Change, Institutions, and International Organisations

Essays on the English School of International Relations

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Abstract

The overall topic of this thesis is the English School understanding of international order, which I approach specifically by analysing the English School idea of international institutions and their change. The purpose is to develop the theory in a meta-theoretically conscious and coherent way. The three essays in this volume are independent in relation to each other, yet in some ways cumulative. Essays I and II aim to address primarily the question of how to conceptualise the current international order of multilateralism and international organisations. Essay I uses the empirical issue of UN reform to formulate one English School conceptualisation of international order, building specifically on the School’s central theme of international institutions. Essay II theoretically develops the tools of the English School for capturing how international institutions, according to English School theory the fundaments of international order, might change. Essay III approaches the meta-theoretical question of how change itself is understood in the English School, and how different theoretical readings of what we might mean by change give rise to different approaches to the normative question of what might be improvement in the international order. I argue that an internally coherent understanding of change in international society should emphasise change in institutions, made intelligible by ex-post narratives which contribute to establishing the discursive connection between practices and their normative legitimation, and guided by a sustained normative debate on the nature of improvement. This understanding of change signifies a much-needed addition to the English School toolbox, and brings a promise of a meta-theoretical grounding of the theory. In addition, it opens for similar theoretical inquiries into other IR theories.

Keywords: international relations, English School theory, international society, change, the United Nations, primary institutions

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This thesis is based on the following papers, which are referred to in the text by their Roman numerals.


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A weird thing about academia is that the best one can hope for as a researcher is criticism. If one’s work is bad, people will avoid engaging with it (except if you make an outrageous headline claim which people may criticise without actually reading the text). If one’s work is good, people may take the time to actually read and criticise it. One then has to sort out what parts of the critique are applicable, and what not, and revise the work accordingly to make it better. And, if one is lucky, subsequently receive more criticism. The refinement of one idea, or of a couple of adjacent ideas, might thus take a very long time, and be the very substance of scientific progress.

As I have come to understand it, a large part of what it means to be a PhD student is to be socialised into this quite counter-intuitive way of working. This is done by having supervisors (heroic figures who read and criticise one’s work whether it is any good or not), by repeated examinations in Department seminars (where other researchers also take the time to read and criticise both promising and less-than-satisfactory texts), by presentations at international conferences (where only the interested engage with one’s work, and only if it is promising), and finally by submitting one’s work to journals where (if it is good) it might be considered worthy of being torn apart – but the critique will also provide the tools with which to improve it. Throughout this process of socialisation, I have accumulated a number of debts, and there are many people whom I would like to thank:

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schools, on Democracy in multilateral organisations at the IBEI in Barcelona in 2011, and on the History and philosophy of IR at the Olympic Summer Academy in Greece in 2013. More importantly, however, the scholarships have made possible my discovery of the elusive ‘bubble’, that is, the international community of scholars who work on topics similar to mine. I have discovered the bubble especially during conference trips to the International Studies Association, the European International Studies Association, the British International Studies Association, the World International Studies Conference, and the European Workshops in International Studies. These encounters with the bubble have enabled me to start building an international network, for which I am truly grateful.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Some say politics is ultimately about the good life. How do we organise society to allow people to live the good life? One of the more obvious factors making a good life possible is the absence of war, and at its most fundamental, International Relations (IR) concerns questions of war and peace. This is also evident from the IR canon, which includes Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Kant. Also in the more modern study of international relations, grand efforts have been devoted to making sense of war and peace; why war happens and how to decrease its likelihood (Waltz 2001 [1959]; Suganami 1996; Russett 1994; Holsti 1996; Carr 1942; Carr 1966 [1946]). However, and as the empirical world keeps demonstrating, the answers remain elusive, and a large literature has also addressed issues of when war is legitimate (see for instance Walzer 1992 [1977]) and how to ensure its orderly conduct (von Clausewitz 1993 [1832]).

In the current world order, decisions about war and peace are taken primarily, although by no means exclusively, through states. On the surface, it seems fairly easy and straightforward: if states agree – as they do, for instance, in the pre-amble to the United Nations (UN) Charter – to privilege peace, the space for war ought to be much smaller than it actually is. So what is it that makes peace so difficult for states to achieve and uphold? The usual answer is ‘interests’, often defined in utilitarian value maximisation terms, or as in the title of one pioneering IR book: ‘politics among nations’ (Morgenthau 1949). Simply put, the overall best outcome of international interaction, namely to completely avoid war among states, gets lost in ‘the games states play’ (Manning 1975 [1962]:151-181). A common approach to international relations has consequently been to study them as games of interest maximisation (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984; Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993). However, these games of interest maximisation need some kind of background understanding about world order for the game analogy to make sense; otherwise state behaviour would be unpredictable (Krasner 1983; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997).

The games states play could doubtless be studied in bilateral relationships between states. Yet, at the outset of this project, the more interesting questions seemed to me to be about that underlying world order, so often taken
for granted in rationalist analyses, and whether that order could possibly improve, so that international politics become more peaceful over time. World order is not simply the aggregation of bilateral relationships between states. Rather, it preconditions such relationships. Logically, therefore, world order and its possible improvement should best be studied in multilateral arenas where many states interact with each other. This thesis thus started out with an empirical and theoretical interest in multilateralism, and in the normative question of how multilateralism might contribute to a more peaceful world.

Almost from the start, however, I also nurtured a frustration with the weaknesses of IR-theory to capture overarching queries of world order with a more or less explicit normative focus. Among the usual IR theories, there was little inspiration to find. The traditional Realist1 view of multilateralism is that it is dominated by great power interaction (Gilpin 1983; Waltz 1979) or, in the post-Cold War era, by the lone hegemon (Krauthammer 1990, 2002). For Realism, multilateralism is therefore logically irrelevant, and only serves as window-dressing for the ‘real’ power politics that go on beneath this show window (Krasner 1982; Mearsheimer 1994). If the goal of the research is to understand world order as organised through multilateralism, then, Realism has little guidance to offer.

The traditional Liberal view of multilateralism at the outset seemed much more promising, as Liberalism of all forms takes cooperation between states seriously. Moreover, some varieties of Liberalism draw heavily on the game metaphor (Allan and Schmidt 1994). However, modern Liberalism tends to assume that states are rational, and sometimes unitary, actors in the multilateral setting – an assumption which is not necessarily justifiable, especially given that the assumed goal for interaction is often framed in microeconomic terms as the maximisation of interests by rational egoists (Moravcsik 1997). In my view, this assumption obscures many Liberal insights, and risks leading to an overestimation of states’ will to cooperate. Moreover, in the shadows of this tendency often hides a rarely spoken assessment of an underlying harmony of interest: if enough layers are peeled off the onion, all states really want the same things. But what if they do not? Then the goals for international interaction vary across participants, and the idea that cooperation necessarily leads to better outcomes for all, and therefore deepens over time, no longer applies. Liberalism in this way imposes a flawed framework on the study of multilateralism.

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1 As is the convention, IR-theories are here written with initial capital, to distinguish them from the homonymous philosophical, political or meta-theoretical positions, which are written in lowercase.
The third obvious theoretical candidate, Constructivism, at the outset seemed much too complicated for my purposes. With time, I have come to understand that this impression is grounded in Constructivism’s status as a meta-theoretical position (and a debated one, at that!), rather than a theoretical framework for grasping international relations as such, although it tends to be presented as ‘one of the paradigms’ in undergraduate classes. This constructivist dilemma will be discussed at length later in this introduction, so it will suffice to say here that although there are constructivist accounts that could help frame my questions on the overall workings of multilateralism (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Barnett and Finnemore 2004), Constructivism-as-IR-theory is an extremely broad church, so that delimiting it for my purposes proved overwhelming. Over time, however, I, like many of my authors of reference, have come to draw a lot on both Constructivism-as-IR-theory and (meta-theoretical) constructivist insights (for instance Reus-Smit 1997, 2009; Wendt 1999), and this will be obvious throughout this collection.

The frustration with the usual IR theories eventually led me to taking an interest in English School theory, which combines a defining interest in broad-brush questions of international order with a very modest idea of the goals for international interaction. The English School is more optimistic than Realism, assuming that states see an interest in multilateral cooperation, but more restrictive than Liberalism, assuming that this cooperation a priori has no more ambitious goals than serving a basic form of coexistence. Compared to Constructivism, the English School is focused around a number of key concepts, which makes it easier to both apply and adjust. Moreover, it combines normative theorising with analytical theorising, so that the question of what the good life might be can be kept open for debate instead of being assumed away. Its overarching concern for understanding international order makes for a nice baseline for research interests such as mine. There is, however, an open-endedness in the theory, which makes it falter on the issue of changes in the very world order that is its most fundamental concern. It should therefore be possible to develop the theory to allow for better theorising of the crucial issue of changes in world order. Hence, what started out as a project to use theories for studying the functioning, risks, and opportunities of multilateralism became a project of using the study of multilateralism for theory development of the English School.

The English School has been chosen as the topic of this dissertation, in short, because of its potential for nuancing black and white world-views. It does not have to simplify world politics by assuming constancy or repetition over time (as Realist accounts tend to do); neither that progress is inevitable (as Liberal and some Constructivist accounts tend to do). Rather, it is open to the possibility that there is very likely both repetition and some kind of progress in international politics. Moreover, it does not deny the practical importance of mor-
als and ethical concerns (as Realism sometimes does), while it also does not assume that everybody has the same morals or ethical standards (as Liberalism and Constructivism sometimes do). In short, it is, at least potentially, open for productive tensions, and it does not give in to the naturalist temptation of assuming away deep and important questions to get to a parsimonious – or empirically testable – account. The English School is, in short, a broad church, which has at its very centre the issue of how to understand world order.

The overall topic of this thesis is thus the English School understanding of international order, which I approach specifically by analysing the English School idea of international institutions and their change. The purpose is to develop the theory in a meta-theoretically conscious and coherent way. The three essays in this volume are independent in relation to each other, yet in some ways cumulative. Essays I and II aim to address primarily the question of how to conceptualise the current international order. Essay I uses the empirical issue of UN reform to elaborate on one English School conceptualisation of international order, building specifically on the School’s central theme of international institutions. Essay II theoretically develops the tools of the English School for capturing how international institutions, in that conceptualisation the fundamentals of international order, might change. Essay III then approaches the meta-theoretical question of how change itself is understood in the English School, and how different theoretical readings of what we might mean by change give rise to different approaches to the normative question of what might be improvement in the international order.

The rest of this introduction will flesh out the claim that the English School needs theoretical development. I argue that central parts of its theoretical armour, namely the questions of change and improvement in world order and the meta-theoretical grounding that they entail, are under-theorised. To this end, the rest of this introduction is outlined as follows: first, in chapter 2, I offer a brief overview of the theoretical IR landscape that IR scholars tend to take for granted, a short presentation of the English School and why it needs theory development, and spell out the main take-aways from the inquiry. Second, in chapter 3, I contextualise the English School by showing how it relates, in its own understanding, to the customary disciplinary historiography of three great debates, and how its lack of engagement with the third debate corresponds with its meta-theoretical quietism. Third, in chapter 4, I follow up on this claim of lacking engagement with the third debate by demonstrating why the English School needs to engage more with this debate, or specifically, accept its implications. Fourth, in chapter 5, I discuss the methodology employed and the research design for each of the three essays included in this thesis. Finally, in chapter 6, I offer some conclusions to which this particular framing of the essays in this collection gives rise.
Chapter 2: Theory in International Relations

The basic problem facing anyone trying to understand contemporary world politics is that there is so much material to look at that it is difficult to know which things matter and which do not. Where on earth would you start if you wanted to explain the most important political processes? (Baylis and Smith 1997:3)

The real world begins here, though the contents page of this book contains no reference to an actual place or event in international history. But the reader should not be thereby misled into thinking that this is one of those books about something called ‘theory’ which is removed from what is usually understood to be the ‘real’ world. This book, we would argue, is fundamentally concerned with places like Bosnia and Rwanda, and with events such as world wars and also with the prospects for world politics in the twenty-first century. (Smith et al. 1996:1)

In IR as in all science, systematic thinking is theoretically guided. This is because we never start thinking from a clean slate, but always have some preconception about what we study. Sometimes, we might build our thinking on intuitions or prejudices, but in science we strive to avoid those and instead build on theories that point out the most important parts of reality to approach, given what we are looking for. In the words of one of IR’s most widespread beginner’s textbooks: ‘a theory is some kind of simplifying device that allows you to decide which facts matter and which do not. …It is not as if you can say that you do not want to bother with a theory, all you want to do is to look at the “facts”’ (Baylis and Smith 1997:3).

Theory is thus indispensable for navigating the universe of IR facts, and any beginner’s level student of IR must first of all (often to their great frustration) master the basics of the most influential theories, and the differences between them. Without that knowledge, IR is a jungle, and it is impossible to see how the world can be interpreted so differently by different observers. By using the theories, however, we structure our thinking, make selections of what is important, and in some cases give away our conclusions even at the outset of our enquiries. If, for instance, we use the Realist frame hinted at in the previous chapter, we know from the outset that our study will not end in the conclusion that selfless cooperation is a dominant strategy for states. Yet, Realism might be a very useful device to explain other outcomes.
Moreover, no theory is value-neutral. While theories may often seem to represent common sense, they have a tendency to reinforce their own assumptions. Again very well put in the beginner’s text book:

After all, if we teach world politics to generations of students and tell them that people are selfish, then doesn’t that become common-sense and don’t they, when they go off into the media or to work for government departments or the military or even when they talk to their kids over the dinner table, simply repeat what they have been taught and, if in positions of power, act accordingly? (Baylis and Smith 1997:4)

This suggests that we, as researchers and analysts, should take great care to select our theory, and also to remember that our theory cannot show the whole picture. Just like a pair of tinted glasses, it helps us to see clearly the most relevant features of the specific question that interests us, at the cost of obscuring other aspects of the problem at hand. It might, however, also work the other way around (and I would suggest that the probability for this increases the more we study, as we become better-versed in our theories and get used to thinking about the world through their particular lens): we select a question to study because the theoretical glasses we already wear make it seem important. Given all this, at the outset of a study, we need to justify why we have chosen to work with one theory rather than another, and although I have already hinted at the practical reasons for my own choice, I will devote the next section to briefly describing the IR context which eventually convinced me that the English School was worth being developed in a dissertation.

An Overview of a Theoretical Landscape

The end of the Cold War came as a surprise for most students of international relations. There was not much in the dominant theoretical paradigms to handle that sort of sudden change in the international game plan (Gaddis 1992; Patomäki 1992:182). In general, scholars’ aptitude for accounting for stability was far more developed than that for accounting for change. Realism, the theoretical framework for studying international politics that had been preferred by academia and analysts alike ever since the Second World War, especially in America, is inherently geared towards explaining recurrence and repetition over time. Its main rival theoretical framework, Liberalism, as manifest both in the idealism of the interwar period and in the Neo-Liberal Institutionalism of the 1980s, did foresee progress in international relations, but was equally powerless in predicting, or explaining, the sudden
collapse of the Berlin Wall. For the third rival paradigm at the time, Marxism or Word-System theory, the end of the Cold War also brought major reformulations of its research agenda (Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995; Goldmann and Allan 1992).

Notwithstanding the drastic effects of the sudden changes in 1989-1991 on the world political stage, they also fed into an already on-going process of serious reconsideration of the IR theories used to make sense of world politics (Price and Reus-Smit 1998:166). Realism, which had previously used to emphasise the automatic tendency for a balance of power to arise – and which had predicted anarchical disorder on the world political stage in the absence of such a balance of power between two roughly equal powers or alliances – was debating its theory of unipolarity, according to which one strong state could uphold world order alone in the absence of a balance of power (Mearsheimer 1990, 1994; Gilpin 1983; Waltz 2001 [1959]; Webb and Krasner 1989; Krauthammer 1990, 2002; Wohlforth 1999). Liberalism, often interpreting the end of the Cold War as a sign of progress towards a world where liberal democracy would be the only alternative, devoted much of its energy to theorising about the tendency for peace between those liberal democracies (Fukuyama 1992; Russett 1994). Marxism was reformulated into its historical materialist and world systems components (Rosenberg 1994; Wallerstein 2004; Gill 1993).

Yet, despite the dominant position in academia of these paradigms, they had already been under harsh criticism for quite some time; and with the end of the Cold War, the IR community at large became more receptive to those criticisms (Cox 1981; Ashley 1984, 1988). After all, the dominant paradigms had demonstrated very clearly that they were ill equipped for making sense of the sudden major change on the international scene. During the 1990s, Realism and Liberalism in IR were constantly under attack, by each other as well as by critical theorists, feminists, constructivists, post-structuralists and post-modernist (Tickner 1992; Sylvester 1994; Walker 1993; Bartelson 1995; Legro and Moravcsik 1999; Feaver et al. 2000; Guzzini 1993, 1998; Ashley 1984). This theoretical unrest (which will be discussed further under the heading of ‘The third debate: The missing link’ in a subsequent section) resulted in a more varied theoretical landscape, and in Constructivism emerging as a new major theoretical framework for studying international politics (Wendt 1999:135-138; Onuf 1989; Kratochwil 1989; Adler 1997; Guzzini 2000).

The opening for this development was precisely that the older mainstream paradigms were said to be unable to account for the sudden change that was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War (Wendt 1999:4;
Finnemore 1996; Buzan and Little 2000:22-24; Kratochwil 1993). This is what Knud Erik Jørgensen has called the ‘external explanation’ of the post-Cold War climate of theoretical innovation, as it was driven by empirically visible transformations. He also identifies a parallel process of ‘epistemological progress’ which was internal to IR theory and which also contributed to pushing theoretical development (Jørgensen 2000:9-10). This was the continuing trend of questioning Cold War theorising and concepts. Not only were theoretical paradigms reworked and criticised, but concepts central to the discipline, such as structure (Wendt 1987; Carlsnaes 1992; Hollis and Smith 1994), power (Guzzini 1993), security (Buzan et al. 1998; McSweeney 1996; Hansen 2000), anarchy (Wendt 1992; Milner 1991) and sovereignty (Krasner 1999; Ashley 1984; Thomson 1994; Bartelson 1995), were also continually interrogated, scrutinised and reconceptualised. As part of this development of questioning received IR wisdom for external and internal reasons, a new interest emerged in the writings of some earlier IR scholars, notably those of the English School (Checkel 1998:324-325; Wæver 1992; Robertson 1998; Dunne 1998; Kratochwil 1993).

While the English School, a quite recent term for the traditional way of studying IR in Great Britain in the post-war period, had never been completely out of fashion in the UK, interest in the School elsewhere surged in the climate of questioning the dominant paradigms at the end of the 1990s. A prime argument for this was the School’s refusal to engage with the paradigm rivalry, instead privileging its openness to historical study (Hobden 2002:51-53; Patomäki 1992:182, footnote 9; Smith 1996:11). The School had long criticised (or, alternatively, ignored) the meta-theoretical bases of both Realism and Liberalism (Bull 1976:104. See also comparisons and exchanges in Copeland 2003; Devlen et al. 2005; Desch 2003; Glaser 2003; Little 2003; Spegele 2005; Evans and Wilson 1992; Keohane 1988). Now, the School was employed as an inspiration for the new Constructivist framework, and also experienced a simultaneous revival as an independent school of thought (Dunne 1995, 1998; Buzan 2001:474. For Constructivist reactions to the English School, see for instance Guzzini 2001; Finnemore, 2001; Adler et al. 2005; Reus-Smit 2009).

The specific advantage of the School was its already well-established conception of the international arena as an ‘anarchical society’, as in the title of Hedley Bull’s (2002 [1977]) famous book. This international society which states are taken to form, is a carved-out space in between the Realist conception of a timeless Hobbesian anarchy and the Liberal conception of Kantian progress. Recognising that the School built on a social ontology and is focused on the study of meaningful historically evolved practices, rather than solely on behaviour, Constructivists drew on these concepts as an inspiration for their own theorising about such claims as anarchy being ‘what states

Meanwhile, the internal revival of the English School built on a proud belief in its difference, philosophically and in terms of breadth of inquiry, compared to other approaches to international relations. Barry Buzan expressed this conviction: ‘The English School is not just another paradigm to throw into the tedious game of competing IR theories. It is, instead, an opportunity to step outside that game, and cultivate a more holistic, integrated approach to the study of international relations’ (Buzan 2001:472). Today, the English School is an important theoretical tradition in IR in its own right. New monographs drawing on the tradition are published regularly by the major academic publishers, it is taught in IR courses at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, there is an English School section in all the major international IR conferences and articles drawing on the tradition are commonplace in IR journals.

Yet, the English School is far from a flawless theoretical construct. It is a diverse tradition that has strengths as well as weaknesses both empirically, theoretically and meta-theoretically. The essays in this volume are focused in various ways on its weaknesses with regards to theorising change. However, thanks to the enhanced meta-theoretical sensibility and the new language which the afore-mentioned theoretical unrest brought, including the breakthrough of Constructivism, some of its weaknesses can now be addressed – and perhaps even resolved. The new theoretical climate now allows the discussion of issues that have previously been out of reach. This is, in short, why I deem engaging with developing the English School a worthwhile endeavour. A brief introduction into the history and content of the framework which has come to be known as the English School of International Relations is therefore in order.

What is the English School?

The English School as a single theoretical framework for international relations is a fairly recent invention. The various thinkers that are usually seen as the founding members of the School were brought together under the moniker of ‘English School’ by a severe critic who called for its closure in the early 1980s (Jones 1981; see also replies in Grader 1988; Wilson 1989). Although the name ‘English School’ would suggest that there is something particularly English about it, that is mainly on the surface. It is true that it was developed by scholars active at British universities (also including Ab-
erystwyth in Wales), but they were not all British. Bull, the most famous representative of the School, was Australian, and C. A. W. Manning, ‘the doyen of the English School’ (Navari 2009a:7), was South African. There is

*prima facie* nothing British about the theory itself – apart from its resistance to the methodological and philosophical bases of what Ole Wæver has called ‘the American-partly-turned-global discipline’ (Wæver 1998:717), and, related to this, its roots in history, law and philosophy. The label stuck, however, and the English School is now the established name for the theoretical tradition.

### A Brief History of the School

There are several accounts of the origins of the English School (Buzan 2001; Navari 2009a:7-8; Suganami 2012; Vigezzi 2005). The School is usually associated with the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, a scholarly community which met regularly from the 1950s to the 1980s to discuss international theory (Dunne 1998). The British Committee was financed by a grant from the American Rockefeller Foundation (which already financed a similar American committee), convened by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, and led successively by Butterfield, Wight, Bull and Adam Watson (Dunne 1998:1-22). Certainly, many of the School’s key figures were members of the British Committee, and a large part of the School’s most important classical publications appeared during their British Committee period (Butterfield and Wight 1966; Bull 2002 [1977]; Bull and Watson 1984; Wight 1977). Yet this story has been subject to criticism for its exclusivity; even agreeing that the British Committee was very important for the development of English School thought, some observers want to locate its roots earlier and include additional founding members, like Manning and E. H. Carr (see debate in Suganami 2000; Dunne 2000).

Meanwhile, Brunello Vigezzi argues that the British Committee, an exclusive ‘club’, which as a matter of fact had insiders and outsiders, should be kept separate from the much wider and less distinct English School (Vigezzi 2005:9-14). The key defining feature of the English School is the common research agenda and the common concepts, which were by and large worked out by the British Committee, individually and as a collective. However, its members were by no means cut off from the contemporary scholarly debate and were certainly inspired in various ways by non-members as well as by the internal discussions of the Committee.

The roots of the School have some importance for the present inquiry, as its background provides some keys to its distinctness relative to other IR theories that draw heavily on social science concepts and methodology. By con-
contrast, several of the scholars in the British Committee (in particular Butterfield, Wight and Watson) were historians by education; and their working environment in early British IR was influenced by Manning, whose background was in International Law. Manning was the Montague Burton Professor at the London School of Economics, where he taught International Relations from 1930 onwards for over 30 years, and in that capacity had an enormous influence on British IR (Manning 1975 [1962]:ix-xxxiv). He built his idea of international relations based on his own experience of the League of Nations in Geneva, and contributed to familiarising the idea of international society. Manning’s influence on the British IR scene overall as well as on the participants in the British Committee was considerable (Suganami 2001). Wight and Bull were both working with Manning at the London School of Economics, and even Carr acknowledges his debt to Manning in the preface to The Twenty Years Crisis (Carr 1966 [1946]:x).

The British Committee meetings ceased after Bull’s death in 1985 but its ideas lived on. What was becoming known as the English School continued to be taught and researched, and new major work was produced (Watson 2009 [1992]; Vincent 1986). Meanwhile, another group of scholars, partly but not wholly associated with the efforts of the British Committee, and not in total accordance with the key concepts and distinctions coined under its auspices, carried the tradition forward through a series of seminars at the London School of Economics from the mid-70s and throughout the 80s, and important contributions to the School emanate from that group (Donelan 1978; Mayall 1982, 1990; Navari 1991). In my reading, however, much of the work of these scholars is rather leaning towards international political philosophy, primarily addressing issues of morality and ethics in international affairs, while the British committee tended to devote its attention more squarely to developing theoretical frameworks for empirical and ontological analysis, keeping the normative voice more as a complementary chord. Some scholars participated in both groups, however, and Manning, Wight and Bull are frequent references in the writings of both.

The present interest in the English School results in large part from Buzan’s (2001) call for ‘reconvening the English School’. This call was answered from various directions, both from self-identified members of the school and from sympathetic outsiders (Guzzini 2001; Finnemore 2001; Adler et al. 2005). The new momentum resulted in both ‘introspective’ work reflecting on the school, its developments and its key concepts; and in ‘applied’ books that put the concepts to work. Examples include English School methodology (Navari 2009a); ‘contemporary reassessments’ of the English School canon (Linklater and Suganami 2006; Almeida 2003); a new historiography of the School (Vigezzi 2005); questioning of its Euro-centrism (Keene 2002); and development of its key features, such as world society (Buzan...
international institutions (Holsti 2004), or its conception of legitimacy (Clark 2005). Probably for the first time, active researchers in the tradition came to self-identify as participants in a common venture, and Buzan’s call therefore in a way led to the creation of a coherent School. As will be pointed out repeatedly, though, members tend to work with or on the School’s tools without really having thought through the meta-theoretical disposition of their common toolbox.

The Contents of English School Theory

Just like Bull did in 1977, current research in the English School tradition takes for its object of study the ‘anarchical society’ which it postulates that states form in the international arena, despite its formal anarchical condition. ‘Anarchy’ is a central concept in IR, and it generally refers to the absence of a world government; various theories then draw different conclusions as to the implications of this absence. As for the English School, it unites around the defining idea that in spite of the absence of government, ‘order is part of the historical record of international relations; and in particular, that modern states have formed, and continue to form, not only a system of states but also an international society’ (Bull 2002 [1977]:22-23). The idea of international society implies that there is a layer of shared norms, principles and rules at the international level, despite international anarchy. It is not (yet) the large, overarching, inter-human community of humankind which idealists and cosmopolitans tend to visualise, but nor is international anarchy the lawless sphere of constant security dilemmas between self-contained states that Realists describe. Rather, the international arena is characterised by order, ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society’ (Bull 2002 [1977]:8). An international society, in turn, ‘exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relation with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’ (Bull 2002 [1977]:13).

In a thumb-nail sketch, English School theory builds on the idea that international politics are different from domestic politics, so that the same logics that apply to the latter do not necessarily resonate with the former. This standpoint is often called ‘the rejection of the domestic analogy’ (Bull 1966c; Suganami 1986), and it has served to mark IR off from political science (Waever 1998:710). In essence, the rejection of the domestic analogy means that the same rules that apply to domestic politics cannot a priori be taken to apply also at the international level. However, the wide-spread Realist conception of international anarchy as a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’
cannot be the whole story about international relations, as states in international anarchy are significantly different from individuals in Hobbes’ state of nature. Equally, the optimistic cosmopolitan idea of the coming unity of humankind also cannot be the whole story, as it has difficulties in reconciling the harsh realities of international politics with an assumed underlying harmony of interests (Bull 1966c). What is specific for the international arena is hence the element of international society, in which states are members by virtue of the recognition of their sovereignty by other states. To keep this system running, states are interested in upholding some basic rules and institutions which work as a safety net against the Hobbesian anarchy (Bull 1966a). Notably, it means that they will sometimes be prepared to agree to conform to rules which go against their will, even if nobody forces them, because they see the value of having common rules and institutions.

Importantly, in the English School, the three elements of international reality are thought to co-exist, which is the basis of the three key concepts of the School. ‘International system’, firstly, signifies the realist, or Hobbesian, realm in which states have sufficient interaction ‘to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other’ but not enough to cooperate in common institutions (Bull 2002 [1977]:9-13). This corresponds at least superficially quite well to the traditional interpretation of Realism (Morgenthau 1949; Waltz 2001 [1959], 1979; however, see also Wendt 1992, 1999 for the term ‘Hobbesian anarchy’).

‘World society’, secondly, is the revolutionist, or Kantian, realm in which the community of mankind overshadows the importance of states. This does not correspond very well to any other traditional IR theory – although there are similarities with Carr’s stereotyped utopian idealists, see the account of the ‘first debate’ under that heading below – but its closest associate is instead cosmopolitan political theory (see for instance Held 1995). In the English School, however, revolutionism is traditionally viewed as scarcely any better than realism, as it is accused of a tendency to overestimate the degree of community of mankind that is present; Wight places Lenin and Marx in this category (Wight 1991). It follows that it tends to overestimate the degree of universalism present, and to force its own interpretations of that universalism. However, in recent IR, primarily in Constructivism, world society has begun to be explored as an interhuman domain that can co-exist with a society of states, and consequently it has achieved a more positive connotation on the current IR scene than it had in the classical English School works (Kratochwil 2014; Wendt 2003; Buzan 2004).

‘International society’, or the society of states, thirdly, is the rationalist, or Grotian, via media in which states interact following established rules of conduct and sharing in the working of common institutions. As this concept
was originally the key contribution of the School to international studies, this is also where most studies in the English School place their emphasis. Virtually all English School research takes the existence of international society for granted, and, as with all theoretical precepts, this has implications for the kind of inquiries that the School takes on.

The key defining feature of the English School is thus widely recognised to be the common research agenda with its central concern with overarching questions of order, and the common concepts, most centrally that of ‘international society’ and its institutions. Rather than being a ‘paradigm’ in the Kuhnian sense, the English School, with its common intellectual postulates about order and society, should be understood as a conceptual toolbox, which allows for a specific understanding of the international arena. This understanding can then be varied and extended in numerous directions, and, in the modern English School, not necessarily in ways which are completely faithful to the original ideas expressed most famously by Bull in *The Anarchical Society* (Linklater and Suganami 2006:12-42). This thesis is intended as a contribution to this toolbox, insofar as it succeeds in offering developments of English School theory, especially with regards to its understandings of institutional interaction and change in international order.

**International Order according to the English School**

The English School’s overarching concern is that of international order. It is therefore particularly well suited to broad-brush analysis of over-arching concerns about international order of the kind presented here. It openly unites the normative with the analytical (in a time when the scientific ideal has long been to separate normative concerns from analytical thinking), and it can contain both pessimistic and optimistic discourses in an open dialogue. Its understanding of order is however not as self-explanatory as one might think, and it is therefore worth taking a moment to show what the School means by order, and how it relates to other accounts.

As described above, the characterisation of international society as a way of combining anarchy with order was one of the central features that originally set English School theory apart from other theories of international relations. In the School, order is understood in the sense of ‘orderly’; that is, as opposed to disorder or chaos. Bull’s definition of international order as ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states’ (Bull 2002 [1977]:8) has already been quoted in the previous section. One of his delimitations has also already been hinted at in this introduction, namely that the kind of order in question is international order; that is, order among states. This also comes through clearly in the choice made in this collection of situating the empirical references of the discussion at the Unit-
ed Nations (see especially Essay I), as opposed to studying world order, which would imply situating the discussion instead at the level of human-kind. According to Bull, the elementary goals served by international order are to maintain the society of states; safeguard the independence of states themselves; and as far as possible to uphold peace as the normal condition in the society of states (Bull 2002 [1977]:16-19). In this way, there is no contradiction between order and anarchy in Bull’s account; the form of (political) order present in the ‘anarchical society’ of states exists in formal anarchy.

This idea of international order is thus adopted in the present collection, and it breaks explicitly with several other influential ideas of how the international sphere is organised. According to Realism, international anarchy is disorder, or a lack of order among states, as they are continuously threatened by each other. For instance for Kenneth Waltz, ‘the absence of an authority above states to prevent and adjust the conflicts inevitably arising from particular wills means that war is inevitable’ (Waltz 2001 [1959]:182). The only way of overcoming this fearful condition is to strive for security through power, which in the Realist perception leads to a balance of power – the closest there is to international order in anarchy. According to Liberalism, order and anarchy are also opposites, but order can be built out of anarchy via the identification of overlapping interests and cooperation through international regimes, thus creating conditions of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2012 [1977]). Like interwar idealism, Liberalism tends to buy into Realism’s account of anarchy as necessarily menacing, and therefore looks for ways to overcome anarchy. In idealism, there was allegedly an assumption of an underlying harmony of interests which needed to be brought out, while current Liberalism often sticks to a thinner notion of self-interested states cooperating for mutual benefits. Constructivism, finally, has largely taken up Bull’s idea of anarchy as potentially ordered (Reus-Smit 1999). This comes through most clearly in Alexander Wendt’s (1992) claim that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’.

**International Society and its Institutions**

In their writings on international society, the early writers of the English School tended to place the empirical/historical emergence of international society in 16th-17th century Europe, in connection with the Reformation and the Peace of Westphalia (hence the expression ‘the Westphalian international society’, sometimes used to signify today’s international order). Wight also points to earlier instances of international society in world history: the Hellenistic society of city-states in ancient Greece and the Chinese system of warring states (Wight 1977:22). The Westphalian international society is then thought to have expanded throughout the world from the late 19th centu-
ry onwards, and to include the whole world today (Bull and Watson 1984; Gong 1984). This basic understanding of the roots of international society already goes some way towards demonstrating the English School approach to history, which is in turn one of its central methodological trade-marks: international society is not necessarily thought to be eternal, but to have existed and disappeared at several points in history. Current international society is also thought to have started out as a regional arrangement at a particular point in European history, and then expanded outwards as other political communities came to accept its basic rules and institutions (Bull and Watson 1984), thereby ‘joining the club’. And if international society has changed before, there is a clear possibility that it might change again.

It must, however, be pointed out already at this stage that ‘other political communities “coming to accept” the rules and institutions of international society’ is admittedly an overly nice formulation obscuring the often very violent nature of European expansion, *inter alia* through colonialism. The advantage of nevertheless using this ‘expansion story’ is the historical perspective it offers, in which it is pointed out clearly that something happened which made European international society spread over the globe. If presentism, that is, the assumption that international relations have always been similar to what they are today, is enforced, as is the case notably in (neo-) Realism, the questions of how, or with what means, expansion happened cannot even be asked. The English School has at least used its historical perspective to devote quite some attention to the issue of international society’s violent spread (Howard 1984; Gong 1984; Keene 2002; Keal 2003).

As described in the previous section, order in international society is upheld by common interests in certain primary goals (relating to preserving the society itself and its units, the states), by rules that guide the preservation of that society, and by institutions that safeguard the rules (Bull 2002 [1977]: 51). These common institutions of international society make up a central theme of the essays contained in this volume. It is essential, therefore, that we take a moment to establish the difference between the common institutions of international society, sometimes denoted ‘primary’ or ‘master’ institutions, and international organisations (Buzan 2004:187; Makinda 2002:366). The common institutions that states share in international society are not of the formal kind that scholars of international regimes would study (Buzan 2004; for the different understandings of institutions, see Keohane 1988). Institutions in the English School sense are not necessarily formalised (although some aspects of them might be), and they do not – as Neo-liberal Institutionalists would have it – come about by rational action to eliminate coordination problems. Rather, they are historically evolved shared practices; basic organising phenomena that states routinely acknowledge and reproduce, regardless of whether there are treaties or other formal arrangements
surrounding them. The classical examples, taken from Bull’s work, are the balance of power, diplomacy, war, management by the great powers and international law (Bull 2002 [1977]). The institutions of international society will be questioned and elaborated on throughout the three essays contained in this volume, and thus make up a considerable part of the topic of the inquiry.

Given the important role of those institutions for maintaining international society, it is no wonder that the question of what institutions there are (presently) or must be (in general) in international society should have attracted a lot of attention (see for instance Wilson 2012; Schouenborg 2011). This distinction is also very relevant for the question of change in international society: should the institutions of international society be understood as eternal or timeless (like the balance of power for Realism); or as evolving and developing over time (which opens the way for a more progressive stance on change)? The idea is that if the institutions, which are constitutive of international society, are timeless, international society is timeless, too; whereas if the institutions of international society evolve, international society evolves as well. The relationship is constitutive, not causal. This is a central insight of the English School, and it is rehearsed, drawn on and developed in all three essays in this volume.

Why Study Change?

It is often implied, but not clearly shown, that the English School would fare better than the Cold War paradigms did, if a new surprising major change were to occur in world politics (Hobden 2002:51-53, 58; Wæver 1992:106-107). John Vincent (1983:64) has pointed out how the English School’s traditional reliance on history, law and political philosophy means that it is concerned with change as much as with continuity. It has even been claimed to be ‘the exception’ to the ‘ahistoricism’ of IR as a field of study, avoiding the ‘chronofetishism’ and ‘tempocentrism’ to which the rationalist paradigms fell prey (Hobson 2002:5-15; Hobden 2002:58). Yet, it is quite unclear what views of change the English School actually represents. Typically, the School is framed as a middle-way between idealism and Realism; but what conception of change is acceptable to a middle-way between the idealist ‘belief in progress’ and the Realist conviction of an international life of ‘permanent laws and cyclical patterns’ is less clear from the disciplinary historiographies (Bull 1972b:34, 39).

This does not only go for the early writers of the English School, but change is under-theorised even in the reconvened School of the post-Cold War era.
There is simply no agreement on what constitutes significant change in international society, or on how to recognise it when one sees it. That change is an unresolved issue in English School theory has been observed repeatedly, for instance by Wæver (1992:122): ‘Should not the approach of international society be able to point out which [...] changes are happening, where the tensions in the present norms and institutions are, and where the possible avenues of evolution for international society are?’ Similar, Alex Bellamy (2005:7) asks: ‘Why and how do the norms, interests, and rules that underpin international societies change and sometimes erode and dissolve?’

Change is an unresolved issue in the English School, not only conceptually (what is it?) and theoretically (when does it happen?), but also empirically; judgements on alleged cases of change in international society differ widely within the School. An important example of this lies in the School’s theorisation of humanitarian intervention. A bearing principle in the society of states is the principle of non-intervention, which limits the possibilities of states with great powers to interfere with the affairs of smaller states (Vincent 1974; see also UN Charter, art 2(4) and 2(7)). But this image of states as the basic units in international politics has become more complex as individual persons have increasingly come to be understood as referents in international affairs alongside states, and as human rights are becoming increasingly politically important. Meanwhile, cruelty against civilians is often perpetrated, or fails to be prosecuted, by representatives of their own state, and so the question of exceptions to the principle of non-intervention in cases of ‘supreme humanitarian emergency’ (Wheeler 2000:34) demands an answer. It has been asked when other states are, or should be, allowed – or even required – to intervene in another state in order to save lives.

As argued in Essay III of the present collection, the English School is deeply divided over whether humanitarian intervention – since 2005 formalised as the Responsibility to Protect (often abbreviated R2P) – constitutes a change in international society. On the one hand, Nicholas Wheeler (2000) has argued, using English School theory, that a normative shift with regards to humanitarian intervention occurred in international society between the 1970s and 1990s. Wheeler demonstrates that while humanitarian intervention was sometimes undertaken in the 1970s – by India in Eastern Pakistan, by Vietnam in Cambodia, and by Tanzania in Uganda – it was not legitimised as such. To the extent that the intervening states managed at all to legitimise their intervention in a neighbouring state, they did so instead with reference to the principles of safe-guarding international peace and security, referring to the risk that conflict would spread. In the 1990s, by contrast, interventions with humanitarian purposes – such as the no-fly zone over northern Iraq, interventions in Somalia and twice in ex-Yugoslavia – were
also legitimised as such. This arguably shows a change in norms, principles and practice with regards to the acceptance of humanitarian intervention.

On the other hand, the opposite point of view, that no significant change has occurred in international society with regards to humanitarian intervention, is also present in the English School. It is argued that humanitarian intervention does exist but takes place within the traditional normative framework of international society (Jackson 2000:287-293; Mayall 2000:123-148). Greater powers have always intervened in smaller states whenever it has suited them, and for whatever reason. Because there are not many instances of interventions with allegedly humanitarian purposes to choose from, all observers use largely the same empirical cases to elucidate their argument, still coming to differing conclusions about whether change has occurred in this domain.

These different judgements about what goes on in the world around us serve to underline the importance of the question of how change can be understood in such widely differing ways within the English School. The best effort to come to terms with this vexing question has been advanced by K. J. Holsti (1991, 1998, 2004:1, 6), who points out that scholars, as well as ‘armchair analysts’, are in general too quick in claiming change and transformation: “Lacking in all this claim of novelty is a consensus not only on what has changed but also on how we can distinguish minor change from fundamental change, trends from transformations, and growth or decline from new forms”.

One guiding idea in this thesis is consequently that there is some theoretical weakness lurking beneath the differing English School conceptions of change. Questions of change ought to be central to its defining concern with international order, and so the under-theorisation of change might be a symptom of other problems as well. I therefore employ the study of change to challenge the theoretical framework of the School and scrutinise its meta-theoretical coherence. More specifically, I ask of the School what it means by change, why it thinks that change happens, and what change is for the better. This reflects Holsti’s concern with ontology (what changes?) but also adds an explanatory question about the causes of change, and a normative question about the nature of improvement. The answers to each question need to harmonise to form a meta-theoretically coherent attempt to understand change. While Essay I makes a preparatory move for this venture, the meta-theoretical critique is partially implicit in Essay II, but outspoken in Essay III, which concludes with a suggestion of how to reconstruct the School’s understanding of change in a meta-theoretically sound way.
The Contributions of this Thesis

I envisage two main contributions for this thesis. The first is a thorough theorisation of English School institutions and their relation to continuity and change. This is part of a wider movement in English School theory, and it therefore fits well into an on-going debate and a collective research enterprise. Second, and following on from the first contribution, is the meta-theoretical development of the theory. Starting specifically from the School’s understanding of change, its unclear meta-theoretical placement becomes evident, and the main outcome is therefore a suggested re-brush of the theory, meta-theoretically. This is, as will be demonstrated in this introduction, not a very well-developed theme in the English School literature, and should therefore be understood rather as a pioneering suggestion (and a potentially controversial one, at that!). All in all, these two contributions lead to a considerable development of the theory including an increased meta-theoretical sensitivity. I will discuss both contributions in turn.

International Order, Institutions, and Change

The first contribution starts from the conceptualisation of the current international order advanced in Essays I and II. To some extent, this particular conceptualisation is already given by the chosen focus on English School theory, but the School’s tools are then considerably extended by the account of how international society and its primary institutions relate to empirical international organisations such as the UN. The toolbox is further developed by the ideas advanced on how other organising devices (‘secondary institutions’), such as treaty provisions, and primary institutions, such as great power management, interact to contribute to change and stability in international society. These connections between formal and underlying institutional arrangements are rarely systematically accounted for in IR, and this study might hence contribute to bridging disciplinary gaps.

Following directly on from this empirical/theoretical groundwork is the theoretical/meta-theoretical point advanced in Essays II and III about how we must see international society and its institutional inventories as continuously constructed, rather than independently ontologically pre-given, to make possible the study of change in a world of contingent history and a social world in flux. An account of contingent history without a relationist conceptualisation of flexible institutions will always have to rely on external shocks or other exogenous sources of change to explain how institutions appear and disappear over time, or more generally, how stable equilibria give way to new stable equilibria. Stasis can sometimes come from on-going change, but change cannot come spontaneously from stasis.
Meta-theory and the Interpretivist Turn

Once the effect of thoroughly theorising institutions plays into the theory’s understanding of change, its meta-theoretical incoherence becomes inadmissible. The greater contribution of this thesis is therefore the systematisation of a meta-theoretically coherent understanding of change for the English School. This is a substantial meta-theoretical adjustment of how international society and its inventories should be conceptualised, and it moves the School’s understanding of international society in a post-structuralist direction. In essence, this meta-theoretical re-brush of the English School proceeds in three steps. Essay I makes a preparatory move by connecting the theory to a case of (potential and actual) concrete empirical change, Essay II sets the stage theoretically for a nuanced English School understanding of change, and Essay III addresses the meta-theoretical implications of this reading of change.

Apart from the obvious implications for the School’s meta-theoretical grounding, this re-brush also helps to raise awareness of how analytical and normative thinking cross-fertilise each other, and how problematic the naturalist ambition of bracketing normative theorising has been. The English School framework allows for normative discussion of what improvement in international order might be, and I argue that this is an opportunity that the School must take. Not discussing what we mean by improvement does not lead to detachment, but only to normative ideals, such as peace, being taken for granted and thereby flying beneath the radar and avoiding scrutiny and problematisation. Importantly, this stowing away of normative thinking in a separate compartment justifies very simplistic analyses of world politics, also in the policy world. Consider, for example, the idea that since democracy empirically correlates with peace, democracy could be implanted on authoritarian states from the outside in order to make them peaceful and friendly. It also encourages a black and white world-view in which allies and enemies become static ideas of good and evil, rather than dynamic relationships that can transform over time in changing circumstances. The contribution of making visible the normative facet of change comes through most clearly in Essay III of this collection, but it needs Essays I and II to prepare the ground, as the whole discussion of change in the abstract may seem out of place without the institutional connection provided by those two essays.
Chapter 3: The English School and the Historiography of IR

After this brief introduction to the problems addressed in this dissertation, the presentation of the main characters and the main contributions of the inquiry, it is time to expand on the framing of the thesis. This will be done in this chapter by a discussion of the disciplinary historiography with which all IR scholars are expected to be more or less familiar, but from an English School angle. The chapter starts out with general introductions to the three great debates of IR, and follows up with the English School’s self-understanding with regards to each debate. The chapter ends in the conclusion that the School has not engaged sufficiently with the third debate; a lacuna that is addressed in chapter 4.

IR as an academic discipline is a much more recent invention than political science (see overview of the development of IR in several national contexts in Wæver 1998:704; Jørgensen 2000). Although IR scholars (even this one in the introduction) like to point out how their enquiries are guided by the insights of classical writers like Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, the first Chair of International Politics was set up only after the First World War, in 1919 at Aberystwyth University in Wales. This first chair was quite soon followed by others around the United Kingdom, and allowed IR to develop as an independent discipline in Britain (Wæver 1998:710). In most other countries, however, it has rather developed as a branch of political science. In the United States, conventionally seen as the centre of the political science scene, interest in the study of International Relations surged only after the Second World War (Wæver 1998:713).

The self-understanding of IR as a field, or even as a distinctive discipline, has been heavily defined by what is commonly known as IR’s ‘foundational debates’ (Guzzini 1998). As stated by Wæver (1998:715): ‘ask a scholar to present the discipline in fifteen minutes, and most likely you will get a story of three debates. There is no other established means of telling the history of the discipline’. Whether these really were debates, or foundational, has however been increasingly questioned within the discipline (Schmidt 2002; Bell 2003). Moreover, there is a risk that the ‘debate story’ obscures other important dimensions of the field’s development. Brian Schmidt (2002:688,
points out how ‘the tendency has been to describe the history of IR as if a complete consensus existed on the essential dimensions of the field’s evolution. …This particular construction of the field’s history [the “debate story”] tends to have the effect of making the present debate a matter that all serious students of IR must focus on while relegating previous debates to obscurity’.

Yet, it is clear that the idea of the foundational debates has served, and still serves, as an important disciplining device in IR discourse. As pointed out by Wæver, the existence of central debates is also a sign that there is an established common understanding of what is at stake. Whereas many related fields are comparatively more fragmented, IR is relatively coherent: ‘the major debates orient the minor ones, and there is translatability across issues. A debate produces a shared frame of reference and expresses a less than totally fragmented discipline’ (Wæver 1998:716). Moreover, the ‘debate story’ provides an excellent background for situating the English School, as the School’s specific self-understanding draws very much on the first two debates in particular (Bull 1972b). The third debate has received much less attention from the School, and, as I argue in this introduction, this signals a massive omission of something that the School urgently needs to address, namely its meta-theoretical underpinnings. I will therefore discuss the debates and the English School’s position in relation to them, in chronological order.

The First Debate: Justifying the English School

The ‘first debate’, as traditionally understood, was a debate between ‘idealism’ and ‘Realism’. Interwar scholars of history, philosophy and international law, and Second World War scholars of International Relations had different understandings of the international sphere and its prospects for peace, and ultimately of human nature. In Carr’s (1966 [1946]:9) contemporary statement, these different views came down to how to build a scientific discipline, not on wishful thinking but on facts, thus ‘to distinguish the analysis of what is from aspiration about what should be’. In a present era assessment, ‘the conventional wisdom in IR holds that idealism (associated with liberal internationalist ideas and writers) was beaten in a “Great Debate” with [R]ealist thinkers such as Carr [and] Morgenthau…. An important part of the reason for their defeat at the hands of [R]ealism, the argument goes, was the failure of appeasement. This belief seems to unite both [R]ealist and anti-realist scholars’ (Ashworth 2002:34).
This framing of the first debate is very influential and has, somewhat mythically, come to occupy a central position in IR historiography. Yet, it has been convincingly argued (Navon 2001:612-613; Bell 2003:154-155) that the ‘first debate’ was neither a real debate, nor in any way specific to IR. In fact, the whole category of ‘idealism’ was rather ‘Carr’s clever device for discrediting a whole range of things he happened to disagree with’ (Wilson 1998:1). Moreover, as demonstrated by Peter Wilson (1998:1-8), the replies provoked by Carr’s book made the ensuing debate as much an internal debate inside the Realist camp as a debate across camps. Subsequently, too, idealism has come to be defined as a Kuhnian paradigm, its ‘central features … the exact antithesis of the tenets attributed to [R]ealism’ (Schmidt 2002:698). In Schmidt’s view, this framing of idealism comes from a wish to see scientific progress in IR, where one paradigm over time is replaced by a better paradigm. This, however, justifies a writing of history, which is both ‘presentist’ and ‘Whiggish’, where every development leads up to the present and makes the present seem both inevitable and normatively desirable (Schmidt 1994, 2002; Butterfield 1965 [1931]; see also Skinner 1969).

Yet, as a foundational narrative, the story of the first debate has had a considerable influence on IR as a discipline, not least pedagogically; and for the English School it has even served to provide one of its raisons d’être. Thinking about international society was framed as a middle-way between the idealist, or utopian, thinking which Carr (1966 [1946]) – himself one of the first holders of the IR chair at Aberystwyth – suggested had characterised the inter-war period, and later Realist thinking. A central issue which united the founders of what was to become the English School – in Wæver’s (1998:711) terms ‘reformist [R]ealists’ – was thus their ambition to avoid the strict contradiction between (allegedly naïve) utopianism/idealism and (allegedly cynical) Realism, which Carr had popularised (Dunne 1998:23-46). Wight, one of the central figures of the English School, wrote the article ‘Why is there no international theory?’ (1960) which can be read as a manifesto against the idealist/Realist stand-off. Instead, Wight and his colleagues emphasised what they saw as the middle-ground ‘rationalist’ idea that states could form an international society, even under anarchy, when they had enough interaction to conform to certain common rules. This idea was not originally theirs, but is on the contrary relatively common in the history of ideas, from thinkers such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Emmerich de

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2 As Schmidt (2002:698-99) also mentions, this reading of Kuhn’s paradigms might not have been approved by Kuhn himself, who held both that his philosophy of science was not applicable to the social sciences, and that it could not be used to assess progress.

3 ‘Rationalist’ in the English School means of the ‘Grotian’ world-view (named after 17th century international philosopher Hugo Grotius) that emphasises the element of society in international relations. As such, it has prima facie little to do with the kind of rationalism called on in for instance rational choice theory.
Vattel (1714-1767). Wight integrated the idea of international society in his ‘three traditions’ framework with which he wanted to replace the Realist/idealistic deadlock (Wight 1991). This way, instead of a zero-sum stand-off between Realism and idealism, he formulated his ‘international theory’, and the aforementioned three key concepts, as an on-going conversation between three theoretical strands: Realism (or the Hobbesian world-view), rationalism (or the Grotian world-view) and revolutionism (or the Kantian world-view).

Bull, in the first disciplinary historiography, names a number of representatives of the ‘idealistic’ tradition. Yet, he questions that label and instead claims that their ‘distinctive characteristic … was their belief in progress’, such that a more peaceful and just world order was possible; that the transformation was on-going; and that their role was to assist in this development (Bull 1972b:34). In terms of history, ‘idealistic’ thinking was characterised by a radical break between past and present, where the past provides the lessons learnt, and the present is guided by a sense of never-again (Bull 1972b:35). On the Realist reaction to this thinking, Bull (1972b:36-39) argues that Realism was as moral as the ‘idealism’ it turned against, but instead of seeing the past as ‘merely anarchy and disorder’, Realist writers – also named – explained ‘international life in terms of permanent laws and cyclical patterns’, which in turn denied them any possibility to ‘throw light’ on drastic changes. In his re-reading of Carr’s (1966 [1946]) book The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, Bull pinpoints what he finds wanting in the first debate perspectives:

The idea of an international society - of common interests and common values perceived in common by modern states, and of rules and institutions deriving from them - is scarcely recognized in The Twenty Years’ Crisis. In the course of demonstrating how appeals to an overriding international society subserve the special interests of the ruling group of powers, Carr jettisons the idea of international society itself. This is the idea with which a new analysis of the problem of international relations should now begin. (Bull 1969:638)

Although modern re-readings of the first debate tend to assign blame to Bull (Wilson 1998:8; Schmidt 2002:23) for contributing to perpetuating the narrative of a great debate between Realists and idealists in his chapter in the 1972 Aberystwyth Papers (edited by Brian Porter), the main problem with the conventional story of the first debate does not come down to his intervention. As pointed out by several observers, the lasting effect of the first debate has been to discredit ideas and avenues of research associated with the idealistic label (Wilson 1998:14; Ashworth 2002:48; Schmidt 2002:21-23). The present collection will, at least on the margin, contribute to addressing that very issue, by investigating how the School which frames itself as the via media of the first debate fares with regards to the study of change.
The Second Debate: Placing the English School

The ‘second debate’ in the 1960s was more credibly than the first debate an actual debate, although Duncan Bell (2003:155) describes it as ‘at most, a skirmish between scholars’. In the English School, it is understood as primarily a trans-Atlantic affair, between (British) traditionalists who drew on classical methodologies to theorise about international politics, and (American) behaviourists who employed formal and statistical methods to seek to build a scientific base for the study of international relations. Bull was one of the main contenders in this debate, defending a ‘classical approach’ according to which the ‘scientific approach’ was completely counter-productive (Bull 1966b; Knorr and Rosenau 1969). The main reason for this was the quite simple conviction, shared by the members of the British Committee, that the subject material of IR did not easily lend itself to quantification, the search for covering laws, and hypothesis testing through strict procedures of empirical verification. The attitude towards behaviouralism and its standards of science differed even within the British Committee, however, where Wight, who had spent a term in Chicago replacing Hans Morgenthau in 1957 and rejected the offer of a professorship there (Hall 2006:9), preferred ignoring behaviouralism altogether, while Bull chose to confront it straight on (Bull 1976:103-104).

The ‘scientific approach’ of the second debate thus focused on building generalisable and cumulative knowledge subject to empirical verification. The preferred methods of the ‘scientific’ side can be recognised from economics as well as from the natural sciences. ‘Behaviorism came late to International Relations, at least compared to other areas of political science, but it arrived with the force of deep arguments already rehearsed elsewhere in the social sciences … By the 1970s, the behaviorists declared victory’ (Lake 2013:569-570). This development was specific to American academia, and might have had to do with the hierarchy that Wæver claims was imposed on science in the American context. Natural sciences were seen as more successful than the social sciences and humanities, and economics as somehow bridging the divide. It follows that borrowing theory and methodology from economics was seen as the way to pass the threshold for a ‘real’ science (Wæver 1998:714; Schmidt 2002:24).

Meanwhile, the defence of the ‘classical approach’, emanating from Britain especially, is explained by Wæver (1998:709-711) as originating with the traditional emphasis on ‘a liberal education as “gentlemen’s knowledge”’. The British context thereby lacked the idea of a hierarchy of sciences that was so central to American academia. Moreover, the idea of ‘the international’ as a different environment from domestic society contributes to lending
IR legitimacy as its own field of study rather than as a branch of political science (Waever 1998:711). This logically leads to less inclination to adopt methods and thinking from other domains, such as economics, as those are seen to apply to a different subject matter. As already mentioned, the scholars of the English School have also directly contributed to this apprehension by their outright rejection of the ‘domestic analogy’ (Bull 1966c, 2002 [1977]; Manning, 1975 [1962]).

‘The debate became polarized between those who believed that the methods of the natural sciences, or at least those described by logical-positivist philosophers of science as the hypotheticodeductive model, could be emulated and adopted in the study of international politics, versus those who argued that the study of the social world was not amenable to the strict empirical methods of natural science’ (Schmidt 2002:700). Although the ‘scientific’ side is supposed to have won the second debate in the American version of the story, this is much less true in both continental Europe and in Britain (Lake 2013:570; Waever 1998:711), although fairly well accepted in Scandinavia (Jørgensen 2000:15-16). According to Simon Curtis and Marjo Koivisto (2010:435), the heart of the matter in the second debate was the question of ‘unity of science’; that is, ‘whether the natural and social sciences can be studied similarly’. This is a useful way of making sense of the debate, and it puts the different starting points of the participants in a clearer light. It also foregrounds the argument made by several scholars, that the second debate was really not very different from the third debate (Lake 2013:570-571; Navon 2001). This argument will be developed in the next section for the English School specifically, as I argue that its failure to engage the third debate has denied the School its possibilities to scrutinise its meta-theoretical underpinnings. In short, after Bull’s intervention in the second debate, the English School has largely avoided discussing methodology (Navari 2009a:1) – and everything that goes with it.

For the self-understanding of the English School, the second debate is as central as the first. The English School consciously sought to profile its classical approach between the ‘scientific’ requirements of IR as an emerging social science, and an older humanist tradition of historical studies. While Bull was the banner carrier of the English School in this debate, Butterfield was simultaneously engaged in a similar debate in the discipline of history, with Sir Lewis Namier as his main opponent (Keene 2008:385). Bull expressed their enterprise as seeking to ‘warm the coals of an older tradition of historical and philosophical reflection during the long, dark winter of the “social scientific” ascendancy’ (Bull 1972b:48). He points out how the ‘common characteristic’ of all the representatives of the ‘scientific tradition’ was their ‘self-consciousness about methodology’. ‘Students of international relations in the [late 1950s and 1960s] became sensitive as to the under-
developed state of theoretical work in their own subject by comparison with that of other branches of the social sciences’ (Bull 1972b:40).

Bull was explicit in its condemnation of the ‘scientific approach’: ‘The scientific approach has contributed and is likely to contribute very little to the theory of international relations, and in so far as it is intended to encroach upon and ultimately displace the classical approach, it is positively harmful’ (Bull 1966b:366). To him, it was clear that it is the subject matter of international relations which will not allow for ‘scientific’ analysis. He summarised his preferred way of theorising international politics:

[T]he approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and that is characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations, that general propositions about this subject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition, and that these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin. (Bull 1966b:361)

In this context, it is important to recall that the ambition of the scholars of the British Committee was to produce ‘international theory’. Notwithstanding their resistance to behaviouralism and their preference for ‘the approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law’ (Bull, 1966b:361), their enterprise was not to reproduce debates which were ongoing in the discipline of history, nor about accepting social science at face value, but rather to walk a cumbersome path with one leg in each domain. On the topic of history in International Relations, Bull writes with appreciation about Wight’s striving to unite theorising of international relations with historical inquiry. ‘The professional diplomatic historians, on the whole, have not been interested in large questions of theory. The theorists of International Relations have lacked the capacity or the inclination to do the historical work … Wight is one of the few to have bridged this gap with distinction’ (Bull 1976:116). This complaint about IR theory as historically naïve or ‘chronofetischist’ is common in the discipline even today (Lawson 2010; Lawson and Hobson 2008; Hobden 2002; Reus-Smit 2008). On the other hand, and perhaps less often appreciated, Bull’s defence of ‘the classical approach’ nowhere denied that IR was a specific branch of science; rather he affirmed its belonging to that category. ‘The theory of international relations should undoubtedly attempt to be scientific in the sense of being a coherent, precise, and orderly body of knowledge, and in the sense of being consistent with the philosophical foundations of modern science’ (Bull 1966b:375). He also made clear that the purpose of historical study in IR was to ‘delve into
the past in order to throw light on contemporary interstate politics’ (Bull 1972a:252).

In Bull’s formulation, ‘historical study is the essential companion of theoretical study itself: not only because history is the laboratory of the social sciences, the source of the material by which general propositions may be verified or falsified, but also because theory itself has a history, and theorists themselves elaborate their ideas with the preoccupations and within the confines of a particular historical situation’ (Bull 1972b:32). Note here that Bull acknowledges the possibility of using history as a ‘laboratory for the social sciences’, while at the same time stressing the place of the theorist so that a given theorist must be understood in his or her own time and context.

Today, we might call the English School project primarily one of ontological theorising; that is, the study of central concepts using philosophy and history, and not reducible to only empirical theorising (Guzzini 2013:534). In their own understanding, the scholars of the British Committee were concerned with a traditional form of political theory, in which the central concepts are deeply historically informed, as opposed to only analytical constructs. Butterfield and Wight note that the scholars of the British Committee ‘have probably been more concerned with the historical than with the contemporary, with the normative than the scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological, with principles than policy’ (Butterfield and Wight 1966:12).

The Third Debate: The Missing Link

The ‘third debate’ in IR started in the late 1980s, and is in some sense still on-going (as evidenced, for instance, by International Studies Quarterly’s symposium celebrating the debate’s 25th anniversary in 2014). Inanna Hamati-Ataya (2013:670) even argues that IR so far has still failed to take the ‘reflexive turn’ that was at stake at the outset of the debate. There is however some confusion as to the terminology of the ‘third debate’. In the American context, ‘third debate’ sometimes denotes what is in a European context often called the ‘interparadigm debate’\(^4\), taking place in the 1970s.

\(^4\) The ‘interparadigm debate’ has some relevance to the project of developing the English School as it sharpened the discipline’s meta-theoretical awareness, including the view expressed in the introduction to this volume, that the theory we employ shapes what reality we see. The main contenders of the debate were Realism, Pluralism and Structuralism, and if included at all, the writers of the English School (notably Martin Wight and Hedley Bull) were placed in the Realist camp (Banks 1985:14). This debate will not be dealt with here at any length (but see Wæver 1996:174-175).
What is here called the third debate therefore sometimes becomes the ‘fourth debate’ (Schmidt 2002:20-21). David Lake (2013:570) simply calls it ‘the final great debate’. Interestingly, he then suggests the possibility of a new debate between positivism and post-positivism, which overlaps considerably with what is here understood as the third debate. His intervention thus rather lends support to the idea that the third debate is still on-going.

The disciplinary divide which is usually termed the ‘third debate’ is commonly understood as a clash between positivism and post-positivism (Lapid 1989), but has also been formulated in terms of rationalism vs. reflectivism (Keohane 1988), explaining vs. understanding (Hollis and Smith 1990) or, quite unfortunately in the IR context, naturalism vs. constructivism (Moses and Knutsen 2007). However the debate has been framed, and what different aspects of it have been emphasised, it somehow comes down to what are to be counted as valid scientific claims (for an overview, see Jackson 2011:3-10). This fundamental questioning of claims has led to a problematisation of ontological and epistemological assumptions used by the major IR-theories, and by extension also to the break-through of Constructivism as an alternative to rationalist perspectives (such as (neo-)Realism, Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism). The self-understanding of many IR scholars is that the debate is no longer (if it ever was) about methods, but about ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations (Lapid 1989:236). In this text, I will follow Yosef Lapid’s terminology, and discuss positivism and post-positivism, respectively.

‘Positivism’ in IR has only remote connections to the logical positivism of the 1920s Vienna circle. In IR, the label has instead come to denote the work of scholars who hold that ‘research and researchers can separate themselves from reality and objectively observe the world they inhabit, that science is and should be limited to observable implications and factors, and that the purpose of science is causal inference’ (Lake 2013:578). This understanding of positivism ironically leads to inclusion into the positivist canon of thinkers who explicitly criticised logical positivism (e.g. Popper), and often leads to misunderstandings between IR and other branches of political science.

‘Post-positivism’ is a similarly problematic label, as it tends to denote any research which is not positivist in orientation (Lapid 1989:239). In the most common accounts, however, it includes critical theory, post-structuralism, postmodernism and some versions of feminism and constructivism (Schmidt 2002:707). What these have in common, however, is not so much their substantive concerns as their scepticism to the positivist definition of science, and especially to its dominance and related hegemonic privileges in the discipline.
As formulated by Lapid, we might understand the third debate as a partial continuation of the second debate, where the natural sciences also provided the model for a successful scientific endeavour.

For too long the tragedy of international relations scholars was, of course, that they proved incapable of either fruitfully adopting or decisively rejecting the grail of positivist science. Via positivism the discipline became locked in a sterile and frustrating worshipful relationship to the natural sciences. Presently emerging from this self-imposed positivist trap, many scholars are favorably impressed by the new latitude of maneuver offered by a multitude of post-positivist idioms of enquiry. And although notably lacking the exclusive luster of the positivist “mantle of science,” the post-positivist counterpart – or counterparts – are far more accommodating in their acknowledged posture of tolerance and humility. (Lapid 1989:246)

The same idea shines through in other early contributions to the debate (in some ways echoing Bull’s intervention in the second debate): by sacrificing the claim to a science on par with the natural sciences, IR could be more tolerant and come closer to its substance. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith located the problem at the level of explanation when they developed Max Weber’s distinction between erklären and verstehen as ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ international relations. Explaining would then be the ‘outside’ story and entail what we now call positivist causal explanation, whereas understanding would be the ‘inside’ story and work with hermeneutic interpretation of meaning (Hollis and Smith 1990). The risk with this distinction is that ‘understanding’, like ‘post-positivism’, might be understood as a residual category; that is, what you do if your research is not quite up to the standard of positivist explanation (for comparison, see Keohane 1988 and Kurki 2006).

In Smith’s illuminating interpretation, positivism should be understood primarily in terms of its epistemology (what we can know about the world) rather than its ontology (what there is) or methodology (how we can know anything about it). Seen in this way, positivism builds on four assumptions: first, positivism assumes the unity of science, where the social sciences are similar to the natural sciences, and can therefore use the same, or similar, methods. Second, positivism assumes that it is possible to make a waterproof distinction between facts and values, and also that facts are neutral so that it is possible to first study something, and then form an opinion on it. Third, positivism assumes that because there are empirical regularities in the world, we may make valid generalisations (such as for instance about causal inference). Fourth, positivism assumes that ‘real science’ must rely on empirical verification (Smith 1996:15-17). Post-positivism, as understood in the third debate, questioned all of these assumptions, but not all post-positivism questioned all of the assumptions. Again in Smith’s terms, ‘there is no hope of a
(single) post-positivist approach because some very distinctively different and mutually exclusive epistemological positions underlie post-positivist international theories’ (Smith 1996:38). Apart from an increased meta-theoretical awareness in the discipline, there has not been any real conclusion to the third debate: some scholars continued their (positivist) business as usual, whereas others set out to refine the alternatives.

Although the massive meta-theoretical questioning brought about in the third debate also provided the impetus for Constructivism in IR, the placement of Constructivism in third debate terms is uncertain. Jonathon Moses and Torbjørn Knutsen – in accordance, I believe, with its use within certain other social sciences – use the label ‘constructivism’ to denote the entire ‘post-positivist’ meta-theoretical side of the debate – which in IR would rather be called ‘interpretivism’ (Moses and Knutsen 2007:9-12). As hinted at in the introduction, the term Constructivism has in IR more often come to denote a broad theoretical tradition, albeit one with its own meta-theoretical grounding (Guzzini 2000). While Emanuel Adler famously claimed that Constructivism was ‘seizing the middle ground’ (Adler 1997), and Wendt claimed that it was able to square a social ontology with a positivist epistemology (Wendt 1999), others have argued forcefully that Constructivism belongs on the ‘critical’, or post-positivist, side of the third debate (Price and Reus-Smit 1998).

For some leading scholars of the emerging Constructivist approach to international relations, the English School canon provided non-positivist inspiration (Wendt 1999; Finnemore 1996). A self-reflective movement within the English School thus came to recognise the interpretivist (perhaps even ‘pre-positivist’ in third debate terms) nature of their canonical literature. Thanks to the Constructivist break-through on the larger IR scene, theoretical cross-fertilisation suddenly provided the English School with an established vocabulary in which to express this insight.

It was in this intellectual environment that the English School was ‘reconvened’ (Buzan 2001). According to Christian Reus-Smit (2009:58ff), the sense of ‘common orientation’ of the English School and Constructivism has been cherished by both sides alike. He goes on to point out, however, that this sense of common orientation is partly due to misconstrued views of what the other school actually does, and of how united and paradigmatic the two schools really are, internally. Specifically, he means that Constructivists largely ignore the normative aspects of English School scholarship, while the English School view of Constructivism seems to be unduly influenced by Wendt’s systemic Constructivist theory alone, rather than drawing on a fuller spectrum of constructivist theorising. This is a reasonable assessment, but the English School’s meta-theory is not explicit enough to be sure.
The interpretivist orientation of the School was not yet conventional wisdom in the 1990s, but has become increasingly accepted during the last 15 years. It has been pointed out increasingly often that the scholars of the British Committee as well as Manning were (proto-) constructivist in metatheoretical orientation (Aalberts 2010; Navari 2009b:39-41; Buzan and Little 2001:35; Bellamy 2005:1-26; Dunne 1995). This stands in contrast to earlier disciplinary historiographies, where the English School was simply understood as a British variety of Realism (Guzzini 1998:42-43). Since Tim Dunne’s observation in 1995 of international society as a social construction, the interpretivist orientation of the School has gradually become central to its self-understanding (Dunne 1995, 1998; Buzan 2001; Linklater and Suganami 2006:101). For instance, Buzan’s (2001:474) criteria for recognising someone who belongs to the English School are adapted from Dunne’s (1998), and consist of two elements: interest in the traditional inquiries (understood as interest in the key concepts); and adherence to a ‘broadly interpretive approach to the study of international relations’. Dunne (1995, 1998) along with Richard Little (1995, 1998, 2009) and Buzan (2001) pioneered the placement of the English School along the axes of the third debate. This move has however not been completely expressed or accepted within the School, and the present collection is meant as a contribution to that on-going venture.

The third debate fulfils one of the criteria that arguably fail the first debate, namely that the participants are aware that they are participating in a debate (Ashworth 2002:35). Yet, the third debate is at least as contested as the first two debates, on the grounds that the rival camps of the debate are misconstrued and that its topic in fact is only a rehearsal of earlier debates (Navon 2001). Yet, it has had a clear impact on IR as a field of inquiry, because of the theoretical innovation it has brought, but also through the new language which it has put at the disposal of IR scholars. If the second debate was thought to be about methodology, the third debate has brought awareness as to why the different participants of the second debate took such differing stances on methodology. For the English School specifically, the idea of a third debate raises issues that the School needs to handle, but has largely avoided, namely the clarification of its meta-theoretical underpinnings.

Like behaviouralists during the second debate, ‘positivist’ IR scholars have difficulties with the English School in the third debate context. Realist efforts of understanding the English School very often amount to trying to press it into a positivist mould of science – and, unsurprisingly, finding that it does not perform very well forced into this shape. At other times, the focus of comparison seems to be on whether the English School is ‘nicer’ than Realism rather than on the underlying meta-theoretical differences (Desch 2003; Glaser 2003; Little 2003; Copeland 2003; Spegele 2005). With regard
to Liberalism, there clearly are some common themes, such as the concern with institutions (Evans and Wilson 1992; Keohane 1988). However, both the ontology of institutions, and the methodology used to study them, differs sharply (see Krasner 1982; Buzan 1993). Before the label ‘English School’ stuck, the tradition was sometimes referred to as ‘British institutionalism’, a name which led the thoughts to a quite uneasy association with Neo-liberal Institutionalists (Suganami 2000). This confusion about what the English School does, and how it works, is arguably partly due to its very unclear meta-theoretical set-up. If the placement of the English School in third debate terms were clearer, it would be easier to see where all these misunderstandings come from, and also how to work around them.

The conduct of meta-theoretical inquiry will thus serve the School well, for several reasons. First, it will be clearer in its contacts with other scholars what the School actually does, how and why it does it, and what its claims to science are. This will be discussed in the next chapter. Second, being upfront about meta-theoretical assumptions will help the School to place itself in the IR landscape, and facilitate its drawing on insights from cognate approaches, rather than isolating itself and playing the ‘fog in the Channel’ (Brown 2001) game. This concern is evidenced especially in Essay II of this collection. Third, being explicit about its meta-theoretical underpinnings will contribute to a better understanding within the English School – admittedly a traditionally very diverse theoretical tradition – so that it can become clearer where diverging opinions, concerns and conclusions originate. This is discussed thoroughly in Essay III with regards to the differing understandings of change in the School.

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5 As in the title of Chris Brown’s 2001 book chapter on the development of IR theory: ‘Fog in the Channel: Continental International Relations Theory Isolated’.
Chapter 4: The English School and the Interpretivist Turn

Theoretical inquiry into International Relations is [...] philosophical in character. It does not lead to cumulative knowledge after the manner of natural science. Confronted by controversy, like the great debate which Wight explores among the three traditions, we may identify the assumptions that are made in each camp, probe them, juxtapose them, relate them to circumstances, but we cannot expect to settle the controversy except provisionally, on the basis of assumptions of our own that are themselves open to debate. All of this must follow once we grant Wight’s initial assumption that theoretical inquiry into International Relation is necessarily about moral or prescriptive questions (Bull 1976:114).

The argument of the last chapter was that the English School, having eagerly defined itself in terms of the first and second debates, has not engaged sufficiently with the third debate. Its meta-theoretical underpinnings are remarkably unclear, and this reduces the School’s capacity to communicate with, learn from, and inspire scholars who work in other theoretical traditions. Also for the sake of its own internal coherence, it is important that the School becomes more up-front about what it actually does, how and why it does it, and what its claims to science are. Supplying this missing link could therefore be beneficial to the School in various ways. In this chapter, the implications of the third debate for the English School are discussed, ending in the conclusion that several meta-theoretical positions are in principle available to the School, but that the position taken needs to be coherent, explicit and well thought through.

Formulating empirically testable hypotheses is not the main activity of English School writers, although that is often taken to be the central scientific endeavour (Reus-Smit 2012:528). Rather, the English School typically focuses on different types of ‘what’ questions: What is order in world politics (Bull 2002 [1977])? What ought to be done about human rights (Vincent 1986)? What is the meaning of world society (Buzan 2004)? What does the standard of civilisation do (Gong 1984)? These ‘what’ questions are almost always accompanied by ‘why’ questions, which is natural given the School’s traditionally historical orientation. Although these ‘why’ questions can very rarely be fit into a framework of Humean causality as constant co-variation, it does not mean that they are necessarily without merit. So what does the
School actually do, and how does it relate to other research enterprises within the common field of IR?

As has been pointed out repeatedly, neither Bull in the second debate nor later English School writers have been very keen on specifying their methodology in any positive sense (Navari 2009a; Little 2009; Adler et al. 2005). This opacity in the methodology department has generally been held against the English School (Jones 1981:1, 7-8). It is important, however, that the methodological disagreements between the English School and its various counterparts are not reduced to concerning only methods. Against the backdrop of the three successive debates in IR as understood by the English School as presented above, I argue that in fact the opacity goes much deeper. Indeed, it covers the whole meta-theoretical set-up of the English School, including its view of science, and should therefore be understood in the context of the third debate, rather than the second debate.

By way of summarising what we already know about the meta-theoretical set-up of the English School, it should first be reemphasised that the School is broad and varied in itself. Yet, it has several particularities, which contribute to distinguishing it from other ways of studying IR. It is, firstly, explicitly oriented towards history and historical comparisons. It consistently looks to history for models, and it does not assume that there are timeless truths. Rather, it assumes that history continues to unfold and that our position in it is essentially contingent. Second, it has consistently protested against reducing its ambitions to the positivist quest for causality, instead claiming to represent a ‘classical approach’ to international relations. Nowadays, this insistence puts it on par with other forms of interpretivism, especially some forms of Constructivism, but largely at odds with rationalist paradigms such as Realism, Liberalism or Neo-liberal Institutionalism. Finally, the English School has never completely bought into the idea that normative inquiry can be separated from analytical thinking. To the English School, questions about international affairs are inherently ethical, and the scientist’s efforts to be impartial are rather of a Bourdieuan kind, that is, being aware of one’s specific partialities and trying to take them into account, rather than striving for objectivity in any positivist sense.

Ever since the second debate, there has been a perceived difference between the American way of ‘doing IR’ and the British way. In Cornelia Navari’s words, there was ‘clear blue water between the then dominant aspiration for a social science that approximated the natural sciences, especially positivist methodologies that aimed to exclude the subjective views of the actors being studied, and a “human science” that took into account the value orientations of actors and the norms embedded in institutions’ (Navari 2009b:40). This was also the perception that gave the School its name. ‘Members of the Eng-
lish school of international relations ignore scientific procedure in two ways. Their basic standpoint is metaphysical. And, second, they are indifferent for the most part […] to the experience of the other social studies’ (Jones 1981:8). Although this perception of difference has become evident under the influence of the third debate, it is clear that it has been present much longer. In summary, British IR in general have been difficult to understand, judged by American/global standards, and the participants of the English School have not focused on helping outsiders in this regard.

The usual response from writers in the English School when confronted with criticism as to their methods as well as to their broader meta-theoretical commitments has thus been to distinguish between different ways of conducting international studies. Bull did this during the second debate when he contrasted the ‘classical approach’ and the ‘scientific approach’; and, although representing British IR at large rather than the English School specifically, Hollis and Smith (1990) did something similar when contrasting the ‘inside’ with the ‘outside’ perspective in their work of reference Explaining and Understanding International Relations, discussed in the previous chapter. However, there are several grounds on which we are entitled to question this reaction: first, it seems to be ultimately unconvincing as the same criticisms keep resurfacing. Second, it involves settling for an under-defined category (the classical approach), or a negatively defined category (understanding), which carries with it an air of second-best choice, which in turn has important implications for the possibilities of dialogue within the discipline. Third, leaning on this argument has allowed the English School to avoid disentangling its scientific claims for a long time. I will discuss each of those problems in the following sections.

The Case for Scientific Dualism

In his recent book, Patrick T. Jackson (2011:3) traces the debates on how to define a scientific enterprise, arguing that ‘playing the science card raises the stakes’. This statement aptly captures the problematique of meta-theoretical debate. IR, as a discipline, has, at least since the second debate, been divided between a dualist and a monist view of science. According to the latter position, only a naturalist meta-theoretical stance, with accompanying (positivist) implications for methodology and causal explanation, is scientific. According to the former position, naturalist and interpretivist meta-theoretical stances are equally scientific although different in methods, methodologies and areas of interest (Moses and Knutsen 2007:6-8; Hollis 1994:202). From an English School perspective, the ‘American way’ of doing social science embraces a monist conception of science influenced by the natural sciences,
in which only those studies conforming to that mould can be scientific. In the dualist conception, there is a sharp distinction between the ‘inside’ interpretivist view and the ‘outside’ naturalist view, both of which are seen as valid enterprises (although the term ‘science’ is not always employed equally for both).

The monist argument finds a strong contemporary formulation in the American methods bible of the 1990’s, ‘KKV’: *Designing Social Inquiry* by Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba.

A major purpose of this book is to show that the differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are only stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant. All good research can be understood – indeed, is best understood – to derive from the same underlying logic of inference. Both quantitative and qualitative research can be systematic and scientific. Historical research can be analytical, seeking to evaluate alternative explanations through a process of valid causal inference. History, or historical sociology, is not incompatible with social science. (King et al. 1994:5, emphasis added)

A corollary of KKV’s influential statement was that studies using qualitative methods (too) were claimed by the naturalist approach, as they are taken to ‘derive from the same underlying logic of inference’ as quantitative methods. Even this distinction, between qualitative and quantitative methods, is however very unclear: quantitative methods are methods which use numbers in some shape, such as statistics or formal modelling; and qualitative methods are then defined negatively as methods which do not use numbers.

Before KKV’s colonisation of qualitative methods took root, the distinction was probably a way of getting at Bull’s ‘scientific’ vs. ‘classical’ approaches. At least Bull did mix methods with general scientific ambitions, in describing ‘the scientific approach’ as aspiring ‘to a theory of international relations whose propositions are based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification’ (Bull 1966b:362). However, I want to claim here that his argument was actually not only about methods but also about conceptions of science. Under the influence of the monist conception, a lot of the work that the English School does simply is not scientific. Traces of this idea can often be seen in critique of the English School (see for instance Copeland, 2003).

A well-known statement of the dualist conception of science in IR is Hollis and Smith’s. Their formulation of the dual view acknowledges that there are always ‘two sorts of story to tell’, and that ‘both traditions are fertile for the study of international relations, despite a lively tension between them’ (Hollis and Smith 1990:1). At the same time, however, they contribute to the
conflation of causal explanation with methodology and with a broader concep-
tion of valid science. They start from the premise that science is about
either explaining or understanding, and therefore implicitly buy into natural-
ism’s idea that science is about searching for empirical regularities, although
they nuance it to say that those regularities can be either explained (from the
outside) or understood (from the inside). In this way, they also reinforce the
idea of a hierarchy built into the dualist view of science.

Importantly, the monist conception of science denies any particular standing
to social sciences, which is just seen as one kind of overall science, whereas
the dualist view recognises both an interpretivist (or in some formulations:
constructivist) and a naturalist meta-theoretical position within the social
sciences (Moses and Knutsen 2007). There could of course also be a re-
versed monist position which denies any utility of a naturalist position in the
social world. Carr took that stance in the 1960s, and Bull also came close to
it when he argued that nothing good would ever come out of the ‘scientific
approach’ (Bull 1966b; Carr 1987 [1961]). Arguably, however, the monist
(naturalist/positivist) and the dualist conceptions have been the more com-
monly recognised claims to valid scientific endeavours.

Bull, interestingly, uses ‘scientific’ in two senses in his polemical article
about international theory. First, he uses it in a depreciatory sense about ‘the
scientific approach’, yet claiming that he has chosen the term scientific ‘ra-
ther than scientistic so as not to prejudge the issue I wish to discuss by resort
to a term of opprobrium’ (Bull 1966b:361). Secondly, he also uses ‘scien-
tific’ in a broader and appreciatory sense, as something worth striving for.
As quoted in the discussion of the second debate in chapter 3 above, this use
of ‘scientific’ refers to ‘being a coherent, precise, and orderly body of
knowledge’ (Bull 1966b:375). This use of the concept ‘scientific’ makes
possible a reading in which Bull is not granting ‘science’ to his adversaries
but is rather arguing for a wider understanding of science (for comparison,
see Jackson 2011:6).

The Perils of Understanding

Some of the criticisms of the English School’s ‘methodological quietism’
(Spegele 2005:97) at the surface seem to target the School’s approach to
causal explanation. For instance, Dale Copeland argues:

[F]or American social scientists, it is difficult to figure out what exactly the
School is trying to explain, what its causal logic is, or how one would go
about measuring its core independent (causal) variable, “international socie-
ty”. As it stands, the English School is less a theory that provides falsifiable
hypotheses to be tested (or that have been tested) than a vague approach to thinking about and conceptualising world politics. (Copeland 2003:427)

Copeland (2003:428, emphasis in original) maintains that he is not holding the English School to a positivist standard but that most scholars would agree that ‘there are causal forces out there (power, domestic factors, shared ideas and so on) that drive state behaviour, and that our collective goal is to understand when and how these forces operate, and with what explanatory salience’. This is of course only reasonable given a monist view of science, and should consequently be rejected by scholars associated with the English School.

However, similar criticism of the English School comes also from other standpoints; for instance from Martha Finnemore using a Constructivist perspective:

[C]ausal arguments in the two most common American senses of the word are not the centrepiece or motivator of most English School work. Most English School work does not fit well into the independent/dependent variable language that dominates American IR, nor does it make arguments in the constitutively causal sense. (Finnemore 2001:510)

Both of these criticisms upon further consideration turn out to ask deeper questions than solely about causal explanation: Copeland in assuming that the English School is interested in testing hypotheses about underlying causal forces, and Finnemore in pointing out that the English School seems to have another agenda than the causal concerns common to American IR. Together, they amount to a questioning of the general scientific ambitions of the English School. In Milja Kurki’s words:

[T]he assumption elicited by Hollis and Smith that there is a fundamental dichotomy between causal and non-causal approaches to the social world, has come to permeate the discipline of IR in the last decade or so. While the so-called scientific theorists have advocated systematic causal analysis in IR, the so-called reflectivist “constitutive” theorists have maintained that causal analysis is neither a necessary, nor a desirable aim in understanding world politics. (Kurki 2006:189)

The unfortunate conflation of scientific ambitions in general with one’s attitude to causal explanation in particular comes down to the influence of the monist view of science as the venture of explaining behaviour. Rather than accepting this conflation, however, scholars who claim to practice understanding would do well to redefine the scientific venture in terms that do not automatically put them in a defensive position.
The very idea of ‘scientific standards’ has its origin in the ambition of logical positivism to approximate the natural sciences. R. G. Collingwood pointed this out very clearly:

But positivism, though it actually was a philosophical system, refused to claim that title. It claimed only to be scientific. It was in fact nothing but the methodology of natural science raised to the level of a universal methodology: natural science identifying itself with knowledge. Consequently an attack on positivism was bound to appear in addition as a revolt against science and also as a revolt against intellect as such. ... [but] it was [rather] a revolt against the philosophy which claimed that science was the only kind of knowledge that existed or ever could exist. (Collingwood 1956 [1946]:134)

As a result, whenever the founding members of the English School took the trouble to discuss their scientific standards, they necessarily did so to contrast their own work with that inspired by logical positivism; today, that would be positivism, whereas in the 1960s, it meant behaviouralism. This, to some extent, obliged them to use the vocabulary of their adversaries.

As logical positivism, behaviouralism and third debate positivism alike tend to emphasise the presence of an underlying pattern in which correlations can be identified, and causal relations (and in the extreme case even general laws) can be postulated, causal questions are necessarily important in those views of science (Moses and Knutsen 2007:8, 19-52; Jackson 2011:41-42; Hollis and Smith 1990:3). In Hollis and Smith’s version, therefore, explaining a correlation with causal hypotheses is the ‘outside’ approach, which is matched by the ‘inside’ approach of understanding actions from the inside, including actors’ intentions. However, if no underlying pattern in which to identify regularities is assumed, understanding reasons for action is a much less central enterprise to the ‘inside’ approach than explaining is to the ‘outside’ approach. There is also a difference between explaining (mechanic) behaviour and understanding (norm-bound) conduct (Navari 2009b:40), so that users of the two approaches are not necessarily interested in the same things. Hollis and Smith, in spite of their explicit ambition to put the two traditions on an equal footing, therefore contribute to cementing the idea of science as identifying causes for behaviour – which the ‘outside’ approach logically cares more about doing, and is better at. It is also in this light that we should understand Finnemore’s question about the English School’s allegedly non-causal scientific ambitions.

To reiterate, the English School has not been well served by the dualist conception of science as it has been used in IR, either by the distinctions between explaining and understanding, or between causal and non-causal approaches. From the monist perspective, all of these distinctions look like there is only one alternative, and the English School is not conforming to
that option. Moreover, even from a dualist perspective, interpretivism, understanding and non-causal approaches are less developed and less specified than naturalism, explaining, and the Humean approach to causality, so that naturalism becomes the preferred option even then. A useful venture therefore seems to be to sketch a wider meta-theoretical background against which the English School has a chance to start this inquiry on an equal footing with other theoretical approaches, in lieu of the common, but unhelpful, distinctions discussed above.

The Meta-Theoretical Lacuna

Jackson has helpfully traced the problem of differing conceptions of science in history: starting with Descartes, he argues that our conception of science is fundamentally a question of philosophical ontology, and the ‘hook-up’ of the mind to the world. He maintains that with mind-world dualism, that is, where the researcher’s mind is thought of as isolated from the world, the recurrent issue will be to escape the ‘Cartesian anxiety’ of not knowing whether what we study is really the world (das Ding an sich in Kant’s well-known formulation) or only what the world seems like to our mind. If the researcher’s mind is instead thought about as an integral part of the world (which can then no longer be thought of as ‘external’ to the mind), that is mind-world monism, the issue of Cartesian anxiety dissolves. Jackson overlays this dichotomised conceptualisation of philosophical ontology with a second philosophical wager, on how to relate to unobservables. Phenomenalism essentially amounts to taking empirical observations at face value, whereas transfactualism admits the possibility of studying objects and relations that are ‘real but unobservable’. Jackson thus produces four methodologies, all of which are equally scientific to him (Jackson 2011:32ff): neopositivism, critical realism, analyticism and reflexivity. This ideal-typical way of thinking about science undermines the dual as well as the monist conceptions of science; if there is not one, nor two, but at least four ways to think about science, it seems clear that we should be extremely wary to declare other people’s work ‘unscientific’.

In Jackson’s framework, the ‘scientific approach’, positivism and explaining is only appropriate in one out of four ideal-typical methodologies, namely the one he calls ‘neo-positivist’ (Jackson 2011:chapter 3). Logically, that means that the ‘classical approach’, interpretivism and understanding are appropriate to various degrees in all of the other three ideal-typical methodologies he suggests. This corresponds well to the remark made above on the status of ‘understanding’ as a dustbin category where the only universally shared idea is an opposition to the naturalist conception of science and ad-
herent naturalist methods. In third debate terms, only the naturalist ‘neo-
positivist’ methodology is positivist, while the three other methodologies,
although very different amongst themselves, are post-positivist.

To reiterate, therefore, what we know about English School meta-theory is
the following: first, the School is at least nominally ‘interpretivist’, or post-
positivist in third debate terms – although certain scholars would rather
claim something like a ‘pre-positivist’ label (R. Jackson 2009). This means
that English School work does not conform to the (neo-)positivist ambition
of causal inference – but apart from that restriction, the English School un-
derstanding of interpretivism differs widely. Just like the different post-
positivist epistemologies in Smith’s discussion of the third debate, quoted in
the previous chapter, writers within the English School have occupied sever-
al possible meta-theoretical positions. They range from an empiricist orienta-
tion (Holsti 2009; Wilson 2012) via explicitly eclectic ambitions (Little
2009) to a rather critical orientation (Linklater and Suganami 2006). In terms
of Jackson’s (2011) ideal-typical positions, scholars in the English School
may place themselves in all corners of his map, except for the neo-positivist
one. While this means that they have a common meta-theoretical enemy, so
to speak, they are not necessarily closer to each other, than they are to the
common rival.

In brief, there are many scholars in the English School who appear largely
to share the assumptions of what Jackson calls critical realism6, that is the
combination of mind-world dualism with transfactualism (Jackson
2011:37, 72-111). This position has been developed in IR by Constructiv-
ists (Wendt 1999; Kurki 2006; Patomäki and Wight 2000; Wight 2006) and
therefore seems logical to embrace for newly awakened interpretivists.
However, it is also quite easy to identify English School works that tend
towards what Jackson calls analyticism (Jackson 2011:112-155); the com-
bination of mind-world monism and phenomenalism (see insights in Keene
2009). Also Jackson’s third post-positivist possibility reflexivity (Jackson
2011:156-187), combining mind-world monism with transfactualism,
seems to be in principle available to the English School (for instance
Manning 1975 [1962]).

Importantly, therefore, I must reiterate that the English School is a di-
verse tradition. It is reasonable to assume that it has no one meta-
theoretically coherent position, but several, depending on who is asked.
My contribution here is thus intended to shed light on this lacuna in Eng-

6 Jackson has however later stated (during a presentation at the International Studies Associ-
lish School theorising, to explore ways of arriving at a coherent position, and then to propose *one* meta-theoretically sound reconstruction of the School with regards to its understanding of change (in Essay III), and with a workable conceptualisation of institutions (in Essay II). This reconstruction might not be accepted by all scholars drawing on the School, but importantly, discussing it will have the positive effect of encouraging scholars with differing meta-theoretical ideals to come clear about those, and scrutinising their coherence.
Chapter 5: Research Design

After the contextualisation in theoretical terms, and framing in meta-theoretical terms, of the inquiry of this dissertation in the preceding chapters, the time has now come to ask how this study has been undertaken. This chapter will therefore be devoted to how each of the three essays in this volume is constructed, and their respective logic of inquiry. The chapter starts with a general statement on methods, and follows up with a closer description of the crafting of each of the three essays.

This thesis is about theory development of one specific IR theory, namely the English School of International Relations. As such, it employs what Stefano Guzzini has termed ‘meta-theoretical theorising’, namely the study of ‘the building blocks and fundaments on which all theories are built’ (Guzzini 2013:533). The ‘building blocks and fundaments’ that are scrutinised are primarily central concepts (order, institution, change) with associated basic assumptions. I term this way of proceeding with theory development a critical ‘reconstruction’ (Guzzini 2000:149-150; Onuf 1989:1; Dewey 1920): to take central pieces out of the theoretical armour of the English School, polish them up by analysing their coherence and implications, and put them back in again in a more illuminating way. ‘A reconstruction is a hermeneutic enterprise which provides a specific interpretation … if [it] “works”, it appears …self-evident. …To the reader unacquainted with the subject matter… [the reconstruction] must provide a consistent view; for the acquainted, the specific interpretation must fit’ (Guzzini 2010:304).

This type of critical reconstruction is not the same kind of concept analysis as the historical interpretation of the Cambridge School, which would have meant instead studying how concepts ‘emerge, are defined, redefined and become embedded’ (Bell 2001:21; Skinner 1969). It is thus not the historical development or evolving understanding of concepts that is central here, but rather their function, and how they fit into an already established whole. Critical reconstruction is also not the same as genealogy, which would refer to critically studying discursive practices, including the relations of dominance which can be exposed through changes in the meaning of central concepts (see for instance Bartelson 1995; Milliken 1999:243). I have thus not focused particularly on what structures of dominance the English School might contribute to upholding. Finally, critical reconstruction is also differ-
ent from deconstruction, which would involve breaking down discourse to expose its inherent contingencies and power biases, but not building them up in an improved manner (Milliken 1999:242-243). Instead, it involves conceptual analysis in the sense suggested by Felix Berenskoetter (2017:155-158): dealing with how central concepts are used in academic discourse and, to a lesser extent, with how they operate in society.

Concretely, this critical reconstruction is done in three cumulative steps: Essay I, at the intersection of empirical and theoretical study, elaborates on one conception of world order through international society and its institutions. Essay II, at the intersection of theoretical and meta-theoretical study, problematises several prevalent understandings of institutions, and suggests a reinterpretation of the concept and of how it contributes to change and stability in international order. Essay III meta-theoretically questions what change might mean to the English School and proposes a meta-theoretical re-brush of the School which can accommodate a coherent understanding of change.

Following from the different purposes of the three essays contained in this collection, the craftsmanship of each is different. In Essay I, I do a fairly straightforward analysis of secondary empirical material in describing the different suggestions for reforming the UN which have been presented by states and various UN observers. Applying an essentially ready-made theoretical framework to that debate serves to interpret reform suggestions in a coherent way, illuminating what they say about international society and the internal relations of its ‘primary’ institutions. Slicing the reform debate according to this framework hence allows a reinterpretation both of the inherent strains and tensions in the UN setting, and of the idea of primary institutions as drivers of change in international society.

In Essay II, I problematise the central concept of ‘institution’, which leads to the usual scientific assumptions used to study institutions being thrown into sharp relief. Here, I first discuss various interpretations of what the concept of ‘institution’ might mean in various IR and also larger political science interpretations. I then scrutinise the often implicit idea that institutions, in the English School sense, have independent ontological existence, that is, that they exist whether anybody acknowledges them or not; and that they have ontological priority, that is, exist before the social relations that they make up (in this case international society). Finally, I question this understanding of institutions, suggesting instead that institutions lack independent ontological existence, and instead are constructed, and thus come into being as institutions, by the discursive connection of practices to norms, beliefs and expectations designating them as pillars of international order. I also suggest that institutions of international society are in this way to a large ex-
tent created by international society, so that it is counter-productive to think of them as having ontological priority. In this way, the meta-theoretical questioning of one concept, central to the English School understanding of international order, leads to a re-evaluation of how to think about that order, and especially about the prospects of change and stability therein. By extension, this rethinking of institutions leads to new insights about what sort of dynamics maintain the current international system, but also about what might threaten it.

In Essay III, the central concept that I scrutinise is instead ‘change’, and several packages of assumptions which are arguably typically associated with assessments of change and continuity are therefore brought to the fore. To this end, I draw in Essay III on some basic conceptual analysis, but the bulk of its methodology is the meta-theoretical scrutiny of assumptions surrounding change and continuity. Suggesting a division of the concept of change into an ontological, an explanatory and a normative facet, I then discuss several critical themes which may affect how change is understood: a view of history as contingent or determined; an idea of the social world as stable or in flux; and what might count as improvement, deterioration or status quo. For each of these themes, I suggest a ‘best solution’ for English School theory, thus ending up with a reconstruction of the School’s understanding of change that bears quite profound implications for the meta-theoretical grounding of the School as such.

At a lower level of abstraction, each individual essay in this volume also addresses its own research gap. In the next sections, the essays will be presented somewhat more in-depth, and their respective arguments and research-designs discussed more thoroughly.

International Organization in International Society: UN Reform from an English School Perspective

For Essay I, the specific research gap addressed is the need for a better empirical grip on the UN. There was a blank spot in the classic English School literature on how to understand international organisations, which were to a large extent simply treated as uninteresting by those scholars, as the most important action was thought to happen rather via the more basic common institutions of international society. This gap is being addressed in the modern English School (see especially Knudsen and Navari forthcoming 2017), and Essay I was written as one early contribution to this venture. My specific addition to the literature is to suggest how primary institutions can be read and their workings interpreted within the UN system, thus preparing the
ground for a reconciliation of these two sets of organising principles for international interaction.

Essay I deals with one quite commonly trodden path for improvement in multilateral relations between states, namely efforts to reform the United Nations. A wide-spread apprehension of international order, shared by many Liberal as well as Constructivist scholars, is that the UN is the closest there is to a world government, and that it needs to be reformed in order for it to make better decisions. The current order, as well as improvement in that order, is taken to be self-evident, and what is needed, according to this view, is to find sustainable answers to how to achieve better outcomes. By analysing the implications of various reform proposals in terms of the primary institutions of international society, Essay I goes beyond this arguably simplistic view of UN reform.

The first, and arguably most important, move in Essay I is therefore to problematise the dominant ideas of what the UN is, and what the purposes of the organisation are. It is argued that the UN should be understood, not merely as an arena for power struggles, nor as an international agent with its own agenda, nor as an intergovernmental enterprise with a set direction decided by member states, but rather as a somewhat static formalisation of certain aspects of international society – incidentally as that society came across around 1945 when the organisation was designed. In this perspective, the goals for the different suggestions of UN reform are not necessarily to achieve a more correct distribution of power, nor to achieve better (in whatever sense) outcomes, but simply to bring the organisation better in line with how the underlying international society has developed during the organisation’s 70-odd years of existence. Likewise, in this perspective, the drivers for reform are not given by the substantial goals which UN reform should supposedly fulfil, but the drivers are instead tensions among the ‘primary’ institutions of international society which make up the international order that underlies and surrounds the UN. These institutions keep evolving even when the formal organisation cannot easily evolve, and the basic idea is that the repeated calls for reform of the UN are expressions of the institutional strain resulting from the inability of the UN to accommodate these developments.

Specifically, two such tensions between primary institutions are explored in Essay I: the first one is between great power management as formalised in the Security Council, and sovereign equality as formalised in the General Assembly, somewhat mediated by regional representation as practiced (but not clearly formalised) throughout the UN system. The other one is between sovereign equality and equality of people in the Human Rights Council, where the human rights of individuals, citizens of states, stand against states’ traditional sovereign right to mind their own business in their own territory.
It is argued that both of these tensions led to repeated calls for reform of the UN; in the case of the Security Council so far unsuccessfully, but one institutional reform was carried out in 2006, when the older Commission on Human Rights was dismantled and replaced with the newer Human Rights Council. Importantly, however, this organisational rearrangement did not solve the underlying tension between sovereign equality and equality of people, which means that while the Human Rights Council might be an organisational improvement over the Commission on Human Rights, the clashes between the two underlying primary institutions will continue within the UN – as they do in international society overall, beyond and around the UN.

The research design of Essay I is simple. It is a reading of an on-going empirical debate through a theoretical perspective that is not usually applied to that particular piece of reality. Applying a different theory to the debate brings certain elements out that are otherwise not discussed. In this case, it is especially the drivers of the reform process, which usually tend to be implicit or taken for granted, that are suddenly open for scrutiny. The application of the English School framework also helps us understand why the same conflicts re-occur in the UN system (in relation to the primary institutions of international society, the conflicts are built into the UN by organisational design), and can thus help us see why no reform of the Security Council has happened, and why the reform of the human rights body will not solve the underlying problem.

The most important and original contribution of Essay I to knowledge is thus the translation of the UN and of UN reform into English School terminology and the reconceptualisation of the UN which it entails. It could be argued, and is indeed argued in the essay, that this is progress relative to the conventional Liberal and Constructivist understandings of the UN; but more importantly, it is progress relative to the conventional English School account of the UN. In traditional English School writings, international organisations are often overlooked or treated as window-dressing, as the important developments and processes that relate to international order are thought to go on elsewhere, namely in the society of states, or international society, that is assumed to have existed long before the UN, and which would continue to exist even if the UN no longer existed. By contrast, this essay shows that the UN is of direct importance as a multilateral arena for international society, where its primary institutions can be observed in action.

In this sense, the contribution of Essay I to English School theory is the development of a specific conceptualisation of international order, namely as organised at the current time through multilateralism. It points at a way of reconciling the idea of a long-standing international society with the more or
less durable organisational clothing that it might put on. Importantly, this rethinking of what the UN is in English School terms also opens the way for the possibility that the link between the underlying international society and the organisational framework that it has taken on, that is, the UN, is not a one-way street. The possibility that the UN is not only receptive to impulses from international society, but in turn influences international society, is explored further in Essay II.

**On the Evolution of Primary Institutions of International Society**

For Essay II, the specific research gap addressed is an internal English School debate on how different levels of international institutions contribute to change and stability in international society. Buzan (2004) and to some extent Holsti (2004) and Samuel Makinda (2002) opened the way for this debate, and many others have participated (see for instance Schouenborg 2011; Knudsen 2013; Friedner Parrat 2014; Spandler 2015). This debate is far from settled, and Essay II should be understood as a contribution to it. Essay II continues down the theoretical route opened in Essay I, investigating how international organisations such as the UN may contribute to change and stability in international society via primary institutions. This entails some re-thinking of the English School concept of primary institutions, including re-adjusting meta-theoretical assumptions of how social reality is constituted, from the traditionally rather empiricist approach of the English School (drawn on in Essay I) to a more intersubjective and relationist approach inspired by Constructivism and post-structuralism. The principal thrust of Essay II is therefore theory development.

The main argument in Essay II is that while primary institutions, such as great power management, have traditionally in the English School been treated as having independent ontological existence (that is, to exist ‘out there’, independently of whether anyone acknowledges them), a more workable approach for understanding change in international society would be to conceptualise them as ever-evolving practices which become institutions by their discursive connection to norms, beliefs and expectations. This reconceptualisation of primary institutions opens the way for the question of when their permanent reproduction leads to stability, and when it leads to change; and this in turn allows for a more active role for international organisations than what is usually admitted in the English School. If the development of primary institutions can be influenced by formalised rules in international organisations, in Essay II denoted secondary institutions, it means that such secondary institutions can, over time, contribute to both modifying and
‘freezing’ primary institutions. The example discussed in Essay II is how the primary institution of great power management evolves as a practice, while staying discursively connected to the norms, beliefs and expectations embodied by the Security Council membership rules in the UN Charter, hence effectively freezing the understanding of great power management as guardianship of international peace and security by those states that were the victorious powers in 1945.

The research design of Essay II is to apply a theoretical and meta-theoretical critique to a central concept in order to build a more thorough understanding of continuity and change in international society. Through conceptual and meta-theoretical analysis, the key concept is interrogated and re-adjusted until it captures its function as a socially constructed vehicle for international order. The crux of the matter is that with a traditional, empiricist understanding of institutions as having ontological priority and independent ontological existence, the sources of change in international society are difficult to understand. If we agree that international society somehow evolves, there must also be some flexibility in its primary institutions. With the reconceptualisation exercise undertaken in Essay II, it becomes logically possible to square the notion of institutions with the idea that international society develops over time.

The most important and original contribution to knowledge of Essay II is therefore the opening up of primary institutions into flexible and continuously discursively constructed phenomena, rather than empirically static habits which could supposedly be mapped out if only scholars could agree on a precise enough definition. This is a contribution to English School theory as it throws off some of its empiricist limitations, but it is also a contribution to a wider interpretivist IR literature where practices, institutions and evolving concepts are important topics, as it suggests one mechanism for accounting for change and stability in a socially constructed, intersubjectively interpreted international reality.

Essay II thus delves further into the attempt advanced in Essay I on the empirical query of how to understand the current international order. As it also details an avenue for understanding change and stability in that international order, it begs the normative question of whether stability and change, or what sort of stability relative to what sort of change, might be conceptualised as improvement of the international order. In this way, it explicitly opens the way for the considerations of how we ought to understand change investigated in Essay III.
Change in International Society: How Not to Recreate the ‘First Debate’ of International Relations

For Essay III, the specific research gap is the under-theorisation of change in the English School. Most of the time, change is simply taken in a common sense way to mean that something somehow becomes different, and it is not made clear what sort of assumptions underlie our assessments of what needs to change, and how much it needs to change, for change to count. Essay III draws on inspiration from the philosophy of history to address these questions (notably Collingwood 1956 [1946]; Carr 1987 [1961]), and it should be read as my contribution to English School theory, as the reconstructed understanding of change that I suggest carries meta-theoretical implications for what kind of science the School ought to do. My specific contribution is thus a development of English School theory that enables it to grasp a problematic which it has previously avoided. By extension, the analysis in Essay III will make possible the same kind of development for other IR theories.

Essay III sets out by seeking to demonstrate that change is an under-theorised concept, possibly in IR generally, but especially in the English School. This is done by means of a discussion of how an empirical development, namely the adoption by the UN Summit Meeting in 2005 of the Responsibility to Protect, can be understood both as change in international society and as no change in international society by different researchers drawing on the same English School equipment, and studying the same empirical reality. The suggested solution to this paradox is that it cannot be established whether something like the R2P is change or not, as long as we have not scrutinised what we mean by change, including whether we understand the R2P as a desirable development or not.

The main argument of Essay III is that change has been treated as a commonsensical concept in the English School, and that it would be helpful to understand it as composed of three facets: one ontological (what is change?), one explanatory (what causes change?), and one normative (is change desirable?). This reconceptualisation of change permits cross-checking the three facets against each other to pinpoint internally coherent assessments of change, but most of all, it makes visible the underlying assumptions used to study change, so that history, causation and normative preferences can be openly scrutinised, questioned and defended rather than treated as self-evident.

For the English School, this means that its most common way of discussing change, that is, as an opposition between a progressive ‘solidarist’ perspective according to which international society changes for the better, and a
conservative ‘pluralist’ approach according to which international society in principle does not change, is a dead end. Moreover, it is a dead end which was exhausted in IR as a field of study already during what has in this introduction been described as the ‘first debate’ between Realists and idealists in the 1930s – and which even inspired thinking about international society as a middle way approach to international relations in the first place. As argued in the essay, the English School understanding of change should therefore instead be reconstructed according to each of the three facets of change, in order to expose potentially incoherent assumptions, previously hidden by the commonsensical understanding of change. In this way, it is also demonstrated that the pluralist and solidarist labels are meaningless as empirical shortcuts for what are actually rather normative ideas about what kind of change is desirable.

For the English School to approach change in a more logical and meta-theoretically coherent manner, it is suggested in Essay III that it ought to see the ontological facet of change as the selection of what it can argue is historically significant change, grounded in a contingent rather than determined conception of history. In this way, it could continue to put emphasis on its idea of institutional change as the primary matter of change in international society, but without ascribing either fixed life-cycles or eternal existence to those institutions. For the explanatory facet of change, it is argued, first, that the English School should engage with the causes of change. This is a topic which it has had a tendency to avoid, given the close association of questions of causation with a positivist research agenda. Second, it is argued that the English School ought to see the social world as in permanent flux rather than as static equilibria. This quite closely follows the reconceptualisation of primary institutions as permanently evolving practices discursively tied to norms, beliefs and expectations, advanced in Essay II. Moreover, it makes available causal narratives to make change intelligible by drawing on mechanical processes, volitional acts and chance events, while also making visible how such narratives rely on normative ideas for allocating praise or blame when rationalising change *ex-post*; that is, after the actual change. For the normative facet of change, it is suggested that given the understanding of history as contingent, the English School ought to be guardedly optimistic about the prospects of reconciling such values as order and justice, law and politics, and humans as citizens and as cosmopolitan persons. This is because of the performative potential of academic study: only by maintaining a sustained normative debate defining what would be desirable progress can it be visualised, and improvement in that way can become an available option. If, instead, we were to settle for the pessimist account that progress is impossible, that would justify a permanent recreation of the *status quo* – and improvement would then not be an available option.
Essay III thus makes visible the connection between the empirical and the normative, or rather the other way around: how normative ideals contribute to preconditioning what we read into a socially constructed empirical reality. Our assumptions about the course of history and about the static or fluid nature of the social world might play into what we find to be a desirable development, but we must also be open to the possibility that our ideas of what is desirable may likewise play into the assumptions we make about the course of history and the nature of the social world. Therefore, we cannot afford to let normative theorising take a backseat, or even a separate vehicle, to analytical theorising – as prescribed by the naturalist orthodoxy of a strict division between empirical and normative study – but our normative assumptions must, just like our assumptions about history and causation, be out in the open to be questioned and defended.

The research design of Essay III is to apply meta-theoretical critique to the English School through one critical concept, namely that of change. By meta-theoretical analysis, the assumptions underlying the common sense use of the concept of change are scrutinised and a suggestion of one coherent reconstruction of its facets presented. The theoretical toolbox of the English School is thereby adjusted and extended, so as to allow it to discuss changes in the international order in a nuanced way, and avoid getting stuck in an internal repetition of the first debate of IR over again.

The most important and original contribution to knowledge of Essay III is thus the questioning of change as a commonsensical concept that is either taken for granted or treated as trivial. This is a contribution to IR, as it provides a more nuanced vocabulary for discussing change and making visible the underlying assumptions which we employ when discussing change – and which may, upon scrutiny, turn out to be internally conflicting or externally implausible. Most of all, however, Essay III provides a contribution to English School theory, as it has been remarkably unclear throughout the history of the School how to conceptualise change in between the idealist belief in progress and the Realist eternal cycles of recurrence in international affairs, which were the predominant alternatives against which the account of international society was originally formulated. The suggestion of an internally coherent understanding of change in international society as change in institutions, made intelligible by *ex-post* narratives which contribute to the discursive connection between practices and the norms, beliefs and expectations which make them institutions, and guided by a sustained normative debate on the nature of improvement, therefore provides a much-needed addition to English School theory. It brings a promise of a significant meta-theoretical overhaul of the School, which, if taken up, will open up new horizons for the School. Discarding the solidarist and pluralist labels is a small
cost for achieving this and avoiding the dead end which comes from the tired
opposition of idealism and Realism.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this introduction, I have sought to frame the three essays contained in this collection so that their contributions, individually and collectively, to English School theory and to larger IR theory, become clear. The main contributions of the inquiry have already been addressed in chapter 2, so I would like to reiterate here instead three aspects of this framing of my inquiry.

First, the historical orientation of the English School is important. It is important for understanding processes of change and continuity, as argued in Essays II and III, but also quite simply for making sense of today’s world without getting stuck in the presentist thought that the only time that counts is now. This argument comes through for the UN in Essay I: the UN is only the latest forum in a long tradition of organising the interactions of international society. And that goes only for the Westphalian international society of the present era – earlier societies have been organised in other ways. By extension, this means, as pointed out in Essay III, that there is no particular reason to assume that knowledge about socially constructed phenomena is in principle generalisable. Although history can provide us with potential models for the present and the future, it is important to state that knowledge which is applicable now might also very well be applicable only now, if we cannot accept the assumption that history is repetitive.

Second, with regards to the arguments about the English School’s lacking engagement with the third debate, the ‘classical approach’ to international studies is a diverse project which might be usefully specified. Simply thinking of the School as an older and more naïve form of Constructivism will not suffice. The classical approach is not, as has been the conventional wisdom, simply a negatively defined methodology, understood as the rejection of a positivist orthodoxy. Rather, it is a different understanding of science, or in Jackson’s (2011) terms, several different understandings of science. Questioning the School’s meta-theoretical assumptions, which are elicited by the scrutiny of ‘institutions’ and ‘change’, respectively, in Essays II and III, serves to suggest a ‘best practice’ for the English School. In turn, this ‘best practice’ can point to a conception of science which serves the aims of the English School, and also contributes to make clearer how that conception differs from both the neo-positivist conception, and from other alternative
conceptions which are often bundled together under the common label of non-positivist approaches.

Third, the English School has not been able to, and definitely should not, separate analytical from normative theorising. Analytical and normative thinking cross-fertilise each other, and the neo-positivist ambition of bracketing normative theorising, dominant in IR ever since the second debate, has been self-deceptive. Not discussing what we mean by improvement does not lead to detachment, but only to normative ideals flying beneath the radar and avoiding scrutiny. Importantly, striving for waterproof divisions between normative and analytical thinking justifies very simplistic analyses of world politics, also in the policy world. Consider, for example, the idea that since democracy empirically correlates with peace, democracy could be implanted on authoritarian states from the outside in order to make them peaceful and friendly. It also encourages a black and white world view in which allies and enemies become static ideas of good and evil, rather than dynamic relationships which can transform over time in changing circumstances. The contribution of making visible the normative facet of change comes through most clearly in Essay III of this collection, but it needs Essays I and II to prepare the ground, as the whole discussion of change in the abstract may seem out of place without the institutional and empirical connection provided by those two essays.


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