Mexico

post-conflict societies. Nevertheless, the analysis indicates some level of support for the causal explanation under analysis. This chapter will demonstrate that the empirical findings suggest multiple challenges and limitations in assessing the DV in general. At the same time, the presence of other factors that potentially influenced the levels of widespread inequality and violence against women raises significant questions about the explanatory power of the theory tested.

#### **4.17 Case-by-case analysis – connecting fragmentation of the women’s movement with the prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict countries**

For the first case, Guatemala, I am looking at fragmentation of the women’s movement in terms of commitment problems and information problems. Empirical findings for fragmentation of the women’s movement demonstrate that in terms of commitment problems, the women’s movement was quite divided. Even though they were present as a separate group to the conflict parties, the agglomeration of organizations into the Assembly of Civil Society (ACS) prevented the women’s movement from rallying under a collective issue during the process. As was noted, “gender issues were not on the negotiating agenda as such...” (Alvarez 2002, 51) Given that they could not credibly commit to a collective issue, and that they lacked representation as part of either conflict party, they were only able to include vague provisions that were sensitive to gender issues but not binding to reach an agreement. Information problems also created a lack of coordination within the movement; for one, there were many women’s groups participating in the negotiations; an estimated 32 groups. These groups represented a range of different points of view from both urban and rural areas. The absence of a clear leader also complicated the diffusion of a clear framework; Luz Mendez, the sole female negotiator from the guerrilla’s delegation, sought to ensure that many of the recommendations from the women’s movement in the ASC were included in the final agreement, nevertheless, as previously stated, these were not binding and were quite vague. Both of these factors; high prevalence of commitment and information problems made it quite complicated for the women’s movement to articulate their framework under one voice.

For the dependent variable, widespread inequality and violence against women, prevalence of lethal violence both in the public sphere and the private sphere is low or non-existent for the first three years 2000-2002. Nevertheless in 2003, I begin to see higher reporting incidences of female homicide prevalence in the public sphere. For example, in 2003, both the USD report and the AI report indicate several or many instances of widespread inequality and violence against women. Breaking this down even further, the USD report indicates that, “more than 220 women were killed, most by gunshot, during the year...” (United States Department of State, 2004). Studies link the use of firearms as risk factors for intimate partner killings and female homicide (Shaw, 2013, p. 25, as seen in Lethal Violence doc, p. 102). The AI report also provides indications of “hundreds of women who had been subjected to various forms of sexual violence before they were killed.” This is another example of extreme violence, such as sexual violence, before death, an indication of lethal violence in the public sphere (Amnesty International. 2004, 118). It is important to point out that an increase in the prevalence of female homicides in the public sphere throughout the 2003- time period demonstrates an increase in the prevalence of lethal violence used against women in Guatemalan society, despite the high participation of women during the peace process, which in essence sought to reverse this trend. This trend was also evident in 2004, which presents several or many cases in both the USD report and the AI report as well.

Non-lethal violence, unlike lethal violence, was pervasive in Guatemala throughout the whole-time period (2000-2004). Non-lethal violence in the form of physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence was more widely reported for all the years in which these questions were asked. The HRW report provides indications of this in 2004, “Younger women and girls, in particular, sometimes face sexual harassment and violence in the homes where they work.” (Human Rights Watch, 2005) This demonstrates that non-lethal violence was being used more pervasively as tool by men to control women, rather than as a method to terminate their lives. As noted above, a common trend seen throughout the time period being assessed is the prevalence of massive or some incidences of sexual violence. During the war, sexual violence was a systematic practice; as Leiby (2009, 454) notes, rape was the most frequent form of abuse, with the state, through the military, being the most frequent offender in 70% of the cases (Wartime Sexual Violence, p. 454). And given that after the defeat of the URNG guerrilla in 1984, sexual offenses reduced to 11%, Leiby (2009) also suggests that the state was using sexual violence as a weapon to quell the armed opposition (460). This systemic practice before the war continued to be quite

prevalent in the post-conflict years, as a result, this could imply that given the presence of fragmentation in the women's movement, it prevented them from addressing issues of gender-based violence, such as sexual violence, and hence resulting in greater prevalence during the post-conflict years.

For the second case, Chiapas, the situation was quite different, both commitment problems and information problems were absent; factors determining the presence of fragmentation. Women were present, separate from the conflict parties, in a consultative model of inclusion, but they also advised one of the main conflict parties, the EZLN. EZLN support allowed the women's movement to work together and legitimize their concerns with one of the conflict parties. With this in consideration, and given that they rallied under one collective issue, they were more effective at presenting their perspectives to the EZLN. The broad agenda in the negotiation table had as one of its main points of discussion women's rights, it was therefore enshrined as part of the agreement that women's issues needed to be addressed. This is obvious from the agreement itself, where the agreement between the EZLN and the Mexican government defined a set of actions, commitments, declarations and proposals referring to gender equality (Bell 2015, 31-33).

Information problems were also less prevalent; women took part in different models of inclusion; unofficial and public consultations. In terms of public consultations, different groups within the movement could vote in nationwide consultations addressing issues pertinent to the San Andres Dialogues, such as women's issues and equality (Sámamo, Alcántara and González 2000, 9). As part of the unofficial consultations, it was mentioned that "this consultative forum invited 178 indigenous organizations, with many women delegates among these, to advise the EZLN negotiators." (Paffenholz et al. 2016, 23) But the most important development, was the participation of women in direct negotiations. Given that this is the mode of inclusion is said to be the one where women can exercise the most influence in the negotiation process, it is notable that they served as direct advisors to the EZLN, this ensured that the state understood what the women's movement would settle for; there was no misinformation from their part on what issues were important to them. It also seems that the number of organizations involved in direct negotiations had no effect in terms of information problems; high levels of fragmentation observed in the number of organizations involved, 100, did not create uncertainty among the

parties. This might be due to the fact that one of the four main issues being discussed by the parties was women's rights and therefore it was easier for the women's movement to coordinate the issues within a framework which they would push for in the negotiation agenda. This agenda included ten specific points with a gender perspective ranging from changes in labor laws; community participation; political participation; health; physical security; amongst others (Servicio Internacional para la Paz 2016, 34). As a final point, the lack of an uncontested leader does not seem to have influenced the prevalence of fragmentation in the women's movement either; the presence of women groups advising the EZLN was enough to push for an agenda that served their interests.

For the dependent variable, the lack of fragmentation could indicate a lower prevalence of female homicides in the public sphere and intimate partner killings in the private sphere. No indications of prevalence are recorded for any of the years in the analysis. As Hoewer (2013, 225) states, the peace process brought a renewed sense of dialogue and change in community traditions and gender roles, changes encouraged by the Zapatista women's movement. A consistent indication throughout the reports is the prevalence of massive instances of physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence. I argue that this was not a result of increased prevalence per se, but a result of transformed gender perceptions; women reported these incidents more often and stood up for their rights. Hoewer (2013, 224) makes a reflection on this, "the gender equality rule in the Zapatista movement made it easier for changes in gender images and structures to become a part of normality..." Societal transformations in Chiapas as a result of absent instances of fragmentation allowed for a lower prevalence of inequality and violence against women in post-conflict Chiapas.

#### **4.18 Between case comparison – implication to the theory tested**

The empirical findings on the two case studies give modest support to the hypothesis, *presence of fragmentation of the women's movement during peace negotiations tends to result in higher prevalence of inequality and violence against women in post-conflict societies*. However, the limitations and the presence of potential alternative explanations prevent me from drawing any conclusions on the validity of the causal mechanism. Nevertheless, there are implications in

favor of fragmentation of the women's movement and the subsequent prevalence of widespread inequality and violence.

#### **4.19 Implications for the hypothesis**

Support for the theory is not completely warranted, this is because even though presence of fragmentation in the women's movement during peace negotiations correlates with higher levels of lethal and non-lethal violence against women in Guatemala, the opposite cannot be said for the Chiapas case. In order for fragmentation to be present, I established that the women's movement needed to suffer from both commitment and information problems. In the first case, Guatemala, the women's movement suffered from both; women groups, separate from the conflict parties did not rally under a collective issue during the negotiation process, thus creating commitment problems, and the lack of a clear leader and the presence of many groups during the consultations also created information problems when consulting with other groups in the Assembly of Civil Society (ACS), hence creating a situation where they focused on a wide array of issues instead of rallying under one common framework. On average, widespread inequality and violence against women as non-lethal violence during the years in which the analysis was conducted was massive (i.e. widespread). Lethal violence as intimate-partner killings was not prevalent at all while female homicides in the public sphere saw several or many instances during the final two years of the analysis. Given the increase in prevalence of lethal violence from 2003 and 2004, it is assumed that the situation worsened in the years following the period under analysis. I can therefore say that the hypothesis is partially supported for this case; assigning an observed prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict Guatemala as 'highly prevalent'.

In the Chiapas case-study, fragmentation was not present during the negotiation process. Women's groups did not face commitment problems given that they worked both as advisors to one of the conflict parties and had consultations with a clear 10-point framework to mainstream gender issues into post-conflict society. This is important because even though they had many groups within the movement and no clear leader, notably signs of information problems, they still managed to influence the process and create a situation of less ambiguity because they

rallied under one common identity. Nevertheless, non-lethal violence as physical harm, psychological abuse and sexual violence was massive, at least in terms of the USD reports, throughout the whole period under study. The lack of data for many of the questions for both the AI and HRW reports is a severe limitation for this study, but this will be addressed in section 5.1. *Limitations and biases of the study*. At this point it is safe to assume that even though lethal violence was not prevalent or at least minimally observed, non-lethal violence was massive or widespread, therefore I classify the observed prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict Chiapas as ‘highly prevalent’.

**Table 17. Summarizing key theoretical implications**

<b>Case studies</b>	<b>Fragmentation as a lack of bargaining power during peace negotiations (explanatory variable)</b>	<b>Theoretically expected prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict countries</b>	<b>Observed prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict countries</b>	<b>Support for hypothesis</b>
Guatemala	Present	High prevalence	High prevalence	Supported
Chiapas (Mexico)	Absent	Low prevalence	High prevalence	Not supported

#### 4.20 Implications for the causal story

Connecting more explicitly to the causal story, there are differences between the two cases in terms of the upholding of patriarchal norms but in both cases the result has been quite similar: high prevalence of inequality and violence against women. In Guatemala, patriarchal norms of domination persisted even after negotiations, Berger (2006, 45) provides an example of the

upholding of gender differences in the peace agreement which recognizes indigenous women as defenseless and vulnerable. Indigenous women were continually being defined as human beings in need of protection. Gendered institutions were also prominent, this is more visibly seen as a result of legislation that did not address gender or power inequalities. For example, Berger (2006, 47) states that in 1996, after the end of the negotiation process, Guatemalan Congress passed a law on intrafamily violence instead of a bill on violence against women, arguing that Congress wanted to keep the law neutral even though domestic violence heavily targeted women as opposed to men. Another example is the women's movement lobbying for the passage of a law that denounced all forms of discrimination against women in 1999, the "*Ley de dignificación y promoción integral de la mujer*". This was a major victory for women's groups, nevertheless, as Berger (2006, 50) mentions, the law "clearly positions the stability of the nation in the family and thus guarantees the rights of women in relationship to the family." I argue that the relationship between the state and gender was not transformed, given that gender was reduced to this conception of women as vulnerable and responsible for dynamics in the private sphere. The Women's Liberation shared this conception of patriarchy in the realm of public dominance and women in the private, or at home; when looking at the composition of Congress during the years in which I explored the prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women, it is notable that it was dominated throughout the whole period by men<sup>154</sup>. Men continued to see themselves as dominant or top-dog, while women continued facing many of the same challenges and relegations, thus representing an upholding of patriarchal norms.

In Chiapas, patriarchal norms in both the private and the public spheres varied. Change in the public sphere was evident; successful negotiations led to national dialogue on the transformation of unequal power domination. For example, in 2004, the State of Chiapas recognized limited gender quotas of 70/30 for all personnel all 3 branches of government; way above the national average (Chiapas Paralelo 2014). New community leadership also saw the criminalization of intimate partner violence and the role of women in government, such as coordinators of women's organizations and cooperatives or as municipal presidents (Olivera 2005, 621). Nevertheless, men continued to see themselves as providers and viewed women as subordinate to them in the private sphere. This makes sense considering that non-lethal violence against women was highly

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<sup>154</sup> On average, 8.0% of members of congress from 2000 – 2004 were women; <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm>

prevalent throughout the whole time-period under study. It was also notable in indigenous customs and traditions that still viewed women as property. Hoewer (2013, 226) provides two examples of this with young girls being forced into marriage or the use of violence in the private setting to control women.

Presence of fragmentation as both commitment and information problems seems to have resulted in bargaining failure for the women's movement in pushing for a specific framework of identity issues affecting them in Guatemala. It is evident that patriarchal norms in the post-conflict years did not change; they persisted and resulted in high prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women. In Chiapas, fragmentation was not present, and a clear framework of identity issues allowed them to push for specific patriarchal changes in the public sphere, as well as criminalizing intimate-partner violence. Yet, this has not translated as effectively in the private sphere in terms of non-lethal violence. But it might serve as an indication as to why lethal violence, in the form of female homicides in the public sphere and intimate-partner killings, are not observed for the time-period in the study.

## **5. Broadening the analysis – alternative explanations and additional observations**

As the aforementioned analysis demonstrates, the empirical findings lend low support to the hypothesis but implies some level of encouragement to the causal explanation. The empirical findings have also shed light on other conditions that potentially explain higher prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women, and on the explanatory power of the theory tested. Looking back on previous literature, it is important to note that in both Chiapas (Mexico) and Guatemala, the peace accords were never fully implemented. This as a result of spoilers and elite pacts to derail frameworks that were discussed during the negotiations. I will now compare the role of spoilers and the ensuing elite pacts that could shed light in the upholding of patriarchal norms, ultimately ensuing high prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women that is seen in both cases.

I recognize the role of spoilers during the implementation phase of the agreements, rather than fragmentation, as a factor that resulted in the continued upholding of patriarchal norms, thus

influencing the prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict countries. Irrespective of the presence or absence of fragmentation during peace negotiations, both states continue to experience widespread inequality and violence against women, even though peace processes are supposed to exemplify moments in which conflict parties and other social movement organizations can promote structural changes in society. Spoilers, rather than fragmentation, requires further attention.

Stedman (1997, 5) defines spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” As Stedman (1997) also notes, spoilers seek to undermine negotiated peace processes because negotiated peace often has losers, usually leaders and/or factions who do not achieve their aims. By aligning themselves with one of the conflict parties, the women’s movement in Chiapas was less prone to spoilers given that the EZLN exerted influence over the conflict, while the women’s movement in Guatemala had to work under the umbrella of the ACS, which had limited ability to influence the process.

In both cases, Guatemala and Chiapas, there were particular types of spoilers, these spoilers sought dominant power to subjugate the demands of not only the women’s movement, but also the demands made by other SMO’s. But the extent of their spoiling behavior was quite different. In Chiapas, the government sought to limit EZLN influence in Chiapas both during the negotiations and after these had ended. Kampwirth (2004, 113) mentions that during the negotiations, the federal government sought to divide popular movements by offering material benefits to its members in exchange for support, this reinforced divisions within civil society organizations and reduced their bargaining power when pushing for change, given that some members benefitted from the government’s assistance, whilst others saw it as a method to undermine their demands. This is relevant because even after establishing clear demands that included women’s rights as one of the core discussion points in the agenda during the peace negotiations, the government was probably not honest about its commitments to complying with any of them once the negotiations were over. This is also exemplified in a massacre that took place during the final year of the negotiations, in 1997, when paramilitaries aligned with the government killed forty-five people, including women and children; a clear breach of one of the

ten points in the “women’s revolutionary laws” (*Ley Revolucionaria de Mujeres*) presented during the negotiations. In Guatemala, the private sector acted as a spoiler by undermining clear provisions set out by SMO’s. The private sector, largely comprising conservative factions, mounted an effective ‘no’ campaign to prevent the agreement from being fully implemented in a referendum after the end of the peace negotiations. At the same time, the far-right party that took power in 1999 did not envision reform as a top priority and thus, many changes stipulated during the peace negotiations did not take place. Both groups were able to do so because the URNG posed no threat to the survival of the Guatemalan state. The URNG could not pressure the government to make concessions in the face of powerful business elites and a powerful military that defeated them *de facto* in the 80’s.

Even if the women’s movement suffered from fragmentation, the role of spoilers must be acknowledged. Spoilers can derail peace processes especially if one of the conflict parties, such as the URNG in Guatemala, poses no threat to the survival of the state. This may result in the exacerbation of structural inequalities, such as patriarchal norms, and the resulting prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women. Assessment of spoiler types is beyond the scope of this paper, nevertheless, how the conflict parties and mediators manage spoilers may provide further indication of the prevalence of violence and inequality seen in post-conflict countries.

## **5.1 Limitations and biases of the study**

As observed in the analysis, the focus on only two cases weakens the credibility of the empirical findings. At the same time, since both cases demonstrate recurring trends of massive prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women, lethal and non-lethal, this limits my ability to explore alternative explanations on the dependent variable. I will now discuss the main limitations and biases of this paper.

### Limitations and biases in the research design

The main limitations related to the research design relate to the generalizability and representativeness of the case selection. Restricting the study to two cases prevents this analysis from observing the impact of nuances in the levels of prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women. The limited case selection also prevents me from assessing potential alternative explanations. By including more cases, it would have been possible to strengthen or further disavow the explanatory variable, and at the same time it would have rendered the results more robust. Unfortunately, the research design was limited to cases that experienced high participation of women groups during peace processes; something that is still relatively uncommon even today. The use of the most-similar case design reduced the focus to countries that not only included a relatively robust participation of women's groups, but also to countries that share similar characteristics, such as Guatemala and Chiapas, Mexico. This decreased the generalizability of the findings.

I must also discuss selection bias influencing the representativeness of the cases. Even though the cases provided theoretical and methodological comparison, they also represent cases where information was more readily available. I could have selected cases from the African continent that share similar socio-economic histories, such as Somaliland and South Africa, or made a comparison between one country with high women's inclusion and full implementation of the peace agreement prior to the passage of Resolution 1325, such as South Africa (1990 – 1997), and another case with high women's inclusion and full implementation of the peace agreement that took place after the passage of Resolution 1325, such as Liberia (2003-2011). Nevertheless, given that fragmentation of women's movements during peace processes has never been employed as an explanatory variable for post-conflict widespread inequality and violence against women, I selected cases based on available data in the "Chapter 3: Lethal Violence against Women and Girls, Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts" report that pinpoints to the Americas as the most violent region for women in the world for the 2007-2012-time period (92). Based on this it follows that the cases studied might produce higher values of prevalence of widespread inequality and violence than a general assessment of other cases. Therefore, it calls for caution when trying to generalize the implications of this study.

As a final point, the time period for the analysis of prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women, a five-year period, prevents us from investigating long-term trends;

whether lethal and non-lethal violence against women increased, decreased or remained the same. For example, in Chiapas, lethal violence in the form of intimate-partner killings and female homicide in the public sphere was not evident during the five years under the study. Did this downward trend remain the same? Did it influence non-lethal indicators as well? Or was there a reversal? For the Guatemala case, did other factors, such as a reduction in homicide rates in subsequent years reduce the incidence of lethal violence against women as well? These questions were beyond the scope of this study.

### Empirical limitations

For empirical limitations, I look at difficulties in assessing the validity of the indicators used to measure both commitment problems and information problems as sources of fragmentation. Given that this has not been done before, the data used to capture these indicators depends in great part from secondary sources spanning personal accounts from people involved in the peace processes, UN Women reports, and other national reports in both English and Spanish. In terms of challenges, the indicator assessing whether women groups rallied under a collective identity could be questioned given that the women's movement could have rallied under one issue but if the conflict parties did not take it into account, it would not have been reported as part of the negotiation framework. An alternative to this is to employ the outcomes of peace negotiations, such as clauses in a peace agreement focusing on gender issues, this would have allowed us to infer the presence of a collective identity *ex post*. Additionally, measuring the number of women's groups participating in the negotiation process as an indicator for information problems presents another problem in terms of validity. In Chiapas, there is no real estimate on the number of women's groups participating in the negotiation process, this may be due to secrecy surrounding peace negotiations, therefore I have been forced to settle for various reports indicating estimates which for the purpose of assessing presence or absence of fragmentation, were enough.

The empirical material concerning the dependent variable, widespread inequality and violence against women, must be assessed in terms of the incompatibilities in the sources and the

credibility of the sources utilized. The three reports used to assess the DV, provide a range of information concerning human rights and specifically, sections on women. I employed a scale to determine prevalence in all three reports, this scale is adapted from the SVAC Codebook as well. The main limitation when using these reports is that they often repeat similar information from one year to the next and when comparing the material in all three reports, it is by no means identical, thus weakening the findings by relying on subjective measures of comparability. The findings in my empirical analysis are also heavily focused on the US State Department Annual reports, which provide a more thorough analysis on the indicators I sought to measure. This imbalance between the reports bears a risk of disproportionately emphasizing findings that the US government felt were necessary to present, while the other two reports presented limited findings for each year. One thing to note is that it was not until 2004 that member states of the UN began responding to questionnaires from the UN Secretariat in regards to the application of the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action dealing with article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. Article 18 sought for countries to report on legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures to prevent any form of inequality against women<sup>155</sup>. Prior to this period, reports used to measure the operationalization of the DV more than likely reported levels of lethal violence in the public and private spheres against women as part of generalized patterns of homicide in society. This might help explain why there are no indications of intimate-partner killings for any of the reports during the time period under analysis.

Therefore, collecting empirical data to assess widespread inequality and violence against women has been one of the main limitations of this study. Alternative methods of collecting data for these time periods, such as conducting interviews or collecting indicators through public information requests to specific governmental agencies would have increased the internal validity of the thesis and would have provided more reliable indicators. Nevertheless, this was beyond the time frame of this study.

## Theoretical limitations

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<sup>155</sup> For more information on the specific articles, please refer to the CEDAW document: <http://www.hrcr.org/docs/CEDAW/cedaw7.html>

As stated in the operationalization of the explanatory variable, defining the different dimensions of fragmentation as both commitment and information problems allows me to assess the upholding of patriarchal norms as the mechanism leading to widespread inequality and violence in post-conflict countries. But as Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham and Seymour (2012, 278) mention, “questions about mechanisms bring up tricky theoretical concerns about endogeneity.” One could argue that if post-conflict societies are violent and unequal to women, it is likely that these societies were violent prior to the peace processes. But seeing how most literature has focused on the importance of including women in peace processes, I have sought to address a different aspect of this; how fragmenting women who are already participating in peace processes can further enforce patriarchal norms and lead to post-conflict societies that are violent to them. Given that the empirical data on the dependent variable has provided only limited explanations for this, future research should expand on these initial steps and look into a bigger pool of cases to determine whether fragmentation does in fact uphold patriarchal norms or if other concepts, such as spoilers, bring about violent and unequal societies for women.

## **6. Conclusion**

The inclusion of women and women’s groups during peace processes has been extolled as an opportunity to bring about change in post-conflict countries. Despite numerous studies pointing to these positive aspects, there is still a lot of variation in levels of inequality and violence against women in post-conflict contexts. Therefore, this thesis sought to address the following question: *under what conditions do peace processes contribute to unequal and dangerous societies for women?*

The theoretical argument states that fragmenting the women’s movement during peace processes contributes to unequal and violent societies for women because it upholds a patriarchal system that privileges men over women, thus contributing to violence and inequality in post-conflict societies. Moreover, I hypothesized that the presence of fragmentation of women’s movements during peace negotiations tends to result in a higher prevalence of widespread inequality and violence against women in post-conflict societies. This hypothesis stemmed from previous research that argued that variation in fragmentation of self-determination movements and other

movements organizing along ethnic and nationalist lines can result in less stable and violent societies by undermining a movements' capacity to act collectively in the pursuit of a common aim.

A qualitative comparison of two cases; Guatemala and Chiapas, in Mexico; was conducted given that both cases demonstrated high levels of women participation in their respective peace processes. Fragmentation was evaluated along two dimensions; commitment problems and information problems, and its presence –or lack thereof—was estimated through the whole negotiation process in each case. This thesis found very little support for the hypothesis; the women's movement was fragmented in Guatemala and not in Chiapas, Mexico, but levels of widespread inequality and violence against women were high in both post-conflict contexts. The causal story pointed to patriarchal norms that persisted even after negotiations were over but this could be due to other factors unrelated to fragmentation, such as the presence of spoilers. Another factors is that in both cases, peace agreements were reached but never fully implemented, and research points to spoilers in both processes as a consequence for this. Future research should look into the presence of spoilers in peace processes as a factor that could lead to violent post-conflict societies; societies that are violent and unequal not only to women but to everyone.

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