The making of a terrorist

A discourse analysis of the expert construction of violent Islamic extremism in Sweden

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MA Programme Euroculture Declaration

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Abstract

This study focuses on the ontological and epistemological assumptions within the construction of expert knowledge regarding violent Islamic extremism in Sweden. Setting out from the academic field of critical terrorism studies, previous research highlights how following the 2001 attacks against the United States (9/11) Islam and terrorism have been presented as codependent. In this thesis I argue that in a Swedish context two overarching themes have been constructed by Swedish experts regarding violent Islamic extremists in Sweden, that of the passive victim, who is susceptible to the particular nature of their environment which is tainted by ‘alienation’, ‘segregation’, along with extremist influences; and the active threat, who is ‘anti-democratic’, ‘manipulative’, and ‘violent’. In order to analyze the discursive constructs of the experts I have strategically selected reports from four Swedish centers of expertise and thereafter analyzed the reports through a theoretical and methodological framework based upon Michel Foucault’s (1972) discourse analysis. I argue that by applying Foucault’s discourse analysis to the reports it is possible to see how the experts do construct a connection between Islam and Muslims to violent extremism and terrorism by ascribing a particular notion of vulnerability amongst the perceived group in regards to their susceptibility to radicalization and violent extremism. In turn, exceptionally associating violent extremism and terrorism with Islam and Muslims. More so, I argue that the experts derive their legitimacy from the Swedish government and from internal and external confirmation and are as such part of a limited epistemological community. Therefore, the Swedish government acts not only as delimiters of the emergence of experts within the field, but also in the discursive rule formation of what is deemed as related to the field of terrorism studies and what is not.
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1.0 Introduction
In 2014 the Swedish government appointed Mona Sahlin as the first National coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism. The aim of the new appointment was to create opportunities for a more effective preventative approach to violent extremism by engaging and involving relevant parties – both nationally and locally – and also to promote and establish arenas for the exchange of knowledge and best-practice between the affected parties (2014:103). As the National Coordinators role was developed, its aim grew to include the aiding of municipalities and other actors with “expert knowledge regarding violent extremism” and more so, to develop “knowledge-based preventative measures against violent extremism, locally, regionally and nationally” (Dir 2016:43). Across Europe, centers of expert knowledge have, or are being, established in order to increase knowledge regarding violent extremism and terrorism, such as the International Centre for Counter-terrorism in the Netherlands, Quilliam Foundation in the UK, and Radicalization Awareness Network out of the European Commission. These types of centers of expertise play an important role in the construction of the epistemological and ontological foundation regarding who, and what types of actions, are to be deemed as ‘terrorist’, and which are not. As Ondrej Ditrych points out, “there is no terrorism beyond the discourse of terrorism” (Ditrych, 2014:1). Ditrych statement highlights the discursive power aligned to certain actors in the constitution of a subject, as I will present, the violent Islamic extremist in Sweden. The importance of such analyses lies in illuminating the constructive power based on the epistemological and ontological assumptions of experts, i.e. that through texts it is possible to construct an assumption that the act of terrorism is inherently related to a specific group of people, for example Islam as a religion and Muslims as a presumed homogenic population. Therefore, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the construction of expert knowledge, I will examine the discursive construction of the Swedish elite expert discourse of violent Islamic extremism.

1.1 Purpose and Research question
Previous research regarding terrorism studies as a field highlights the instability of terrorism discourses and how discourses are content-dependent, particularly regarding appeals from political and expertise elite (Holland, 2013, Jackson & Hall, 2016).
Therefore, it is important to analyze the construction and legitimization of expert knowledge within the discourse to better understand the structure of the discourse. I will through this study analyze the epistemological and ontological foundation of the expert knowledge, setting out from a social constructivist standpoint based in the school of critical terrorism studies in order to gain a deeper understanding of the discourse. Another important aspect of the study is the hypothesis that by analyzing the discourse it is plausible to assume that there will be variations within the epistemological community. These variations are important to identify as the production of knowledge regarding countering/preventing terrorism and violent extremism is heavily intertwined with actions taken by the state, with the two acting as counteracting legitimizers (Jackson, 2015:50; Stampnitzky, 2013:47; Ditrych, 2014:2). A second aim of this study is therefore to problematize the field of knowledge surrounding counter-terrorism practices and highlight the variations, sometimes competitive, discrepancies within the field.

In all, the objective of this thesis is to gain an insight into the construction of expert knowledge regarding violent Islamic extremism, and particularly in Sweden within a limited time-frame of 2009-2017, mainly focusing on the period following the addition of the National Coordinator in 2014. This thesis aims therefore to complement international research whilst highlighting the lack of research – both genealogical and time-situated – regarding expert discourses of states other than the United States. Another aim of this thesis is therefore to contribute to the understanding of the contemporary discourse construction of the field in relation to countering and preventing ‘violent Islamic extremism’, as previous research highlights how counter-terrorism strategies are particularly susceptible to derogative breaches of human rights and democratic values (Agambe, 2016; Ignatieff, 2004), based on oriental and cultural assumptions (Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012; Kundnani, 2014; Jackson, 2007), as well as inflated security assessments (Jackson, 2015; Jarvis, 2016). In order to obtain the proclaimed objectives the following research question underlines the study’s outlook:

- How is it possible to understand the epistemological and ontological assumptions of expert knowledge regarding violent Islamic extremism in Sweden produced within the discourse?
1.2 Sweden and “violent Islamic extremism”
Sweden has been relatively spared of domestic jihadi-inspired attacks, however, with over 300 foreign fighters having travelled to Syria and Iraq (the Soufan Group, 2015), and the participation in planning and executing attacks by Swedish citizens in Europe (Nesser, 2015), the debate on how to prevent future attacks has gained increasing importance in the political spectrum. More so, the government’s ability to reassure the efficiency of counter-terrorism has become a key factor in communicating the government’s legitimacy (Stradh & Eklund, 2015:360). Over the past years, and especially following a failed suicide bombing in Stockholm, the Swedish government has developed policies to counter and prevent terrorist attacks domestically. A priority amongst these measures is that of increasing and spreading knowledge regarding violent extremism and best-practice methods. As a step in this process the government has established several key actors in the realm of knowledge and education regarding violent extremism and terrorism. However, several cases of government-funded studies aimed at producing expert knowledge have been heavily criticized, leading to public challenges of expert knowledge by other actors in the field (Gardell, 2009; Ackfeldt et al., 2017).

How is the heterogenic field of expert knowledge to be understood, and what implication do variations and dividing tendencies in the field have on the countering and preventative measures? European and North American research shows when groups and actions are framed as security threats, and more specifically, terrorist threats, the actions and reasoning, and thereby the groups and individuals themselves, related to the threat are presented as being unreasonable and irrational. As a result, the methods to combat such actions and groups are given excessive leeway and the extent of the threat overly dramatized (Jarvis, 2016:279; Atran, 2010:267; Jackson, 2007:421; Fekete, 2002:106). More so, once an attack or criminal offence is classified as terrorism, their actions are applied on an entire group (Bhatia, 2008:11). In the post 9/11-era violent extremism and terrorism has in Europe and North America been predominantly linked with religious extremism and more specifically Islamic extremism, a presumed connection which subjugates the followers of an entire religion to the association of their religions – Islam – to that of terrorism and violent extremism (Kundnani, 2014:27; Ditrych, 2014:5; Hörnqvist & Flyghed:327; Jackson & Hall, 2016:297; Mullin, 2011:270, Edmunds, 2011:74; Jackson, 2007:403).
1.3 Relevance
I will in this study be setting out from the scientific tradition that is Critical Terrorism Studies. Research regarding terrorism and radicalization studies, and the relation between experts and state, has seen limited research, (Stampnitzky, 2013, Ditrych, 2014, Sedgwick, 2010, Jackson, 2007, Jackson, 2015), particularly in comparison to the more overarching field of terrorism studies which predominantly focuses upon the development of methods to combat terrorism and violent extremism (Jackson, 2015: 46). The field of terrorism studies has throughout its history been connected to contemporary politics and in the case of Islamic terrorism, to oriental studies of the Middle East and Arab culture and religion (Jackson, 2007; Stampnitzky, 2013). Not only has the connection between Islam and terrorism affected policy-making as many anti-terror laws where previously crafted with “Islamic terrorism” in mind (Bleich, 2007), but more so, by connecting Islam and terrorism, and thereby establishing the assumption that Islamist ideology is the root cause of terrorism, enables a displacement of terrorism onto Muslim culture as a whole, and a monopoly in which the act of terrorism is isolated to Islam (Kundnani, 2014:27, Mullin, 2011:266, Jackson, 2007:403, Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2010:326). This displacement is particularly problematic as the “war on terror” following 9/11 has been based upon the articulation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ logic (Holland, 2012:77). Such a logic may act as a dividing mechanism in which one group must be defended against another, and the methods to do so are thereafter disconnected from not only derogative legal elements (Fekete: 2002:106; Jackson, 2007:409), but also communal societal norms, in turn activating citizens against ‘terrorist’ within their communities (Salerno, 2017).

What a discourse analysis enables is illuminating the epistemological and ontological assumptions that establish the above-mentioned discursive construction of terrorism and Islam. Thereby revealing how actors (i.e. experts) use their position to portray their understanding of an aspect (i.e. violent Islamic extremism) and how the actors are active in the changing and creation of the produced phenomenon (Jörgensen & Phillips, 2002:9).

Although the field of critical terrorism studies has developed over the past decade it remains a relative minority within overall terrorism studies, particularly regarding the use of discourse analysis as the methodological and theoretical framework of choice (Stump & Dixit, 2013:105). Previous research regarding terrorism discourses has
primarily centered on a more international sphere of experts, particularly in the United States. There has to date been a substantial amount of research regarding terrorism and radicalization deriving from academia in the Middle East and North African, however such studies will not be discussed in this study as the geographical area of focus of this study is Sweden. I will for the purpose and relevance of this study focus upon the previous research of academics situated in the ‘West’. When studying violent Islamic extremism discourse a certain degree of internationalization is inevitable considering the borderless nature of activities as well as the geographical location of contemporary groups such as Al Qaida and ISIS in the Middle East and Northern Africa and the actions of such groups has negatively poured over onto efforts and legislation aimed at preventing terrorism and violent extremism, particularly amongst minority groups within Western States (Fekete, 2002:105; Bleich, 2009:372ff). Returning to Sweden, although this thesis will not in itself examine the counter-terrorism strategies of the Scandinavian country, the agencies and knowledge centers at the center of this thesis either stem directly from CVE/PVE strategies or today hold an influential role in contemporary and future policy development within the field. Following a brief presentation of the methodological and theoretical framework of this study I will illustrate the gaps in contemporary research by presenting previous research regarding Islamic terrorism discourses as well as the production of knowledge and expert discourses.

1.4 Methodological and theoretical framework
The methodological framework for this study is based on a qualitative discourse analysis. When conducting a discourse analysis the overarching goal is to examine the “produced, communicated, legitimated and resisted” constructions of what counts as knowledge, and what does not (Stump & Dixit, 2013:117). The term discourse is by itself an analytical term, which may be described as the particular way of talking about, and understanding an aspect, phenomenon, worldview etc. (Jörgensen & Philips, 2002:9). According to Jörgensen and Philips discourse analyses are by default dependent on its theoretical and methodological framework. Theoretically the understanding of discourse will set out from the perspective of Michel Foucault in which discourses are ever-changing constructions, and in order to understand such constructions the researcher must investigate the structure and rules – the regimes of
knowledge – that determine what is deemed as true and what is false (Foucault, 1972:84; Jörgensen & Philips, 2002:18). The discursive formations may be seen as representation of a social world through text, a world in which the groups and individuals that create knowledge are those that hold the power of the discursive production (2002:16ff). The data gathered derives from reports produced by two government agencies, The National Coordinator to Safeguard Democracy Against Violent Extremism and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), along with two centers of expertise, the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish Defence University and the Segerstedt Institute at the University of Gothenburg. Each of the strategically selected cases is directly connected to the Swedish government in the way of a government agency, through funding, and/or having been established as part of a government initiative. A total of seven reports have been subjugated to analysis and complimented with the directive of one of the reports from MSB, all of which have been strategically selected to best help myself as the researcher to understand the research question (Cresswell, 2014:189).

1.5 Previous research and research gap
Research regarding Swedish expert knowledge has been sparse, however Veronica Strandh and Niklas Eklund of the Umeå University have in their paper “Swedish Counterterrorism Policy: An Intersection Between Prevention and Mitigation?” examined what they mean is an ‘intellectual leap’ in Swedish Counterterrorism. According to Strand and Eklund this development has taken shape from a previous focus on preventative approaches, as part of a broader ‘war-on-terrorism discourse’, to a more refined mitigating approach based upon engaging in a social multi-actors context focusing upon criminal prevention methods (Strand & Eklund, 2015:373). This development highlights according to the researchers a new way of thinking in which social context, alienation and economic situations are deemed as negative aspects which must be addressed in order to counter terrorism (2015: 374). Strand and Eklund’s study is one of the few regarding discursive formations on terrorism and violent extremism. Therefore, for the remainder of this previous research chapter I will divide the previous international research into two overarching themes, that of the Islamic Terrorism Discourse and the Expert Discourse.
1.5.1 Islamic Terrorism Discourse
When discussing the discourse of Islamic terrorism, that be if internationally or not, one must remark upon the attacks by Al Qaeda against the United States in 2001, or at the very least set out from there. The attacks led to an exponential growth in the production of knowledge in the scholarly field. As Lisa Stampnitzky points out, 54 percent of the scholarly articles published between 1972 – 2002 where in the years 2001 and 2002 (Stampnitzky, 2013:196). Arun Kundnani has in his book “The Muslims are Coming” described how two modes of thinking have emerged following 9/11 as justifications for assuming that Islamist ideology is the root cause of terrorism. The first of these is the conservative approach in which Islamic cultures failure to adopt modernity “pervade the war on terror”. The second of these is the liberal approach, which rather places the blame on the emergence of political Islamism, a distortion of Islam adopted and produced by totalitarian regimes. According to Kundnani these approaches not only give rise to the belief that the root cause of terrorism is Islam, but more so, the assumptions are inherently institutionalized as a part of the “war on terror” (Kundnani, 2014: 27f). However, prescribing an entire religion with such a value is both problematic and highly contestable. The underlying assumptions connecting Islam to terrorism are founded in a long tradition of cultural stereotypes and based in oriental scholarship in which the connection between religion and politics is key to understanding the argument that Muslim societies are particularly prone to violence (Jackson, 2007:400; Cavanaugh, 2009:194). Kundnani argues that cultural analyses such as Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations offers an endlessly recyclable simplistic production of an understanding of a culture (Kundnani 2013, 131). Kundnani’s theory is shared by Magnus Hörnqvist and Janne Flyghed who studied the discourse of radicalization from a culturalist and an exclusionist perspective. According to Hörnqvist and Flyghed a culturalist perspective presents Islamic society as nourishing radicalization, in turn not only associating being Muslim with being a terrorist, but also assuming that individuals are prisoners of their culture and unable to break free from its grip (Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012:326ff).

Other research regarding Islam and terrorism within critical terrorism studies highlights how a heightened risk anxiety has predominantly focused on Muslims to the degree where governments are viewing their citizens as Muslims first, and citizens
second (Edmunds, 2011:74). June Edmunds argues in “The New Barbarism: Governmentality, Securitization and Islam” how the West holds the monopoly on human rights, its establishment and defense, whilst Islam is categorized with colonial discursive practices of barbarism and backwardness (Edmunds, 2011:82). More so, as a result of the risk anxiety, the need to combat what is deemed evil is enhanced, leading to derogative measures dehumanizing the other. The notion of the ‘ civilized’ against the ‘barbaric’ is shared by Corinna Mullin who in her article “The US Discourse on Political Islam” states how the ‘war on terror’ discourse – under both President Bush and Obama – has enabled for double standard regarding the use of legitimate and illegitimate political violence in which the denial of the surrounding context of a groups (Islamic) actions are negated and diminished to irrational and barbaric (Mullin, 2011). In all, it is possible through the previous research on the Islamic terrorism discourse identify how a system of ‘us’ (the West) versus ‘them’, (Muslims) has been constructed and how such a system has resulted in the negative categorization of Islam and Terrorism as codependent.

1.5.2 Expert discourse
Regarding research on actors considered experts, Richard Jackson (2007) and Stampnitzky’s (2013) analyses highlight how the construction of knowledge within the field of terrorism studies has developed and operates in the boundaries between science and policy. The relationship between the field of terrorism science and the government is complex and multilayered. Jackson argues that during the 2000’s the knowledge produced by actors assumed to be authorized speakers – amongst them policy makers, think tanks and academics – was used to produce counter-terrorism policy. However the knowledge and expertise was according to Jackson highly debatable and evidently dismissible (Jackson, 2007:425). More so, the political and academic discourses where at the time founded on certain core labels and discursive formations, which in itself implied that certain forms of Islam where by nature violent and terroristic (Jackson, 2007:404). Not only may such an oversimplification lead to negative mistreatment of Muslims in general, but also claims by “experts” painting an image of exceptionality may lead to exceptional responses from states (Ditrych, 2014:3; Jackson, 2007:421). In a more recent study Jackson argues that counter-terrorism has passed through an epistemological crisis in which speculation,
imagination and counter-factual, unproven knowledge has been deemed as evidence (Jackson, 2015:49). Jackson describes the current epistemological crisis as based on the known [there will be an attack]; the unknown (we cannot know when, where and why there will be an attack); and a morale imperative (we must do everything possible to prevent attack), (2015:35f). This paradigm has according to Jackson established a “professional crisis of knowledge”, resulting in an endless search for knowledge which can be developed into practical actions, but to no avail (Jackson, 2015:45). This claim returns us to the relationship between expertise and policy, according to Ditrych, the field of terrorism studies has lent its scientific credibility to the purpose of authorizing government actions, a particularly problematic finding as Ditrych argues that states have articulated terrorism as a phenomena of juxtapositions in which the state is the righteous and the “terrorist” is barbaric (Ditrych, 2014:9).

Ditrych’s argument of experts as a legitimizer of state action is shared by Lisa Stampnitzky, in her book “Disciplining terror: How experts invented terrorism” (2013). Stampnitzky argues that “terrorism experts” are significantly constraint by what she refers to as the politics of anti-knowledge. This anti-knowledge bears with it a demand for a morale stance, which resembles that of Jackson and Ditrych’s arguments. According to Stampnitzky anti-knowledge refers to the public and political discourse in the US following the 9/11 attacks. The discourse was following the attacks centered around the construction of the “terrorist” as an evil, irrational entity whose actions could not be justified or understood (Stampnitzky, 2013:186ff). This in turn established a taboo surrounding terrorism studies in which the attempt to seek and understand “terrorists” by experts demanded that they, the experts, take a morale stand against the object, the terrorists (Stampnitzky, 2013:192). This idea of a taboo surrounding the understanding of terrorists is shared by Jackson, who argues that not only does such a taboo prevent the gathering of direct knowledge of terrorists, but also renders previous knowledge as obsolete (Jackson, 2015:46ff). In summary, the previous research regarding the emergence and analysis of the field of terrorism experts presents a picture in which terrorism studies and experts are highly dependent on the legitimization of the state, and state is dependent on the experts to legitimate their actions and strategies (Jackson, 2007; Jackson, 2015; Stampnitzky, 2013; Ditrych, 2014). It is bearing this in mind that I approach the Swedish expert discourse. There has to date been little to no research like that of Stampnitzky, Jackson, and
Ditrych setting out from a Swedish context. Therefore, I hope with this study to not only shed light upon the lack of research regarding the discursive construction of the Islamic terrorist and the terrorist expert, but also contribute to field of critical terrorism studies by analyzing the Swedish milieu. It is bearing this in mind that I wish to analyze the Swedish expert discourse and the construction of the Islamic extremist as such.

1.6 Disposition
The thesis will be structured as such, in the following chapter a walkthrough of the development of Swedish counter-terrorism and preventative methods against violent extremism will be presented in the context of acts of violence by self-proclaimed jihadists. In chapter three the operationalization of the methodological and theoretical aspects – qualitative inductive discourse analysis – of this study will be discussed along with a more developed presentation and motivation of the selected cases and material. In chapter four the thematic analysis of the material will be presented into two overarching themes, that of the passive victim and the active threat. The thematic findings will be presented through the theoretical and methodological framework that is Foucault’s discursive formations in order to highlight the discursive construction of knowledge in the field. Following the analysis, chapter five will bear a discussion regarding the findings in regards to previous research in an international context will be developed. The aim of such a chapter is to zoom out and discuss the findings as a fraction in the larger epistemological community referred to as critical terrorism studies. In the conclusion in chapter six the entity of the study will be summarized and key points discussed.
2.0 Methodological and theoretical framework
The methodological framework for this study is based upon a qualitative discourse analysis. In the following chapter I will describe the pillars of Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis, how the analysis may be operationalized for the aim of this study, as well as an overview of the cases and material to be analyzed. A brief summarization of a discourse, as described by Foucault, may be seen as the process of an ever-changing constructed representation of reality by a certain actor. When conducting a discourse analysis the overarching goal is to examine how what is deemed as knowledge, and what is not, is “produced, communicated, legitimated and resisted” (Stump & Dixit, 2013:117).

In previous discourse analyses regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism studies a reoccurring aspect is that of the discourse being founded on core labels such as the ‘West’, ‘Islamism’ etc. (Jackson, 2007:401) and the differentiation between two groups, a legitimate and an illegitimate (Mullin, 2011:271f; Ditrych, 2014:5). The presentation of labels highlights the outset of the post-structuralist approach to language in discourse analyses in which language and text is a means for constituting knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes of a speaker, situated and occasioned in time (Jackson & Hall, 2016:294). Theoretically the understanding of discourse will set out from a Foucauldian perspective in which discourses are ever-changing social constructions, and in order to understand such constructions the researcher must investigate the structure and rules, the regimes of knowledge, that determine what is presented and legitimized as true and false within the discursive formations (Foucault, 1972:80; Jørgensen & Philips, 2002:18ff). Foucault uses a book as an example to illustrate his constructivist outlook. According to Foucault a book is more than a mere object it is a constructed unity. When the books unity is questioned, it begins to “construct itself” on the basis of discursive rules that determine what is accepted as meaningful and truthful (Foucault, 1972:26f; Jørgensen & Philips, 2002:12). This construction is not isolated, but rather the book, through other books, texts and material reconstructs itself built upon the premises of the discourse to enable a specific representation of reality. In discourse analysis, language is a means of creating such representations of reality (Bryman, 2008:475; Jørgensen and Philips, 2002:15). Language, which in this study derives from official reports produced by the selected cases, is part of the continues construction of knowledge. However,
analyzing language on its own is not enough, in order to analyze the construction of a discourse the researcher must analyze statements.

A statement is in a discursive analysis more than language, it is linked to the articulation of speech and exists in the field of memory; the statement is unique yet subject to repetition and transformation; and is linked to situations and consequences as a result of the statements (Foucault, 1972:31). By analyzing statements, it is possible to gain insight into the construction of a discourse and the internal rules that enable the articulation of statements (Ditrych, 2014:21). One example of such a construction is how in the 1960’s plane hijackings and hostage situations – which where relatively common in the United States with 85 hijacked United States airplanes directed to Cuba between 1961-1973 – where not considered as terrorism. However, towards the end of the 1970’s hijackings and hostage situations had been melded together with bombings and kidnappings, no longer deemed to solely be a form of tactic, but tied to a new threatening form of actor, the terrorist (Stampnitzky, 2013:2f). Stampnitzky’s example, which relies heavily on a previous analysis of Zulaika and Douglas (1996), highlights the connection between certain tactics and the development of new concepts in the field. This development may not only open for the possibility of a linguistic transformation, but more so, for a transformation and the emergence of new areas of knowledge and understanding of a field or phenomenon (Stampnitzky, 2013:25ff).

2.1 The formation of concepts, objects and subjects
Returning to Foucault, in order to analyze the construction of knowledge I will analyze and identify the elements that uphold a certain division, these are known as the rules of formation. The elements that are to analyzed are according to Foucault, objects, modes of statements (formations), concepts, and thematic choices (Foucault, 1972: 42).

2.1.1 The Object
Foucalt’s objects may be described as the definition of what is talked about within a domain (Foucault, 1972:45). The formation of objects is made possible by ”a group of relations between authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification”
(1972:49), which according to Foucault is described through three questions; how objects emerge through the differentiation of a specific domain in relation to others; who the authorities of delimitation are; and, what are the systems that divide and specify within the domain (Foucault, 1972:45f). Understanding the formation of objects is in a sense an attempt to understand the relations that characterize a discursive practice. These discursive relations are to be found at the limit of a discourse and act as determining circumstances for a discursive practice (Foucault, 1972:53). Relations as such are to be understood as the establishment of the boundaries of objects. An object is thus established through a delimitation of what is not an object along with the designation of, naming and classification of objects within a discourse (Foucault, 1972:45f).

2.1.2 Modes of Statements (enunciative modalities)
As presented above, relationships are key to understanding Foucault’s discourse analysis. Therefore, it is also important to ask what links the previously described statements together? For Foucault this may be answered in three questions; who is speaking, and what are their qualifying characteristics; where are they speaking from and how these institutionalized sites are affecting what is being spoken; and, the position of the subject (Foucault, 1972:55ff). Foucault uses the example of a doctor and the medical field to illustrate the outcome of these answers. The societal status of doctors, the medical facility at which he or she professionally applies their knowledge, and the position from which they are engaging – perceiving, observing, describing, teaching, etc. – play a part in understanding the construction of the medical field and the unity of dispersion of the field as such (Foucault, 1972).

2.1.3 Concepts
Concepts are in a sense constructed upon various orderings of enunciative series and may be identified as a set of rules for arranging statements within the series (Foucault, 1972:63). When a set of concepts are specific enough to characterize the group of relations and rules that have enabled for a conceptual formation they may in turn be able to characterize individualized discursive formations (Foucault, 1972:70). It is upon these concepts, objects and enunciative modalities that Foucault builds his analysis of a discourse. In the Archeology of knowledge, Foucault describes how
through certain models of concepts, objects and modalities it is possible that themes or theories will be produced (Foucault, 1972:71). Through the determination of these models that uphold objects, statements, concepts and theoretical options it is possible to prescribe a discourse with its own form of discursive uniqueness (Foucault, 1972:80).

2.2 Operationalization
The operationalization of the methodological framework is built upon several key assumptions. Before presenting these assumptions I would like to clarify that this study sets out from an inductive logic of research. Through an inductive approach this study will commence by gathering material, which baring in mind the assumptions to be presented will be analyzed in order to form themes. Following the thematic categorization the empirical findings will be subjected to further analyses in order to potentially present theoretical result (Cresswell, 2014:66). The assumptions centered to this study are inspired by Jackson and Mall (2016) analysis of the vernacular discourse on terrorism, in which three key assumptions lay the foundation for the understanding of a discourse; The first of these assumptions is that knowledge, beliefs and attitudes are established through language and text within the discourse (Jörgensen & Phillips, 2002:102). One of the main strengths of a discourse analysis is the ability to withdraw patterns of knowledge and structures from a text, which in itself is a unique presentation of the discourse (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008). The other two assumptions build upon the premise that has been described above, that of discourses as being both constructed and constructive. In so that discourses are not only constructed, but in a sense are central in the construction of a world that is deemed to be correct by the author. More so, a discourse and its construct are always situated or occasioned, that is, relative to their time (Jackson & Mall, 2016:294, Wiggins, 2007:77). Considering the assumption that discourses are fluid and continually constructed, the relativity between when and how a discourse is constructed may reveal specific aspects of a discourse within its frame of time. As this studies main focus is on a recent period of time situated in the post 9/11-era, the final findings present a glimpse into the contemporary discourse.
As the aim of this study is to garner a deeper understanding of the construction of the elite expertise discourse on violent Islamic extremism in Sweden this study will look upon the knowledge produced by the selected centers of expertise. In order to operationalize Foucault’s theoretical and methodological framework, the material gathered for this study will be subjected to analysis from the outset of Foucault’s formations of concepts, objects and enunciative modalities. Practically the material gathered for this study will be applied to a form of systematic framework approach borrowed from Jarvis and Lister (2016). In their study, Jarvis and Lister develop a thematic framework based upon the studies participant’s responses by categorizing the responses in three broad indexes (2016:282). I will in this study be adapting this approach to a framework and instead basing it upon Foucault’s theory of discursive construction. Thereafter, the framework will be applied to the material and through this a redistribution of data under theme and sub-group developed. Once these steps are completed it is possible for the researcher to structure and analyze the empirical data (Jones, 2000:560, Ritchie & Spencer, 2002). However, the redistribution as mentioned above is to be approached from a methodological standpoint as more of an analytical mentality, rather than a strict coding of data into prefixed frames (Bryman, 2008:475). With that being said, the coding of data takes on more of a systemizing approach setting out from Foucault’s theoretical framework. That is, through an immersive reading of the texts, the identification of the construction of discursive formations – the formation of concepts, objects and statements – constitute the findings of the study. More so, this study is inspired by Lisa Stampnitzky’s analysis of how the field of terrorism studies, and terrorism experts, has developed. Stampnitzky argues that the expert discourse on terrorism operates at the boundary between politics and science and it is the construction of these boundaries, as well as the field itself, that she studies (Stampnitzky, 2013:13f). Much like Stampnitzky, I will study the construction of knowledge from actors in the borderland between politics and science. By approaching the construction of knowledge in the field in this matter it is possible that Foucault’s theoretical framework will illuminate discursive aspects of the elite expert field regarding violent Islamic extremism in Sweden.
2.3 The elite experts and strategic selection of material
When conducting a discourse analysis the intertextual relationship between texts, and the constant recontextualization of the discourse must be taken into account (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008:2). This in turn means that texts produced within the field are interdependent of each other, and in the process of producing new texts, actors often recontextualize the language of the discourse. Therefore in order to conduct a discourse analysis of the epistemological and ontological assumptions of elite experts, the selected centers of knowledge production have been strategically selected due to their relationship and varying dependency of the Swedish government, and also by their relationship and interdependency of each other. By strategically selecting cases it is possible for the researcher to identify the material which they deem to be most relevant for answering the research question, and in regards to a discourse analysis, a field which is most likely contain relations that are numerous, interlinked and easy to describe (Cresswell, 2014:189, Foucault, 1972:32).

2.3.1 The “elite experts”
The National Coordinator to Safeguard Democracy Against Violent Extremism has since being appointed by the Swedish government under the Ministry of Culture in 2014 aimed at increasing and improving the cooperation between state agencies, municipalities and organizations as well as increasing knowledge regarding violent extremism and methods to prevent and combat it as such. The National Coordinator is to date a temporary agency and is to as part of its government commission recommend a permanent instance to take over the assignment. In early 2017 the National Coordinator recommended that MSB take over as the permanent agency to safeguard democracy against violent extremism. According to the National Coordinator the motivation behind the recommendation, MSB’s existing knowledge regarding violent extremism, the agencies current role as national coordinator for the emergency management area, and its ability to finance and develop research in the field (SOU 2016:92, 107). One beneficiary from such research funding is The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish Defense University, who was able through MSB funding to conduct five years of studies regarding strategic counter-terrorism policy and intelligence studies (Swedish Defence University, 2011). This is just one of the links between the agencies and CATS. Another is that of the National Coordinators reference group, in which CATS is an important member. The
Reference group gathers representatives of national agencies with the intention to spread knowledge and good practices.

The Segerstedt institute (SI) is a result of a government commission from 2015 in which the University of Gothenburg (GU) was assigned the task to develop and spread knowledge and methods with regards to preventing recruitment to violent extremist ideologies and racist organizations (U2015/01523/UH). The aim of the Segerstedt Institute was to establish a national resource center for knowledge and research, and representatives of the institute participate in the National Coordinators reference group. When analyzing material produced by government agencies it is important to be aware of the political construction of the texts in the sense that they are not to be viewed as objective depictions of reality (Bryman, 2008:495). However, as this study sets out from a discursive constructivist standpoint the idea of language as a depiction of a true reality is established as contested from the outlook.

2.3.2 Material
Following the strategic selection of centers of expertise two reports from each elite expert has been selected. By strategically selecting material in qualitative studies the aim is to identify and analyze material, which is most likely to help the researcher understand the research question (Cresswell, 2014:189). The motivation for the material selected is based upon the following criteria, that the predominant focus of the publication is on ‘violent Islamic extremism’; that it is a major publication1; and the date of publication in which all but one report has been published following the appointment of the National Coordinator. In total, seven reports and the directive for MSB’s reports have been analyzed. The motivation for including the directive for the report is due to the limited amount of research conducted or commissioned by MSB and due to the pre-assumed connection stated by MSB that ‘Islamism’ and ‘violent Islamic extremism’ share a common goal, to “[re-] establish a utopian Caliphate” (MSB, 2016). It is worth mentioning that the final report has been deemed quite controversial, resulting in twenty-two academics from eleven Swedish universities signing an article condemning the report (Religionvetenskapliga kommentarer, 2017).

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1 By major publication I mean a publication which is a product as part of a government commission.
The final report is however part of MSB’s knowledge bank and therefore important in regards to the knowledge produced by the government agency.

Much like MSB, the amount of publications deriving from the National Coordinator and the Segerstedt Institute are quite limited. This is due to several reasons, including their limited time of existence, with the SI being established in 2016, as well as the role of the National coordinator as a knowledge distributor rather than producer. However, this has not prevented the National Coordinator from producing their own reports. The report “National strategy against violence promoting [våldsbejakande] extremism”, was not outlined by the government’s directives (2014:103) yet deemed as part of the coordinators role by the coordinator themselves (Nationella Samordnaren, 2015:4). This is not the case for the second piece of material from the Coordinator. As part of the 2016 extension directive the coordinator was, commissioned by the government, to develop and present a proposal regarding the permanent structure of the national coordinator as the current structure is due to change as of 2018 (2016:43,7). As for the Segerstedt Institute, the government funded “national resource center” has to date released four editions in their report series. The two selected, are besides being the first two reports chronologically, also the two reports which most meet the delimiting selection criteria.

CATS present a different problem in regards to the material selection and delimitation of the field, as they are out of the selected experts, the most seasoned in regards to terrorism studies. The reports selected for this study are motivated by their exclusive focus on ‘violent Islamic extremism’. This selection results in a limited analysis of the knowledge produced by CATS, and is as such a fairly small representation of the expert’s products. However, as the aim of this study is to examine the epistemological and ontological assumptions which lay the foundation of the construction of the violent Islamic extremist, a smaller sample selection enables for a more in-depth analysis of the data. More so, by analyzing documents published by the centers themselves it is possible to obtain the language of the experts, and thereby their representation of “reality” (Creswell, 2014:191). Next, I will further develop the delimiting factors regarding the material and give examples and motivation for some of the cases and reports left out as such.
2.3.3 Delimitation of material
The experts selected have been so through several criteria as presented above, including within the time frame following the appointment of the National Coordinator. By doing so, it is possible to analyze a snapshot within the discourse rather than attempting to genealogically trace the evolution of the discourse. As discourses are never completely uniform, and are constantly changing and evolving (Jackson, 2007:402; Foucault, 1972:84), an analysis of a specific time frame enables the research to garner a deeper understanding of the discursive field at that present time. Nevertheless, one document has been strategically selected outside of the time frame. The “Rosengård rapport” from CATS was published in 2009 and has been selected as it is one of the agencies more prominent reports regarding violent Islamic extremism in Sweden. This study’s focus group – elite experts – has in turn resulted in the delimitation of knowledge created by other government agencies. These include the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society as well as government agencies such as The Swedish Prison and Probation Service, and The Swedish National Board of Institutional Care, all of which have particular government commissions requiring the development of knowledge regarding violent extremism. Nevertheless, the agency most relevant to Swedish efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism which has not been selected is that of the Swedish Security Services (Säpo). Säpo, has not been selected for two reasons, due to its strategic security standpoint and because the agency’s does not in its mission hold a knowledge producing directive in the manner that the selected cases of this study do.²

² The Swedish Security Services do produce material in the form of “year books” and thereby contribute in a sense to the field of knowledge.
3.0 Background – Swedish Counter-terrorism
The Swedish Government’s efforts to prevent violent extremism and terrorism as it stands today have predominantly been developed during the twenty-first century. However, the measures implemented and political activity regarding preventing violent extremism has particularly increased in recent years, especially following the failed Stockholm bombing in 2010. More so, during the process of this study a stolen truck was driven down Stockholm’s main shopping street – resembling attacks in Nice and Berlin – on a Friday afternoon killing five people. At the point of this study much remains unknown and unproven in court. Therefore, it will not be represented further within the study. However, future research could examine the political and medial responses and consequences of the Stockholm attack. Here next I will describe the development of Swedish counter-terrorism and preventative efforts against violent extremism and how such efforts have developed in conjunction with attacks, threats, and events. Following the presentation of the government’s efforts I will add the context of the Swedish debate, and key actors within the debate regarding the development of preventative and counteractive measures.

3.1 Preventing violent extremism, strategies, legislation, and violent attacks
Sweden has in the post 9/11-era been relatively spared of violent attacks motivated by self-proclaimed jihadists. However, the attacks that have taken place, or been prevented, have predominantly been a response to Swedish artist Lars Vilks cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, which were published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. Not only has Vilks himself been subject to a number of attacks – including the Copenhagen attacks which left two people and the suspected attacker dead –, but also Jyllands-Posten who published a series of cartoons depicting the prophet in 2005, have been the target of planned attacks (Nesser, 2015:63ff). One such planned attack was conducted in 2010 by five men, however the suspected attackers where stopped prior to executing their plans by the Danish (PET) and Swedish (Säpo) security services. At the time of the arrest, the suspected attackers – which consisted of three Swedish citizens, one Tunisian and an Iraqi asylum seeker – where apprehended with machine guns and plastic strips suspected to be used as handcuffs against the staff of Jyllands-Posten (Nesser, 2015:252). Another reference to Vilks cartoons was found in Taimour Abduwahab suicide note, the Iraqi born Swede who on December 11, 2010
detonated an explosive device on Stockholm’s main shopping street in the midst of the Christmas shopping rush (Nesser, 2015:64). Although the explosions only casualty was Abduwahab the Swedish Government launched the following year an action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting [väldsbekjakande] extremism (2011/12/44). The aim of the action plan was to counteract tendencies, which are deemed to counteract the democratic rule (2011/12:44,6). More so, the plan – which was developed by the former center-right government – aimed at engaging civil society actors and the educational system in order to fulfill several of the actions put in place. The actions, which have been divided into six main blocks, include goals such as strengthening awareness regarding democratic values, increasing knowledge about violence promoting extremism and further strengthening national and local structures promoting cooperation. The action plan implemented in 2011 further developed the idea of democracy’s need for protection against a violent threat. More so, the plan established the definitions of violent extremism as an action promoting violence to achieve political change (2011/12:44,35). Prior to the 2011 action plan Swedish efforts against violent extremism had been distinguished as anti-democratic forces and had predominantly focused upon threats to politicians following the murder of then minister of foreign affairs Anna Lindh, the return of far-right neo-nazi movements, and to a lesser extent the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaida (2001/02:80,25; Skr. 2003/04:110,125). The current level of threat that violent extremist groups are believed to represent to Sweden is determined by the Swedish Security Services (Säpo). Säpo estimate that the most predominant terrorist threat present is that by violent Sunni-extremist groups based in the Middle East and with supporters around the world. According to Säpo it is estimated that 300 Swedes have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join violent extremist outings, with returning foreign fighters potentially being deemed as the post present threat from violent extremist groups (Säkerhetspolisen 2016:52; NCT, 2017).

3.2 The Ministry of Culture and the National Coordinator
The current governmental constellation has divided the preventative measures (Ministry of Culture) from the legal and reactive security measures (Ministry of Justice). The division does not entail the removal of co-operation, as there are several internal working groups within the Swedish Government Offices. However, the
division does result in different portfolios in regards to violent extremism and terrorism amongst two ministers with Alice Bah Kuhnke (Minister of Culture and Democracy) responsible for the preventative measures to safeguard democracy against violent extremism and Anders Ygeman (Minister of Interior) responsible for anti-terrorism efforts. Answering under the ministry of Culture is National coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism, spearheading the Government’s efforts against violent extremism as a result of a 2012 Government commission (2012:57). The commission was tasked with gathering best practices as well as proposing how to develop and strengthen local efforts against violent extremism. The commission suggested that a national coordinator be implemented as an independent division tasked with developing and supporting local efforts against violent extremism (SOU 2013:81). The following year the former Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden Mona Sahlin was appointed as the first National Coordinator to Safeguard Democracy against Violent Extremism in Sweden. The National coordinator – currently Anna Carlstedt – has since 2014 prioritized efforts directed towards local municipalities, including visits to almost all of Sweden’s 290 municipalities and who have through the coordinators support implemented a contact person at each municipality, participated and conducted tens of conferences, initiated and funded research on violent extremism, and established the reference group consisting of sixteen government agencies (Nationella Samordnaren mot Våldsbejakande Extremism, n.d.). More so, the National Coordinator has produced a recommended strategy to prevent violent extremism as well as recommended MSB as the permanent residence for the future coordinator. Both of which are to be analyzed in this text. However, in June 2017 the Swedish minister of democracy and culture, Alice Bah Kuhnke, announced that the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention are to overtake the permanent role of national coordinator against violent extremism and during the same month the Swedish government announced that all efforts against violent extremism are to be gathered under the Ministry of Justice.

3.3 Debating the way forward: Actors, arguments, and assumptions
The development of anti-, counter-, and preventative efforts in Sweden has been influenced by an enduring medial debate in which actors from academy, the government, journalism, and ‘the field’ lend their credibility. Several of the actors
analyzed in this study frequently publish opinion pieces or discuss issues related to the field via several different forms of media. Magnus Ranstorp at CATS is perhaps the most active as he is often called upon by leading media outlets to discuss recent attacks and developments within counter-terrorism. The National Coordinator have as well been actively engaged in public debates. Since its introduction in 2014 the Coordinator has published several opinion pieces in Sweden’s leading newspapers, in which they discuss a broad array of issues, from the future of the National Coordinator, religions role as an exit from extremism, to perceived lack of efforts against returning foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq. Although I will not be analyzing the medial debate I would like to point out its potential and the need for future analyses in order to gain a deeper understanding for if, and thereby, how it may influence counter-terrorism strategies. As Jackson points out, it is most often elite political appeals which tend to resonate with the public and online and offline media are essential tools for the spreading of such appeals (Jackson & Hall, 2016:305).

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4.0 Analysis
In the following analysis I will present the expert’s discursive construction of the ‘Islamic terrorist’ and the ‘violent Islamic extremist’ through the lens of Foucault’s theoretical framework of the construction of discursive formations. I will do so by examining the attributes ascribed by the experts to the ‘Islamic terrorist’ and how the experts accredit themselves as legitimate speakers regarding the subject and the discourse.

4.1 Democracy, terrorism, Islamism: from where, by who and how are they defined?
The construction and presentation of discursive subjects by the elite experts may from a Foucauldian perspective be described through the formation of objects. As Foucault states, three aspects are crucial in the emergence of objects; firstly, the emergence of objects through limitation of domain, defining what it (the discourse) is talking about, thereby assigning the status of an object; secondly regarding the assignment of authorities of delimitation, i.e. who is the authority delimitating, designing, naming and establishing the objects, Foucault argues that the juxta-positioning of objects plays an important role in the construction of the objects; and thirdly, the grids of specification in which systems of differentiation are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified and derived (Foucault, 1972:45f).

4.1.1 The Emergence of the ‘violent Islamic extremist’
The limitation of the domain in the emergence of objects may typically take form through objects being related in juxtapositions. The object is thereby connected to situated labels such as ‘alienation’, ‘illness’, ‘undemocratic’ and ‘violence-glorifying’, thereby separating the object from the remaining society, which is ‘integrated’, ‘healthy’, ‘democratic’ and ‘non-violent’. The subject has through this differentiation been given the status of an object, however, the establishment of the object in relation to violent Islamic extremism needs further specification. The outermost differentiation between the object and its outer limits may be found in the Swedish term “våldsbejakande”, which may be translated as violence promoting/assenting/endorsing. The National Coordinator defines the violence promoting aspect as “ideologies and movements that endorse and legitimize violence as a means to achieve extreme opinions and ideas” (SOU 2016:92,29). The label is
applicable to all forms of violent extremism, and in the case of the national coordinator encompasses left-, right, and Islamic extremism. Therefore, we must look specifically at the emergence of boundaries of what is to be defined as particularly applicable to the “Islamic extremist”. As has been previously mentioned, when an act has been classified as terroristic, the actions of a few are generally used to describe an entire group and their actions as follows (Bhatia, 2008:11). Such a broad swipe of representation may be found in British and US counter-terrorism responses in the 9/11-era, in which the blurring of differentiation between the ‘Muslim’ and the ‘Islamist’ has lead to collective punishment of a constructed heterogeneous groups labeled as ‘Muslims’ (Kundnani, 2007:43). This blurring of the accepted and unaccepted forms of Islam may be found within the reports of this analysis. This becomes particularly problematic when ‘Islamists’ are presented as ‘manipulative’, ‘adaptive’ and ‘deceitful’ as in the case of MSB and the Rosengård reports:

“All respondents have answered the cultural organizations [kulturföreningar] are not what they set out to be. In certain cases they are actually conducting religious operations with a radical stance...Several of the respondents state that the organizations most often show two faces, one towards the city of Malmö and another towards its members” (Ranstorp and Dos Santos, 2009:17)

In the Rosengård report it is local congregations that are through their “two faces” deceiving the local municipality. However, in the MSB report the Muslim Brotherhood has as part of their “Islamisation of European Muslims” ‘infiltrated’ into European and Swedish society in a broader context, making it impossible to distinguish whom its members are: “MB works more or less as a hidden structure for outsiders, a global network and a spiritual brotherhood more than an organization from a Swedish understanding” (Norell et. al., 2016:10). More so, the network has adapted to Swedish organizational structures:

“Throughout the years, MB have through a flurry of organizations been able to establish a completely dominating position within the government funded so called civil society’s Muslim part...So when government agencies, politicians, and journalists turn to a Muslim organization it is often MB that they are speaking too, most often completely unknowing” (Norell et. al., 2016:10f).

According to Kundnani, such labeling of disguising double-speak as an attribute of the ‘Islamist’ is common in liberal analyses of terrorism and violent extremism
following 9/11 (Kundnani, 2007:51). Similar arguments may be found in CATS analysis regarding the ‘two-faced’ cultural organizations that in fact are “radical, religious movements that oppose democracy” whom “According to many of the respondents the sermons often occur in other languages and where a pronounced hate against both Sweden and the West are present” (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009:17). Despite an obvious – at least to the authors – hate towards Sweden and the West by these groups, they are able to adapt and disguise their motives by using the “right rhetoric” in order to obtain government funding for their organizations (ibid, 17).

The cloud of uncertainty regarding the boundaries of the object may be found within the other reports of this study, in the reports from the Segerstedt institute the classification of violent Islamic extremism as an “ordinary problem”:

“The preventative efforts should not be about mapping, educating about radicalization or about specific organizations, instead the preventative efforts should be directed generally towards all, preferably locally anchored in a local society. Efforts should be organized within the realm of ordinary operations and not have as a pronounced aim to work against radicalization or extremism. The aim should be instead to cater for democratic, social, and human rights” (Herz, 2016:62).

Hertz arguments, when put in the same context as CATS or MSB, make for a similar situation in which the boundaries for who may be (or not be) an extremist, are endless and incomprehensible. However, there are several labels applied by the experts which do separate the object from its surroundings. These include a ‘distrust’, ‘hate’ or ‘exclusion’ of Muslims from predetermined Western inclusion through ‘democracy’ and ‘inclusion/participation in society’. The emergence of the object is as such determined by the exclusion of the violent Islamic extremist from Western society, rather than the opposite. By this I mean that it is the experts that determine the limitations that govern the emergence of the object and which attributes and labels remove the object from the rest of society, thereby providing the objects its particular status.
4.1.2 Who defines the Islamic terrorist? The practitioner, the academic or the professional?

Regarding Foucault’s second aspect in the emergence of objects – the authorities of delimitation – it is possible to identify certain variations within the field. All four cases analyzed exhibited a self-proclaimed designation of authority with the legitimacy to name, delimit, design, and establish the object in accordance to Foucault’s authorities of delimitation (Foucault, 1972:46). Three main actors may be identified through the empirical findings as authorities of delimitation, ‘academics’, ‘practitioners’, and ‘professionals’. Academics are assigned a particularly important role in the development of knowledge regarding violent Islamic extremism and the methods to prevent it as such. The Segerstedt Institute is out of the selected cases the most outspoken regarding the role of the academic. SI are not only very critical of previous and current research regarding violent Islamic extremism, but more so, apply to themselves the unique task of presenting a “nuanced image” regarding Islamic extremism (Mattsson, Arfvidson & Johansson, 2016:63). In the same report Mattson, Arfvidson and Johansson arrive at the conclusion that there is:

“A great responsibility of the science community is to contribute more well-founded knowledge surrounding the phenomenon radicalization and an understanding for the relationship between the individuals way into violent extremism and societies surrounding structures and attitudes”
(Mattsson, Arfvidson & Johansson, 2016:69).

The authors apply as such responsibility on their own field and in a sense a monopoly of knowledge simultaneously, particularity as the authors state that:

“Methods that have been developed around Europe essentially lack scientific support in the sense as they have not been accessed through research...There is a sense of urgency that research must be intensified regarding the methods that are long-term, longstanding and have extensive tested experiences to exhibit. The primary purpose of such types of research is not necessarily to improve the methods but rather to extract knowledge that is transferable to other contexts.”
(Mattsson, Arfvidson & Johansson, 2016:69)

Once again the ownership of knowledge and evaluation is situated amongst academics, however SI do not deter from criticizing other academics in the field. Reports such as Ranstorp and Dos Santos contribute according to SI to an infected climate in which the constructed link between Islam and terrorism – which Herz
Hartshorne, Eric  
*The Making of a terrorist*

argues Ranstorp continuously has – is reinforced within a security discourse (Herz, 2016:49f).

Regarding the ‘practitioners’ and ‘professionals’ the difference between the two is somewhat diluted. Practitioners are often discussed as the groups to which the expert’s knowledge is to be disseminated amongst. The previous examples from the Segerstedt institute highlight one aspect of the relationship between the authorities. However, practitioners are given a passive role in the construction of knowledge. SI’s statements regarding the lack of scientific support and assessment share tendencies with Ranstorp and Dos Santos study in Malmö. In their Report Ranstorp and Dos Santos interviewed practitioners such as police, security services, social service workers, school representatives, and local representatives. The final concluding remarks are a combination of the presentation and legitimization of practitioners risk assessment and area of need of development as well as calls for increased research:

> “An overwhelming majority of the respondents consider the situation in Rosengård to be untenable and require several different actions not least within the area of radicalization. The study [Ranstorp and Dos Santos] wishes till lift a particular few of the presented suggestions into actions”  
> (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009:19ff).

The authors in turn act as a legitimizer, summarizing the knowledge of an array of practitioners under one delimiting authority, the researcher. The professional as identified in the texts produced by the National Coordinators reports differ slightly from the presentation in the Rosengård report. Here the authorities of delimitation are not so much practitioners directly engaged in the field, or academics for that matter, but more so government commissioned reports and inquiries typically conducted by state agencies or government committees. In the empirical findings regarding the documents selected from the National Coordinators a fairly small amount of authorities are selected, all of which are connected to the government, either internally as the reports from the National Board of Health and Welfare or MSB, or externally through commissions and funding such as to the Swedish Research Defence Agency (FOI), Segerstedt institute, or to the Swedish Defence University. The ‘professional’s’ actions as authorities of delimitation are important to understand as presented by Richard Jackson and Gareth Hall. What they found was by studying the vernacular – ‘everyday’ – discourse on terrorism, was that there was a significant
degree of convergence between the dominant assumptions and narratives of terrorism and counter-terrorism amongst elites as well as amongst the “public” respondents in their study’s findings (Jackson and Hall, 2016). More so, Jackson and Hall found that “elite political appeals” are far more likely to resonate with the public (Jackson and Hall, 2016:305). Their findings illustrate the power of the ‘elite political appeal’ and with such groups typically empowering internal authorities of delimitation, much of the designating power remain within the elite discourse.

4.1.3 From victim to terrorist, the process of radicalization as the grids of specification
Foucault’s grids of specification act as the differentiation between, in the case of this study, forms of violent extremism as well as variations within discourse of violent Islamic extremism in Sweden (Foucault, 1972:46). Grids of specification are in a sense organizing principles which present each other as objects within the expert discourse. In regard to the Swedish case these may materialize as the different stages of what is labeled as the radicalization process. The final step in such a process is shared by all the reports analyzed for this study, that of an act of violence, i.e. terrorism. However, the initial step, as well as the process to which an individual becomes a ‘terrorist’ or an ‘extremist’ varies. In MSB and CATS reports the starting point of the process is determined by the individuals background and surroundings. Being Muslim or from an area that has a particularly high population of immigrants and social issues is in the MSB and the Rosengård report enough to be susceptible to radicalization. When introducing the area of Rosengård in the report Ranstorp and Dos Santos decide to illustrate an image of the area by presenting demographic aspects such as the geographical location of the area, the amount of immigrant inhabitants and of immigrant background, as well as the areas high levels of unemployment and overcrowded housing situation:

“Malmö stands out (even in a European context) as there is a large amount of immigrants in proportion to the population...Within Malmö the nearby districts differ socioeconomically as well as preconditions for cramped housing conditions, alienation, segregation, and in certain cases radicalization” (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009:6)
In the MSB report, the authors choose to tie Islam with what they define as the political ideology that is Islamism:

“In Islamism is not its own form of Muslim faith. It is a political ideology based on, and derived from Islam where it gathers its legitimacy...The commonality may be found in the focus on the ideological-religious base as leading for how society and its citizens shall be governed and where the individual is under the state.” (Norell et.al. 2016:3)

The grids of specialization are ever changing within the discourse, as a result, it is problematic to determine the specific grids of specification. Nevertheless it is possible to identify certain general aspects such as; the susceptible individual, which is heavily tied with a passive actor; the unknown threat, which is a passive but potentially active within the discourse; the active threat; and the terrorist, who is past the point of return. Those at the “point of no return” are distanced from the contemporary structure of the democratic society:

“Followers of violent extremism discount [underkänner] democratic principles and rules, which constitutes a threat against fundamental democratic values. What they [followers of VE] share is also a will to change the democratic society and implement another social order. The road to there [new social order] perceives violence and other crimes as a legitimate method” (SOU, 2016:92,14)

The grids of specification illustrate the elements of the susceptible victim and the final stage of radicalization as the democracy thwarting violent terrorist. However, to merely list the emergence of objects, authorities of delimitation, and grids of specification, is not sufficient according to Foucault in order to understand the discursive formations. In order to dive deeper into the analysis of the formation of objects, the relations between the three must be analyzed (Foucault, 1972:49f).

4.2 The relation between the State, the social, and the security sites
The discursive relations that Foucault discusses are to be found at the outer limit of the discourse, in turn limiting and legitimizing objects of which to speak. However, such objects are not simply built upon language, to be able to analyze a discourse one must use the formations of objects to reveal the rules and practices of a discourse (Foucault, 1972:50ff). Objects in Foucault’s discourse exist under a complex set of relations between, amongst others, institutions, systems of norms, and social
processes. These relations do not as Foucault states, “indicate the web” when analyzed internally, however by placing objects in juxtapositions it is possible to not only determine the limitations of the discourse, but also to determine the group of relations that allow for the classification, naming, and analysis of relations and objects (Foucault, 1972:50f). Foucault in his analysis uses the relationship between institutions such as the medical, criminal and judicial field, and how each field with its specific determination of authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification contribute to the discourse of mental illness. Within the elite expert field each case is connected to several different fields. All four cases are directly connected to the Swedish Government, either through funding, particular commissions, and more importantly, as they are in varying degrees government agencies. However, terrorism stands as such a much different field than that of the medical as there is a history of specific institutions tasked with a general exclusive authority of delimitation.

In terrorism studies it is possible to identify three institutional sites as Foucault’s medical, judicial, and family, that of ‘security’, ‘social’, and the ‘governmental’. As has been previously mentioned, the role of the government in terrorism studies and the relation between the academic and the government is heavily intertwined. This is particularly relevant in regards to the creation of expert knowledge regarding violent Islamic extremism as governments in their classification of extremist and non-extremist Islam in turn are classifying correct and incorrect interpretations of a religion (Kundnani, 2007:54). More so, as Jackson has pointed out, appeals from political elites are more likely to resonate with the public than other forms of appeals (Jackson & Hall, 2016:305). The case of the National Coordinator highlights how relations between actors in the field delimit and legitimate one another. By only credentialing government agencies and actors with relations such as Segerstedt or CATS, the National Coordinator is delimiting the field of knowledge to only include government-initiated knowledge as legitimate. Therefore it is possible to identify that the relation between the actor and the government is an important factor in regards to the legitimacy of the knowledge produced. This first layer of differentiation between legitimate speakers and outsiders therefore is situated by a governmental recognition. However, though the Swedish government holds a central role amongst the relations there remain discrepancies within the discourse. The relation between ‘security’ and
‘social’ highlights different grids of specification regarding what types of extremism are to be classified and derived.

The Segerstedt Institute tackle this directly in their first report, “Social work, pedagogic, and efforts against the so called violent extremism”. In the report Herz analyzes the efforts of first-line workers – social workers etc. – in regards to preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. According to Herz a central problem in contemporary efforts is the transferring of securitized efforts and the security discourse of VE onto first-line workers:

“One conclusion of this report is that first-line staff should not take over the securitized discourse that now is setting the tone for efforts against so-called violent extremism…The preventative efforts should not be about mapping, educating regarding radicalization or about specific organizations but rather preventative efforts should aim at being more general and locally anchored. Efforts should be organized within the frame of regular activities and not have as a pronounced goal to work against radicalization or extremism. The goal should instead be to cater for democratic, social and human rights” (Herz, 2016:4)

The methods presented within the report as disconnected from the security discourse are referred to as ‘soft’ – to satisfy democratic, social, and human rights needs (2016:4) –, methods that despite retaining criticism for their efficiency, should set the tone for preventative efforts against violent extremism according to Herz. The positioning of security contra social efforts does not necessarily determine the limitations that position the discourse, it does however highlight a chafing relationship amongst the grids of specification. The relationship between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ (security) methods leads us to the final aspect regarding the discursive relations and the formation of the object, that of the monopoly of knowledge. Mark Sedgwick argues that rather than dividing soft (integration) and tough (security) into two independent stances they are along with a foreign policy context variations in viewing the radicalization, which Sedgwick argues as a term stems from the emergence of ‘homegrown’ western terrorism. The emergence of the homegrown terrorist through the differentiating contexts acts as an individualizer. Emphasizing the individuals attributes rather than broader political, social, economical, or other causes to terrorism (Sedgwick, 2010:480)
As hitherto presented all cases claim there is a need for an increase in knowledge regarding violent extremism and terrorism, more so, in the reports certain actors are identified and legitimized as capable of producing such knowledge. Here we find differentiations such as that between CATS and MSB with the Segerstedt institute regarding the anti-west sentiment of the subject and the alarmist security response to such threats. The lack of knowledge, and the experts active process of self-legitimization through the pointing out of “white-spots” of knowledge, such as MSB regarding the Muslim Brotherhood (MSB, 2016), or Segerstedt regarding securitized counter-extremism (Herz, 2016 & Mattson et.al. 2016) reassures the actors hierachical position as elite experts within the field.

4.3 The Formation of Statements: who, from where, and how are experts speaking?
Foucault describes the formation of objects as signs, signs which Foucault means compound a discourse. However, signs do more than designate “things”, it is this more that Foucault argues needs to be analyzed to identify the construction of a discourse. The next step in the analysis is therefore to identify the formation of a statement, which Foucault bases upon three questions; who is speaking; from where are they speaking; and the position/ situation of the subject (Foucault, 1972:55ff).

4.3.1 Who is speaking?
The cases strategically selected for this study are all situated within the Swedish government, either through funding (Segerstedt Institute, CATS) or directly within a Swedish government agency (National Coordinator, MSB). However, they are not as such direct representatives of the government and are therefore relatively independent. Regarding who is speaking there are two initial differentiations that must be addressed, that of the individual and the institution. Foucault exemplifies the importance of the speaker through the field of 19th-century medicine:

“Medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, their existence as medical statements cannot be dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to make them, and to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and death.” (Foucault, 1972:56).
In Foucault’s example a doctor is the statutory defined person, in regards to the elite experts, certain individuals such as the National Coordinator, Anna Carlstedt, and Magnus Ranstorp of CATS hold a specific qualification as experts. However, their position as legitimate speakers is founded upon the system of qualification, status, and institutions (Foucault, 1972:56). Magnus Ranstorp and the National Coordinator, particularity during Mona Sahlin and Hillevi Engströms tenures, used their position within the public debate. Yet they did so not as individuals, but rather as representatives of institutions specifically designated to preventing violent extremism and/or increasing knowledge of the field. Once again, it is from the Swedish government that the position of expertise has been delegated, the National Coordinator is as mentioned a Government commission under the Ministry of Culture. CATS is according to it’s website a national research center, however like the National Coordinator, CATS receives its funding from the Swedish Government Offices and Government Agencies, and is as part of the Swedish Defence University commissioned under the Ministry of Defense. Regarding MSB and Segerstedt there are resembling positions of the individual as a qualified speaker. For example, the report commissioned by MSB and written by Norrel, Carlbom, and Durrani, led to ranking officials within MSB to pronounce that the study’s result was that of the researchers (Kasurinen, 2017). Yet, the report was added as part of MSB’s “knowledge bank” and was commissioned by MSB in order to “make visible the Muslim Brotherhood, and its networks, influence in Swedish society, and the consequences as such” (MSB, 2016). As a result, the study’s findings represent knowledge regarding ‘Islamism’ in Sweden, sanctioned and published by a government agency. Nevertheless, there are certain individuals that own the status of legitimate speakers, however, they do so by speaking from institutional sites which will be examined here next.

4.3.2 From where are they speaking? 
I have hitherto focused a great deal on the institutional sites from where the experts speak. However, one aspect, which Foucault highlights and has yet to be discussed, is that of the altering of institutional sites over time. This is particularity interesting in regards to the National Coordinator and Segerstedt as they have in the since 2014 respectively 2016 been tasked with the development of knowledge regarding the
prevention of violent extremism. The institutions from which our experts produce their discourse and derive their legitimacy from are universities, government agencies, and “the field”. The field, is vaguely described by the experts and can vary from the specific area in Malmö as in the Rosengård’s report, to all of “Europe and the Muslim world”, as in the MSB report. Each representation of the field from the authors acts as representations, or signs, of knots within the “real world”, the discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002:28). More so, the idea of the field in this study sets out from a Bourdiuedian perspective, that not only are these ‘knots’ representations of reality, but agents in the field occupy positions within the field aiming at transforming or conserving the structure of the field (Bourdieu, 2005:30). By presenting the authors outtake of “reality”, the expert is heightening their hierarchal position in regards to competing experts. With the establishment of the National Coordinator and Segerstedt the position of the field has in their report shifted from a war on terror perspective – which has been the dominant narrative following 9/11 (Strandh & Eklund, 2015:369; Cavanaugh, 2009:4; Jackson, 2007:394) – to a more localized, regional, and front-line narrative in which municipalities, social workers, and citizens are the key actors in preventing violent extremism rather than security apparatuses.

A second conflicting position of experts may be found in the sites of knowledge in accordance to the ‘academics’ and the ‘practices’. Historically, the field of terrorism studies has upheld a relatively weak a permeable discursive boundary, continuously constructed in the space between academia, the state, and the media (Stampnitzky, 2013:46). In the elite expert discourse, the National Coordinator is tasked as the overarching gatherer of knowledge, legitimizing and presenting the results in their reports to the Swedish Government. The agencies tasked with producing such knowledge – MSB, Segerstedt and CATS – to different degrees derive their position as expert from the National Coordinator. Such legitimization is presented through the inclusion of the above in the National Coordinators reference group as well as the use of material from the elite experts within the reports deriving from the National Coordinator. However, the target-group particularly represented by the experts varies, MSB as such represent a reactive government agency directly connected to Swedish municipalities and regional authorities. The reports from Segerstedt and CATS highlight a competition over representing the needs of practitioners whilst
maintaining their academic independency, and the National Coordinator in turn is predominantly tasked with representing municipalities and enabling the exchange of knowledge. It is impossible and not necessary relevant to this study to try and analyze the exchange of knowledge between the experts. What is however relevant is the relationships and internal chafe amongst the experts. The Segerstedt institute has in their first report (Herz, 2016) analyzed what they refer to as the “medial expert discourse”. In their analysis of the discourse, two experts analyzed in this study are discussed, Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Norell. In his analysis Herz is critical of the designation of expert appointed to Norell and Ranstorp by the ‘media’, particularly as according to Herz the two experts derive their language and labels from a security discourse, predominantly focusing upon Islam and violent Islamic extremism:

“Both Norell and Ranstorp have a language derived from a security discourse, which can be seen.... A part of the critique which they [Norell and Ranstorp] direct towards the debate climate or against the National Coordinator mirrors an attitude towards Islam and Muslims as risks.” (Herz, 2016:50)

The critique towards reports such as MSB’s and the Rosengård report are possible to add to Richard Jacksons “epistemological crisis of counter-terrorism”. Jackson argues that speculation, imagination, set the foundation for the use of un-provable knowledge deemed as evidence for counter-terrorism progress (Jackson, 2015:49). Such critique may harm the legitimacy of experts as they attempt to assert themselves and from their particular position as experts. In all, two broad positions have been established, that of the ‘academic’ and the ‘practice’ experts, as well as the position from which the expert is speaking, as a representative of ‘the field’, ‘the government’, or ‘academia’.

4.3.3 The Position of the Subject
As the experts entertain specific areas of the discourse such as the ‘field’ etc. the position of the expert as a subject highlights how the expert is engaging with the discourse (Foucault, 1972:58). Foucault describes four particular forms of subjects, the questioning; the listening; the seeing; and the observing subject. In the following section I will describe how these variations are applicable to the experts examined for this study. However, before presenting the empirical analysis the idea of the taboo of terrorism must be presented. The taboo of terrorism represents within critical
terrorism studies the condition in which terrorism, and more specifically, terrorists are described as dangerous and irrational, therefore any attempts of understanding the rationality of the terrorist are deemed as inexplicable and morally questionable (Jackson, 2015:46). Lisa Stampnitzky describes this condition as the *politics of anti-knowledge*, that by constructing the terrorist as ‘evil’ and ‘irrational’, any attempts to understand this terrorist are tainted by a taboo, which in turn may harm the credibility of experts depending on their moral stance against terrorism and terrorist (Stampnitzky, 2013:191f). The National Coordinator has identified this taboo but referred to as “a fear of [first-line practitioners] engaging in conflict with freedom of religion” (2016:92,50). The moral stance in turn establishes a physical and ontological distance between the expert and the subject. This distance is according to the American anthropologist Scott Atran one of the main issues of terrorism studies as it is difficult for the researcher to make the differentiation between those who sympathize with groups such as Al Qaeda together with those willing to commit acts of violence (Atran, 2010:289). Of the seven reports analyzed for this study, only one set of empirical data is predominantly derived from those deemed to be ‘terrorists’ or ‘violent extremists’. The remaining studies have derived their data from alternative sources such as first-line personnel, believed to work in the areas where such movements exist.4

As I have previously mentioned, the reports by MSB and Ranstorp and Dos Santos have been subjugated to these types of arguments, accused of conjugating a diverse and complex group of people under the label as “Muslims” (Ackfeldt et al. 2017; Gardell, 2009). Nevertheless, both these studies may be categorized under Foucault’s seeing subject as the authors are illuminating an issue deemed to be unknown to others then themselves. One example of the expert’s exclusive knowledge and seeing ability is how in MSB’s report, Norell et.al. proclaim that “…when government agencies, politicians, and journalists turn to a Muslim organization it is often MB [Muslim Brotherhood] they are speaking too” (Norell et.al. 2016:11). Similar statements may be found in Ranstorp and Dos Santos Rosengård’s report, in which

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4 By predominant I mean that the results of the reports analyzed have not been based upon empirical findings deriving from the group in question, ‘violent Islamic extremists’. The only study to gather its data as such was Linus Gustafsson of CATS (2015) analysis of propaganda produced and released by assumed followers, members, and sympathizers of Al Qaida and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS).
they state their exclusive view of the unknown, such as the people of Rosengård’s “distorted perception of the ‘Swede’” (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009:13) and the need to “dare to discuss values” as “these groups choose to live in society but outside of its norms” (2009:21). Both sets of experts claim to illuminate aspects of the “Islamic extremism” yet the empirical foundation of their studies is set in secondary sources, either first-line field workers (CATS) or as in the MSB report “the large ‘insider’ understanding of how the movements [Muslim Brotherhood] members think organizationally and tactically” (2016:2) due to one author’s previous membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, MSB and CATS may be categorized as the seeing subjects in this study, obtaining a quite different role from that of Segerstedt and the National Coordinator.

The National Coordinator may be categorized as the observing subject in Foucault’s structure. The Coordinator as an expert acts by observing, gathering, and disseminating knowledge produced by actors deemed legitimate in the field. Although the National Coordinator produces knowledge – particularly in their report regarding the Coordinators future – their knowledge is rather a conception of previous knowledge and a gathering as such, rather than an illuminating aspect as in the seeing subject. The Segerstedt’s Institutes reports highlight how the experts draw on several of Foucault’s position of subjects, particularly as observing as they analyze the field of terrorism studies; as they see the gaps in current research and position themselves in a relatively exclusive section of terrorism studies; and the questioner as they illuminate the missteps of others and question the order of knowledge production. It is possible that the experts are able to exist within several of Foucault’s positions of the subjects, however, as presented above there is evidence which suggests that certain experts are possible to categorize as particularly relevant as seeing subjects or observing subjects.

4.4 The Formation of concepts: The Democratic West and Radical Islam

The next step in Foucault’s analysis is to examine the formation of concepts, which according to Foucault may be found in the rules for arranging statements in series characterized by elements, and how these elements are related to one another (Foucault, 1972:66). The elements include the configuration of a text, it’s placement in time, and it’s relation to other texts. By looking at the arrangement of statements
into the formation of concepts it thereby possible to portray discursive and conceptual formations (1972: 66ff).

Foucault uses the example of Natural History during the seventeenth and eighteenth history to highlight his arguments:

“In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Natural History was not simply a form of knowledge that gave a new definition to concepts like ‘genus’ or ‘character’, and which introduced new concepts like that of ‘natural classification’ or ‘mammal’; above all, it was a set of rules for arranging statements in series, an obligatory set of schemata of dependence, of order, and of successions, in which the recurrent elements that may have value as concepts were distributed (1972:63).

As you may see above, it is not the field of knowledge as such which breeds new definitions and the introduction to new concepts but rather the rules in place for arranging statements that gave value to the concepts. By applying this mindset to the empirical findings of this study it is possible to identify a system of rules for the emergence and recontextualization of concepts. As Stampnitzky and Jackson have pointed out, the taboo on terrorism results in the expert’s moral obligatory to condemn terrorism and violent extremism. The juxta-positioning of terrorism and violent extremism against that of western democracy by the experts follows such a moral positioning. This is particularly relevant in regards to violent Islamic extremism and the ‘West’, as several instances within the expert’s reports – predominantly MSB & CATS – highlight the relationship between the foreign (Islam) and the Western (democracy) as incompatible:

“Another issue is that immigrant parents have often received a very limited introduction, which brings with it a very poor sense of how society with laws and living conditions functions. This in turn exacerbates unemployment, segregation, isolation as these parents are never integrated which brings with it a lack of understanding – and many times a direct opposition – to Swedish social life, cultural living standards and the foundation of democratic values as a whole (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009:13).

Once again, CATS present an image in which the foreign (immigrants) are separate from what is deemed as Swedish. In the MSB report, Norell and the other authors go as far as to say that there is an ongoing competition over society as a whole:
“Given that MB has as their objective to increase the amount of practicing Muslims on Swedish or European territory the chances are great that a tug of war will arise between the majority of society and the Muslim society directed by MB over which fundamental norms are to be valid for Swedish citizens” (Norell et al., 2016:31).

Previous research regarding this construction highlights how Islam has in the post 9/11-era not only been associated with terrorism and violent extremism, but as presented as incompatible with western forms of democracy (Kundnani, 2014:137; Mullin, 2011:272; Edmunds, 2011:82). Therefore, the first arrangement of statements highlights the juxta-positioning of the norm, western democracy, as threatened by a violent threat presented by violent Islamic extremists. However, there are discrepancies within the field. The elements of the threat draw from what the Segerstedt Institute refer to as the security discourse and what Jackson refers to the moral imperative in which all must be done to prevent unknown attacks (Jackson, 2015: 36). This leads us to the second constellation of statements which is that of the social aspects.

Concepts such as ‘alienation’, ‘discrimination’, ‘stigmatization’, and ‘vulnerability’ offer a broad image of the elements connected to radicalization. One interesting aspect of the social elements is how they are re-contextualized by the experts to characterize a formation. The Segerstedt Institute argue that radicalization and violent extremism are to be approached as any other form of social issue: “Unemployment, poverty and social vulnerability may thereby be seen as causes [of extremism]” (Herz, 2016:62) and that the security discourse surrounding terrorism studies is a construction that stigmatizes individuals and groups, particularly focusing on Muslims and Islam: “One challenge with pointing out specific groups, in this case Muslims, is the risk of stigmatization which could counteract the purpose [minimizing violent extremism]” (2016:47ff). CATS on the other hand – which are according to Herz key contributors to the security discourse – apply the same concepts such as ‘alienation’ and ‘segregation’, yet connect these terms specifically to those of an immigrant background, and attribute radicalization as a process where an individual may present visual attributes – related to stereotypical Muslim radicalization – such as growing a beard along with a change in behavior:
“Increased frequency of visits to Mosques; radically changed religious dedication combined with similar demands on its surroundings (siblings and peers); greatly increased personal time [fritidsumgänge] with persons that share the same extremist world views; signs of isolation from previous friends and family as well as not wanting to socialize with non-Muslims” (Ranstorp & Don Santos, 2009:10).

Although CATS and Segerstedt institute share the use of key concepts in regards to their ideas of radicalization, they differ greatly in the application of the terms to specific ethnic or religious groups. That is, the rules constituting the relationship between the concepts and the eventual radicalization of violent Islamic extremists are dependent on the position of the subjects. As such, ‘alienation’ and ‘segregation’ become relevant to radicalization not in any particular population in Sweden, but are dependent on the subjects of radicalization consisting of elements such as ‘immigrants (background)’, ‘Muslim’ and an ‘anti-west sentiment’. In such a structure the rules of formation are codependent on the socio-and economical aspects shared by the experts within the field, however, such aspects are only relevant when positioned alongside concepts that individualize broader social issues with the Rosengård reports key identifiers of Islamic extremism.

What we can see above is part of the rotation between elements which enable the delimitation of elements into groups of relations, or a conceptual formation (Foucault, 1972:66). This rotation of elements is applicable to that of the National Coordinator as they combine the ‘anti-democratic’, ‘alienation’, ‘discrimination’ with a particular focus on areas such as Rosengård that are deemed as socio-/economically challenged suburbs: “The Coordinators experience is that particularly newly established associations in socio-economically week suburb areas need support in order to establish and grow” (SOU 2016:92,140). Although the connection between Islam, immigrants, and violent extremism is mostly found in the reports by MSB and CATS, the core labels applied are re-contextualized international labels that have been developed and adapted throughout the 9/11-era. Once again, Jackson highlights how the political and academic discourse regarding Islamic terrorism has been constructed in binaries, the West versus Islam (Jackson, 2007:401). Similar tendencies may be found in the conceptual formation by the experts in this study in which the above mentioned socio-economical vulnerability of the subjects does not entertain the value of being violent Islamic extremist without the connection to that of the ‘Islamist’,
‘Immigrant’ or the ‘alienated’. By clustering broader terms such as alienation and immigration along with elements, groups of rules are established that delimit a set of characteristics, in turn presenting particular a discursive formation (Foucault, 1972:70). In all, two rules of formations are particularly present in the emergence and recontextualization of concepts within the discourse. Firstly, we have the system of security concepts that has been constructed upon the foundation of concepts developed in the post 9/11-era and rewritten to be applicable to a Swedish context. As I have tried to illustrate, MSB, CATS, and to a certain degree the National Coordinator are key contributors within discourse as they establish the connection between socio-economic issues and a sense of lacking democratic participation with the security paradigm presented by violent acts of terrorism or by extremist groupings, and particularly to Muslim and immigrant populations in Sweden. An outtake from an interview with a local municipal coordinator highlights the above-mentioned connection: “Linköping is a large municipality, Sweden’s fifth largest. We also have one area in Linköping – Skäggetorp – which may be described as particularly vulnerable, an area perceived as segregated. It sticks out statistically when it comes to unemployment and similar factors” (SOU 2016:92, 61). In the interview the coordinator also highlights the threat and issues presented by right- and left-wing extremism. However, Skäggetorp, an area with a large population of immigrant background residents, is the only area of the city identified by name and discussed in regards to violent extremism.

The second formation of rules consists of the socio-economic issues which are primarily developed by the Segerstedt Institute and the National Coordinator, but also by CATS however as presented in more regards to that of a security discourse. Here we find the process of radicalization in which the failed fulfillment of socio- and democratic needs may develop into anti-democratic and violent behavior as I discussed in the presentation of the grids of specialization as radicalization (chapter 4.1.3). If the security paradigm and the construction of conceptual formations in regards to terrorism and Islam has retained a certain amount of international attention the second formation of concepts is more underdeveloped. Mark Sedgwick argues that the security context in preventing radicalization is less politically charged than that of integration and immigration, with the latter related to politically and culturally charged labels such as ‘democracy’, ‘citizenship’, and ‘values’ (Sedgwick, 2010:
486). Sedgwick’s theory resembles that of Strand and Eklund who argue that public and official counter-terrorism policy in Sweden are related to the process of government legitimization in which the Swedish government aim is firstly portray government efforts to curb terrorism and violent extremism as a form of public reassurance (Strand & Eklund, 2015: 360). The rewriting of social issues into issues related to radicalization, terrorism, and violent extremism constitute a broader system of relations which in turn establish the Foucauldian discursive formation (1972: 66). However, in rewriting broader social issues in such a manner, it is possible as in the Rosengård report to attribute a complex, multicultural population of a city with a large variation of inhabitants as either active in the recruitment, development, and/or engagement in extremist activities, thereby constructing a negative persona of the area.

4.5 From weak to dangerous: the passive victim and the active threat
I have so far looked at the formation of object in which the emergence of the violent Islamic extremist is associated with labels representing the vulnerable situation of the susceptible, and the threatening, anti-democratic actions of the active. In the formation of statements and the positioning of the expert and the subject we have seen how the experts speak not as individuals, but as institutional representatives receiving and mediating legitimacy in an interdependent relationship between the Swedish government and the academic as well as the professional. Regarding the formation of concepts our experts position the ‘democratic west’ against that of the dangerous ‘violent Islamic extremist’ based upon a security and a social paradigm. In all, the experts in their construction of the ‘violent Islamic ‘extremist’ paint a twofold image, not only positioning the rational and democratic west against the violent and extremist Islamic actor, but also the connection between those deemed as susceptible to radicalization and the eventual Islamic terrorist. As discourses give rise to certain structures it is possible, depending on their relations, to identify themes and theories developed (Foucault, 1972: 71). Two such themes have been identified within this study, that of the passive victim, and the active threat.
4.5.1 The passive victim
When conducting the first level of analysis of the gathered material two distinct themes presented themselves, that of the passive victim, and the active threat. The passive victim is attributed with several core labels, terms and discursive formations including: ‘alienation’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘segregation’, ‘illness’, ‘stigmatization’ and ‘racism’: “Unemployment, poverty, and social vulnerability may accordingly be seen as causes [of extremism], however the efforts are rarely about this instead explanations and efforts are instead placed on the individual or on a category of people” (Herz, 2016:62). Herz gathering of labels is conducted through existing literature and focus predominantly on social issues, in the National Coordinator’s strategy the ‘illness’ labels are highlighted as potential radicalization aspects: “In certain cases depression, psychoses, posttraumatic stress and other forms of psychic illness may be one of the complex underlying reasons that lead to an individual turning to a violent milieu” (Nationella samordnaren, 2016: 31). These formations of vulnerability and illness may be found throughout the Swedish expert discourse, however, each formation holds within it under-labels, and it is important to account for the variation amongst the studied experts.

A key component in the creation of the passive victim is that of its susceptibility to external influence. The passive victim may be in an environment, which weakens the subject such as in CATS ‘Rosengård rapport’. In the government commissioned report such environmental influences are referred to as “internal factors” and are gathered under the formations “extreme segregation and alienation”: “The foremost internal driving force is about the extreme segregation and alienation that is perceived in areas like Rosengård...Segregation leads to an evil spiral of alienation, unemployment, distrust, and bitterness towards society, and in turn increased isolation” (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009:12). The subject is in these environments exposed to a plethora of contesting terms, which in turn lay the foundation for the establishment of an “us” and a “them”. These labels include, alienation, mistrust, and bitterness towards “society”. Terms such as these are rarely defined but are yet deployed in a fashion that may account for the process of the passive victim evolving into the violent Islamic extremist. However, by applying such labels to a specific target the subject in turn is established as the one susceptible to becoming the violent Islamic extremist. This is particularly present in the reports by CATS and MSB:
“Here [MB:s multiculturalism] it is not about individual integration/assimilation but rather that Muslims are to be incorporated into society as a collective unity in which all surrender to Islam in MB:s version of what religion demands, and that this group demands collective rights” (Norell et.al., 2016: 25). Islam and Muslims are consequently associated with radical and political interpretations of religion in MSB:s statements. Within the reports analyzed for this study the passive subject is categorized in opposing binaries, particularly in regards to the differentiation between what is deemed as the “West”, and in opposition what is deemed as non-Western. This type of opposing categorization will be further developed under the next section of this study, but for the construction of the passive subject it is key to highlight how MSB and CATS have presented this proclaimed problematic relation.

The subjects in the Rosengård Report (2009) and the Muslim Brotherhood in Sweden (2016) are defined as immigrants and Muslims, two groups which are ascribed conflicting attributes, such as ‘poorly integrated’ lacking understanding of ‘Swedish society and its democratic foundation of values’, or “twisted understanding” of the Swede as promiscuous and unhealthy (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009: 13). In MSB’s report the Muslim Brotherhood aim is to control Muslims in order to reduce the “cultural infection risk” which Muslims in the West are subjected to through norms and values (Norell et.al., 2016:29). This culturist presentation of contesting Western and Muslim/immigrant cultures applies a “guilt of association” principle on specific groups (Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012: 327), just by living in Rosengård or being ‘Muslim’, the subjects are exposed, and inherently internally hold, attributes conflicting with those ascribed by the authors to the West. The prescription highlights a contradiction in the labeling as it suggests that the subject is subjugated to both a localized as well as an international mode of influencing. This type of reasoning is not isolated to CATS and MSB’s reports but may also be found in the binary opposition of democracy and violent extremism by the active threat as presented in the National Coordinators texts, along with CATS and MSB’s, which will be presented further.

Returning to the passive subject and the labels of segregation and alienation, the National Coordinator and Segerstedt Institute, differ in their presentation of the terms attributed to the passive subject. ‘Racism’, ‘alienation’, ‘age’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘desperation’, ‘illness’, and ‘unmet democratic trust and expectations’ are politically,
culturally and historically loaded words, which are to a varying degree defined within the texts. Although the Segerstedt institute dedicate a significant portion of their publications to questioning the growth of the field of terrorism studies (Mattson, Arfvidson & Johansson, 2016), the lack of practices based on scientific knowledge (Herz, 2016), and the continuously questioning of terminology – violent Islamic extremism and radicalization –, the institute share a remarkable resemblance with the other experts within the elite discourse. This is particularly present regarding the passive subject as the subject is presented as unable to affect its surroundings and is unable to control the negative influence it is subjugated to as such. “Alienation”, “structural inequality” (Mattson, Arfvidson & Johansson, 2016:6), “unmet democratic needs” (Herz, 2016: 16), and “stigmatization” (Herz, 2016:62) are terms connected to the passive subject (victim). The Segerstedt Institute do however anchor their claims in contemporary academic research in a more developed fashion than that of MSB or CATS and complement their analyses with their own studies of actors in the field. Overall, SI attributes themselves the role of a detached and nuanced analyses of the discourse: “The aim of this text is to give a deepened and nuanced image of the development efforts ongoing in Sweden aimed at preventing recruitment of young people to organizations and movements that exercise violence and terror in the name of Islam” (Mattson, Arfvidson & Johansson, 2016: 63). However, such disconnect from a discourse is methodologically problematic, particularly as the Segerstedt institute as an elite expert are a key contributor to the construction of knowledge within the discourse (Ditrych, 2014: 12).

Similar to SI, the National Coordinator connects terms such as ‘alienation’, ‘illness’, ‘racism’, ‘youth’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘stigmatization’, and ‘desperation’ to the passive victim. In the case of the passive victim, the National Coordinator presentation resembles MSB and CATS as they present the causes and preventative possibilities in regards to violent Islamic extremism in binaries. ‘Discrimination’, ‘racism’, ‘threats and hate’ are portrayed as push factors, which in turn should be met with ‘democracy strengthening measures’ in order to counter-act the ideological, political and religious pull factors legitimizing violence: “One explanation to people joining Islamic extremism is that they experience discrimination, racism, threats and hatred. Real and perceived injustices induces and motivates violence” (SOU 2016:92, 67). According to the National Coordinator, democracy as the binary opposite of violent
extremism may act as a ‘vaccine’ (SOU 2016:92, 73). The application of the label ‘vaccine’ entitles a form of illness amongst the subject, and returning to the passive subject, another theme is built upon the labels in regards to the mental and physical health of the violent extremist.

In regards to ‘health’, labels such as ‘mental illnesses, ‘life crises’, ‘fundamental psychic needs’, and ‘PTSD’ illustrate issues that may push the passive subject towards violent extremism (Nationella Samordnaren, 2016:31; SOU 2016:92, 149). The National Coordinator base their arguments on reports from other government agencies such as the National Board of Health and Welfare and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, however in the National Strategy the mental issues presented as factors in possible radicalization are presented as by the Coordinator itself. An important differentiating factor of the National Coordinator and the Segerstedt institute may be found in their reports where they, much like MSB and CATS, refer less to academic research and more to their own sources of knowledge. In the National Coordinators report regarding the permanent structure of the agency (SOU 2016:92), several other reports are presented as representative of violent extremism in Sweden. A majority of the reports derive from other government agencies with reports from SI and CATS dominating the spectrum. The delimitation of knowledge is thereby congested to a small number of actors, thereafter when the National Coordinator presents arguments and strategies, believed to prevent violent extremism, the underlying assumptions consist of a relatively limited field of knowledge. As Stampnitzky points out, the growth of terrorism studies during the 1970’s consisted of a networked social arena. Within this arena terrorism became known as the new problem of which to study and in conjunction with this the emergence of a new actor with a particular status from which to speak emerged, the terrorism expert (Stampnitzky, 39f). This emergence is crucial to the understanding of the violent extremist, as the states discourse bares with it a tremendous amount of power in the construction of a subject (Ditrych, 2014:1).

The presentation of the passive subject as a victim follows a similar pattern within the field of knowledge as it projects an understanding of the subject as weak, ill, and susceptible to its surroundings without possibly withstanding such influence. The subject is caught in a situation in which they are not possible to control how they are
affected by uncontrollable structural factors such as ‘racism’, ‘alienation’, and ‘illness’ along with intangible forces aiming to pull the passive subject towards “extremism”. All of this is in turn to be met with – or contrasted to – the wests monopolized weapon, democracy.

4.5.2 The active threat
The second thematic constellation is that of the active threat. The subject is in this case connected to labels such as ‘anti-democratic’, ‘violence glorifying’ [våldsglorifierande], ‘jihadist’, ‘terrorist’, ‘security’, ‘manipulative’ and ‘anti-west’. A quick overview of the labels will illustrate a resembling binary opposition of ‘us and them’: “As a whole violent extremism is to be regarded as a democratic problem. The individuals in this study [CATS Social media] sympathize with non-democratic movements that with violence and threats of violence attempt to erect an authoritative state” (Gustafsson, 2015: 43). The label ‘anti (un)-democratic’ serves as the underlining differentiation between the threat and the threatened. Not only is the threat presented as imminent, but also, to the degree that it encompasses all of society.

The National coordinator argues in their strategy that the “threat is far too important to not have an appointed contact person in each municipality” (Nationella Samordnaren, 2016:21) – Sweden has 290 municipalities with varying populations from a couple thousand to around one million – and in their report deems violent extremism as “one of our times greatest threats” (SOU 2016:92, 15). The exceptionalism of the global terrorism discourse following 9/11 is that of particularly pointing out ‘Muslim extremist’, ‘Islamist’ and/or ‘jihadi terrorist’ as the prominent threat to the ‘dominant west’ (Mullin, 2011; Shepard, 2008; Edmunds, 2011; Kundnani, 2014; Jackson, 2007). This security conundrum is uplifted from the localized labels associated with the passive subject to an international context with the active threat. In MSB’s report on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the brotherhood are presented as the “godfather” [fadder] of “European Islamisation” and that the Muslim Brotherhoods motto – as cited by Norell et. al. "Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur'an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope." –, along with a historical ‘hate’ towards ‘western involvement’ in Arabic Muslim society, establishes that there is a strong resemblance between
‘Islamist’ groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and violent Islamic extremist groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS, Daesh) (Norell et. al., 2016: 6). The report by Norell et.al. was commissioned by MSB and published as part of their “knowledge bank”, the reports findings have been regarded as highly controversial due to – amongst other things – its proclamation of Muslims in Sweden as a homogenic group. The critique, which predominantly derives from over twenty Swedish academics, is directed to both the reports authors and MSB itself. The government agency MSB have responded to the critique by claiming that the reports contents stand for that of the authors alone (Kasurinen, 2017), however MSB’s directive states that “Islamist and jihadist organization utter goal is to [re]-establish the utopian Caliphate but how this is to be achieved differs the politically directed organizations from the violence promoting” (MSB, 2016). The directive acts as predetermining the goals of a wide array of groups and organizations as well as the results of the final report. The connection between the political and the violent is not isolated to one single actor within the discourse, as will be presented, the ‘Islamist’ and the ‘violent extremist’ share many labels within its construction. This link is identified by SI and thereafter criticized as a construction following 9/11, and an apparent connection, which in term clouds the relation between preventative social and reactive security measures:

“There will always be a grey area where it is not possible to draw a clear line between the securitized and the socially politicized starting points and areas of responsibility...What in one end of the grey area may be perceived as powerful and resolute may in the other end be a contra-productive “push into a corner”” (Mattsson, Arfvidson & Johansson, 2016: 67).

SI do not hold back in their criticism regarding the lack of knowledge or regarding other experts in the field, which is primarily focused upon CATS research, however we will return to this in the later stages of this study as it revolves around the legitimization and monopolization of knowledge rather than the construction of subject. Despite their critique of contemporary research, Mattson et.al identify the link between preventative efforts and the security aspects of counter-terrorism:

“The preventative efforts are to be understood as long-term and not directed towards immediate impending acts of violence. It is thereby a link a coherent effort against terrorism in which police and security services are tasked with the final physical prevention of acts of violence” (Mattson, Arfvidson & Johansson, 2016: 1).
The application of this threat onto a specific group may be found in CATS publications regarding violent Islamic extremism and threats towards democracy ‘the immigrant’, ‘the Muslim’, and ‘Rosengård’ – with the later referring to a specific area in Malmö – are congregated into one identity, which is susceptible in the terms of the passive subject, but also as an active threat. As the passive subject was dependent on its locality, the active threat emerges through an internationalized context consisting of external factors such as the Iraq war and global attacks against Muslims: “The foremost external driving force identified is regarding what is known as ‘the single narrative’. Firstly regarding the war in Iraq and secondly what many Muslims perceive as the West’s abuse of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and other regional conflicts” (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009: 12). What these external factors and the previous mentioned internal factors share is their juxtaposition to that of ‘Swedish society’, ‘Swedish rules’, ‘democratic values’, and the polarization of the West and the other: “Complicated issues regarding identity such as standing between two cultures – where one does not feel a sense of belonging to Sweden or ones parents country of origin – are reinforced by experiences of alienation, marginalization, idleness, and lack of future prospects.” (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009: 12). Such a positioning of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not isolated to Sweden, the binary opposition of ‘the West’ against a ‘Muslim’, ‘Islamist’, ‘Jihadi’, threat has developed in the United States following 9/11 (Mullin, 2011:264) and in Europe particularly following the Madrid bombing in 2004 (Strandh & Eklund, 2015: 366). The differentiation and juxta-positioning between the other and the righteous objects acts as a delimitation of the discourse. It is therefore through such authorities of delimitation that specific grids of specification classify, contrast and divide the discourse from its surroundings (Foucault, 1972:46). Hence, the relations prescribed by the experts between the ‘West’ – who have monopolized the defense of human rights and in this case democracy (Edmunds, 2011:82) – and the active threat, the violent Islamist extremist, has empowered one object with the ability to delimit, construct and speak of discursive formations whilst subjugating the other into a “thing”, a specified system of attributes constructing the subject (Foucault, 1972: 46ff).

More examples of the binary positioning of the West versus the violent Islamic extremist may be found in the reports from MSB and CATS. One variation in the presentation of the other within the discourse is that of the ‘manipulative’ extremist.
MSB and CATS describe in their reports “cultural organizations are not what they state to be” (Ranstorp & Dos Santos, 2009:17), how groups like ISIS intertwine humanitarian messages with extremist content (Gustafsson, 2015: 37), and how “the Muslim Brotherhood have ‘adapted to Swedish organizational forms...practicing ‘double-speech’: presenting themselves as good democrats towards Western leaders as they simultaneously show an intolerant side when they stand in front of a Muslim audience’” (Norell et. al., 2016: 8ff). By presenting such claims, the authors construct an ‘other’ to be understood as more than a single individual or organization, but rather as a set of ideas (Kundnani, 2014: 22). However, not only does such a labeling negatively congregate a complex and heterogenic group such as Muslims, but also, the clouding of the ‘unknown’, ‘manipulative’, and ‘conforming’ subject present a threat which at best is difficult to analyze. This problem may also be referred to as the “epistemological crisis of counter-terrorism” (2015). Jackson’s analysis, baring the same name, focuses on how counter-terrorism strategies around the world are founded in the ‘known’, that there will be terrorist attacks, the ‘unknown’, regarding when and where the attacks will take place, and the ‘moral imperative’ that all must be done in order to prevent such attacks (Jackson, 2015:35). More so, such a spiral may increase the role of imagination and fantasy in regards to counter-terrorism strategies, which in turn develops exaggerated threat scenarios. This development has not only led to the exaggeration of threat according to Jackson, but also to an ever-chasing crisis of knowledge seeking for practical, achievable knowledge (Jackson, 2015: 41ff). Jackson’s analysis may be applied to that of MSB and CATS. The known in this case is that there are movements challenging the present democratic security order, however who these individuals, or groups are, is at best vaguely accounted for, leaving a gap of knowledge built upon imagination and speculation. The moral imperative is therefore directly connected to the relation between the passive subject and the active threat, consisting of a wide-range of preventative, reactive, and at times derogative measures.
5.0 Discussion
In this next chapter I will try to take a step back from the study’s findings and place them in an international context alongside previous research regarding expert discourse and the construction of the discourse of Islamic terrorism. The aim is as such not to conduct a comparative case study but rather to discuss the findings from the Swedish context in regards to the international context and thereby possibly identify themes and elements.

In Richard Jackson’s *Constructing Enemies: Islamic Terrorism in Political & Academic Discourse*, which I have continuously referred, Jackson explores how the texts published by policy-actors, think-tanks and academics, are built upon an interpretive logic in which labels – assumptions, narratives, metaphors and arguments – construct an image of terrorism as inherent to Islam, that such terrorism is labeled as a concrete threat to the ‘West’, and that terrorism studies as a whole is built upon assumptions founded in a long tradition of cultural stereotypes and orientalism (Jackson, 2007). The consequences of such assumptions are according to Jackson the demonization of “terror-groups”, which implicates and entitles the use of tough counter-terrorism efforts. Across Europe it is possible to identify such implementation of tougher legislation to combat terrorism, in France the state of emergency which was implemented following the attacks in Paris in 2015 remain two years past the attacks and the French state has received criticism from human rights organizations and scholars for their actions under the state of emergency (Amnesty, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016: Agambe, 2015). The United Kingdom has also implemented ‘tough’ legislation, entitling the state the legal ability to remove citizenship of suspected terrorists, including citizens that only retain a British citizenship, rendering in the convicted becoming stateless. The implementation of tougher counter-terrorism legislation result in “clash of civilizations” according to Stefano Bonino at the University of Northumbria in which the progressive, liberal democratic United Kingdom is positioned against the perceived regressive values of Islam (Bonino, 2016: 238). The positioning of the ‘democratic’, ‘dominant’, ‘rational’ West (Shepard, 2008: 223; Kundnani, 2014: 180) versus the ‘barbaric’, ‘irrational’, ‘violent’ Islam (Edmunds, 2011: 82; Mullin, 2011: 267; Bleich, 2009: 362) may be found throughout international discourse research regarding violent Islamic
extremism and terrorism. The positioning of the threat and the threatened may also be identified within the construction of the *active threat* by the Swedish experts.

Although specific reports from Swedish experts such as the MSB report regarding the Muslim Brotherhood deem democracy and Islam as incompatible, the overarching theme within the experts discourse is that a lack of fulfilling democratic needs may be a factor in the radicalization of the passive subject into the active threat. As the National Coordinator states: “*Efforts to strengthen democracy also aim to prevent the ideological, political and religious assumptions that legitimize violence as a political method to change society*” (SOU 2016:92, 67). Hence, the efforts to strengthen democracy, that be to increase democratic participation or combat segregation and alienation, democracy as implied by the experts is to be seen as a positive factor in preventing extremism. Thus, Islam and democracy are not outright portrayed as incompatible by the National Coordinator.

Academics such as Kundnani and Cavanaugh demonstrate how Islam, in both the West and abroad has been prescribed as incompatible with democracy. Kundnani describes how from a culturalist logic of reasoning Muslims have historically not been able to produce an acceptable form of democracy, with attempts of democratization resulting in either war or autocracy, and due to this failure all Muslims are deemed suspicious and Muslim extremists are deemed dangerous (Kundnani, 2014: 137ff). Cavanaugh on the other hand argues that the myth of religious violence acts as the differentiator between the religious Muslim and the rational secular (democratic) Westerner (Cavanaugh, 2009: 198). Although not all of the Swedish experts construct such an image of incompatibility there are undertones indicating a chafing relation in the shape of political Islam – Islamism – and democracy. These describe violent Islamic extremism as a means for a change in social order such as by the National Coordinator but more so as presented by CATS in their description of Islamism as opponents of democracy are “*pleading for a religious enforcement of social order*” (Gustafsson, 2015: 8). However, most similar to such arguments of incompatibility is MSB as they declare that the Muslim Brotherhood is “*democratically destructive*” and that “*the Muslim brotherhood advocates in other terms an “integration model” [authors citation marks] that aims to split society*” (Norell et.al. 2016: 26). In all, the National Coordinator and Segerstedt Institute differ

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in their presentation of Islam and democracy as compatible, along with CATS more
diluted stance. However, the attachment of stereotyping labels to Islam and Muslims
as a whole is present in the expert’s presentation. Yet the distinction of the passive
victim from the active threat does illuminate an aspect overlooked in the previous
research presented.

Discursive studies regarding international terrorism studies have predominantly
focused upon the securitization and congregation of Islam and terrorism under the
same umbrella (Jackson, 2007; Mullin, 2011; Kundnani, 2014; Bleich, 2009). Yet
nevertheless, although these studies illuminate the clustering of a religion with
violence they often tend to surpass the initial labels which are related to violence and
religion. By this I mean that previous research has yet to look at the non-violent
aspects associated with the radicalization process as it is defined. One study that has
looked beyond such securitized aspects is June Edmunds “The new barbarians”.
Edmunds argues that Muslims have due to the emergence of the assumption of Islam
being inherently violent garnered the role as the current other in the public discourse.
Furthermore, governments are viewing Muslims by their religion first, and citizenship
second (Edmunds, 2011: 74). Edmunds findings highlight the difficulty in the
differentiation between regular Muslims, which may include non-believers included
due to their assumed cultural or ethnic background, and those individuals or groups
presenting a threat to greater society. The Rosengård report by CATS falls in under
such a categorization as Ranstorp and Dos Santos prescribe the local population as
particularly susceptible to radicalization in comparison with the rest of Swedish
society. Although there are discrepancies within the Swedish discourse and within the
international discourse, if even possible to gather previous research under such a
discursive formation, there is a specific prescribed association between Muslims and
violent extremism amongst experts. Isolating Muslims as a single unit, vulnerable and
susceptible to being drawn into violence and which is consequently directed towards
the West.

In all, although there are variations within Swedish discourse it is possible to identify
how Muslims as a constructed unity are associated with particular labels, and are
deemed susceptible to radicalization due to their position as ‘immigrants’, ‘alienated’,
‘international’, ‘anti-/ undemocratic’. In doing so, the connection between the passive
victim, the active threat, and the terrorist is constructed as universally applicable to Muslims. Thus, being a Muslim and/or immigrant in a social-economical exposed area is connected to the risk of being drawn into violent extremism and eventually terrorism. Also, the threats towards Muslims in Swedish society are disregarded by some of the experts, particularly MSB as Norell et.al. in their report use scare quotes around the term *islamofobia* [“islamofobi”], a tactic used to employ doubt over words or ideas within the mark (Trask, 1997). In all, Muslims as a perceived unity are in a Swedish context particularly associated with anti-democratic behavior and violent extremism resembling the findings of previous international studies by the likes of Kundani, Jackson, Edmunds etc. Next I will look at the legitimization process of experts in the context of international research.

5.2 The Swedish Experts and the knowledge on violent extremism and terrorism
As I have tried to highlight, the legitimization, and most often the emergence, of terrorism experts in Sweden is enabled through the Swedish government. As research by the likes of Stampnitzky, Ditrych, and Jackson has highlighted, internationally the connection between state and the scientific field has resulted in a failed pursuit of practical, actionable knowledge (Jackson, 2015: 46). The main goal of expert research has thereby been to rationalize government and social policy (Stampnitzyk, 2013: 203), predominantly through the presentation of today being an extraordinary time, thereby legitimizing the politics of extraordinary responses (Ditrych, 2014: 3). Marc Sageman adds another dimension to the debate as he argues that there is a stagnation in terrorism research due to a lack of sources and effort to establish standards of academic excellence (Sageman, 2014: 572). According to the former CIA-operations officer and Harvard alumni the emergence of experts has come through “politically motivated layman” and “self-proclaimed media experts” who debate new findings in the media rather than academically (2014:566). As has already been presented, the Segerstedt institute is the most vocal of the experts in their critique towards contemporary ‘security discourse’ research on violent extremism, and more specifically how Ranstorp and Norell participate in the construction of such a discourse. Herz statements mirrors the arguments by Sageman, along with that of Kundnani, Jackson, and Edmunds in which Swedish experts are clustering Islam with perceived Muslims and thereafter terrorism and violence. As such, the emergence of
terrorism experts in Sweden resembles the emergence of expert in other Western states. An emergence heavily dependent on the state as a legitimizer in which research is mostly conducted within governments and the relation between research and government communities are affected by the structure of funding and exaggerated security concerns (Sageman, 2014: 573). The experts are competing for not only government funding and legitimization, but more importantly for the role of designator when it comes to violent Islamic extremism. A key component in the legitimization and designation processes is that of differentiating what is deemed as correct and incorrect. We have in the previous international research seen how the differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate violence acts as the separation between state and extremist. However, there is also the aspect of the government and its agencies defining what is to be deemed as correct and incorrect interpretations of Islam (Kundnani, 2007: 54) and actors attempts to address the ‘misguided’ interpretations of Islam (Sageman, 2014: 569). This returns us once again to an important divide within the discourse, that of security (active threat) contra social (passive victim). Although the experts tie the two together in the process of radicalization the two themes focus upon different elements. MSB and CATS as I have mentioned tend to focus upon the negative aspects of religion, as in Gustafsson study of violent Islamic extremism in social media in which he states that:

“Within these profiles [Facebook] and groups it is possible to find a number of motives and reasons why someone would sympathize with violent Islamic ideologies and movements, as well as reasons for why someone would travel to Syria to join ISIS. Several factors circle and overlap: humanitarian, religious and ideological motives together with martyrdom, adventure, violence, weapons and community” (Gustafsson, 2015: 43)

The connection between the passive victim and the active threat is present in Gustafsson’s factors, which he argues are combined with an anti-west sediment. Gustafsson’s factors resemble the findings and arguments of the Rosengård report and MSB’s report regarding the Muslim brotherhood. What these three have in common is that they unlike Kundnani’s theory do not focus upon determining correct interpretations of Islam, but rather attempt to illuminate how to address misguided interpretations which are deemed to be a direct threat to the ‘West’, once again returning the discussion to a securitized debate. The expert do as such not attempt to describe a correct version of Islam, however to argue that the binary positioning of
Islam and the democratic West indicates that the experts do not believe in a compatible version of Islam is to stretch the analysis to far. Nevertheless, Ranstorp and Dos Santos statement: “the need for repeated introduction for newly arrived immigrants” and that we “must dare to discuss values” (Ranstorp and Dos Santos, 2009:20) highlights that without the implementation of ‘western values’ on new Swedes they run the risk of radicalizing and drawn into extremist movements. The experts are as such not only acting as legitimate producers of knowledge regarding violent extremism, but also of what is to be deemed as Swedish, and Western values. Such arguments may be compared to the culturalist perspective presented by Hörnqvist and Flyghed (2015), which assume that individuals are prisoners of their culture (2015: 327). Such a cultural clustering is according to Hörnqvist and Flyghed problematic as it forces Muslim communities to associate themselves with the government’s efforts against terrorism (2015: 331). The reports by MSB and CATS along with the example by Hörnqvist and Flyghed highlight how the discursively constructed relation between the passive victim, the active threat, the terrorist, and society not only clusters the complex and diverse set of groups that are deemed as ‘Muslim’, but also how the experts act as the delimiters of what is deemed as correct, and incorrect behavior, and who is to be deemed as a threat.

The emergence in conjunction with the Swedish government highlights the states role in the legitimization of knowledge. The implications of this type of analysis leads to the questioning of the epistemological foundation for the emergence of experts and the ontological foundation of the subject studied. Not only is the state a key actor regarding the emergence of new knowledge, more so, the findings regarding the construction of Islam and terrorism/extremism in a Swedish context highlight how the two are constructed as intertwined. As reports such as those by Norell et.al. and Ranstorp and Dos Santos seek to implement definitions such as Islamist to explain the political and thereby, as I have presented, assumed radical wings of Islam, the lines between ordinary and radical Islam and Muslims are being diluted leading to development of collective punishment for the perceived homogenic group (Kundani, 2007:43) in times of which increasingly derogative leeway is being given to counter-terrorism and preventative efforts against violent extremism.
6.0 Conclusion
In this chapter the analysis, findings, and discussion will be summarized and re-connected to the research question.

6.1 Analytical summary and research question

- How is it possible to understand the epistemological and ontological assumptions of expert knowledge regarding violent Islamic extremism in Sweden produced within the discourse?

In all, by analyzing reports from Swedish experts regarding violent extremism it is possible to identify, despite the many internal discrepancies, how the experts construct two themes regarding the violent Islamic extremist, that of the passive victim and the active threat. Amongst the aforementioned discrepancies is the connection of Islam and Muslims to violent extremism and terrorism, all experts do ascribe a particular notion of vulnerability amongst the group in regards to the susceptibility to radicalization and violent extremism. In turn, exceptionally associating violent extremism and terrorism with Islam and Muslims. The assumptions are to be understood as products of knowledge deriving from the experts in conjunction with the Swedish government. Sharing resemblance with the previous international research presented as part of this thesis, the Swedish experts emergence and credibility is heavily linked with the Swedish state, as it is the Swedish government that initiates, funds, or is responsible for the centers of expertise. The experts are as such part of a limited epistemological community and act accordingly along with the Swedish government as delimiters of not only the emergence of experts within the field, but also in the discursive rule formation of what is deemed as related to the field of terrorism studies and what is not. Therefore, the connection between Islam and terrorism by the elite experts, despite their internal discrepancies, indicates that the two are inherently clustered and inter-dependent. Not necessarily in the sense as Islam and terrorism, but more so in the thematic differentiation of the passive victim, who is susceptible to the particular nature of their environment which is tainted by ‘alienation’, ‘segregation’, along with extremist influences, and the ‘anti [un]- democratic’, ‘manipulative’, ‘jihadi’, ‘terrorist’ active threat.
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