Passing on the Torch

Discourse Strategies in the Inaugural Speeches of Jiang, Hu and Xi

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Abstract

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Following the death of Mao Zedong the new Chinese leadership attempted to avoid some of the problems associated with the concentration of personal political power, and Deng Xiaoping, though still playing a paramount political role, sought to rule through a leadership collective. Starting with Jiang Zemin, it has become a new norm in Chinese politics that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP also serves as President of the PRC.

This reemergence of (official) leadership concentration around a single person leads to the question of how transitions of leadership are presented within Chinese politics, and to what extent they are indicative of new directions of policy and ideology. An inaugural speech is designed to set the tone for new beginnings when a new officeholder assumes responsibilities. This thesis uses inaugural speeches and speeches given in connection with inaugurations to the two offices mentioned above as research material to address this question. Drawing inspiration from a Master’s Thesis by Tawfic and Fattah (2015), perspectives from critical discourse analysis are employed to examine the relationships between language, power and discourse in the speeches. Focus is placed on the use of two discourse strategies: group orientation and group representation. This thesis assesses to what extent Jiang, Hu and Xi differ in their employment of these discourse strategies, and if differences or similarities can be explained by correlation with changes in policy direction or the sociopolitical background of the speeches.

Keywords: China, politics, political language, discourse, discourse strategies, CDA
**Abbreviations**
CCP: The Chinese Communist Party  
CCYL: Chinese Communist Youth League  
CDA: Critical discourse analysis  
CMC: Central Military Commission  
NPC: National People’s Congress  
PRC: The People’s Republic of China  
PSC: Politburo Standing Committee  
WTO: World Trade Organization

**Translations and transcription**
Unless otherwise stated, all translations have been made by the author. For transcription of Chinese, the hanyu pinyin 汉语拼音 romanization scheme has been used throughout this thesis, with the exception of certain given names that are commonly spelled using other transcription systems.
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1. Introduction

To the Chinese Communist Party, the Cultural Revolution was a horrifying example of what could happen if individuals at the top of the party started to wield political power for their own purposes, and several leading members with impeccable red credentials, who had participated in the revolution, were purged as well, among them Deng Xiaoping 邓小平. Following the death of Mao Zedong 毛泽东 the new Chinese leadership attempted to avoid some of the problems associated with the concentration of personal political power, and Deng Xiaoping, though still playing a paramount political role, sought to rule through a leadership collective. Starting with Jiang Zemin 江泽民, a notable development in the leadership structure of the PRC in comparison to the Deng-era is how the offices of General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC again have become concentrated on the same person. Regardless of how power actually is distributed among the party leadership, it could be argued that a paramount leader holds great symbolic value, and that the passing on of power, through the ceremony of the inauguration, heralds a new era of politics.

Inaugural speeches present the leader and the party with an opportunity to rebrand themselves, to communicate their ideological message, and to present a new policy direction. For a political speech to exert any influence, it must be presented in a persuasive fashion, and rhetoric and wordsmithing must be employed. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how language is employed in the inaugural speeches of the CCP leaders of this new era, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 and Xi Jinping 习近平.
2. Research question

As mentioned in the introduction, a reemergence of leadership concentration around a single person has occurred in the PRC, starting with Jiang Zemin. The norm is now that the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party also serves as President of the People’s Republic of China, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The formal recognition of the holder of these offices as paramount leader of the PRC gives the inauguration to these offices a symbolic meaning and is an opportunity for both the party as well as the individual assuming these offices to make statements and launch new policies. Of particular interest here are inaugural speeches, which can be seen as the affirmation of a new leadership and potentially indicative of new policy directions.¹

As suggested by Irekvist, who in his Bachelor’s thesis using quantitative methods compared the content of speeches made by Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao in conjunction with their accession to these offices, an observable change in Chinese political rhetoric has occurred where Xi in comparison to Hu employs proactive and nationalist vocabulary to a larger extent.² In order to expand on Irekvist’s work, and to further analyze the workings of Chinese political rhetoric, this thesis also includes speeches by Jiang Zemin. In addition, it will not primarily focus on differences in lexical content, but rather on how language features are utilized to serve rhetorical purposes. Or, to put it differently: how language is used rather than what language is used. To this end this thesis borrows some concepts from the field of critical discourse analysis, which will be discussed in section 4. Of central interest to this thesis is the concept of discourse strategies: the way in which grammatical and rhetorical devices are employed to achieve various purposes. Two particular discourse strategies were selected for this study (the selection process is accounted for in section 5): group orientation and group representation.

The analysis section of this thesis assesses whether or not Jiang, Hu and Xi differ in their employment of these discourse strategies. This is accomplished by a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Please note that the data subjected to quantitative analysis is derived from a subjective coding process that will be accounted for in section 5. The research material for each leader consists of a small corpus comprising three speeches: two inaugural speeches and one

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speech given in close connection to an inauguration. Notable differences or similarities between the speakers are accounted for by attempting to correlate them to changes in policy direction and the sociopolitical background of the speeches.

The research questions this thesis addresses are:

1. To what extent do Jiang, Hu and Xi employ group orientation and group representation in their speeches?
2. Towards which purpose do Jiang, Hu and Xi employ group orientation and group representation in their speeches?
3. Regarding both extent and purpose, do notable differences or similarities exist between how Jiang, Hu and Xi employ group orientation and group representation in their speeches, and why do differences or similarities exist?

2.1 Thesis layout

Section 3, **Background**, provides information about the leaders Jiang, Hu and Xi that consists of some biographical data, noteworthy political developments and backgrounds to the speeches that will be analyzed in section 6.

Section 4, **Theoretical framework and previous research**, accounts for the theoretical framework that the thesis relies on, and will discuss the relationship between language, discourse and power, and the concepts of critical discourse analysis. This is followed by a review of research in the PRC that analyses political speech through the framework of critical discourse analysis.

Section 5, **Methodology and research material**, discusses the concept of discourse strategies, provides a description of the discourse strategies used in the analysis section, and the research method used. This is followed by an account of how the research material was selected, and some notes about the limitations and reliability of the thesis.

Section 6, **Analysis**, begins with a summary of the data produced by the research material. The speeches are then analyzed in chronological order. The analysis of the speeches is followed by a comparison between the three speakers. Please see the analysis section for a more detailed overview of the order.
Section 7, Summary & Conclusion, summarizes the findings of the study and evaluates to what extent the study has been able to address the research questions. It is followed by some concluding remarks and suggestions on future research that the results of this study enables.

3. Background

3.1 Jiang Zemin

Jiang Zemin 江泽民 was born 1926 in Yangzhou, Jiangsu province. After a background working with engineering and technological research he was from 1980 appointed to various vice- and ministerial posts, and became a member of the CCP Central Committee in 1982 and mayor of Shanghai in 1985, which led to him being appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee in 1987.3

The circumstances under which Jiang became appointed as general secretary of the party can be described as tumultuous to say the least: it was a result of the necessary reshuffling of party personnel following the military suppression of the 1989 student movement in Beijing and throughout the country.4

Following a development of increased student protest throughout the late 1980s, the movement increased in magnitude following the death of Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 April 15 1989,5 who was seen as a proponent of reform. He had been demoted from the position of general secretary of the CCP in 1987, and one of the goals of the movement at this time was to reevaluate his standing. While the student movement was initiated by “pro-Western intellectual elites” who argued for political reform, the main body of protesters can be described as “rank-and-file students” who were displeased with the uneven distribution of the wealth created by China’s economic reforms and limited career opportunities for intellectuals.6 About 50,000 students gathered outside the Great Hall of the People at Hu’s funeral, a gathering which was denounced in an editorial in the People’s Daily.7 An even larger number of students marched to Tiananmen Square to protest

4 Loc. cit.
6 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
7 “Bixu qizhi xianming de fandui dongluan” 必须旗帜鲜明地反对动乱 [Upheaval must be opposed with clear colors], Renmin ribao 人民日报 [The People’s Daily], 1989-04-26.
the denunciation, which led the government to follow a strategy of making concessions instead. Following dialogue between the government and the students, many students returned to class. Some however chose to go on a hunger strike, and eventually gained further support from the local populace as well. Despite martial law being declared on May 19, protesters continued to gather around the square, and eventually on June 3 the government saw no other recourse than to remove the protesters with military force.

Following the 1989 military crackdown on demonstrations in Beijing and elsewhere, the party was hard pressed with crafting a response to the situation, and the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Party Congress was seen as one of the most important meetings in the party’s history. According to Jiang Zemin, the congress was held at a “key moment where the party and country was faced with survival or extinction.” The content of several news articles from the period leading up to the Fourth Plenary Session testify to the need for the party to place blame and mete out punishment for the unrest. There are for instance descriptions of arrests, of death sentences being rendered in order to “sternly suppress counterrevolutionary riot,” and even reported arrests of Guomindang agents who allegedly had “conspired to instigate societal turmoil and to overthrow the democratic regime of the PRC.”

8 Zhao, 2008, pp. 156-8.
9 Ibid., pp. 161-171.
10 Ibid., p. 183.
11 Ibid., p. 187.
12 Ibid., p. 203.
15 “Beijing you zhua he bufa fenzi” 北京又抓获一些暴徒和不法分子 [A few more hooligans and criminals have been caught in Beijing]. Remmin ribao 人民日报 [The People’s Daily], 1989-06-19.
16 “Yancheng fangeming baolun zhong daza qiangshao zuifan Beijing panchu ba ming yanzhong xingshi fan sixing” 严惩反革命暴乱中打砸抢烧罪犯 北京判处八名严重刑事犯死刑 [Severe punishment to the criminals who under the counterrevolutionary upheaval vandalized and started fires, 8 severe criminals are sentenced to death in Beijing]. Remmin ribao 人民日报 [The People’s Daily], 1989-06-18.
17 “Chashou dongluan, zaoyao shandong, yipi Taiwan guomindang tewu luo wang, youxie tewu fenzi xiang guojia anquan jiguan zishou” 插手动乱 造谣煽动 一批台湾国民党特务落网 有些特务分子向国家安全部门自首 [Interference in the upheaval, rumormongering and instigation, a group of Taiwanes Guomindang agents have been caught, some agents have surrendered to the national security apparatus]. Remmin ribao 人民日报 [The People’s Daily], 1989-06-23.
One of the primary topics of the fourth plenary session of the 13th Party Congress was to what extent the current general secretary of the CCP, Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳, was to blame for the unrest\textsuperscript{18}, and it was decided that he had to be replaced. Jiang was appointed his successor by Deng Xiaoping\textsuperscript{19}, partly because he was seen as a compromise choice between leftists and rightists\textsuperscript{20}, but also because he as mayor of Shanghai had shown political savvy by managing to suppress local demonstrations with “relatively little violence.”\textsuperscript{21} Jiang came to the forefront of a party whose core socialist ideology had been seriously undermined by China’s policy of reform and opening (gaige kaifang 改革开放) set in motion by Deng in 1978. The crisis of June 1989 made this plain: It was seen as a failure on Deng’s part to reconcile the inherent conflict between the concepts of socialism and a market economy, and “senior figures now criticised the degree of attention that had been paid to the privatisation of the state-owned sector, the pursuit of material wealth and the neglect of ideological strengthening.”\textsuperscript{22}

In the speech Jiang held when appointed to the post of General Secretary of the CCP\textsuperscript{23} he addressed these concerns by stating that “it had been wrong to assume that a rise in living standards was enough to create social stability and the right conditions for political reform.”\textsuperscript{24} The speech was held in the Great Hall of the People to an audience consisting of the leadership of the CCP, the primary addressee group of the speech. The contents of the speech largely focused on retaining the support of the leftist or neo-Maoist faction, and ensuring continued support for Deng’s policies. Jiang thus had limited opportunities to launch a new policy direction of his own. The policies of Jiang’s first few years in office can be viewed as a conservative leftist period where he by “placating factions on the left” ensured party stability and consolidated his power base.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{18} “Jianchi li guo zhi ben, zou hao qiang guo zhi lu” 坚持立国之本，走好强国之路 [Adhere to foundation of the establishment of the country, follow the path of a strong nation]. \textit{Renmin ribao 人民日报} [The People’s Daily], 1989-06-25.
\textsuperscript{20} “Jiang Zemin”, Britannica Academic, 2016.
\textsuperscript{23} Jiang Zemin. Speech held at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Party Congress, 在党的十三届四中全会上的讲话, 1989-06-24
\textsuperscript{24} Translation from Hughes, 2006, p. 43.
Deng, though having stepped down from his last high-level official position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989 in favor of Jiang, had by no means retired from the political scene. He had grown impatient with the slow pace of economic reform and in 1992 set out on a propaganda tour in the south of China visiting Guangzhou and the special economic zones of Shenzhen and Zhuuhai. The purpose of the tour was not only to defend the policies implemented during the period of reform and opening and to urge on further economic reform, but also to criticize the leftist faction that had held considerable sway since 1989. Moreover, “Deng also declared that anyone who opposed reform should ‘step down’ - a threat that would be carried out against several conservative leaders the following fall and was clearly intended to shake up the cautious Jiang Zemin as well.”

It is evident that Deng still exerted considerable influence since Jiang was subsequently forced to propose the hastening of economic reform in the 14th Party Congress held 1992. The party had again oriented itself toward the realization of a socialist market economy, which is also evident from an increase in indicators of economic growth in the content of the eight five-year plan. This refocus on economic reform can be seen as formative for the years to come, where the themes laid out by Deng’s Southern tour and the 14th Party Congress presented “an interpretation of reality in which the CCP is presented as the party of national salvation, implementing a market-orientated economic reform process.” An article in the People’s Daily testifies to the emphasis that was placed on connecting the party’s leadership with economic reform at this time, by stating that “under the party’s leadership the Chinese economy had risen from a momentary all-time low to now be on a high speed development expressway.”

The early 1990s also saw increased tension in the foreign relationships of the PRC as several countries responded to the military suppression of the student movement with sanctions. Relationships deteriorated further following US fighter jet sales to Taiwan in 1992, and with the Clinton administration embarking upon a “policy of using economic leverage to promote democracy in China.”

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29 Hughes, 2006, p. 52.
30 “Zai shisi da qizhi xia qianjin” 在十四大旗帜下前进 [Advance under the banner of the 14th National Party Congress], *Renmin ribao* 人民日报 [The People’s Daily], 1993-03-26.
During the 8th National People’s Congress in 1993 Jiang was elected as President of the PRC, and his inauguration speech was held at the Great Hall of the People to the 2978 representatives of the National Congress. The content of the speech is consistent with the themes laid out above; it emphasized the necessity of furthering economic reform, as well as reaffirmed Deng’s leading role within the party.

Though initially placating factions on the left, Jiang’s policies can be seen as eventually evolving toward keeping “a steady middle course between extremes on the left and right,” and at the core of his political career has been the suppression of destabilizing tendencies and ensuring political stability and economic modernization. However, the inherent contradictions within party ideology still had to be resolved, and as mentioned, Jiang emphasized the importance of building a “socialist spiritual civilization,” a concept which in reality “had little to do with socialism,” but rather placed focus on “China’s revival as a great civilization.” By placing emphasis on nationalism/patriotism rather than socialism it became easier to legitimize the economic reforms. Nationalism had a higher degree of malleability since any policy that could be construed as serving the interest of the people could also be seen as legitimate. While promoting nationalism Jiang had to ensure it did not impair the PRC’s foreign relations. The economic reforms also meant growing interdependence between the PRC and the international community, and “the Deng-Jiang leadership sought political and cultural as well as economic acceptance by the world community.” As discussed in Karlsson 2009 since the CCP had drawn upon nationalism to gain legitimacy it also became possible to voice dissenting opinions from a nationalist standpoint. In order to keep nationalism from becoming parochial or xenophobic, and

37 Loc. cit.
40 Karlsson, 2009, pp. 6-7.
thus negatively influencing foreign relations, or from being used to question the legitimacy of the party, the CCP had to contain it.

In a speech given as chair of a national meeting of the Policy Research Office of the Provincial Committees of the CCP, to an audience consisting of his fellow party members, Jiang further argued for the necessity of economic reforms. He also proposed the importance of maintaining the party’s tradition of research and investigation to address some of the issues that had emerged, such as the impact of said reforms on the “spiritual culture” and the building of the party.\(^{41}\)

Following the death of Deng in 1997, Jiang, in his eulogy to Deng, vowed to adhere to the policy direction laid out by Deng,\(^{42}\) and Deng Xiaoping Theory was written into the constitution of the PRC in an amendment in 1999.\(^{43}\) Jiang continued along the course of opening and reform, further attempting to improve relations with the international community and the U.S. in particular.\(^{44}\) The economic reforms throughout the 1990s had paved the way for the emergence of a new elite, and the leadership collective, bureaucracy and institutions surrounding Jiang can be described as technocratic rather than ideologically driven.\(^{45}\) There was also an increased “overlap between the political elite and the new economic elite,”\(^{46}\) where family ties and close personal relationships existed between high-ranking officials and private enterprise. To address this change in class relations within the PRC, and “the increasingly sterile debates between ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ that had come to dominate discussion,”\(^{47}\) Jiang formulated his own theory of The Three Represents (san ge daibiao 三个代表). Among other things, the theory states that the CCP should represent the “the most advanced production mode”\(^{48}\) which can be interpreted as a direct CCP endorsement of the new economic elite\(^{49}\), and the possibility to induct members into the party not necessarily

\(^{44}\) “Jiang Zemin”, Britannica Academic, 2016.
\(^{45}\) Fairbank 1998, pp. 445-446.
\(^{46}\) Lagerkvist, 2003, p. 11.
\(^{47}\) Hughes, 2006, p. 6.
\(^{49}\) Lagerkvist, 2003, p. 11.
coming from a “red” background.

Jiang’s contribution to economic reform culminated with the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization in late 2001, which would pave the way for increased globalization and interdependence with the global economic community in the throughout the 2000s.\textsuperscript{50}

In connection with the 16\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress in 2002, Jiang resigned as general secretary, and the following year he resigned as president as well. Hu Jintao was appointed his successor in both positions.\textsuperscript{51} The Congress also saw the inclusion of Jiang’s theory of the Three Represents included in the CCP constitution, which Hu (then vice-president) had been campaigning for.\textsuperscript{52} Like Deng before him, Jiang continued to exert a lingering influence on politics in the PRC after his resignation, most notably by having passed a resolution increasing the number of members in the Politburo Standing Committee, positions that were filled by members loyal to Jiang. He also remained as Chairman of the CMC until 2004.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{3.2 Hu Jintao}

Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 was born 1942 in Taizhou, Jiangsu province. After graduating from Tsinghua University in 1965 with a degree in hydroelectric engineering, he held a number of technical and political positions in Gansu province. There he came under the mentorship of party elder Song Ping 宋平 who appointed him to several posts and introduced him to the current general secretary of the CCP Hu Yaobang.\textsuperscript{54} Hu Yaobang’s patronage became an important stepping-stone in his career since it was through this connection that he was appointed to serve as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1984. In this position he was able to “gain access to the vast talent pool that the league represented,” building the basis for his future political support.\textsuperscript{55}

In 1985, Hu Yaobang sent him to serve as party secretary for Guizhou province, in order to prepare him for a higher promotion.\textsuperscript{56} Following Hu Yaobang’s downfall, which was brought about by failing to handle a student movement in 1987, Hu Jintao was appointed to the position of

\textsuperscript{50} Zheng, 2014, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{51} “Jiang Zemin”, Britannica Academic, 2016.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., pp. 17-18.
\textsuperscript{55} Lam, 2006, pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 7.
party secretary for the Tibetan autonomous region in 1988. His appointment to Tibet “was not a good omen for any cadre’s rise to the top,” and was a consequence of Hu having made enemies among party elders for failing to criticize Hu Yaobang.\(^{57}\) However, the move proved fortuitous to Hu’s career since his handling of unrest and demonstrations in Lhasa, which had been growing since 1986, made an impression on Deng Xiaoping.\(^{58}\)

Song, who retired from the Politburo Standing Committee in conjunction with the 14\(^{th}\) Party Congress in 1992, had “successfully lobbied for Hu to replace him.”\(^{59}\) Owing to Hu’s technocratic background, Jiang initially intended to appoint him to a ministerial position, but Deng hoped that he could pave the way for new generation of more reform-oriented Chinese leaders, and thus supported Hu’s accession to the PSC since Deng considered him “a man associated with the liberal traditions of Hu Yaobang.”\(^{60}\)

However, Hu did not serve as a proponent of change as Deng had intended, but showed more political shrewdness by embarking on what Lam describes as “ten-year career of self-effacement,”\(^{61}\) and “became a master at self-denial largely by hiding his ambitions, and very often, even his thoughts.”\(^{62}\) This allowed him to remain at his position, and throughout the 1990s he could consolidate political power and establish connections within the party.\(^{63}\)

Thus, by playing the role of a faithful understudy to Jiang, Hu had managed to remain at the top of the CCP throughout the 1990s, and by 2002 had managed to gain enough support to be appointed as Jiang’s successor to the post of general secretary of the CCP at the 16\(^{th}\) Party Congress.\(^{64}\) Even though, as mentioned above, Jiang and his supporters managed to retain some influence by increasing the number of members in PSC, “Jiang’s move apparently failed to prevent Hu from building a large bloc of faithful adherents, especially at the provincial level.”\(^{65}\)

The focus of the 16\(^{th}\) Party Congress was the increase in economic wealth the Chinese people had enjoyed during Jiang’s reign,\(^{66}\) and in a speech Hu clearly stated the party’s ambition to continue along the road of reform and opening and modernization, while also stressing the

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\(^{57}\) Lam, 2006, p. 8.
\(^{58}\) Ibid., pp. 8-10.
\(^{60}\) Lam, 2006, pp. 9-10.
\(^{61}\) Ibid., pp. 11-12.
\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 12.
\(^{64}\) Ibid.
\(^{65}\) Lam, 2006, p. 21.
\(^{66}\) Lagerkvist, 2003, p. 2.
importance of both Deng Xiaoping’s theories as well as Jiang’s theory of the Three Represents.67

The content of the 10th five-year plan (approved in 2001)68 featured an unprecedented focus on education, technology, resources and environment,69 and it is apparent that an attempt was made to tackle the consequences of China’s rapid economic development during the last decade. When assuming the post of general secretary of the CCP, Jiang had been forced to deal with the problems generated by Deng’s policy of reform and opening, such as growing corruption, economic inequality and polarization between urban and rural areas. Largely unresolved, these problems had under Jiang’s leadership been “magnified by the deepening of the reform process and entry into the WTO.”70 “Hu Jintao showed a high awareness of [increasing inequality] from the first months when he became Party Secretary.”71

A main concern was that public grievances were directed against local officials, “because they had been asked to do the state’s dirty work, in collecting taxes and in implementing unpopular land and family planning policies.”72 Earlier attempts at giving local officials legitimacy had been made in the 1980s by introducing village elections, a process that Hu was not interested in implementing further. Hu’s response to the problem was instead to introduce greater party accountability.73 Hu addressed some of these issues in a speech held in late 2002,74 and emphasized that dealing that these problems was crucial to the country’s future.75 The speech was held at Xibaipo in Hubei province, a historically significant location for the CCP.76

Following the pattern laid out by Jiang, Hu was also elected as president of the PRC. When elected by the 10th National People’s Congress in 2003 Hu held a speech further emphasizing the value of Jiang’s contribution and the theory of The Three Represents, and also stressing the

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69 Hu 2013, p. 632.
70 Hughes, 2006, p. 91.
72 Ibid., p. 42.
73 Ibid., p. 43.
74 Hu, Jintao 胡锦涛, “Jianchi fayang jianku fendou de youliang zuofeng, nuli shixian quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui de hongwei mubiao” 坚持发扬艰苦奋斗的优良作风 努力实现全面建设小康社会的宏伟目标 [Uphold the good conduct of arduous struggle, strive to realize the magnificent goal of total construction of a moderately prosperous society], 2002-12-06, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/02/content_731349.htm.
76 Irekvist, 2014, p. 66.
important role that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” had played in ensuring the future of the Chinese people.\textsuperscript{77} By 2004, Hu had managed to further consolidate his power, and after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee Jiang was forced to retire as chairman of the CMC, with Hu succeeding him.\textsuperscript{78}

Lam argues that for members of the Chinese Communist Youth League “the be-all and end-all of statecraft” is the survival of the party, and that this view had influenced Hu when serving as general secretary for the CCYL. This led him to launch “a package of plans to perpetuate the CCP’s ruling party status.”\textsuperscript{79}

The decline in socialist ideology and the increased use of nationalist ideology to claim legitimacy was another part of Jiang’s legacy that Hu had inherited,\textsuperscript{80} and the dynamics between popular and elite nationalist discourse continued to influence foreign policy.\textsuperscript{81}

Just as Deng and Jiang before him, Hu wanted to leave his mark on Chinese politics, and 2004 saw the introduction of Hu's own concept, the Harmonious Society (or hexie shehui 和谐社会 in Chinese), which proposed “a drastic reorientation from the development-first strategies implemented by Deng and Jiang, to people-centered policies” in order to address the social problems generated by the economic reforms.\textsuperscript{82}

The extent to which Hu has managed to achieve political reform is limited and many of the problems inherited by Hu have remained unresolved. Subsequently tension has increased in the PRC with an increase in the “number, scale and intensity” of mass incidents.\textsuperscript{83} At the end of Hu’s term as leader the CCP attempted to resolve these issues through “social management”, which can be described as “a combination of better [governmental] services and stronger police work” rather than political reform.\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[78] Lam, 2006, p. 27.
  \item[79] Ibid., p. 22.
  \item[80] Hughes, 2006, p. 92.
  \item[81] Ibid., p. 117.
  \item[82] Zheng, 2014, p. 35.
  \item[84] Ibid., pp. 177-178.
\end{itemize}
3.3 Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping was born 1953 in Fuping county, Shaanxi province. After graduating from Tsinghua University earning a degree in chemical engineering in 1979 he went on to serve in a number of secretarial positions until 1985 when he was appointed vice mayor of Xiamen, Fujian province. From then he continued to steadily rise through the ranks and was appointed governor of Fujian in 2000. In 2002, he was appointed as acting governor of Zhejiang province. In 2007, he was elevated to the position of party secretary of Shanghai following the implication of his predecessor in a corruption scandal. During his brief stay in this position, he focused on “promoting stability and rehabilitation of the city’s financial image,” and apparently made a favorable impression on the party leadership since he in October 2007 joined the PSC. After being named vice president of the PRC in 2008, he emerged as a strong candidate for succeeding Hu, a position that was reconfirmed by his appointment to the position of vice chairman of the CMC.85

Many of the problems created by China’s economic development still remained unsolved, and the contents of the 12th five-year plan, adopted in 2011, emphasized resources and environment while downplaying economic growth.86 In comparison with Hu, who came to lead the PRC just as it joined the WTO and saw an increased integration into the global economic system, “Xi took office just as an economic downturn was beginning and growth was slowing.”87 It could be argued that the party at this time was facing a legitimacy issue since it from the Deng era partially had based it on economic performance. While Hu focused on addressing these issues through the implementation of people-centered policies, Xi “has led a far-reaching anti-corruption drive and a wide-ranging move to clamp down on dissent.”88 Xi seems extremely focused on maintaining political stability, where all threats to party rule must be resolutely dealt with. Zhao describes it as “a discourse of fear,” which “leads to a general sense within the Party that the shadows are flickering everywhere, that trouble is on the way, and that enemies are lurking on all sides.”89

Since the last years of Hu’s term, which saw violent riots in Lhasa, Shaoguan and Ürümqi, increasing interethnic conflict and violence has become a threat to party legitimacy since it is “seen
as a sign of policy failure by a significant segment of the Chinese population.” In comparison with his predecessors, Xi has employed a more forceful approach to handling interethnic conflict.

In 2012, during the 18th Party Congress, Xi was appointed as Hu’s successor as general secretary of the CCP. In a speech he emphasized the importance of the party’s leadership of the people in embarking upon the path to transform the “impoverished” and “backward” old China into the “prosperous,” “wealthy” and “strong” new China, while also stressing the need to maintain party discipline in order for the party to continue to serve this purpose.

Shortly after his appointment, in a speech Xi stressed the importance of adhering to and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics, and expressed his gratefulness towards his predecessors’ contributions. Again, he also expressed the necessity of adhering to party discipline and fighting corruption.

In 2013, Xi was also elected as President of the PRC by the 12th National People’s Congress, confirming his role as paramount leader and cementing the status of the presidential role as a ceremonial extension to the position of party general secretary. In a speech delivered at the closing ceremony, Xi not only stressed the importance of patriotism and the necessity of a humble and industrious attitude, but also talked in length about the “Chinese Dream,” or Zhongguo meng 中国梦 in Chinese. In comparison with the slogans and concepts launched by Jiang and Hu, such as Jiang’s Theory of the Three Represents, the Chinese Dream is not as tangible or as easy to correlate to specific policy changes. It is related to the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (zhonghua minzu weida fuxing 中华民族伟大复兴), a concept that “has been used by many

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91 Carlsson, 2015, p. VII.
94 Xi, Jinping 习近平, “Jinjin weirao jianchi he fazhan Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi xuanchuan guanche dang de shiba da jingshen” 紧紧围绕坚持和发展中国特色社会主义 学习宣传贯彻党的十八大精神 [Closely encircle the adherence and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, study, spread and carry out the spirit of the 18th Party Congress], 2012-11-17, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2012-11/19/c_123967017.htm.
Chinese leaders. [...] Almost every generation of Chinese leaders, from Sun Yet-sen to Chiang Kai-shek and from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, has used the national humiliation discourse and the goal of rejuvenation to mobilize the Chinese populace to support their revolution or reform.”

In comparison, the rhetoric of the Chinese Dream appeals to a larger group of people than for example Jiang’s Theory of the Three Represents, and Xi explicitly states that “the realization of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the shared dream of the sons and daughters of China at home and abroad.” (实现中华民族伟大复兴是海内外中华儿女共同的梦) The Chinese Dream is portrayed as the culmination of more than 5000 years of Chinese cultural history, and Xi uses a broad, inclusive, definition of what the Chinese people is by placing emphasis on a shared cultural background rather than on nationality: "Chinese culture is the shared spiritual genes of the sons and daughters of China.”

However, the implications of the Chinese dream is broader than simple nationalist discourse: “The elusiveness is to a large extent caused by the attempt to incorporate many different layers of society into the Dream. It is collective as well as private. [...] It is at once a dream of a strong and happy nation and a dream of achieving private happiness through the realization of personal goals.”

When resigning, Hu also stepped down from the position of chairman of the CMC in favor of Xi, in stark contrast with how Jiang had handled the previous power transition. Zheng argues that this choice has a “profound impact” on China’s political system since it sets a precedent for serving two terms in the position as chairman of the CMC. This also strengthens the “three-in-one formula that has become a symbol of the new leader’s mandate,” where the positions of general secretary of the CCP, president of the PRC and chairman of the CMC are concentrated on the same person. According to Tsang the political system of the PRC that has emerged throughout the post-Deng era, which he calls “consultative Leninism”, has brought with it an “institutionalized

99 Ibid., p. 64.
102 Loc. cit.
way to manage succession.” In comparison with how power was handed over from Jiang to Hu, where Jiang was reluctant to step down from various positions such as chairman of the CMC, Xi’s accession to power has been relatively smooth. “The period 2012–2013 was also the first time in the history of the PRC when the new party chairman and premier emerged from an agreement reached in the previous Party Congress five years earlier, and was not the result of having been anointed by a strongman.”

It could be argued that Xi’s rule relies on a broader basis of party consensus than his predecessors.

Since his rise to power, Xi has consolidated his power and acted proactively to implement his policies, and Carlsson argues that the Xi era in many ways differ from those of the previous leaders. Notable developments are an increased effort to handle corruption and dissent, harder policies towards dissenters within ethnic minority groups, and bolder foreign policies. In addition, Xi has contrary to precedent not waited for his successor to acknowledge his contribution to party ideology, and 2014 saw the publication of Xi’s collected speeches, *The Governance of China*.

In comparison with Jiang and Hu, who both to some extent were willing to make concessions toward the global community in order to safeguard international trade, Xi seems more interested in projecting an image of China as a powerful nation.

### 4. Theoretical framework and previous research

#### 4.1 Critical discourse analysis

Language plays an integral part in how we construct our worldview, and our worldview influences the construction of language. In order to understand why or how something has been said it has to be put into context: Language never exists independently but is always framed within a context, such as the material world, history or intertextuality.

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104 Carlsson, 2015, p. VII.

105 Ibid. p. VI.


107 Carlsson 2015, pp. VI-VII.
Central to this thesis is the concept of discourse: “[W]hen we speak of discourse, we are always speaking of language that is in some way situated.”108 Conversely, individuals using language of course also do so within a context: “[N]ot only is discourse situated partly by who says (or writes) what to whom, but people [...] who say or write these things are also situated by discourse.”109 This implies that not only our worldview but also our identities themselves influence and at the same time are influenced by discourse. It is by the analysis of discourse that we can examine the interdependent relationship between language, the individual and society: “[D]iscourse analysis is the study of the ways sentences and utterances are put together to make texts and interactions and how those texts and interactions fit into our social world.”110

The way of understanding discourse (or orders of discourse) used in this thesis is commonly attributed to Foucault who argued that discourses are connected to “systems of knowledge,” and that they are the tools by which knowledge is constructed and thus has an ability to influence how people think and act.111 In this view, “[l]anguage is seen not just as a system for making meaning, but as a part of larger systems through which people construct social identities and social realities.”112 “According to Foucault, ‘discourses’ (orders of discourse) can exert a tremendous power over us by creating constraints regarding how certain things can be talked about and what counts as ‘knowledge’ in particular contexts.”113 What can and what cannot be said is dependent on the discourse participants are situated in, and discourse can in this way be said to have a limiting or controlling aspect.

One way to exert control over language is through formalization: In his work about political language in the PRC, Doing things with words in Chinese politics: five studies114, Schoenhals argues that the CCP has to a great extent purposefully employed language control in order to exert political influence. The constraints upon what can and what cannot be said are largely defined by the formalized nature of the language used within Chinese politics: “Chinese political discourse is restricted in form rather than content.”115 Formalization in political language is of course not a

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110 Ibid., p. 2.
113 Ibid., p. 15.
115 Ibid., p. 20.
uniquely Chinese feature. In all political expression a good degree of deliberation on wording is required in order for a message to come across favorably, but the large extent to which language is formalized in the context of Chinese political language is notable.\textsuperscript{116} Formulations (tifa 提法) has been of great concern to the leadership of the CCP and the possible ways in which things can be described has been limited by requirements to adhere to officially established formulations.\textsuperscript{117} The Chinese context can serve as an example of the symbiotic relationship between language use and discourse: Institutions (e.g. editorial boards, propaganda departments) situated within discourse impose restrictions on what can be said through language, and language in turn determines the boundaries of discourse, thus creating a feedback loop. To some extent the system can be perceived as self-sustaining: Schoenhals argues that “the proscription of selected formulations makes the introduction of new concepts [...] cumbersome” since they have to be introduced using established formulations, and “it also simplifies the defense and perpetuation of that which is already established, conventional, or traditional.”\textsuperscript{118} Formalization thus can serve a paradigmatic or conservative function: “Ultimately, formalization becomes a form of power for the already powerful.”\textsuperscript{119}

At the point in time when \textit{Doing things with words in Chinese politics} was written (published 1992) Schoenhals predicted that there would be a de-emphasis on formalized language in the PRC, arguing that the power of formalized language “is lacking in instrumentality to a degree that ultimately makes it useless for solving \textit{specific} problems”\textsuperscript{120} such as modernization of industry etc. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess whether or not this has happened, especially to what extent power has been successfully exercised through the use of formalized language during the period that this study focuses on. Irekvist’s thesis\textsuperscript{121}, which partly uses the same research material as this study, and a preliminary study conducted while selecting the research material for this study indicate that the lexical content of the speeches contain a considerable amount of what can be considered to be formalized or orthodox language. Irekvist however argues that there are differences between how and to what end Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping employ formalized language.\textsuperscript{122}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{116} Schoenhals, 1992, p. 26. \\
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 6. \\
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 21. \\
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 1992, p. 22. \\
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., pp. 28-29. \\
\textsuperscript{121} Irekvist, 2014. \\
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
\end{flushright}
As seen above the control over language and discursive practices can be a powerful tool. van Dijk argues that the control over language (discourse as a social practice) also implies a form of mind control, the control of “knowledge, opinions, attitudes, ideologies as well as other personal or social representations.” 123 This is achieved through a process which Fairclough calls naturalization, by which he means the way in which established practices can become viewed as universal or commonsensical, that they are taken for granted or assumed. 124 Interactions (and language interactions) that are based upon assumptions promote them since the interaction reproduces the established assumptions: “Whenever people produce or interpret discourse, they necessarily draw upon orders of discourse [...] in order to do so. Through being drawn upon, these structures are constantly being created anew in discourse and practice generally.” 125 “Ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depends on the power relations which underlie the conventions.” 126 Thus power relationships, when reproduced within discourse, can potentially become naturalized: Fairclough calls this ability to “project one’s practices as universal and ‘common sense’” ideological power. 127 Ideology here should be seen as a “specific set of beliefs and assumptions people have about things such as what is good and bad, what is right and wrong, and what is normal and abnormal.” 128 It could be argued that in order for ideological assumptions based on underlying power relationships to be successfully reproduced, they have to be made less salient or noticeable, and Fairclough suggests that it is “quite possible for the expression of power relationships to be played down as a tactic within a strategy for the continued possession and exercise of power.” 129

Of central concern to the academic orientation most commonly referred to as Critical discourse analysis (or critical language studies as Fairclough refers to it in Language and Power 130 are the topics explored above, namely the relationship between discourse and language and the reproduction of power relations through discourse. van Dijk defines the boundaries or interest areas of CDA as the “properties of discourse that are most typically associated with the expression,

125 Ibid., p. 39.
126 Ibid., p. 2.
127 Ibid., p. 33.
129 Fairclough, 2001, p. 60.
130 Ibid., p. 1.
confirmation, reproduction or challenge of the social power of the speaker(s) or writer(s) as members of dominant groups.”

He further argues that the perspective of CDA also implies an aspect of sociopolitical awareness. Not only is the concept of power of interest but also that of power abuse: “Traditionally, control is defined as control over the actions of others. If such control is also in the interest of those who exercise such power, and against the interest of those who are controlled, we may speak of power abuse. If the actions involved are communicative actions, that is, discourse, we more specifically deal with control over the discourse of others, which is one of the obvious ways discourse and powers are related.”

It must be noted that the making of a distinction between the use and abuse of power was considered to lie outside of the scope of this thesis, and in this regard the thesis does not adhere to the definition of CDA laid out by van Dijk above. However, since it examines the tools by which power abuse can be exerted, and attempts to unmask or unveil the mechanisms for how power and power relationships are reproduced through language use and discourse, this thesis will hopefully contribute to the field of CDA in general.

According to Biria & Mohammadi, “one of the significant objectives of CDA is to unearth and examine the complex mechanisms of discursive practice utilized by the speakers.” One aspect of discursive practice which was considered as being of interest for this study is the employment of certain strategies within discourse, in this case the discourse of Chinese politics. The use of the framework of CDA to examine discursive strategies in political discourse can be found in previous literature, (see Reyes-Rodríguez for a list) and thus considered apt for this study.

4.2 Chinese critical discourse analysis of political speech

Some articles that use critical discourse analysis to examine political speech have been published by Chinese scholars. To the author’s knowledge, no Chinese-language articles exist that directly compare the speeches of different leaders of the PRC. However, speeches exist where intercultural comparisons are made between Chinese and foreign leaders. There are also speeches that examine individual speeches through a framework of critical discourse analysis, without making any

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131 van Dijk, 2008, p. 5.
132 Ibid., p. 9.
comparison to other speakers or speeches. According to Yang, there are few studies that employ a CDA framework on political speech in the PRC. While the following review is not exhaustive, it provides an insight in the use of critical discourse analysis in PRC academia, and supports the choice of theoretical framework for this thesis by demonstrating the applicability of the framework in a Chinese language context.

In an article Sun has examined the discourse of “the construction of ecological civilization” from a critical discourse analysis perspective to examine the relationship between this discourse and the society of the PRC, ideology and power. The article analysis a speech held by Xi at the 6th Collective Study Session of the Politburo, in order to expose the use of discourse strategies. In the analysis Sun shows how Xi uses first person collective pronouns strategically: “through the use of the address form ‘we’, General Secretary Xi closely connects himself and the people.”

In an article comparing speeches of Chinese and American leaders held at The London G20 Summit Meeting in 2008, Tian and Gao employ a framework of discourse analysis to examine the use of the reproduction of metaphors. The article examines Hu Jintao’s speech at the summit meeting, where he for instance uses a war metaphor to describe the financial crisis. The article also shows that differences exist between American and Chinese leaders’ use of metaphors, and that these differences are attributable to the cultural and ideological background of the speakers. The use also show how power relationships and ideology can be reproduced through the use of metaphors.

In an article Hu uses a framework of critical discourse analysis to examine a speech of Hu Jintao speech held at a G8 Summit Meeting. The article shows that Hu Jintao employs language in a strategic fashion. For instance, the first person collective pronoun “we” is purposefully used in an addressee-inclusive fashion to increase the directness and feeling of intimacy of the speech.

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135 Yang, Fan 杨帆, “Cong pipingxing huayu fenxi shijiao jiedu liangan guanxi huayu” 从批评性话语分析视角解读两岸关系话语 [Interpreting Cross-strait Discourse From the Perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis], Xiandai yuwen 现代语文, no. 4 (2016), p. 128.
139 Ibid., p. 95.
141 Ibid., p. 163.
Yang has in an article employed a critical discourse analysis framework to interpret discourse on cross-strait relations.\(^{142}\) The article analyses the speeches held by Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou (马英九) at the historical first meeting of the leaders of the PRC and the Republic of China since 1949. The article shows that differences exist between the leaders in several aspects e.g. choice of vocabulary and pronoun usage, and that these differences are attributable to the leaders’ differing political agendas. Of particular interest to this thesis is the usage of pronouns: Ma uses it to a larger extent than Xi in order to ”maintain the ideology of perpetual cross-strait peace.”\(^{143}\)

5. Methodology and research material

5.1 Discourse strategies

Drawing inspiration from a Master’s Thesis by Tawfic and Fattah titled *Egyptian Presidents’ Speeches in Times of Crisis: Comparative Analysis* (2015), this study aims to illustrate how different discourse strategies are employed in political speech. Tawfic and Fattah’s study employs the perspective of critical discourse analysis to address the main goal of the thesis, to “highlight the discourse strategies used by Egyptian presidents during periods of crisis in different socio-political contexts.”\(^{144}\) Secondly, by comparing how the speakers employ discourse strategies, the authors illustrate differences and similarities between speakers and how they address the crises confronting them.

The main discourse strategies included in Tawfic and Fattah’s analysis are:

- Positive self-representation and negative other-representation
- Code switching
- Establishing Speaker-Addressee relationship
- Religious reference

\(^{142}\) Yang, Fan 杨帆, “Cong pingxing huayu fenxi shijiao jiedu liangan guanxi huayu” 从批评性话语分析视角解读两岸关系话语 [Interpreting Cross-strait Discourse From the Perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis], *Xiandai yuwen* 现代语文, no. 4 (2016), p. 128-130.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., p. 130.

\(^{144}\) Fattah, Abdha & Tawfic, Dina. *Egyptian Presidents’ Speeches in Times of Crisis: Comparative Analysis*, (Master’s Thesis), The American University in Cairo, 2015, p. 3.
5.2 Selection of discourse strategies discussed in this study

Below the discourse strategies found to be most relevant to the study are listed. Certain strategies, e.g. “code switching” (where the speaker establishes proximity to the addressee by switching to a local dialect) was considered to be of less use in this study owing to the standardized and formalized nature of the language of the CCP. Also, “religious reference” seems unsuitable as well due to the official atheistic position of the CCP. While attempting to keep the selection in line with that found in previous literature, the selection was done on subjective grounds and it must be noted that other strategies might have been selected which potentially could have affected the outcome of the study. Moreover, it was decided that for the purpose of maintaining clarity while presenting the analysis, the strategies will be placed in two macro categories. The different uses of the establishment of speaker-addressee relationships will be included under group orientation, and positive self-representation and negative other-representation will be placed under group representation.

Discourse strategies to be used in this study:
- Group orientation
- Group representation

The following sections contain a description and definition of each discourse strategy. Each description also includes a checklist, which was used to produce the data for the quantitative part of the analysis. This is followed by a presentation of how the study on the research material was conducted.

5.2.1 Group orientation

A common strategy to gather support for a position is what Tawfic and Fattah calls “group orientation,” 145 i.e. the establishment of a connection between the speaker and addressee, portraying them as sharing the same goals and values.

According to Cheng, through repeated usage of the pronoun “we” and omission of the pronoun “I” Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian 陈水扁 in his inaugural addresses purposely

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attempted to “create a feeling of inclusion and togetherness.”\textsuperscript{146} Merely comparing the amount of singular or collective pronouns avoids touching upon how pronouns due to their inexact nature depend on an external context for interpretation, and Cheng’s study lists seven possible interpretations for the pronoun “we” (women 我们) found in the speeches, also noting that the amount of variation is due to the varied audience attending the speeches.\textsuperscript{147} In the sections of the speeches devoted to Taiwan’s relationship to mainland China Chen “played with the vague, ambiguous meaning which the addresses constructed for the pronoun ‘we’ to show goodwill toward China.”\textsuperscript{148}

Through their inherent malleability pronouns such as “we” can be employed in a variety of fashions. Zhang argues that the psychological effect on the receiver of first person collective pronouns can be employed persuasively. In an example discussing pronoun use in advertisements, Zhang states that “the first person collective pronouns in their reference includes the addressee and can give the receiver a stronger sense of proximity, which makes the receiver (the consumer) feel closer, and is beneficial to the receiver’s psychological acceptance of the product (content) that the advertisement relates to.”\textsuperscript{149}

Maalej has in a study comparing the three last speeches of the “ousted president of Tunisia” shown how distance and proximity between the speaker and the addressee can be established through the use of deictic pronouns (i.e. pronouns whose meaning is dependent on external contextual information).\textsuperscript{150} A shift occurred in how the “ousted president of Tunisia,” as the speaker at the deictic center, created different dyads of pronouns (for example We-Them). “[T]he observable changes and shifts in the pronoun configurations of the speeches were motivated by parallel events in the political, economic, and social context.”\textsuperscript{151} The agency implied by the speaker’s ability to put language to instrumental use means that “the shift is not one between


\textsuperscript{147} Cheng, 2006, p. 594.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 2006, p. 596.


\textsuperscript{150} Maalej, Zouheir A., “The ‘Jasmine revolt’ has made the ‘Arab spring’: A critical discourse analysis of the last three political speeches of the ousted president of Tunisia”, \textit{Discourse & Society}, vol. 23, no. 6 (2012).

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 697.
different values filling the deictic pronouns. Rather, it is the speaker as a deictic center that shifts his use of pronouns, filling them with different values.”

Conversely, the speaker can shift the position of the deictic center itself and by adopting different roles establish different relationships with the addressee throughout a speech. Reyes-Rodríguez illustrates this by analyzing the different personas evoked by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez in his speeches: “The flexibility of the speaker in presenting arguments from different angles (personas) not only helps him to deliver the message favorably, it also brings dynamism to the speech.”

In comparison with inflecting and conjugating languages, such as English, Chinese has a “relatively simple” pronominal system, and the number of possible forms of first person collective pronouns is limited. The pronoun zanmen (咱们), which in comparison to women (我们) always includes the addressee, was excluded due to its colloquial nature. A pilot study conducted on the research material also confirms that indeed no cases of the word’s use were found in the speeches. This leaves us with the mainly used first person collective pronoun “we” (women 我们), and some composite words were the character wo (我, literally “I”) is used in a possessive collective fashion, e.g. “our country” (woguo 我国) and “our side” (wofang 我方).

In the analysis section of the thesis the different uses of first person collective pronouns will be categorized according to what extent they could be construed as inclusive of an addressee, or multiple addressees. The possible categorizations are based on Petersoo’s concept of a “wandering we” which is also mentioned in Maalej’s study. In Petersoo’s article about expressions of banal Scottish nationalism in media, she argues that the changing meaning of the pronoun “we” is complex and that actual usage does not follow the assumption that “if an article tries to make rhetorically a Scottish point or a British point, it would use the deictic expressions consequently and consistently.” Instead, “the deictic expression ‘we’ keeps wandering between

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153 Reyes-Rodríguez, 2008, p. 133-152.
the newspaper ‘we’, Scottish ‘we’ and British ‘we’. To distinguish between the various usages, Petersoo categorizes them according to their level of inclusiveness. The categorizations are: addressee-exclusive, addressee-inclusive and all-inclusive. In comparison to Petersoo’s article, the all-inclusive category will be used where the speaker addresses the people of the PRC, and for the sake of clarity, the third category will henceforth be referred to as PRC-inclusive. In a preliminary stage of this study an additional category was also included which was inclusive of Chinese people outside of the PRC, and thus would have included the people of Taiwan and overseas Chinese. The number of actual supportable use cases were however too few, and consequently the category was excluded.

This leaves us with three possible categorizations, which will be used in the analysis section:
1. Addressee-exclusion
2. Addressee-inclusion
3. PRC-inclusion

A pilot study conducted on the research material concluded that the usage of second and third person collective pronouns was too low to produce meaningful data in the same way as for first person collective pronouns. There were only two instances of the common second person collective pronoun “you” (nimen 你们), and only 25 of the common third person collective pronoun “they” (tamen 他们). Other possible collective pronouns, such as the feminine “they” (tamen 她们) and the non-human “they” (tamen 它们) are virtually nonexistent. These pronouns will therefore not be subjected to analysis.

**Checklist**
- Is a first person collective pronoun used?
- Can its use be classified as addressee-exclusive, addressee-inclusive or inclusive of the population of the PRC?

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157 Loc. cit.  
In the following example the pronoun “our” is used two times, first to create a feeling of inclusiveness by referring to the party as “our party,” and the second time simply to refer to a group, “us” (i.e. the leadership collective). Xi is speaking on behalf of. While for the first instance a case can be made for the deliberate establishing of speaker addressee relationship, the second is used in an addressee-exclusive fashion.

The report of the 18th Party Congress sketched a magnificent blueprint for how to comprehensively establish a moderately prosperous society, hasten and advance the modernization of socialism and achieve a new victory for socialism with Chinese characteristics under these new historical conditions. [The report] is our party’s political manifesto and action plan for uniting and guiding the people of all nationalities in the country in the struggle to continue advancing along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the struggle for the comprehensive establishment of a moderately prosperous society. [The report] has guided the work for us in the new central leadership collective.

党的十八大报告勾画了在新的历史条件下全面建成小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化、夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利的宏伟蓝图，是我们党团结带领全国各族人民沿着中国特色社会主义道路继续前进、为全面建成小康社会而奋斗的政治宣言和行动纲领，为我们这一届中央领导集体的工作指明了方向。\(^{159}\)

5.2.2 Group representation

Various studies on political speech\(^{160}\) illustrate the implementation of a discursive strategy of positive self-representation and negative other-representation, in which events and actors are construed as being a part of a narrative such as good vs. evil, victim vs. perpetrator or oppressor vs. oppressed. The speaker can employ representations of groups strategically to achieve various purposes:

\(^{159}\) Xi, Jinping 习近平, “Jinjin weirao jianchi he fazhan Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi xuexi xuanchuang guanche dang de shiba da jingshen” 紧紧围绕坚持和发展中国特色社会主义 学习宣传贯彻党的十八大精神 [Closely encircle the adherence and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, study, spread and carry out the spirit of the 18th Party Congress], 2012-11-17, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2012-11/19/c_123967017.htm

\(^{160}\) Examples:
In a CDA-based study comparing the inaugural addresses of Barack Obama and George Bush, Biria and Mohammadi argue that although both presidents employed a strategy of positive self-representation and negative other-representation, they employed them differently in order to achieve different goals\textsuperscript{161}, and “[...]what is important is not to discuss perceptions of self and other and how they are created; rather, why they are created and what the intended functions of behind these concepts are.”\textsuperscript{162} The analysis part of this thesis will attempt to assess to what purpose different groups are represented. One possible purpose is the reproduction of power relationships: van Dijk argues that binary representations of groups or “polarized discourse structures play a crucial role in the expression, construction, confirmation and hence the reproduction of social inequality.”\textsuperscript{163}

**Checklist**
- Is an in-group represented in positive terms?
- Is an out-group represented in negative terms?

This leaves us with two possible categorizations, which will be used in the analysis section:

4. Positive self-representation (PS)

5. Negative other-representation (NO)

Please note that other possibilities exist for how groups could be described and that they were considered, but omitted due to the limited scope of the study. This thesis also does not focus on positive or negative descriptions of individuals.

The following example from the inaugural speech by Li Xiannian 李先念, while not so much illustrating directly negative other-representation, depicts the Chinese people as “peace loving,” and China as a playing a positive, stabilizing role in international politics and a supporter of countries in the Third World. Without actually naming an opponent, Li hints that the peaceful World order is threatened by “hegemonism,” which must be opposed. It can be argued that the purpose of this paragraph is to state that the goals of China’s foreign policy is aligned with the

\textsuperscript{161} Biria & Mohammadi, 2012, p. 1301.
\textsuperscript{162} Biria & Mohammadi, 2012, p. 1292.
\textsuperscript{163} van Dijk, 2008, p. 5.
wishes of its people (which are peace loving) and the people of the world, thus legitimizing it. The argument is further strengthened by the notion that there is an (albeit a vague) opponent.

The Chinese people are a peace loving people. Preserving a peaceful international order is the shared demand of our people and the people of the world. We will unremittingly implement a foreign policy of independence and self-determination, and on the foundation of the five principles of peaceful coexistence continue to develop the relations with other countries, continuously expanding mutual economic cooperation, cultural exchange and the friendly relations between people. We will continue to greatly strengthen the cooperation with the countries of the Third World. We are resolved, together with the people of the whole world, to continue opposing hegemonism, keeping world peace, strive for the improvement of humanity, and to express our own diligence and contribution.

中国人民是爱好和平的人民。保持一个和平的国际环境，是我国人民和全世界人民的共同要求。我们将始终不渝地贯彻执行独立自主的外交政策，在和平共处五项原则的基础上继续发展同各国的关系，不断扩大相互间的经济合作、文化交流和人民友好往来。我们要继续大力加强同第三世界各国的团结和合作。我们决心同全世界人民一起，继续为反对霸权主义，维护世界和平，争取人类进步，作出自己的努力和贡献。164

5.3 Research method

To answer the first research question, “to what extent” Jiang, Hu and Xi employ these discourse strategies, frequencies of discourse strategy usage were derived by subjecting the research material to a coding process. In the description of each discourse strategy above, a checklist detailing the criteria of the coding process is provided with the purpose of providing as much transparency as possible. The intention is that the reader, by following the same checklist while looking at the same material, should be able to reproduce similar findings. Following each checklist is an example illustrating the reasoning behind why certain examples were considered as meeting the criteria in the checklists.

In order to compare the extent of discourse strategy usage between the speeches, occurrences were compared to the word count of the speeches. Word counts were calculated by

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164 Li, Xiannian 李先念, “Zai Zhonghua renmin gongheguo di liu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi shang, Li Xiannian zhuxi de jianghua” 在中华人民共和国第六届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上 李先念主席的讲话 [At the first plenary session of the sixth National People’s Congress, President Li Xiannian’s speech], Renmin Ribao 人民日报 [The People’s Daily], 1983-06-22, http://www.people.com.cn/zgrdxw/zlk/rd/6jie/newfiles/a1220.html
using the computer programs SegmentAnt and AntConc. (Please see bibliography for version number and reference.) Please note that computer-assisted calculation of word counts in Chinese has a degree of inaccuracy, but it was considered low enough for the purposes of this study. Since the same method was used to calculate the word count of all speeches, they should be intercomparable.

The results were then normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words, i.e. the number of occurrences was multiplied by 10,000 divided by the word count of the speech, so as to make them comparable. The normalized results were rounded to integers.

To assist in the comparison of the findings, a chi-square test was performed to assess the degree of variation of the results. The chi-square test compared the findings (observed frequency) against a null-hypothesis that employment of the discourse strategies was evenly distributed among the speeches (expected frequency), where a high chi-square value indicates deviation from the null-hypothesis. The formula for calculating the chi-square value is:

\[ \chi^2 = \frac{(\text{observed frequency} - \text{expected frequency})^2}{\text{expected frequency}} \]

The purpose of this operation is to produce a value that reflects “the aggregate degree of difference that actually exists between the observed and expected patterns of frequencies,” and does not reflect if differences are positive or negative.

In order to determine if cases of deviation were significant and not just attributable to random chance, the chi-square value was converted into a probability value (P). In order to calculate a P-value, the chi-square value is compared to a distribution table dependent upon the number of possible categories, or degrees of freedom. Conversion was performed using a computational tool for calculating P-values from chi-square values. In this case, where there is only one dimension of categorization (the number of speeches), the degree of freedom is 8 (number of speeches -1). A high P-value indicates consistency between the findings and the null-hypothesis. The results were compared to an assumed randomness of 5%, or P 0.05, which is a

commonly used assumption when analyzing P-values.\textsuperscript{168} So, for the purpose of this thesis, p-values of less than 0.05 were considered as significantly deviating from the null-hypothesis. P-values were rounded to three decimal places. In addition, extremely low P-values (below 0.001) are presented as $<0.001$ to make the presentation clearer. Please see section 6, Analysis, for a presentation of the results.

The analysis section also contains a summary for each speaker, as well as a comparison between them. In this case, the values were obtained by calculating the average for each speaker, and in order to compare these averages against each other a new chi-square and P-value was calculated for each category and each speaker. The calculations for these values were performed in the same way as described above, with the notable difference that the degree of freedom while calculating these P-values was 2 (number of speakers -1), and that they were compared against a null-hypothesis that the use of the discourse strategies were evenly divided between the speakers.

In general, the choice of using a chi-square test is relevant in cases where all expected frequencies are 5 or higher, a criterion that the research material meets, and the method was thus considered as being appropriate for this study.\textsuperscript{169} Some inconsistencies might still however exist due to the limited size of the research material, in particular for some categories where there were large deviations from the null-hypothesis. Such cases will be accounted for in the analysis in section 6.

To answer the second research question of “towards which purpose” Jiang, Hu and Xi employ discourse strategies, a qualitative approach was used. To provide transparency for these more subjective interpretations, the analysis section will contain examples illustrating the primary objectives for the employment of the strategies. In the summary for each speaker, an attempt was made to find consistent purposes towards which each speaker employs discourse strategies. This evaluation was mainly done on subjective grounds, but one formal criterion was adhered to: a purpose was only considered as consistent if it appeared in at least two of the three speeches of each speaker. Alternately, in cases were the use of a particular discourse strategy was mainly confined to a single speech, the purpose for that usage was noted.

To answer the third research question, if differences or similarities in discourse strategy employment exists between the speakers, and why it exist, a comparison based on the summaries


for each speaker is made. Similarities and differences are correlated to the leaders’ differing political agendas, and to the sociopolitical background for when the speeches were given, provided in the background section of this thesis.

5.4 Research material

Tawfic and Fattah’s thesis focuses on the responses of different Egyptian presidents to crisis situations in order to assess how and to what extent they employ various discourse strategies to attain various goals such as gaining public approval or legitimacy. The speeches analyzed are those of incumbent presidents, whose purpose can be said to be the preservation of power.

This thesis adopts a slightly different approach by choosing to examine inaugural speeches and speeches given with connection to inaugurations instead, with the purpose of illustrating how changes in leadership reflect upon political discourse. Campbell and Jamieson argue that inaugural speeches can be seen as indicative of the policy direction of a new leadership:

An inaugural speech is designed to set the tone for new beginnings when a new officeholder assumes responsibilities. It seeks to unify the audience by reconstituting its members as the people, who can witness and ratify the ceremony; rehearse communal values drawn from the past; set forth the political principles that will govern the new administration; demonstrate through enactment that the president appreciates the requirements and limitations of executive functions; and finally, each of these ends must be achieved through means appropriate to epideictic address.\footnote{Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, pp. 14-15.}

Please note that Campbell and Jamieson here are talking about inaugurations in a Western liberal democratic context. It could however be argued that inaugurations in other state forms also serve symbolical and/or communicative purposes.

The inaugural speeches of two offices have been selected for analysis in this study: the President of the People’s Republic of China and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In addition, the research material will also include an additional speech that was given in close connection to an inauguration for each leader. For Xi and Hu the selection of speeches are identical to the selection in Irekvist’s thesis,\footnote{Irekvist, 2014, p. 12.} and for Jiang an additional speech comparable in length and content was selected.
5.4.1 President of the People’s Republic of China

The President of the PRC is elected every five years by the National People’s Congress and can serve a maximum of two terms. It can be argued that the post of the President of the PRC is mainly a ceremonial one. However, following the era of collective leadership under Deng Xiaoping, every president starting with Jiang Zemin has concurrently also held the posts of General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The accession to the office of President can be viewed as confirming the General Secretary’s role as head of state. It can be argued that presidential inaugural speeches provide an additional forum to make political statements, further expanding the vision set forth by the inaugural speech to the post as General Secretary.

5.4.2 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

The holder of the post General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (henceforth-abbreviated General Secretary) is considered to be the highest-ranking official in the PRC.

5.5 List of speeches

Jiang Zemin:

- Jiang 1, 1989-06-24: Speech held at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Party Congress (在党的十三届四中全会上的讲话) General Secretary inauguration speech
- Jiang 2, 1993-04-01: Jiang Zemin’s speech at the First Plenary Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress (江泽民主席在八届全国人大一次会议上的讲话) Presidential inaugural speech
- Jiang 3, 1993-07-05: No right to make policy without investigation (没有调查就没有决策权) Speech given in connection with assuming office as president

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Hu Jintao:
- Hu 1, 2002-11-15: The new Politburo Standing Committee meets with journalists from China and abroad (新一届中央政治局常委与中外记者见面) General Secretary inauguration speech
- Hu 2, 2002-12-06: Uphold the good conduct of arduous struggle, strive to realize the magnificent goal of total construction of a moderately prosperous society (坚持发扬艰苦奋斗的优良作风努力实现全面建设小康社会的宏伟目标) First big speech given after assuming office as General Secretary
- Hu 3, 2003-03-18: Hu Jintao’s speech at the First Plenary Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress (胡锦涛在第十届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的讲话) Presidential inauguration speech

Xi Jinping:
- Xi 1, 2012-11-15: Xi Jinping’s speech at the press conference of the standing committee of the Politburo (习近平在常委见面会上的讲话) General Secretary inauguration speech
- Xi 2, 2012-11-19: Closely encircle the adherence and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, study, spread and carry out the spirit of the 18th Party Congress (紧紧围绕坚持和发展中国特色社会主义学习宣传贯彻党的十八大精神) First big speech given after assuming office as General Secretary.
- Xi 3, 2013-03-17: Make persistent efforts, continue striving to realize the Chinese dream (再接再厉，继续为实现中国梦奋斗) Presidential inauguration speech

5.6 Limitations
The limited scope of the study warrants the exclusion of what Fairclough calls “visuals,” extratextual language features such as body language, emphasis and pauses. Obviously, such factors could potentially alter the outcome of the study, but their exclusion is supported since the formalized nature of (Chinese) political speech make such features less important. “Political speech usually reflects less frequency and less variation of paralinguistic features than other oral
manifestations. For that reason, it can be considered a formal manifestation of language.” Also, the amount of speeches is limited. A larger corpus would have been able to increase the reliability of the study, but the selection had to be kept narrow to fit the scope of the study.

5.7 Reliability

Since the study uses qualitative approaches where subjective reasoning is employed, the result is dependent upon the interpretations of the author. This applies to both the analysis section below as well as the coding process for the quantitative analysis. An effort has however been made to make the reasoning behind the interpretation as transparent as possible.

There also exists some inconsistencies in the body of research material. There is variation between the length of the speeches, and the total word count for each leader. (For word counts, please see table 1 and 2 in the following pages.) For the sake of comparison, the quantitative part of the analysis employs probability values derived from normalized frequencies to make the numbers comparable, but some statistical discrepancies might exist because of the varied word count of the speeches. Also, even though the speeches were selected for the sake of comparability, it must be noted that Jiang in his inaugural speech to the position of General Secretary of the CCP addresses a different primary addressee group than Hu and Xi. This will be taken into account in the analysis section.

6. Analysis

Throughout this section, frequent references will be made to the appendix found attached at the end of this document. The format of these references will be: Appendix, [Page No.] : [Line No.] So for instance, a reference to (Appendix, 12:3) would indicate page 12, line 3 in the appendix. For the sake of brevity, the speeches will occasionally be referred to according to the scheme presented in the list of speeches found in the previous section, e.g. “Jiang 1” would be a reference to Jiang’s speech “Speech held at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Party Congress” (1989-06-24).

173 Reyes-Rodríguez 2008, p. 133.
The analysis is presented in the following order:

1. The overall findings for group orientation is presented in a quantitative fashion.
2. The overall findings for group representation is presented in a quantitative fashion.
3. The speeches of each leader is analyzed in chronological order, and after the three speeches of each leader a summary is presented. The summaries attempt to make generalizations about the extent and purpose of discourse strategy employment.
4. Each speech will be analyzed in the following order:
   a. A brief recap providing background information about the speech.
   b. Group orientation
   c. Group representation
5. A comparison between how Jiang, Hu and Xi employ the discourse strategies based on the generalizations made in each summary.

6.1 Quantitative findings

Table 6.1.1 lists occurrences group orientation, divided into the three categories discussed in section 5.

Table 6.1.2 presents the same material, normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words, and with P-values.

Table 6.1.3 lists the findings for group representation, divided into the three categories discussed in section 5.

Table 6.1.4 presents the same material, normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words, and with P-values.
### 6.1.1 Results for group orientation, actual findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>AX</th>
<th>AI</th>
<th>PI</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Word Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>12652</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: AX = addressee-exclusive, AI = addressee-inclusive, PI = PRC-inclusive

### 6.1.2 Results for group orientation, normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words and with P-values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>AX</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>AI</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>PI</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-hypo</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 1</td>
<td>292</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 1</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant deviations (P<0.05) from null-hypothesis marked in bold

Legend: AX = addressee-exclusive, AI = addressee-inclusive, PI = PRC-inclusive, P = Probability value, 0-hypo = null-hypothesis
6.1.3 Results for group representation, actual findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Word Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12652</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: PS = Positive self-representation, NO = Negative other-representation

6.1.4 Results for group representation, normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words and with P-values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-hypo</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang 3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.652</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu 3</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 1</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 2</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>0.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi 3</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant deviations (P<0.05) from null-hypothesis marked in bold
Legend: PS = Positive self-representation, NO = Negative other-representation
P = Probability value, 0-hypo = null-hypothesis
6.2 Analysis of Jiang Zemin’s speeches

6.2.1 Jiang 1

Title: Speech held at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Party Congress (在党的十三届四中全会上的讲话)

Date: 1989-06-24

Background: Jiang’s speech when assuming office as general secretary was delivered at a precarious moment in the party's history following the military suppression of protests just a few weeks earlier. It was seen as a moment where the future of the party and the country would be decided. Jiang had been entrusted the task of defending Deng and the policy of reform and opening, while at the same time placating the leftist faction within the party to ensure party stability. An account for the cause of the societal upheaval had to be made, and if the implementation of the policy of reform and opening was to continue, blame had to be placed elsewhere.

Venue: Great Hall of the People, Beijing

Primary addressee group: High-ranking party members

Group orientation

Addressee-exclusion
Jiang does not use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech. Even though the P-Value for this count (<0.001) indicates a significant discrepancy, the average used in the null-hypothesis is skewed by the large amount of usage of addressee-exclusion in the speeches Hu 1 and Xi 1. It should rather by argued that the norm is that addressee-exclusion is not employed, except for in speeches held at press conferences where the speaker is speaking on behalf of the CCP towards reporters.

Addressee-inclusion
Extent: During Jiang’s speech, he to an average extent (P=1.000) uses first person collective pronouns to establish a relationship with the primary addressee group, in this case his fellow members of the CCP present at the National Party Congress.
Purpose: When used, it is primarily to establish a relationship with the primary addressee group in order to promote party unity. For instance, at one point of the speech Jiang states that “our party is the avant-garde of the working class, it is the leading force of the socialist endeavor.” (我们党是工人阶级的先锋队，是社会主义事业的领导力量。)\textsuperscript{174} Here party unity is promoted by the implication that the party is our party.

To some extent Jiang also employs the strategy in order to gain support for policy, as an example he at one point states that “we will continue to more efficiently carry through the policy of reform and opening, to make it even faster and better.” (我们要继续更有效地进行改革开放，把这项工作搞得更快更好。)\textsuperscript{175} Here Jiang establishes a relationship with the primary addressee group, implying that there is a consensus towards implementing the policy of reform and opening.

There are also cases where Jiang establishes a relationship with the primary addressee group, and connects it to Deng Xiaoping. When Jiang talks about how to perform the continued political work he especially mentions the value of the experience of Deng and the old generation of revolutionaries. He establishes a relationship with the addresses, and places him and the addressees in a hierarchically lower position to Deng and the old generation.\textsuperscript{176} In this case, it serves the dual purpose of both affirming Deng’s position as well as the seniority of the older generation of revolutionaries, of which many had leftist leanings. It could be argued that Jiang here is attempting to placate the leftist faction within the party.

\textit{PRC-inclusion}

Extent: Jiang uses PRC-inclusion to a significantly lesser extent than the average of the research material in this speech. (P=0.009) Only a few instances of first person collective pronoun usage allow for a broader interpretation that would include the citizens of the PRC, which indicates that the speech was mainly directed towards the party.

\textsuperscript{174} Appendix, 3:25.
\textsuperscript{175} Appendix, 2:16.
\textsuperscript{176} Appendix, 1:17.
Purpose: It is to some extent used to legitimize policy, in this case economic reforms. In the following example, Jiang uses “us” in a broader sense that is inclusive of the people of the PRC to connect the goal of economic reform to the survival of the nation.

International competition is basically the competition of economic power. It is economic development and strengthening national power that will allow us to resist any natural and societal calamity and withstand any foreign threat or oppression, and realize the revival of the people and enable their greater contribution to humanity.

By establishing a relationship with a wider addressee group, Jiang implies that the adherence to socialism when developing the democratic and legal systems of the PRC is a national shared goal, and a necessity for ensuring the country’s future.

Finally, there are also instances of Jiang establishing a relationship with this wider group in order to emphasize the necessity of patriotic education. At one point Jiang states that “a significant number of young people” do not understand “the history and reality of China” and thus are more easily subjected to “propaganda for introducing a capitalist system.” He proposes

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177 Appendix, 2:7.
178 Appendix, 3:15-3:20.
179 Appendix, 3:16.
180 Appendix, 3:18
181 Appendix 2:36.
that they “should be rooted in their homeland, and should absorb spiritual nutrients from our workers, farmers and soldiers.” (理应在这块土地扎下深根,理应从我们的工人、农民、战士的身上汲取精神营养。)\(^{182}\) Jiang here implies that there is a common worldview shared within the PRC, and that it is a national concern that this view is propagated to promote national unity.

**Group representation**

**Positive self-representation**

Extent: There is only one instance of positive self-representation in this speech, which is significantly lower than the average found in the research material. (P<0.001) It could be argued that the low usage is attributable to the general negative attitude of the speech. Jiang seems more interested in uniting the party against various out-groups, please see negative other-representation below.

Purpose: Jiang uses positive self-representation to emphasize the necessity for patriotic education by assigning importance to the “education about the excellent tradition of the Chinese people” (中华民族优秀传统的教育), thus promoting national unity.\(^{183}\)

**Negative other-representation**

Extent: There are numerous instances of Jiang employing a strategy of negative other-representation in this speech, to a significantly larger extent than the average of the research material. (P<0.001) A reason for this might be the need to assign blame for the political chaos following the 1989 student movement.

Purpose: His primary objective when employing this strategy is to assign blame for the protests and turmoil preceding the congress and to delegitimize the actions of those involved. In the following example, he uses derogatory terms to describe the instigators and participants in the protests:

\(^{182}\) Appendix, 3:2.

\(^{183}\) Appendix, 2:25.
We will definitely continue to uncover and thoroughly expose all political conspiracies that have engineered the disturbances and riots, and not give up halfway. As for the conspirators who planned, organized and commanded the disturbances and the riots, and the counterrevolutionary thugs that participated in the riots, they must be punished according to law and resolutely attacked. [We] cannot be softhearted.

我们对制造动乱和暴乱的一切政治阴谋，一定要继续清查和彻底揭露，决不可半途而废。对于策划、组织、指挥动乱和暴乱的阴谋分子，参与暴乱的反革命暴徒，务必依法惩处，坚决打击，决不能心慈手软。\(^{184}\)

Jiang here shifts blame from the CCP by claiming that events were instigated and organized by “conspirators.” The negative representation serves to strengthen this argument and to delegitimize the actions of the protesters.

Jiang also employs negative other-representation in order to defend the policy of reform and opening. At one point of the speech, Jiang states that although great contributions have been made to the modernization of socialism and formalization of the policy of reform and opening, serious issues have emerged from the inpouring of “the decadent ideology the Western capitalist class.” (西方资产阶级腐朽思想)\(^{185}\) This negative representation of the West both portrays the policy of reform and opening as Chinese, while at the same time assigning blame for the problems that have emerged to Western ideology.

In addition, a strategy of negative other-representation is also employed to legitimize the political system of the PRC and CCP rule. Jiang at one point states that “some young students and groups lack a correct understanding of democracy” (一些青年学生和群众对民主缺乏正确认识), and goes on to state that the democracy they wish to impose is “lawless extreme democratization” (无法无天的极端民主化), and ”anarchy” (无政府状态).\(^{187}\) By portraying proponents of increased democracy as unreasonable, and that their claims would create chaos, Jiang implies that it is adherence to the current political system that will ensure political stability.

\(^{184}\) Appendix, 1:30.
\(^{185}\) Appendix, 3:3.
\(^{186}\) Appendix, 3:21.
\(^{187}\) Appendix, 3:22.
Summary, Jiang 1

Extent:

Addressee-exclusion is not used.

Addressee-inclusion is used to an average extent.

PRC-inclusion is used to a lesser extent, which is due to Jiang primarily addressing the party in this speech.

Positive self-representation is used to a lesser extent, due to the general negative attitude of the speech.

Negative other-representation is used to a large extent, which can be explained by the need for the party leadership to assign blame for the political chaos of surrounding the 1989 student movement.

Purpose:

Addressee-exclusion is not used.

Addressee-inclusion is primarily used to promote party unity. This is consistent Jiang trying to resolve divisions between those within the party with leftist leanings, who argued for increased party control, and those who argued for increased economic reform. His secondary and tertiary purposes for employing this strategy, to gain support for the policies of reform and opening, and to affirm the leading role of Deng and the old leadership are also rooted in this cause.

PRC-inclusion is used for legitimizing policy and party rule, here through the use of nationalist rhetoric. The survival of the nation is portrayed as dependent on continued reforms and the leadership of the CCP. To some extent it is also used to promote national unity.

Positive self-representation is used with the purpose of promoting national unity.
Negative other-representation is employed. The primary purpose is to assign blame for the chaos following the student movement of 1989, and to delegitimize the actions of those involved. This is consistent with the generally harsh attitude of the party towards participants in the 1989 student movement. Secondarily, Jiang employs the strategy to defend the policy of reform and opening, and also to legitimize party rule. Blame for the failings of the policy of reform and opening and the party are placed on conspirators and Western capitalists.

6.2.2 Jiang 2

Title: Jiang Zemin’s speech at the First Plenary Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress (江泽民主席在八届全国人大一次会议上的讲话)

Date: 1993-04-01

Background: This is the speech Jiang held when appointed to the position of President of the PRC. The content of the speech can be viewed as a continuation of the themes laid out by Deng’s Southern tour and the 14th Party Congress, where emphasis was placed on connecting economic development to party legitimacy and the future of the country. Jiang, after being indirectly criticized by Deng for tardiness in implementing economic reform, had largely sided with Deng and the pro-reform faction. After some setbacks following the suppression of the student movement in 1989, the economy of the PRC had started to expand again, and an important issue at the time was how to reestablish relationships with members of the international community who had imposed sanctions. Relations with foreign countries were strained, particularly after US sales of fighter jets to Taiwan the previous year.

Venue: Great Hall of the People, Beijing

Primary addressee group: Delegates of the National People’s Congress

Group orientation

Addressee-exclusion

Jiang does not use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech.188

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188 Please see the analysis of addressee-inclusion in Jiang 1 for an explanation of why this does not constitute a discrepancy.
**Addressee-inclusion**

Extent: Jiang employs inclusion of the primary addressee group (the National People’s Congress) throughout the speech to a significantly larger extent in comparison with the rest of the research material. (P=0.005) It could be argued that the large extent is due to Jiang wanting to resolve factionalism within the party.

Purpose: Jiang employs this strategy with the primary purpose of achieving support for policy by consolidating the party line around the policy direction. At one point, he states that “our construction of the modernization of socialism is still in an arduous creative period.” (我们的社会主义现代化建设还处在艰巨的创业时期。)\(^{189}\) By using a first person collective pronoun Jiang implies that the goal of modernizing socialism is shared by the addressee group. In another example, he again portrays the policy direction as shared within the party:

> Fundamentally, if we are to complete the coming arduous task of reform and opening and the construction of the modernization of socialism, it is under the guidance of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics formulated by Deng, and the main party line […]

> 我们要实现今后改革开放和现代化建设的繁重任务，最根本的，是要以邓小平同志建设有中国特色社会主义的理论和党的基本路线为指导[…]\(^{190}\)

In addition, at one point Jiang employs a strategy of establishing a speaker-addressee relationship with the audience in order to portray the party as a staunch defender of national territorial integrity:

> “Peaceful unification, One country, two systems” is the established policy for how we will realize the great undertaking of uniting the motherland. We will resolutely oppose any form of “Two countries,” “One China and One Taiwan” or “One country, two governments.” [We will] resolutely oppose any plan or action to create an independent Taiwan. [We will] resolutely protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

\(^{189}\) Appendix, 4:28.  
\(^{190}\) Appendix, 4:23.
“和平统一、一国两制”，是我们实现祖国统一大业的坚定方针。我们坚决反对任何形式的“两个中国”、“一中一台”或“一国两府”，坚决反对任何制造台湾独立的企图和行动，坚决维护国家主权和领土完整。191

This usage could possibly be interpreted as a reaction to growing tensions in foreign relationships, more specifically the threat of US military intervention in the Taiwan issue.

**PRC-inclusion**

Extent: In this speech, Jiang establishes a relationship with a broader addressee group that could be considered inclusive of all citizens of the PRC to a large extent in comparison with the average of the research material. (P<0.001) This can be attributed to Jiang’s increased use of nationalistic/patriotic rhetoric rather than socialist rhetoric to frame arguments, as discussed in the background section of this thesis.

Purpose: His primary objective is to legitimize the party and the policy of economic reform, by connecting it to the future of the country. For instance, Jiang states:

 [...] the party central leadership collective with Deng at its core has lead the people of our country to embark upon the path of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics, which has resulted in our country entering a new period of vigorous development.

 [...]以邓小平同志为核心的党中央领导集体，领导我国人民开创建设有中国特色社会主义的道路，使我们的国家进入蓬勃发展的新时期。192

It could be argued that Jiang employs this strategy to respond to leftist criticism when he portrays party legitimacy as dependent on economic development. At the end of the speech, he explicitly ties the future of the nation to the current policy direction by stating that “a better future” (gengjia meihao de weilai 更加美好的未来) will belong to the Chinese people if “we unwaveringly struggle along the road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.”193

191 Appendix, 4:35.
192 Appendix, 4:22.
193 Appendix, 5:11.
**Group representation**

*Positive self-representation*

Extent: In comparison with the research material, Jiang employs positive self-representation to an average extent. (P=0.999)

Purpose: The example discussed earlier where Jiang describes how “the party leadership collective with comrade Deng Xiaoping at its core” has brought about development,\(^{194}\) is arguably an attempt to portray the party central leadership collective (which Jiang is a part of) favorably. This serves to affirm Deng’s position and gain support for the current policy direction of reform and opening. In the other account of positive self-representation, Jiang describes the people of China as “industrious, brave and wise” (qinlao 勤劳, yonggan 勇敢, zhihui 智慧), and states that they “in the past have contributed greatly to human civilization.” (曾经对人类文明做出过巨大的贡献)\(^{195}\) Positive self-representation here must be construed as supportive of the following argument, that socialism and patriotism is key to economic development. Thus, Jiang again emphasizes the connection between nationalism, party legitimacy and economic reform, in order to gain support for policy.

*Negative other-representation*

Extent: In comparison with the average of the research material, Jiang employs negative-other representation to an average extent. (P=1.000)

Purpose: Jiang states that “we [the PRC] resolutely oppose hegemonism and supremacist politics, and continue to untiringly exert [ourselves] to establish a peaceful, stable, just and reasonable new international order.” (我们坚决反对霸权主义和强权政治，继续为建立和平、稳定、公正、“

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\(^{194}\) Appendix, 4:22.

\(^{195}\) Appendix, 5:7.
合理的国际新秩序，做出不懈的努力。)
While not explicitly stated, by using negative wording such as “hegemonism,” the above sentence heavily implies that other nations are adversaries to the PRC’s place in international affairs, and portrays the PRC as having a strong foreign policy stance. This might again be a reaction towards growing tension in foreign relationships.

Summary, Jiang 2

Extent:

Addressee-exclusion is not used.
Addressee-inclusion is used to a large extent, which is due to Jiang wanting to resolve factionalism within the party
PRC-inclusion is used to a large extent, due to Jiang’s increased usage of nationalism to frame arguments.
Positive self-representation is used to an average extent.
Negative other-representation is used to an average extent.

Purpose:

Addressee-exclusion is not used
Addressee-inclusion is used to unite the party around the policy direction, and secondarily to portray the party as having a strong foreign policy.
PRC-inclusion is used to gain support for the policy direction economic reform by connecting it to party legitimacy and portraying it as a necessity for the future of the nation.
Positive self-representation is used to gather support for the policy of reform and opening, and to affirm the position of Deng and the old leadership.
Negative other-representation is used with the purpose of portraying the PRC as having a strong foreign policy.

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196 Appendix, 5:5.
6.2.3 Jiang 3

**Title:** No right to make policy without investigation (没有调查就没有决策权)

**Date:** 1993-07-05

**Background:** Jiang held this speech when he was chair of a national meeting of the Policy research office of the provincial committees of the CCP a few months after his appointment to the position as President of the PRC. The main concerns of the time was the continued implementation of the policy of reform and opening, and to address issues encountered during the implementation. The main topic of the speech, to uphold the party’s tradition of “investigation and research” (diaocha yanjiu 调查研究), could arguably be intended to address growing inequality and to some extent corruption. Jiang’s emphasis on “investigation and research” should here be seen as an appeal to his fellow party members to not lose touch with the common people, and he at one point describes ”investigation and research” as ”an important channel for the party to maintain the intimate connection with the masses.” (是党保持同人民群众密切联系的重要渠道) 197

**Venue:** National meeting of the Policy research office of the provincial committees of the CCP

**Primary addressee group:** Party members

**Group orientation**

*Addressee-exclusion*

Jiang does not use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech.198

*Addressee-inclusion*

Extent: Jiang establishes relationships with the primary addressee group to an average extent in comparison with the research material. (P=0.989)

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197 Appendix, 6:11.

198 Please see the analysis of addressee-inclusion in Jiang 1 for an explanation of why this does not constitute a discrepancy.
Purpose: When it is employed, it is mainly with the purpose of portraying party unity. In the following example, Jiang establishes a relationship with the addressees through first person collective pronoun use and emphasizes the importance of the in-group by describing it as entrusted with a historical task:

In this new period, we shoulder the historical task of reform and opening and the construction of modernization, and all comrades of the party, especially leading cadres at all levels, should emphasize and improve investigation and research.

在新的时期，我们肩负着改革开放和现代化建设的历史重任，全党同志首先是各级领导干部更要重视和加强调查研究。^{199}

Jiang also establishes a relationship with the primary addressee group in order to gain support for policy by uniting the party line around the policy direction of economic reform:

We must not continue using the old set of methods of the planned economy system to address these contradictions and issues; they will at best solve them poorly. Instead, [we] must hasten the establishment of a socialist market economy system, and do [our] utmost to find new methods.

我们不能沿用过去计划经济体制那套老办法来解决这些矛盾和问题，那是解决不了也解决不好，必须加快建立社会主义市场经济体制，努力寻求新的办法来解决。这才是根本出路。^{200}

Jiang here creates consensus towards moving away from a planned economy system by implying that this goal is shared within the group.

**PRC-inclusion**

Extent: Jiang only occasionally addresses a wider addressee group, significantly less frequently in comparison with the average of the research material. (P<0.001) This can be explained by the fact that Jiang here is mainly addressing the party.

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^{199} Appendix, 6:17.

^{200} Appendix, 7:5.
Purpose: When he does so it is to legitimize the policy direction of economic reform by portraying it as a national necessity:

Only if the economy develops greatly will the economic force and overall national power be strengthened, the lives of the people continually improve, the country gain importance, and our friends be more numerous.

只有经济大大发展了，全国的经济实力和综合国力大大增强了，人民生活才能不断改善，国家才能更有分量，我们的朋友才能更多。\textsuperscript{201}

Jiang argues that economic development is a prerequisite for national power and the international standing of the PRC.

\textbf{Group representation}

\textit{Positive self-representation}

Extent: The extent of Jiang’s use of positive self-representation is consistent with the average of the research material. (P=0.138)

Purpose: When he does so it is with the purpose of underlining the main topic of the speech, the necessity of investigation and research to create a foundation for correct policy decisions. To this end, Jiang claims that “investigation and research is the excellent tradition of our party.” (重视调查研究，是我们党的优良传统。)\textsuperscript{202}

\textit{Negative other-representation}

Jiang does not employ negative other-representation in this speech.

\textsuperscript{201} Appendix, 7:1.
\textsuperscript{202} Appendix, 5:16.
Summary, Jiang 3

Extent:

**Addressee-exclusion** is not used.

**Addressee-inclusion** is used to an average extent.

**PRC-inclusion** is used to a lesser extent since Jiang is primarily addressing the party in this speech.

**Positive self-representation** is used to an average extent.

**Negative other-representation** is not used.

Purpose:

**Addressee-exclusion** is not used.

**Addressee-inclusion** is used to promote party unity and to unite the party line around the policy goal of economic reform.

**PRC-inclusion** is employed with the purpose of legitimizing economic reform policy.

**Positive self-representation** is used to emphasize the importance of the main topic of the speech, investigation and research.

**Negative other-representation** is not used.
6.2.4 Summary, Jiang Zemin

Summary for Jiang, normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words, compared to expected frequencies for null-hypothesis of even distribution between speakers, and with P-values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Jiang 1</th>
<th>Jiang 2</th>
<th>Jiang 3</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: AX = Addressee-exclusive, AI = adressee-inclusive, PI = PRC-inclusive, PS = Positive self-representation, NO = Negative other-representation, significant discrepancies marked in bold.

Extent
When looking at the average usage in Jiang Zemin’s speeches in comparison with the average of all speakers, the following conclusions can be made:

- Jiang uses addressee-exclusion to a significantly lesser extent, which is unremarkable since Jiang’s speeches did not include a press conference like the speeches of Hu and Xi.
- Addressee-inclusion is used to an average extent.
- PRC-inclusion is used to an average extent. The high frequency found in Jiang 2 constitutes a discrepancy, but the same discrepancy exist for all speeches held at the National People’s Congress, (i.e. also Hu 3 and Xi 3), so a generalization can be made here.
- Positive self-representation is used to a significantly lesser extent.
- Negative other-representation is used to a significantly larger extent. The high frequency found in Jiang 1, attributable to the unstable political situation at the time, constitutes a significant discrepancy.

Purpose
Addressee-exclusion: not applicable, Jiang does not use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion.

Addressee-inclusion: Jiang’s employment of a strategy of establishing a relationship with the primary addressee group can be tied to two purposes:

1) He uses it to gain support for policy, which he does to in Jiang 1 and Jiang 2.
2) He uses it to promote party unity, which he does in Jiang 1 and Jiang 3.

PRC-inclusion: Jiang’s employment of a strategy of establishing a relationship with an addressee group inclusive of the population of the PRC can be tied to one purpose:
1) He uses it to gain support for policy, which he does in Jiang 1 and Jiang 2.

Positive self-representation: the case is not strong enough to make any generalizations about Jiang’s employment of positive self-representation.

Negative other-representation: Jiang uses negative other-representation primarily in Jiang 3, towards the purposes of delegitimizing protesters, gaining support for policy, and legitimizing party rule. No generalizations can be made otherwise.

6.3 Analysis of Hu Jintao’s speeches

6.3.1 Hu 1

**Title:** The new Politburo Standing Committee meets with journalists from China and abroad (新一届中央政治局常委与中外记者见面)

**Date:** 2002-11-15

**Background:** This speech was held after the conclusion of the 16th National Party Conference and Hu’s appointment to the position of General Secretary of the CCP. The speech was directed towards the media, and the primary addressee group is reporters who attended the press conference. Following the PRC’s recent accession to the WTO, it could be argued that an important concern of the time was to portray the leadership transition as stable. Hu does not present a new political direction in this relatively short speech, but rather emphasizes the adherence to the political legacy of Deng and Jiang. It could be argued that Hu’s reluctance to introduce new policies or concepts was due to Jiang still exerting considerable influence over the party at this time.

**Venue:** Press conference held following the 16th National Party Conference

**Primary addressee group:** Domestic and foreign reporters at the press conference

**Group orientation**

**Addressee-exclusion**

Extent: Hu uses first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion frequently throughout the speech, to a significantly larger extent than the average of the research material (P<0.001), which as noted in Jiang 1 is attributable to the fact that the speech is held at a press
conference, and the primary addressee group, “reporters from China and abroad” are spoken to in the second person.

Purpose: Where collective pronouns are used in an addressee exclusive fashion, it is primarily to inform the reporters about the policy direction that was established during the conference, and the pronoun is used to portray the party as speaking with a unanimous voice. For instance, Hu states that:

[…]
The 16th National Party Conference has established that the important ideology of “The Three Represents,” Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and the theories of Deng Xiaoping together constitute the long-term guiding ideologies that our party will adhere to. This is a historical resolution, as well as a historical contribution, and points out the direction forward for us.

[…]
十六大把“三个代表”重要思想和马克思列宁主义和毛泽东思想、邓小平理论一道确立为我们党要长期坚持的指导思想，这是一个历史性的决策，也是一个历史性的贡献，为我们指明了前进的方向。

First person collective pronouns are also used when Hu lists the new members of the PSB. In these cases pronoun usage is not employed in a strategic fashion.

Addressee-inclusion
Hu does not use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech, which is due to Hu addressing the primary addressee group in an addressee-exclusive fashion.

PRC-inclusion
Extent: There is only one case where Hu uses a collective pronoun in a way that can be construed as inclusive of the population of the PRC, which is significantly less frequently than the average of the research material. (P<0.001) The low usage in this speech could be attributed Hu focusing on the political vision of the party under his term. It could also be attributed to the fact that the audience partly consisted of foreign journalists, and that PRC-inclusive pronoun usage would be less useful in this context.

203 Appendix, 8:20.
Purpose: It is employed to portray Jiang’s contribution as having a national significance:

In his report at the 16th National Party Conference, Comrade Jiang Zemin has systematically summarized the basic experiences of the last 30 years, comprehensively described the fundamental requirements of implementing the important ideology of “The Three Represents,” and clearly stated the goals for our party and country in the first 20 years of the new century […]

江泽民同志在十六大的报告当中，系统地总结了十三年来的基本经验，全面阐述了贯彻“三个代表”重要思想的根本要求，明确提出了新世纪头二十年我们党和国家的奋斗目标[…]²⁰⁴

It could be argued that Hu here presents Jiang’s contribution as having national importance in order to portray party unity around the leadership transition, and possibly also to placate Jiang and his allies who still held considerable power.

Group representation

Positive self-representation
Hu does not employ positive self-representation in this speech.

Negative other-representation
Hu does not employ negative other-representation in this speech.

²⁰⁴ Appendix, 8:22.
Summary, Hu 1

Extent:

Addressee-exclusion is used to a large extent, which can be explained by the speech being held at a press conference.

Addressee-inclusion is not used.

PRC-inclusion is used to a lesser extent, since Hu is focusing on presenting the political vision of the party, and possibly due to the presence of foreign journalists.

Positive self-representation is not used.

Negative other-representation is not used.

Purpose:

Addressee-exclusion is used to portray party unity. This is consistent with the party wanting to present a united front towards the international community, and portray the leadership transition as stable.

Addressee-inclusion is not used.

PRC-inclusion is used to promote party unity.

Positive self-representation is not used.

Negative other-representation is not used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse strategy</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-exclusive</td>
<td>High (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>1. Party unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-inclusive</td>
<td>Low (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-inclusive</td>
<td>Low (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>1. Party unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive self-representation</td>
<td>Low (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative other-representation</td>
<td>Low (P=0.030)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3.2 Hu 2

Title: Uphold the good conduct of arduous struggle, strive to realize the magnificent goal of total construction of a moderately prosperous society, (坚持发扬艰苦奋斗的优良作风 努力实现全面建设小康社会的宏伟目标)

Date: 2002-12-06

Background: This speech was held by Hu shortly after his appointment to the position of General Secretary of the CCP, at a study session conducted at a significant location for the party’s history,
Xibaipo in Hubei province. This speech was almost exclusively devoted to a single topic, the necessity for “arduous struggle” (jianku fendou, 艰苦奋斗). “Arduous struggle” must here be interpreted as adhering to party discipline and opposing corruption within the party, which was one of the party’s main concerns at the time. The unchecked corruption and growing inequality that Hu had inherited from Jiang had to be addressed, particularly at the local level where officials implementing governmental policy easily became targets for public grievance. With this speech Hu attempted to inspire adherence to party discipline and to resolve these issues.

**Venue:** Study session at Xibaipo, Hubei Province

**Primary addresssee group:** Party members at all levels

**Group orientation**

**Addressee-exclusion**

Extent: There is only one instance where Hu uses first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech, which is significantly lower than the average of the research material. (P<0.001).

Purpose: In the instance when Hu uses addressee-exclusion, it is to distinguish between the leadership and the rest of the party. Addressee-exclusion is employed to emphasize the importance of “arduous struggle” and arguing for combatting corruption within the party. Hu states that high-ranking cadres should serve as an example, and that “the power in our hands is bestowed by the party and the people, and can only be used to serve the interest of the masses.” (我们手中的权力是党和人民赋予的，只能用来为广大人民谋利益。)

**Addressee-inclusion**

Extent: Hu employs a strategy of establishing relationships with the primary addressee group to a large extent in this speech in comparison with the average of the research material. (P<0.001) It could be argued that the high frequency is due to Hu attempting to use a familiar tone when

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205 Please see the analysis of addressee-inclusion in Jiang 1 for an explanation of why this does not constitute a discrepancy.

206 Appendix, 13:22.
addressing his fellow party members to serve rhetorical purposes. Another explanation could be that Hu to an unusually large extent (as compared to the research material corpus) employs role-switching, where he speaks through quotes of other PRC leaders, most notably Mao Zedong, who it could be argued had a proclivity for addressing audiences with first person collective pronouns.

Purpose: Hu’s primary purpose in this speech for establishing relationships with the primary addressee group is to emphasize the main topic of the speech, the necessity for upholding the party’s tradition of “arduous struggle,” which as discussed should be viewed as a stance against corruption. In the following example, Hu describes “arduous struggle” as a necessary quality for CCP members:

In short, arduous struggle is the work style we must vigorously promote, as well as the ideological style we must vigorously promote; it is the political quality that members of the CCP should possess.

总之，艰苦奋斗既是我们必须大力弘扬的工作作风，又是我们必须大力弘扬的思想作风，是共产党人应有的政治品质。207

Hu also establishes relationships with the primary addressee group to promote party unity. For instance, a passage of the speech where Hu discusses party history208 includes no less than eight instances of Hu describing the party as “our” party. There are also several instances where Hu indirectly promotes party unity when he establishes a relationship with the primary addressee group through role switching. For instance, he quotes Mao saying, “We will soon be victorious throughout the country. This victory will breach the eastern front of imperialism, and has a profound international significance.” (我们很快就要在全国胜利了。这个胜利将冲破帝国主义的东方战线，具有伟大的国际意义。)209 By using a quote where Mao employs a strategy of establishing a speaker-addressee relationship, Hu implies that he and his fellow party members are part of that group (albeit indirectly), and share the historical legacy of the revolution, thus promoting party unity.

207 Appendix, 13:20.  
209 Appendix, 9:32.
PRC-inclusion

Extent: Hu uses first person collective pronouns to establish relationships with a wider group that is inclusive of the population of the PRC, to an average extent in comparison with the research material. (P=1.000)

Purpose: His primary objective is to gain support for policy by portraying party policy as national concerns. In the following example, Hu employs a strategy of establishing a speaker-addressee relationship in order to portray the goals of development and the construction of a “moderately prosperous society” (xiaokang shehui, 小康社会) as key to solving the “contradictions” of the PRC, and ties these goals to the necessity for “arduous struggle.”

Our country is, and for a long time will be, at the first stage of socialism. The contradiction between the daily growing materialistic cultural needs of the people and the undeveloped production of the society is still the primary contradiction in our country’s society. When the report of the 16th National Party Congress stated the goal of comprehensive construction of a moderately prosperous society, it thoroughly analyzed the prominent issues and difficulties we are facing, and clearly stated the necessity of prolonged arduous struggle for the entire party and the entire population of the country.

我国正处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段，人民日益增长的物质文化需要同落后的社会生产之间的矛盾仍然是我国社会的主要矛盾。十六大报告在提出全面建设小康社会的奋斗目标时，深刻分析了我们面临的突出和困难，向全党和全国人民明确了必须长时期艰苦奋斗的要求。^{210}

Also observable in the example above, is Hu’s secondary objective for establishing relationships with a nationwide addressee group, to emphasize the main topic of the speech, the need for “arduous struggle.” In the following example, Hu uses role switching when he quotes Mao using an argument not dissimilar from his own:

He said, “I want all cadres and all of the people to frequently think about that our country is a great socialist country, and at the same time an economically underdeveloped poor country. This is a great contradiction. If our country is to become prosperous and strong, it will take decades of arduous struggle.”

^{210} Appendix, 12:6.
他说：“要使全体干部和全体人民经常想到我国是一个社会主义的大国，但又是一个经济落后的穷国，这是一个很大的矛盾。要使我国富强起来，需要几十年艰苦奋斗的时间。”

Hu here argues that the future of the country is dependent on “arduous struggle”. While in Mao’s case it could be argued that he by “arduous struggle” actually means working hard towards the goal of national prosperity and strength, Hu uses the quote to strengthen his own argument for the necessity of “arduous struggle”, which it could be argued more is related to adhering to party discipline and opposing corruption.

**Group representation**

*Positive self-representation*
Extent: Hu uses positive self-representation in this speech to an average extent in comparison with the research material. (P=0.652)

Purpose: When he does, it is primarily with the purpose of supporting his main argument for the necessity of “arduous struggle.” Hu at one point of the speech portrays the Chinese people as “renowned throughout the world” for being “diligent and courageous, unafraid of hardship.” (qinlao yonggan, buwei jianku, 勤劳勇敢、不畏艰苦) The positive description serves to strengthen the following argument, where Hu claims that “arduous struggle” is a necessity for the nation, the country and the party.

*Negative other-representation*
Extent: There are some instances of negative other-representation found in this speech. In comparison with the research material, Hu employs negative other-representation to an average extent. (P=0.661)

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211 Appendix, 10:20.
212 Appendix, 11:15.
213 Appendix, 11:17.
Purpose: When employed it is to strengthen the argument behind the necessity of “arduous struggle.” In the following example, Hu talks about corruption and decadence when representing “some party members and cadres” in a negative fashion:

It should be observed that during the last years, a wind of mammonism, hedonism and extravagance has spread throughout the ranks of party members and cadres. The excellent tradition of arduous struggle has faded from the memory of some party members and cadres, to the extent that a minority has almost abandoned it completely.

应该看到，这些年来，拜金主义、享乐主义和奢靡之风在党员队伍和干部队伍中有滋长蔓延之势，艰苦奋斗的优良作风在一部分党员、干部那里被淡忘了，在少数人那里甚至被丢得差不多了。214

There are also some instances of negative-other representation when Hu is quoting Mao, where the negatively represented out-group is “imperialists” (帝国主义者) and “the bourgeoisie.” (资产阶级)215 Mao employs negative representation to further strengthen the argument for “arduous struggle,” but it would be a stretch to say that Hu here is doing the same by quoting Mao; it should rather be understood as a case of Hu strengthening his own argument by relating it to party history.

214 Appendix, 11:31.
215 Appendix 9:35.
Summary, Hu 2

Extent:

**Addressee-exclusion** is used to a lesser extent.

**Addressee-inclusion** is used to a large extent, which can be explained by Hu wanting to address his fellow party members in a familiar tone, and by Hu frequently using role switching by quoting other leaders that often uses inclusive pronouns.

**PRC-inclusion** is used to an average extent.

**Positive self-representation** is used to an average extent.

**Negative other-representation** is used to an average extent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse strategy</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-exclusive</td>
<td>Low ($P&lt;0.001$)</td>
<td>1. Anti-corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-inclusive</td>
<td>High ($P&lt;0.001$)</td>
<td>1. Anti-corruption 2. Party unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-inclusive</td>
<td>Average ($P=1.000$)</td>
<td>1. Policy 2. Anti-corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive self-representation</td>
<td>Average ($P=0.652$)</td>
<td>1. Anti-corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative other-representation</td>
<td>Average ($P=0.661$)</td>
<td>1. Anti-corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Purpose:

**Addressee-exclusion** is used with the purpose of arguing for the need to combat corruption within the party.

**Addressee-inclusion** is used to support Hu’s argument for strengthening party discipline and fighting corruption, and to promote party unity.

**PRC-inclusion** is used to portray party policy as national concerns, and to support his main argument of strengthening party discipline and fighting corruption.

**Positive self-representation** is used to rally the party in the fight against corruption.

**Negative other-representation** is used to rally the party in the fight against corruption.

6.3.3 Hu 3

**Title:** Hu Jintao’s speech at the First Plenary Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress (胡锦涛在第十届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的讲话)

**Date:** 2003-03-18

**Background:** This is the speech that Hu held when being appointed to the position of President of the PRC by the first plenary session of the 10th National People’s Congress. Hu employs a framework of connecting party legitimacy to nationalism, and the main topic of the speech is the
necessity of socialism with Chinese characteristics for the future of the PRC. Hu had inherited the model of connecting nationalism to party legitimacy, and with it contradictions between elite and popular nationalist discourse that still remained unresolved. Using nationalism to gain legitimacy was not uncomplicated, since it also allowed for dissenting discourses from popular nationalists.

**Venue:** The 10th National People’s Congress

**Primary addressee group:** Delegates of the National People’s Congress

**Group orientation**

*Addressee-exclusion*

Hu uses first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech to a lesser extent (P=0.036).²¹⁶ It is only used to distinguish between the delegates at the congress and the state personnel and not used strategically.²¹⁷

*Addressee-inclusion*

Extent: Hu uses first person collective pronouns to establish a relationship with the primary addressee group throughout this speech to a large extent in comparison with the average of the research material. (P=0.005) In this speech Hu addresses a large number of party member delegates at the NPC, and the high usage can be attributed to Hu wanting to address this audience in an inclusive and intimate fashion.

Purpose: His primary purpose is to gain support for his policy direction by creating consensus around party ideology and policy, and connecting it to the ideological legacy of the CCP. In the concluding part of the speech, Hu repeatedly establishes a relationship with the primary addressee group towards this purpose, stating that it is only by adhering to “Deng Xiaoping’s theories,” “the important ideology of ‘The Three Represents’” and “the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics” that “we” will reach the “glistening shores of modernization.” (现代化的光辉彼岸)²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Please see the analysis of addressee-inclusion in Jiang 1 for an explanation of why this does not constitute a discrepancy.
²¹⁷ Appendix, 14:14.
²¹⁸ Appendix, 15:10.
**PRC-inclusion**

Extent: Hu establishes relationships with a wider addressee group inclusive of the population of the PRC in this speech to an average extent in comparison with the research material. (P=0.53)

Purpose: PRC-inclusion is in this speech used by Hu with the primary purpose of gaining support for his policy direction by creating a consensus around party ideology and connecting it to the ideological legacy of the CCP. At one point of the speech, Hu thanks Jiang for his contribution to the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, especially his formulation the “Three Represents,” which according to Hu “has an important and profound guiding significance to the development of all undertakings of our country.” (对于我国各项事业的发展具有重大而深远的指导意义。) Hu establishes support for Jiang’s ideological legacy by portraying it as important to the whole nation.

**Group representation**

**Positive self-representation**

Extent: Hu frequently employs positive self-representation in this speech, to a significantly larger extent than the average of the research material. (P<0.001) The high extent can be attributed to Hu frequently supporting arguments with nationalism.

Purpose: At several points of the speech, he uses positive representation of the PRC or the Chinese people to frame his arguments in a nationalist context for various purposes. In the following example, it is with the purpose of portraying socialism (and implicitly the CCP) as the nation’s savior, thus promoting party legitimacy:

> Today, our great motherland is flourishing; the prospects for development are the best they have ever been. The great experiment of the Chinese people show the people of the world: it is only socialism that can save China, and it is only socialism with Chinese characteristics that can develop China.

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219 Appendix, 14:9.
At one point Hu also uses positive representation of the Chinese people to portray the Chinese people, and the PRC, as a proponent of world peace and friendly cooperation:

The Chinese people have been peace loving throughout history. We will continue to implement an independent and peaceful foreign policy, and maintain and develop relationships of friendly cooperation with all countries. Together with all the people in the world, [we will] strive to promote the establishment of a new reasonable political and economic international order, and unceasingly advance the noble task of human peace and development.

It could be argued that Hu here attempts to address criticism from popular parochial nationalism by promoting a version were the PRC is portrayed as a responsible global actor.

*Negative other-representation*

Hu does not employ negative other-representation in this speech.

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220 Appendix, 14:28.
221 Appendix, 15:4
### Summary, Hu 3

**Extent:**

- **Addressee-exclusion** is used to a lesser extent.
- **Addressee-inclusion** is used to a large extent, which can be attributed to Hu wanting to address the audience in an inclusive and intimate fashion.
- **PRC-inclusion** is used to an average extent.
- **Positive self-representation** is used to a large extent, which can be attributed to Hu employing a strategy of framing arguments in a nationalist context.
- **Negative other-representation** is not used.

**Purpose:**

- **Addressee-exclusion** is not used towards any discernible purpose.
- **Addressee-inclusion** is used in order to achieve support for the party’s ideology and policy direction.
- **PRC-inclusion** is used in order to achieve support for the party’s ideology and policy direction.
- **Positive self-representation** is used to legitimize party rule, and to contain popular nationalism.
- **Negative other-representation** is not used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse strategy</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-inclusive</td>
<td>Low (P=0.036)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-inclusive</td>
<td>High (P=0.005)</td>
<td>1. Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-inclusive</td>
<td>Average (P=0.530)</td>
<td>1. Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive self-representation</td>
<td>High (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>1. Legitimize party rule 2. Contain nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative other-representation</td>
<td>Low (P=0.030)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3.4 Summary, Hu Jintao

Summary for Hu, normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words, compared to expected frequencies for null-hypothesis of even distribution between speakers, and with P-values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Hu 1</th>
<th>Hu 2</th>
<th>Hu3</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AX</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
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<td>PI</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: AX = Addressee-exclusive, AI = addressee-inclusive, PI = PRC-inclusive, PS = Positive self-representation, NO = Negative other-representation, significant discrepancies marked in bold.

Extent

When looking at the average usage in Hu Jintao’s speeches in comparison with the average of all speakers, the following conclusions can be made:

- Hu uses addressee-exclusion to a significantly large extent. Again, this must be attributed to the fact that Jiang’s speeches do not include a press conference, thus lowering the average.
- Addressee-inclusion is used to a significantly large extent.
- PRC-inclusion is used to an average extent. The high frequency found in Hu 3 constitutes a discrepancy, but the same discrepancy exist for all speeches held at the National People’s Congress, (i.e. also Jiang 2 and Xi 3), so a generalization can be made here.
- Positive self-representation is used to an average extent.
- Negative other-representation is used to an average extent.

Purpose

Addressee-exclusion: Hu uses addressee-exclusion to promote party unity, in Hu 1. No other generalizations can be made.

Addressee-inclusion: Hu’s employment of a strategy of establishing a relationship with the primary addressee group can be tied to one purpose:

1) To promote party unity, which he does in Hu 2 and Hu 3

PRC-inclusion: Hu’s employment of a strategy of establishing a relationship with an addressee group inclusive of the population of the PRC can be tied to one purpose:

1) He uses it to gain support for policy, which he does in Hu 2 and Hu 3.

Positive self-representation: the case is not strong enough to make any generalizations about Hu’s employment of positive self-representation.
Negative other-representation: negative other-representation is only used in Hu 2, with the purposes of combatting corruption. No other generalizations can be made.

6.4 Analysis Xi Jinping’s speeches

6.4.1 Xi 1

Title: Xi Jinping’s speech at the press conference of the standing committee of the Politburo, (习近平在常委见面会上的讲话)

Date: 2012-11-15

Background: This is the speech held after the 18th National Party Congress, when Xi was appointed to the position of General Secretary of the CCP. The primary topic of the speech is the party’s leadership of the people. Many of the issues that Hu had inherited from Jiang were also passed on to Xi. Even though Hu had addressed issues of growing inequality with the implementation of more people-centered policies and his concept of the “Harmonious Society”, these issues still constituted a challenged to the party’s legitimacy. The end of Hu’s term also saw a growing number of so-called “mass incidents,” which testifies to the unstable social climate of the times. In this speech, Xi continues along his predecessors’ line of connecting legitimacy to nationalism, and also addresses corruption issues.

Venue: Press conference

Primary addressee group: Domestic and foreign reporters

Group orientation

Addressee-exclusion

Extent: When Xi uses first person collective pronouns in this speech, it is most frequently in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech. Xi’s usage here is significantly more frequent than the average of the research material (P<0.001).\(^\text{222}\) This is due to the speech being targeted toward reporters and journalists, the primary addressee group. He uses it both to refer to the party as a whole and to the party leadership.

\(^{222}\) See Jiang 1 for a discussion about the findings for addressee-exclusion.
Purpose: When Xi uses first person collective pronouns in this fashion, it primarily serves two purposes:

1) He portrays the party as a collective devoted to serving the people. In the following example, the people are portrayed as the source of the party’s strength. This portrayal serves to legitimize party rule.

The people are the creators of history; the masses are the real heroes. The masses of the people are the source of our strength. We are deeply aware: each person’s strength is limited, but if we stand united, there is no difficulty that cannot be overcome; each person’s working hours is limited, but wholeheartedly serving the people is without bounds.

人民是历史的创造者，群众是真正的英雄。人民群众是我们力量的源泉。我们深深知道：每个人的力量是有限的，但只要我们万众一心，众志成城，就没有克服不了的困难；每个人的工作时间是有限的，但全心全意为人民服务是无限的。223

2) Xi also uses first person collective pronouns to portray the party as united in the fight against corruption. At one point of the speech, Xi describes the party leadership as taking a leading role in the fight against corruption:

If you want to work with iron, you must be tough yourself. Together with the comrades of entire party, it is our responsibility to uphold the party’s control of itself and to manage the party strictly. [We should] resolve prominent internal issues, thoroughly improve our work ethic, and establish an intimate relationship with the masses, so that our party always is the strong leading core of the endeavor of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

打铁还需自身硬。我们的责任，就是同全党同志一道，坚持党要管党、从严治党，切实解决自身存在的突出问题，切实改进工作作风，密切联系群众，使我们的党始终成为中国特色社会主义事业的坚强领导核心。224

While not explicitly mentioning corruption, the “prominent internal issues” that Xi mentions should be understood as corruption in this context.

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223 Appendix, 16:27.
224 Appendix, 16:24.
\textit{Addressee-inclusion}

Xi does not use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-inclusive fashion in this speech, which is due to Xi addressing the primary addressee group in an addressee-exclusive fashion.

\textit{PRC-inclusion}

Extent: There are some instances where Xi uses first person collective pronouns to address a wider addressee group inclusive of the population of the PRC. In this speech, Xi’s use of PRC-inclusion is consistent with the average of the research material. ($P=0.906$).

Purpose: Xi’s primary purpose is to legitimize party rule by presenting the party as the savior of the in-group, the people of the PRC:

From the modern age an onward, our people have endured suffering, and the Chinese people were at the most precarious point in time. From that time, countless people with high ideals rose up to take a stand in order to realize the great restoration of the Chinese people, but failed time and time again. After the CCP was founded, it united and guided the people to advance wave upon wave and tenaciously struggle to transform the backwards old China into the increasingly flourishing, prosperous and strong new China. The prospects for the great restoration of the Chinese people looked unprecedentedly bright.”

近代以后，我们的民族历经磨难，中华民族到了最危险的时候。自那时以来，为了实现中华民族伟大复兴，无数仁人志士奋起抗争，但一次又一次地失败了。中国共产党成立后，团结带领人民前赴后继、顽强奋斗，把贫穷落后的旧中国变成日益走向繁荣富强的新中国，中华民族伟大复兴展现出前所未有的光明前景。\textsuperscript{225}

In this example Xi explicitly ties the faith of the nation to CCP leadership, thus granting it legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{225} Appendix, 15:35.
Group representation

Positive self-representation
Extent: Xi frequently employs a strategy of positive self-representation in this speech. In comparison the average of the research material, this is significantly higher. (P<0.001) The high usage can be tied to Xi using nationalist rhetoric to frame his arguments.

Purpose: His primary purpose is to legitimize party rule, which he achieves directly by describing the CCP in positive terms, for instance Xi at one point states that “the party’s leadership of the people has already achieved results attracting worldwide attention.” (党领导人民已经取得了举世瞩目的成就)226 He also achieves CCP legitimacy by more indirectly using positive representation of the Chinese people, and connecting it to the leading role of the party:

Our people are a great people. During the development course of 5000 years of civilization, the Chinese people have made an imperishable contribution to the progress of human civilization.

我们的民族是伟大的民族。在五千多年的文明发展历程中, 中华民族为人类的文明进步作出了不可磨灭的贡献。227

This example should be viewed in context with the argument discussed in the PRC-inclusive category above, where the CCP was portrayed as the saviors of the nation, and should be construed as supportive of it.

Negative other-representation
Xi does not employ negative other-representation in this speech.

---
226 Appendix, 16:18.  
227 Appendix, 15:34.
Summary, Xi 1

Extent:

Addressee-exclusion is used to a large extent, which is due to the speech being held at a press conference.

Addressee-inclusion is not used.

PRC-inclusion is used to an average extent.

Positive self-representation is used to a large extent, which is due to Xi using nationalist rhetoric to frame his arguments.

Negative other-representation is not used.

Purpose:

Addressee-exclusion is used to legitimize party rule and to portray the party as united in the fight against corruption.

Addressee-inclusion is not used.

PRC-inclusion is used with the purpose of legitimizing party rule.

Positive self-representation is also used to legitimize party rule.

Negative other-representation is not used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse strategy</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-exclusive</td>
<td>High (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>Legitimize party rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-inclusive</td>
<td>Low (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-inclusive</td>
<td>Average (P=0.906)</td>
<td>Legitimize party rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive self-representation</td>
<td>High (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>Legitimize party rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative other-representation</td>
<td>Low (P=0.030)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4.2 Xi 2

Title: Closely encircle the adherence and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, study, spread and carry out the spirit of the 18th Party Congress (紧紧围绕坚持和发展中国特色社会主义 学习宣传贯彻党的十八大精神)

Date: 2012-11-17

Background: This speech was held at the first collective study session of the 18th National Party Congress’s Politburo, and was primarily directed towards Xi’s fellow party members. This speech was devoted to defining socialism with Chinese characteristics, but also addressed party legitimacy and corruption issues, which as previously discussed was a main concern during Xi’s coming to power. The focus on combating corruption was important to Xi, since the slowing economic
growth meant that the party could not use economic performance to legitimize its rule to the same extent. In this speech, Xi also continues using the rhetorical model used by Hu and Xi where nationalism is connected to party legitimacy.

**Venue:** Study session of the Politburo

**Primary addressee group:** Party members

**Group orientation**

*Addressee-exclusion*

Xi does not use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech.²²⁸

*Addressee-inclusion*

Extent: Xi establishes a relationship with the primary addressee group through the use of first person collective pronouns. His use in this speech is consistent with the average of the research material. (P=0.113)

Purpose: His primary purpose is to gain support for his policy direction by rallying the party around the ideological foundation of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the following example, Xi by using a first person collective pronoun directly appeals to his fellow party members to deepen their understanding of socialism with Chinese characteristics:

> It could be said that adhering to and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics is a main thread that runs through the report of the 18th National Party Congress. We must tightly grasp this main thread, and make the adherence and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics the focal point when [we] study how to implement the spirit of the 18th National Party Congress […]

可以说，坚持和发展中国特色社会主义是贯穿党的十八大报告的一条主线。我们要紧紧抓住这条主线，把坚持和发展中国特色社会主义作为学习贯彻党的十八大精神的聚焦点[…]²²⁹

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²²⁸ Please see the analysis of addressee-inclusion in Jiang 1 for an explanation of why this does not constitute a discrepancy.

²²⁹ Appendix, 17:13.
Xi also establishes a relationship with the primary addressee group in order to rally the party around the fight against corruption and the adherence to party discipline. He uses first person collective pronouns to imply that the goal of fighting corruption is shared within the party. For instance, he at one point states that “opposing corruption, establishing clean governance and preserving the health of the party body, always is the clear political position that our party adheres to. (反对腐败、建设廉洁政治，保持党的肌体健康，始终是我们党一贯坚持的鲜明政治立场。)” He later in the same paragraph further stresses this point by exclaiming: “a large amount of facts tells us that when corruption issues increase in severity, they ultimately will topple parties and countries! We must wake up!” (大量事实告诉我们，腐败问题越演越烈，最终必然会亡党亡国！我们要警醒啊！)

**PRC-inclusion**

Extent: Xi establishes a relationship with a broader addressee group inclusive of the population of the PRC. His use in this speech is consistent with the average of the research material. (P=0.983)

Purpose: When employed, it is primarily with the purpose of portraying socialism with Chinese characteristics as a necessity for the future of the country, thus legitimizing the policy direction:

The path of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the path our country must follow to realize the modernization of socialism, and the path that must be followed to create a good life for the people.

中国特色社会主义道路，是实现我国社会主义现代化的必由之路，是创造人民美好生活的必由之路。

In this example, Xi states that socialism with Chinese characteristics is the only way forward to improve the lives of the people.

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230 Appendix, 21:32.
231 Appendix, 21:35.
232 Appendix, 18:17.
Group representation

Positive self-representation
Extent: Xi employs a strategy of positive self-representation in this speech to an average extent in comparison with the research material. (P=0.396)

Purpose: When used, Xi mostly describes the Chinese people and the CCP in positive terms, with the purpose of strengthening his main argument, the necessity of adherence to socialism with Chinese characteristics, and legitimizing the policy direction and CCP rule:

Socialism with Chinese characteristics is the result of the long-term experience of the party and the people. […] Our party has closely relied on the people, and fundamentally changed the future of the citizens of the PRC and the people of China. [We have] irreversibly ended the tragic fate that had befallen China since the modern era of domestic troubles, foreign invasion, long-term poverty and weakness. [We have] irreversibly started the historical march of the Chinese people’s unceasing development and strengthening toward the great restoration. The Chinese people, with their more than 5000 years of cultural history, now stand tall in the forest of the people of the world with a new posture.

This example, in which Xi ties socialism with Chinese characteristics to the party and the people, contains instances of both these uses.

Negative other-representation
Extent: Xi employs negative other-representation in this speech to an extent that is consistent with the average of the research material. (P=0.942)

Purpose: When he does so, it is primarily to strengthen the argument for the need of dealing with corruption:

233 Appendix, 17:24.
The last few years, some countries have because of the long-term accumulation of contradictions brought about popular grievance, societal turmoil and political collapse, a major cause in this is embezzlement and corruption.

近年来，一些国家因长期积累的矛盾导致民怨载道、社会动荡、政权垮台，其中贪污腐败就是一个很重要的原因。^{234}

In this example, Xi provides a cautionary example of what could happen if corruption is left unchecked by negatively representing “some countries,” implying that the same could happen to the PRC.

**Summary, Xi 2**

*Extent:*

- **Addressee-exclusion** is not used.
- **Addressee-inclusion** is used to an average extent.
- **PRC-inclusion** is used to an average extent.
- **Positive self-representation** is used to an average extent.
- **Negative other-representation** is used to an average extent.

*Purpose:*

- **Addressee-exclusion** is not used.
- **Addressee-inclusion** is used to gain support for policy, and also to rally the party around the goal of fighting corruption.
- **PRC-inclusion** is used with the purpose of gaining support for policy.
- **Positive self-representation** is used with the purpose supporting policy and legitimizing party rule.

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^{234} Appendix, 21:34.
Negative other-representation is used to argue for the necessity to fight corruption.

6.4.3 Xi 3

Title: Make persistent efforts, continue striving to realize the Chinese dream (再接再厉，继续为实现中国梦奋斗)

Date: 2013-03-17

Background: This speech was held at the 12th National People’s Congress, when Xi was elected as President of the PRC. The main topic of the speech is the realization of “the Chinese Dream.” As discussed in the background summary for Xi 2, the slowing economic growth had made it harder to legitimize policy and party rule by economic performance. Part of the discourse of “the Chinese Dream” is a focus on not only the Chinese people, but also on Chinese culture and history, and in this speech Xi legitimizes the policy direction by portraying it as a continuation of China’s cultural heritage. Xi’s administration also faced growing tension among ethnic groups, and the discourse of “the Chinese Dream” is also drawn upon to promote national unity.

Venue: 12th National People’s Congress

Primary addressee group: Delegates of the National People’s Congress

Group orientation

Addressee-exclusion

Xi does not use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in this speech.235

Addressee-inclusion

Extent: Xi only occasionally uses first person collective pronouns that only are inclusive of the primary addressee group in comparison with the average of the research material. (P<0.001) This arguably is not due to Xi employing a strategy of establishing speaker-addressee relationships to a lesser extent, but on the contrary that he uses first person collective pronouns in a more inclusive fashion, please see the next category.

235 Please see the analysis of addressee-inclusion in Jiang 1 for an explanation of why this does not constitute a discrepancy.
Purpose: Where Xi establishes a relationship with the primary addressee group, it is primarily to consolidate the party line around the policy direction, which the following example illustrates:

We will adhere to the strategic ideology that development is a hard principle, adhere to focusing on economic construction, and extensively advance the construction of socialism’s economy, political system, culture, society and ecological civilization. [We should] intensify reform and opening, promote scientific development, and unceasingly tamp the material cultural foundation for realizing the Chinese dream.

我们要坚持发展是硬道理的战略思想，坚持以经济建设为中心，全面推进社会主义经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设、生态文明建设，深化改革开放，推动科学发展，不断夯实实现中国梦的物质文化基础。236

Here Xi uses a first person collective pronoun to imply that there exists consensus around the policy direction.

**PRC-inclusion**

Extent: As mentioned above, Xi frequently establishes a relationship with a broader addressee group inclusive of the population of the PRC, to a large extent in comparison with the average of the research material. (P<0.001) This can be attributed to Xi frequently employing nationalist rhetoric in this speech.

Purpose: His primary purpose when doing so is to legitimize the policy direction of socialism with Chinese characteristics by portraying it as the “correct” path for China:

The Chinese people are an extraordinarily creative people, we created the great Chinese civilization, and we can continue to expand and follow a development path that fits China’s national conditions. All the people in the country should definitely strengthen their confidence in the theories, path and system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and unwaveringly advance bravely along the correct Chinese path.

中华民族是具有非凡创造力的民族，我们创造了伟大的中华文明，我们也能够继续拓展和走好适合中国国情的发展道路。全国各族人民一定要增强对中国特色社会主义的理论自信、道路自信、制度自信，坚定不移沿着正确的中国道路奋勇前进。237

---

236 Appendix, 23:30.
237 Appendix, 23:8.
Secondarily, Xi also uses first person collective pronouns in this fashion to promote national unity:

To realize the Chinese dream [we] must focus China’s power. This is the power of the unity of the people of all nationalities in China. The Chinese dream is the dream of the nationalities, and it is also the dream of every Chinese. Only if we unite closely, act as one, and struggle to realize [our] shared dreams, the power to realize dreams will be incomparably strong, and every one of us will have ample space to strive for the realization of our own dreams.

实现中国梦必须凝聚中国力量。这就是中国各族人民大团结的力量。中国梦是民族的梦，也是每个中国人的梦。只要我们紧密团结，万众一心，为实现共同梦想而奋斗，实现梦想的力量就无比强大，我们每个人为实现自己梦想的努力就拥有广阔的空间。238

In this example, Xi argues that the realization of “the Chinese dream” is dependent on uniting the people of all nationalities in China, and establishes a speaker-addressee relationship in order to strengthen the argument.

**Group representation**

**Positive self-representation**

Extent: Xi significantly more frequently employs positive self-representation in this speech compared to the average of the research material. (P<0.001) This usage is also attributable to Xi using nationalist rhetoric.

Purpose: Xi employs it towards two primary purposes. Xi employs positive self-representation to support policy:

To realize the goal of the comprehensive realization of a moderately prosperous society, and the construction of a prosperous and strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious modernized socialist country; to realize the Chinese dream of the great restoration of the Chinese people, is the realization of a prosperous and strong country, the rejuvenation of the nation, and the happiness of the people. It not only embodies the ideals of the Chinese

238 Appendix, 23:17.
today, but also deeply reflects our predecessor’s honorable tradition of untiringly struggling towards progress.

实现全面建成小康社会、建成富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家的奋斗目标，实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦，就是要实现国家富强、民族振兴、人民幸福，既深深体现了今天中国人的理想，也深深反映了我们先人们不懈奋斗追求进步的光荣传统。239

It is also employed to promote national unity. At one point of the speech, Xi employs positive self-representation by describing the Chinese people as having “more than 5000 years of uninterrupted cultural history,” (5000 多年连绵不断的文明历史) and having made “irreversible contributions to the progress of human civilization.” (为人类文明进步作出了不可磨灭的贡献) This is followed by an argument that the unity of China’s 56 ethnic groups ultimately derives from “the ideals and beliefs we have collectively adhered to.” (我们共同坚守的理想信念)240 Here, all the nationalities of China are portrayed as united and sharing a common cultural history and worldview.

*Negative other-representation*

Xi does not employ negative other-representation in this speech.

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239 Appendix, 22:33.
Summary, Xi Jinping

Extent:

**Addressee-exclusion** is not used.

**Addressee-inclusion** is used to a lesser extent, which arguably is due to Xi using first person collective pronouns in a more inclusive fashion.

**PRC-inclusion** is used to a large extent, due to Xi’s extensive use of nationalist rhetoric.

**Positive self-representation** is used to a large extent, due to Xi’s extensive use of nationalist rhetoric.

**Negative other-representation** is not used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse strategy</th>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-exclusive</td>
<td>Low (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressee-inclusive</td>
<td>Low (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC-inclusive</td>
<td>High (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>Policy, National unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive self</td>
<td>High (P&lt;0.001)</td>
<td>Policy, National unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative other</td>
<td>Low (P=0.030)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Purpose:

**Addressee-exclusion** is not used.

**Addressee-inclusion** is used to gain support for policy.

**PRC-inclusion** is used to gain support for policy, and to promote national unity.

**Positive self-representation** is used to gain support for policy, and to promote national unity.

**Negative other-representation** is not used.

6.4.4 Summary, Xi Jinping

Summary for Xi, normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words, compared to expected frequencies for null-hypothesis of even distribution between speakers, and with P-values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Xi 1</th>
<th>Xi 2</th>
<th>Xi 3</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AX</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.026</td>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: AX = Addressee-exclusive, AI = addressee-inclusive, PI = PRC-inclusive, PS = Positive self-representation, NO = Negative other-representation, significant discrepancies marked in bold.
Extent
When looking at the average usage in Xi Jinping’s speeches in comparison with the average of all speakers, the following conclusions can be made:

- Xi uses addressee-exclusion to a significantly large extent. Again, this is attributable to the fact that Jiang’s speeches do not include a press conference, thus lowering the average.
- Addressee-inclusion is used to a significantly lesser extent.
- PRC-inclusion is used to an average extent. The high frequency found in Xi 3 constitutes a discrepancy, but the same discrepancy exist for all speeches held at the National People’s Congress, (i.e. also Jiang 2 and Xi 3), so a generalization can be made here.
- Positive self-representation is used to a significantly large extent.
- Negative other-representation is used to a significantly lesser extent.

Purpose
Addressee-exclusion: Xi uses addressee-exclusion to promote party legitimacy, and to counter corruption in Xi 1. No other generalizations can be made since addressee-exclusion is only used in Xi 1.

Addressee-inclusion: Xi’s employment of a strategy of establishing a relationship with the primary addressee group can be tied to one purpose:
1) To gain support for policy, which he does in Xi 2 and Xi 3.

PRC-inclusion: Xi’s employment of a strategy of establishing a relationship with an addressee group inclusive of the population of the PRC can be tied to one purpose:
1) He uses it to gain support for policy, which he does in Xi 2 and Xi 3.

Positive self-representation: Xi employs a strategy of positive self-representation towards one purpose:
1) To legitimize party rule, which he does in Xi 1 and Xi 2.

Negative other-representation: negative other-representation is only used in Xi 2, with the purpose of combatting corruption. No other generalizations can be made.

6.5 Comparison between Jiang, Hu and Xi
This section summarizes the analysis by illustrating and accounting for similarities and differences between to what extent and to what purpose Jiang, Hu and Xi employ the different strategies. Please note that the comparison is based on the generalization done in the summaries for each leader. The two tables below present the summaries for all speakers placed against each other, first
the findings of the quantitative findings for extent, and then the findings of the qualitative analysis for purpose. The tables are followed by a comparison between the speakers.

6.5.1 Extent, summary for all speakers with values normalized to occurrences per 10,000 words, with P-values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse strategy</th>
<th>Jiang</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Hu</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Xi</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AX*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: AX = Addressee-exclusive, AI = adressee-inclusive, PI = PRC-inclusive, PS = Positive self-representation, NO = Negative other-representation, significant deviations from the average marked in bold. * = indicates that large discrepancies or inconsistencies exist within the category, which makes generalization less meaningful.

6.5.2 Purpose, summary for all speakers based on generalizations made in the analysis section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse strategy</th>
<th>Jiang</th>
<th>Hu</th>
<th>Xi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AX</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Party unity*</td>
<td>Party legitimacy* Anti-corruption*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Party unity</td>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Legitimize party rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Delegitimize protesters* Policy* Legitimize party rule*</td>
<td>Anti-corruption*</td>
<td>Anti-corruption*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: AX = Addressee-exclusive, AI = adressee-inclusive, PI = PRC-inclusive, PS = Positive self-representation, NO = Negative other-representation, * = indicates that the use of a discourse strategy was confined to one speech.

**Addressee-exclusion**

Addressee-exclusive usage of first person collective pronouns is mainly found where the primary addressee group consists of non-party members, all other cases are too few to be statistically significant to this analysis. **Extent:** Unsurprisingly, this fashion of usage is lower in Jiang’s speeches, since his inaugural speech to the position of General Secretary of the CCP, in comparison with the speeches of Hu and Xi, was not held at a press conference but rather directed towards his
fellow party members. This reflects on the party having closed in on itself following the events of June 4 1989. **Purpose:** In the speeches of Hu, first person collective pronouns when used in an addressee-exclusive fashion are employed to portray party unity. A possible explanation might be that growing involvement with the global economy following the PRC’s economic reforms in the 1990s, and especially following its accession to the WTO, motivates the party to present leadership transitions as frictionless, the outcome of unanimous party decisions. Xi uses first person collective pronouns in an addressee-exclusive fashion in order to legitimize party rule, and to portray the party as united in the fight against corruption. In comparison with Hu, who it could be argued had an agenda of representing the leadership transition as smooth to the international community, Xi seems more interested in addressing a domestic audience since his purpose is to promote party legitimacy and to counter corruption, one of the most serious issues undermining party legitimacy. This would also be consistent with Xi’s focus on maintaining political stability.

**Addressee-inclusion**

There are differences in how Jiang, Hu and Xi use first person collective pronouns in an addressee-inclusive fashion, both in extent and purpose. **Extent:** Hu’s usage is higher, Jiang’s is at an average and Xi’s is lower. Hu’s frequent usage of inclusion of the primary addressee group could be attributed to Hu heavily focusing on the party in his speeches, particularly Hu 2. It could be argued that he attempts to gain support from the party by addressing them in an intimate and familiar way, implying that there is a connection between him and the party. Xi’s low usage is remarkable. While he devotes several sections of his speeches to discuss the party, it is common that he talks about the party in the third person instead of directly including the addressees. The low usage could possibly be attributed a decrease in party factionalism when Xi came to power, and Xi not having to pursue a goal of promoting party unity. In Jiang’s case, the party was divided between the leftists and the proponents of continued reform, and in Hu’s case Jiang still exerted considerable influence after having stepped down. In comparison, Xi’s rise to paramount leader of the PRC is arguably supported by a greater consensus than that of Jiang and Hu. Jiang occupies a middle ground between the two, and uses first person collective pronouns to include his fellow party members, albeit not as frequently as Hu. **Purpose:** Hu uses addressee-inclusion in order to promote party unity. His focus on party unity is consistent with his background in the CCYL, to which, as noted in the background section of this thesis, “the be-all and end-all of statecraft” is the survival of the
party.\(^\text{241}\) Also, as noted above, Hu’s strategic use of addressee-inclusion to promote party unity could be an attempt to resolve conflict within the party. When employed by Jiang it is to promote party unity and to gain support for policy. This might have been necessitated by the factionalism within the party during the period Jiang came to power, and it could be argued that Jiang employs group orientation here in order to unite the party both structurally and politically. In comparison, Xi’s main objective for employing addressee-inclusive pronouns is to gain support for policy. In comparison with Jiang, who was pressured by Deng to pursue a somewhat criticized policy direction (the policy of reform and opening), it could be argued that Xi does not use his speeches to launch any new policies. Arguably Xi’s focus on policy indicates that he wants to be perceived as proactive leader.

\textit{PRC-inclusion}

There are notable similarities as to how Jiang, Hu and Xi employ first person collective pronouns in a PRC-inclusive fashion. \textbf{Extent:} For all speakers it is more frequently employed during speeches held at the National People’s Congress, which could be attributed to the fact those speeches were inaugural speeches for the presidential position. Jiang, Hu and Xi here addressed the audience in the capacity of leader of the country and not just the party. All speakers employ the strategy to an average extent. \textbf{Purpose:} There are also notable similarities regard what purposes it is used. PRC-inclusive usage of first person collective pronouns is employed by all speakers primarily to support policy by framing it in a nationalist context, with the caveat that there are differences regarding which policies that they support.

\textit{Positive self-representation}

There are mainly differences, but also some similarities, in how and to what extent Jiang, Hu and Xi differ when they employ positive self-representation. \textbf{Extent:} A notable similarity between all speakers is that the speeches held at the National People’s Congress generally contain more instances of positive self-representation. As with the employment of PRC-inclusion, this is attributable to the speakers addressing the audience in the capacity of head of state. This is a context in which it is more natural to focus on the country rather than on the party, and all of the speakers use positive representation of the Chinese people to frame their arguments in nationalist

\(^{241}\) Lam, 2006, p. 22.
discourse. Where Jiang, Hu and Xi differ is to what extent this strategy is used: Jiang uses it less frequently than Hu, who in turn uses it less frequently than Xi. In the context of the research material of this thesis, a linear progression of growing usage of positive self-representation between the leadership changes can be observed. Even though all leaders employ positive representation of the party, the increase is mainly attributable to an increase in the use of positive representations of the Chinese people, especially in the speeches held by Hu and Xi at the NPC. (Hu 3 and Xi 3.) This thesis argues that this would indicate an increase in the usage of nationalist rhetoric to frame various arguments. **Purpose:** There exists some differences in what purpose positive self-representation is employed. No consistent purpose can be determined for Jiang and Hu. Instead, it could be argued that their usage is contextual, since employment in some speeches seem to correlate with the main topic of the speech. For instance, Jiang uses it to promote the tradition of “investigation and research” in his speech devoted to that topic (Jiang 3), while Hu similarly uses it to promote the party’s tradition of “arduous struggle” in Hu 2, which is devoted to that topic. In comparison, Xi has a more consistent purpose, to legitimize party rule. This would be consistent with Xi’s focus on maintaining political stability discussed in the background section of this thesis.

**Negative other-representation**

There exists some similarities and some differences for how negative other-representation is employed by all three speakers. **Extent:** Throughout the majority of the speeches, negative other-representation is sparsely used. The most notable exception is Jiang’s speech when elected as General Secretary, (Jiang 1) which contains numerous instances of negative other-representation, which raises Jiang’s average considerably. The other main exception is Hu’s speech at Xibaipo (Hu 2). In comparison with the other speakers, Xi only uses it to a small extent, and only in Xi 2. It could be argued that extent and usage is linked to challenges to party legitimacy, please see below. **Purpose:** When Jiang uses negative other-representation in his first speech (Jiang 1), it is employed to delegitimise the actions of those involved in the student movement of 1989, to gain support for policy and to legitimize party rule. Hu in his speech at Xibaipo (Hu 2), uses negative other-representation, primarily to argue for the fight against corruption. Xi also employs negative other-representation towards this purpose. It could be argued that negative other-representation generally is not employed in this selection of speeches, except to address serious issues threatening
the party’s legitimacy, in Jiang’s case the student movement, and in the case of Hu and Xi to address issues of corruption that had emerged from previous decades of economic development.

7. Summary & Conclusion

The purpose of this section is to summarize the findings of the analysis, and to assess to what extent this thesis has managed to address the research questions. This will be followed by some concluding remarks, and some suggestions on future research that the results of this study enables.

Research question 1: To what extent do Jiang, Hu and Xi employ group orientation and group representation in their speeches?

The study was able to measure the extent of usage of most of the categories of group orientation and group representation. There were however some notable discrepancies, which made it hard to draw conclusions for certain categories.

Group orientation

Addressee-exclusion was almost only found in a specific context, where the speaker was addressing journalists and media. In this case the context is the only variable this usage is correlated to, making it impossible to draw conclusions regarding the extent to which the speakers employ this strategy. This is further complicated by inconsistencies in the research material since Jiang’s inaugural speech to the position of General Secretary of the CCP was not held at a press conference in comparison with Hu and Xi.

Addressee-inclusion was measurable. In comparison with the average of the research material, Jiang uses it to an average extent, Hu uses it to a larger extent, and Xi uses it to a lesser extent.

PRC-inclusion was measurable. There was a notable discrepancy regarding this category, where usage was higher in speeches held at the National People’s Congress. However, the same discrepancy exists for all speakers, so this does not constitute a problem for comparability. In comparison with the average of the research material, all speakers use PRC-inclusion to an average extent.
Group representation

Positive self-representation was measurable. In comparison with the average of the research material, Jiang uses it to a lesser extent, Hu uses it to an average extent, and Xi uses it to a larger extent.

Negative other-representation was only occasionally used by all speakers, with some remarkable discrepancies for individual speeches, in particular Jiang 1 and Hu 2. The uneven usage throughout the research material makes it hard to draw any conclusions regarding the extent of usage for certain speakers. The common denominator for this strategy is that it is employed when the speaker attempts to address issues challenging to party legitimacy.

Research question 2: Towards which purpose do Jiang, Hu and Xi employ group orientation and group representation in their speeches?

The study was partially able to determine the purpose behind the usage group orientation and group representation. However there were some notable discrepancies and inconsistencies, which makes it hard to draw conclusions for certain categories.

Group orientation

Addressee-exclusion, noted above is primarily only employed in two speeches, Hu and Xi’s inaugural speeches to the position of General Secretary. Therefore, the only generalization about the purpose behind this employment that can be made are for those speeches: Hu uses it to promote party unity, while Xi uses it to promote party legitimacy and to counter corruption.

Addressee-inclusion: The purpose behind the use of this strategy could be determined. Jiang uses it to gain support for policy, and to promote party unity. Hu uses it to promote party unity. Xi uses it to gain support for policy.

PRC-inclusion: The purpose behind the use of this strategy could be determined. All speakers primarily use it to gain support for policy.
Group representation
Positive self-representation, though used by all speakers, was harder to discern a general purpose for. Jiang and Hu employ it inconsistently towards various purposes. The only generalization that can be made is that Xi uses it to legitimize party rule.

Negative other-representation, as noted above, is only occasionally used, and only found in a limited number of speeches. Therefore it is not possible to make any generalizations about the purpose behind the employment except for those speeches. Both Hu and Xi use it to counter corruption, while Jiang uses it to delegitimize protesters, legitimize party rule and to gain support for policy.

Research question 3: Regarding both extent and purpose, do notable differences or similarities exist between how Jiang, Hu and Xi employ group orientation and group representation in their speeches, and why do differences or similarities exist?

The results of the analysis shows that there exists both similarities and differences between Jiang, Hu and Xi regarding their employment of the discourse strategies examined. It has also been able to explain differences and similarities by correlating them to background information. However, there exists discrepancies and inconsistencies for some categories, which makes comparison less meaningful.

Group orientation
Addressee-exclusion: Comparison between the extent of usage for this strategy is meaningless, since it is primarily only used in two speeches, please see the account of the extent of addressee-exclusion above. As for purpose, some differences exist between Hu and Xi. Hu uses it to portray the leadership transition as smooth, which could be attributable to growing interdependence with the global economic system. Xi uses it to promote party legitimacy and to counter corruption, one of the main challenges to party legitimacy. This is attributable to Xi having a strong focus on political stability.

Addressee-inclusion: There are differences both in extent and purpose for this category. Extent: Hu uses it more frequently than the others, which is attributable to his focus on the party. Jiang uses it to an average extent. Xi’s usage is low, which is attributable to Xi not needing to
promote party unity to the same extent as the others, since his accession was based on a relatively strong party consensus. Purpose: Hu and Jiang uses it to promote party unity, which attributable to them attempting to resolve party factionalism. Jiang also uses it to gain support for policy, which can be attributed to the need to convince the leftist faction within the party to support the policy of reform and opening. Xi also uses it to gain support for policy, but in comparison with Jiang, Xi does not have to defend a criticized policy direction. It could be argued that Xi’s focus on policy here is attributable to him wanting to be perceived as a proactive leader. This would be consistent with the results of Irekvist’s thesis, which showed that in comparison with Hu, Xi has a more proactive tone.\(^\text{242}\)

PRC-inclusion: All speakers employ this strategy similarly, regarding both extent and purpose. Extent: All speakers use it to the same extent. Usage is higher at speeches held at the National People’s Congress for all speakers. Purpose: All speakers employ it towards the same purpose, to gain support for policy. This is attributable to the speakers addressing the audience in the capacity of head of state.

**Group representation**

Positive self-representation: There exists both differences and similarities for this category. Extent: Common to all speakers is that employment of positive self-representation is higher at speeches held at the NPC. As with PRC-inclusion above, this is attributable to the speakers acting in the capacity of head of state. However, the speakers differ in the extent to which this strategy is used. A linear increase from Jiang through Hu to Xi can be observed, which is attributable to an increased use of nationalist rhetoric. This would also be consistent with the development described in Irekvist’s thesis, where Xi uses nationalistic vocabulary to a larger extent than Hu,\(^\text{243}\) and expand those findings with the inclusion of Jiang. Purpose: No common purpose can be found for Jiang and Hu. Xi uses it to legitimize party rule, which consistent with Xi’s focus on maintaining political stability.

Negative other-representation: There exists both similarities and differences regarding the employment of this strategy. Extent: Usage of this strategy is unevenly distributed, and is sparsely used with some major exceptions, making a comparison of the extent less meaningful. A

\(^{242}\) Irekvist, 2014, p. 52.
\(^{243}\) Loc. cit.
connection between the speaker addressing issues related to party legitimacy and usage of negative other representation can be observed. The high use in Jiang 1 can be attributed to the serious challenges to party legitimacy addressed in that speech. Purpose: Both Hu and Xi use negative other-representation to counter corruption, which can be attributed to corruption constituting a serious threat to party legitimacy during their accessions. Jiang uses it to delegitimize protestors, gain support for policy, and to legitimize party rule. The purpose behind Jiang’s usage can be attributed to the unstable political climate during the time the speech were held.

Concluding remarks
As shown in this summary, this thesis has been able to address the research questions, albeit with some exceptions, most notably in regard to addressee-exclusion and negative other-representation. For both these categories there existed some discrepancies and usage was unevenly distributed between the speeches. The linear increase in the use of positive self-representation by Jiang, Hu, and Xi is remarkable, and shows that there has been an increase in the use of nationalist rhetoric throughout the post-Deng era, at least in inaugural speeches. Another noteworthy finding is that negative other-representation seems to be related to challenges to party legitimacy.

7.1 Future research
The most obvious implication for future research would be the examination of a larger body of research material, possibly containing speeches held under other conditions or by other leaders. Another possibility is the inclusion of other discourse strategies. During the writing of this thesis, several other strategies were considered, e.g. temporal proximization. By placing distant events closer in time to the recipient, they appear to have a bearing on the current situation, thus constructing a narrative that potentially could serve legitimizing functions.244 Another avenue of research that might be explored is the inclusion of speeches by other Chinese-speaking leaders outside of the PRC, such as Taiwan and Singapore.

244 Please see Oddo, 2011, for an example.
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Software

Appendix: Speeches in chronological order

Jiang Zemin 1989-06-24

在党的十三届四中全会上的讲话

这次中央全会推选我担任政治局常委、总书记，我没有这个思想准备，又缺乏中央全面工作的经验，深感担子很重，力不从心。现在全会已经作出决定，我感谢同志们的信任，决心同大家一道，刻苦学习，加强调查研究，尽心尽力做好工作，不辜负老一辈革命家和同志们的期望。

我们党已经制定和形成了一条建设有中国特色社会主义的路线和一系列基本政策。概括地说，就是小平同志多次指出、最近再次强调的，以经济建设为中心，坚持四项基本原则，坚持改革开放。这是我们有信心做好工作的根本的、坚实的基础。

这次中央领导机构作了一些人事调整，但是，党的十一届三中全会以来的路线和基本政策没有变，必须继续贯彻执行。在这个最基本的问题上，我要十分明确地讲两句话：一句是坚定不移，毫不动摇；一句是全面执行，一以贯之。

小平同志几次讲话都表示了对新的中央领导的殷切期望。我深深感到，要把今后的工作做好，一定要首先在党内充分发扬民主，依靠中央领导集体的智慧和力量，依靠全党同志和人民群众的支持和监督。同时，有一个很有利的条件，就是邓小平同志等老一辈革命家健在，一般日常的工作，我们绝不打扰他们，但遇到很重大的问题，我们还是可以随时向小平同志请教，听取其他老一辈革命家的意见。他们在长期革命斗争和建设实践中积累起来的治党治国治军的丰富经验，形成的崇高威望，是党的宝贵财富，对我们新领导集体的工作仍然十分重要。

这次全会开得很成功，不仅正确处理了赵紫阳同志的问题，而且初步总结了教训，讨论和研究了不少重要问题。

最近，小平同志的几次重要讲话，以及其他几位老同志的讲话，对于今后党的各项工作具有现实的指导意义和深远的历史意义。李鹏同志代表中央政治局扩大会议向四中全会的报告的第三部分，对于当前的工作已经作了初步的部署，我完全同意。在他们讲话的启发下，讲一些想法，作为我在全会的发言。我初到中央，了解情况不多，不当之处，请同志们批评指正。

彻底平息反革命暴乱，是当前第一位政治任务。回想起这场反革命暴乱，如果没有邓小平同志等老一辈革命家的决断，如果没有英勇的人民解放军、武警部队和公安干警的献身，后果不堪设想。我们对制造动乱和暴乱的一切政治阴谋，一定要继续查清和彻底揭露，决不可半途而废。对于策划、组织、指挥动乱和暴乱的阴谋分子，参与暴乱的反革命暴徒，务必依法惩处，决不能心慈手软。对于不同程度卷入动乱和暴乱的人，要多做争取教育、分化瓦解工作。对于不明真相而有过某些错误言行的青年学生和群众，要帮助他们总结教训，提高认识。为了严格区分和正确处理两类不同性质的矛盾，需要尽快着手制定一系列具体政策。各地要结合当地实际情况妥善处理。总之，要通过坚决果断、艰苦细致的工作，集中打击极少数首恶分子和拒不改悔的顽固分子，尽力扩大教育面和团结面。
各级党组织和全党同志，要深入思考两个问题：这场动乱和暴乱发生、蔓延的主要教训在哪里：怎样彻底消除动乱产生的思想、政治、经济、社会因素，保证党和国家长治久安。这些问题解决好了，革命、建设和改革的成果才能从根本上得到巩固和发展。

按照中央和小平同志确定的“三步走”发展战略，积极稳步地发展国民经济，始终是我们现代化建设的中心任务。在发展经济中，要十分重视发挥教育和科学技术的作用。国家的昌盛，人民的富裕，说到底是经济实力问题。国际竞争，说到底也是经济实力的竞争。经济发展了，国力强大了，我们才能有力量抵御任何自然的和社会的风浪，顶住任何外来的威胁和压力，才能实现民族振兴，对人类作出更大贡献。

当前，经济工作的迫切任务，是遵循党的十三届三中全会确定的方针，继续抓好治理整顿和深化改革。国务院已经制定和将要制定的各项措施，各级党委都要坚决支持和保证贯彻执行。全党同志都要为挽回动乱和暴乱造成的损失，贡献全部力量。

在发展多种经济成分的同时，我们要千方百计搞好搞活国营大中型企业。这是我国社会主义经济的骨干和基础。要全心全意依靠工人阶级。离开他们的积极性、创造性和主人翁责任感，一切都无从谈起。

十年来的改革开放，改变了中国的经济和社会生活面貌，为中国社会主义事业注入了蓬勃的生机和活力。我们要继续更有效地进行改革开放，把这项工作搞得更快更好。

改革开放的总设计者和指导者是邓小平同志。邓小平同志提出的、我们坚持贯彻执行的改革开放，是坚持社会主义道路，坚持人民民主专政，坚持共产党领导，坚持马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想的改革开放。作为鲜明的对照，那些顽固搞资产阶级自由化的，却是以实现西方资本主义为目的，放弃人民民主专政，取消共产党的领导，背弃马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想的“改革开放”。他们的“改革开放”，中心就是资本主义。这当然是党和人民绝对不能允许的。

赵紫阳同志的一个严重错误，就是把改革开放同四项基本原则割裂开来、对立起来，实际上是背离和放弃四项基本原则，怂恿和助长资产阶级自由化的泛滥，酿成这次动乱和反革命暴乱，给党和国家带来巨大的灾难。这就从反面惊醒了我们。这个用鲜血换来25年的深刻教训，我们一定要永远记取。

在抓紧社会主义物质文明建设的同时，必须抓紧社会主义精神文明建设，坚决纠正“一手硬、一手软”的状况。

几年来，物质生活水平提高了，但“一切向钱看”，追求高消费，追求眼前实惠而放弃远大理想，计较个人私利而不顾国家、民族整体利益，鄙薄自己的祖国和人民而崇洋媚外等思想倾向滋长了，甚至腐化堕落的不良风气发生了，建国初期就早已绝迹的种种丑恶现象再度出现了。面对这个严峻的现实，我们必须认真思考小平同志所指出的坚持四项基本原则缺乏一贯性、十年最大的失误是教育的问题，并从中引出深刻的教训。

加强教育，我想特别提出国情教育的问题。这就是近百年来中国历史的教育，社会主义必然性的教育，经济文化发展现状的教育，经济资源配置问题的教育，中华民族优秀传统的教育，等等。广大青年拥护改革开放，但他们中不少人不了解中国的历史和现实，因此也就不可能了解改革的长期性、艰巨性、复杂性，幻想在一夜之间把西方的物
质文明搬到中国土地上，比较容易接受实行资本主义制度的宣传。他们生长在祖国土地上，理应在这块土地扎下深根，理应从我们的工人、农民、战士的身上汲取精神营养。

党的十一届三中全会以后，宣传思想工作在批评“两个凡是”、促进思想解放方面，在探讨社会主义现代化建设和改革开放的规律方面，作出了很大贡献。但是，后来几年中，各种错误思潮特别是西方资产阶级腐朽思想纷至沓来，暴露出来的问题相当严重。赵紫阳同志打击坚持四项基本原则、抵制腐朽思想和丑恶现象的同志，保护、信任、提拔顽固坚持资产阶级自由化立场的人，由来已久，一些舆论阵地已经不在党和人民手里。有关部门一定要采取坚决措施进行整顿。

我们有一支很好的知识分子队伍。他们活跃在生产、国防、科研、教育、卫生、宣传、新闻、出版、文艺等各条战线，忘我工作，无私奉献，正是民族的精英，是社会主义现代化建设的骨干。知识分子中出现了极少数以骂共产党、骂社会主义出名的所谓“精英”。他们已经自己撕去“爱国”、“民主”的外衣。几年来，他们被捧得很高，不仅进行反共反社会主义的政治宣传，而且形成了一种哗众取宠的很坏的学风。他们不能代表中国知识分子，恰恰是中国知识分子中的败类。

民主法制建设要抓紧进行。许多群众和青年学生希望加快民主法制建设，他们的要求是可以理解的。我们的各项民主制度和法律制度，都需要继续完善和发展，以保证党和国家的政策和工作能够充分体现人民的利益，保证各级干部置于人民群众的有效监督之下。但是，我们的民主法制建设，决不能离开社会主义的方向和轨道，决不能引进西方资产阶级的那套所谓“民主”、“自由”的制度。全部中国近代史证明了它们在中国的破产。这次动乱也充分说明，想那样做，结果只能是天下大乱。

这次学潮的事实还表明，一些青年学生和群众对民主缺乏正确认识，法制观念相当淡薄。有的人所要的“民主”，实际上是无法无天的极端民主化，是无政府状态，同民主根本不是一回事，是对民主的反动和破坏。他们所主张的极端民主化，在世界上任何一个地方，也都是行不通的。

我们党是工人阶级的先锋队，是社会主义事业的领导力量。形势和任务不断变化，党的路线方针政策和斗争策略、活动方式、工作方法也要相应改变，但党的性质不能变，共产主义的最高目标不能变。

共产党的力量和作用，主要不在于党员的数量，而在于党员的素质。要结合建设、改革的实际和当代世界发展的状况，在全党进行马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想基本理论的教育，进行社会主义、共产主义思想的教育，进行党党章和党的路线方针政策的教育。

这次动乱中所以有那么多人被阴谋分子煽动起来，一个重要原因，是一些党员、干部特别是极少数领导干部中存在严重腐败现象。全国各族人民的眼睛盯着我们，看我们能不能拿出惩治腐败的实际行动来。必须在近期办几件使党心民心为之振奋的事情。再经过一定时间的努力，制定防止和惩治腐败的制度，使党风有根本好转，恢复和加强党同群众的密切关系。
同志们，我们是在党和国家面临生死存亡的关键时刻，召开这次中央全会的。这次全会，将以党的胜利载入史册。但是，必须看到，要挽回赵紫阳同志给党的事业造成的巨大损失，解决赵紫阳同志留给我们的重重难题，使中国社会主义现代化建设事业健康发展，保证先烈用生命换来的民族独立不致丧失，保证社会主义现代化建设目标的实现，任重而道远。我们决心发扬艰苦奋斗、自力更生的精神，排除任何干扰，克服一切困难，以百倍的努力进行工作。

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Jiang Zemin 1993-04-01

江泽民主席在八届全国人大一次会议上的讲话

各位代表：

这次大会选举我担任中华人民共和国主席，我衷心感谢各位代表和全国各族人民对我的信任。国家主席责任重大。我将忠诚地履行宪法赋予的职责，恪尽职守，勤勉工作，不辜负各位代表和全国人民的重托。

杨尚昆同志担任国家主席期间，坚定不移地坚持建设有中国特色社会主义的理论和党的基本路线，致力于国家的建设和改革，以其卓有成效的工作，赢得了全国人民的尊敬和国际上的赞誉。我们衷心地向杨尚昆同志表示感谢和敬意！

各位代表，从国际环境和国内条件来说，今后的五年，对于我们国家的繁荣昌盛和社会主义事业的兴旺发达，是很重要很宝贵的时期。胜利地完成本次大会确定的各项任务，我们就能在建立社会主义市场经济体制方面迈出重大步伐，就能提前实现国民生产总值翻两番的目标，就能在社会主义民主法制建设和精神文明建设方面取得重要进展，从而为我国以更加雄健的步伐进入二十一世纪，打下良好的基础。

十一届三中全会以来，以邓小平同志为核心的党中央领导集体，领导我国人民开创建设有中国特色社会主义的道路，使我们的国家进入蓬勃发展的新时期。我们要实现今后改革开放和现代化建设的繁重任务，最根本的，是要以邓小平同志建设有中国特色社会主义的理论和党的基本路线为指导，积极、全面、正确地贯彻落实党的十四大精神，抓住机遇，深化改革，加快发展，集中力量把经济建设搞上去，推动社会全面进步。

我们的社会主义现代化建设还处在艰巨的创业时期。伟大的创业实践，需要有伟大的创业精神来支持和鼓舞。解放思想、实事求是，积极探索、勇于创新，艰苦奋斗、知难而进，学习外国、自强不息，谦虚谨慎、不骄不躁，同心同德、顾全大局，勤俭节约、清正廉洁，励精图治、无私奉献，这些都应该是新时期我们推进现代化建设，所要大加倡导和发扬的创业精神。这些精神的核心和精髓，就是小平同志所一再倡导和论述的解放思想，实事求是。各级国家机关和国家工作人员，要在这方面起好表率作用，当好人民的公仆。

“和平统一、一国两制”，是我们实现祖国统一大业的坚定方针。我们坚决反对任何形式的“两个中国”、“一中一台”或“一国两府”，坚决反对任何制造台湾独立的企图和行动，坚决维护国家主权和领土完整。我们将严格执行香港基本法和这次
大会通过的澳门基本法，克服困难，排除阻力，努力实现香港、澳门平稳过渡和保持长期稳定繁荣。

我们始终不渝地奉行独立自主的和平外交政策，坚持在和平共处五项原则的基础上，同所有国家保持和发展友好合作关系。在国际交往中，我们绝不强加于人，也绝不允许别的国家干涉我国的内政。我们坚决反对霸权主义和强权政治，继续为建立和平、稳定、公正、合理的国际新秩序，做出不懈的努力。

勤劳、勇敢、智慧的中华民族，曾经对人类文明做出过巨大的贡献。我们要在爱国主义、社会主义的伟大旗帜下，更加紧密地团结起来，抓住有利时机，集中力量发展自己，到本世纪末，使我们的国民经济再上一个新台阶，使占世界人口四分之一的中国人民生活水平进入小康。这是中国历史上一个伟大壮举，也是二十世纪人类进步的一个辉煌成果。只要我们坚定不移地沿着建设有中国特色社会主义的道路奋斗下去，更加美好的未来，必将属于历尽沧桑而自信自立自强的中国人民！

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Jiang Zemin 1993-07-05

没有调查就没有决策权

重视调查研究，是我们党的优良传统。坚持理论与实际相结合，由此制定和执行正确的路线方针政策，是我们党领导革命、建设、改革的基本经验。我们党过去领导全国人民走出了一条有中国特色的民主革命和社会主义革命道路，现在又走出了一条有中国特色的社会主义现代化建设道路，最根本的是把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际结合起来，运用马克思主义的立场、观点、方法，正确地认识中国国情，创造性地解决革命和建设中的问题。这个结合的过程，始终是以调查研究为前提、为依据的。也就是说，是在调查研究的基础上，实现并不断深化马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际的结合和统一的。

毛泽东同志为我们党的调查研究优良传统的形成和发展作出了巨大贡献。新民主主义革命时期，在极为艰难的条件下，他进行过大量实地调查，写出了影响深远的《中国社会各阶级的分析》、《湖南农民运动考察报告》以及《寻乌调查》、《兴国调查》等一系列调查报告。他提出了“没有调查，没有发言权”的著名论断。新中国成立后，毛泽东同志仍经常到各地了解实际情况，并亲自组织对一些重大问题进行调查研究。一九五六年，他和党中央其他领导同志一起，用了半个月的时间，听了三十四个部委的汇报，仔细了解各地战线取得的成绩、存在的问题和工作中的经验教训，在此基础上写出了《论十大关系》这篇重要著作，为探索适合中国情况的社会主义建设道路作出了积极努力。一九六一年，为了克服国民经济遇到的严重困难，为了了解各方面的真实情况，采取正确的政策措施，毛泽东同志亲自组织三个调查组，分别到浙江、湖南、广东进行调查。在此基础上，并根据其他许多调查组的意见，制定了农业六十条，对促进国民经济恢复和发展起了极为重要的作用。

邓小平同志在我国革命、建设、改革的过程中也一贯重视调查研究工作，为党的调查研究优良传统的形成和发展也作出了重大贡献。他指出，实事求是是马列主义的精髓，也是毛泽东思想的精髓。这个著名论断本身就包含和体现了调查研究的重要性。
因为离开调查研究，就谈不上理论与实际的结合和统一，也就谈不上实事求是。六十年代初的三年困难时期，邓小平同志为主持制定农业七十条和其他文件，亲自进行了大量卓有成效的调查研究。尤其是在党的十一届三中全会以后，邓小平同志在全党进行拨乱反正、总结历史经验教训的基础上，对一系列关系经济社会发展全局的重要问题进行深入调查研究，为形成建设有中国特色社会主义理论，制定党的”一个中心、两个基本点“的基本路线，作出了巨大贡献。一九九二年春，他不顾八十多岁高龄，亲自到武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地视察，发表了重要谈话，为加快我国改革开放和经济发展提出了重要指导方针。

总之，无论在调查研究的理论方面，还是在实践方面，毛泽东同志、邓小平同志都是我们学习的楷模。

坚持调查研究，是辩证唯物主义认识论的基本要求，是党保持同人民群众密切联系的重要渠道，也是我们党的一个基本工作方法和领导制度。回顾建党七十多年的历史，什么时候全党从上到下重视调查研究，工作指导方针符合客观实际，党的事业就顺利发展；什么时候忽视调查研究，就会导致主观与客观相脱离，造成工作中的失败，使党和人民的事业遭受损失甚至挫折。因此，加强调查研究不仅是一个工作方法问题，而且是一个关系党和人民的事业得失成败的大问题。

在新的时期，我们肩负着改革开放和现代化建设的历史重任，全党同志首先是各级领导干部更要重视和加强调查研究。尽管我们现在进行调查研究的对象、内容、手段、条件都发生了新的变化，但调查研究在党的决策工作和全部领导干部工作中的地位和作用，不仅丝毫没有改变，而且更为重要。为了适应改革和发展的需要，调查研究的工作只能全面加强，决不可有任何削弱。建设有中国特色社会主义事业任重道远，在前进中会遇到许多复杂的新情况新问题，需要不断探索和解决。而对任何问题的探索和解决，须臾也离不开调查研究。

当前，在邓小平同志视察南方的重要谈话和党的十四大精神指引下，国民经济保持强劲的发展势头，以建立社会主义市场经济体制为核心的各项改革正在深入进行，各项事业都取得了新的进步。一个抓住机遇、深化改革、促进发展的新局面越来越充分地展现在人们面前。总的形势很好。越是在形势好的情况下，越要头脑清醒、不骄不躁，善于及时发现和解决新的矛盾和问题，越要注意把干部群众的积极性引导好、保护好、发挥好；越要坚持科学的态度和务实的作风精心指导，过细工作，掌握驾驭经济社会发展全局的主动权。

应该看到，我们在前进中确实存在一些问题，经济工作中有些问题还相当突出，社会治安、精神文明建设、党的建设等方面也有一些不可忽视的问题。对于这些问题的出现，我们既不要惊慌失措，也不能麻痹大意，解决的态度要积极稳妥，从历史经验看，这些问题如不及时处理或处理的不好，就可能引发一些新的社会问题。最重要的是，要坚定不移地执行党的基本路线，始终不渝地坚持以经济建设为中心，抓住机遇，加快发展，同时又要扎扎实实地避免损失，力争国民经济隔几年上一个新台阶。发展是硬道理，解决好前进中的问题也是为了更好地保证和促进发展，二者是统一的。只有经济大大发展了，全国的经济实力和综合国力大大增强了，人民生活
才能不断改善，国家才能更有分量，我们的朋友才能更多。邓小平同志在三强调发展才是硬道理，硬就硬在这里。

我们要不失时机地集中力量把经济建设搞上去，关键在于深化改革。正确解决前进中的矛盾和问题，关键也在于深化改革。因为这些矛盾和问题的产生，从根本上说，是由于新的经济体制尚未确立，各种经济关系尚未完全理顺。我们不能沿用过去计划经济体制那套老办法来解决这些矛盾和问题，那是解决不了也解决不好。必须加快建立社会主义市场经济体制，努力寻求新的办法来解决。这才是根本出路。

中央正在研究如何加快建立社会主义市场经济体制的问题。现在已组织中央有关部门的负责同志带队下去调查研究，希望各省区市的领导同志，以及政策研究室和其他部门的同志，也要围绕深化改革和经济社会发展中的一些重大问题，深入到群众之中，广泛调查研究，特别是要多搞一些典型调查、专门调查、系统调查。总之，为了抓住机遇、深化改革、促进经济又快又好的发展，为了在这种新形势下保证党的决策的科学制定和有效执行，正确解决前进中的问题，全党同志必须在邓小平同志建设有中国特色社会主义理论和党的基本路线指导下，深入各个领域的实际，大兴调查研究之风。

在这里，我再一次提议，县以上各级领导同志，尤其是主要负责同志，一定要带头大兴调查研究之风。（一）每年至少抽出一两个月的时间，深入基层调查研究。所谓深入基层，去农村要到农村户，去工厂要到车间到班组，亲自听取群众呼声，了解群众向什么，盼什么，欢迎什么，反对什么。每个领导干部都要在工人、农民、知识分子中交一些知心朋友，经常促膝交谈。这样，在工作指导上才有可能真正做到群群众之所想，急群众之所急，真正切合实际。（二）要对本地区部门迫切需要解决的重要问题进行系统的调查研究，提出解决问题的正确对策。（三）每个领导干部都应该亲自动手写调查报告。调查报告要报送同级党委和上级党委。对有价值的调研报告，还应该及时转发交流。各省区市党委每年要向中央选送一些优秀的调研报告，供中央决策参考。

全党同志特别是各级领导干部，真正把调查研究这一最基础性的工作做深做透了，好处很多，可以使领导机关、领导干部同群众、同实际生活的密切联系，有利于防止和减少工作中的官僚主义、形式主义、主观主义；可以使领导干部通过对实际情况的了解，增加共识，减少分歧，有利于统一认识、统一步调；可以使领导机关的决策工作提供充分的第一手材料，有利于作出切合实际的科学分析和判断，形成正确的方针政策；可以及时发现新的问题，包括带倾向性的问题，以便及早采取对策加以解决，减少和避免失误；等等。谋事在人，成事也在人。可以这样说，坚持做好调查研究这篇文章，是我们的谋事之基、成事之道。
新一届中央政治局常委与中外记者见面

女士们先生们，朋友们，同志们，大家好很高兴与大家见面，中国共产党第十六次全国代表大会已于昨天闭幕，大会开得很成功，这是一次团结的大会、胜利的大会、奋进的大会、继往开来的大会。刚才我们又召开了中国共产党第十六届中央委员会第一次全体会议，选举产生了新一届的中央领导机构，中央政治局常务委员会由九位同志组成。全会选举我为中共中央总书记，下面我将把新当选的其他八位政治局常委给大家介绍一下：这位是新当选的中央政治局常委吴邦国同志，这位是新当选的中央政治局常委温家宝同志，这位是新当选的中央政治局常委贾庆林同志，这位是新当选的中央政治局常委曾庆红同志，这位是新当选的中央政治局常委黄菊同志，这位是新当选的中央政治局常委李长春同志，他是我们中央政治局常委当中最年轻的成员，这位是新当选的中央政治局常委罗干同志，他是我们中央政治局常委当中的老大哥。我代表新当选的中央领导机构成员感谢全党同志的信任，我们一定不辜负全党同志的重托和全国人民的期望，高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，全面贯彻“三个代表”重要思想，认真落实十六大提出的各项任务，紧密团结和依靠全党全国各族人民，继往开来、与时俱进，为全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化，开创中国特色社会主义事业的新局面而努力奋斗。听说新闻传媒的朋友们都希望了解我们新当选的中央领导集体将如何开展工作，在这里我愿意明确地告诉大家，十六大把“三个代表”重要思想和马克思列宁主义和毛泽东思想、邓小平理论一道确立为我们党要长期坚持的指导思想，这是一个历史性的决策，也是一个历史性的贡献，为我们指明了前进的方向。江泽民同志在十六大的报告当中，系统地总结了十三年来的基本经验，全面阐述了贯彻“三个代表”重要思想的根本要求，明确提出了新世纪头二十年我们党和国家的奋斗目标，并且对经济、政治、文化、国防、祖国统一、外交以及我们党的建设的各个方面都提出了方针政策，所有这些都体现了我们全党的意志，代表了全国各族人民的愿望，是我们党在新世纪、新阶段的政治宣言和行动纲领。我们新一届的中央领导集体将坚定不移地、一以贯之地加以贯彻执行。我们坚信在十六大精神的指引和鼓舞下，中国共产党将进一步向世人展现出与时俱进、开拓进取的良好形象，我们全党和全国各族人民将更加紧密团结在一起，聚精会神地搞建设，一心一意谋发展，把改革开放和现代化建设继续推向前进。中国的明天一定会更加美好，中国的发展进步一定会对世界的和平发展做出更大的贡献。我衷心地感谢新闻传媒的各位朋友为采访报道我们党的十六大所付出的辛劳并期待着今后与各位有更好的合作。谢谢大家！

坚持发扬艰苦奋斗的优良作风 努力实现全面建设小康社会的宏伟目标

这次，我和中央书记处的几位同志一起到西柏坡来，主要目的是回顾我们党带领人民进行伟大革命斗争的历史，重温毛泽东同志在党的七届二中全会上的重要讲话，牢记毛泽东同志当年倡导的“两个务必”，首先从自身做起，并号召全党同志特别是
领导干部，大力发扬艰苦奋斗的作风，为实现党的十六大确定的目标和任务开拓进取、团结奋斗。

刚刚闭幕的党的十六大，全面分析新世纪新阶段党和国家面临的新形势新任务，把“三个代表”重要思想同马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论一道确立为我们党必须长期坚持的指导思想，科学总结党领导人民建设中国特色社会主义的基本经验，提出全面建设小康社会的奋斗目标和推进各方面工作的方针政策，选举产生了新一届中央领导集体，从思想上、政治上、组织上为党和国家事业在新世纪新阶段的发展奠定了坚实的基础。

现在，目标已经确定，蓝图已经绘就。要实现宏伟目标，把蓝图变成美好的现实，需要全党同志和全国各族人民团结一致，艰苦奋斗。在这样的时刻，重温毛泽东同志在党的七届二中全会上的重要讲话，重温邓小平同志、江泽民同志关于全党和全国人民要长期艰苦奋斗的一系列论述，结合新的实际坚持做到“两个务必”，具有十分重要的意义。

通过参观学习，我们进一步了解了党的七届二中全会和毛泽东同志提出“两个务必”的历史背景和重大意义。从1947年5月刘少奇、朱德同志抵达西柏坡和1948年4月周恩来、任弼时同志、5月毛泽东同志抵达西柏坡，到1949年3月23日毛泽东同志和党中央离开西柏坡前往北京，这一段时期在我们党的历史上具有重大的意义。周恩来同志曾经说过，西柏坡是我们党进入北京、解放全中国的最后一个农村指挥所，党中央和毛泽东同志在这里指挥了辽沈、平津、淮海三大战役。1949年3月5日至13日，我们党在西柏坡召开了七届二中全会。这是我们党在中国革命的重大历史关头召开的一次极其重要的会议。当时，中国革命处于全国胜利的前夜。我们党领导人民经过28年的浴血奋战，即将完成以农村包围城市、最后夺取全国胜利的历史任务，掌握全国政权、建立新中国的历史使命摆在了党的面前。随着中国革命局势的胜利发展，我们党面临的主要任务将由通过武装斗争夺取政权转向掌握全国政权、领导人民建设国家，我们党的工作重心将由农村转向城市。面对这个重大的历史转折，党中央和毛泽东同志深刻地认识到，如何使全党同志在伟大的胜利面前保持清醒的头脑，在夺取全国政权后经受住执政的考验，始终保持党的性质和宗旨，防止出现骄傲自满、贪图享乐、脱离群众而导致人亡政息的危险，是我们党面临的全新的历史性课题，必须及时地、郑重地向全党同志提出这个问题，使全党同志保持高度的警觉，做好充分的思想准备。在党的七届二中全会上，毛泽东同志高瞻远瞩地向全党特别是高级干部敲了警钟，提出了全党同志必须做到“两个务必”的著名论述。这里，我想完整地念一下这段论述。

毛泽东同志深刻地指出：“我们很快就要在全国胜利了。这个胜利将冲破帝国主义的东方战线，具有伟大的国际意义。夺取这个胜利，已经是不要很久的时间和不要花费很大的气力了；巩固这个胜利，则是需要很久的时间和要花费很大的气力的事情。资产阶级怀疑我们的建设能力。帝国主义者估计我们终久会要向他们讨乞才能活下去。因为胜利，党内的骄傲情绪，以功臣自居的情绪，停顿起来不求进步的情绪，贪图享乐不愿再过艰苦生活的情绪，可能生长。因为胜利，人民感谢我们，资产阶级也会出来捧场。敌人的武力是不能征服我们的，这点已经得到证明了。资产阶级的捧场则可能征服我们队伍中的意志薄弱者。可能有这样一些共产党人，他们是不曾被拿枪的敌
人征服过的，他们在这些敌人面前不愧英雄的称号；但是经不起人们用糖衣裹着的炮弹的攻击，他们在糖弹面前要打败仗。我们必须预防这种情况。夺取全国胜利，这只是万里长征走完了第一步。如果这一步也值得骄傲，那是比较渺小的，更值得骄傲的还在后头。在过了几十年之后来看中国人民民主革命的胜利，就会使人感觉那好像只是一出长剧的一个短小的序幕。剧是必须从序幕开始的，但序幕还不是高潮。中国的革命是伟大的，但革命以后的路程更长，工作更伟大，更艰苦。这一点现在就必须向党内讲明白，务必使同志们继续地保持谦虚、谨慎、不骄、不躁的作风，务必使同志们继续地保持艰苦奋斗的作风。我们有批评和自我批评这个马克思列宁主义的武器。我们能够去掉不良作风，保持优良作风。我们能够学会我们原来不懂的东西。我们不但善于破坏一个旧世界，我们还将善于建设一个新世界。”

毛泽东同志的这段论述非常重要，特别是其中的两个重要思想具有长远的指导意义。一是，在伟大的成就面前，党内一部分同志可能会骄傲起来，贪图享乐的思想可能滋长，不愿意再做艰苦的工作，如果不坚决防范和克服这种情绪，党的事业就不能继续向前发展，甚至会失败。二是，不论我们党取得什么样的成就，都必须长期艰苦奋斗，始终坚持马克思列宁主义政党的本色和宗旨，不断维护和实现最广大人民的根本利益，这样我们党才能始终保持同人民群众的血肉联系，始终得到广大人民群众的拥护和支持，始终立于不败之地。

新民主主义的这段论述非常重要，特别是其中的两个重要思想具有长远的指导意义。一是，在伟大的成就面前，党内一部分同志可能会骄傲起来，贪图享乐的思想可能滋长，不愿意再做艰苦的工作，如果不坚决防范和克服这种情绪，党的事业就不能继续向前发展，甚至会失败。二是，不论我们党取得什么样的成就，都必须长期艰苦奋斗，始终坚持马克思列宁主义政党的本色和宗旨，不断维护和实现最广大人民的根本利益，这样我们党才能始终保持同人民群众的血肉联系，始终得到广大人民群众的拥护和支持，始终立于不败之地。

新中国成立 50 多年来，我们党对坚持艰苦奋斗的问题一直是高度重视的，总是反复地，经常地向全党同志特别是领导干部加以强调。

新中国成立后，毛泽东同志曾多次要求全党同志和领导干部要坚持艰苦奋斗。他说：“要使全体干部和全体人民经常想到我国是一个社会主义的大国，但又是一个经济落后的穷国，这是一个很大的矛盾。要使我国富强起来，需要几十年艰苦奋斗的时间。”他强调：“我们要保持过去革命战争时期的那么一股劲，那么一种革命热情，那么一种拼命精神，把革命工作做到底。”

党的十一届三中全会以后，邓小平同志一再告诫全党：“中国搞四个现代化，要老老实实地艰苦创业。我们穷，底子薄，教育、科学、文化都落后，这就决定了我们还要有一个艰苦奋斗的过程。”他还说：”艰苦奋斗是我们的传统，艰苦朴素的教育今后要抓紧，要抓六十至七十年。我们的国家越发展，越要抓艰苦创业。提倡艰苦创业精神，也有利于克服腐败现象。”

党的十三届四中全会以后，江泽民同志反复强调全党特别是领导干部要永远艰苦奋斗。1991 年 9 月，江泽民同志专程来到西柏坡，强调在新的历史条件下全党同志必须始终坚持“两个务必”，并且着重强调：“牢记‘两个务必’，建设有中国特色的社会主义。”1995 年，江泽民同志强调：“艰苦奋斗，是中国共产党的光荣传统，是我们党保持同人民群众密切联系的一个法宝，也是一个干部特别是领导干部必须具备的基本政治素质。我们党正是靠艰苦奋斗不断发展壮大起来的。过去千革命需要艰苦奋斗，今天搞社会主义现代化建设，同样要靠艰苦奋斗。”1997 年，江泽民同志指出：“党的性质和肩负的历史使命，决定了我们艰苦奋斗的本色。实现党的崇高理想需要经过长时间的奋斗，广大党员和干部无论在什么情况下都要发扬艰苦奋斗精神，永不停步地前进。”2001 年 11 月，他到河北考察工作时，再一次要求全党同志坚持
“两个务必”，指出：“要结合新的实际在全体党员干部中广泛开展坚持‘两个务必’的教育，使全党同志在日益复杂的国内外环境中始终保持清醒的头脑，居安思危，增强忧患意识，扎扎实实地为国家和人民工作。”

党的三代领导核心关于坚持艰苦奋斗的论述，语重心长、寓意深刻，我们要认真领会，切实贯彻。

现在，我国已进入全面建设小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化的新阶段。经过十一届三中全会以来 20 多年特别是十三届四中全会以来 13 年的艰苦奋斗，我国的改革开放和社会主义现代化建设取得了举世瞩目的伟大成就，我们完全有理由为此感到自豪，但我们决不能自满，决不能懈怠，决不能停滞。成绩越大，喝彩声越多，我们越要保持清醒的头脑。而且，必须看到，我们取得的成就只是在伟大征途上迈出的坚实一步，要完成十六大提出的全面建设小康社会的奋斗目标，要完成基本实现现代化、把我国建设成为富强民主文明的社会主义国家的历史任务，要不断开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面，我们要走的路还长得很，我们肩负的任务还很艰巨，我们可能遇到的困难和挑战还会很多，我们必须始终谦虚谨慎、艰苦奋斗。

中华民族历来以勤劳勇敢、不畏艰难著称于世。我们的古人早就讲过，“艰难困苦，玉汝于成”，“居安思危，戒奢以俭”，“忧劳兴国，逸豫亡身”，“生于忧患，死于安乐”，等等。这些警世名言，今天对我们依然有着重要的启示作用。历史和现实都表明，一个没有艰苦奋斗精神作支撑的民族，是难以自立自强的；一个没有艰苦奋斗精神作支撑的国家，是难以发展进步的；一个没有艰苦奋斗精神作支撑的政党，是难以兴旺发达的。在我们党 80 多年的历程中，艰苦奋斗作为强大的精神力量，始终激励着我们顽强进取、百折不挠，在各种困难和考验面前巍然屹立、敢于胜利。可以说，我们党是靠艰苦奋斗起家的，也是靠艰苦奋斗发展壮大、成就伟业的。没有艰苦奋斗，就没有我们党今天的局面。艰苦奋斗作为我们党的优良传统和作风，作为我们马克思主义政党的政治本色，是凝聚党心民心、激励全党和全体人民为实现国家富强、民族振兴共同奋斗的强大精神力量，是我们党保持同人民群众血肉联系的一个重要法宝。在革命战争年代和社会主义革命、建设、改革时期，千千万万革命先辈和共产党人为了党和人民的事业无私奉献、忘我奋斗，他们中的许多人不惜牺牲了宝贵的生命，谱写了我们党坚持艰苦奋斗的壮丽篇章。我们永远不能忘记他们为党和人民建立的丰功伟绩，永远不能忘记他们用生命培育的奋斗精神，一定要继承和发扬他们的优秀品质和崇高精神，做到为党和人民的事业生命不息、奋斗不止。

应该看到，这些年来，拜金主义、享乐主义和奢靡之风在党员队伍和干部队伍中有滋长蔓延之势，艰苦奋斗的优良作风在一部分党员、干部那里被淡忘了，在少数人那里甚至被丢得差不多了。大量事实表明，在新的历史条件下，能不能坚持发扬艰苦奋斗的优良作风，能不能经得起权力、金钱、美色的诱惑，对每个党员特别是领导干部是一个很现实的考验。我们讲艰苦奋斗，当然不是要人们去过清教徒式、苦行僧式的生活，也不是要否定合理的物质利益，而是要大力提倡艰苦奋斗、自强不息，与时俱进、开拓创新的精神，要求每个领导干部始终保持共产党人的政治本色。越是改革开放和发展社会主义市场经济，越要弘扬艰苦奋斗的精神。
了，人民的生活富裕了，艰苦奋斗的精神也不能丢。那种认为艰苦奋斗是老一套、已经过时了的想法是错误的，也是有害的。

在这里，我向全党同志特别是领导干部提出四点希望。

第一，牢记我国的基本国情和我们党的庄严使命，树立为党和人民长期艰苦奋斗的思想。要深刻认识坚持艰苦奋斗的重要性，关键是要清醒地认识我国的基本国情。我国正处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段，人民日益增长的物质文化需要同落后的社会生产之间的矛盾仍然是我国社会的主要矛盾。十六大报告在提出全面建设小康社会的奋斗目标时，深刻分析了我们面临的突出问题和困难，向全党和全国人民明确提出了必须长期艰苦奋斗的要求。我国是一个有近13亿人口的发展中大国，生产力和科技、教育比较落后，实现工业化和现代化还有很长的路要走。我国人民生活总体上达到了小康水平，但现在达到的小康还是低水平的、不全面的、发展很不平衡的小康，巩固和提高目前达到的小康水平，还需要进行长期的艰苦奋斗。同世界先进水平相比，我国的经济实力、科技实力、国防实力还存在很大的差距，我们仍然面临发达国家在经济科技等方面占优势的压力。面对复杂多变的国际局势，国内繁重艰巨的改革、建设任务和我们党肩负的庄严使命，我们没有任何理由不思进取，没有任何理由固步自封而止步不前，没有任何理由满足现状而稍有懈怠。全党同志特别是各级领导干部必须清醒地看到激烈的国际竞争给我们带来的严峻挑战，清醒地看到我们肩负的任务的艰巨性和复杂性，清醒地看到我们工作中存在的困难和风险，增强忧患意识，居安思危，深刻认识坚持艰苦奋斗的极端重要性，牢固树立为党和人民长期艰苦奋斗的思想。

第二，牢记全心全意为人民服务的宗旨，始终不渝地为最广大人民谋利益。艰苦奋斗，是我们党作为马克思主义政党的本色，也是我们党坚持执政为民、始终成为中国特色社会主义事业领导核心的必然要求。只有坚持艰苦奋斗，心中装着人民群众，始终同人民群众同呼吸、共命运、心连心，才能保持我们党同人民群众的血肉联系，才能增强抵御腐朽思想侵蚀的能力，才能不断与时俱进、开拓创新。如果丢掉了艰苦奋斗的作风，贪图享乐，不愿意再做艰苦的工作，对群众的疾苦漠然置之，对群众的呼声充耳不闻，就必然会脱离群众。牢记党的宗旨，坚持艰苦奋斗，这两者之间有着十分紧密的联系。只有牢记全心全意为人民服务的宗旨，才能保持艰苦奋斗的革命意志和革命品格；只有坚持艰苦奋斗，才能更好地履行全心全意为人民服务的宗旨。坚持艰苦奋斗，根本目的就是要为最广大人民的根本利益而不懈努力，不断把人民群众的利益维护好、实现好、发展好。这也是我们贯彻“三个代表”重要思想的必然要求。各级领导干部要坚持深入基层、深入群众，倾听群众呼声，关心群众疾苦，时刻把人民群众的安危冷暖挂在心上，做到权为民所用，情为民所系，利为民所谋。尤其要关心那些生产和生活遇到困难的群众，深入到贫困地区、困难企业中去，深入到下岗职工、农村贫困人口、城市贫困人口等困难群众中去，千方百计地帮助他们解决实际困难。要通过扎实有效的工作，实实在在地为群众谋利益，带领群众创造自己的幸福生活。

第三，牢记党的基本理论、基本路线、基本纲领和基本经验，以艰苦奋斗的精神做好各项工作。发扬艰苦奋斗的作风，要同贯彻落实党的基本理论、基本路线、基本
纲领和基本经验紧密结合起来，同全面贯彻落实“三个代表”重要思想紧密结合起来。实践证明，要把党的事业不断推向前进，需要有正确理论、路线和方针政策的指引，还要有良好的精神状态和扎实的作风，经过艰苦奋斗，把各项工作落到实处。我们讲要聚精会神搞建设，一心一意谋发展，不要真功夫、苦功夫是不行的。所有领导干部要保持昂扬向上的精神状态，发扬百折不挠的斗志，坚定不移地在工作中贯彻落实党的理论、路线和方针政策，扎扎实实地做好各项工作。要坚持实现远大目标和切实做好当前工作的统一，坚持发扬共产党的革命精神和坚持科学务实态度的统一，脚踏实地，埋头苦干，讲实效，办实事，坚决反对形式主义和官僚主义。要不畏艰难，奋力拼搏，勇于开拓，善于创新，在带领群众战胜困难的过程中，切实落实党的方针政策，全面做好改革发展稳定的各项工作。

第四，牢记党和人民的重托和肩负的历史责任，自觉在艰苦奋斗的实践中加强党性锻炼。毛泽东同志曾经指出：“坚定正确的政治方向，是与艰苦奋斗的工作作风不能脱离的，没有坚定正确的政治方向，就不能激发艰苦奋斗的工作作风；没有艰苦奋斗的工作作风，也就不能执行坚定正确的政治方向。”毛泽东同志的这段话，深刻地揭示了坚持正确的政治方向和坚持艰苦奋斗之间的辩证关系。对于共产党员和领导干部来说，保持和弘扬艰苦奋斗的精神，说到底就是牢固树立和坚持马克思主义的世界观、人生观、价值观的问题。只有从根本上解决好世界观、人生观、价值观的问题，牢固树立群众观点，才能使艰苦奋斗的精神在思想上真正扎根、在行动上自觉体现。只有真正做到为党和人民艰苦奋斗，才能在思想上作风上真正贴近群众，也才能在实践中不断解决好世界观、人生观、价值观的问题。总之，艰苦奋斗既是我们必须大力弘扬的工作作风，又是我们必须大力弘扬的思想作风，是共产党人应有的政治品质。

大力弘扬艰苦奋斗的精神，关键是领导干部要以身作则，首先是高级干部要率先垂范。我们手中的权力是党和人民赋予的，只能用来为广大人民谋利益。要树立正确的权力观，保持立党为公、执政为民，真正为人民掌好权、用好权，做到夙兴夜寐、勤奋工作。无论在成绩面前还是在困难面前，领导干部都要始终保持谦虚谨慎、不骄不躁的作风，保持艰苦奋斗的作风。各级领导干部特别是年轻干部，要自觉地发扬脚踏实地、真抓实干的作风，弘扬艰苦朴素、勤俭建国的精神，坚决反对浮躁浮夸、急功近利，坚决反对铺张浪费、大手大脚。各级领导干部要在实践中不断加强自身修养，牢固树立艰苦奋斗的思想，磨练艰苦奋斗的意志，始终保持共产党人的蓬勃朝气、昂扬锐气、浩然正气，扎扎实实地工作，不断为党和人民建立新的业绩。

1949年3月23日上午，从西柏坡动身前往北京的时候，毛泽东同志说：“今天是进京赶考的日子。”这是一句意味深长的话。毛泽东同志充分估计到，在这个重大历史关头，党所肩负的任务是繁重的，党所面临的挑战是严峻的，需要全党同志继续进行艰苦的努力。50多年的实践证明，在党的三代中央领导集体的领导下，我们党在这场考试中取得了优异的成绩。今天，在新世纪新阶段，我们党要带领人民实现全面建设小康社会的奋斗目标，不断开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面，是这场考试的继续。我们新一届中央领导集体的同志，所有领导干部和全体党员，一定要高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，全面贯彻“三个代表”重要思想，紧紧依靠全国各族人民，在这场考试中经受考验，努力交出优异的答卷。
Hu Jintao 2003-03-18

胡锦涛在第十届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的讲话

各位代表:

这次大会选举我担任中华人民共和国主席，我对各位代表和全国各族人民的信任，表示衷心的感谢。我深知，担任国家主席这一崇高的职务，使命光荣，责任重大。我一定忠诚地履行宪法赋予的职责，恪尽职守，勤勉工作，竭诚为国家和人民服务，不辜负各位代表和全国各族人民的重托。

江泽民同志担任国家主席 10 年间，高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，以审时度势的领导才能、与时俱进的政治勇气和励精图治的工作精神，为中国特色社会主义事业的发展建立了卓著的功勋，赢得了全国各族人民的衷心爱戴和国际社会的普遍赞誉。尤其是他集中全党智慧创立的“三个代表”重要思想，对于我国各项事业的发展具有重大而深远的指导意义。我们向江泽民同志表示衷心的感谢和崇高的敬意！

我们新一届国家机构工作人员是在国际形势复杂多变、国内建设任务艰巨繁重的新形势下担负重任的，为了履行好人民赋予的神圣职责，我们一定努力做到：

第一，发扬民主、依法办事，坚持党的领导、人民当家作主和依法治国的有机统一，坚定不移地维护社会主义民主的制度和原则，维护社会主义法制的统一和尊严。

第二，忠于祖国、一心为民，坚持国家和人民的利益高于一切，做到权为民所用、情为民所系、利为民所谋，始终做人民的公仆。

第三，继往开来、与时俱进，继承和弘扬中华民族的优良传统，学习和发扬我国老一辈领导人的崇高品德，永不自满，永不懈怠，开拓进取，不断前进。

第四，严以律己、廉洁奉公，始终保持谦虚谨慎、艰苦奋斗的作风，为国家和人民夙兴夜寐地勤奋工作。

我和新一届国家机构工作人员诚心诚意地接受各位代表和全国各族人民的监督。

各位代表，五千多年来，中华民族历经沧桑，创造了灿烂辉煌的中华文明，也经受过屈辱和磨难。近代以来，无数爱国志士和中国共产党人为中华的崛起前赴后继、英勇奋斗。新中国成立半个多世纪来，在中国共产党的领导下，经过全国各族人民的顽强努力，中国大地上发生了翻天覆地的历史巨变。今天，我们伟大的祖国欣欣向荣，发展前景无比美好。中国人民的伟大实践向世人昭示：只有社会主义才能救中国，只有中国特色社会主义才能发展中国。全面贯彻十六大精神，把中国特色社会主义伟大事业继续推向前进，这是历史和时代赋予我们的崇高使命。

我国的发展正处在一个新的历史起点上。我们要坚持解放思想、实事求是、与时俱进，紧紧抓住本世纪头 20 年的重要战略机遇期，聚精会神搞建设，一心一意谋发展，大力推进改革开放，促进社会主义物质文明、政治文明和精神文明的协调发展，坚定不移地朝着全面建设小康社会的宏伟目标前进。
实现祖国的完全统一是海内外中华儿女的共同心愿。我们要继续坚持“一国两制”方针，保持香港、澳门繁荣稳定，大力推动海峡两岸经济文化交流和人员往来，为早日解决台湾问题、实现祖国的完全统一而继续奋斗。

中华民族历来爱好和平。我们要继续奉行独立自主的和平外交政策，同所有国家保持和发展友好合作关系，同世界各国人民一道，努力推动建立公正合理的国际政治经济新秩序，不断促进人类和平与发展的崇高事业。

各位代表，1954年9月15日，毛泽东同志在第一届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上致开幕词时指出：“我们有充分的信心，克服一切艰难困苦，将我国建设成为一个伟大的社会主义共和国。”我们已经朝着这个光辉目标迈出了伟大的步伐，我们必将迈出更加伟大的步伐。只要我们坚定不移地高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，坚定不移地贯彻“三个代表”重要思想，坚定不移地走中国特色社会主义道路，万众一心、团结奋斗，自强不息、艰苦创业，我们就一定能够胜利到达现代化的光辉彼岸，一代又一代中国人梦寐以求的中华民族的伟大复兴就一定能够实现，中华民族就一定能够对人类作出更大的贡献！

女士们，先生们，朋友们：大家好！让大家久等了，很高兴同各位记者朋友见面。

昨天，中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会胜利闭幕了。这些天来，各位记者朋友们为这次会议作了大量报道，向世界各国传递了许多“中国声音”。大家很敬业、很专业、很辛苦，我代表中央和全国各族人民，向你们表示衷心的感谢。

刚才，我们召开了中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第一次全体会议，会议上选举产生了新一届中央领导机构。全会选举产生了七位中央政治局常委，选举我担任中共中央总书记。接下来，我把其他六位常委同事向大家介绍一下。

他们是：李克强同志、张德江同志、俞正声同志、刘云山同志、王岐山同志、张高丽同志。

李克强同志是十七届中央政治局常委，其他同志都是十七届中央政治局委员，大家对他们都比较了解。

在这里，我代表新一届中央领导机构成员，衷心感谢全党同志对我们的信任。我们一定不负重托，不辱使命！

全党同志的重托，全国各族人民的期望，这是对我们做好工作的巨大鼓舞，也是我们肩上沉沉的担子。

这个重大的责任，是对民族的责任。我们的民族是伟大的民族。在五千多年的文明发展历程中，中华民族为人类的文明进步作出了不可磨灭的贡献。近代以后，我们
的民族历经磨难，中华民族到了最危险的时候。自那时以来，为了实现中华民族伟大复兴，无数仁人志士奋起抗争，但一次又一次地失败了。

中国共产党成立后，团结带领人民前赴后继、顽强奋斗，把贫穷落后的旧中国变成日益走向繁荣富强的新中国，中华民族伟大复兴展现出前所未有的光明前景。

我们的责任，就是要团结带领全党全国各族人民，接过历史的接力棒，继续为实现中华民族伟大复兴而努力奋斗，使中华民族更加坚强有力地自立于世界民族之林，为人类作出新的更大的贡献。

这个重大的责任，就是对人民的责任。我们的人民是伟大的人民。在漫长的历史进程中，中国人民依靠自己的勤劳、勇敢、智慧，开创了民族和睦共处的美好家园，培育了历久弥新的优秀文化。

我们的人民热爱生活，期盼有更好的教育、更稳定的工作、更满意的收入、更可靠的社会保障、更高水平的医疗卫生服务、更舒适的居住条件、更优美的环境，期盼着孩子们能成长得更好、工作得更好、生活得更好。人民对美好生活的向往，就是我们的奋斗目标。

人世间的一切幸福都是要靠辛勤的劳动来创造的。我们的责任，就是要团结带领全党全国各族人民，继续解放思想，坚持改革开放，不断解放和发展社会生产力，努力解决群众的生产生活困难，坚定不移走共同富裕的道路。

这个重大的责任，就是对党的责任。我们的党是全心全意为人民服务的政党。党的领导人民已经取得了举世瞩目的成就，我们完全有理由因此而自豪，但我们自豪而不自满，决不会躺在过去的功劳簿上。

新形势下，我们党面临着许多严峻挑战，党内存在着许多亟待解决的问题。尤其是一些党员干部中发生的贪污腐败、脱离群众、形式主义、官僚主义等问题，必须下大气力解决。全党必须警醒起来。

打铁还需自身硬。我们的责任，就是同全党同志一道，坚持党要管党、从严治党，切实解决自身存在的突出问题，切实改进工作作风，密切联系群众，使我们的党始终成为中国特色社会主义事业的坚强领导核心。

人民是历史的创造者，群众是真正的英雄。人民群众是我们力量的源泉。我们深深知道：每个人的力量是有限的，但只要我们万众一心，众志成城，就没有克服不了的困难；每个人的工作时间是有限的，但全心全意为人民服务是无限的。

责任重于泰山，事业任重道远。我们一定要始终与人民心心相印、与人民同甘共苦、与人民团结奋斗，夙夜在公，勤勉工作，努力向历史、向人民交一份合格的答卷。

记者朋友们，中国需要更多地了解世界，世界也需要更多地了解中国。希望你们今后要继续为增进中国与世界各国的相互了解作出努力和贡献。

谢谢大家！

* * *
紧紧围绕坚持和发展中国特色社会主义，学习宣传贯彻党的十八大精神

党的十八大报告勾画了在新的历史条件下全面建成小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化、夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利的宏伟蓝图，是我们党团结带领全国各族人民沿着中国特色社会主义道路继续前进、全面建成小康社会而奋斗的政治宣言和行动纲领，为各级党政机关、企事业单位、社会团体等提供了一个学习的方向。中央已经发出关于认真学习宣传贯彻党的十八大精神的通知，各级党委要按照通知要求，把学习宣传贯彻党的十八大精神引向深入。

党的十八大强调要高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，强调中国特色社会主义是党和人民90多年奋斗、创造、积累的根本成就，必须倍加珍惜、始终坚持、不断发展，号召全党不懈探索和把握中国特色社会主义规律，永葆党的生机活力，永葆国家发展动力，奋力开拓中国特色社会主义更为广阔的发展前景。可以说，坚持和发展中国特色社会主义是贯穿党的十八大报告的一条主线。我们要紧紧抓住这条主线，把坚持和发展中国特色社会主义作为学习贯彻党的十八大精神的聚焦点、着力点、落脚点，只有这样，才能把党的十八大精神学得更加深入、领会得更加透彻、贯彻得更加自觉。

为什么我要强调这一点？这是因为，党和国家的长期实践充分证明，只有社会主义才能救中国，只有中国特色社会主义才能发展中国。只有高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，我们才能团结带领全党全国各族人民，在中国共产党成立100年时全面建成小康社会，在新中国成立100年时建成富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家，赢得中国人民和中华民族更加幸福美好的未来。

紧紧围绕坚持和发展中国特色社会主义学习宣传贯彻党的十八大精神，我体会，应该从理论和实践的结合上把握好几个方面。

第一，深刻领会中国特色社会主义是党和人民长期实践取得的根本成就。中国特色社会主义是改革开放新时期开创的，也是建立在我们党长期奋斗基础上的，是由我们党的几代中央领导集体团结带领全党全国各族人民历经千辛万苦、付出各种代价、接力探索取得的。我们党紧紧依靠人民，从根本上改变了中国人民和中华民族的前途命运，不可逆转地结束了近代以后中国内忧外患、积贫积弱的悲惨命运，不可逆转地开启了中华民族不断发展壮大、走向伟大复兴的历史进军，使具有5000多年文明历史的中华民族以崭新的姿态屹立于世界民族之林。

我们要永远铭记党的三代中央领导集体和以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央为中国特色社会主义作出的历史性贡献。以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体，为新时期开创中国特色社会主义提供了宝贵经验、理论准备、物质基础。以邓小平同志为核心的党的第二代中央领导集体，成功开创了中国特色社会主义。以江泽民同志为核心的党的第三代中央领导集体，成功把中国特色社会主义推向二十一世纪。新世纪新阶段，以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央，成功在新的历史起点上坚持和发展了中国特色社会主义。可以看出，中国特色社会主义，承载着几代中国共产党人的理想和探索，寄托着无数仁人志士的夙愿和期盼，凝聚着亿万人民的奋斗和牺牲，是近代以来中国社会发展的必然选择，是发展中国、稳定中国的必由之路。
实践充分证明，中国特色社会主义是中国共产党和中国人民团结的旗帜、奋进的旗帜、胜利的旗帜。我们要全面建成小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化、实现中华民族伟大复兴，必须始终高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，坚定不移坚持和发展中国特色社会主义。党的十八大要求全党坚定对中国特色社会主义的道路自信、理论自信、制度自信，其根本原因就在这里。

第二，深刻领会中国特色社会主义是由道路、理论体系、制度三位一体构成的。党的十八大阐明了中国特色社会主义道路、中国特色社会主义理论体系、中国特色社会主义制度的科学内涵及其相互联系，强调：中国特色社会主义道路是实现途径，中国特色社会主义理论体系是行动指南，中国特色社会主义制度是根本保障，三者统一于中国特色社会主义伟大实践。这是中国特色社会主义的最鲜明特色。

这个概括告诉我们：中国特色社会主义是实践、理论、制度紧密结合的，既把成功的实践上升为理论，又以正确的理论指导新的实践，还把实践中已见成效的方针政策及时上升为党和国家的制度。所以，中国特色社会主义特就特在道路、理论体系、制度上，特就特在其实现途径、行动指南、根本保障的内在联系上，特就特在这三者统一于中国特色社会主义伟大实践上。在当代中国，坚持和发展中国特色社会主义，就是真正坚持社会主义。

中国特色社会主义道路，是实现我国社会主义现代化的必由之路，是创造人民美好生活的必由之路。中国特色社会主义道路，既坚持以经济建设为中心，又全面推进经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设、生态文明建设以及其他各方面建设；既坚持四项基本原则，又坚持改革开放；既不断解放和发展社会生产力，又逐步实现全体人民共同富裕、促进人的全面发展。

中国特色社会主义理论体系，是马克思主义中国化最新成果，包括邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想、科学发展观，同马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想是坚持、发展和继承、创新的关系。马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想一定不能丢，丢了就丧失根本。同时，我们一定要以我国改革开放和现代化建设的实际问题、以我们正在做的事情为中心，着眼于马克思主义理论的运用，着眼于对实际问题的理论思考，着眼于新的实践和新的发展。在当代中国，坚持中国特色社会主义理论体系，就是真正坚持马克思主义。

中国特色社会主义制度，坚持把根本政治制度、基本政治制度同基本经济制度以及各方面体制机制等具体制度有机结合起来，坚持把国家层面民主制度同基层民主制度有机结合起来，坚持把党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机结合起来，符合我国国情，集中体现了中国特色社会主义的特点和优势，是中国发展进步的根本制度保障。

应该看到，中国特色社会主义制度是特色鲜明、富有效率的，但还不是尽善尽美、成熟定型的。中国特色社会主义事业不断发展，中国特色社会主义制度也需要不断完善。邓小平同志 1992 年在视察南方重要谈话中指出：“恐怕再有三十年的时间，我们才会在各方面形成一整套更加成熟、更加定型的制度。”党的十八大强调，要把制度建设摆在突出位置，充分发挥我国社会主义政治制度优越性。我们要坚持以实践基础
上的理论创新推动制度创新，坚持和完善现有制度，从实际出发，及时制定一些新的制度，构建系统完备、科学规范、运行有效的制度体系，使各方面制度更加成熟更加定型，为夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利提供更加有效的制度保障。

第三，深刻领会建设中国特色社会主义的总依据、总布局、总任务。党的十八大强调，建设中国特色社会主义，总依据是社会主义初级阶段，总布局是五位一体，总任务是实现社会主义现代化和中华民族伟大复兴。这“三个总”的概括，高屋建瓴，提纲挈领，言简意赅。深刻领会和把握这个新概括，有助于我们深刻领会和把握中国特色社会主义的真谛和要义。

强调总依据，是因为社会主义初级阶段是当代中国的最大国情、最大实际。我们在任何情况下都要牢牢把握这个最大国情，推进任何方面的改革发展都要牢牢立足这个最大实际。不仅在经济建设中要始终立足初级阶段，而且在政治建设、文化建设、社会建设、生态文明建设中也要始终牢记初级阶段；不仅在经济总量低时要立足初级阶段，而且在经济总量提高后仍然要牢记初级阶段；不仅在谋划长远发展时要立足初级阶段，而且在日常工作中也要牢记初级阶段。党在社会主义初级阶段的基本路线是党和国家的生命线。我们在实践中要始终坚持“一个中心、两个基本点”不动摇，既不偏离“一个中心”，也不偏废“两个基本点”，把践行中国特色社会主义共同理想和坚定共产主义远大理想统一起来，坚决抵制抛弃社会主义的各种错误主张，自觉纠正超越阶段的错误观念和政策措施。只有这样，才能真正做到既不妄自菲薄、也不妄自尊大，扎扎实实夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利。

强调总布局，是因为中国特色社会主义是全面发展的社会主义。我们要牢牢抓好党执政兴国的第一要务，始终代表中国先进生产力的发展要求，坚持以经济建设为中心，在经济不断发展的基础上，协调推进政治建设、文化建设、社会建设、生态文明建设以及其他各方面建设。随着我国经济社会发展不断深入，生态文明建设地位和作用日益凸显。党的十八大把生态文明建设纳入中国特色社会主义事业总体布局，使生态文明建设的战略地位更加明确，有利于把生态文明建设融入经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设各方面和全过程。这是我们党对社会主义建设规律在实践和认识上不断深化的重要成果。我们要按照这个总布局，促进现代化建设各方面相协调，促进生产关系与生产力、上层建筑与经济基础相协调。

强调总任务，是因为我们党从成立那天起，就肩负着实现中华民族伟大复兴的历史使命。我们党领导人民进行革命建设改革，就是要让中国人民富裕起来，国家强盛起来，振兴伟大的中华民族。按照现代化建设“三步走”的战略部署，建设富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家，是我们党和国家在整个社会主义初级阶段的奋斗目标。我们党的庄严使命、改革开放的根本目的、我们国家的奋斗目标，都聚焦于这个总任务、归结于这个总任务。我们要紧紧扭住这个总任务，一代一代锲而不舍干下去。

我们党在不同历史时期，总是根据人民意愿和事业发展需要，提出富有感召力的奋斗目标，团结带领人民为之奋斗。党的十六大提出全面建设小康社会的目标，顺应我国经济社会发展和广大人民群众新期待，对全面建设小康社会目标进行了充实和完善，提出了更具明确政策导向、更加针对发展难题、更好顺应人民意愿的新要求。这些目标要求，与党的十六大提出的全面建设小康社会奋斗目标和党的十七大提出的实现全
面对建设小康社会奋斗目标新要求相衔接，也与中国特色社会主义事业总体布局相一致。
全党全国要同心同德、埋头苦干，锐意创新、开拓进取，共同为实现党的十八大提出的全面建设小康社会和全面深化改革开放的目标而奋斗。

第四，深刻领会夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利的基本要求。党的十八大提出了在新的历史条件下夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利必须牢牢把握的基本要求。这些基本要求是根据党的基本理论、基本路线、基本纲领、基本经验，深刻总结 60 多年来我国社会主义建设特别是中国特色社会主义建设实践提出的，是最本质的东西，是体现共产党执政规律、社会主义建设规律、人类社会发展规律的东西，表明我们党对中国特色社会主义规律的认识达到了新水平。

党的十八大提出的基本要求，进一步回答了在新的历史征程上怎样才能夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利的基本问题。中国特色社会主义是亿万人民自己的事业，所以必须发挥人民主人翁精神，更好保证人民当家作主。解放和发展社会生产力是中国特色社会主义的根本任务，所以必须坚持以经济建设为中心，以科学发展为主题，实现以人为本、全面协调可持续的科学发展。改革开放是坚持和发展中国特色社会主义的必由之路，所以必须始终把改革创新精神贯彻到治国理政各个环节，不断推进我国社会主义制度自我完善和发展。公平正义是中国特色社会主义的内在要求，所以必须在全体人民共同奋斗、经济社会发展的基础上，加紧建设对保障社会公平正义具有重大作用的制度，逐步建立社会公平保障体系。共同富裕是中国特色社会主义的根本原则，所以必须使发展成果更多更公平惠及全体人民，朝着共同富裕方向稳步前进。社会和谐是中国特色社会主义的本质属性，所以必须必须团结一切可以团结的力量，最大限度增加和谐因素，增强社会创造活力，确保人民安居乐业、社会安定有序、国家长治久安。和平发展是中国特色社会主义的必然选择，所以必须坚持开放的发展、合作的发展、共赢的发展，扩大同各方利益汇合点，推动建设持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界。中国共产党是中国特色社会主义事业的领导核心，所以必须加强和改善党的领导，充分发挥党总揽全局、协调各方的领导核心作用。

党的十八大提出的基本要求，是对当前我国经济社会发展中存在的突出问题、改革攻坚和加快转变经济发展方式面临的难点问题、干部群众普遍关注的热点问题的积极回应，是对我国进入全面建成小康社会决定性阶段改革发展稳定、内政外交国防、治党治国治军的正确指引。这些基本要求，既涉及生产力和生产关系、又涉及经济基础和上层建筑，既涉及中国特色社会主义伟大事业、又涉及党的建设新的伟大工程，同时还涉及统筹国内国际两个大局。党的十八大对各项工作谋划和部署都是遵循和体现这些基本要求的。抓住了这些基本要求，就能更好凝聚力量、攻坚克难，继续推动科学发展、促进社会和谐，继续改善人民生活、增进人民福祉，完成时代赋予的光荣而艰巨的任务。

第五，深刻领会确保党始终成为中国特色社会主义事业的坚强领导核心。党的十八大强调，我们党担负着团结带领人民全面建成小康社会、推进社会主义现代化、实现中华民族伟大复兴的重任。党坚强有力，同人民保持血肉联系，国家就繁荣稳定，人民就幸福安康。形势的发展、事业的开拓、人民的期待，都要求我们以改革创新精神全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程，全面提高党的建设科学化水平。治国必先治党，
治党务必从严。为此，党的十八大提出了新形势下全面提高党的建设科学化水平的总要求和各项任务。全党要深刻学习领会、逐条贯彻落实。

党的十八大提出的党的建设总要求，既是着眼于继承和弘扬我们党90多年来保持和发展马克思主义政党先进性的根本点提出来的，又是着眼于顺应和应对新形势下世情、国情、党情的新变化提出来的。这些年来，我们全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程，党的执政能力得到新的提高，党的先进性和纯洁性得到保持和发展，党的领导得到加强和改善。同时，与国内外形势发展变化相比，党的领导水平和执政水平、党组织建设状况和党员干部素质、能力、作风都还有不小差距。特别是新形势下加强和改进党的建设面临“四大考验”、“四种危险”，落实党要管党、从严治党的任务比以往任何时候都更为繁重更为紧迫。全党要增强紧迫感和责任感，牢牢把握党的建设总要求，不断提高党的领导水平和执政水平、提高拒腐防变和抵御风险能力，使我们党在世界形势深刻变化的历史进程中始终走在时代前列，在应对国内外各种风险和考验的历史进程中始终成为全国人民的主心骨，在坚持和发展中国特色社会主义的历史进程中始终成为坚强领导核心。

坚定理想信念，坚守共产党人精神追求，始终是共产党人安身立命的根本。对马克思主义的信仰，对社会主义和共产主义的信念，是共产党人的政治灵魂，是共产党人经受住任何考验的精神支柱。形象地说，理想信念就是共产党人精神上的“钙”，没有理想信念，理想信念不坚定，精神上就会“缺钙”，就会得“软骨病”。现实中，一些党员、干部出这样那样的问题，说到底是信仰迷茫、精神迷失。全党要按照党的十八大部署，深入学习实践中国特色社会主义理论体系特别是科学发展观，讲党性、重品行、作表率，矢志不渝为实现中国特色社会主义共同理想而奋斗。

密切党群、干群关系，保持同人民群众的血肉联系，始终是我们党立于不败之地的根基。一个政党，一个政权，其前途和命运最终取决于人心向背。如果我们脱离群众、失去人民拥护和支持，最终也会走向失败。我们要适应新形势下群众工作新特点新要求，深入做好组织群众、宣传群众、教育群众、服务群众工作，虚心向群众学习，诚心接受群众监督，始终保持同人民群众的血肉联系，始终与人民群众心连心、同呼吸、共命运。要从人民伟大实践中汲取智慧和力量，办好顺民意、解民忧、惠民生的实事，纠正损害群众利益的行为。党的十八大提出，要在全党深入开展以为民务实清廉为主要内容的党的群众路线教育实践活动。中央将对这项活动进行部署，各级党委要切实抓好落实，着力解决人民群众反映强烈的突出问题，保证活动取得实效。

反对腐败、建设廉洁政治，保持党的肌体健康，始终是我们党一贯坚持的鲜明政治立场。党风廉政建设，是广大干部群众始终关注的重大政治问题。物必先腐而后虫生。近年来，一些国家因长期积累的矛盾导致民怨载道、社会动荡、政权垮台，其中贪污腐败就是一个很重要的原因。大量事实告诉我们，腐败问题越演越烈，最终必然会亡党亡国！我们要警醒啊！近年来我们党内发生的严重违纪违法案件，性质非常恶劣，政治影响极坏，令人触目惊心。各级党委要旗帜鲜明地反对腐败，更加科学有效地防治腐败，做到干部清正、政府清廉、政治清明，永葆共产党人清正廉洁的政治本色。各级领导干部特别是高级干部要自觉遵守廉政准则，既严于律己，又加强对
亲属和身边工作人员的教育和约束，决不允许以权谋私，决不允许搞特权。对一切违反党纪国法的行为，都必须严惩不贷，决不能手软。

党的十八大强调指出，发展中国特色社会主义是一项长期的艰巨的历史任务，必须准备进行具有许多新的历史特点的伟大斗争。全党同志一定要以更加坚定的信念、更加顽强的努力，毫不动摇坚持、与时俱进发展中国特色社会主义，不断发展中国特色社会主义的实践特色、理论特色、民族特色、时代特色，团结带领全国各族人民，努力实现全面建成小康社会各项目标任务，继续实现推进现代化建设、完成祖国统一、维护世界和平与促进共同发展这三大历史任务。这是我们这一代共产党人的历史重任，我们要为之付出全部智慧和力量。

** Xi Jinping 2013-03-17 **

再接再厉，继续为实现中国梦奋斗

各位代表，这次大会选举我担任中华人民共和国主席，我对各位代表和全国各族人民的信任，表示衷心的感谢！

我深知，担任国家主席这一崇高职务，使命光荣，责任重大。我将忠实履行宪法赋予的职责，忠于祖国，忠于人民，恪尽职守，夙夜在公，为民服务，为国尽力，自觉接受人民监督，决不辜负各位代表和全国各族人民的信任和重托。

各位代表！中华人民共和国走过了光辉的历程。在以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体、以邓小平同志为核心的党的第二代中央领导集体、以江泽民同志为核心的党的第三代中央领导集体和以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央领导下，全国各族人民戮力同心、接力奋斗，战胜前进道路上的各种艰难险阻，取得了举世瞩目的辉煌成就。

今天，我们的人民共和国正以昂扬的姿态屹立在世界东方。

胡锦涛同志担任国家主席 10 年间，以丰富的政治智慧、高超的领导才能、勤勉的工作精神，为坚持和发展中国特色社会主义建立了卓越的功勋，赢得了全国各族人民衷心爱戴和国际社会普遍赞誉。我们向胡锦涛同志，表示衷心的感谢和崇高的敬意！

各位代表！中华民族具有 5000 多年连绵不断的文明历史，创造了博大精深的中华文化，为人类文明进步作出了不可磨灭的贡献。经过几千年的沧桑岁月，把我国 56 个民族、13 亿多人紧紧凝聚在一起的，是我们共同经历的非凡奋斗，是我们共同创造的美好家园，是我们共同培育的民族精神，而贯穿其中的、最重要的是我们共同坚守的理想信念。

实现全面建成小康社会、建成富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家的奋斗目标，实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦，就是要实现国家富强、民族振兴、人民幸福，既深深体现了今天中国人的理想，也深深反映了我们先人们不懈奋斗追求进步的光荣传统。
面对浩浩荡荡的时代潮流，面对人民群众过上更好生活的殷切期待，我们不能有丝毫自满，不能有丝毫懈怠，必须再接再厉、一往无前，继续把中国特色社会主义事业推向前进，继续为实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦而努力奋斗。

实现中国梦必须走中国道路。这就是中国特色社会主义道路。这条道路来之不易，它是在改革开放30多年的伟大实践中走出来的，是在中华人民共和国成立60多年的持续探索中走出来的，是在对近代以来170多年中华民族发展历程的深刻总结中走出来的，是在对中华民族5000多年悠久文明的传承中走出来的，具有深厚的历史渊源和广泛的现实基础。中华民族是具有非凡创造力的民族，我们创造了伟大的中华文明，我们也能够继续拓展和走好适合中国国情的发展道路。全国各族人民一定要增强对中国特色社会主义的理论自信、道路自信、制度自信，坚定不移沿着正确的中国道路奋勇前进。

实现中国梦必须弘扬中国精神。这就是以爱国主义为核心的民族精神，以改革创新为核心的时代精神。这种精神是凝心聚力的兴国之魂、强国之魄。爱国主义始终是把中华民族坚强团结在一起的精神力量，改革创新始终是鞭策我们在改革开放中与时俱进的精神力量。全国各族人民一定要弘扬伟大的民族精神和时代精神，不断增强团结一心的精神纽带、自强不息的精神动力，永远朝气蓬勃迈向未来。

实现中国梦必须凝聚中国力量。这就是中国各族人民大团结的力量。中国梦是民族的梦，也是每个中国人的梦。只要我们紧密团结，万众一心，为实现共同梦想而奋斗，实现梦想的力量就无比强大，我们每个人为实现自己梦想的努力就拥有广阔的空间。生活在我们伟大祖国和伟大时代的中国人民，共同享有人生出彩的机会，共同享有梦想成真的机会，共同享有同祖国和时代一起成长与进步的机会。有梦想，有机会，有奋斗，一切美好的东西都能够创造出来。全国各族人民一定要牢记使命，心往一处想，劲往一处使，用13亿人的智慧和力量汇集起不可战胜的磅礴力量。

中国梦归根到底是人民的梦，必须紧紧依靠人民来实现，必须不断为人民造福。

我们要坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一，坚持人民主体地位，扩大人民民主，推进依法治国，坚持和完善人民代表大会制度的根本政治制度，中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度、民族区域自治制度以及基层群众自治制度等基本政治制度，发展基层民主，推进协商民主，坚持和完善人民代表大会制度的根本政治制度，推进政治建设和政治文明建设，发展协商民主，推进政治建设，发展民主政治，建设社会主义民主政治。我们要坚持发展是硬道理的战略思想，坚持以经济建设为中心，全面推进社会主义经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设、生态文明建设，促进工业化、信息化、城镇化、农业现代化同步发展，全面深化改革开放，推动科学发展，不断夯实实现中国梦的物质文化基础。

我们要坚持发展是硬道理的战略思想，坚持以经济建设为中心，全面推进社会主义经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设、生态文明建设，促进工业化、信息化、城镇化、农业现代化同步发展，全面深化改革开放，推动科学发展，不断夯实实现中国梦的物质文化基础。

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我们要巩固和发展最广泛的爱国统一战线，加强中国共产党同民主党派和无党派人士团结合作，巩固和发展平等团结互助和谐的社会主义民族关系，发挥宗教界人士和信教群众在促进经济社会发展中的积极作用，最大限度团结一切可以团结的力量。

各位代表！“功崇惟志，业广惟勤。”我国仍处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段，实现中国梦，创造全体人民更加美好的生活，任重而道远，需要我们每一个人继续付出辛勤劳动和艰苦努力。

全国广大工人、农民、知识分子，要发挥聪明才智，勤奋工作，积极在经济社会发展中发挥主力军和生力军作用。一切国家机关工作人员，要克己奉公，勤政廉政，关心人民疾苦，为人民办实事。中国人民解放军全体指战员，中国人民武装警察部队全体官兵，要按照听党指挥、能打胜仗、作风优良的强军目标，提高履行使命能力，坚决捍卫国家主权、安全、发展利益，坚决保卫人民生命财产安全。

一切非公有制经济人士和其他新的社会阶层人士，要发扬劳动创造精神和创业精神，回馈社会，造福人民，做合格的中国特色社会主义事业的建设者。

全国广大青少年，要志存高远，增长知识，锤炼意志，让青春在时代进步中焕发出绚丽的光彩。

香港特别行政区同胞、澳门特别行政区同胞，要以国家和香港、澳门整体利益为重，共同维护和促进香港、澳门长期繁荣稳定。广大台湾同胞和大陆同胞要携起手来，支持、维护、推动两岸关系和平发展，增进两岸同胞福祉，共同开创中华民族新的前程。广大海外侨胞，要弘扬中华民族勤劳善良的优良传统，努力为促进祖国发展、促进中国人民同当地人民的友谊作出贡献。

中国人民爱好和平。我们将高举和平、发展、合作、共赢的旗帜，始终不渝走和平发展道路，始终不渝奉行互利共赢的开放战略，致力于同世界各国发展友好合作，履行应尽的国际责任和义务，继续同各国人民一道推进人类和平与发展的崇高事业。

各位代表！中国共产党是领导和团结全国各族人民建设中国特色社会主义伟大事业的核心力量，肩负着历史重任，经受着时代考验，必须坚持立党为公、执政为民，坚持党要管党、从严治党，全面加强党的建设，不断提高党的领导水平和执政水平、提高拒腐防变和抵御风险能力。全体共产党员特别是党的领导干部，要坚定理想信念，始终把人民放在心中最高的位置，弘扬党的光荣传统和优良作风，坚决反对形式主义、官僚主义，坚决反对享乐主义、奢靡之风，坚决同一切消极腐败现象作斗争，永葆共产党人政治本色，矢志不移为党和人民事业而奋斗。

各位代表！实现伟大目标需要坚忍不拔的努力。全国各党派、各团体、各民族、各阶层、各界人士要更加紧密地团结在中共中央周围，全面贯彻落实中共十八大精神，以邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想、科学发展观为指导，始终谦虚谨慎、艰苦奋斗，始终埋头苦干、锐意进取，不断夺取全面建成小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化新的更大的胜利，不断为人类作出新的更大的贡献！