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FRITHIOF RUNDGREN

Contents

Demotische Ostraka. Varia III

STEN V. WÅNGSTEDT

Die hier veröffentlichten zweiundzwanzig demotischen Ostraka sind in Bezug auf den Inhalt sehr anderartig. Von den aus verschiedenen Kollektionen kommenden Ostraka sind acht aus der Sammlung des British Museum (DO BM), fünf sind im Besitze des Victoriamuseums zu Uppsala. Vier Ostraka gehören zu der Sammlung der Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin und drei zu dem Ostrakabestand des Kunsthistorischen Museums in Wien (KhM). Zwei sind aus der ehemaligen Sammlung des Herausgebers (DO W).[1]

Die vier ersten Dokumente sind Steuerquittungen über Geldzahlung verschiedener Art.

DO BM 5724 (I) ist eine thebanische Quittung über nicht spezifizierte Steuer (τέλος) vom Jahr 260/59 v. Chr.

DO Uppsala 1307 (II) ist eine vom 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr. datierende Haussteuerquittung aus Theben.

DO BM 20279 (III), eine Bescheinigung über Biersteuer datiert ebenso vom 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Der Herkunftsort lässt sich nicht mit völliger Sicherheit feststellen.

DO Uppsala 612 (IV) ist der untere Teil einer von der Regierungszeit des Kaisers Claudius datierenden Steuerquittung aus Theben.

DO Uppsala 1027 (V) ist eine thebanische Privatquittung, welche über eine Geldtransaktion erzählt. Das Datierungsjahr ist wahrscheinlich 264/63 v. Chr.

DO Berlin P 14955 (VI), eine thebanische Quittung vom Jahr 131 v. Chr. erzählt von einer für Brotbereitung bestimmten Weizenlieferung.

DO BM 19509 (VII) ist ein Brief von spätptolemäischer oder frührömischer Zeit, welcher von dem Vorsteher des Hauptspeichers in Theben und die Priester eines Dorftempels gesandt war, mit der Aufforderung dem Tempelverwalter und einem Propheten Weizen auszuhändigen.

DO Berlin P 6165 (VIII) ist, der Abfassung nach, eine Bekanntmachung über den Einhalt (?) restierender Geldbeträge. Der Herkunftsort des Dokumentes ist unbekannt, so auch das Datierungsjahr. Paläographisch ist römische Zeit am wahrscheinlichsten.

In DO BM 25765 (IX), eine thebanische Urkunde aus frühptolemäischer Zeit, handelt es sich um eine Bargeldeinzahlung, welche eine Brüderschaft für das Alter gemacht hat.

Die folgenden sieben Ostraka (X–XVI) sind als „Abrechnungen" rubriziert.

DO W 175 (X) ist ein Tableau über die Tagesration von Wein, welche Funktionären eines Bastet-Tempels erhalten haben. Zeitlich ist das Dokument ptolemäisch. Der Herkunftsort ist unbekannt.

DO Uppsala 667 (XI) ist als Abrechnung über Wein bezeichnet. Betreffs der Abfassung des Textes könnte, da drei von den vier Grundrechnungsarten

I. DO BM 5724

angewandt sind, vielleicht die Bezeichnung ,,Rechenübung`` zutreffender sein. Der Herkunftsort is Theben. Die Datierung ist unsicher.

DO KhM 5997 (XII) ist eine Abrechnung über Ausgaben in Bargeld, welche den Göttern und den Priestern eines Tempels zugeteilt worden sind. Zeitlich ist die Abrechnung wahrscheinlich römisch. Der Fundort ist unbekannt.

DO KhM 6000 (XIII), eine Abrechnung über Gänse, ist aus ptolemäischer Zeit. Der Herkunftsort ist unbekannt. Der Inhalt des Textes ist schwer zu erklären.

DO W 70 (XIV), ein Verzeichnis über Weihrauchlampen, ist thebanisch und wahrscheinlich vom Jahr 6/5 v. Chr.

DO BM 23364 (XV), eine Abrechnung über Bargeld, ist römisch. Der Herkunftsort ist unbekannt.

DO Uppsala 895 A (XVI) ist in Bezug auf die Art der Abrechnung schwer zu klassifizieren. Zeilich ist sie wahrscheinlich ptolemäisch, und der Herkunftsort kann Theben sein.

DO BM 43597 (XVII) ist eine ptolemäische Flachs-Saat (?)-Quittung aus Theben.

DO Berlin P 6497 (XVIII) ist eine thebanische und zeitlich römische Bescheinigung über Verkauf von Weizen.

DO BM 31550 (XIX) ist eine spätptolemäische Quittung über Strohlieferung. Der Herkunftsort ist Theben.

In DO BM 41258 (XX) handelt es sich um Lieferungen von Gartenerzeugnisse. Die Urkunde – aus Theben – ist zeitlich römisch.

DO KhM 6006 (XXI) ist wahrscheinlich eine Namenliste, welche von ptolemäischer Zeit datiert. Der Herkunftsort ist unbekannt.

DO Berlin P 12264 (XXII) ist möglicherweise eine Schulübung. Der Herkunftsort ist unbekannt, und die Datierung ist unsicher.

Quittung über Steuer

I. DO BM 5784. Grösse: 10,3×6.7 cm. Theben. Jahr 260/59 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Pa-nȝ sȝ P̍ȝ-ḫl-Ḥnsw n pȝ tnj ḥt-ḳt 5*
2. *sḫ Ỉmn-ḥtp sȝ Ḥrj n ḥȝ.t-sp 26* (supra lin.) *ỉbt*-[. . .] ⟨*sw*⟩ 12

II. DO Uppsala 1307

Übersetzung

1. Pana, Sohn des Pkhelchons, für die Steuer 5 Silber-Kite.
2. Es hat geschrieben Amenhotep, Sohn des Herieu, im Jahr 26 (supra lin.) am
   12. [...].

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Pana (S. des Pkhelchons) kann mit dem Choachyten desselben Namens, der in zahlreichen Bescheinigungen über Begräbnissteuer erscheint identisch sein, und während der bisher festgestellten Zeitperiode, 265/64–250/49 v. Chr., in diesem Beruf tätig war (Vgl. OrSu 23–24, 1976, S. 8ff., Nr. I–XIV.). – *n pȝ tnj* „für die Steuer". Die Präposition *n* und der best. Artikel sind, wenn die Transkription korrekt ist, zusammengeschrieben.

  Z. 2. Der Schreiber Amenhotep (S. des Herieu) ist mir nur aus diesem Ostrakon bekannt. – Jahr 26 = Ptolemaios II. Philadelphos 26 (= Jahr 260/59 v. Chr.)

Quittung über Haussteuer

II. DO Uppsala 1307. Grösse: 9×6,5 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *in Pȝ-rmt-mm sȝ Pȝ-tj-Ỉmn ḥt-ḳt 1/2 ⟨n⟩*
2. *ḥt ꞉ᶜ.wj꞉ ⟨n⟩ Nw.t n ḥȝ.t-sp 16 tpj šm (?) [...]*
3. *sḫ Pȝ-tj-Wsỉr sȝ Pȝ-šr-Mn*

Übersetzung

1. Es hat bezahlt *Pȝ-rmt-mm*, Sohn des Peteamun, 1/2 Silberkite (als)
2. Haussteuer (in) Theben im Jahr 16, am ... Pachons (?).
3. Es hat geschrieben Peteusire, Sohn des Pshenmin.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Als Anfangszeichen erwartet man hier *in* (Term. techn. für „bezahlen"). Das Wort erscheint in einer sehr sonderbaren Form, welche mit der schlechten

III. DO BM 20279

Qualität der Scherbe zusammenhängt. Die Tinte is ausgeflossen, weshalb die Identifizierung des Zeichens beim ersten Anblick nicht gegeben ist. – Zu dem Namen *P3-rmt-mm* vgl. Thompson, Theban Ostraca, Part. 2, D 82/1 und Ursula Kaplony-Heckel, Die demotischen Tempeleide, 1/3; vgl. auch Pap. British Museum 1201 v/16 (Recueil de travaux etc, Vol. 31, Taf. 5.).

Z. 2. *ḥt* ⟨*n*⟩ *ꜥ.wj* ,,Haussteuer''. Die Kontur der verschiedenen Zeichen ist wegen der ausgeflossenen Tinte sehr schwer zu unterscheiden. – Zu dieser Steuer vgl. Wångstedt, Ausgewählte demotische Ostraka, Nr. 28 und S. 36:6. Ausser der vorliegenden Quittung sind m. W. nur drei veröffentlicht worden Wångstedt, a. A.; OrSu X, 1962, S. 14, Nr. II und Mattha, Demotic Ostraka, Nr. 24. Alle datieren vom III. oder II. Jahrhundert v. Chr. – Jahr 16 kann entweder Ptolemaios II. Philadelphos 16 (= Jahr 270/69 v. Chr.) oder Ptolemaios III. Euergetes 16 (= Jahr 232/31 v. Chr.) sein.

Quittung über Biersteuer

III. DO BM 20279. Grösse: 8×7,2 cm. Oberägypten. 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *T3-s.t ḳt 1 n* ⟨*ḥt*⟩ *ḥnk*
2. ⟨*n*⟩ *ỉbt-2 pr sḫ Pa-Ḥmn*
3. *ỉbt-3 šm* ⟨*sw*⟩ *10*

Übersetzung

1. Teset 1 (Silber)-Kite als Bier(-Steuer)
2. (für) Mechir. Es hat geschrieben Pakhnum
3. am 10. Epiphe.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Der Schreibung nach ist der Name *Ta-s(.t)*, Taset, (wörtl. ,,Die des Platzes'') zu lesen. Der Name ist m. W. in bisher veröffentlichten Ostraka-texten nicht früher belegt. Er kommt aber in dem vom Jahre 45 n. Chr. datierenden Pap Berlin P 6857+30039/2 vor. (Vgl. Zauzich, Enchoria IV, S. 71.) – Der kleine

IV. DO Uppsala 612

Punkt nach *n* kann eine nachlässige Schreibung für *ḥt* ,,Silber`` sein (vgl. Erichsen, Demot. Glossar, S. 333, Früh.). – *ḥnk* ,,Bier``. Über diese Steuer vgl. Mattha, Demotic Ostraka, S. 56: (42).

Z. 2. Eine sichere Ortsbestimmung kann ich nicht geben. Der Name des Schreibers kann freilich auf Elephantine deuten, aber der Schreiber kann auch in Theben tätig gewesen sein. – Die Angabe des Jahres der Einzahlung mangelt. Paläographisch scheint mir 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr. am nächsten zu liegen.

Steuerquittung

IV. DO Uppsala 612. Grösse: 8,8×8 cm. Theben. Römische Zeit (Claudius).

Transkription

x+1. [. . .]*n* . . . [. . .]
2. [. . .] *n Tjbr*[*js*]
3. [*Glw*]⌐*t*⌐*js Gᵉsrs*
4. [*Sb*]*sts Grmnjk*
5. [*3w*]*tgrtwrs tpj pr sw 15*
6. πτολεμα[. . .]

Übersetzung

x+1. [. . .] . . . [. . .]
2. [. . .] des Tiber[ius]
3. [Claud]ius Cäsar
4. [Augu]stus, Germanicus
5. [Au]tokrator, am 15. Tybe.
6. Ptolema[ios]

Bemerkung

Die Art der Quittung ist nicht möglich festzustellen, aber dass es sich um eine in Geld erlegte Steuer handeln dürfte ist m. E. nicht unwahrscheinlich.

V. DO Uppsala 1027

Quittung über Geld

V. DO Uppsala 1027. Grösse: 7,5×5 cm. Theben. Wahrscheinlich 264/63 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. . . . -*Ỉmn sȝ Pa-Ḥr pȝ ntj ḏd* ⟨*n*⟩ *Pa-Ḫnm sȝ* ⌈*Pa-tȝ.wj*⌉
2. ⌈*tw=k n=j*⌉ *ḥt-ḳt 1 r sttr 1/2 r ḥt-ḳt 1* ⌐*n ḥn ḥt 1/2 ntj ỉw.ỉr=k n=j*
3. ⟨*n*⟩ *Pa-br sȝ sp-2 ḥt-sp-2 5 ḥn ḥt 1/2 ntj ỉw.ỉr=k n=j n*
4. *Pa-br sȝ sp-2 šp=j s n t.t=k sḫ Tḥwtj-ỉw* (?) ⟨*sȝ*⟩ *Pa-tȝ.wj*
5. *r ḥrw=f n ḥȝ.t-sp 22 ỉbt-2 pr sw 8*

Übersetzung

1. . . .-Amun, Sohn des Pahor, ist es, der sagt (zu) Pakhnum, dem Sohn des Patou:
2. ,,Du hast mir gegeben 1 Silberkite, macht 1/2 Stater, macht 1 Silberkite wiederum, von 1/2 Silberling, den du mir gegeben hast
3. für Pebel, den Sohn des Pebel. Macht 5 (Silberkite) von echter Silber, von 1/2 Silberling, welche du mir gegeben hast für
4. Pebel, den Sohn des Pebel. Ich habe es von dir empfangen." Es hat geschrieben Thetheu (?), (Sohn) des Patou,
5. auf sein Geheiss im Jahr 22, am 8. Mechir

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Von dem ersten Namen sind die Endzeichen deutlich sichtbar, und können *Ỉmn*, Amun, transkribiert werden. Der Anfang ist wegen der verblassten Schrift dagegen schwerer mit sicherheit zu identifizieren. Es kann *nḥt.t* sein, und der Name so *Nḥt.t-Ỉmn*, Nechtamun. Die erhaltenen Zeichenspuren zeigen indessen, dass die Rekonstruktion als fraglich betrachtet werden muss.

Z. 4. *Tḥwtj-ỉw* (?), Thetheu (?). Was die Lesung unsicher macht ist die Schreibung des Wortes *ỉw* ,,kommen". Vgl. Erichsen, Demot. Glossar, S. 20, wo jedoch keine ähnliche Form verzeichnet ist. Die alternative Lesung *Tḥwtj-ỉ.ỉr-*

VI. DO Berlin P 14955

tj=s Thothartais, ist auch nicht sicher. Das Götterdeterminativ in *Tḥwtj-ỉw* ist im solchem Falle das Zeichen *s3* „Sohn", das im übrigen hier vorkommenden Fällen die übliche (kurze) Form hat.

Quittung über Weizen
VI. DO Berlin P 14955. Grösse: 11×8,3 cm. Theben. Jahr 131 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *ḥȝ.t-sp 39 ỉbt-3 šm ⟨sw⟩ 2 tw Tḥwtj-ỉ.ỉr-tj=s s3 Ỉmn-ḥtp*
2. *ḥn pȝ šm n ḥȝ.t-sp 39 rtb ⟨n⟩ sw 11 1/6 r sw 5 1/2 1/12*
3. *r sw 11 1/6 ꜥn mtw=f ỉw ỉr=w n ꜥḳ wbȝ* ～ɔ꜀₊)ꜧ
4. *st šp ⟨n⟩ ỉp sẖ Pȝ-tj-Ỉmn-ỉpj*

Übersetzung

1. Im Jahr 39, am 2. Epiphe hat Thothartais, Sohn des Amenhotep, gegeben
2. aus der Ernte des Jahres 39 11 1/6 Artaben Weizen, ihre Hälfte macht 5 1/2 1/12 (Artaben) Weizen,
3. macht 11 1/6 (Artaben) Weizen wiederum, und er wird sie zu Brot machen für ～ɔ꜀₊)ꜧ [2]
4. Sie sind gutgeschrieben. Es hat geschrieben Peteamenope.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Jahr 39 is Ptolemaios VIII. Euergetes II. 39 (= Jahr 131 v. Chr.).

Z. 2–3. Der Abfassung des Textes nach ist das Wort *šm* kaum in der Bedeutung „Ernteabgabe" zu fassen, sondern *šm* zielt hier auf die Ernte des betreffenden Jahres ab, von welcher 11 1/6 Artaben für Brotbereitung aufgemesst worden sind, und die Bereitung soll Thothartais selbst besorgen. Doch können 11 1/6 Artaben ein Teil Thothartais' Ernteabgabe sein, welcher – ohne an den Staatlichen Speicher geliefert zu sein – ihm gutgeschrieben worden ist. In Solchem Falle ist der Weizen von der Tenne an seinen eigenen Speicher transportiert worden. – Das Zeichen ╱ *r* „macht" ist mit dem Bruch 1/6 und dem nachfolgenden *sw*

VII. DO BM 19509

„Weizen" zusammengeschrieben. – Die Schreibung des Bruches 1/12 is sonder-
bar. Die Deutung der nach *wbꜣ* „*für*" folgenden Zeichengruppe ist wegen der
Schreibung des letzten Wortes unsicher.

Brief

VII. DO BM 19509. Grösse: 9×6,5 cm. Theben. Spätptolemäische oder Frührö-
mische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *ἰ.ir-ḥr nꜣ wᶜb.w ntj ḥn Pꜣj-g[r]j* (?)
2. *mj tw=w rtb ⟨n⟩ sw 5 n tꜣ ἰpj(.t) ⟨n⟩ ḥ.t-ntr*
3. *⟨n⟩ Pꜣ-tj-Ìs pꜣ rt ḥnᶜ Pꜣ-tj-Wsìr pꜣ ḥm-ntr*
4. *ìw=w šp n=n n ìp*
5. *sḫ Nḫt.ṯ-Mnṯ* (?) *sꜣ* ...
6. *n ḥꜣ.t-sp 11 ἰbt-2 šm ⟨sw⟩ 27*
7. *sḫ ᶜnḫ-Ḥᶜpj sꜣ [Wn]-nfr* (?)
8. *sḫ Mnṯ-ḥtp*

Übersetzung

1. An die Priester, welche in *Pꜣj-g[r]j* (?) sind.
2. „Möge man geben 5 Artaben Weizen mit dem Mass des Tempels
3. (dem) Petese, dem Verwalter, und (dem) Peteusire, dem Propheten,
4. indem man bei uns quittiert hat."
5. Es hat geschrieben Nechtmonth (?), Sohn des ...
6. im Jahr 11, am 27. Mechir.
7. Es hat geschrieben Enchhapi, Sohn des [Wen]nofre (?).
8. Es hat geschrieben Monthhotep.

Bemerkungen

Z.1. Pꜣj-g[r]j (?) Ortsname in der Thebais (Erichsen, Demot. Glossar, S. 130). In
dem vorliegenden Dokument ist der Name, der Schreibung nach, *Pꜣj-gj* (oder *Pꜣj-*

VIII. DO Berlin P 6165

ḳj) zu transkribieren. Die Auslassung des *r*-Zeichens könnte ein Übersehen des Schreibers sein.

Z. 3. *P₃-tj-Wsir p₃ ḥm-ntr*, Peteusire, der Prophet. Die Schreibung, etwas nachlässig, lässt m. E. keine andere Deutung zu.

Z. 4. *n=n* „bei uns". Zur Schreibung vgl. Erichsen, Demot. Glossar, S. 197. Die Formulierung *iw=w šp n=n ip* „ indem man bei uns quittiert hat" deutet darauf hin, dass die Quittierung in dem (Haupt)-Speicher in Theben stattgefunden hat.

Z. 5. *Nḫt.t-Mnṱ* (?), Nechtmonth (?). Zur ähnlichen Schreibung des Wortes *nḫt.t* vgl. DO BM 5775/2 (OrSu 23–24: VII). – Das Datierungsjahr 11 kann entweder Ptolemaios XII. (Auletes) 11 (= Jahr 70/71 v. Chr.) oder – wenn römisch – Cäsar Augustus 11 (= Jahr 20/19 v. Chr.) sein.

Inkassobeleg
VIII. DO Berlin P 6165. Grösse: 9,8×8 cm. Oberägypten. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *p₃ š⁽t ḫn ḥt.w* (?)
2. *P₃-lw s₃ Pa-sw ḥt 5 r p₃j=f sp*
3. *Pa-Wn s₃ P₃-tj-Mnṱ n p₃ ⁽.wj n P₃-hb*
4. *p₃ rḫ.t ḥt 5 p₃j=f sp*
5. *r ḥt 10 iw=w r.ir=w n mn tj*

Übersetzung

1. Der Fehlbetrag(?) von Geld(?).
2. Pelu, Sohn des *Pa-sw*, 5 Silberlinge, macht sein Rest.
3. Pauon, Sohn des Petemonth, für das Haus des Phib,

IX. DO BM 25765

4. des Wäschers, 5 Silberlinge, macht sein Rest.
5. Macht zusammen 10 Silberlinge. Man soll sie hier zum Verbleib lassen.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. p3 š‘t ḥn ḥt.w (?) ,,der Fehlbetrag von Geld (?)" Das Wort š‘t in der Bedeutung ,,Fehlbetrag" kann begründet sein, so auch die Bedeutung ,,Einhalt", welche nicht ganz ausgeschlossen ist. Die Aussage in Zeile 5 spricht jedenfalls nicht dagegen.

Z. 2. Pa-sw [wörtl. ,,Der (Diener) des Sternes"]. Dieser Name war mir bis heute unbekannt. – Das Wort sp ,,Rest", ,,Rückstand" erscheint hier in Gestalt zwei schräger Striche, sowie auch in Zeile 4.

Z. 3. Der Name Pa-Wn, Pauon, erscheint hier mit sowohl Götter- als Personendeterminativ, was ab und zu in Dokumenten der römischen Zeit vorkommt. – ‘.wj ,,Haus". Das Determinativ erscheint in einer sehr vereinfachten Schreibung. Der wagrechte Strich, welchen ich für n des Genitivs halte, kann auch zu dem Determinativ gehören. n des Genitivs vor dem Personennamen ist in solchem Falle zu ergänzen.

Altersversicherung

IX. DO BM 25765. Grösse: 8,5×7,5 cm Theben. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. ìn P3-wr s3 P3-šr-Mn ìrm n3j=f ìrj(.w)
2. [p3j=w] wṭ n t3 ìw.t ḥt 12 kt 5 r
3. ḥt(?) 6 kt 2 1/2 r ḥt(?) 12 kt 5 ‘n sḥ Ḥr-m-ḥb s3
4. Pa-Ìj-m-ḥtp n ḥ3.t-sp 33 ⌈ìbt-3⌉ pr ⟨sw⟩ 28

Übersetzung

1. Es hat bezahlt Peuer, Sohn des Pshenmin, und seine Genossen
2. [ihre] Zahlung für das Greisenalter 12 Silberlinge 5 (Silber)-Kite, ihre Hälfte macht

Vorderseite

Rückseite

X. DO W 175

3. 6 Silberlinge(?) 2 1/2 (Silber)-Kite, macht 12 Silberlinge 5 (Silber)-Kite wie-
derum. Es hat geschrieben Horemheb, Sohn
4. des Paimhotep, im Jahr 33, am 28. Phamenoth.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1–2. Die Wendung [*p3j=w*] *wṯ n t3 iw.t* ,,[ihre] Zahlung für das Greisenalter''
deutet darauf hin, dass es sich um eine Brüderschaft handelt, welche für das
betreffende Jahr, durch ihren Vertreter Peuer den Altersversicherungsbetrag,
erlegt hat. Ein Dokument dieser Art war mir früher nicht bekannt.

Z. 4. Das Dokument ist Jahr 33 datiert, und die Regenten, welche in Betracht
kommen können sind Ptolemaios VIII. Euergetes II. 33 (= Jahr 138/37 v. Chr.)
und Ptolemaios IX. Soter II. 33 (= Jahr 85/84 v. Chr.).

Abrechnung über Wein

X. DO W 175.[3] Grösse: 9,2×7,3 cm. Fundort unbekannt. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

Vorderseite
  1. *p3 wn ⟨n⟩ irp hn 20*
  2. *n3 imj.w(?) hn 4*
  3. *[p3] rt n3 ntr.w ⟨hn⟩ 7*

4. *P₃-išwr s₃ P₃-rr* ⟨*hn*⟩ 2
5. p₃ mr ḫ₃s.t (?) *hn 1*
6. *n₃ wᶜb.w* ⟨*n*⟩ *n₃ ḥjḳ.w* (?) ⟨*hn*⟩ 2

Rückseite

7. n₃ wn.w hn 2
8. Ḥr-Tḥwtj s₃ Wn-nfr ⟨hn⟩ 2
9. . . .
10. . . .

Übersetzung

Vorderseite

1. Der Anteil von Wein	20 Hin (-Mass).
2. Die Katzen (?)	4 Hin.
3. Der Vertreter der Götter	7 Hin.
4. *P₃-išwr*, Sohn des *P₃-rr*,	2 (Hin).
5. Der Nekropolenvorsteher(?)	1 (Hin).
6. Die Priester der Zaubereien(?)	2 (Hin).

Rückseite

7. Die Schreinöffner	2 Hin.
8. Harthoth, Sohn des Uennofre,	2 (Hin).
9. . . .	
10. . . .	

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Die Überschrift deutet darauf hin, dass die Abrechnung, in der Form eines Buchführungsauszuges über ausgehändigte Tagesrationen, in einem Tempelspeicher geschrieben worden ist. Die Empfänger des Weines sind fast durchgehend Priester verschiedenen Ranges.

Z. 2. n₃ ìmj.w (?) ,,die Katzen'' (?). Die Schreibung weicht von den üblichen ab, aber keine andere Lesung scheint mir zutreffend zu sein. Die Katze galt als Erscheinungsform der Göttin Bastet, und die Katzen ,,wurden in den Tempeln von Wärtern bedient und von Frommen gefüttert'' (Erman, Die Religion der Egypter, S. 333). Es liegt deswegen nahe anzunehmen, dass es sich um einen Tempel handelt, in welchem Bastet verehrt wurde.

Z. 3. Der Titel *rt* ⟨*n*⟩ *n₃ nṭr.w* ,,Vertreter der Götter'' sowie die Grösse der Weinquantität zeigen, dass er Vorsteher des Tempels war.

Z. 4. P₃-išwr, Der Syrer. Seine Funktion ist nicht angegeben. Wenn er Wärter sein sollte gehörte er der Priesterschaft des Tempels als ,,Priester des (Katzen)-Stalles'' (Vgl. Bonnet, Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte, S. 818). Oder ist *P₃-išwr* sowie *Ḥr-Tḥwtj* (Z. 8) der Vertreter eines Kult-Vereins von Katzenverehrer? – *P₃-rr*, Der Schwein. Zur Schreibung vgl. Lüddeckens Demotisches Namenbuch, Bd. I, Lief. 3, S. 198. Das Determinativ mangelt hier, wahrscheinlich des begränzten Raumes wegen.

Z. 5. mr ḫ₃s.t ,,Nekropolenvorsteher''. Wenn die Deutung stimmt – die Schrei-

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bung ist unklar – ist die Nekropole wahrscheinlich für Katzen. Als Vorsteher ist seine Weinration auffallend klein.

Z. 6. n₃ wᶜb.w ⟨n⟩ n₃ ḫjḳ.w ,,die Priester der Zaubereien". Zu dem Titel ,,Priester des Hike" vgl. Bonnet. a. A., S. 877 und s.v. Hike. Zur Schreibung des Wortes *ḫjḳ* ,,Zauberei" vgl. Erichsen, Demot. Glossar, S. 333. Auch hier ist das Determinativ wegen des begränzten Raumes ausgelassen. Die Zaubereien sollten die Katzen gegen Unheil schützen und die kranken und beschädigten Katzen heilen (Vgl. Roeder, Urkunden zur Religion der alten Aegypter, S. 84 und S. 93).

Z. 8. Ḥr-Tḥwtj, Harthoth. Zur Schreibung des Namens *Tḥwtj*, Thoth, vgl. Miriam Lichtheim, Demotic Ostraca from Medinet Habu, 129/1 und Ursula Kaplony-Heckel, Die demotischen Tempeleide der Berliner Papyrussammlung, S. 134, Nr. 1/3 (Forschungen und Berichte, Bd. 6, 1968).

Von den zwei letzten Textzeilen sind nur schwache Zeichenreste sichtbar. Betreffs der Datierung dürfte das Dokument (paläographisch) frühptolemäisch sein.

Abrechnung über Wein

XI. DO Uppsala 667. Grösse: 7,8×7,3 cm. Theben. Ptolemäische Zeit (?).

Transkription

1. [...]⁴
2. [...] ... *50 r ìrp 75 wp.t n m-s₃=w*
3. [...] *ḥn=w r ìrp 62* (sic) *m-s₃=w ìrp 63 wp.t p₃ 1/10 ìrp 5*
4. [...] *m-s₃=w ìrp 68 wp.t p₃ 1/4 ìrp 17*
5. [...] (?) *m-s₃=w ìrp 51 wp.t p₃ 1/4 n sḫ* (sic) *n₃ k₃m.w 12 1/2 1/4*
6. [...] (?) *m-s₃=w p₃ 1/2 r ḥn ìrp 2 r 14 1/2 1/4 sp n=f 60 1/4*
7. [...] (?) *wp.t p₃ ìsw mḥ-1 41 1/2 sp n=f 18 1/2 1/4 wp.t p₃ ìsw*
8. [...] (?) *mḥ-2 ìrp 8 m-s₃=w 10 1/2 1/4 wp.t n₃ sḫ.w ⟨n⟩ Ḏm₃ [7]*
9. [...] (?) *Ns-Ḫnsw 2 1/2 1/4 r 9 1/2 1/4 sp n=f ìrp [l]*

10. [. . .] (?) [*wn*ʾ [7] *ḥn*ᶜ (?) *ỉrp 1 tj sp 1/2 1/4 n n₃j=f* (sub lin.) *ḥn ỉrp* . . . (?)
11. [. . .] (?) . . .

Übersetzung

1. . . .
2. . . . . . . 50, macht 75 (Hin) Wein. Spezifikation: Bleibt übrig
3. 12 (Hin) Wein davon, macht 62 (sic) (Hin) Wein, bleibt übrig 63 (Hin) Wein. Spezifikation: Das Zehntel 5 (Hin) Wein.
4. . . ., bleibt übrig 68 (Hin) Wein. Spezifikation: Das Viertel 17 (Hin) Wein.
5. . . . (?), bleibt übrig 51 (Hin) Wein. Spezifikation: Das Viertel für den Schreiber (?) der Gärten 12 1/2 1/4 (Hin) Wein.
6. . . . (?), bleibt übrig die Hälfte, macht 2 Hin Wein, macht 14 1/2 1/4 (Hin) Wein, bleibt übrig für ihn 60 1/4 (Hin) Wein.
7. . . . (?). Spezifikation: Die erste Lieferung 41 1/2 (Hin) Wein, bleibt ihm übrig 18 1/2 1/4 (Hin) Wein. Spezifikation:
8. . . . (?). Die zweite Lieferung 8 (Hin) Wein, bleibt übrig 10 1/2 1/4 (Hin) Wein. Spezifikation: Die Schreiber in Djeme 7 (Hin) Wein,
9. . . . (?) Eschons 2 1/2 1/4 (Hin) Wein, macht 9 1/2 1/4 (Hin Wein), bleibt ihm übrig 1 (Hin) Wein.
10. . . . (?). Es sind [7]4 nebst 1 (Hin) Wein hier, bleibt übrig 1/2 1/4 (Hin) von seinem (sub lin.) . . . Hin Wein.
11. . . .(?)

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. Die zwei ersten Zeichengruppen (vor der Zahl 50) kann ich nicht deuten. – *wp.t* ,,Spezifikation". Das Zeichen ist zum Teil ausgetilgt, aber die erhaltenen Zeichenspuren lassen m. E. keine andere Lesung zu. – *n.m-s₃* ,,hinter". Die Schreibung (mit *n*) ist ungewöhnlich, vgl. aber Nims, JEA 24 (1938), S. 78. Der Ausdruck (*n*).*m-s₃=w* ist in der Bedeutung ,,bleibt übrig" zu fassen, so auch in allen hier vorkommenden Fällen.

Z. 3. Das erste Zeichen (über der Zeile) kann der erhaltene Teil der Zahl 12 sein. [Oder ist die Zeichenfolge . . . *ḥn 5 r ỉrp ḥn 2 m-s₃=w ỉrp ḥn 3* ,,. . . von 5 (Hin), macht 2 Hin Wein, bleibt übrig 3 Hin Wein"? Diese Transkription ist aber m. E. hier ausgeschlossen.] – *p₃ 1/10 ỉrp 5* ,,das Zehntel 5 (Hin) Wein" bezieht sich auf die in Zeile 2 angegebenen 50 Hin. Die Schreibung des Wortes *ỉrp* ,,Wein" ist sehr nachlässig, vielleicht des begränzten Raumes wegen.

Z. 4. Die Zahl 68 kann nur dadurch erklärt werden, dass das Zehntel der Zahl 50 hinzugelegt wird. – *p₃ 1/4 ỉrp 17* ,,das Viertel 17 (Hin) Wein", das ist der Viertel der Zahl 68.

Z. 5. *m-s₃=w 51* ,,bleibt übrig 51". Auch hier ist die Zahl 68 der Ausgangspunkt, welche minus 17 51 gibt. – *p₃ 1/4 n ⟨p₃⟩ (?) sḫ ⟨n⟩ n₃ k₃m.w 12 1/2 1/4* ,,das Viertel für den Schreiber(?) der Gärten 12 1/2 1/4 (Hin) Wein". Diese Quantität ist das Viertel der Zahl 51, und ist der Gehalt des Gärtenschreibers, oder was mir wahrscheinlicher scheint ,,der Gehalt der Schreiber der Gärten" (*n ⟨n₃⟩ sḫ(.w) ⟨n⟩ n₃ k₃m.w*).

Z. 6. Die notierten 60 1/4 Hin = 75 (Zeile 2) – 14 1/2 1/4.

Z. 7–8. Die 41 1/2 Hin der ersten Lieferung sollen von den obigen 60 1/4 Hin abgezogen werden um die Schluss-Summe 18 1/2 1/4 Hin erhalten, und der Rest 10 1/2 1/4 Hin wird erhalten wenn die 8 Hin der zweiten Lieferung von den 18 1/2 1/4 Hin abgezogen sind. – *nꜣ sḥ.w ⟨n⟩ Ḏmꜣ* „die Schreiber in Djeme". Von dem Pluralzeichen ist nur die untere Hälfte sichtbar. Es dürfte kein Zweifel darüber bestehen, dass es sich hier um Speicherschreiber handelt, welche den gelieferten Wein buchten. Der Gehalt (oder die Gebühr) der Schreiber ist 7 Hin, wie aus der Schluss-Summe in Zeile 9 hervorgeht.

Z. 9. Eschons hat 2 1/2 1/4 (Hin) Wein bekommen. Es bleibt ihm indessen 1 Hin übrig um die Schluss-Summe 10 1/2 1/4 (Zeile 8) zu geben.

Z. 10. Wegen des am Anfang fast ausgetilgten Textes ist die Entzifferung unsicher. Das oben erwähnte 1 Hin erscheint auch hier, aber der Rest 1/2 1/4 (Hin) kann ich nicht zufriedenstellend erklären.

Die Tabelle gibt die vorkommenden Rechenoperationen wieder.

Z.		Z.	
2.	$25+50 = 75$	6.	$2+12\ 1/2\ 1/4 = 14\ 1/2\ 1/4+60\ 1/4 = 75$
3.	$75-12 = 63$	7.	$60\ 1/4-41\ 1/2 = 18\ 1/2\ 1/4$
	$50:10 = 5$	8.	$18\ 1/2\ 1/4-8 = 10\ 1/2\ 1/4$; 7
4.	$5+63 = 68$	9.	$+2\ 1/2\ 1/4 = 9\ 1/2\ 1/4$ Rest 1
	$68:4 = 17$	10.	$64+1+(10\ 1/2\ 1/4) = 75\ 1/2\ 1/4$;
5.	$68-17 = 51$		Rest 1/2 1/4
	$51:4 = 12\ 1/2\ 1/4$		

Abrechnung über Tempelausgaben

XII. DO Wien KhM 5997. Grösse: 15,8×14 cm. Oberägypten. Wahrscheinlich römische Zeit.

Transkription

Vorderseite

1. *sw 20 34 + 36 r 70 wp.t nꜣ nṯr.w ⟨ḥt⟩ 1 ḳt ⸢4⸣ Pꜣ-bk ⸢6⸣*
2. *Pꜣ-ꜥꜥn 3 pꜣ ḥm-nṯr Ḥr 3 ⸢pꜣ⸣ ⸢mr-šn⸣ 3 ⸢pꜣ⸣ ⸢ḥm-nṯr⸣ ⸢n⸣ ⸢Mnṯ⸣ (?) ⸢7⸣*
3. *pꜣ hj n nꜣ wꜥb.w sw ꜥrḳj (?) Pa-rṯ ⸢sꜣ⸣ Ḥr 2 Pꜣ-šr-⸢Ìnp⸣ (?)*
4. *sꜣ Ìmn-ḥtp 1 ꜥnḫ-pꜣ-ḫrt.ṯ pꜣ ꜥꜣ n wꜥb ⸢ḳt⸣ ⸢7⸣ Ìn=f-Ḫnsw*
5. *sꜣ ꜥnḫ-pꜣ-ḫrt.ṯ ḳt 2 Ḥr sꜣ Ḫ=f-Ḫnsw ḳt 1 (?)*
6. *nꜣ wꜥb.w ntj ꜥḳ Ḥr sꜣ Pa-Mnṯ 1 ⸢Wn-nfr⸣ (?) sꜣ Nḫt.ṯ-nb=f 5*
7. *Ns-Mn sꜣ Ḫ=f-Ḫnsw ḳt 5 Pꜣ-ìwìw-Ḥr sꜣ Pꜣ-šr-Tḥwtj ḳt 5 ⸢...⸣ (?)*
8. *Klḏ sꜣ Ṯꜣj-ḏj (?) ḳt 5 r 34*
9. *30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30*
10. *... (?)*

Rückseite

11. *sw 29 30 ⸢r⸣ (?)*
12. *nꜣ nṯr.w ḥt 1 ḳt 5 Pꜣ-bk 6 Pꜣ-⸢ꜥꜥn⸣ (?) 3*
13. *Ìmn-ḥtp pꜣ mr-šn 3 Pꜣ-stm pꜣ mr-šn 4 r ⟨ḥt⟩ 2 (sic) ḳt 1*
14. *Pꜣ-tj-Ḥr-sꜣ-Ìs ⟨ḥt⟩ 4 ḳt 1 ⸢Wsìr-wr⸣ pꜣ ḥm-nṯr Mn sꜣ ... ḳt 5*
15. *Pꜣ-rṯ pꜣ sḫ ⟨n⟩ ḥ.t-nṯr ḥt 1 nꜣ wꜥb.w ntj ꜥḳ 6*

Vorderseite   Rückseite
XII. DO Wien KhM 5997

16. *P3-išr s3 ... Ḥr(?)- ... s3 Ns-n3j=w-Ḥmn-ì w* (?) ⟨*ḳt*⟩ *1*
17. *Nḫt.t̬-Ḥr-m-ḥb s3 Nḫt.t̬-Ìmn 1 P3-tj-Ḥr-p3-Rᶜ* (?) *s3 Ḳrr* (?) *ḳt 5* ⌈*...*⌉ (?)
18. *... p3 sḫ ḳnb ḳt 5*
19. *...*
20. *...*

Übersetzung

Vorderseite

1. Tag 20. 34 (+) 36 macht 70. Spezifikation: Die Götter 1 (Silberling) ⌈4⌉ Kite;
   Pebek ⌈6⌉ (Kite)
2. *P3-ᶜᶜn* 3 (Kite); der Prophet des Horus 3 (Kite); des Lesonis 3 (Kite); der
   Prophet des Month (?) 7 (Kite)
3. Die Ausgaben für die Priester am 30.(?). Paret, Sohn des Hor, 2 (Kite);
   Pshenanup (?),
4. Sohn des Amenhotep 1 (Kite); Enchpekhrat, der Oberste der Priester 7
   (Kite); *Ìn=f-Ḥnsw*,
5. Sohn des Enchpekhrat, 2 Kite; Hor, Sohn des Chefchons, 1 (Kite) (?)
6. Die Priester, welche eintreten: Hor, Sohn des Pamonth 1 (Kite); Uennofre
   (?), Sohn des Nechtnebef, 5 (Kite);
7. Esmin, Sohn des Chefchons, 5 (Kite); *P3-ìwìw-Ḥr*, Sohn des Psenthoth, 5
   (Kite); ... (?)
8. Kludj, Sohn des Jidoi (?), 5 Kite, macht 34 (Kite).

9. 30 30 30 30 30 usw.

10. ... (?)

Rückseite

11. Tag 29. 30, macht (?) ...

12. Die Götter 1 Silberling 5 Kite; Pebek 6 (Kite); P3-ᶜᶜn (?) 3 (Kite);

13. Amenhotep, der Lesonis 3 (Kite); *P3-stm*, der Lesonis 4 (Kite), macht 2 (Silberlinge) (sic) 1 Kite.

14. Peteharsiese 4 (Silberlinge) 1 Kite; Usiruer, der Priester des Min, Sohn des ..., 5 Kite

15. Paret, der Schreiber des Tempels, 1 Silberling (?); die Priester, welche eintreten, 6 Kite;

16. *P3-išr*, Sohn des ...; Hor-..., Sohn des Esnachomneu (?), 1 (Kite);

17. Nechthoremheb, Sohn des Nechtamun, 1 (Kite); Peteharpre (?), Sohn des Krer (?), 5 Kite;

18. ... der Urkundenschreiber 5 Kite

19. ...

20. ...

Bemerkungen

Vorderseite

Z.1. Die Schreibung der Zahl 34 ist sehr unklar. Die Ziffer 30 ist – wie es sich zeigt – punktähnlich. Um die Ziffer verständlich zu machen hat der Schreiber sie am Ende des Textes, in korrekter Form, mehrfach wiedergegeben (Zeile 9). – Die Münzeinheiten *ḥt* „Silberling'' und *ḳt* „Kite'' sind oft ausgelassen, und *ḳt* ist hier in der Bedeutung *ḥt-ḳt* „Silberkite''. – Zur Lesung *P3-bk* ⌈6⌉ (*ḳt*) vgl. Zeile 12, wo die Ziffer deutlich erscheint.

Z. 2. Eine sichere Feststellung der vorkommenden Beträge in der letzteren Hälfte der Zeile lässt sich kaum machen, aber die Schluss-Summe 36 (Silber)-Kite ist dagegen sicher. Die zweite Summe (die Beträge in Z. 3–8) ist 34 (Silber)-Kite, welche sonderbarerweise zunächst notiert ist (Z. 1). – Beim ersten Anblick kann man geneigt sein, *P3-bk* und *P3-ᶜᶜn* als Personennamen aufzufassen (zu dem Namen *P3-ᶜᶜn*, Der Pavian, vgl. Lüddeckens, Demotisches Namenbuch, S. 162). Da amtliche Titel wie auch Angaben der Vaterschaft fehlen, scheint diese Interpretation wenig wahrscheinlich. Eher haben wir es hier mit heiligen Tieren, „dem Falken'' und „dem Pavian'' zu tun, wenn es nicht so ist, dass *p3-bk* und *p3 ᶜᶜn* gerade als Sondertitel für „Falkenpriester'' und „Pavianpriester'' – d. h. Horus- bzw. Thothpriester – aufzufassen sind. [Vgl. *n3 ìmj.w* (DO W 175/2) „Katerpries-ter'' – ob als Bastet – oder vielleicht Atumpriester zu deuten ?]. Dass sie in solchem Falle, wie der Tempelvorsteher (Lesonis) und die Propheten, zu der oberen Priesterklasse gehörten dürfte ziemlich sicher sein. Mutmasslich sind die fünf hier erwähnten Tempelfunktionäre Mitglieder eines Priesterkollegiums, und die oberste Leitung des betreffenden Heiligtums (Vgl. Otto, a. A., S. 49 sowie Bonnet, Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte, S. 605.).

Z. 3–5. *p3 hj n n3 wᶜb.w* „die Ausgaben für die Priester''. Es handelt sich hier um Mitglieder der niederen Priesterklasse, unter welchen Enchpekhrat als Ober-

priester (*p3 ꜥ3 n wꜥb*) die Geschäfte des Heiligtums verwaltete (Vgl. Bonnet, a. A., S. 604 f.). – Der Name *Ìn=f-Ḫnsw* ,,Er hat Chons gebracht'' war mir bis heute unbekannt.

Z. 6. n3 wꜥb.w ntj ꜥḳ ,,die Priester, welche eintreten''. Über diese zu dem höheren Range gehörende Priester, welche Zutrittsrecht zu dem Naos des Gottes hatten, um den Dienst an dem Götterbild zu verrichten siehe Bonnet, a. A., s. v. Stolist und Otto, a. A., S. 84.

Z. 8. *T3j-ḏj*, Jidoi. Zur Schreibung vgl. Mattha, Demotic Ostraka, Nr. 238/3. Rückseite.

Z. 11. Bis auf die Tagesangabe und die Zahl 30 ist der Text fast ganz ausgetilgt, und die erhaltenen Zeichenspuren sind zu schwach um eine wahrscheinliche Ergänzung zu ermöglichen.

Z. 12. Vor der letzten Zeichengruppe ist nur die Ziffer 3 eindeutig. Die unscharfe Zeichenkombination kann sowohl *p3 mr-šn* als *p3-ꜥꜥn* gelesen werden. Handelt es sich um eine Wiederholung des Textes in Z. 1–2, was ich für sehr wahrscheinlich halte, ist *p3-ꜥꜥn* die korrekte Transkription.

Z. 13. Statt 2 Silberlinge 1 (Silber)-Kite soll die Gesamtsumme 3 Silberlinge 1 (Silber)-Kite sein.

Z. 15. Der Tempelschreiber gehörte infolge seiner Gelehrsamkeit zu einer Sondergruppe der höheren Rangklasse. Seine Dienstobliegenheiten waren wechselvoll und um sie vollbringen zu können waren umfassende Kentnisse notwendig (vgl. Bonnet, a. A., s. v. Hierogrammat). – Die ꜥḳ-Priester sind nicht mit Namen genannt, wie der Fall war in Zeile 6 ff.

Z. 16. Wegen des stellenweise ausgetilgten Textes kann ich keine sichere Transkription geben. Zu dem Namen Esnachomneu (vgl. aber Mattha, a. A., Nr 261/2).

Z. 18. Von dem Text tritt nur das Zeichen ⟨ (Transkription und Bedeutung sind mir unklar. Ob eine ungewöhnliche Schreibung für *mj-nn* ,,ebenso'' ?) und am Ende *p3 sḫ ḳnb ḳt 5* ,,der Urkundenschreiber 5 (Silber)-Kite deutlich hervor. – Als Hierogrammat gehörte der Urkundenschreiber der oben (Zeile 15) erwähnten Sondergruppe der höheren Rangklasse.

Z. 19–20. Es ist mir nicht gelungen die Personennamen zu lesen, was auch die vorkommenden Beträge gilt.

Abrechnung

XIII. DO Wien KhM 6000. Grösse: 11,1×9,7 cm. Oberägypten. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *tpj pr sw 20 ìpt.w 54 wb3 53 r 1*
2. *sw 21 77 wb3 76 r 1*
3. *sw 22 42 wb3 40 r 2*
4. *ìbt-2 pr sw 2 41 wb3 38 r 3*
5. *r p3 sḫj r.ìr=f r.r=f sḫ tmt-nfr 7*
6. *ìbt-2 pr sw 20 88 wb3 87 r 1*
7. *sw 21 59 wb3 58 r 1*

XIII. DO Wien KhM 6000

8. *sw 22 66 wb3 65 r 1*
9. *sw 23 60* (?) (*wb3*) . . .

Übersetzung

1. Am 20. Tybe. 54 Gänse für 53 macht 1;
2. am 21. 77 für 76 macht 1;
3. am 22. 42 für 40 macht 2;
4. am 2. Mechir 41 für 38 macht 3,
5. wegen des Schlages, den er gemacht hat gegen ihn. Geschrieben (als) gute Summe: 7.
6. am 20. Mechir 88 für 87 macht 1;
7. am 21. 59 für 58 macht 1;
8. am 22. 66 für 65 macht 1;
9. am 23. 60 (?) (für) . . .

Bemerkungen

Z. 5. Zur Lesung *sḫ* ,,schreiben'' vgl. Erichsen, Demot. Glossar, S. 459, in dem Ausdruck *sḫ ḳt 2* ,,Geschrieben: 2 Kite''. – *tmt-nfr* ,,Gute Summe'' (Profit). Für ähnliche Konstruktion vgl. *ḥw-nfr* ,,guter Gewinn'' (Ursula Kaplony-Heckel, Tempeleide, Nr. 123/6 und Nr. 180/6–7). – Die erste Abrechnung ist in Z. 5 abgeschlossen. Dann folgt ein Spatium, und mit Z. 6 fängt eine neue Auflistung an. Die erste Abrechnung besieht sich auf drei Tage (20., 21. und 22. Tybe) und auf einen Tag in dem nachfolgenden Monat (2. Mechir). Die zweite Abrechnung, welche auch am 20. Tag des betreffenden Monats (Mechir) beginnt, setzt dagegen ohne Unterbrechung der Tagesreihe fort.

Die Erklärung dieses rätselhaften Textes muss ich offen lassen.

Abrechnung über Lampen für *brb*[e]-Duft

XIV. DO W 70.[5] Grösse: 8,7×5,7 cm. Theben. Wahrscheinlich Jahr 6/5 v. Chr.

XIV. DO W 70

Transkription

1. *ḥ3.t-sp 25 ỉbt-2 šm sw 6 wꜥ ỉp ⟨n⟩ ꜛmꜜ[šplṭ.t n st ...]*
2. *sw 6 mšplṭ.t n stj b[rbᵉ ...]*
3. *sw 7 mšplṭ.t n stj bꜛrbᵉꜜ [...]*
4. *sw 8 mšplṭ.t n stj br[bᵉ ...]*
5. *sw 9 mšplṭ.t n stj ꜛbrbᵉꜜ [...]*
6. *sw 11 mšplṭ.t n stj brb[ᵉ ...]*
7. *sw 12 mšplṭ.t [n stj brbᵉ ...]*
8. ...

Übersetzung

1. Jahr 25, am 6. Payne. Eine Abrechnung (über) [Lampen für *brbᵉ*-Duft ...]
2. Tag 6. Lampe für b[rbᵉ]-Duft [...]
3. Tag 7. Lampe für brbᵉ-Duft [...]
4. Tag 8. Lampe für br[bᵉ]-Duft [...]
5. Tag 9. Lampe für brbᵉ-Duft [...]
6. Tag 11. Lampe für brbᵉ-Duft [...]
7. Tag 12. Lampe für brb[ᵉ-Duft ...]
8. ...

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. In Bezug auf die Datierung kann sich Jahr 25 sowohl auf die Regierungszeit eines Ptolemäerkönigs als auf die des Kaisers Augustus beziehen, und in diesem Falle datiert das Verzeichnis vom Jahr 6/5 v. Chr. Das Dokument dürfte römisch sein, wenn das Wort *mšplṭ.t* (*mšprṭ.t*), das nur aus der Römerzeit belegt ist (vgl. Erichsen, Demot. Glossar, S. 182) als genügender Beweis betrachtet werden kann. – *ỉbt-2 šm sw 6* ,,am 6 Payne". Die Lesung *sw 6* ist in Zeile 2 verifiziert. – Die Ergänzung des Textes ist m. E. korrekt.

XV. DO BM 23364

Z. 2. brbᵉ. Das Wort ist im Erichsens Glossar nicht verzeichnet. In Zeile 5 ist es ganz erhalten und dort ᴍᴍᴄ/ᴀ geschrieben. Dem Determinativ nach kann es sich um eine Art Gefäss handeln. Koptisch ist ein Wort ᴪᴘᴙᴄ „Gefäss", „Behälter" belegt (Crum, Copt. Dict., S. 42) und es liegt deswegen nahe es auf das demotische *brbᵉ* zurückzuführen. Im vorliegenden Falle scheint mir aber diese Bedeutung nicht zutreffend zu sein. Das Wort *stj* zeigt hier ein kugelähnliches Determinativ, was darauf hindeutet, dass *brbᵉ* ein in Kugeln geformter, weihrauchähnlicher Stoff sein könnte.

Abrechnung

XV. DO BM 23364. Grösse: 6,5×5,8 cm. Oberägypten. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *Nḥm=⟨s⟩-Ptḥ ḥt 3 ḳt 1/2*
2. *Sbk ḥt 3 ḳt 1/2*
3. *Pȝ-mr-ȋpt ḥt 2*

Übersetzung

1. Nehem(es)ptah 3 Silberlinge 1/2 Kite;
2. Sebek 3 Silberlinge 1/2 Kite;
3. *Pȝ-mr-ȋpt* 2 Silberlinge

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. Der Name, der hier in einer sehr sonderbaren Schreibung erscheint, ist m. E. *Sbk*, Sebek, zu lesen. Für andere wenig genaue Schreibungen vgl. Erichsen, Demot. Glossar, S. 423. Sebek als Personenname scheint wenig gewöhnlich zu sein, und bis heute sind mir nur zwei Belege bekannt [Mattha, a. A., Nr. 19/10 und DO Pisa 69, Kol. 2/4 (Studia classici e orientali, Vol. 21, Pisa 1972, S. 345)].

Z. 3. Pȝ-mr-ȋpt „Der Vorsteher der Gänse(ställen?)". Der Name war mir früher unbekannt. – Zu der Konstruktion vgl. *Pȝ-mr-ȋḥ* „Der Vorsteher der Rinder(herden)" (Lüddeckens, Demotisches Namenbuch, Bd. I, S. 188).

Betreffs der Datierung scheint mir, dass das Dokument paläographisch aus spätrömischer Zeit stammen kann.

XVI. DO Uppsala 895 A

Abrechnung

XVI. DO Uppsala 895 A. Grösse: 7,8×6,5 cm. Oberägypten. Wahrscheinlich
ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

Kol. 1.		
x+1. *sw 26*	3	
2. *sw 27*	3	
3. *sw 28*	3	
4. *sw 29*	4 (?)	
5. *sw ꜥrkj*	4	
6. . . .		
7. . . .		

Kol. 2.		
x+1. *sw 13*	2	
2. *sw 14*	3	
3. *sw 15* (?)	3	
4. *sw 18*	6 (?)	
5. *sw 17*	3	
6. . . .		

Übersetzung

Kol. 1.		
x+1. am 26.	3	
2. am 27.	3	
3. am 28.	3	
4. am 29.	4 (?)	
5. am 30.	4	
6. . . .		
7. . . .		

Kol. 2.		
x+1. am 13.	2	
2. am 14.	3	
3. am 15 (?)	3	
4. am 18.	6 (?)	
5. am 17.	3	
6. . . .		

Bemerkungen

Kol. 2

Z. 4. Die Tagesangabe ist der Schreibung nach *sw 18* ,,am 18.'' zu lesen.
Mutmasslich liegt ein Verschreiben für *sw 16* ,,am 16.'' vor, aber M. E. kann es
sich kaum um ein Verschreiben handeln. – Statt ,,6'' könnte die Zeichengruppe
,,11.t 1/2'' gedeutet werden, eine Lesung, welche mir weniger wahrscheinlich zu
sein scheint. – Der Herkunftsort ist nicht angegeben, kann aber Theben sein.

XVII. DO BM 43597   XVIII. DO Berlin P 6497

Quittung über Zahlung für Flachs-Saat (?)

XVII. DO BM 43597. Grösse: 11,1×7 cm. Theben. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *ìn Ḏd-ḥr s3 Pa-ḥj ḳt 1 n pr mḥ* (?)
2. *n ḥ3.t-sp 31 sḫ P3-b3 n ḥ3.t-sp 31 ìbt-4 pr sw 21*

Übersetzung

1. Es hat bezahlt Djeho, Sohn des Pachi, 1 Kite für Flachs-Saat (?)
2. für Jahr 31. Es hat geschrieben Peba im Jahr 31, am 21. Pharmuthe.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. *Pa-ḥj*, Pachi. Zur Schreibung vgl. Mattha, Demotic Ostraka, Nr. 200/2. – *ḳt* ,,Kite'' = Silber-Kite. – Die Lesung *pr mḥ* ist unsicher, vor allem betreffs der ersten Zeichengruppe. Das Deutzeichen der zweiten Gruppe deutet darauf hin, dass es sich um ein Kraut handelt, und die Lesung *mḥ* ,,Flachs'' scheint mir am nächsten zu liegen. Die vorgeschlagene Lesung, *pr mḥ*, ist, wie gesagt unsicher, aber ich kann keine andere Entzifferung geben.

Z. 2. Das Datierungsjahr kann Ptolemaios VI. Philometer 31 (= Jahr 151/50 v. Chr.), Ptolemaios VIII. Euergetes II. 31 (= Jahr 140/39 v. Chr.) oder Ptolemaios IX. Soter II. 31 (= Jahr 87/86 v. Chr.) sein. Frühere Ptolemäer dürften m. E. kaum in Betracht kommen.

Quittung über Verkauf von Weizen

XVIII. DO Berlin P 6497. Grösse: 8,8×8,2 cm. Theben. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *r tw Mw.t-⟨ì⟩.ìr-tj=s r bnr*
2. *rtb n sw 2 r ḥn r sw 15*
3. *ꜥn sw 19 rtb 1 1/3*

XIX. DO BM 31550

Übersetzung

1. Was Mutartais herausgegeben hat:
2. 2 Artaben Weizen bis zum 15.;
3. wiederum am 19. 1 1/3 Artaben.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Zu dem Namen *Mw.t-⟨i⟩.ir-tj=s*, Mutartais, vgl. Ursula Kaplony-Heckel, Die demotischen Tempeleide, Nr. 23/1. – Zu der Wendung *tj r bnr* ,,herausgeben", ,,verkaufen" vgl. Spiegelberg, Demot. Gramm., § 400.

Z. 3 Der Tag kann entweder ⟨*sw*⟩ *4* ,,Tag 4" oder ⟨*sw*⟩ *9* ,,Tag 9" sein. Da weder das Jahr noch der Monat, in welchen der Verkauf stattgefunden hat, angegeben ist, kann m. E. keiner der angeführten Tage in Betracht kommen. Die Verkäufe sind zweifelsohne in ein und demselben Monat geschehen, und zwar am 15. und am 19. – *sw 19*. In der Tagesangabe ist der lange schräge Strich das Artabenzeichen.

Quittung über Strohlieferung

XIX. DO BM 31550. Grösse: 9,8×7,9 cm. Theben. Spätptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *in Pȝ-šr-Mnt sȝ Ḥr-...*
2. *ḥn pȝ ip ⟨n⟩ Pȝ-tj-Ḥnsw*
3. *r ȝntwg mjḥ*
4. *tḥ 20*
5. *sḥ Glᶜ sȝ Nḫt.t*

Übersetzung

1. Es hat bezahlt Pshenmonth, Sohn des Hor-...,
2. von der Abrechnung (zu) Petechons
3. auf Lieferungsaufforderung Mass

XX. DO BM 41258

4. Stroh 20.
5. Es hat geschrieben Gale, Sohn des Necht.

Bemerkungen

Z. *1*. Der letzte Name, dessen erste Bestandteil *Ḥr*, Hor, ist, kann ich nicht deuten. Die Lesung *Ḥr-mȝj*, Harmui, ist m. E. nicht möglich.

Z. *3*. *ȝntwg*, hier wahrscheinlich mit der Bedeutung „Lieferungsaufforderung" (griech. ἐντάγιον). Das Wort ist m. W. in vier Dokumenten belegt, alle römisch. Zwei sind von Thompson [PSBA 35 (1913), S. 261 ff.] und zwei von Mattha (Demotic Ostraka, Nr. 1 und 2) veröffentlicht. Betreffs der Lesung scheint mir *ȝntwg* die richtige zu sein. Die Schreibung im vorliegenden Dokument, und in einem von den Dokumenten des Thompson[1] sowie in Mattha,[2] a. A., Nr. 2 zeigt m. E., dass keine andere Transkription zutreffend ist. Hinsichtlich des Determinativs des Wortes liegt keine Einheitlichkeit vor,   ♂ (ȝ),[1]   ϒ ⟨ːʃːɣ⟩ und hier ϟ ,[2] welche From als eine nachlässige Schreibung für das letztere Zeichen betrachtet werden könnte. Die Bedeutung des Wortes ist unklar (vgl. Mattha, a. A., Nr. 1/2, Anm.), aber, wie oben angeführt ist, scheint es mir nahe zu liegen – jedenfalls im vorliegenden Dokument – das Wort als die demotische Entsprechung des griechischen ἐντάγιον zu erachten.

Lieferungen in natura
(Gartenerzeugnisse)
XX. DO BM 41258. Grösse: 14,3×11 cm. Theben (Karnak). Römische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *tw=j ἰn=w Bl ḥrš ꜥb* [. . .]
2. *ȝtsj.t 5.t n-t.t Tȝ-hb tȝ ꜥnḫ-* [. . .]

3. *T3-ḥb t3 ꜥ3.t ntj ꜥrb 1/24 tl[tl]* [. . .]

4. *T3-šr.t-Twtw t3 ḥm trš(.t) 1.t*

5. *w3ḥ=j tj ỉrp 3* ⟨*n*⟩ *Ns-p3-wt s3 P3-ḥb ḥr ḥt 229 bw-ỉr-tw=f*

6. *tj ḥt ỉw=f tj s ỉw=j tj s r bnr bw-ỉr-tw=j šp s* (?)

7. *mj ỉn=w p3 wnm 2 ḥn p3j=j mšḥṱ*

Übersetzung

1. Ich habe veranlasst, dass man gebracht hat dem Belle . . . Bündel Lattisch

2. 5 *3tsj.t* in die Hand der Tephib, der Tochter des Ench . . .

3. der Tephib, der Älteren, Mehl (für) Kuchen 1/24 (Artabe) (und) Wein (?) . . .

4. der Tshentuot, der Jüngeren, *trš* 1

5. Ich habe drei (Keramion) Wein an *Ns-p3-wt*, den Sohn des Phib, verkauft für 229 Silberlinge, bevor er das

6. Geld ausgehändigt hatte. Er hat es übergeben. Ich habe ihn (den Wein) verkauft bevor ich es (das Geld) empfangen hatte.

7. Möge man bringen die zwei *wnm* von meinem *mšḥṱ*

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. ḥrš ,,Bündel''. Die Schreibung des Wortes – in Erichsen, Demot. Glossar nicht verzeichnet – kommt in DO BM 26102/3, 4 (Quittung über Gartenerzeugnisse. Unveröffentlicht.) vor. – *ꜥb* ,,Lattisch'' (altäg. ⟨hieroglyphs⟩, Äg. WB I, S. 176; Kopt. ⲱⲃ . Näheres über diese Pflanze siehe Keimer, Die Gartenpflanzen im alten Ägypten, S. 2 ff. und S. 121 ff. Das Wort ist im Glossar nicht notiert.

Z. 2. ⟨demotic⟩ *3tsj.t.* Das Wort ist m. W. nicht früher belegt. Das Determinativ deutet darauf hin, dass es sich um eine Gartenpflanze handeln könnte. Das Wort ist mir nur aus diesem Ostrakontext bekannt.

Z. 3. njt ꜥrb 1/24 ,,Mehl (für) (dünne) Kuchen, 1/24 (Artabe)''. Das Wort *ꜥrb*, das auch nicht im Glossar verzeichnet ist, ist mir aus DO Berlin P 6327 v./1 (Unveröffentlicht) bekannt, dort ⟨demotic⟩ geschrieben. Die kopt. Entsprechung ⲟⲣⲃⲉ ,,dünner Kuchen'' (Crum. Copt. Dict., S. 256) ist in Spiegelberg, Handwörterbuch, S. 89 als ,,Ölkuchen'' angegeben. – 1/24 zielt m. E. auf das Getreide und nicht auf das Mehl. 1/24 Artabe macht – nach Massangabe von der Artabe = 29, 52 L. = 1, 24 L., d. i. 1 Choinix, eine Quantität, welche in römischer Zeit die Tagesration für Soldaten war (Wilcken, Griech Ostraka I, S. 747 f.). – Von dem letzten Wort ist nur der Anfang erhalten. Wenn die vorgeschlagene Ergänzung ⟨demotic⟩ *tl[tl]*, eine Art Wein (?), kopt. ⲧⲁⲗⲧⲉⲗ (Crum, a. A., S. 411) zutreffend ist, liegt es nahe anzunehmen, dass es sich in diesem Text durchgehend um Lebensbedürfnisse handelt.

Z. 5. ⟨demotic⟩ (im Glossar nicht verzeichnet). Es dürfte sich auch hier um eine Art Erzeugnis handeln, dessen Bezeichnung möglicherweise mit ,,rot'' (vgl. Glossar, S. 649) zusammenhängt, und die nachstehende Zahl kann als ,,1 (Mass)'' oder ,,1 (Stück)'' aufgefasst werden. Die Bedeutung ist mir indessen unklar.

Z. 6. Das letzte Zeichen der Zeile ist wohl eine nachlässige Schreibung des Pronomens absol. *st* ,,sie'' (Plur.), das auf die 229 Silberlinge zielt.

Z. 7. p3 wnm 2 ḥn p3j=j (?) *mšḥṱ* ,,die 2 *wnm* von (oder in . . .) meinem *mšḥṱ*. Es ist mir nicht möglich, eine zutreffende Deutung der beiden Hauptwörter zu geben.

XXI. DO Wien KhM 6006

XXII. DO Berlin P 12264

Namenliste

XXI. DO Wien KhM 6006. Grösse: 6,7×6,5 cm. Oberägypten. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. ... ... *P3-Wr* ... ...
2. *n* (?) *ỉbt-4 3ḫ* ...
3. *Lwgrs*
4. *P3-šr-P3-Wr s3 P3-mr-ỉḥ*
5. *P3-wršj* (sic) *s3 Ḥr-ᶜnḫ* (?)
6. ... ...

Übersetzung

1. ... ... Peuer ... ...
2. am ... Choiakh ...
3. Lykros
4. Pshenpeuer, Sohn des Pleehe,
5. Peurshe, (Sohn) des Horench (?)
6. ... ...

Bemerkungen

Z. 3. *Lwgrs*, Lykros, (griech. Λούκρος). Der Name ist in Preisigke, Namenbuch nicht verzeichnet, auch nicht in Tait, Greek Ostraka. Vgl. aber der Name Λούκρα (fem.) (Preizigke, a. A., Sp. 198).

Z. 4. Statt *P3-šn-P3-Wr* ist die Lesung *P3-tj-P3-Wr*, Petepeuer, auch möglich.

Schulübung (?)

XXII. DO Berlin P 12264. Grösse: 9,7×7,1 cm. Oberägypten. Römische Zeit (?).

Transkription

x+1. ...
2. [...] *-Ḥnm* 1 2.t 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 ...
3. [...] *-Ḥnm* 1 2.t 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 ...

4. [. . .] . . .*ml^e* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 . . .
5. [. . .] . . . 1 2.t 4 5 6 *mtr ḥm* 1 2.t 3 4 5 6 7 8 . . .
6. [. . .] . . . *n* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 . . .
7. [. . .] 1 2.t 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
8. [. . .] 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 . . .
9. [. . .] 5 6 7 8 9 10 . . .
10. [. . .] 5 . . .

Bemerkungen

Z. 2–3. Namen, welche möglich sein können sind *Pa-Ḥnm*, Pakhnum, *Pꜣ-šr-Ḥnm*, Pshenkhnum, und *Pꜣ-tj-Ḥnm*, Petekhnum.

Z. 5. *mtr ḥm* ,,nicht richtig", ,,fehlerhaft"; vielleicht auch in der Bedeutung ,,Fehl". In der aritmetischen Reihe hat der Schüler (?) die Ziffer 3 ausgelassen, das Schreiben abgebrochen und sofort notiert, dass er einen Fehler gemacht hat.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Die Ostraka sind jetzt im Bestize der Universität Helsinki.
2. *nꜣj=f nbj.w* (?) ,,seine Frohnarbeiten (?)".
3. Kalksteinscherbe. In Kairo gekauft.
4. Die Zahl 25 ist allem Anschein nach in Zeile 1 notiert. Von dem Text ist nur ein diminutiver Zeichenrest sichtbar.
5. In Luxor eingekauft.

Acht Holztafeln aus dem Britischen Museum, London*

WOLFGANG BRUNSCH

Die im folgenden vorgelegten fünf demotischen, eine griechische und zwei kopti-schen Holztafeln befanden sich ursprünglich unter den demotisch/griechischen Mumienschildern des BM.[1] Dabei stammen die Nummern 1, 2 und 5 aus privaten Spenden, über die Erwerbsumstände der anderen gibt es keine Angaben.

1) BM 29518 (Taf. 1): Abrechnung über ,,extra charge''.
   (13, 5×7,5 cm; Herkunft: Elephantine (?);[2] Datierung: spätptol./röm.;[3] Schrift stark abgerieben)

Text

1) *p3 ip   n p3 wt^a n ⌜rnp.t⌝* [X
2) [.....] *101 (?) 211 ibt 3 šmw (sw) 1*
3) *..?.. 1200 ..?.. (sw) 9* ⌜*..?..*⌝
4) [................................]
5) [................................]
6) ⌜ . . ? . . ⌝ [.................] *2*
7) [................................] *1*
8) ⌜*..?..*⌝ [.......................]

Tafel 1

Tafel 2

9) ⌈..?....?..⌉ 2
10) [.....] *1*

Übersetzung

1) Die Abrechnung über ,,extra charge''[a] vom Jahre X
2) [........] 101 (?), 211, Epiphi (Tag) 1
3) .... 1200 .... (Tag) 9 ......
4)–5) ....
6) ⌈ . . ? . . ⌉ [.................] 2
7) [............................] 1
8) ....
9) [.................] 2
10) [...........] 1

[a] Zu *wt* = ,,extra charge'', einer Steuer zur Deckung der Steuererhebungskosten s. Nur-el-Din, O. Leiden, 15; sie betrug gewöhnlich 1 1/2 Obolen pro Stater, also etwa 0,06%. Unser Stück stellt wahrscheinlich eine (Gesamt-)Abrechnung eines Steuererhebers dar.

2) BM 29532 (Taf. 2): Quittung.
   (9×5 cm; Herkunft: Aus Privatbesitz; Datierung: ptolemäisch, Jahr 16)

Text

1) *P3-šr-ỉmn s3 sp-2 (?) (?) qt 2 n*
2) *p3 ..?..*[a] *sh Dd-hr (?)*
3) *h3.t-sp 16 tpj 3h.t(sw) 26*
4) *sw 26 qt 2 sh n3 shn.w (?)*[b]
5) *h3.t-sp 16 ⟨tpj⟩ 3h.t sw 26 qt 2 sh Dd-hr (?)*

Tafel 3

Übersetzung

1) Psenamounis, Sohn des gleichnamigen (?) (?): Kite 2 für
2) den/die/das . . ? . .[a] Geschrieben hat Teos (?)
3) Regierungsjahr 16, Thot, (Tag) 26.
4) Tag 26: Kite 2. Geschrieben haben die Steuererheber (?)[b]
5) Regierungsjahr 16, Thot, Tag 26: Kite 2. Geschrieben hat Teos (?)

[a] Die fragliche Gruppe besteht aus 2 Worten, von denen das zweite vielleicht *s.t* zu lesen ist. Es ist jedenfalls eine Ortsangabe, wo die Zahlung quittiert wurde (s. auch Mattha, Ostraka, 10–13).

[b] Lesung mit Vorbehalt; die Gruppe könnte auch *ḥtr.w*(?) (ϩⲱⲧⲉ/ϩⲧⲟⲣ) gelesen werden.

Der Text bietet eine Reihe von Problemen, die auf Grund der unsicheren Gruppen in den Zeilen 2 und 4 unklar bleiben: Der Betrag von 2 Kite wird Psenamounis dreimal mit zweieinhalbmaliger Datumsangabe quittiert, u.z. zweimal von Teos(?) (ohne Filiation!) und einmal von den Steuererhebern(?). Der sonst nicht belegte Sachverhalt wird auch dann nicht unkomplizierter, wenn man Zeile 4 zu *sḫ ⟨n rn⟩ n3 sḥn.w*(?) (sc. *Ḏd-ḥr*(?)) ergänzt.

3) BM 29546 (Taf. 3): Literarischer Text (?).

(11,5×8 cm; Herkunft: ?; Datierung: ptol. oder röm; Schrift bis auf Weniges sehr stark abgerieben)

Text

1) [. . . . .] *11* [. . . . .
2) [. . . . .] *špj=w* [. . . . . . .
3) [. . . . .] *i3bṭ* [. . . . .
4) [. . . . .] *ir.t* [. . . . . . .
5) [. . . . .]
6) [. . . . .] *iwṭ* [. . . . .
7) [. . . . .]

Übersetzung

1) . . . . 11 . . . .
2) . . . . sie schämten sich . . . . . .
3) . . . . Osten . . . .

4) .... Auge ....
5) ....
6) .... ohne (ⲁⲧ-) ....
7) ....

In Anbetracht des schlechten Erhaltungszustandes des Stückes sei hier nur auf die Nummern 325/326 (Hymnen(?)) und 335–357 (Briefe) bei Nur-el-Din, O. Leiden, als eventuelle Parallelen hingewiesen.

4) BM 30248 (Taf. 4): Quittung über das Telestikon.
   (9×5 cm; Herkunft: Oberäg.; Datierung: August Jahr 35 = 6 n. Chr.)

Text
1) *ḥ3.t-sp 35 tpj šmw sw 4*
2) *Gsr*^{c} *..?..*
3) *tn ⟨n ỉr⟩ w^{c}b*[a]
4) ⌈..............⌉
5) *n-d.t Pa-rt (?)*
6) *⟨n⟩ ⌈t3⌉ s.t*
7) ⌈..?..⌉ *ḥt* ⌈..?..⌉[b]
8) ⌈*ḥt*⌉ *12 qt 5 ^{c}n (?)*
9) *n p3j hrw*[c]

Übersetzung
1) Regierungsjahr 35, Pachon, Tag 4
2) (des) Kaisar,

Tafel 5

3) Telestikon[a]

4) . . . .

5) durch Pareitis (?)

6) (am) Orte

7) . . ? . . Silberlinge . . ? . .[b]

8) Silberlinge 12, Kite 5 wiederum (?)

9) an diesem Tage.[c]

   [a] Zu *tn* (*n ìr*) *w^c b* = τὸ τελεστικόν s. Mattha, Ostraka, 69 (77). Zu *ìwṭ tn* s. Rosettana, 9 und I Setne 3, 16.
   [b] Man erwartete eine Umrechnung nach dem Schema *X r 1/2 X r X ^c n*; doch passen weder Platz noch die Schriftspuren dazu (Ob *ḥt 5*?).
   [c] Zur Wendung vgl. etwa Graffito Charge Nr. 2, 1[4].
   Eine weitere demotische Quittung über das Telestikon ist P. Kairo 50108 vso.; zu griechischen Quittungen darüber s. Wilcken, Ostraka I, 398. Diese stammen jedoch aus der Ptolemäerzeit.

5) BM 50145 (Taf. 5): Orakelfrage.

   (11×4 cm; Herkunft: Oxyrhynchos[5]; Datierung: ptol. oder röm.; Schrift stark abgerieben)

Text

1) *ḥrw-bk.t*[a] *sḥm.t Ta-p3-ìwìw(?) t3 šr.t* [. . . . .] *-wsìr(?)*

2) *m-b3ḥ p3j=s ḥrj* ⌈. . ? . .⌉[b] [. . . .

3) *ḥt 1 t3j=w^c* ⌈*pš.t*⌉ [*ḥt 1/2 r ḥt 1 ^c n* . . . .

4) ⌈. . ? . .⌉ [. . . . .] *ìw=j* ⌈*ḥwj*⌉ (?) [. . . . .

Übersetzung

1) 'Stimme der Dienerin'[a] der Frau *Ta-p3-ỉwỉw* (?), Tochter des [.......]-
wsỉr(?),

2) vor ihrem Herrn ⌜..?..⌝[b] [.............

3) 1 Silberling, ihre[c] Hälfte (beträgt) [einen halben Silberling, macht 1 Silberling
wiederum ......

4) ⌜..?..⌝ [...............] ich werde dreschen (?) [..........

[a] Zu *ḫrw-bk* s. Hughes, in: JNES 16, 1957, 58 f. und 17, 1958, 6 ff. und Erichsen, Demotische
Orakelfragen, 5. Bresciani[6] übersetzt die Wendung in den entsprechenden Texten (o.c. Nrn. 1–12)
dem Kontext entsprechend mit „supplica", Hughes, l.c., mit „communication".

[b] Hier ist ein Gottesname zu erwarten; doch die erhaltenen Spuren erlauben keine sichere Lesung
(ob *ỉtm* ?).

[c] *t3j=w* für *t3j=f*.

Die Orakelfrage der Frau *Ta-p3-ỉwỉw* (?) bezog sich auf die Zahlung von 1
Silberling für Getreide (?), das sie auch dreschen lassen musste (?).

6) BM 21615 (=a) + BM 21617 (=b) (Taf. 6): Schulübung.

(15×3 cm + 14×5 cm; Herkunft: ?; Datierung: röm.; 2 nicht zusammenpas-
sende Bruchstücke einer linierten Holztafel)

Text

x + 1) M .. ΧΡИCIΘC H[...

x + 2) KAI MHKA[a] [...

x + 3) EN TϷ[...

x + 1) ...] CA MICANΘΡΩΠOC

x + 2) ...] ΠANTA ΠIPACAC

x + 3) ...] ΩΘHC

x + 4) ...] AN ...

x + 5) ....] TON

Übersetzung

a

x + 1) .... nützlich ...... [

x + 2) und blöken[a] [

x + 3) in dem [......

b

x + 1) ....] .. Misanthrop

x + 2 ....] alles versucht habend

x + 3)–x + 5) ....

a) Eine Form (des Präsensstammes) von μηκάομαι.

Auf dem vso. von Seite a ist der Buchstabe Ψ, auf dem von b sind die
Buchstaben Γ, H, Δ und Θ geschrieben.

Tafel 6

Der Text ist zu fragmentarisch, als dass eine Bestimmung des Inhalts und damit ein Schluss auf die Vorlage möglich wären. Ob es sich bei diesem um eine Komödie oder einen bukolischen Text handelte? (zum Schreibunterricht im Hellenismus s. Wilcken, Grundzüge I, 136 ff.).

Tafel 7

7) BM 5896 (Taf. 7): Schulübung.

(10,5×7,5 cm; Herkunft: Oberäg. (Sahidisch); Datierung: 4.–6. Jahrhundert; 2 Löcher zum Durchziehen einer Kordel; Schrift stark abgerieben; 2 verschiedene Hände auf a und b)

Text

a
1) ✝ Π̄ ⲐⲟⲨⲐ ⲁ̄ ⲓⲏⲆ° [. . .
2) Ⲡⲁ̈ ⲛⲉ Ⲡᵃⲁ . ⲱ . Ⲏ̄Ⲟ [. . .
3) ⲎⲦ̄Ⲏ̄ᵇ ⲤⲓⲞⲤ [. . . . .] ⲗ
4) Ⲏ̄ᵀⲎ [. . . . .] Ⲓ̄Ⲍ [. . .
5) [. . . . .] ⲋⲱⲤ̈ [. . . .
6) ⲤⲎⲞⲨ⳨ⲗⲟ⳨ Ⲏ̄Ⲥ . [. . .
. . . .

b
1) . .] ✝ [. . .] ⲤⲞ . ⲤⳡⲐ
2) Ⲡ̄ⲤⲱⲔ □ . . [. . . .
3) Ⲡ̄ᵀⲎⲎ̄ [ⲗ]ⲁⲁⲨ
4) Ⲏ̄ᵀⲎⲎ̄ [. . . .
5) ⲤⲤ [. . . .
6) [. . . . . . .] ⲋ [. . . .

ᵃ Das Π ist auf zwei Arten geschrieben: ϖ und Π.
ᵇ Das N is auf zwei Arten geschrieben: μ und N.

Übersetzung

a
1) ✝ Monat (μ(ήνος)) Thout, (Tag) 1, Indiktion [. . . . .
2) Dies ist der/mein . . . .
3) Wir/unser . . . .
4) Wir/unser . . . . 17 . . . .
5) . . . . schief(?)[7] . . . . .
6) Und ein Bett von . . . .

b
1) . . . .
2) hinter dich . . . .

Tafel 8

3) Und wir bringen etwas . . . .
4) Und wir bringen . . . .
5) . . . .
6) . . . .

Der (die) Schüler hatte(n) offensichtlich, wie man an den Wiederholungen a 3/4 bzw. b 3/4 sieht, einen Übungstext kopiert. Die Hausaufgabe ist 'stilgerecht' mit der Datierung überschrieben.

8) BM 27445 (Taf. 8): Homiletischer Text.
   (12×5 cm; Herkunft: Oberäg. (Sahidisch); Datierung: ?; Schrift fast vollständig abgerieben)

Text

1) [. . . . .] ⲉⲃⲟⲗ
2) . .] ⲙⲛ̄ [. . . . .
3) . .] [ⲙ] ⸢ⲙⲟϥ⸣ [. . .
4) . .] ⲁⲥ [. . . . .
5) . .] ⲁϫⲛ̄ ⲛⲟⲃ [ⲉ ⲛ
6) ⲧⲱⲧⲛ̄ [. . . . .
7) ⲁⲓⲡ[ⲁⲣⲁⲕⲁⲗⲉⲓ

Übersetzung

1) . . . . aus
2) . . . . mit(?) . . . . .
3) . . . . ihn . . . . .
4) . . . .
5) . . . . ohne Sünde . . . .
6) euch . . . .
7) ich bat (?) . . . .

Auf Grund des Erhaltungszustandes des Stückes verbietet sich eine weitergehende Interpretation. Vom Inhalt her sei auf die Holztafel BM 21614 (s. hier, Fussnote 1) verwiesen.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Meine Publikation derselben ist im Druck. – Zu weiteren, von mir publizierten, Holztafeln des BM s. GM 40, 1980, 11 ff. (BM 21614), Orientalia 50, 1981, 246 ff. (BM 29423), GM 57, 1982, 93 ff. (BM 41666) und Enchoria XI, 1982, 11 ff. (BM 29495). Vgl. auch die Holztafeln in: *Fouilles franco-polonaises* I, Cairo 1937, 193 ff. (koptisch).

2. Laut Inventarbuch.

3. Aufgrund paläographischer Evidenz.

4. Brunsch, in: WZKM 72, 1980, 8.

5. Laut Inventarbuch.

6. L'archivio demotico del tempio di Soknopaiu Nesos nel Griffith Institute di Oxford, vol. I, Milano 1975.

7. Vielleicht vulgär für ϭⲱⲱⲗⲉ , Crum, Dict. 818 a.

Vignette zum ägyptischen Totenbuch, Kap. 110

SIEGBERT HUMMEL

Bei dieser Vignette[1] handelt es sich bekanntlich um das sogenannte Gefilde der Opfergaben (äg.: *śḥ.t ḥtp*), wo auch das begehrte und fruchtbare Feld der Binsen (äg.: *śḥ.t ì3rw*) zu suchen ist, ein idealisiertes Jenseitsland, zu dem der Verstorbene nach dem osirianisch motivierten Totenglauben auf einem abenteuerlichen und gefahrvollen Weg gelangt, nach einigen Totenbuchtexten im Anschluss an seine Rechtfertigung im Totengericht. K. A. Frank sieht auf der Zeichnung im rechten unteren Feld eine Parallele zur Poseidonstadt im Atlantisbericht nach Platons Kritias (113 a).[2] Danach lag die Residenz auf dem Hügel einer Insel, von konzentrischen, sich abwechselnden Land- und Wasserringen umgeben. Am Fusse des Berges lag die Stadt, zu deren Hafen man durch einen Kanal, der die Land- und Wasserringe durchstach, gelangen konnte.

Schwerlich lässt sich demnach in unserer Vignette das Boot mit dem Stufenberg (äg.: *ḥtjw*) darüber von einem Wasserhügel getragen denken, wie im Anschluss an die Deutung durch Nebseni (*nbsnj*) vermutet wird, eine Deutung aus der 18. Dynastie, die den Sinngehalt der Darstellung bereits nicht mehr voll erfasst hat. Das Boot liegt vielmehr am Ende eines Kanals im Hafen. Die Stellung der Ruder des Bootes auf unserem Bilde entspricht der im Hafen liegender Schiffe. Zur gleichförmigen Gestaltung von Bug und Heck vergleiche man das fahrende Boot ganz oben auf unserer Vignette, aber auch die vorgeschichtlichen Schiffe auf einem Felsbild im Wadi Hammâmât mit der gleichen Ruderstellung.[3]

Bedeutsamerweise trägt die Zeichnung in einem Oval über der Barke die auf unserem Bilde nicht mehr lesbare, aber schon auf Illustrationen zu Sargtexten vorhandene Bemerkung ,,Landestelle'' (äg.: *t3 sm3*),[4] ausserdem bei Naville am Anfang des Kanals im Wasser meines Erachtens eindeutig die Hieroglyphe ,,Insel'' (äg.: *ìw*). Das entspricht altmediterranen, ehedem auch den Etruskern bekannten Vorstellungen vom Jenseits, das man sich auf Inseln dachte. So heisst es auf einer Stele der 18. Dynastie ,,er führt die Barke ... zu den Inseln des *śḥ.t ì3rw*'' (Naville, l.c., Einleitung, S. 156).

Die Barke diente ausserdem der Versorgung des Verstorbenen, wie aus Kap. 102 des Totenbuches (ed. Hornung, S. 202) hervorgeht. Ob sich die Bezeichnung (Göttliche) ,,Nahrung'' (äg.: *df3w*) über einer Barke zum gleichen Kapitel im Papyrus Ani[5] auf die Ladung des Bootes bezieht, vermag ich nicht, zu entscheiden.

Im Totenbuch des Ani liest man noch rechts vom Kanal ,,Prächtiges Ufer'' (äg.: *ìdbw ḏśr*), was ebenfalls für einen Wasserlauf und gegen einen Wasserberg spricht. Dondelinger (Kommentar, S. 77) sieht in der Treppe zum Boote eine Andeutung des aus dem Urwasser aufsteigenden Urhügels (äg.: *ḥˁ.t*) ägyptischer Schöpfungsberichte. Wir werden aber auch an Osiris-Mysterien erinnert, an das Grab der Gottheit auf einer von Wasser umflossenen Anhöhe.

Das Opfergefilde (nach Naville, l.c.).

Zweifellos sind sowohl im Bericht von der Poseidonstadt in Atlantis als auch in der Jenseitskarte des Opfergefildes Vorstellungen vom Urhügel und von den Inseln der Seligen enthalten, selbst wenn an der Karte ägyptischer Totenbücher mit ihren von Wasserläufen umgebenen Landstücken die Topographie des Nildeltas beteiligt gewesen sein sollte. So enthält die Vignette zu Kap. 110 bei Ani tatsächlich eine Insel mit einem Stufenberg.

In meiner Rezension des Buches von Frank (l.c.) habe ich in Ergänzung der vom Verfasser zum Vergleich angeführten Beispiele (u.a. prähistorische Grabanlagen, Abb. S. 35) auf den stufenförmigen Weltberg Sumeru der buddhistischen Kosmologie hingewiesen, der ebenfalls von Land (Berg-)- und Wasserringen umgeben ist. Vor allem aber wird hier der sogenannte Glasberg, der Stufenberg der Jenseitsreise einer spätmegalithischen Gnosis, zu erwähnen sein, der, von Wasser umgeben, im tibetischen Ge-sar-Epos mit seinen reichen alt-vorderorientalischen Traditionen eine bedeutende Rolle spielt.[6]

Da die megalithische Schicht der ägyptischen Kultur weitgehend westmediterran bestimmt ist, lassen sich in der Gestaltung der elysischen Gefilde des Totenbuches sehr wohl Erinnerungen an eine vergangene Kultur Weissafrikas vermuten, wie das von Platons Poseidonstadt gilt, in der ideale und typische altmediterrane Vorstellungen realisiert sind, zumindest aber in sie hineinprojiziert, Vorstellungen vom Welt- und Stufenberg, aber auch von den Inseln der Seligen.[7]

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Nach E. Naville, Das ägyptische Totenbuch der XVIII.–XX. Dynastie, Berlin 1886, Neudruck Graz 1971, Bd. 1, CXXIII; vgl. E. Hornung, Das Totenbuch der Ägypter, Zürich 1979, S. 216, Abb. 58.
2. K. A. Frank, Atlantis war anders, Graz 1978, S. 42 mit der Vignette nach Naville (l.c.); vgl. meine Rezension in: Almogaren, IX, Graz 1980.
3. E. Otto, Ägypten – der Weg des Pharaonenreiches, Stuttgart 1953, Abb. 1.
4. Hierzu auch A. Piankoff, The Wandering of the Soul (Princeton 1974, Tafel 1).
5. Mit Kommentar herausgegeben von E. Dondelinger; bisher Kommentar, Graz 1978.
6. S. Hummel, Das tibetische Megalithikum (in: Ethnologische Zeitschrift Zürich, II, 1975, S. 31 ff.). – Zur spätmegalithischen Idee vom Stufenberg in Altägypten S. Hummel, Ägyptisch-tibetische Parallelen (in: Almogaren, IX, Graz 1980).
7. Zu Binsenfeld als Ort der Seligen auch Pyr. 1010, als Insel Pyr. 1188–91; zur Landestelle des Verstorbenen Pyr. 1751 b.

Dependence and Prophetic Originality in the Koran*

TRYGGVE KRONHOLM

I

The Koran depends on Muhammad. This statement, which apparently is nothing but a truism, actually gives expression to fundamental achievements of modern, critical research.

According to the unanimous view of early Islamic tradition, the Koran—the holy book which today is the unifying link between approximately 750 millions of Muslims[1]—contains the revelations received by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh in Mecca from about 610 C. E. and for twenty odd years onwards until his death in Medina in 632 C. E.[2]

Apart from the evidence supplied by the Koran itself, not merely in isolated verses (like e.g. Q 3.144; 33.40; 47.2; 48.29; see below) but in its entirety,[3] this traditional view is pre-eminently based on the pieces of information concerning the life of Muhammad found in the four major ancient biographies: 1. The Life of the Messenger of Allah (Kitāb sīrat rasūl Allāh) by Ibn Hišām (d. 833), a work which has preserved some two thirds of Ibn Isḥāq's (d. 768) Kitāb al-maġāzī, in which the Prophet, evidently for the first time, is depicted as the ultimate goal of Jewish and Christian salvation history;[4] 2. The Military Expeditions [of the Prophet] (Kitāb al-maġāzī) by al-Wāqidī (d. 822);[5] 3. The Classes/Generations (Kitāb aṭ-ṭabaqāt al-kabīr) by Ibn Saʿd (d. 845);[6] and 4. The Annals (Taʾrīḵ al-mulūk wa'r-rusul) by aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 922);[7] it is also supported by early scattered biographical notes in a number of other works and minor fragments, as listed by F. Sezgin.[8]

This basic, traditional conviction of the Prophetic authenticity of the Koran has not been seriously questioned by the critical Islamwissenschaft of the last century. Hardly any scholar today is willing to defend the extreme criticism advanced by, for instance P. Casanova in his Mohammed et la fin du monde (Paris 1911–1924).[9] Not even the modest questioning of the authenticity of isolated Koranic verses, like that by S. de Sacy (e.g. on Q 3.144),[10] G. Weil (e.g. on Q 3.185; 17.1; 21.35f.; 29.57; 39,30; 46.15)[11] and H. Hirschfeld (e.g. on Q 3.144; 33.40; 47.2; 48.29),[12] is particularly in vogue. 'Modern study of the Qurʾān has not in fact raised any serious question of its authenticity. The style varies, but is almost unmistakable. So clearly does the whole bear the stamp of the Prophet that doubts of its genuineness hardly arise'—this well-known statement in R.

Bell's already classical 'Introduction to the Qurʾān' (first pronounced in 1953)[13] is no less summarizing the status of scholarship thirty years later. In fact, the dependence of the Koran on the person of the Prophet is rather more emphasized today than in the 1950's, especially since R. Burton's debated investigation 'The Collection of the Qurʾān' of 1977 (see further below).[14]

The now prevalent conviction of the fundamental dependence of the Koran on Muhammad personally is affected neither by the results of recent *ḥadīṯ* and *sīra* criticism, nor by modern scholarly unwillingness to accept the traditional view on the compilation of the Koran.

In the ancient *sīra* compilations referred to, we find, of course, much material which is totally irrelevant to the question of the relation between the Prophet and the Koran. A series of literary critical, form-critical, and traditio-historical studies in the early *sīra* literature has enabled us to distinguish more or less strictly between various *Gattungen* represented, like *tafsīr* specimens, pieces of poetry, actual documents, genealogies, *maġāzī* notes, and *ḥadīṯ* material proper. Whilst *tafsīr* sections fall outside our interest here, and the documents, genealogies, and poems occasionally are of a self-evident relevance, if *critically* employed (this applies in particular to the poetic pieces, as pointed out by e.g. W. Arafat),[15] the scholarly discussion has focalized on the *ḥadīṯ* and *maġāzī* material.

As is well known, the earlier studies by I. Goldziher,[16] C. Snouck Hurgronje,[17] L. Caetani,[18] H. Lammens,[19] C. H. Becker[20] and others made it indisputably clear that the majority of the legal *ḥadīṯs* is devoid of authenticity and accordingly most difficult to use as a source of the *vita* of Muhammad. This result has been confirmed by the more recent investigations, of which those by J. Schacht[21] and G. H. A. Juynboll[22] are the most thorough and elucidating. In his major work, 'The Origin of Muhammadan Jurisprudence' (Oxford 1950), Schacht was able to demonstrate more clearly than his predecessors the remarkable tendency of the *isnāds* of the legal *ḥadīṯs* to grow backwards; he also advanced his now famous 'common-link' theory, which recently has been painstakingly scrutinized and improved by Juynboll in his 'Muslim Tradition: Studies in Chronology, Provenance and Authorship of Early *Ḥadīth*' (Cambridge 1983). Regarding the relation between the evidence of the *ḥadīṯ* material and the historical activity of the Prophet in person the outcome of Juynboll's research is hardly more positive than that of earlier critics: 'I am sceptical as to whether we will ever be able to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that what we have in the way of "sound prophetic traditions" is indeed just that what it purports to be'[23]—this general scepticism of Juynboll might certainly be applied even to the question of proving the authenticity of the Koran by means of the *ḥadīṯ* material. Nonetheless, this material supplies us, as J. Burton has pointed out, with a curious piece of evidence that might turn out to be conclusive in this connexion: the fact that all sources, in spite of massive contradictions, are unanimous in claiming that the Koran was not collected by the Prophet himself (see below).[24]

However, the so called *maġāzī* material has appeared to be positively relevant in the scholarly attempts to reconstructing an historical skeleton of the biography of Muhammad. This material, which in G. von Grünebaum's opinion is rooted in the Christian *vitae sanctorum* genre—the lives of the saints being regarded as

'fights'[25]—might be looked upon as a developed form of the pre-Islamic stories of bedouin clan combats, as safeguarded (and expanded) by professional *quṣṣāṣ*.[26] Now, in the *maǧāzī* material of the early *sīra* literature, unlike the *ḥadīt* material originally also spread by the *quṣṣāṣ*,[27] we do not find much of what Th. Nöldeke styled 'die tendenziöse Gestaltung der Urgeschichte des Islams'.[28] Rather these fragmentary stories of the military campaigns of the Prophet appear to put at our disposal a fairly reliable historical framework, into which the basic data of the Prophet's life can be placed. Naturally, this does not mean that these *maǧāzī* notes enable us to reconstruct a complete, running history of the Prophet's activity. This has been rightly emphasized by e.g. R. Blachère,[29] R. Bell,[30] and K. Rudolph.[31] But it means, as W. Montgomery Watt puts it, that this material is 'eine wesentliche Grundlage für den historischen Bericht über das Leben Mohammeds', and he continues: 'Ohne dieses Material ist der Koran als historische Quelle unbrauchbar. Auf seiner Grundlage aber kann man einen zusammenhängenden Abriss der Leistungen Mohammeds geben, in welchen dem koranischen Material eine angemessene Stellung zukommt'.[32] In addition, and this might in the present connexion be even more important, do the *maǧāzī* texts supply a historical context, in which a series of Koranic passages and sections can be properly *understood* and in the light of which the traditional notes on *asbāb an-nuzūl* might be scrutinized.[33]

Thus, the modern *ḥadīt* criticism in general and the *sīra* investigations in particular have in fact revealed nothing which is bound to diminish the intimate, historical relationship between the Koran and the person of the Prophet professed by tradition. On the contrary, this relationship might be even deeper than proposed by ancient tradition. At least this is suggested by some of the recent studies in the early traditions concerning the compilation of the Koran.

Let us commence with a minor problem, viz. that whether Muhammad was able to read and write or not. It is commonly known that the early Islamic tradition answers this question in the negative, and that the expression 'the *ummī* prophet' in Q 7.157f. is employed as a major argument (*ar-rasūla n-nabīya l-ummīya*, 157; *fa-āminū bi-llāhi wa-rasūlihi n-nabīyi l-ummīyi*, 158), particularly since in Q 2.78 the term *ummī* is explicitly connected with people 'who do not know the Scripture' (*ummīyūna lā yaᶜlamūna l-kitāba*).[34] However, in this respect the early tradition, as in many similar cases, is at least partially in conflict, since for instance some versions of the account of the negotiations, which in 628 lead to the al-Ḥudaybiya treaty, depict the Prophet as signing 'Ibn ᶜAbd Allāh' in his own hand![35] In fact, it is of course not reasonable to conceive that Muhammad, as a member of the commercial circles of Arabia—where the art of reading and writing was far from unknown—has been absolutely illiterate. Moreover, the contextually most reasonable understanding of the Koranic *ummī* in 7.157f. remains the one initially advocated by A. J. Wensinck[36] and J. Horovitz:[37] *ummī* simply denotes that Muhammad was 'the heathen prophet' in contradistinction to the classical Jewish prophets (Horovitz rightly refers to the rabbinical *ummōt hā-ᶜōlām*, τὰ ἔθνη τοῦ κόσμου, i.e. 'the non-Jewish peoples of the earth').[38] And this conception is supported by the function of *ummīyūn* in three other Koranic loci, viz. 3.20,75, where the expression is employed to designate the opposite of Jews,

and 62.2, where Muhammad in a parallel way is styled 'a Messenger among the *ummīyūn*, from their own ranks' (*fī l-ummīyīna rasūla m-minhum*). The Koran only asserts that the Prophet was a 'heathen' in the Jewish (and Christian) sense of the word, i.e. that he was an Arab not conversant with the holy Scriptures of the Synagogue and the Church by education, before he received his extraordinary revelations (cf. Q 29.48 *wa-mā kunta tatlū min qablihī min kitābin wa-lā takuṭ-ṭuhū bi-yamīnika*, 'And you [Muhammad] have not previously [i.e. before the revelation of the Koran] read any holy Scripture, nor copied any with your right hand'). Why then, were the early traditionists so eager to claim that their Prophet had been illiterate. The only sensible answer seems to be that the alleged illiteracy is nothing but a logical pendant to the unanimous view of tradition that Muhammad had had nothing to do with the compilation of the Koran.

Even in this respect there is a tension between the testimonies supplied by the Koranic texts themselves and those offered by early tradition.

In the Koran itself we are able to detect scattered intimations to the effect that there existed a fragmentary Koran as early as in the Meccan time. Thus, in Surah 19, which according to Nöldeke–Schwally belongs to the 2nd Meccan period,[39] the term *kitāb* appears several times in a function apparently deviating from those otherwise found in the Koran, like 'letter/document', 'report [of human acts preserved by the angels]' (e.g. Q 17.71; 69.19f., 25f.; 84.7f., 10), 'thesaurus [of divine knowledge]', 'Scriptures [of Jews or Christians]' etc.[40] For in Q 19.16, 41, 51, 54, 56 the word *kitāb* unmistakably refers to some sort of written record of Muhammad's own revelations, i.e. the term functions as an equivalent to a Koran, though naturally merely a most fragmentary one. 'Remember [the Holy] Mary in the book!' (*wa-dkur fī l-kitābi Maryama*, v. 16), is the command which the Prophet receives; furthermore: 'Remember Abraham in the book!' (v. 41), 'Remember Moses in the book!' (v. 51), 'Remember Ishmael in the book!' (v. 54), and 'Remember Idrīs [Andreas?][41] in the book!' (v. 56). In Surah 28, which in Nöldeke–Schwally's view derives its origin from the 3rd Meccan period,[42] we come across the word *kitāb* in a context partially parallel to that of the recurrent phrase *fī l-kitābi* in Surah 19: Muhammad receives the command to invite his opponents to bring forth a 'book' better than those of Moses and himself (*qul faʾtū bi-kitābi m-min ʿindi llāhi huwa ahdā minhumā attabiʿhu in kuntum ṣā-diqīna*, v. 49; as regards the general contents, cf. Q 2.23; 10.38; 11.13; 52.34). In Surah 11, finally, which probably stems from the same time,[43] the non-believers are invited to present *ten* Surahs like those given to Muhammad (*qul faʾtū bi-ʿašri suwari m-miṯlihī* ..., v. 13; cf. 2.23; 10.38; 11.36). It is difficult to evade the conclusion that even before the *Hijra* there must have existed a written record of revelations containing at least ten Surahs, though, of course, not necessarily identical with Surahs known to us. At all events, the three Koranic texts adduced intimate the existence of a pre-*Hijra* collection of Muhammad's prophetic revelations.

This Koranic evidence might prove to be of some significance, when we proceed to the testimony of early Islamic tradition regarding the compilation of the Koran. This testimony is namely a testimony in conflict. There is nothing really problematic in the various notes about those particular men, who are

honoured by the title of *kuttābu l-waḥy*, like ʿUtmān, Muʿāwiya, Ubayy b. Kaʿb, Zayd b. Ṭābit,[44] and in addition ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Sarḥ,[45] for it is merely natural that Muhammad made use of various reliable secretaries in the writing down of his revelations, in a way parallel to his employing of secretaries for normal correspondence.[46] Pieces of information of this nature are not in conflict, they are only complementary in a manner to be expected.

This is, however, not the case with the notes on the further fate of the Koranic material. Since much of this traditional material is easily accessible in most works on the growth of the Koran following the major contribution by Th. Nöldeke–Fr. Schwally, it is only necessary to mention here the various views of early tradition: the collection of the Koran document (*muṣḥaf*) is to some extent attributed to various senior companions of the Prophet, like Miqdād or Muʿāḏ, Abū Mūsā, ʿAbd Allāh, ʿUbāda, and Zayd b. Ṭābit; or to one of the Prophet's widows ʿĀʾiša, Ḥafṣa, and Umm Salama; or to one of the Prophet's four immediate successors, the *kulafāʾ ar-rāšidūn*.[47] A majority of scholars following Nöldeke–Schwally are inclined to accept the particular significance attributed by tradition to the *ṣuḥuf* of Ḥafṣa and in particular the view that there existed no complete collection of the Koran prior to the one brought together by Zayd b. Ṭābit and, consequently, no official, authoritative text of the Koran before the one established by Zayd and his co-operators some time between 650 and 656 (in the chaliphate of ʿUtmān); accordingly early traditions in conflict are rejected, pre-eminently that concerning an earlier collection of the Koran in the chaliphate of Abū Bakr.[48] The actual reasons for accepting some of these traditions at the expense or rejection of those in conflict appear often more traditional than historical. It is no wonder that this dominating conception of the growth of the Koran has been fundamentally questioned in recent times, especially by J. Burton and J. Wansbrough. Thus, in his 'The Collection of the Qurʾān' (1977), Burton claims that all the traditional attributions are nothing but mirrors of school conflicts (especially between 850–950 C. E.), the significant trait common to all of them being the desire to avoid the problematic historical reality: the central role of the Prophet himself in the compilation of the Koran. Thus Burton's investigation ends up in the following conclusion: 'We have isolated and neutralised the only motive for excluding Muḥammad from the editing and promulgating of the Qurʾān texts. In those processes, Muḥammad at last must now be once more re-instated. What we have today in our hands is the *muṣḥaf* of Muḥammad'.[49] In his 'Quranic Studies' (1977), Wansbrough, on the other hand, whilst sharing Burton's basic conviction as regards the unreliability of the early traditions, arrives at an almost opposite conclusion by means of form-critical investigations in the Koranic text, viz. that the unit 'Surah' derives its origin neither to the Prophet, nor to the ʾUtmānic redaction but to an extensive process of textual establishment on the basis of a number of varying *logia* of the Prophet.[50] However, already the fact that these two recent critics of tradition end up in conclusions as much in conflict as tradition itself suggests that prevalent scholarly consensus will continue to function as the best working explanation to cover all the data (cf. the criticism passed on Wansbrough, spec. by A. Neuwirth, and that on Burton by Neuwirth and J. van Ess).[51]

Even though it is not possible to follow Burton all the way back to the assumption of a total dependence of the redaction of the Koranic text on Muhammed personally, it appears critically defendable to hold that the final ʿUtmānic recension of the Koran essentially contains the authentic message of the Prophet, although not necessarily in complete form. Now, even if we are justified in holding that the *contents* of the Koran in reality depends on Muhammad to such an almost total extent as early tradition suggests, then we are faced with an even more entangled and complex problem of dependence, viz. that concerning the tension between dependence and originality in the prophetic revelations themselves; more precisely, the question in how far the Koran texts testify to a far-reaching dependence of Muhammad on elements from Jewish, Christian, Gnostic-Manichaean, and Iranian concepts and in how far they display a creative originality of the Arab Prophet.

II

One aspect of Koranic dependence has been obvious and acknowledged long before the commencement of critical research on the Koran in the 19th century, an aspect which is likely to impress also a modern Western reader already at the first cursory study of the holy book of the Muslims: the vast amount of Biblical material, sometimes in a shape fairly similar to that found in the Old and New Testament, sometimes richly developed with new traits.

The abundance of Old Testament material in the Koran is particularly impressive. The most striking feature is not a number of parallels as regards the concept of creation as expressed in the Hebrew Scriptures, such as the idea of a creative work of six days,[52] the making of sun and moon to give light upon the earth and to distinguish time,[53] the submission of nature under man[54] etc. Concepts of this nature are, furthermore, not especially distinctive, since they are far from unique in relation to the wider ancient Near Eastern context.[55]

The connection between the Koran and Old Testament traditions is much more striking, when the Koranic material revolving around particular Old Testament figures is considered.

Many elements from the biblical *Urgeschichte* (Gen 1,1–11,26) recur in the Koran in connection with scattered notes on the creation and fall of Adam (*Ādam*) and his wife,[56] on the fate of the two sons of Adam,[57] on Noah (*Nūḥ*), his contemporaries, and the Deluge,[58] as well as on a number of other minor traits.[59]

It is also immediately evident that much material from the biblical stories of the patriarchs of Israel (Gen 11,27–50,26) has found its way into the Koran: elements concerning Abraham (*Ibrāhīm*), Lot (*Lūṭ*), Ishmael (*Ismāʿīl*), Isaac (*Isḥāq*), Jacob (*Yaʿqūb*), Joseph (*Yūsuf*), Benjamin (anonymously), and Pharaoh (*Firʿawn*).[60]

Among further of the Pentateuchal persons recurring in the Koran we might mention Moses (*Mūsā*) in particular, but also Aaron (*Harūn*), his brother, Mirjan (*Maryam*), his sister, and Amram (*ʿImrān*), his father; we even find references to Korah (*Qārūn*) etc.[61]

From the remaining parts of the Old Testament (*Nᵉbīʾīm* & *Kᵉtūbīm*) we recognize above all the three first kings of Israel: Saul (*Ṭālūt*), David (*Dāwūd*),

and Solomon (*Sulaymān*), but also a number of other figures, like Elijah (*Ilyās;* even *Ilyāsīn*), Goliath (*Jālūt*), Job (*Ayyūb*), Jonah (*Yūnus*), Ezra (*ʿUzayr*), Haman (*Hāmān*), Gog (*Yājūj*) and Magog (*Mājūj*), in addition Israel (*Isrāʾīl*) and Baal (*Baʿl*); further place names such as Babel (*Bābil*), Midian (*Madyan*), and Sheba (*Sabāʾ*) etc.[62]

In a more restricted manner the Koran draws on New Testament tradition. The figures we meet are primarily Jesus (*ʿĪsā*) and Mary (*Maryam*), his mother; further John the Baptist (*Yaḥyā*) and his father Zechariah (*Zakārīyāʾ*). We may in this connexion also pay regard to non-human beings like Gabriel (*Jibrīl*), Michael (*Mīkāl*), and the Devil (*Iblīs*) etc.[63]

Most of these Biblical elements are, accordingly, almost immediately striking. A somewhat closer study of the relevant Koranic passages will, however, soon reveal that the relation between the Koran and the Hebrew Bible and the Christian New Testament respectively is not adequately described as a dependence proper, since the Koranic presentation of the various Biblical elements commonly deviates much from their role in the Biblical context. Thus, whilst the Koran for instance in conformity with biblical tradition depicts Adam as created from dust by the word of Allāh (Q 3.59), as formed by the Creator and vivified by his breath (Q 32.9; 15.28f.; 13.37 etc.), as able to name everything (2.30–33), as commanded not to approach the forbidden tree, fallen and driven out of Paradise (Q 2.35–39; 7.19–25; 20.117–124), it also suggests a remorse and restitution of the fallen Adam and his wife (Q 2.37; 7.23,149; 11.47; 20.122), which is not intimated in the Hebrew Bible. And whereas many Koranic traits in the Abraham legend correspond to that of the book of Genesis, e.g. that of his divine call (Q 2.124), his intercession on behalf of the people of Lot (Q 11.74–76; cf. 15.57–60; 29.31f.; 51.31–34), his blessing through Isaac (Q 19.49f.; 21.72f.; 37.101,112f.), other traits have no parallel whatsoever in the Biblical material, for instance ideas of a controversy between Abraham and his father and countrymen concerning idolatry (Q 19.41–50; cf. 6.74–84; 21.51–73; 26.69–89; 29.16f.; 37.83–100; 43.26–28; 60.4–6) or of an escape of Abraham from a building of fire (Q 37.97f.; cf. 21.66f.). Adducing one more example only, it is worth noting that the Koran shares many New Testaments concepts about Jesus, who is mentioned in no less than 14 Surahs, e.g. his virginal birth (Q 3.47; 19.20f.), his righteousness (Q 3.46), his mildness and compassion (Q 57.27), his wondrous 'signs' (*āyāt*) in healing the blind and leprous and vivifying the dead (Q 3.49; 5.110) etc., whilst the Koran on the other hand brings a lot of additional traits to the Jesus story, such as that of his mother as growing up in the temple under the supervision of Zecheriah and receiving her food in a woundrous way (Q 3.37) or that of Jesus himself as producing birds of clay (Q 3.49; 5.110). Examples of this nature suggest that the Koran is far from being nothing but a Biblical echo.[64]

This aspect of a problematic dependence of the Koran on material from the Old and New Testaments was, of course, noticed and discussed long before the period of critical research, but the constant inspiration for such discussions were apologetical or even polemical intentions. Thus, already Christian writers like Johannes Damaskenos (8th century) and Niketas of Byzantium (9th century) displayed an interest in the holy texts of the Muslims, Petrus Venerabilis of Cluny

initiated the first translations of the Koran into Latin in 1143, and a few medieval theologians of the West wrote monographs on the Koran, such as Nikolaus of Kues' 'Cribratio Alkoran' (1461), and Ludovico Marracci's 'Refutatio Alcorani' (1698).[65]

However, whereas Old Testament criticism actually commenced in the 17th century by Richard Simon (Histoire critique du Vieux Testament, 1678) and Baruch Spinoza (Tractatus theologico-politicus, 1670), and New Testament criticism began in the 18th century by Johann Salomo Semler (Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Canons, 1771–1775) and Johann David Michaelis (Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des Neuen Bundes, 1750),[66] the critical study of the Koran had to wait until the end of Enlightenment in the 19th century. And this is when the problem of dependence in the Koran was not merely restricted to the question of the Koranic-Biblical relationship, but was gradually widened so as to include a dependence on all conceivable fields. Nonetheless, it was the influence from Judaism and Christianity that first arouse the attention of critical minds.

An early critic to approach this problem was a Jew, one of the most outstanding representatives of the German *Wissenschaft des Judentums*—and especially the *Reformbewegung*—Abraham Geiger (1810–1874).[67] Having received a traditional Jewish education including a vast knowledge of extra-biblical law and legend, Geiger, at the age of 23 (1833), composed a dissertation on the theme 'Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?'[68] In this study, for which he received a prize from the philosophical faculty of Bonn, Geiger was able to demonstrate that Muhammad, due to his natural contact with the Jews of contemporary Arabia, was bound to be influenced not only by biblical elements but also by post-biblical Jewish tradition, especially extra-canonical legend (*haggada*). Although Geiger adduced a number of such elements as transmitted in classical rabbinic sources and also displayed an awareness of the related problem of the explicit negative judgements passed by Muhammad on the Jews, Geiger's critique failed to take the development of the Koran itself into consideration.

The critical investigation into the dependence of the Koran was, though, brought a bit further by another Jewish scholar, Hartwig Hirschfeld (1854–1934),[69] who apart from a small doctoral dissertation which he published at the age of 24 (Jüdische Elemente im Ḳorân. Ein Beitrag zur Ḳorânforschung. Berlin 1878) made two major contributions: 'Beiträge zur Erklärung des Ḳorân' (Leipzig 1886), and 'New Researches into the Composition and Exegesis of the Qoran' ([Asiatic Monographs 3]. London 1902). Already in his initial thesis Hirschfeld was able to make considerable additions to the Jewish comparative material adduced by Geiger. But more important was that Hirschfeld tried to distinguish carefully between the Meccan and the Medinan parts of the Koran, although these terms, of course, were used in conformity with Islamic tradition. In his 'Beiträge' Hirschfeld pursued the intentions of the thesis, adduced additional material, including some New Testament passages and concluded—in the terminology of tradition—that 'die grosse Mehrzahl der eigentlichen Gesetze, Beziehungen zum Alten und Neuen Testament und den rabbinischen Schriften, endlich der fremden Ausdrücke den mekkanischen Theilen des Ḳorân angehört'.[70] Hirschfeld's 'New Researches' did not contribute much to the problem of

dependence. The work is primarily orientated along literary critical lines, distinguishing between the first proclamation of Muhammad, the subsequent confirmatory, declamatory, narrative, descriptive, and legislative revelations etc. Nonetheless, Hirschfeld finds himself able to state that the [Hebrew] Bible is 'that ancient book which speaks through the mouth of the "Seal of the Prophets"', so that 'The Qorân thus betrays Biblical colouring even in those portions, in which Muhammad expressed views which were undoubtedly original, or when he promulgated laws, which grew out of the incidents of the day'.[71] What Hirschfeld did not clearly observe was the problem of how to distinguish between Biblical elements and ancient Arabic elements.

The track of Jewish influence on the Koran was pursued a step further in the early work of a third Jew, Israel Schapiro (1882–1957).[72] In a doctoral thesis, which he defended at the age of 24 (Die haggadischen Elemente im erzählenden Teil des Korans 1. Berlin 1907; defended 10.02.1906), Schapiro undertook a detailed examination of the Koranic *Yūsuf* tradition as contained in Surah 12 (cf. Q 6.84, which Schapiro does not note, and Q 40.34). Being a disciple of the great Th. Nöldeke, Schapiro based his investigation not merely on a representative and well defined collection of rabbinical sources[73] but also made use of Arabic commentators on the Koran and historiographers (Zamaḵšarī, Baiḍāwī, Ṭaʿlabī, Ṭabarī, Ibn al-Atīr) and a few Church fathers (Ephrem the Syrian, Aphrahat, Jerome, Basil the Great of Caesarea, Mar Narses, and Barhebraeus etc.). Schapiro carefully analysed all conceivable Jewish and Christian parallels to the Koranic *Yūsuf* Surah but avoided all general conclusions and neglected to draw any attention to the problem of historical, literary critical, and form-critical problems, whereby his thesis remains mainly a collection of material.

Discussing the early studies on a Koranic dependence on Jewish and Christian tradition, we might also mention here the famous Dutch arabist Arent Jan Wensinck, who in a special investigation on 'Mohammed en de Joden te Medina' (Leiden 1908)[74] painstakingly pointed out the possible Jewish influence on the development of the Islamic cult.

However, the main line of studies of Jewish-Christian influence on the Koran was pursued and preliminary summarized in the doctoral dissertation of the now renowned Old Testament scholar Wilhelm Rudolph, the significant title of which is 'Die Abhängigkeit des Qorans von Judentum und Christentum' (defended in 1920; published in Stuttgart 1922). Rudolph defined that the intention guiding his study was 'übersichtlich darzustellen, was die Qoranwissenschaft bis heute über die Frage der Abhängigkeit des Qorans von Judentum und Christentum zutage gefördert hat'.[75] This means that the actual investigation of the sources, with the natural exception of the Koran itself, became subordinated under the problems discussed in the dominant secondary literature, in particular those connected with the aspects of history and history of religion. Rudolph's investigation led him to formulate two fundamental conclusions, of which the second one partly testifies to a new orientation: 1. 'Judentum und Christentum haben auf Muhammed einen ausserordentlich weitgehenden Einfluss ausgeübt'; 2. 'Vom Christentum ist der entscheidende Anstoss zu Muhammeds Auftreten ausgegangen',[76] yea, Islam is actually 'vom Christentum ausgegangen'.[77] In fact, a partially

similar view had been advanced already in Saint-Clair Tisdall's pamphlet 'The Original Sources of the Quran' (London 1905), though obvious shortcomings of that work had diminished its influence on scholarly discussion.[78] However, Rudolph's investigation suffered from the absence of clear definitions as regards exactly what type of Christianity that was 'die Wiege des Islam'[79] and in particular from the negligence of a more careful study of the Arabic sources regarding the *Jāhilīya* (in spite of a condensed critique of H. Grimme's 'südarabische These').[80]

On the whole, the debate on Jewish and Christian elements in the Koran was very intense and fruitful in the 1920's and 1930's, although this debate, at least seemingly, ended up in the two absolutely contradicting works by K. Ahrens and C. C. Torrey.

The studies of a Jewish influence on the Koran was rendered great service by the German orientalist Joseph Horovitz (1874–1931), himself a Jew.[81] In his outstanding study 'Das Koranische Paradies' ([Scripta Univ. atque Bibl. Hieroso-lymitanarum]. Jerusalem 1923)[82] Horovitz pointed out not merely a number of Jewish and Christian ideas, which might have influenced Muhammad's conception of Paradise, but also the national-Arabic elements (based on solid source studies; cf. also his 'Die paradiesischen Jungfrauen im Koran', Islamica 1/1925, p. 543[83]), as well as various cultural traits active in these elements, as discernible e.g. in many loanwords. Horovitz pursued his Koranic studies by a full scale investigation on 'Jewish Proper Names and Derivatives in the Koran' (Hebrew Union College Annual 2/1925, pp. 145–227),[84] which meant a great step forward in comparison with earlier somewhat parallel studies on Koranic loanwords (like S. Fraenkel, De vocabulis in antiquis Arabum carminibus et in Corano peregrinis, Leiden1880; Die aramäischen Fremdwörter im Arabischen, Leiden 1886; scattered contributions in Hirschfeld's studies mentioned above; R. Dvorak, Über die Fremdwörter im Koran [Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie, Philos.-hist. Klasse 109], Wien 1885, pp. 481–562; Th. Nöldeke's studies in his 'Geschichte des Qorāns' [see above], and 'Neue Beiträge zur semitischen Sprachwissenschaft', Strassburg, 1910; the chapters on Christian words and names in L. Cheiko's 'Le Christianisme et la littérature chrétienne dans l'Arabie préislamique', 1–2, Beirut 1909–1919 etc.).[85] The major merit of this work appears to be that Horovitz consistently takes into consideration not merely the relevant classical Arabic sources, but also Southern Arabian inscriptions, Oriental Christian and Mandaic and even Parsee sources, Byzantine chroniclers referring to Arabian conditions etc. The Jewish elements in the narrative sections of the Koran were excellently distinguished in Horovitz' 'Koranische Untersuchungen' (Berlin-Leipzig 1926, pp. 1–77; the second part of the work is devoted to proper names, pp. 78–165), but Horovitz makes simultaneously justice to Christian elements.

The same cannot, however, be said about C. C. Torrey's 'The Jewish Foundation of Islam' (New York 1933),[86] containing five lectures on 'The Jews in Arabia', 'The Genesis of the New Faith', 'Allah and Islam in Ancient History', 'The Narratives of the Koran', and 'Muhammed's Legislation'. Torrey, who is well known for his extremist convictions also as a Biblical scholar,[87] ends up in

stating 'the undeniable fact, that the very foundations of Mohammedanism were laid deep in an Arabian Judaism which was both learned and authoritative, altogether worthy of its Palestinian and Babylonian ancestry'.[88] Thus, Muhammad is regarded as mainly a disciple of the Synagogue, i.e. primarily the Jewish community in Mecca. The problem why Muhammad does not display any knowledge of the classical prophets of Israel is solved by the bold supposition that their message went beyond the intellectual capability of the Prophet of Mecca. Torrey further maintained that Muhammad had cheated his Jewish informants as long as he needed instruction by pretending an interest to become a proselyte, whilst, at a later stage, he made himself independent.

Curiously, at about the same time there evolved also an opposite extremist opinion, the way of which was prepared by two sober and scholarly works, viz. T. Andrae's 'Der Ursprung des Islams und das Christentum' (Kyrkohistorisk Årsskrift 23/1923, pp. 149–206; 24/1924, pp. 213–292; 25/1925, pp. 25–112),[89] and R. Bell's 'The Origin of Islam in its Christian Environment'. London 1926).[90] In his very thorough study Andrae drew attention to the literature of oriental Christianity, and concluded on the basis of a vast literary material that Muhammad had been influenced by Christian mission, presumably of Nestorian confession. This would explain 'dass der Prophet nicht nur die christliche Lehre von dem Gericht, von der Vergeltung und den guten Werken in den Grundzügen kennt, sondern auch im Einzelheiten die in den Kirchen des Orients übliche Auffassung dieser Lehren wiedergibt, teilweise sogar in Stilformen und Ausdrücken, die christlichen Ursprungs sein müssen'.[91] Bell likewise, in a sober and modulated tone, emphasized the impact of Christianity on early Islam in its various phases, clearly aware of the change of Muhammad's attitude towards Christianity in the span of his career. However, the ideas of Andrae and Bell, which in several respects had its fore-runners in J. Wellhausen and A. von Harnack,[92] were expanded by K. Ahrens (Christliches im Koran. Eine Nachlese, ZDMG, NF 9/1930, pp. 15–68. 148–190; Muhammad als Religionsstifter, Leipzig 1935). Ahrens did not merely claim that 'in Mekka der entscheidende und überweigende Einfluss auf Muhammed von Christen ausgeübt worden ist'[93] but also that much of Muhammad's anti-Christian arguments were taken from Christian fractions;[94] and it is of significance to note that the reason why Muhammad had become essentially a disciple of the Church was an alleged opportunism!

The absolute extremism on this line of reasoning has apparently been reached recently through the works of the German scholar G. Lüling (Kritisch-exegetische Untersuchung des Qur'āntextes, Diss. Erlangen 1970; Über den Ur-Qur'ān. Ansätze zur Rekonstruktion vorislamischer christlicher Strophenlieder im Qur'ān. Erlangen 1974; Der christliche Kult an der vorislamischen Kaaba als Problem der Islamwissenschaft und christlichen Theologie. Erlangen 1977; and finally Die Wiederentdeckung des Propheten Muhammad. Eine Kritik am ''christlichen'' Abendland. Erlangen 1981). Lüling's argument is very complex. His main thesis is, however, that Muhammad is a representative of Jewish Christianity, in fact original Christianity, though admittedly in sympathy with Abrahamite-Ishmaelite old Arabic paganism. The opponents of Muhammad were mainly Hellenistic, image-serving, trinitarian Christians of the Central Arabia.

And Lüling, who prosecutes his studies from the perspective of the relation between Islam and Christianity of today, goes as far as to claim that we are able to rediscover real Christianity by studying the pure form of Islam as this might be reconstructed from the authentic layers of the Koran. In Lüling's view, Muhammad is actually a preacher of genuine Christian, i.e. non-trinitarian faith.[95]

In the meantime there has, fortunately, appeared a number of other studies, which have helped us to avoid the most extreme views on possible Jewish and Christian influence on the Koran. Thus, a series of historical investigations, especially those by C. A. Nallino,[96] R. Devresse,[97] M. Guidi,[98] J. Ben-Zvi,[99] J. A. Stillman,[100] and also J. P. Asmussen,[101] have contributed to clarify the Jewish and Christian expansion, diversity, and role in pre-Islamic Arabia. It is now evident that there has been a considerable Jewish population in Arabia, particularly as a result of the great national catastrophes through the fall of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. and the failure of the Bar Kochba revolt in 132–135 C.E., though probably also at an earlier period.[102] It is true that there is no clear evidence for the existence of a Jewish community in pre-Islamic Mecca, but the fact that there were Jewish communities in Medina, in Jemen, and in the oases of North-West Arabia (Fadak, al-Ḥijr, Ḵaybar, al-ʿOla, Tayma, Wādī 'l-Qurā)[103] makes it extremely unlikely that—in view of intense commercial exchange—there was not a theoretical possibility for Jewish influence on Muhammad already in Mecca. As regards Christianity, the presence of which derives its origins back to apostolic times,[104] the role of its Orthodox branch seems to have been little in pre-Islamic Arabia. In South Arabia (Najrān) we find since the 4th century C.E. a form of a Syriac/Mesopotamian (Nestorian?) Christianity of an ascetic-monastic type, on the other hand also a Monophysite form, partly influenced from Ethiopia. In the time of Muhammad the South-Arabian Church was basically Nestorian.[105] In al-Ḥīra in North Arabia was another, very influential center of Nestorianism.[106] As far as Central Arabia is concerned, the sources are fairly meager: notes of scattered eremites,[107] of Christian slaves in Mecca (Ethiopian and Syrian faith),[108] and of Christians among a few northern tribes, like Banū Tajlib and Banū Bakr.[109] In addition there must have been a number of other more or less heretical or secterical forms of Christianity.[110] Thus, the opportunities of Muhammad to become influenced by Jewish and Christian doctrines and traditions were certainly present.

However, the real amount and character of the Jewish and Christian elements in the Koran are utmost difficult to establish. This is clearly seen in the studies from the later fifty years, quite regardless of extreme views. True, it is not particularly difficult to list the Biblical figures occurring in the Koran (as J. Walker did in his popular but valuable 'Bible Characters in the Koran'. Paisley 1931). Much more painstaking are the attempts by D. Sidersky and H. Speyer to adduce not merely the Biblical parallels to the narrative material of the Koran but also relevant texts from the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, and in addition from the rabbinical collections of Jewish *haggada* (viz. Sidersky's 'Les origines des légendes musulmanes dans le Coran et dans les Vies des Prophètes'. Paris 1933; and Speyer's now standard compilation 'Die biblischen Erzählungen im Qoran'. Gräfenheinichen, *s.d.*, though from the 1930's).[110] But although these authors are

correct in explaining many narrative traits in the Koran (like those intimated above)[111] as connected with parallel traits in Jewish *haggada* and Christian legend, the problem of dependence is only solved to a minor extent. Sidersky avoids general discussions and conclusions on the whole, whereas Speyer at least tries to distribute the comparative material in accordance with the Nöldeke–Schwally chronology ('Zusammenfassung', pp. 462–492), and he claims that the Jewish and Christian elements in the Old Testament fragments of the Koran 'zeigen, wie Mohammed im Laufe seiner Entwicklung mehr und mehr Stellung zu jüdischen und christlichen Lehren nahm, sie billigend oder ablehnend. In Mekka fühlte er sich in mancher Hinsicht den ,,Völkern des Buches'' verbunden. In Medina endlich zog er dann die Grenzen zwischen Judentum, Christentum und Islam'.[112] Naturally, in many cases parallels of the nature discussed may be understood or even proved to be specimens of influence. In other cases a parallel now preserved in one of the collections of Jewish *haggada* may very well ultimately prove to have either originated within the Church or to have been overtaken or transmitted by the Church. The opposite alternative will, though, be even more likely (as recent studies in various Church Fathers' Christianizing of Jewish haggadic elements have shown).[113] Moreover, there will be a need of much future research, as regards what particular kind(s) of Judaism and Christianity, that served as a channel to the Prophet. Concerning Christianity, T. Andrae's extreme emphasis on the role of Nestorianism[114] has already been questioned by e.g. M. Guidi, who points to the impact of Monophysite (spec. Gassanide) tradition.[115] But many problems will remain until more source material is brought into light. Admittedly, a number of solid contributions to the question of the Koran and ancient Christianity have been written from a purely theological/dogmatical perspective (like G. Parrinder, Jesus in the Qur'ān. London 1965; J. Bouman, Das Wort vom Kreuz und das Bekenntnis zu Allah. Die Grundlehren des Korans als nachbiblische Religion. Frankfurt am Main 1967; *idem*, Gott und Mensch im Koran [Impulse der Forschung 22]. Darmstadt 1977; H. Räisänen, Das koranische Jesusbild. Ein Beitrag zur Theologie des Korans [Missiologian ja ekumeniikan seuran julkaisuja 20]. Helsinki 1971; and C. Schedl's impressive Muhammad und Jesus. Die christologisch relevanten Texte des Koran, neu übersetzt und erklärt. Wien-Freiburg-Basel 1978), not to mention specimens of the modern dialogue clima.[116] But contributions of this character are by nature bound to devote at the best only a minimal interest in the definition of Christian influence on the Koran, for this problem can only be properly treated in the terms of general history of religion, in pursuance of the commendable attempts of K. Rudolph.[117] The same applies, in fact, to the question of Jewish influence (some of the reasons why this problem is so complicated are masterly pointed out in S. D. Goitein, Jews and Arabs. Their Contacts Through the Ages. New York 1955; repr. 1974).[118] However, influence and dependence is not the same (see below III).

Even though Judaism and Christianity have constantly been focalized in the discussions of the religious sources of early Islam, some scholars have in addition pointed to the possible influence from Gnosticism, Manichaeism, and Iranian Zoroastrianism.

The question of a Gnostic influence on the Koran has been discussed for a long time already,[199] pre-eminently on the basis of Muhammad's definition of the Sabians (*aṣ-Ṣābiᶜūn*) as being a 'people of the Book' (*ahl al-kitāb*, Q 2.62; 5.69; 22.17, all from Medina).[120] These Sabians, which earlier were identified with the *Ḥanīfs* (e.g. J. Pedersen),[121] have more recently been regarded as a sect of Gnostic baptists (cf. Aram. *ṣbᶜ*), originally a Jewish fraction from eastern Syria-Palestine.[122] Koranic elements, which allegedly derive their origins from this Gnostic group, have been discussed by e.g. M. Guidi,[123] G. Widengren,[124] and K. Rudolph.[125]

Parallel with the question of these Gnostic-baptistic elements, the problem of Gnostic-Manichaean traits in the Koran have been dealt with by e.g. G. Widengren[126] and M. Lidzbarski,[127] who are inclined to define much of the Koranic terminology as influenced by Gnostic-Manichaean *Kunstsprache* (though terms like *ᶜālimūn*, 'aeons', *furqān*, 'redemption', *ᶜilm* 'knowledge', *mārid*, 'rebellious', *bāṭil*, 'futile' etc. appear to the present writer to be highly disputable as examples). More plausible seems the suggestion that Muhammad's view as regards the death of Jesus (Q 4.157) might have been influenced by Manichaean concepts,[128] whereas, again, the idea of Muhammad's mission (*rasūl Allāh*) cannot be deemed as specifically Manichaean.[129]

It is also possible that Gnostic-Manichaean sects are responsible for having transmitted the alleged Iranian-Zoroastrian elements (the *Hārūt/Mārūt* concept and some eschatological traits)[130] and loan-words.[131] Only once in the Koran are, however, these Zoroastrians (*al-Majūs*) mentioned (Q 22.17, from Medina).

When we in this way survey the scholarly attempts to define various conceivable sources of influence on the Prophet of Islam, we end up in no little embarrassment. We are faced with a flood of influence with almost innumerable branches: Old Testament figures and narratives, New Testament elements, material from the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, Jewish *haggadot* and *halakot*, post-biblical Christian legend, traits of ascetic-monastic ideals, and minor component parts from Gnostic-baptistic sects, Gnostic-Manichaean groups, Iranian-Zoroastrian concepts, not to speak about foreign words, which are said to have come into the Koran from the Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac, Ethiopic, Greek, Iranian, Nabataean, Coptic, Turkish, Negro and Berber languages![132] And this magnificent flood of alleged influence is likely to fully drown the opposite question: What about the originality of the Prophet? In fact, this question was asked with emphasis by J. Fück some fifty years ago.[133] It has also been kept alive by R. Paret and his school,[134] by M. Bravmann,[135] and a number of other prominent Arabists.

III

Let us start with a few remarks of a general nature, some arguments of normal plausibility. It is probable that a book, which has won hundreds of millions of believers throughout the centuries, is nothing but a specimen of syncretism? Would we not rather presuppose that such a book must have a remarkable amount of fresh creativity and originality?

Furthermore, scholars of the latter two centuries have arrived at strongly

conflicting opinions as regards Koranic dependence (cf. e.g. Torrey versus Ahrens, Andrae versus Guidi, Goitein versus Lüling). Maybe these conflicts indicate that something essential has been overlooked, something of a unifying nature?

Even if we have convinced ourselves that there are in fact many Biblical, many Jewish and Christian, many Gnostic and Zoroastrian elements in the Koran, do these observations necessitate the conclusion that the Koran has been dependant on these elements? This question must be answered in the negative. Let us take a comparative example. In Old Testament scholarship it is agreed that Jeremiah, the prophet who was active more than 1200 years prior to the Prophet of Mecca (c. 627– after 597), has been conversant and even influenced by early traditions of Israel, like those concerning the exodus, the *Landnahme*; further the David traditions, the Zion traditions, the Covenant traditions etc.[136] But no Old Testament scholar would claim that these pieces of influence constitute a burden of dependence so that it would interfere with the very marked, prophetic originality of Jeremiah. Theoretically, we are bound to be open to the possibility that Muhammad, likewise, made use of various extraneous elements in service of his prophetic originality. If he really did so, then the loan material would lose most of its own originality and become transformed in accordance with the concept of the Prophet, i.e. what appears to be dependence might actually be a servant of creativity. A readiness to consider such a logical inference seems to be a scholarly must, in fact, something as elementary as the awareness of the distinction between etymology and function in the field of linguistics.

This distinction becomes important, when we reflect on the fact that the Koran, although richly intermingled with Jewish and Christian elements, has never been accepted neither by Jews nor by Christians. The Jews, whilst recognizing in the Koran a lot of narrative stuff from the Biblical Scriptures and the post-biblical *haggada* and in addition many issues in conformity with Jewish law, have always been unable to consent to a religious faith, in which the imminent Day of Judgement is the central issue, the virgin birth of Jesus is professed, and major points of Jewish *halaka* on purity, offerings, prayers, holy scriptures etc. are absent, not to mention in detail here the open critique of Judaism in certain parts of the Koran.[137] The Christians, on the other hand, have similarly—apart from occasional exceptions[138]—never been able to accept the Koranic dogma, though, of course, acknowledging in it many elements of Christianity. What about Muhammad's claim that Jesus is merely one among the Jewish prophets, inferior to both Abraham and Moses, whilst Muhammad himself is the 'Seal of the prophets' bringing the ultimate revelation? What about the Koranic rejection of the very Christology of the New Testament? What about Koranic laws in conflict with the gospel, e.g. those concerning prayers, holy-days, polygyny? And what about the explicit criticism of the Christians in the Koran? Lüling's resort to the supposition that the *Ur-Koran* actually represents original Christianity in a Jewish-Christian form, of which we know almost nothing, is a blind alley, or in R. Paret's words: 'völlig abwegig'.[139] The majority of the foreign elements of the Koran are better explained as servants of Muhammad's prophetic originality.

In order to come close to the reality and true nature of this fundamental originality, we will have to approach the personality of the Prophet himself, as testified to in the only indisputably authentic source of his person and message, the Koran itself. What kind of a man do we meet there? Was one of the world's great religions in reality founded by an impostor, as Th. Carlyle once claimed? Or was he a deceitful opportunist, as K. Ahrens thought? Or was he a medical case, suffering from epilepsy, as G. Weil suggested, or even an hysterical epileptic, as A. Sprenger held? Or shall we seek for a more bewildering explanation and hold, e.g. with D. S. Margoliouth, that Muhammad was a person deliberately mystifying the people like a modern spiritist, or, with W. Muir, that Muhammad succumbed to the wiles of Satan? Or shall we look for other solutions?[140]

Contrary to ideas of this nature, the Koran reveals a man of honesty, a man of strength and firm character, a man of consideration and good will, and a man of exceptional influence on others. Everything points in the direction that the acts and words of this man were whole-hearted and genuine. On several occasions we receive the impression that this man found himself in fear, anguish, and even doubt, but nonetheless under an obligation to do what he did and to proclaim what he proclaimed. In that respect he is akin to many of the ancient prophets of Israel. The sources leave no doubt as to the fact that Muhammad considered himself as something of a suffering servant in obedience to a call and a message. The sources also leave it beyond doubt that this conviction of his was due to some real, but extra-normal and non-escapable experiences. And however much Muhammad might have listened to Christian monks or Jewish scholars, these experiences of his were in themselves unique. From a phenomenological point of view we can only describe them as revelations.

Now, Koranic scholarship has long recognized not only that we have to distinguish carefully between the various periods from which the Surahs of the Koran derive their origin but also that the Koranic texts stemming from the first Meccan period are subject to a considerably lesser degree of influence from Jewish or Christian elements than the later texts of the Koran. There can hardly be any methodological objection against searching for the basic traits of a supposed prophetic originality exactly in the most ancient Surahs. What is their testimony?

The traditional account in Ṭabarī's *Taʾrīk* on the authority of ʿUrwa b. az-Zubayr on the call of Muhammad as commencing by genuine visions (*ar-ruʾyā ṣ-ṣādiqa*, I,1147 = ed. Moḥammad Abul Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo: Dar al-Maaref, *s.d.* [Dhakhāʾir al-ʿArab 30], 2, p. 298) is supported by Koranic evidence, viz. the famous description in Q 53.1–18 of the initial two visions: 'By the star, when it falls! Your compatriot [Muhammad] has not gone astray, nor has he erred. Nor does he speak of [his personal] inclination. It is nothing but an inspired revelation (*waḥyun yūḥā*), Taught him by One, strong in power, And firm: He stood upright, Upon the high horizon. And then he drew near, and he let himself down, Till he was [only] two bow-lengths off, or [even] nearer. And he revealed unto his servant what he revealed (*fa-awḥā ilā ʿabdihi mā awḥā*). The heart [of the Prophet] did not falsify what it saw ... He saw him, too, at a second descent, By the sidra-tree at the boundary, Near which is the garden of the abode, When the sidra-tree was enveloped. The eye [of the Prophet] did not turn aside [so that he

might have seen unclearly], and he was not out of balance. Verily, he has [even on other occasions?] seen great signs from his Lord.'

We shall not here enter on a discussion on whether Muhammad in these first two visions found himself in the presence of Allāh or before a heavenly Messenger, nor on the nature of Muhammad's previous devotions at Mt. Ḥirā in the vicinity of Mecca, nor on the fear and suicidal thoughts that accompanied these visions according to tradition. We shall merely draw attention to these revelations as being genuine, extraordinary experiences, overwhelming revelations, which hardly can be interpreted as anything but burdens of prophecy, visions with the inherent claim to be proclaimed.

A careful analysis of the early Surahs of the Koran—such as those undertaken by pre-eminently R. Bell,[141] H. Birkeland,[142] and W. Montgomery Watt[143]—will enable us to discern the basic features of this original prophetic burden and message.

These sources reveal that the central issue of Muhammad's early message was not only that of monotheism or that of the imminent Day of Judgement. It was also his personal experience of 'God's merciful guidance in the life of himself and his people'.[144] And this absolutely personal experience is the nucleus out of which Muhammad's special concept of a revelatory cyclus grows. This concept is, as J. Fück has seen long ago, 'der beste Beweis dafür, dass Muhammad den entscheidenden Anstoss zu seiner Predigt weder von Juden noch von Christen erhalten haben kann'.[145] For this concept implies that Allāh, the one and unique God, in earlier times had chosen to reveal himself to the prophets of ancient Israel and to the prophet Jesus of Christianity, but now had come to the tribes of the Arabs and to the Prophet of Mecca. If only this personal conviction of Muhammad is kept in mind, even the other features of his early message will become understandable as consequences. If, on the other hand, this concept is not constantly born in mind, most of the details of Muhammad's early preaching will seem as merely an echo of Biblical themes.

When the Surahs of the 1st Meccan period are scrutinized, it will become evident that the first message of the Prophet was focalized on his experience of Allāh as now turning to the Arab tribes through the person of Muhammad. True, one of the prominent themes of the Prophet's initial message was that of Allāh as the wonderful Creator of humanity from the first embryo (Q 96.1–8; 80.19–23), the God who reveals his power by the shape of the camels, by the highness of heaven, by the erection of the mountains, by the extension of the earth etc. (Q 88.17–20), the God who reveals his providence and goodness towards man not only by watering the earth and supplying corn, vines, olives and palms (Q 80.24–32) but also by acting to the best of man in the history of a people. But according to the Koran, this message, however general it might appear, is unravellably related to the person of the Prophet. The powerful and providing Allāh has not only guided the people of Muhammad. He has also sought for him personally and has found him and accepted him, already when the Prophet was a mere orphan. Allāh has guided him, although the young Muhammad was found erring around (Q 93.3–8). Thus, the general revelation of Allāh's power and love of humanity is part of the personal experience of the Prophet.

The same is true of another dominant theme of the early proclamation of

Muhammad, namely the admonishing of people to be godfearing and thankful. Since Allāh is both powerful and all-present, man is called to live in purity, in remembrance of God and in prayer (Q 87.14f.). It is typical that the debated term for an 'unbeliever' (*kāfir*)[146] actually seems to have a more original sense of 'ungrateful'.[147] But the simple religious ethics of the young Prophet was again based on personal experience to the effect that Allāh had visited *him* and *his* people and there revealed his grace and purity and compassion.

The latter aspects leads us a step further: the practical ethics of Muhammad's early teaching seems to have been concentrated on the concepts in the ancient tribal ethics of the Arabs: to free the slaves, to feed the hungry, to take care of orphans, widows and the poor (Q 90.13–16; 93.9–11; 51.16–19; 69.33f.). But again, these traditional ethical claims were inspired by a revelatory encounter between the Prophet, who himself had experienced both being an orphan and being destitute of means, and Allāh, who had visited him and made him rich (Q 93.3–8).

Even the central theme of the imminent Day of Judgement, which in its early form was preached in considerable restraint (Q 84.1–12), was connected with the Prophet's own revelatory experience of Allāh, who has *now* come to visit the Arabs and reveal his power and love. However, if the people continues to live in evilness and greed and self-sufficiency, then Allāh's ultimate coming will reveal itself as a severe judgement. 'Nay', the Prophet complains, 'man oversteps his bounds (*yaṭġā*), [because] he considers himself independent' (*istaġnā*, Q 96.6f.). It is in view of this excession and strive towards independence among his compatriots that *Muhammad* has received the mission: 'Rise and warn!' (*qum fa-anḏir*, Q 74.2), 'And admonish, as long as admonition is of use [to man]' (*fa-ḏakkir i n-nafaʿti ḏ-ḏikrā*, Q 87.9).

The suggestion that the fundamental themes of Muhammad's early message are consequences of the personal experiences and visions of the Arab Prophet and not merely the echoes of Jewish and Christian instruction is also supported by the very form of the most ancient texts of the Koran: the words are moulded in a most condensed rhymed prose; they are exponents of the *qarīnat as-sajᶜ* which we know, not from the Jewish or Christian liturgical language, but from the ancient Arabic *kāhins* and speakers: 'Denn die *āyāt* der frühen Suren der ersten Periode zeigen zwar noch deutlich ihre Herkunft aus dem altarabischen *Saǧᶜ*', as A. Neuwirth recently has confirmed.[148] In fact, not only the particular modes of expression—the phrases being distinguished by alliteration and the message being proclaimed in a most solemn way, emphasized by elevated oaths etc.—but the whole of Muhammad's early activity, including his activity in making legal decisions and judging between his followers, delineates him as a traditional Arabic seer and visionary, an Arab *kāhin*,[149] endowed with a special unavoidable burden of prophecy.

The last-mentioned formal peculiarity of the earliest prophecies of Muhammad might serve as a first intimation that we are bound to search in another direction than those of Jewish, Christian, Gnostic, Manichaean, Zoroastrian or whatever impulses, when looking for the milieu in which the natural dependence of Muhammad is rooted, viz. that of the traditional culture of pre-Islamic Arabia, as we know it from the literary remnants of the *Jāhilīya*. Thus, to take but a few

examples, E. Haeuptner, of the Paret school, has collected an impressive amount of 'Koranische Hinweise auf die materielle Kultur der alten Araber' (Diss. Tübingen 1966) not only in the fields of the city culture (with its special terminology connected with building activities, various types of handicrafts etc.) but also as regards the bedouin life (terms related to the various animals of the nomads, to their hunting and fishing, their dresses, tents, food, and implements etc.). J. K. Sollfrank, likewise of the Paret school, has investigated the legal terminology of Muhammad (Spuren altarabischer Rechtsformen im Koran. Diss. Tübingen 1962), and, like E. Haeupter, he concludes that the juridical language of the Koran mirrors the amalgamation of the bedouin and the city life of Mecca: 'Beide Lebensformen sind hier noch nicht klar voneinander abgetrennt. So vermischen sich auch bei den Rechtsbegriffen im Koran auf eigenartige Weise Rechtsformen rein beduinischen Charakters mit solchen, die bereits deutliche Züge einer kaufmännisch-städtischen Rechtspraxis an sich tragen'.[150] But even the principal concepts of Muhammad's teaching are mainly re-creations of pre-Islamic Arabic concepts: this applies to the very *sunna* and *sīra* of the Prophet himself, but also to the ethical teaching of *murūwa*, '*virtus*', *amr*, 'a man's command to himself' in the tribal context, *islām*, as designating a man's 'fight' (cf. *jihād*) also in a religious sense, *imān*, a man's 'assurance' in a perilous life etc., as succinctly pointed out by M. M. Bravmann (The Spiritual Background of Early Islam. Studies in Ancient Arab Concepts. Leiden 1972).

However, even if we in pursuance of these examples will be able to discern— and that will presumably cost more pains than to demonstrate for instance the amount of Jewish and Christian elements—that the Koran is deeply rooted in the traditions of the ancient Arabs, their culture, ethical concepts, legal practise, verbal mastery, as, on the whole, in pre-Islamic Arabic religion,[151] even this track would lead us astray, in so far as we regard the Prophet of Mecca as nothing but a product of inner Arabic impulses.

In the centre of the Koranic message we meet the personality of Muhammad, his own special character, his hard years of poverty, his devoted search for Allāh, his overwhelming visions and the message contained in them: the conviction that Allāh has now visited the Arab tribes and has chosen Muhammad as his prophet. On the basis of this experience his prophetic message becomes understandable and logical. And only when this central issue is kept in mind, will we be able to appreciate rightly not only the function of the traditional Arabic elements in the Koran but also that of the many foreign elements that gradually find its way into the message of the Prophet. These elements, then, are not to be interpreted as tokens of a spiritual dependence. Rather they are employed and transformed by Muhammad into obedient servants of his prophetic originality.

NOTES

1. The number of Muslims in the population of the world can, of course, only be given in most approximate terms. The figure noted here (1980) is taken from a fresh survey presented by B. Utas in Kultur, religion och nutrition. En seminariestudie arrangerad vid Inst. för näringslära, Uppsala universitet, vårterminen 1981, ed. by C.-M. Edsman – L. Hambraeus – O. Mellander, Uppsala 1983, pp. 156 f.

2. For a first introduction to the relation between Muhammad and the Koran according to early Muslim tradition, see spec. Th. Nöldeke, Geschichte des Qorāns. 2. Aufl. Band 1–2 bearb. von Fr. Schwally. Leipzig 1909–1919; Band 3 von G. Bergsträsser und O. Pretzl. Leipzig 1938 (repr. in 1 vol. Hildesheim 1961 = N-S); T. Andrae, Muhammed, sein Leben und sein Glaube. Göttingen 1932; R. Bell, Introduction to the Qurʾān [Edinburgh University Publications, Language & Literature 6]. Edinburgh 1953 (repr. 1963); W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford 1953 (repr. 1960); idem, Muhammad at Medina. Oxford 1956 (repr. 1981); R. Paret, Muhammed und der Koran. Stuttgart (1957) [4]1976; W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad, Prophet and Statesman. London 1961; J. Burton, The Collection of the Qurʾān. Cambridge-London-New York-Melbourne 1977 (repr. 1979); J. Wansbrough, Quranic Studies. Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation [London Oriental Studies 31]. Oxford 1977; W. Montgomery Watt – A. T. Welch, Der Islam I. Muhammed und die Frühzeit – Islamische Recht – Religiöses Leben [Die Religionen der Menschheit 25/1]. Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz 1980.

3. Cf. e.g. N-S, 2, pp. 81–93; Bell, op. cit., pp. 43–47.

4. C. Brockelman, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur, 1–2. Leiden [2]1943–1949 [= GAL[2]], 1, p. 141; F. Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. Leiden 1967 ff. (= GAS), 1, pp. 288 f., 297–299.

5. GAL[2], 1, pp. 141 f.; GAS, 1, pp. 294 f.

6. GAL[2], 1, pp. 142 f.; GAS, 1, pp. 300 f.

7. GAL[2], 1, pp. 148 f.; GAS, 1, pp. 323–328.

8. GAS, 1, pp. 275–302.

9. For a critique, see e.g. Bell, op. cit., pp. 46 f.

10. See N-S, 2, pp. 81–83.

11. Ibid., pp. 81–93.

12. Ibid., pp. 83 f.

13. Bell, op. cit., p. 44.

14. See above, n. 2.

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29. Le probleme de Mahomet, Paris 1952, p. 17.

30. Op. cit. (n. 2), p. 20.

31. Op. cit. (n. 26), p. 303.

32. Op. cit., 1980 (n. 2), p. 50.

33. Ibid., p. 48.
34. On *ummī*, see e.g. N-S, 1, pp. 14–17; Bell, op. cit., 17–20; Enzyklopädie des Islams, 1–4, Erg. Bd., Leiden-Leipzig 1908–1938 (= EI¹), art. *Ummī*; J. Horovitz, Jewish Proper Names and their Derivates in the Koran, HUCA 2/1925, pp. 190f.; idem, Koranische Untersuchungen, Berlin-Leipzig 1926, pp. 51–53; A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, Cambridge 1932, p. 6; C. A. Nallino, Raccolta di scritti, 2, Roma 1940, p. 60; see also Rudolph, op. cit., p. 315, n. 110; R. Paret, Der Koran. Kommentar und Konkordanz, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz ²1977 (repr. 1980), p. 21 f.
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49. Burton, op. cit., pp. 239f.
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51. Burton's views are critically examined by J. van Ess in The Times Literary Supplement 8/1979, pp. 99f.; and by A. Neuwirth in a review in OLZ 76/1981; see further A. Neuwirth, in W. Diem, Hrsg., Einführung in die Arabistik. Darmstadt 1981; and Neuwirth, op. cit. (n. 48), pp. 10 on both Burton and Wansbrough.
52. Q 7.54; 10.3; 11.7; 25.59/32.4; 50.38; 57.4; cf. Gen 1,1–2,4a; Ex 20, 11; 31,17; for parallels in Jewish and Christian tradition, see spec. H. Speyer, Die biblischen Erzählungen im Koran, Gräfenheinichen, *s.d.* (the 1930's); Hildesheim-New York ³1971, pp. 2f.
53. Q 6.69f; 10.5; 17.12; 36.38f.; 55.5; cf. Gen 1,14–18; Ps 104,19; 136,7–9; see also Speyer, op. cit., 17–21.
54. Q 22.65; 31.20; 45.13; cf. Gen 1,28f.; see also Speyer, op. cit., p. 21.
55. For a bibliographical survey, see spec. C. Westermann, Genesis [Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament I/1], Neukirchen-Vluyn 1966ff., pp. 97–103; idem, Genesis 1–11 [Erträge der Forschung 7]. Darmstadt 1972.
56. See spec. D. Sidersky, Les origines des légendes musulmanes dans le Coran et dans les Vies des Prophètes, Paris 1933, pp. 9–16; Speyer, op. cit., pp. 41–83.
57. See spec. Sidersky, op. cit., pp. 16–18; Speyer, op. cit., pp. 84–88.
58. See spec. Sidersky, op. cit., pp. 26–28; Speyer, op. cit., pp. 89–115.
59. On the whole, see spec. Speyer, op. cit., pp. 1–119.
60. See spec. Sidersky, op. cit., pp. 31–68; Speyer, pp. 120–224; on Abraham, see in addition C. Snouck Hurgronje, Het Mekkaansche Feest [Verspreide Geschriften 1], Bonn-Leipzig 1923, pp. 1–124; E. Beck, Die Gestalt des Abraham am Wendepunkt der Entwicklung Muhammeds. Analyse von Sura 2, 118(124)–135(141), Le Muséon 65/1952, pp. 73–94 (cf. Y. Moubarac, REI 22/1954, pp. 118–120); Y. Moubarac, Abraham dans le Coran, Paris 1958 (cf. R. Paret, Der Islam 35/1960, pp. 148–151); J. Jomier, La figure d'Abraham et le pèlerinage musulman de la Mekka, Mélanges E. Tisserant 1, 1964, pp. 229–244; J. Gutmann, "Abraham in the Fire of the Chalde-

ans". A Jewish Legend in Jewish, Christian and Islamic Art, Frühmittelalterliche Studien 7/1973, pp. 342–352; on the *Yūsuf* Surah, see spec. I. Schapiro, Die haggadischen Elemente im erzählenden Teil des Korans 1. Berlin 1907; on the Koranic adaptation of the Old Testament proper names, see Horovitz, op. cit., 1925 (n. 34). As regards *Firʿawn*, see the following note.

61. See spec. Sidersky, op. cit., pp. 73–103; Speyer, op. cit., pp. 225–363; and Horovitz, op. cit., note in particular the remarks about *Maryam*, p. 153 f.
62. See spec. Sidersky, op. cit., pp. 109–134; Speyer, op. cit., pp. 364–425; Horovitz, op. cit.
63. See spec. Sidersky, op. cit., 135–150; G. Parrinder, Jesus in the Qurʾān. London 1965; H. Räisänen, Das koranische Jesusbild. Ein Beitrag zur Theologie des Korans [Missiologian ja ekumeniikan seuran julkaisuja 20]. Helsinki 1971; C. Schedl, Muhammad und Jesus. Die christologisch relevanten Texte des Koran, neu übersetzt und erklärt. Wein-Freiburg-Basel 1978; and Horovitz, op. cit.
64. As to possible sources, see the works mentioned in nn. 59–63.
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66. The standard *Forschungsgeschichte* as regards Old Testament studies is H.-J. Kraus, Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart, Neukirchen-Vluyn ²1969; concerning New Testament studies, see e.g. A. Wikenhauser, Einleitung in das Neue Testament. Freiburg ²1956 (see, however, also on R. Simon's works of 1689–1693, p. 4 f.).
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75. W. Rudolph, Die Abhängigkeit. . ., Stuttgart 1922, p. III.
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77. Op. cit., p. 90.
78. See e.g. Sidersky, op. cit., p. 2.
79. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 90.
80. E. g. H. Grimme, Mohammed, in Weltgeschichte in Karakterbildern, 2. Abt., 1904; Der Logos in Südarabien, Orientalische Studien = Festschrift Th. Nöldeke, 1906, pp. 453 f.; Über einige Klassen südarabischer Lehnwörter im Qoran, ZA 1912, pp. 158 ff.
81. EJ, 8, cols. 980 f.
82. Repr. in Der Koran, Hrsg. R. Paret [Wege der Forschung 326], Darmstadt 1975, pp. 53–73.
83. Repr. in op. cit., p. 74.
84. A repr. of 1964 is mentioned in EJ, 8, col. 981, where also a reference to Horovitz' bibliography is found.
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Subjectless sentences in Arabic dialects

JAN RETSÖ

The traditional definition of a sentence as consisting of two basic elements, subject and predicate, makes it necessary to establish certain distinctions when analysing the structure of a particular language. On a morphosyntactic level this binary structure is often absent. In a sentence like *puer currit* 'the boy runs' it may be said that the SP relation is represented by two formal elements, *puer* (S) and *currit* (P). But what about *currit* 'he runs'? From a morphosyntactic point of view this sentence does not possess such a binary structure. From a logical viewpoint the analysis between subject and predicate may be made, but if the former is further defined as a noun in the nominative case or its pronoun there is still no subject of this kind in this sentence. To say that *currit* is an ellipsis of *is currit* is unsatisfactory in many respects, since the explicit 3rd person pronominal subject is of rare occurrence in Latin. The actor of *currit* is specified from a context, while the form when isolated as here may refer to different actors (he, she, it etc.). To call the suffix *-it* a pronominal element is no solution either because why, in that case, does it occur in *puer currit*? From a semantic point of view both sentences are parallell in referring to an action which is performed by a specified actor, but it is clear that such a relation is represented on the morpho-syntactic level of the language in question (Latin) sometimes by a two-term phrase, sometimes by a one-term phrase only.

In Latin the verb may also occur in a one term sentence as *curritur* 'there is running (going on)'. In this case the same action but no actor is referred to. If the subject is defined formally as done above both *currit* and *curritur* are subjectless. The non-reference to an actor is marked in the latter by the suffix *-ur*.

Apart from the logical definition of subject as opposed to predicate, the term is also used to distinguish (*a*) the word in a sentence which in certain languages (e.g. Latin and Classical Arabic) has a special form (nominative) and with which the verb agrees in various ways, (*b*) the actor of a verbal process like the one just mentioned. If the term subject is used one should be aware of its three meanings established here since they do not cover each other in all cases.[1] E.g. in a passive construction like *John was hit by Mary, John* is the subject according to defini-tion (*a*) but not (*b*). This is a grammatical commonplace. But it is also clear that the definition of the subject on the semantic level is not a simple one. In sentences like *I heard her, She loves him, I know it* etc. it is not very meaningful to define the formal subject as actor.[2] The classification according to semantic criteria is also difficult since the possible distinctions are infinite. In *Tesnière*'s valency grammar the term "actant" is used for the nominal participants in the situation ("the drama") denoted by the verb.[3] In the sentences *the boy runs* and *I heard her, the boy* and *I* both constitute the 1st actant because each is the nominal phrase which is first generated by the verb. In *currit* the 1st actant is referred to by the suffix *-it* defining it as 'he', 'she', or 'it'. The term *her* is the

second actant being on a lower level since it cannot normally be generated if the
1st actant has not been so already.

The relations between the verb (the predicator) and its actants (complements)
exist on the semantic level. They are made manifest by the morphological and
syntactic structures existing in every particular language. The first actant is thus
mostly represented by the traditional "grammatical" subject and its place in the
hierarchy of actants is marked by its special relationship to the verb (agreement)
and by a special form (nominative) opposing it to representations of the second
(accusative) and third (dative) actants. If the 1st actant is called subject it should
be distinguished from the subject on the morphosyntactic level.

When discussing subjectless sentences one should thus distinguish between
subjectlessness on the actant level (= absence of the first actant) and on the
morphosyntactic level (absence of formal representation of the first actant). As
was pointed out in the beginning a sentence may well be subjectless on the latter
level without being so on the former.[4] It will appear that it also may be *vice
versa*. This study will be focussed on cases in Modern Arabic dialects which are
subjectless both on the actant level and the morphosyntactic level. This is
equivalent to the Latin example *curritur* above. These constructions are often
called *impersonal*, a term which is not very adequate since it suggests that all
other constructions are personal, i.e. that their 1st actants refer to persons.

A well known case of subjectless sentences in many languages are the so called
verbs of meteorology. As an example the rendering of the subjectless construc-
tion in Luke 17:29 in different languages may be illustrative. The Greek context
does not imply any subject/1st actant to the verb in question:

Greek: ἢ δὲ ἡμέρα ἐξῆλθεν Λὼτ ἀπὸ Σοδόμων *ἔβρεξεν πῦρ* καὶ *θεῖον* ἀπ'
            οὐρανοῦ[5]

Latin: qua die autem exiit Lot a Sodomis, *pluit ignem et sulphur* de caelo

Gothic: iþ þammei daga usiddja Lot us Saudaumim, *rignida swibla jah funin*
            (dative) us himina

Icelandic: En á þeim degi er Lot fór úr Sódómu, *rigndi eldi og brennisteini*
            (dative) af himni[6]

Estonian: aga sel päeval mil Lott väljus Soodomast, *sadas* (singular) *tuld ja
            väävlit* (obl. case) taevast

Syriac: wa-b̲-yawmā d̲a-npaq Lûṭ men Sd̲ûm *'amṭar nûrā w-k̲eb̲rîṭā* men
            šmayyā[7]

Arabic: wa-lākinna l-yawma l-lad̲ī fīhi xaraǧa Lūṭu min Sudūma *'amṭara
            nāran wa-kibrītan* min-a l-samā'i

These verbs do not differ formally from verbs like *currit*: they might refer to a
first actant and it has in fact often been supposed that the first actant here is God.
This would be supported by Latin and Greek evidence where Iuppiter and Zeus
may occur as formal subjects.[8] It is of course impossible to determine to which
extent a producer of sentences like Ζεὺς βρέχει or *Iuppiter pluit* thinks about the
divine power when uttering them. But this very difficulty should warn us of
drawing too hasty conclusions about the nature of the first actant with such
verbs. What about an atheist saying the same thing? Why did the Greeks and

Romans sometimes mention the divine when describing meteorological phaenomena while the ancient Germans did not? It might be argued that the views of the realms of the gods were different but then we will end up discussing comparative religion and theology instead of grammar.

It seems more practical to regard the verbs of meteorology as basically zero-valent, i.e. as verbs with no first actant, describing a process only, without bothering about the actor or source of this process. The introduction of "divine subjects", i.e. the explicit mentioning of them and thus making the verb monovalent, is due to special cultural and religious conditions which lie outside the scope of grammar.[9]

The fact remains, however, that the form of the verbs in the examples above is identical with verbs which do take a first actant. Mostly it is the third person masculine singular form of the finite verb which is ambiguous, or rather multifunctional. This form may have three functions: (1) referring to the first actant in the cases where it is a mentioned noun or its pronoun (explicit subject sentence), (2) when it is an unmentioned noun of this kind which may be indicated from the context by the pronouns *he, she,* or *it,* (3) when no first actant is referred to.

It is evident that such a finite form has a much wider referential function than the other finite forms of a verb in languages which possess such an inflexional system. It may be argued that this form is in fact a *neutral* finite form also with other verbs than the meteorological ones. In Arabic this is evident from the fact that, when introducing a sentence with a hitherto not mentioned subject, the verb may have the 3rd person sing. masc. form regardless of the gender and number of the following subject (= first actant).[10] It is thus quite natural that this form is used also when referring to verbal processes where no 1st actant is understood.

The verbs of meteorology are examples of verbs which are *inherently zero-valent* and which only under very special circumstances may become monovalent. Their inherent zero-valency explains why, in the languages mentioned here, they do not differ formally from verbs with one or more actants. There are, however, occasions when other verbs as well do not generate the first actant in a "normal" way. It may be absent altogether or be referred to as a circumstantial complement. On the morphosyntactic level this absence of the first actant may be marked in different ways which may be classified in two types: (*a*) the place of the first actant is left void or marked by a semantically void dummy word; (*b*) its place is filled by one of the other actants which then appears "disguised" as the first actant, i.e. takes its form. The fact that this is not the normal first actant is however always marked in one way or the other. It should be observed that nothing is said yet about the conditions under which these sentences occur. A typology of the different possibilities would look like the following:[11]

a 1. The first actant is simply missing and its absence is not marked in the verb; the verb takes the neutral form described above.

With 1st actant:	*Without 1st actant:*
Polish:	
Oficery posłali Stefana (acc.) na front = 'The officers sent Stefan to the front.'	*Posłali* Stefana (acc.) na front = 'Stefan was sent to the front'

Icelandic:

Sólin leysir ísa (acc.) = 'the sun melts the ice'

Nú leysir ísa (acc.) = 'Now the ice melts'

Arabic:

Badā l-raǧulu li-l-maliki = 'The man appeared to the king'

Badā li-l-maliki fī tilka ṣ-ṣifati = 'Dem König kam jene Beschreibung in den Sinn'[12]

'inna *l-ḍubbāṭa baʿaṭū*-hu 'ilā l-ḥarbi = 'the officers sent him to the war'

baʿaṭū-hu 'ilā l-ḥarbi = 'he was sent to the war'

a 2. The verb marks the absence of the first actant with a special form.

Polish:

Oficery posłali Stefana na front = 'The officers sent S. to the front'

Stefana *posłano* na front = 'S. was sent to the front'

Estonian:

Mees peksab last (obl. case) = 'The man spanks the child'

Last (obl. case) *pekstakse* = 'The child is spanked'

Mees laulab = 'The man sings'

Lauldakse = 'There is singing'

Icelandic:

Sólin leysti ísana (acc. pl.) = 'The sun melted the ice'

Nú hefur ísana (acc. pl.) *leyst* (the verb is sing.) = 'Now the ice is melt-ed'

Han saknar hennar (gen. obj.) = 'He misses her'

Hennar *er saknað* (part. neutr.) = 'She is missed'

Þeir dansa í kvöld = 'They dance tonight'

Er dansað (part. neutr.) í kvöld = 'There is dancing tonight'

Arabic:

'*axraǧa Zaydun* kitāban = 'Zayd brought out a book'

'*uxriǧa* kitāban = 'A book was brought out'

a 3. Actant 1 is replaced by a dummy word. The verb is not changed.

French:

Il vend la maison = 'He sells the house'

On vend la maison = 'The house is sold'

Swedish:

Han spelar piano = 'He plays the piano'

Man spelar piano = 'Piano is played'

Icelandic:

Han segir oft þetta = 'He often says this'

Maður segir oft þetta = 'This is often said'[13]

a 4. The first actant is replaced by a dummy word and the verb is changed.

German:

> *Er tanzt* = 'He dances'

> *Es wird getanzt* = 'There is dancing (going on)'

Swedish:

> *De jagar* räv = 'They hunt foxes'

> *Det jagas* räv (obj.) = 'There is fox-hunting'

Icelandic:

> *Þeir dansa* í kvöld = 'They dance tonight'

> *Það er dansað* í kvöld = 'There is dancing tonight'

Arabic:

> *raqaṣa/raqaṣat-i l-bintu* 'amsi = 'The girl danced yesterday'

> *ruqiṣa* l-'amsi = 'There was dancing yesterday'

Similarly four different solutions are possible with type (b) above where one of the actants is raised to fill the place of actant 1. Of these two may be mentioned here:

b 1. The replacing second or third actant takes the form of the first actant and the verb is changed. This is the traditional passive construction.

Polish:

> *Oficery posłali* Stefana na front = 'The officers sent S. to the front'

> Stefan *został posłany* na front = 'S. was sent to the front'

Icelandic:

> *Sólin leysir* ísana = 'The sun melts the ice'

> Nú *eru ísarnir leystir* = 'Now the ice is melted'

Arabic:

> *kataba* l-raǧulu l-kitāba = 'The man wrote the book'

> *kutiba* l-kitābu = 'The book was written'

b 2. Neither the form of the replacing actant nor the verb is changed. The absence of the first actant is marked by the word order.

English:

> *He sells* the book

> *The book sells* well

Swedish:

> *Han säljer* boken

> *Boken säljer* bra

Old Chinese:

> *Rén xiān fá* zhí mù = 'A man cuts the straight tree'

> *Zhí mù xiān fá* = 'The straight tree is cut'

From what has been said the following conclusion may be drawn: When using the term "subject" as a linguistic term a distinction should be made between on the one hand the first actant and, on the other hand, the nominal phrase with which the verb agrees and which, in languages with a nominal inflectional system,

takes a form (nominative) opposing it to other nominal phrases in a sentence. If the term subject is used on both these levels one might distinguish between *actant-subject* and *formal subject*.[14] From what has been shown, a sentence with no actant subject may well have a formal subject, and vice versa. When we now turn to the colloquial Arabic evidence the term subjectless sentence will refer to *sentences which lack actant subject as well as formal subject*, i.e. type a 1 and a 2 above.

In Literary Arabic the passive construction of type b 1 is used together with constructions a 1 and a 2, the former being rather common, the latter not infrequent with intransitives and objectless transitives (i.e. transitives with no explicit object) but rather rare with transitives with explicit object, the passive usually being preferred here. In spite of the fact that the verb in Literary Arabic (and, as it appears, in the colloquial as well) has the same form in constructions a 2 and b 1 the two should be kept apart and be distinguished in the analysis.[15]

The subjectless construction is said always to contain a prepositional complement (*'isnād al-fiʿl 'ilā l-ǧārr wa-l-maǧrūr*).[16] A transitive verb in a subjectless construction may, conforming to this pattern, introduce its object by a prepositional complement (PC), usually *li-*, which constitutes the *'isnād al-fiʿl*.[17]

With a subjectless verb there may thus occur a prepositional complement referring to an object or locative/instrumental circumstance.[18] It should be remarked that with many formally intransitive verbs, i.e. verbs that never take a direct object in the accusative, the prepositional complement refers to a semantic object (i.e. a second actant). E.g. the verb *ǧalaba* ('to defeat') may take its object by a noun in the accusative (or a corresponding pronoun) or by the preposition *ʿalā: ǧalaba-hu/ǧalaba ʿalayhi* = 'he defeated him'. There are several verbs which in Classical Arabic are transitive but in Modern Arabic are usually intransitive in a similar way.[19]

There are thus prepositional complements which do not refer to locative or instrumental circumstances and should be seen as object referents instead. Even if judgement in every single case might be difficult (see below), subjectless sentences may nevertheless be classified as follows:

I a: $V^{intr} + PC^{loc/instr}$

I b: $V^{intr} + PC^{obj}$

II a: $V^{trans} + PC^{loc/instr}$

II b: $V^{trans} + PC^{obj}$

The last case should be exchangeable by an FPV (finite passive voice) construction and should be constructable with a direct object in the active construction as well. II a should also be possible in an FPV construction if provided with a direct object.

In the colloquial material used here constructions of all the types listed here occur.[20] Of the types classified on pp. 74–6 only type a 2 is taken into account, i.e. subjectless sentences with verbal marking of the absent 1st actant.[21]

I a: Intransitive + PC^{loc/instr}

(1)

qāl-ilbádawi: wallāhi ma *bintām fi* *baládčim*	'Da sagte einer der Beduinen "Bei Gott, in eurem Dorf kann man nicht übernachten"' (Schmidt/Kahle I, 50: 12)

The verb *nwm* 'to sleep' is registered as "impers. passif" by Barthélemy in the remarkable form *yənnáwəm*. A subjectless construction with this verb is also noted for Baghdad in Woodhead/Beene's dictionary:

hal-ġurfa bārda; *ma-yinnām bīha* (W/B 475)	'This room is cold; it can't be slept in'

(2)

hādā fī ḍēʿa qæbli mšarreq ʿan eššām ʿal māši sāʿatēn u ši *binraḥ la* mneššāġūr ...	'A sud-est de Damas, à deux heures de marche et un peu plus se trouve un village, que l'on peut gagner en pas- sant par Šaġur ...' (Malinjoud 260: 2)

A similar expression is found in Barthélemy: *mən hōn bərrāḥ ʿala* 'par ici on va à ...'. The verb occurs also in the G*t* stem in the same function: *mən hōn bərtāḥ ʿala* ... The verb is intransitive in the G stem with locative prepositional complement.

I a lexicon:

In Woodhead/Beene's dictionary for Baghdad several such constructions are listed (*sub vocibus*):

(3) hal-māy bārid; ma yinsibiḥ *bī*	'That water's cold. It can't be swum in.'
(4) hal-bēt ma-*yinsikin bī*	'This house can't be lived in'
(5) hal-qarya ma-*yinʿāš bīha*	'It is not possible to live in this town'
(6) hal-bēt ʿatīg; ma-*yingiʿid bī*	'This house is old. It can't be lived in'
(7) l-ġurfa malyāna ġaraḍ ma-*yinmiši* *bīha*	'The room is so full of things you can't walk'
(8) has-sirdāb ma-bī daraǧ; ma-*yinnizil-la*	'This basement has no stairs; it can't be gotten down into' (*sic*)
(9) hal-kursi mṭaʿṭaʿ; ma-*yinwuguf* *ʿalē*	'This chair is wobbly; it can't be stood upon'
(10) s-šamis ḥārra; ma-*yinwuguf* ġawwāha	'The sun is so hot one can't stand in it'

Two cases from Barthélemy's dictionary:

(11) *bəntáleʿ ʿaṣṣṭúḥ* (active: ṭalaʿ ʿaṣṣṭuḥ)	'Peut-on monter sur la terrasse?'
(12) mā *bəntáleʿ ʿaṣṣqāq* əlyōm	'On ne peut pas sortir de chez soi aujourd'hui'

I b: Intransitive + PC^{obj}

In principle, the verbs included here should be verbs which never take a direct object but whose prepositional complement nevertheless must be seen as representing the second actant and not a circumstantial complement (spatial or temporal). The criterion used here has been its intransitivity as documented in the available dictionaries of the dialect in question. An indication of the actant meaning of the PC may be the occurrence of the same verb as transitive in another Arabic dialect (including Classical Arabic).

(1)

wiššu ṣarat ḥālte? *yurṭālha* (= yurṭā la-hā)	'Wie wurde sein Zustand? Man musste ihn beklagen' (Schmidt/Kahle I, 200: 23)

Both Barthélemy and Denizeau give the G stem as intransitive with prepositional complement only. In Literary Arabic it occurs with both PC and direct object with a negligible difference in meaning. The same is found in Baghdad according to Woodhead/Beene (s.v.):

riṯa l-wazzīr il-marḥūm ib-qaṣīda faxma	'he elegized the deceased minister with a magnificent poem'

(2)

wqāl binefsoh āh ʿala mitl ṣāḥibt hāda *yibka weyunāḥ la* ʿala derāhim wela dinār	'(il) se dit: ''Ah, ce sont les femmes pareilles à la maîtresse de ce bracelet qui valent des larmes et des plaintes et ni l'argent ni l'or''' (Östrup 60: 19)

Of the two verbs in this sentence the G stem of *nwḥ* is documented only with PC (*ʿala*) in the dictionaries (Wehr, Barthélemy, Woodhead/Beene, Fox/Abu Talib); *bky* is both transitive and intransitive with objective PC in Wehr. It is not documented as transitive in any of the dictionaries. A subjectless construction is found in Woodhead/Beene s.v.:

l-māḍi ma-*yinbiči* ʿalē	'The past isn't worth crying for'

(3)

lukān rrāžəl hāda-lli ḥnān ʿusqīn	'si l'homme dont nous pleurons le décès,
biäspīdu žā radwān u qamūh, wəllä bårmənnām, bäʿd əlḥādd *tbåwṭål* ʿlih	s'était ruiné et qu'on l'avait emmené, ou bien s'il avait été victime d'une injustice …' (D. Cohen, Textes 60: 15)

The verb *båwṭal* is listed in Marçais/Guîga's dictionary for the dialect of Takroûna with the meaning 'agir de mauvaise foi; user de subterfuges, de mensonges, de moyens torteux, dans qqch = *fī*, envers qqn = *ʿala*'. The latter PC is to be considered an object (actant II).

(4)

hāda lli yuṣṭbuḥ *minne* ma yitʿaššaš   'Jener bekam nie zu Abend, wovon er
minne   morgens gegessen hatte' (Schmidt/
                                           Kahle I, 194: 3; cf. also ibid. 1. 26)

The verb is translated: 'es wird ihm am Morgen vorgesetzt'.[22] It seems to be an
apophonic derivation from *iṣṭabaḥ* 'do something in the morning', 'den Morgen-
imbiss einnehmen' (Schmidt/Kahle),[23] 'to have a morning draught' (Wehr). The
apophonic form would thus mark the absence of actant I.

(5)

eḥna ma *yinǧidir* ʿaliena la enta walā   'Gegen uns kann keiner aufkommen,
l-akbar minnak   weder du, noch einer, der grösser ist
                                           als du' (Weissbach 156: 2)

From a purely semantic viewpoint the prepositional complement to this verb is
rather an object (2nd actant) than a locative. The same idea is expressed in many
other languages by a transitive verb (*to control, master, überwinden, beherr-
schen*). The verb is registered in Woodhead/Beene in the same type of construc-
tion:

hāda ʿifrīt. ma-*yingidir* ʿalē   'He is very strong, he can't be beaten'
ibnak wakīh ma-*yingidir-la*   'Your son is a bad boy. He can't be
                                           controlled'

In Takroûna the G stem occurs as transitive: *yaqdor ssxāna* 'il est capable de
supporter la chaleur' (Marçais/Guîga, s.v.) as well as intransitive with PC:

zämmä ma-qådretš ᵃʿlēha-nneʿmä   'une sécheresse qui les céréales n'ont
                                           pu supporter'

I b: examples from the dictionaries:

hada ma-*yinwiṭaq bi*   'he can't be trusted' (Woodhead/
                                           Beene, s.v.)

The same construction occurs in Takroûna:

nās kīfhum ma *yiṭṭoq bīhum*   'des gents comme eux il n'y a pas à
                                           compter sur eux' (Marcais/Guîga,
                                           s.v.)

In spite of the absence of documentation of this verb as transitive the PC should
be seen a 2nd actant rather than locative complement.

Hal-mukān ma-*yinwuṣil-la* b-fadd yom   'This place can't be reached in one
                                           day' (ibid.)

The verb *wṣl* in Literary Arabic is both transitive and intransitive with objective
PC (Wehr, s.v.).[24]

II a: transitive + PCˡᵒᶜ/ⁱⁿˢᵗʳ

If a verb is documented as transitive in the same dialect where it is found with a

PC with identical meaning it is classified as belonging to this group. The PC may refer to locative/instrument or the third actant.

(1)

ilbint xāfat *yinḥača ʿalēha*   'Das Mädchen fürchtete sich, man
                                                   möge über sie sprechen' (Schmidt/
                                                   Kahle I, 110: 19)

The verb is transitive in Barthélemy in the meaning 'conter qqch à qqn' (*ḥaka ši lahada*). So also in Wehr. The direct object is not realised in this example and the PC is of another kind not replaceable by an object.

(2)

[z-zäläme] qāl "sāwu l-muʿāmale   '[the man] said: "They have done the
    raḍḍēnāhon bälä faḍḍa". whēk   *nfar-*   operation, we payed them without sil-
ğet   ver". Thus it became easier for us.'
    ʿalēna (Sabuni 241: 11)

The verb is transitive in Barthélemy: 'soulanger; consoler un affligé' (*farağ ʿan haḍa lqadar*). The meaning of the verb is actually 'to dispel', 'drive away' (trouble, sorrow) (Wehr s.v. and Barthélemy s.v. VII). The PC here should thus be interpreted as locative and the direct object (actant II) is not expressed.

(3)

kəll səne w'ənte sālem – *yən ʿād*   'Mögest du das ganze Jahr gesund blei-
    ʿalēk bəṣṣaḥḥa wəssalāme   ben, möge zu dir immer Gesundheit
                                                   und Wohlergehen kommen' (Bloch/
                                                   Grotzfeldt 110: 31)

The meaning of the verb in this connection is 'répéter' (Barthélemy s.v.). The potential object is probably 'year': may the year be repeated for you with health and happiness.

(4)

udezz ʿal'awrāq māl seyyid Ğāsim elli   'Am Morgen schickte er nach den Pa-
    yinḥakum bihinn   pieren des Seijid Djasim die zur Ver-
                                                   handlung nötig waren' (Meissner,
                                                   Iraq 96: 43)

The verb is transitive: *ḥikama lḥākim ʿašar isnīn* (Woodhead/Beene s.v.) 'the judge sentenced him to ten years'. In this example the verb may be either subjectless or have a passive subject. The translator has chosen the former which may be defended by the context. The ambiguity between the two constructions arise with transitive verbs in the 3rd person sing. masc. where the difference between them also becomes very clear. Analysed as a subjectless construction the transitive verb is here used intransitively, i.e. without reference to any object. In example II b: 7 below the same construction occurs with this verb with a transitive reference by the PC.

(5)

mā *wuṭī-buh* umā rə‘ī

'(vom Boden) unbetreten und un-
abgeweidet' (Socin, Diwan: Text
74: 10 Note a)

In Wehr both these verbs are transitive ('tread, step, walk on something'; 'to
graze, to tend a flock of animals'). They are both transitive also in Syro-
Palestinian (Barthélemy r‘y; Denizeau *wṭy*). The latter is documented as transi-
tive in the poetry of al-‘Aǧārma, thus in a dialect close to the one in Socin's
material.[25] The verb r‘y would thus belong to this type (it is supposed that the PC
buh is also the complement of r‘y above), while *wṭy* is of the following type (see
II b below).

(6)

wi’aḥyānan yišīl ši‘la min nār wi
yiliff¹ bīha ḥawalēn il balad
wi-xuṣūṣan il ḥitta-lli *t’atal fīha*.
(Elder 91: 22)

'and sometimes they carry a torch of
fire and they walk around the village
with it and especially [in] the area
where the killing has taken place'

This description of a ceremony which is performed when a murder has been
committed is introduced by a sentence in which the same verb occurs in a passive
construction: *wi ktīr min in nās yixāfu mil maṭraḥ illi-t’atal fīh il’atīl* 'many
people have fear of the place where the victim has been killed' (ibid. line 16). This
is an interesting case where the exchangeability between the subjectless and the
passive constructions is seen: in the latter case the subjectless sentence is
avoided by providing a pseudosubject derived from the transitive verb by forming
a passive participle: the killed one has been killed (see further examples below).

(7)

ġēr qūl-li: *ktābet-‘līya* u-stər ma
stər aḷḷāh (Colin, Chrestomathie)

36: 3)

'just say to me: it has been decided for
her and what God has hidden is   hid-
den'

(8)

lli dār ši, *ittdār-lo* (ibid. 162: 17)

'He who does something, to him   is
done'

The proverb is a play with the trivalent verb in question, the PC representing the
third actant.

II a: Lexicon

nradd ‘ala hass’āl

'il a été répondu à cette question'
(Barthélemy s.v.)

The object of the transitive verb *radd* is *ǧawābāt* 'answers' and and the PC in the
example is not on the object level. The transitive construction occurs in Sabuni's
Aleppo texts.[26]

II b: Transitive + PC^{obj}

The criterium here should be the exchangeability between the PC and a direct
object in the non-marked form of the verb within the same dialect.

(1)

winnās ṭālᶜa min iṣṣalā uqāᶜdin bāb dārna *binṭuqq fī ḥanač*	'und die Leute kamen gerade vom Ge- bet. Sie sassen vor unserem Hause und ihre Kiefer standen nicht still' (Schmidt/Kahle I, 36: 2)

The transitivity of this verb is well documented, e.g. *ᶜamma bīti'' sinn ibsinn*
'zähneklappernd' (Littman 44: 5).[27] In Féghali's Contes its *masḍar* occurs in an
iḍāfa construction: *ṭaqq el-ḥanek* in the same meaning as found in Schmidt/
Kahle: 'bavarder', where *ḥanak* is the object.[28] The PC in the example above
should thus be replaceable with a direct object.

(2)

qālat: *indaqq fī rrāᶜi*	'(sie) sagte: Der Hirte ist überfallen worden' (Schmidt/Kahle I, 148: 12)

The verb is transitive in most of its meanings, e.g. *daqq ḥada qatle* 'battre qqn'
(Barthélemy s.v.). It occurs also with a PC with object meaning as 'attraper,
empoigner qqn, offenser' (Barth.). Frayha gives *'indaqqa fulān^{un}* = 'uṣība bi-
makrūh^{in}* (s.v. *dqq*). In the example here the action is of a more violent kind than
the ones designated by the intransitive variant and it is best analysed as a PC of
the direct object in the meaning 'to beat, hit'.

(3)

wayza *fī 'lbāb yiṭraq*	'Tout à coup on frappa à la porte' (Östrup 68: 14)

(4)

wayza *bilbāb yindaqq*	id. (Östrup 102: 27, cf. also 106: 8)

The two verbs meaning 'to knock on the door' are transitive as documented by
e.g. Barthélemy. In Östrup's *Contes* the "active" form of *dqq* occurs in the
immediate surroundings of the two mentioned examples: *wayza bilmufti yeduqq*
elbāb (102: 22, cf. also 106: 5). In Littman's and Lewin's texts from Hama the
verb *daqq* occurs in the same connection but in the passive construction:

bīsāwū lᶜaša – illa *l-bāb byinda''*	'Da bereiteten sie das Abendessen – plötzlich wurde an die Tür geklopft' (Littman 36: 5, cf. also 23: 2)
wənno *nda'' əlbāb*	'Da würde an die Tür geklopft' (Lewin Hama 78: 5)

That the former case is a passive construction is clearly seen from the immediate-
ly following active question: *mīn bīduqq il-bāb?* (Littman 23: 5). The subjectless
and passive constructions are thus alternatives here.

(5)

w-ɔ́z bnəṣṣ əllēl – ma mənlā'i 'əlla	'Und dann, plötzlich mitten in der
tata'ṭa'ṭa' *ʿal bāb *ʿam yətxabbaṭ	Nacht war da ein Pochen an der Tür,
*ʿam yəṭṭa'ṭa'	es wurde geklopft und gepocht'
	(Bloch/Grotzfeldt 14: 30)

The D stem *xabbaṭ* has the meaning 'frapper fort plusieurs fois' and is transitive (Barthélemy s.v.). The PC in this example would thus be exchangeable with a subject and the *tD* form would then signal a passive construction. The context makes it most probable that this is to be interpreted as a subjectless construction (cf. the preceding examples). The onomatopoeticon *ṭṭa'ṭa'* should also be seen as such.

(6)

tere qaḍīteh derekiye, u *yinxāf min*	'You see, his case is desperate, and the
tāliyet-he	consequence of it is to be feared'
	(McCarthy/Raffouli 105: 18)

The verb *xāf* is in Woodhead/Beene attributed both PC object and direct object, e.g. *xāf 'allā* 'fear God' and *yxāf min marta* 'He's afraid of his wife'. In Literary Arabic both are possible (cf. Wehr s.v.). The PC is probably the more common construction in the dialects (cf. Barthélemy s.v.).

(7)

'ām 'āl il'áḍi "ya salām il marra di	'Then the judge said: "Good heavens,
yinḥikim ʿalēk ya farrān"	this time there will be a judgement
(Elder 27: 4)	upon you, baker."'

The verb *ḥakam* is transitive. Spiro gives the phrase *ḥakam ʿalayya* 'he gave judgement against me, he forced me'. The use of PC instead of direct object seems thus not to mark any great difference in meaning (cf. II a: 4 above).[29]

III a: Subjectless verbs with sentence complement

The similarities between these constructions and the subjectless constructions (and the passive construction) are pointed out in Cowell's grammar on Syrian Arabic.[30]

(1)

baqa yʿīš, nhār əlwēḥəd, *ndaqqət*	'So lebte er vor sich hin: Eines Tages
fəlbalad, əlyawme bənt Hārūn Raśīd	wurde in der Stadt verkündert: Heute
tatfūt ʿağğaʿde	wird die Tochter Hārūn ar-Raśīd sich
	auf die Strasse begeben' (Jastrow,
	Qəltu II 12: 25)

(2)

yuḥka inn el melik hārūn erraśīd	'it is told that one day the king
galas yōm fī maḥill elmubāsəṭa	Harun al-Rashid was sitting in the
(Spitta Gramm. 469: 32)	place of enjoyment'

(3)

ġēr səmᶜo hād-əl-klām,   'When they heard this speech it
  *kā-ittsḥāb-*lhom *ši-wāhəd mən-əl-*   seemed to them as if one of the dead
  *mūta nād-*lhom (Colin, Chrestomathie   had shouted at them'
  95: 16)

(4)

ᶜAlī daḥa lbāb ibriġläh wå'iḍa lbāb   'Ali stösst mit seinem Fusse gegen die
  mafkūke wiṭṭallāge māl elbāb rāḥat   Tür. Die ist plötzlich offen, und der
  mā*yinderā wēyn rāḥat*   eine Thürflügel ist verschwunden,
          niemand weiss, wohin' (Meissner,
          Iraq 90: 12)

(5)

*wurrī-*li *arūḥ laššām*   'ich habe es für gut gefunden/es gefiel
          mir nach Damaskus zu reisen' (Socin
          Diwan 17: 21 Note a, cf. ibid. 7: 10
          and
          Note d)

The (double) transitivity of this verb is documented for al-ᶜAġārma (Jordan): *u-ma ywarri ḥālo 'aḥad* 'he did not show himself to anyone'.[31] Also Barthélemy gives the meaning 'faire voir, montrer qqe à qqn' (root *wry*). In Socin's examples the verb is given a slightly different translation but is clearly connected with the basic meaning found in other dialects: 'it was shown (to) me, it appeared to me'. The replacement of the direct object (= passive construction) by a PC (= subject-less constr.) is probably connected with a semantic development in this verb towards a more specialised meaning and the two syntactic devices are used to make a difference.

(6)

wlek xēto rēḥa bətmūti. *byənsaxa*   'Liebe Schwester, du wirst einmal ster-
  ᶜalēki ᶜala ṣbāki *təbtəli bəlwağaᶜ*?   ben. Kann man es denn mit ansehen,
          dass du, jung wie du noch bist,
          Schmerzen leidest?' (Lewin, *Hama*
          100: 3)

The G stem means according to Barthélemy: 'se montrer généraux, ne pas reculer devant une dépense'. The *n*G form is employed in the expression *ma bənsaxa fiyon* 'on ne peut en consentir le sacrifice' (cf. Wehr s.v.).

Further examples from the dictionaries:

ma-*yindiri raḥ-yistiqīl lō yibqa*   'it is not known if he's going to resign
          or stay' (Woodhead/Beene s.v.)
*tteshab-*li *l-bāb kānet mesdūda*   'I thought the door was closed'
          (Fox/Abu Talib s.v.)
ktāb ᶜlīh īmūt f-dāk lḥādīta   'It was fated that he should die in that
          accident' (Fox/Abu Talib)

There are several ways of analysing these sentences. They could be seen as passive constructions with the sentence as subject to the marked verb. This is however difficult to prove since it cannot be decided if the verb is in agreement with this kind of subject (the "subject" cannot be put in the plural). It seems more plausible that the marked form of the verb indicates non-reference to the first actant and the dependent sentence is either an object or an appositional complement to the verb.[32] If the possibility of "subjectless" sentences is acknowledged the latter alternative is the most practical and natural.

III b: Subjectless *qāla* with complement

A consequence of this is that constructions with a marked form of the verb *qāla* in the meaning 'be called something' should belong here with the predicative as a complement rather than a subject:

(1)

ṣār ġarb is-swīda fi-maṭraḥ *binqallu* *tall il-ḥadīd*	'it was to the west of /sˈwida/ at a place called /tall il-ḥadīd/' (Blanc, Druzes 100: 6; cf. Barthélemy, s.v. *qwl*)

(2)

betterki, bizamān el awwal, kān *yinqāl lawāḥed metbeyyen ebḏīᶜa ...* sīd čōrbaji	'autrefois on appelait en turc čorbaji une personne notable d'un village' (Malinjoud 293: 15)

(3)

yəngālhom ᶜeylt l-ᶜabdalla	'they were called the family of Abdalla' (Palva ᶜAġārma 64: 16)

(4)

w-fī gowm *yəngālhom 'əbən sarrāḥ* b-əl-ǧowf	'In al-Ǧōf there was a clan called Ibn Sarrāḥ' (Palva Ḥesbān 68: 2)

(5)

ham yiᶜṭūnu wġeidin maᶜham *yigāl-lu* ṭāl ᶜumrak, *yigāl-lu šaḥḥād ibin mxeimir*	'They give it to a boy who was called, May you live long, who was called Šaḥḥād ibn Mukhaimir' (Ingham, North East 132: 35; cf. also ibid. 152: 36)

(6)

ǧirīb məčān *yigāl-lih ᶜakēf*	'near a place called ᶜUkaif' (Johnstone, Eastern Arabian 226: 5)

(7)

terāh markūze ḥaṭbe f mekān *yqāl-lo* *lémed*	'Sieh! ein Holz ist an einem Ort gepfählt, welcher Lemed heisst' (Reinhardt 333: 19; cf. ibid. 317: 4; 337: 7, 16; 339: 4; 341: 2; 373: 1; 381: 5)

(8)

ila an waṣalu ila qarīb ḥille min ḥilal wād ilMaʿāwil *yeqāl lha lüʿWēne*	'bis sie nahe zu einem der Stadtviertel von Wād il Maʿāwil kamen, Namens lüʿWēne' (Rössler Nachal 77: 22, cf. ibid 80: 3)

(9)

hāḍa vəblayyda mawḍaʿ tall Tižəgža sāḥəlha *yəngāllha ləmkarkba*	'C'est dans un lieu-dit du coté de Tižəgža au Nord-ouest de Tižəgža on l'appelle la Mkarkba' (D. Cohen Ḥassānīya 260: 17, cf. also ibid. 266: 17; 268: 21)

The following example from Egypt (Cairo) may be adduced in spite of the verb having a non-dialectal form:

(10)

baʿdēn ḥarāmi-llēl ṭallaʿ min gēboh suryāq ʿand elḥarāmiye *yuqāl loh sellim* (Spitta, Gramm. 459: 29)	'then the night thief took out of the pocket of the thief called Sellim a rope-ladder'

With these sentences may be compared the more common use of the verb *sammā* in the passive construction with the same meaning, e.g.

bitsamma hāḍa l-ʿaša ʿaša bint il-amm	'dieses Abendessen nennt sich das Abendessen der Mutterstochter' (Czapkiewicz Mādabā 24: 1)

Also *qāla* may occur in a passive construction with its normal meaning 'to say something':

xāləg *nūʿ məl-gīvān yəngāl* lhēyh mən gadd	'Il y a des gāfs d'une certaine sorte qui se récitent là-bas à propos de quelqu'un ...' (D. Cohen, Ḥassānīya 238: 30)

Lastly, two examples without context given by Ingham from southern Iraq:

mā *yinḥārab wiyyāh*	'he cannot be fought with' (Ingham p. 43)
ma *yinsōlaf wiyyāh*	'he cannot be spoken with' (ibid.)

In Literary Arabic the particle *'iyyā-* is used to mark a second object in the accusative if it is a pronominal suffix. It may further mark an object standing before the finite verb and it may be used when coordinating two objects if one of them is a pronominal suffix.[33] The two verbs in question here are registered as transitive by Barthélemy: *sōlaf ḥada* 'raconter à qqn des histoires des vieux temps'; *ḥārab* '(v. tr.) faire la guerre à un tribu etc.'. The former is documented as transitive with an inanimate object in a passive construction from Jordan: *hayy eṭ-ṭalaba ma tissōlaf* 'this affair should not be told' (Palva Balgāwi 3, 7: 19). In the

examples from Ingham the particle may be interpreted both as a preposition and an object marker. Its use in Literary Arabic would give support to both. If seen as an object marker we would here have a case of a subjectless construction with transitive verbs and explicit direct object.[34]

The cases where the subjectless verb occurs in the third person sing. fem. should be noted: *ktābət* (II a: 7), *nfarğet* (II a: 2), *ndaqqət* (III a: 1). Especially noteworthy is the first one. It may be interpreted as gender-attraction.[35] This is however less likely with the other two which are better seen as neuter expressed by the finite feminine form.[36]

The very few cases of *t*-augmented derived stems used without a subject should also be noted: *tbåwṭal* (I b: 3), *yətxabbaṭ/yətta'ṭa'* (III b: 5).

A characteristic of these constructions in Literary Arabic which was pointed out earlier is also found in the colloquial material, viz. the obligatory prepositional complement. This may be seen as a means of filling the hole of the missing representation of the first actant. In the finite passive construction such complements are common but not obligatory since the hole is here filled by the second actant taking over the form of the missing first actant. In the examples of type III it may also be absent (III a: 2 and 4) since there is already a complement here.

Of the 49 cases extracted from the extensive textual material used here, only 10 are found west of the Suez canal. Of the three cases from Egypt, two are probably due to influence from Literary Arabic (*mağhūl*-forms).[38] One of the examples from Morocco occurs in a proverb.[39] No cases are found in the rather extensive material from South Arabia. This might suggest that the use of subjectless constructions of type a 2 is somehow dependent on verbal morphology. In North Africa and South Arabia *t*-augmented forms of the verb are mostly used to mark a passive subject while the *n*-augmented forms are rarer or non-existent. In the Middle East and North Arabia on the contrary the *n*G form is a productive morphological category and is extensively used in the finite passive construction. Due to the scarcity of the extracted material one should beware of too categorical conclusions but a suggestion would be that the *t*G and G*t* dialects prefer other means of marking an absent first actant, probably type a 1.

The last question to be discussed here is: Under which circumstances do subjectless sentences of the present kind occur? It might be supposed that they would occur when reference is made to actions and processes where no actor or origin is possible to formulate (like e.g. the verbs of meteorology). If the context of the present sentences is taken into account it appears, however, that this is the case in only a few instances. Arabic may choose the subjectless construction also when the first actant is vaguely specified by the context. In a modern European language like English we may formulate this by using different kinds of indefinite pronouns. Such pronouns are as a rule scarce in Arabic and the use of subjectless sentences may in fact be seen as a means of handling the problem of such actants. A tentative classification of the present examples looks as follows:

(*a*) No first actant. Only the verbal action or process is referred to. II a: 2, 3, 7, 8; II a: 3, 5.

(*b*) The first actant is negated, corresponding to English expressions with

nobody. It may be seen as the negation of (*c*) or, more rarely, of (*d*). I a: 1; I b: 5; II a: 5; III a: 4.

(*c*) The first actant is anybody or the totality of possible first actants with the verb, in English *anybody, everybody.* I a: 2; I b: 1, 2; III a: 2, 6; III b: 1–10.

(*d*) The first actant is the one (ones) mentioned explicitly in the context, in English often *they.* I b: 4; II a: 1, 4; II b: 1, 6, 7.

(*e*) The first actant is a distinct but as yet unknown entity, potentially specifiable, Latin *quidam.* I b: 3; II a: 6; II b: 2, 3, 4, 5; III a: 1.

If compared to the use of the finite passive construction it is seen that the contextual first actant is in general more vague and unspecified when the subjectless construction may be used than with the passive. As has been shown elsewhere the passive construction may well be used in a context where the first actant is specified and may be recovered from the context. It may also be referred to in the sentence itself by a prepositional complement.[40] The finite passive construction thus has a much wider range of use and may be employed as a stylistic means of variation, while the subjectless construction is much more restricted in use. An investigation of both constructions in different forms of Literary Arabic is a desideratum.

NOTES

1. For these distinctions cf. in general Sandmann, especially part III. Cf. also the discussion in Jespersen, pp. 140–154.

2. See Palmer, pp. 77–78, where the necessity of purely formal definitions when using subject-predicate as linguistic terms is stressed.

3. Tesnière pp. 102 sqq.

4. In Literary Arabic *'anā ḍarabtu-hu* 'I hit him' has, according to this definition, a subject on the morphosyntactic level, while *ḍarabtu-hu* is subjectless. Both, however, do have two actants, the first of which is marked by the suffix *-tu* and in the first case also by the pronoun *'anā.*

5. Cf. Bauer s.v. βρέχω and James, 5: 17. Cf. also the LXX rendering of Gen. 19: 24 with κύριος as subject, following the Masoretic text.

6. A parallel in Old Swedish is

Oc *rängde* ower jordhina fyretighi	'and it rained over the earth for
dagha oc fyretighi nätter ...	forty days and forty nights ...'
(Wessén III, p. 188)	

For the existence of subjectless meteorological verbs in Old English cf. Visser, pp. 4 sqq.

7. Thus according to the Sinai palimpsest (*Ewangelion da-mfarrše*). The text used in the edition of the Syriac Bible from the London Bible Society introduces *moryō/maryā* (the Lord) as subject, probably under influence from Gen. 19: 24. One subjectless example with this verb occurs in Biblical Hebrew:

ḥælqå̄ 'aḥat *t·im·å̄ṭer* w-ḥælqå̄	'one piece was rained upon and the piece
'ᵃšær lo' *tamṭîr* ʿål̇æ̇hå̄ tîbå̄š	whereupon it rained not withered'
	(Amos 4: 7)

For the feminine form of the verb cf. note 36. The LXX and the Vulgate introduced God as subject here while the Peshitta has *meṭrā/meṭrō* ('rain') in the same function, thus avoiding the subjectless construction. The Masoretic version is to be considered *lectio difficilior.* In his translation of the New Testament into Hebrew Delitzsch renders Luke 17: 29 thus: *wayhî bay·ôm 'ᵃšær yåṣå' Lôṭ mis·dôm way·amṭer 'eš w-gåprît min-haš·åmayim.*

8. For these verbs in Greek see Schwyzer/Debrunner, pp. 620–621.

9. Cf. Jespersen, pp. 25 and 141 sqq; Tesnière, pp. 239–240; Matthews, pp. 103–105.
10. Reckendorf, Verhältnisse, pp. 69 sqq; Féghali, Syntaxe, pp. 126–128; Blau, Syntax, pp. 174 sqq; Cowell, pp. 421–423. A parallel to this is the development in Scandinavian. In Old Scandinavian there was full distinction between all three persons in the verbal conjugation. E.g. the preterite of the so-called *o*-verbs looked as follows in Old Icelandic:

kallaða	'I called'	kǫlluðum	'we called'
kallaðir	'thou calledst'	kǫlluðuð	'you called'
kallaði	'he/she/it called'	kǫlluðu	'they called'

In Modern Icelandic the use of the form *kallaði* (3rd person sing.) has been extended to the 1st person sing. as well and in the singular there is thus distinction only between the 2nd person and the rest. A further step was taken in Old Swedish where *kallaði* was used for all persons in the singular (Wessén I, pp. 132–133). In Modern Swedish, finally, *kallaði* (now *kallade*) is used for all persons both in the singular and the plural, thus replacing all the forms above. When giving up verbal agreement the language has chosen the neutral finite form.
11. This sketch is based on Xrakovskij, especially pp. 20–23. The examples from Polish and Chinese are taken from him. I am obliged to cand. mag. Kristinn Jóhanneson, lecturer in Icelandic at Göteborg University, for checking the Icelandic examples in this article, and to Rev. Jaak P. Reesalu, Göteborg, for providing the Estonian ones.
12. Example from Nöldeke, Zur Grammatik, p. 76; cf. Brockelmann, Grundriss II, pp. 124 sqq.
13. This construction is said to be common in spoken Icelandic today but is not yet fully accepted in the schools.
14. For a similar distinction cf. Matthews, pp. 104–105. In light of this some of Martinet's criticism of Sandmann (BSL 54 (1959), 42–45) is not quite to the point. According to the former, the fact that one in French can say *les pauvres mangent la soupe, les pauvres mangent* but not **mangent la soupe* shows the universality of the subject-predicate relation in the language, this relation being that the one cannot exist without the other. In view of this, subjectless sentences would be a *contradictio in adjecto*. From the evidence quoted here it is clear that constructions of the type *mangent la soupe* are normal in many languages and are used in certain contexts. The "solidarité entre les deux termes" is not a universal in the meaning adduced by Martinet. This has been pointed out by Tesnière (loc. cit.).
15. For the concept of subjectlessness in Classical Arabic see Fischer, pp. 98–99, 166; Reckendorf, Verhältnisse, pp. 318 sqq; idem, Syntax, pp. 358 sqq. The criticism of Reckendorf by Retsö, p. 31 note 2 and p. 32 should be corrected. The point is that Reckendorf when describing construction b 1 in Verhältnisse presents a theory of the meaning of the *maġhūl* verbs used in this construction. When discussing construction a 2 in Verhältnisse (pp. 321–322), in which the same form of the verb is used, the theory does not fit and the "impersonal" verbs are not integrated into the theory of "activity of suffering" which is his basic interpretation of the verbs in the Arabic passive construction.
16. Reckendorf, Syntax, p. 358; Fischer, loc. cit. § 199 b and Anmerkung 3. In Wright (II, p. 269) the prepositional complement is called "subject" which in light of the stand taken here is not very adequate. Cf. Reckendorf's discussion in Verhältnisse, pp. 321–322.
17. For objects introduced by *li-* in Classical Arabic in general see A. Fischer who only treats active subject constructions. For such objects with subjectless verbs see Retsö, pp. 20 sqq with further references. This alternative construction with transitives is occasionally met with also in other Semitic languages. For Aramaic cf. the remarks by Nöldeke, Syrische Grammatik, p. 224. For Biblical Hebrew:

ham·ayim hå'el·ǣ yôṣ'îm ...   'these waters issue out ... and go into
ûbå'û hay·åm·ā̄ 'æl-hay·åm·ā̄   the sea; which being brought forth into
ham·ûṣå'im *wnirp·'û* ham·åyim   the sea, the waters shall be healed'
                                                                    (Ez. 47: 8)

but

ûbaḥᵃburåtô *nirp·å' lånû*   'and with his stripes we are healed'
                                                         (Is. 53: 5)

18. The term "locative" is used here in the widest possible sense referring to positions and movements in both time and space.
19. See further cases in Monteil, p. 264.
20. For the texts from which these examples have been extracted see Retsö, pp. 13–18.
21. For subjectless constructions of type a 1 in Classical Arabic, cf. Reckendorf, Verhältnisse, pp. 318–320; idem, Syntax, pp. 359 sqq; Brockelmann, Grundriss II, pp. 119–120. Subjectless constructions are usually not treated systematically in descriptions of Arabic dialects. A positive exception in this respect, as in several others, is Cowell's grammar in which clear distinctions are made between "true passive" (= b 1) and "impersonal passive" (= a 2) illustrated with several examples (ibid. pp. 234–237, 365). Cf. also Féghali, Syntaxe, pp. 118–121, 130–131, and Blau, Syntax, p. 34.
22. Schmidt/Kahle I, p. 74.
23. Ibid. p. 285, cf. II, 52: 8 *hadīk issēʿa qām iṣṭabaḥ uġassal* 'in derselben Stunde machte er sich auf, frühstückte und wusch sich'.
24. Cf. Monteil, loc. cit.
25. Palva, Ḥesbān, 74: 3–4.
26. *w-bəkṛa baṛəddálläk əǧ-ǧawāb* (241: 8) 'tomorrow I will give you the answer'.
27. Cf. Barthélemy, s.v.
28. Féghali, Contes I, 41: 13.
29. For a subjectless sentence of this type in a poetic context, see D. Cohen, Ḥassaniya 236: 9, quoted in Retsö, p. 142.
30. Cowell, pp. 365 and 451.
31. Palva, ʿAǧārma 84: 9, cf. also Spiro s.v. and Talmoudi, Texts, p. 29 note 14 with further references.
32. So Cowell, pp. 417, 365, 451.
33. Wright II, pp. 69 d, 326 a, 329; Reckendorf, Verhältnisse, pp. 393–395.
34. With this the phaenomenon of "passive" (= subjectless) verb + object marked with *'æt* in Biblical Hebrew may be compared: *way·ug·ad lribqā̈ 'æt dibrê ʿeśåw* ... 'and these words of Esau were told to Rebekah' (Gen. 27: 42). According to Blau these *'æt*-phrases should be seen as objects (Gebrauch § 6). The particle *'æt* is used with definite objects (as with the "active" verb), cf. *way·iw·åled laḥᵃnok 'æt ʿîråd* 'to Enoch was born Irad' (Gen. 4: 18) but *ûlᶜebær yul·ad šnê bånîm* 'to Eber were born two sons' (ibid. 10: 25). For reference to the discussion of these constructions see Blau, op. cit.
35. Cf. Brockelmann, Grundriss II, p. 126 Anm. 2, and, for Biblical Hebrew, Blau, op. cit.
36. For subjectless feminines cf. Cowell, pp. 365 (bottom) and 428 (also of type III with a sentence as complement); Brockelmann, Grundriss II, pp. 120 (Arabic) and 121 (Aramaic). For Aramaic, see further Nöldeke, Syrische Grammatik, pp. 191–192, and for Hebrew the present study note 7. Cf. also Féghali, Syntaxe, pp. 118–119. According to the latter the feminine depends on a feminine subject which sometimes is restituted, e.g. the noun *dunyā* 'world' with verbs of meteorology. In light of the evidence presented here and in e.g. Aramaic it seems more plausible that the feminine form of the verb is not dependent on the suppressed subject but vice versa, i.e. the inherently zero-valent verbs (marked by the neutral finite feminine) may be given a dummy subject with feminine gender in agreement with the form of the finite verb.
38. III a: 2; III b: 10.
39. II a: 8.
40. Cf. Retsö, pp. 169–186.

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On the Representation of Morphemic Categories in Arabic

A Contribution to the Fundamentals of Literary Hermeneutics

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In a series of articles I have stressed the importance of distinguishing between the morphemes of language, i.e. its behavioural universals, and the morphological representations of these morphemes. Among the morphemes that of the *texteme* plays a central role in my exposition of the structure of language, this texteme being the minimal unit of the text and thus determining to a great extent lower, integrated levels. This means that the analyst has to pay attention to what may be called "the condition of the beginning", known from physics. It makes a considerable difference if the analysis starts from the text or from the phoneme (in the conventional sense). While it is possible to derive the phoneme from the text, it is impossible to reconstruct the text from the phonemes (in the conventional sense). Therefore I would like to offer a minor contribution to the characteristic of the texteme as represented in Classical Arabic, in addition to what has been said in OS 30, pp. 104 ff. There will be no discussion here of *almubtada'–alxabar* and *alfāʿil–alfiʿl* respectively. On the contrary, I shall continue to insist on the importance of deriving grammatical terms from more realistic ideas about language (cf. IM, § 1, p. 2).[1]

One of the most important steps taken forward in linguistics is represented by the doctrine of the phoneme. However, the phoneme was mostly treated in terms of an "entity by abstraction" (cf. below), so that no further really valid insights could be obtained into the structure of language with the aid of this concept. It remained a rather isolated *result* of linguistic science (OS 30, p. 76). It is not out of place to quote Bertrand Russell in this connection: "Much philosophy inspired by science has gone astray through preoccupation with the *results* momentarily supposed to have been achieved. It is not results, but *methods*, that can be transferred with profit from the sphere of the special sciences to the sphere of philosophy." (The Herbert Spencer lecture, Oxford, 1914.[2]) Thus it is, to a certain extent, the *method* by which the doctrine of the phoneme was elaborated that has inspired the reasoning leading to the concept of the *radical* (OS 21/1973, pp. 68–72; IM, pp. 6 f.; Principia, passim). This concept, based in turn on the concept of *ontological structuralism* rooted in language itself, can be used for *all* morphemic levels, and in this paper I shall deal, briefly, with what may be called textual and textemic radicals respectively (OS 29 and OS 30, passim).

Let us begin with an old text, namely the following, quoted from *alKitāb alKāmil* by alMubarrad (dead 898), ed. W. Wright, p. 527: *Qāla Abū l'Abbāsi: Ḍakara ahlu l'ilmi mina ṣṢufrīyati, anna lXawāriǧa, lammā 'azamū 'alā lbay'ati li 'Abdillāhi bni Wahbini rRāsibīyi mina l'Azdi, takarraha ḏālika, fa abaw man siwāhu wa lam yurīdū ġayrahu* "Abū l'Abbās said: Learned men belonging to aṣṢufrīya tell that when the Xāriǧites had decided to swear allegiance to 'Abdal-lāh Ibn Wahb arRāsibī from al-'Azd, this showed repugnance to that, but that they rejected every other than him and did not want anyone but him." Here we must distinguish between the term "text" in a conventional sense and the text as a linguistic concept, i.e. as a piece of textual behaviour, constituting a certain kind of *behavioural form* (OS 30, p. 94), an organization of behavioural elements (cf. IM, p. 1), the physical form of which is behavioural events (cf. OS 30, pp. 90 f.). These *behavioural events* appear in language as complementary unities composed of "expression" and "content". It is, in this connection, of no importance that the "material" of the expression *is* phonetical events and that of the content biophysical and electrochemical events. For both kinds of material is in language co-organized and co-articulated (OS 30, pp. 88 f.) in the brain to yield just behavioural events. Thus even the physics of language is, in the last resort, the physics of behavioural events (OS 30, p. 74). This is to say something more comprehensible than the rather enigmatic "la langue est une forme et non une substance" (Cours, p. 169). And still more comprehensible than "cette combinai-son produit une forme, non une substance" (p. 157); cf. the commentaries of T. de Mauro, No. 227, pp. 463 f. (ed. of the "Cours", 1983). For it is obvious that statements like "Die nächst grössere sprachliche Einheit nach dem Satz ist ein Text, der aus einer Verbindung von mehreren (oft vielen), dem Sinn nach zusammenhängenden Sätzen besteht" (OS 30, p. 206) are, from a linguistic point of view, completely non-committal. The physical form of language *being* behav-ioural events, organized in accordance with the conventions valid for each linguistic community, it follows from this state of affairs that the deep structure to be derived from such behavioural systems must also be behavioural, namely the *intuitional structures* "texteme", "lexeme", "word", and "phoneme".

Being itself integrated in *culture* (p. 113), the text integrates smaller units called textemes (p. 104). Thus the section quoted above can also serve as a text (e.g. in a colletion of *ḥadīt's*), or, as in our case as a piece of a larger text. Now, taken in an absolute sense, even the phraseme *Qāla Abū l'Abbāsi* is sufficient to establish a text(eme) in the *casus rectus*:[3] (Now Abū l'Abbās spoke). However, already the fact that this texteme is to be found in a work like *alKāmil* seems, from the perspective of the receiver, to require a continuation, and the organization of the network (OS 29, p. 99) of the following textemes confirms, of course, this expectation. It follows what Abū l'Abbās reports, that is, *Ḍakara ... ġayrahu.*

Now this complex phraseme is in itself a texteme in the *casus rectus*, but in its position here, it is the content of the utterance of Abū l'Abbās and thus function-ally also a texteme in the *casus obliquus*, being dependent on the words *Qāla Abū l'Abbāsi*, thus: *Qāla Abū l'Abbāsi: Ḍakara ... ġayrahu.* In the same way, taking the phraseme *Ḍakara ahlu l'ilmi mina ṣṢufrīyati* in an absolute sense, we will find this unit sufficient to establish a text(eme) in the *casus rectus* (It was they who

mentioned that). However, disregarding the possible knowledge of historical facts on the part of the receiver, already the *literary* consciousness of this receiver tells him that a continuation will come. It is in the nature of "literarity" as a linguistic concept to have such effects on the receiver.

As has already been pointed out, the texteme in question functions here as a texteme in the *casus obliquus: Qāla Abū lʿAbbāsi: Ḍakara ahlu lʿilmi mina ṣṢufrīyati, anna lXawāriǧa ... ǵayrahu.* Moreover, the two phrasemes introduced by *anna*, i.e. *lammā ʿazamū ..., takarraha ḏālika*, being in themselves a texteme in *casus obliquus* and one in *casus rectus*, could together constitute a text, for instance, as an example in a grammar book of Arabic. Now, the texteme *lammā ʿazamū ... mina lʾAzdi* might even alone have this function—as the title of a poem or of a prose narrative—, and the same, of course, holds true of *takarraha ḏālika.* For in this case the distinction between what we call "subordinate clause" and "main clause" would be abolished, namely in the texteme in the function of a text. That this is so intimates that notions like "clause", "sentence" etc. are not genuinely linguistic terms, but only artificial expedients of the conventional grammarian (cf. OS 30, p. 82). As a unit of textual behaviour the texteme changes its ontological state according to the way in which it is integrated in the contextual situation. The two last phrasemes, *fa abaw man siwāhu wa lam yurīdū ǵayrahu*, are, it is true, in themselves two textemes in the *casus rectus*. However, taken in an absolute sense, the same could be said about them, i.e. they might be used as texts. Moreover, both expressions are formally governed by *anna* and, from this point of view, are in the *casus obliquus*. Here we can, on the level of the text, observe the tension between "sameness" and "otherness" pervading the whole of language (cf. OS 30, p. 129).

The network of textual behaviour is organized in a linear way, as pure syntax, textemes in different case-forms following on behind other textemes (OS 29, p. 102). This organization creates a certain pattern of relation, typical of every language. This kind of pattern I shall call the "configuration" of the textual behaviour, belonging to what I call the supratextual discursivity of language (OS 29, p. 102; OS 30, p. 117). That is the kind of metalinguistic level, the morphological representation of which is at the base of the concept of "literarity" (OS 30, pp. 112 ff.), conceived of as a specific functional level of language and linking this with the sphere of culture. This means that language in its various representations is always also an expression of culture in a truly linguistic sense, "literarity" being then a specific linguistic aspect of culture founding "cultural signs", so to speak.

Now, speaking of cultural signs in a purely linguistic sense, we ought, by this term, exclusively to understand the result of an interaction of the textual sign and a specific cultural sign, on a level linking language and culture as being two ontologically different semiotic systems. This level appeals, primarily, to the emotional life of man. Being the content of the "supratextual discursivity" (OS 29, pp. 102), this idea of "literarity" indicates the "mode" of the text, expressed in the concatenations of textual behaviour (OS 30, pp. 112 ff.) the content of which are the corresponding configurations. It is on this level that we find language as pure art, and a cultural sign, so I shall contend, is always also a sign

of art (OS 30, p. 205). Thus, it is—*inter alia*—in the art-aspect that language and culture meet each other, and it is in this sense that I maintain that the text is integrated in culture, "literature" being a social form of existence of textual behaviour.

Descending, in our analysis, to the level of the "word", as an entity by abstraction, we can more easily grasp this "art-aspect" of language. For comparing, for instance, such words as *horse, cheval, Pferd, at, faras* etc. we are able to observe, more closely, the different ways in which the object "equus" is "painted" in English, French, German, Turkish, and Arabic (cf. OS 23–4, p. 220). Here we can speak of different "modes" of painting the object in question, using quite different technemes in achieving the various picture-signs (cf. OS 30, p. 89). Thus we can speak of the English, German etc. mode or "style" of painting an object (cf. below, p. 108).

The same—*mutatis mutandis*—holds true of the textual level on which the syntactic concatenations and configurations respectively are indicators of the English, French etc. style of textual behaviour. On the level of the supratextual discursivity there are no pragmatic referents in a purely linguistic sense. Nevertheless, the textual configurations create, in the consciousness of the receiver, an individual, in principle wholly subjective kind of pragmatic referents, appealing to the feelings of the receiver. Such supratextual configurations are also expressions of culture and thus part of cultural signs. However, it is only by segmenting the expressions in question in textemes, in their concatenations, that we can reach the specific level of culture within the very hierarchy of language. Thus we shall say that the sequence *Qāla Abū l*ᶜ*Abbāsi: Ḍakara ahlu l*ᶜ*ilmi mina ṣṢuf-frīyati, anna lXawāriǧa, lammā* ᶜ*azamū* ᶜ*alā lbay*ᶜ*ati li* ᶜ*Abdillāhi bni Wahbini rRāsibīyi mina l'Azdi, takarraha ḍālika, fa abaw man siwāhu wa lam yurīdū ǧayrahu* forms a concatenation of textemes in different case forms showing us a certain kind of supratextual discursivity, speaking, so to say, to the feelings of the receiver and being interpreted by him, on the one hand, in an individual, on the other in a formal-conventional way, limiting his freedom of interpretation (cf. OS 29, p. 46, n. 13 a). For the expression of this supratextual discursivity is built on conventional signs, yielding in the present case also the feeling of "historicity"; cf. on "preciosity" OS 30, p. 117.

We have now, on the one hand, been talking of language as textual behaviour, on the other, of the language of this textual behaviour in itself. The question has often been posed: What is the function of language? And the answer has often been: The function of language is communication. Moreover, it has also been a subject of discussion what, in this connection, should be meant by communication. For it must be observed that it is not the question here of the distinctions made by Roland Barthes in "Le degré zéro de l'écriture" but only the question of language as textual behaviour, which may be spoken or written. Let us then first make the statement that language as such, being a system of hierarchically organized levels resulting, in the last resort, from evolution (OS 29, pp. 62 ff.), cannot *directly* have the function of communication. For it is only under certain conditions that it can serve as a means of such a function. In this connection we shall not, in the first place, think of the fact that a sender and a receiver are

necessary for its function. Instead we shall ask the question, *how* language meets the receiver in what we can call the communicative situation. We shall say that language always meets him, in some way, also as "literature". This "also" implies, on the one hand, a complication of a hierarchical nature, on the other, that we will have to consider "literature" also as a linguistic term.

It is the function of literature to be the social *form of existence* of textual behaviour that connects the concept of literature with culture (cf. p. 98). In other words, it is as literature that culture integrates language in its capacity of textual behaviour, and this kind of integration allows us to extend the notion of the "linguistic", an extension which gives us the opportunity of ranging language among other manifestations of culture. This state of affairs can be utilized in different ways, but here we shall say that literature is also a level of language within the purely relational organization of the morphemic signs. Moreover, from the fact that "literature" is a specific form of existence of language we can extract the aesthetic quality "literarity" as being part of the linguistic sign as represented in morphology. This analytic procedure is made possible by the fact that language as a means of communication meets us always also as literature, reflecting a collective, conventional consciousness.

In this our cultural consciousness there is an *acquired* connection between language and culture. Very often we speak of "language and culture" or of "language as an expression of culture". However, it is not, indeed, this, in itself very important, but fairly general aspect of the relationship between language and culture that we are thinking of here. In this case, we shall think of "literature" as a specific kind of functional level of textual behaviour. This means that we are obliged to fix the place of this level within the true linguistic hierarchy of language as elaborated in "Principia", but then so that it could serve as a link between "the linguistic" and "the extra-linguistic" in a conventional sense (cf. OS 30, p. 205).

One might, with some reason, maintain that individual need is the beginning of man's communication with what we call "nature", that is, his original environment (cf. OS 29, pp. 69 ff.). The moment man gets this "nature" to answer his "addressing" it, for instance by succeeding in making a flint knife he has created an element of an expression of culture. When this flint knife has become the *pattern* for a series of flint knives, it has become an object that now appears as the immediate constituent of a specific pattern based on social convention. From now on, it is also an expression of the culture in question, a quantum of quality, namely the holistic quality of belonging to a certain pattern. On the other hand, the *pattern* itself owes its ontological state to the existence of a sufficient number of this object, appearing to the user or observer as representations of the same pattern, in consequence of certain *pertinent* similarities. For this kind of similarity is always based on certain features, perceived by the observer as being relevant from the view-point of the pattern, being apt to constitute a certain ontological state for the instances of the object: the quality of their being *variants* of each other (cf. OS 29, p. 58).

Thus, the configuration constituted by the relevant features of such flint knives may be said to be the result of a realization of a certain pattern of relation. To this

pattern the various instances of the object can be related, and the instances might then be said to be variants of each other (cf. OS 29, p. 58). Similarly, all the texts of a language could be considered to be variants of a specific textual behaviour valid for a certain language community. However, the stream of textual behaviour, representing a specific kind of behavioural form (OS 30, p. 94), must allow of being segmented in some way, i.e. in textemes, integrated in the text as being an "intuitional" category, namely the morpheme "text" in its relevant minimality. For it is as a minimal unit of textual behaviour that the text gives us the intuition of "something having been said", in a preliminary sense.[4] This means that the text is the primary unit, integrating other texts. However, in consequence of this integration these other texts are—as integrated elements—transformed into *parts* of the text in its primary, constitutive sense. It is these parts that are to be called "textemes", changing as entities by derivation (cf. p. 104) their ontological state; as an entity by abstraction (p. 104) such a texteme is from the point of view of the expression a *phraseme*, the term "sentence" being highly inappropriate from a truly linguistic viewpoint.

The relationship between the text and the texteme is a double one, for, on the one hand, the text integrates the texteme, and, on the other, the texteme is an immediate constituent of the text. But the important thing is to look upon the text also as a manifestation of a *cultural* behaviour, for, in this perspective, we can envisage the text as being integrated in culture. The text could then be regarded as a product of a kind of cultural behaviour, the flint knife being the product of another kind of cultural behaviour. Both kinds of behaviour have been acquired although in different ways. Comparing now these products with each other we find that there is a certain resemblance between a written text and a flint knife. Moreover, a literary text implies an extension of the cultural element in relation to a simple communication in writing, and writing means in itself an extension of the cultural element in relation to simple communicative speech.

Now, if we compare such simple speech with our flint knife we find that the latter is something permanent while the speech vanishes immediately or is transmitted to a receiver who memorizes it for some time. Speech is produced behaviour, the flint knife being reproduced behaviour, so to speak. Speech is an activity which is its own product or a product which is its own behaviour, that is, as behaviour speech has a "performative" character, the communication taking place together with the behaviour (cf. OS 29, pp. 76 ff.).

Thus it is the minimal unit of such a behaviour that is called "texteme", this term indicating then also that the unit in question is integrated in the text as being *cultural* behaviour. This means that in the texteme, considered to be an "entity by derivation", something of the cultural behaviour characterizing the text is preserved. Thus it is to be expected that this relationship of integration has left some traces manifesting themselves in various ways according to the level under observation (OS 30, pp. 112 ff.).

Now it is in its capacity as cultural behaviour that the text appears to us as "literature", i.e. as *ars litterarum* in the sense of OS 30, p. 115, that is, as "Buchstabenkunst", the acquired art of painting reality with the aid of non-figurative elements. The same holds true of the phonemes of the spoken lan-

guage. From this point of view not even the simplest utterance could be said to be *artless*. In language the phonemes exist only in the function of radicals, and the function of the radical is to be a *techneme*, a unit of art, of the non-figurative form of art with the aid of which language describes and speaks of reality. Thus culture is completely interwoven with language already in its being an *ars phonematum*. On this fact my concept of "literarity" is, in the last resort, founded (OS 30, pp. 112 ff.).

Returning now to the more or less tentative definition of the text as the intuition "something has been said" in the sense of a διάνοια αὐτοτελής (OS 30, p. 103), it is important to realize that this "something has been said", i.e. the morpheme as a fundamental behavioural universal, is, first and foremost, to be considered, psycholinguistically, to be a mere sense-datum, constituting the intuitional content of the text as a pure morpheme. From the morpheme "text" in this sense the textemes are derived with the aid of integration while the so-called sentence is an entity by abstraction created by the conventional grammarian (cf. OS 30, p. 89); cf. below, p. 104.

When an Arab hears the utterance *Faras!* "Look, a horse!", he has, in the first place, an auditory sensation of something completed, perceiving it first only as a chain of sounds constituting a pure sense-datum. Here "sensation" indicates *that* he hears something, not *what* he hears. Thus, to hear something means here that the source of the sense-datum is sound, and, inversely, that sound is something one hears. However, we shall have to distinguish between sound and hearing as a pure relation of stimulus-response in a primitive sense and hearing as a more complicated behaviour, i.e. linguistic behaviour as an act of understanding (OS 30, p. 89). Being elements of such an act, the stimulus (sound) and the response (the hearing of the sound) are now integrated in a relationship of functional isomorphism, and this integration entails a *change of quality* in the elements "sound" and "hearing", transforming them into the immediate constituents of the relation in question, which is now a relation between "expression" and "content", valid for the native sender and receiver.[5] Moreover, from now on this relationship is one between behavioural elements. For the *physical form* of language is not sound but *behavioural events* (cf. OS 30, p. 90), acoustic behavioural elements being isomorphically co-organized and co-articulated with mental behavioural elements to yield signs of textual behaviour (OS 30, p. 93); cf. below, p. 114.

This is the fundamental structure of the morpheme as a behavioural universal, and our *Faras!* is only one of innumerable possible morphological representations of the morpheme "text". To begin with, this *Faras!* is a piece of *Arabic* textual behaviour, embedded in a social context, implying a certain relational enmeshment concerning *also* what we call "culture". For not only the "word" *faras* but also the text *Faras!* are "painted" according to an Arabic fashion of representing the word as well as the text (cf. OS 30, p. 205). Moreover, we now realize that the full meaning of our *Faras!* is "the text *Faras!*", and that of *faras*, "the word *faras*" (IM, p. 15). This means that "text" and "word" here indicate levels in the hierarchy of language.

Now, a text can be of unlimited length, a fact which creates considerable

difficulties in analysing it linguistically. However, taking the text in its relevant minimality (p. 114) as our point of departure, we are able to divide any text in smaller units, as entities by derivation, as practiced above, p. 94 ff. Here the notion of "relevant minimality" is of great importance. In a case like *Faras!* "Look, a horse!" we have no difficulties to cope with, the textual minimality of this utterance being obvious. For in this case the text, as an entity by derivation, is materially identical with the word *faras* considered to be an entity by abstraction. However, the analysis of more or less complicated utterances would give a similar result. For there is always the question of discerning the relevant morphological features, valid for a morpheme. That this is so depends on the fact that the morphemes, as being the genetic and thus constant element of language, always show the same basic structure, however mutable their morphological and thus variable representation might be (OS 30, p. 206).

This structure consists of the following elements: *expression, content, pragmatic referent,* and a *metareferent* (Principia, passim). As an organization (cf. OS 29, p. 40) these elements form the purely relational constituents of the morpheme as a linguistic sign (OS 29, pp. 42 f.). The pattern of relation of this structure can be described in the following way: "a minimal unit, the expression of which is its own content, and the content of which is its own expression, and which, at the same time, is its own referent" (cf. OS 29, p. 54). Thus, such a unit is in itself also a *unity*, and it is in its capacity as a unity that it signifies its own referent, i.e. the level of the unit (OS 29, p. 54). Moreover, a unit the referent of which is its own level is also an *entity*, and it is in its capacity as an entity by derivation that it has a specific ontological status constituting a *value* within an organization of integrating and integrated units, these units being then hierarchically organized. Thus these kinds of level have *holistic* qualities not inherent in the parts *as such*, that is, the parts integrated by such a level.

However, that this is so can, it is true, only be *inferred* from the morphological representation of the morphemes. But this representation would not be so varied and yet function with such a communicative precision were the morphemes not behavioural universals. Thus scientific morphemics has to be understood as metamorphology (OS 29, p. 80; OS 30, pp. 77 f.). Consequently for a correct description of language the terms "(minimal) unit", "unity", and "entity" (by derivation and abstraction respectively) are of fundamental importance. However, the minimality of a unit does not always appear immediately from its morphological representation but has to be established by stating the *pertinent features*, this always according to the level of the unit in question. Thus it is important to realize that in morphemics "minimality" is a relative notion.

From a scientific point of view a linguistic unit is thus always also a unity as well as an entity by derivation. The relevant properties of a morpheme—in its capacity as an entity by derivation—are always based on the same pattern of relation, containing a certain kind of information. However, for ontological reasons, i.e. the degree of hierarchically organized integration (text > texteme > phrase > word > radical > phoneme), there is a great difference of value in the basic pattern of relation between a unit like *Faras!* (text) and *faras* (word), the two units giving us wholly different kinds of information (cf. OS 29, pp. 80 ff.; OS 30, p. 206).

It is customary to comment upon a unit like *faras* in terms of "sound" and "meaning". However, there is no direct way from "sound" or even "phoneme" to meaning. It is obvious that we have to distinguish between sound as material and the *function* of this kind of material. For the function of the sound chain *faras* is to be an expression on the part of the sender and an impression on the part of the receiver. In its capacity as an expression our *faras* is no longer a sound-chain but a linguistic unit, and as such a unit it is also an expression of a content and thus the half of a unity. Now, since this unity constitutes the morphemic value "word" we realize that the elements *f-a-r-a-s* must, first and foremost, be conceived of as parts of a representation of this value. We might speak of these elements as "parts of the word" in a conventional sense (cf. OS 30, p. 73 infra). However, the term "word" is, in this sense, an artificial grammatical concept, and we are hardly able to divide such a concept into smaller linguistically meaningful elements. Nevertheless, analysing language we are dealing with a world of representations, giving us the opportunity of an operationalistic approach, and the *representation* of the value "word" we are no doubt able to analyse (cf. OS 30, p. 127).

According to the degree of hierarchically organized integration, valid for the "word" we should divide the unity in question (*faras* ~ *FARAS*), as being a *sign-picture*, into "picture-signs", i.e. into the elements *f-a-r-a-s*, in their capacity as immediate constituents of the unity. From a truly linguistic point of view, these constituents could conveniently be called radicals (IM, passim). For the function of the radical is to be a techneme in a sign-picture. The radical is an "entity by derivation", the phoneme being an "entity by abstraction". It is thus impossible to reconstruct the word *faras* from the phonemes *a, f, r, s* while it is possible to derive these phonemes from the text *Faras!* although not directly, the text itself also being integrated in culture and integrating in turn the unit *faras* as a phrase. For considered to be a texteme our text contains two phrases, *Ø-faras* or *faras-Ø*, two phrasemic radicals yielding quite another kind of information than the word *faras* derived from the phrase *faras*—a part of the phraseme exhibiting a quantum of the holistic value of this phraseme.[6]

The difference between these two kinds of entity is of the greatest importance. For the radical is derived immediately from the word in its function as a *lex*, the content of the sign-picture *par excellence* (cf. Principia, passim), thus preserving—as a quantum of the holistic quality—something of the function of the word, while the phoneme means a further step downwards in the analysis, thus being a derivation from a derivation, so to speak. When we speak of "the phonemes of Arabic" we use the term "phoneme" in the sense of an entity by derivation in the first degree, namely in its function as a representation of the radical. As such a representation the phoneme has to be called the "substance" of the radical, or if we prefer this, the expression of the radical, the latter being then the content of the expression and the content the function as a techneme. As an entity by abstraction the phoneme is only an element, while, as an expression, it is an *immediate constituent*.[7] With the exposition now given above one should compare Benveniste's instructive pages in "Problèmes de linguistique générale" I/1966, pp. 119–131. Although I deviate considerably from him in my approach I must say that I have learned very much from this famous article.

I shall now conclude this little contribution by confronting my theory of language as being essentially textual behaviour with my doctrine of aspect. In "Intensive und Aspektkorrelation" (1959), p. 117, I coined the term "aspectual clause", cf. OS 29, p. 99. For it is obvious that the category of aspect belongs, first and foremost, to the level of the text and should consequently be treated within the framework of text linguistics. In so doing, we will obtain information on the *expositional function* of the aspectual texteme in Arabic. For it goes without saying that it is not the "verb" in itself that "has" aspect but, primarily, the *text*. Thus we shall use the terms "static texteme" and "fientic texteme", this in accordance with our well-known doctrine of aspect (cf. OS 29, pp. 32 ff.). Moreover, to the function of the aspectual textemes belongs also the level of supratextual discursivity constituted by the configuration formed by the concatenations of the textemes in question (cf. below).[8]

Let us contemplate a piece of Arabic prose (Kitāb al'Aġānī III/1929, p. 3 ff.), segmented in textemes, "cr" standing for *casus rectus* and "co" for *casus obliquus* (cf. above, p. 94 ff.).

(1) *Kāna min ḥadīti Qaysi bni lXaṭīmi, anna ġaddahu ʿAdīya bna ʿAmrin qatalahu raġulun min Banī ʿAmri bni ʿĀmiri bni Rabīʿata bni ʿĀmiri bni Ṣa-ʿṣaʿata, yuqālu lahu Mālikun* (cr) "It belongs to the story of Qays Ibn alXaṭīm, that his grandfather ʿAdī Ibn ʿAmr, *him* killed a man from Banū ʿAmr Ibn Rabīʿa Ibn Ṣaʿṣaʿa, whose name was Mālik." In designating this complex utterance as a cr-texteme we have applied the doctrine of the "relevant features" mentioned above (p. 100). Moreover, we shall now call this texteme a static one. — (2) *wa qatala abāhu lXaṭīma bna ʿAdīyin raġulun min ʿAbdi lQaysi mimman yaskunu Haġara* (cr < cr+co) "And his father alXaṭīm Ibn ʿAdī, a man from ʿAbd alQays, killed, one of them who lived in Haġar." — (3) *Wa kāna Qaysun yawma, qutila abūhu, ṣabīyan ṣaġīran* (cr, including a co) "And Qays was the day his father was killed (still) a young lad." — (4) *Wa qutila lXaṭīmu qabla an yaʾtara bi abīhi* (cr, including a co) "and alXaṭīm was killed before he had avenged his father." — (5) *Fa xašiyat ummu Qaysin ʿalā bnihā, an yaxruġa fa yaṭluba bi taʾri abīhi wa ġaddihi fa yahlika* (cr, including two co) "So the mother of Qays feared for her son that he would go out and seek vengeance for the blood of his father and his grandfather and perish."

In the morphological representation of the textemes Classical Arabic distinguishes sharply between static textemes and fientic textemes. The way these types of aspectual texteme are combined is also of the greatest importance for the text as a *picture* and as a piece of literal art (cf. OS 29, p. 102). Simple examples of static textemes are *Zaydun ʿālimun* "Zayd is learned", *Anta šarīfun* "You are noble", *Allāhu huwa lḥaqqu* "God is the truth". Moreover, in these cases it is presupposed that the textemes are, at the same time, texts, i.e. expressions of a relatively independent, complete communication (in the technical sense of the word). In the intuitive understanding of the receiver such textemes or texts are often understood as giving "a description of a person or thing, either absolutely, or in the form of a clause descriptive of state" (Wright, II, p. 251–2). This feeling of a "description" is the result of a realization of the specific morphological representation of the morphemic category phraseme ~ texteme, e.g. *anta-šarī-*

fun, constituting a sign within the network of textual behaviour, determining the properties of the so-called speech-act (cf. OS 30, pp. 110 ff.). We shall say that, in a case like this, where the phraseme is the signifier and the texteme the signified, the metareferent of the whole sign is *per se* just "communication", the pragmatic referent being then the specific Arabic textual behaviour (OS 30, p. 206), *Anta šarīfun*, understood by the receiver not only as such (You are noble), but also, for instance, as a descriptive communication, cf. J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (1980, passim).

Now we are used to call textemes of the type just quoted "nominal sentences". However, the term "nominal sentence" is based on certain formal types of expression, being thus a rather artificial, conventional entity by abstraction, taking no account of the function of such units within the framework of the text from which it has been derived, cf. OS 30, 73 and pp. 111 f. It is important to study the unit in question as an entity by derivation, thus preserving the ontological quality inherent in the texteme as connected with other textemes integrated in the text. In so doing, we will find that the feeling of "description" emanates from the specific representation in Arabic of the morphemic category "texteme", *in opposition* to the other specific representation of the same category, namely the so-called "verbal sentence". Let us therefore take a look at this type of representation.

A texteme like *māta Zaydun* can mean 1. "Z. has died." 2. "Z. is dead." 3. "Z. died" (punctual). 4. "Z. died" (neutral). 5. "Z. dies." 6. "Z. will die", and 7. "Z. had died." To begin with, this semantic polyvalence is, to some extent, due to a variation in the order of relation of the texteme, considered then as a textemic radical (p. 110), within the network of the text. Moreover, the notion of "texteme" includes what is commonly called the "situation", for there are no texts outside a situation. However, "situation" not being a linguistically relevant term, we shall, in this connection, have to recall the fact that the text, in its capacity as "literature", is integrated in "culture" (cf. above, p. 94). This implies, at the level of supratextual discursivity (p. 96), on the part of the receiver, for instance the feeling of "historicity" (p. 96), determining the hermeneutic horizon of the receiver and enabling him to make the appropriate choice between the semantic possibilities mentioned above. In many languages we have to translate the aspectual value chosen by the author of a text with the aid of what we call "tense". However, also the tense is, then, determined by the hermeneutic horizon of the interpreter. In any case, there is, in classical Arabic, no "tense" that is not also, in some way, an aspectual value, belonging, first and foremost, to the texteme. Let us now return to our story.

The situation described in the concatenation of the textemes 1–5 gives us the background to what follows, introduced by a *fa*: (6) *Fa ʿamadat ilā kūmatin min turābin ʿinda bābi dārihim* (cr) "So she went away to a mound of dust beside the door of their dwelling",—(7) *fa waḍaʿat ʿalayhā aḥǧāran* (cr) "and she laid stones on it",—(8) *wa ǧaʿalat taqūlu li Qaysin* (cr) "and began to say to Qays",—(9) *Hāḍā qabru abīka wa ǧaddika* (cr) "This is the grave of your father and your grandfather." Here we are dealing with a series of fientic textemes (6–8), only (9) being static. Thus aspect is, in the first place, a textemic quality,

the so-called "verbal aspect" being a somewhat artificial notion "by abstraction", created by the grammarians, who, moreover, have frequently misunderstood what should be meant by aspect.

Here it is appropriate to add some further words on the term "description". On the one hand, the textemes 6–9 could no doubt be said to compose a description of what happened, of what the mother of Qays did in order to protect the life of her son. On the other, we have concerning the textemes 1–5 maintained that they give the receiver the impression of being a description of a situation. This is description in the sense of a literary quality. Consequently we must distinguish between the literary term "description" and the fact that a series of events has been described so and so. In the latter case we could, to avoid misunderstandings, speak for instance of "relation" (cr. Wright, II, pp. 251–2), but then also include the words of the mother of Qays, (9) *Hādā qabru abīka wa ğaddika*. For, although this utterance is represented by a static texteme it gives us no immediate feeling of a description in an expositional sense; it is a *declaration* made by the mother.

Above I have dealt with some problems of textual grammar, based on a theory about the very essence of language, i.e. language as textual behaviour, integrated in "culture" through the medium of "literature" being the form of existence of textual behaviour. The primary concept of a textual grammar of this kind is the *texteme* in the function of a text, in the sense of a διάνοια αὐτοτελής, or "communication" in the pregnant, technical sense of the word. It is, according to the present writer, a misconception to believe that "the text consists of two layers: the macro- and micro-structure" (W. Maciejewski, Podstawy polsko-szwedzkiej kontrastywnej lingwistyki tekstu, 1983, p. 248). For these "layers" are no other than the result of the efforts of the analyst, that is, his different viewpoints on the same phenomenon, the text as a minimal unit of textual behaviour. The concept of the texteme emanates from the concatenation of two or more texts: *ʿAzamū ʿalā lbayʿati li rRāsibīyi* "They decided to swear allegiance to arRāsibī" = text I. *Takarraha ḏālika* "He showed repugnance to that" = text II. Now, if an author decides to put together the communications I and II he has created a new text: *ʿAzamū ʿalā bayʿati li rRāsibīyi fa takarraha ḏālika* "They decided to swear allegiance to arRāsibī, but he showed repugnance to that" = text III. In the cases I and II the text and the texteme coincide materially but not functionally, while in the case III the text, as being the true first articulation, now integrates I and II as *parts* of III. In consequence of this integration the ontological state of I and II has been changed, I and II being now immediate constituents of III. As such constituents they are textual radicals of III (p. 110). For the radical is, in its relativity, the primary concept of *all* kinds of morphological representation of morphemic categories. As textual radicals the units I and II, i.e. the textemes I and II have now the function of being technemes of the text III, considered to be a picture painted in the fashion of Arabic textual behaviour. Maciejewski suggests the acceptance of the term "sub-text" as the linguistic unit of what he calls the macro-structure of the text (op. cit., p. 248). It is, however, important to realize that this "sub-text", being integrated by the text, is no longer a text, although it undoubtedly could, in some way, be said to be "sub". Therefore I prefer the term "texteme" as being an adequate designa-

tion of this unit in its capacity of an entity by derivation (p. 98). To my mind Maciejewski's terminology is, to a certain extent, scientifically non-committal.

The more specific Arabic representation of segments of textual behaviour will be treated at length in another place. Let us therefore stop here, only calling the attention of the reader to a possible variant of this behaviour in the first text quoted on p. 102. Instead of *anna ǧaddahu ʿAdīya bna ʿAmrin qatalahu raǧulun ... we could find also a type like annahu qatala ǧaddahu ʿAdīya bna ʿAmrin raǧulun*. As we know, this *-hu* is called *ḍamīru ššaʾni* "the pronoun of the fact", and I shall now linger a while on the etymology of this grammatical term.

Šaʾn means "thing, affair, business". How has it come to mean this? There is in Swedish an expression *syna någon i sömmarna* "to scrutinize someone". To this expression the Arabic expression *la ašʾananna šaʾnahum (xabarahum)* "I will assuredly know, try, prove, test their state" (Lane 1490), seems to correspond. In this case *šaʾana* would be a denominative from *šaʾn*, pl. *šuʾūn* "suture of the skull". This means that Hebrew *kī kål-sɔʾōn sōʾēn bɔ-raʿaš wɔ-śimlā mɔgōlālā bɔ-dāmīm wɔ-hāyɔtā li-śrēfā, maʾᵃkolät ʾēš* "For every boot of the *caligatus* in clamour, and (every) garment rolled in blood shall be burn-ing—food for the fire" (Isaiah 9:4) could belong here. A *sōʾēn* is one who has donned the soldier's boots, and thus a denominative from *sɔʾōn* "boot, sandal" for which Bauer–Leander, quite rightly posit a **śaʾn*, apparently in view of Old Ethiopic *šaʾn*, written *šāʾn* (Hist. Gr. der hebräischen Sprache des A.T., 1922, p. 474). According to these scholars *sɔʾōn* "ist sekundär in diese Klasse (scil. *qitāl*) übergeführt worden". However, it is also possible to think of a development **śaʾ-n > *šān > *sōn* (cf. *ṣōn* to Arabic *ḍaʾn*) > *sɔʾōn* like *bɔʾēr < biʾr*. To Ethiopic *šaʾn*, pl. *ʾašʾɔn, ʾašʾān, ʾašāʾɔn* "soles, calceus" fits formally rather well Arabic *šaʾn* "suture", pl. *šuʾūn, ʾašʾun, šuʾn*, and *šiʾān* (cf. *qitāl* above!), recalling the fact? that the leather boots were sewn together in various ways, cf. Akkadian *mašʾanum, mašʾenum, mešēnum* "Sandale, Schuh" (W. von Soden, Akka-disches Handwörterbuch, Lief. 7/1966, p. 648b; cf. also A. Salonen, Die Fuss-bekleidung der alten Mesopotamier, 1969). Jewish-Aramaic *sēnā* "shoe, sandal" recalls more Akkadian *šēnum* "Sandale, Schuh", while Old Syriac has *sūnā < sɔʾūnā* "calceamentum", cf. *mɔsānā* "calceus", also in Jewish-Aramaic; accord-ing to Junker *MSNʾ* (= *mɔsānā*) is an allogram for Pahlavi *kafš* "shoe" (Das Frahang i Pahlavik, 1955, p. 30). According to von Soden there exists also in Old Aramaic a *šʾn* (sic!) (Akkad. Handwörterbuch, Lief. 13/1976, p. 1213b). Person-ally I know only of Imperial Aramaic *šʾny*, Axīqār 206 (Cowley, p. 219). Thus Arabic *šaʾn* "state, thing" seems to be derived from an expression such as *šaʾ-ana šuʾūnahu* "scrutinize its sutures", *šaʾana* being then itself a denominative from *šaʾn* "suture", related to the **śaʾn-* discussed above.

Summing up I would like to emphasize some points concerning the representa-tion of morphemic categories, points constituting the very fundamentals of text linguistics as developed in my analysis of the poem "Dayr ʿAbdūn" (OS 30, pp. 104–112).

1. There cannot be a question of any kind of text linguistics without due attention paid to a general theory of language, derived from language itself and not based on terms taken over from Antiquity or the Middle Ages.

2. Language manifests itself also as "literature".

3. Literature being thus the social and cultural form of existence of language, it is in this mode of existence that language is integrated in "culture".

4. The concept of integration is of primary "holistic" importance in linguistics, determining the ontological state of a unit.

5. The hierarchic organization of language compels the analyst to pay attention to "the condition of the beginning" (p. 93).

6. Language being essentially textual behaviour, integrated—as literature—in culture, it goes without saying that text linguistics has nothing to do, immediately, with conventional grammar or phonetics or even phonemics. The primary concept is here always the radical in its relativity and in the function of a techneme. Moreover, we are here dealing with psycho-linguistic phenomena.

7. It is a grave misunderstanding to believe that linguistics is an exception to what is valid for other established sciences, so that the difference between everyday language (here in the shape of conventional school-grammar language) and scientific terminology should, in some curious way, be negligible in linguistics. The linguistic sign is a complicated psycholinguistic phenomenon, and to deal with such a phenomenon in terms of, for instance "sentence" or "long and short vowels" is to show very little understanding of the very essence of the human language in general. Arabic is, by no means, an exception in this respect. To maintain, for instance, that certain *phonemes*, in themselves, contribute to the forming of an atmosphere of a poem is to treat aesthetic phenomena in inappropriate terms, cf. OS 30, p. 64 and p. 66. We are in such cases not dealing, primarily, with speech sounds one hears but, above all, *with acoustic signs one understands and feels* (OS 30, p. 93 and p. 115), this understanding including thus also the supratextual discursivity. Linguistic science is, of course, one and the same also to Semiticians.

8. It is my belief that literary hermeneutics could never be completely successful without some basic insights into the real structure of its medium, the human language, in the sense of culturally conditioned representations of the hierarchic organizations of the morphemes, the behavioural universals, derived from a careful study of these representations being *conventional organizations of behavioural events.*

Recalling now what has been said in "Principia" p. 51 on Heidegger and Gadamer (cf. OS 25–6, p. 153), I would like to call attention to the following words by de Saussure: "la langue est nécessaire pour que la parole soit intelligible et produise tous ses effets; mais celle-ci est nécessaire pour que la langue s'établisse; historiquement, le fait de parole précède toujours" (Cours, p. 37). As I pointed out in OS 30, pp. 121 f., it is important to realize that a change of quality takes place when *la langue* is developing from *la parole*. The opposition *langue/parole* exists, strictly speaking, only from a synchronic point of view. This would mean that, historically, "le fait de parole" is then not yet perceived with the aid of language as an accomplished system of signs, being still more as a system of "words", the "word" taken in the sense of Gadamer, i.e. as "disclosing", in a more direct way, the world to man.

Now according to Sartre, "l'existence précède l'essence" (L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1970, pp. 17 ff.). While de Saussure's famous dichotomy is, as

we have seen, only valid in a synchronic sense his expression "précède" has a formal parallel in Sartre's "précède", and we can ask ourselves whether the statement of Sartre would take on another shape in the perspective of de Saussure, from whom Sartre may have borrowed his "précède". For when Sartre asks: "Qu'est-ce que signifie ici que l'existence précède l'essence?" he gives *inter alia* the following answer: "Cela signifie que l'homme existe d'abord, se rencontre, surgit dans le monde, et qu'il se définit après." However, man defining himself "après", is doing so as a product of evolution, in nature, in society. Thus, man emerges in society, being his "closest" world, a constant although culturally changing factor in his development, and by this factor he is already "défini" to his "essence". One may say that man is *inter alia* defined as a ζῷον πολιτικόν. Within the scope of this his situation, man is in principle free but only to a certain extent. For the pressure of society always limits his freedom. What is called "die Systemwelt" has always influenced "die Lebenswelt". However, it is, likewise, important to realize that "die Lebenswelt" precedes "die Systemwelt", namely in what the linguist calls the diachronic perspective.

Now, if such concepts are to make sense within the framework of a philosophy of culture they must be put into a scientifically fruitful relation to each other. Moreover, disregarding the philosophical validity of, for instance, Heidegger's view of the ontological character of what he calls "understanding" as being the medium through which "die Faktizität der Welt" presents itself to man, disregarding also the justification of Derrida's onslaught on de Saussure, it seems likely that a realistic theory of language, based on ontological structuralism in the sense of the present writer, might serve as a means of *formalization* of the relation between the various concepts of modern hermeneutics. As for the Sartrean problem just mentioned, one might think of the existence as a kind of realization of the essence. For, from a synchronic point of view, "l'essence est nécessaire pour que l'existence soit intelligible et produise tous ses effets", while, from a diachronic viewpoint "l'existence est nécessaire pour que l'essence s'établisse". However, the essence developing from the existence, it will always be transformed in a qualitative sense, and entering together with the existence into the relationship of a purely relational sign, it influences also the ontological state of the actual existence of man.

Regarding a hermeneutic term like "interpretation", I would like to venture the following sketch. From a behaviouristic point of view, an interpretation can be regarded as a kind of counterpart to the speech-act in which language, as a collective system, manifests itself. From a purely structural point of view I would like to deal with this fundamental question thus: it is "understanding", next in the Heideggerian sense, that manifests itself in the individual act of interpretation, but then as a concrete realization of this "understanding", being in itself *form*, i.e. an organization of elements. As such a *noetic morpheme* "understanding" arises in the borderland between "die Welt in ihrer Faktizität" and the human "consciousness" (cf. below, p. 113). Such problems belong, in the last resort, also to the study of the linguistic categories of Arabic, Hebrew etc., valid also for the interpretation of texts. What we understand is always a *text* of some kind, it may be a question of the states and events of the world, or of a text in the

proper sense of the word. For the states and events of the world are perceived by *us* as a network, and this network forms for *us* a texture which we interpret and thus understand in some way. It is not the objective world that we understand but the world as *text*. However, we are ourselves part of the texture of the world, and it is through us that the world understands itself, so to speak. I have said that, in the last resort, *la vida es sueño*, in the sense namely that the life of a human being is the dream of the principle of life (OS 30, p. 131, n. 33). In a similar way, the world can only understand itself by the medium of the form of life which is called ''man''.

Above (p. 96) I have already mentioned the term ''style'', and in addition to what has been said in the section ''On Style'' in OS 30, pp. 112 ff., I would like to discuss some points of the important article (in Swedish) ''On Style in the Light of a General Theory of the Sign- and Symbol Functions of Language'' by Bertil Malmberg.[9]

There is, to begin with, according to Malmberg, ''the question of the descriptional level to which style belongs'' (p. 151), i.e. whether it belongs to ''la langue'' being here understood as ''the supra-individual system'', or to ''la parole'' in the sense of ''the concrete speech-act'', the physical manifestation of the system''. To this the following remarks ought to be added.

If we take the concept of *la langue* in the sense of a supra-individual system it is not out of place to recall the words ''nihil est in *lingua* quod non prius fuerit in *oratione*'' (OS 30, p. 121). This has its counterpart also in a purely synchronic perspective. For even if the analyst starts from the assumption that there is something that may be called the supra-individual system he must for every language *derive* this system from the speech-acts. Moreover, he must realize that the system in question is observable only *through a medium*, an extremely important fact. For when J. Lyons says that *la langue* ''is independent of the physical medium (or substance) in which it is realized'' (New Horizons in Linguistics, 1980, p. 15), he is right insofar as the concept of ''underlying system'' is in principle independent of the *materialization* of its realization. But the realization itself is ,of course, always a reflection of the system of which it is a realization. From this point of view the realization is, by no means, independent of ''la langue''. Thus we must distinguish between ''material'' and ''substance'', the substance being, in this connection, the observable part of what may be called ''mental form'' (cf. Fenno-Ugrica Suecana 5/1982, p. 237). The material is sound, i.e. physical events, but linguistic substance is already *formed* sound, functioning as behavioural events (p. 114). The material is a sequence of sounds, the substance is a *unit* of phonemes, completely dependent on the corresponding mental unit, both units constituting a significant *unity*. Moreover, this unity functions always as an *entity*, i.e. as a *morpheme* of which the phonemic unit is only the substance of the observable *representation*.

For if we take *la langue* in the sense of a supra-individual system we must realize that this could also be understood in a more general sense, i.e. as a ''supra-national'' system or as the ''language in the languages'' (OS 29, p. 62), the realization of which constitutes the specific language systems of the world as observable, for instance, on a very small scale in *horse, cheval, Pferd, at, faras*

(cf. p. 96). The morphemes, the behavioural universals, comprise a purely relational *organization*, common to all languages, a system in the systems, so to speak. This means that we have also, and in the first place, to deal with *la langue* in a general sense, as the underlying structure of *la langue* in a specific sense (Chinese, French, Arabic etc.). Thus Arabic *faras* "horse" could, on the one hand, be said to be a realization of a unit of the general system ("word"), on the other, a realization in *la parole* of the specific sign (*faras ~ FARAS*), entering into a so-called paradigmatic relationship with other units of Arabic (OS 30, pp. 69 ff.). It goes without saying that the organization of the morphemes has nothing to do, immediately, with sound. The same holds true of the observable part of a sign like Arabic *Faras!* "Look, a horse!". For the concrete speech-acts are realizations of the systems they constitute (cf. above). Now, the systems in question being *form*, i.e. organizations of elements (IM, p. 1), they can only be made observable in their *substance*. It is important then to distinguish between the substance of form and the materialization of this substance. It would no doubt be wrong to maintain that *faras* were simply a "physical" manifestation of the morpheme "word" or even of the content *FARAS*, that is, in the sense of physical "Lautsubstanz" or the like, this use of "physical" being scientifically non-committal or even wrong. The sign (*faras ~ FARAS*) constitutes an isomorphically integrated unity, phonemic and mental form being integrated to yield what I call *behavioural form* (OS 30, p. 96), the material of which are behavioural events; cf. below, p. 114. Therefore, it goes without saying that such a complicated phenomenon as behavioural form cannot be, directly, analysed in phonetic or even phonemic terms.

Now, regarding the question of the descriptional level, let us consider the unit *Faras!* in the sense of "Look, a horse!". This unit is a text (OS 29, p. 80), and language can only appear as textual behaviour, to be structured in *textual radicals*, the radical being a minimal unit of linguistic behavioural form in general and with a specific morphemic *value* for every level. In this case we have to deal with a *texteme* in the function of a text, i.e. *Faras!* is a representation of an underlying structure indicating *per se* only that "something has been said" and to be called the morpheme "texteme" (p. X). This kind of morpheme is observable to us, in the first place, as the expression *Faras!* which is to be called a *phraseme*. However, dealing with a representation of the phraseme we are entitled to *infer* the existence of a mental counterpart of the expression in question, to be designated as *FARAS!*, constituting the content of the expression and *also* to be called "texteme" (cf. OS 30, pp. 69f.). Thus the sign (*faras ~ FARAS*) is a specific representation of the morpheme (phraseme ~ texteme), in itself a purely relational structure indicating the value "communication". This value belongs to "la langue" in a general sense. The choice of the representation *Faras!* is, on the one hand, conditioned by the situation, on the other, possibly also by the existence of a conscious selection from the acquired dictionary (cf. OS 30, p. 75), dictated by reasons of "literarity" (p. 98). The representation itself, i.e. the whole sign (*Faras! ~ FARAS!*) is to be considered to be a realization in *la parole* of the language system valid for Arabic textual behaviour or of *la langue* in a specific sense. Thus we are here dealing with the descriptional level of the

"text", and it goes without saying that the phenomenon of "style" is, primarily, only accessible to us on this level, constituting the true "first articulation".

Now it is exactly as behavioural form that the text *Faras!*, produced by the sender, manifests itself to the receiver, being understood by him as acoustic or visual signs of Arabic behavioural form. Moreover, the value of this unit of textual form is "communication", and the full meaning of this unit is thus "the communication *Faras*". This is the true "signifié" here. We obtain the sign (expression ~ content) with its metareferent "communication", the pragmatic referent being then "the specific Arabic textual behaviour" (OS 30, p. 206), in this case *Faras!*, a realization in *la parole* of both the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic dimensions of this textual sign. From this it follows that the phenomenon of style is, primarily, accessible to us in *la parole* where, however, an expression is always a representation of the *whole* sign. The stylistic value of the text *Faras!* can only be established within the scope of other existing *configurations* at the disposal of the sender, expressed in the textual concatenations, constituting the syntagmatic dimension of the textual sign, i.e. the organization of the textemic radicals, the phrases (p. 100).

Now, for his own part, Malmberg considers he has advanced "a general theory of the sign- and symbol-functions of language", and in the light of this theory "style" appears to thim "as equivalent to the symbolic functions of language (what goes beyond its pure signification)." (op. cit., p. 159). My own theory of the structure of human language is based on *ontological structuralism*, and within the framework of this theory I have tried to define style linguistically (OS 30, p. 117). My own theory of language seems, however, to deviate considerably from that of Malmberg.

It is customary to try to evaluate certain linguistic theories with respect to their explanatory power. Such evaluations today often seek to explain our ability to produce and understand "grammatical sentences", even outside their context. Let us therefore consider for a moment what Danny D. Steinberg calls "Nobody's Whole Sentence Theory"—according to Steinberg a "clearly inadequate theory",—presupposing 'that speakers learning language essentially acquire whole sentences, doing this by memorizing every string of words (an utterance) that they hear along with the environmental context of the utterance so that it may have meaning. Thus, speakers would have stored in their memories a number of utterances and their meanings'. (Psycholinguistics. Language, Mind, and World, 1982, p. 3). Unfortunately, however, in his exposition of this theory Steinberg uses terms such as "speaker", "sentence", "utterance", "meaning" and "string of words". Now, the ability to speak sets man apart from all other animals, so that the term "speaker" must here refer to a human being having a human brain. So when Steinberg maintains that 'a speaker who had only the knowledge which was proposed would *not* be able to produce a novel sentence' he has, strictly speaking, no right to use the term "speaker". For the "knowledge" of a speaker is based on the fact that the human brain is capable of having, in the first place, the "intuition sentence", from which this knowledge can derive the "intuitions lexeme and word" respectively, from which it can, in turn, derive also the "intuition phoneme" (OS 29, p. 56). Now, having the "intuition sen-

tence" means simply the realization that "something has been said", i.e. the so-called sentence is, in principle, to be regarded as the purely relational content of the minimal unit of communication, namely the texteme. It is, then, extremely important to realize that language is learnt as textemes from which the human brain abstracts the intuitions in question, i.e. the true morphemes, constituting what may be called the universal behavioural grammar of language.

Let us now consider what Steinberg calls "Chomskyan deep structure" (op. cit., p. 49). Language being textual behaviour, a conventional analysis of this kind is inappropriate. We are here confronted with what might be called inverted simplified parsing, the result of which is called "deep structure". Thus the "knowledge of the speaker" would be his ability to parse a sentence in a conventional way. This can only mean that a speaker of a language is a person who has acquired certain parsing habits. How to make a scientific principle of this banality? In order to establish such a principle we must first of all abandon the highly positivistic approach of N. Chomsky, introducing a kind of relativity founded on functional ontology (OS 30, p. 129). In other words: How to "parse" textual behaviour? The answer to this is: in units consistent with this kind of behaviour, i.e. in textual morphemes including derivations. I would also like to emphasize that this kind of parsing constitutes only a special case of the capacity of symbolic thinking typical of man. To take only Steinberg's example *While at Queen's Surf Beach, my wallet, which I left in the trunk of my car, was stolen* (op. cit., p. 3). According to Steinberg Mr. Nobody's speaker would not be able to produce such a sentence if it had not previously been experienced and stored. This is a mistake because even the speaker of Mr. Nobody is, as a human being, wholly capable of producing such a concatenation of textemes (textemic radicals) constituting a text (a textual radical in the textual representation of his world). For language is only accessible to us, and thus also to the speaker of Mr. Nobody, as textual behaviour, a psycholinguistic fact of primary importance. This kind of behaviour is *form* represented by forms, that is, organized behavioural events, acoustic as well as mental (p. 113).

Now every kind of form has a structure, and a structure can be analysed. The structure of the texteme as being a segment of textual behaviour has to be accounted for in terms of morphemics in my sense. The example just quoted is an English *representation* of the text as a morphemic category. Thus *While at Queen's Surf Beach* is a co-texteme, *my wallet ... was stolen* a cr-texteme, and *which I left in the trunk of my car* a co-texteme. This is a specific concatenation of the representation of the facts "Once I was at Queen's Surf Beach + "There I left my wallet in the trunk of my car" + "My wallet was stolen". In the representation of these facts the textemic concatenation constitutes a certain *configuration*. What the speaker of a language has learnt by imitation comprises, in the first place, such configurations of textual behaviour, constituting a *framework* of habits of speaking and understanding, allowing him to form by combination-habits, incessantly, new texts. For the deep grammar of the true morphemes, the behavioural universals, is, in principle, very simple, although its realization in the various representations may make it appear extremely complicated, so that it could seem a mystery how man can master language. And it is, indeed, a miracle,

but a natural one, cf. OS 30, p. 131, n. 33! Let us now, in conclusion, contemplate a 'grammatical sentence outside its real context' in the sense of Steinberg, and let us also state that even the speaker of Mr. Nobody is able to produce and understand this sentence without having heard it before because he is a human being (p. 111). Thus, in Caspari-Wright, A Grammar of the Arabic Language II/1951, p. 1 we read: "Syntax. I. The several Component Parts of a Sentence. A. The Verb. 1. *The States or Tenses.*" Then the exposition runs: "1. *Perfect, almāḍī* ... indicates: (a) an act completed at some past time (the historic tense, the Greek aorist, German imperfect, and English past); as *tumma ǧāʾa Zaydun then came Zèid, ...* " As we see, the authors of this famous grammar have not realized the importance of "the condition of the beginning" (p. 93); they go from the parts of the sentence to the sentence itself, and they can consequently never give the student an idea of what language really is, which, however, is an important task of any teacher of languages. For one ought no doubt to know the nature of the subject one is lecturing on, as already Socrates stated, cf. I. Gelb, Bibliotheca Orientalis XII/1955, p. 94a.

While the term *almāḍī* "the past" is based on a specific *use* of the formal category in question (cf. Folia Linguistica II/1968, p. 33), the term "perfect" is borrowed from Latin grammar, which has seduced the authors to the opinion that *qatala* "indicates an act completed at some past time". However, as I have pointed out (for instance IA, passim) this category indicates in itself nothing of the kind. From another point of view I would like to repeat the fact that it is never the "verb" in itself that "indicates", simply because the "verb" is only an entity by abstraction. The verb can never as such be a "component of a sentence", only as a predicate phrase *qatala* can have this function, or, more correctly, the function of being an immediate constituent of a texteme. From the passage quoted above it appears that the authors intend what may be called a punctual preterite, although the same constative may also have the function of a neutral preterite, here, for instance, *Tumma ǧāʾa Zaydun*, as the title of a poem (p. 93).

Now it is, in the first place, the texteme *tumma ǧāʾa Zaydun* that "indicates" something, namely a complete utterance, that is, a cr-texteme (p. 102) the representation of which *also* indicates "historicity" (*tumma*, cf. p. 96). The order of relation of the phrases is: *tumma ǧāʾa* = predicate phrase—*Zaydun* = subject phrase, constituting a semantically relevant order of specific Arabic behavioural events, an order corresponding to the equivalent mental behavioural events. This means that the texteme in question is fientic (cf. IA, p. 15 and p. 115ff.; OS 29, p. 99), the sense of "punctuality" being the result of a realization in *la parole* of the textemic category, as represented in Arabic. The *value* of this isolated texteme is established by the existence—*in absentia* (OS 30, p. 75)—of the static texteme. This may suffice to illustrate the semantic mechanism of what is called "verbal aspect", an entity by abstraction.

As regards the term "in absentia" I would like to refer the reader to OS 29, p. 51 and pp. 70ff.; OS 30, p. 74, p. 77, p. 78, p. 89, p. 93, p. 94, pp. 98f., p. 123, and p. 130, n. 15, as well as for the "interaction" between levels, to IM, p. 12; OS 29, p. 72, p. 81. For this term concerns also what is called "consciousness". As far as I can see, my linguistic theory might, as a whole, be taken as a kind of model

for the functioning of the "consciousness" in relation to the brain. The integrated circuits of Roger Sperry seem, in principle, to function according to the laws of the *ontological structuralism* on which my theory of language is founded. Rejecting the modern dualism of John Eccles, Sperry considers himself a "mentalist" (Science and Moral Priority, Merging Mind, Brain, and Human Values). However, the *functional* values of *la langue*, valid for the integrated neuronic circuits of the brain are neither material nor mental but behavioural form, constituted by *neuronic behavioural events*. Thus one should also here distinguish between the biophysical and electrochemical processes constituting the material of the cerebral behavioural events and the *organization* of these events to "form". The so-called consciousness is not more "mental" than is the content of the linguistic sign. Only if we realize that we may use "mental" as a kind of topological term (cf. OS 29, p. 91f.). Thus it is my firm belief that the architecture of the organization of the human language—in my sense—will in the future be a source of inspiration for brain research, language reflecting like a mirror the function of the brain.

The insight into the fact that a language is a system of hierarchically ordered organizations has deep consequences for our understanding of language as being "form" represented by specific forms (OS 29, pp. 47ff.). Such *representing forms* constitute the given empirical starting point for obtaining knowledge of the nature of language, determining also "the condition of the beginning". This means that the right appreciation of this condition is of decisive importance to the linguist's taking 'the first step in the study of language' (Fenno-Ugrica Suecana 5/1982, p. 236), a step the linguist must be prepared to take if he really wants to understand what he is doing, and to understand that must be regarded as something good for every scientist and thus also for the linguist desiring to be a scientist and not preferring to be a scholar in the conventional sense of the word.

Thus, contemplating an Arabic utterance such as *Albaytu kabīrun* "The house is big" being composed of the representing forms *Albaytu* and *kabīrun* we ought to realize that what, in the first place, is represented is "form", in this case the behavioural, intuitional morpheme "text", the representing element being likewise form and consequently not sound in the physical sense of the word. The concept "form" not being accessible to us in an absolute sense (OS 29, pp. 55ff.), I have given an operationalistic definition of the concept in question: form is an organization of elements (IM, p. 1). Here the stress should be put on "organization", the "element" being of secondary importance, although the physical properties of the material constituting the elements are not completely unimportant (OS 30, p. 88). Now "organization" is a *holistic* term conferring upon the elements it organizes the rank of immediate constituents at a certain level of the behavioural system a language always constitutes. Such a level is conditioned by the degree of integration, for instance, "culture" > "text" > "texteme" > "phrase" > "lexeme" > "word" > "radical" *par excellence* > "phoneme" > "distinctive feature" (phone). The form created by the organization is behavioural form, the material of which is composed of behavioural events, this material may then be of an acoustic or a chemical nature. Thus an utterance like *Albaytu kabīrun* is throughout behavioural form, manifested acoustically or visually in the

phraseme *Albaytu kabīrun*, that is, the substance of the textual form represented by *ALBAYTU KABIRUN*. The common denominator is here always rooted in the specific material of language, i.e. *the behavioural events*. For one can never "cross" the species "sound" directly with the species "meaning", for instance, *baytun* = sound with *BAYTUN* = meaning, or divide "meaning" into "sounds". Both species must first be transformed and transubstantiated into varieties of the same species (OS 29, p. 75). This species is *the behavioural event*, representing the specific linguistic viewpoint (Fenno-Ugrica Suecana 5, p. 243), comprising in itself physical, physiological, psychological, logical and sociological phenomena and yielding a new "sort", behavioural form. Thus also the sign *baytun* = (*baytun* ~ *BAYTUN*) can be divided into the radicals *b-a-y-t-u-n*, the radical being the minimal unit of behavioural form. And, after all, what is physics if not the theory of integrated, organized behavioural events (OS 29, pp. 91 f.).[10] And what *is* the *schema*, for instance, in Ricoeur when he says—with Hjelmslev: "if we remove from semiology the substance of sounds and of meanings, such as they are, each of them, accessible to the feeling of speakers, it is necessary to say that phonetics and semantics do not belong to semiology. Each of them relates to *usage* or *use*, not to the *schema*." (The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde, 1974/1981, p. 92.) Take away from the Arabic sign *faras* its manifestation (*faras* ~ *FARAS*), what is left? The answer is (~), i.e. a structure where ( ) = minimal unit, and ~ = a bidirectional relationship (cf. OS 29, p. 73) implying that two types of behavioural material are co-organized and co-articulated in the brain to yield behavioural events, the material of behavioural form, organized holistically as "expression" (the substance) and "content". At this level the expression is constituted by a specific kind of cerebral co-articulation of acoustic and mental elements (cf. OS 29, p. 46), the content being the "intuition word", abstracted from its *use* as a phrase in a phraseme-texteme, and, at the same time necessary for the realization and generation of the use.

NOTES

1. O. L. Barnes has based his exposition of what he calls Hebrew tense syntax "On reliable facts instead of unsatisfactory grammatical theories" (A New Approach to the Problem of the Hebrew Tenses and its Solution without Recourse to Waw-Consecutive, 1965, p. IV). In this year it is the twenty-fifth anniversary of IA; cf. G. Garbini, Rivista degli studi orientali 36/1961, p. 303; D. Cohen, École pratique des Hautes Études. IVe section. Sciences historiques et philologiques. Annuaire 1966–67, p. 146. There was, of course, also the "conjuration du silence" (Cours, ed. T. de Mauro, p. 327), staged by some famous "authorities". This sad spectacle has since then been rehearsed again and again, cf. for instance, Ariel Bloch (ZDMG 113/1963, pp. 41 ff.) and Edward Lipiński in "La lingua di Ebla" (1981), pp. 191 ff. The prize winner is, of course, Herr Dr. Rüdiger Bartelmus. But also silence can speak.

2. Reprinted in "A Free Man's Worship" (1976, pp. 96–120). In his interesting paper "La structure, le mot, l'événement" Paul Ricoeur has sketched out his reflections on the "word" which, according to him, is the place where an exchange between structure and event is constantly produced (Le conflit des interprétations, 1969, p. 81). Now Ricoeur says that such a sketch "présuppose une notion tout à fait fondamentale: à savoir que le langage est fait d'une hiérarchie de niveaux" but that "Tous les linguistes le disent, mais beaucoup atténuent cette affirmation en soumettant tous les niveaux à la même méthode, par exemple à celle qui a réussi au niveau phonologique ..." (cf. OS 29, pp. 79 f.). The importance of phonemics for the methodology of

language study is here rightly emphasized. But the fault with its use is rather to be found in the fact that one never transferred the *method* by which the phoneme was found to the level from which it is primarily derived, namely the word. From my point of view, there is no "coupure" or "mutation dans la hiérarchie des niveaux" when we compare the word *faras* with the phoneme *f*. For the phoneme *f* is *integrated*, as the radical *f-*, i.e. *f- ~ F-* in *faras*, and there is no structural difference between the phoneme and the word; they are both signs but for different "things" (cf. OS 29, p. 46). The phoneme *f* and the radical *f-* belong, however, to different *ontological states*.

3. OS 30, p. 72.
4. OS 30, p. 72.
5. The reason why this is so is, of course, highly complicated. From a certain point of view, I would like to say: *Nihil est in perceptione humana quod non prius fuerit in natura*. The organs of perception being "imprinted" by Man's being in the world, the surrounding nature etc., the perception can, basically, only function according to the result of the process of imprinting, a process subject to evolution. It is, however, impossible for me to enter, in this connection, upon the opinions expressed by M. Merleau-Ponty.
6. OS 30, p. 102.
7. For the phoneme as a derived morpheme, cf. OS 29/1981, p. 46.
8. OS 30, p. 102.
9. Om stilforskning (1983), pp. 151–9 (Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien. Konferenser, 9).
10. It is obvious that Ricoeur, passing from the phoneme to the word and from the word to the sentence, has not observed the "condition of the beginning". Moreover, he says: "Le mot, c'est beaucoup plus et c'est beaucoup moins que la phrase." And he continues: "C'est beaucoup moins, parce qu'il n'y a pas encore de mot avant la phrase" (Le conflit des interprétations, p. 92). On the contrary, as a part of the sentence the word is no longer a word but a phrase or a part of a phrase. However, the word has, in fact, also an existence outside the texteme, namely *in absentia* in the Saussurean sense—as a potential phrase or part of a phrase, cf. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 93! Moreover, Ricoeur is of the opinion that before the sentence the word is only pure signs and "des valeurs dans le lexique" (p. 92). He seems not to realize then that the dictionary is a kind of text-book, the words (entries) being here parts of the text of the dictionary ("style of the dictionary"). Ricoeur says: "Le signe, en tant que différence dans le système, ne dit rien" (p. 92). For whom? The author seems to forget that a difference within a system has a *value*, namely, on the one hand, the value of not being something else at the same level of the system, and on the other, the value of being just a "difference" which is a meaningful concept. If something has a meaning it "says" in any case something. To the analyst language speaks of itself (cf. OS 29, p. 84).

Eine volkstümliche Yunus Emre Kultstätte

OTTO F. A. MEINARDUS

Die hier zu beschreibende Kultstätte, die dem Derwisch-Dichter Yunus Emre geweiht ist, liegt auf einem kleinen Plateau 6 km südlich des Ortes Sarigöl in der westlichen Türkei an der Straße Sarayköy–Buldan–Sarigöl. Von dem Plateau, das am nördlichen Abhang des Boz Dag gelegen ist, hat man einen herrlichen Ausblick auf die sich nach Westen erstreckende Gediz-Ebene und auf die Ortschaft Sarigöl mit ihren Minaretten, die wie Nadeln aus der Landschaft hervorstechen. Von dem 1 500 m hohen Paß über den Boz Dag führt die Straße in steilen Serpentinen nach dem in einer Höhe von 850 m gelegenen Sarigöl. Die Kultstätte liegt auf der linken Straßenseite von Buldan kommend, ungefähr 120 m von der ersten Serpentine entfernt.

Die Stätte besteht aus drei Kultanlagen, die ineinander übergehen, aber doch funktionell unterschiedliche Bedeutung besitzen. Von der Straße kommend geht man zuerst durch eine Friedhofsanlage. Rechts vom Friedhof sind die Äste der Sträucher mit einer Vielzahl von Fetzenopfern behängt. Am nördlichsten Ende der Kultstätte, wo die Vegetation von Felsen abgelöst ist, erkennt man in den Felsen mehrere natürliche Vertiefungen. Es handelt sich hier eindeutig um eine volkstümliche Kultstätte, wo gewisser Erlebnisse des Derwisch-Dichters Yunus Emre gedacht wird.

Yunus Emre ist ein in vielen Gebieten Anatoliens verehrter Derwisch-Heiliger, über dessen Leben wir wenig wissen.[1] Verehrt wird er bis auf den heutigen Tag auf Grund seiner volkstümlichen Gedichte und Lieder, die er in Silben-Reimen für die gläubige anatolische Landbevölkerung geschrieben hatte. Seine weitgehende Anerkennung und Popularität gründen sich aber auch auf seine tiefe Frömmigkeit und auf seine bescheidene und asketische Lebensweise. Yunus Emre wurde im Jahre 638 A. H. (1240) in Sariköy bei Eskişehir geboren und war ein Zeitgenosse der großen islamischen Derwisch-Mystiker Hadji Bektasch, Tapduk Emre, Sari Saltuk, Barak Baba und Mevlâna Jalaluddin Rumi. In vieler Hinsicht verkörperte Yunus Emre die Frömmigkeitsideale und Lebensauffassungen dieser großen Dichter und Sänger. Seine Jugend verbrachte Yunus in Sariköy, und es wird berichtet, daß er als armer Tagelöhner sich schon mehr um seine Nachbarn sorgte als um sein eigenes Leben. Sein größter Wunsch aber bestand darin eines Tages dem großen Derwisch Altmeister Hadji Bektasch zu begegnen, der einem Derwisch-Kloster (Dergâh) in Kirşehir vorstand. Hadji Bektasch verkörperte die religiösen Ideale, die für Yunus lebensbestimmend waren, die Liebe für die Armen und Verstoßenen, für Gott und Gottes Schöpfung. Es war auch Hadji Bektasch, der Yunus zu dem Derwisch Schech Tapduk Emre sandte, wo er dem Derwisch-Kloster (Tapduk Dergâhi) bei Salihli beitrat. Für vierzig Jahre diente der Derwisch Yunus dem Kloster als Holzfäller, und viele seiner Gedichte und Gesänge stammen aus dieser Zeit. Als wahrer Mystiker erkannte und fühlte

er die Gegenwart Gottes in sich selbst. Eines Tages empfahl ihm sein Schech Tapduk Emre, das Kloster zu verlassen und auf Wanderschaft zu gehen. Yunus Emre hatte einen Grad der Gotteserkenntnis erreicht der für seinen Scheich Tapduk Emre bedrohlich schien. Für viele Jahre zog Yunus durch die Weiten Anatoliens, bis er eines Tages wieder an der Tür seines Scheichs Tapduk stand und um Aufnahme in das Kloster bat.[2] Yunus Emre starb im Jahre 722 A. H. (1322). Sein Grab ist in seinem Geburtsort Sariköy, wo alljährlich an seinem Todestag, am 25. Mai, Zehntausende von Pilgern zusammenkommen, um Yunus Emre zu gedenken und von ihm *bereket* zu empfangen.

Die volkstümliche Verehrung diseses Derwisch-Heiligen ist aber so weit ver-breitet, daß in mehreren Ortschaften Anatoliens sein Grab verehrt wird. So existiert ein *Yunus Emre Grab in dem Dorf Tuzcu bein Erzerum, wo Yunus* neben seinem Lehrer und geliebten Schech Tapduk ruht. Ein weiteres Yunus Emre Grab gibt es in Bursa. In Keçiborlu, auf dem Wege von Isparta nach Dinar, ist ein mit Rosen bepflanztes Grab des Derwisch-Dichters. Außerdem existieren noch Yunus Emre Gräber in dem Dorf Çay bei Sandihk, in Aksaray, halbwegs zwischen Ankara und Adana, und in Karaman südlich von Konya auf dem Wege nach Silifke. Eine weitere Gedenkstätte befindet sich in dem Dorf Emre bei der Ortschaft Kula, wo man glaubt, daß Yunus Emre unter der Türschwelle des Hauses von Tapduk Emre ruhe, während der große Scheich und seine Familie im Mausoleum begraben sind.

Ein Grab des Derwisch-Dichters Yunus Emre wird an dieser Kultstätte bei Sarigöl nicht verehrt. Im Gegenteil, der Volksglaube, der hier zum Ausdruck

kommt, beruht auf den Fußabdrücken in den Felsen des kleinen, etwas überstehenden Plateaus. Auf meine Fragen nach der Bedeutung dieser Vertiefungen in den Felsen wurde mir gesagt, daß von diesem Ort Yunus zum Himmel aufgefahren sei. Wie der Prophet Elias, Jesus, Maria und Muhammad so sei auch Yunus nicht begraben, sondern im Himmel, und die Abdrücke in den Felsen seien der Beweis.

Der islamischen Volksfrömmigkeit sind derartige Vorstellungen nicht fremd, nämlich daß gewisse heilige Personen die Eigenschaften besitzen, Steine zu erweichen und Spuren auf ihnen zurückzulassen. Erwähnt seien hier die Fußabdrücke des Kamels des Propheten Muhammad unter dem Gipfel des Moses-Berges oder die Fußspur des Maultieres des Propheten in Medina. Im Felsendom zu Jerusalem ist an der Südwestecke des Felsens seit alter Zeit ein größeres Stück ausgeschnitten und die dadurch entstandene Nische durch einen niederen *mihrâb* ausgefüllt. Über diesem *mihrâb* liegt die Steinplatte mit der Fußspur des Propheten Muhammad, welche er bei seiner Himmelsreise im Felsen zurückgelassen haben soll. Als der Felsen während der Kreuzfahrerzeit vorübergehend in christlichem Besitz war, gab man sie als die Fußspur Jesu aus. Nördlich vom Felsen steht ein weiterer *mihrâb* an einer Stelle, wo der Prophet mit anderen Propheten bei seiner nächtlichen Reise gebetet haben soll. Östlich vom Felsen sieht man abermals einen *mihrâb* mit Fußspuren am Rande des Felsens, die auf Elias und Henoch zurückgeführt werden. Man glaubt sogar, noch weitere Fußspuren des Propheten selbst zu erkennen, der bei seiner Himmelfahrt in den Felsen eingesunken sei. In der Mitte der Ostseite der Höhle erblickt man an der Decke des Felsens eine runde Ausbuchtung von etwa 70 cm Durchmesser; der Prophet soll an dieser Stelle gebetet haben, und als er sich aus seiner gebückten Haltung erhob, habe er den sich erweichenden Felsen mit seinem Turban eingedrückt.

Es besteht wohl kein Zweifel, daß Abdrücke von Füßen und Händen des Propheten für die im islamischen Raum so weit verbreitete Volksfrömmigkeit als Vorbilder gegolten haben. Warum sollten nicht auch andere Heilige oder Propheten mit ihren Körperteilen Steine und Felsen zum Erweichen bringen, wie zum Beispiel Hadji Bektasch, dessen Handabdruck in Sidi Ghazi von den Gläubigen verehrt wird? Es ist in diesem Fall unwesentlich welche Vertiefungen im Felsen den Fußspuren des Yunus Emre zugeschrieben werden. Die Tatsache, daß von diesem Felsen der Derwisch-Dichter dem Propheten in den Himmel gefolgt ist, ist für die Gläubigen das Ausschlaggebende.

Eine weitere Vertiefung im Felsen wird als die Türschwelle des Hauses von Schech Tapduk Emre bezeichnet, auf der Yunus geschlafen haben soll. Diese Begebenheit, die die Überlieferung in die letzten Lebensjahre von Yunus Emre gelegt hat, ist eine in der anatolischen Volksfrömmigkeit weit verbreitete Geschichte. Es ist somit auch verständlich, daß an einem volkstümlichen Kultort dieses Erlebnisses mit besonderem Eifer gedacht wird.

Nachdem Yunus für mehrere Jahre das Derwisch-Kloster (Tapduk Dergâhi) verlassen hatte, klopfte er eines Tages an die Tür seines geliebten Schechs Tapduk Emre. Ana Baci, seine Frau, öffnete ihm die Tür und sagte: ,,Yunus, Tapduks Augenlicht ist schwach geworden, er kann kaum sehen, aber in einigen

Minuten wird er einen Spaziergang machen. Laß uns sehen, ob dieses die rechte Zeit ist, daß du bei uns hier wieder einkehrst. Wenn du ihn kommen siehst, so leg dich auf die Türschwelle. Er wird dann ja über dich stolpern und mich fragen, was da liegt, und ich werde ihm sagen, es ist Yunus. Wenn er sagt, 'es ist unser Yunus', das bedeutet du bist von ihm angenommen, und du hast seine Erlaubnis in die Tapduk Dergâhi zurückzukehren. Sollte er aber sagen, 'um welchen Yunus handelt es sich?', dann werde ich dich nicht verraten, und dann nimm deine Tasche und ziehe weiter.'' Als Yunus die Schritte seines Scheichs hörte, legte er sich erwartungsvoll und mit Herzklopfen auf die Türschwelle und wartete mit Angst und Zagen auf die Reaktion von Tapduk. Als Tapduk mit seinem Stock Yunus berührte, wußte er um wen es sich hier handelte, und mit Freuden schrie er auf: ,,O, es ist unser Yunus.'' Yunus war im Derwisch-Kloster wieder aufgenommen, und sein Lebenswunsch war erfüllt.

Unweit der überstehenden Felsen befinden sich wild wachsende Sträucher, deren Äste mit einer Unzahl von großen und kleinen Fetzenopfern behangen sind. Die Bedeutung von Fetzenopfern ist sehr vielschichtig. Oft gelten die Fetzenopfer lediglich als Gebetszeichen. In den meisten Fällen sind die Fetzen Teile von Kleidungsgegenständen, die einen erkrankten Körperteil bedeckten. Der Kranke spricht beim Aufhängen des Fetzens ein Gebet und sagt: ,,Ich habe meine Krankheit auf dich geworfen, O, Mann Gottes''. Es kommt auch vor, daß vor und nach der Hochzeit Bräute Fetzen opfern in der Hoffnung ihrem Bräutigam zu gefallen. Auffallend bei diesen Fetzenopfern sind die ungewöhnlich großen Stoffreste, Teile von Untergewändern und auch Teile von Schleiern. Häufig wollen die Besucher auch nur lediglich zum Ausdruck bringen an dem Ort gewesen zu sein und ihre religiösen Pflichten erfüllt zu haben. Die Fetzen können aber auch den Heiligen erinnern, den Besucher und seine Wünsche nicht zu vergessen. Es ist auch möglich einen Fetzen zur Heilung von Krankheiten von den Ästen abzunehmen und mitzunehmen, da diese Fetzen etwas von der Heilungsgabe des Heiligen angenommen haben. In diesem Falle aber muß man einen

anderen Fetzen an den Sträuchern befestigen. Mitgenommene Fetzen können nämlich anschließend zu Räucherungen verwandt werden, womit die Krankheit vertrieben wird.

Die dritte Kultanlage ist der ,,Yunus Emre Friedhof bei der Topuzlu Gedächtnis Stätte'' (Topuzlu mevkinde Yunus Emre Mezarliğina Tapinak Yeri). Der Friedhof besteht aus ungefähr dreißig unbehauenen aufgerichteten, rohen Feldsteinen, die in mehreren Steinkreisen auf einem kleinen Feld zwischen den Sträuchern stehen. Der Durchmesser der Steinkreise ist verschieden, dürfte aber zwischen 4 und 6 m liegen. Ein schmaler Fußpfad führt durch die Anlage. Da keine Aufschüttungen erkennbar sind, handelt es sich um eine inaktive Friedhofsanlage. Vier behauene weiße Steine, die aber ohne Inschriften und Symbole sind, treten deutlich hervor. Drei dieser Steine sind am oberen Ende zugespitzt, bei einem Stein ist der obere Teil kreisförmig. Einem weiteren Steinpfeiler ist ein runder Stein, wohl einen Turban darstellend, aufgesetzt.

Daß Gläubige es bevorzugen sich an einem Ort begraben zu lassen, der einem Heiligen geweiht ist, ist verständlich. Diese Sitte ist weitverbreitet in der Volksfrömmigkeit des gesamten Orients. Zeitlich gesehen müßten wir demnach die Friedhofsanlage nach der Entstehung der Kultstätte ansehen. Eine Datierung ist leider nicht möglich, da weder Inschriften noch Symbole an den Steinen erkennbar sind. Die Fetzenopfer aber beweisen, daß, wenn auch heutzutage der Friedhof nicht mehr gebraucht wird, Besucher aus der Umgebung zu dieser Kultstätte ziehen, um dort zu beten und dem Derwisch-Dichter Yunus Emre zu gedenken.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Die wenigen Einzelheiten aus seinem Leben sind uns in den Traditionen der Bektaschi Derwische überliefert.
2. Aus seinen Gedichten läßt sich schliessen, daß Yunus Emre auch Mekka, Damaskus und Aintab während seiner Wanderungen besuchte.

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Old Syriac *xanninā* "fosterling"

EVA RIAD

The Acta Martyrum (ed. P. Bedjan) 2, pp. 57ss contains fragments of a *mēmrā*[1] which is partly metrical in structure and which constitutes the prologue to a collection of acts of martyrs sometimes attributed to Mārūtā, bishop of Mayperqaṭ in Armenia at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century.[2] These acts depict the sufferings of the Christian martyrs under Šāpūr II.

A passage in the beginning (p. 58, 14–59, 8) is written in rhymed prose and consists of fourteen sentences similar in structure and content and forming a well defined unity. The message of the text can be summarized as follows:

A. The just have suffered—undeservedly.
B. "We" the wicked have enjoyed ourselves—undeservedly.
C. Through their martyrdom the just have become "saviours".
D. Through the martyrdom of the just we, who are guilty, are "saved".
E. We show ourselves to be ungrateful.

The stylistic devices that the author uses to put across his message consist mainly of parallelism and antithesis. A and B are expressed in thirteen variations in the first thirteen sentences, while C, D and the central message of E are encapsulated in the fourteenth and final sentence. In each sentence, A and B are expressed in two short coordinated antithetical clauses, the first containing A and the second B. On the one hand the whole of the first clause contrasts with the whole of the second, on the other hand there is a contrasting lexical correspondence between the subjects as well as between the predicates in the two clauses. The formal structure reflects the contrast in content, that is, the sufferings of the good and the life of the wicked. The author achieves a kind of chiasmus, by inverting the predicates of the clauses, thus: predicate–subject: subject–predicate. The semantic contrast between the two predicates is stressed by the difference in structure: the verb of the first clause is always a perfective, while that of the second is a participle (except for s. 12 where the predicate is a subclause). The difference between the two verbforms (*qəṭal/qāṭēl*), however, is not aspectually relevant here. Both are in a position of neutralization having thus only stylistic function, whereby the value of the verb itself stands out all the more, displaying the antithesis even more clearly. We have here what could be called an aspectual expression *per merismum*, a rhetoric device not often adverted to (see F. Rundgren, Abriss der Aspektlehre, 1961, p. 103; after Rundgren H. Ringgren, "A Law of Stylistic Balance in Hebrew" in Pistis kai erga, Horae Soederblomianae VI, pp. 9–15).

There is an almost complete parallelism between the fourteen sentences. They have the same grammatical structure, the equivalent rhyme throughout and

numerous assonances brought about by the structural parallelism. The structural conformity emphasizes and strengthens, with the effect that the theme is hammered out. In the last sentence where C is contrasted with D, the author—or preacher—comes to the central point of this whole passage, namely E: to demonstrate the ungratefulness of the people. After our passage a few sentences in prose follow, not quoted by me, where the theme of the necessity to revere the remains of the martyrs is expanded and exemplified. There is a strong poetic element in our text but as the number of syllables varies one cannot call it a metrical homily. Most sentences contain 9+8 syllables. The function of the stylistic devices is to create an elevated language that suits the seriousness of the theme. In the preceding text purely metrical compositions are interspersed. On p. 57, for example, two anaphorical verses of seven syllables are followed by another five anaphorical verses of five syllables. By arranging our material as a poem we get a good apprehension of the symmetrical structure of the passage. One gets the impression of an oral sermon and the style reminds one of the style in Melito's homily On the Pasch.

The text runs as follows (p. 58, 14ss):

1. *Qāmw zakkāyayn bät dinā:*
   wa-xnan xayyābä šəbiqin-nan.
2. *ᶜalw šarrirayn lə-quṭrāgā də-ᶜawlā:*
   wa-xnan daggālä marpän-nan.
3. *etnawwalw ᶜanwāyayn bät asirä:*
   wa-xnan məfannəqä məšammərinnan.
4. *eštannaqw makkikayn bə-negdä marrirä:*
   wa-xnan rāmä metgaᵓᵓän-nan.
5. *eṭṭarrafw ṣayyāmayn bə-kafnā da-qṭirā:*
   wa-xnan āsōṭä metlaᶜᶜəbin-nan.
6. *ibeš leššānhōn da-nzirayn bə-ṣahyā d-ananqē:*
   wa-xnan rawwāyä metparpəᶜin-nan.
7. *etxappiw abilayn bə-saqqayhōn:*
   wa-xnan səqilä mezdalləfin-nan.
8. *etᵓeleṣw xəfiṭayn bə-tašnidä qəšayyä:*
   wa-xnan rəfayyā mettənixin-nan.
9. *eštəlemw xakkimayn lə-šuᵓᵓālä ᶜəwirä:*
   wa-xnan saklä məfaqqəqinnan.
10. *ezalw malləfānayn kad məᶜattədin ba-šrārhōn:*
    wa-xnan bə-tulmādan zēfānninan.
11. *šanniw sābayn kad məzawwədin bə-ṭaᶜməhōn:*
    wa-xnan ṭəlāyä pakkihinnan.
12. *pərašw mədabbərānayn mennan bə-qeṭlā də-ᶜal appayn:*
    wa-xnan xanninä āf lā ᶜuhdānhōn ᶜābar bə-tarᶜitan.
13. *etrəgemw rāᶜawwātan bə-kēfä meṭṭulātan:*
    wa-xnan ᶜallānä kulnāš nafšeh mətarsä.
14. *mitw pārōqayn bə-saypā xəlāfayn:*
    wa-xnan pəriqä garmayhōn a(y)k də-kulnāš hā xəšibin lan.

Translation

1. The just among us stood up in court: while we, the guilty, are forgiven.[3]
2. The truthful among us faced a criminal charge: while we liars are left in peace.
3. The ascetic among us suffered in prison: while we who live in luxury[4] are free.
4. The meek among us were tormented by bitter torturing: while we proud ones rejoice.
5. The fasting among us suffered from imposed hunger: while we gluttons enjoy ourselves.
6. The tongues of the continent among us were parched by forced dryness: while we drunkards lead a luxurious life.
7. Our monks covered themselves with their rags: while we elegant people adorn ourselves.
8. The assidous among us were afflicted with hard instruments of torture: while we slack ones rest.
9. The wise among us were subjected to blind interrogations: while we stupid ones babble.
10. Our teachers passed away prepared by their truth: while we are false in our teaching.
11. The old among us departed[5] provided[6] with their prudence: while we young ones talk nonsense.
12. Our fosterers separated themselves from us by being killed in front of us: while we fosterlings do not even perpetuate their memory in our minds.
13. Our pastors were stoned by rocks on our behalf: while each of us, their assistants,[7] looks after himself only.
14. Our saviours died by the sword for our sake: and we who indeed were saved value their bones no more than we value anybody else's.

The antitheses are sharp and consistent throughout: the truthful are opposed to the liars, the fasting to the gluttons etc. We can discern two categories, moral and social. Sentences 1–2 are of the former kind: the just and truthful being in opposition to the guilty and the liars respectively. In sentences 3–8, however, we have not only the moral category but also the social, as ʿanwāyayn in sentence 3 and abilayn in sentence 7 signify ascetics and monks and thus refer to definite groups of Christians. In sentences 9–13 it is the social category which dominates. The author describes spiritual leaders of different kinds. The teachers and the pastors are those most specified here. madɑbbərānayn in sentence 12 may denote a particular kind of leader or may be an expression which denotes leaders in general. In sentence 14, finally, both categories are fused and the good of both categories, through their martyrdom, have become saviours. Contrasting with these are the saved who, through ungratefulness neglect to treat the remains of the martyrs with the care and reverence which they are due.

The strict, antithetical structure of the text gives the interpreter an excellent opportunity of arriving at a more precise understanding of the meaning of the words used. Sentence no. 12 deserves our special attention in this respect. Here

we have *mədabbərānayn* contrasted with *wa-xnan xanninä*. A *mədabbərānā* is a leader and it appears from the placing of the word between *sābayn* and *rāᶜawwātan* that here we are dealing with spiritual leaders. The words *āf lā ᶜuhdānhōn ᶜābar bə-tarᶜitan* are also informative in this respect. A standard phrase in prefaces to Acts of martyrs and Lives of saints says that it is the duty of the survivors to celebrate the memory of these people, thus for example Paulus, bishop of Sarūǧ, in the biography he wrote of his predecessor Arōn (PO 5, p. 125) states: *wālä lan də-naytä la-mṣaᶜtā ᶜuhdāneh də-naṣṣixā māry Ahrōn*, "It is our duty to bring forward the memory of the victorious Mār Arōn". The fact that the objects of these leaders' devotion, namely the *xanninä*, do not even remember them in spite of their suffering martyrdom in their presence, displays an extreme-ly despicable attitude on the part of the *xanninä*. Now, having established that the whole passage is made up of distinct antitheses, we must presume an equally distinct correspondence between *mədabbərānayn* and *xanninä* as that evident in the other pairs. The question, then, is; what does *xaninnä* stand for here and which type of leader is meant by the word *mədabbərānayn?*

The word *xannin* is, according to the dictionaries, derived from *xan* (*xnn*; arab. *xanna*) in the sense of "rancid". The examples given there do not point to a metaphorical use of the word. The example from Afrēm that is quoted in Thesaurus and Brockelmann's Lexicon Syriacum is taken from the extremely unreliable Editio Romana by Benedictus. In Beck's edition of the same text (Hymnen contra haereses, CSCO, SS, 76, 1957, hymn 19, p. 69) the text is quite different. The word *xanninä* does not appear, even as a variant. It is, however, quite common that words designating sensory perceptions are used metaphorical-ly for aesthetical and ethical concepts. *pakkih*, for example, in our text (s. 11)[8] originally meant "stale" of taste, then "insipid, senseless, foolish" (in Arabic *fukāhatun* means "joking, jesting"). On the other hand words for "good" or "bad" often have originally physical sensations as their basic meaning. For example, the Syriac *bišā* "bad" originally meant simply "foul, rancid" (see F. Rundgren, Semitische Wortstudien in OS, 10/1962, pp. 109ss.). If we are here dealing with such a metaphorical use, *wa-xnan xanninä* would mean "and we the rancid ones = wicked, bad".[9] This, however, does not at all fit in as a contrast to *mədabbərānā*. Thesaurus gives another possibility (p. 1315), namely *xannin* = *xənin* from *xan* (*xnn*; arab. *ḥanna*) "to pity, to have compassion". It would then mean "misericordiam adeptus". This meaning, which is not taken up by Brockel-mann, is not supported by any example[10] and once again, does not suit as a contrast to *mədabbərānā*. The only remaining point of departure for our *xaninnä* is the word *xannā<xaᶜnā* meaning "bosom, lap" (hebr. *xōṣän*; arab. *ḥiḍn*; jew.aram. *xannā, xinnā*). Arabic has the expression *ḥaḍana ṣṣabīya* "he put the child in his *ḥiḍn* (i.e. under his arm, or in his bosom): or he nourished him, reared him, fostered him" (Lane, p. 591). We have the same in Ethiopic: *ḥaḍana, yəḥḍən* "sinu fovit", "educavit", denominative<*ḥəḍn* "sinus", cf. *ḥaḍānī* "nu-tritor, tutor"*. Our *xannin* could belong here. Now, the nominal form *qaṭṭil* is normally used as passive participle or verbal adjective of intransitive verbs. When it occurs with transitive verbs next to *qəṭil* it seems to have an active, intensifying meaning while *qəṭil* is passive, for example *yaṣṣif* "careful, solici-

tous" beside *iṣif* "cared for". *ilif* and *yallif* both mean "learned, skilled" but *yallif* also means "disciple". Similarly one could interpret *xannin* as "cared for" and then "fosterling" or the like. That we do not have any instances of *xənin* in this sense might be due to the fact that this form has been claimed for the passive participle of *xnn* in the sense "have pity". The most obvious course, however, would be, not to start from a verb, of which we have no trace, but to see *xannin* as a denominative directly from *xannā* "bosom, lap" with the meaning "nurseling, Busenkind, sw. skötebarn", "one who is taken care of, educated" by a *mədabbərānā* for example.

The meaning of *mədabbərānayn* in our text may be illustrated by the introduction to the letter of Mārā bar Serapion to his son (Spicilegium syriacum, ed. Cureton, pp. 43ss; F. Schulthess, Der Brief der Mara bar Serapion in ZDMG, 51, pp. 395ss.). Mārā bar Serapion, who apparently lives imprisoned far from his son, has received a letter from his son's tutor and teacher (*rabbā wa-mrabbəyānā*) containing good news about the boy's diligence and serious disposition. The father replies by writing a letter to his son saying: *l-Alāhā barrəket d-at ṭalyā zəʿōrā də-lā mədabbərānā bə-renyā ṭābā šarrēt*, ". . . then I blessed God that you, my little boy, without a 'leader' have begun with a good intention". Apparently *mədabbərānā* here refers to the father himself and denotes a role which is broader than that of teacher-tutor (*rabbā wa-mrabbəyānā*). Possibly a similar denotation is intended in our text. *mədabbərānayn* might be regarded as some kind of *paidagogoi* rearing and fostering *xanninä*. *mədabbərānā* is, however, also a title applied to Christ and the twelve apostles—and henceforth also to bishops—in early Christian literature. In Liber Graduum (Patrologia Syriaca, I: 3, ed. M. Kmosko, Paris, 1926) we read (Col. 297, 19–20): *meṭṭul hānā āf Māran wə-kārōzawhy də-hennōn ennän mədabbərānä də-kulnāš:* . . . "therefore, also our Lord and his heralds who are the leaders of all men . . .". And in the only authentic homily of Mārūtā that we possess, Homilia in "Dominicam novam", we read (§ 14): *hākannā āfʿēttā məsabbətā ba-treʿsar šəlixä. wə-hānnōn itayhōn abāhäh wa-mdabbərānäh wa-b-garmä dilhōn ṭāfsā wə-ba-šmāhayhōn met-gawwəzā.* "Thus the church is adorned with twelve apostles. They are its fathers and leaders and she seeks shelter by their bones and takes refuge by their names." (Oriens Christianus, 3, 1903). Here it is perhaps not the *paidagogos* or educator but the image of the shepherd that is intended. We have numerous instances of *dabbar* used in the original sense of "leading a flock" in Afraates' tenth demonstration called De pastoribus where we also find *rāʿawwātā* and *mədabbərānä* side by side (Patrologia Syriaca, I, 1, ed. J. Parisot, Paris, 1894). We read about Moses (Col.445, 20–21): *w-etgəbi men ʿānā də-nerʿä lə-ʿammeh w-a(y)k rāʿyā ṭābā dabbar ennōn.* "he was elected by the flock to pasture his people and he led them like a good shepherd"; and later on (Col.457, 23-4): *wa-b-hānā mēmrā ketbet lāk ʿal rāʿawwātā mədabbərānawhy da-gzārā.* "In this homily I have written to you about the shepherds who lead the flock." The author of our text may intend bishops while speaking about *mədabbərānä* and possibly the word evokes for him the image of the good shepherd carrying the lamb in his arms. Our interpretation of *xannin* lends itself very well to this. Whatever the associations that suggest themselves to the reader of our text, I

venture to bring forward the interpretation of *xanninä* here as "fosterlings", although, so far, I have not found any other instances of the word being used in this sense. That the word *xannin* has not been able to consolidate itself in this meaning or in that of "misericordiam adeptus" is probably due to the competition from the third *xannin* "rancid" which is dominant.[13]

Finally, a few words about *pārōqayn* and *pəriqä* in sentence 14. These words have a different quality from the other pairs of contrasting notions. In the Syriac version of a hymn of Severus about the Persian martyrs there is a prayer addressed to the martyrs: *xəläf kullän hännōn d-etpəreqw w-eštawzabw men ṭācyūtä bə-yad atlēṭūtkōn bəcaw w-etkaššafw*, "... by means of your combat pray and entreat on behalf of all of us who have been *saved*[11] and delivered from error" (PO, 7, p. 713; transl. Brooks). In another hymn from the same collection it is said about the martyrs that they were *mədamməyänä bə-xaššä qaddišä wə-pārōqäyä*, "imitators of the holy and *saving*[11] Passion" (transl. Brooks, PO, 7, p. 636). The continuation of this text runs as follows: "since by the means of the limbs of your constancy you hallow the prayer-house buildings in which you are laid". This refers to the remains of the martyrs that were collected and venerated. In his treatise on the martyrs (ca 570) Išay (nestorian in Seleucia and successor as interpreter of Mār Abrāhām who initiated the commemoration of the martyrs) talks about how the martyrs, through their martyrdom (*sāhdūthōn*), extended help (*cudränä*) to the people and how their bones could work miracles after their death: *äf men bātar mawtəhōn bə-yad xaylä dəxilä də-mestacrin bə-garmayhōn*. It is for this reason that the bones of the martyrs are venerated everywhere, Išay continues: *wə-cal hädä metyaqqərin garmä də-sāhdä bə-kul atar*.[12] It is because of their neglect of this duty of veneration that the author-preacher reproaches the "saved" (*pəriqä*) in our text, sentence 14. Išay does not use the word *pārōqä* for the martyrs. *pārōqä* means "saviour, liberator". When the word is used in our text for the martyrs it probably signifies that the martyrs were considered participating actively in Christ's work of salvation, through their struggle and sacrifice, and therefore in a sense as "saviours" themselves. The word σωτήρ is used in a text from the fifth century in reference to Stephen, the first martyr, and also sometimes in reference to the apostles (G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 1369). *pārōqä* may also include the notion of "intercessors" as almost every hymn or text about the martyrs contains a prayer calling for their intercession.

NOTES

In this paper *i=ī*, and *ä=ẹ̄*; the fricative pronunciation of *k, p, t, b, d, g* has, for typographical reasons, not been marked, with the exception of *p:f*. The texts are given, with some exceptions, in transliteration.

1. It is through the epilogue of the *mēmrä* that we know what this work looked like originally, Bedjan, 2, pp. 394–396; M. Kmosko in Patrologia Syriaca 1:2, pp. 681ss.
2. There are numerous problems connected with this collection. I refer to G. Wiessner, Untersuchungen zu einer Gruppe syrischer Märtyrakten aus der Christenverfolgung Schapurs II, diss. Würzburg, 1962, for a full treatment of the subject.

3. From another point of view one could see both sentences here as stating facts in the past in which case we should translate "were forgiven, were left in peace" etc. I prefer to regard them as two constatives referring to the preterite and the present respectively.

4. For the meaning of *məfannəqā*, cf. for instance the Liber Legum Regionum, Col. 588, 12, ed. F. Nau, Patrologia Syriaca I: 2 (1907).

5. *ezalw* and *šanniw* are both euphemisms for "die"; for further examples, see F. Rundgren in OS 10/1962, p. 114; OS 14–15/1966, p. 79.

6. For *məzawwədin* (11) cf. a similar expression Bedjan, 2, p. 354: *kad məzawwədā bə-ṭaʿmā, idaʿtā wa-šrārā*, and arab. *zādun* "provisions", often in a metaphorical sense, for ex. in the Qur'ān 2,193 (196): *watazawwadū fa'inna xayra zzādi ttaqwā*.

7. For the meaning of *ʿallānā*, see Payne-Smith, Thesaurus, Col. 2879; E. Beck in his translation of the Carmina Nisibena, Scriptores Syri, 93 (1961), p. 43 and n. 1.

8. *pakkih* is certainly chosen here as contrasting with *ṭaʿməhōn, ṭaʿmā* signifying originally "taste"; it is also used in an aesthetical sense: *āfen sammānay pakkihin: eṣūr dəmūtā məyattartā dəneṣxānkon bə-ṣebʿy*, "even if my colours are dim I shall paint an excellent picture of your triumph with my finger". (In *Sāhdūtā də-ʿAqqebšəmā*, Bedjan, 2, p. 355).

9. Thesaurus quotes from ʿAbdišōʿ's Hymns of Paradise: *lə-xuddāt xanninä* (ed. Beirut, 1889, p. 14). We must, however, read *xəninä* here metri causā. If we consider it as a *xanninä* written *xəninä* we have an example of *xanninä* used metaphorically. The editor renders it with *al-fāsidīna* (note 33).

10. Bar Bahlūl gives *xanninā = alladī šamilathu rrafʾatu* 1, p. 764.

11. Italics by me.

12. One can understand that reverence for the remains of the martyrs could easily have led to relic-worship. That this was seen as a real danger and a cause of worry is evident from the title of a chapter in Išay's treatise: *də-kad pālginnan iqārā lə-garmayhōn də-sāhdä law segdətā d-Alāhā məqarrəbinnan ləhōn*, "When we venerate the bones of the martyrs we do not worship them as gods". To do that would be *rušʿā* "a crime, blasphemy".

13. The whole homily and the passage that we have analysed in view of interpreting the word *xannin* is worth a more general study. It clearly belongs to the same sphere as the early Syriac texts analysed by Robert Murray in his suggestive book Symbols of Church and Kingdom, Cambridge, 1975.

Les Nestoriens du Proche-Orient au XIIIe siècle

CHRISTIAN CANNUYER

Depuis le siècle dernier, des historiens allemands, français et, plus récemment, anglo-saxons ont consacré une multitude de monographies ou de travaux de synthèse à divers aspects de l'histoire des Croisades. Presque tous les domaines ont été abordés; histoire politique, militaire, économique, sociale, juridique, institutionnelle, religieuse, culturelle ... La masse impressionnante d'informations recueillies et de sources publiées a permis la rédaction de sommes parfois colossales[1] sur cette période fascinante du moyen âge. Les Croisades intriguaient et suscitent, aujourd'hui encore, une vive curiosité, qu'on en soit admirateur ou détracteur.

Dans la foulée de ces chercheurs qui s'attelaient à l'étude de l'histoire des croisés, d'autres se sont intéressés aux relations de tous genres, politiques, économiques ou culturelles qui existèrent au moyen âge entre l'Occident et l'Islâm. Certains ont même tenté la synthèse et essayé de résumer l'évolution de l'attitude mentale européenne vis-à-vis des Musulmans[2]. Le réveil contemporain de l'Islâm et son importance politico-économique accrue ont encore, dans les dernières décennies, encouragé davantage ces directions de recherches.

Cependant, il y a des populations orientales dont le sort a considérablement été modifié par l'épopée des Croisades et qui n'ont, jusqu'ici, fait l'objet que de très peu d'études : les communautés chrétiennes dissidentes, monophysites, nestoriennes, orthodoxes, arméniennes, maronites ... Comme le signalait J. Prawer[3], nous ne connaissons presque rien de la situation de ces chrétientés au moyen âge et, surtout, de leurs rapports avec leurs maîtres latins ou musulmans.

Sans doute les sources manquent-elles; ces communautés étaient marginales et minoritaires; elles n'avaient que rarement le moyen d'entretenir et de nourrir leur mémoire collective. Les guerres et les oppressions les ont décimées; elles ont, en outre, bien souvent détruit les traces de leur histoire.

Or, à cet égard, il est un document qui constitue une mine d'informations; il s'agit du livre premier de l'Historia Hierosolimitana abbreviata (appelé parfois Historia Orientalis) de Jacques de Vitry (1160/70–1240), évêque de Saint-Jean d'Acre lors de la cinquième croisade.

Depuis quelques années déjà, le personnage avait suscité notre intérêt; il fut l'une des grandes figures, trop méconnue toutefois, de l'Église du XIIIe siècle, un prédicateur hors pair, un littérateur de talent ... Un mois passé, durant l'été 1980, non loin d'Acre, à Tell Keisân en Palestine, à l'occasion d'une mission archéologique franco-belge menée sous les auspices de l'École Biblique de Jérusalem, nous a permis de visiter le lieux mêmes où vécut Jacques de Vitry et de communier plus intensément avec la mémoire de cette personnalité au destin peu commun. D'autre part les merveilles du trésor d'Oignies, aujourd'hui conservé à Namur, dont les pièces les plus remarquables sont des dons de Jacques de Vitry en provenance d'Orient, nous ont définitivement gagné à l'étude de sa biographie

et de ses œuvres. Celle-ci nous permettait de conjuguer des recherches dans des domaines relevant de l'histoire médiévale occidentale avec d'autres qui touchaient à l'orientalisme.

L'Historia Hierosolimitana est sans doute le premier texte médio-latin de quelque consistance qui traite des communautés chrétiennes d'Orient et dont l'auteur soit un témoin autorisé. Auparavant, certes, plusieurs *peregrinationes,* plusieurs itinéraires en Terre sainte ou plusieurs histoires des Croisades[4] avaient évoqué l'existence des chrétientés orientales mais leurs renseignements étaient par trop fragmentaires ou laconiques.

Curieusement, si l'Historia Hierosolimitana a déjà fait l'objet de plusieurs travaux[5], aucun d'entre eux ne s'est donné pour objectif l'analyse des six chapitres de cette œuvre qui décrivent les Chrétiens dissidents orientaux. Au contraire, ces passages pourtant très originaux et riches d'informations sont presque passés inaperçus[6].

Pourtant, l'histoire des Églises orientales ne manque pas d'intérêt. Qu'on rappelle seulement qu'elles sont les plus vieilles chrétientés du monde et que leurs trésors liturgiques et spirituels ont été d'une influence déterminante sur la constitution de ceux de l'Église universelle. Qu'on évoque ensuite les douloureuses épreuves subies par ces communautés : dominations byzantine, musulmane, turque, vexations de tous genres, génocides impitoyables (ceux des Arméniens et des Assyriens chrétiens sont les plus connus), asservissement culturel ... Qu'on pense encore que ces souffrances sont loin de s'être adoucies de nos jours et que les Chrétiens d'Orient connaissent encore les affres de la guerre[7] ou la crainte grandissante de voir se préciser le réveil d'un certain fanatisme musulman[8] ... On conviendra que ces frères dans le Christ n'ont pas démérité de l'Église et que leur fermeté dans la tradition de leur Foi doit fonder notre admiration et légitimer notre intérêt à leur égard.

Trois raisons, l'intérêt historico-culturel des communautés chrétiennes d'Orient, la sympathie vis-à-vis de leurs difficultés d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, et la volonté de travailler dans une optique œcuménique nous ont conduit à tenter l'analyse des six chapitres que Jacques de Vitry leur consacra dans son Historia Hierosolimitana.

L'un des chapitres étudiés par nous[9] concerne les communautés nestoriennes de l'Orient au XIIIe siècle.

Nous en donnons ici une traduction française[10] que nous assortissons des commentaires qui nous paraissent devoir être faits.

La traduction est divisée en sept paragraphes pour en faciliter le commentaire.

Dans la mesure du possible, on a préféré suivre assez littéralement le texte latin au risque de nuire quelque peu, ici ou là, à la correction du français.

LES NESTORIENS

1. Il y a d'autres peuples, qui vivent non seulement en Terre Sainte ou parmi les Sarrasins, mais indépendants, dans la plus grande partie de l'Inde.

2. Ils se nomment Nestorins ou Nestoriens, du nom d'un hérésiarque appelé

Nestorius qui a mortellement corrompu, de sa perverse doctrine, l'Orient dans sa plus grande partie,

3. et surtout ceux qui demeurent dans le royaume du très puissant prince que le vulgaire appelle Prêtre Jean.

4. Tous ces Nestoriens et leur Roi sont, à ce qu'on dit, avec les Jacobites, de loin plus nombreux que les Latins ou les Grecs. Tant et si bien, en effet, que de ceux qui vivent dans l'indépendance, nous tairons le nombre, lequel est infini; et les Chrétiens qui vivent parmi les infidèles ne sont pas moins nombreux, d'après ouï-dire, chez les Sarrasins que les Sarrasins eux-mêmes.

5. Malheureusement, ces Chrétiens, qui n'ont pas voulu recevoir la doctrine pestilentielle de Mahomet, ont été cependant misérablement corrompus par les hérétiques. Ce fils de perdition déjà cité, Nestorius, évêque de Constantinople, et tous ses fidèles nient que la bienheureuse Vierge Marie soit la mère de Dieu. Certes, ils concèdent qu'elle est la mère de l'homme Christ, mais ils affirment que dans le Christ, autre est la personne divine que la personne humaine; comme les deux natures, ils distinguent deux personnes dans le Christ. Ils ne croient pas en un seul Christ dans le verbe de Dieu et dans la chair; mais, ils proclament que, séparément et distinctement, le fils de Dieu est autre que le fils de l'homme. Cette détestable hérésie a été réprouvée et condamnée au Concile d'Ephèse, où siégèrent trois cents Pères. En effet, ainsi que l'homme est un, âme rationnelle et chair, ainsi le Christ est un, Dieu et homme. Car bien que la nature de l'âme soit autre que la nature de la chair, l'homme n'est pas autre selon l'âme qu'il n'est selon la chair. Bien que la nature du fer soit différente de celle du feu, un fer brûlant est une seule chose. D'après cette hérésie, les propositions suivantes ne sont pas recevables : le Christ est Dieu et homme; le fils de Dieu est mort et a été enseveli. (Elles sont irrecevables parce que le fils de Dieu est impassible et immortel.) Et pourtant, Isaïe a dit : « Un tout petit vous est né et son nom sera : Dieu fort. » De sorte qu'un tout petit enfant fut Dieu, ce qui est à l'opposé de la doctrine perverse de ces gens-là. Semblablement, Jérémie a dit du fils de Dieu : « Après cela, il a été vu sur terre, et il a conversé avec les hommes. » Alors que d'après cette hérésie Dieu devrait être invisible! Et le bienheureux Paul : « Dieu a envoyé son fils né d'une femme, sujet d'une loi. » Par là, il est manifeste que le fils de Dieu fut fils de la Vierge, et que Marie fut mère de Dieu. « Car un homme est né en elle et le Très-Haut lui-même l'a fondée. » Donc l'homme qui est né de la Vierge Marie l'a créée, et cet homme fut Dieu. De même, nous admettons que c'est cet enfant qui a créé les étoiles, qui fut depuis l'éternité consubstantiel au Père et égal à lui. « Car le Verbe s'est fait chair et il a habité parmi nous. » En effet, lorsque lui-même dit à son propos : « Moi qui vous parle, je suis le début », il n'est pas douteux, pour qui a la tête bien faite, que cette même personne, qui est le début et la créatrice de tout, a parlé aux hommes. Ainsi, il apparaît sans aucune ambiguité, que la personne divine est la même que la personne humaine, ce que nient pourtant ces misérables Nestoriens.

6. Ils utilisent les lettres chaldéennes pour les divines Ecritures,

7. et ils confectionnent les divines espèces avec du pain fermenté, à la manière des Grecs.

A. L'EXPANSION GÉOGRAPHIQUE DES COMMUNAUTÉS NESTORIENNES

Fidèle à sa façon habituelle de procéder, Jacques de Vitry entreprend de situer géographiquement les communautés nestoriennes du Proche-Orient avant d'aborder la description de leurs coutumes et de leurs doctrines.

D'après lui, les Nestoriens peuplent trois aires distinctes : la Terre Sainte (c'est-à-dire, sans doute, le Royaume d'Acre lui-même, la partie de l'Orient sous domination latine[11]), les pays musulmans[12] et l'Inde. Depuis 1187 au moins, il y avait en effet en Palestine des groupes plus ou moins importants de Nestoriens venus de l'Est; ils étaient implantés probablement à Jérusalem[13] mais il est particulièrement difficile, malgré le témoignage d'un ordinaire du lieu comme Vitry, de savoir s'il y en avait à Acre même[14].

La grande majorité des Nestoriens habitaient les régions musulmanes à l'est du territoire islamique, soit, essentiellement, la Mésopotamie et la Perse ('Iraq et Iran actuels). Les origines de la chrétienté persane restent plus méconnues que celles des autres chrétientés orientales; certes les traditions de cette Église la font remonter à un certain Thomas, disciple d'Addaï, lui-même élève de saint Thomas l'apôtre, mais elles peuvent malaisément être contrôlées par la critique moderne. L'évangélisation de la Mésopotamie et de la Perse semble s'être réalisée à partir d'Edesse, dès la fin du second siècle. Au IIIe siècle était érigé l'évêché de Séleucie-Ctésiphon. Aux IIIe–IVe siècles, l'Église perse s'organisa, jouissant tantôt de la faveur des souverains iraniens quand Rome persécutait encore le christianisme, redoutant au contraire leur intolérance aussitôt que l'empire romain fit de la foi dans le Christ sa religion d'état.

En 410, le célèbre synode de Séleucie-Ctésiphon reconnut le Crédo de Nicée mais, en même temps, l'évêque de l'endroit prit le titre de « Catholicos », qui équivalait à celui de Patriarche, affirmant ainsi une certaine autonomie de son Église par rapport au reste de la Chrétienté. Quatorze ans plus tard, au demeurant, le synode de Markabta entérina ces décisions et accentua le caractère autocéphale de l'Église perse.

En 484, le Catholicossat de Séleucie-Ctésiphon passa formellement au nestorianisme, hérésie sur laquelle il nous faudra revenir plus loin dans ces pages[15].

On sait que, malgré la conquête arabe, l'Église nestorienne, dans un formidable élan missionnaire, a, du VIIe au XIVe siècle, fondé des communautés, évêchés ou métropoles dans toute l'Asie, du Turkestan jusqu'en Chine ou en Mandchourie; ses influences étaient grandes à la cour des khans mongols, notamment au temps de Gengis Khan[16]. Du reste, quelque soixante ans après la rédaction de l'Historia Hierosolimitana abbreviata, un prêtre nestorien mongol monta sur le trône catholicossal sous le nom de Yahballâhâ III (1281–1317)[17]. Dès le XIIe siècle, le clergé romain avait eu quelques contacts avec ces communautés asiatiques, mais c'est seulement dans la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle, après l'échec devenu de plus en plus évident des croisades et la soudaine invasion tartare en Asie occidentale, que les papes établirent des rapports plus constructifs et des relations plus constantes, tentant même l'élaboration d'alliances politico-militaires voire d'unions ecclésiales[18].

Ce dialogue n'avait cependant pas encore été amorcé vers 1220 et Jacques de Vitry n'en souffle mot dans son œuvre; mais il ne semble pas tout à fait ignorer la formidable expansion de l'Église nestorienne qui, selon des documents sans doute un peu trop optimistes de l'époque, aurait pu compter jusqu'à près de quatre-vingt millions de fidèles[19].

Quant à l'Église nestorienne de l'Inde, ces Chrétiens de saint Thomas qui, eux aussi, se réclamaient du plus incrédule des compagnons de Jésus[20], elle s'était développée dès la seconde moitié du IVe siècle à tout le moins, au sud de l'Inde, dans la région du Malabar (Kérala). Elle dépendait du métropolite perse de Riwardasir et, à l'échelon supérieur, du Patriarche de Séleucie-Ctésiphon.

Devenue nestorienne, à la suite de l'Église mère, organisée de main de maître par le grand Patriarche Timothée Ier (780–823), elle avait vu s'accroître le nombre de ses fidèles aux VIIIe et IXe siècles, à la suite d'immigrations successives de Chrétiens mésopotamiens qui fuyaient l'Islâm. Florissante à l'époque de Jacques de Vitry, la chrétienté du Kérala n'était cependant pas encore entrée en relations suivies avec l'Occident; celui-ci ne s'y intéresserait concrètement qu'à la fin du XIIIe siècle et, surtout, au XIVe siècle lorsque les dominicains et les franciscains entreprendraient « l'évangélisation » de l'Asie lointaine[21].

A en croire Jacques de Vitry, les Nestoriens indiens ne se contentaient pas de former une communauté confessionnelle; ils étaient politiquement indépendants et leur royaume, l'un des plus prestigieux de l'Asie, n'avait pas d'autre monarque que ce mystérieux personnage que l'Europe avait appris à connaître depuis quelque temps déjà : le prêtre Jean.

B. LE ROYAUME DU PRÊTRE JEAN

Jacques de Vitry affirme qu'un grand nombre des Nestoriens sont sujets de ce personnage fabuleux dont rêva tout le moyen âge et au sujet duquel tant d'encre a déjà coulé : le prêtre Jean.

En 1220, Jacques de Vitry, lors de la rédaction de l'Historia Hierosolimitana, estimait donc que le royaume de ce souverain avec lequel la Chrétienté espérait confusément faire alliance pour prendre l'Islâm à revers, était l'Inde ou du moins une partie de cette péninsule; les informations de l'évêque d'Acre lui venaient, d'après ce qu'il confie dans son Epistola II, d'un marchand. Encore faut-il noter qu'en 1217[22], ses idées sur la question étaient plutôt confuses, puisqu'il croyait que les sujets du prêtre Jean, nestoriens à l'origine, étaient devenus jacobites[23] : « *Nestoriani vero in Christo duas personas asserunt, sicut in eo sunt due naturae et due voluntates, unde licet Christus sit Deus, dicunt Mariam fuisse matrem Christi non tamen Dei; et tales erant omnes qui sunt in terra presbyteri Iohannis, sicut dixit mihi quidam mercator cum nuper inde venerat, qui omnes de novo facti sunt Iacobite ...* »[24].

D'autre part, nous savons que l'Epistola VII de Jacques de Vitry, écrite à Damiette le 18 avril 1221, identifie le prêtre Jean au Roi David dont Jacques de Vitry tenait à faire connaître le nom et les succès militaires en Europe. Ainsi donc, en l'espace de quatre ans, les documents nous permettent de saisir assez

précisément l'évolution de l'opinion de l'évêque d'Acre sur la personne du prêtre Jean;

- en 1217, Vitry estime que le prêtre Jean règne sur un peuple d'origine nestorienne récemment converti au monophysisme.
- en 1220, par contre, l'Historia Hierosolimitana semble faire fi de cette conversion, réaffirme le nestorianisme des sujets du prêtre Jean et situe le Royaume de celui-ci en Inde.
- enfin, en 1221, le prêtre Jean est assimilé au Roi chrétien David dont les conquêtes fulgurantes en Asie ne laissent pas d'éblouir.

Cette confusion dans l'information et cette polyvalence de la figure du prêtre Jean dans l'esprit du futur cardinal de Tusculum est extrêmement révélatrice des avatars de cet élément important de l'imaginaire médiéval que fut ce Roi-prêtre d'un mystérieux peuple chrétien.

Il semble bien maintenant que la légende du prêtre Jean soit née d'un vieux fonds de traditions qui concernait en fait le souverain chrétien d'Éthiopie, le Negus[25]. Le nom même de « Jean » pourrait très vraisemblablement dériver du titre *Žân* qui, en langue gheez (langue liturgique des Éthiopiens) signifie « Majesté »[26]. Le caractère nettement sacerdotal du Negus[27] et l'ordination diaconale qui lui était conférée lors de son couronnement[28] expliqueraient en outre la qualité de prêtre attribuée au « Roi Jean ».

Aux XIIᵉ et XIIIᵉ siècles, l'identification du prêtre Jean au Negus éthiopien aurait été largement délaissée, mais le souvenir, qui en redeviendrait vivace au début du XIVᵉ siècle[29], ne s'en était pas totalement perdu[30]; il nous semble que l'hésitation de Jacques de Vitry, qui ne sait trop, en 1217, si le prêtre Jean est jacobite ou nestorien, soit témoin de la persistance de cette tradition. En effet, il n'est pas du tout impossible que le monophysisme qu'il reconnaît, en définitive, être la confession du prêtre Jean, soit en fait le monophysisme copte et, plus précisement, abyssin du souverain éthiopien.

Si, par contre, en 1220, Jacques de Vitry n'hésite plus à voir dans le prêtre Jean un nestorien, c'est que la majorité des auteurs de son temps le considéraient comme tel. Depuis que le chroniqueur Othon de Freising, en 1145, avait rapporté le témoignage de l'évêque Hugues de Gabala à propos de la prise d'Ecbatane (capitale du sultan de Perse Sanjar) par Jean, Roi et prêtre nestorien résidant *ultra Persidem et Armeniam in extremo Oriente*[31], les Occidentaux avaient commencé à situer le Royaume du monarque chrétien de légende aux alentours de la péninsule indienne. Du reste, la confusion très ancienne et très courue qui plaçait l'Éthiopie en Asie et une partie de l'Inde en Afrique avait sans doute facilité ce déplacement du royaume johannique. Plus tard, l'adjonction au « cycle » du prêtre Jean d'éléments de la légende de l'apôtre saint Thomas[32] et de celle de trois Rois Mages[33] acheva de conforter la situation du pays du prêtre souverain en Inde[34].

Quant à l'identification, acceptée par Jacques de Vitry, d'un Roi David asiatique, grand pourfendeur des Musulmans devant l'Éternel, au prêtre Jean nestorien, son origine reste délicate à interpréter malgré toutes les recherches qui ont été conduites à ce sujet.

Il semble bien que les succès militaires attribués à David par la Relatio que l'on trouve dans l'Epistola de Jacques de Vitry fassent écho aux conquêtes de Gengis-Khan en Perse et au Turkestan. Encore faut-il expliquer pourquoi les Latins ont pu assimiler Gengis-Khan à un souverain nestorien et le nommer David.[35]

D'aucuns pensent, avec vraisemblance, que Gengis-Khan aurait pu être confondu avec le chef turc naïman nestorien de nom de Kütchlüg qui, fuyant les Mongols, avait conquis le royaume des Qara-Khitaï à la mort de leur chef, le Gur-Khan[36]. On aurait ensuite déguisé Gengis-Khan en le prénommant, en plus de son assimilation au nestorien Kütchlüg, David en souvenir du fougueux Roi de Géorgie David IV le Restaurateur dont le successeur lointain, Georges IV, jouissait aussi d'une belle réputation militaire[37].

Quoi qu'il en soit des problèmes très complexes que pose la légende du prêtre Jean[38], les confusions et les repentirs de Jacques de Vitry à son sujet illustrent bien l'incertitude générale de ses contemporains qui est, elle-même, à la source de la complexité de la recherche en ce domaine.

C. IMPORTANCE DES ÉGLISES DISSIDENTES

Dans le paragraphe 4 du chapitre LXXVI, Jacques de Vitry, regroupant les deux Églises issues des dissidences du Ve siècle, jacobites et nestoriennes, laisse entendre que le nombre de leurs fidèles, encore qu'il ne puisse le préciser avec exactitude, est, d'après ce qu'on lui a dit, bien plus important que celui de l'Église Catholique latine ou que celui de l'Église Orthodoxe grecque.

Les effectifs réduits que comptent ces Églises aujourd'hui pourraient faire douter le lecteur non-averti de l'Historia Hierosolimitana de la vraisemblance des affirmations de son auteur. Pourtant, bien que les documents de l'époque ne permettent pas de chiffrer le nombre de fidèles de ces communautés, il est certain (même si l'on ne tenait compte que de la seule Église nestorienne) que celui-ci était supérieur à celui ou à ceux de l'orthodoxie ou du catholicisme, même si les évaluations avancées ici ou là[39] paraissent parfois forcées[40].

D. NESTORIUS ET LE NESTORIANISME

La majeure partie du chapitre consacré aux Nestoriens est réservée à la réfutation de leur hérésie. Les Nestoriens, on l'aura déjà lu, étaient très peu nombreux en Palestine même et peut-être inexistants à Acre. Jacques de Vitry demeure largement ignorant de leurs rites et de leurs mœurs; l'essentiel de son information à leur sujet ne peut donc résider que dans la connaissance de leur hétérodoxie.

Historiquement parlant, Jacques de Vitry dit simplement que l'hérésiarque Nestorius était évêque de Constantinople et que sa doctrine fut condamnée au Concile d'Ephèse. Rien de tout cela n'est faux[41] mais on peut s'étonner de la maigreur des données fournies. Pour le reste, Jacques de Vitry résume de la sorte l'hérésie nestorienne : elle consiste, à ses yeux, dans la distinction illégitime entre la personne divine et la personne humaine de Jésus-Christ, de sorte que la Vierge

Marie n'est guère la mère de Dieu mais seulement celle de l'homme Jésus. La réfutation de Jacques de Vitry est articulée comme suit :

- en premier lieu, il invoque l'autorité du Concile d'Ephèse dont la condamnation est sans appel.
- Ensuite, il établit un audacieux parallèle entre l'unité constitutionnelle de l'être humain, pourtant composé d'éléments aussi dissemblables que la chair et l'âme, et l'unité constitutionnelle qu'on se doit de reconnaître dans le Christ, pourtant à la fois Homme et Dieu[42].
- Enfin, il propose toute une panoplie de citations scripturaires vétéro- (Isaïe, Jérémie) ou néo-testamentaires (saint Paul, Évangiles) qui attestent, selon lui, l'union profonde de l'humanité et de la divinité dans une même personne en Jésus-Christ.

Il est évident que l'idée que se fait Jacques de Vitry de la doctrine de Nestorius manque de nuances et est tributaire des écrits des adversaires de l'hérésiarque[43]; si tant est que l'on puisse déterminer avec précision ce que fut la pensée de celui-ci (son œuvre écrite ne nous est parvenue que très fragmentaire), il faut convenir qu'elle n'a pas professé explicitement l'hérésie des « deux personnes » ou des « deux hypostases ».

De même l'Église nestorienne n'a jamais défendu la théorie des « deux personnes » en matière christologique et toute son « hérésie » tient au refus de la définition de l'union hypostatique telle qu'elle avait été proposée par saint Cyrille; ici encore, les problèmes de concept et de traduction ont été déterminants dans le processus de rupture et d'incompréhension entre la communauté nestorienne et le reste de l'Église. Même sur le délicat problème de la « Theotokos », la Vierge Marie, les Nestoriens n'ont jamais rien affirmé d'autre que l'orthodoxie : pour eux aussi, la Vierge fut mère de Dieu. Tout au plus, ont-ils toujours aimé préciser qu'elle était mère de Dieu en son incarnation humaine Jésus-Christ, et qu'elle n'était pas « mère de la Trinité »[44].

Jacques de Vitry qui semble ne pas douter que les Nestoriens professent l'hérésie du fondateur de leur Église sous la forme tranchée et franchement hétérodoxe qu'il a décrite, fait preuve à leur égard de bien moins d'objectivité et de souci de réelle information qu'à l'égard des Jacobites dont il avait essayé, de façon bien plus nuancée, de connaître le fond de la pensée dans un chapitre antérieur (LXXV).

Sans doute, le caractère abrupt de son opinion est-il ici conditionné par les lacunes de ses connaissances et témoigne-t-il de l'absence totale ou du peu de contacts personnels qu'il avait pu entretenir avec la communauté nestorienne.

E. DERNIÈRES INFORMATIONS

Jacques de Vitry termine son exposé sur les Nestoriens en livrant deux informations assez laconiques qui paraissent être comme ajoutées artificiellement au chapitre LXXVI, un peu comme par dépit, pour combler un tant soit peu les évidentes faiblesses de la documentation de l'évêque d'Acre : les Nestoriens,

dans les domaines scripturaire et liturgique, utilisent l'écriture syriaque (chaldéenne) et, ils emploient du pain fermenté lors de l'eucharistie.

Les deux notations sont exactes[45], mais il y aurait eu bien plus à raconter sur les particularités liturgiques des Églises nestoriennes. Là encore, Jacques de Vitry avoue son ignorance, si bien qu'à l'analyse, ce chapitre LXXVI, qui concerne les Nestoriens, est probablement celui de ceux de l'Historia Hierosolimitana étudiés qui mérite le moins d'attention et se trouve être le moins digne d'intérêt.[46]

NOTES

1. Par exemple: R. Grousset, Histoire des Croisades et du royaume frac de Jérusalem, Paris, 1934–1936, en trois volumes (optique résolument favorable au Croisades et à la « francité » de celles-ci).
2. Par exemple : G. Zananiri, L'Église et l'Islam (La Barque de Saint-Pierre), Paris, 1969. N. Daniel, Islam and the West. The Making of an Image, Edimbourg, 1960.
3. J. Prawer, Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem (Le monde Byzantin), t. I, 2e éd., Paris, 1975, p. 513, n. 11.
4. Par exemple, on trouve de nombreuses évocations des Chrétiens d'Orient dans l'Historia de Guillaume de Tyr. Mais elles ne sont jamais systématiques.
5. Ainsi E. Sivan, L'Islam et la croisade, Paris, 1968, emploie abondamment les informations sur Mahomet contenues dans cette œuvre.
6. P. Funk, Jakob von Vitry, Leben und Werke (Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance, 3), Leipzig–Berlin, 1909, y consacre à peine trois lignes.
7. Les Nestoriens chaldéens pris dans la tourmente du conflit irano-irakien; les Maronites du Liban; toutes les communautés de Palestine.
8. Sensible, par exemple, en Égypte où les Coptes voient de plus en plus leurs églises saccagées.
9. C. Cannuyer, Les communautés chrétiennes orientales dans l'Historia hierosolimitana abbreviata de Jacques de Vitry (1160/70–1240), évêque d'Acre, mémoire dactylographié, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982.
10. On trouvera le texte latin de ce chapitre dans l'édition Bongars, Gesta Dei per Francos, Hanovre, 1611, chapitre LXXVI. D'après nos recherches, l'Historia Orientalis fut rédigée en 1220. Cfr C. Cannuyer, La date de rédaction de l'Historia Orientalis de Jacques de Vitry, in Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, vol. LXXVIII, 1, Louvain, 1983, pp. 65–72.
11. Puisque Vitry distingue la « Terre Sainte » des régions où règnent les Sarrasins; c'est que cette « Terre Sainte » est sous domination chrétienne.
12. Inter Saracenos.
13. G. Every, Syrian Christians in Palestine in the Early Middle Ages, in The Eastern Churches Quarterly, vol. VI, 7, juillet–septembre 1946, p. 365.
14. J. Prawer, Histoire du royaume latin de Jerusalem, t. I, p. 515, n. 16.
15. Excellent résumé des origines de l'Église perse : P. Krüger, Nestorianische Kirche, in Kleines Wörterbuch des Christlichen Orients, Wiesbaden, 1975, pp. 275–277.
16. R. Grousset, Le conquérant du Monde. Vie de Gengis Khan, Paris, 1944, pp. 75 et suivantes.
17. E. A. W. Budge, History of Jaballaha III, New York, 1927.
18. L. Brehier, L'Église et l'Orient au Moyen âge, Paris, 1907, pp. 219–221, 268–286 et 311–313.
19. A. M. Heidt, Les Églises syriennes orientales, assyrienne et chaldéenne, in Vivante Afrique, n° 253, novembre–décembre 1967, p. 10.
20. Selon certains, les traditions qui feraient de l'Église du Malabar une communauté apostolique dont le fondateur aurait été l'apôtre Thomas, traditions qui trouvent d'ailleurs un écho dans certaines légendes des milieux hindouistes, ne seraient pas tout à fait dénuées de vérité. E. R. Hambye, L'Église syro-malabare, in Les Églises orientales de l'Inde, in Vivante Afrique, n° 236, janvier–février 1965, pp. 12–13.

21. Résumé de l'histoire de la chrétienté indienne : P. J. Podipara, The hierarchy of the syro-malabar Church, Dasarahalli, 1976.

22. La seconde partie de l'Epistola II, qui contient les lignes que nous citons ici, a, en effet, été écrite entre février et Pâques 1217. R. Huygens, Les lettres de Jacques de Vitry, Leyde, 1960, p. 59.

23. Pour mémoire et à simple titre de curiosité, notons ici que bien plus tard, en 1653, une importante fraction des communautés chrétiennes de l'Inde, sous la conduit de Thomas Parambil (Mar Thomas) devint jacobite et s'unit canoniquement à l'église syrienne monophysite de Syrie–Palestine.

24. Epistola II, 432–437. R. Huygens, op. cit., p. 96.

25. E. Denison Ross, Prester John and the empire of Ethiopia, in Newton, Travels and travellers in the middle ages, Londres–New York, 1926, pp. 174–194. Voir aussi : J. Richard, L'extrême-Orient légendaire au moyen âge. Roi David et Prêtre Jean, in Annales d'Éthiopie, II, 1957, pp. 229–230.

26. C. Marinescu, Le prêtre Jean. Son pays. Explication de son nom, in Bulletin de la Section historique de l'Académie Roumaine, t. X, 1923, pp. 101–102. Cette appellation, Žân, ou Žân-hôj, qui voulait dire « Éléphant » à l'origine et a été conservée par l'amharique (langue moderne d'Éthiopie) Zahôn, est, au fond, un vocatif honorifique, « ô Roi! » qui, placé devant le nom du souverain a pu passer pour un prénom auprès d'auditeurs inavertis. E. Mittwoch, Dschanhoi – die amharische Bezeichnung für « Majestät », in Zeitschrift für Assyriologie, t. XXV, 1911, pp. 281–286. A. Klingenheben, Deutsch-amharischer Sprachführer nebst einer grammatischen Einführung im Amharische, Wiesbaden, 1966, p. 109.

27. Attesté, par exemple, par un écrivain arabe chrétien du XIIIᵉ siècle du nom d'Abû Sâlih. C. Marinescu, op. cit., p. 104.

28. J. Richard, L'extrême-Orient légendaire au moyen âge . . ., p. 230.

29. Notamment à partir des Mirabilia de Jourdain Cathala (1323). J. Richard, L'extrême-Orient légendaire au Moyen âge . . ., p. 238 et suivantes.

30. Ibidem, p. 230.

31. Ibidem, p. 232. R. Hennig, Terrae Incognitae. Eine Zusammenstellung und kritische Bewertung der wichtigsten vorcollumbischen Entdeckungsreisen an Hand der darüber vorliegenden Originalberichte, t. II (200–1200 n. Chr.), 2ᵉ éd., Leyde, 1950, pp. 438 et suivantes.

32. H. Hosten, Saint Thomas and San Thomé, Mylapore, in Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, t. XIX, 1923, pp. 153–256.

33. J. Richard, L'extrême-Orient, légendaire au Moyen âge . . ., p. 236.

34. Textes rassemblés par F. Zarncke, Der Priester Johannes, in Abhandlungen der Philologische Historische Klasse der Königlichen Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, t. 7, 1879 et t. 8, 1880.

35. J. Richard, L'extrême-Orient légendaire au moyen âge . . ., p. 233.

36. Le grand-père de Kütchlüg, Inantch, était surnommé Bulga-buqa, ce qui correspondrait assez bien au Bulgaboga donné comme grand-père de David par Jacques de Vitry. Ibidem, p. 234, n. 4; R. Grousset, L'empire des steppes, Paris, 1939, pp. 293–296.

37. R. Hennig, op. cit., t. III (1200–1415 n. Chr.), 2ᵉ éd., Leyde, 1953, pp. 10–23.

38. Sur le Prêtre Jean, on consultera encore : C. Marinescu, Encore une fois le problème du Prêtre Jean, in Bulletin de la Section historique de l'Académie Roumaine, t. XXVI, 1945, pp. 202–222; F. Denis, Le Monde enchanté. Cosmographie et Histoire naturelle et fantastique au Moyen Age, Paris, 1843; G. Oppert, Der Presbyter Johannes. Sage und Geschichte, Berlin, 1870; L. Olschki, Der Brief des Presbyters Johannes, in Historische Zeitschrift, t. 144, 1931, pp. 112–124. J. Le Goff, L'Occident médiéval et l'Océan Indien : un horizon onirique, in Pour un autre Moyen Age. Temps, travail et culture en Occident (Bibliothèque des histoires), Paris, 1977.

39. Cfr. supra.

40. Sur l'importance de ces Églises au moyen âge, lire : E. Honigmann, Évêques et Évêchés monophysites dans l'Asie antérieure au VIᵉ siècle (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 127, subsidia 2), Louvain, 1951. P. Pelliot, Chrétiens d'Asie centrale et d'Extrême-Orient, in T'oung Pao, t. XV, 1914, pp. 623–644. H. Cordier, Le christianisme en Chine et en Asie centrale sous les Mongols, in T'oung Pao, t. XVIII, 1917, pp. 49–113.

41. Sur Nestorius, archevêque de Constantinople de 428 à 431, condamné au concile d'Ephèse (431)

et mort en exil dans la Grande Oasis vers 451, voir : E. Amann, Nestorius, in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, t. XI, I, Paris, 1931, col. 76–156. T. Camelot, De Nestorius à Eutychès, l'opposition de deux christologies, in Das Konzil von Chalkedon . . ., sous la dir de A. Grillmeier et H. Bacht, t. I, Würzbourg, 1951, pp. 213–229. Sur le concile d'Ephèse, outre les actes qu'on trouvera in extenso dans les collections spécialisées (Mansi, Schwartz), voir un bon résumé chez R. Devreesse, Les Actes du Concile d'Ephèse, in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, t. 19, 1929, pp. 223–242 et 407–431.

42. Outre une comparaison avec l'union du fer et du feu dans le fer brûlant.

43. Le résumé de Jacques de Vitry me semble fort proche de celui de Saint Léon dans son tome à Flavien, cité par E. Amann, Nestorius, col. 138. Appréciation de la doctrine nestorienne, ibidem, col. 154–155.

44. On trouvera une appréciation fort précise et très détaillée, argumentée d'un flot abondant de citations, à propos de la christologie réellement professée par l'Église nestorienne, dans : E. Tisserant, Nestorienne (l'Église), in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, t. XI, I, Paris, 1931, col. 292–301 (paragraphe intitulé : Christologie). Il n'est peut-être pas inutile de rappeler ici que l'hérésie consistant à considérer la Vierge comme mère de la Trinité tout entière a réellement existé en Occident, au moins à la fin du moyen âge, comme l'attestent des représentations sculpturales de Marie dont le ventre contient le Père, le Fils et l'Esprit et certaines prières où la mère de Jésus est appelée « chambre de toute la Trinité ». J. Huizinga, L'automne du Moyen Age (Petite Bibliothèque Payot, 373), Paris, 1980, pp. 161 et 162, n. 1.

45. R. M. Wooley, The bread of the eucharist, Londres, 1913, p. 76. Voir aussi : E. Peterson, Hostien, Partikel und Opferanteil, in Ephemerides Liturgicae, t. LXI, 1947, pp. 3–12.

46. Voir, à titre comparatif, nos études : C. Cannuyer, Les Géorgiens dans l'Historia Hierosolimitana de Jacques de Vitry, in Bedi Kartlisa, vol. XLI, 1983, pp. 175–187, et Les Arméniens dans l'Historia Orientalis de Jacques de Vitry, in Revue des Études Arméniennes, n.s., t. XVII, 1983, pp. 197–199. Signalons aussi l'étude d'ensemble d'A.-D. von den Brincken, Die « Nationes Christianorum Orientalium » (Kölner Hist. Abh., 22), Cologne, 1973.

Aramaica V

Biblical Aramaic ʾadrazdā *and* śām bāl

FRITHIOF RUNDGREN

The much debated word *ʾadrazdā* is only to be found in Ezra 7,23: *kål-dī min-ṭaʿam ʾᵃlāh šᵊmayyā yitʿᵃbed ʾadrazdā lᵊ-bēt ʾᵃlāh šᵊmayyā, dī-lᵊmā lāhᵃwē qᵊṣaf ʿal-malkūt malkā ū-bᵊnōhī* "Whatsoever is commanded by the God of heaven, let it be diligently done for the house of the God of heaven: for why should there be wrath against the realm of the king and his sons?" (King James Version).[1] According to S. Segert the word in question signifies "wohl 'eifrig'" (p. 238), but later on, p. 525, it really *means* "eifrig, mit Hingabe" (Altaramäische Grammatik, 1975). However, no reason is given for this translation, only "Aus dem Pers." (p. 238), cf. H. H. Rowley, The Aramaic of the Old Testament (1929), p. 138! Under the heading "Adverbia" Bauer–Leander present us with an *ʾadrazdā* "richtig" without any comments (Grammatik des Biblisch-Aramäischen, 1927, p. 11 and p. 256), while Franz Rosenthal in his truly admirable "A Grammar of Biblical Aramaic" (1961) gives us what could be given at the time: "*ʾadrazdā* 'diligently' (<*drazdā, Av. *zrazdā*)" (p. 59), cf. E. Vogt, Lexicon linguae Aramaicae Veteris Testamenti (1971), p. 3. Now, from a certain point of view, we are here confronted with a rather interesting problem, bearing also on the origin of the phraseme *śam bāl* and thus requiring a new treatment, in addition to the fine remarks made by Peter Nober in Biblische Zeitschrift 2:1 (1958), pp. 134–8.

In the Septuagint the corresponding passage runs: πᾶν, ὅ ἐστιν ἐν γνώμῃ θεοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, γιγνέσθω.προσέχετε μή τις ἐπιχειρήσῃ εἰς οἶκον θεοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, μήποτε γένηται ὀργὴ ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν υἱῶν αὐτοῦ (Esdras II, Rahlfs). W. Rudolph, who understands our *ʾadrazdā* as an Old Persian *drazdā* "gläubig, hier etwa mit gläubigem Eifer", compares ἐπιμελῶς in Esdras I,8,21 with this *drazdā* although such a word is not attested for Old Persian (Handbuch zum Alten Testament herausgeg. von O. Eissfeldt, 1. Reihe, 20/1949, p. 72); 1930 Schaeder had posited an Old Persian *ᵃ*drazdā* "zu aw. *zrazdā*" (Iranische Beiträge I, p. 75/278). The meaning of ἐπιμελῶς is "carefully" and together with ἐπιτελεσθήτω it renders *yitʿᵃbed ʾadrazdā* fairly well, while the Syriac Version is not completely clear to me: *wᵊ-kulmeddem bᵊ-feṭqā netiheb, wᵊ-habw leh ʾa(y)k nāmōsā d-Alāh šᵊmayyā, nessab wᵊ-neʿbed, wᵊ-lā nehwä rugzā ʿal malkūt malkā wa-bnawhy*.[2] To begin with, the word *peṭqā* "scida, tessera" is according to Brockelmann (Lexicon Syriacum, p. 618) identical with *peṭqā* "tabula" < πιττάκιον "tablet for writing on; written message", cf. Jewish Aramaic *pittᵊqā* "Schreibtafel; Los, Geschick", and *piṭṭāqā* "id." (Dalman, Handwörterbuch); Arabic *biṭāqā* also belongs here. Thus our *peṭqā* is originally a *peṭṭᵊqā* designating here the writing in question (cf. OS 30, pp. 178 ff.): "Whatsoever (is) in the writing (letter) shall be given, and give (it) him then, according to

the law of God of heaven he shall take (it) and act, so that there will be no wrath against the realm of the king and his sons."

As we saw, the words *yit^{ca}bed* *'adrazdā* are rendered by γιγνέσθω.προσέχετε in Esdras II,7,23. Now the full expression is προσέχω τὸν νοῦν τινι "give heed to someone", νοῦν being here an equivalent for Aramaic *bāl* in Christian-Palestinian *hbw blkwn* = προσέχετε (Schulthess, Lexicon Syropalaestinum, 1903, p. 80 a); cf. Grammatik des Christlich-Palästinischen Aramäisch, 1924, p. 130 b: *yhb blh mn* "sich hüten vor", cf. *wə-nātattī 'ät-libbī li-drōš* (Ecclesiastes 1,13), an aspectually neutral *texteme*, for in living language there is no such thing as "verbal aspect" *per se*, "verbal aspect" being only an entity by abstraction. Without this complement προσέχειν means "devote oneself to", and προσεχόντως "attentively, carefully" would no doubt be a good rendering of our *'adrazdā*. However, if understood as an imperative this word could also be translated by πρόσεχε (cf. Rahlfs' variant, p. 915) or προσέχετε "be attentive!". On the other hand, *yit ^{ca}bid* is also in Esdras II,7,21 rendered by γιγνέσθω.

Now we are ready to consider the posited Old Persian **drazdā*, and to begin with, I shall contend that **draz-* corresponds, semantically, to Aramaic *bāl* "heart" and *-dā* to Aramaic *śīm*, which in any case means that we have to deal with an ieu. **-dhē*, cf. OS 30, p. 177. But what is **draz-*? In Daniel 6,15 we read: *'ᵃdayin malkā kədī millətā šəmaᶜ śaggī' bə'eš ^{ca}lōhī wə'-al Dānī'ēl śām bāl lə-šēzābūtēh* "Then the king, when he heard these words, was sore displeased with himself, and set his heart on Daniel to deliver him", where "set his heart on" is, etymologically, quite to the point, while Theodotion has καὶ περὶ τοῦ Δανιηλ ἠγωνίσατο τοῦ ἐξελέσθαι αὐτὸν (Rahlfs), cf. Vulgata 6,14 *et pro Daniele posuit cor ut liberaret eum;* the Syriac version has *sām bə-reᶜyāneh da-nfassäwhy lə-Dānī'ēl;* the words καὶ ἐβοήθει τοῦ ἐξελέσθαι αὐτὸν of the Septuagint have the sense of "and he tried to help to liberate him", the new Swedish rendering "och han föresatte sig att rädda Daniel" being based mainly on the MT (Nio bibel-böcker, 1984, p. 185).

Thus we have *śīm bāl ᶜal* = *ponere cor pro*, and one would like to have also at least a Pahlavi *dil dātan ō* (cf. OS 30, p. 176). However, the logogram for *dil* "heart" is according to Nyberg *LBBH* (Manual II, p. 63), and according to MacKenzie *LB(B)ME* (Dictionary, p. 26); in Imperial Aramaic *lbb'* = *libbā* is of course "heart" in various meanings, cf. Nyberg, Die Religionen des alten Iran, p. 451. If we now take one more step, assuming that *śām bāl* in Daniel reflects an Iranian *dā+draz* or *draz+dā* "cor ponere" being at the basis of the compound *'adrazdā*, we cannot escape deciding on this **draz-*, which is, indeed, not so easy.

Let us, to begin with, contemplate Old Persian *adam* "I", Median **azam*, cf. Avestan *azəm*, presupposing a *ĝ* or *ĝh* (Kent, Old Persian, 1953, § 88). Thus an Old Persian **draz-* could *per se* reflect an ieu. *ĝ* or *ĝh* = Aryan *ź, źh-* corresponding to Sanskrit *j-, *jh-*. Now Benveniste has for the Avestan *zrazdā* "gläubig, gläubig ergeben" (Bartholomae, 1702) posited an older **srazdā* (assimilation), cf. Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes, 1, 1969, pp. 172–3. Such an *s-* corresponds to an Old Persian *ϑ*. In this case we are then also entitled to posit an Old Persian **δrazdā < *ϑrazdā*, the assimilation *ϑ>δ* having then taken place before the development of *ϑr>ç* (< ieu. *tr, tl, k̂l*), cf. Kent, § 29. Our

Old Persian *$\vartheta razdā$ < *$\vartheta razdā$ recalls Sogdian δrjyy, δrzy "heart" but reflects more directly perhaps an Aryan *$\acute{s}r̥d$-, from ieu. *$\hat{k}r̥d$-, the latter form giving for instance κραδίη and καρδία as well as Sanskrit[3] *śrad*- in *śraddhā* "confidence, devotion, generosity". As for Sanskrit *hŕd*- and *hŕdaya*- these forms seem to reflect an ieu. *$\hat{g}hr̥d$-, which would give an Aryan *$\acute{z}hr̥d$ > Sanskrit *$\acute{s}hr̥d$- ~ *$\acute{s}hrad$- (dissimilation). In *$\acute{s}hrad\text{-}dhā$- the sequence *śh-dh*- was dissimilated to yield a *śraddhā* (Hauchdissimilation). According to H. Frisk Sanskrit *hŕdaya*- "zeigt ein sekundäres *h*- (für *ś*- < idg. $\hat{k}$-)" (I, p. 788) but later on he maintains that *hŕd*- has its *h*- from $\hat{g}h$- (II, p. 1112). This may suffice to demonstrate the difficulties connected with the ieu. word for "heart". Being unable to remove any of these difficulties, I would nevertheless like to call the attention of the reader to the extension of the forms καρδία, *hŕdaya*-, *zərədaya*- as against κῆρ, *hŕd*-, and *zərəd*-, for we are confronted with a similar phenomenon in Semitic, namely in Hebrew *lēbāb* < *libab*- as against *lēb* < *libb*- etc., cf. the Arabic collective type *fiʿal*- to *fiʿl-at*.

Taking now the posited intermediary *$\vartheta razdā$ (above, p. 144) as our point of departure I would like to recall that also such a form had to be rendered in Aramaic as ʾadrazdā/ʾaḏrazdā/ as well as the fact that this compound may, in the last resort, reflect an ieu. *$\hat{k}r̥d\text{-}dh\bar{e}$- = *sīm bāl* instead of an expected *sīm libbā*. That *bāl* belongs already to Imperial Aramaic is shown by Axīqār 97, where we find the expression ʾth ʿl bl "to come into the mind of someone" (Cowley, p. 215). Now the same expression is also to be found in Old Syriac: *lā tētä ʿal bālēk(i) hādä ʿəbidtā* "regard not this thing", II Samuel 13,20 = Onqelos *lā təšawwīn yāt libbīk lə-fitgāmā hādēn* = LXX μὴ θῇς τὴν καρδίαν σου τοῦ λαλῆσαι εἰς τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο = TM ʾal tāšītī ʾät libbēk la-ddābār hazzä. Although Syriac ʾetā ʿal bāleh might also have been influenced by expressions like ἐπὶ νοῦν ἐλθεῖν τινι, I prefer to connect the Syriac expression, in the first place, with Imperial Aramaic ʾth ʿl bl and Syriac *sīm bāl ʿal* with Daniel *śām bāl ʿal;* in Syriac we also find ʾayti ʿal bāleh, *sāleq* and ʾasseq ʿal bāleh (Thesaurus, 529).

The word *bāl* "heart, mind" being thus rather frequently attested in Aramaic we have to ask: What kind of a word is this *bāl*? Being unable to ascertain an Iranian or Accadian origin for this word, I must agree with H. Bauer when he says: "Mit einer Wurzel *bwl*, unter der es in den Wörterbüchern aufgeführt wird, kann es nichts zu tun haben" (Zeitschrift für Semitistik 10/1935, p. 1). For, indeed, there seems to be no semantic link between Arabic *bāla, yabūlu, bawlun* "he urined" etc. (Lane) and Arabic *bāl* "heart, mind; state, condition" (Lane), cf. *albālu lqalbu wa mā yaxṭuru bi lqalbi. alxāṭiru* (Payne Smith, Thesaurus, 529). Bauer suggests a *bāʾa lī* "es ist mir gekommen" > *bā-lī* > *bāl-ī* "meine Absicht" (l.c.), an ingenious suggestion, perhaps too ingenious to be true, cf. Bauer–Leander, Grammatik des Biblisch-Aramäischen, p. 179: "*bāl* 'Herz', 'Aufmerksamkeit' (arab. *bāl*)", without etymology. Within the framework of ideomorphemics we could, of course, consider the resemblance between *lbb* and *bl*, suggesting thus a relationship between these ideomorphemes. However, for the time being we have to accept *bāl* "heart" as a specific isogloss between Aramaic and Arabic. Another formation with *-dhē* is νουθετέω "admonish, warn, rebuke", cf. *anim-adverto*.

NOTES

1. This version is used throughout this paper.
2. The edition of the Trinitarian Bible Society, 1913; S. Lee has the same text.
3. The term "Sanskrit" is here used in an imprecise way.

The Legal Systems of the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Dharmaśāstra* and Some Problems of the Evolution of Two Genres of Literature

A. M. SAMOZVANTSEV

In this essay we set ourselves the task of investigating the legal ideas of the *arthaśāstra* and the *dharmaśāstra* brought together as complete legal systems and to throw light on some problems of composing the legal branch of the *dharmaśāstra* in the process of the evolution of both genres of literature. To our belief, if we don't know the legal systems themselves (just systems but not only their separate components), we aren't able to ascertain the peculiarities of these systems, that makes impossible, in its turn, to follow the integration of genres of the *arthaśāstra* and the *dharmaśāstra*, from the point of view of the texts' composition and the terminology accepted in a text. Through an investigation of this kind, in our opinion, we are able to solve the problem, which should be a dominant one in indology, namely, concerning the functioning of these genres of literature. Thus, the following logical order lines up here: there are legal systems and their integral components, peculiarities of systems and the interaction of texts towards the development of genres.

The legal stuff of the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* had been researched in the works of the general character till now, especially, if we cite as an example monographs of B. Breloer or R. P. Kangle.[1] The separate components of the legal system of the *Arthaśāstra* had been observed there, whereas we shall try to take it as a complex of ideas, complete models here.

We should take into consideration that the same notions which we shall speak about below are represented both in the *Arthaśāstra* and *smṛtis*, and the question is the different terms. As to the specificity and the degree of the development of notions of the legal system of the *Arthaśāstra*, we should notice, that the legal system of the compendium on political science displays some considerable peculiarities: in contrast to the body of the *dharmaśāstra*, the *Arthaśāstra*, judging by the terminology used by its compiler, contains the chronologically homogeneous layer of legal ideas and uses the homogeneous juridical terminology, whereas *smṛtis* apply to the terminology of both the genres of the *arthaśāstra* and the *dharmaśāstra*. We should also underline that, though the legal stuff of the *Arthaśāstra* was placed into a scientific treatise with all consequences, it doesn't appear scholastic, whereas in *smṛtis* the law became a scholastic one to a greater degree, especially, in late sources of this genre.

One should bear in mind that notions which will be observed below don't embrace all of those ones represented in the compendium, and we apply to the main notions, which serve as a basis of the legal system of the *Arthaśāstra*. Some of them, for example, *deśa*, *svakaraṇa* and *saṃpūrṇācāra* may be shown as like certain notions in the system of European law.

From the standpoint of our investigation, we may find the most considerable

stuff to be located in the *Arthaśāstra*'s Chapter III.I where the valid and invalid legal actions included transactions are talked over. The part previous to description of legal preceedings is composed in the following way: at first there is given the general rule concerning invalid actions (III.1.2), then the punishment is stated in case of the infringement of this former (III.1.3–5), there are given then exceptions to the every condition of an invalid action (III.1.6–11) and additional conditions nullifying an action (III.1.12–13) with exceptions to them, punishments in case of the infringement of rules relating to contractors and witnesses (III.1.14), and, finally, the general formula of a valid legal action and first and foremost a transaction is stated (III.1.15). All formulas of valid or invalid legal actions and all cases of *vyavahāra* included into *dharmasthīya* (Book III) may be shown to be deduced from this general formula. There can be no doubt, the formula may be considered to be the only one of its kind in the Ancient Indian literature on the whole. And it seems to be quite natural, that it involves all the most considerable notions of the legal system of the *Arthaśāstra* (the *arthaśāstra*) and the Ancient Indian law, which we should dwell at length on.

Undoubtedly, R. P. Kangle was right while speaking, that "a *vyavahāra* is primarily a transaction entered into by two parties",[2] and there is meant a transaction of acquisition—alienation of the belongings. Such differentiation finds its expression not in a *vyavahāra*'s formula itself, but proves expressed by its components depending on one or another case of judicial practice. One phenomenon speaks in favour of this formula's universality, namely, that it refers to objects of transaction of different types. So, for example, *pramāṇa* or dimensions may deal with both movables and immovables, but *rūpa* or form may, probably, deal with only movables (IV.6.10), and so on.

The transaction must have been considered to be valid one answering eight components of *vyavahāra*, i.e. following demands: it should be struck in the limits of time and place corresponding to *varga*, that means a category of contractors. It should be struck on the legal ground, which is transmitted by the term *svakaraṇa*, that means, for example, that an owner's document has to confirm his ownership over an object that he alienates by means of transaction. Both the contractors who strike a transaction must be capable just at the very moment of striking it, that is conveyed by the term *sampūrṇācāra*. The validity of a transaction should be legitimated by guarantors, i.e. witnesses or document which would have fixed, for example, the rights of a buyer to purchased property, and both a witness and a document should meet the requirements of the law, thanks to which their evidences become the legal ones—*śuddhadeśa*. The same buyer and seller or donee and donor should preliminarily discuss the form—*rūpa*, features—*lakṣaṇa*, dimensions—*pramāṇa* and quality—*guṇa* of an object of transaction. All of them must be evident, i.e. *dṛṣṭa*, for both contractors and witnesses, being fixed in the document or engraved in witnesses' memory on (*sve sve tu varge deśe kāle ca svakaraṇakṛtāḥ sampūrṇācārāḥ śuddhadeśā dṛṣṭarūpalakṣaṇapramāṇaguṇāḥ sarvavyavahārā sidhyeyuḥ*).

Some of the properties of an object mentioned above, including dimensions of a plot or form of a thing and so on, obviously, should be clear for one. The property *guṇa* is regarded by the compiler as referring to men and animals. Some transac-

tion, though it had been struck, but it turned out later on that it was coupled with the so-called *aviṣahya*, is to be annuled (III.15.4). Likely, it is *guṇa* that was connected with the *aviṣahya* as the most considerable property of goods of people and animals-type. So, we see *guṇa* to be not mentioned in text II.18.4 with respect to things. It seems not accidental, that the compiler inserts *aviṣahya* just into Chapter III.15: there are some examples of the annulment of transaction here which involve perforce several cases of such annulment in consequence of the absence of the important qualities, properties of people and animals (III.15.16). The *guṇas* are found here to be opposed to *nirguṇas* or defects (comp. III.15.12–15).

The notion *karaṇa* should be regarded as a central one of the legal system of the *Arthaśāstra* meaning a judicial argument, authority, proof to be submitted in a court of law. It seems to be like *pramāṇaṃ trividham* in smṛtis. The *karaṇa* appears as a "proof" in text III.1.17 where both the plaintiff and the defendant come to the court for giving their *karaṇas* for fixing them side by side with another information by clerk. There exists another opinion regarding the meaning of the term *karaṇa*, namely, that it is to be a kind of suit in court. But this opinion seems hardly acceptable, for the term gets too broad sense then, but the term *ṛṇa* (see III.1.17) gets too narrow one, which are conflicting with one other. More-over, it would be reasonable to apply to text of the *Bṛhaspatismṛti* I.4.1, where the term *kāraṇa* (which is analogous to that *karaṇa* in late *smṛtis*) accepts a meaning which may be decoded as a "proof" in the context similar to that of the compendium's *sūtra* III.1.17.

The text III.1.19 proves that the *karaṇa* covers the verbal and documentary evidences in the *Arthaśāstra*, and *nirṇaya* (the sentence) may be seen to be produced in court after an examination of *karaṇas* of both *pakṣas* (sides in court), that finds its confirmation in text IV.8.13 (*tasmātsamāptakaraṇaṃ niyamayet*).

The karaṇa may be also met to be referred to the witnesses in III.12.37–38, where the artisans accept an article for manufacture (*nikṣepa*) without striking a transaction in the presence of the witnesses. The text III.12.53 tells us, that transactions with a *nikṣepa* (article for manufacture and deposit) should be struck in the presence of the witnesses.

Taking into consideration that text III.1.17 might implicate a non-legalized user (for example, of another's plot), we may conclude, that this user might produce his own *bhoga/bhukti* or use in defence of his *pakṣa* in court, therefore use under some circumstances could be a *karaṇa* as well (see III.16.29). As a rule, use would be observed in court to be a *karaṇa* if a user's witnesses would confirm the prescription for the present instance.

In our opinion, the expression *pramāṇaṃ trividham* contained in *smṛtis* is to be similar to *karaṇa* of the *Arthaśāstra*. It is talked over, for example, in the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* II.22 (*pramāṇaṃ likhitaṃ bhuktiḥ sākṣiṇaśceti kīrtitam*) and the *Nāradasmṛti* I.65 of *Bhāvasvāmin*'s version (*likhitaṃ sākṣiṇo bhuktiḥ pra-māṇaṃ trividhaṃ viduḥ*). The idea towards *pramāṇa* as a triple-term legal authority through which property is acquired or the right to it is proved is a traditional one in the genre of the *dharmaśāstra*. It had been constituted long before composing the *smṛtis* Manu and Yājñavalkya.

The notion *pramāṇa* receives some indefinite sense in the compendium, that may be seen from the text of the *dharmasūtras*, where it gets not juridical but rather ritual semantics (see the *Arthaśāstra* III.11.25–26: *sampratipattāvuttamaḥ / asampratipattau tu sākṣiṇaḥ pramāṇam* ...; III.19.19–21: "*kalahe pūrvagato jayati, akṣamāṇo hi pradhāvati*" *ityācāryāḥ / neti kauṭilyaḥ / pūrvaṃ paścādvābhigatasya sākṣiṇaḥ pramāṇam* ...; III.12.35: *nikṣepāpahāre pūrvāpadānaṃ nikṣeptāraśca pramāṇam*; see also I.11.3, I.16.27, II.2.12, II.24.21, II.29.36, II.30.13, II.32.11, X.2.16).

We have tried to show in our monograph that the word *āgama* means the title of ownership in *smṛtis*, and it is interpreted by commentators as a combination of *pramāṇas* (legal authorities), i.e. *pramāṇa* must have been regarded as a carrier of āgama.[3] But *āgama* accepts another meaning in the *Arthaśāstra*, namely, a legal acquisition, a transaction. So, we can read in III.12.51 that a judge should examine an *āgama* to the belongings which are in somebody's use and also features of a transaction itself and the validity of plaintiff's real action (*dravyabhogānāmāgamaṃ cāsyānuyuñjīta, tasya cārthasya vyavahāropaliṅganam, abhiyoktuścārthasāmarthyam*). The comparison between expressions *vyavahāropaliṅgana* and *lābhopaliṅgana* (IV.6.13) speaks in favour of interpretation of the word *vyavahāra* with a sense "acquisition of property (transaction)", which must result in acquiring the belongings into legal property or into legal possession which were distinguished by the compiler (IV.6.7–8).

A *deśa* is a proof, an evidence to be submitted in court in the *Arthaśāstra*. It covers more frequently a document and rarely both document and witnesses, but formerly the word *deśa* had been interpreted with a sense "place" in the present context (see J. J. Meyer's translation of the *Arthaśāstra* into German and B. Breloer's opinion regarding the meaning of *deśa*).[4] The true meaning of *deśa* was ascertained later on (especially we should refer to the work of R. P. Kangle). The using of the term twice in text III.1.15, that certainly couldn't be an ordinary repetition, suggests an idea, that the expression *śuddhadeśa* implies something quite different from the meaning of it in the stable combination *deśa–kāla* (place–time).

The same term occurs in III.16.29. It is said here that the prescription leads to the loss of the ownership over property which is in somebody's use, and the *bhoga* should be voted to be the title of ownership (*bhogānuvṛttirucchinnadeśānāṃ yathāsvaṃ dravyāṇām*); so, the proof of the ownership (*deśa*) is lost through use of a non-legalized user here.

It is pointed out in IV.6.9 that the validity of an *āgama* (acquisition, included transaction) may be proved in trial through *śucirdeśa* or "honest evidence" (comp. *śuddhadeśa* or "pure evidence" in III.1.15) or through *dīrgha paribhoga* or "lasting use", that means, in particular, a dispute relating to a lost thing (*nāṣṭikaścettadeva pratisaṃdadhyāt, yasya pūrvo dīrghaśca paribhogaḥ śucirvā deśastasya dravyamiti vidyāt*).

We are inclined to think that the expression *śuci/śuddhadeśa* observed in the *Arthaśāstra* has to be analogous to that *śuddhāgama* in *smṛtis*.

According to R. P. Kangle: "Evidence to be submitted in a court of law appears to be called *deśa* (3.1.19 etc.). It evidently refers to all kinds of evidence, document, witnesses and so on".[5] But we can't agree with this opinion, for,

likely, a document only is conveyed by the word *deśa* in most cases (with some exceptions to this rule, as it can be seen in III.1.15, that may be explained by circumstances). The meaning a "document" which the term *deśa* gets is proved by its semantics in the description of legal proceedings in III.1.19, where the compiler, obviously, divides *karaṇas* into documentary and verbal evidences, and the former of them are transmitted by *deśa*. We may find the similar meanings of *karaṇa* and *deśa* in the *Manusmṛti* VIII.52 which was composed, evidently, under the influence of the *Arthaśāstra*, where a *karaṇa* is adduced to have a more broad sense than *deśa* too (see III.1.19).[6]

The similar division into *sākṣya* and *deśa* (verbal and documentary evidences in court) may be shown to be fixed in the context describing the legal procedure in IV.9.14–15: *pṛcchyaṃ na pṛcchati, apṛcchyaṃ pṛcchati ... madhyamamasmai sāhasadaṇḍaṃ kuryāt / deyaṃ deśaṃ na pṛcchati, adeyaṃ deśaṃ pṛcchati, kāryamadeśenātivahayati ... uttamamasmai sāhasadaṇḍaṃ kuryāt*, i.e. when a judge doesn't examine a person who should be examined or examines a person who should not be examined he must pay the medium *sāhasadaṇḍa*; when a judge doesn't inquire after a documentary evidence which should be offered in trial or when he inquires after a documentary evidence which should not be offered in trial, or delays a law-suit by means of the document which isn't considered to be a proof, he is fined with the highest *sāhasadaṇḍa*. Judging by the sizes of fines, it appears to be evident that a document is a more considerable evidence, proof in eyes of judges than a witness, that corresponds in general to the indian tradition.

Following to the description of the legal procedure, the *deśas* must have been divided into *deśas* (documents bearing an immediate relation to the present law-suit and drawn up in accordance with necessary demands), *adeśas* (documents which have no bearing on the present question) and *hīnadeśas* ("weak" documentary evidences, though bearing a relation to the present law-suit, but drawn up without observance of necessary rules, for example, if they are without signatures of witnesses (in case they were demanded), but also without showing place and time of their drawing up and so on (comp. the *Nāradasmṛti* Intr. II.8)). We could already see both *deśa* and *adeśa* in the text of the *Arthaśāstra* IV.9.15 cited above. To our mind, the expression *hīnadeśa* which is utilized by the compiler may be hardly applied to witnesses, who, if we follow the same terminology, might be *deśa* or *adeśa*, whereas *hīnadeśa* might be applied to a document too. So, while saying of the document (*āgama*) to be not considered as a quite valid one *Vijñāneśvara* in his commentary on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* II.27 affirmed: ... *tasminnāgame balaṃ sampūrṇaṃ naivasti*.

We should also refer to texts III.16.29 and IV.6.9, in our opinion, speaking in confirmation of our supposition with regard to the semantics of the term *deśa*. We may conclude on the basis of them that all kinds of evidence aren't covered with *deśa* at all, but *deśa* and *bhoga* are opposed to one other. Besides, this opposition which may be clearly followed in the *Arthaśāstra* is usually observed by *smṛtis*' compilers as that of *āgama* (document)—*bhoga* (use) that may be brought to light if one take into consideration the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* II.26–28 and *Viśvarūpa*'s comments on these texts.

We should also point to the next fact: though the verb *likh* may be found in

Book III (III.1.17) and Book IV (IV.9.17) of the compendium as well as the clerk is mentioned here (IV.9.17), and though terms derived from the verb *likh* are used now and then (*gūḍhalekhya* (cryptography)—I.12.13, *lekhya* (inscription)—I.16.25, *lekha* (document)—II.10.4–6, 22, 24, 38, 40, 43, 45, 47), it is very strangely that document isn't mentioned in Book III. In consequence of that *deśa* appears to mean just documentary evidence or document in the text of the *Arthaśāstra*.

However, objecting to R. P. Kangle's opinion regarding the meaning of the term *deśa* we have to subscribe to his one, that *deśa* appears as such one in the function of a proof in court of law here, that may give some explanation of the etymology of the term.

An evidence *deśa* to be brought before a judge must have been naturally *śuci* or *śuddha* that means a document's drawing up according to current rules.

We could see above citing as an example text IV.6.9 that the validity of *āgama* or acquisition, included transaction might be proved in court by means of *deśa*. Since transactions should be understood to imply *ādhāna* (mortgaging), *kraya* (purchase) and *pratigraha* (getting of gift) in IV.6.8, therefore *deśa* could be *svakaraṇa* or a proof of ownership (i.e. *karaṇa* of *sva/svāmya* which implicates purchase-deed or settlement) or *ādhilekhya* (mortgage). In the same way a lasting use could prove the validity of an *āgama*-acquiring in court as well (III.16.29, IV.6.9). In the latter case an acquisition didn't result from certain transaction, but rather from the prescriptive right.

The notion *svakaraṇa* gets two meanings in the text of the *Arthaśāstra*, namely, a narrow one (*svakaraṇa* implies by its semantics the proof of *sva/svāmya*) and a more broad one (the legal ground of any action or the capability, as it may be seen in III.1.15). For example, it is said in IV.1.54–55: *paurvapauruṣikaṃ nidhiṃ jānapadaḥ śuciḥ svakaraṇena samagraṃ labheta / svakaraṇābhāve pañcaśato daṇḍaḥ, pracchannādāne sahasram*, i.e. one who found a treasure becomes its owner after his *svakaraṇa* confirms his right to a thing. In absence of *svakaraṇa* the fine 500 *paṇa* is imposed on him and if he hides a treasure the fine increases twice as much (comp. IV.2.1).

The carriers of *svakaraṇa* could be both documents and witnesses, for an acquisition into property of movables has been legalized in the presence of witnesses, but that of immovables has been legalized by means of drawing up a document. *Svakaraṇa* should be regarded, for example, as meaning a correctly drawn up document which permits an owner to strike transactions with the belongings rights to which it proves. It may also appear in its proving function being brought in court as *deśa* to prove certain rights to the belongings.

Svakaraṇa accepts the semantics similar to that of *āgama* in *smṛtis*. So, the *Arthaśāstra* III.16.17–19 runs: *nāṣṭikaśca svakaraṇaṃ kṛtvā naṣṭapratyāhṛtaṃ labheta / svakaraṇābhāve pañcabandho daṇḍaḥ / tacca dravyaṃ rājadharmyaṃ syāt*, i.e. an owner whose belongings were lost after they will be found out may recover them by *svakaraṇa*. If there is no *svakaraṇa*, he pays the fine equal to fifth part of the price of the belongings, and they pass into the hands of the king. Evidently, *svakaraṇa* may be replaced by *deśa* in the similar context in IV.6.9. But the thing is that text III.16.17–19 was borrowed by the compiler of the

Yājñavalkyasmṛti II.175, who shows: *āgamenopabhogena naṣṭaṃ bhāvyamato'-nyathā / pañcabandho damastasya rājñe tenāvibhāvite //*. It seems obvious that both the terms by their semantics have a relation to one and the same notion, and both *svakaraṇa* and *āgama* convey the idea of ownership in bounds of two traditions of literature. As it turns out, the *āgama* of *smṛtis* which is usually expressed through *pramāṇaṃ trividham* system should be voted by one as not like *āgama* of the *Arthaśāstra*. It seems noticeable that in similar way one of kinds of *karaṇa, deśa* should serve in the compendium's text as a carrier of *svakaraṇa*. Although *smṛtis' āgama* is replaced by *deśa* in the *Arthaśāstra*, and the semantics of *deśa* doesn't correspond to that of *svakaraṇa*, it is small wonder, since *pramāṇa* being the carrier of *āgama* often means the notion *āgama* in *smṛtis* themselves. Just so way *deśa* should be thought of as meaning *svakaraṇa* in the *Arthaśāstra* appearing in the role of an equivalent of *āgama* in *smṛtis*. In confirmation of the supposition we should apply to the comment of *Viśvarūpa* on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* II.175: *āgamenalekhyādinā prakāśamaskhalitacirabhogena vā naṣṭaṃ dravyamanyahastagataṃ madīyamityevaṃ bhāvyam*. Thus, *Viśvarūpa* says directly that *āgama* is to be defined as a document. The same *āgama* occurs in the *Manusmṛti* VIII.200 (*sambhogo dṛśyate yatra na dṛśyetāgamaḥ kvacit / āgamaḥ kāraṇaṃ tatra na sambhoga iti sthitiḥ //*) and the *Yājñaval-kyasmṛti* II.27 (*āgamo'bhyadhiko bhogādvinā pūrvakramāgatāt / āgame'pi balaṃ naiva bhuktiḥ stokāpi yatra no //*). The original semantics of both *svakaraṇa* and *āgama* seems to be very like while meaning "appropriation to oneself", "acquiring".

The notions *svakaraṇa* (ground of a legal action) and *sampūrṇācāra* (absolute capability) prove to be coupled with one other needing the special explanation. Judging by text III.1.15, *sampūrṇācāra* implicates the absolute capability referring to those circumstances which make a person who is capable de jure that who is capable de facto. As examples of temporary incapable persons the compiler gives in III.1.13 those who are angered, distressed, drunk, mad and forced (*tatrāpi kruddhenārtena mattenonmattenāvagṛhītena vā kṛtā vyavahārā na sid-hyeyuḥ*). Hence it follows, *sampūrṇācāra* is the real capability at the present moment. It should be differed from the capability of a person to make one or another legal action or *svakaraṇa* meaning in its more broad sense the legal ground of an action. The *sampūrṇācāra* may be conditioned by the very moment of striking a transaction and so on. This notion refers to a sanction to certain legal action as well.

As to the term *svakaraṇa* to be observed in III.1.15, it implies the legal ground of legal action (not obligatorily a transaction—see III.11.28) which is available or not available subject to the kind of legal action itself and contractors. The compiler enumerates a circle of men in III.1.12 whose capability is limited when they strike transactions and make other legal actions on their own initiative, including son dependent on father, slave, "pledged" person etc. It seems obvious from the text that their actions would accept a legal ground if those ones would be sanctioned by someone. The stuff of Chapter III.11 prompts that not only transactions, but also legal actions in more broad sense are covered with the term *vyavahāra*, for example, it may be a right to give an evidence in court. One may

also infer that completely incapable persons aren't meant in text III.1.12 at all. We may see from the text III.11.32 that the grown-up children may give an evidence in court when a law-suit of their parents is the question and without sanction to children's action. Some persons listed in III.1.12 cannot be regarded as undoubted witnesses, but they may give an evidence in court under certain circumstances without sanction to it from the side of another juridical person (III.11.28). Though, according to III.1.12 a pledged person is not capable, and his legal actions demand his master's sanction, we may conclude proceeding from the stuff of Chapter III.13 that the case is somewhat different here: to all appearances, he is considered as a capable person, and he may inherit, acquire the belongings and may marry (III.13.16); he is an incapable person dealing with property and activity of his master. Another example should be also cited here, namely, concerning parents mentioned in III.13.5: since they are imprisoned being brought to trial, they should be persons limited in their capability. But the text proves that they may dispose of their belongings and children, for it is said here of the alienation of children by their parents taking a loan on the security.

At last, an old man, a cripple and some other persons, clearly, may acquire the belongings and undertake one or another engagement (for example, an old man should carry out his obligations as a debtor, as it is stated in III.11.13). It seems also notable that a person who is in trouble may sometimes give an evidence in court (III.11.30–31). Perhaps, a minor was a completely incapable person only.

The general definition of legal action and more narrow definitions of *svakaraṇa* and *sampūrṇācāra* aren't testified in *smṛtis* that should be explained by peculiarities of *smṛtis'* legal system, though their compilers knew these notions.

In difference from the categories which were discussed above that *varga*, as it is known, is a logical one in the first place, appearing in the role of a group (category) of homogeneous elements which are brought together in the limits of such group, from point of view of certain logical level. In consequence of the plurality of such possible levels which are different from one other the text of the *Arthaśāstra* involves different *vargas*. Following such certain feature the compiler either brings together juridical persons or divides them in the limits of one or another *varga*. For example, some persons listed in III.11.29 give an evidence in court when a person belonging to their own *varga* went to law. So, a *śrotriya* (learned *brāhmaṇa*) may give an evidence in case of a *śrotriya*, a village serf—in case of the same village serf or a *caṇḍāla*—in case of the same *caṇḍāla* and so on. And, on the contrary, a *śrotriya* may not be called to witness in the case of an outcast and so on. The persons are divided into different *vargas* here, while they take into consideration their social status including sacral inferiors (cripple etc.). There are some persons in text III.13.30 belonging, on the contrary, to different social groups, but brought together within the limits of a single *varga* of hired workers having one trait in common: there is no fixed rule or norm which would stipulate the term of work or the rate of remuneration, etc. in respect thereof, but they will depend on a kind of occupation and relations between employer and employee.

We should consider a *varga* of type of that one contained in III.1.15 to be composed not on the base of the social status and it doesn't refer to *varṇa* or

caste of men here. There are implicated *sūtras* 2–9 of Chapter III.1 which say that different persons have the right to make legal actions in different places and times (by day or at night, openly or keeping secret etc.) depending on kind of their activity and physical state.

To make it more clear the necessity of introducing *vargas* of such kinds into judicial practice we have to notice that the usual and important condition of making the majority of legal actions (transactions), we mean the publicity, cannot be kept always on account of specificity of activity (occupation), physical state of men and kind of a legal action itself. Thus, the division into *vargas* had to bring the variety of judicial cases to the conformity with norms of the law. In the majority of cases we deal with exceptions to the rule which demands the publicity of one or another legal action (transaction), i.e. even for lack of the publicity this action (transaction) will be nevertheless regarded as a legalized one.

We could satisfy ourselves on the base of the stuff which we dwelled above on, that these two legal systems of both the *arthaśāstra* and the *dharmaśāstra* display a row of peculiarities, and their main notions are expressed by different terms. We intend to call these terms—carriers of notions the matrices of the legal text for two reasons: since they fix the text in the bounds of literary monuments of both the genres of literature in form of certain blocks of information; and because the process takes place even if such terms fix the stuff which must be voted as an alien to one or another genre. In addition, just the availability of these terminological legal systems permits us to consider two legal systems of two genres of literature dominant and very stable ones. We represent both the terminological systems taken schematically below, meaning to indicate the legal ways of acquiring property and proofs of their validity and rights to it.

The *Arthaśāstra*

āgama
(the legal way of acquiring
property, including *kraya*,
dāya, *ādhāna* etc.—see
IV.6.7–8).

↓

*karaṇa*
(the proof in court—see
III.1.17).

↓

deśa[7]　　　　　　*sākṣiṇa*　　　　　　　　　*bhoga*[8]
(the documentary　(witnesses in court—　(the use—see
evidence in court,　see III.1.19).　　　　　III.16.29, IV.6.9).
see III.1.19).

↓

ādhi[9]　　　　　*svakaraṇa*
(see IV.6.8).　　(the title, proof of
　　　　　　　　　ownership—see III.
　　　　　　　　　16.17–18).

The *Dharmaśāstra*

kraya, pratigraha, ādhāna,
riktha, adhigama etc.
(at times all of them appear as
āgamas—ways of acquiring proper-
ty—see the *Manusmṛti* X.115).

↓

pramāṇaṃ trividham
(the triple-term authority, proof
in court—see the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*
II.22, the *Nāradasmṛti* I.65).

likhita[10]
(the documentary
evidence in court).

sākṣiṇa
(witnesses in court).

bhukti[11]
(the use).

ādhilekhya, bhoga-
lekhya etc.
(see the *Bṛhaspati-*
smṛti I.6.7).

āgama
(the title, proof of ownership—
see the *Manusmṛti* VIII.200, the
Yājñavalkyasmṛti II.27–28; *kraya-*
lekhya, dānalekhya etc.—see
the *Bṛhaspatismṛti* I.6.7.).

(Touching the latter of schemes we should emphasize that we offer the only one semantics of the term *āgama* here, which is connected with the universal system of grounding property rights laying aside others occurring in *smṛtis* too.[12])

In our opinion, the constitution of the legal systems had been preceeded by the long development of the legal traditions of both genres of literature. There can be little doubt, that the juridical terminology of the *Arthaśāstra* was elaborated in schools of the *artha(nīti)śāstra* being contained in sources of the *arthaśāstra* which haven't reached us. In the same way the legal tradition of the *dharmaśās-tra* was included in the limits of several topics into *smṛtis* from the *arthaśāstras*, while the terminology of the *dharmaśāstra* was developed in schools of compilers of the *dharmasūtras*, though in row of cases it should have appeared in earlier sources of dharmic literature.

We may find the formula of the triple-term legal authority for the first time in the *Vasiṣṭhadharmasūtra* XVI.10: *likhitaṃ sākṣiṇo bhuktiḥ pramāṇaṃ trividham*

smṛtam / dhanasvīkaraṇam pūrvam dhanī dhanamavāpnuyāditi //, i.e. the owner gets the thing at his own disposal after the acquisition of the thing (in other words—after transaction—*svī(sva)karaṇa* that corresponds by its semantics to the original meaning of the word *āgama*) and by means of the triple-term authority consisting of document, witnesses and use (comp. the similar reading of the *Nāradasmṛti* I.69 *Asahāya*'s version: *likhitam sākṣiṇo bhuktiḥ pramāṇam trividham smṛtam / dhanasvīkaraṇe yena dhanī dhanamavāpnuyāt //*).

As it was remarked earlier, the term *pramāṇa* accepts a meaning of some abstract authority in the *Arthaśāstra*, and we can see the following construction with its using here: such an object is *pramāṇa* or authoritative. So, the compiler affirms in III.1.45: when the *dharmaśāstra* will come in conflict to some decree, the *śāstra* loses the validity for this decree should be regarded as *pramāṇa* (*śāstram vipratipadyeta dharme nyāyena kenacit / nyāyastatra pramāṇam syāt ...*). Or it is said in III.2.10: dharmic marriages demand a permission of the bride's father whereas other marriages—of her father and mother (*pitṛpramāṇāścatvāraḥ pūrve dharmyāḥ, mātāpitṛpramāṇāḥ śeṣāḥ*). The similar constructions may be found in II.25.21, IV.1.2.

The ritual semantics of both the terms *āgama* and *pramāṇa* may be signified if we follow the texts of the *dharmasūtras*. In accordance with text of the *Āpastambadharmasūtra* I.1.2–3: *dharmajñasamayaḥ pramāṇam // vedāśca*, i.e. "an accord (conduct) of those who are experienced in *dharma* is *pramāṇa* as well as *vedas*". The semantics of the term *pramāṇa* may be clarified by drawing a parallel between this text and that of the *Vasiṣṭhadharmasūtra* I.3–4 where the compiler says: *śrutismṛtivihito dharmaḥ // tadalābhe śiṣṭācāraḥ pramāṇam*, i.e. "what is told by *śruti* (and) *smṛti* is *dharma*, (but if) they are not the conduct of knowers (has to be considered) to be *pramāṇa*". Hence, the latter text implies the oral tradition immediately connected with learned *brahmāṇas*' conduct, that should be understood as their religious piety, the correct following the spread among them "usage". *Haradatta* means an "accord" in the same sense in his commentary on the *Āpastambadharmasūtra* I.1.2 while referring to as knowers of *dharma* to legendary Manu and other sages whose opinions on *dharma–adharma* are authoritative: *dharmajñā ye manvādayasteṣām samayaḥ pramāṇam dharmādharmayoḥ*.

The *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra* defines *pramāṇa* as qualification, determination of the "accord", "conduct" of virtuous men following the "correct", "true" mode of life (i.e. *sadācāra*) while saying in I.1.2.10: ... *tasmin ya ācāras sa pramāṇam*, referring to the locality (*āryavarta*), "where the current usage is *pramāṇa*". Some earlier the compiler of the *dharmasūtra* noticed (I.1.2.6): *tatra tatra deśaprāmāṇyameva syāt*, i.e. "in every place the authority will (depend) on the place". The context makes us think that this "place" is to mean situations, actions of the sacral as well as unsacral character, which an indian accomplishes in everyday life. In every concrete case they can be "true" (*pramāṇa*) or "untrue' (*apramāṇa*).

The authority in the same sense may be seen to be implied in text IV.6.6.9 of the *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra*: *mantramārgapramāṇam tu vidhane samudīritam / bharadvājādayo yena brahmaṇasamatām gatāḥ*; this means: "And in the rule

the authority of *mantras'* reading is pointed out, by means of which *Bharadvāja* and others became similar to *Brahmaṇa''*. It appears to be the "authority" that should arise from the proper observance of the rules of everyday life's conduct, through which the religious desert is achieved.

We should also cite the passage of the *Gautamadharmasūtra* XI.20 (comp. the *Nāradasmṛti* I.136): *deśajātikuladharmāśca''mnayairaviruddhāḥ pramāṇam*, i.e. "*dharmas* (customs) of localities, castes and families which don't contradict sacred texts are *pramāṇa''*. It should be evident that the term transmits the same shade of meaning here, that was shown in texts cited above.

These observations may be applied to the term *āgama* too, which is found to be closely connected with that *pramāṇa* in *dharmaśāstras* as well as in *dharmasū-tras*.

If we look at the text I.1.1.4 of the *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra* we read: *tṛtīyaḥ śiṣṭāgamaḥ*, i.e. "the third is the conduct of learned (persons)". We deal with three kinds of *dharma* here which is achieved through *śrūti, smṛti* and learned *brāhmaṇas*. The comparison with the *Vasiṣṭhadharmasūtra* I.3–4 indicates *āgama* to have the semantics which is similar to that of *ācāra* here. Meanwhile the distinct semantic similarity between *āgama* and *pramāṇa* may be shown too. The construction of the passage makes belief that the compiler utilized the word *āgama* in a meaning, that stands in close relation to that of the expression *śāstrāgama* to be implicated in the *Manusmṛti* XII.105.

The word *āgama* meaning a custom occurs in the *Āpastambadharmasūtra* I.17.13: *yathāgamaṃ yajñe*; this means: "According to the custom by offering". *Haradatta* clears up the sense of this passage: *yajñapātre tu yathāgamaṃ śodhi-taṃ prayataṃ bhavati*, i.e. "as regards the sacrificial vessel, it becomes pure being purified in accordance with the tradition (custom)". It seems to be notable, that a "custom" is immediately correlated with a rite here, the performance of which is demanded for the purification of some offering vessel. In another place the compiler of the dharmasūtra says (II.5.17): *yathāgamaṃ śiṣyebhyo vidyāsaṃ-pradāne niyameṣu ca yuktaḥ syādevaṃ vartamānaḥ pūrvāparān sambandhān ātmānaṃ ca kṣeme yunakti*, i.e. "who keeps rules regarding the transferring of knowledges to leaners in the same way how it was transferred (to him), if he acts so he ensures the safety for ancestors, descendants and himself". *Haradatta* interprets the text: *yena prakāreṇā''gamaḥ paṭhārthayoḥ* ..., i.e. "how the achievement of a (sacred) text and a thing (occurs) ...", but it appears clear that he touches upon an "achievement" to be connected and expressed through the "true", "due" conduct and observance of rules, by means of which the religious merit is achieved. Such *āgama* may be also met in the context referring to "impure nature (origin)" (see the *Vasiṣṭhadharmasūtra* III.36, comp. XIX.10).

Thus, before they had accepted the juridical semantics *pramāṇa* and other terms had to have the ritual semantics because of the functioning in the ritual texts. Most likely, the acceptance by them of the juridical semantics should be explained by interaction of the *dharmasūtras* with the early *arthaśāstras*, from which these former incorporated practically all the juridical subjects in the limits of *rājadharma*.[13] This interaction appeared on two levels: on that of the incorpor-ation of the terminology accepted in a text and adopted by treatises of one genre from those of another one and on the level of the composition of texts.

We already remarked earlier, that the ritual terms of the *dharmaśāstra* became those, which like matrices fixed the stuff of the *arthaśāstra* after the process of integration of both the genres had begun. The process was the main reason of the transformation of *pramāṇa* into *pramāṇaṃ trividham* and so on.

Two stages of this integration of both the *arthaśāstra* and the *dharmaśāstra* (stage "A"—early *arthaśāstras–dharmasūtras*, stage "B"—the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* and its immediate sources—the *Manusmṛti*, the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* etc.) were discussed by us in another essay in short.[14] Following our consideration contained in that essay it is opportune to mention here the indefinite semantics of juridical terms in late *smṛtis*. So, we should refer to frequent replacing the term *karaṇa* by that *kāraṇa*, that may be found, for example, in the *Bṛhaspatismṛti* I.4.3. All three terms—*pramāṇa, karaṇa* and *kāraṇa* proved to be frequently like one another in late *smṛtis*, whereas terms *karaṇa* and *kāraṇa* are used in earlier *smṛtis* more strictly getting the semantics similar to that of these terms in the *Arthaśāstra* (comp., for example, the *Manusmṛti* VIII.51, 57, 200).

As to the term *āgama*, it may be observed in the *Manusmṛti* to be used in several places in both the judicial and ritual context having the semantics, examples of which we already cited having applied to text of the *Āpastambadharmasūtra* II.5.17 and *Haradatta*'s commentary on it: we mean "acquisition", "achievement" irrespective of what is acquired or achieved (see I.81–82, VIII.347, IX.246, X.115). As regards the term *pramāṇa,* in any case it gets not juridical but rather ritual semantics here (see II.13, XI.84).

In the process of the composing of the legal branch of the *dharmaśāstra* the majority of late *smṛtis* continued to discuss ritual matters while using, in particular, terms *āgama* and *pramāṇa*, and their ritual semantics may often be found here. So, according to the *Atrisaṃhitā* (v. 155): *teṣāṃ vacaḥ pramāṇaṃ syādṛtaścānṛtameva ca,* i.e. "their directions regarding true and untrue should be authoritative" (see also the *Āṅgirasasmṛti* I.28). The *Kātyāyanasmṛti* XXVII.16 says: *prāmāṇikaṃ śrūtau yat syād* . . .—"the authority that should be in *śruti*". The compiler of this *smṛti* points out in XVIII.17: *virodhe yatra vākyānāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ tatra bhūyasam / tulyapramāṇatve tu nyāya evaṃ prakīrtitaḥ //*, i.e. "if a contradiction between statements (is observed) there the authority (of each of them) has the major importance; but if the equality of authorities (is observed) in the same way the logical reasoning is declared (to be authoritative)' (see also the *Vedavyāsasmṛti* I.4, the *Parāśarasmṛti* VIII.16, the *Brahmoktayājñavalkyasaṃhitā* III.166).

The term *āgama* doesn't accept meanings "custom", "tradition" in late *smṛtis* with rare exceptions (*sadācāra* or *ācāra* may be met more frequently here: *sadācāra* occurs in the *Parāśarasmṛti* I.20, *ācāra*—in the *Parāśarasmṛti* II.1, the *Bṛhatparāśarasmṛti* I.47, the *Vasiṣṭhasmṛti* I.3, 12 etc.). The juridical semantics of both the terms *āgama* and *pramāṇa* occurs in late *smṛtis* as well.[15]

With the incorporation of *vyavahāra* in its narrow sense *smṛtis* continued to remain the ritual texts, and least of all they should be interpreted as a genre of literature devoted to judicial matters, even if we deal with the *Nāradasmṛti*, since the legal stuff grows from the king—later king-*kṣatriya*'s duties in it, which are ritually comprehended in these treatises. From this point of view, taking into consideration the logic of genre's evolution, we should arrive at the conclusion,

that the legal stuff of the *dharmaśāstra* is apprehended by *smṛtis'* compilers in channel of the general dharmic tradition. J. Jolly and J. J. Meyer have underlined that this tradition was guided by *sadācāra* or the conduct of virtuous men which was modelled by one or another usage. Thus, the Ancient Indian Law is an integral part of indian's ethics, and overcoming the magically comprehended evil by help of virtuous conduct served as a basis of this ethics.[16] It will be recalled that the majority of *smṛtis* didn't involve the legal stuff at all.

After they had incorporated the stuff of *vyavahāra, smṛtis* remained private admonitions on *dharma,* but gradually became the legal authoritative texts. Partly just because of this process and in the same time the *arthaśāstra* lost the authority of a legal text, though its functioning as a legal text which a trial was guided by began, likely, after its including into the texts of the *dharmaśāstra.* The process led to the disappearance of important themes of the *arthaśāstra.* We are also disposed to think that acquiring the authority of a legal text by *smṛtis* was expressed in dividing the genre into ritual by their stuff texts (for example, the *Parāśarasmṛti*) and those ones concerned only legal matters (the *Nāradasmṛti*); dealing with the *Nāradasmṛti* we should suppose fixing and composing a *smṛti* in the form of a separate legal text.

It was already mentioned above, that *smṛtis* fixed the traditional norms of men's conduct, including here everything they usually call the traditional Indian law, i.e. both the marriage-family and inheritance law and the *vyavahāra* in its narrow sense. This *vyavahāra* by itself didn't contradict the purposes of the *dharmaśāstra* at all. However there were, probably, two different levels of composing law. *Smṛtis* fixed a custom relating to the opposition man–community; all questions were solved according to some tradition outside king's court here, and the custom itself couldn't be fixed in the form of a legal system on this level. A great number of legal norms underlay the amorphous law of the *dharmaśāstra* that may explain, in particular, a great number of heterogeneous juridical terms. The genre of the *arthaśāstra,* on the contrary, offered another level of composing law relating to the opposition man–state which allowed, that the law might be an object of regulation from the side of state, that, in its turn, should explain why the legal stuff of the *Arthaśāstra* assumed an air of a regular legal system.

There exist some features showing another level of the functioning of the legal stuff of the *dharmaśāstra,* which differs from that of the functioning of the legal stuff of the *arthaśāstra*: we mean the illegible juridical terminology, the absence of considerable legal definitions, explanations and specifications, the amorphous legal structure, abstracting and levelling of the legal stuff coupled with swelling of many norms and rules, frequently taking a shape of classifications (a usage presupposes the plurality and the vagueness of legal norms). All these features stare us in the face sometimes just in late *smṛtis* of the *Nāradasmṛti*-type (for instance, if we apply to the enumeration of *asākṣiṇas* or non-witnesses), for all that both their stuff and structure affected an air of a more organized legal system (it seems to be the very circumstance which, evidently, connected with *smṛtis'* transformation into authoritative legal texts). Taken as a whole, the legal system of the *dharmaśāstra,* beyond any doubt, functioned otherwise than that of the *Arthaśāstra* (the *arthaśāstra*).

Thus, *smṛtis* in the period of the Middle Age were authoritative legal texts but not sources of law in force. They could become such ones because they modelled the judicial affairs on the level of traditional norms (customs), according to which an indian lived; the legal stuff of the *dharmaśāstra* accepted the sacral colouring; at last, the livelling of the legal stuff and the amorphous structure of texts allowed using the *dharmaśāstra*'s text as such one which proposed alternative decisions.

The commentaries of the *Mitākṣara*-type first and foremost fixed the text of one or another *smṛti* that says by itself of its transformation into an authoritative text, but at the same time the commentaries became in their way intensifiers of the validity of one or another decision by means of using rules of text's interpretation elaborated in the school of *Mīmāṃsā*, when they interpreted the text in accordance with current legal norms. In the same way *smṛtis* themselves became such intensifiers of the *pariṣad*'s judgement. Touching on these problems R. Lingat wrote: "The solutions they (i.e. interpretators – A. S.) commended must have been those which, in their eyes, had the greatest chance of passing into actual practice. If the texts were capable of several different interpretations, that one should be preferred (to their minds) which best fitted the needs of their times and was nearest to current usage. A rule taken from *smṛti* which is confirmed by practice acquires a particular force, for the religious sanction is accompanied then by a social sanction: it becomes a juridical rule. Usage would thus be a sort of test for interpretation".[17]

The legal system of the *dharmaśāstra* looks lifeless and living: lifeless, for being transferred from reality and fixed as a scheme of a conduct it has to be regarded as only a copy of some relations between men fixed in a text by the traditional character of the genre; it is living since the traditional character of the genre to considerable extent should be connected and explained by such sort of relations themselves which have been regulated in the 1st millennium B.C. and in the 1st millennium A.D. by current usage.

We should review: the process of the development of the *arthaśāstra* looks as the development of science, coming to an end with joining of different trends of this science and the birth of the compendium bringing together all of them—the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*. This process led to the elaboration of the complex of legal ideas and definitions and also specific terminology which we call the legal system of the *arthaśāstra*. *Smṛtis*, on the contrary, elucidated the practice of an indian's life in the light of his ethical values. The synthesis of both the ethics of the *dharmaśāstra* and the legal ideas and stuff of the *arthaśāstra* should explain the peculiarities of the legal system of the *dharmaśāstra*.

NOTES

1. B. Breloer, *Kauṭalīya*-Studien, Bd. II, Altindisches Privatrecht bei *Megasthenes* und *Kauṭalya*, Bonn 1928; R. P. Kangle, The *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, Pt. III, A Study, Bombay 1965.
2. R. P. Kangle, op. cit., p. 217.
3. A. M. Samozvantsev, Teoriya sobstvennosti v drevnei Indii, Moscow 1978 (in Russian), Ch. 1.
4. B. Breloer, op. cit., S. 154.
5. R. P. Kangle, op. cit., p. 218.
6. A. M. Samozvantsev, *Arthaśāstra* and *Dharmaśāstra*—Two Traditions and Systems of the

Matrix Juridical Terminology: Dr Ludwik Sternbach Commemoration Volume, Indologica Taurinensia, vol. VIII–IX, Torino 1980–1981, p. 362.

7. A *deśa* appears first and foremost as a carrier of one or another *svakaraṇa* (comp. III.16.17 and IV.6.9.), but also may be a proof of the right of a possessor, for example, to mortgage (see IV.6.8–9).

8. A *bhoga* appears usually being coupled with *sākṣiṇa* and may play the role of one or another *svakaraṇa* (see III.16.29).

9. This *ādhi* would be designated as *ādhilekhya* in *smṛtis*.

10. A *likhita* appears first and foremost as a carrier of one or another *āgama* (see the comment of *Viśvarūpa* on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* II.27 and the comments on the *Manusmṛti* VIII.200).

11. A *bhukti* appears usually being coupled with *sākṣiṇa* and as such one may play the role of one or another *āgama* (see the comments of *Vijñāneśvara* on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* II.27–28).

12. A. M. Samozvantsev, Some Observations on the Evolution of Ancient Indian Law (the Property): Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume, Pt. I, Lucknow 1979, p. 221.

13. R. P. Kangle, op. cit., p. 15.

14. A. M. Samozvantsev, *Arthaśāstra* and *Dharmaśāstra*, pp. 359–362.

15. A. M. Samozvantsev, The *Dharmaśāstra*: Ritual and Juridical Terminology (concerning one Trend in its Functional Evolution): Archiv Orientalni, 1983, vol. 2, pp. 125–126.

16. J. Jolly, Recht und Sitte, Strassburg 1896, S. 1; J. J. Meyer, Über das Wesen der altindischen Rechtsschriften und ihr Verhältnis zu einander und zu *Kauṭilya*, Leipzig 1927, S. 1 ff.

17. R. Lingat, The Classical Law of India, Los Angeles 1973, pp. 167–168.

Reflections on the Tamil Alphabet

RUTH WALLDÉN

I

In Tolkāppiyam, the earliest extant Tamil grammar,[1] we already find the alphabet[2] which, apart from a few minor alterations, is still used to-day. In its present form it is thought to be a version of the so-called Brāhmī alphabet used e.g. in southern Aśoka inscriptions, which has been adapted to suit the Tamil language. The earliest Tamil inscriptions in Brāhmī script date from about the 3rd century B.C.[3]

In Tolkāppiyam the alphabet consists of 12 vowels, 18 consonants and 3 "secondary" sounds/letters. This latter term is used because no sharp distinction is made between sound and symbol.

It is only natural that an alphabet of such standing and such stability attracted the interest of dravidianists who represent a fairly young discipline.

The vowels have perhaps offered relatively few problems with the exception of the centralization of the *i*- and *e*-vowels[4] and the character of the diphtongs *ai* and *au*.[5]

In this article we shall primarily be concerned with the consonants and centre our attention on some problems which have been the subject of discussion over the last 100–120 years.

For practical reasons the consonants will be divided into three groups rather than listed in one single column.[6]

k	*y*	*r̠*
ṅ	*r*	*n̠*
c	*l*	
ñ	*v*	
ṭ	*ḷ*	
ṇ	*ḷ*	
t		
n		
p		
m		

If we look at the left-hand column, we find that
(1) a distinction is made between orals and nasals
(2) each oral consonant is followed by a homorganic nasal, and
(3) the consonants are arranged according to the place of articulation with remarkable consistency—remarkable because it shows phonetic awareness at this very early stage.[7] This group of consonants makes us realize the structural importance in Tamil of the place of articulation, a point to which we shall return.[8]

It has often been said that this consistency in the arrangement of the conso-

nants in the alphabet makes the ordering of our own alphabet appear gratuitous. Perhaps this principled arrangement can help to clarify some of the obscure points associated with the Tamil alphabet.

First let us consider the sound/letter *c*. In my view there is no doubt that this *c* designated a dorsal palatal, i.e. approximately /ç/, possibly with a /t/ onset and then, according to the usual terminology, an affricate.[9,10] The facts that speak in favour of this view are

(1) the position of the sound/letter between velars and postpalatals and immediately before the clearly palatal nasal;

(2) its assignment in Tolkāppiyam to *valliṉam*, "the hard group", which seems to comprise only tenues;

(3) the description in Tolkāppiyam of its articulation. This description is found in the chapter called *Piṛappiyal* and runs as follows in Zvelebil's translation:[11] "*c* [and] *ñ* [are produced by the contact of] the middle tongue with the palate", and lastly

(4) the result of the following investigation of what "loanwords"[12] can be "tamilized" by means of the sound/letter *c*.[13]

Initial position

Skt. Ta.

c->c-	*candraka-~cantirakam*	(or ∅)
ch->c-	*chāga-~cākam*	(or ∅)
j->c-	*jagat~cakattu*	
jh->c-	*jharjhari~caccari*	
ś->c-	*śāka-~cākam*	(or ∅)
s->c-	*saha-~caka*	(or *t*-or ∅)
kṣ->c-	*kṣema-~cēmam*	(or ∅)

Medial position

Skt. Ta.

-c->-c-	*śaci-~caci*	(or *-y-*)
-cc->-cc-	*saccidānanda-~caccitāṉantam*	
-cch->-cc-	*guccha-~kuccu*	
-j->-c-	*gaja-~kacam*	(or *-y-* or ∅)
-jj->-cc-	*kajjala~kaccalam*	
-jh->-cc-	*jharjharī~caccari*[14]	
-ś->-c-	*śaśa-~caca*	(or *-y-* or ∅)
-s->-c-	*sasya-~caciyam*	(or *-y-* or *-v-*)
-kṣ->-cc-, *-kk-*, *-ṭc-*	*akṣa-~accu*	
	lakṣana-~ilakkaṇam	
	lakṣa-~laṭcam	

It appears that Ta. *c* replaces the Skt. palatals *c*, *ch*, *j*, *jh* and palato-alveolar *ś* both initially before a vowel and medially single or double, between vowels.

However, it also replaces Skt. *s*, a dental sibilant, initially before a vowel and medially between vowels. Here the phonetic similarity probably plays a part; moreover there is no danger of ambiguity. If e.g. the Skt. name *Sundara-* or *Saundarī* is pronounced with an initial dorso-palatal—with or without a /t/ on-set—this causes no ambiguity. The same is true if Skt. *kāsa-* is pronounced in the same way; it is like speaking with a defect, e.g. lisping, and no misunderstanding need arise.

But in the case of a possible combination of Ta. *c* with a following consonant we are faced with problems. Either the speaker drops the "borrowed" sibilant, or he inserts an epenthetic vowel, which, being a vowel, of course allows *c* before it. In script the symbol *s* from the Grantha alphabet is used, as it has been since the 7th century A.D. Medially there is a third possibility: the word may be "tami-lized" by means of a double dental *t*, cf. *pustakam~puttakam*. A Tamil *c* is never found before a plosive. The reason for this is probably that Tamil generally avoids consonant clusters—it is well known that *i* and *u* are used "zur Auflocke-rung von Konsonantenballungen in Sanskritwörtern", vide Beythan, op. cit., p. 24. In script we find Skt. *stotra-* as Ta. *stōttiram*—provided the "borrowed" sibilant is not dropped altogether—and English *spoon* as Ta. *spūṉ*; everywhere the Grantha symbol *s* is used.

Skt. *kṣ-* initially before a vowel also becomes Ta. *c* or disappears, cf. Skt. *kṣema-* which becomes Ta. *cēmam* or *ēmam*.[15] In medial position there are three possibilities: 1) doubling of *c* to *cc*, e.g. Skt *akṣa-~accu*; 2) the *k* element prevails and the result is *kk*, e.g. *lakṣaṇa-~(i)lakkaṇam*; 3) "tamilization" by means of the symbols most similar in sound, resulting in *ṭc*, e.g. *lakṣa-~laṭcam*. This last combination is allowed by sandhi rules,[16] which also indicate what sounds/letters may precede *c*, viz. the homorgan nasal *ñ*, *ṭ* and *ṟ*. This means that in sandhi *c* follows the same rules as the other Tamil plosives (= oral obstruents belonging to the group *valliṉam* in Tolkāppiyam). This may be an argument in favour of the view that *c* has developed from a palatal plosive to an affricate. Cf. Ladefoged, op. cit., p. 41.

The fact that Ta. *c* replaces palatal mediæ like Skt. *j*, *jh* points to a more comprehensive problem concerning the Tamil alphabet. I am referring to "the Convertibility of Surds and Sonants", a rule which Caldwell established in his pioneering work A Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South Indian Family of Languages, London 1856.[17] It is well known that the Tamil alphabet, being phonemic in nature, contains no symbols for mediæ. The group *valliṉam*, "the hard group", includes only tenues.

However, it is also a fact that nowadays these tenues are pronounced as mediæ, e.g. medially after nasals. Intervocalically they can be given a light fricative pronounciation, while initially and in gemination they are pronounced as *k*, *ṭ*, *t* and *p*.[18]

Has this situation always been the same, or has it changed with time? A full and detailed account of different views in this much-debated question from Caldwell's days to the present day is found in Zvelebil, K., CDP, p. 78 ff., with its bibliography and references. Discussion has continued after the publication of Zvelebil's book in 1970.[19] This is not surprising; in the early inscriptions usage varies with

regard to symbols for so-called voiceless and voiced sounds/letters, and the same is true of usage in the Greek transcriptions of South Indian geographical names.

No genuine Tamil word begins with *g, d* or *b*, but right from the start there are loanwords from Sanskrit where initial *g, d* or *b* are likely to have been perceived and probably also pronounced as mediæ. Why then were not Brāhmī symbols borrowed for the purpose? They were, as Zvelebil states, "readily available", CDP, p. 79, note 3.

Just as in the case of *c*, which could be used for many purposes where it did not cause serious misunderstanding, it may be assumed that special symbols for mediæ were simply not needed. Obviously the phonetic environment may have determined the pronunciation of symbols for voiceless sounds. This would then be the case in medial position, but it can hardly serve as an explanation for occurrences in initial position.

Personally I have come to the conclusion that the explanation lies in the presence, or rather absence, of aspiration.

The rules proposed by different scholars for the pronunciation of e.g. initial *k, t, p* in Tamil give us no clear guidance on this point.[20] Some of these sounds are said to have "slight aspiration", others are said to be "void of aspiration". A possible reason for these rather vague directions is that Tamil possesses only one series of plosives; consequently no ambiguity arises if they are pronounced with some aspiration, and Tamil speakers today vary their pronunciation in this respect. But the traditional pronunciation of Tamil *k, t, p* is non-aspirated; a careful pandit will give directions accordingly, without using our terms.

Now if an initial or medial *k, t,* or *p*, or a palatal affricate, is pronounced without aspiration before a vowel in a word, the resulting sound may be perceived as a tenuis *or* a media; it may be difficult for the human ear to perceive the difference. Ladefoged, op. cit., i.a. pp. 10 and 57 gives an explanation for this phenomenon.[21] With the assistance of Dr Olle Engstrand, Research Assistant, Dept. of Linguistics, University of Uppsala, Uppsala, to whom my thanks are due, I have made a phonetic investigation of a tape-recorded material of c. 50 words with initial *k, t,* or *p*, all pronounced without aspiration by a Swede totally unfamiliar with Tamil. The words have also contained the same sounds in medial position, written with a single or double symbol. The double symbols have been pronounced without aspiration, whereas the simple symbols have been pronounced (*a*) without aspiration; (*b*) with slight friction as in present-day Tamil. In addition we have tape-recorded c. 40 words with initial non-aspirated *k, t,* or *p* and with nasal + *k, t, p* in medial position. All of these words have been pronounced (*a*) with non-aspiration of the medial plosive; (*b*) with the same plosive pronounced as unaspirated *g, d, b*. Finally, c. 20 words have been tape-recorded in which the initial *k, t,* or *p* has been pronounced alternately as a non-aspirated tenuis and as a non-aspirated media. Oscillograms have been made of the whole material.[22]

The following oscillograms may serve as instances.

1. Initial *k, t, p*; pronounced unaspirated without voice and with voice respectively.

(*a*) *kākai/gākai*

DURATION IN MSEC = 510.00

DURATION IN MSEC = 606.00

(*b*) *tīku/dīku*

DURATION IN MSEC = 454.40

DURATION IN MSEC = 426.80

(*c*) *pōku/bōku*

DURATION IN MSEC = 480.00

DURATION IN MSEC = 505.60

2. Medial *t* between vowels; pronounced unaspirated without voice and with voice respectively.

(a) kāṭai/kāḍai

DURATION IN MSEC = 665.60

DURATION IN MSEC = 569.60

(b) kaṭai/kaḍai[23]

DURATION IN MSEC = 544.00

DURATION IN MSEC = 492.80

3. Medially after a nasal; pronounced unaspirated without voice and with voice respectively.

(a) pōṅku/pōṅgu

DURATION IN MSEC = 710.40

DURATION IN MSEC = 614.40

(b) *kantai/kandai*

(c) *tīṇpu/tīṇbu*

The above illustrations, which have been taken from a larger investigation (though still one of limited scope) will have shown that it may be very difficult for a listener to perceive the distinction between unaspirated voiced and unaspirated voiceless plosives.[24] A Tamil speaker, who has only one series of plosives in his language, lacks the frame of reference that would be necessary for him to identify, in this case, a series of voiced plosives.

In my view this is the reason why (1) Tamil did not need, and consequently did not borrow more symbols from the Brāhmī-alphabet, and (2) there is such disparity, today as well as in earlier periods, between descriptions of the pronunciations of the relevant symbols.

II

Reference has already been made to Tolkāppiyam's division of the Tamil Alphabet which is as follows.

valliṇam (the hard group)	*melliṇam* (the soft group)
k	ṅ
c	ñ
ṭ	ṇ

t	*n*
p	*m*
ṟ	*ṉ*

iṭaiyiṉam (the middle group)

y

r

l

v

ḷ

ḻ

The last sounds/letters in *valliṉam* and *melliṉam* are *ṟ* and *ṉ* respectively. Nowadays these are generally believed to have been alveolars and some scholars think they still are. I have myself analyzed *ṉ*.[25] I believe that it still often designates an alveolar and that the opposition between *ṇ*, *n* and *ṉ* is realized when required.

It is highly probable that *ṟ* once stood for an alveolar *t*. However, various opinions on the realizations of *r* have been voiced over the years. See e.g. Zvelebil, CDP, pp. 94 ff. with references to scholars holding widely different views. Cf. also J. R. Marr, op.cit., p. 162. Ladefoged, op.cit., p. 40, tables the *t*-sounds in Modern Malayalam, analysing them as (1) dental, (2) alveolar and (3) postpalatal (retroflex), i.e. with three different places of articulation still involved. In Ladefoged's view, this holds also for the *n*-sounds.

Like alveolar *n*, *ṟ* is never found in initial position, and *ṟ* does not appear finally. Like the rest of the *valliṉam* it has to have an enunciative *u* in this position. It only occurs medially, single after the homorganic nasal, single before a plosive, or single or double between vowels. In Modern Standard Tamil it is pronounced as an *r* when single between vowels. When double, it is pronounced *ṭṟ*, when single after a nasal (*d*)*ṟ*. In colloquial speech *ṟṟ* and *ṉṉ* are heard as *ṭṭ*[26] and *nn* respectively. In very careful speech an alveolar *t* is still heard before a plosive. P. Jotimuttu, when recording the lessons from his A Guide to Tamil, Madras (1956) 1970, may serve as an instance of this.

Tolkāppiyam's treatment of *ṟ* obviously provides an important argument in support of the view that today's *ṟ* was formerly an alveolar stop; Tolkāppyam places it among the oral obstruents and accounts for its articulation in the chapter *Piṟappiyal*, sūtra nr. 94, where it says (in Zvelebil's translation): '*ṟ* and *ṉ*, the two are produced when the tip of the tongue is raised and strikes the palate''. Here the oral *ṟ* and the nasal *ṉ* are clearly given the same place of articulation.

Another argument in favour of the view that *ṟ* originally represented, or was originally apprehended as, a *t* can be found, it seems to me, in sandhi-phenomena. It is quite clear that just as *ṭ* replaces *ḷ* and *ṇ* in front of *k*, *c*, *t* and *p*, so *ṟ* replaces *l* and *n* in front of the same sounds/letters. This is another instance of the importance that has been attached to the place of articulation. A postpalatal replaces a postpalatal and an alveolar replaces an alveolar as follows:

l + *k* > *ṟk*	*ḷ* + *k* > *ṭk*
l + *c* > *ṟc*	*ḷ* + *c* > *ṭc*

$l + p>\underline{r}p$

$l + t>\underline{rr}$ or $\underline{kr}$, rarely $\underline{r}$

$l + m>\underline{n}m$

$l + n>\underline{nn}$ or $\underline{n}$

$\underline{n} + k>\underline{r}k$

$\underline{n} + c>\underline{r}c$

$\underline{n} + t>\underline{n}\underline{r}$ or $\underline{rr}$

$\underline{n} + p>\underline{r}p$

$\underline{n} + n>\underline{nn}$ or $\underline{n}$

$\underline{l} + p>\underline{t}p$

$\underline{l} + t>\underline{tt}$ or $\underline{kt}$, rarely $\underline{t}$

$\underline{l} + m>\underline{n}m$

$\underline{l} + n>\underline{nn}$ or $\underline{n}$

$\underline{n} + k>\underline{t}k$

$\underline{n} + c>\underline{t}c$

$\underline{n} + p>\underline{t}p$

$\underline{n} + t>\underline{n}t$ or $\underline{tt}$

$\underline{n} + n>\underline{nn}$ or $\underline{n}$

Instances where the alveolars are involved in sandhi:

$kal + ka\underline{l}>ka\underline{r}ka\underline{l}$

$po\underline{n} + kalam>po\underline{r}kalam$

$patil + col>pati\underline{r}col$

$po\underline{n} + cankili>po\underline{r}cankili$

$kal + t\bar{u}\underline{n}>ka\underline{rr}\bar{u}\underline{n}$

$po\underline{n} + taka\underline{t}u>po\underline{rr}aka\underline{t}u$

$k\bar{a}l + pa\underline{t}i>k\bar{a}\underline{r}pa\underline{t}i$

$po\underline{n} + p\bar{a}\underline{l}am>po\underline{r}p\bar{a}\underline{l}am$

$kal + ne\tilde{n}cu>ka\underline{nn}e\tilde{n}cu$

$kal + malai>ka\underline{n}malai$

$mu\underline{n} + nilai>mu\underline{nn}ilai$[27, 28]

The place of the alveolars in the alphabet is interesting. We have noted with admiration how strictly one feature, the place of articulation in the oral cavity, has been adhered to as guiding principle in the organization of the groups *k–p* and *ṅ–m*. But why are the alveolars placed last?

According to one hypothesis the alveolars, which count among *ci̱rappe̱luttukka̱l*, i.e. special sounds/letters, like others of the same kind have been placed last because they designated genuine Tamil sounds without Sanskrit equivalents. We notice that the groups *k–p* and *ṅ–m* follow the order of the Sanskrit alphabet, apart from its aspirates and mediae. A corollary has been that these *ci̱rappe̱luttu̱-kka̱l* cannot by rights occur in so-called loanwords.

Another hypothesis could be that we are concerned with a reverse order: perhaps the last positions in the groups are assigned to sounds/letters needed for special purposes. Consider the vowel-series, which ends in *au*, a much-discussed diphthong. It is extremely rare in genuine Tamil words, but is required in not a few loans from Sanskrit, as we can easily see by consulting a dictionary.[29]

To have the one or the other hypothesis corroborated it would be of interest to find out what 'loanwords' or 'gemeingut' words contain $\underline{r}$ and $\underline{n}$.

For practical reasons I have used Winslow's dictionary as the basis of a "mini-dictionary", where as many occurrences of $\underline{r}$ and $\underline{n}$ as possible can be comfortably surveyed. I have also made a rough division of the material into sandhi and non-sandhi phenomena.

If we look for words that have been marked as loanwords by means of an asterisk or through a reference to an assumed origin, hereafter: *alleged loan-*

words, it appears that words containing *r* are comparatively few, which is in accordance with the first hypothesis referred to above. Such words if starred are often instances of the abovementioned sandhi rules, i.e. an *l* has been replaced by *r* in front of e.g. *k*, *p*; by *ṇ* in front of *m*:

Skt.	*ulkā-*	Ta.	**urkai*
	alpa-		**arpam*
	kalmaṣa-		**kaṇmaṭam*

But the Tamil alveolars also replace Skt. *t*, *d* in front of *k*, *c*, *p*, *n* and *m*:

Skt.	*utkada-*	Ta.	**urkatam*
	udgāra-		**urkāram*
	utsava-		**urcavam*
	adbhūta-		**arputam*
	unnaya-		**uṇṇayam*[30]
	ātma-		**āṇmā*

In Tamil, the last *t* in Skt. *sat*, *cit*, *tat* is replaced in front of a plosive by *r* and in front of a nasal by *ṇ*.

Thus Tamil alveolars replace Skt. dentals as in the instances above. This seems again to prove that Ta. *r* and *ṇ* share the same place of articulation. It may also provide another argument for the view that *r* is the reflex of a plosive.

The alleged loanwords cited above with their sandhi phenomena are found, according to available evidence, from the time of Kalittokai (A.D. 300–500) to the time of Piṅkala-nikaṇṭu (c. A.D. 900).[31] Thus they are comparatively early.

In a few cases a Skt. *s* in front of *m* or *k* has been replaced by *r* in Tamil, e.g. Skt. *bhasma-~parpam*, later also *parmam*, *paṇmam*; Skt. *bhaskara- parkaraṇ* (A.D. 800–900).

Sanskrit words with *nis-*, *nir-* and *dus-*, *dur-* as first elements appear in Tamil with *nir-*, *niṇ-*, and *tur-*, *tuṇ-* respectively as first elements, though Ta. *nir-*, *tur-* are stated by Winslow to be "improperly used for" *nir-* and *tur-* respectively.

Skt. *ud-daṇḍa-* is given in TL as Ta. *uttaṇṭa-*, apparently found in Taṇippāṭar-riraṭṭu, an anthology treated by Zvelebil in his chapter called "Late Mediaeval Period" (1200–1750). This word is not found in old Tamil works. In the mediaeval period a double *r* in Tamil was probably pronounced with a flap or a trill, with or without a *t*-onset, and could not be used for a *t*-sound proper.

The label "improp." is also attached to most of the c. 20 words that are marked as loans from Skt. and where a Skt. *r* has been replaced by Ta. *r* in front of other consonants, e.g. Skt. *tarjanī* "**tarcani* 'forefinger' see *tarccaṇi*"; Skt. *dar-pana-* "**tarpaṇam* (prop. *taruppaṇam*) 'a ceremony'"; Skt. *dharma-* "**tarmam* (improp. for *tarmam*) 'charity'".[32] On the whole the "proper" forms seem older.[33]

The remark that *r* is incorrect in these cases is found with such consistency in dictionaries that it has to be taken seriously. It cannot very well be simply a way of lending support to the view that *r* usually does not occur in "loanwords". Presumably it was felt that Tamil possessed and *r* which equalled the Sanskrit *r* in these cases.

When it comes to establishing the nature of the sound/letter r in this context it is interesting to note that when "improper" r precedes k, c, t, and p in words like those cited above, the stop is always single, whereas in the "proper" spelling r is followed by a double stop when no epenthetic vowel is used. This may also seem to support the view that r was a plosive at least originally, since a cluster of three plosives in a word is impossible in Tamil.

In this connection I would like to point at some features of the declension of nouns in Tamil. A noun belonging to the second declension takes the inflexional base -*ttu*, e.g. *maram*, *marattu*. There are only two types of words belonging to the third declension, viz. those ending in -*ṭu* and -*ṟu*. In these cases the inflexional base is -*ṭṭu* and -*ṟṟu* respectively.

Attention should be drawn also to the modifications -*ṟṟ*- and -*ṉṟ*- of Ta. verb roots in -*l* and *ṉ*, which appear already in Puranānūru (c. 100 B.C. – A.D. 300). These modifications are found in the past tense of verbs of the fifth conjugation, *kal*, *karrēṉ*; *nil*, *niṉṟēṉ*; *eṉ*, *eṉṟēṉ*. The past tense morpheme in Tamil is generally taken to be -*t*-, -*tt*-;[34] here we have an old sandhi phenomenon manifested in (as far as we know) genuine Tamil words.

The facts accounted for above seem strongly to support the view that tamil r originally was, or was perceived as a plosive, t, homorganic with the nasal $ṉ$.

However, it is not easy to find genuine Tamil words where r can safely be said to designate or to have designated an alveolar t except in sandhi. Conclusions must here be drawn from a t retained in other Dravidian languages, cf. Zvelebil, CDP, pp. 94 ff. and DED, pp. XII and XIII.

Nor is it easy to find in a dictionary alleged loanwords from Skt. containing an intervocalic r, single or double, except when provided with a note that the word should be looked for spelt with an ordinary r.

Are there possibilities, then, of finding hidden "loanwords" or "gemeingut", where an attempt could be made to establish whether Ta. r corresponds to an t, th, d, or dh in Skt.?

Only with the greatest caution could the following possibilities be suggested, viz.:

Ta. *aṟa* 'wholly, entirely'; Skt. *sata*- 'völlig' (EWA)[35]
Ta. *aṟi* 'to know' etc.; Skt. *adhī* id.
Ta. *aṟṟai* 'that day'; Skt. *adyā* 'to-day'[36]
Ta. *kaṟi* 'to bite'; Skt. *khād*- id.
Ta. *kuṟu* 'to diminish'; Skt. *kṣud*- id.[37]
Ta. *ciṟai* 'to restrain'; Skt. *sidh*- id.
Ta. *paṟa* 'to fly'; Skt. *pat*- id.
Ta. *paṟai* 'to speak', 'utterance'; Skt. *vad*-, *vāda*- id.[38]
Ta. *paṟai* 'to disappear, to destroy'; Skt. *vadh*- id.
Ta. *paṟṟu*/vai 'to kindle'; Skt. *pat*- id.
Ta. *paṟṟu* 'to catch, hold, adhere' etc.; Skt. *ba(n)dh*- id.[39]

Seven of the Tamil words are found already in Puranānūru.

It is of course impossible to *prove* a correspondence. Still, in my opinion, they are real possibilities because of 1. the doubtless semantic correspondence, 2. the

well-known phonetic fact that an alveolar intervocalic plosive, when single, easily changes into an *r*-sound. When double the second element of an alveolar plosive may dissolve into a fricative or a trill.

In the above examples, both those in sandhi and the "possible" rest, we find that a Sanskrit dental plosive has been or might have been rendered by a symbol designating an alveolar sound in Tamil.

Let us look for a moment at the corresponding nasals. We have already seen instances of those in sandhi, and if we glance at the "mini-lexicon", we find a great number of alleged loanwords, where Skt, dental *n* corresponds to Ta. alveolar *n*, e.g. Skt. *anagha-*~Ta. *aṇakam*, Skt. *hanu*~Ta. *aṇu*, to mention only two out of an excessive number.

It would seem, then, that a Skt. dental was either pronounced, or else was perceived, as an alveolar by Tamilians.

The tendency to "retract" the pronunciation of dental–post-dental *t, d* in words taken over from another language is present even to-day among Tamilians.[40] I need point only at two well-known examples, viz. Eng. *ticket*, Ta. *ṭikkaṭṭu*, Eng. *driver*, Ta. *ṭiraivar*, where a so-called retroflex is used even initially, a feature unknown in genuine Tamil Words. In the case of the above two examples, there is no symbol for an alveolar plosive available in Tamil any more, since a possible former *ṭ* now has an *r*-pronunciation.

English *n*, on the other hand, may have e.g. the following correspondences in Ta.: Eng. *neck*, Ta. *nek*; Eng. *printing*, Ta. *piriṇṭiṇg*; Eng. *engineer*, Ta. *eṇjiṇ-iyar*.

However, the Tamil dictionaries give other indications as to how Tamil *ṟ* might have been used in words taken over from Sanskrit or used in both Sanskrit and Tamil. *taṟi* 'to lop, be broken' has a reference to Skt. *tṛd* in TL. The experience we have by now acquired in discussions on "gemeingut" tells us that a correspondence with Skt. *dṛ* is much more likely—there is so far no way of explaining how the last *d* of the Sanskrit root could have disappeared in Tamil.[41] Given a *dṛ-*~*taṟi* correspondence we soon find e.g. *dhṛ-*~*taṟu* 'to wear'. We have Skt. *hṛ-*~Ta. *iṟa* 'to surpass', further Ta. *aṟu, iṟu* 'to sever'; Skt. (*apa-*) *hṛ-*[42] ~Ta. *paṟi* 'to take by force'; Skt. *bṛh-, bṛṅh-*~Ta. *viṟa* 'to be thick, increase'; Skt. *bhṛ-*~Ta. *piṟa, peṟu, poṟu* 'to bear';[43] Skt. *bhṛj-*~Ta. *vaṟu* 'to fry'; Skt. *sṛj-*~Ta. *eṟi* 'to hurl', and Skt. *spṛhāvat*~Ta. *pṟavati* 'desirous'.

The instances could be multiplied, but those mentioned will suffice to show that quite early—some of our examples are found already in Puṟanāṉūṟu—a Skt. vocalic *r* can correspond to a Ta. *ṟ*, both presumably with an *r*-pronunciation.

The alleged loanword *paṟi* 'gold', in Winslow, referred to Skt. *bharu* id., and used in Ilampūraṇar's commentary (c. A.D. 1000–1100) on Tolkāppiyam Collati-kāram, may serve as an instance of the results that an *r*-pronunciation of the *ṟ* could bring about and has brought about. Cf. Skt. *trotra-* 'goad'~Ta. *tuṟaṭṭi, tuṟaṭu, tuṟōṭṭi*—this last item provided with the remark: "(for *tuṟōṭṭi*)" and thus considered "improper"—and finally *toṭṭi*, all alleged loanwords in Winslow and all with the meaning 'goad'.

Some items of this kind are labelled "improper", then, but a very great number are not. Just a few examples of a Skt. *r* corresponding with a Ta. *ṟ*: Skt. *kharma-*

'harshness'~Ta. *karuvu* 'anger', *karumu* 'to be enraged'; Skt. *bhara-* 'war, battle'~Ta. *paru* 'to fight' with a referenc in TL to *poru* id., cf. also Ta. *pōr* 'war'; Skt. *bhrāj-* 'to shine'~Ta. *piral* id. A glance in the dictionaries reveals that quite a few of the Skt. *para-* items correspond to the Ta. *pura-* items etc.

As it is, we could now fully understand the authors of the DED when they say, under item 3317 *pari* 'to pluck' etc. as well as under item 3267 *pari* 'to break off' etc.: "there has been so much convergence of meaning and modern confusion of *r* and *ṛ* that it is difficult to make a separation."

To return to the question of the place of the alveolars in the Tamil alphabet: It seems quite plausible, I think, that these *cirappeluttukkaḷ* were originally used "for special purposes", more precisely as symbols designating sounds perceived as alveolars, needed in—and possibly also outside—sandhi.

NOTES

1. Cf. Zvelebil, K., Tamil literature. Handbuch der Orientalistik. II. Abt., II. Band, 1. Abschn. Leiden/Köln 1975, pp. 69–71.
2. The term should rather be "syllabary", cf. J. R. Marr's review of Zvelebil, K., Comparative Dravidian Phonology. The Hague 1970, (CDP), in BSOAS XXXVI, Part 1, p. 162.
3. Cf. Meenakshisundaran, T. P., Is the Tamil Alphabet System an Adaptation? Journal of Tamil Studies (JTS) 2. Madras 1972, and Zvelebil, K., CDP, p. 16.
4. Cf. Walldén, Ruth, Studies in Dravidian Phonology and Vocabulary. Uppsala 1982.
5. Cf. J. R. Marr's discussion, op. cit., p. 162.
6. The transcription used here of the strictly phonemic alphabet is that of Tamil Lexicon. It is well known that this transcriptional system, as well as all the other systems in use is incomplete and unsatisfactory from a phonetic point of view. Among other things it does not reveal the fact that tenues, *k, t, p,* change their pronounciation between vowels and after a nasal.
7. This consistency must nowadays be regarded as an overall Indian phenomenon, as has, indeed, long been the case. But cf. V. Sp. Manickam, An Introduction to the Study of Tolkappiyam. JTS 2. Madras 1972, p. 40. See further Kuiper, F. B. J., Two problems of old Tamil Phonology. Indo-Iranian Journal. Vol. II. 1958 with literature and references.
8. Cf., however, Zvelebil, K., Tolkāppiyam. JTS 1. Madras 1972, p. 57.
9. Cf. Ladefoged, P., Preliminaries to Linguistic Phonetics. Chicago 1971, pp. 40 and 41, 55 and 57. From the last mentioned pages one would seem justified in drawing the conclusion that affricates could be sibilant or non-sibilant. Designating Ta. *c* as a non-sibilant affricate would be in perfect compliance with the opinion of the Tamil pandits who often profess that Tamil possesses no sibilant but cannot explain the character of the *c*, which is transcribed as *ç* e.g. by P. Meile ("when single pronounced as *s* ..."), in his Introduction au Tamoul. Paris 1945.
10. Cf. Zvelebil, K., CDP, p. 105 ff.
11. Cf. Zvelebil, K., JTS, 1, p. 51 with note.
12. Not "hidden" ones but *tatsamas*, which are marked in the lexicon, with an asterisk or otherwise, as originating in Skt.
13. For many of the statements here see Vaidyanathan, S., Indo-Aryan Loanwords in Old Tamil. Madras 1971, p. 83 ff. This goes also for the supplementary information given within parentheses. See also Beythan, H., Praktische Grammatik der Tamilsprache. Leipzig 1943, p. 28.
14. In medial position Skt. *-rc-*~Ta. *-cc-*, cf. *kūrca-*~*kuccu*; *jharjharī* should therefore perhaps be analyzed as: *-rjh-*~*-cc-*.
15. Both *ēmam* and *cēmam* occur as early as Puranāṉūṟu, vide Subramonian, V. I., Index of Puranaanuuru. Nagercoil 1962. (IPN). For Skt. *kṣ->Ta.k.-* cf. Walldén, op.cit., LII, p. 153 ff.
16. See e.g. Beythan, H., op. cit., pp. 41, 42 and 50. *āṭci<āḷ + ci* is found in Kuraḷ.
17. My copy was printed in London 1913. The rule is found on p. 138.
18. In present-day speech, initial and intervocalic *c* is pronounced [ç] or [tç] or [s]. Doubled in medial

position this [ç] receives a marked [t] onset. Following a nasal it is pronounced very much like [dz]. Variations occur even in one and the same individual.

19. See e.g. Indo-Iranian Journal for the most important contributions to the debate. Cf. also J. R. Marr, op. cit., pp. 162–163.

20. Cf. e.g. Firth, J. R., Appendix on Tamil Phonetics in Arden, A. H., A Progressive Grammar of Common Tamil. Madras 1934, pp. IV ff.; Arden, A. H., A Progressive Grammar of the Tamil Language. Madras 1969, pp. 41 ff.; Andronov, M. S., A Standard Grammar of Modern and Classical Tamil. Madras 1969, pp. 16 ff.; Tokunaga, M., Tamil. Tokyo 1981, p. 2.

21. For a relevant discussion on the definition—in terms of articulatory and acoustic features—of the plosives in question cf. Ladefoged, op. cit., Lisker, L. & Abramson, A. S., A Cross-Language Study of Voicing in Initial Stops: Acoustical Measurements. Word, vol. 20, No 3. New York 1964, and Kim, Chin-W., On the Autonomy of the Tensity Feature in Stop Classification (with Special Reference to Korean Stops). Word, vol. 21. New York 1965; all with literature and references.

22. The reason for using an informant "totally unfamiliar with Tamil" is that he is completely ignorant of modern Tamil pronunciation. At the same time he is able to use instructions given in internationally accepted phonetic terms. Phoneticians consulted agree with me on this point. The test material is available in the Dept. of Indology, University of Uppsala, Uppsala, Sweden.

23. Medial *k, t* and *p* are less suitable for the discussion since there is here a contrast between an unaspirated plosive pronunciation and a fricative one.

24. For problems with symbols indicating unaspirated voiceless plosives, cf. also the modern transcription of Chinese where e.g. unaspirated *k, t* and *p* are transcribed *g, d* and *b*. This easily leads Westerners to pronounce them wrongly as the mediæ known to them. Vide O. B. Anderson, Hur fungerar pīnyīn? Tidsspegel Nr 2. Uppsala 1980.

25. Cf. Walldén, R., Studies in Dravidian Phonology and Vocabulary. Uppsala 1982, III, p. 155. For a recent investigation on part of the present subject see Balasubramanian, T., Intervocalic double nasal and lateral consonant articulations in Tamil. Journal of Phonetics (1982) 10, 99–104.

26. It is an interesting idea that the *t*-sound may have been retained outside Standard Tamil. In CDP, p. 97, Zvelebil gives the pronunciation of e.g. *-tt-* as "a dental or retroflex stop." This problem has surely never been properly explored, and an alveolar pronunciation should perhaps not be left out of account.

27. See Beythan, op.cit., pp. 42–50, and Arden, op.cit., pp. 71–72. In the last-mentioned work, p. 72, it says: "It is useful to know all the above [changes in Consonants when combined] as they are occasionally used in ordinary written prose or letters. But they are less and less used . . .".

28. Another fact to be kept in mind is that *āytam* is used before *ṟ* in sandhi. *Āytam* is used only with sounds/letters belonging to *valliṉam*.

29. Cf., however, P. S. Subrahmanya Sastri, History of Grammatical Theories in Tamil. Madras 1934, p. 32.

30. Cf. Skt. *unnaya-*. Note the Skt. dental *n*.

31. For the occurrence of the words in literary works I have drawn on Index des mots de la littérature tamoule ancienne. Institut Français d'Indologie. Pondichéry 1967–1970, (IMLTA), Tamil Lexicon I–VI. Madras 1926–1936. Supplement. Madras 1938–1939, (TL), and Subramoniam, V. I., Index of Puranaanuuru. Nagercoil 1962, (IPN). The dating is that of Zvelebil, K. V., Tamil Literature. Handbuch der Orientalistik. II. Abt., II. Band, 1. Abschn. Leiden/Köln 1975.

32. This last word is found also in the forms *tarumam* and *taṉmam* from A.D. 450–500.

33. The reason for this could be that the *t*-pronunciation is earlier; the *ṟ–ṟ* confusion should not have existed before *ṟ* had an *r*-pronunciation.

34. Cf. Beythan, op. cit., p. 78: "Vgg.: *t, tt, nt*[1]; *t* kann zu *ṭ* oder *ṟ* werden; bei einer Klasse *iṉ*; bei einer Klasse Verdoppelung des letzten Konsonanten, *k, ṭ* oder *ṟ*.[1] Nach den alten Grammatikern eigentlich auch *tt*. Das erste *t* durch Sandhi *ṉ*."

35. An initial *s* i Skt. often disappears in the corresponding Ta. word. Cf. Vaidyanathan, S., op. cit., p. 85.

36. A *y* in this position in a Skt. word disappears in Ta., e.g. Skt. *jyoti-*~Ta. *jōti*.

37. For Skt. *kṣ-*~Ta. *k-* see e.g. Anavaratavinayakam Pillai, S., The Sanskritic Element in the Vocabularies of the Dravidian Languages. Dravidic Studies No. III. University of Madras 1974, p. 129. E.g. Skt. *kṣana-*~Ta. *kaṇam*.

38. For a discussion of the initial *p, b, v, m* alternation, cf. Walldén, R., op. cit., L I, pp. 169–170. There is also *maṟai* 'word'.
39. Cf. Winslow: "*paṟṟam* 'grasping, taking hold . . .'. Compare *pattam*." Ta. *pattam* 'a bond, tie', in turn, is starred. In TL it is referred to Skt. *baddha-*.
40. For a discussion on English loanwords, see e.g. Shanmugam Pillai, M., English Borrowings in Educated Tamil. Studies in Indian Linguistics (Professor M. B. Emeneau Ṣaṣṭipūrti Volume) Deccan College, Poona 6. 1968.
41. Cf. TL *tiram, tiṟam* 'strength, firmness' referred to Skt. *sthira-* vs. *tiṭṭam, tiṭam* 'strength', both referred to Skt. *dṛḍha-*.
42. For "Verschliffene Präfixe", cf. Walldén, R., op.cit., L II, p. 143, note.
43. Cf. DED 3622, 3641, 3792, and Walldén, R., op. cit., L I, pp. 168–169.

Book Reviews

Gerhard Oberhammer, *Strukturen yogischer Meditation. Untersuchungen zur Spiritualität des Yoga.* Vienna 1977. 244 pp. (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, Bd. 322 = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, 13.)

Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils. Das Problem in indischer und christlicher Tradition. Arbeitsdokumentation eines Symposiums. Hrsg. von Gerhard Oberhammer. Vienna, Institut für Indologie der Universität Wien, 1978. 253 pp. (Publications of the de Nobili Research Library, 5.)

Under the first of these titles, the indologist will find not primarily a reference work on the methods of yoga but a close analysis of three different texts, one treated in each of the three chapters of the book. In the first chapter, the Sāṃkhya text Yuktidīpikā from the first half of the 6th century A.D. is discussed. By this choice, Oberhammer seems to widen the concept of meditation, when he interprets the different stages of knowledge as stages of meditation by reason of the stress laid on *tuṣṭi* in this text. Anyhow, he points out the importance of the "begrifflich-intellektuelle Dimension" in Sāṃkhya meditation (pp. 43 ff.). This represents in Oberhammer's summary a *nirodha* type of meditation, to the effect that *samādhi* is related to *prajñā*.

The text treated in the second chapter is Mṛgendratantram, which probably dates from the second half of the first millenium A.D.; it is a text of the theistic yoga, adhering to the Paśupāta tradition. Oberhammer considers closely also the vṛtti on the text by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, written in Kashmir *c.* 1000 A.D. The author of the vṛtti has no direct contact with any genuine yoga tradition (p. 59) and he is apt to relate yoga to the ritual, especially *dīkṣā*. The yoga procedure described in this text is dominated by *prāṇayāma. tarka* ("prüfende Reflexion") is likewise of a certain importance in the text and in Oberhammer's view is presumed to be a *yogāṅga*. The objects of the meditation are in fact the parts of Śiva, but since the total Śiva himself is separated from the world, he cannot really be reached by mental procedures. This, the main problem of all meditation as mysticism, is expressed in this text about Siva in the fact that the goal is reached only in death (p. 124). Also the intimations of "gegenstandslose Meditation" (*nirālambana*) imply this basic problem (pp. 125 ff.). This is presented by Oberhammer as the second type of meditation, which is theistic and in which the *samādhi* is related to *īśvara*. The vṛtti also refers to the "aneignende Meditation", *samāpatti*, otherwise also linked to Śivaism. This type would not be homogeneous with the first two types, *nirodha* and *samādhi*, since its content is rather the world of objects than the basic entities of the world, such as a *prakṛti* or as a *puruṣa*. Oberhammer does, however, for this third type suggest some kind of dependence on the *nirodha*, although it is rather a kind of "Zur-Ruhe-Bringen" than an intellectual restraint; there are also methods of *samāpatti* which are parallel with those of *samādhi*.

Such is the analysis which underlies the approach to Patañjali's Yogasūtra in Chapter III. To clear the lines of this text, it was necessary to bring forward also *saṃyama* as a type of meditation, a fourth one. This type has other sources and concentrates on yoga as healing, with *dhāraṇā* as the central feature of the method. With this scheme of four kinds of meditation, Oberhammer has given us a most reliable guide to a possible way of looking into the structure of Yogasūtra, a contribution to the research on yoga that should never be neglected. Parts of the results of his investigation may be debated in the future, but the main lines of his analyses and his fresh and ingenious method are convincing. Oberhammer is an author whose work is very difficult and time-consuming, owing both to his style and to his arrangement of the material, but this book is necessary reading for the indologist.

The second book under review here is not of such conclusive importance. It originated from a symposium at which some indologists discussed the concept of "transcendence" together with some Christian theologians, a discussion that came to be directed rather along historical than metaphysical lines on the part of the indologists. Oberhammer's contribution in this case is, besides an introduction to the subject, a selection of a few points from his other book, mainly on how the Sāṃkhya concept of transcendence has affected the structure of Sāṃkhya-Yoga mysticism and how thus *samādhi* and

nirodha came to dominate the system of Yoga. There are some other indological contributions. J. C. Heesterman has explained how the Vedic sacrifice continuously moved away from the transcendent, gradually leaving room for a more direct experience of the transcendence. T. Vetter follows Śaṃ-kara's path of development from yoga to the pure *tat tvam asi* experience. B. Bäumer discusses Abhinavagupta and stresses the fourth way to Śiva, the immediate one (*anupāya*), which in itself is a timeless state. A. Roest Crollius describes how Dārā Śikuh combined Sufism and *bhakti*. In spite of his material, the author of this paper only puts the question (without answering it) whether there is a primary, common experience of transcendence or whether every such experience mainly carries the imprint of its own traditions. L. Schmithausen makes a historical summary of the experience of transcendence in Buddhism. He emphasizes that the special experience of this kind is to be found in Theravāda and Yogācāra, where just one main truth represents liberation. E. Steinkellner finally focusses his attention on expressions of yogic insight in some Buddhist texts.

Two things characterize these papers on the material of Indian mysticism. The first is that the notions are discussed historically, bound to definite cultural settings; this Oberhammer defines by pointing out how the experience of transcendence is one whole, together with its contents (Introduction, p. 11). The second is that, in discussing different Indian experiences of transcendence, the notion of "transcendence" seems at the end of the papers to be set aside for expressions purely of "identification"; Oberhammer tries to express this as a general and final religious result, an experience not of an object but of a "Bei-sich-Sein" (p. 12).

There is then—it must be admitted—a gap when some contributions by Christian theologians follow. In these latter papers, some dualistic features are much stressed. There is the difference between the experience of transcendence and the verbal reflexion, the question of before and after, the distinction between knowledge and gnosis, the concept of God as personal or impersonal, and in all these grids of contrasts the Indian material seems to escape. In Christian mysticism, the main Christian essentials are there to reconcile the antitheses, such as the symbols, the belief, the grace. Of the Indian essentials, it would instead be possible to say that experience and knowledge are one and the same throughout, merely an undistinguished insight, and the belief is not an addition to this insight. The words give immediate access to God, since they are what they express, no distinction being made between symbol and reality. The final experience in Christian mysticism of the extinction of subject *v.* object is not merely final in Indian mysticism but the necessary prerequisite for any mind striving for liberation.

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Patrick Olivelle, *Vāsudevāśrama Yatidharmaprakāśa. A Treatise on World Renunciation*, critically edited with introduction, annotated translation and appendices. Part I: Text. Part II: Translation. Vienna, Indologisches Institut der Universität Wien, 1976–1977. I: 139 pp. II: 231 pp. (Publications of the de Nobili Research Library, 3–4.)

To an indologist, it is always a pleasure to get a fresh and reliable critical edition of any Sanskrit text in his hand, and there is also a special pleasure in getting hold of an edition of a text not published before. This is the case with Olivelle's edition of Yatidharmaprakāśa.

Indian religious life has, since very early times, been peopled by individuals who have renounced the world, and here we have a group of individuals that has also been rather conspicuous to the observer. As everywhere else in Indian life and customs, the behaviour of this group is strictly regulated and therefore there must also be a literature codifying the rules. For the world-renouncers in Hindu religious life, the rules have, from the beginning, been codified in the general *dharma* literature with its commentaries. There is also a group of Upaniṣads dealing with renunciation, i.e. the so-called *saṃnyāsa-upaniṣads*. From the late Middle Ages and later on, we find a great number of special works on *yatidharma*, but, of these, only two have been edited previously, i.e. Jīvanmuktiviveka by Vidyāraṇya, dating from the 14th century, and Yatidharmasaṃgraha by Viśveśvara Sarasvatī, dating from the 16th century (Vol. II, p. 25). This text, the Yatidharmaprakāśa, now edited by Olivelle is later and its author's life has cautiously been dated by Olivelle to between 1675 and 1800 A.D. (Vol. I, p. 18). The text in itself is comprehensive, well arranged and clear. Vāsudevāśrama shows his

knowledge of the subject by his quotations from various sources, which are scrupulously accounted for in the running text.

In all respects, this is a commendable work. Olivelle has treated his six MSS. carefully, has made use of textual criticism and has worked out a thorough *apparatus criticus*. He has added some very useful appendices and indexes. The introduction to the translation in the second volume is a readable survey, which gives a clear picture of the position of the literature on renunciation in Sanskrit. This introduction should be read by every student of Indian religion and society.

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Ludvig Munthe, *La tradition arabico-malgache, vue a travers le manuscrit A-6 d'Oslo et d'autres manuscrits disponibles*. [Antananarivo] 1982. 327 pp.

At the south-east coast of Madagascar, around the Matatana river, there lives a tribe called the *Antemoro* ('the people of the banks'). The rich spiritual heritage of this tribe includes a fairly vast literature in the fields of history, religion (pre-eminently on magic, charms, astrology), and folk-lore. This literature is composed in the *Antemoro* dialect of the Malagasy language, but it is written in Arabic characters, and is generally designated as the *Sorabe* ('the great script'). In Western terminology the French expression *arabico-malgache* is the most common (for a fresh introduction to the linguistic problems concerning the *Sorabe*, see O. Chr. Dahl, Sorabe revelant l'évolution du dialecte Antemoro, [Antananarivo] 1983).

The existence of this *Antemoro* literature written in *Sorabe* has been known to Western scholars since the 17th century. Though occasionally mentioned in account of travels and visits in c. 1615–1640 (Mariano, c. 1615–1620; Boothby, 1630; Cauche, 1630–1649), the *Sorabe* was first described by E. de Flacourt, chief of the French colony of Fort Dauphin 1648–1655, in his Histoire de la grande Ile de Madagascar, 1658–1661, who notes: 'Les lettres dont les Ombiasses [Malg. *ombiasa*, 'sorcerer', T.K.] se servent, sont les mêmes que les Arabes ... mais en quelques lettres, il y a différence de prononciation d'avec la langue arabe ... L'usage des lettres y a été apporté depuis deux cents ans par certains Arabes qui sont venus de la mer Rouge', quoted from A. Grandidier – G. Grandidier – H. Froidevaux, Collection des ouvrages anciens concernant Madagascar, 8, Paris 1913, pp. 278 f.). However, a close examination of other source material reveals that there has been waves of Arabic immigrants to the Matatana region prior to the mid-fifteenth century intimated by de Flacourt (see Dahl, op. cit., p. 14).

The *arabico-malgache* literature—to-day primarily preserved in Malagasy, French, British, and Norwegian collections—became the object of scholarly interest in the middle of the 19th century (spec. É. Jacquet, 1832–1833, and A. Grandidier, from 1865 and onwards), more pronounced, though, from the latter parts of the 19th century (L. Dahle, 1876–1878; A. S. Hucket, 1887), and the beginning of the 20th century (G. Ferrand, 1891–1928; G. A. Shaw, 1893 f.; M. Cotta, 1900; M. Marchand, 1901; E. F. Gautier, 1902–1911 [with H. Froidevaux, 1907]; G. Mondain, 1907–1951/52; Ardant du Picq, 1911–1933; A. Cabaton, 1912; H. Berthier, 1913–1950; Ch. Renel, 1913; M. Colançon, 1922 f.; G. Julien, 1925/26–1942; J. Ph. Rombaka, 1933; O. Chr. Dahl, 1938–1983). Apart from Mondain, Berthier, and Dahl, the more prominent students of the *Sorabe* literature in the period after the Second World War are L. Molet, 1951/52–1957; H. F. Pastor, 1953; J. Raharijaona – G. Raveloson, 1954; E. Gerbinis, 1956; G. Pain, 1956; F. Kasanga, 1956–1963; S. Vianes – L. Molet, 1956; J. Faublée, 1958–1975; C. Ravaomalala, 1959; J. C. Hébert, 1960–1962; M. Mahefamanana, 1963–1965; J. Rakotonirainy, 1963–1978; L. Munthe 1964–1982 (with Ch. Ravoajanahary – S. Ayache, 1976); J. Dez 1966–1983 (with F. Vire, 1982, *bis*); S. Rabedaoro, 1966; M. M. Rajoharson, 1967; F. Ramiandrasoa, 1967; E. Ralaimihoatra, 1970; J. Valette, 1975; L. Michel, 1977; M. Robert, 1977; J. Rakotonindrina – A. D. Ranaivosoa, 1978; Z. M. Rasoaliny, 1979 f.; E. Rajaonarison, 1980; N. J. Gueunier, 1981; A. D. Ranaivosoa, 1981 f.; and E. Rajaonarison – A. D. Ranaivosoa, 1983 (full titles of all contributions referred to might be gathered in the bibliographies by Munthe, 1982, under review, pp. 289–299; Dahl, op. cit., 1983, pp. 75–77; J. Dez, Essai sur le calendrier arabico-malgache, Dép. de Recherches Linguistiques, Univ. Paris 7, 1983, pp. 51–57; idem, Les sora-be: sources documentaires, ibid., 1983, pp. 32–47).

In view of the numerous endeavours to publish and discuss the *Sorabe* texts in the last 150 years, it is remarkable that no attempt has been made to survey the manuscript and research situation until the recent work by L. Munthe, which accordingly is to be deemed a pioneer work (though followed already a year later by Dez, Les sora-be). Dr Munthe, who received his doctorate at Sorbonne in 1964 (thesis: La Bible à Madagascar: les deux premières traductions du Nouveau Testament malgache. Thèse pour le doctorat de 3ème cycle), and now holds the professorial chair of missiology (*misjonsvitenskap*) in the Free Faculty of Theology at Oslo (*Det teologiske menighetsfakultet*), was a missionary to Madagascar in the years 1946–1965. He has published extensively on the *Sorabe* literature (from 1964 and onwards). Among his special investigations we might mention: Arabisk-gassiske manuskript ved Etnografisk Museum i Oslo (Norsk Tidsskrift for Misjon, 1964/2, pp. 78–87); Trefjöla på Stavanger Museum (Stavanger Aftenblad 13.05.1965); Ny sorabe sy ny fiangonana (Ny finoantsika 52/1973, pp. 20–26); Deux manuscrits en provenance de Londres (Bulletin de l'Académie Malgache- = BAM 51/1973, pp. 13–23); Löynleg skrift vaktast vel på Madagaskar (Forskningsnytt fra NAVF 1974/5, pp. 10–14); Deux manuscrits en provenance de Londres (Misjonskall og forskerglede, Festschrift O. G. Myklebust, ed. N. E. Bloch-Hoell, Oslo 1975, 173–194); Étude sur un manuscrit sorabe (1792) conservé à Paris (BAM 53/1975, pp. 19–21); Note sur les manuscrits religieux arabico-malgaches (Colloque de linguistique de Tananarive 9/1977); La tradition écrite arabico-malgache: un aperçu sur les manuscrits existants (BSOAS 40/1977, pp. 96–109); Études sur Madagascar (Fontes Africanae Historiae, Bulletin of Information, Univ. of Ghana, Accra 1977); La tradition arabico-malgache (Compte-redus trimestriels des séances de l'Académie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer 37/1977, pp. 265–278); Le manuscrit arabico-malgache HB 4 à Paris (Acta Orientalia 36/1978, pp. 127–179); and, together with Ch. Ravoajanahary and S. Ayache, Radama I et les Anglais (Omaly sy anio, Revue d'études historiques, Univ. de Madagascar, Dep. d'histoire, Antananarivo 1976/3–4, pp. 9–104).

The new monograph La tradition arabico-malgache is disposed in the following manner: Introduction (pp. 7–14); 1. Les sources disponibles (pp. 15–223); 2. Analyse de ces sources (pp. 225–271); 3. Conclusion (pp. 273–276); Notes (pp. 277–288); Sources et Bibliographie (pp. 289–299); and Index (pp. 300–327).

Actually, the work contains three major sections: 1. A survey of the Arabic-Malagasy manuscripts (including publications); 2. A detailed examination of MS A-6 of the Ethnographic Museum of Oslo, with a reproduction of the full text, a full transcription, translation, and commentary; 3. An analysis of the historical, religious, and folk-loristic contents of the *Sorabe* sources.

In his introduction, Dr Munthe first delineates a background for his undertaking (in addition discussing the events leading to the adoption of Latin characters for the Malagasy script in March 1823 by King Radama I on the suggestion of missionaries from the London Missionary Society); he presents in particular the MS A-6 of Oslo. In a following subsection Dr Munthe defines the aim of his present work: 'Par cette publication nous espérons atteindre trois buts: 1. Rendre à la tribu antaimoro et à Madagascar un manuscrit arabico-malgache qui grâce au pasteur Bjørn Elle a été gardé et sauvé au Musée Ethnographique de l'Université d'Oslo. 2. Donner aux chercheurs malgaches la possibilité de s'orienter plus facilement dans les collections de documents *sorabe* dispersés à Madagascar et en Europe et difficilement accessibles. 3. Indiquer par une analyse préliminaire de la documentation retrouvée la valeur de ces documents pour la connaissance du passé de Madagascar' (p. 10). In addition a few technical terms are discussed (like *sorabe, soratra, katibo, ziny, ombiasa*), and the principles for transcription and translation are presented (N.B.: 'nous avons décidé de rendre les différents caractères des textes arabico-malgache selon leur valeur phonétique actuelle et d'après la prononciations des *katibo* d'aujourd'hui', p. 12). Finally a short section is devoted to a few words on the present situation as regards the *Sorabe* MSS (the author draws especial attention to the fact that many of these MSS, due to their sacred and secret character, are hidden by the magicians of the Matatana region; the number of these MSS not accessible for research is estimated to more than one hundred, p. 12).

The first major part of Dr Munthe's work is devoted to a description of 'les sources disponibles', subdivided in 'Textes *sorabe* publiés anciennement', 'Textes *sorabe* publiés récemment', and an 'Aperçu sur les textes *sorabe* inédits mais rendus disponibles'.

In his survey of earlier and recent publications of the *Sorabe* texts, Dr Munthe presents the following editions: G. Ferrand, 1891–1902; *idem*, 1902; *idem*, 1905; *idem*, 1907; E.-F. Gautier, 1902; E.-F. Gautier – H. Froidevaux, 1907; H. Berthier, 1934; G. Mondain, 1910–1911; C. H. Julien, 1929;

idem, 1933 (*bis*); L. Munthe, 1975; L. Munthe–Ch. Ravoajanahary–S. Ayache, 1976; L. Munthe, 1978. It is obvious that Dr Munthe has not aimed at completeness, but has chosen to present merely the more prominent publications. Among other editions of significance might be mentioned e.g. Ardant du Picq, 1911; some of J. Faublee's works; G. Ferrand, Généalogies, 1902; *idem*, Un texte, 1904 (monograph 1906); *idem*, Un chapitre, 1905; Prières, 1905 (separate fascicle 1906); *idem*, Un vocabulaire, 1908; G. Julien, 1925–1926; *idem*, 1942; J. Rakotonirainy, 1965 (for full titles, see the references given above). It is also of note that two important publications of texts appeared in the years 1981–1982, viz. A. D. Ranaivosoa, Édition critique du manuscrit arabico-malgache nᵒ 6 de l'Academie Malgache. Transcription, traduction, notes. Antananarivo 1981; J. Dez–F. Vire, Le manuscrit arabico-malgache malayo-polynésien 26 de la Bibl. Nat., Dép. de Recherches Linguistiques, Univ. Paris 7. I. Reproduction. II. Transcription et commentaires. 1982.

The most important section of the first part of Dr Munthe's study is the one which contains a survey and condensed description of the Arabic-Malagasy MSS available for research.

The *Sorabe* MSS preserved in Great Britain are astonishingly few, mainly brought in light by Dr Munthe himself: in the British Library two documents (Add. MS 18141), and in the archives of the London Missionary Society three biblical texts (Archives box 1 Madag. 1774–1823, Folder 1, Jacket C). However, it is likely that there are further *Sorabe* texts in England (cf. e.g. Journal asiatique 248/1960, pp. 203–211).

Due to the activities of Norwegian missionaries to Madagascar, there are to-day a few MSS preserved in Norwegian libraries. Thus, in the Ethnographical Museum of Oslo there are six MSS (MS A-5, MS A-6, MS A-7, MS A-8, MS A-9 or 18338, and a MS without *signum*), all of which are treated by Dr Munthe. In the archives of the School of Mission and Theology (Misjonshøgskolen), Stavanger, there are a few *Sorabe* MSS, of which Dr Munthe mentions three (MS Gassisk trolldom; now: *Sorabe* 1; MS Fandraky; now: *Sorabe* 3 [a MS which seems to have been lost; however, a Norwegian translation, entitled Tadidin-drazana I–II, is preserved]; MS Jensenius; now: *Sorabe* 2). There is, however, also a fourth MS (now: *Sorabe* 4); it contains 43 pp., and is magical in character (containing much Koranic material), and will if possible be edited by Dr O. Chr. Dahl and the reviewer. At the Stavanger Museum, finally, there were two texts at the time of Dr Munthe's studies there (MS Stokstad, and a wooden tablet with Koranic texts from Vohipeno). Allegedly, they have later been lost.

As regards the French *Sorabe* collections, Dr Munthe confines himself to those preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris), and the Bibliothèque de l'Académie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer (Paris). This means, that he is bound to leave out of consideration the *Sorabe* MSS found in the Musée de l'homme (Paris), Départment de Madagascar (collection Grandidier and Millot); Musée des arts africains et océaniens (Paris), Bibliothèque Mazarine (Paris), Bibliothèque de la congrégation de la mission Lazariste (Paris), Procure des Missions Chine-Madagascar; and, finally, the collections of respectively G. Ferrand, G. Julien, and J. Faublee (for particulars, see Dez, Les sora-be, 1983, pp. 12–19). As concerns the two collections treated by Dr Munthe, the description of the Arabic-Malagasy MSS at the Bibl. Nat. is very valuable (making mention of the MSS Malayo-Polynésien 18–26, Madécasse 1–9, and the MS Arabe 5132; but not of MSS Mal.-Polyn. 285 and 290, and the MSS Madécasse 9–11–Arabe 4940–4942; cf. Dez, op. cit., pp. 7–9). Regarding the *Sorabe* MSS of the Bibl. de l'Acad. des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Dr Munthe presents the MSS HB 1–12 (not making mention of MS YOU; cf. Dez, op. cit., p. 11). On the whole, Dr Munthe supplies condensed and most useful descriptions of the various MSS and their contents. It is of particular importance that he has taken pains to make occasional comparisons between the MSS, since the *Sorabe* tradition, especially as concerns the magic texts, is very conservative, so as to include a lot of parallel material in the MSS. Here, of course, much work has still to be done, even after the publication of the separate texts, since a thorough investigation of MSS of a similar genre will claim for something like synoptic lists, in order to trace the origins and development of a particular tradition.

Dr Munthe's previous experience of Madagascar has made it possible for him to undertake a pioneer investigation of the *Sorabe* MSS accessible there. Accordingly, he has been able to supply a presentation of the *Sorabe* MSS preserved in the University of Madagascar, Antananarivo; the Museum of the Palais de la Reine, Antananarivo; and the Library of the Académie Malgache, Antananarivo.

As concerns the collections of the Univ. of Antananarivo, Dr Munthe has described the 7 Arabic-

Malagasy MSS found at the Department of Malagasy language and literature (ARMA 1–6, and N° 18, all of which are essentially magical-religious in character). There are, however, two further *Sorabe* MSS in the Centre of social and cultural anthropology at the University (a MS of 78 pp., and an excercise-book, both magical-religious in nature; see Dez, op. cit., p. 25).

From the Museum of the Palais de la Reine Dr Munthe describes the exercise-book of King Radama I (54 pp.; cf. Berthier, 1934, who in fact also makes mention of another *Sorabe* document in these collections, viz. a French-Malagasy vocabulary with Arabic-Malagasy transcription, see in addition Dez, op. cit., p. 24).

In the collections of the Library of the Académie Malgache Dr Munthe has undertaken thorough investigations, and his description of the MSS there constitutes a section of particular excellence in his work (pp. 52–75). It is, though, to note that a very preliminary presentation of this collection was given in 1978 by J. Rakotonodrina–A. D. Ranaivosoa (Travaux de recherches en sorabe, Antananarivo), and the problem is that the two works give various series of *signa*. Thus, what Dr Munthe styles MSS 1–20 (pp. 52–71), the previous description styled 670/1–20. However, Dr Munthe does not merely give a much more thorough description than the one of 1978; he has also noted further MSS (MS N° 556, MS N° 661, MS N° 662, and MS N° 665, pp. 71–75). It is, furthermore, to note that MS 6 (670/6) was completely edited in 1981 (A. D. Ranaivosoa, Édition critique du manuscript arabico-malgache n° 6 de l'Académie Malgache. Transcription, traduction, notes. Antananarivo). In addition to these MSS now described by Dr Munthe there might be a few more to judge from scattered references in previous scolarly studies (cf. Dez, op. cit., pp. 22 f.; the article by G. Pain /Un manuscrit arabico-malgache inédit, BAM 34/1956, pp. 77–79/ seems especially promising).

It is, however, openly stated by Dr Munthe that there are much more *Sorabe* MSS to be found at Madagascar. Thus, he expresses his conviction that 'A Madagascar, il existe, dispersés dans toute la région de la Matitanana au moins une centaine de manuscrit[s] dont nous n'avons pas obtenu l'autorisation de consulter. Dans le village Tsimeto de Savana seulement, il y en avait en 1973 une dizaine. Dans les autres centres de différents clans il y en a également' (p. 12). Presumably, this is an intentional understatement. There is no need for prophetic gifts to foresee that many of these MSS will be permitted for use in a near future. Nonetheless, there are a few Malagasy collections besides those mentioned by Dr Munthe which already are open to study (the Library of Charles Poirier, who himself in 1947 made an inventory list covering 26 items; the Library of M. Ramel, 4 MSS; the Mission provinciale des Lazaristes de Fort-Dauphin, 1 MS; and another 3–4 MSS; see Dez, op. cit., pp. 25–28; see also for a few more scattered references, pp. 30 f.).

As already stated, the MSS descriptions by Dr Munthe represent a pioneer work, highly commendable. From this aspect it is only natural and desirable that other scholars may bring supplementary notes and comments.

Turning now to Dr Munthe's edition of MS A-6 of Oslo, it is to note as an introductory remark that the very fact that the Ethnographical Museum of Oslo actually disposes of a series of Arabic-Malagasy MSS is due to a donation in 1909 by the Rev. Bjørn Elle, who during his service as a missionary to Madagascar had earned an outstanding recognition for his justice and wisdom by the local population and had accordingly been entrusted some *Sorabe* MSS.

The MS A-6 of Oslo contains 73 + 12 pp. and is of an excellent character, easily legible, fairly consistently furnished with vowel signs and diacritical points. The contents are basically historical, mirroring glimpses of the modern history of Madagascar from the arrival of the descendants of Josef from Mecca to the region of Maritanana and onwards (earlier contributions to publication or elucidation of the historical *Sorabe* MSS included e.g. Ferrand, La Légende, 1902, *idem*, Généalogies, 1902 reprint 1974; Mondain, 1910; Julien, 1929–1942; Hébert, 1960–1962; Faublee, 1970; Rasoaliny, 1979; later also Dez-Vire, 1982). Much of the material of this MS is already known to the historians through the publication of a related MS in French collections in 1910 (G. Mondain, L'histoire des tribus de l'Imoro au 17ème siècle d'après un manuscrit arabico-malgache, Paris; see also previously E. F. Gautier–H. Froidevaux, Un manuscrit arabico-malgache sur les campagnes de la Case dan l'Imoro de 1659 à 1663), but unfortunately the MS on which these studies were based has later disappeared; in addition the texts previously published were not reproduced but merely transcribed.

Dr Munthe has rightly deemed it most correct to reproduce the Arabic-Malagasy text (a method also followed by Dez-Vire). It appears to the reviewer that this method is, in fact, the only defendable

one, since no transcription can make full justice to all the minor variations in a certain MS of this nature (this applies e.g. to the normally inconsistent usage of diacritical points, vowel signs, punctuation marks, division of words, variations as regards the Arabic and Malagasy portions of the texts respectively etc.).

The transcription system employed by Dr Munthe is to 'rendre les différents caractères des textes arabico-malgaches selon leur valeur phonétique actuelle et d'après la prononciation des *katibo* d'aujourd'hui' (p. 12). This method might in principle be justified (almost the same method is employed by Dez-Vire), though it should be admitted that Dr Munthe's system is hardly a strictly phonetical transcription system. In addition the problem of the development of certain linguistic features is intentionally left out of consideration by Dr Munthe (cf. Dahl's recent Sorabe, 1983).

The French translation is essentially clear and concentrated in expression. The notes are abundant and elucidating. Occasionally some further references to earlier studies might have added to the value of the comments (cf. spec. Dez, Les Sora-be, 1983). A few deficiencies are, naturally, unavoidable (just one example: the Hebrew for 'les Egyptiens' is not *mashrim*, but *ham-miṣrīm*, p. 81, n. 2). Furthermore, the historical information supplied by the text might have been analyzed more extensively, so as to create a broader bridge between the traditional historiography and the Western one.

Of special interest is Dr Munthe's concluding 'Analyse de ces sources' (pp. 225–271), where he discusses the authenticity of the *Sorabe* literary tradition, the religious aspects of the sources (animism, ancestor worship, the concept of the Creator, magic of astrological origin etc.), the historical and folk-loristic/ethnographical aspects (with some notes on the arrival of the Arab immigrants to Madagascar, their history, and the organization of their society, the Malagasy history of the latter centuries in contact with the Western civilization etc.; N.B. the disposition of this section is in disorder: C.a.a. – and C.b.b., p. 6 etc.). Many of Dr Munthe's observations, though, of course, dependent on earlier studies, are highly rewarding, and on the whole his monograph, which actually contains three separate studies, is likely to remain an indispensable handbook.

The service rendered by the present monograph to Malagasy students—especially of historiography and linguistics—can hardly be overestimated. The contribution to Western knowledge of the *Sorabe* literature and MSS is likewise highly praiseworthy.

The exceptional esteem and respect in which Dr Munthe is held at the academical and scholarly circles of Madagascar, as well as in the local population there, make it reasonable to think that he will be the Westener who in the near future is able to negotiate with the Malagasy authorities and MSS owners to make the *Sorabe* treasures fully accessible to linguists, historians, and historians of religion all over the world.

Uppsala   *Tryggve Kronholm*

Johann Maier, *Jesus von Nazareth in der talmudischen Überlieferung* (Erträge der Forschung 82). Darmstadt 1978. 367 pp.

A priori there are good grounds to suspect that the classical rabbinical literature contains much information about Christianity in general and about Jesus of Nazareth in particular.

Such a preconception is likely to be evoked by the Christian counterpart to this literature, viz. the patristic sources. Many of these sources devote a considerable attention to the Jews, their laws and their habits, as well as fundamental issues of their theology (for an introduction, see K. H. Rengstorf–S. von Kortzfleisch, eds., Kirche und Synagoge. 1. Stuttgart 1968). Let it suffice to mention in this context the prominent role played by the 'Jewish problem' in the works of Justin Martyr (see O. Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy. Oslo 1981), Origen (see H. Bietenhard, Caesarea, Origenes und die Juden. Stuttgart 1974; N. de Lange, Origen and the Jews. Cambridge 1976), Tertullian (see C. Aziza, Tertullien et le judaisme. Niece 1977), Ephrem (see T. Kronholm, Motifs from Genesis 1–11 in the Genuine Hymns of Ephrem the Syrian. Lund 1978), and Aphraat (see J. Neusner, Aphraat and Judaism. Leiden 1970).

Moreover, there are a number of patristic sources supplying fragments of a Jewish conception of Jesus. The most well known are those found in Justin Martyr's Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo (from the mid-second century) and in Origen's Contra Celsum, where we have extracts from an anti-Christian work by Celsus (written c. 178).

The Jew, who speaks through the mouth of Justin, naturally opposes the Christian claim on the divinity of Jesus by means of denying the virgin birth (LXXVIII). Furthermore, Jesus of Nazareth is depicted as a magician (μάγος) and seducer of the people (λαοπλάνος, LXIX). In addition we find a warning to the communities of the Jewish diaspora against 'the God- and Law-less schism (αἵρεσις), which has been caused by a certain Jesus, a Galilean deceiver (πλάνος), whom, when we had crucified him, his disciples stole from the grave by night ... saying deceitfully (πλανῶσι) to people that he had risen from the dead and ascended into heaven' (CVIII). Are we, then, to look for opinions of this nature in the genuine rabbinical texts? Hardly. It does not take much time to see that the alleged Jewish recognition in Justin's Dialogue that 'we [Jews] crucified him' (ὸν σταυρωσάντον ἡμῶν) is fictitious and that the accusation against Jesus as a deceiver of the people and against his disciples as grave-robbers depends on inner-Christian tradition (cf. Matt. 27, 63–66; 28, 12–15).

The arguments adduced by Celsus' Jew are apparently more promising: The mother of Jesus—a handicraftswoman (χερνήτις)—conceived in adultery with a soldier by the name of Panthera; therefore her (intended) husband—a carpenter—drove her away (I, 28 ff.). The traditional Christian concept of the virgin birth is merely a product of heathen myths (I, 67). The Jew of Celsus admits that Jesus visited Egypt as a child (I, 66), but he also claims that Jesus, at a later stage of his life, went to Egypt in order to earn his living. There he became a disciple of Egyptian magic, and on his return to Israel, he purported to be divine and trying to rival God, he made use of demons (I, 28). The conjuring trick of Jesus were, accordingly, of the same kind as those performed by many itinerant sorcerers (I, 68). As regards the judgement ultimately passed on Jesus, the Jew underlines that Jesus was condemned in conformity with Jewish law (II, 5), and this being so, it is impossible for any Jew to accept his claims on being the Son of God (II, 8 ff.). Concerning the alleged resurrection of Jesus, this is, like his virgin birth, dismissed as being nothing but a construction based on pagan myths (II, 55). Are these fragments of a proposed Jewish view on Jesus (fragments which cannot simply be explained away as an evolution of inner-Christian ideas of anti-Jewish nature) in reality supplying us with a resumé of concepts which we will recover in rabbinic literature (as e.g. M. Lods tries to demonstrate in his pioneering article Étude sur les sources juives de la polémique de Celse contre les chrétiens, Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses 21/1941, pp. 1–33)?

Presumptively, the answer to this question is likely to be positive, especially since Jesus of Nazareth (*Yešuˁ han-noṣrī*) is explicitly mentioned in several rabbinical texts and since many of the traits noted by the Jew of Celsus actually recur in rabbinic *dicta*, though admittedly often in connexion with figures that have to be interpreted as Jesus-figures in disguise (spec. *Ben Pnṭyry/ Pnṭrˀ/Pndyrˀ/Pndrˀ* etc. and *Ben Sṭdˀ/Sṭrˀ/Syṭrˀ/Swṭdˀ/Swṭrˀ* etc.).

It is remarkable that no thorough, scholarly investigation of this theologically prominent problem has been undertaken prior to the 1950's, the major reasons naturally being those of Jewish/Christian polemics and apologetics.

A glimpse beyond the Jewish borderline reveals that the question of Jesus in rabbinical literature plays hardly any role in the early anti-Christian works by David al-Moqammeṣ (ˁIšrūn maqālāt, 9th century) and Jacob b. Ruben (Milḥᵃmōt haš-Šem, 12th century), nor in Isaac b. Abraham of Troki's (d. 1594) important apologetical contribution (Ḥizzūq ˀᵉᵐmūnā). A main reason for this was evidently the existence of various Toledot Jeshu-collections—a genre which probably was not fully developed before the 10th century (cf. Encyclopædia Judaica, vol. 15, p. 1208 f.). As regards actual references to Jesus in the rabbinic sources, the Jews of the Middle Ages, confronted with Christian censorship and anti-semitism, explained that even commonly accepted references (like b Soṭ 47 a; Sanh 43 a, 67 a, 107 b) in reality concerned a Jesus living some 200 years B.C., and this essentially apologetic view survived at least to the Enlightment (it was still advocated by Moses Mendelsohn, d. 1786). A fresh interest in the problem of Jesus and Christianity in the rabbinic literature was evoked by the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* in the 19th century with its radical and conservative after-rolls, and it is perchance not surprising that the radical scholars tended to find more elements of Christian tradition in the sources than did the conservative. Thus, Abraham Geiger, the most prominent advocate of the *Reformbewegung*, discerned comparatively much Christian material in the rabbinic texts, and to a similar direction, though from strongly varying aspects, pointed the studies by W. Bacher, A. Marmorstein, and M. Joel. The same is true also of the first scholarly Jesus-study on the Jewish side, viz. Yešū han-noṣrī by J. Klausner (Jerusalem 1922). Whilst admitting that the rabbinic sources contain merely a minimal amount of Jesus-*testimonia* and that the rabbis were not actually interested

in Jesus, Klausner maintains that the sources contain fairly much of Jewish reaction against early Christianity. However, the conservative historian H. Grätz had already become a pioneer for a more critical view, denying with a few exceptions the existence of any Jesus-tradition in the rabbinic works. This critical line was pursued by J. Derenbourg, M. Friedländer, and, with symptomatic emphasis, by S. Zeitlin. The strongly critical approach has come to dominate the real scholarly investigations from the 1950's, viz. M. Goldstein's Jesus in the Jewish Tradition (New York 1950), where the entire earlier discussion is evaluated (the outcome being that only five Tannaitic texts are seen as containing references to Jesus), and J. Z. Lauterbach's Jesus in the Talmud (Rabbinic Essays, Cincinnati 1951, pp. 473–570), who applies a literary-critical method and holds that the Jesus-texts, which are few, mirror a rabbinic reaction to Christianity in growth (for a detailed *Forschungsübersicht*, see Goldstein, op. cit., 1950; Y. Fleischmann, Bᵉᶜayat han-naṣrūt bam-maḥᵃšābā hay-yᵉhūdīt mim-Mendelsohn ᶜad Rosenzweig, Jerusalem 1964; D. R. Catchpole, The Trial of Jesus. A Study in the Gospels and Jewish Historiography from 1770 to the Present Day [Studia Post-Bibl. 18]. Leiden 1971; G. Lindeskog, Die Jesusfrage im neuzeitlichen Judentum, Uppsala 1938 [reprint: Darmstadt 1973]).

As regards Christian studies, there is no need to devote any attention to works appearing before the 19th century. Practically every Christian study on *judaica* prior to the outgoing Enlightenment was stamped by anti-Jewish sentiments (the classical examples being J. Chr. Wagenseil's Tela Ignea Satanae, 1681, and J. A. Eisenmenger's Entdecktes Judentum, 1700); the only exceptions worth mentioning are a few works influenced by an humanistic spirit (spec. by J. Buxtorf, sr., d. 1629, and jr., d. 1664). However in the 19th century the polemical attitude was at least partially succeeded by a missionary zeal inspired by the pietistic movement. The most important fruit as concerns our problem was H. Laible's Jesus Christus im Thalmud (Nathanael 6/1890, pp. 1–39.73–127; ibid, Leipzig 1891; ²1900). Laible, whose work from a critical view appears almost grotesque, detected numerous references to Jesus and Christianity in the rabbinic texts on the basis of a total absence of contextual analysis. Curiously, the great H. L. Strack wrote a foreword to Laible's work (²1900, p. III), and his own critical judgement, although of another quality than Laible's remained partly obscured (Jesus, die Häretiker und die Christen nach den ältesten jüdischen Angaben, Berlin 1910). A lack of proper criticism is also discernible in the spirit dominating Strack-Billerbeck's famous Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrash. 1–5 (München 1922–56; see e.g. K. Hoheisel, Das antike Judentum in christlicher Sicht [Studies in Oriental Religions 2], Wiesbaden 1978, pp. 41–43). In the first decade of the 20th century two important works appeared: R. T. Herford's Christianity in Talmud and Midrash (London 1903; reprint: New York-London 1966), which was inspired by a friendly attitude towards the Jews, was from a methodological point of view fairly turbid, dominated by themes and not by contexts; A. Meyer's Jesus, Jesu Jünger und das Evangelium im Talmud und verwandten jüdische Schriften (in E. Hennecke, Handbuch zu den neutest. Apokryphen, Tübingen 1904, pp. 47–71), was less friendly towards the Jews in tone but only partially more reliable (this applies particularly to his treatment of the Ben Stada-problem). Before we arrive at the 1970's, we might merely mention M. Goguel's La vie de Jésus (Paris 1932), who brought the critical views of Klausner a bit further, specially observing that the rabbinic Jesus-texts have nothing to do with the historical Jesus, but are polemical-apologetic texts deriving from Christian tradition. In 1971 K. Hruby's Die Stellung der jüdischen Gesetzlehrer zur werdenden Kirche (Zürich) appeared, being, in its context, a first fruit of the post War dialogue clima. Although the work is of a popular character, Hruby in scholarly sobriety takes textual history, the censure of the Medieval Church, the existence of inner-Jewish controversy etc. into consideration, and he arrives at the conclusion that there are only five Tannaitic texts dealing with Jesus (b Sanh 43 a: t Ḥul II, 22 f; 'Ben Panthera'; b AZ 16 b–17 a; t Ḥul II, 24, with parallels) and only a very few Amoraitic Jesus-texts (b Sanh 43 a; y Shab XIV, 4 [14 d]; b Giṭ 56 b–57 a; b Ber 17 a–b; cf. also b Sanh 103 a). The major deficiencies of Hruby's work are the lack of a full contextual analysis and the absence of comparative studies in the relevant history of religion.

Against this background it is easy to see that a full scale investigation of the problem of Jesus in rabbinical literature was worth the fresh attempt by J. Maier, professor of judaica at the University of Cologne since 1966. Maier has rightly earned a reputation not only as an exceptionally learned and industrious investigator of Judaism but also as an highly objective one (the major documentation being Die Texte vom Toten Meer, 1–2, München-Basel 1960; Geschichte der jüdischen Religion, Berlin-New York 1972; Das Judentum, München 1973; Die Tempelrolle vom Toten Meer, München 1978;

after 1978 also Grundzüge der Geschichte des Judentums im Altertum [Grundzüge 40], Darmstadt 1981; Kleines Lexikon des Judentums (with P. Schäfer), Stuttgart-Konstanz 1981; Jüdische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum in der Antike [Erträge 177]. Darmstadt 1982). However, for a critical analysis of the alleged Jesus-*testimonia* in the rabbinic sources, Maier's experience as a former Old Testament exegete has apparently been no less important (cf. Maier's Vom Kultus zur Gnosis, Salzburg 1964, and his Das altisraelitische Ladeheiligtum, Berlin 1965). For the immediate impression of Maier's study Jesus von Nazareth in der talmudischen Überlieferung (the title should rightly have ended: . . . in der rabbinischen Literatur) is that of an Old Testament exegete at work. In commendable detail Maier undertakes to examine all conceivable Jesus-texts in the classical rabbinic sources by means of a careful contextual analysis, and minute observations concerning the traditio-historical, motif- and form-critical, as well as text-transmissory problems. It is hard to conceive a more defendable approach or competent analysis than Maier's.

The author divides his investigation in six main sections: (1) 'Einleitung' (pp. 1–17), (2) 'Grundzüge der Forschungsgeschichte' (pp. 18–41), (3) 'Nichtrabbinische Quellen' (pp. 42–47), (4) 'Die rabbinischen Quellen' (pp. 48–248), (5) 'Die Nachrichten über jüdische Aussagen in nichtjüdischen Quellen in deren Verhältnis zur rabbinischen Tradition' (pp. 249–267), and (6) 'Ergebnisse' (pp. 268–275). The work is accompanied by abundant notes (pp. 276–315), an excellent, up to date bibliography (pp. 317–337), and relevant indexes (339–367).

The major parts of Maier's condensed introduction are dedicated to a treatment of a few basic problems: the fundamental difference between the interests of the Jews and Christians of antiquity, furthermore the rich inner-Jewish and inner-Christian variety; in addition the problem of rabbinic traditions as regards matters of Christianity and Jesus, especially the possible reasons of losses of traditions by means of Christian censure (from the disputation of Barcelona in 1263 and onwards) and Jewish self-restraint and self-critique, and reversely the possible reasons of a growth of tradition, due to e.g. apologetical needs in view of the treats from the increasing power of the Church as well as the emergence of Islam. A careful consideration of problems of this nature is, of course, the necessary starting point for establishing a methodology regarding a correct treatment of the rabbinic sources, and by necessity such a consideration is bound to lead to a particular stress on the claim for a minute analysis of context, development of tradition etc., although it is to be admitted that this unobjectionable program is more easily expressed than pursued—a fact of which Maier himself is aware.

After a section devoted to the *Forschungsgeschichte*—a section which naturally depends considerably on previous surveys by Goldstein and others—Maier in remarkable briefness deals with a few non-rabbinic Jewish sources, which sometimes are thought to contain references to Jesus. He rightly notes that Philo Alexandrinus nowhere makes mention of Jesus, obviously because he was not aware neither of Jesus nor of Christianity. As regards Josephus, Maier discusses the *Testimonium Flavianum* (Ant XVIII, 63 f.), the Paulina-episode (Ant XVIII, 65 ff.), the Samaritan Messiah (Ant XVIII, 85 ff.), and the note of the death of Jacob, 'the brother of Jesus, the Messiah' (Ant XX, 200), displaying most interest in the *Test. Flav.* and the recent studies by S. Pines (An Arab Version . . ., 1971) and E. Bammel (Festschrift O. Michel, 1974, pp. 9–22). It seems, though, that the treatment is far to condensed to constitute a real contribution to the entangled problem. Evidently, it has not been possible for Maier to take into consideration the study from 1977 by A. M. Dubarle (Le témoignage de Josephe sur Jésus d'après des publications récentes, Revue Biblique 84/1977, pp. 38–58); nor is he to be blamed for not fore-seeing that P. Bilde in 1981—in the reviewer's judgement—was able to definitely demonstrate the total secondary character of the *Test. Flav.* (Josefus' beretning om Jesus, Dansk teologisk Tidsskrift 44, 1981, pp. 99–135). It is to note, finally, that Maier also discusses the source value of the so-called Slavonic Josephus.

As might be expected, it is in his treatment of the rabbinic sources proper that Maier is able to display his methodological mastery. It is, of course, not possible to review here even a modest part of all the relevant texts which Maier discusses. In fact he seems to have taken into consideration almost all rabbinic texts which have figured in the scholarly debate of the Jesus-*testimonia* of the rabbis in the last century (a few conceivable exceptions being NumR XX, 7, which as early as in 1881 was interpreted by J. Stier as referring to Jesus [Das Jüdische Literaturblatt 10, Nos. 31 f.]; b Yom 86 b; Sanh 38 b; y Shab VI, 9 [8 d], GenR XXVI, 5; DeutR II, 33, and Semaḥot VIII, ed. Higger, New York 1931, p. 163; for a discussion, see Lauterbach, op. cit., 1951, pp. 513, 542, 544, 551–553; it might also be noted that Maier does not observe that the famous text b Sanh 43 a extends also a bit into 43 b). It is

not to be forgotten, though, that the way of Maier has been well prepared by pre-eminently Zeitlin, Friedländer, Lauterbach and Goldstein.

Now, even by means of his—admittedly truistic—claim for a thorough contextual analysis, Maier is able to reject a number of previous Jesus-identifications in rabbinic sources. Let us look at a few examples.

A tannaitic text which has been understood by many scholars as a Jesus-*locus* is M Yeb IV, 13 (e.g. J. Dérenbourg, 1881; S. Kraus, 1902, 104; J. Klausner, 1922; R. T. Herford, 1903; B. Pick, 1913; H. Laible, 1891, ²1900). As its name suggests, the treatise Yebamot deals with legal discussion on the application of the Deuteronomic law on levirate marriage (Deut 25, 5–10). One of the problems discussed is the definition of the term *mamzer* (bastard). After referring the definition of three authorities (R. Akiba's, Simeon of Teman's, and R. Joshua's), the Mishna continues: 'R. Simeon b. Azzai said: I found in Jerusalem a family register, in which it was written: So-and-so is a *mamzer* through an adulteress' (*'îš pᵉlōnî mamzer meʾešæt ʾîš*). This *dictum* appears absolutely natural in the context, where it is obvious that R. Simeon b. Azzai's words are adduced in support of R. Joshua's definition. Any attempts to trace in this dictum a fragment of early Jewish irony vis-à-vis the virgin birth of Jesus is contextually absurd. Quite another thing is, of course, the possibility that this utterance in later times might have been employed as a hidden anti-Christian critique. But if so, this critique has nothing to do with the Tannaitic text itself, nor, in fact, with the Gemara (b Yeb 49 a–b). And Maier's conclusion is self-evident: 'Kein Hinweis in der Textüberlieferung und in sonstigen Traditionen deutet darauf hin, dass man unter dem N.N. (*pᵉlônî*) Jesus verstanden hätte' (49), although he is far from being the first to draw this conclusion (cf. A. Mayer, 1904, W. Bacher, 1905, J. Bergmann, 1908, H. L. Strack, 1910, idem–P. Billerbeck, 1922, K. H. Rengstorf, 1929, S. Zeitlin, 1933, M. Guttman, 1927, M. Goldstein, 1950, J. Z. Lauterbach, 1951, and K. Hruby, 1971).

Similarly, Maier finds himself able to reject also some other alleged Jesus-identifications in Mishnaic texts mainly on the basis of arguments of context, even if these arguments are of a slightly different nature. The two most important texts are found in the treatise Sanhedrin (VII, 5; X, 2), a treatise which primarily treats questions on criminal law (these texts are at least worth somewhat more attention than e.g. M Ab V, 19 f.; cf. Maier, 48 f.).

The first of these two Sanhedrin texts (VII, 5) belongs to a wider context concerning criminals, which are punishable by stoning, especially 'a stubborn and rebellious son' (Deut 21, 18 ff.) but also e.g. 'the blasphemer' (Lev 24, 10 ff.) (VII, 4–VIII). In this Mishnah it is defined that a 'blasphemer' is culpable only if he clearly has pronounced the Tetragrammaton. This leads over to the question: If so, how are the witnesses to behave in court, without making themselves culpable? In answer to this problem, the Mishnah refers to a *dictum* by R. Joshua b. Qorḥa: 'On every day [of the trial] the witnesses are examined by means of a substituted name, [like] "May Jose smite Jose" (*yakkæ Yōsē ʾæt Yōsē*).' The context makes evident without doubt that the name 'Jose' functions as a circumlocution for the Tetragrammaton, the meaning probably being that a 'blasphemer' is he who has uttered the Tetragrammaton making it the subject as well as the object. In the continuation of his dictum, R. Joshua states that after the conclusions of the negotiations in court, the most prominent of the three witnesses is to say the blasphemy expressly, though in camera. Thereby the judges stand up and rend their garments. Thereafter even the second and third witness are to give evidence that this is the blasphemy they heard—without repeating it. Obviously, the remote parallels between this *dictum* and fragmentary notes on the trial of Jesus in the version of Matthew (26, 59–66) have made some scholars inclined to identify 'Jose' with Jesus (thus first I. Levi, 1857–58). But, again, the general context of this Mishnah makes it certain that 'Jose' originally has nothing to do with Jesus: 'Jose' functions as a substitute for the Tetragrammaton in a trial formula. On a contextual basis Maier rightly holds the alleged Jesus-identification as 'völlig unbegründet' (51), a conclusion which several Jewish scholars long ago has maintained (e.g. Goldstein, 1950; Lauterbach, 1951).

The second one of the two Sanhedrin texts (X, 2) is more complicated since the larger context offers no help, the text being part of an excursus inserted in a comprehensive section concerning crimes punishable by burning, decapitation, and strangulation. Remarkably, this excursus is inserted at somewhat different places in various editions of the Mishnah. The contents of the excursus concern sinners which have no share in the world to come (the insertion is possibly influenced by X, 4). The answer to this problem is given in a typically rabbinic list mentioning three kings and four commoners who have no part in the coming life: the kings Jeroboam, Ahab [Ahaz?], and Manasseh, and the

commoners Balaam, Doeg, Ahitophel, and Gehazi. In this excursus some scholars have scented a Jesus-figure, viz. in Balaam. The cause for this is partially that the fore-going Mishnah discusses other persons/groups who will have no share in the world to come: those who hold that the doctrine of resurrection cannot be deduced from the Torah, those who deny the heavenly origin of the Torah; further liberals (Epicureans!), those who read extra-canonical scriptures (*sᵉfārīm /ha/ḥiṣōnīm*), and those who utter charms over a wound. In earlier scholarship this Mishnah was frequently interpreted as at least partly anti-Christian. Why not, then, the following Mishnah? Especially, since the Balaam-figure, which in rabbinic literature in general often functions as a *typos* of wickedness and blasphemy (see J. R. Baskin, Reflections of Attitudes towards the Gentiles in Jewish and Christian Exegesis of Jethro, Balaam and Job. Diss. Yale Univ. 1976, not used by Maier), in the anti-Christian literature of the Middle Ages also might be employed as a Jesus-*typos* (e.g. S. Krauss, Toledot Jeschu. Das Leben Jesu nach jüdischen Quellen, Budapest 1902 [reprint: Hildesheim 1977], p. 267 f). Nonetheless, the inner context in M Sanh X, 2 makes it extremely improbable that Balaam really should represent Jesus in this Tannaitic list. If so, what persons or groups are represented by the other six names. Actually, this list is of a type of which the classical rabbinic tradition swarms; the *Sitz im Leben* of this type is likely to have been the synagogue homily—the homiletical midrash. In other words: the context in M Sanh X gives no argument whatsoever for a Balaam-Jesus identification (cf. also [later] formulations of the major elements of the mishnah, like NumR XIV, 1; Tanḥ, *Mᵉṣōrāᶜ*, I; TanḥB, *ibid.*; ARN XXVIᴬ; XLIᴬ), and Maier's demonstration of this is both thorough and convincing, although not essentially original (cf. e.g. Bacher, 1905; Meyer [1904], 1914; Klausner, 1922; M. Guttmann, 1927; Goldstein, 1950; Lauterbach, 1951; Hruby, 1971).

The examples referred to demonstrate the relative certainty which occasionally might be achieved merely through a contextual analysis. In most cases, however, such an analysis alone is insufficient: the question of a possible Jesus-identification remains and claims for a traditio-historical investigation. The best example of this is offered by the two greatly comprehensive cycles of traditions revolving round the Jesus (ben) Pandera and Ben Stada figures (Maier, pp. 130–243).

As regards the early rabbinical traditions concerning Jesus (ben) Pandera (*Yšw Pndyrʾ, Yšw Pndrʾ, Yšwᶜ bn Pnṭyry, Yšwᶜ bn Pnṭrʾ* etc.), an identification with Jesus of Nazareth suggests itself to anyone conversant with the alledged Jewish Panthera-legend in Origen's *Contra Celsum*: the soldier Panthera as the biological father of Jesus. The temptation to a Jesus-identification will increase, when one finds a number of additional traits in the rabbinic texts which are seemingly related to those connected with the Jesus-polemics of Celsus' Jew: sorcery, healing in the name of Ben Pandera, the heretical nature of Ben Pandera etc. When one, furthermore, detects that parts of the Talmudic manuscript tradition attaches the name of *Yešuᶜ han-noṣrī* to some of these Ben Pandera texts, then it is time for a traditio-historical analysis! Let it suffice to note here that the rabbinical Ben Pandera tradition is contextually related to three spheres of interest: 1. the halakah concerning who is disqualified to perform a ritual slaughtering: the Samaritan (*kūtī*), the uncircumsized (*ᶜārel*), and the apostate (*yiśrāʾel mᵉšummād*, T Ḥul II, 22–24); 2. the halakah concerning idolatry and various types of splitting/heretical doctrine (*minūt* b AZ 16 b–17 a; 27 b); 3. the problem of *minūt* treated *en passant* in a Midrashic text (QohR I, 1, 8). The problem of apostasy/heresy is, thus, a topic common of the three major Ben Pandera contexts. Now, a minute traditio-historical analysis of the whole of this extremely entangled complex of Ben Pandera-related texts reveals that apparently there were originally two distinct figures who at a later stage coalesced: firstly the halakist Yešuᶜ ben *Pnṭyry* (c. 100 C.E., T Ḥul II, 24), secondly the idolater and magician Ben Pandera (2nd century C.E.). Nowhere in this complex of traditions do we find any clear indication pointing to a Jesus-identification in Tannaitic times; this is demonstrated with excellence by Maier, in prosecution of earlier critical studies (pp. 130–202.265, with notes).

Another traditio-historical brushwood is the one in which the Ben Stada figure hides (*Sṭdʾ, Sṭrʾ, Syṭrʾ, Swṭdʾ, Swṭrʾ* etc.). From a contextual point of view this tradition complex is related to two totally different halakic problems: 1. the Sabbath halakah and the connected prohibitions against writing (T Shab XI, 15; y Shab XII, 4 [13 d]; b Shab 104 b); 2. the question as to the measurements to be taken—in consequence of Deut 13—against a person leading others to idolatry (T Sanh X, 11; y Sanh VII, 16 [25 c–d]; cf. y Yeb XVI, 6 [15 d]; b Sanh 67 a). The points suggesting a Jesus-identification in this case are especially the idea that in two of the Sabbath texts (y-b) it is claimed that Ben Stada brought magical knowledge from Egypt (according to b he did so by means of tattoos on his body [i.e. sorcery tattoos?]), and the idea in the apostasy halakah that Ben Stada was a people's

seducer ultimately executed in Lod (by stoning according to T Sanh, y Sanh, and y Yeb; by hanging according to b Sanh). However, even in this case a thorough traditio-historical analysis makes plausible that many traits in the tradition represent an amalgamation of two initially distinct figures: an odd person (heretic?) who had tattooed his teaching on his skin, and a sorcerer who had smuggled magical formulas from Egypt by means of tattooings (Maier, 237). What is more important is that the transmitted text gives no evidence for a Jesus-identification in the Tannaitic period, i.e. even here Maier expands previous critical views (pp. 203–237, with notes).

Nevertheless, although Maier's fresh and solid analyses have brought critical research a long step forward, his strongly negative conclusions are hardly to be deemed final. The variations between related name forms are sources of uncertainty. A lack of knowledge regarding the historical figures referred to adds to this uncertainty. The combination of the Ben Pandera and the Ben Stada figures in some Babli-texts (Shab 104 b; Sanh 67 a) makes the consternation even greater, and the Ben Pandera of the Celsus-Jew, i.e. Jesus of Nazareth, does not diminish the unclarity. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Jewish scholar D. Rokeach as late as in 1970 advanced the theory that the designations Ben Stada and Ben Pandera respectively evolved between 70 and 100 C.E. in Jabne as a Jewish reaction to Christian propaganda, moreover, that there is a direct line of development from here to the Jew of Celsus and his Ben Panthera (Ben Sṭrʾ ben Pnṭyrʾ hū, Tarbiz 39/1969–70, pp. 9–18). The difficulty with Rokeach's explanation is that a traditio-historical investigation of the rabbinical texts in question does not actually furnish any undisputable evidence. His conclusion remains tentative—and so does, in the reviewer's opinion, Maier's negative standpoint. Furthermore, even if Maier's results were more clearly provable—and he is doubtlessly right in holding that a Jesus-identification cannot be proved for the Tannaitic period, hardly even for the Amoraitic—then when and why is this identification evolving, as we find it in certain later Babli texts (e.g. b AZ 16b–17a)? And how are we to explain that the Jew of Celsus applies a Ben Panthera haggadah on Jesus of Nazareth as early as in the Tannaitic period? Are we to reckon with an oral, popular identification between the rabbinical Ben Pandera – Ben Stada figures and the Jesus of the Christians in the 2nd or even 1st century C.E.—an identification not mirrored in the rabbinical literature until the beginning of the Middle Ages?

In addition, the very manuscript situation is a warning against claiming that Maier's conclusions are to be regarded as final. In a Baraita in b Sanh 43 a we find an illustrative example: evidently a Tannaitic text in an Amoraite context. Now, in this text, which not seldom is brought into connexion with the Ben Stada tradition—we actually come across the name of Jesus, in MS. München from 1343 and a few other text witnesses we also find the addition 'from Nazareth' (*han-noṣrī*). The text of the Baraita runs: 'On [the Friday and] the eve of the Passover Jesus [from Nazareth] was hanged. For 40 days [before the execution took place], a herald had been going before him [and cried]: This [Jesus from Nazareth] is going forth to be stoned; he has practised sorcery, seduced and enticed Israel to apostasy. Anyone, who has anything to say in his favour, let him come and do so'. The decisive difficulty regarding this text does not, of course, consist in its relation to New Testament statements, e.g. the problem whether the point of time mentioned could be brought into harmony with John 19, 14, or whether the sequence stoning-hanging might have something in common with intimations that Jesus was first killed and then hanged upon a tree (Acts 5, 30; 10, 39), or whether there ever was a Jewish law to the effect that in some cases—especially when a rebellious elder (*zāken mamrē*, cf. M Shab XI, 4) denied the authority of the oral law—the execution really was postponed until 40 days after the judgement had been passed (cf. Lauterbach, op. cit., 490–501). Nay, the significant difficulty is merely this: Does the text at all speak about Jesus of Nazareth? This question is answered in the positive by MS. München from the 14th century and a few other witnesses—but before this? In other words: the very manuscript situation makes it impossible to decide at present—eventually for ever—whether this Tannaitic text was speaking of Jesus in its own, original shape, or about an entirely different enticer to apostasy. We are not able to confirm the medieval identification as being that of the Tannaitic original, nor are we able to reject it as being merely late.

It does not appear particularly probable that we in the time to come will be able to certify the existence of authentic Tannaitic or even Amoraitic rabbinical *dicta* about Jesus of Nazareth. The character of the textual material, the lateness of the manuscripts, and the limitations of the traditio-historical analysis retain us from regarding the negative answer of to-day as definite. This also applies to the *per se* well documented conclusion of Maier's investigations: "Kontextanalyse, überliefe-

rungs-, stoff-, motiv- und formgeschichtliche Beobachtungen sprechen sogar dafür, dass es keine einzige rabbinische ,,Jesus-Stelle'' aus tannaitischer Zeit (bis ca. 220 n. Chr.) gibt' (p. 268); and likewise concerning the Amoraite period: 'Es gibt keine ,,Jesus-Stelle'', die als solche nicht eine umgemünzte ältere Tradition, welche mit Jesus Christus zunächst nichts zu tun hatte, darstellt' (p. 269).

Let us end with summing up only one critical question: Taking the anti-Christian polemics of the Celsus-Jew as a point of departure, we cannot but recover a number of parallels in rabbinic texts which in reality seem to speak about something entirely different, e.g. Ben Pandera or Ben Stada. Is it, then, impossible that in Jewish antiquity there evolved a Jesus haggadah of oral nature built on well-known rabbinical sayings, which were taken out of their actual context in order to serve polemical/iroical purposes? Is it impossible that such interpretative tendencies were in vogue as early as in the 2nd century, when Celsus wrote against Christianity? If not, when did this anti-Christian interpretation of rabbinical dicta in reality set in? The existence of such a reinterpretation is common in the Middle Ages, but when did it commence? As long as this question is unanswered, the problem of Jesus of Nazareth in the rabbinical literature is not to be regarded as solved.

Uppsala   *Tryggve Kronholm*

Fathi Talmoudi, *The Diglossic Situation in North Africa: A Study of Classical Arabic/Dialectal Arabic Diglossia with Sample Text in 'Mixed Arabic'*. Göteborg, 1984. Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis. *Orientalia Gothoburgensia* 8. 161 pp.

The Arabic linguistic situation is characterized by diglossia: the Classical language with its modern variety, mostly called Modern Standard Arabic, used for literary and other cultural purposes as against the dialects used for everyday communication. The opinions vary concerning the emergence of this diglossia. According to one view the spoken language of Mecca was typologically different from the Classical Arabic in which the Coran is written and a diglossic situation existed already in pre-Islamic Mecca. On this assumption K. Vollers built up his famous thesis—exposed in Volkssprache und Schriftsprache im alten Arabien, 1906, later taken up in a milder form by P. Kahle (see Fück, Arabīya, 1950, p. 3, note 1)—that the Coran was composed originally in this Meccan vernacular and later adapted to the rules of Classical Arabic particularly by the introduction of the $i^c r\bar{a}b$. Th. Nöldeke, in Beiträge zur semitischen Sprachwissenschaft, 1904, and Neue Beiträge, 1910, as well as C. Brockelmann, in his Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der Semitischen Sprachen, 1908–13, have proved that this was not the case, as the consonantal skeleton of the Coran demonstrates the existence of $i^c r\bar{a}b$. The existence of deviations also shows that the holy text has not been tampered with. Moreover, the traditions adduced by Kahle do not seem to prove that the Coran was recited without $i^c r\bar{a}b$ by the Prophet and his companions. They only prove that this certainly happened later on and that the grammarians felt obliged to warn against it. However, the opinion that there existed a diglossic situation at that time is favoured by scholars like A. Fischer, A. Spitaler, H. Wehr, W. Fischer and F. C. Corriente. The opposite view is held by Th. Nöldeke. According to this view the vernacular of Mecca, as well as the literary language of Mecca, belonged to the old Arabic type, to no remarkable degree different from the Standard Arabic used by the poets. J. Blau, in Origins of Neoarabic in Afroasiatic Linguistics, 4,4,1977, claims that no diglossia existed before Islam, at least not among the tribes who partook in the literary culture of the $^c arabiyya$. The poets composed Classical Arabic poetry free from Neoarabic or pseudo-correct elements without having any grammar of Classical Arabic at their disposal. This would sufficiently prove that the spoken language cannot have been too different from the supertribal Standard Arabic of the poets and the Coran. Instead, Arabic diglossia arose as a result of the great Arab conquests. In the towns of the new Arab empire various types of dialects emerged and a dichotomy arose between these Neoarabic types and the Bedouin language. In time also new Bedouin dialects arose. Whichever view one adopts it is a fact that we have diglossia at least from the first century of Islam. Two languages, the everyday language used by both the educated and the masses and the literary language accessible only to the educated, began to exist side by side. The literary language of which the Coran is the first testimony in prose, maintained its position as the prestige language. Although seldom reached in practice, the skill of correct speech and oral eloquence was appreciated much more than the advantages of the natural,

easy everyday speech. This situation greatly contributed to the preservation of Arabic as the sole literary medium and prevented it from branching out into several languages. On the other hand the dialects never acquired the status of written language. In the middle ages the literary language was reserved for an elite. It is not until the 20th century with the spread of education and the appearance of mass media that the diglossia became a general phenomenon and a problem (W. Diem, Hochsprache und Dialekt im Arabischen, 1974, p. 24). Nowadays, in the Arab countries, all speakers speak an illiterate Arabic language from childhood which is their mother tongue. Educated and non-educated use this language in their daily life and they think and feel in this language. Beside this language they learn a literary language at school which is to be used in writing and formal oral speech. This is the Modern Standard Arabic, the modern form of Classical Arabic. In the age of democracy more and more people want to partake in the life of society and make their voices heard in public life. In order to do that they must express themselves in the literary language. The restriction of the use of the literary language to an intellectual elite is nowadays seen as a serious social problem. W. Diem, Hochsprache, gives a detailed account of the attitudes among the Arabs towards this problem. The prestige of the Classical language as the vehicle of a religious and cultural heritage and the symbol of Arab nationalism is deeply rooted. The dialects, on the other hand, are seen as signs of ignorance, poverty and regionalism. For this reason there is a great resistance to accepting them as languages in their own right. The need for a language reform is nevertheless acute and various reforms have been proposed in order to fill the gap between the spoken and the literary language. One proposal is to create a variant between Classical Arabic and the vernaculars, a kind of semi-Classical Arabic that would be adapted to the social and political changes which affect the Arab society. This variant would serve as an effective means of education and function as a servant rather than a master of the masses (Talmoudi, pp. 26–7). According to the author of the book under review this attempt has not met with success, at least not in North Africa. This is partly due to political rivalries in the Arab world but also to cultural factors. The author recommends another solution. Colloquialism should be introduced as a means of relating this new language approach to the psychology, creativeness and life of the people who are meant to use it (pp. 27–8). For the North African countries F. Talmoudi therefore advocates a Common Standard Maghrebine Arabic which would be based on the cultural traditions and the common language features of North African Arabic. This language variant should be a self-sufficient and expressive medium which would give the majority of the people in these nations the opportunity to express in writing whatever they wish. The accomplishment of this language approach neccessi-tates the recognition of the diglossic situation and an urgent linguistic reform. Talmoudi, therefore, wants to raise the dialect to the status of a literary language. A person who has learnt to read and write would then have access to the written literature. This would ameliorate his acquisition of a koineized language form which could be developed to the Standard Arabic advocated by some reformers. The last part of this statement may be a little too optimistic. As the author himself points out (p. 30, n. 3) many scholars are of the opinion that the gap between Classical Arabic and the dialects is too wide and that it tends to remain unchanged at the structural level. H. Palva and others have shown how difficult it is to cross the gap (H. Palva, Notes on the classicization in Modern Colloquial Arabic, in Studia Orientalia, 40: 3, Helsinki, 1969, p. 41). The problem of grammatical interference in general is a much debated question of general linguistics. The opinions differ widely from an outright rejection of the possibility of such interference (Meillet and Sapir) to the opposite view: "there is no limit in principle to the influence which one morphological system may have upon another" (Bazell, quoted in H. Weinreich, Languages in contact (1953) 1979, p. 29). F. Talmoudi quotes M. C. C. Killeen who found grammatical borrowings from Classical Arabic in Spoken Egyptian Arabic and he claims to have found classicizational features operating also on the syntactic level in his material. He does not, however, develop this point further. His immediate concern is to create a working method for the present time when the gap is a fact. That is why he advocates the promotion of an active bilingualism Dialect/Classical Arabic instead of the diglossia that exists now. The author's conviction that a good acquisition of the mother tongue would help the person to learn also the Classical Arabic is corroborated by the experiences of teaching immigrant children their mother tongue alongside with the language of the new country.

   The author is not unaware of the consequences of realizing the bilingual programme. The use of the dialect in comprehensive schools calls for modification of the alphabet and the establishment of spelling rules (p. 33, n. 3). He does not go into a more extensive discussion of what this would imply in

terms of costs and efforts. He is of the opinion that the cheapest and most effective way of abolishing illiteracy would be to teach children in their mother tongue. It would only require the teaching of the alphabet to the illiterate to reintegrate them in society. The opposite view put forward by for instance A. Moatassime in Education et développement, Revue Tiers-monde, 15, 59–60, 1974, 'Le bilinguisme sauvage' is that the introduction of the dialect in schools would burden the already heavy programme of teaching.

The study of F. Talmoudi is part of a project studying the diglossic situation in North Africa. The main task of this project is to study the impact of the two language codes on each other and to investigate if the emergence of a North African koine is possible. The object of the study under review is to show what kind of levelling features the speakers of the three Maghrebine countries use in order to raise their language level in a formal discussion. The study demonstrates quite clearly how difficult it is even for an educated person to achieve anything like a literary Standard Arabic when trying to speak pure Arabic. The author has based his investigation on recordings of speakers of the three Maghrebine dialects in guided conversation on a formal subject. The informants were asked to speak their purest possible Arabic. They were not chosen for any particular proficiency in Classical Arabic and what they produced was a semi-formal spoken Maghrebine Arabic, a mixed variety of Arabic. The big gap between the two language levels made an harmonious mixture impossible. Hybrids and faulty grammatical constructions occur frequently. The levelling features used by the informants to raise their language level are mainly of three types: classicizational, colloquializational and interdia-lectalizational operating on all linguistic levels i.e. phonological, phonotactic, morphological, syntac-tical and lexical. By "interdialectalizational" the author means the same as "koineizational" used by Palva or "levelling" as used by H. Blanc, Style Variations in spoken Arabic, 1959. To study the lexicon the author classified all the items occurring in the appended text into four different groups: classical, modified classical, dialectal and modified dialectal.

The author accounts for the aim of the study in Chapter I. Chapter II contains the author's view on the subject of diglossia as exposed above. Chapter III contains the extensively annotated text and translation. The author's thorough acquaintance with the Maghrebine dialects enables him to give a full analysis of all features used by the individual speakers in order to raise their language level. It is interesting to note at least five instances of Eastern Arabic forms or structures which are interdialec-talizational features meant to raise the level of speech as Eastern Arabic enjoys a certain prestige in the Maghreb. Chapter IV is an inventory of the lexicon classifying all the items occurring in the text with reference to Classical Arabic and the vernaculars. As could be expected the lexicon is the area in which classicizational features are most abundant. Chapter V systematically deals with the levelling features as they operate on the phonological, phonotactic, morphological, syntactic and lexical levels. The syntactic level is the one where the speakers have the greatest difficulties. The inconsistent use of the rules of Classical Arabic gives rise to ungrammaticality and to a non-harmonious mixture of Arabic variants. Here or in the following chapter one would have welcomed some conclusive remarks on the results of this investigation answering questions like: on which level do classicizational features occur the most and on which level the interdialectalizational? which are the elements that remain essentially dialectal? is the impact of koineization stronger than that of Classical Arabic? which levelling features are consistent, which more accidental? do the three groups of speakers use the same kind of levelling devices or are there variations? The author's analysis gives an excellent basis for finding answers to these questions. Chapter VI, Conclusion, is a mere summary of Chapters II and V. Chapter VII contains the references.

The exterior presentation is in general clear and well done. A few typing errors occur: p. 139, fn 5, where the reference to fn 29 should be 22; p. 116, the fn 2 seems to refer to the paragraph on the *hamza* and not to the following paragraph on interdentals as indicated. Fn 1 on the same page lacks reference in the text. The conclusions are not always clearly marked out in the typing which may cause confusion, for instance p. 136: "To conclude . . .". One gets the impression that these words refer to the section C only whereas in reality they refer to the whole paragraph 5.5.1.2. As for the Conclusion p. 141, it would perhaps more adequately be numbered 5.7. instead of 5.6.1.3. as it refers to the whole chapter.

Until recently descriptionists of colloquial language usually "preferred detailed descriptions of 'pure' dialects or standard languages rather than the careful study of the mixed, intermediate forms often in wider use" (Ferguson, Diglossia, Word 15,2,1954, p. 340). The study of F. Talmoudi is such a

careful investigation of the mixed variety of Arabic that emerges as a result of interdialectal conversation on a formal subject between speakers of the three Maghrebine dialects. It gives us illuminating information about the mechanisms which regulate the speech of the interlocutors in this endeavour to raise their language level. The author estimates that the mixture produced corresponds to what H. Blanc called "elevated" or "semi-literary" colloquial which is the number 3 in a scale from 1 "plain colloquial" to 5 "Standard Classical" (Style Variations, p. 85). This level is, of course, heterogenic and unsatisfactory as a model. The study aims at showing in which direction the process is going, how a koineized Maghrebine colloquial language could emerge and probably, although the author does not go into that question, how it could be codified and regulated. F. Talmoudi's work opens up interesting perspectives and it is to be hoped that the project of which this study is a part will contribute to solving the serious problem of diglossia in the North African countries.

Uppsala   *Eva Riad*

Arabische Handschriften. Teil I, unter Mitarbeit von F.-J. Dahlmanns, P. Dressendörfer, G. Schoeler u. P. Schulz beschrieben von Ewald Wagner. XIX, 517 pp., Wiesbaden, 1976. (Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland hrsg. v. Wolfgang Voigt, Bd XVII, Reihe B. Arabische Handschriften, Teil 1.)

In this catalogue the eminent Arabist Ewald Wagner gives descriptions of 533 manuscripts selected out of those acquired by the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin after that the Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften by W. Ahlwardt was completed in 1899. The manuscripts date from 597/1200 to 1335/1916, the majority from the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. The author himself says in the introduction that the manuscripts have been picked out at random and that no great treasure happens to be included in their number, a statement that cannot but somewhat moderate one's interest whilst reading the introduction. The manuscripts cover the whole range of Arabic literature and do not form a homogenous collection from any particular field or area of interest. A certain interest, however, lies in the fact that more than half of their number come from a collection of manuscripts that belonged to the maronite collector Rušayd ad-Daḥdāḥ, acquired by the library in 1949. Around half the items of this collection are described here. Similar to the rest of the collection most of these works are Muslim, a fact that shows the open mind of this Christian collector. Ad-Daḥdāḥ's own critical works on Islam are also included (Cat. 518-520).

The catalogue is outlined in accordance with Ahlwardt's catalogue and conforms to the same classification. The descriptions of the manuscripts are divided into two sections, the first dealing with the exterior of the manuscript and the second with the contents. The technical description is made with great minuteness. In the second section we find the following pieces of information: the name of the author; the dates of his life, when known, with references to GAL[2], GALS and other bibliographical works; the title of the work in Arabic script as well as in transliteration; the beginning and the end of the text in Arabic script; characterization of the contents; a record of other manuscripts; remarks on the manuscript concerning completeness, structure etc. In the approximately fifty cases where we have to do with hitherto unknown or not described manuscripts, these remarks develop into small treatises on problems connected with authorship, identification of the manuscript etc. Here the author displays his great erudition. In no. 34, for instance, the author has managed to attribute a work entitled *As'ila ʿazīza ʿaẓīma taḥtāğu lahā l-ğawāb fī risāla mubīna bil-adilla aš-šarʿīya* to ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Muḥammad Axīzādā (d. 1605), mystic and *qāḍī* from Istanbul. The author's name is not mentioned in the manuscript, nor is a work with this title mentioned by any of Axīzādā's biographers. The manuscript or.oct. 2811 (37 and 377 in the catalogue) contains two works of the Ṣūfī ʿAlī Ibn Muḥammad al-Aṭwal al-Xalwatī al-Qasṭamūnī, called Qarabās Walī (17th century). E. Wagner provides a list of six works by this hitherto rather unknown author and clears up a questionmark in GAL in which no article is devoted to this author.

Some of the manuscripts date from the lifetime of the author. No. 94, Ibn al-ʿArabi, *ʿAnqaʾ muġrib fī maʿrifat xatm al-awliyāʾ wa-šams al-maġrib* was written 597/1200. No. 93, al-Qayṣarī's commentary of the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* is an autograph written in 1332. No. 11, al-Ğaʿbarī's excerpts of *Asbāb an-nuzūl* by al-Wāḥidī dates from 1309. The author died 1333. No. 501 is an autograph of al-Āqšahrī's *ar-Rawḍa al-firdawsīya* written 1391 and describing the tombs of saints that were venerated at Medina in the author's time.

..er no. 503, as-Suyūtī, *Ḥusn al-muḥāḍara fī axbār Miṣr wal-Qāhira*, a number of other manu-
..ipts are listed. One manuscript of this work kept at the University library of Uppsala, is not
recorded here, nor in GAL. It is described in C. J. Tornberg, Codices Arabici, Persici et Turcici
bibliothecae regiae universitatis Upsaliensis, 1869, nr 264 = J. G. Sparwenfeldt, Catalogus centuriae
librorum rarissimorum, nr IX. The incipit as it is recorded in the catalogue under review is preceded in
this manuscript by the *basmala* and *allahumma lā sahla illā mā ǧaʿaltahu sahlan walaka iḏā šita
ǧaʿalta l-ḥazra sahlan*. The manuscript is dated 977/1569. Likewise one manuscript of aṭ-Ṭaʿālibī,
Yatimat ad-dahr fī maḥāsin ahl al-ʿaṣr (here no. 333) is kept in Uppsala, Tornberg no. 296 =
Sparwenfeldt XX.

The 533 manuscripts are described in 446 pages. After an extensive bibliography we find the
following indices: Titel in arabischer Schrift; Titel in Umschrift; Verfasser; Schreiber; Andere
Personennamen; Geographische Angaben und Baulichkeiten; Verzeichnis der Miniaturen; Biblio-
thekssignaturen; Katalognummern der Sammlung Daḥdāḥ; Datierte Handschriften. The titles ren-
dered in Arabic script are those that occur in the manuscripts described whereas those rendered in
transliteration include all current titles of the works concerned. For this reason the latter index is
more useful.

The catalogue holds the highest standards in all respects and one must be grateful for E. Wagner's
valuable contribution to the series Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland.

Uppsala   *Eva Riad*

Adel Y. Sidarus, *Ibn ar-Rāhib's Leben und Werk*. Ein koptisch-arabischer Enzyklopädist
des 7./13. Jahrhunderts, Freiburg, 1975. XXXVIII, 218 pp. + 11 Tafeln und Dokumentenbei-
heft. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen. Band 36.

The 13th century was the golden age of Christian Arabic theological and scientific literature in Egypt.
This is interesting. One would have thought that the political and ecclesiastical conditions of the
time—the crusade wars, the inner struggle for power between the Ayyubides and the Mamluks and
the confusion that prevailed within the Coptic church during the long sedisvacancy of the patriarchate
1216–1236 and also afterwards—would have hampered cultural and spiritual activity. Instead we
witness a flourishing age of science and literature.

Among the outstanding Christian writers of this period we find Nušūʾ al-Xilāfa Abū Šākir Ibn ar-
Rāhib, hitherto mostly known as historian and author of the so called Chronicon orientale erroneously
ascribed to him. Thanks to the author of the book under review, Adel Sidarus, this personality and his
encyclopaedic work have been brought into the focus of attention. The author has thereby given him
his due place beside his two contemporaries Muʾtaman ad-Dawla Abū Isḥāq Ibn al-ʿAssāl and Šams
ar-Riʾāsa Abū l-Barakāt Ibn Kabar, as an exponent of this upsurge of intellectual activity among the
Copts in Egypt.

The only old source of information on Ibn ar-Rāhib that we have is the ecclesiastical-encyclopaedic
work *Miṣbāḥ aẓ-ẓulma* by Abū l-Barakāt Ibn Kabar, who mentions his name and three of his works.
By analysing his full name, as it has been handed down by the tradition, and by studying all the titles
assigned to him together with what can be gathered from the manuscripts of his works, and finally
combining this information with the data of the general history of the Coptic patriarchate of his time
A. Sidarus has successfully drawn a maximum of information about the life of Ibn ar-Rāhib.

Ibn ar-Rāhib came from a distinguished Coptic family. His father as-Sanā ar-Rāhib played an
important role during the sedisvacancy of the patriarchate. He acted more or less as an interim
patriarch and continued to exercise a great influence within the church. He also enjoyed a great
reputation among the Muslims. His son Abū Šākir seems to have made a career within the state
administration. From what can be gathered from the titles assigned to him he must have held a high
office by the year 1249. He will also have played an important role earlier on, at the election of the
patriarch 1243. Apparently he began his scholarly work quite late in life. The objective of the book
under review is to present and analyse Ibn ar-Rāhib's four great works together with their text
tradition. These are: *Kitāb at-tawārīx*, a Coptic scala with grammar, *Kitāb aš-šifā* and *Kitāb al-
burhān*.

In this work, the first systematic study done of Ibn ar-Rāhib's life and work, the author brings new

light on several points thereby modifying the judgements of earlier scholars. One of his contributions concerns the *Kitāb at-tawārīx*, a work dealing with chronology as well as world and church history, used by Christian and Muslim historiographers and translated into Aethiopic. A. Sidarus (in Ch. 2) proves that Ibn ar-Rāhib beyond doubt is the author of this work and clarifies its relationship to the "Chronicon orientale" which turns out to be a revised summary of the work of Ibn ar-Rāhib made by somebody else. In this question G. Graf went wrong as did also M. Chaine before him (see GALC, II, pp. 432–3).

By the 13th century Arabic had taken over completely as the language of the people. In fact, the arabization proceeded very quickly in Egypt. Already in the 10th century, the bishop Severus Ibn Muqaffaᶜ complained about the prevailing ignorance of religious matters owing to poor knowledge of the Coptic language and—as a consequence—poor understanding of Coptic liturgy. In the 13th century, grammars and dictionaries of Coptic were composed with Arabic works on grammar and lexicography as models. This proves that the Coptic language had fallen into oblivion and was taught as a foreign language. Ibn ar-Rāhib, in 1263–4, also wrote one such philological work which comprises a grammar and a vocabulary after a known pattern, the grammar being presented as a *muqaddima* to the vocabulary. Only the *muqaddima* has survived. A. Sidarus (in Ch. 3) does not agree with G. Graf's supposition that the vocabulary may never have been written. By thorough examination of the prologue to the *muqaddima*/grammar he is able to render a quite clear picture of what the vocabulary must have looked like, since method and aim of the vocabulary is outlined in this prologue. He arrives at the conclusion that the vocabulary in many respects was superior to that of Ibn al-ᶜAssāl with which it has been unfavourably compared by, for instance, A. Mallon. As for the *muqaddima*/grammar A. Sidarus shows that the two last parts are genuine appendices and not anonymous small praefationes as is often stated in the handbooks and that they also contain more originality than one generally attributes to them.

After a brief analysis of the christological-exegetical work *aš-Šifā᾽* (Ch. 4), the author consecrates the last part, chapters 5 and 6, constituting almost half of the book, to his main object of research namely the *Kitāb al-burhān*, the summa theologica of Ibn ar-Rāhib. This part is meant to be the prolegomena to a planned edition. *Kitāb al-burhān* is divided into 50 questions subdivided into sections of varying length and importance dealing with philosophical and theological problems as well as ethical and ritual questions. The aim is to serve the defence of the Christian faith (especially the monophysite) as well as practical religious instruction.

It cannot have been an easy task to systematize and analyse the huge material contained in this book. The approximately 500 closely written manuscript pages are not arranged logically by the author and they vary both in the treatment of themes and employment of methods. One must admire A. Sidarus for his systematic arrangement and clear disposition of the material. Arab medieval authors were fond of breaking down their material into endless divisions and subdivisions not always retaining logic and clarity. Ibn ar-Rāhib is no exception. The author of the book under review is not exempt of this love of *taqsīm* himself, but in his case it serves clarity and order.

In Chapter 5, the author disposes the questions in three parts: I. Pars theologica, II. Pars ethica et disciplinaria, III. Pars theologico-liturgica, and gives a summary analysis of each question. The prolegomena logica (= questions 1–8 in Ibn ar-Rāhib's text) and the christological treatise (= questions 41–43) are analysed more extensively. Chapter 6 gives an exhaustive account of the text tradition with minute descriptions of the three Vatican manuscripts on which the author has based his work and summary descriptions of the other manuscripts. A stemma illustrates the relationship between the manuscripts. The book contains the following indices: Sachregister, Allgemeines Namensregister, Register der modernen Autoren, Arabische Personen- und Autorennamen, Handschriftverzeichnis, Verzeichnis der arabischen Termini, Verzeichnis der griechischen Termini. The book ends with 22 pages of "Tafeln", reproductions of manuscript pages.

Prefaces are often brought up for comment in the analysis. The author uses words like "Vorwort", "Vorrede", "Prolog", "Einleitung" interchangeably for stylistic variation. This is likely to cause some confusion. When the author talks about Ibn ar-Rāhib's introduction to the scala and grammar as a "Prolog" in the text (p. 69) and as a "Vorwort" in the note (17), for instance, one is not quite sure whether he refers to the same text or not. In view of the various functions of the preface: "Vorwort" as "Fürwort" or as a mere introduction to the subject, it would perhaps be a good idea to distinguish between different kinds of prefaces in the terminology used.

It has not been the objective of the author to evaluate the *Kitāb al-burhān* as to its position among the philosophico-theological summas and the ecclesiastical encyclopaedias of Christian, especially Coptic, Arabic literature. The value of Ibn ar-Rāhib's work seems to lie less in his own thinking than in the use he makes of numerous philosophical and theological texts from Christian, Muslim and antique sources—he builds, for instance, a long treatise on the theodicy entirely on the *Kitāb al-arbaʿīn fī uṣūl ad-dīn* by the great Muslim theologian Faxr ad-Dīn Ibn al-Xaṭīb ar-Rāzī. A. Sidarus has laid a solid foundation for such an evaluation and it is to be hoped that he will complete his work on Ibn ar-Rāhib with a comprehensive study of the latter's place in the history of Arabic, especially Christian literature.

Uppsala　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*Eva Riad*

Bertil Wiklander, *Prophecy as Literature*. A Text-Linguistic and Rhetorical Approach to Isaiah 2–4. (Coniectanea Biblica. Old Testament Series 22. Ed. T. Mettinger and H. Ringgren.) Stockholm 1984. Liber. C. W. K. Gleerup. 278 p.

Since 1973 I have been developing a new general theory of language, including also the fundamentals of text linguistics. It is thus understandable that I will, in the future, have to decide, at some length, on the scientific value of this book. For the moment I must confine myself to a short *Anzeige*. First the contents of the book. Preface, pp. vii–x. 1. General Introduction, pp. 1–38; 2. General Aspects of Text Theory, pp. 39–48; 3. Provisional Delimitations of the Object of Interpretation, pp. 49–52; 4. The written Text and the Utterance Units, pp. 53–81; 5. Some Pragmatic Features in the Macro-Structure, pp. 82–96; 6. The Syntactic Dimension, pp. 97–107; 7. The Semantic Dimension, pp. 108–153; 8. The Pragmatic Dimension, pp. 154–242; 9. Summary of Results and General Conclusions, pp. 243–49; Abbreviations, pp. 250–52; Bibliography, pp. 253–78.

In the publisher's blurb we read: "The book may in many ways be read as a 'pedagogical handbook' on the use of text linguistics and rhetoric in biblical interpretation." In any case it is a handbook on Mr. Wiklander's use of what *he* calls text linguistics in dealing with biblical texts. To begin with, I must say some words concerning the term "text linguistics". This term is today very often used to designate what might be called modernized philology of literature. But it *should* mean the linguistics of the text as a linguistic level. In order to know the implications of this, we ought also to know the true nature of the object of linguistics as a *science*. Who does? In a letter to Antoine Meillet from 1894 Ferdinand de Saussure says: "Mais je suis bien dégoûté de tout cela, et de la difficulté qu'il y a en général à écrire seulement dix lignes ayant le sens commun en matière de faits de langage ... Sans cesse, cette ineptie de la terminologie courante, la nécessité de la réformer, et de montrer pour cela quelle espèce d'objet est la langue en général ... Cela finira malgré moi par un livre où, sans enthousiasme, j'expliquerai pourquoi il n'y a pas un seul terme employé en linguistique auquel j'accorde un sens quelconque." (E. Roulet, F. de Saussure, 1975, p. 4.) It is obvious that the author of the book under review does not share the pessimism of de Saussure. To W. "linguistics" seems to be a completely established science, even so established that we can speak of "text linguistics". However, as far as text linguistics concerns he seems not to be altogether sure of his case, for he says that "in view of the fluid state of research at present, it is impossible to take much for granted in a text-linguistic study" (p. 31). I would say that I am not inclined to take much for granted in a text linguistic study of the kind the author presents here, and I shall give some reasons for this attitude of mine.

On p. 30 the author states: "The more recent development of text linguistics and discourse analysis has been characterised by an expansive broadening of concerns by a full-scale interdisciplinary 'fertilisation' of insights from the philosophy of language, logic, psychology, sociology, stylistics, rhetoric, theory of communication, semiotics, cybernetics, hermeneutics, action theory, and various other branches of linguistic and literary theory." Amen. And, indeed, Mr Wiklander is himself not a bad fertilizer of Old Testament philology. His medium is not seldom the *floscage*, and sometimes the medium is the message. However, this state of affairs is not only revealing but also alarming. For it was a methodical pluralism of this kind that gave rise to the endeavours of de Saussure and Hjelmslev: to find the specific linguistic viewpoint (cf. Fenno-Ugrica Suecana 5/1982, p. 243). For without knowing the true nature of the human language we cannot create a linguistic theory of some solidity,

let alone a theory of text linguistics. It is true that pure linguistics and text linguistics are not today the same thing. They are, however, different aspects of the same phenomenon, the so-called natural language (OS 29, pp. 76 ff.). For language exists exclusively in texts, as texts. Thus linguistics is *per se* always in some way also text linguistics, the text being the first articulation.

Language manifests itself to us as *textual behaviour*, and we are thus, first and foremost, concerned with the grammar of the text. Here we have to distinguish between the text as an *entity by derivation* and the text as an *entity by abstraction*. In the first case the text is integrated in *culture*, among many other expressions of culture, in the second case the text is considered from a purely linguistic viewpoint. If we wish to reach the level of the text as an entity by derivation I think it is wise to start from the text as an entity by abstraction, disregarding, to begin with, the cultural factor.

It is obviously important to try to use terms that have *something* to do with the level they are supposed to define. Thus the term "sentence" should not be used to designate the *immediate constituents* of a text (OS 30, p. 129, n. 1). The only relevant minimal unit at the level of the text is the *texteme*. Let us take the following example: *wa-ybārāk* $^{ʾä}lōhīm$ *ʾät-Nōᵃx wa-ʾät-bānāw* = text I; *wa-yyōmär* $^{ʾä}lōhīm$ *lāhäm: pǝrū ū-rǝbū ū-milʾū ʾät-hāʾāräṣ* = text II. Now an author wants to express these facts in one single text, thereby suppressing the second $^{ʾä}lōhīm$: *wa-ybārāk* $^{ʾä}lōhīm$ *ʾät-Nōᵃx wǝ-ʾät-bānāw wa-yyōmär lāhäm: pǝrū ū-rǝbū ū-milʾū ʾät-hāʾāräṣ* = text III (Genesis 9,1). Being now only parts of the text III, the texts I and II change their *ontological state* being reduced to textemes integrated by the new text. A consequence of the new state is a *change of quality* on the part of the textemes, these being now picture-signs in the textual sign-picture (III).

Now all kinds of textual behaviour are integrated in culture as "literature" (OS 30, p. 205). Thus the degree of literarity is part of the text considered as a network (OS 29, p. 99). This means that "literarity" can be established as a specific linguistic level of the sign (OS 30, pp. 112 ff.). In linguistics the level of literarity is observable as supratextual discursivity, as supralexemic and supratextemic discursivity. Let us after this contemplate Section 4.2 with the title "The utterance units".

W. says: "I shall begin by segmenting the discourse into its basic units of meaning, its 'utterance units'" (p. 63). In Isaiah 2,1 we read: *ha-ddābār* $^{ʾa}šär$ *xāzā Yǝšaʿyāhū Bän-ʾĀmōṣ ʿal-Yǝhūdā wī-rūšālāyim*. This could, of course, be called an utterance by Isaiah, but why adopt a phrastic attitude to the problem and then immediately "segment" the utterance in "units of meaning"? There is by no means a direct way from utterance to meaning in the sense of W. (cf. OS 29, pp. 37 f.). For in W. these units are: *ha-ddābār* "This is a word" / $^{ʾa}šär$ *xāzā Yǝšaʿyāhū Bän-ʾĀmōṣ* "Isaiah son of Amoz saw it" / *ʿal-Yǝhūdā wī-rūšālāyim* "It concerns Judah and Jerusalem" (p. 65). The astonished reader finds now that W. has 'rewritten each one of them into the underlying proposition', 'leaving the syntactic links aside' etc. This procedure W. calls his "translation" which "should be regarded as a convenient way of formalising the Hebrew text" (p. 63). How can one formalize an utterance by rewriting it to "main clauses", here called "propositions", a term belonging to philosophy? Immediately, and with some smartness, W. remarks: "For translation as a valid tool in linguistic description, see Barr etc." However, it is obvious that W. was never sufficiently trained in linguistics and Semitic philology. He therefore appears, sometimes, as a defenceless victim of the numerous books and articles with which he has adorned his *opus*.

Now, in our case we are in the position of dealing with a texteme being in itself able to function as a text. For the utterance *ha-ddābār* $^{ʾa}šär$ *xāzā Yǝšaʿyāhū Bän-ʾĀmōṣ* is a phraseme (= the expression of the texteme) the content of which is a texteme functioning as a statement—a heading or a conclusion. Considered as a text the utterance in question is composed of two textemes, one in *casus rectus*, and one in *casus obliquus* (OS 30, pp. 105 ff.): "This (is) the word that Isaiah the son of Amoz saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem", an English rendering of the pragmatic referent of the text as a sign, the metareferent being "communication" (Principia, passim); it is with the pragmatic referent and the supratextual discursivity (OS 30, p. 129) that an interpreter of the textual behaviour of Isaiah is primarily concerned. The pragmatic referent is to be considered as the result of a realization in *la parole* of the textual category as a sign, including the metareferent.

Now, observing the *concatenation* of the textemes we find that it is the expression of a certain kind of textual *configuration*, to be compared with Isaiah 1,1 *xᵃzōn Yǝšaʿyāhū Bän ʾĀmōṣ* $^{ʾa}šär$ *xāzā ʿal-Yǝhūdā wī-rūšālāyim ...*, showing another kind of textual configuration. Nothing can stop the linguist regarding this as a *variant* of a concatenation such as *hä-xāzōn* $^{ʾa}šär$ *xāzā* etc., that is, conforming to

2,1. To the philologist, however, things appear in another light, for he must consider the difference in place between the two kinds of concatenation within the text as a whole. Moreover, he has to pay attention to the difference in meaning between the lexemes *xāzōn* and *dābār*, belonging to different semantic fields. As a textual category Is. 1,1 could, from an aspectual point of view, be envisaged as a static texteme, and, at the same time, as a textual radical (a macroradical) in the text of Isaiah. The function of the radical is to be a *techneme*, a picture-sign of a certain degree in a sign-picture (the text as a network), the technemic value being ultimately dependent on the position of the radical. In our text the radical *ha-ddābār ʾªšär* etc. is, in its initial position, realized with the connotation of "heading", belonging to what I call the supratextual discursivity (OS 29, p. 102).

Before I proceed to the discussion of some of the exegetical results of the author I would like to say some words on a phenomenon of capital importance to every kind of interpretation of texts, namely what I call the *act of understanding*. Here I deviate in some respects from Martin Heidegger (Sein und Zeit) as well as from Paul Ricoeur (Le conflit des interprétations), although I am not, within the framework of a short review, in the position of dealing with this question at length.

What we understand is, from the point of view of scientific humanism (OS 30, p. 184, n. 3), always a text, it may concern the states and the events of the world or a text in the proper sense of the word. For the events or states of the world are perceived by us as a kind of network forming a text which we interpret and thus understand. It is never the so-called objective world we understand but the world interpreted as a text (*textus* means "web"). However, we are *ourselves* included in this text of the world, a curious position, of fundamental importance for the ontological state of the act of understanding. For I shall contend that it is through *us* that the world understands itself, so to speak. I have maintained that *la vida es sueño*, in the sense namely, that when a human being "lives" it may be said of this life that it is the principle of life that "dreams" (OS 30, p. 131, n. 33). In a similar way, I now contend that the network of the world becomes, through the medium of man, its own understanding. From this point of view I can subscribe to the opinion according to which "understanding is the medium of ontological disclosure" (Heidegger). Now "understanding" is *form* (= an organization of elements, cf. OS 29, p. 51), and considered as a noetic morpheme we may say that an act of understanding is a minimal process, the impression of which is, on its specific level, its own perception and *vice versa*, and which, at the same time, is its own referent (level of understanding), cf. Principia, p. 54. This means that the concept of "die Welt in ihrer Faktizität" must ultimately include also the observer, the subject. This does not, however, mean "la mort du sujet" of the structuralists, but a natural miracle, and only such kinds of miracle come from God. The rise of "subjectivity" is a true miracle by the help of which, for instance the atom "knows" its behaviour—through the medium of the scientist. Now Wiklander says: "The question of the relevancy of the biblical texts to modern man has become an acute problem in the field of Christian theology" (Preface, p. VII). However, I cannot see how *los intereses creados* in the shape of a "text-linguistic and rhetorical approach" could possibly help Christian theology to solve the alleged problem. To speak in an oecumenical vein: also Jewish theology has the same problem. Will text linguistics à la Wiklander help to solve it?

Having stated this I shall confine myself to some philological remarks to the pages 70–81, in the hope to be able to make some contributions to the subject treated by W., i.e., Isaiah 2–4, according to Buhl "en fullstændig afsluttet Profeti".

According to W. "there exists no conclusive evidence for the view that *nhr* I is at all attested in Old Testament Hebrew" (p. 70), although *nhr* I can, in linguistics, only mean the ideomorpheme *nhr* I (OS 29, pp. 85 ff.), richly attested in *nāhār* etc. Moreover, the versions seem to be against W.'s interpretation 2,2: *yitpanyān*, ἤξουσιν, *nəsakkōn*, *fluent.* — I find W.'s treatment of *yaśpīqū* 2,6 rather uninteresting. From a Semitic point of view we may posit a **śapiq* "to be empty, free, vacant". If you are free *for* someone you are at his disposal, you have time and place for him, you care for him. This is Arabic *šafiqa ʿalā fulānin* "to have compassion with, to care for". If there is place for something it is sufficient: *ʾim-yiśpoq ʾªfar Šōmərōn li-šᶜālīm lə-kål-hāᶜām* "si suffecerit pulvis Samariae pugillis omnis populi". If something is sufficient it may be abundant. Thus I suggest a **śāfeq, yiśpoq lə* "to be sufficient, abundant for", and *hiśpīq bə* "let it abound with", cf. Latin *vacare alicui*! To this intransitive **śāfeq* "be empty etc." there could also have existed a transitive **śāfaq* "empty out", which perhaps is preserved in *sāfaq* Jeremiah 48,26; of this I am, however, not sure. — W. changes *wa-šāfēl* in 2,12 into *wə-šefål* that he calls "a one-part nominal clause" and translates as "And humiliation will come", 'Humiliation' serving, as he says, "as the logical (!) subject of the units

2: 13–16''. However, Is. 2,9.11.17; 5,15; 29,4 seem to tell us that *wšpl* contains a finite verb, this expression constituting a separate, aspectually static texteme: ''and it/they shall be humiliated''. Moreover, even the versions are against W. here. — As for *śəkīyōt* 12,16 W. calls the comparison with Ugaritic *ṯkt* an ''equally valid solution'' (p. 75). I would not say that. Although the *bīrānəyāt šufrā* of the Targum (''beautiful palaces'') is not entirely clear to me, the ϑέα of the Septuagint, the *dawqä* of the Syriac version as well as the *visu pulchrum* point in the direction of ''beautiful, or precious sights''. — I must say that I have also some difficulty in accepting W.'s handling of 2,20; suffice it to mention *hišlīk la-kkäläb* Ex. 22,30. — That *ba-mmäh* 2,22 should be *bāmäh* = *bəhēmäh* ''beast'' I cannot really believe, and, once again, the versions are—on the whole—against W. — 3,3. Beyond the statement ''The translation is uncertain'' W. has not much to offer. It is here also a question of the ideomorpheme behind Hebrew **xäräš: C-rs* or *ḥrṯ*. W. prefers ''magician'', Buhl ''Haandværksmester''; S *xakkim naggārä*, LXX σοφὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα, and *sapientem de architectis* may point in the direction of *xārāšīm* to *xārāš* ''faber''. — 3,4. W. renders *nəʿārīm* by ''servants'', a translation based on ''the recognition that the overall emphasis in 3: 1–15 is upon the contrast between men in high and low social, political and religious office'' (p. 76); for this translation cf. also *naʿⁿarē śārē ha-mmədīnōt* 1 K. 20,15. Moreover I would not render *taʿⁿlūlīm* ''by mischiefs''. I take it to be an *abstractum pro concreto*: **taʿⁿlūl = ʿōlēl* from *ʿwl*, cf. Akkadian *tarbītum*. For the ''wantonness'' of the *taʿⁿlūlīm* cf. my remarks on Arabic *ṣabīy-* as well as the semantic field of *päti* from a Semitic point of view (Studia Orientalia in memoriam Caroli Brockelmann, 1968, p. 164). And, what about *naʿar/zāqēn* in 4,5? — As for the treatment of *xōbēš* p. 76–7, I cannot find that W. has contributed something new with his ''text linguistics'', cf. *xubbāšū* 1,6; T has *rēš*, LXX ἀρχηγός, S *rēšā*, V *medicus*; the metaphorical use of the *xōbēš* is quite in accordance with 1,6. – 3,8. W.: ''They distress the humble regarding his glory'', cf. T *margəzīn qᵈdām yəqāreh*; ἐταπεινώθη ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν; S *la-ʿnānā d-iqāreh*; V *ut provocarent oculos majestatis ejus*. The reason why I think we should follow the Scroll and V is, for instance, the expression Ps. 78,17 *la-mrōt ʿälyōn*, cf. *himrā ʾät-pī Yahwä*, *ʾimrē ʾēl* etc.; LXX < *ʿānī kəbōdām*?

This may suffice for a short ''Anzeige''. The result has turned out to be highly negative. It is, then, only to hope that the ambitious and energetic author will be applauded by his colleagues in the exegetical business.

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