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Vol. XIX-XX, 1970-1971

<i>Peterson, Bengt J.</i> : Ausgewählte ägyptische Personennamen nebst prosopographischen Notizen aus Stockholmer Sammlungen	3
<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Demotische Steuerquittungen aus ptolemäisch-römischer Zeit	23
<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Zwei demotische Grabstelen	49
<i>Ahlström, G. W.</i> : An Israelite God Figurine from Hazor	54
<i>Meinardus, Otto</i> : The Panagia of Soumela: Tradition and History	63
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Arabische Literatur und orientalische Antike	81
<i>Toll, Christopher</i> : Minting Technique according to Arabic Literary Sources	125
<i>Sjöberg, Åke W.</i> : Hymns to Meslamtaea, Lugalgirra and Nanna-Suen in Honour of King Ibbisuen (Ibbisin) of Ur	140
<i>Jewett, Iran B.</i> : FitzGerald and Jami's <i>Salâmân and Absâl</i>	179
<i>Wikander, Stig</i> : Maya and Altaic III	186
<i>Menges, Karl H.</i> : The European Word for Pearl of Dravidian Origin?	205
<i>Book Reviews</i>	216
<i>Works Received</i>	225

Vol. XXI, 1972

<i>Peterson, Bengt J.</i> : A Tomb-Relief from the End of the First Intermediate Period	3
<i>Meinardus, Otto</i> : A Note on Some Maronite Monasteries in the Wādī Qadisha	9
<i>Ahlberg, Hans</i> : Esquisse d'une théorie sur la formation de <i>qitl</i> en arabe	26
<i>Riad, Eva</i> : Miskawayh sur la colère	34
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Zur arabischen Wortkunde II	53
<i>Toll, Christopher</i> : Die Wurzel PRŞ im Hebräischen	73
<i>Sjöberg, Åke W.</i> : Die göttliche Abstammung der sumerisch-babylonischen Herrscher	87
<i>Rausing, Gad</i> : The Earliest Date in History?	113
<i>Poppe, Nikolaus</i> : Über einige Verbalstammbildungssuffixe in den altaischen Sprachen	119
<i>Book Reviews</i>	142
<i>Works Received</i>	154

Vol. XXII, 1973

<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Demotische Bescheinigungen und Abrechnungen	3
<i>Grotzfeld, Heinz</i> : L'expérience de Sa'îd 'Aql. L'arabe libanais employé comme langue littéraire	37
<i>Hartmann, Angelika</i> : La conception gouvernementale du calife an-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh	52
<i>Riad, Eva</i> : A propos d'une définition de la colère chez al-Kindī	62
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Aramaica II	66
<i>Johanson, Lars</i> : Sprachbau und Inhaltssyntax des Türkischen	82
<i>Sjöberg, Åke W.</i> : Hymn to Numušda with a Prayer for Siniqīšam of Larsa and a Hymn to Ninurta	107
<i>Holst, Staffan</i> : Into the Indus Script	122
<i>Walldén, Ruth</i> : Contribution to the Study of the Pronunciation of <i>i-</i> and <i>e-</i> sounds in Tamil, especially before retroflex Consonants	127
<i>Book Reviews</i>	182
<i>Works Received</i>	211

Vol. XXIII-XXIV, 1974-1975

<i>Meinardus, Otto F. A.</i> : Coptic Pilgrimage Testimonies	3
<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Demotische Bescheinigungen über Begräbnissteuer	7

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FRITHIOF RUNDGREN

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Contents

<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Demotische Ostraka. Varia II	5
<i>Riad, Eva</i> : Šafā ^ʿ a dans le Coran	37
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : The Poem “Dayr ʿAbdūn” by Ibn alMuʿtazz	63
<i>Almbladh, Karin</i> : hélāk—“miserable”, and ḥīn—“strength” and “supplication”	133
<i>Eskhult, Mats</i> : Hebrew and Aramaic ʾāloqīm	137
<i>Gutwirth, E.</i> : The ‘World Upside Down’ in Hebrew	141
<i>Kronholm, Tryggve</i> : The Vale of Tears	149
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Aramaica IV	173
<i>Book Reviews</i>	185
<i>Works Received</i>	216

Demotische Ostraka. Varia II

STEN V. WÄNGSTEDT

Von den im Folgenden veröffentlichten sechszwanzig demotischen Ostraka gehören neun der Sammlung des British Museum (DO BM). Sie liegen hier in Pausen vor, aber die Texte sind nach der ersten Abzeichnung ein zweites Mal nachgeprüft worden. Von den dreizehn Oxfordscherben gehören acht der Bodleian Library (DO B) und fünf dem Ostrakonbestand des Ashmolean Museum (DO A). Aus der Papyrussammlung der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek (DO Wien) liegen fünf Ostraka vor, und eines (DO W), in Kairo gekauft, gehört nunmehr der Universitätsbibliothek zu Helsinki.

Der Inhalt der Texte ist sehr verschiedenartig. Neun (I–IX) sind Abrechnungen, und acht (X–XVII) sind allgemein als Briefe bezeichnet worden, wenn auch einige von ihnen als Amtsschreiben zu betrachten sind. In einigen Fällen ist die Abfassung des Textes derartig, dass die Deutung wegen textanalytischer Probleme Schwierigkeiten bietet.¹

In Bezug auf die Herkunft der Dokumente dürften die Mehrzahl thebanisch sein. Drei sind aus Gebelên und ein aus Kous, während vier schlechthin als oberägyptisch bezeichnet sind. Die ältesten datieren vom Jahr 259/58 v. Chr. und die jüngsten aus frühromischer Zeit.

Abrechnung

I. DO A 38. Grösse: 17,2×9,8 cm. Theben. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

Vorderseite


1. *p3 wn n ht 439 kt 5*
2. *wp.t Pa-hr p3 sht.t*
3. *h3 n3 h3.t.w 'n' [n3] 'hm'-hl.w*
4. *ht 17 kt 5 T3-šr.t-Hnm ht 10*
5. *r in T3-šr.t-Mw.t r pr Mnt nb M3t ht 10*
6. *r ht 37 kt 5 m-s3=w ht 402 'P3-šr-Mn'*
7. *s3 Sm3-t3.wj [ht 7] 2 m-s3=w ht 330 r t3j iwj.t*
8. *ht 269 m-s3=w ht 61.*

Rückseite

9. *p3 hw n pr Mnt*
10. *nb M3t <n>-t.t Imn-htp*
11. *klm ht 9 r in=f wb3*
12. *hw ht 5 r 14 <n>-t.t P3-šr-c3-ph4*
13. *skn 1/4 ht 7 kt 5 r pr Mnt*
14. *nb M3t wb3 hw ht 15*
15. *r ht 22 kt 5 r ht 36 kt 5 r Imn-htp ht 8(?) kt 1 1/2(?)*



Vorderseite
I. (DO A 38)



Rückseite

Übersetzung

Vorderseite

1. Die Geldsumme: 439 (Silberlinge) 5 Kite.
2. Spezifikation: Paho, der Weber,
3. selbst für die Herzen der Knaben:
4. 17 Silberlinge 5 Kite. Tshenknum: 10 Silberlinge.
5. Was Tshenmut gebracht hat an den Tempel des Month, des Herrn von Medamud: 10 Silberlinge;
6. macht 37 Silberlinge 5 Kite. Es bleibt übrig 402 Silberlinge. Pshenmin,
7. Sohn des Semtou, [7] 2 [Silberlinge]. Es bleibt übrig 330 Silberlinge. Für(?) diesen(?) Pfand(?)
8. 269 Silberlinge. Es bleibt übrig 61 Silberlinge.

Rückseite

9. Die Unkosten des Tempels des Month,
10. des Herrn von Medamud. An Amenhotep
11. (für) (einen) Kranz: 9 Silberlinge, den er gebracht hat. Für
12. Unkosten: 5 Silberlinge; macht 14 (Silberlinge). An Pshenapahte

13. (für) 1/4 (Mass) Salbe: 7 Silberlinge 5 Kite. Geschuldet von dem Tempel des Month,
 14. des Herrn von Medamud für Unkosten: 15 Silberlinge;
 15. macht 22 Silberlinge 5 Kite. Macht 36 Silberlinge 5 Kite. Geschuldet von Amenhotep 8(?) (Silberlinge) 1 1/2(?) Kite.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. *kt* „Kite“, in der Bedeutung (*ht*)-*kt* „(Silber)-Kite“.

Z. 2. *h3 n3 h3.t.w* 'n' [n3] 'hm¹-hl.w „vor den Herzen der Knaben“. Ich bin nicht im klaren wie die Phrase gedeutet werden soll. Ob „zum Besten der Knaben“ die zutreffende Deutung ist?

Z. 7–8. Die Einzahlung des Pshenmin muss 72 Silberlinge sein, um in dem Endergebnis den Restbetrag 61 Silberlinge zu erhalten. – Statt Bargeld ist ein Pfand im Werte von 269 Silberlinge übergeben worden.

Z. 15. Statt 8 ist die Lesung 18 auch möglich. – Die Schlussumme der Ausgaben ist 36 Silberlinge. Wie der Eintrag des Geldbetrages des Amenhotep gedeutet werden soll ist eine Frage, welche ich offen lassen muss.


Die Abrechnung ist ein Auszug des Kassenbuches des Monthtempels in Djeme. In das Buch wurden täglich die Einkommen und die Ausgaben eingetragen und am Ende des Monats wurden sie mit einander verrechnet. (Über die Tempelbuchführung siehe Otto, *Priester und Tempel*, II, S. 145 f.) Die Einnahmen des betreffenden Monats sind 439 Silberlinge 5 Kite. Von diesem Betrag sind laut der unterstehenden Verrechnung 61 Silberlinge 5 Kite nicht einbezahlt worden. Die Unkosten sind 36 Silberlinge 5 Kite. In der Verrechnung ist ausserdem der Schuld des Amenhotep mitgenommen worden. Verhält es sich vielleicht so, dass Amenhotep Mitglied der Beamtenschaft der Tempelkasse war, und die Kasse für ihn Bürgschaft geleistet hat? Die 8 oder 18 Silberlinge 1 1/2(?) Kite sollten dann als ein indirekter Ausgabeposten der Tempelkasse betrachtet werden.

Abrechnung

II. DO Wien 161. Grösse: 14,5×11,3 cm. Theben(?). Ptolemäische Zeit(?).

Transkription

1. *h3.t-sp 5.t ibt-2 pr sw 1 smn P3-šr-Īs s3 P3-šr-Mw.t p3j=f d^cl n ht hmt*
2. *<n> ibt-2 pr r ibt-4 šm sw r^crkj r ibt 7 wp.t hrw n Īs 28*
3. *sp ibt 6 hrw 2 wp.t p3 hm-ntr n Nj.t n hmt kt 150 r ht 1092*
4. *Pa-hj s3 P3-šr-Īs ht 30*
5. *P3-^chm s3 P3-tj-Hr-sm3-t3.wj swⁿ (sic) w^c ĩrp n T3-šr.t-p3:h^f ht 100*
6. *w^c s^c r ht 200*
7. *n-t.t T3-^cpjr(?) ht 450*
8. *T3j-n.īm=w s3 Hj3nkw^s ht 100*
9. *^cn r tw=f n=j ht 50*
10. *^cn r tw n=j P3-^chm ht 100*
11. *r ht 1030 sp ntj ^c.wj=f ht 62*



II. (DO Wien 161)


Übersetzung

1. Jahr 5, am 1. Mechir. Es hat festgesetzt Pshenese, Sohn des Pshenmut, seine Sammlung in Silber- (und) Kupfer(geld)
2. (von) Mechir bis zum 30. Mesore, macht sieben Monate. Spezifikation: Achtundzwanzig Isistage.
3. Rest sechs Monate (und) zwei Tage. Spezifikation: Der Prophet der Neith: 150 Kupferkite. Macht 1092 Silberlinge.
4. Pachi, Sohn des Pshenese: 30 Silberlinge.
5. Peachem, Sohn des Peteharsemtou, den Wert eines (Keramion) Weines für Tchenpehof: 100 Silberlinge.
6. Ein Ofen, macht 200 Silberlinge.
7. Aus der Hand der T3-^cpjr: 450 Silberlinge.
8. T3j-n.im=w, Sohn des Hiankus: 100 Silberlinge;
9. nochmals, was er mir gegeben hat: 50 Silberlinge;
10. nochmals, was mir Peachem gegeben hat: 100 Silberlinge.
11. Macht 1030 Silberlinge. Rest, den er Schuldet: 62 Silberlinge.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. *d^cl* „Sammlung“. Die Schreibung ist undeutlich aber kein anderes Wort scheint mir zutreffend zu sein. – *ht hmt* „Silber (und) Kupfer“, in der Bedeutung Silbergeld bzw. Kupfergeld.

Z. 2–3. Die erste Zeichengruppe ist, obwohl die Schreibung von der üblichen abweicht *ibt-2 pr*, Mechir, (vgl. oben). Vor dem Worte ist die Präposition *n* zu ergänzen. Die ganze Phrase ist somit zu lesen *<n> ibt-2 pr r ibt-4 šm* „(vom) Mechir bis zum 30. Mesore“. (Vgl. Sethe, Bürgschaftsurkunden, S. 350, d.) – Die Anzahl Isistage ist während sieben Monate 28, d. i. allmonatlich vier Tage und jeder Isistag bringt 39 Silberlinge ein.



III. (DO Wien 30)

Z. 11. Die 1092 Silberlinge (Z. 3) ist die Summe der in Z. 4–10 angegebenen Beträge, einschliesslich des Restbetrages des Peachem. Nach der Rechnungsablegung des Pshenese enthält seine Kasse 1092 Silberlinge und 150 Kupferkite. Die 1092 Silberlinge sind das Einkommen während 28 Isistage oder 29 Silberlinge pro Tag.

Abrechnung über restierende Tempelspenden

III. DO Wien 30. Grösse: 18,8×13,5 cm. Wahrscheinlich Theben. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

- | | |
|--|--|
| x+1. ... sw 15(?) | |
| 2. r hn r ibt-2 pr sw 4 r h wtn 80 n p ³ hrj | |
| 3. n h.t-ntr p ³ sp n n ³ wtn.w | |
| 4. Wn-nfr <s ³ > N ³ -nh.t.t=s | p ³ sp 9 |
| 5. Pa-Mnt s ³ Nht.t=s- <i>lnp</i> | p ³ sp 28 |
| 6. Wn-nfr s ³ Mn-k ³ -R ^c | p ³ sp 32 1/2 ... (?) |
| 7. Pa-Dm ³ s ³ Htjl | p ³ sp 57 1/2 hr p ³ kns 3 ^r 1/2 ^r |
| 8. Mn-k ³ .R ^c | p ³ sp 39 |
| 9. Dd-Hr p ³ in-w ³ w ³ j | p ³ sp 20 |
| 10. P ³ -ljn | p ³ sp 13 |
| 11. Pa-Mnt-Gmt | p ³ sp 7 1/2 |
| 12. Stm | p ³ sp 20 |
| 13. İw=f ^c nh | p ³ sp 30 hr (supra lin.) p ³ kns 1 1/4 irp 2 |

Übersetzung

- x+1. [... vom] 15. [...]
 2. bis zum 4. Mechir gemäss 80 Trankopfern an den Vorsteher
 3. des Tempels. Der Rest der Spenden:
 4. Uennofre, (Sohn) des Nechutes: der Rest 9.
 5. Pamonth, Sohn des Nechsanup: der Rest 28.
 6. Uennofre, Sohn des Menkare: der Rest 32 1/2.
 7. Padjeme, Sohn des *Htjl*: der Rest 57 1/2, für die Busse 3 1/2.
 8. Menkare: der Rest 39.
 9. Djeho, der Isonom: der Rest 20.
 10. Palin: der Rest 13.
 11. Pamonth-Gemti: der Rest 7 1/2.
 12. Seten: der Rest 20.
 13. Efonehe: der Rest 30, für (supra lin.) die Busse 1 1/2 (und) zwei (Mass) Wein.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1–3. [*n t̄3j n ibt-2 3h*] sw 15 „[vom] 15. [Paophe]“. Es ist möglich, dass darüber *p3 ip n n3 wtn.w* „die Abrechnung der Trankopfer“ gestanden hat. Die vorgeschlagene Ergänzung geht aus der Fortsetzung des Textes hervor, und setzt voraus, dass während der angegebenen Zeit (80 Tagen) nur ein Trankopfer pro Tag gespendet wurde. Die Anzahl kann auch zwei (während 40 Tage) oder vier (während 20 Tage) sein, d. i. vom 25. Choiakh (*ibt-4 3h*) oder vom 15. Tybe (*tpj pr*). – *n p3 hrj n h.t-ntr* „an den Vorsteher des Tempels“. Die Präposition *n* ist wegen Raummangels über den best. Art. geschrieben. – *p3 sp n n3 wtn.w* „der Rest der Trankopfer“. Die achtzig Spenden von jedem der unten aufgezählten Personen sind nicht am ersten Tag eingeliefert worden. Zwei von den Spendern (Z. 7 und Z. 13) sind Bussen auferlegt worden, was darauf hindeutet, dass die Abrechnung nach dem 4. Mechir ausgefertigt worden ist, weshalb die Lieferungen von 80 Spenden nicht am 1. Tag stattgefunden haben. Die Art des Trankopfers ist nicht angegeben, auch nicht die verwendete Masseinheit. Dass es sich um Wein handelt ist aber unbestreitbar (vgl. Herodotos, II, 39) und das Mass ist zweifelsohne Hin (= 0,56 L.). Wein ist übrigens unten (Z. 13) erwähnt.


Z. 7. *hr p3 kns 3 1/2* „für die Busse 3 1/2“. Vor der Zahl ist eine Münzeinheit zu ergänzen, so auch in Z. 13. Einheiten, welche in Betracht kommen sind *ht-kt* „Silberkite“ oder *ht* „Silberling“ aber kaum *hmt-kt* „Kupferkite“.

Abrechnung

IV. DO B 567. Grösse: 14,7×14,3 cm. Gebelên. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *p3 ip n n3 ht.w r tw*
2. *P3-tj-Hr-sm3-t3.wj hn krkr 23 <ht> 200*
3. *<n>-t.t.1 n P3-tj-Hr-sm3-t3.wj krkr 3 <ht> 40*
4. *p3 ih r tw=j n=f ht 300 r <krkr> 5 <ht> 40*
5. *Pa-t3.wj N3-nht.t=f Pa-mnh krkr 3*



IV. (DO B 567)

Übersetzung

1. Die Abrechnung des Geldes, das
2. Peteharsemtou ausgegeben hat von 23 Talenten 200 (Silberlinge);
3. an Peteharsemtou: 3 Talente 40 (Silberlinge).
4. Das Rind, das ich ihm gegeben habe: 300 Silberlinge; macht 5 Talente 40 (Silberlinge).
5. Patou, Nechutef, Pameneh: 3 Talente.

Bemerkung

Z. 4. Der Wert des Rindes ist 300 Silberlinge.

Abrechnung


V. DO B 568. Grösse: 14,5×12,8 cm. Gebelên. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. p³ ip n n³ ht.w r tw=f krkr 3 ht 240
2. sw n w^c ih r ht 300 r (krkr) 4 <ht> 240 <n> p³ sh n [ht] 300
3. r <krkr> 5 <ht> 200
4. r tw=f n p³ sh p³ mr sn hⁿ.w (supra lin.): ht 200.

Übersetzung

1. Die Abrechnung des Geldes, das er ausgegeben hat: 3 Talente 240 Silberlinge.
2. Der Wert eines Rindes macht 300 Silberlinge; macht 4 (Talente) 240 (Silberlinge); für den Erheber: 300 (Silberlinge);



V. (DO B 568)

3. macht 5 (Talente) 200 (Silberlinge).
4. Was er dem Schreiber des Lesonis gegeben hat davon (supra lin.): 200 Silberlinge.

Bemerkungen

Z. 4. *mr šn* „Oberpriester“ (Λεσώνης). Über diesen Oberpriester siehe Bonnet, Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte, s.v. Leonis.


Im Gegensatz zu der vorhergehenden von Peteharsemtou ausgefertigten Abrechnung ist hier der Name des Schreibers nicht angegeben. Der Hand nach zu deuten sowie wegen der Ähnlichkeit der Abrechnungen kann kaum ein Zweifel darüber bestehen, dass auch diese von Peteharsemtou geschrieben worden ist.

Abrechnung

VI. DO A 350. Grösse: 12,6×7,2 cm. Wahrscheinlich Theben. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *p³ ip n T³-h³g³.t*
2. *p³ wn krkr 3 <ht> 100 wp.t*
3. *mḥ-1 šp <n> ip n-t.t P³-šr-^c3-ph^t*
4. *s³ Pa-n³ ht 300*
5. *mj nn r t³j=w n P³-šr-H³ns^w s³ Īr.t.w-*
6. *-H³r-r.r.w ht 110*
7. *w^c rmt Kbt ht 52 kt 5*
8. *Mnḥ-p³-R^c h³=f ht 137 kt 5*
9. *r krkr 2 m-s³=w ht 400*



VI. (DO A 350)

Übersetzung

1. Die Abrechnung der *T3-hjg3.t*.
2. Der Betrag: 3 Talente 100 Silberlinge. Spezifikation:
3. Die erste empfangen in Abrechnung von Pshenapahte,
4. dem Sohn des Pana: 300 Silberlinge;
5. ebenfalls was man genommen hat von Pshenchons, dem Sohn des Ina-
6. ros: 110 Silberlinge;
7. ein Man aus Koptos: 52 Silberlinge 5 Kite;
8. Menchpre selbst: 137 Silberlinge 5 Kite.
9. Macht 2 Talente. Es bleibt übrig 400 Silberlinge.


Bemerkungen

Z. 1. *T3-hjg3.t*. Der Name deutet auf nicht-ägyptische Herkunft.

Z. 3. *mh-l* „die erste“, hier in der Bedeutung „die erste Einzahlung“.

Z. 5-6. *r t3j=w n P3-šr-Hnsw* „Was man genommen hat von Pshenchons“. Da es sich in diesem Verzeichnis um Darlehnsnehmer handelt, welche Zurückzahlung gemacht haben kann keine andere Deutung in Betracht kommen.

Z. 7-8. *kt=(ht)-kt* „(Silber)-Kite“. Das Dokument ist, der Abfassung nach zu schliessen, ein Buchführungsauszug über von *T3-hjg3.t* an eine Anzahl Personen



VII. (DO A 806)

verleiten Geldbeträge. In der Ptolemäerzeit war das Bankgeschäft ein Staatsmonopol, aber der König konnte Banken an Privatpersonen verpachten. Der Pächter hatte nur die Erlaubnis Wechsel- und Leihgeschäfte zu machen. (Vgl. Mitteis-Wilcken, Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde, I, S. 245 u. I: 2, S. 213.) Als Bankpächterin war *T3-ḥjg3.t* ohne Zweifel schuldig der Staatlichen Bank über ihre Leihgeschäften Rechenschaft abzulegen. Es scheint mir nicht ganz ausgeschlossen, dass dies Verzeichnis ein solcher Geschäftsbericht sein könnte.

Abrechnung


VII. DO A 806. Grösse: 8×7,9 cm. Theben. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *p3 ip P3-šr-Ḥnsw s3 Hrij*
2. *r c.wj=f krkr 7 p3j=w wt ht 150*
3. *r krkr 7 ht 150*
4. *hr irp ht 340 r krkr 8 <ht> 190*
5. *wtb r tw=f krkr 8 <ht> 177*
6. *Gphls ht '13' r [krkr] 8 <ht> 190*

Übersetzung

1. Die Abrechnung des Pshenchons, des Sohnes des Herieu.
2. Geschuldet von ihm: 7 Talente; ihr Zuschlag: 150 Silberlinge;
3. macht 7 Talente 150 Silberlinge;
4. für Wein 340 Silberlinge; macht 8 Talente 190 (Silberlinge).
5. Veränderung. Er soll geben 8 Talente 177 (Silberlinge) (und)
6. Kephalos 13 Silberlinge; macht (insgesamt) 8 Talente 190 (Silberlinge).



VIII. (DO A 533)

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. $p^3j=w$ $w\dot{t}$ $h\dot{t}$ 150 „ihr Zuschlag 150 Silberlinge“. Das macht etwa 7 Prozent (genau gerechnet 7,14).

Z. 5. Die erste Zeichengruppe ist der Schreibung nach wb^3 „für“, „gegen“ zu transkribieren. Die Fortsetzung des Textes zeigt indessen, dass wb^3 hier nicht passt. Dagegen ist wbt in der Bedeutung „Änderung“ das treffende Wort. (Vgl. Erichsen, Glossar, S. 106.) Das Determinativ ist hier ausgelassen.

Abrechnung über Weizen


VIII. DO A 533. Grösse: 9×7 cm. Wahrscheinlich Theben. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

1. $i\dot{p}$
2. $t^3 m^3j[.t](?) kr^c .w n h^3.t-sp 16$
3. $r P^3-šr-Mnt s^3 \dot{I}w=f^c nh sw 6 1/3 \dots$
4. $\dots P^3-šr-İmn s^3 Nht.t-Mnt sw 6 1/3$
5. $Pa-Mnt s^3 P^3-šr-İmn sw 6 1/3$
6. $P^3j-Bh s^3 Nht.t-Hr(?) sw 6 1/3$
7. $Hrj s^3 P^3-tj-Wsir sw 4 r sw 29 1/3$

Übersetzung

1. Abrechnung (in Bezug auf)
2. die Uferinsel im Jahr 16.
3. Geschuldet von Pshenmonth, dem Sohn des Efonehe: 6 1/3 (Artaben) Weizen;...
4. ... (von) Pshenamun, dem Sohn des Nechtmonth: 6 1/3 (Artaben) Weizen;
5. (von) Pamonth, dem Sohn des Pshenamun: 6 1/3 (Artaben) Weizen;



IX. (DO B 899)

6. (von) Pibekh, dem Sohn des Nechthor(?): $6 \frac{1}{3}$ (Artaben) Weizen;
 7. (von) Herieu, dem Sohn des Peteusire: 4 (Artaben) Weizen. Macht $29 \frac{1}{3}$ (Artaben) Weizen.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. *ip* „Abrechnung“. Die Schreibung ist ungewöhnlich aber kein anderes Wort ist zutreffend und es steht hier statt der üblichen Phrase $p_3 \dot{i}p n n_3 sw.w$ „Die Abrechnung des Weizens“.

Z. 2. Zu *m_3j* „Insel“, d. i. ein Acker, der ringsum oder nur teilweise (als Uferland) überspült wurde vgl. Brugsch, Thesaurus II. S. 598. Im vorliegenden Falle handelt es sich um einen Uferlandsacker.

Z. 3. Zu *r* als Abkürzung für $r^c.wj$ „zu Lasten von“, „geschuldet von“ vgl. Spiegelberg, Demot. Gramm., § 320. – Das letzte Zeichen kann ich nicht deuten. Es kann kein Bruch sein, denn in solchem Falle stimmt nicht die Schlussumme.

Z. 4. Die Zeichen vor dem Personennamen können *r s* (Pron. absol. „sie“ (Plur.) gelesen werden und sind wahrscheinlich an das letzte Zeichen in Z. 3 angeknüpft (r / s). Die Bedeutung ist mir aber unklar.

Abrechnung

IX. DO B 899. Grösse: $8,7 \times 8,6$ cm. Oberägypten. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *sw* 16 n_3 *tkm.w* *tlh(?) kt* 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
2. *hm(.t) kt* 5 *hnk* 13 *wp.t*
3. P_3j -*Mn* 15 P_3 -*mnh kt* 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
4. *sw* 18 *sgn* 2 15 . . .

5. *sw 28 sgn 2 n P3-mnh*
6. *sw 20 hm(.t) 1(?) ...*
7. ...
8. ...
9. ...

Übersetzung

1. am 16 ... Die *tlh(?)*-Ölfrüchte: 7 1/2 Kite;
2. Fracht: 5 Kite; Bier: 13. Spezifikation:
3. Pimin 15; Pamench 7 1/2 Kite;
4. am 18 ... Salbe 2 ... 15:
5. am 28 ... Salbe 2 für Pamench;
6. am 20 ... Fracht: 1(?) (Kite)(?).
7. ...
8. ...
9. ...

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. *tlh(?)*. Dem Determinativ nach zu schliessen eine Ölpflanze. Die Transkription *tlm* ist auch möglich aber m. E. weniger wahrscheinlich. Das Wort ist in Erichsen, Glossar nicht verzeichnet. Obwohl die Auskunft über das verwendete Mass fehlt, was auch für andere hier vorkommende Erzeugnisse gilt, ist für die *tlh(?)*-Früchte die Artabe als Massgefäss benutzt.

Z. 2. *hnk* 13 „Bier 13“. Ob 13 sich auf den Wert oder auf die Quantität bezieht ist nicht angegeben, auch nicht für die Salbe (unten Z. 4 u. 5).

Z. 4. Die Entzifferung der auf die Ziffer 2 folgenden unscharfen Zeichengruppe sowie der abschliessenden Gruppe ist mir nicht gelungen.

Z. 6. Statt *hm(.t) 1* „Fracht 1 (Kite)(?)“ ist auch die Lesung *hm(.t).w* „Frachten“ möglich. Der nachstehende unleserliche Text, von welchem nur sehr schwache Spuren sichtbar sind, hätte mutmasslich eine sichere Deutung geben können. – Von dem Text der drei letzten Zeilen sind nur vereinzelte Zeichen schwach sichtbar.


Brief

X. DO B 631. Grösse: 9,5×7,9 cm. Oberägypten. Ptolemäische Zeit.


Transkription

Vorderseite

1. *Hr s3 Hrj <n> Hr p3 hm-ntr Hnsw ...*
2. *tw=j in=w rtb <n> sw 223 n rkrj*
3. *r pr mhꜥ ht mr(.t) hr hpr rtb <n> sw*
4. *ll [iw ir s](?) hn=w*
5. *mj tw=w rtb <n> sw 15 <n> Ptlwmjs*
6. *s3 3ktn hn=w mtw=k tj.t*
7. *ir n=j w^c.t(sic) bk s n-im=w dd*



Vorderseite
X. (DO B 631)



Rückseite

8. $tw=k \ st \ n=j \ hr$
9. $[p^3 \ ip \ r \ p^3] \ r^{c1}(?)$.
10. ...

Rückseite

11. $tw=j \ in=w \ rtb \ \langle n \rangle \ sw \ 220$
12. $\langle n \rangle \ P^3-tj-Imn-nsw-t^3.wj \ s^3 \ Hr-s^3-Is$
13. $tj \ n \ twt \ \langle rtb \rangle \ \langle n \rangle \ sw \ 3 \ r \ 223$
14. $mj \ tw=w \ t^3 \ hm.t \ hn=w$
15. $wn \ \langle rtb \rangle \ \langle n \rangle \ sw \ 1 \ 1/2 \ n \ c^k \ mj(?) \ t^3j[=w]$
16. $ht \ mr(.t) \ bnr=w$
17. $mj \ \langle t^3j=w \rangle \ \langle rtb \rangle \ \langle n \rangle \ sw \ 15$
18. $n \ p^3j \ sh \ \langle n \rangle \ wd^3$

Übersetzung

Vorderseite

1. Hor, Sohn des Herieu, (an) Hor, den Propheten des Chons ...
2. „Ich habe veranlasst, dass man gebracht hat 223 Artaben Weizen mit dem Schiff
3. nach dem Norden. Die Hafensteuer pfl egt 11 Artaben Weizen zu betragen,
4. [indem sie] in ihnen mit eingerechnet sind.
5. Möge man geben 15 Artaben Weizen dem Ptolemaios,
6. dem Sohn des Agaton, aus ihnen, und du sollst veranlassen
7. mir eine Urkunde zu machen in Bezug auf sie, sagend:
8. Du gibst mir sie für

9. [die Abrechnung mit dem] Speicher.

10. ...

Rückseite

11. „Ich habe veranlasst, dass man gebracht hat 220 (Artaben) Weizen,

12. (und) Petemestou, Sohn des Harsiese,

13. hier in *twt* 3 (Artaben) Weizen; macht 223.

14. Möge man nehmen den Lohn aus ihnen.

15. Er beträgt 1 1/2 (Artaben) Weizen für Brot (und) möge (man) nehmen (die)

16. Hafensteuer aus ihnen.

17. Möge (man nehmen) 15 (Artaben) Weizen

18. für jenen Schreiber des Speichers“.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Das Dokument ist als „Brief“ rubriziert, aber dem Inhalt nach zu urteilen dürfte eher „Amtsschreiben“ die treffende Bezeichnung sein. Das Schriftstück ist an den Propheten eines Chonstempels gerichtet, und der Absender, Hor, ist allem nach zu schliessen Speichervorsteher. – Die letzte Zeichengruppe ist zu stark beschädigt um eine wahrscheinliche Ergänzung zu ermöglichen.

Z. 2. Das letzte Wort ist zum Teil ausgetilgt aber, dass es sich um ein Schiff handelt ist unbestreitbar, und in diesem Falle kann nur *krj*, Art Lastschiff für Korn o. ä., in Betracht kommen. Das Determinativ (deutlich sichtbar) spricht jedenfalls dafür. (Vgl. Erichsen, Glossar, S. 543 und Hinweise dort.)

Z. 3–4. *ht mr(.t)* „Hafensteuer“. Die Abgabe wurde von Schiffen, welche im Hafen geankert hatten um Frachtgut ein- oder auszuladen, erhoben und wurde nach der Quantität und dem Wert der Ladung berechnet, und in Bargeld erlegt. (Vgl. Wallace, Taxation in Egypt, S. 275.) Im vorliegenden Falle ist das Schiff nach einem Hafen im nördlichen Ägypten bestimmt, und die Hafensteuer des Bestimmungsortes ist hier in natura und in der Schiffsladung mit eingerechnet. In pharaonischer Zeit wurde die Hafengebühr für Güterbeförderung zwischen inländischen Orten in natura erlegt. Der Übergang in Barzahlung fand in der Ptolemäerzeit statt. (Vgl. Wallace, a. A., S. 469, Anm. 108.) Die Weizenladung ausschliesslich der Abgabe des Bestimmungsortes ist 212 Artaben, und die 11 Artaben als Hafengebühr machen zunächst 1/20 oder 5 Prozent der Ladung. – [*iw ir s*] *hn=w* „indem sie mit eingerechnet sind“ (wörtl. „indem sie in ihnen sind“). Zur Konstruktion und Bedeutung vgl. Erichsen, Glossar, S. 44 und OrSu 16, Nr. XIV/3, S. 38f.


Z. 7. Über das nach *bk* stehende **𓂀** bin ich nicht im klaren.

Z. 8–9. *hr* „für“ (Z. 8) und *r3* „Speicher“ (Z. 9) sind erkennbar, weshalb die vorgeschlagene Ergänzung nicht unwahrscheinlich ist.


Z. 13. *twt* „Raum“, auch im Tempel (Erichsen, Glossar, S. 617). Das Wort ist m. E. hier in der späteren Bedeutung zu fassen.

Z. 18. Der Schreiber, hier nicht bei Namen genannt, ist zweifelsohne der in Z. 5 erwähnten Ptolemaios. Für seine Schreibearbeit hat er als Gebühr 15 Artaben Weizen erhalten.

Die Weizenquantität ist in beiden Schreiben 223 Artaben, und es scheint mir



XI. (DO B 399)



XII. (DO BM 35168)

kein Zweifel darüber zu bestehen, dass es sich in beiden Schreiben um denselben Schiffslast handelt. Das zweite Schreiben spezifiziert genau die verschiedenen Abträge, auch den Lohn des Schiffers.

Brief

XI. DO B 399. Grösse: 11,7×8,3 cm. Kous. Römische Zeit (?).

Transkription


1. T3-hjb t3 Wsir-wr
2. tw=j in=w w^c smh n
3. ʾ3llj¹ n Wsir-wr
4. mj in=w t3 glt.t r hrj
5. mj in=w n=j w^c ʿsm
6. n p3 hj(?) hb n=j w3h
7. ij n Gs
8. sh

Übersetzung

1. Tachib, Tochter des Userer.
2. „Ich habe veranlasst, dass man bringt ein Bündel von
3. Weinstöcken dem Userer.
4. Möge man senden den Ring später,
5. möge man mir (jetzt) senden einen Pflänzling



6. für die Unkosten. Sende mir eine Botschaft;
7. komme nach Kus“.
8. Geschrieben.

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. *smḥ* „Bündel“. Das Wort, in Erichsen, Glossar nicht verzeichnet, erscheint in noch einem Ostrakontext DO BM 18739/2 (unveröffentlicht) in der Verbindung  *smḥ n 3llj 20* „Zwanzig Bündel von Weinstöcken“. Das Wort scheint mir die demotische Entsprechung des kopt. **CMAG** „bunch“ (Crum, Copt. Dict., S. 342) zu sein.

Z. 3. *3llj* „Weinstock“. Über die Identifikation der unscharf hervortretenden Zeichengruppe besteht m. E. kein Zweifel.

Z. 4. *gl.t* „Ring“. Das Wort zeigt hier die Femininendung *.t*. Im demot. Glossar ist sie nicht vorhanden. Es dürfte sich hier um einen Siegelring handeln.

Z. 5. *šm*, wahrscheinlich in der Bedeutung „Pflänzling“. Das Wort, bei Erichsen (a. A.) nicht notiert ist allem Anschein nach die demotische Schreibung des altäg.  *šmw*,  *šm* (gr.) „Blätter“(?), „(kleine) Zweige“(?) (Äg. WB I, S. 226). Die im WB angegebenen Bedeutungen sind unsicher. Die letztere scheint mir hier am nächsten zu liegen aber in der oben vorgeschlagenen Bedeutung.

Z. 6. Die Lesung *p3 hj* „die Unkosten“ scheint mir sicher zu sein. Die Schreibung ist römisch.

Z. 7. *Gs*, Kus (die heilige Stadt mit demselben Namen; in griech.-römischer Zeit Apollonopolis parva genannt). Der Brief ist von Kus abgesandt und der Bestimmungsort könnte Theben sein.

Brief

XII. DO BM 35168. Grösse: 8×7,5 cm. Theben. Spätptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *P3-tj-Wsir s3 nḥ-p3- hrt.t sm r*
2. *Hrj=s-n=f s3 Ns-bj p3 ḥm-ntr Ḥnsw*
3. *m-b3ḥ Ḥmn-n3j=w-Ḥmn.ḥw p3j=j(?) ḥrj wp.t tw=j*
4. *ḥn=w k3 2 k3k3 3.t lhḫ(.t)*
5. *1.t mj ḥn=w nḥḥ r Dm3*
6. *[iw] bw-ir-tw=w ḥn n=n n p3j(?) ḥbt*

Übersetzung

1. Peteusire, Sohn des Enchpekhrat, grüsst
2. *Hrj=s-n=f*, den Sohn des Esbi, den Propheten des Chons,
3. vor Amunnachomneu, meinem(?) Herrn. Spezifikation: „Ich habe veranlasst,
4. dass man gebracht hat zwei grosse Brote, drei Kaka-Brote (und) ein *lhḫ(.t)*- (Mass) (Wein).
5. Möge man Öl nach Djeme bringen,
6. bis man uns geliefert hat für diesen(?) Monat“.

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. Zu dem Namen $Hrj=s-n=f$ (wörtl. „Sie ist mit ihm zufrieden“) vgl. Glanville, Catalogue of Demotic papyri in the British Museum 1, S. 37.

Z. 3-4. $\dot{I}mn-n\dot{3}j=w-H\dot{I}mn.\dot{i}w$, Amunnachomneu. Der Gott Amun, mit dem Epitheton Nachomneu ($n\dot{3}j=w H\dot{I}mn.\dot{i}w$) erscheint in mehreren Urkunden aus Djeme, vor allem in Tempeleiden, in welchen der Eid vor diesem Gotte geleistet wird (vgl. Thompson, Theban Ostraca, Part 2, S. 59f.; Ursula Kaplony-Heckel, Die demotischen Tempeleide, 1, S. 21). Amun tritt in diesen Urkunden als einer der Acht Urgötter auf. Nach der thebanischen Überlieferung sollten die Urgötter ihre Grabstätte bei Medinet Habu haben und ptolemäischen Zeugnissen nach scheint der kleine Tempel von Medinet Habu das Grab zu bezeichnen (vgl. Sethe, Amun und die acht Urgötter von Hermopolis, S. 53f.).² In der Spätzeit wurden in dem kleinen Tempel die acht Urgötter verehrt (vgl. Otto, Topographie des thebanischen Gaus, S. 72), und als einer von diesen – dazu der bedeutendste – erscheint Amun, in spätptolemäischer und frühromischer Zeit, in dem Kultus unter dem Namen Amunnachomneu. An dem Totenkult der Urgötter beteiligten sich thebanische Götter, u. a. Chons, der jeden Tag Medinet Habu besuchte um dort dem Amun, der $K\dot{3}-\dot{3}.f$ -Schlange und den acht Urgöttern Opfer zu überbringen (vgl. Sethe, a. a., S. 61). – Die nach dem Götternamen folgende Zeichen-gruppe ist wohl $p\dot{3}j=j hrj$ „mein Herr“ ($\rho\mu\mu$) zu lesen. $w p . t$ „Spezifikation“. Im vorliegenden Falle gilt die Spezifikation eine früher bei dem Speicher des Tempels des Chons in Karnak eingerichtete Requisition von Bedarfsartikeln (Brot und wahrscheinlich auch Wein). Peteusire als Kulddienstverrichter vor Chons in Medinet Habu erhielt – wie es sich zeigt – seinen Unterhalt von dem Haupttempel in Karnak. – $lh\dot{t}(.t)$. Das Wort, in Erichsen, Glossar nicht verzeichnet, ist mir aus noch einem Ostrakontext bekannt (DO Berlin P 1684. Unveröffentlicht). Es handelt sich dort um Lieferungen von Brot und wahrscheinlich auch Wein [($\dot{k} \dot{v} \dot{s} \dot{t} / \mu \mu \dot{4} \dot{u} \dot{5} \dot{6}$ „zwei $k^c k^c$ -Brote und ein $lh\dot{t}(.t)$ - (Mass) (Wein)“]. Kopt. ist ein Flüssigkeitmass $\lambda\lambda\kappa\omicron\tau\epsilon$, vorzugsweise für Wein benutzt, belegt (Crum, Copt. Dict., S. 140), das zweifelsohne mit dem demotischen $lh\dot{t}(.t)$ - (Mass) identisch ist.

Z. 6. Statt $n p\dot{3}j ibt$ „für diesen Monat“ könnte die Lesung $n p\dot{3} ibt$ „für den Monat“ möglich sein. Die Schreibung des best. Art. macht aber die Lesung sehr unsicher.

Brief


XIII. DO BM 30263. Grösse: 10,5×7,5 cm. Theben. Römische Zeit.

Transkription


1. ... $Ws\dot{i}r-wr s\dot{3} Ws\dot{i}r-wr sm r Hr-Wn-nfr$
2. $s\dot{3} [Hr-(p\dot{3})]-bk(?) p\dot{3} sh p\dot{3} bk ntj iw ir P\dot{3}-tj-\dot{I}mn-\dot{i}p\dot{j}$
3. $s\dot{3} Ws\dot{i}r-wr p\dot{3}j=j sn iw \dot{i}j=j n=k tb\dot{3}.t=f hr$
4. $n\dot{3}j sw.w r.\dot{i}r=j s$

Übersetzung

1. Userer, Sohn des Userer, grüsst Haruennofre,



XIII. (DO BM 30263)



XIV. (DO W 69)

2. den Sohn des [Har(p)]bek, den Schreiber: „Betreffs der Urkunde, welche Peteamenope,
3. der Sohn des Useruer, mein Bruder, machen wird, komme ich zu dir ihretwegen mit
4. jenem Weizen, welchen ich fertig gemacht habe.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Ich kann keine Erklärung geben für den wagrechten Strich am Anfang der Zeile.

Z. 2. [Hr-(p³)]-bk(?), [Har(p)]bek(?). Was die Lesung unsicher macht ist der erste senkrechte Strich. In Erichsen, Glossar, S. 316 ist Hr in einer ähnlichen Schreibung verzeichnet. Die Schreibung kommt ferner in DO Uppsala 1070/3 (OrSu 7, S. 72.) vor, so auch in Mattha, Dem. Ostr., 165/1. Der best. Art. p³ ist ausgelassen, was übrigens ab und an vorkommt. Vgl. DO BM 21406/3 (OrSu 16, S. 40), DO BM 21426/2 (OrSu 12, S. 56) sowie DO Berlin P 6234/2 (OrSu 22, S. 15). Die angeführten Belege sind alle aus der römischen Zeit.

Brief


XIV. DO W 69.³ Grösse: 11,5×6,5 cm. Theben. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

1. P³-šr-Īmn s³ Htr [sm]
2. r P³-šr-Īmn s³ P³-w^rh¹[r]



XV. (DO B 846)



XVI. (DO BM 5679)

3. *i.îr n Îs 'š mj îr=w*
4. *ks P3-ḥtp-ḥrt.ṯ(?)*
5. *sh n ḥ3.t-sp 6 ibt-4 pr sw 4*

Übersetzung

1. Pshenamun, Sohn des Hatre, grüsst
2. Pshenamun, den Sohn des Peuher.
3. „Rufe doch Isis an: Möge man
4. *P3-ḥtp-ḥrt.ṯ(?)* bestatten!“
5. Geschrieben im Jahr 6, am 4. Pharmuthe.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Die Abfassung des Textes lässt erkennen, dass *sm* „grüssen“ der treffende Ausdruck ist.

Z. 2. Zu dem Namen *P3-whr*, Peuher (wörtl. „der Hund“) vgl. Miriam Lichtheim, *Medinet Habu Ostraca*, Nr. 51/1.

Z. 4. Der Name *P3-ḥtp-ḥrt.ṯ* ist m. W. früher nicht belegt.

Brief

XV. DO B 846. Grösse: 11,2×9,5 cm. Oberägypten. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *i.îr-ḥr Ṭḥwtj-îr-rḥ=š (s3) Ṭḥwtj-nḥt.ṯ*
2. *mtw=k p3j=j 'š wb3 ḏd m.îr ij*

3. *hw r.r=k iw ir=k ddj r tb3(=j)(?)*

4. *kj sp iw ir=w ir ij m-s3=k*

Übersetzung

1. An Thetharrechtes, (den Sohn) des Thethnecht.
2. „Du bist mein Beschwörer. Möge nicht
3. Böses dir treffen, wenn du in Feindschaft bist meinetwegen(?)
4. ein anderes Mal, und man dich verfolgt“.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Zu dem Namen *Thwtj-nht.t*, Thethnecht, vgl. Ranke, Personennamen I, S. 408: 7. Im Demotischen ist diese Namenskonstruktion ungewöhnlich.

Z. 2. *ʿš wb3* „Beschwörer“. M. W. ist diese Benennung nicht früher belegt. Der Schreibung nach ist das Wort *wbj* zu transkribieren. Kopt. kommt ein Wort **ⲠⲚⲈⲐⲌⲚ**, mit derselben Bedeutung vor (Spiegelberg, Kopt. Handwörterbuch, S. 184), das wohl das demotische *ʿš wb3* entspricht.

Z. 3. Die Entzifferung der letzten Zeichengruppe ist sehr unsicher, vor allem wegen des Nichtvorhandenseins des Personensuffixes, das in vorkommenden Fällen stets ausgeschrieben ist.

Z. 5. Die erhaltenen Zeichenspuren sind zu schwach um eine Deutung zuzulassen.

Z. 6. Die aufgeklebte Etikette deckt die Zeitangabe des Briefes. Das letzte nach links schwach sichtbare Zeichen ist m. E. *sw 9* „Tag 9“.

Brief

XVI. DO BM 5679. Grösse: 9,3×8,8 cm. Theben(?). Römische Zeit (?).

Transkription

x+1. [...] *P3-šr-Mnt s3 Wn-nfr*

2. [?.]4 *ʿmn1 mtw=j mt ntj mtw=k s*

3. [?. n]4 *rn P3-šr-hw p3 w3h-mw*

4. [?.]4 *hn=j s r tj.t wn t3j=f*

5. *s.t r h3.t=j sh*

6. *Wn-nfr s3 Nht.t-Hr*

Übersetzung

- x+1. ... Pshenmonth, Sohn des Uennofre.
2. „Ich habe keine Sache, welche dir gehört
3. im Namen des *P3-šr-hw*, des Choachytens.
4. Ich habe befohlen öffnen zu lassen seine
5. Grabstätte vor mir“. Es hat geschrieben
6. Uennofre, Sohn des Nechthor.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. *P3-šr-Mnt*, Pshenmonth. Die erhaltenen Zeichenreste zeigen, dass kein anderer Name in Betracht kommen kann. – *Wn-nfr*, Uennofre. Zur Schreibung vgl. Miriam Lichtheim, a. A., Nr. 113/1.

Z. 2. *mn mtw=j mt ntj mtw=k s*, wörtl. „Nicht ist bei mir (eine) Sache, welche dir gehört“. *ntj* „welche“ ist wahrscheinlich durch Übersehen seitens des Schreibers ausgelassen. Das Zeichen 𓄿 *m* in *mtw=k* ist wohl hier auch als *ntj* aufzufassen. – Das absol. Pron. *s* erscheint in Gestalt eines triangulären Punktes.

Z. 4. *hn=j s* „Ich habe befohlen“. *s* hier pleonastisches Objekt.

Z. 5. *r ḥ3.t=j* „vor mir“, d. i. „in meiner Anwesenheit“.

Z. 6. Das Zeichen für *s3* „Sohn“ ist die untere wagrechte Abschliessung des Götterdeterminativs in *Wn-nfr*.

Die oben gegebene Übersetzung gibt den Text Wort für Wort wieder. Wenigstens zwei Deutungen bieten sich dar. 1. „Ich habe mit dir nichts zu schaffen“, im Beisein des Choachyten *P3-šr-ḥw* als Zeuge. „Seine Grabstätte“ ist dann als „die ihm unterstellte Grabstätte“ zu verstehen. 2. „Ich habe mit dir nichts zu schaffen betreffs des Choachyten *P3-šr-ḥw*“. Dann scheint „seine Grabstätte“ das Grab des genannten Choachyten zu sein. Im letzten Falle wäre aber vielleicht „*P3-šr-ḥw*, Sohn des X“, eine natürliche Personenbestimmung.

Brief

XVII. DO BM 15797. Grösse: 10,2×8,5 cm. Oberägypten. Ptolemäische Zeit (?).

Transkription

1. *Ḥmn-ḥtp s3 P3-sšm(?)*
2. *mj t3j=w n3j šs.w r Ta-mj(?)*
3. *t3 ḥsj.t(?) šḥ Thwtj-ḥ.ḥr-tj=s .?.*
4. *s3(?) Sgr(?)*

Übersetzung

1. Amenhotep, Sohn des Pshem(?).
2. „Möge man bringen diese Leinen der *Ta-mj(?)*,
3. der Sängerin(?)“. Es hat geschrieben Thothartais,
4. Sohn des *Sgr(?)*.

Bemerkungen


Z. 1. Zu dem Namen *P3-sšm*, Psechem (wörtl. „das Götterbild“) vgl. Wångstedt, Demot. Ostraka Zürich, Nr. 30/2.

Z. 2. Zu *t3j r* in der Bedeutung „bringen“ vgl. Erichsen, Glossar, S. 664. – Ist der Name vielleicht *Ta-mj* („die Katze“) zu lesen? Die Schreibung des Hauptwortes ist sonderbar und lässt sich schwerlich mit *mj* „Katze“ identifizieren. Ich kann aber keine andere Lesung geben.


Z. 3. Die Lesung *ḥsj.t* „Sängerin“ ist der Schreibung wegen nicht sicher. Dass es sich um einen Titel handelt ist dagegen sicher, und der vorgeschlagene scheint mir am nächsten zu liegen. – Die zwei beschädigten(?) Striche am Ende der Zeile sind m. E. hier bedeutungslos.

Quittung über Pfandverkauf (Gartenteil)

XVIII. DO B 459. Grösse: 11,7×10 cm. Theben. Jahr 104/03 v. Chr.



XVII. (DO BM 15797)




XVIII. (DO B 459)

Transkription

1. P₃-šr-Mn s₃ P₃-šr-İmn p₃ ntj dd n
2. P₃j-k₃ s₃ P₃-šr-İmn tw=j mh n ht 940
3. r ht 470 r ht 940 ^cn hn t₃j=j t₃nj.t (supra lin.) <n> p₃ km
4. <r> tw=j n=k tb₃-ht r hn h₃.t-sp 14 r ir h₃.t-sp 11.t
5. ibt-4 šm(?) sw 10 st šp <n> ip
6. sh <n> h₃.t-sp 14 r ir h₃.t-sp 11.t ibt-4 šm(?) sw 10
7. mtw P₃j-k₃ <s₃> P₃-šr-İmn tj.t s wb₃=f
8. <r> t₃j ibt-4 šm(?) sw 10 ntj hrj r h p₃ hj
9. [hr] p₃ sh <r> ir=k irm=j p₃ (supra lin.) hrw h₃.t
10. [sh] Hrj <s₃> Pa-n₃-nht.t.w [r hrw=f](?).

Übersetzung

1. Pshenmin, Sohn des Pshenamun, ist es, der sagt zu
2. Piko, dem Sohn des Pshenamun: „Ich bin vollbezahlt mit 940 Silberlinge,
3. ihre Hälfte macht 470 Silberlinge, macht 940 Silberlinge wiederum, von
meinem Anteil (supra lin.) des Gartens,
4. (den) ich dir verkauft habe bis zum Jahr 14, das Jahr 11 macht,
5. am 10. Mesore(?). Sie sind gutgeschrieben.
6. Geschrieben im Jahr 14, das Jahr 11 macht, am 10. Mesore(?).
7. Piko, (Sohn) des Pshenamun, hat es (das Geld) für ihn (den Gartenteil)
bezahlt
8. seit dem 10. Mesore(?), welcher oben (genannt) ist sowie die Ausgaben



XIX. (DO A 20)

9. für die Urkunde, welche du mit mir gemacht hast *am* (supra lin.) ersten Tag.
 10. Es hat geschrieben Herieu, (Sohn) des Panechate(?), [auf sein Geheiss](?).

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. Die Phrase *tw=j mħ n* „Ich bin vollbezahlt mit“ ist für Bescheinigungen der römischen Zeit bezeichnend. In ptolemäischer Zeit kommt sie vereinzelt vor, u. a. in Tempelquittungen. (Vgl. Wångstedt, Ostraka, S. 61: 18.). Die vorliegende Bescheinigung ist indessen keine Tempelquittung, und wie die Doppeldatierung angibt im Jahr 104/03 v. Chr. ausgefertigt.

Z. 5. Statt *ibt-4 šm*, „Mesore“, könnte die Lesung *ibt-4 pr*, Pharmuthe, möglich sein (vgl. die Schreibung in Z. 8).

Z. 6. *ħ3.t-sp 14 r ħ3.t-sp 11* „Jahr 14, das Jahr 11 macht“ (= Jahr 104/03 v. Chr.). Die Datierung bezieht sich auf die Mitregentschaft der Kleopatra III. und des Ptolemaios X. Alexander I.

Z. 8. *r ħ* in der Bedeutung „wie“ „gemäss“ (vgl. Erichsen, Glossar, S. 375) ist hier nicht zutreffend. Dagegen gibt die Übersetzung „sowie“ einen guten Sinn; zu dieser Bedeutung vgl. Sethe, Bürgschaftsurkunden, S. 210, § 6 und S. 382, § 66 b.

Z. 10. Die Phrase *r ħrw=f* „auf sein Geheiss“ kann die Textzeile beendet haben.

Quittung über Pacht

XIX. DO A 20.⁵ Grösse: 12,3×9,3 cm. Gebelên. Jahr 108/07 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. ... [s3] ᵀNḥt.t-Mn¹ p3 ntj dd [n]
2. P3-mr-ᵀih¹ ᵀs3¹ P3-hb ḥnᶜ Ḥᶜ-Hr s3 Pa-[...]
3. wn rtb <n> sw 200 r t3 pš(.t) sw 100 r sw 200 [ᶜn]
4. r tw=w n=j ḥr p3 šḥn r.ᵀr=k r t3 šj[m3.t n]
5. Ḥ.t-Hr <n> p3 mw <n> ḥ3.t-sp 10.t r ḥ3.t-sp 11
6. <n> t3(sic) k<w>s 29 ḥn n3 pr.w r tw=w s n
7. Tjkspns p3 rmt ḥtr
8. r tw=f <n> Thwmns ḥr ḥ.t-ntr
9. <n> Ḥ.t-Hr r ḥn p3j=[k](?)
10. šḥn ntj šḥ ḥrj ḥr ḥ3.t-sp 11
11. šḥ Nḥt.t-Mn s3 [Nḥt.t-Mn n ḥ3.t-sp 10.t](?)
12. ibt-2 pr(?) sw ...

Übersetzung

1. ..., [Sohn] des Nechtmin, ist es, der sagt
2. zu Pleehe, dem Sohn des Phib, und Chahor, dem Sohn des Pa ...:
3. „Es sind 200 Artaben Weizen, ihre Hälfte macht 100 (Artaben) Weizen, macht 200 (Artaben) Weizen wiederum,
4. welche man mir gegeben hat wegen des Pachtvertrags, den du gemacht hast mit dem Speicher(?)
5. der Hathor, vom Wasser des Jahres 10 bis zum Jahr 11,
6. (mit) dem *ḥws*-(Mass) 29 von dem Getreide, das man
7. Tjkspns, dem Reiter, gegeben hat, (und)
8. das er Thwmns gab für den Tempel
9. der Hathor von [deinem](?)
10. Pacht, welcher oben geschrieben ist für Jahr 11.“
11. Es hat geschrieben Nechtmin, Sohn des Nechtmin, im Jahr 10(?),
12. am ... Mechir(?)

Bemerkungen


Z. 1. Die Zeichenreste des ersten Namens sind nicht genügend um eine sichere Deutung zu geben. Dagegen ist der zweite Name *Nḥt.t-Mn*, Nechtmin, ziemlich sicher (vgl. die Schreibung in Z. 11).

Z. 4–5. *t3 šj[m3.t n] Ḥ.t-Hr* „der Speicher(?) der Hathor“. In Erichsen, Glossar ist *šjm3.t* eine Baulichkeit (Heiligtum o. ä.). Für andere Belege siehe Spiegelberg, Eine Erwähnung eines Aufstandes in Oberägypten in der Ptolemäerzeit (ZÄS 65, S. 56, Anm. XII). – Zu <n> p3 mw <n> ḥ3.t-sp 10 r ḥ3.t-sp 11 „vom Wasser (d. i. die Überschwemmung) des Jahres 10 bis zum Jahr 11“ vgl. Sethe, Bürgschaftsurkunden, S. 165, § 31.


Z. 6. *t3 ḥws 29* „der *ḥws*-(Mass) 29“. *ḥws* ist ein mask. Wort und der fem. Artikel muss ein Lapsus sein. Über diesen Mass vgl. Sethe, a. A., S. 222, § 28 b.

Z. 7–8. Ob hier die Namen Δεξιφάνης (vgl. Preisigke, Namenbuch, Sp. 85) und Θευμένης (vgl. ebd., Sp. 137) zu erkennen sind?

Z. 11. Der Schreiber Nechtmin (S. des Nechtmin) ist mir von einer Gebelëner Tempelquittung vom Jahr 17 v. Chr. bekannt (MDTK, Bd. 21, S. 161, Nr. 31/9).



XX. (DO BM 21476)



XXI. (DO BM 25378)

Quittung über Weizen

XX. DO BM 21476. Grösse: 8×7,7 cm. Wahrscheinlich Theben. Frühromische Zeit (?).


Transkription

1. T3-šr.t- ... t3 Hnm-īw(?)
2. t3 ntj dd n P3-tj-Hnsw s3 Hnsw-Thwtj
3. tw=j mh n n3 sw(.w) i.īr t3j
4. M3j-ħs p3j=j šr
5. n=k mn ⟨mtw=j⟩ m-s3=k n mt ⟨nb⟩ n p3 t3 ħr
6. .r=w st šp n ip
7. sh n ħ3.t-sp 10.t tpj 3ħ sw 27(?)

Übersetzung

1. Tshen . . . , Tochter des Khnumeu(?),
2. ist es, die sagt zu Petechons, dem Sohn des Chonsthoth:
3. „Ich bin vollbezahlt mit dem Weizen, den erhoben worden ist
4. von Miysis, meinem Sohn,
5. von dir. [Ich] habe nichts mehr von dir zu fordern
6. in Bezug auf ihn (den Weizen). Er ist gutgeschrieben.
7. Geschrieben im Jahr 10, am 27(?) Thoth.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Die Entzifferung des ersten Namens ist mir nicht gelungen. – Die Lesung des zweiten Namens ist sehr unsicher. In DO BM 23359/1–2 (unveröffentlicht) kommt der Name vor  geschrieben.

Z. 2. Betreffs des ersten Namens ist er, unbeachtet der ungenauen Schreibung, P3-tj-Hnsw, Petechons, zu lesen.

Z. 3. Zur Wendung *tw=j mh n* „Ich bin vollbezahlt mit“ vgl. Nr. XVIII/2,

Bem. – *r. ır ır t3j* „den erhoben (wörtl. genommen) worden ist“. Zur Konstruktion vgl. Sethe, Bürgschaftsurkunden, S. 347.

Z. 5–6. Die Ergänzungen geben die korrekte Formulierung der Phrase wieder.

Z. 7. Wenn das Dokument römisch ist, datiert es vom Jahr 10 des Augustus (= Jahr 21–20 v. Chr.).

Getreidelieferung

XXI. DO BM 25378. Grösse: 10,5×9,5 cm. Theben. Wahrscheinlich Jahr 24/23 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. [...] *r šlf m-s3=n*
2. [...] *š^c-tw=n tj klm*
3. [...] *rtb <n> sw 10 1/4 tn 5/6 11/12 r p3 rtb*
4. *n t3 m^cd^c.t n T3-p3-wr mtw=f ır*
5. *pr 5 n 3lg*
6. *iw=w f3j iw=w swt*
7. *sh n h3.t-sp 7.t ıbt-2 3h sw 4*

Übersetzung

1. [...] wird hässlich(?) gegen uns sein
2. [...] bis wir [einen] Kranz gegeben haben
3. [...] 10 1/4 Artaben Weizen, je 11/12 auf die Artabe,
4. mit dem Mass der Tapuer, und er hat gemacht
5. 5 (Artaben) Getreide für 3lg,
6. indem sie getragen (und) abgeliefert sind.
7. Geschrieben im Jahr 7, am 4. Paophe.

Bemerkungen


Z. 1. Zur Bedeutung des Wortes *šlf* vgl. Erichsen, Glossar, S. 518. Eine Anzahl Belege, in welchen das Wort erscheint, sind von Spiegelberg angeführt (Die demotischen Papyri Loeb, S. 24, Anm. 25), aber keiner von ihnen zeigt die Wendung *šlf m-s3=*. Wegen des verwischten Anfangs des Textes ist eine treffende Übersetzung schwer zu geben. Der Ausdruck hängt allem Anschein nach mit dem unten erwähnten Kranz zusammen, und der Ablieferung des Kranzes.

Z. 3. Zu dem Ausdruck *tn 5/6 11/12 r p3 rtb* „je 11/12 auf die Artabe“ siehe Mattha, Demotic Ostraka, Nr. 274/3, Anm.


Z. 4. *t3 m^cd^c.t n T3-p3-wr* „des Mass der Tapuer“. Dieser Kornmass kommt in noch zwei thebanischen Dokumenten vor [DO B 1173/6 (Mattha, a. A. Nr. 273) und DO Uppsala 1389/5 (Pachtvertrag. Röm. Unveröffentlicht)].⁶

Z. 5. Zu Namen mit dem Determinativ *ı* vgl. OrSu 18 (1961), S. 99, Nr. XXV/4, Bem. und Hinweise dort.

Z. 7. Jahr 7 ist wahrscheinlich Augustus 7 (= Jahr 24/23 v. Chr.).



XXII. (DO B 964)



XXIII. (DO BM 30258)

Quittung über Lieferung von $\text{P} \llcorner \text{w}$

XXII. DO B 964. Grösse: 7.6×7,5 cm. Theben(?). Wahrscheinlich frührömische Zeit.

Transkription

1. $\text{P}^3\text{-sn-Sbk } \text{p}^3 \text{ ntj } \text{dd}$
2. $n \text{ P}^3\text{j-Hr } \text{tw}=\text{j } \text{mh } 1/2$
3. $n \text{ swt } \text{hn } \text{p}^3 \text{ hw } 3$
4. $t \text{ mtw}=\text{j } r \text{ bk}$
5. $sh \text{ H}^3\text{sw-Thwtj } \text{hr}=\text{f}$

Übersetzung

1. Psensebek, ist es, der sagt
2. zu Pihor: „Ich bin vollbezahlt (mit) (der) Hälfte
3. der Lieferung von dem Überschuss der 3
4. t -(Pflanze), und ich werde (nun) arbeiten“.
5. Es hat geschrieben Chonsthoth für ihn.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. $\text{P}^3\text{-sn-Sbk}$, Psensebek. Die Schreibung ist etwas ungewöhnlich. Das sn -Zeichen erscheint in einer von der üblichen Schreibung sehr abweichenden Form.

Z. 3–4. $3t$. Das Determinativ deutet darauf hin, dass es sich um eine Art Pflanze handelt. Ich kann indessen keinen Beleg für das Vorkommen einer $3t$ -Pflanze vorbringen. Es ist möglich, dass ein Übersehen seitens des Schreibers vorliegt. Wenn so der Fall sein sollte, könnte die betreffende Pflanze $\text{P} \llcorner \text{w}$ $3tr$ „Papyrus“ (?) (vgl. Erichsen, Glossar, S. 13) sein.

Verzeichnis über Hausutensilien und Gartenfrüchte

XXIII. DO BM 30258. Grösse: 9,9×9,6 cm. Theben. Ptolemäische Zeit.

Transkription

- x+1. *dp* [...]
2. *pjng* [3.t]
3. *brs3*(?) .? . [...](?)
4. *hrjskws* [...]
5. [...] *grg* 2 n *Ta-R^c-t3.wj iwf irm*(?) *htjgs*(?) [...](?)
6. [...]t 4
7. *ššw n trmws* 2
8. *ššw n gwg* 4.t
9. *ššw n hrnt* 5

Übersetzung

- x+1. Schale [...]
2. Schüssel(?) 1 [...]
3. (Brot)-Korb(?) .? . [...](?)
4. Kiste [...]
5. [...] zwei Betten für(?) Taratou; Fleisch und(?) *htjgs*(?) [...](?)
6. [...] vier . . .
7. Zwei Krüge Lupinen.
8. Vier Krüge Datteln.
9. Fünf Krüge Granatapfel.

Bemerkungen

Z. x+1. Über die Lesung *dp* ([ⲉⲡ] ⲉⲡ), „Schale“ scheint mir kein Zweifel zu bestehen.

Z. 2. *pjng*[3.t]. Ob die demotische Entsprechung des kopt. **ⲡⲒⲛⲉⲢ** (S), **ⲡⲒⲛⲁⲛⲛ** (B) „Fass“ (griech. Πίναξ „Fass für Speise“ (vgl. Crum, Copt. Dict., S. 41). Vgl. auch Nur El-Din, Demotic Ostraca, Nr. 336/11, wo ein Wort *pjng*3.t erscheint, welches er als „a parallel of the Greek word Πίναξ „wooden tablet“ auffasst. In dem vorliegenden Dokument ist das Wort nicht ganz erhalten. Die drei letzten Zeichen in [ⲉⲡ]ⲛⲁⲛⲛ fehlen, aber dass es sich in den beiden Dokumenten um dasselbe Wort handelt ist unleugbar.

Z. 3. *brs3*(?) (oder ist *brst* zu transkribieren?). Ob dieses demotische Wort die Entsprechung des kopt. **ⲃⲉⲣⲥⲓⲧ** „Korb“ (für Brot) darstellt? Vgl. Crum, a. a., S. 43.

Z. 4. *hrjskws* „Kiste“, „Koffer“. Das Wort, das mir bis heute unbekannt war, ist wohl die demotische Schreibung des griech. Ῥίξος „Koffer“ (vgl. Schneider. Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch, S. 400).

Z. 5. Die Lesung *iwf* „Fleisch“ ist unsicher, so auch *irm* „und“, wegen der sonderbaren Schreibung. Betreffs des letzten Wortes kann ich keine sinnvolle Deutung geben.

Z. 6. Das Determinativ des beschädigten Wortes weist auf einen Gegenstand, nicht unwahrscheinlich aus Holz.

Quittung über Geldzahlung

XXIV. DO BM 5678. Grösse: 11,4×11,3 cm. Theben. Wahrscheinlich Jahr 259/58 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *in Ns-Mn s3 P3-tj-nfr-htp ht-kt 2*
2. *<n> rn(?) Pa-Is s3 Thwtj p3 sh(?) n h3.t-sp 27 <iw> ir ht-kt 1*
3. *r ir=j n=f hn=w sh Pa-bh s3 Ns-Hr(?)*
4. *r hrw P3-sr-Hr(?) p3 rt P3-tj-Imn-nsw-t3.wj*
5. *p3 c3 n pr n h3.t-sp 27 ibt-3 sm <sw> 12*

Übersetzung

1. Es hat bezahlt Esmín, Sohn des Petenefhotep, 2 Silber-Kite
2. (im) Namen des Paese, des Sohnes des Thoth, des Schreibers(?), (indem) 1 Silber-Kite,
3. den ich führ ihn erhoben habe in ihnen ist. Es hat geschrieben Pabekh, Sohn des Eshor(?),
4. auf Geheiss von Pshenhor(?), dem Vertreter des Petemestou,
5. dem Majordomus, im Jahr 27, am 12. Epiphe.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Esmín (S. des Petenefhotep) ist ein aus mehreren Bescheinigungen über Begräbnissteuer (OrSu 23–24, 1976, S. 28ff., Nr. XVI–XXII) bekannter Chochyt in der thebanischen Nekropole, und wie diese bezeugen, war er im Dienst in der Zeitperiode 261/60–251/50 v. Chr.

Z. 2. Das Determinativ des Wortes *rn* „Name“ ist hier auch als Possessivartikel *pa* in dem Namen *Pa-Is*, Paese, zu fassen. – *p3 sh* „der Schreiber“. Die Lesung ist wegen der unklaren Schreibung unsicher. Es handelt sich zweifelsohne um einen Titel und der vorgeschlagene scheint mir der einzig zutreffende zu sein. – Das Zeichen  ist der Schreibung nach „20“ zu deuten, aber das Datierungsjahr in Z. 5 zeigt, dass es „27“ zu lesen ist. Die Zahlzeichen für 20 und 7 sind hier zusammengeschrieben.

Z. 3. Der Name – in der vorliegenden Form sinnlos – kan eine unvollständige Schreibung für  *Ns-Hr*, Eshor, sein. Die Pause ist zweimal nachgeprüft, aber keine Zeichenspuren bestätigen die vorgeschlagene Ergänzung.


Z. 4–5. Der Majordomus Petemestou erscheint auch in OrSu 23–24, Nr. XVI/4. – Jahr 27 = Ptolemaios II. Philadelphos 27 (= Jahr 259/58 v. Chr.).

Zahlungsbescheid betreffs Grablibationen

XXV. DO Wien 43. Grösse: 14,6×9 cm. Wahrscheinlich Theben. Römische Zeit.

Transkription

1. *h3 n r t j m w n n3 m3c .w n n3 sr .w n t3 hnt*
2. *glc ibt-4 sm sw 16 rmt 2 tn tbc 6*
3. *sw 17 rmt 2 tn tbc 6 sw 18 rmt 2 tbc 6*



XXIV. (DO BM 5678)



XXV. (DO Wien 43)

Übersetzung

1. Anfang des Wassersprengens in den Kenotaphen der Söhne der Vorsteherin
2. des Einhüllens(?): am 16. Mesore zwei Mumien, je auf einen 6 Obolen;
3. am 17. zwei Mumien, je auf einen 6 Obolen; am 18. zwei Mumien, je auf einen 6 Obolen.

Bemerkungen


Z. 1-2. $h_3 n tj mw$ „Anfang des Wassersprengens“. Die Entzifferung des undeutlichen Zeichens vor mw „Wasser“ ist etwas unsicher. Die Lesung tj „geben“ ist möglich. Die Lesung $w_3 h mw$, Choachyt, ist m. E. hier nicht zutreffend, und ausserdem lässt sich das betreffende Zeichen schwerlich als $w_3 h$ (vgl. Erichsen, Glossar, S. 76) identifizieren. – $hnt gl^c(?)$ „Vorsteherin des Einhüllens(?)“. Die Lesung gl^c „einwickeln“, „bekleiden“ (vgl. Erichsen, a. A., S. 589) scheint mir ziemlich sicher zu sein. Wie aus der Bezeichnung hervorgeht ist die Frau Vorsteherin eines Arbeitsortes, in welchem Leichname eingehüllt werden. – Der Betrag, sechs Obolen, welchen der diensttuende Choachyt pro Mumie erhob ist wohl als Sporteln zu bezeichnen.

Übertragung eines Choachyentages

XXVI. DO BM 5702. Grösse: 6,7×4,5 cm. Theben. Jahr 259/58 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. $Pa-rt_3 s_3 P_3 j^c w p_3 ntj dd \langle n \rangle Ta-b_3$



XXVI. (DO BM 5702)

2. $t\bar{3}$ Pa-rt \bar{t} tw=t n=j hrw 1 sh
3. P $\bar{3}$ -b $\bar{3}$ j(?) r hrw=f n h $\bar{3}$.t-sp 27 ibt-2 $\bar{3}$ h sw 17

Übersetzung

1. Paret, Sohn des Piau, ist es, der sagt zu Taba,
2. der Tochter des Paret: „Du hast mir einen Arbeitstag überlassen“. Es hat geschrieben
3. Pebai(?) auf sein Geheiss im Jahr 27, am 17. Paophe.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Eine Person, Namens Pa-rt \bar{t} (S. des P $\bar{3}$ j- \bar{c} w), der in einer frühptolemäischen Salzsteuerquittung aus Theben, Jahr 28 datiert, erscheint, kann möglicherweise mit unserem Paret identisch sein (Schubart-Kühn, Papyri und Ostraka der Ptolemäerzeit, Nr. 1334). – Die Empfängerin der Quittung ist eine Choachytin, die aus zwei thebanischen Bescheinigungen über Begräbnissteuer vom Jahr 246/45 v. Chr. bekannt ist (OrSu, 23–24, 1974–1975, S. 39f., Nr. 25 u. 26).

Z. 2. Das beschädigte Zeichen ist wohl hrw „Tag“ zu lesen.

Z. 3. Die Lesung des Namens des Schreibers ist unsicher. Die Schreibung ist in Bezug auf das zweite Zeichen des Hauptwortes, das schwerlich $\bar{3}$ gelesen werden kann, unklar, aber ich kann keinen anderen Namen vorschlagen. – Jahr 27 = Ptolemaios II. 27 (= Jahr 259/58 v. Chr.).

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Ich bin Prof. Dr. Jan Bergman, Uppsala, und Dr. Stefan Grunert, Berlin, Dank schuldig für erfolgreiche Besprechungen über vorkommende Probleme angegebener Art.
2. Abh. Berlin, Nr. 4, 1929.
3. 1963 in Kairo gekauft.
4. Der laufende Text deutet m. E. darauf hin, dass keine Wörter mangeln. n vor rn „Name“ oft ausgelassen.
5. Kalksteinscherbe.
6. Für andere nach Personen benannte Kornmasse siehe Sethe, Bürgschaftsurkunden, S. 186, § 58 b.

Šafā^ca dans le Coran

EVA RIAD

La signification du mot *šafā^ca* dans le Coran s'explique par la place qu'occupe cette notion dans la relation entre Dieu et l'homme, telle que la conçoit le prophète Mahomet, et par la nature de cette relation, surtout telle qu'elle se révèle au moment décisif du destin final de l'homme, c'est à dire lors du jugement dernier. Le verbe *šafa^ca* s'emploie surtout en rapport avec des avertissements concernant le jugement dernier.

La notion de *šafā^ca* existait bien avant l'islam dans le sens ordinaire d'intercession et aussi, semble-t-il, transférée au domaine religieux. La forme même de *šafā^ca* ne paraît pas avoir été très employée avant le Coran, mais d'autres formes du verbe figurent dans les textes. Commençons par une analyse de l'emploi préislamique de cette notion comme on peut le dégager à l'aide d'exemples tirés de la poésie préislamique et de la première période de l'islam pour passer ensuite à sa place dans le Coran.

Šaf^c « nombre pair », « faisant la paire » est opposé à *watr*, *witr* « nombre impair » dans la sourate 89, 1-4 (1-3)¹, le seul exemple de *šaf^c* dans le Coran, dans un des nombreux serments que Mahomet emploie dans sa prédication de la première période : *walfağri walayālin ʿašrin waššaf^ci walwatri wallayli idā yasri*, traduit par R. Blachère : « Par l'aube! par dix nuits! par le pair et l'impair! par la nuit quand elle s'écoule! »² *Šaf^c* est « ce que l'on ajoute au nombre impair pour le rendre pair », « l'autre moitié ». Le verbe *šafa^ca* signifie « rendre qc la moitié d'une paire », « redoubler », « répéter », « ajouter l'équivalent ». Dans un poème d'al-Ḥārīṭ Ibn Ḥilliza (*Mufaḍḍaliyāt*, p. 266) *yašfa^cuhā* est donné comme variante de *yud^cifuhā* « redoubler » et dans un poème de Qays ibn ʿAyzāra la forme *šāfi^cun* signifie *qāʾilun marratan uxrā* (*Carmina Hudsailitarum*, éd. Kosegarten, p. 248; Farrāğ, 2, p. 591; Nöldeke, *Delectus*, p. 34)³; ṭawīl :

*wayaʾmuru bī Ša^clun liʾuqtala muqtalan **
faqultu liŠa^clin, biʾsa mā anta šāfi^cu

« Ša^cl a ordonné que je sois tué; j'ai dit à Ša^cl : c'est mauvais ce que tu répètes là ». La signification « double » revient dans un poème de Ğarīr (*Naqāʾid*, p. 694); ṭawīl :

*wamā bāta qawmun ḡāminīna lanā daman **
fatūfiyanā illā dimāʾun šawāfi^cu

« Personne ne peut se faire garant du sang versé, seulement le sang de deux hommes pour celui de l'un des nôtres⁴ peut nous satisfaire »⁵.

Même s'il n'est pas toujours question d'un dédoublement dans le strict sens du mot, l'idée est justement la correspondance entre ce qui est donné et ce que l'on y

ajoute comme dans l'exemple suivant tiré d'une époque postérieure. Al-Buḥturī y fait l'éloge d'al-^cAlā ibn Ṣā^cid (Dīwān, 2, p. 1334); munsariḥ :

xuliqta watran falaw yuḏāfu ilay-
ka lbaḥru yawma l'ifḏāli mā ṣafa^cak
waqaḏ^ḏ tabadda^ḏta fā^cilan ḥasanan *
famtaṭala lḡaytu ḏāka fattaba^cak*

« Tu fus créé seul et si on t'ajoutait la mer au jour de la générosité elle ne ferait pas pair avec toi. Tu as fait le bien d'abord et cette pluie abondante t'a suivi en t'imitant. » La mer n'est pas assez abondante pour faire l'équilibre avec la bonté d'al-^cAlā. Le maṣḏar est *ṣaf^c* (Lane, Freytag). Et on dit d'une chèvre : *ṣātun ṣāfi^cun* « chèvre ayant un petit dans le ventre ou accompagné par son chevreau, associant avec elle son petit, ou les deux en même temps » (se dit aussi d'une chamelle) (Lisān, 10, p. 50), le maṣḏar dans ce cas *ṣaf^c* ou *ṣif^c*⁷.

Ṣafa^ca peut aussi être employé au sens réflexif-intransitif « se joindre à qn comme, devenir, la deuxième moitié pour former un couple » comme chez an-Nābiḡa à an-Nu^cmān (éd. Derenbourg, 1868, p. 271, trad. pp. 308–309); ṭawīl :

*atāka mru^ḏun mustabḡinun (var.⁴⁶ musta^clinun) liyya buḡḏatan *
lahu min ^cadūwin miṭḡa (var. miṭḡu) ḏālika ṣāfi^cu*

rendu par M. H. Derenbourg : « il est venu vers toi un homme qui cache dans son cœur une haine violente contre moi et qui s'est associé un autre ennemi animé des mêmes sentiments ». Pour faire valoir la valeur réflexive-intransitive de *ṣāfi^cun* je traduirais « à qui s'est associé » (cf. ci-dessous, p. 51); (aussi dans Ahlwardt, p. 19; Cheikho, p. 691). Cette association se fait surtout contre, ^calā, qn, cf. *yu^cādīnī walahu ṣāfi^cun* (Lane 1572c) et al^ḏAḥwaṣ (Tāḡ al-^cArūs, 5, p. 400); munsariḥ :

*ka^ḏanna man lāmanī li^ḏaṣrimahā *
kānū ^calāynā bilawmihim ṣafa^cū*

« Comme si ceux qui me blâment pour que je me sépare d'elle se seraient associés contre nous par leur blâme ». Ce n'est pourtant pas toujours le cas. Al-A^cṣā dit avec une expression elliptique (éd. Geyer; p. 107, éd. 1950, p. 145); sarī^c :

*waṣṣāfi^cūna lḡū^ca ^can ḡārihim *
ḥattā yurā kalḡuṣuni^{7b} nnāḏiri*

« Ils viennent se joindre à leur protégé pour l'aider à chasser la faim jusqu'à ce que celui-ci a l'air d'une branche verdoyante ». Cf. aussi Ka^cb ibn Malik dans Ibn Hiṣām, p. 615, au sujet de la bataille de Uḥūd, ṭawīl :

*wakunna ṣihāban yattaḡī nnāsu ḥurratan (var. ḥarrahu, ṣarrahu) *
wayafrūḡu ^canhu man yalihi wayaṣfa^cu*

« Nous fûmes une flamme dont les hommes craignaient la chaleur. Chacun qui s'en rapprocha ou s'y joignit dut s'en écarter. » *Yaṣfa^cu* serait ici plus ou moins synonyme de *yali* ou porterait la nuance « se joindre comme double ou équivalent », cf *wali* souvent juxtaposé à *ṣafī^c* (voir ci-dessous, p. 46).⁴⁷

Le *mašdar* dans cet emploi intransitif-réflexif de *šafa^ca* est *šafā^ca* selon G. Freytag, par exemple. Lane (p. 1571 b) mentionne aussi ce *mašdar* en citant TA, 5, p. 400. Il hésite toutefois à l'admettre pour une autre signification que celle d'intercession, c.-à-d. *šafa^ca* dans sa troisième signification directement issue de la deuxième : « se joindre à qn dans le but d'intercéder pour lui », « intercéder pour qn auprès de qn », « plaider pour qn ou pour une cause » et « servir d'intermédiaire » (voir ci-dessous la discussion au sujet de la sourate 4, 85 (87)).

Avant de passer à la discussion de cette troisième signification du verbe *šafa^ca* avec dérivations il convient de mentionner la forme *šafā^ci^cu* dans le poème de Qays ibn ^cAyzāra déjà cité (Carmina, éd. Kosegarten, p. 251; éd. Farrāg, 2, p. 594; Nöldeke, Delectus, p. 35); *ṭawīl* :

iḏā ḥadarat (var. *šadarat*) ^c*anhū tamaššat maxāduhā* *
ilā ssirri yad^cuhā (var. *tad^cuhā*) *ilayhi ššafā^ci^cu*

« Quand les chamelles se retirent de lui elles se rendent au fond de la vallée où les plantes qui intercèdent (ou : jumelles) les appellent ». Selon les dictionnaires ce sont des plantes qui poussent deux à deux ou des plantes jumelles. Mais le commentateur as-Sukkarī propose en premier lieu qu'il y a quelque chose dans ces plantes qui intercède pour les chamelles⁸. Il voit sans doute en *šafā^ci^cu* le pluriel de *šafā^ca* (ou de *šafī^c*, normalement *šufa^cā^c*, voir Wright 1, p. 215 et 218) et renvoie à la citation suivante d'al-Farazdaq, *basīṭ* :

ra^cat Hunaydatu aṭlāḥan aḍarra bihā *
šafā^catu nnaumi lil^caynayni wassahari

avec la leçon *wassahari*, *lil^caynayni* et *assahari* étant coordonnés; la traduction serait à peu près : « Hunayda a vu des montures harassées que l'assoupissement (l'intercession pour les yeux et pour l'insomnie) a nuies. » Dans le *dīwān* le premier hémistiche est ainsi conçu: *zārat Sukaynatu aṭlāḥan anāxa bihim* * et la vocalisation du dernier mot dans les deux éditions est *wassaharu* (éd. Boucher, 1, p. 16; trad. p. 35; éd. aš-Šāwī, 1, p. 219), *šafā^catu* se référant seulement aux yeux « l'intercession du sommeil pour les yeux », pour qu'ils se ferment ou se reposent. Le verset est traduit par Boucher : « Sokaina est venue visiter des voyageurs harassés que les veilles et l'assoupissement ont forcés à agenouiller leurs montures . » On pourrait aussi comprendre l'expression dans un sens analogue à celui de la citation d'al-A^cšā ci-dessus : « le sommeil se joignant aux yeux, venant reposer les yeux ».

Avec ce dernier exemple nous passons à *šafa^ca* au sens « d'intercéder » *li* « pour » qn, *ilā* « auprès de » qn, avec le *mašdar* *šafā^ca* « intercession ».

Dans la poésie préislamique et les textes de la première période de l'islam on trouve *šafa^ca* pour « intercéder ». La forme *šafā^ca* semble pourtant rare avant le Coran. L'intercession s'adresse à un *sayyid* ou un juge, *ḥakam*, et vise des buts terrestres tels que la libération des prisonniers, par exemple⁹. An-Nābiġa ad-Ḍubaynī, qui vivait à l'époque à la cour lakhmide de Ḥīra¹⁰, s'adresse dans un poème à des hommes de Ġassān qui l'avaient aidé à plaider auprès d'al-Ḥārīṭ pour qu'il libère des prisonniers des tribus Rabī^ca et Muḍar qui avaient été pris dans une grande bataille où le roi lakhmide al-Munḍir fut tué¹¹. Al-Ḥārīṭ libéra 70

des prisonniers et le poète loue les Ġassān ainsi (l'épigraphe et le poème dans l'éd. Derenbourg, 1899. p. 52, no 57); ṭawīl :

(wa)lillāhi ʿaynā man¹² raʿā ahla qubbatin *
 aḍarra liman ʿādaw waʿakṭara nāfiʿā
 waʿaʿzama ahlāman waʿakṭara sayyidan *
 waʿafḍala mašfūʿan ilayhi wašāfiʿā

(aussi dans Ahlwardt, Supplement to the Appendix no 61, p. 112).⁴⁸ « Bénis par Allāh sont les yeux de celui qui voit des bédouins plus dangereux pour les ennemis et plus utiles et plus sages et plus maîtres et plus excellents en tant qu'accueillants une intercession ou qu'intercesseurs. »¹³ Le poète va louer ensuite la générosité des Ġassān.

Accueillir favorablement une intercession est donc une des qualités louables d'un chef et intercéder pour les plus faibles une qualité louable chez les hommes éminents d'une tribu¹⁴.

Les trois citations qui suivent illustrent trois situations auxquelles la notion de *šafāʿa* s'applique. La première est du même genre que celle qui a suscité les vers d'an-Nābiġa que nous venons de citer. C'est un poème de Ḥātim aṭ-Ṭāʾi dans lequel le poète s'adresse à al-Ḥārīṭ ibn ʿAmr al-Ġafnī¹⁵ qui régnait une courte période à Ḥīra à la place d'al-Mundir III. Al-Ḥārīṭ avait fait prisonniers 90 hommes de Ṭayyi' de la famille de Ḥātim pour se venger de l'assassinat d'un de ses fils. Ḥātim se rend chez al-Ḥārīṭ et négocie la libération des prisonniers en trois étapes à l'aide de trois poèmes successifs dont celui que nous citons est le dernier, visant le dernier prisonnier, Qays ibn Ġaḥḍar (éd. Schulthess, p. 15; K. al-Aġānī, 19, p. 128; Naqāʿid, p. 1083); ṭawīl :

fakakta¹⁶ ʿAdīyan kullahā min isārihā *
 faʿanʿim (var. faʿafḍil) wašaffiʿnī biQaysi bni Ġaḥḍari
 abūhu abī waʿummahātu mmahātunā *
 faʿanʿim fadatka lyawma nafsī (var. qawmī) wamaʿšarī

traduit par F. Schulthess : « Du hast ganz ʿAdī aus den Gefangenschaft befreit; so tu nun ein Uebriges und lass mich auch für Qeis B. Ġaḥḍar eintreten! Sein Vater ist unser Vater und die Mütter sind unsre Mütter. Gewähre es, du bist mir heute teurer als Familie und Verwandtschaft! »

Les dernières paroles du poème suggèrent que Ḥātim, *aššaffiʿ*, offre en gage sa propre personne et sa famille pour la libération des prisonniers, peut-être un indice qu'il a existé un lien concret entre *šafāʿa* et des notions telles que gage, rançon. Il est toutefois impossible d'en tirer une conclusion sûre. Ce genre d'expressions, cf. *ġuʿiltu fidāka*, sont fréquemment employées pour renforcer la demande ou la prière sans comporter le sens littéral. C'est ainsi que F. Schulthess l'a compris ici.

Ḥātim agit ici en tant que chef de famille et poète tout comme an-Nābiġa, cité ci-dessus, qui plaide pour les membres de sa famille. On connaît le rôle du poète comme porte-parole de la tribu.

Šaffaʿa signifie « accepter l'intercession » *bi* « pour », c'est à dire répondre favorablement.

Ce poème de Ḥātim appartient à un genre de poésie qu'on pourrait appeler le genre de šafā^ca. An-Nābiġa ad-Ḍubyanī, par exemple, y excelle. Il agissait comme intercesseur auprès des chefs des Ġassān, comme on vient de le voir, à maintes reprises, et son intercession prenait la forme des poèmes¹⁷. Les vers qu'on vient de citer (p. 40 ci-dessus) sont un exemple d'un poème de reconnaissance après une šafā^ca réussie. – Dans al-Aġānī est relatée l'épisode suivante : Quand ar-Rašīd avait fait prisonnier Abū l-^cAtāhiya et avait juré qu'il ne le lâcherait pas à moins qu'il récite un poème, Abū Habš dit : « As-tu entendu quelque chose de plus bizarre que cette histoire. Les poètes font de la poésie excellente, rare, mais ils ne se font pas entendre. Et cet entêté, obstiné, récite des poèmes d'intercession! » Ensuite il récita une satire adressée à Abū Ishāq c.-à-d. Abū l-^cAtāhiya dont les dernières lignes (K. al-Aġānī², 4, p. 48); wāfir :

*wašabbib billatī tahwā waxabbir **
bi²annaka mayyitun fī kulli sā^cah
*kasadnā mā nurādu wa²in aġadnā **
wa²anta taqūlu šī^craka biššafā^cah

« Compose des poésies érotiques sur celle que tu aimes et déclare que tu es mort à chaque instant. Nos poèmes ne sont pas demandés, on ne veut pas de nous même si nous sommes excellents, tandis que toi, tu récites ta poésie d'intercession! »¹⁸

Si l'intercession se faisait entre tribus dans les poèmes d'an-Nābiġa et de Ḥātim il sera maintenant question d'une intercession au sein d'une tribu. Dans un poème d'al-^cAšā la fille du poète fait appel à un homme important de la tribu pour qu'il plaide auprès du père de la jeune fille pour empêcher celui-ci d'entreprendre un voyage que sa fille estime trop fatigant pour lui. Avec la dixième forme du verbe on obtient une image claire de la hiérarchie qui joue dans ces situations (Dīwān, poème 13; Cheikho, p. 396); basīṭ :

*wastašfa^cat min sarāti lḥayyi dā šaraḥīn (var. ṭiqatin, nasabin) **
faqad ^cašāhā abūhā walladī šafa^ca,

« Elle demanda aux nobles seigneurs de la tribu d'intercéder (pour elle auprès de son père) mais son père lui désobéit à elle aussi bien qu'aux intercesseurs ».

Istašfa^ca bi signifie « chercher l'intercession par qn, demander à qn d'intercéder *ilā*, auprès de ».

La troisième situation est illustrée dans un poème d'al-Farazdaq, donc un peu postérieur, mais qui reflète sans doute les conditions prévalentes aussi avant l'islam. Il s'agit d'un conflit entre deux personnes porté devant un arbitre. C'est le conflit qui opposa le poète à sa cousine et future femme an-Nawār. Le poète était de retour à Bašra après un long séjour à Médine. An-Nawār des Banū Dārim, une subdivision des Banū Tamīm, demanda à son cousin de la marier à un dārimite. Or, al-Farazdaq tomba lui-même amoureux de la jeune fille, appela les témoins qui avaient assisté quand an-Nawār avait confié à al-Farazdaq la tâche de lui trouver un mari, et se proclama lui-même son mari. Ceci ne fut pas accepté par an-Nawār. Après avoir cherché refuge auprès de certaines tribus du désert, aussitôt harcelées par les poèmes satiriques d'al-Farazdaq, elle finit par se

rendre à la Mecque où elle obtint l'appui de Tumādīr (ou Xawlā)¹⁹ Bint Manzūr ibn Zabbān qui était la femme de ʿAbdallāh ibn az-Zubayr, prétendant du califat et considéré comme calife par un bon nombre d'Irakiens. An-Nawār demanda à Bint Manzūr de plaider sa cause, *istašfaʿa*, auprès de son mari. Al-Farazdaq, de son côté, cherchait aussi à soumettre le litige au jugement du calife Ibn az-Zubayr en essayant de faire pencher celui-ci de son côté par l'intermédiaire de Ḥamza, fils d'Ibn az-Zubayr et de Bint Manzūr. Nous trouvons la description de ces événements dans Kitāb al-Aġānī², 9, p. 326 en ces termes : *falamma qadimat (an-Nawār) Makkata nazalat ʿalā Binti Manzūri bni Zabbāna wastašfaʿat bihā ilā zawġihā ʿAbdillāhi waḥdamma lFarazdaqū ilā Ḥamzata bni ʿAbdillāhi bni zZubayri*. Al-Farazdaq loua Ḥamza dans un poème pour obtenir son aide, mais la cause d'al-Farazdaq allait en s'affaiblissant tandis que celle d'an-Nawār se renforçait, ce qui inspirait le poète à chanter; basīt :

*ammā banūhu falam tuqbal (var. tunġih) šafāʿatuhum *
wašuffiʿat Bintu Manzūri bni Zabbānā
laysa ššafīʿu llađī yaʿtika muʿtaziran *
miṭla ššafīʿi llađī yaʿtika ʿuryānā
(Naqāʿid, p. 805; K. al-Aġānī², 9, p. 327)*

traduit par R. Boucher : « La prière de ses fils n'a pas eu d'influence sur lui, mais celle de la fille de Manzhour a été exaucée. Chez toi un solliciteur habillé ne vaut point une suppliante nue » (éd. Boucher, 1, p. 5 et trad. p. 11 et note). Ibn az-Zubayr se fâcha en entendant ces vers et convoqua an-Nawār et s'offrit à tuer le poète insolent ou à l'envoyer dans un pays ennemi. Celle-ci déclina ces propos et consentit au contraire au mariage.

Malgré le ton railleur du poète ses mots reflètent sans doute les mœurs de la société où il vivait. La notion de *šafāʿa* est employée ici dans un contexte pour ainsi dire officiel. Il y est question d'un jugement, *ḥukm*, avec le calife lui-même comme arbitre et les deux antagonistes demandent chacun l'aide d'un *šafīʿ* pour plaider sa cause. Il s'agit de trouver une personne qualifiée pour cette tâche, quelqu'un de puissant ou ayant une position privilégiée auprès du calife. Ce sont les attraits de la femme qui la rendent plus susceptible d'obtenir une réponse favorable à son intercession que le fils.

Par ailleurs nous sommes mal renseignés au sujet du rôle de la *šafāʿa* dans l'organisation judiciaire. L'intercession du tiers auprès du juge en faveur d'un plaideur fut toutefois considérée comme un acte condamnable au temps d'Ibn Qutayba (éd. Brockelmann, 1, p. 82; éd. 1973, 1, p. 61); kāmīl :

*mā fi lqadāʿi šafāʿatun limuxāšimin *
ʿinda llabībi walā lfaqihi lhākimi*

« L'intercession en faveur d'un des antagonistes devant le tribunal n'est point permise pour l'homme intelligent et le juge sage » et dans al-Musnad d'Ibn Ḥanbal nous apprenons que c'est un acte contre Dieu que d'intercéder de telle façon qu'un *ḥadd min ḥudūdi llāhi* soit supprimé (2, pp. 70 et 82, cité dans Wensinck, 3, p. 151), deux restrictions au champ de l'emploi de la *šafāʿa*. Ces deux citations suggèrent, par la négation, qu'il pouvait y avoir quelque abus de la

šafā^ca, un peu comme la *rušwa*, d'un côté, et de l'autre que la šafā^ca était chose courante puisqu'on sentait le besoin de formuler les limites de son emploi.

Une quatrième situation où le šafī^c joue un rôle est celle où l'amant emploie un médiateur pour atteindre sa bien-aimée. Dans sa qašīda à Lubnā Qays ibn Ɖarīḥ s'exprime ainsi (al-Qāli, *Amālī*, 2, pp. 314–318; al-Bakrī, p. 133; al-Aġānī², 9, p. 214)²⁰; ṭawīl :

*maḍā zamanun wannāsu yastašfi^cūna bī **
fahal lī ilā Lubnā lġadāta šafī^cu

« Autrefois les gens me demandèrent d'intercéder pour eux; aurai-je, moi-même, demain un intercesseur auprès de Lubnā? »²¹

L'intercession peut se faire par quelque chose de plus concret que des paroles. Ainsi il est dit chez ʿAntara ibn Šaddād (p. 176; Cheikho, p. 852); kāmīl :

*yuxbirki man ḥadara šŠāma bīʿannanī **
ašfaytu wuddan man arāda halākī
*ḍalla Pulā ḥtālū ʿalayya waʿašbaḥu **
yatašaffa^cūna bisayfiya lfattākī

« Celui qui était avec moi en Syrie te racontera que j'ai une amour sincère pour celui que voulait ma perte. Ceux qui employaient des stratagèmes contre moi ont été abaissés et ont été accordés l'intercession par mon épée foudroyante. » Pour *tašaffa^ca* en ce sens, voir Lane 1571 c avec la correction de TA.

✶ Dans un poème d'une date plus récente d'aš-Šimma al-Qušayrī (m. en 710)²² c'est *annaḥs* qui est le šafī^c (*Abū Tammām*, Ḥamāsa, 1828, pp. 540–541; 1953, no 455, pp. 1220–1222); ṭawīl :

*wanubbī[?]tu Laylā arsalat bišafā^catin **
ilayya fahallā nafsu Laylā šafī^cuhā

« J'ai entendu que Laylā m'a fait parvenir une intercession. L'âme de Laylā, n'intercède-elle donc pas pour elle? » Selon les commentateurs at-Tibrīzī et al-Marzūqī *arsalat ilayya bišafā^catin* = *arsalat ilayya ḍā ššafā^cati*. Selon ces commentateurs l'intérêt se concentre sur celui qui présente la šafā^ca et non sur la šafā^ca en elle-même.

Almāl est *aššafī^c* dans un poème d'aṭ-Ṭirimmāḥ ibn Ḥakīm ibn Ḥakam Abū Nafs (m. après 738) (K. al-Aġānī², 12, p. 43); ṭawīl :

*wašayyabanī (var. wasabbabanī) mā lā azālu munāḥiḍan **
biġayri ġinan asmū bihi waʿabū^cu
*waʿanna riġāla lmāli aḍḥaw wamāluhum **
lahum ʿinda abwābi lmulūki šafī^cu

« Le fait que j'ai lutté incessamment sans une fortune par laquelle j'aurais pu m'élever et que j'aurais pu offrir m'a chagriné tandis que les hommes riches apparaissent avec l'argent plaidant pour eux aux portes des rois ».

Dans les deux derniers exemples, qui peuvent être multipliés si l'on regarde la poésie de l'époque abbasside²³, il est peut-être question simplement d'expressions poétiques²⁴. Il est cependant possible d'y voir aussi la trace d'une šafā^ca

qui se fait par des moyens matériels. On peut comparer ici le rôle du *ḥammālatu atqālin* « celui qui assume la responsabilité du paiement du prix de sang », titre d'honneur porté par exemple par al-Ḥārīt, avec celui du *šafī*. Le premier agit au cas de meurtre et apporte la satisfaction matérielle, la *ḥamāla*, du sang versé en tant que représentant de la tribu entière (voir par ex. Hātīm aṭ-Ṭāʿī, poème 52). La *šafā*, d'un autre côté, n'est pas matérielle et obtient son efficacité par le prestige et le rang social élevé etc. du *šafī*, en tant que représentant quelquefois de la tribu ou de la famille, quelquefois d'un individu. Est-il possible que la *šafā* eusse comporté comme la *ḥamāla* originairement quelque chose de plus matériel, le *šafī* étant essentiellement = *dū ššafā*? On ne saurait le dire. Il est pourtant évident que dans une société sans un système juridique élaboré la personnalité joue un grand rôle. Le fort saura toujours imposer son droit et le moyen le plus sûr pour avoir son droit ou du soutien fut certainement d'appeler au plus fort. C'est la personne du *šafī* qui garantit le succès de la démarche et non le contenu concret de la *šafā*.

Nous avons constaté que certaines qualifications sont exigées chez celui qui intercède pour un autre. Il doit être d'un rang plus élevé que le solliciteur ou avoir une certaine position par rapport à celui auquel s'adresse la demande, par exemple par un lien d'affection comme chez al-Farazdaq (Naqāʿid, p. 965, v. 24); *kāmil* :

*falaqad yuṭā u binā ššafī u ladaykumū **
wanuṭī u fiki mawaddatan man yašfa u

« L'intercesseur de chez vous fut obéi par nous; nous obéissons à ton sujet par affection pour celui qui intercède ». Le solliciteur, de son côté, allègue surtout des liens de parenté avec la personne à qui il demande l'intercession²⁵. Et la *šafā* semble, comme nous avons pu le constater, avoir été quelque chose de plus efficace et plus concret que ce que reflètent ordinairement nos notions d'intercession, de Fürsprache ou Fürbitte.

L'insuffisance des sources ne nous permet pas de parler d'une institution de *šafā* en Arabie à l'époque immédiatement antérieure à l'avènement de l'islam. La notion ne semble pas avoir fait partie de la nomenclature de la justice privée ou de la juridiction arbitrale mais appartient plutôt au vocabulaire décrivant les mœurs sociales qui réglaient le commerce des gens et des tribus entre eux et comme telle elle semble avoir été accompagnée de certaines formes de procédure telle que la restriction apportée à certains genres de situations et l'application selon une certaine hiérarchie.

En passant maintenant au Coran nous allons voir que Mahomet a une attitude hésitante vis-à-vis de la *šafā*. Ce n'est pourtant pas à la *šafā* que nous venons d'examiner qu'il s'oppose mais à son application au domaine religieux, à la relation entre Dieu et l'homme. Comme c'est surtout le Coran qui nous renseigne sur l'emploi de la notion de *šafā* dans le sens religieux à l'époque préislamique il convient d'analyser les passages pertinents du Coran à ce stade.

Le concept de *šafā* et d'autres formes du verbe *šafa* de la première forme se trouve vingt-six fois dans le Coran dans le sens « d'intercession » ou de

« médiation ». Dans la sourate 4, 85 (87) il est employé en outre quatre fois dans un sens un peu différent et on le trouve une fois comme *aššaf^c* dans le sens de « pair » dans la sourate 89,2. Il n'apparaît pas dans les formes dérivées dans le Coran.

La notion de *šafā^ca* figure dans trois genres de thèmes : a. en combinaison avec l'avertissement pour le jugement dernier, b. en polémique contre l'idolâtrie dans toutes ses formes, c. dans des hymnes de louanges à Allāh. Souvent il y a une combinaison de deux ou des trois thèmes. Les passages en question se répartissent selon le degré d'admissibilité de la façon suivante :

1. Il est établi sept fois qu'aucune intercession ou médiation n'est possible au jour du jugement dernier, à savoir dans les sourates 2, 48 (45) (et 2, 123 (117)) : « Prenez garde à un jour où nulle âme ne sera en rien récompensée pour une (*autre*) âme, (*où*) nulle intercession ne sera acceptée à son endroit, (*où*) nul équivalent (Zetterstéen : lösepenning = rançon) ne sera pris à sa place, (*où* les Impies) ne seront point secourus! »²⁶, ces paroles adressées aux enfants d'Israël, et 2, 254 (255). « O vous qui croyez!, faites dépense (*en aumône*) sur ce que Nous vous avons attribué, avant le venue d'un jour où il n'y aura ni troc, *bay²*, ni amitié, *xulla*, ni intercession, *šafā^ca*, (*où*) les Impies seront les Injustes. » On trouve le même message dans la sourate 7, 53 (51) adressée aux Hôtes du Feu : « Qu'attendent-ils sinon l'interprétation (*ta²wil*) (de cette Ecriture)? (*Mais*) au jour où leur arrivera l'interprétation (de cette Ecriture), ceux qui antérieurement l'auront oubliée, s'écrieront : 'Les Apôtres de notre Seigneur sont venus avec la Vérité (*mais en vain*). Aujourd'hui, avons-nous des intercesseurs qui intercèdent, *min šufa^cā²a fayāšfa^cū lanā*, pour nous, ou bien pourrions-nous être renvoyés (*sur terre*) afin de faire autre chose que ce que nous faisons?' (*Non*) ils se sont perdus eux-mêmes et ont été abandonnés par les Faux Dieux qu'ils forgeaient » et 26, 100–102 dans un discours fait par ceux qui ont été précipités dans *alğahim* : « Nous n'avons (*maintenant*) aucun intercesseur, *min šāfi^cina*, aucun ami ardent, *šadiq ħamim*. Que n'avons-nous (*la possibilité d'*) un retour (*sur terre*), afin d'être parmi les Croyants! » et 40, 18 (18–19) : « Avertis-les (*, Prophète!*) du Jour de l'Imminente quand, angoissés, les cœurs jusqu'à la gorge, les Injustes n'auront ni (*ami*) ardent, *ħamim*, ni intercesseur, *šafi^c*, capable d'être obéi », et 74, 48 (49) au sujet des pécheurs qui sont dans la Saqar : « Vaine pour eux sera l'intercession des Intercesseurs, *šafā^catu ššāfi^cina*. » Les commentateurs arabes affirment que ce n'est pas *aššafā^ca*, étant un concept qui devient très important plus tard dans l'islam, qui est rejetée mais *aššaf^c*, c'est à dire qu'il n'y aura pas d'intercesseur compétent accessible au jour du jugement dernier, cf. aussi sourate 6, 70 (69) sous 3. ci-dessous.

2. Neuf fois *aššafā^ca* se rapporte à des idoles ou à des faux dieux, ainsi sourate 6, 94 adressée aux Mekkois : « Vous voila venus à Nous, isolés, comme Nous vous avons créés, une première fois. Ce que Nous avons octroyé, vous l'avez laissé derrière vous. Nous ne voyons point avec vous ceux que vous prétendiez (*devoir être*) vos intercesseurs, *šufa^cā²akum*, et être vos associés, *šurakā²*! Certes, ce que vous prétendiez (*être des Associés d'Allah*) a rompu avec vous et vous a abandonnés »; 7, 53 (51) déjà citée; 10, 18 (19) au sujet des païens mekkois : « Ils adorent, en dehors d'Allah, ce qui ne leur nuit ni ne leur est utile et

(, montrant leurs Faux Dieux,) ils déclarent : 'Ceux-ci seront nos intercesseurs, *šufa^cā²unā*, auprès d'Allah.' Dis-(leur) : 'Aviserez-vous Allah de ce qu'Il ne sait pas, dans les cieus et (sur) la terre? Combien Il est plus glorieux et plus auguste que ce que vous (Lui) associez!' »; 19, 87 (90) cité ci-dessous; 30, 12–13 (11–12) : « Au jour où surgira l'Heure, Il frappera les Coupables, *almuğrimūna*, de mutisme. Ils n'auront point d'Intercesseurs, *šufa^cā²*, en ceux qu'ils associaient à Allah, *min šurakā³iħim*, et ils, *šurakā³uhum*, seront infidèles à ceux-ci »; 34, 22–23 (21–22) : « Dis (aux Incrédulés) : 'Priez ceux que vous prétendez (être des dieux) en dehors d'Allah! Ils ne possèdent pas le poids d'un atome dans les cieus ni sur la terre. Ils n'ont là (, avec Allah,) aucune association et Il n'a en eux aucun adjuteur.' L'intercession, *aššafā^ca*, ne sera efficace, auprès d'Allah (au Jugement Dernier), qu'en faveur de qui Il permettra (d'intercéder) . . . »; 36, 23 (22) dans la parabole des citadins impies : « Prendrai-je en dehors de Lui des divinités telles que si le Bienfaiteur me veut du mal, leur intercession, *šafā^catuhum*, ne servira à rien et (telles) qu'elles ne me sauveront pas? »; 39, 43–44 (44–45) : « (Les Impies) prendront-ils des Intercesseurs, *šufa^cā²*, en dehors d'Allah? Dis-(leur) : 'Et si (ces Intercesseurs) ne détenaient rien et ne raisonnaient point?' Dis : 'A Allah revient l'intercession, *aššafā^ca*, tout entière. A Lui La Royauté des Cieus et de la Terre. A Lui enfin vous serez ramenés' » et 43, 86 citée ci-dessous. La compétence des idoles à faire une intercession effective est reniée catégoriquement dans ces sourates.

3. Trois fois il est établi qu'il n'y a pas d'intercesseurs en dehors d'Allāh, ainsi dans les sourates 6, 51, dans une recommandation au prophète : « Par ceci, avertis ceux ayant peur d'être rassemblés vers leur Seigneur qu'ils n'auront en dehors (d'Allah) ni patron (*walī*) ni intercesseur, *šafi^c*! Peut-être seront-ils pieux »; 6, 70 (69) adressée aux païens mekkois : « Laisse ceux qui ont pris leur religion comme jeu et distraction et que la Vie Immédiate a trompés! Edifie-(les) par ceci (de crainte) que (leur) âme ne soit exposée à sa perte, du fait de ce qu'elle se sera acquis. (Leur) âme, en dehors d'Allah, n'aura ni patron, *walī*, ni intercesseur, *šafi^c*, et si (, au Jugement Dernier,) elle offre son égale (en compensation), *wa²in ta^cdil kulla^c adlin* (Zetterstéen : rançon) cela ne sera point accepté. Ceux qui se seront exposés à leur perte, du fait de ce qu'ils se seront acquis, auront boisson bouillante et tourment cruel, en prix d'avoir été impies » et 32, 4 (3) dans un hymne à Allāh : « Allah est Celui qui créa les cieus et la terre et ce qui est entre eux, en six jours, puis (*qui*) s'assit en majesté sur le Trône. En dehors de Lui, vous n'avez nul patron (*walī*) et nul intercesseur, *šafi^c*. Et quoi! ne vous amenderez-vous point? »

L'intérêt du Coran aux passages cités sous 1 à 3 est concentré à deux choses, d'une part à faire valoir la responsabilité individuelle de chaque homme lors du jugement dernier, d'autre part à exalter Allāh et souligner l'impuissance des divinités inférieures et des idoles.

Les sourates contenant la notion de *šafā^ca* se répartissent sur toute la période des révélations mais appartiennent surtout à la période où Mahomet rompt définitivement avec le culte des dieux anciens. Elles datent principalement de la deuxième et troisième période mekkoises à l'exception de la sourate 74 qui est de la première période mekkoise et²⁷ des sourates 2 et 4 qui sont médinoises.

Mahomet avait rencontré de la résistance et avait été l'objet de pressions pour qu'il permette le culte des dieux anciens à côté de celui d'Allāh. Tout indique qu'il y avait à la Mecque, à l'époque où Mahomet commença sa prédication, la croyance à un dieu suprême, un « high god », le dieu créateur, au sujet de qui on avait des idées vagues mais à qui on avait recours en cas de grande détresse. C'est à lui qu'on attribuait le pouvoir absolu et les divinités d'un rang inférieur avaient la fonction d'intercéder pour les hommes auprès du dieu suprême, voir ci-dessous, p. 53.

C'est donc à des gens ayant de telles idées, et qui avaient peut-être commencé à douter de la capacité de leurs dieux, que s'adresse Mahomet avec son message, proclamant Allāh comme dieu seul, unique, tout-puissant, devant qui chaque homme doit apparaître individuellement pour répondre de sa vie au jour du jugement dernier. Les lois sociales tribales ne sont pas applicables à cette situation, ni la *šafā^ca*.

Il y a cependant des cas où la *šafā^ca* est admise avec la permission de Dieu ou sur sa commande, *biⁱidni llāhi*.

4. Quatre fois il est simplement dit qu'aucune intercession n'est admise sauf celle qui se fait avec la permission de Dieu, ainsi dans les sourates 2, 255 (256) : « Allah – nulle Divinité excepté Lui –, est le Vivant, le Subsistant. Ni somnolence ni sommeil ne Le prennent. A Lui ce qui est dans les cieux et ce qui est sur la terre. Quel est celui qui intercédéra²⁸, *yašfa^cu*, auprès de Lui, sinon sur Sa permission, *illā biⁱidnihi*? Il sait ce qui est entre les mains des (Hommes) et derrière eux, alors qu'ils n'embrassent de Sa science, que ce qu'Il veut. Son Trône s'étend sur les cieux et la terre. Le conserver ne Le fait point ployer. Il est l'Auguste, l'Immense »; 10, 3 : « Votre Seigneur est Allah qui créa le ciel et la terre, en six jours, puis s'assit en majesté sur le Trône, élaborant l'Ordre. Nul intercesseur, *šafī^c*, ne se lèvera (, *au Jugement Dernier*), sinon après qu'Il (l') aura permis. C'est là Allah, votre Seigneur. Adorez-Le! Eh quoi! Ne réfléchirez-vous pas? »; 34, 22–23 (21–22) déjà citée et 53, 26 citée ci-dessous. Cf. aussi 32, 4 (3). Dans cette dernière ainsi que dans 2, 255 (256) et 10, 3 le point central n'est pas la notion de *šafā^ca* mais l'exaltation de la Majesté d'Allāh par des références surtout à la création.

5. La *šafā^ca* est aussi déclarée possible sous certaines conditions :

a. Il est permis à certains serviteurs de Dieu de plaider pour ceux dont Allāh est satisfait ou qu'il rend dignes d'être l'objet de la *šafā^ca* : la sourate 21, 25–28 (29) : « Nous n'avons envoyé avant toi aucun Apôtre sans lui révéler : 'Il n'est nulle divinité excepté Moi. Adorez-Moi!' (Mais les Impies) ont dit : 'Le Bienfaiteur s'est donné des enfants.' Gloire à Lui! Tout au contraire, ceux (*qu'ils nomment Ses enfants*) sont (*seulement*) des serviteurs honorés, *ibādun mukramūna*. Ils ne le devancent point par la Parole (*qawl*) et ils agissent sur Son ordre. Il sait ce qui est entre leurs mains et derrière eux et ils n'intercédèrent, *yašfa^cūna*²⁹, que pour ceux qu'il a agréés, *liman irtaḏā*, et qui, de la crainte qu'Il inspire, sont pénétrés »; la sourate 20, 109–110 (108–109) : « Ce jour-là, l'Intercession, *aššafā^ca*, ne sera efficace qu'en faveur de qui le Bienfaiteur permettra (*d'intercéder*) et pour qui Il agréera qu'on parle, *warāḏiya lahu qawlan*. Il sait ce qu'ils ont dans leurs mains et derrière eux, tandis qu'ils ne L'embrassent point en

(leur) science »; la sourate 53, 26 (26–27)³⁰ : « Que d'anges, dans les cieux, dont l'intercession, *aššafā'a*, ne servira à rien, sinon après qu'Allah l'aura permise en faveur de qui Il voudra et Il agréera, *liman yašā'u wayarqā!* »

Dans ces passages il est constaté positivement qu'il existe des personnes en faveur de qui Allāh peut admettre l'intercession. En même temps toute tendance à invoquer des anges ou tout autre être en dehors d'Allāh, que ce soit les divinités des arabes païens ou Jésus, les anges ou les saints des chrétiens qui soient visés, y est combattue³¹.

Comme intercesseurs ou médiateurs sont mentionnés « des serviteurs honorés » et des anges. Il ne semble pas que ce soit deux groupes distincts, cf. sourate 43, 19 (18) au sujet des anges qui sont les serviteurs du Raḥmān. Jésus, fils de Maryam, est aussi appelé serviteur, voir sourate 19, 30 (31) et 43, 59, et sous le nom de Messie dans la sourate 4 de Médine, 4, 172 (170). La médiation de ces anges et serviteurs consistent en ce qu'ils exécutent la volonté d'Allāh, et si l'un d'eux essayait de s'élever à une place l'instituant dieu à côté d'Allāh (ou à la place d'Allāh : ma remarque), *min dūnihi*, (la traduction de Blachère « au-dessous de » n'est guère plausible) il serait puni par l'enfer (sourate 21, 29 (30)). Dans la sourate 7, 194 (193) le terme *'ibād* est employé aussi pour les idoles et les idolâtres, sans toutefois l'épithète *almukramūna : inna llaḏīna tad'ūna min dūni llāhi 'ibādun amṭālukum*.

b. Le deuxième cas où l'intercession est déclarée possible est décrit dans la sourate 19, 87 (90) : *lā yamlikūna ššafā'ata illā mani ttaxaḏa 'inda rraḥmāni 'ahdan*, traduit avec les deux versets précédents : « Au jour où Nous rassemblerons les Pieux, en masse, vers le Bienfaiteur, où Nous pousserons les Coupables, en troupe, vers la Gehenne, (*ces Infidèles*) ne posséderont aucune intercession sauf ceux qui ont pris un pacte auprès du Bienfaiteur. » Le verset offre trois interprétations possibles dont deux sont citées par R. Paret, soit : « ... vermögen sie keine Fürsprache (zu erlangen) », avec « les coupables » du verset précédent comme sujet, soit « ... vermögen sie (d. h. die himmlischen Wesen) keine Fürsprache einzulegen ». Nous optons pour la dernière qui considère les *āliha* mentionnés au verset 81 (84) comme sujet du verbe vu que les mots *lā yamlikūna* est une formule très fréquemment employée pour tous ceux qui sont invoqués en dehors d'Allāh pour exprimer leur impuissance, par exemple sourate 39, 43 (44) : *ami ttaxaḏū min dūni llāhi šufa'a'a qul awalaw kānū yamlikūna šay'an*, cf. 13, 16 (17); 17, 56 (58); 25, 3 (4); 29, 17 (16); 34, 22 (21); 35, 13 (14); 43, 86. Une troisième interprétation est présentée par K. V. Zetterstéen qui considère « les coupables » ou « les pieux » des versets 85–86 (88–89) comme sujet, tout en attribuant à *yamlikūna ššafā'ata* le sens « d'opérer l'intercession » i.e. « åstadkomma medling », ce qui signifie que certains pieux ou coupables pourraient recevoir la permission d'intercéder. Ceci n'est pas en accord avec ce qui est dit ailleurs sur les intercesseurs. Pour l'expression *ittaxaḏa 'inda rraḥmāni 'ahdan* les dictionnaires offrent une interprétation théologique, par exemple Lane : « Except such as hath made a covenant with the Compassionate to assert his unity » (p. 2183 a). *'Ahd* veut dire un pacte comportant des obligations mutuelles des deux parties en question mais peut aussi revêtir le sens de « promesse » se référant à Dieu, tout comme le *berit*, hébreu (voir F. Buhl) ou « ordre » (voir al-

Baydāwī, 2, p. 48 et az-Zamaxšarī, Kaššāf, 2, p. 841)³². R. Paret traduit : « ein (bindendes Versprechen) ». C'est une transformation qui se fait naturellement quand Dieu devient une des parties impliquées dans ce pacte. La même chose se passera pour *aššafā^ca*.

Quoi qu'il en soit le pouvoir de servir d'intermédiaire ou d'être susceptible d'être l'objet d'une intercession est restreint à qui Allāh veut bien le donner, en vertu du pacte qu'il a conclu avec eux ou de la promesse qu'il leur a donnée.

c. Dans la sourate 43, 86, finalement, il est aussi question de ceux qui ont les qualifications nécessaires pour faire l'office d'intercesseurs ou médiateurs : « Ceux qu'ils prient en dehors de Lui, ne posséderont nulle intercession (*au Jugement Dernier*) excepté ceux qui auront témoigné de la Vérité et qui, eux, savaient », *walā yamliku llađīna yad'ūna min dūnihi ššafā^cata illā man šahida bilḥaqqi, wahum ya^clamūna*. Tandis que R. Blachère, comme aussi R. Paret avec la traduction « ausgenommen diejenigen », regarde *illā* comme *istiṭnā⁷ muttašil*, ce qui implique que *allađīna yad'ūna min dūnihi* comporte les anges (voir Reckendorf, Syntax, § 262 et al-Baydāwī, 2, p. 244 qui présente les deux possibilités) K. V. Zetterstéen le traite comme *istiṭnā⁷ munqati^c*, incluant dans « ceux qu'ils prient en dehors de Lui » seulement les idoles des païens. Il traduit en conséquence *illā* dans le sens adversatif « utan de som » i.e. « mais seulement ceux qui », au lieu de « excepté qui », contrairement à ce qu'il fait pour la sourate 19, 87 (90). Il évite dans les deux cas d'inclure les anges parmi ceux qui sont adorés. La différence n'est pas sans importance. Avec la première explication Mahomet inclurait dans « tout ce qui est invoqué en dehors d'Allāh » non seulement les idoles mais aussi des anges et peut-être Jésus. Il leur désigne à tous leur place : 1. Les idoles, qui sont sans doute les plus actuelles pendant cette période, sont déclarées exemptes de tout pouvoir. 2. Les anges en général sont aussi déclarés sans pouvoir d'intercession. Il s'agit d'empêcher qu'ils soient adorés comme des divinités. 3. A certains anges, peut-être à Jésus, est accordé quelque pouvoir d'intercession en tant que serviteurs de Dieu mais ils ne doivent pas être adorés, donc une attitude plus souple vis-à-vis les juifs et chrétiens qui, eux, s'appuient pour leur doctrine d'intercession sur leurs livres sacrés. Avec la deuxième interprétation de *illā*, par contre, l'adoration d'autre chose que les idoles des païens n'est pas envisagée.

Selon les commentateurs arabes ceux qui « auront témoigné de la vérité » sont Jésus, Esdras et certains anges (Tafsīr al-Ġalālayn, 2, p. 487) : *'Isā wa^cUzayru walmalā⁷ikatu fa⁷innahum yašfa^cūna lilmu⁷minīna*. *Alḥaqq* est la vérité révélée, cf. sourate 4, 106 (105) : *innā anzalnā ilayka lkitāba bilḥaqq*. Au sujet des anges cf. sourate 4, 166 (164) : *lākin allāhu yašhadu bimā anzala ilayka anzalahu bi^cilmihī walmalā⁷ikatu yašhadūna, bi^cilmihī* se référant aussi au contenu de la révélation (voir Paret, p. 112); cf. aussi sourate 3, 18 (16).

L'analyse des passages concernant *aššafā^ca* montre que le but de Mahomet à son sujet est d'empêcher tout ce qui pourrait mener à élever des êtres intermédiaires à une position qui menacerait l'unité de Dieu et son pouvoir exclusif, outre celui, peut-être encore plus pressant, d'avertir les hommes en vue du jugement dernier, où ils seront seuls devant le juge sans aide aucune. La *šafā^ca* n'a pas de place dans la nouvelle relation entre Dieu et l'homme que prêche le

prophète mais est gardée comme un reste de quelque chose de passé ou comme une concession aux juifs et chrétiens³³. Ce qu'il faut est la pénitence et la confiance en Dieu seul. Quand l'intercession est quand même admise il faut la regarder plutôt comme un acte de bonté, de grâce de la part d'Allāh. Au lieu d'être une démarche de l'homme vers Dieu elle est devenue un don de Dieu qu'il confère à celui qu'il considère digne ou qu'il rend digne de l'accepter, cf. le concept de *ahd* qui peut changer de « pacte » à « promesse » ou « ordre » quand Dieu fait partie de la relation que le mot exprime. Les anges ne sont pas des médiateurs dans le vrai sens du mot, mais simplement des serviteurs d'Allāh. Leur rôle d'intermédiaires consiste en ce qu'ils sont des instruments pour Allāh comme l'ange Gabriel et Mahomet lui-même sont des instruments pour faire arriver la révélation jusqu'aux hommes. Ils ne fonctionnent pas dans l'autre sens.

Il reste à analyser la sourate 4, 85 (87) qui présente la notion de *šafā'a* dans une lumière différente des autres passages du Coran. Le verset est ainsi conçu : *man yašfa' šafā'atan ḥasanatan yakun lahu našibun minhā waman yašfa' šafā'atan sayyī'atan yakun lahu kiflun minhā*, « Quiconque fait jouer une heureuse intercession bénéficiera d'une part de celle-ci (*au Jugement Dernier*). Quiconque (*au contraire*,) fait jouer une mauvaise intercession aura contre lui le double de celle-ci (*au Jugement Dernier*). Allah, sur toute chose est vigilant. » *Kiflun* est ici traduit avec « le double » ce qui n'est pas le cas dans les autres traductions (Paret, Zetterstéen, Arberry). Le mot signifie « part » comme par exemple dans la sourate 57, 28 : *kiflayni* « deux parts », (voir *Wörterbuch*, s.v. *k f l*). La traduction de Blachère ne semble pas justifiée même si le Coran prêche souvent la doctrine de la double rétribution. En outre, il n'est pas sûr qu'il s'agisse ici d'une rémunération au jugement dernier. Dans ce verset il n'est pas immédiatement évident que *šafā'a* signifie « intercession » comme c'est le cas partout ailleurs dans le Coran où *šafā'a* est liée à *šafa'a* au sens « intercéder » et non à *šafa'a* au sens « doubler, ajouter ». Mais que signifie une intercession mauvaise? Les commentateurs arabes ont interprété ce verset selon deux lignes :

1. *Šafā'a* est l'équivalent de *šaf'* et signifie « addition ». On traduit : « Celui qui ajoute une bonne action à une autre . . . » (TA, 5, p. 400). On s'attendrait à une *šaf'a* pour exprimer l'action d'une fois, mais *šaf'a* est spécialisée pour signifier les deux inclinaisons de la prière de la matinée³⁴. Probablement T. Huitema voit la chose de la même façon puisqu'il ne mentionne pas ce verset du Coran dans son livre *De Voorspraak (šafā'a) in den Islam*.

2. Nous trouvons une autre nuance dans TA. On explique *šafā'a* en général ainsi : *aššaf'u ḍammū šay'in ilā miṭlihi waššafā'atu l'inḍimāmu ilā āxara nāširan lahu wašā'ilan 'anhu* (TA, 5, p. 401, l. 33) « *aššaf'* : joindre une chose à son pareil et *aššafā'atu* : se joindre à un autre l'aidant et plaidant pour lui ». L'auteur explique la sourate 4, 85 (87) de la façon suivante : *ay man inḍamma ilā ḡayrihi wa'āwanahu wašāra šaf'an lahu aw šaf'an fi fi'li lxa'ayri awi ššarri fa'āwanahu aw šārahahu fi naf'ihi waḍarrihi* (TA, 5, p. 400, l. 25, trad. Lane p. 1571 b). Il interprète donc *šafā'a* comme le masdar de *šafa'a* au sens réflexif « se joindre à qn » et sans la correspondance exacte entre les deux parts du « couple » en question. Al-Bayḍāwī fait la même analyse de *šafā'a* commentant sourate 2, 48 (45) : *mina ššaf'i ka'anna lmašfū'a lahu kāna fardan faḡa' alahu ššaf'u šaf'an*

biḍammi nafsihi ilayhi (1, p. 58). Aṭ-Ṭabarī donne une interprétation musulmane dans le même sens : *aššafā^ca* : « celui qui est ajouté au nombre impair des adhérents à Mahomet de sorte que l'on obtient un nombre pair, et qui se joint à eux pour faire le *ḡihād* contre leurs ennemis, pour la cause d'Allāh, est une *šafā^ca ḥasana*, tandis que celui qui se joint aux ennemis du prophète est une *šafā^ca sayyi³a* (Tafsīr, 8, p. 580). Al-Bayḍāwī et az-Zamaxšarī ont des interprétations semblables qui impliquent que « la bonne addition » est celle qui veille aux intérêts d'un musulman et « la mauvaise addition » celle qui s'y oppose. TA mentionne encore une nuance, c'est à dire que *šafā^ca* ici signifie que quelqu'un montre le chemin qui mène au bien ou au mal à un autre et que cet autre suit son exemple de sorte que le premier devient comme son *šaf^c*, son pareil, la moitié d'un couple. Cette interprétation est probablement influencée par une parole connue de la tradition : *man sanna sunnatan ḥasanatan falahu aḡru man ^camila bihā waman sanna sunnatan qabiḥatan falahu iṭmuhā wa³iṭmu man ^camila bihā* (TA, 5, p. 400)³⁵. L'intercesseur comme guide et conseiller est connu aussi dans la tradition judaïque et chrétienne (voir N. Johansson, pp. 46–48).

Ce ne sont pas les interprétations exégétiques qui nous intéressent en premier lieu mais le fait que ces explications partent de l'une de deux significations du verbe *šafa^ca*, soit a. « ajouter qc de pareil pour rendre pair ce qui est impair », soit b. « se joindre à qn comme son pareil ». Les traducteurs du Coran occidentaux, de leur côté, voient tous *šafā^ca* ici comme le maṣdar de *šafa^ca* au sens c. « intercéder ». R. Blachère parle « d'une heureuse intercession » et « d'une mauvaise intercession », R. Paret de « eine gute Fürbitte » et « eine schlechte Fürbitte », A. J. Arberry de « a good intercession » et « a bad intercession » et K. V. Zetterstéen de « medling i god avsikt (intention) » et « medling i ond avsikt ». Ils se basent sur le fait que *šafā^ca* en général et partout ailleurs dans le Coran signifie « intercession » en contradistinction avec *šaf^c*. C'est aussi l'objection de Lane à l'interprétation dans TA (Lane, p. 1571 b). Or, il est dans ce verset question d'une *šafā^ca* qui est possible et effective et qui n'est pas liée au jugement dernier. La sourate est plus récente que les autres où figure le mot *šafā^ca*. Les versets 86–95 (84–93) sont considérés comme datant d'une période où Mahomet avait déjà contracté une alliance avec plusieurs tribus (Zetterstéen, p. 500; Nöldeke–Schwally, p. 201). La situation n'est pas la même que celle que reflètent les autres sourates où il est question de *šafā^ca*. Ce ne serait donc pas si étonnant si le mot portait une signification un peu différente ici que dans les autres passages du Coran. Bien que *šafā^ca* en général signifie « intercession » il ne paraît pas impossible que le maṣdar se rapporte plutôt ici au sens b. à savoir « se joindre à qn comme son pareil pour l'aider » comme dans les exemples de chez al-A^cšā et an-Nābiḡa cités ci-dessus (p. 38). On traduirait en ce cas, en accord avec l'interprétation donnée dans TA, dans ce sens : « quiconque se joint à un autre en bonne aide (pour le bien) bénéficiera d'une part de ce bien, et quiconque se joint à un autre en mauvais renfort aura une part de ce mal (le mal qu'il cause) » en laissant aux exégètes de décider si ce « bien » et ce « mal » visent la manière de faire l'union, la solidité de celle-ci, l'intention, l'efficacité ou le résultat de l'action³⁶.

Šaf^c, en tant que ce que l'on ajoute pour rendre pair ce qui est impair,

présuppose une correspondance exacte entre les deux parts (cf. ci-dessus, p. 37). *Šafā^ca* au sens « se joindre à qn comme son pareil pour l'aider » n'implique plus cette correspondance rigoureuse et *šafā^ca* au sens « intercéder », finalement, présuppose plutôt que celui qui se joint à l'autre soit en quelque sorte son double idéal, d'un rang plus élevé et d'une position plus favorable pour être écouté, que celui auquel il se joint.

Il est intéressant de comparer la forme *šafā^ca* avec des formes comme : *ḥamāla*, maṣdar de *ḥamala* au sens « se rendre responsable, assumer la responsabilité du paiement du prix du sang » (Lane, p. 647a), le maṣdar transitif étant *ḥaml*, *ḥumlān* et *ḥamāla* signifiant aussi le prix du sang même (voir par ex. Ibn al-Anbārī, p. 140 : *waqad ḥamala lḥamālata al-Ḥārīṭu bnū ʿAwfin*); *kafāla* au sens « se rendre caution, garant pour » à côté de *kafl* et *kufūl* (Wörterbuch, p. 268); *šabāra*, maṣdar de *šabara* au sens « devenir responsable pour » à côté de *šabr* (Lane, p. 1643c, 1644a); *ḡarāma* maṣdar de *ḡarima* « être tenu de payer une dette », signifiant aussi la dette même; cf. aussi *qasāma* au sens « serment assertorique » employé surtout en cas de meurtre, le serment de 50 personnes remplaçant le paiement du prix du sang quand un preuve positif fait défaut (voir Pedersen, 1914, pp. 180 ss.); *amāna* au sens « pacte, traité » et *barā²a* de *bari²a* « être libre, affranchi d'une obligation, d'une dette de sang ». Toutes ces formes ont une signification réflexive : on s'engage ou engage sa personne, se rend en quelque sorte garant du solliciteur.

Les grammairiens citent la forme *fa^cāla* comme le maṣdar de certains verbes transitifs de la forme *fa^cala* à côté de *fa^cl* (Fleisch, 1979, p. 162), comme le maṣdar dominant des verbes intransitifs de la forme *fa^cula* pour désigner une qualité : *šagā^ca*, *zarāfa* (Fleisch, 1979, p. 165; Wright, 1, p. 113 A; Reckendorf, Verhältnisse, 1, p. 21) et aussi comme maṣdar des intransitifs *fa^cila*, *yaf^calu* comme *ya²isa* *yay²asu*, *ya²āsa*; *ḡarima*, *yaḡramu*, *ḡarāma* etc. (voir Barth, p. 140 et ci-dessus). On ne cite pas cette forme pour des verbes intransitifs-réflexifs de la forme *fa^cala*. En même temps on sait d'une part que les affectations des formes de maṣdar à certaines catégories sémantiques ne sont connues qu'en gros, surtout en ce qui concerne les intransitifs, d'autre part que la forme *fa^cāla* est très répandue, voir Solá-Solé, p. 7, et n'est pas restreinte aux trois catégories mentionnées. La conformité sémantique des verbes cités ci-dessus implique un sens intransitif-réflexif qui semble avoir entraîné une conformité des formes.

Šafā^ca n'est pas le seul mot dans le Coran qui désigne intercession. Le verbe *istaḡfara li* s'emploie au sens « intercéder pour obtenir le pardon pour qn ». Les intercesseurs sont Abraham, Jacob, les fidèles, Mahomet et les anges. Ce mot n'est jamais employé au sujet de la situation propre au jugement dernier et il n'est pas permis de demander pardon pour les infidèles. Ainsi la prière d'Abraham pour son père est rejetée, sourate 19, 47 (48) et 60. De même Mahomet est mis en garde contre la prière pour les infidèles, les idolâtres, sourate 63, 5–6; 9, 80 (81); 48, 11; 9, 115–116 (114–115). Dans ce dernier passage l'avertissement s'adresse aussi à Abraham et aux fidèles. Seules permises sont l'intercession de Mahomet pour les fidèles et pour lui-même sourate 3, 159 (153); 24, 62; 47, 19 (21), et la prière des anges aussi pour les fidèles sourate 40, 7 et 42, 5 (3). Dans ce dernier verset il est écrit qu'ils prient pour « ceux qui sont sur la terre ». La comparaison

avec les autres exemples rend probable que ce qui est visé ici est aussi les fidèles (voir Eichler, p. 96). Dans la sourate 4, 64 (67) il est question d'un cas hypothétique. Si les hypocrites étaient venus à Mahomet et avaient demandé pardon à Allāh et si l'apôtre avait demandé pardon pour eux, ils eussent trouvé Allāh miséricordieux.³⁷

Nous avons examiné la notion de šafā^ca dans le Coran et dans les textes profanes du temps préislamique et de la première période de l'islam. Mais la notion d'intercession semble avoir existé aussi au sens religieux avant l'islam. Le verbe šafa^ca et ses dérivations sont employés dans le Coran pour désigner une fonction des dieux adorés en dehors d'Allāh, dieu suprême, en Arabie, à l'époque qui précède immédiatement l'avènement de l'islam. Pour la notion d'Allāh comme « high god » je m'appuie sur les recherches de W. M. Watt dont les résultats sont présentés entre autres dans « 'The High God' in Pre-islamic Mecca », et « The Qur'an and Belief in a 'High God' » où on trouve des références. La tradition des trois ǧarānīq « dont on peut espérer l'intercession » que nous trouvons chez aṭ-Ṭabarī, Ibn Sa'd et Ibn al-Kalbī suggère la même chose³⁸, voir Kitāb al-aṣnām, 1914, p. 19; 1941, p. 12 : *wAllāti wal'Uzzā wa Manāta ttālītati Puxrā fa'innahunna lǧarānīqu l'ulā wa'inna šafā'atahunna laturtaǧā. kānū yaqūlūna : banātu llāhi ('azza waǧalla 'an dālika) wahunna yašfa'na ilayhi*; voir aussi la sourate 39, 3 (4) : « Ceux qui ont pris des patrons (*awliyā'*) en dehors d'Allah disent : 'Nous ne les adorons que pour qu'ils nous rapprochent tout près d'Allah.' »

L'emploi préislamique religieux de la notion de šafā^ca au sens « plaider la cause des hommes auprès du dieu suprême » fut sans doute en gros calqué sur l'emploi profane de ce mot tel qu'il figurait dans le cadre des usages qui réglaient les relations des gens entre eux dans la société bédouine. Le dieu suprême fut regardé comme un *sayyid* et les dieux inférieurs comme des hommes importants agissant comme porte-parole des gens simples en leur capacité d'*awliyā'*, protecteurs. On pria pour obtenir de l'aide et de la protection dans la vie, par exemple pour avoir de la pluie, et il n'y avait aucun rapport avec un jugement final. Nous trouvons un reflet de ce genre de prière dans deux traditions chez al-Buxārī, qui bien que d'une période postérieure, illustrent bien, par analogie et en se servant de la dixième forme du verbe, comment il faut passer par des intermédiaires pour arriver jusqu'au dieu suprême : *iḍā stašfa'a lmušrikūna bilmuslimīna 'inda lqaḥṭ* (aṣ-Šaḥīḥ, Istisqā, 13) et *iḍā stašfa'u ilā l'imāmi liyastasqiya lahum* (Istiqrād, 18). Dans ces deux cas ce sont les musulmans et l'imām respectivement qui servent d'intercesseurs auprès de Dieu.

Mahomet rompt avec la façon d'appliquer les conditions et les relations humaines à la relation entre Dieu et les hommes, ce qui est autre chose. Il faisait ceci d'abord en reniant la faculté des dieux inférieurs d'intercéder et d'aider – il ne semble pas être arrivé à renier complètement leur existence à l'époque où les sourates dans lesquelles nous trouvons la plupart des mentions de l'intercession furent révélées – et deuxièmement en donnant un sens nouveau à la conception même de la divinité se basant sur sa propre expérience de Dieu dans les révélations.

La šafā^ca au sens ordinaire présuppose que l'individu est membre d'une

communauté qui assume la responsabilité de cet individu et au sein de laquelle il y a une hiérarchie bien définie qui décide qui a l'autorité de plaider pour les autres. La caractéristique de la situation lors du jugement dernier, au contraire, est justement que l'individu est seul. Donc la *šafā'a* est exclue ou devient la prérogative de Dieu seul.

Si donc le Coran a en gros une attitude négative vis-à-vis de la *šafā'a* et les *šufa'ā'*, au sens intercession-médiation et intercesseurs-médiateurs, il est d'autant plus remarquable que cette notion eut un développement si riche plus tard dans l'islam, surtout dans la doctrine de l'intercession du prophète lors du jugement dernier (voir Wensinck, *Concordance*, et l'article *šafā'a* dans EI¹ du même auteur pour des références au *ḥadīth*)³⁹. Le point de départ de cette doctrine fut pris dans les passages étudiés ici où l'intercession est déclarée possible, toutefois sans référence au prophète, et dans d'autres passages du Coran, surtout la sourate 17, 81 (79)⁴⁰ où les mots *maqāman maḥmūdān* sont interprétés comme donnant le droit d'intercéder. Ainsi le prophète obtient une position de médiateur entre l'homme et Dieu, en tant qu'intercesseur pour la communauté lors du jugement dernier, qui ne lui revient pas selon le Coran même. L'appartenance à la tribu était en quelque sorte une garantie pour avoir la possibilité d'une intercession en cas de danger ou de besoin. Cette garantie est sur le plan religieux remplacée par l'appartenance à la *umma* islamique. Déjà Ḥassān ibn Tābit expose cette foi dans l'intercession de Mahomet dans un poème exaltant la bataille de Badr où il décrit le courage des adhérents à Mahomet (Dīwān, poème CXXXII); ṭawīl :

*li'annahumū yarġūna minhu šafā'atan **
iḏā lam yakun illā nnabiyīna šāfi'u

traduit par O. A. Farrukh (p. 58) : « Denn sie hoffen auf eine Fürsprache von ihm, wenn niemand, ausser den Propheten, Fürsprecher sein kann. »⁴¹ Encore plus explicite est 'Abbās ibn Mirdās, converti à l'islam l'an 8/629, en disant du prophète (K. al-Aġānī, 13, p. 66) qu'il est, ṭawīl :

*amīnan 'alā l'furqāni awwalu šāfi'in **
wa'āxiru mab'ūtin yuġību lmalā'ikā

traduit par O. A. Farrukh (p. 57) : « Ihm (Muhammad) ist der *Furqān* (= Qur'ān) anvertraut; er ist der Erste, der am (jüngsten Tage) Fürbitte einlegt, und er ist der letzte (von Gott) Gesandte, der den Engeln antwortet. » Et le bédouin Sawād ibn Qārib récita devant le prophète à Médine (Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *Isti'āb*, 2, p. 599); ṭawīl :

*wa'innaka adnā lmursalīna wasīlatan **
ilā llāhi ya bna Pakramīna Paṭāyibi
*wakun lī šāfi'an yawma lā dū šafā'atin **
bimuġnin fatīlan (var. *siwāka bimūġnin*) 'an Sawādi bni Qāribi⁴²

traduit par O. A. Farrukh (p. 57) : « Du bist der nächste der Gesandten in bezug auf Mittel und Wege zu Gott, o Sohn der Edelsten, der Besten. Drum sei mir ein

Fürsprecher an dem Tage, wo kein Fürsprecher (ausser dir) dem Sawād nützen kann (selon la variante). »

La perspective du jugement était inquiétante et le besoin d'un intercesseur devenait impérieux. Et qui pouvait être plus digne d'obtenir l'autorisation de Dieu d'intercéder pour les hommes que le prophète Mahomet?

Le concept s'élargissait aussi de sorte que de nouveaux groupes furent ajoutés ayant le pouvoir d'intercéder auprès de Dieu : des prophètes, des anges, des saints, *awliyā'*, des martyrs, *šuhadā'*, sans doute sous l'influence des idées judaïques et chrétiennes⁴³. Ce développement a été étudié entre autres par T. Andrae, par exemple dans *Die Person Muhammeds*, pp. 234-256 et par T. Huitema dans *De Voorspraak (šafā'a) in den Islam* et ne nous occupera pas ici.

Nous nous bornons à constater que les idées au sujet des intercesseurs et des médiateurs dans les grandes religions monothéistes semblent remplir un besoin de combler la grande distance qui sépare Dieu des hommes, elle-même une manifestation sur le plan religieux de la conception néoplatonicienne de la polarité entre Dieu et la matière⁴⁴. Le cas d'*aššafā'a* et d'*aššafī'* illustre bien cet état des choses. Pour Mahomet lui-même cette « institution » menaçait le pur monothéisme. Ses successeurs immédiats et même ses contemporains ne pouvaient pas s'en passer.

Nous avons vu que la *šafā'a* du Coran se rapporte à la résurrection et au jugement dernier. Mahomet rend par là dans un certain sens à la notion de *šafā'a* sa signification ancienne et spécifique d'intercession auprès d'un juge arbitre, un *ḥakam*, ou d'un *sayyid* dans un cas litigieux, tout en la restreignant au moment du jugement dernier quand elle devient en réalité impossible. Les traductions dans nos langues occidentales font perdre ce sens spécifique du mot. Les mots « intercession, Fürbitte, Fürsprache », sont trop faibles et imprécis et d'une application trop générale et le mot suédois « medling » c'est à dire « médiation » employé par K. V. Zetterstéen rend bien l'efficacité impliquée dans le mot arabe mais ne fournit pas la connotation comportant la différence de rang entre les deux parties impliquées que comporte le mot arabe.

NOTES

1. Je suis le numérotage coufique des versets avec les numéros selon l'édition de Flügel entre parenthèses. Pour une appréciation des différents systèmes de division, voir Neuwirth, pp. 11-13.
2. Voir J. Pedersen, 1912, p. 170; 1914, p. 194, avec la traduction : « ved Morgenrøden og de ti Naetter, ved det parvise og den enkelte (= le couple humain et Dieu) ved Natten naar den indtraeder ». Dans *Lisān al-ʿarab* (*Lisān*), 19, p. 104 sont présentées deux explications des mots *wallayli idā yasri* : *idā yasri* = *idā yamḍī* ou *idā yusrā fihi*. La traduction de Pedersen « par la nuit quand elle commence » n'a donc pas d'appui chez les lexicographes arabes (cf. *Tāğ al-ʿArūs* (TA), 10, p. 175).
3. La même idée se retrouve dans un poème dans la *Ḥamāsa* d'Abū Tammām (1828, p. 759; 1953, p. 1740); *ṭawīl* : *waqāla muzaʿfarun* :

*waʿinnī laʿusdī nīʿmatī tumma abtağī **

lahā uxtahā ḥattā aʿulla faʿašfaʿā (var. *waʿašfaʿā*)

« Je fais un don généreux et ensuite je désire donner aussi sa sœur de façon que je donne une deuxième fois et je double mon bienfait ». Comme le dit al-Marzūqī dans son commentaire : « ... ḥattā tašīra nniʿmatu ʿindahū šafʿan lā witrān ».

4. On retrouve dans cet exemple ce que F. Rundgren a appelé « das Mišnāe-Motiv » ou « das doppelt vergolten werden-Motiv » qui est très typique de la conception de la vengeance chez les arabes préislamiques, voir *Acta Orientalia*, 21, 4, pp. 302 ss. où l'on trouve des exemples de l'Ancien Testament et du Coran. Chez les Arabes le talion s'exerce en fonction du rang de celui qui a été tué, ainsi aussi pour le paiement de la *diyya*, voir Ibn Hišām, p. 802 (la fin) : *qāla : kāna Banū l'Aswadi bni Raznīn yu'addawna fī lġāhīlyati diyatayni diyatayni wanu'addā diyatan diyatan liḡaḡlihim finā*.
5. Cf. aussi Ġarīr (Naqā'id, p. 686. 1.12); ṭawīl :

*wamin dūnihi tihun ka'anna šixāšahā **
yaḡulna bi'amṭālin fahunna šawāfi'u

« Et entre toi et lui un désert qui fait que les silhouettes se transforment à l'aide des pareils et apparaissent comme doubles ».

6. La vocalisation de l'éditeur *waqadu* n'est pas correcte.
7. Cf. aussi : *ḡamaltuhu tis'an wawaḡa'tuhu ḡa'fan wa'arḡa'tuhu šaf'an* (Al-A'sā, éd. Geyer, p. 73, commentaire); *šaf'an* = deux ans.
- 7b. La leçon *kaḡuṣni* de l'éd. 1950 ne va pas metri causa.
8. Az-Zamaxšarī interprète *šafā'i'u* de la même façon qu'as-Sukkarī, *Asās al-balāġa*, p. 325.
9. Ainsi Ġarīr intercède une fois pour al-Farazdaq fait prisonnier, K. al-Aġāni, 19, p. 42.
10. Selon Blachère an-Nābiġa « semble s'être attaché aux Laḡmides de Ḥīra dès le règne de Munḡir IV (m. 580) » (*Histoire*, 2, p. 299) tandis que Sezgin dit qu'il était attaché à la cour des Lakhmides dès le règne d'al-Munḡir III (env. 505–554) (2, p. 110). La date de l'accès du poète à la cour de Ḥīra est donc incertaine. Les deux rois sont toutefois l'objet des poèmes de louanges de sa part.
11. Peut-être le *Yawm al-Ḥiyār* où selon la tradition al-Ḥarīṭ II des Ġassān vaincut al-Munḡir III de Ḥīra env. 554 (voir EI², 5, p. 633).
12. *wa* omis dans l'éd. de Derenbourg est nécessaire metri causa. – Pour l'expression *lillāhi 'aynā*, voir Wright, 2, p. 150, Rem.e. C'est une formule d'admiration comme *lillāhi abūka* « Quel homme que ton père! » Ici il y a une autre nuance : Heureux, bénis, favorisés les yeux de celui qui voit... et l'admiration se porte sur l'objet *ahla qubbatin*.
13. Pour l'expression *ahla qubbatin* cf. le récit de Ḥassān ibn Ṭābit au sujet d'an-Nu'mān ibn al-Munḡir (Cheikho, p. 651) : *wa'anā ma'ahu fī qubbatin lahu idā raġulun yartaġizu ḡawlahā (mina lraġaz)* :

*anā'imun am sāmī'un ḡū lqubbah **
alwāhibu nnūqa lhiġāna ṣṣulbah

(aussi Ahlwardt, p. 165) « Est-il dormant ou écoute-t-il, le maître de la tente, donneur des chameles aux reins excellents ».

14. Cf. par exemple un poème d'al-Farazdaq louant Naṣr ibn Sayyār (éd. aṣ-Ṣāwī, p. 512); ṭawīl :

*wa'anta mru'un in tus'ali lḡayra tu'tiḡi **
ġazīlan wa'in taṣfa' takun ḡayra šāfi'i

« Tu es un homme qui si on te demande un bien le donnes en abondance et si tu intercèdes es le meilleur parmi les intercesseurs » (la vocalisation *tas'al* de l'édition me paraît incorrecte, cf. al-'Ubaydī, p. 207). – Voir aussi al-Buḡturī dans un poème adressé à al-Manṣūr (Dīwān, p. 1281); xaff :

*yā Abā Ġa'farin 'adimtu nawālan **
lasta fihī muṣaffī'i aw šāfi'i

« Oh, Abū Ġa'far, je n'ai pas de faveur que tu ne m'as accordée ou sollicitée pour moi ». – Un chef peut aussi être loué pour montrer de la générosité sans intermédiaire ou intercesseur, voir 'Utayba ibn Mirdās ibn Faṣwa dans un poème de louanges à al-Ḥurr ibn Manī' (Ibn Ḥabīb, p. 143); ṭawīl :

*wamuxtabiṭin māla Bni Ša'tata nālahu **
bilā nasabin dānin walā biṣaffī'i

- « et plus d'un qui demanda de l'argent à Ibn Ša'ta l'obtint sans lien de parenté et sans intermédiaire, šafī' ».
15. Selon Schulthess il y a pourtant une incertitude à ce sujet, v. p. 8; dans *Naqā'id* ces versets sont insérés dans le récit du *yawm Uwāra* et adressés au roi 'Amr b. Hind de Ḥira.
16. Il y a une erreur dans l'éd. Schulthess : *fakaktu*, par rapport à la traduction « Du hast . . . befreit ». *Naqā'id* lit aussi *fakaktu*.
17. Des exemples du genre est un poème d'an-Nābiġa au sujet des Banū Asad, (voir Derenbourg, no 13, p. 281; trad. p. 329) et un poème d'al-Muṭaqqib adressé au roi an-Nu'mān Abū Qābūs de Ḥira en faveur de la tribu Lukayz des 'Abd al-Qays (Dīwān, p. 26; al-Mufaḍḍaliyāt, poème XXVIII).
18. Cf. aussi la prière de 'Alqama ibn 'Abada adressée à al-Ḥārīṭ ibn Ġabala le ġassanide à la même occasion que le poème d'an-Nābiġa (voir ci-dessus, p. 40) pour des prisonniers des Tamīm parmi lesquels le frère du poète Ša's ibn 'Abada (Šarḥ dīwān 'Alqama, pp. 40–41; al-Mufaḍḍaliyāt, poème CXIX).
19. Xawla selon R. Boucher, 1, p. 4, trad. p. 9.
20. Attribué aussi à al-A'sā et à Qays ibn Mulawwaḥ Maġnūn Laylā (Dīwān Maġnūn Laylā, p. 192 : Laylā au lieu de Lubnā).
21. C'est pourtant encore mieux si on n'a pas besoin d'intercesseur, voir Yahyā ibn Ziyād al-Ḥārīṭī (al-Buḥturī, Ḥamāsa, p. 376); kāmīl :

*lā taṭlubanna mawaddatan bišafā'atin **
inna lmawaddata hākaḍā lā taġmulu

« Ne cherche pas l'amour par une intercession, un tel amour n'est pas beau ». Cf. aussi al-'Abbās al-Aḥnaf (Dīwān, p. 168 et p. 99; Abū Tammām, 1953, p. 298); ṭawīl :

*iḍā anta lā yaṭnika (var. ya'tifka) illā šafā'atun **
falā xayra fī wuddin yakūnu bišafā'i

« Si rien qu'une intercession ne peut te ployer (sache qu') il n'y a rien de bon dans un amour qui se manifeste par intermédiaire ».

22. Attribué aussi à Qays Maġnūn Laylā.
23. Le visage peut servir d'intercesseur, voir Abū IFaṭḥ Kušāġim (m. 861) (K. al-Aġānī², 10, p. 68); basīṭ :

*fī waġhihī šāfi'un yamḥū isā'atahu **
mina lqulūbi muṭā'un ḥayṭumā šafa'ā

« Dans son visage il y a un intercesseur qui efface le mal qu'il a fait, obéi par les cœurs dès qu'il intercède ». Cf. aussi al-Buḥturī qui parle de la jeunesse comme intercession (Dīwān, p. 1276); ṭawīl :

*wakuntu uraġġī fī ššabābi šafā'atan **
wakayfa libāġī ḥāġatin bišafā'ihī

« J'espérais (trouver) dans la jeunesse une intercession mais comment celui qui désire quelque chose arrivera-t-il à trouver un intercesseur? »

24. Quelquefois le blâme peut avoir l'effet d'une intercession, voir 'Amr ibn Ma'dikarib (Kāmīl, p. 517); wāfir :

*ka'anna muhariššan fī bayti Su'dā **
yu'allu bi'aybiḥā 'indī šafī'u

« Comme si un qui crée des disputes dans la maison de Su'dā en la blâmant coup sur coup serait un intercesseur pour elle auprès de moi ».

25. Aux exemples cités ajoutons un poème d'al-Farazdaq adressé à Ziyād ibn ar-Rabī' ibn Ziyād (éd. aṣ-Šawī, 2, p. 493 où la leçon *kiltāhā* est incorrecte; Boucher, 3, p. 152); ṭawīl :

*amīrun waḍū qurbā wakiltāhumā lanā **
ilayhi ma'a ddayyāni xayru šafī'i

traduit par Boucher : « Ziyad est prince et notre parent : ces deux titres, avec le nom d'el-Daiyān, sont auprès de lui nos meilleurs avocats », et un vers d'un anonyme des Banū Ġaṭafān qui ont un homme de Ṭayyi³ comme protégé (Kāmil, p. 46); ṭawīl :

*waqālu ta'allam anna mālaka in yuṣab **
nufidka wa'in tuḥbas nazurka wanaṣfa'i

« Ils dirent : sache que si ta fortune est prise nous te donnerons et si tu es mis en prison nous te visiterons et intercèderons (pour toi) ».

26. Je suis la traduction de R. Blachère, 1966, que je cite intégralement avec les additions du traducteur, en ajoutant moi-même des mots clés entre virgules. Je ne discute pas l'interprétation sauf dans les cas où cela touche directement notre thème.
27. Les versets 23 et 26–31 de la sourate 53 sont des interpolations selon Nöldeke–Schwally, Bell et Blachère. Ils se rapportent aux versets mentionnant les trois *ġarāniq*. Sans cela la sourate date de la première période mekkoise.
28. Les philologues al-Mubarrad et Ṭa'lab interprètent *yaṣfa'u* ici comme « prier, plaider » tout court, TA, 5, p. 401 : *waṣṣaf'u waṣṣafā'atu ddu'ā*. – C. Schedl, dans Muhammad und Jesus, fonde son exégèse de ce verset sur une interprétation de *ṣafa'a* pour le moins bizarre en le traduisant par « bei jemand eintreten » ce qu'il affirme être le sens original du verbe. Ici il s'agirait des anges qui entrent jusqu'au trône d'Allāh pour acquérir *al'ilm*. Nous avons vu que *ṣafa'a* peut signifier « se joindre à qn » toutefois avec l'addition nécessaire « comme quelqu'un de pareil, de semblable et dans le but d'aider ». L'essentiel est la notion d'équivalence et de solidarité entre celui qui se joint à l'autre et cet autre. On ne peut évidemment pas extraire le premier membre de la phrase, à savoir « se joindre à », pour représenter le verbe *ṣafa'a* surtout que l'accent est sur le deuxième membre, ce qui ressort du développement sémantique ≥ « intercéder ».
29. C'est la division coufique qui est correcte ici, à savoir que le verset 28 comporte aussi la phrase *illā* ..., voir Neuwirth, p. 42. – C. Schedl, op. cit. veut ici interpréter *ṣafa'a* selon son sens original « verdoppeln, begeben », cf. note 28 qui présente un autre « sens original ». Il traduit : « Sie (die Gesandten) fügen nichts hinzu, ausser Er stimmt zu », sans indiquer comment il voit le *liman* qu'il ne traduit pas.
30. C'est la division coufique qui est correcte, voir Neuwirth, p. 23.
31. Voir Paret, Der Koran, pp. 26–27.
32. Voir aussi Pedersen, 1914, pp. 8–9.
33. Le double message de Mahomet au sujet de la *ṣafā'a* s'explique selon P. A. Eichler par le fait que Mahomet s'adresse à deux catégories : les païens de la Mecque d'un côté et les chrétiens et les juifs de l'autre, voir Der Dschinn, pp. 96–97.
34. Voir al-Ḥarīrī, p. 115 : *ṣahidtu ṣalāta lmaġribi fī ba'di masāġidi lmaġribi falammā addaytuḥ bifaḍliḥ waṣafa'tuḥ binaḥliḥ* ... et le commentaire d'aš-Šarīṣī, p. 243 : *ṣafa'tuḥ zawwaġtuḥ yurīdu annahu ṣallā lfarīḍata tumma ṣallā lnāfilata*.
35. Cette parole, à son tour, a été comparée à une parole du Dabistān, 42, 3 : Ein Mann der einen Heiden bekehrt, erhält den Lohn der guten Taten, die der Proselyt tut (cité Andrae, 1918, p. 252).
36. On a rapproché sourate 4, 85 (87) d'une parole du Talmud citée par A. Geiger, pp. 92 ss. : « Wer für einen andern um Erbarmen fleht, während er selbst derselben Sache bedarf, erhält zuerst Abhilfe. » (Bābā Qammā 92).
37. Selon la tradition Mahomet se serait consacré à l'*istiġfār* déjà de son vivant notamment au cours de la *ṣalāt al-ġanā'iz*, dans laquelle l'intercession fut ensuite intégrée, v. EI¹, p. 269 a citant Muslim : « Wenn eine hundert Seelen starke Gemeinde von Muslimen über einen Muslim die *ṣalāt* verrichtet und alle für ihn um Sündenvergebung beten, wird ihnen diese Bitte sicher erhört. » Il est intéressant de noter qu'un nombre fixe est requis pour que l'intercession soit efficace. Dans une autre tradition il est question de « trois rangs d'intercesseurs » (Ibn Ḥanbal, IV, 79, 100). Cela rappelle l'institution de *qasāma* où le témoignage de 50 personnes remplace le payment du prix du sang, voir ci-dessus et Pedersen, 1914, pp. 180 ss. – Dans un poème d'al-Buḥtūrī nous trouvons deux synonymes de *ṣafī'* ou *ṣafā'a* (Diwān, p. 1309); kāmil :

*innī urīduka an takūna qarī'atan **
fī ḥāġatī wawasilatan waṣafī'ā

« Je veux que tu deviennes un moyen pour obtenir ce dont j'ai besoin, un contact et un intercesseur ». *Wasila* figure deux fois dans le Coran traduit par « proximité » de Dieu, sourate 17, 57 (59) : *ulā'ika llađina yad'ūna yabtağūna ilā rabbihimu lwasilata* et sourate 5, 35 (39) : *yā ayyuhā llađina āmanu ttaqū llāha wabtağū ilayhi lwasilata*. L'origine est *wasila* au sens concret de « la corde de la tente, lien », ainsi dans un poème d'an-Nābīga (Diwān, p. 287; trad. p. 340; Cheikho, p. 700); *ṭawīl* :

*laqad 'ālanī mā sarrahā wataqatṭa'at **
liraw'ātihā minni lquwā walwasā'ilu

« J'ai été peiné de ce qui les a réjouis, et que de fois j'ai vu, pour celui qui était l'objet de leur terreur, se briser mes forces et mes affections! » (trad. Derenbourg). *Alquwā* se rapporte aux tresses de la corde et *alwasā'il*=*al'asbāb* c.-à-d. les cordes de la tente. La perte d'an-Nu'mān a brisé les liens de l'affection qui étaient forts, bien tressés, *mubrama* (voir Cheikho, p. 700, note 5). *Wasila* est donc le lien, le moyen de contact, ainsi par exemple aš-Šahrastānī au sujet des idoles : *waman kāna lā ya'tarifū bihim (almalā'ikata) kāna yaqūlu:aššafī'u walwasilatu minnā ilā llāhi ta'āla huwa l'ašnāmu*. Ce mot est employé à côté de *šafī'* au sujet de Mahomet dans le poème de Sawād ibn Qārib cité ci-dessus p. 54. L'expression la plus fréquente dans les textes islamiques pour la notion de médiation de cette racine est la cinquième forme du verbe *tawassala ilā llāhi bi* comme dans al-Buxārī (Istisqā', 3) : *innā kunnā natawassalu ilayka binabiyyinā fatasqīnā*. – Le mot *ḍarī'a* « moyen d'arriver à » et *ḍara'a* «*inda* ou *ilā* » intercéder auprès de qn », peut-être originairement « tendre le bras vers qn en plaidant », ne semble pas avoir une connotation religieuse.

38. L'origine du mot *garāniq* est obscur, voir Nöldeke-Schwally, I, pp. 100 s. et Fraenkel, p. 118.
39. Le locus classicus pour la restriction du droit de *šafā'a* à Mahomet est une tradition souvent citée (voir EI¹, p. 269 pour des références) selon laquelle Allāh rassemble les fidèles pour le jugement. Ceux-ci s'adressent alors à Adām, Nūh, Ibrāhīm et 'Īsā à tour de rôle pour obtenir l'intercession. 'Īsā indique Mahomet qui obtient le droit de *šafā'a*.
40. Blachère place ces mots au verset 80/78.
41. Aussi (Dīwān, p. CLXXV); *ṭawīl* :

*amāma rasūli llāhi lā yaxḍulūnahū **
lahum nāširun min rabbihim wašafī'u

« devant l'envoyé d'Allāh, ils ne le trahissent point; ils ont un aide en leur seigneur et un intercesseur ».

42. Ces vers sont cités avec des variantes dans Farrukh, 1937, pp. 56–58 où on trouve aussi d'autres citations. L'auteur constate que les bédouins ont mal compris le Coran sur ce point de *šafā'a*.
43. Pour une étude compréhensive de ces idées, voir N. Johansson, Parakletoi. Vorstellungen von Fürsprechern für die Menschen vor Gott in der alttestamentlichen Religion, im Spätjudentum und Urchristentum, 1940. L'opinion au sujet de la possibilité d'une intercession lors du jugement dernier est divisée dans les écrits judaïques et chrétiens. Très proche de la position de Mahomet est par ex. l'auteur du IV Esdras qui exclut la possibilité d'intercession des justes pour les infidèles au jour du jugement. Ce jour-là signifie la fin du temps présent : le père ne pourra plus intercéder pour son fils, ni le fils pour son père, ni le frère pour son frère etc. Le temps où Abraham, Moïse, Saul, David, Salomon, Élisée, Ézéchiass etc. ont pu prier pour leur peuple sera terminé : « The present Age is not the End; the glory of God abides not therein continuously : therefore have the strong prayed for the weak. But the Day of Judgment shall be the end of this age and the beginning of the eternal age that is to come : wherein corruption is passed away, weakness is abolished, infidelity is cut off; while righteousness is sprung up. So shall no man then be able to have mercy on him who is condemned in the Judgment, nor overwhelm him who is victorious » (Charles, pp. 589s.). Ce passage dans l'Apocalypse d'Esdras semble être dirigé contre des conceptions libérales de l'intercession qui ont donc dû être répandues à cette époque. Il semble en effet avoir choqué des théologiens chrétiens et a disparu dans la version latine de Jérôme. T. Andrae attribue la même position à Afrem qui nie catégoriquement l'intercession lors du jugement dernier contre l'opinion courante dans la chrétienté syrienne de son temps : personne ne peut aider son prochain, chacun portera son fardeau seul... le fils ne pourra pas intercéder

pour son père, ni les parents pour leurs enfants etc. (voir Kyrkohist. årsskrift 1925, p. 50). On trouve pourtant chez Afrem des paroles qui vont dans un autre sens, par ex. Carmina Nisibena, 14,25, trad. Beck : « Und (ich) der Sünder, der (ich) Zögling der drei bin, mögen die drei für mich bitten, *ṭalāṭayhōn neb'ōn 'alay*, wenn sie den Dritten (c.-à-d. le Christ) sehen, – wie er die Türe seines Brautgemaches (vor mir) verschlossen hat, dass er mir ein klein wenig seine Tür öffne! » Un autre exemple est Hymnen de Paradiso 7,25, trad. Beck : « Dort mögen für mich bitten alle Söhne des Lichts, *neb'ōn 'alay tammān kulhōn bānay nuhrā*, – dass unser Herr ihnen schenke eine Seele aus Gnade », et aussi Hymnen auf Abraham Kidunaya II,26 : *hawī bā'yā bā-yōm dinā*, « Sei mir Fürbitter am Tag des Gerichts! » E. Beck doute de l'authenticité des hymnes à Abraham mais considère toutefois ces mots compatibles avec la doctrine eschatologique d'Afrem. Il faut distinguer l'intercession pour les infidèles de celle pour les croyants. Dans les trois exemples donnés il est question du deuxième genre. Une attitude différente se fait valoir dans l'église devenant de plus en plus sacramentelle offrant aux fidèles la garantie d'une place au Paradis. A ce moment-là le jour du jugement reste une menace uniquement pour les ennemis de l'église et non pour le membre individuel (voir Andrae, 1924, pp. 256s.).

44. F. Rundgren, 1981, a souligné la nécessité de considérer « the pragmatic context » dans l'étude des textes tels que le Coran, p. 224.
45. « L'étymologie de l'arabe *šf'* n'est pas encore élucidée. Le mot *šaf'* signifie 'l'un d'une paire' et c'est, dans un certain sens, le cas aussi de l'accadien *šēpum* 'pied' < **šap'um*. En mesurant un espace on peut ajouter un pied à l'autre et ainsi on rend pair un nombre impair, c'est-à-dire on *yašfa'u* (dénominateur de *šaf'* *'pied'). De plus, on peut comparer latin *passus*, proprement 'écartement des jambes', d'où 'espace entre cet écartement' (Ernout-Meillet, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine⁴, 1959, p. 478). Donc, il s'agit ici d'une *intercessio*, d'où on obtient facilement pour l'arabe le sens de *šafā'a*. Ce qui le latin *passus* est à *pandere* (probablement de **ped-*) l'arabe *šaf'* l'est à l'accadien *šēpum*, l'hébreu *pāša'* 'pas' étant une métathèse de **šāfa'*, cp. H. Holma, Die Namen der Körperteile im Assyrisch-Babylonischen (1911), p. 137. » (F. Rundgren).
46. Je n'ai pas la prétention d'avoir consulté tous les mss des textes cités. J'indique les variantes que j'ai rencontrées au cours de mes lectures sans toutefois spécifier la source de chacune.
47. Je suis le texte de Wüstenfeld avec la variante *ḥarrahū* de son ms C, Bd II, p. 148. Les éditions ultérieures ainsi que les traductions de Weil et de Guillaume lisent *yašfa'u* de *šafa'a*, « hâler (le visage) » et Weil traduit en conséquence : « Wir waren einer Flamme gleich, deren Hitze die Menschen fürchteten, wer in ihre Nähe kam, entflohen mit verbrannten Gesichte ». Wüstenfeld qui fonde son édition sur un grand nombre de manuscrits ne mentionne pas cette variante. Je garde la leçon *yašfa'u* en tant que lectio difficilior. Comme le montrent plusieurs exemples *šafa'a* peut avoir ce sens intransitif et le rapprochement de *yašfa'u* et *yalihi* ici est suggestif. Un jugement définitif présuppose toutefois l'examen des mss de ce texte qui présente aussi d'autres difficultés, par ex. les leçons *ḥurratan* et *šarrahū* citées seulement par Wüstenfeld, et sera réservé pour une autre occasion.
48. Ces deux lignes apparaissent comme un fragment dans Derenbourg et Ahlwardt. Dans une édition récente faite par M. Abul Faḍl Ibrāhīm, *Diwān Al-Nabigha Al-Dhobyāni*, Le Caire 1977, (Dhak-hā'ir Al'Arab 52), p. 164, ces deux versets introduisent un petit poème de cinq versets adressé à un certain Ibn Salmā selon la relation d'Ibn as-Sikkīt.

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The Poem "Dayr 'Abdūn" by Ibn alMu'tazz

An Introduction to the Fundamentals of Text Linguistics

FRITHIOF RUNDGREN

Margaretæ uxori optimæ

I chose this little poem as the point of departure for a discussion of what I would like to call the fundamentals or principles of text linguistics because this famous piece of poetical "Kleinkunst" has already been the object of what the author, Renate Jacobi, describes as "a structural analysis" (Journal of Arabic Literature, VI/1975, pp. 35-56, below quoted as "Jacobi"). Despite the rather critical attitude I here adopt towards her handling of linguistic and aesthetic phenomena I am anxious to point out that the article in question also has many merits, and I myself learnt much from its perusal.

The poem is given according to Bernhard Lewin's edition in the Bibliotheca Islamica, 17.c, pp. 49-50, Istanbul 1950, under a comparison with the Dīwān Ibn alMu'tazz, Dār Šādīr, Bayrūt, 1961, pp. 246-7. I shall first present the poem in transcription (*basīṭ*), cf. Jacobi, p. 38. Since Jacobi has given a very good translation of the poem (p. 39) I can see no reason for trying to offer one myself. If I sometimes discuss the translation or deviate from it this will be for specific, mainly linguistic reasons.

- 1 Saqā lĠazīrata ḏāta zẓilli wa ššaġari
wa Dayra 'Abdūna haṭṭālun mina lmaṭari
- 2 Qad ṭāla mā nabbahatnī li šṣabūḥi bihā
fī ġurrati lfaġri, wa l'ušfūru lam yaṭiri,
- 3 ašwātu ruhbāni dayrin fī šalātihimu
sūdi l'aṭānīni na'ārīna fī ssaḥari
- 4 muzannarīna 'alā l'awsāṭi, qad ġa'alū
fawqa rru'ūsi akālīlan mina šša'ari.
- 5 Kam fihimu min malīḥi lwaġhi muktaḥilin,
bi ssiḥri yaksiru ġafnayhi 'alā ḥawari
- 6 Lāḥaẓtuhu bi lhawā, ḥattā staqāda lahu
ṭaw'an wa aslafanī lmi'āda bi nnaẓari
- 7 Wa ġā'anī fī qamīši llayli mustatiran,
yasta'ġilu lxaṭwa min xawfin wa min ḥaḏari
- 8 wa lāḥa ḏaw'u hilālīn kāda yafḏaḥuhu
miṭli lqulāmati, qad quṣṣat mina zẓufuri

Abbreviations: Benveniste, Problèmes = E. Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale I (1967), II (1974); Cours = F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale⁴ (1949); I A = F. Rundgren, Intensiv und Aspektkorrelation (1959); IM = F. Rundgren, Integrated Morphemics (1976); OS = Orientalia Suecana; Principia = F. Rundgren, Principia linguistica Semitica (OS 29/1981, pp. 32-102).

- 9 fa qumtu afrušu xaddī fī ṭṭarīqi lahu
 ḏullan wa ašḥabu akmāmī ʿalā lʿaṭari.
 10 Wa kāna mā kāna mimmā lastu aḏkuruḥu
 fa ḏunna xayran wa lā tasʿal ʿani lxabari

According to Jacobi "the question whether it is possible for European scholars to determine the aesthetic value of Arabic poetry has not aroused much interest" (p. 35). There may, however, be rather strong reasons for a certain lack of interest on the part of scholars in this respect. Moreover, a scholar is by no means *eo ipso* also a scientist while a scientist is almost always a scholar in his field. This being so it is not really astonishing that only very few have had the courage to tackle the extremely difficult task of determining the aesthetic value of poetry in a tolerably scientific way, let alone the aesthetic value as the whole. For what is an aesthetic value, at least linguistically? What is aesthetics, and what is a value in this connection? Jacobi does not ask any such questions, and her own research program could perhaps be said to be included in the following statement: "There can be no doubt that western orientalists will never be able to compete with Arabs in susceptibility, taste or intuition as regards Arabic poetry. But it is equally valid that these subjective methods of approach, useful as they may be in the first appreciation of a poem, are of no interest whatever in literary criticism, if not supported by objective criteria." (pp. 35-6). Thus, there are according to this author "subjective methods" which, however, may be useful only in what she calls "the first appreciation" of a poem but which must, in the case of their usefulness, be supported by what she calls "objective criteria". Let me, to begin with, state that I attach a great importance to this first appreciation which may very well coincide with the last one. For the first appreciation seems to me to have some affinity with what I call the true first articulation, namely the *text* (p. 67).¹ To this corresponds, in some way, the articulation of the "world" in texts, in a literary sense then, as so-called literary genres. But what should be meant by "subjective methods" I really do not know. As far as the "objective criteria" or aesthetic judgments are concerned I must confess that I have more and more gained the impression that the concept of "objectivity" is, on the whole, here highly problematic. To Jacobi the frequency of, for instance, the *sound* *ṭ* in our poem is such a criterion or at least an element thereof. The aim of her structural analysis is to determine whether the poem is good or bad (p. 36), and she later comes to the conclusion that it is "of great aesthetic value", this in accordance with what she calls "our standards of criticism". The principal reason for this judgment is to be found, she *believes*, "in the fact that Ibn al-Muʿtazz has refrained from applying rhetorical devices, which mainly appeal to the intellect". The poet has instead, she maintains, "based his composition on sound effects, which appeal to emotion and the senses" (p. 52). As far as I can see, Ibn alMuʿtazz chose, in the first place, the *words* he needed for the expression of his thoughts, an extremely important viewpoint.

Now, Jacobi "gladly" acknowledges the methodical stimulation received from the analysis of Baudelaire's "Les chats" by C. Lévi-Strauss and R. Jakobson. As will appear from the following investigation I am inclined to believe that the

author should not have been so glad of this kind of inspiration, cf. p. 106 f.² Be that as it may, in order to determine whether "Dayr 'Abdūn" is a good or bad poem Jacobi proceeds in the following way. First she describes what she calls "the different linguistic levels" which according to her are the phonological, morphological, syntactical and semantic levels (p. 36). As will have appeared from IM and "Principia", we must distinguish between the separation of such levels for *analytical* purposes in a linguistic sense, and the real structure of language in function, in which case the levels appear as hierarchically integrated *organizations*, each of which possesses its own phonemic structure, its own morphology, its own syntax as well as its own kind of semantics. Could not, for instance, *faras* "horse" be called a syntactic structure (IM, p. 10)? Of course it can! (cf. p. 93 f.). Thus, when the author continues: "then (I shall) try to define their structure, and finally I shall point out any (!) relations which may exist between them on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative evidence" (p. 36), this is, it seems to me, a bad omen, and still more so, the immediately following declaration: "The degree of correlation or harmony existing between linguistic levels of the poem will be used as the final criterion of judgment. I have purposely avoided the traditional dichotomy of form and content, thus escaping the necessity of drawing the line between them." (p. 36 and n. 5). But, "la langue est une forme et non une substance" (Cours, p. 169), and if the drawing of a line between form and content is considered a "necessity" it is not advisable to try to escape this procedure by simply avoiding it. For my part, I shall contend that linguistic form is, on principle, an *integration* of "expression" and "content" constituting the linguistic sign *in abstracto* and in the Saussurean sense. Since "form" in Greek is μορφή it seems appropriate to designate such a sign, being the fundamental form here, a *morpheme*, to be carefully distinguished from its *morphological* representations. How is it then possible to base a final aesthetic judgment on the "degree of correlation" between linguistic levels the true nature of which one is not aware of? (cf. p. 36). This question is of decisive importance in this connection.

With J. Cantineau³ Jacobi is, throughout the analysis, distinguishing between common (*l, m, n*) and rare consonants (*ḍ, ṣ, z, ṭ, ṣ̣, ḡ, ṭ, z, ḡ*), and according to the author the "distinctive feature" of this first verse is the accumulation of such rare consonants (pp. 40–1). Thus in v. 1 *Saqā l'Ġazīrata ḍāta zẓilli wa ššaḡari//wa Dayra 'Abdūna haṭṭālun mina lmaṭari* we find ḡ, z, z, z, ṣ, ṣ, ḡ, ṭ, ṭ (=10), in the order in which these consonants appear in this line. For geminated consonants are counted as two by the author although in this connection she also speaks of "the phonemes from the group of rare consonants". However, the quantity of the phonemes is generally regarded as relevant in Classical Arabic. According to the alleged "modern structuralistic methods" one would then perhaps have expected rather the count: ḡ, z, z: ṣ:, ḡ and ṭ:/ṭ (=7).⁴ However, Jacobi is discussing the poem in terms of *sounds*, and she finds that it is only in v. 1 that the common consonants are surpassed in number, "the relation being 10 rare consonants to 9 sonants" (p. 41). Here we are also confronted with the concept of "sonant".

Now v. 2 begins *Qad ṭāla . . .*, which circumstance leads the author to the statement that "the well-known rhetorical device in Arabic poetry of repeating a word from the end of a line at the beginning of the following verse is reduced here

to the mere repetition of a sequence of phonemes (*ṭāl*)” (p. 41). Thus the alleged device would imply v. 1 . . . *haṭṭāli*. V. 2 *Qad ṭāla* . . . instead of the existing . . . *maṭari*. *Qad ṭāla*. The author now speaks of the reduction of this (here non-existing) device to a mere repetition of a sequence of phonemes, namely *ṭāl*. This is, I think, not quite clear. However, “In this way”, she continues conclusively, “the effect remains on the level of sound, appealing more to emotion than to reason” (p. 41). I have some difficulty in understanding why exactly the non-existence of the device in question should have this effect here. Furthermore, what is meant by “effect” here? It is the circumstance that *ṭ*, ‘the rarest consonant in Arabic, is particularly conspicuous at the end of the line through gemination (*haṭṭāl*) and occurrence in the rhyme (*maṭari*)’. This is what is called “effect” here, and this effect seems to the author to be “echoed” by the *ṭ* of *qad ṭāla* and of *yaṭiri* of v. 2.

This, at least to my mind, unrealistic idea of “objective criteria” of aesthetics (p. 36) presupposes, *inter alia*, that the poet had deliberately chosen the *ṭ* here in order to appeal “more to emotion than to reason”, as the author so “objectively” puts it. However, Jacobi may also intend to say that it is to the European scholars (p. 35) that the *ṭ* appeals in this way, independently of the possible intentions of the poet. However that may be, Ibn alMu‘tazz has now in fact selected the *words* he needed for the expression of his thoughts, namely *haṭṭālun*, *maṭarun*, *ṭāla* and *yaṭir*. This means, in the first place, that he has chosen his textual behaviour according to the demands of the situation which he intended to describe, and describe as a poet, thus achieving no doubt also an accumulation of—not primarily the sound *ṭ*—but the *radical ṭ*; cf. IM and “Principia”, *passim*.

There can be no question here of an atomizing of linguistic data in the manner of Jacobi. Poetry is not linguistics. Poetry uses language to depict situations and translate feeling. As is well known, the “sound” cannot in language have such an autonomous status as the author seems to ascribe to it. In all the words just mentioned the *ṭ* is a different radical although it is the same phoneme; the *ṭ:s* are different radicals because they represent different *technemes*, in wholly different words. From this point of view we can only speak of an accumulation in the phonemic representation of the different radicals, determining, in their way, the sense of the words and thus appealing both to emotion and to reason. For we can never, *in rebus aestheticis*, simply eliminate the meaning of a word, isolating from it merely the sounds. These are only the “material” of the phonemes. That this is so is mainly due to the fact that the word is a linguistic sign. Thus *haṭṭālun* is only the directly observable part of the sign (*haṭṭālun* ~ *HATṬĀLUN*) = “*haṭ-ṭālun*”, and it is from such a whole sign, considered then as the expression of a *new* sign in a supratextual language that every investigation of a possible aesthetic value must start. Below I shall propose an approach here within the framework of my morphemics (p. 104 ff.).

Unfortunately, on closer inspection it becomes completely clear that Jacobi’s “structural” analysis of the poem closely resembles the old-fashioned, highly conventional grammatical analysis, invariably followed in the analysis of the classical authors. Considered as such an analysis Jacobi’s article may, from a philological point of view, prove very useful for teachers of Arabic poetry. The

following remarks seek only to supplement her analysis with a treatment of some problems with the help of a method, in my opinion, more fittingly described as "structuralistic". Moreover, they contain what might be called the fundamentals of text linguistics.

1. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TEXT LINGUISTICS

By "fundamentals" I mean, in this connection, the linguistic foundation of text linguistics, an expanding field of science of literature in a wider sense. As its point of departure text linguistics must always have the *texteme* as a minimal unit.⁵ Since this unit, in its capacity of a linguistic sign, has, as its metareferent, the value "communication" it is clear that text linguistics also embraces scientific branches upon which we cannot enter here. On the whole, the concept of communication opens up wide perspectives (*Principia*, p. 80), and there is also something called the "theory of communication", a field which, likewise, must remain outside our consideration. In this paper I shall draw almost exclusively on positions already adopted in OS 21/1973, pp. 68-72; 23-4/1976, pp. 217-21; *Integrated Morphemics*, 1976; *Principia linguistica Semitica* (OS 29/1981, pp. 32-102), and *Fenno-Ugrica Suecana* 5/1982, pp. 235 ff. Thus I shall, on the one hand, consider the relation between morphemics and morphology, on the other, the appropriateness of describing the structure of poetical works, in our case the poem "Dayr 'Abdūn" (p. 63), with the aid of the terms of conventional school grammar.

To begin with I shall consider "la langue", for this concept is certainly in need of some clarification. First of all we must distinguish between "la langue" in the sense of "the language in the languages" (*Principia*, p. 62) and "la langue" as the morphological system of a *certain* language as realized in "la parole" (cf. *Principia*, p. 78). While the common "inner form" of all languages can rather easily be stated in terms of "la langue" in the first sense, i.e. in terms of "the morphemic principle" (*Principia*, *passim*), it is less easy to establish the more *specific* values of the various morphological systems. However, the distinction between purely morphemic categories and morphological categories is here extremely important. For this distinction leads us to the comprehension of what has to be understood as a purely linguistic value. From the existence of the true morphemes, the behavioural universals, we can infer the existence of a "principle of value" also for the various morphological systems. For there are, no doubt, also more specific "universals" like "person", "number", "genus", "aspect", "tense" etc., constituting values realized in various ways in the various morphological systems. Within these various conventional morphologies we have *a priori* to expect specific ways of looking at the world depending on cultural factors creating "subvalues" or certain categories. Since all languages have the morphemes "phoneme", "word", and "phraseme" in common within the scope of the first articulation, i.e. the text, we must always start every description of a language from the *text*.


It is appropriate to recall, in this connection, the following words of M. Foucault: "Mais les choses, au XX^e siècle, ont pris une allure singulière: c'est le

'formel' lui-même, c'est le travail réfléchi sur le système des formes qui est devenu un enjeu. Et un remarquable objet d'hostilités morales, de débats esthétiques et d'affrontements politiques. . . . Il ne faut pas oublier qu'il a vite été désigné, en pays stalinien ou fasciste, comme l'idéologie ennemie et l'art haïssable. C'est lui qui a été le grand adversaire des dogmatismes d'académies et de partis. Les combats autour du formel ont été un des grands traits de culture au XX^e siècle." (Le Nouvel Observateur, 2-8.10.1982, p. 51). This is a very perspicacious statement. "Le formel" has, indeed, become a problem in itself, a problem *sui generis*. That this is so depends, to a great extent, on the fact that, on the one hand, "form" has a structure, and on the other, the structure itself has always a *certain* form (Principia, p. 63). This state of affairs has far-reaching implications also for the study of language: *la langue est une forme et non une substance* (Cours, p. 169).

These famous but enigmatic words have to be re-interpreted in terms of the morphemic principle (Principia, *passim*). As "form" language is "a specific behaviour which is its own expression and an expression which is its own behaviour and which is at the same time its own referent in the sense of the metareferent" (Principia, p. 49). In order to be able to speak of "la langue" we must take as a starting-point a minimal unity of textual behaviour, the metareferent of which is "communication", i.e. *a texteme in the function of a text*. Now, de Saussure also says: "La langue est encore comparable à une feuille de papier: la pensée est le recto et le son le verso; on ne peut pas découper le recto sans découper en même temps le verso" (Cours, p. 157). However, a "pensée" which appears as the "recto" is no longer a "pensée" but a *content*, and a sound which appears as the "verso" is no longer a sound but an *expression*. This phenomenon of qualitative transformation is due to the fact of *integration* (Fenno-Ugrica Suecana, 5/1982, p. 244). This is, indeed, the reason why the following words are of great interest to us: "de même dans la langue, on ne saurait isoler ni le son de la pensée, ni la pensée du son; on n'y arriverait que par une abstraction dont le résultat serait de faire de la psychologie pure ou de la phonologie pure" (Cours, p. 157). For it is in consequence of the integration of expression and content that an abstraction of this kind is unrealistic, the content being a *representation* of the mental counterpart of the expression—and *vice versa*. This means, also, that the "découpage" of the "recto" and the "verso" must be conceived of as a division of an *integrated* unity, a unity consisting of *radicals* based on the principle of isomorphism in the sense of "Principia". It is in this light that the following words must be re-interpreted: "La linguistique travaille donc sur le terrain limitrophe où les éléments des deux ordres se combinent; *cette combinaison produit une forme, non une substance*." (Cours, p. 157). This "terrain limitrophe" can be understood as a certain kind of relationship making the phenomenon of isomorphic integration possible, and consequently the Saussurean "combinaison" has to be re-interpreted exactly in terms of this kind of integration. Moreover, this type of integration implies an organization of elements which is our definition of linguistic form (IM, p. 1), the structure of which has, in turn, a certain form in the sense of a "configuration" of the relationship of the relevant elements. This kind of form constitutes a *value*, and the notion of value is

extremely important to our understanding of the nature of language, as also de Saussure has clearly stated. So he says, for instance, "Mais en fait les valeurs restent entièrement relatives, et voilà pourquoi le lien de l'idée et du son est radicalement arbitraire." (Cours, p. 157). Let us now take Arabic *faras* "horse".

"Le lien" between the object "horse" and its linguistic representation is, of course, *on principle* arbitrary. However, in the special case this kind of representation appears to the native speaker as a *natural* one, and this functional naturalness depends on the fact that in the specific case "le lien" between the object in question and its representation *faras* is, likewise on principle, a conventional one, and "conventional" is by no means the same as "arbitrary" (Principia, p. 36). For "La collectivité est nécessaire pour établir des valeurs dont l'unique raison d'être est dans l'usage et le consentement générale". (Cours, p. 157). Conventionality and collectivity belong together, and within the Arabic linguistic community "le lien de l'idée et du son" is by no means arbitrary. For a unity like *faras* is not only an arbitrary representation of the object but also, and above all, a conventional representation of the sign *faras*, i.e. (*faras* ~ *FARAS*) = "faras". Within the scope of this sign "le lien de l'idée et du son" should not be considered as arbitrary since arbitrariness has no immediate relevance at this stage of linguistic analysis. Now, this "natural" representation of the object is, as a sign, also a representation of something else, namely of the morpheme "word" which is a value. Thus, the full meaning of the *isolated* unity *faras*—as "le fait linguistique dans son essence et dans son ampleur" (Cours, p. 162)—is the "word *faras*" (Fenno-Ugrica Suecana, 5/1982, p. 237).⁶ Now, the value "word" being nevertheless a *derived* one, we are here confronted with a problem which occupied de Saussure intensely, namely the relation between "valeur" and "signification" (Cours, pp. 158 ff.). Thus, it is necessary to decide on the attitude of de Saussure to this difficult problem. Let us consider the following structural sketch:



On the one hand, de Saussure says: "le concept nous apparaît comme la contrepartie de l'image auditive dans l'intérieur du signe", and, on the other "ce signe lui-même, c'est-à-dire le rapport qui relie ses deux éléments, est aussi, et tout autant la contrepartie des autres signes de la langue" (Cours, p. 159). What is the meaning of this not altogether clear statement? We can accept the view that *FARAS* is the counterpart of *faras* (A) etc. But, can we accept a view whereby the *sign itself*, i.e. (*faras* ~ *FARAS*) = "faras", in the sense of "le rapport qui relie ses deux éléments", is also the counterpart of (*šāḡar* ~ *ŠAĠAR*) = "šāḡar" etc.? As we have seen, this "rapport" is to be regarded as a relation of integration, and there can be no question of considering this specific kind of integration *in its representation* as a counterpart of the other signs. But we can, of course, maintain that the phenomenon of integration as such has its counterpart in the signs B, C etc. I shall contend that A, B, and C are representations of one and the same value, namely that of "word". Moreover, when de Saussure says: "com-

ment se fait-il que la valeur, ainsi définie, se confonde avec la signification, c'est-à-dire avec la contre-partie de l'image auditive?" we must answer that there is some difficulty in looking at things in this way. For *FARAS* is only a representation of the *half* of the sign and cannot as such coincide with the value of the whole sign, i.e. (*faras* ~ *FARAS*) = "faras". However, one can say that *faras* as a sequence of *radicals* has the meaning it has because *šağar* and *dahab* are different sequences of radicals, while *FARAS* has the meaning it has because *faras* is its expression and *vice versa*. Thus one could, in a way, maintain, positively, that the representation of the value "word", *faras*, has the meaning it has because the representation of the same value "word", *šağar*, has the meaning it has etc. (cf. Principia, p. 34). Therefore I would like to rewrite the famous statement Cours, p. 159, in the following way: "Puisque la langue est un système de *radicaux* dont tous les termes sont solidaires la signification de chaque terme ne résulte que de la présence simultanée des autres." : *f-a-r-a-s*, *š-a-ğ-a-r* (cf. OS 21/1973, p. 72). From this it follows that the *f* of *faras* is a value, i.e. a phoneme. And now we can use the following formulation: "comment se fait-il que la valeur, ainsi définie, se confonde avec la signification, c'est-à-dire avec la contre-partie de l'image auditive?" (Cours, p. 159). For, as a morpheme the phoneme *f* is here a representation of a sign, i.e. (*f* ~ *F*-), where the value (*f*-) coincides with its "meaning", i.e. with (*F*-), as a techneme. Thus "la signification" of the value is here, in fact, the function of the value.

Now, the phoneme *f* is in itself "une chose *dissemblable* susceptible d'être échangée contre celle dont la valeur est à déterminer" (Cours, p. 159). Thus the phoneme *f* can be exchanged for an *f*-, that is, for a *radical*, for instance for the *f* in *faras*. Moreover, this phoneme *f* belongs also to the "choses similaires qu'on peut *comparer* avec celle dont la valeur est en cause" (ibid.): it can be compared with other phonemes, for instance with *a* in *f-a* of *faras*. Thus the value of a phoneme is not established as long as one confines oneself to the statement that it can be exchanged for a radical, i.e. that it has this or that technemic function. We shall also have to compare the phoneme in question with other phonemes to which our phoneme could, in a meaningful way, be opposed (cf. Cours, p. 160).

Similarly the value of a *word* is established by the fact that it can be exchanged for a *lex*, i.e. that it has this or that technemic function, as well as by comparison with other words to which the word in question could, in a meaningful way, be opposed. In principle, this holds true also of the *phraseme*, the value of which can be exchanged for a *texteme* and compared with other phrasemes. Thus the value of a morpheme is established by both "vertical" and "horizontal" relations (cf. below, p. 127):

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 1. \text{ FARAS} \\ \updownarrow \\ \text{faras} \end{array} \right\} \text{ "word" } \leftrightarrow 2. \text{ faras } \leftrightarrow \text{ šağar } \leftrightarrow \text{ dahab}$$

Let us in this connection also consider the famous case French *mouton*/English *sheep* as dealt with by de Saussure. According to him *mouton* can have the same "signification" as *sheep* but not the same value because a sheep served as a dish

is called *mutton* (Cours, p. 160). However, here it is a question of a comparison between certain representations of the behavioural universal "word" in two different languages, and so far there is no difference in value between *sheep* and *mouton* on the one hand, or between *sheep* and *mutton* on the other. We are here confronted with differences in the morphological representations of the morpheme "word", which, in itself, is, from a morphological point of view, only a "difference" since we have various kinds of words, that is, lexemes.

Now, the values phoneme, word and phraseme being always integrated in a hierarchically organized system we must also take this fact into due consideration. Thus a word like *faras* only occurs in the function of a *phrase*, and in this capacity the whole sign (word ~ lex) is a "chose dissemblable" which can be exchanged for the corresponding phrase, and at the same time a "chose similaire" which can be compared with another phrase. Moreover, the two main kinds of phrases (subject and predicate phrase) can, together, as a "chose dissemblable" be exchanged for the corresponding *phraseme* and at the same time, as a composite sign, be compared with another phraseme. Similarly, the phraseme can, as a "chose dissemblable" be exchanged for the corresponding *texteme*, which, in turn, can be compared with another phraseme.

From all this follows that every expression can, *on its level*, always be exchanged for its content and at the same time compared with other expressions. This means that such an expression is a morphemic value. Such a morphemic value may then be represented in the most varied morphological ways, what is represented being always, in the first place, an integrated system of values, the phoneme, the word, and the phraseme, with their mental counterparts the radical, the lex, and the texteme, thus justifying the definition of the morpheme given in "Principia", p. 54.

If we say that language is the material of literature we must also realize, on the one hand, that this "material" is already in itself an integrated system of *form*, and, on the other, that language itself is only accessible to us as—literature. It is possible that Anita Boström Kruckenberg, in her excellent book "Roman Jakobsons poetik" (1979), has not always done full justice to these fundamental viewpoints.

From what has been said follows that the concept of the structure of language as being the result of a "summarized one-dimensionality" will be rejected (Principia, p. 44). The idealizations and models used here generally start from those inaugurated by Ferdinand de Saussure. However, as appears from IM and "Principia" they have undergone an essential re-interpretation. Thus, my work can be regarded as a continuation of the Saussurean revolution in linguistics.⁷ According to J. Searle there is also a "Chomsky's revolution" in linguistics (On Noam Chomsky, Critical Essays, ed. G. Harman, 1974, pp. 2 ff.), but Ian Robinson holds that there is not (The New Grammarians' Funeral, 1979), and already Charles F. Hockett seems to have been of the same opinion (The State of the Art, 1968). Personally I agree with Chomsky when he says: "it seems to me that the substantive contributions to the theory of language structure are few, and that, to a large extent, the concepts of modern linguistics constitute a retrogression" (Principia, p. 45). Concerning my own attitude to the problem of the

structure of language, I would like to say that, as an isolated assertion, nothing could be more misleading than the following *dictum*: "Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing definitions." (Charles S. Peirce, *Selected Writings*, 1966, p. 117). For, what could not be learnt, for instance, by analyzing the definitions of the so-called "morpheme"! That this is so, not least C. E. Bazell could show in his paper "On the Problem of the Morpheme" (*Archivum Linguisticum* 1/1949, pp. 1 ff.).⁸

Thus, the architecture of linguistic theory must be based on a realistic conception of the notion of the morpheme which Bazell correctly designates as "the central unit of language". However, this unity has nothing to do, directly, with its different morphological representations. It is in itself a relational complex so to speak, constituting, as an organizational principle, *values* in a linguistic universe of chance and chaos (*Principia*, p. 36). As explained in the "Principia", the morphemic principle is also what could be called a means of "pattern recognition", on the part of the speaker as well as on that of the listener (cf. D. B. Fry, in *New Horizons in Linguistics*, ed. J. Lyons, 1980, pp. 29 ff.) These values of the morphemes are functionally identical with the levels of language, levels which are all derived from the *texteme*, i.e. the sign for "something has been said" (*Principia*, p. 41).⁹ This is therefore the place to consider two statements made by Fry. "The cardinal fact", he says, "which emerges from any discussion of language is that every language is a system, a system which operates on several different levels and with units of different magnitude—phonemes, morphemes, words, sentences". (*New Horizons*, p. 30). For conventional verbalizations of this kind the reader is referred to "Principia", p. 44.

A natural language is a *representation* of the morphemic principle in its hierarchical organization (*Principia*, pp. 79 ff.). It is with this language in the languages (*Principia*, p. 62) that morphemics is chiefly concerned.¹⁰ Moreover, the phoneme *is*, on its primary or derived level, a morpheme, as is also the word, while the linguistic status of the so-called "sentence" is, on closer inspection, exposed to serious doubts (cf. p. 74). According to Fry it is further made "plain that in speech reception the message is built up on phoneme, morpheme, word and sentence level at the same time" (*New Horizons*, p. 49). However, what the listener understands is primarily that "something has been said", that is, a *texteme* in *casus rectus* (p. 105 f.), in the minimal case in function of a text. This impression on the part of the listener corresponds to the phraseme of the speaker, i.e. the expressional side of the textemic morpheme the content of which is the "message". But, this phraseme is "built up on" *phrases*, not on words, for what the listener *understands* are not words but just the "message", and this has its consequences for what Fry calls "speech decoding" (cf. *Principia*, p. 49 f.), the counterpart of "coding" (*Principia*, p. 51, n. 20). We have always to distinguish between speech forms and linguistic form (as the coding and decoding principle respectively).¹¹

Let us now illustrate, by an example chosen at random, the confusion prevailing in this respect still today even in Arabic studies. To do so will be necessary already at this stage of the exposition, because it is not possible to survey the linguistic categories of Arabic without considering the question of what has to be

understood by the term "linguistic category". In order to obtain a point of departure for the discussion we shall—in *instar omnium*—choose V. Cantarino's treatment of a simple utterance like *ḥādītun?* "Is there a case?" (Syntax of Modern Arabic Prose, I/1974, p. 5). According to this author a noun "by itself states the existence of the idea expressed by the noun and also its presence in a definite place", which the author wants to illustrate by the example just quoted. The statement agrees in the main with Brockelmann's words "so kann die blosser Nennung eines Nomens auch in einfacher Aussage die Behauptung des Daseins der mit ihm bezeichneten Sache in sich schliessen" (Grundriss, II, p. 35), save that the exposition of Brockelmann is somewhat better. Such expositions of the so-called grammatical "Tatsachen" being of great importance for my treatment of the structure of the poem "Dayr 'Abdūn" (p. 107 ff.) I shall mention already here a specific methodological question.

First it is essential to consider *the structure of the method* which has been used. Just as it is crucial, when describing a certain linguistic state, to distinguish between diachrony and synchrony, in the same way it is of the greatest importance, in describing, synchronically, a linguistic phenomenon not to confuse the levels of language and try to explain a phenomenon belonging to one level, *directly*, from a phenomenon belonging to another. Thus a noun is, as constituting a certain class of words, to be designated as a *lexeme*, while a so-called "sentence" (i.e. a *texteme*) belongs to quite another level of language, namely the level of communication (p. 68).¹² Consequently, it is not correct to maintain that a "noun" by itself states also the *existence* of the idea expressed by the noun, let alone the presence of the idea in a definite place. We find that the structure of the method used here is not *homogeneous* but shows a mixture of disparate elements (cf. Principia, p. 75 *infra*). This state of affairs appears clearly in the formulation: "This noun, having a complete meaning in itself, represents the simplest form of a nominal sentence" (Cantarino, *op. cit.*, p. 5).¹³

This lack of homogeneity in method depends on the inveterate habit of classifying the units of language with the help of categories obtained by an analysis of units belonging to *higher* levels without considering *what has been lost* in the analytic procedure. Thus, we can practically derive a certain unit called a "noun" from a "sentence", while the reverse is less easily achieved. For what is being derived as a "noun" is *in vivo*, i.e. at the moment of derivation (p. 121 f.), not yet a noun but still a *phrase*, as a constituent of a *phraseme*, for instance *Ḥādītun?* "Is there a case?" (cf. Principia, pp. 80 ff.). In consequence of the derivation this function as a phrase is lost, the unit *ḥādītun* being now only an element from which the *texteme* can by no means be directly reconstructed or "built up" as the expression here usually runs (p. 87). The functional loss thus implies a *change in quality* (Fenno-Ugrica Suecana, 5/1982, p. 244). This change in quality is due to a change in the *ontological* status of the unit in question (cf. Principia, pp. 82 ff.). A sentence, that is, in reality a *texteme*, is not composed of words but of parts of the *texteme*. In the same way, Arabic *ḥarīr* "silk" allows us to establish the existence of the phoneme *r* in Arabic (by so-called substitution). However, as a "word" this *ḥarīr*, being "une chose double", is by no means composed of phonemes but of parts of the word, i.e. of *radicals* (p. 89). Thus the

noun *hādītātun* and the "sentence" *Hādītātun* belong to quite different organizations of what, from the viewpoint of "material", may appear as the same element, and a noun cannot therefore *qua* noun be an immediate constituent of the sentence as an organization.

Thus, it is not possible to derive, directly, a higher function from a lower one, since, within different organizations, elements which may appear, materially, as the same units have in fact *different quality*, owing this qualitative "otherness" to the difference in ontological status (cf. above). The "dialectic" tension between "sameness" and "otherness" is of the greatest importance to linguistics on the whole, and I speak here of ontological transubstantiation (*Principia*, p. 82). Let us establish, as a fact, that conventional linguistics, to which most trends of modern linguistics must be counted, presents facts in a way which could only be designated as bad empiricism. Moreover, according to Searle, N. Chomsky "has used his results about language to try to develop general anti-behaviourist and anti-empiricist conclusions about the nature of the human mind that go beyond the scope of linguistics" (*On Noam Chomsky*, p. 2). This is, indeed, alarming. To be a bad empiricist is, of course, not good, but to be an anti-empiricist is still worse. Besides, already particles and atoms have a behaviour (cf. OS 23-4/2976, p. 219; *Principia*, pp. 91 ff.). Furthermore, Searle is of the opinion that "each language has a finite number of phonemes and a finite though quite large number of morphemes", and that "within structuralist assumptions it is not easy to account for the fact that languages have an infinite number of sentences" (op. cit., p. 4). However, within the assumptions of true structuralism, there is in living language no such thing as a "sentence", but only *texts*, segmented in textemes. On the textemic level, the morphemic principle accounts quite easily for an open number of *morphological representations* of the texteme as a linguistic sign. The method of reconstructing so-called "deep structures" directly from such purely occasional and conventional representations respectively seems to be just bad empiricism (*Principia*, p. 50; *Fenno-Ugrica Suecana* 5/1982, p. 244). A natural language appears in the shape of a specific behaviour, represented in the morphology of the language in question. Now, if we ask what it is that is represented in this behaviour *per se* the answer must be: a certain kind of behaviour, represented in the first place by the morphemic principle in the sense of the texteme (cf. *Principia*, passim), and this morphemic principle is, of course, only a kind of translation of still another mode of behaviour, represented by the biological behaviour etc. Thus, when Searle says: "One uses human behavior as evidence for the laws of the operation of the mind, but to suppose that the laws must be laws of behavior is to suppose that the evidence must be the subject matter" (op. cit., p. 2), I am afraid I cannot follow him here. Also on the molecular and atomic levels, existing, in the last resort, behind the directly observable linguistic behaviour we shall have to speak of "behaviour" (cf. above). Thus, the laws regulating these different kinds of behaviour must, in one way or another, be considered also as laws of behaviour, and the laws themselves are the result of the behaviour of the human mind interpreting the universe. So what?

With all this is now connected the question of the so-called "creativity" of language. One can ask oneself whether or not this very term "creativity" has led

the whole debate astray. I shall therefore understand this term in the sense of "what can possibly appear to some scholars as creativity". Now according to Jakobson-Halle "Speech implies a *selection* of certain linguistic entities and their *combination* into linguistic units of a higher degree of complexity. At the lexical level this is readily apparent: the speaker selects words and combines them into sentences according to the syntactic system of the language he is using; sentences are in their turn combined into utterances. But the speaker is by no means a completely free agent in his choice of words: his selection . . . must be made from the lexical storehouse which he and his addressee possess in common." (Fundamentals of Language, 1956, p. 56). Let us contemplate this passage a little. According to Aspelin-Lundberg the terms "selection" and "combination" correspond to the Saussurean "in absentia" and "in presentia" respectively.¹⁴ However, the point of greater interest to us here is what I would like to call the psycho-linguistic atomism which has coloured the description of this very process. It may, in some sense, be true, that what de Saussure called the psycho-physical side of linguistic study (Cours, p. 37) could be, in the last resort, so described. But, to the linguistic observer, the selection and combination appear in the first place as *one single act of textual behaviour*, and it is from this phenomenon we have to start here. Then the utterance appears as a text, the sentence as a *texteme*, and the words as parts of a *phraseme*, that is, as phrases.

As de Saussure pointed out, language has, from different points of view, a double character. "La langue", he says for instance, "existe dans la collectivité sous la forme d'une somme d'empreintes déposées dans chaque cerveau, à peu près comme un dictionnaire dont tous les exemplaires, identiques, seraient répartis entre les individus (voir p. 30). C'est donc quelque chose qui est dans chacun d'eux, tout en étant commun à tous et placé en dehors de la volonté des dépositaires". (Cours, p. 38; Principia, p. 85), cf. Jakobson-Halle, Fundamentals of Language, p. 58. According to this view, speech, as a realization of *la langue*, implies a selection from this common "dictionary". But, as already said, this kind of selection is always to be conceived of as being a textual behaviour. Thus the so-called "creativity" is to be placed within the field of tension between *la langue* and *la parole* in the Saussurean sense, cf. J. Lyons, Noam Chomsky, 1975, p. 93. Even the outstanding French linguist Émile Benveniste, a scholar who knew more about the world of languages than most persons in our time, has touched upon this question, thereby obviously trying to back up Chomsky, although in a personal way.

In his splendid book "Problèmes de linguistique générale" (1967) Benveniste never mentioned Chomsky by name. But in an "entretien de Pierre Daix avec Émile Benveniste" from 1968 he decided, although vaguely, on one of the main features of the doctrine propagated by the famous American professor (Problèmes de linguistique générale II/1974, pp. 16 ff.) After having spoken of structuralism, as *he* understands it, Benveniste says: "Aujourd'hui un effort comme celui de Chomsky est dirigé contre le structuralisme. Sa façon d'aborder les faits linguistiques est exactement inverse" (p. 16). However, as far as I can see, Chomsky seems in any case to presuppose a mental structure of a specific kind, related to the so-called "innate ideas" and should perhaps therefore, in some

way, be counted among the structuralists, in a rather positivistic sense of the word.

Now, according to Benveniste Chomsky's break with structuralism consists mainly in that "il part de la parole comme produite" (p. 18), and he then gives also his own view on this question. "Or", he says, "comment produit-on la langue? On ne reproduit rien. On a apparemment un certain nombre de modèles". However, if it is so obvious that the speaker disposes of a number of models the consequence of this seems unavoidable: he reproduces in any case these models, and the "rien" is thus unjustified. That this is so is probably clear to every linguist, for otherwise language could not function as it does. In his ardour to strengthen the confidence of the layman in Chomsky, without compromising himself, the great linguist then tests the following approach: "Or", he repeats, "tout homme invente sa langue et l'invente toute sa vie. Et tous les hommes inventent leur propre langue sur l'instant et chacun d'une façon distinctive, et chaque fois d'une façon nouvelle." (pp. 18-9). This is no doubt a misuse of the word "inventer". On the contrary, the remarkable thing is rather that man everywhere *finds* his language within himself. It is at his disposal whenever he needs it because it is an *acquired* form of behaviour (Principia, p. 85). This also appears, in a way, from Benveniste's "sur l'instant", while "d'une façon distinctive" and "chaque fois d'une façon nouvelle", in the first place, refer to purely pragmatic circumstances (cf. Cours, p. 38). Such features can therefore hardly carry the weight as arguments for the "invention" that Benveniste seems to assign to them. Plainly embarrassing is the following statement: "Dire bonjour tous les jours de sa vie à quelqu'un, c'est chaque fois une réinvention". For here we are dealing with a so-called "phatic" case where the behavioural moment is still more prominent. And what is, after all, a "réinvention" supposed to mean in this connection, especially in the light of the—untenable—assertion that "on ne reproduit rien"?

However, the continuation is still more difficult to follow, for later on Benveniste makes the following statement: "A plus forte raison quand il s'agit de phrases, ce ne sont plus les éléments constitutifs qui comptent, c'est l'organisation d'ensemble complète, l'arrangement original dont le modèle ne peut pas avoir été donné directement, donc que l'individu fabrique. Chaque locuteur fabrique sa langue. Comment la fabrique-t-il?" (p. 19). Above we had "produire" and "inventer", now this play on words continues with "fabriquer". Now, it is obvious that a speaker reacts in his speech to *stimuli* of different kinds by a linguistic behaviour which is, essentially, determined by the speech habits of the linguistic world he lives in. The creative moment is here reduced to what could be called a kind of *creative reproduction*, corresponding—*mutatis mutandis*—to the speakers conventionally allowed freedom in the articulation of the phonemes (cf. p. 85). By the way, it may be observed that the—rather small—amount of progress made in linguistics after de Saussure and Trubetzkoy seems to have been due to methodological inspiration from phonemics, which led also, partly, to the discovery of the *radical* as the smallest morphemic unit, the link between morphemics and morphology. For we must—which Benveniste does not—distinguish between the morphemes, which are to be regarded as *behavioural univer-*

sals, and their highly varied morphological representation. The important thing is then to discern how a speaker represents his fundamental acquired morphemic "intuitions". And here the words of Benveniste apply: "C'est une question essentielle, car elle domine le problème de l'acquisition du langage." (p. 19), but the theory of Chomsky has certainly nothing to do with this. We are here confronted with a specific aspect of the relation between "the individual" and "the collective" (cf. Cours, p. 30 and p. 38). How much is individual in ordinary speech, and what is collective, i.e. conditioned by language as an "institution sociale"? Language is, *inter alia*, an acquired system of symbolic behaviour, regulating the mechanisms of stimulus and response, a system, however, that functions *as if it were* natural mechanisms, sometimes almost of reflex type. It is obvious that the speech-act, as a fact, is individual, but it is always also, in some way, a realization of a supra-individual, collective speech-act, in the minimal case, of an "archiphraseme", so to speak. Here we are dealing with a way of organizing, incessantly, new elements so that these elements appear as representations of *constituents* of what is, in the proper sense of the word, linguistic form, corresponding to the intuition "something has been said" (texteme). For as behavioural, acquired universals the true morphemes are also informational quanta of different orders (Principia, p. 83). Just as the phoneme shows an individual, allowed freedom of articulation (freedom of phonetic usage), the texteme shows an allowed freedom of (morphological) usage. Contrary to what Benveniste seems to maintain, it is exactly the elements which are *constituents* of the morpheme which really count here, i.e. the subject phrase and the predicate phrase. Likewise, "l'arrangement original" is, as regards the degree of creativity always somehow conditioned by the collective language, by *la langue* in the Saussurean (particular) sense. Moreover Benveniste seems to contradict himself also when he says that the child "utilisera en partie des structures données" in forming "des phrases". It is obvious that expressions like "modèles" and "structures données" are being used here also with the aim of diverting, if possible, the severe criticism of Chomsky's "innéisme". Unfortunately, these vague attempts have failed in their purpose.

In a last, almost desperate attempt to back up Chomsky Benveniste says: "On peut donc présumer qu'il y a une organisation mentale propre à l'homme, et qui donne à l'homme la capacité de reproduire certains modèles mais en les variant infiniment." (p. 19). Apart from the fact that this is no novelty but a banality—for how could we otherwise possibly speak?—it is important to observe that it never can be a question of varying the models as such, i.e. the behavioural universals. That which is varied are the *representations* of the models, just as it is the phonetic representation of the phoneme, this acquired mental organization, which is always individually varied. Thus, we need not only *presume* the existence of a mental organization in this connection. For the linguistic faculty of man is, as we know, a universal fact, presupposing, as a matter of course, a mental organization in the sense, for instance, of W. Penfield, *The Mystery of Mind* (1975), and thus also the faculty to "understand", behind the most varied morphological representation, what these "certain models" are symbolizing. However, "certain models" is too vague an expression here. Scientific morpho-

logy can, in its capacity of *metamorphology* more or less exactly show us which these models are. They are the *real morphemes*, i.e. the phraseme, the word, and the phoneme, reflecting the socially conditioned structure of the faculty of speaking and understanding. The morphemes are, linguistically, universal patterns of phonemic behaviour corresponding to a mental *aptitude* for such a behaviour. Although apparently localized to specific parts of the brain this aptitude is a fairly *general* one, capable of handling all kinds of semiotics. This general aptitude is, of course, the result of evolution (cf. Principia, p. 69 ff.). There is no such "thing" as "the mental", "the soul", "the consciousness" etc.¹⁵ What we, for want of more adequate terms, call so are only qualitatively different states of function, depending on the phenomenon of integration, the source of "organization" and "immediate constituents". One usually speaks here of "levels", unfortunately mostly without paying attention to the *ontology* of these levels, determined in the last resort by the nature of hierarchy.

I have been commenting upon the text as the first articulation (p. 67), and here some further remarks may be added. In its capacity as the truly first articulation, the text, i.e. the network of textemes, implies also a kind of solution of what I would like to call "the problem of communicative redundancy" on the textual level. This specific kind of solution offered by textual behaviour deserves, I think, our attention. Let us therefore consider again *The man hit the ball* and then in the only way this expression *should* be considered, namely as an *act of communication*, performed in a certain situation by a person *A* and containing a message *B*, understood by a person *C*. We can try to resume this act of communication in the following way: " $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ ". The persons *A* and *C* can, in relation to the message *B* and to each other, be supposed to be placed at all practicably thinkable points, and the point *A* can also coincide with this of *C*. This trait of communicational complexity language, as a text, can only reproduce *in substantia* in a linear way. Thus, linearity is then also a means of reducing, formally, communicational redundancy to a minimum. This is made possible also by the fact that the text as such and *per definitionem* presupposes an *act of understanding* on the part of *C*, an understanding the quality of which in turn depends on the hermeneutical horizon of *C*.

Now, in our isolated expression *The man hit the ball*, as we see, both *A* and *C* are suppressed, which we can write as \emptyset -*The man hit the ball*- \emptyset , the communication as *act* being thus only "virtually" represented. By this implicit representation of some communicational elements redundancy can, in this respect, be diminished considerably. For we *understand* that there is a person *A* who is saying something (*B*) to another person, *C* (*D*, *E*, *F* etc.). This we do by understanding, in the first place, that "something is being said or has been said", and this "something" is in fact the minimal communication as a morpheme, i.e. a texteme, here in function of a text. But we ought also to understand something else. All definitions in which we are trying to capture reality are, however exact they may appear, in the last resort, only approximations, expressed in languages. In consequence of its structure, every natural language is, in a way, apt to reduce textual abundance, thus distilling away, so to speak, parts of reality, parts which,

on closer inspection, might turn out to be essential. For what in our case is understood by the receiver is by no means only the fact that "a man hit the ball"—to vary a little what I in my morphemics call "the pragmatic referent"—but also that he is dealing with a text, a linguistic sign, a morpheme; on this kind of "absent structure", cf. *Principia*, p. 54.

Let us now compare a usual type of edition of a Platonic dialogue, e.g. "Gorgias". For the benefit of the reader, the senders are visualized throughout the text: ΚΑΛ., ΣΩ., ΧΑΙ., ΓΟΡ., and ΠΩΔ. In addition, the persons who are participating are often indicated in the beginning of the dialogue, namely Callicles, Socrates, Chairepho, Gorgias and Polus; who is the sender and who is the receiver almost always appears, and we are thus confronted with a certain overplainness. On the contrary, in a modern novel the persons can be introduced by and by; there can be pages without the actors being mentioned by name. Such things and similar circumstances appear then through an attentive reading of the text, which, by this kind of stylistic arrangements, manifests a well-known principle of art, cf. Liebermann's words that "Zeichnen bedeute Striche auszulassen".

I mentioned the factor of *understanding*, and this is a primary fact on which a theory of text linguistics perhaps should be founded in the first place (cf. *Principia*, p. 51). One might then postulate that there is a complex correlation between an utterance (*enuntiatum*), i.e. a text or a part of the text, and the understood (*intellectum*). What is the structure of this correlation? In order to answer this question we must ask ourselves: What is it that the receiver understands on hearing for instance *The man hit the ball*? It is hardly likely that this very first reaction is: This is, indeed, correct English, it satisfies the demands of "grammaticalness" (in the Chomskyan sense). He probably thinks nothing of the kind. What he understands, in the first place, is a certain kind of social behaviour, placed as he is—like the sender—in a certain social position. It is a question of a communication between two actors in a socially conditioned life-play (*Principia*, p. 52), a fact influencing to a great extent the act of understanding and thus also the content of the speech-act, or, more correctly the act of communication. For to every speech-act corresponds an act of understanding, constituted, *inter alia*, by an impression, that is, "the understandable" or *intelligibile*, and its content, "the understood" or *intellectum*, cf. p. 118.¹⁶

After all that physics has taught us it is certainly no profound remark to say that "la réalité de l'objet n'est pas séparable de la méthode propre à le définir". Moreover, that this insight should belong to "le grand changement survenu en linguistique", as Benveniste maintains, is perhaps true, but in this case apt to discredit linguistics as a science. Benveniste correctly points out in his splendid article "Les niveaux de l'analyse linguistique" that the problem is bound up with "ce que l'on doit admettre comme fait" (*Problèmes de linguistique générale* I, p. 119). This is, of course, an *ontological* question, and we shall now mention briefly the attitude of the great linguist to the ontology of language.

As our point of departure we shall take the following statement: "Le sens est en effet la condition fondamentale que doit remplir toute unité de tout niveau pour obtenir statut linguistique." (op. cit., p. 122). Now, the author also speaks

of "le niveau *phonématique*" and "le niveau *mérismatique*" (p. 121). Thus we have to ask: do the units of these levels have a "sens"? If not we would be dealing here with levels without any "statut linguistique", this according to the aforesaid condition. Unfortunately, the author is not altogether clear on this point, for he says only: "le phonème n'a de valeur que comme discriminateur de signes linguistiques, et le trait distinctif, à son tour, comme discriminateur des phonèmes" (p. 122). Here we come across the term "valeur", and the phoneme would then possess "valeur" but not "sense". Since no one would deny that the phoneme is a linguistic unit, and the author himself is of the opinion that the phonemes constitute a specific level, we must conclude that the phoneme is a levelbound unit without sense, having thus no linguistic status. This is of course absurd. We are here confronted with the old question of the meaning of meaning,¹⁷ in our case the relation obtaining between "sense" and "value", and here ontology comes in.

Now, the author also says: "si le phonème se définit, c'est comme constituant d'une unité plus haute, le morphème." (op. cit., p. 122). Here we encounter the central notion of linguistics, the morpheme, mentioned by Benveniste only accidentally later on: "Du phonème on passe ainsi au niveau du signe, celui-ci s'identifiant selon le cas à une forme libre ou à une forme conjointe (morphème)." (p. 123). Here we come across the level of the sign, to the author coinciding "pratiquement" with the "word", free or bound; on the last point I agree with Benveniste: *house* and *house-s* should be treated together, not only "pratiquement" but also "théoriquement", cf. p. 100. Thus we have before us "phoneme", "morpheme", "sign", "sense" and "value", and I shall now try to show that the author's manner of dealing with these notions—sometimes in rather declamatory tirades—is, as far as I can see, not to be recommended. For "la langue est une forme et non une substance" (Cours, p. 169), and one should not even try to define structure in linguistics without paying due attention to this fundamental statement (Principia, p. 63). De Saussure himself realized this: "On ne saurait assez se pénétrer de cette vérité, . . . etc." (Cours, p. 169).

However, it was necessary for me to elucidate this "une forme" further and make the concept of form subservient to the architecture of a linguistic theory worthy the name. This task was, at least preliminarily, achieved in IM and "Principia", in the first place, with the help of a slightly "operative" definition of "form" as "an organization of elements", these elements being then conceived as transformed and transubstantiated to *immediate constituents* of the organization in question. As in physics and biology the ontological concept of immediate constituents is of crucial importance also to linguistics (Principia, p. 74 and pp. 91 f.). Let us now, in the light of already achieved results, consider the following statement of Benveniste's: "Le mot a une position fonctionnelle intermédiaire qui tient à sa nature double. D'une part il se décompose en unités phonématiques qui sont de niveau inférieur; de l'autre il entre, à titre d'unité signifiante et avec d'autres unités signifiantes, dans une unité de niveau supérieur." (p. 123). What is the sense of this? Since the author regards the word as a sign, which is quite correct, we must first consider it in this capacity.

"Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une

image acoustique." (Cours, p. 98). One could say that a sign such as Arabic *faras* "horse" is used as if it connected the object with a name, its own name. However, it would never be able to function as it really does if it were not "une entité psychique à deux faces" (Cours, p. 99), i.e. a conceptual sound picture (Principia, p. 76). From this it follows that an analysis such as:

faras = "unité signifiante", "avec d'autres unités signifiantes" (e.g. *šaḡar* "trees") entering "dans une unité de niveau supérieur"
f-a-r-a-s = "unités phonématisques qui sont de niveau inférieur"

is not founded in linguistic reality. Firstly, what is the sense of an "unité signifiante entrant dans une unité de niveau supérieur", especially in the light of the Saussurean "entité psychique à deux faces"? Since *faras*, *šaḡar* etc. could no doubt be, as words, designated "des unités signifiantes", and the term "signifiant" should be used only of the expressional side of one and the same "unité", the word, there seems to be some misuse here of the term "unité". Secondly, what is superior and what is inferior in a complementary unity like the morpheme "word"? Here it is appropriate to recall the passage where de Saussure speaks of "toutes les erreurs de notre terminologie, toutes nos façons incorrectes de désigner les choses de la langue" as arising exactly from our unawareness of the fact that "la langue est une forme" (Cours, p. 169). A word like *faras* could never as "form" be analysed in the aforesaid manner. It must be "décomposé" in units accounting for the *phenomenon of complementarity* and thus participating in both sides of the linguistic sign as being integrated. This unit is the *radical* the discovery of which was presented in IM. Thus the word *faras* is to be analysed in the five radicals *f-a-r-a-s*, since this *faras* is, in fact, a *faras* = expression ~ *FAR-AS* = content, being integrated in each other, so to speak. The radical is the immediate constituent of every morpheme in the sense of a linguistic sign, i.e. the morpheme as a unity of *la langue*. The linguistic status of the phoneme is entirely derivative. Its *function* is here to represent the radical.

Now Benveniste is of the opinion that "Le mot peut donc se définir comme la plus petite unité signifiante libre susceptible d'effectuer une phrase, et d'être elle-même effectuée par des phonèmes". (p. 124). We are, as we see, here confronted with the old positivistic, summarized one-dimensionality rejected in "Principia". We must distinguish, thoroughly, between the word as an element of language, representing the iconic level, and the word as an immediate constituent of what Benveniste calls "la phrase". The word in the first sense is, like the phoneme, a purely derivative entity arising from the activities and procedures of the analyst. In its function as an immediate constituent of the phraseme it is not to be called word any longer but "phrase" or "part of the phrase". Unfortunately, Benveniste does not distinguish between "constituent" and "immediate constituent", a crucial distinction in linguistics. There is no *direct* way from the word to the phraseme, although words, from the point of view of the "material", could be said to be intermediary constituents of the morpheme in question. The word should, so I contend, be regarded as the immediate constituent of the *lexeme*, being a class of words (cf. above, p. 71).

Now it is of the utmost importance to the analyst to remain within the limits of

linguistics as a *behavioural* science when carrying the analysis further. Thus we must also interpret the so-called "sentence" in behaviouristically relevant terms, which means, *inter alia*, that we will have to distinguish between philosophy and linguistics. According to Benveniste "Le prédicat est une propriété fondamentale de la phrase, ce n'est pas une unité de phrase." (p. 129). I have also here, I must confess, some difficulty in following the great linguist. For on the one hand, he maintains that "Il n'y a pas plusieurs variétés de prédication." (ibid.) although, for instance, the important distinction between main clause and subordinate clause is known to every linguist, on the other he says: "Les types de phrases qu'on pourrait distinguer se ramènent tous à un seul, la proposition prédicative, et il n'y a pas de phrase hors de la prédication." (ibid.). Moreover, he is of the opinion that "le présence d'un 'sujet' auprès d'un prédicat n'est pas indispensable: le terme prédicatif de la proposition se suffit à lui-même puisqu'il est en réalité le déterminant du 'sujet'" (p. 128). However, already de Saussure had recognized the *zéro* as a sign (Cours, pp. 124, 163, 254, 257), and I would like to emphasize that there will be no "proposition" or "catégorème" or anything else of the kind without a "subject". But above all, according to the author, whose mental agility is, as always, astonishing: "la phrase contient des signes, mais n'est pas elle-même un signe." (p. 126). How could we speak, then? Terms like "sentence", "proposition" etc. belong to philosophy, but can receive a place within linguistics, but then only as designations having, in some way, reference to the *content* of the phraseme as being the expressional side of the *texteme* as a morpheme, i.e. a true linguistic sign, indicating the behavioural intuition "something has been said".¹⁸ It goes without saying that there can be no "proposition" outside the network of a text. So far Benveniste. The true levels of living language are one thing, the artificial levels of the analyst another.

In this connection I shall, to a certain extent, also comment upon a paper by B. Malmberg, with the title "Det språkliga teckenbegreppet och dess historiska bakgrund" (Vetenskapssocieteten i Lund. Årsbok 1978, pp. 16-42). Let me then, at the outset, state that to de Saussure "le lien" between the signifier and the signified is not only indissoluble but the sign is to him also "une entité psychique à deux faces" (Cours, p. 99), by which in fact the notion of complementarity is foreboded. Now, Malmberg maintains that the Saussurean doctrine of the arbitrariness of the sign also has reference to the relation between the signifier and the signified, "a relation the arbitrariness of which is easily realized and easily verifiable, with remarkable exceptions, sometimes neglected" (p. 16). This is, indeed, a curious statement, recalling however, it is true, the following formulation: "Le lien unissant le signifiant au signifié est arbitraire . . . (Cours, p. 100). Now, signifier and signified can, according to the author, "in popular terms" be designated as "sound and meaning", which is, to my mind, too "popular" in a very learned and instructive paper such as this. I would say "expression" and "content" in a non-technical sense. It is obvious that the *relation* between the signifier and the signified never can be one of arbitrariness, and de Saussure certainly did not teach anything of the kind. On the contrary, this relation is one of mutual, isomorphic integration, and in 1973 I started to develop my doctrine of the true sense of the morphophoneme, i.e. the *radical* as a link between morpheme-

mics and the arbitrary, although conventional, morphologies of the world (OS 21, pp. 68–72).

Moreover, it is remarkable that a man who mastered the thinking of de Saussure completely has nevertheless, for some reason, misunderstood him. Thus Benveniste says of de Saussure: "Or—ceci est essentiel—il entend par 'signifié' le *concept*. Il déclare en propres termes (p. 100) 'que le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique'. Mais il assure, aussitôt après, que la nature du signe est arbitraire parce que il n'a avec le signifié 'aucune attache naturelle dans la réalité'. Il est clair que le raisonnement est faussé par le recours inconscient et subreptice à un troisième terme, qui n'était pas compris dans la définition initiale. Ce troisième terme est la chose même, la réalité." (Problèmes I, p. 50). Firstly, de Saussure wanted to avoid the ambiguity of *arbor* as designating, on the one hand, the whole sign, that is, according to my morphemics (*arbor* ~ *ARBOR*), and, on the other, only "l'image acoustique". (Cours, p. 99). For *arbor* can only function 'de telle sorte que l'idée (= *ARBOR*) de la partie sensorielle (= *arbor*) implique celle du total (p. 99), that is, *arbor* = (*arbor* ~ *ARBOR*) = the sign, or *ARBOR* = (*arbor* ~ *ARBOR*) = the sign. Thus he suggests replacing "le concept" by "signifié" and "l'image acoustique" by "signifiant" since "ces derniers termes ont l'avantage de marquer l'opposition qui les sépare soit entre eux, soit du total dont ils font partie" (p. 99). In regard to the "sign" he is inclined to retain it since "nous ne savons par quoi le remplacer, la langue usuelle n'en suggérant aucun autre" (pp. 99–100). Thus it is an—involuntary—retention of the term "sign" that has governed the choice of the two others. According to my morphemics this "sign" should be called the "morpheme" *par excellence*, composed by the two isomorphically integrated immediate constituents "expression" and "content".

Let us now return to Benveniste's criticism of de Saussure. Is it correct to maintain that the latter understands the concept by the signified? No, language being in principle "form", de Saussure understands here instead the concept *as* the signified, within the framework of the sign as an "unité psychique à deux faces". In the same way he understands "l'image acoustique" *as* the signifier. Is it correct to say that de Saussure "aussitôt après" maintains that the nature of the sign is arbitrary since the sign does not have "aucune attache naturelle dans la réalité"? Certainly not. The first quotation is to be found on p. 98, the second on p. 101!, and in quite another context. One ought not to "supposer", says de Saussure, "que le lien qui unit un nom à une chose est une opération toute simple, ce qui est bien loin d'être vrai". (Cours, p. 97). This can only mean that he considered the relation obtaining between "un nom" and "une chose" as rather complicated which indeed it is. Thus, when he says that "le lien unissant le signifiant au signifié est arbitraire" (Cours, p. 100) he is using the word "lien" exactly in the sense of "opération", i.e. as a designation of the procedure leading to the conclusion that the signifier is not a "natural" expression of the *content* of the signified, this content being then understood by de Saussure as "la chose". He can therefore say: "le signe linguistique est arbitraire". (Cours, p. 100). By all this he means that the "opération" making it possible to connect the signifier and the signified is of an arbitrary nature since the sign (= signifier ~ signified) is

always or at least in principle "immotivé" in relation to "la chose". That this is so must also have been completely clear to Benveniste (Problèmes I, pp. 49 ff.). For de Saussure speaks on the one hand of "les faits de conscience, que nous appellerons concepts, se trouvent associés aux représentations des signes linguistiques ou images acoustiques servant à leur expression" (Cours, p. 28), and, on the other, of these two elements as being "unis dans notre cerveau par le lien de l'association" (p. 98). Moreover, he considers the "image acoustique" to be "(non) pas le son matériel, chose purement physique, mais l'empreinte psychique de ce son" (p. 98). Thus he definitely could not have held the opinion that "le lien de l'association" between the signifier and the signified should be arbitrary. Unfortunately, J.-M. Benoist has not realized that Benveniste would have understood this (*La révolution structurale*, 1980, pp. 98 ff.).

Thus, in the sign *faras* "horse", i.e. *faras* ~ *FARAS* or *FARAS* ~ *faras*, "une entité psychique à deux faces", the relationship obtaining between the two sides of the same sign could, as a matter of course, never be arbitrary. On the contrary, "le lien" is absolute, but not only this: it constitutes an extremely important kind of relationship, namely that of a total, mutual functional integration. It is on this kind of integration the function of the sign *faras* is founded, and it was, by the way, the ontological properties of the phenomenon of integration that led me to the discovery of the technemic concept of the *radical* in IM (1976), cf. OS 21/1973, pp. 68 ff.¹⁹

Now, there can be no language without *two* kinds of referents, the pragmatic referent and the metareferent (*Principia*, p. 49). As for what Malmberg calls the "referent" he is of the opinion that this term, although missing in the text of the "Cours" is considered *implicite* there. According to Malmberg the referent of the sign implies "everything outside the language we speak and write about and to which the signs of the language have reference" (op. cit., p. 16). However, on hearing the sequence *faras* an Arab may react in various ways. All that this sequence means in the specific *act of understanding* I call the pragmatic referent, to be distinguished from the object itself, designated by the sequence in question. But I would not maintain that this referent implies something *outside* the language which this Arab speaks, although the object itself could be said to be outside every language (cf. *Principia*, p. 67). To our Arab the sequence *faras* functions *as if it were* the natural expression of the object in question. This is an extremely important viewpoint, explaining, in its way, how language can function as it really does. The transformation of *per se* conventional designations to artificially or functionally natural designations seems to have its source exactly in the fact that there can be no question of a relation of arbitrariness obtaining between the two sides of the linguistic sign, cf. above on "integration", p. 68. On the other hand, our Arab can also have the "intuition" that *faras* is a "word" in his language. Then he has recognized the metareferent of the sequence *faras* in its capacity as a sign or morpheme. This kind of referent indicates the level of the morpheme.

Let us now consider the Arabic text *APamīru 'aẓīmun* "The prince is mighty" and compare the following statement: "The possibility of decomposing the sayings in simple signs (words, morphemes) and the further splitting up of the expressions in the smallest distinguishing (but not meaning-carrying) elements

(phoneme and grapheme) have been called the double articulation" (Malmberg, op. cit., p. 17). However, there can be no sayings outside a textual situation, and thus *alʔamīru ʕazīmun* is to be considered as a *texteme*, to be decomposed, in the first place, in textual parts, i.e. in the phrases *alʔamīru* and *ʕazīmun*. But, far from being "simple signs (words, morphemes)" the phrases are the immediate constituents of the phraseme for which that holds true which Benveniste says about "la phrase": "Une phrase constitue un tout, qui ne se réduit pas à la somme de ses parties" (Problèmes I, p. 123; cf. Principia, p. 68). In consequence, the phrase participates in the properties of the phraseme, and this ontological phenomenon is not explained by an analyst who is trying to decompose a *texteme* directly in words. Moreover, the lexemes *alʔamīru* and *ʕazīmun* are, likewise, by no means, to be directly decomposed in phonemes but in the radicals $ʔ-a-l-ʔ-a-m-i:-r-u$ and $ʕ-a-z-i:-m-u-n$ respectively, the radicals being here also, at the same time, the constituents of the words *alʔamīru* and *ʕazīmun*. It goes without saying that the so-called phonemes in this position are "meaning-carrying" in their capacity of radicals functioning as *technemes* in conceptual sound pictures. For "value" is certainly to be regarded as a kind of "meaning". The phoneme does not have an autonomous existence. It exists only as a radical or, more correctly, as the substance of the radical as "form". We must never forget that the radical like every true morpheme is "une entité psychique à deux faces": $f-a-r-a-s = f \sim F-a \sim A-r \sim R-a \sim A-s \sim S!$ (cf. p. 88).

It appears from all that has been said hitherto that one of the main causes of the confusion prevailing in linguistics today is a phenomenon I would like to call "material positivism", manifesting itself as an incapability of defining correctly the place of *phonetics* and *morphology* within the framework of a realistic theory of linguistics. This inability appears the more remarkable if one considers what a great advance after all, the discovery of the *phoneme* as a psychic entity has meant to the development of linguistics (cf. p. 76). The phoneme is, as a linguistic term, a derived entity, and *in statu derivandi*, as already pointed out (p. 73), something has been lost, so that it is no longer accessible to the conventional theory of phonemics. This "something" is in the first place the *function* of the phoneme manifesting itself as *polyvalence* (IM, p. 8). What the phenomenon of phonemic polyvalence really implies does not seem to have been satisfactorily elucidated. The reason for this is obviously the almost complete absence of the concept of "ontology" in the so-called "general linguistics".

The linguist has created the artificial semantic world of phonemics (cf. Principia, p. 46), a poor world consisting of a very limited number of notions such as "voiced", "unvoiced", "front", "back" etc. All these phonetic ways of articulation constitute the "infrastructure", so to speak, of the phonemic world, and this infrastructure is not perceived by the sender or the receiver (in the normal case), a not unimportant fact. For from this kind of unconsciousness we can learn something concerning the question of language acquisition: the existence of a certain *freedom of articulation*. For this kind of conventionally allowed freedom has its parallel on the level of morphology (in the conventional sense), constituting a completely different semantic world (cf. p. 102). However, both worlds, the phonemic and the morphological, have one trait in common: both have repre-

sentative functions, although on different levels. Let us take Arabic *Kataba maktūban* "He wrote a letter". This is a specific, Arabic morphological representation of the morpheme "texteme", and as such only one of an unlimited number of representations of the same morpheme.

It goes without saying that phonetics has nothing *immediately* to do with the analysis of a texteme like this. If we now take the phrase *kataba* "he wrote" we find that this phrase cannot possibly be analysed in phonemes. For there is no immediate connection between "phoneme" and "phrase" or "part of the phrase". Thus *kataba* must in the first place be analysed in phrasically or at least morphologically relevant units, i.e. in the six radicals *k-a-t-a-b-a*. In order to illustrate the aforesaid confusion, it seems appropriate to consider an article by the phonetician Sven Öhman with the title "Aktuell svensk forskning i fonetik" (Actual Swedish Research in Phonetics), published in "Ord och stil" (Språkvårdssamfundets skrifter, 9/1978, pp. 57-80); it is, likewise, appropriate to recall that this article appeared after the publication of IM.

According to Öhman there has in recent times "cropped up a new conceptual distinction which has begun to make itself felt in linguistics", namely the distinction between "theory" and "practice" (op. cit., p. 58). In the light of the history of Marxism this is, indeed, an amazing statement, cf. e.g. C. Castoriadis, *L'Institution imaginaire de la société* (1975). Regarding the "practice" Öhman is of the opinion that this concept has here to be understood as "the practical reality, that which is done, the means used, and the products produced by concrete activity of living persons in the well-known natural environment we live in. Also the speaking is part of this reality, and as long as linguistics wants to remain empirical, it can be nothing but this concrete speaking (actual linguistic practice) that constitute our object of research". (p. 58). This too is an amazing statement.

Let us, to begin with, consider the expression "the natural environment we live in". It is obvious that "the natural environment" cannot have an immediate relevance in this connection. For, in the first place, it will here always be a question of the *cultural*, social environment as constituting the framework of the "actual linguistic practice". Language is an "*institution sociale*" (cf. *Principia*, p. 41 and p. 80). Moreover, it is surely a grave mistake to believe that one might even be slightly aware of the theory of this kind of practice if one does not finally decide on the extremely important question of the *immediate constituents* of the structure of this practice, involving, of course, also "understanding" (cf. *Principia*, p. 51). This is an *ontological* question, and what this implies does not seem to be clear to the author of the article under review.

"Empiricism" is even today a rather misused word, and it is certainly still another mistake to believe that linguistics could not be "empirical" if "something else" than "the concrete speaking" constitutes its object of research. For this "concrete speaking" is, as the directly observable phenomenon, only the mechanical-material side of what the author calls "actual linguistic practice", which is, in the first place, a behaviouristic concept, implying also the behaviour of understanding. On the contrary, an indispensable prerequisite for empirical linguistic research is exactly this "something else", and it is, on the whole, a mistake to believe that a *phonetical* investigation of behaviouristic phenomena

might in itself be apt to constitute true empiricism in a linguistic sense. Unfortunately, later on it becomes still more difficult to follow Öhman's exposition. For as regards the "theory of practice" he maintains that this is not "the object of our research (vår forsknings föremål). It is our empirical 'subject matter', but only our understanding of the concrete linguistic reality, thus the speaking itself" (»Den är vår empiriska 'subject matter', utan endast vår förståelse av den konkreta språkliga verkligheten, alltså själva talandet») (p. 58). Disregarding the fact that an understanding even of the "concrete" linguistic reality implies an enterprise of enormous complexity, the author is probably trying to tell us that the "theory of practice" is *not* his empirical 'subject matter' etc.

Let us here state that "understanding" is a hermeneutic term of great subtlety. Let us also state that "the concrete linguistic reality" is by no means equivalent to the "speaking *per se*". It is thus clear that we have good reasons to scrutinize Öhman's exposition of the difficult problem of "form" and "substance", of primary importance to linguistic theory as a whole. "In our theoretic understanding of the speaking (talandet)", the author says, "we perceive, as we know, this as taking on certain forms" (p. 59). For my own part, I interpret speech "theoretically" in the first place as behaviour of a certain kind, i.e. as *textual* behaviour. It is this behaviour we might call the form of speech, if we wish to retain the terminology of the author. There exists no speaking outside the text, in which this speaking always manifests itself at first. This "at first" is of primary importance to linguistic theory, a theory still today dominated on the one hand by the doctrines of antiquity on the "sentence", λόγος, *sententia*, and, on the other, by the doctrine of "root", "stem", "ending" etc., depending on a *morphological* analysis. Accordingly Öhman also says: "Particularly we perceive the linguistic expression as taking on a certain linguistic form—it consists, as we know, of stems and endings joined together to words, of words joined together to phrases, and of phrases to sentences, etc." (p. 59). Apart from the fact that this interesting "etc." keeps us in suspense as to the next step in this "joining together" it is quite clear that this kind of "theoretic understanding" belongs to a fairly elementary level, the level of school grammar. Thus, the declaration that a linguistic (språkligt) expression (or expression of speech) has a "linguistic" form here becomes more or less a tautology. One must distinguish between linguistic form and specific grammatical forms in the conventional sense, i.e. speech forms (*Principia*, p. 43 ff.). Thus, "theoretical understanding" in the sense of the author appears to be no other than the usual old artificial understanding, based on a derived traditional "theory", a kind of understanding presupposing a hermeneutic horizon essentially narrower than that of the understanding of speech as textual behaviour, integrated by the level of communication in the sense of "Principia". One might have thought that the primitively grammatical positivism which finds expression in the contribution in question and that—to crown everything—pretends to represent true empiricism should have been overcome nowadays. A speech expression is, of course, only a highly occasional representation or a realization of linguistic form in speech forms. For "la langue est une forme et non une substance" (*Cours*, p. 169), and linguistic form only *apparently* manifests itself on the phonetic level. For there is no direct connection between

“sound” and “meaning”, i.e. “mental” form (cf. p. 93). The linguist must distinguish between “material” and “substance”.

The *technics* of communication of course depend on the material that is used, e.g. colour, marble, social phenomena, sound etc. One paints on canvas, carves in marble, behaves oneself in society, and speaks in a situation. This being so, it may be appropriate to recall, in addition, a statement by de Saussure: “Le signifiant, étant de nature auditive, se déroule dans le temps seul et a les caractères qu’il emprunte au temps: a) *il représente une étendue*, et b) *cette étendue est mesurable dans une seule dimension: c’est une ligne.*” (Cours, p.103). Here the greatest of linguists may seem to appear as an advocate for the phonetic positivism rejected above. This is only superficially true. It must, however, be admitted that in this context he did not consider the circumstance that in a phonetic sequence functioning as a “signifiant” neither “la nature auditive” nor “le temps” is any longer of primary interest to the linguist. For within the scope of the organization of the linguistic sign the signifier is the substance of the “signifié”, a substance which, in this function, is not composed of sounds or even phonemes but of *radicals* of various kinds (cf. IM and Principia, passim). In other words, we are not entitled to speak of the signifier in terms of “sound substance”, “Lautsubstanz” etc., cf. Öhman, op. cit., p. 57 and n. 3. p. 79! What de Saussure here, primarily, has in mind is the material of what I call the substance of the signified, including the technicalities of production conditioned by the material.

As has already been pointed out, the *technics* of the communication depend on the nature of the material, and we shall therefore examine how de Saussure further develops his opinion of “la caractère linéaire du signifiant”: “Tout le mécanisme de la langue en dépend ... les signifiants acoustiques ne disposent que de la ligne du temps; leurs éléments se présentent l’un après l’autre; ils forment une chaîne. Ce caractère apparaît immédiatement dès qu’on les représente par l’écriture et qu’on substitue la ligne spatiale des signes graphiques à la succession dans le temps.” (Cours, p. 103); in the last case he could also have said that the expression is “de nature visuelle”. Now, of this his “second principe” he says: “il est fondamentale et les conséquences en sont incalculables” (cf. IA, p. 28). However, as a matter of fact, he has little to tell us about these consequences later on. Yet he maintains that the linear character of language excludes the possibility of pronouncing two elements at the same time (Cours, p. 170). This statement shows, it seems to me, that de Saussure in such cases is speaking exclusively of the “material” side of language. For according to his general doctrine the linguistic sign is in principle “une chose double” (Cours, p. 98), and in consequence of this doctrine we must even maintain that we are in fact also, at the same time, pronouncing, so to speak, the content of an expression even if this may sound odd (cf. IM, p. 3 f. and Principia, p. 77 f.); for instance in *horse = ho:s* we are also “pronouncing” its content *HO:S*, thus in fact *h ~ H-o: ~ O:-s ~ S* (cf. p. 85).

Let us then look at things from this new angle. If we do so, the necessity of integrating every spoken or written element as being a reproduction of *two* elements in one and the same “acte phonatoire” or written articulation appears

to us clearly as the foremost consequences of the linear nature of language. For it is in the nature of the sound picture to be composed of picture sounds—but then in the function of a sign picture and picture signs respectively (OS 23–4/1976, p. 219), e.g. *horse* = *ho:s* where the phoneme *h*, in consequence of its ontological status of being a picture sign, is no longer a sound or even a phoneme but, as such, only the material of the radical *h*. The radical *h* is then the substance in which *H* manifests itself in its function as a *techneme* in the sound picture *ho:s*, *HO:S* = "horse". Thus we are pronouncing—mentally and phonetically—the technemes *H-O:-S* as *h-o:-s* just as we hear or read *h-o:-s* but understand this as *H-O:-S*. This means that in English the concept *equus* is pronounced *ho:s*, in Arabic *faras* etc. (OS 23–4, p. 220). Through the total, reciprocal integration of the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions a qualitative transformation and transubstantiation are produced, necessary for the functioning of language. In consequence of the interaction of these two dimensions it is also obvious that it is no longer only a question of sounds one hears but of *acoustic signs* one *understands* in that the hearing affects the technical side of the transmission. In the same way one not only sees the graphic representatives of the written *horse* but one understands a visual sign (*HORSE*), the seeing *per se* affecting primarily the technical side of this kind of transmission. We are thus here confronted with the specific language of understanding, appearing as a kind of "pronouncing", hearing and seeing. We are dealing here, in *our* way, with what Benveniste considers the first distinctive character of a semiotic system, namely "le mode opératoire", i.e. "la manière dont le système agit, notamment le sens (vue, ouïe, etc.) auquel il s'adresse" (Problèmes, II, pp. 51 ff.).

It remains to be said that the linear nature of linguistic expression is, in the last resort, also a prerequisite for the syntagmatic order of relation in consequence of which e.g. Arabic *ḥarīr* contains two different elements *r*, only materially represented by the one phoneme *r* (cf. p. 73). It is by virtue of the ontological principle of isomorphism, as this has, at least in outline, been elucidated in "Principia" that the order of relation has this differentiating function. After this digression it is time to return to the exposition of Öhman.

Since, as we have seen (p. 87), this author stops, in the well-known Chomskyan manner, at the "sentence" which is said to be "joined together" by phrases, we shall this time begin our refutation by commenting upon the terminology used here in the article in question. Quite apart from how the word *sententia* is formed²⁰ the term is a result of ancient philosophical analysis,²¹ while the term "phrase" is no doubt a fitting designation of speech as an activity. Thus there is already between "sentence" and "phrase" a terminological dissonance, revealing, in its way, the confusion prevailing in linguistics of today. For "sentence" should, according to the original meaning of the term, designate only the content of this specific morpheme, its expressional side being then the *phraseme*, introduced by me in IM as against Benveniste, Problèmes, I, p. 129. A phrase ought therefore only to designate an immediate constituent of the phraseme, being itself then in turn only the substance of a phrasemic radical the content of which is the textemic techneme.

It is in the light of the structural ontology, advanced by me in IM and in

“Principia”, that I shall now consider some assertions made by Öhman. Let us, to begin with, take a “sentence” like *the man hit the ball* (to be thoroughly distinguished from the text *The man hit the ball*) as an instance of what the author calls “the physical form” (op. cit., p. 59). The author is now asking the following remarkable questions: “Is not this form independent of the phonetic substance? And could not some other substance have this very same form?” (ibid.). According to the author a sentence like *the man hit the ball* has “a certain linguistic form”, since it is joined together from phrases which in turn are joined together by words, in our case English words, which definitely guarantees the “certainty” of the linguistic form in Öhman’s sense. But, on the one hand, this “certain linguistic form” could not possibly be independent of the phonetic “substance” which lets us, on the whole, state the existence of this “certain linguistic form”; such a form cannot, so it seems to me, be independent of itself. On the other hand, one can with some confidence maintain that it is a matter of course that e.g. *Der Mann traf den Ball*, as possessing likewise such a “certain linguistic form”, could not possibly have the same “substance” as the English expression. Although the aforesaid questions must, I think, be regarded as preposterous the author takes, as we will see, a great deal of trouble to answer them, in the negative, of course. Despite his acquaintance with IM he does not seem to have realized the importance of scientific morphemics in the light of which both questions could be answered, and then in the positive. For the English as well as the German expression is the *same* morpheme. Thus Öhman’s positivistic, exclusively phonetic orientation of the problem of form and substance leads, unfortunately, only to quasi-empiricism and in any case fails in its purpose.

Now the author also maintains that that which *has* this certain linguistic form is nothing else but “the acoustic speech signal” (p. 59). If one accepts the author’s definition of “the certain linguistic form”, there can be no objection to this. *The man hit the ball* has the form it has, no doubt of that. However, the linguist must distinguish between morphemics, belonging to *la langue*, and morphology, belonging to *la parole*, i.e. between linguistic form and speech forms (Principia, p. 44). Now, already the “sentence”, as a category, is form, namely mental, behavioural form, manifesting itself as a sequence of information quanta (Principia, p. 49f.). Moreover, regarding what the author calls “the acoustic speech signal” it remains to be said that *The man hit the ball* has to be regarded as such a signal, namely, in the first place, for the morpheme “texteme”.

Later on, it becomes still more difficult to follow the author. For of this “certain linguistic form” he says: “This form is the physical form which we by direct observation state that the acoustic signal has *when we rightly comprehend it linguistically*, namely as a *linguistic* expression.” (p. 59). Now, the starting-point of the reasoning is with Öhman precisely “the linguistic expression”, and rightly to comprehend “the acoustic signal” linguistically is, the author maintains, to comprehend it as a linguistic expression. For in so doing, we realize, the author assures us, that the “certain linguistic form” is “physical form”. The author concludes these rather obscure lucubrations with the following verbalization: “Linguistic form is thus simply physical form under the linguistic angle” (p. 59). However, to the linguist, linguistic form is an organization of elements (IM,

p. 1), these elements being then, by virtue of the organizational level, transformed and transubstantiated to constituents of the organization in question (Principia, *passim*).

It has now become completely clear to us that the author does not distinguish between the actual speech forms and their function as entirely contingent representations of *la langue* as being truly linguistic form, i.e. the hierarchically ordered system of behavioural universals, constituting the morphemic organizations which reflect a mental *aptitude* of a certain but fairly general kind (cf. Principia, p. 53). So he can also ask the following question: "is the linguistic-physical form of the speech expression in some way a necessary consequence of the fact that the expression is an acoustic signal formed by the mouth and perceived by the hearing?" (p. 59).

Apart from the misuse of the term "signal" even the layman understands that the mouth and the ear must at least have *something* to do with this. Plainly bizarre is the following question: "Is for instance the subject/predicate form a consequence of the acoustic substance properties of the speech signal?" (p. 59). It goes without saying that it is not the acoustic properties *per se*, of e.g. *The horse runs* that allow an English-speaking person to understand this sequence as a text, but the fact that the sequence in question is morphemically relevant in English, i.e. represents a morpheme, the morpheme "texteme". Moreover, this morpheme is, in the first place, composed of its morphs, i.e. the representations of the textemic radicals, the phrases *The horse-runs*, constituting the fundamental informational unity, the texteme. As such a morpheme *The horse runs* is a unity the expression of which (= the phraseme *the horse runs*) is its own content (= *THE HORSE RUNS*) and at the same time its own metareferent (= communication); the pragmatic referent is "The horse runs", and the denotational dimension of the sign is 'The horse runs', including possibly existing deviations, phonic or morphological, these then of connotational nature (cf. p. 116).

From all this it appears that the term "phrase" belongs to the expressional side of the textemic sign, the phraseme, which constitutes the substance of the content of this sign, i.e. "message", "information". However, our texteme exists only as text, and it is only as text that it is a "communication", an extremely important viewpoint. As such a minimal unit of communication a text has its linguistic reality in the psychological fact that the receiver understands intuitively that "something has been said" by the sender (Principia, p. 41). That "something has been said" implies that the receiver has received a "message". It is obvious that terms like "subject phrase" and "predicate phrase" do not *really* belong to this level of textual communicative behaviour and, of course, still less such terms as "noun phrase" and "verbal phrase". For such terms are based on various kinds of artificial, so-called "grammatical" analyses of the conventional type, unlikely to encompass the properties of textual behaviour in its function of "communication". From the point of view of the content such an act of communication indicates, in the first place, in principle, only that "something is or was", or that "something happens or happened", i.e. stativity or fienticity, the source of most aspectual systems (cf. Principia pp. 32 ff.). Thus, we must always bear in mind the *inadequacy* of the conventional terminology.

However, considered as a grammatical concept a phrase integrates units which in turn are morphemes, that is, *lexemes*, which are themselves morphemes, integrating still other morphemes, i.e. words-lexes, represented by radicals in the function of technemes (primary iconic elements), represented in turn by phonemes, being themselves morphemes represented by phones (IM, p. 12; OS 23-4, p. 221; Principia, p. 72 ff.). First hereafter we are entitled to speak of "sound". The great complexity of the hierarchically ordered structure of morphemes seems—*mirabile dictu*—to be unknown to the author, who, therefore—1978—can state: "We cannot explain all formal traits on exclusively phonetic grounds." (p. 59). Let us instead say: We can never "explain" form directly from material. We can never explain mental, semantic form from sounds. Practically, we cannot explain *any* formal traits of language "exclusively on phonetic grounds".

From what has been said so far, it should be quite clear that a linguistically oriented science of literature or "rhetoric" which does not consider the *ontologic* structure of the phenomena under discussion here cannot be taken seriously. To us, as human beings, there are, on the whole, no phenomena *as such*. The degree of empiricism always depends on the degree of our consciousness of the relativity of the so-called "facts", depending as they do on their mood of existence, such as this appears to our understanding (cf. Principia, p. 51).

What the phoneme is to phonetics, the *radical* is to morphology. For it is important to realize that there is no direct connection between phonemics and morphology. From a phonemic point of view Arabic *faras* "horse" consists of four phonemes (I), but from a morphological viewpoint we have here to do with a unity consisting of *five radicals* (II). This numerical incongruity reveals to us the fundamental difference in ontological status existing between the descriptive levels (I) and (II). In (I) we are exclusively considering the absolute number of phonemic elements, i.e. *a, f, r, s* (alphabetical order), disregarding the fact that the phoneme *a* here occurs twice. On the contrary, in (II) we are considering exactly this state of affairs, namely that the phoneme occurs twice, and we realize that it is then, *inter alia*, on account of the linear nature of language, here a question of two *different a:s* (Principia, p. 47)—just as Ποταμοῖσι τοῖς αὐτοῖσι ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμέν.

For it is obvious that the *a* of the segment *f-a-r* cannot be the same *a* as that of the segment *-r-a-s*.²² Certainly, we have here, on the one hand, to do with two graphic or phonetic instances of the same element, namely the phoneme *a*, but, on the other, they are different constituents, language being also "une chose double". Thus it is of the greatest importance to distinguish between "elements" and "constituents" (Principia, p. 40) and to consider also the *relativity* of the notion "immediate constituent" (IM, p. 3; Principia, p. 85). From a mechanico-material point of view a phoneme is constituted of a more or less complex articulation or co-articulation, producing what we call "sound". But it is only in their capacity as *phones* that these articulative elements and their phonetic results appear as constituents of the phoneme (cf. OS 23-4, p. 221; Principia, p. 40), i.e. "the characters do not give the genus, but the genus gives the characters" (Principia, p. 41). However, considered as a "genus" the phoneme is in itself a *derived* entity, determined in the last resort by the text as "the first articulation"

(Principia, p. 40), an important fact allowing us to regard the phones as the microradicals of the phoneme (Principia, p. 40). In their capacity as distinctive features Benveniste has proposed the term "mérismes" for what I call "phones" (Problèmes I, p. 121). However, it is not as "merismata" in the sense of "délimitations" that the phones are of interest, in the first place, but as *elements of form*, i.e. as constituents of the phoneme. As such even the phones are derived entities and then next from the phonemic level; on the phoneme as a morpheme, cf. Principia, p. 46.

Thus, from a functional point of view the first *a* of *faras* is no longer a phoneme but a morphophoneme (OS 21/1973, p. 69), i.e. a radical, the second *a* of the same word being *another* radical *a* (IM, *passim*). It is as a *class* of sounds that the phoneme represents the radical, being as such a class also the substance of the radical as "form". In its function as a techneme the radical is a "picture-sign" (IM, § 11; Principia, p. 74), and it is exactly as such technemes that the radicals are the acoustically and visually observable constituents of the "sound-picture" *faras*, i.e. (*faras* ~ *FARAS*). In the same way, I described a lexeme of the type *faras* (A) as an "image de signes", while the *-un* of *farasun* "a horse" has been defined as a "signe d'image" (OS 23-4, p. 219; type C, cf. IM, p. 14f.). It is, then, important to emphasize that the phonemes *f-a-r-a-s* (I) which in themselves and from another point of view are morphemes, are in our case only to be considered as the material, or more correctly, as the substantial elements of the radicals *f-a-r-a-s* (II), the function of which is to be technemes, a function which may be, then, represented conveniently as *F-A-R-A-S*. Moreover, it is important to note that in our structural model the component *FARAS* of the linguistic sign (*faras* ~ *FARAS*) also represents the intersection, in which the internal, "mental" factor and the external, acoustic-visual factor (*faras*) meet each other, cf. below.

In this connection it may not be out of place to try to elucidate, further, the implication of the term "conceptual sound-picture" used in "Principia". It is through the total, isomorphic or functionally isomorphic integration of the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions that language can function as it does. In consequence of the interaction between both dimensions (Principia, p. 40 and pp. 55f.) it is likewise obvious that we have not only to deal with the speech sounds one *hears*, but, and above all, with the acoustic *signs* one *understands*, in that the "hearing" in itself belongs more to the technical side of the transmission. In the same way, in a written *faras*, one not only *sees* the graphic representations of a phonemic sequence but, and above all, one understands a visual sign (*faras*) as a *FARAS*, which one can pronounce or read as *faras*, in that the "seeing" here in the first place belongs to the technical side of the transmission (cf. p. 89; Principia, p. 52). That which one understands is a *word-picture*, that is, a *lex*. Thus we obtain the following structural model:

- f-a-r-a-s* = neural "phonemes" as "material"
- f-a-r-a-s* = "mental" radicals, constituting impressional form
- F-A-R-A-S* = technemes, constituting the *lex*
- f-a-r-a-s* = radicals, constituting the expressional form, the word
- f-a-r-a-s* = phonemes as substance or "material"

From this structural sketch it appears how complicated even a single word like *farasun* "a horse", *alfarasu* "the horse" is. Moreover, by this example we also obtain an intimation of the fact that language in itself could perhaps be said, in the last resort, to be neither mental nor material but *behavioural form* in the sense of organizations of elements integrated in each other (IM, pp. 1 ff.; Principia, pp. 91 f.). This simple sketch is also intended to illustrate an extension "inwards" of the structure of the morpheme of the "word", showing, imperfectly, it is true, also the *impressive* counterpart of the "expression", while the "content", the metareferent, here implies the "intuition word", and thus, in consequence of the *functional* isomorphism, also the intuition "texteme": "something has been said" (Principia, p. 41); cf. Fenno-Ugrica Suecana 5/1982, p. 245. The ground for assigning to the "impression" this structural place within the model (cf. above) is to be sought in the linguistic faculty *per se*, as it appears in what I call "the morphemic principle" (Principia, p. 50), reflecting, in its own way, man's biological capacity for different modes of linguistic behaviour. For our purpose here the simplified model of the linguistic sign, the morpheme *par excellence*, may suffice: *faras* = expression ~ *FARAS* = content; (*faras* ~ *FARAS*) = metareferent, i.e. word ~ lex, as well as the pragmatic referent "faras" (Principia, passim). For already this structure teaches us something important about language: the necessity of interpreting every spoken or written unit as a reproduction of *two* elements at the same time in one and the same speech-act or act of understanding respectively (cf. Principia, p. 51). That which leads us, in the first place, to such an interpretation of the facts, is the linear organization of speech in consequence of which Arabic *ḥarīr* "silk", for instance, contains two different elements *r*, materially represented by the phoneme *r* (p. 89). This function is possessed by the order of relation by virtue of the ontological principle of morphemic isomorphism, as this principle was elucidated, at least in outline, in "Principia", cf. above, p. 74.

From what has been said above it appears that we have to distinguish thoroughly between morphemic categories and morphological categories, the latter being only casual, although conventional representations of the *morphemic* categories (Principia, pp. 36 ff.), to be considered as behavioural universals. However, this fundamental statement may not be sufficient. It is in taxonomically oriented descriptions of language that the habit originates of calling certain morphological phenomena morphophonemic features, (cf. Z. Harris, *Methods in Structural Linguistics*, 1951, pp. 219 ff.). For me the morphophoneme is, as one knows, a metamorphological entity = the radical (cf. IM, p. 1), and in consequence of my re-definition of the morpheme these so-called morphophonemic problems assume quite another character.

In his introduction to the paper "Recent Developments in Morphology" by P. H. Matthews J. Lyons says: "I have referred to morphology as a 'level of structure between the phonological and the syntactic'" (New Horizons, p. 96). What is meant by "between" here? And, what about *horse*, *faras*, *at* etc.? Are they not syntactic structures (IM, p. 10, cf. OS 23-4, p. 220). The following alternative definition is hardly an improvement: "Another way of describing what is meant by 'morphology' is to say that it is complementary to syntax:

morphology accounts for the internal structure, or 'form', of words (typically as sequences of morphemes) and syntax describes how these words are 'put together' in sentences" (ibid.). To take only two extremes. Has not the phoneme its own morphology, and has not the text another? And, what is a "sentence", linguistically? As a matter of fact, one has, in the first place, to ask: What accounts for morphology? The answer is: the morphemic principle in the sense of the "Principia", plus the specific linguistic world with its behavioural conventions (OS 23-4, p. 220; Principia, p. 85). Thus Lyons adheres here completely to the conventional, ultimately antique opinion of language as "grammar", built on a collection of "sentences". Merely calling the old units "phonological, morphological, and syntactic levels" cannot be considered as a real improvement, as long as one does not know what ought to be meant by "level" (Principia, p. 79). Starting from similar assumptions Matthews even speaks of a "theory of morphology" (New Horizons, p. 97). However, it should be stated at once that such a theory could only exist as a function of a more general theory of language, in the sense of *morphemic* behaviour (cf. Principia, p. 63). For what is called "morphology" is only a designation for a multitude of highly disparate types of representation, representing a general, relational structure of morphemes. As a matter of fact, it is as a structure of this kind that we should, in the first place, understand what de Saussure, in quite a general way, called "la langue" (Cours, p. 169), cf. Principia, p. 62. The linguistic sign should then be re-interpreted in terms of behavioural form, represented solely by speech forms, which in turn could only be found in texts—a completely fundamental fact for the further development of linguistic theory in the future (cf. 68).

In order to illustrate our point we shall take the English word *room* /ru:m/. Considered as a Saussurean sign this is only an English representation in "la parole" of a unity of *la langue*. That means that the Saussurean sign must be re-interpreted within the framework of this dichotomy (cf. Principia, pp. 62 ff.). Thus we obtain *room* = "image acoustique", *ROOM* = "concept and *vice versa*" (Cours, p. 99). Now, the Saussurean sign lacks both *in abstracto* and *in concreto* something essential to its function in living language, namely *in abstracto* the metareferent = the level (word, texteme), and, *in concreto* the pragmatic referent ("room", cf. Principia, p. 43).²³ The sign of de Saussure seems explicitly only to seize upon expression and content as such, without *situating* the sign in the language. However, the full content of *room* is "the word *room*" or "the lex *ROOM*" (IM, § 11; Principia, o. 42 f.). For a word is a minimal expressional unity the content of which is a lex. Disregarding the fact, necessary for a complete analysis, that a unity like *room* is only to be found in texts, we can, of an isolated *room*, maintain, that its "meaning" in *la langue* is exactly "word ~ lex". But we must then remember that this kind of meaning is derived from the function of the unit in texts, segmented in textemes. However, the unit in question, in this connection, does not seem to exist in the same sense as when we say "*room* is a word of the English language", but rather in the sense "*room* is a word *in* the English language", i.e. the unit has here the function of a "sound picture", and this function it can only have in a texteme. On the other hand, the expression of a texteme is to be called a phraseme, the parts of which are phrases, not words.

This seems to be paradoxical: the word is, and it is not. The reason why this is so is to be found in the ontological relativity inherent in the linguistic system as an organization (Principia, p. 79). The linguistic reality of the "word", for instance, thus depends on the point of observation. This is the sense of my saying that the word is and is not.

Therefore should we not, in the first place, ask with Mathews: "What are the basic *units* of morphological structure, and what are the relations which obtain between them?" (New Horizons, p. 97), but: "What are the basic units of morphemic structure, and what are the relations which obtain between them?" In this connection, we ought to remember that the structure of the linguistic sign implies an isomorphic adaptation of expression and content to each other and that "cette combinaison produit une forme" (Cours, p. 157), to be designated as "linguistic form" *par excellence*, only represented by "morphological form", so to speak. Thus the basic units of morphemic structure, in the sense of the not "situated" structure, are "expression" and "content", in terms of a *co-articulation* of phonemic and mental behaviour. It is exactly the nature of this co-articulation that constitutes the great psycho-linguistic problem. Furthermore, this problem is not made easier by the fact that we must, to a great extent, infer the nature of this co-articulation from a study of *relevant* phenomena in varied morphologies, the relevance itself being here a problem of great importance to the inductive procedure. However, from the following statement of de Saussure we can take a deductive moment: "Il n'y a donc ni matérialisation des pensées, ni spiritualisation des sons, mais il s'agit de ce fait en quelque sorte mystérieux, que la 'pensée-son' implique des divisions et que la langue élabore ses unités en se constituant entre deux masses amorphes" (Cours, p. 156). For, as a matter of fact, it is the phenomenon that such "divisions" *can* arise in the borderland between "A" and "B" (Cours, p. 156) that constitutes "la langue" in the sense of the *linguistic faculty* as such, manifesting itself as the morphemic principle of universal textual behaviour. This faculty implies that one already as a child can avail oneself of the linguistic conventions obtaining in a specific linguistic world in such a manner that the adaptation of "A" to "B" and *vice versa* leads to "des délimitations réciproques d'unités" (Cours, p. 156). In consequence of what has been said in "Principia", pp. 67 ff. we ought, I think, to envisage this phenomenon, in the first place, as a relation "concept-son" and not as a relation "pensée-son". However, a "concept" (*a*) and a phonemic sequence (*b*) cannot enter into such an "union délimitative" without a *qualitative* interaction occurring between (*a*) and (*b*), making (*b*) appear as the expression of (*a*) and (*a*) as the content of (*b*). Thus the "mental" element *ROOM* is then at the same time the phonemic element *room* and *vice versa*, a state of affairs implying also that the impression *ROOM* corresponds to the expression *room* (cf. above, p. 88).

Thus, linguistic behavioural form has been created, and "the morphemic principle" established, a principle which constitutes, in the first place, a *value* at the level of communication, namely the value of "something has been said" (p. 91).²⁴ This value is a consequence of a transubstantiation, making possible "des délimitations réciproques d'unités", but then in the sense of constituents of form (p. 93), i.e. textemic, lexemic and phonemic form respectively. In the present

case, this means that the radicals *r-u:-m* correspond to the technemes *R-U:-M*, i.e. the technemes are their own radicals and *vice versa* (Principia, p. 43 and p. 75).

This being so, we have to start from the level of the text, and on this level a unit like *rooms* is quite as justified as *room*. For both units are here "phrases" or parts of phrases. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that scientific morphemics, in the sense of metamorphology, can shed some light also on certain controversial questions within the field of morphology. On the contrary, it is hardly likely that more specific variants as, for instance, *walked, hacked, waited, weaned* etc. or apothematic patterns like *sink, sank, sunk* could shed so much light on the theory of morphemics. In a case like *walks ~ walked* it is a question of a purely textual variation, while in a case like *walked ~ waited* we have to deal also with conventional phonetic variants *within* textual variation. Could, under these circumstances, Lamb's so-called stratificational theory give us some valuable information here?

In dealing with such questions it is, so it seems to me, appropriate to start from the notion of the pragmatic referent (Principia, p. 49). In a representation of a morpheme like (*faras ~ FARAS*) the function "faras" is to be considered as such a referent. We shall say that this is the "meaning" of the unity, without indicating the level or structural position of this meaning, i.e. whether we intend the word, the phrase or the phraseme *faras*. It is obvious that this pragmatic referent, which in reality can only occur in concrete textual situations, must have a counterpart in *la langue*. This counterpart ought then to have the character of a "metareferent", indicating the "meaning" of the sign as such, the meaning of the unity "expression ~ content" *in abstracto*, so to speak. As was already pointed out this "meaning" is to be found at the iconic level. For the function of being a sound picture is characteristic of the word-lex level as being integrated in the level of the texteme, cf. Principia, p. 43. Summing up we can, of course, always say that the metareferent is just a "sign". However, a sign must always be a sign for something (Principia, p. 44). In this connection it is important to consider the existence of primary and secondary functions even in the domain of the morphemic sign having a semantic world of its own.²⁵

Now, we generally call a unit like *room* a "word", i.e., a word in the English language. This implies that *room* also, in one way or another, "means" word, as *faras* does in Arabic. This is "meaning" as value. The morphemes, as established by me, are values, cf. de Saussure's opinion that "la langue ne peut être qu'un système de valeurs pures" (Cours, p. 155).²⁶ However, these values constitute a hierarchically ordered organization of level-bound integrated organizations, this architecture of the morphemic system being the source of ontological, qualitative differentiation, cf. below, p. 121 f. and "Principia", pp. 79 ff. This "meaning" or function ought then to have a counterpart in "la langue", i.e. "the word X" or simply "word" (Principia, p. 43). Thus we can maintain that "word" is the value of the unity considered as a sign in "la langue". The linguistic sign being "une chose double" (Principia, p. 64) we can also maintain that the same unity is a "lex", i.e. the content of the word. This implies that we have here to do, in the main, with two kinds of meaning, on the one hand the content (lex) of the

expression (word), on the other the content of the sign as a value *per se*, i.e. its referent.²⁷ "La langue" being now a systeme "où tout se tient", or more correctly an organization of organizations (Principia, p. 40), the term "referent" must here denote a level within the purely morphemic organization (Principia, p. 54f.).

In this connection, we have also to consider another circumstance, namely the fact that, from the viewpoint of the function of the word in the texteme, the unity "word-lex" is, from the point of view of morphemic analysis, only a further abstraction from the level of the *lexeme*. On the other hand, the lexeme has the function it has, as a phrase or a part of a phrase (cf. above, p. 81), but also, in the last resort, in consequence of the iconic (lexic) properties of the unity as a word, properties constituting the lexeme as a word-class (cf. IM, pp. 14f.).²⁸ To say that *faras* is a "word" in Arabic involves one kind of information, to say that *faras* is a lexeme another. The first establishes the fact that the sequence in question is a word, the latter defines certain *properties* of this word (cf. Principia, p. 76, n. 34a). In its capacity as a word, *faras* is also a *class-word*, representing a *general idea* of something (Principia, p. 84). However, the minimality of this unity is based on its function as a conceptual image. Thus, we can speak of a minimality which is its own function and *vice versa*. Such a minimality I shall call a "constant" and its property of being an "image" I shall call the "energy" of the constant. This energy of the constant is dependent on the structure of the linguistic *cosmos* in which it is a constant. Only on the level of the texteme is this "energy" actualized, and then in what I call the pragmatic referent or the "meaning" in a trivial sense, including the conventionally allowed *freedom of usage* and *understanding*. In the "abstract" state of the sign there is an equivalence of the "mass" of the sign, in the sense of its minimality, and its energy. Thus the mass is here its own energy and *vice versa*, this in virtue of the function which is *form*.

Here it is important to recognize the following phenomenon. Let us compare three units, namely *Ḍaraba Zaydun 'Amran*, a texteme in *casus rectus* (OS 23-4, p. 218), and furthermore *seviştirilemediklerinden* "from their not having been able to be made mutually to love one another",²⁹ a word in the function of a texteme in the *casus obliquus*, and *cheval*, a word. These three units are completely casual representations of morphemes of different degrees of level and thus also of double articulation. If we consider the unit *cheval* /šəval/ as an expression we realize that this is an expression because it has the content CHEVAL /šəVAL/, a result of the impression *cheval* (cf. above, p. 94). As a morpheme, this unity is a minimal mass, equivalent to its functional energy of being a word, i.e. a conceptual sound-picture. From the *corpuscular* point of view *cheval* can be analysed as š-ə-v-a-l, corresponding to a Š-ə-V-A-L as the mental result of the impression š-ə-v-a-l. For there is here a complete isomorphism between the radicals and the technemes (Principia, p. 43), allowing us to understand a corpuscular š-ə-v-a-l as a *coherent* Š-ə-V-A-L. This would probably not be possible if a corresponding *mental corpuscularity* did not, in some way, exist, cf. above, p. 93f. Thus, the isomorphic co-articulation also implies that we are dealing with a corpuscularity which is its own coherence and *vice versa* (cf. Principia, p. 74).

The same holds true, *mutatis mutandis*, for the aforesaid textemic and pseudo-textemic examples. The specific relation between corpuscularity and coherence, necessary for our understanding of an expression as a *Gestalt*, is one of complementarity in the sense of integrated morphemics (cf. Principia, pp. 91-2).³⁰

The concept of *cosmos* is the prerequisite for the chaos giving birth to function in the sense of form. The linguistic human cosmos is a product of evolution, and so is, probably, also the physical cosmos. Evolution started in chaos, consisting of what we may call universal matter corresponding or equivalent to universal energy.³¹ Thus, the so-called elementary particles are the products of form, making it possible for matter to appear as particles, which are the mode of existence for energy and mass respectively.³² However, as the very principle of form, chance is dependent, ultimately, on the possible physical cosmos, in which the particles appear, *to us*, as the "pragmatic referents", so to speak, corresponding to the metaferent of the physical sign as a metamorphological (meta-physical) structure of order: the morphemic principle of physics, with its hierarchically ordered levels of immediate constituents (particles, atoms, molecules). Consequently, we are entitled to maintain that in linguistics as well as in physics, we are dealing with matter as a "logical construction", as *formed* matter (cf. Principia, pp. 91f.). Matter in itself is "non-existence", as the Gnostics put it, and it is, by the way, exactly this which should be meant when one speaks of the *creatio ex nihilo*.³³ The ability to recognize the derived entities of the phoneme, and the word, as well as the phraseme with their corresponding content-forms, i.e. the radical, the lex, and the texteme belongs to our linguistic competence, our internalized morphemic "grammar", forming the constituents of our ability to communicate and understand. And such is also our competence *in rebus physicis*.

Let us now ask ourselves: What would be the function in "la langue" of *faras* as a "word", if we take "word", on the one hand, in the sense of the "substance" of the lex (*faras* ~ *FARAS*) and, on the other, as the representative of the whole sign *faras* = (*faras* ~ *FARAS*)? This question is of fundamental importance, and the answer is that the word is here, in principle, only an unspecified "class word" the content of which is a so-called general idea (Principia, p. 98). It is appropriate to designate this function as '*faras*', i.e. the meaning in a collective sense, cf. p. 100. This state of affairs can, on the one hand, explain both the general and the special function of the pragmatic referent in its morphological representations, on the other, shed light on the nature of this kind of representation of the word in *la parole*.³⁴ In the light of what has now been said one can ask whether conventional morphemics, with all its propositions for "theoretical" solutions—from Harris' "Methods" and so on—, really has so great a relevance in this connection. In order to illustrate this question we shall start from a statement in J. Kuryłowicz, "L'Évolution des catégories grammaticales".³⁵

Here the great linguist says, *inter alia*: "... par catégorie linguistique on entend généralement une classe d'unités linguistiques (principalement de mots) présentant en commun un sens, une fonction syntaxique qui s'exprime par une forme tangible (phonétique)" (p. 54). He is here considering cases like *room-s*, *table-s*, *pencil-s*, *glass-es* etc., i.e. according to him, *room* is a member of such a class presenting "un sens, une fonction syntaxique qui s'exprime par une forme

commune tangible (phonétique)”, namely *-s* /-z/ ~ *-es* /-iz/ of *rooms* etc. It is important to realize that we are here dealing, in the first place, with morphological representations of a morphemic category, and, in the second, also with phonemic representations of a morphological category.

In a case such as *room* ~ *room-s* we have to deal with mutual variants (Principia, p. 58), these units being at the same time variants of the same morpheme, i.e. the truly linguistic category of the word, here only represented by the sign *ru:m* ~ *RU:M* and *ru:ms* ~ *RU:MS* respectively. Now it is obvious that *room* and *rooms* can, only in texts, appear as forms of existence of the collective sign *room* (“collective” here in the sense of “belonging to the common dictionary”, cf. p. 99). However, considered as forms of existence of such a **room* the units in question can be written *room-∅* and *room-s*, and we can thus also maintain that *-∅* and *-s* are the exponents of the form of existence of *room*, this unit being then in turn an exponent of the form of existence of *-∅* and *-s*. However, *-s* and *∅* are exponents common to many words, *-∅* and *-s* having thus themselves various words as their forms of existence. This gives them a specific status in relation to our *room*. If now *room* ~ *rooms* are, on the level of the word, variants of the same morpheme, there can be no *morphemic* opposition between *-∅* and *-s* on this level where this difference is syntactically and also technically irrelevant. But already on the lexemic level things appear in another light. For considered within the syntax of the lexeme, the difference between *-∅* and *-s* is just lexemically, or more correctly, phrasically relevant. These elements here affect the iconic element of the sign. For within the framework of the domain of the pragmatic referent (“room”, “rooms”) we are able to register certain differences of meaning, according to the conventionally allowed freedom of usage (above, p. 98); cf OS 17/1969, p. 118. That this is so we can only know from the situation of the lexeme in the texteme where it functions as a phrase: *The rooms are empty* / *He has rooms in the house*; *The horses are black* / *Horses are animals*. For the pragmatic referent belongs in the first place to the textual level on which its meanings can be understood within the scope of the conventionally allowed freedom of usage, presupposing also a competence of understanding.

Thus, insofar as the elements *-∅* and *-s* affect our understanding of the conceptual sound picture so that we “see” one or more “rooms” these elements are also technically relevant. Let us take another example. In the textemes *John likes Mary* and *John liked Mary* of the texts *John likes Mary . . .* and *John liked Mary . . .* respectively, the elements *-s* and *-d* are in free morphological variation with respect to *like* in its ontological status of being just a word. Now we must distinguish between the technemes of a word and the technemes of a texteme. The latter have their function as parts of the texteme which in turn also has its function as part of the text. Thus we will have to extend the notion of the techneme to comprise also the textemic level. From the viewpoint of the texteme *likes* and *liked* are only morphological representations of the same phrase or part of the phrase, i.e. the predicate phrase, but they are different technemes of the message, indicating different “aspects” of the lexeme *like*. For the texteme obtains its situation from the text which gives the texteme its situational properties, and the elements *-s* and *-d* are thus in the first place exponents of different

aspects on the situation of the texteme, then also on the phrase or the part of the phrase *like*. We shall say then that *like-s* is here a syntactic structure consisting of the phrasic radicals */laik-s/*, the radical *-s* being thus a determinative of the radicals */laik-/*, constituting thus an exponent of the "frame" of *like* as a phrasic techneme within the scope of the larger frame constituted by the texteme *John likes Mary* as such. Hence it follows that *likes* and *liked* are in a contextually conditioned complementary distribution, the variation *-s ~ -d* being determined by the textual situation.³⁶

Regarding the pragmatic referent we have spoken of a "conventionally allowed freedom of usage" (cf. 100). Confronted with cases like *clocks /-s/*, *rooms /-z/*, and *glasses /-iz/* we have to ask if such phonemic differences in the morphological representation have any theoretical significance of importance in this connection. It is obvious that we are dealing with a variation in the *phonetic* realization of the phonemic representations of a *radical* of a certain type, i.e. a "determinative": "-s of the plural". This kind of variation is a result of phonetic tendencies, depending on a certain allowed freedom of pronunciation during a period. In the synchronic perspective these degrees of allowed freedom appear as conventionally regulated speech habits. Just as it is always built in a trait of indeterminacy in evolution (p. 99), this is also the case with the historical development of linguistic organizations (cf. Principia, p. 70). Now, since from a synchronic point of view it is not regarded as permissible to refer to a historical development **-s>-s~-z~-iz*, we must here describe this state in terms of *variants of equal standing* in the phonetic representation of the radical (determinative) in question, variants following statistically determinable rules of no greater importance for a structural interpretation of the lexeme or the word. Wishing to establish levels or "strata" from such phenomena does not seem to me especially rewarding. But the phenomenon in itself can teach us something valuable on the morphological representation of the morpheme.

Let us consider, for instance, the Latin series *regō, regis, regit; rēxī* etc. These units are all to be regarded as variants of each other (Principia, p. 58). They are all variants of equal standing of their word. They constitute the morphological paradigm of this word, i.e. the inventory of forms of existence of the elements *reg- ~ rēg-*, a form like *rēxī* (<*rēg-si) being only a phonetic variant of no importance on this level of analysis. Here we have to deal with a case of apothematism where either of the elements is a variant of the other, i.e. it is of no importance if we choose to consider the *e* as the result of a shortening of the *ē* or prefer to regard the *ē* as the result of a lengthening of the *e*. The inflectional elements *r-ē-g* are equivalent representations of an *ideomorpheme*, to be designated as *rēg*, consisting of the technically relevant radicals *r-ē-g* symbolizing the *thought* in question (Principia, p. 35 and pp. 85 ff.), the different concepts being symbolized by paradigms of lexemes: *regō* etc., *regiō* etc., and *rēx* etc. As for a case of such monolexic apothematism as English *sink, sank, sunk*, all three units are equivalent variants of the representation of the lexeme. They constitute also the paradigm of their word. But the ideomorpheme could be designated as *s~i~a~u-nk* or possibly *s-nk*. In a case like *go, went, gone* we have formally to do with bilexic apothematism, the units in question thus

constituting, in another way, the paradigm of their word. Moreover, they are equivalent variants of the same lexeme, in contextually conditioned complementary distribution.

As has been already pointed out (p. 100), units like *room* and *rooms* appear only in texts, i.e. in networks of minimal units (textemes). Let us now consider an expression like *The rooms are empty*. Here we can say that *The ... are empty* is the form of existence of *rooms*. The fact that this form of existence is a phraseme exerts its influence on the unit for which the phraseme constitutes the form of existence. This means that it is, in the first place, as a phrase or part of a phrase that we can observe this unit and its variants *in vivo* (Principia, p. 39 f.; pp. 81 ff.), namely as textemic radicals of a textemic picture, i.e. another kind of picture than the conceptual sound-picture (lex, lexeme), the texteme itself being then a constituent in a sequence of textual pictures (p. 114). Now we feel, instinctively, that it would not be appropriate to say that ... *rooms* ... is the form of existence for *The ... are empty*, just as it would not be appropriate to maintain that in *room-s* the unit *room* was the form of existence of *-s* (cf. above, p. 100). Thus, the capacity of being an exponent of the form of existence for another unit is to be assigned to certain units, according to the hierarchical relativity that pervades language (Principia, p. 84). On the one hand, the unit *cars* has its form of existence in *The cars are empty*, on the other, *-s* is itself a form of existence for *car* in *car-s*. Thus we can maintain that in the texteme *The rooms are empty* the "frame" *The ... are empty* is a kind of morphological representation of a constant, the element *rooms* being here a possibility in accordance with the "conventionally allowed freedom of usage" belonging to the specific representation of the textemic constant, guaranteeing the so-called grammaticalness of the texteme. Since the "energy" of the constant is identical with the energy of the metareferent or the level of the linguistic sign, in this case "communication" (Principia, p. 49) we realize that a texteme like *Rooms!* has the same kind of morphemic "energy", i.e. of the communicational type (cf. Principia, p. 80). Here it would be meaningless to analyse *Rooms!* in phonemic radicals, for the phonemic radicals are "smaller" than the representation of the morphemic constant, including its degrees of freedom. However, "smaller" means here also, and primarily "belonging to a lower level of analysis". If we consider the expression *Rooms!*, on the one hand, as an answer to a question or as the result of a deal ('Rooms' it is then!), and, on the other, as an interjection, we have, in the main, accounted for the conventionally allowed freedom of usage. Thus the analysis of *Rooms!* as a textemic constant will be \emptyset -*rooms* ~ *Rooms*- \emptyset (Principia, p. 81), i.e. *Rooms!* = a phraseme the content of which is *ROOMS!* = a message, constituting the sign "texteme". However, a constant always remains a constant, in this case subject phrase—predicate phrase or predicate phrase—subject phrase, "word" or "noun" being of no relevance at this stage of analysis.

Let us now consider the three units *farasun*, *farasin*, *farasan*. As has already been pointed out (p. 100) these forms should be regarded as variants of each other and thus as equal representatives of *faras* which is a representation of the morpheme "word" ~ "lex". Now, the word is in itself only an abstraction, deriving its ontological status from its quality of being also a lexeme (p. 98). As

such a lexeme, *farasun*, *farasin*, *farasan* has another ontological status than it has as a "word". This change in the ontological status implies that the equal representations of the "word" *faras* are transformed into forms of existence of this word, i.e. existence in a texteme which means the existence of the units as a lexeme. In the ontological state as such a lexeme, the three units are no more of equal standing, the lexeme deriving its ontological status from its function as a phrase or as a part of a phrase in a phraseme. As we have seen (p. 82) there are two kinds of phrase, the subject phrase and the predicate phrase, according to the function within the phraseme. The functional difference between these kinds of phrase makes a dichotomy of the forms of existence possible: *-un/-in*, *-an*, i.e. "subjective"/"non subjective" = 1. "Objective". 2. "Neutral", a value indifferent to the values "subjective" and "objective" respectively.

Now it is obvious that the values "subjective" and "objective" must be interpreted here in terms of the phraseme, the minimal expression of "something having been said". That "something has been said" implies in this connection a *διάνοια αὐτοτελής*, i.e. that something has been said to someone or about something. Thus, the phraseme is the minimal "saying", so to speak, this saying being thus a tissue, a *textus* of some kind. This kind of *textus* presupposes the existence also of a speaker and a listener, the textual situation. Consequently it is appropriate to designate this whole sign as a texteme, the minimal relevant constituents of which are the phrasic technemes = the subject phrase and the predicate phrase.

From this it appears that of the units *-un*, *-in*, *-an* only *-un* and *an* are phrasemically relevant, cf. e.g. *Ḍaraba Zaydun 'Amran*. However, at the level of the texteme we shall have to reckon also with variants like *Rakiba Zaydun* and *Zaydun kabīrun*. In its capacity of being a morphological representation of a phrasic morpheme we shall say that *faras-un* is the morph = the form of existence of this morpheme, consisting of two phrasic radicals, *faras-* and *-un*, constituting the form of existence of this phrase (cf. p. 100). It is on this level that a grammar of separate words obtains its empirical reality, for it is as phrases that the lexemes possess their function within the texteme, a function which in Arabic has received its morphological expression in the "case endings" *-un*, *-in*, *-an*. With the phrase deriving its ontological status from the phraseme, it does not make sense to say, here, that *farasun* consists of a stem *faras-* and an ending, quite apart from the fact that a "stem" can hardly be said to have an "ending". As a phrase, *farasun* is also a phrasemic radical, being itself composed of two phrasic radicals, *faras-un*. In its capacity as such a radical the element *-un* is also a "determinative" of the phrasemic radical *faras-*, the *-un* indicating the form of existence of *faras-* and thus the phrase as "syntactic position". For this is what the phrase really is, considered as a phrasemic radical. We shall say that *-un* indicates the syntactic place of *faras*, e.g. in *Hādā farasun* "This is a horse". Whether or not the predicate is determined plays no role in this level of analysis, for *Hādā lfarasu* "This is the horse" is just as much as phraseme as *Hādā farasun*.

We must distinguish between *textual grammar* and *lexemic grammar*. In textual grammar we are dealing with morphological representations of the possible syntactic combinations of textemes in different case forms within the network

of the text. From this kind of grammar the lexemic grammar, the grammar of "words" is derived. From the derivative character of lexemic grammar its limited explanatory power clearly appears. The confusion of textual and lexemic or lexical grammar has not only lead to terms like "noun phrase" and "verb phrase" but also and above all to a false orientation of text linguistics.

2. THE POEM "DAYR 'ABDŪN" AND TEXTUAL GRAMMAR

In ʔiyāʔaddīn Ibn alʔAṭīr (died 1239), a brother of the well-known historian, we read in his exposition of the "simile", *attašbīh*, among other things also: *Wa ʕlam, anna mina ttašbīhi ɖarban, yusammā ṭṭarda wa lʕaksa, wa huwa, an yuḡʕala lmušabbahu bihi mušabbahan wa lmušabbahu mušabbahan bihi, wa baʕɖhum yusammīhi ḡalabata lʔurūʕi ʕalā Pušūli, wa lā taḡidu šayʔan min ḏālīka, illā wa lḡaraɖu bihi lmubālaḡatu* (alMaṭal assāʔir, Cairo 1939, I, p. 421) "And know that to the simile belongs a kind which is called 'ṭard and 'aks', and this implies that that with which something is compared is made to something compared while the compared is made to that with which something is compared, and some call this *ḡalabat alʔurū ʕalā Pušūl* and one does not find anything of this if not that which is intended by it is an exaggeration." As examples of this rhetorical device he quotes *inter alia* two passages from the poem of Ibn alMuʕtazz which in the Bayrūt-edition has the title "Dayr 'Abdūn", designated by Ibn alʔAṭīr as *qašīdatuhu lmašhūratu*; the use of the term *qašīda* for a poem of 18 lines is, by the way, worth mentioning.³⁷ Together with two other passages from ʔū rRumma and alBuḥturī he is also here dealing with the verse 8 from "Dayr 'Abdūn": *wa lāḡa ɖawʔu qumayrin, kāda yafɖahunāl miṭli lqulāmati, qad quššat mina zzufuri* (cf. p. 63). From the discussions about the "ṭard and 'aks" we can, to a certain extent, reconstruct the rhetorical paradigm, so to speak, of Ibn alʔAṭīr (I, pp. 421–2).³⁸ For here he uses the concepts *alʕāda wa lʕurf* and *mutṭarid/ḡayr mutaʕarīf*, reflecting *συνήθεια* as a linguistic term, as well as *mutṭarid/ḡayr mutṭarid*. In *Acta Orientalia* 41/1980, p. 79 I compared *mutṭarid* with "to be ὁμαλός, to be used ὁμαλῶς". As I pointed out in *OS* 21/1972, pp. 59 ff., Ibn alʔAṭīr himself rejects the thought of Greek influence in general. However, it is obvious that designations like *aṭṭard wa lʕaks* and (*ḡayr*) *mutṭarid* have *something* to do with the old concept of ἀνωμαλία, which was originally understood in a formal-logical sense and thus could also be used in the so-called *madḡab kalāmī*, cf. too the interesting paper "Les ornements du style selon la conception d'al-Ġāḡiḡ" by Krystyna Skarżynska-Bocheńska (*Rocznik orientalistyczny*, 36/1973, pp. 5 ff.), unfortunately overlooked by S. A. Bonebakker (*Annali* 41: 4/1981, pp. 561 ff.).

From the point of view developed by Ibn alʔAṭīr, language is, to a great extent, as the Swedish bishop Esaias Tegnér put it, "faded metaphors".³⁹ It is the *συνήθεια* which dominates the exposition. A simile is established and considered as *mutṭarid*, the inversion of the simile being then experienced as a *mubālaḡa* (ἔξοχή) because it is felt as a *ḡayr mutṭarid*, an ἀνωμαλία. One of those who has most efficiently contributed to give us the impression that we are dealing here

with a purely Arabic kind of reasoning is Ibn alMu‘tazz (died 908), in his *Kitāb alBadī‘*, cf. *καὶνός* and its derivations. In 1924 I. Kratchkovsky decided on the position of this work in the rhetoric tradition, namely in the introduction to his edition of Ibn alMu‘tazz' *Kitāb al‘Ādāb* (*Le Monde Oriental* 13/1924, p. 58). Later on Kratchkovsky pointed out that the special thesis of Ibn alMu‘tazz is that he "will zeigen, dass 'das Neue' oder der neue Stil mit seinen Tropen und Figuren keine Erfindung der neuen Poeten ist, wie man gewöhnlich glaubt. Die Formen dieses Stils begegnen uns schon im Koran, im Ḥadīṭ, in der Beduinensprache. Der einzige Unterschied ist die Seltenheit dieser Figuren in der alten Periode; in der neuen Poesie, besonders seit Abū Tammām, sind sie künstlich kultiviert, bis zu vollem Missbrauch." (*Le Monde Oriental* 23/1929, p. 28). In his edition of the *Kitāb alBadī‘* (1935) Kratchkovsky further developed his viewpoints on the subject (Gibb Memorial Series. New Series, X). On alĠāhiz as a predecessor of Ibn alMu‘tazz the reader is referred to the article by Skarżynska-Bocheńska quoted above (p. 104), cf. also Muḥammad ‘Abd alMun‘im Xafāgī in his edition of *alBadī‘* (Cairo 1945). We still know very little of the ways whereby the old theories of rhetorical devices were spread to the Muslims. However, in the light of comparative literature we can allow ourselves to state that, in the last resort, we are confronted here with a variation on the old theme *omnia iam volgata* (*OS* 21/1973, p. 61). To my mind the "logical" attitude of the old Muslims to the analysis of the *maḥāsīn* is, in principle, preferable to the psycho-linguistic atomism performed on the basis of conventional school-grammar as practiced by Jacobi. My own starting-point is textual grammar based on what I consider realistic morphemics (IM, p. 3).

Text linguistics should try to apply to texts a method which arises from considering the text as a socially conditioned behavioural category. This being so, already Dionysios Thrax gives us a starting point for a methodological discussion, namely in his two main variants of textual behaviour, poetry and prose. We shall say, then, that a piece of poetry always has its generic variants outside itself, i.e. in its more or less hypothetical prose version, while a prosaic text has, in a corresponding way, its variants outside itself, namely in its more or less hypothetical poetic version. It is an entirely different matter that an author has such variants at his disposal within himself, as possibilities from which he can choose the one or the other. The important thing is to realize that we have *here* always to do with texts belonging in the first place to the level of communication, to which notions of school grammar such as "noun", "verb" etc. (Lévi-Strauss-Jakobson) or "noun phrase", "verb phrase" (Chomsky) are not applicable at all.

Textual behaviour is segmented in minimal behavioural units, corresponding to units of communication, in accordance with the metareferent of the texteme, i.e. its value (*Principia*, p. 80). On this level, where a poem like "Dayr ‘Abdūn" should be analysed in the first place, the minimal unit is formally identical with the minimal textual behaviour which can be intuitively understood as a message, i.e. a texteme in *casus rectus*. Below we shall dwell upon certain types of Arabic representation of textual behaviour.

Calling, in conformity with B (p. 246),⁴⁰ the poem in question "Dayr ‘Abdūn" I also characterized it as a kind of unity. Considered as a morpheme even the text

is "form", i.e. an organization of elements. However, the concept of form is only accessible to us against the background of either another form or the amorphous. In the amorphous one can very well distinguish "elements" but no organization of these, yielding constituents of the amorphous, which, otherwise, would be form of some kind. This means that "amorphous" is here, in principle, neutral, i.e. indifferent to the idea of form. In the same way, "non-being" is, in this respect, not contradictory of "being"; otherwise it would be another kind of being.⁴¹ For our purpose we have to imagine "non-being" as neutral, indifferent to the idea of being, the contradictory (negative) value leading here to hypostatization and philosophomena of various kinds. From the standpoint of literature we can let the world outside the text consist of such an amorphous background in the neutral sense, a world where chance prevails (*Principia*, p. 52). It should however be pointed out that when this world outside the text is regarded as a background of the text the ontological status of the world is influenced by this very perspective.

The world outside the text can be interpreted from certain viewpoints, in connection with the text or not, but does not itself emit any message (cf. *Principia*, p. 67). Its phenomena can be received as messages, but these messages are not communicable to us outside a textual behaviour of some kind. We can for instance read in the book of nature (cf. *Principia*, p. 69). In the poem in question Ibn alMu'tazz selects some traits from his life, in principle "amorphous" to us, communicating them to us with the help of textual behaviour. Within the framework of this behaviour this life receives a form, textual form, constituting the linguistic basis of poetical form. Now, this kind of poetical form, considered as a whole, as a piece of art, has also an aesthetic metareferent, a value interpreted by the receiver, emotionally, according to his hermeneutical horizon (cf. *Principia*, p. 102).

Let me, thus, make the following statement. To the extent that the conventional grammatical terms, used by Jacobi in her analysis of "Dayr 'Abdūn", could really be said to be founded in the true structure of language—which I doubt—these so-called levels cannot be imagined as being "laid upon each other". This is a primitive, childish opinion of the structure of language, designated by me as a "summarized one-dimensionality" (cf. *Principia*, p. 36 and p. 44). The levels which we ought to recognize as such, i.e. the *morphemes* as being the truly linguistic categories, are to be considered as integrating and integrated levels respectively. Moreover, what the phenomenon of integration means for the relationship obtaining between these levels was dealt with exhaustively in "*Principia*".

As already mentioned (p. 105f.), a poem is also, as a piece of art, *form*. Since language is the material for this kind of form, we must also put the question whether the possible levels of a poem are to such an extent identical with those of language that these latter could be said to form an axis around which can be vertically ordered what Lévi-Strauss calls the variants of the poem. For in the introduction to the analysis of "Les chats" by Baudelaire he maintains "que chaque ouvrage poétique, considéré isolément, contient en lui-même ses variantes ordonnées sur un axe qu'on peut représenter vertical, puisqu'il est formé

de niveaux superposés: phonologique, phonétique, syntactique, prosodique, sémantique, etc." (L'Homme II: 1/1962, p. 5). This seems to imply that there are further levels but that these are so unimportant in this connection that there is no need to mention them. Already this is not likely to inspire confidence in this method of analysing poetry.

Let us take an example like Arabic *kalb* "dog". Considering *-a-* as an "isolated phenomenon" we could say that, from a phonological point of view, this element "contains its variants in itself", e.g. *a*, *ä*, *e*. However, it appears so, to the linguist who can say that *a*, *ä*, *e* are variants of the "archiphoneme" *a*, that is, the real deep structure of the representation of the morpheme in question, namely the radical *-a-* of *k-a-l-b* (*-a-* "expression" *-A-* "content"). It would, I think, be more realistic to say that *a*, *ä*, *e* are variants of each other (cf. Principia, p.58). and that the *a* of *kalb* is simply a variant. Its ontological status is that of a phonetic variant of the phoneme. However, the function of the phoneme is here only to be the "substance" of the linguistic form *-a-*, a radical (techneme) of the sound picture *kalb*. We must always remember that the so-called "double articulation" pervades the whole of language, being, on principle, "une chose double", this in consequence of the phenomenon of integration (cf. Principia, p. 79 ff.). This being so, could then, really, the phonetic and phonemic levels have such a bearing on the aesthetic interpretation of poems as Lévi-Strauss seems to ascribe to them here?; besides, placing the phonetic level between the phonological and syntactical levels he also introduces an element of *la parole* in this "structural" analysis. We shall deal with this question after having given a text linguistic analysis of "Dayr 'Abdūn". It may, however, already be pointed out that the corpuscularity of the phones is balanced by the coherence of the phoneme as a unity, in consequence of the integrative power of this kind of morpheme (p. 98).

Considering now the poem "Dayr 'Abdūn" we find that even a part of v. 1 is sufficient to constitute a texteme, namely *Saqā lĠazīrata ... haṭṭālun (mina lmaṭari)* "May a pouring rain water Mesopotamia". Thus we are dealing here with an Arabic representation of the morphemic category of the texteme, in principle only indicating that something has been said, which is meaningful, i.e. a σύνθεσις διάνοιαν αὐτοτελή δηλοῦσα. Between expression and content there is here, however, as a rule a relation of functional isomorphism (Principia, p. 56),⁴² and it is quite obvious that the phenomenon of redundancy plays a major role in the morphological representations of the texteme as a morpheme (p. 78 f.). This type of isomorphism can therefore be said to be one between textemically relevant features of the expression and the διάνοια αὐτοτελής.

Imitating Jakobson-Lévi-Strauss Jacobi now says: "The verse is distinguished from the rest of the poem by its mood of speech. The verb *saqā* is functioning as an optative here . . ." (pp. 45-6). This statement is made within the scope of the treatment of what the author calls the "syntactic level" of the poem (p. 36), and a piece of art is thus treated here in terms of conventional school grammar, not in terms belonging to text linguistics. Let us, however, before we enter upon this main question, make some remarks concerning this conventional grammar of hers.

To begin with, one should not say that "the verb *saqā*" functions as an

optative. In Semitics a verb form like *saqā* represents, according to established convention, the infinitive "to water" (*saqyun*). It is then, as if the author wanted to maintain that *irrigare* were functioning as an optative. Now, in accordance with the claims of the doctrine of aspect, the convention of quoting the form *qatala* should mean an abridged expression for the verb *qatala* ~ *yaqtulu* ~ *uqtul*, i.e. here *saqā* ~ *yasqī* (*isqī*) or *yasqī* ~ *saqā* (Principia, p. 92). Thus, it would be better to say that the constative *saqā* functions here as an optative. But it is still more important to point out that, on the level of the *text* there can never be a question of a "verb" but only of phenomena referring, in one way or another, to the level of textual behaviour, in our case also regulated by poetical convention.

The grammar of textual behaviour manifests itself firstly as pure syntax, textemes in various case-forms following on behind other textemes (Principia, p. 102). Let us now consider the first verse (cf. above, p. 63).

(1) *Saqā lĠazīrata ḏāta zẓilli wa ššaġari/
wa Dayra ʿAbdūna haṭṭālun mina lmaṭari*

Within the text "Dayr ʿAbdūn", regarded as a whole this verse constitutes a texteme in *casus rectus* (OS 23–4, p. 218). On this level of communication it indicates a message where also the attitude of the sender to reality appears.⁴³ The possibility that the message can indicate even this depends on the communicative situation, reflected in the poem as a whole and then through the relation of opposition prevailing between this texteme and the following, e.g. in its minimal or here in any case limited scope, namely (2) *Qad ṭāla mā nabbahatnī . . .* (3) *aṣwātu ruhbāni dayrin . . .*, a complex texteme where another attitude to reality appears; only a fact is stated. It is, in the first place, on the *opposition* between these two textemes that the difference in attitude to reality is founded, and one could as well maintain that the rest of the poem is distinguished from v. 1 "by its mood of speech". For in structural questions quantitative, statistical viewpoints have a very insignificant place. In v. 1 we could *per se* imagine a *saqā* in the preterite, but a text has always reference to a situation, determining the communicative intentions of the sender as well as the hermeneutical horizon of the receiver, the prerequisite for his understanding of the text (Principia, p. 51). This understanding of the contemporary receiver we must try to restore or recreate as far as possible (Principia, p. 102).

If we speak, then, in terms of the grammar of textual behaviour we can say that it is within the framework of the total communication of the text that the unit *saqā . . . haṭṭālun* appears as an aspectually neutral phraseme, understood by the receiver in an optative sense. For it is, of course, the phraseme and the texteme we intend here. To speak of the mood of an isolated verb form is pointless in this connection. Moreover, the supratextual discursivity, allowing us to perceive the poem as a pure piece of art (Principia, p. 102), does not become accessible to us if the poem is analysed in terms of conventional school grammar.

However, also later on Jacobi's presentation of the facts is remarkable. For after having spoken of "the verb *saqā*" she says: "whereas in the other verses the perfect tense is simply narrative, except for line 10, where the mood is changed to the imperative in the second hemistich" (p. 46). On the whole, it is

difficult to understand what the author wants to attain, trying to analyse a *poem* with the help of such terms. But even from a purely linguistic point of view her exposition is remarkable. Let us for instance consider the syntagm *qad t̄āla*, i.e. the constative of the verb *t̄āla ~ yaṭūlu* "to be long" ~ "to become long". Now, the "perfect tense" of "to be long" is no doubt "to have been long", and of "to become long" no doubt "to have become long". However, Jacobi translates the phraseme *qad t̄āla mā nabbahatnī* by "Long ago I was awakened" (p. 39). As we see, the author is here unaware of the existence of the category of aspect.⁴⁴ And, what is the meaning of "is simply narrative"? In the older Semitic languages the narration is constituted by a network of aspectual clauses (Principia, p. 99), integrated in the text primarily as textemes. Thus, it is in textemes that our poem should be analysed in the first place. No such analysis is to be found in Jacobi.⁴⁵

In analysing the poem in textemes we shall have firstly to account only for the isomorphically relevant features. Then the attention will be directed to the irrelevant, from our viewpoint, redundant features.

After having mentioned "that something irrigates" we shall now consider "that it is long ago" as well as "that something wakens up something". *Qad t̄āla mā nabbahatnī . . . aṣwātu ruh̄bāni dayrin* "It is now long ago that the monks of a monastery awakened me". From a purely formal point of view *mā nabbahatnī aṣwātu* etc. is the subject phrase (=sph) to the predicate phrase (pph) *qad t̄āla*, the element *aṣwātu* etc. being in turn the sph to the pph *nabbahatnī*. This is a good specimen of Arabic textual behaviour, two textemes being here interwoven. Now, the sph *mā nabbahatnī* etc. is itself a texteme in the *casus obliquus* (co), while *t̄āla mā nabbahatnī . . . aṣwātu* etc. constitutes a texteme in *casus rectus* (cr). Here *casus* is a communicational term having reference to the question whether a texteme is a full message or only a part of a message.

Within the cr-texteme we have then the co-texteme *wa l'usfūru lam yaṭir(i)* "in that the sparrow had not (yet) taken wing" developing further *li ṣṣabūhi bihā fi ḡurrati lfaḡri*, just as the co-texteme *qad ḡa'alū fawqa rru'ūsi akālilan mina ṣṣa'ari* "(who) had made crowns of hair on the heads" adds a further trait to the others of the monks.

The next cr-texteme is *Kam fihim min malīhi lwaḡhi* "How many among them there were of sweet-faced (boys)", followed by the co-texteme *bi ssihri yaksiru ḡafnayhil'alā ḡawari* (who) "were bending down, with enchantment, their eyelids over (the) whites". Then in v. 6 a new cr-texteme: *Lāḡaztuhu / bi lhawā* "I watched him with desire" followed by two co-textemes: *ḡattā staqāda lahu / ṭaw'an wa aslafanī lmi'āda / bi nnaẓari* "until he let himself be obediently led by it and gave me in advance a promise of a meeting with a glance". In v. 7 we have a cr-texteme: *Wa ḡā'anī / fi qamiṣi llayli mustatiran* "And he came to me hidden in the skirt of the night" followed by the co-texteme *yasta'ḡilu lxaṭwa / min xawfin wa min ḡadari* "in that he hastened the steps from fear and caution". V. 8: *Wa lāḡa daw'u hūlālin* (cr) "And the light of a crescent shone", *kāda yafḡa-huhu* (co) *miṭli lqulāmati / qad quṣṣat mina zẓufuri* (co) "that was near to dishonour him, like a chip, that had been cut off from the nail". V. 9: *Fa qumtu* (cr) *afruṣu xaddī fi ṭṭariqi lahu ḡullan* (co) / *wa aṣḡabu akmāmī 'alā Paṭari* (co) "And I arose spreading my cheek on the way for him in humility and dragging my

sleeves over the trace.” V. 9: *Wa kāna mā kāna (cr) mimmā lastu aḍkuruḥu (co) / Fa zūnna xayran (cr), wa lā tasʿal ʿani lxabari (cr)* “Then happened what happened of which I shall not tell anything. So think good of it, and don’t ask of it!”

It is in the nature of functional isomorphism that only traits which are immediate constituents of a texteme should be considered in the first place. Thus we find the following types of phrasemes: independent clause, dependent clause and a type of expression that is no clause at all. Let us take v. 7 *Wa ḡāʿanī fī qamīṣi llayli mustatiran*. Here is *ḡāʿanī* “He came to me” alone sufficient to constitute a message, but what about *mustatiran* = *wa huwa mustatirun*? While *wa huwa mustatirun* is a so-called *ḥāl*-clause, *mustatiran* is not. It is a so-called *ḥāl*-accusative functioning like a predicative attribute in Latin. In its predicative function it can be compared with the type *kāna mustatiran* implying an accidental predication (OS 14–5/1966, pp. 69f.), the adjectivization of which appears in our case.

Now, the texteme is, in principle, the minimal unit of the text and must consequently also be defined within the framework of the text as the integrating category. What kind of category is the text then? This is no easy question as one understands. However, the linguist has his specific tools when trying to penetrate the structure of the text as a behavioural representation of the world. As such a representation the text can be considered as a kind of *network* in which informational pictures are expressed with the help of the textemes in the function of *informational quanta*, measured in the category of “message”, i.e. a complete piece of information, constituting a technemic “stroke”, so to speak, in the network producing the textual picture.

In this textual picture pieces of the world are reproduced in prose or poetry, the units of these two main categories being conventionally determined according to the literary genres existing in a cultural community. Now, the syntactical case-paradigm of the textemes fulfils, in their various morphological representations, the purpose of ordering the world linguistically, i.e. translating it to a medium of textual behaviour, appearing as *textual radicals* functioning as textemic technemes of the textual picture, a “Stilleben” or a film.

The basic unit of the text is thus the textual radical, the texteme. A comparison with the function of the radical as a *morphophoneme* may shed some light on the function of the textemic radical in the text. The technemic valence of the phoneme is limited by the number of relevant combinations (cf. OS 21, pp. 69ff.; IM, p. 15; Principia, p. 90). The valence of the texteme is equivalent to the number of all thinkable phrasemes and thus a case of true polyvalence. The case-forms of the phraseme are to be considered as variants of each other, thus constituting a paradigm like that of the lexeme (cf. p. 100). This holds true also of the relation between parataxis and hypotaxis (OS 23–4, p. 218). The specific *configurations* constituted by the pure syntax of the textemes are to be considered as belonging to what I call the “supratextual discursivity” (Principia, p. 102), and this kind of configuration is also of importance to the appreciation of the degree of “literarity” of a text (cf. p. 114).

Now, we must also here distinguish, carefully, between morphemically rele-

vant, and morphemically irrelevant features. From the viewpoint of the phraseme and texteme respectively, so-called "complements" such as *li ṣṣabūhi bihā* and *fī ḡurrati lfaḡri* v. 2 (p. 109) are morphemically irrelevant and should be regarded as *redundant* features. Nevertheless, they cannot be ignored but must have a place within the domain of textual grammar. They are morphological representations of "defective", or more correctly, abridged or reduced textemes, contributing, in their way, to the configuration of the text and thus also to the supratextual discursivity. This holds, in fact, true of all morphemically irrelevant features, like *sūdi Paṭānīni* and *na^cārīna fī ssaḡari* v. 3 (p. 63) etc. If we wish, we can call such textual elements "functional" variants of the texteme, having also a stylistic value. We have thus to deal here with various technemic organizations of *virtual* textemes.

The famous Swedish Latinist Einar Löfstedt used to say: "Analys utan syntes är endast halv vetenskap, men syntes utan analys är diletantism." This is true also of general linguistics. Moreover, in this discipline we are mostly dealing with a pseudo-structural analysis of language yielding more or less awkward syntheses. When this section has been called "textual grammar" we have not been using the term "grammar" in a metaphorical sense since language can only exist in texts, or more correctly, *as* texts, the *textus* being a kind of *συμπλοκή* (cf. Principia, p. 68). Thus, we are, in fact, using the term "grammar" in its proper sense, and I therefore can not agree with what T. Todorov has to say on the use of the term in question in the introduction to his interesting paper "The Grammar of Narration".⁴⁶

As I have more than once pointed out, this state of affairs must affect our opinion of the nature of grammatical categories in general. These ought to be established within the framework of the hierarchical organization of the system of language. Now, in the aforesaid paper Todorov starts with the parts of speech, maintaining that every semantic theory of them "ought to be based on the difference between description and denomination". For my part I shall contend that every semantic theory of the lexemes—so I call the parts of speech—ought to start from the level immediately integrating them. For it is on this level that they have their primary function. Thus the lexemes exist only as *phrases*, i.e. as parts of the phraseme which integrates them. Consequently, it is in terms of "subject phrase" and "predicate phrase" that the lexemes should be interpreted in the first place. However, the terms "subject" and "predicate" having no immediate connection with the phraseme-texteme as a behavioural category, it is appropriate to consider "subject phrase" and "predicate phrase", to begin with, as merely "syntactic positions" (cf. above, p. 103), i.e. on principle, a juxtaposition of what I call the "phrasic radicals" of the phraseme, corresponding to the technemes of the texteme which is a communicational picture or a picture as communication, e.g. *The horse/runs*. Now, we are confronted with the question of whether or not the notions of "subjectivity" and "predicativity", in the conventional sense, are to be considered as real values of *la langue*. What there is, is the phenomenon of juxtaposition of phrases, implying formally, at the most, a relation of *identity*. Thus we are, I think, allowed to draw the conclusion that "subjectivity" and "predicativity" are only the results of a realization in *la*

parole of the value of "identity" belonging to *la langue*. In other words, the subjectivity and predicativity arise from a realization of the category of the phraseme in specific acts of speech. In the act of understanding (p. 78), a phraseme-texteme appears, in its capacity as an "identity", to the receiver as the intuition that "something has been said" in the sense of a complete message.

Now the result of the realization of the aforesaid category of *la langue* as "subjectivity" and "predicativity" respectively ought to tell us something of the properties of the phrases yielding this result. The phraseme is integrating, as phrases, not primarily "words" but lexemes which derive their character of word classes exactly from their function as phrases, i.e. as parts of the phraseme. We find then that the *nomen substantivum* including the *nomen proprium* belongs to "subjectivity" as well as to "predicativity", while the *verbum finitum* only belongs to "predicativity". On this functional difference the concept of the lexeme seems ultimately to be founded (cf. IM, § 10). The postulated relation of "identity" or perhaps "equivalence" thus exists, without further ado, between nouns, yielding the so-called "pure nominal sentence", while the finite verb is confined to the syntactic position of "predicativity". If we consider "identity" or equivalence as the basic idea we obtain for the negative term "non-identity", yielding, on the one hand "different", and, on the other, a neutral term, the "participle", i.e. stativity or fienticity as an adjective. The notion of the verb *par excellence* seems to be founded on the negative term "different". As one sees, this way of reasoning aims at a derivation of the lexemes from their function as phrases in the phraseme, which is the same as the establishing of the values of the lexemes in *la langue*. Having done this, I can, in the main, agree with the approach of Todorov in his "The Grammar of Narration". The narration is, however, only a "symbolic activity" within the symbolic activity of language as it appears in this kind of symbolic behaviour. The narration is only a specific kind of textual behaviour; for Jacobi on the "clauses" of "Dayr 'Abdūn" see, op. cit., p. 46. Here I had to confine myself to the linguistic fundamentals of text linguistics.

3. ON STYLE

In v. 7a we find the expression *fī qamīši llayli* (p. 63), according to Jacobi "a rather weak noun metaphor, supported by a participle" (op. cit., p. 47). As I have already made clear (p. 105), terms like "noun" and "participle" have no business here. It is certainly not as a participle that *mustatiran* supports the metaphor but in consequence of the meaning of *istatara*. Being now unable to obtain so much useful information on style from textbooks and articles on the subject I must, in this connection, confine myself to finding a *linguistic* definition of "style", an important task to my mind.

On the whole, language is, as already mentioned, also what has been called "faded metaphors". However, a faded metaphor is no longer a true metaphor. It is rather a *muṭṭarid* in relation to *ʿurf*, not a *ḡayr muṭṭarid* (p. 104). One should also in this context distinguish between diachrony and synchrony. What appears, from a diachronic point of view, as a metaphor need not, from a synchronic

viewpoint, be one. What is it then that settles a question like this? The *expressional value* of a unit. How could such a value be established linguistically? In the same way, in principle, as is established, on the pattern of linguistic analysis, the purely expressional value of a piece of art, whereby one has to distinguish between a pragmatic referent, i.e. the represented object, and a kind of metareferent, indicating the purely expressional value in a stylistic sense (cf. Principia, p. 102). From a methodological point of view, such a way of looking at things means also an extension of our doctrine of the morpheme to the domain of style. Now this domain stands out more clearly to us when we are dealing with the question of so-called synonyms.

Consider for instance Swedish *stavkarl* in its function as a synonym for *tiggare* (beggar).⁴⁷ In this function, one might think, both morphemes have the same pragmatic referent, since "tiggare" and "stavkarl" designate "the same thing" but in different ways. But this is not entirely true. The term pragmatic referent applies to the individual understanding of a particular sign and must be carefully distinguished from the "object", being outside language; the relation between man and object is a purely epistemological question. However, it is this relation between "sameness" and "otherness" that makes it possible to compare two morphemes which have the same purely linguistic metareferent (word ~ lex, lexeme ~ phrase, phraseme ~ texteme). For there are many "words", and they designate as a rule quite different things. But many of them are said to designate "the same thing", i.e. to be synonyms. However, synonyms in an absolute sense might not exist, and two technically different morphemes have as a rule at least different stylistic value even if we say that they designate, or, denote, as the philosopher puts it, "the same thing". At this point of the exposition it is of the greatest importance to take into consideration the full implication of the fact that two synonymous morphemes are *technically* different.

How is it, to begin with, that in the same language the same thing can be designated by different expressions? The designations of a language being in principle conventional it is then, for various reasons, part of the convention that the same thing is designated by different expressions. This side of the convention appears already in the fact that we have, as a rule, to deal with two main kinds of texts, poetry and prose. Thus, in a certain linguistic state, there is no doubt that *stavkarl* is the poetic and *tiggare* the prosaic expression for the same thing. The convention functions then so that these synonyms condition each other with regard to stylistic value, and *stavkarl* is then considered as a poetic, *tiggare* as a prosaic word. But it is of course entirely possible that in another linguistic state *stavkarl* might be considered as the usual, normal and thus prosaic word for "beggar". Nor is it impossible that the word *tiggare* might be used outside the context to which it properly belongs, thus taking on, occasionally, another, metaphorical, value in consequence of its use in a new context. Stylistic value is then *inter alia* a function of usage in a certain linguistic state.

Let us start from the *phonemes* which are to be found in both words already mentioned, namely (in alphabetical order) *a, e, f, g, i, k, l, r, s, t, v*. We find now that the phonemes *a:* and *a* respectively occupy different positions: *st-a-vk-a-r-l* and *tigg-a-re* (as compared with, for instance, *ligg-a-re* "register"). In accord-

ance with our morphemics we shall say then that we are dealing, on the one hand, with the same phoneme *a*: but with two different radicals *a*: (*st-a:-vk-a:-r*), and, on the other, with the same phoneme *a* but with two different radicals *a* (*tig-a-rellig-a-re*); the same holds true for *t* and *r* if we confine ourselves to the phonemes common to both words. The function of the radical is to be a techneme in a conceptual sound picture which is being designed, so to speak, with the phonemes as material. This kind of picture is constituted by the order of relation within the scope of a minimal unity, including its variants (*tiggare*, *tiggare-n*, *tiggare-n-s* etc., cf. p. 100).

Now, it is important to distinguish between *tiggare* as a representative of the morphemic metareferent (word, phrase etc.) and as a purely stylistic "referent", having reference to what has been called *literaturnost* "literarity", reflecting the degree of stylistic intention or stylistic consciousness of the sender. If we let "literarity" comprise both poetry and prose as well as hybrids of these main genres (rhyming prose, poetic prose etc.) we can speak of literarity and *lack* of literarity, the latter reflecting an indifference to the idea of literarity as a whole.

Thus it follows from what has just been said that we can speak of different *degrees of literarity*, from poetry to prose and *vice versa*, poetry and prose having together, within the scope of the idea of literarity, their own marked value, while the non-marked value is constituted by the lack of literarity. Linguistically, I shall therefore define "style" within the framework of a *privative gradual opposition* with the idea of literarity as the basic idea. As we know from the category of *mood* we often speak of *modus indicativus*, *modus subjunctivus*, *optativus* etc. Now J. Wackernagel has given us a fine contribution to the doctrine of mood, in the following statement on the indicative mood: "Einerseits hat er eine ausgesprochene Spezialbedeutung, indem er die Wirklichkeit im Gegensatz zu dem bloss Gewollten oder Möglichen ausdrückt. Aber zugleich auch kann er, ich möchte sagen eine modale Indifferenz ausdrücken, d.h. da gebraucht sein, wo man weder Wirklichkeit noch Unwirklichkeit aussagen, sondern eine der modalen Färbung überhaupt entbehrende Aussage geben will." (Vorlesungen über Syntax, I, p. 224). From the double function of the indicative follows that it has one negative and one neutral value within the structure of modality.⁴⁸ Thus the negative value must be "non-modality", in the sense of "no subjectively tinged attitude to reality". Thus there is no doubt that a *structural affinity* exists between "mood" and "literarity" insofar as both categories contain the factors of subjectivity and volition, in the one case as to the grammatical representation of the attitude to reality, in the other as to the attitude to the textual (including lexemic) *representation* of this reality.

This means that poetry is not to be understood as "non-prose" or prose as "non-poetry", in the sense of privative oppositions. For if we start from poetry, establishing a negative value "non-poetry", we obtain, on the one hand, the value "prose" and on the other a neutral value, indifferent to both poetry and prose. However, we obtain the same neutral value starting from prose. Thus both genres are to be regarded as *variants of each other* (cf. p. 100) within the scope of the idea of literarity, and, consequently they can, as has already been pointed out, be considered *together* as exponents of degrees of literarity, i.e. as the

positive term of a gradual privative opposition placing itself *en bloc* against a term which is not characterized by the idea of literarity. We obtain then a gradual opposition of the type (poetry/rhyming prose/poetic prose/prose), a term that places itself against a non-marked term, the negative term of which is "non-literarity" or "unliterary", the neutral value then implying indifference to the idea of literarity as a whole; in this case only the idea of the morpheme as such is relevant, i.e. in terms of the morphemic metareferent, "communication" on different levels. We have thereby given a *structuralistic* definition of "style" in terms of "literarity".

Thus we have found the linguistic phenomenon with the help of which "literarity" could be formalized so that one can talk of "style" in tolerably rational terms, which is no doubt important to be able to do, the more so as a good many more or less worthless articles have been published on this topic. In any case, it must be considered desirable to be able to handle this rather subtle subject in terms linguistically relevant. Thus the attitude towards literarity is to literary art what the so-called "mood" is to the representation of reality according to conventional structuralistic grammar.

Now, in our case the reality was represented above (p. 113) by the pragmatic referent of two words, i.e. "stavkarl" and "tiggare", the designations of "the same object", considered as devoid of all stylistic associations. Here it is also appropriate to consider this reality from the viewpoint of the semantic field, but then likewise in a stylistically neutral fashion. In so doing we can state that *tiggare* is derived from *tigga* (beg) while *stavkarl* is composed of *stav* (staff) and *karl* (man), reflecting two wholly different ways of looking at the reality in question, one more direct and one more indirect. However, it is not this that I mean, primarily, when speaking of "stylistic value". For by this term I intend, in the first place, pure art, manifested as "literarity" in the sense of *ars litterarum*, every *littera* being a graphic representation of a phonemic techneme, i.e. a radical, "die etymologische Belichtung" being dependent on the hermeneutic horizon of the receiver. The decisive point is here the *technemic* difference, i.e. the different ways of painting "the same thing" with phonemic material (cf. p. 113). In the one case "hat man Striche ausgelassen" (Liebermann), reproducing the reality more indirectly (*stavkarl*). In the other, one has condensed it into a distinctness appearing, in relation to the first case, as trivial plainness (*tiggare*). Disregarding the etymological consciousness of the receiver we find that a phonemic combination like *stavkarl* already as such recalls a special feeling in the emotional life of the receiver while a phonemic combination like *tiggare* recalls another type of feeling. This difference in feeling originates in the total phonological consciousness of the receiver. But this phonological consciousness is, of course, always in turn dependent also on the *contents* of the expressions, an extremely important fact. There can be no question of an autonomous phonemic "painting" recalling feelings in the receiver. For he recognizes the phonemic units as "words" of a certain kind in his language, and a word is always a linguistic *sign* with two complementary sides (cf. p. 93f.).

Now, in the supratextual discursivity, constituted by the usage of these signs in texts we are able to distinguish a kind of language of pure form. In this language

the *whole* sign, e.g. (*tiggare* ~ *TIGGARE*), functions as the expressional side of a *new* sign the content of which is a certain degree of literarity or lack of literarity (cf. above). This sign of the supratextual discursivity has then as its pragmatic referent the individual, personal experience, while its metareferent is the expressional side as such in the sense of "style" as an additional level, so to speak. It is this level of literary expressional side that is comparable to the "mood" of conventional grammar. All these elements together compose the specific "form" of experience we call "style", belonging, in the last resort, to the domain of "understanding" (cf. Pricipia, p. 51). In this language of pure form the expression could also be said to be its own iconic *value*, so to speak. If we compare the iconic value of */sta:vka:r/* with that of */tigare/* we have thus to deal with specific representations of this iconic value showing a technemic difference which creates in the emotional life of the receiver a certain experience of the designated reality or of the designation of this reality. "Style" is such a special iconic experience as form, which is an organization of elements.

In this connection it may be appropriate to consider what Roland Barthes called "connotational semiotics". But to begin with, it is important to call attention also to the difference between what the *philosopher* intends with the terms "connotation" and "denotation", and what the linguist has in mind using the same terms. In contrast to the linguist the philosopher starts from the "thing" which must have certain properties if it is to be designated for instance by the word *virtue*. To the linguist this unit is primarily a morpheme, a linguistic sign, i.e. *virtue* = expression ~ *VIRTUE* = content, a unity the metareferent of which is word ~ lex, the pragmatic referent being "virtue". Now, it is, in the first place, the relation between the pragmatic referent "virtue" and the object "virtue" that occupies the philosopher, not the referential content of the expressional side of the sign *virtue*, "the word virtue" (IM, p. 15; Pricipia, p. 65). For the expression *virtue* is here also a representative of the whole sign *virtue* which, in turn, is an expression of the general idea and the general representation 'virtue'. This general idea 'virtue' is given, conventionally, with the language in question, the expression *virtue*, when used, may or may not be justified objectively. Thus the philosopher says that the expression *virtue* denotes 'virtue' as a general idea, i.e., all the various virtues. However, the "thing" itself must then also possess certain fixed properties if it be recognized as a 'virtue'. Thus he says that the expression *virtue* also indicates or *connotes* these properties. What the philosopher intends is a *definition* of the concept 'virtue' in an objective sense. But this is not a purpose of primary interest to the linguist.

Now, the philosopher requests us to distinguish thoroughly between the word *virtue* and the "thing" to which this word refers, and the linguist gladly complies with this request. For to him the expression *virtue*, as being only a conventional representation of a "thing", constitutes the essential object of study, no matter how the "thing" is defined in a philosophical sense. Whether or not the word *virtue* is the proper designation of a thing does not, in the first place, interest the linguist to whom "connotation" is or ought to be mainly a *stylistic* term. What to the linguist is connoted are stylistic associations, not fixed properties of the "thing". An incorrect designation is to the linguist a linguistic error not consist-

ent with the convention obtaining within the linguistic community in question. The aforesaid *stavkarl* as a designation for *tiggare* is thus consistent with such a convention while the quality of carrying a *stav* "staff" is not in itself constitutive of a definition of a "tiggare". However, there is nothing to stop the philosopher using *stavkarl*, as a faded metaphor, as a designation for what *he* understands by the concept in question. Within the scope of the language of logistic convention one ought to distinguish between elements which are to be regarded as the *immediate constituents* of a definition, and thus as relevant connotators, and such elements which are not to be thus qualified. The linguist has to distinguish between such elements as are immediate constituents of style as an expression of an emotional experience as form, and elements which are not such constituents and thus not relevant connotators.

Let us now consider Barthes' example *Faites avancer les commodités de la conversation!* According to Barthes a Frenchman understands here on the one hand "a denoted message containing the order to put forward the chairs", on the other a connoted message the *significatum* of which here is 'preciosity' (p. 27).⁴⁹ This is an interesting observation. However, looking at things in this perspective we are confronted with a message containing two kinds of contents, the French representation of the "thing" itself and "preciosity". How to cope with this semantic problem in a structuralistic way? I have in fact already given an answer to this question. It is, according to my analysis, obvious that the "preciosity" here belongs to what I call the supratextual discursivity.

First of all we have to consider the expression in question as a *French* representation of a morpheme of a certain type, distinguishing thus between *la langue* in its primary, universal sense and *la langue* in its secondary, specific (French) sense. For what is, in the first place, denoted in *la langue* in its first sense is that "something has been said", i.e., we have to deal with a *texteme*. On the other hand, what is, in the first place, *connoted* that is the mood of the *texteme*, reflecting the attitude of the sender to reality in the present case, experienced by the receiver as an injunction, *modus imperativus*. A message can only exist in a text of which it constitutes a *texteme*. Now, already in the *casus rectus* (p. 109) the *texteme* forms a gradual, privative opposition based on the idea of mood, e.g. *Qu'on fasse avancer les commodités de la conversation / Faites avancer ...* etc. an opposition which places itself against the indicative as non-modus, that is, on one hand an aspectually relevant communication implying a stative or fientic assertion, on the other an expression indifferent to the positive as well as to the negative value of the opposition of modality. In this neutral value only the idea of the *texteme* as a morpheme is relevant, i.e. its metareferent which is "communication" as a purely informational unit, devoid of modal connotations. *Thus it is within the structural framework of the category of mood that stylistic functions should be treated.*

In order to let what Barthes calls "preciosity" stand out we can compare as an additional signification two expressions for the "same thing", namely *Faites avancer les chaises* with *Faites avancer les commodités de la conversation*. The different ways in which "the chairs" are expressed then constitute the stylistic opposition "literarity" / "non-literarity" (cf. above, p. 114). This opposition can

only appear at the textual level and thus in *la parole*. For it is only in *la parole* that the experience of "difference" can be evoked, which constitutes the deviation from normal usage (*les chaises*).

The experience of stylistic difference, of literarity, belongs to the *act of understanding* conceived as form (cf. p. 79). "Understanding" is on the one hand the fact that one understands, on the other, understanding as a quality, implying the *modus* of understanding. That which is understood is the *whole* of the sign functioning as an *impression* the content of which is "the understood" (cf. p. 94), including also the supratextual discursivity.

As Barthes has pointed out connotational linguistics has not yet been established, and we ought to see to it that this branch of linguistics is not confused with traditional stylistics, remaining within "le plan de la parole", while true connotational linguistics is, still according to this author, studying "codes", thus placing itself on "le plan de la langue". I am happy to say that I can agree with the main points in Barthes' brilliant article and especially with the conclusion that rhetorical analysis is perhaps in need of a new methodological attitude. However, it is not possible for me to subscribe to the opinion that language as the primary semantic system functions as a simple signifier which is *different* from the *significata* of this language. According to my doctrine of integrated morphemics the rhetoric element must, in some way, be integrated in the system of language and therefore always a function of the specific representations of the language in question. What *tiggare* is to *stavkarl*, *la chaise* is to *la commodité de la conversation*. We are also in the French case dealing with synonyms, in the last expression perhaps more correctly with a functional synonym. The "preciosity" of the second expression is in both cases conditioned by the existence—in *absentia*—of the first one in the consciousness of the receiver. Thus "preciosity" can never be separated from language as such. To begin with, I shall—with Barthes—contend that this preciosity is the "content" of a new sign the signifier of which is constituted by the whole sign *la commodité de la conversation* (= expression ~ content): As a *functional* word this sign exists only as a phrase in a phraseme, but as a signifier of a new sign its phrasic function is no longer relevant.

Now, Barthes holds the view that we are here confronted with *two* semiotic systems which are "laid upon each other" although according to a regulated scheme. In fact we have to do with the *same* semiotic system, for language is not only the "material" of literature, language is only to be *found* in literature in the widest sense of the word, cf. C. Brockelmann: "Literatur im weitesten Sinne mag man alles nennen, was der Mensch in sprachliche Form geprägt hat, um es dem Gedächtnis zu überliefern; so wollte A. Boeckh auch die Inschriften eines Volkes seiner Literatur zurechnen." (*Geschichte der arabischen Literatur*², I/1943, p. 1.). Thus we have, in a certain sense, to *start* from literature as a kind of expression of the *culture* of man. However, as I have pointed out (p. 88), the "material" with the help of which symbolic systems are constructed is always of importance to the functioning of such systems. And this holds especially true of literature as a language of culture. For the material of this type of symbolic behaviour is the so-called "natural" language, an extremely subtle organization. Moreover, the great importance of the concept of the *text*, segmented in textemes here appears to us in its full significance.

When Barthes is searching for a new methodological attitude to rhetorical analysis he does so because the formal nature of the literary message seems to him to necessitate an immanent and exhaustive description of what he calls the rhetorical code, before this code can be connected with society and history which produce and consume such codes. These thoughts of Barthes' are most valuable, and here my own contribution to this much debated problem is the concept of the *texteme* as defined in "Principia". For just as the radical functions as a link between phonemics and morphology, the *texteme* can be considered as a link between natural language and the language of literature. As such a link it accounts for the fact that both "culture" and "language" are "des institutions sociales", culture being here, in fact, the integrating level in the hierarchy of social anthropology (cf. Principia, p. 80): culture as a level integrates language. Literary art is *one* of the manifestations of this kind of integration, and the "connoted message" (Barthes) can thus never be a message separate from the denoted message (the content of the *texteme*). On the contrary, this connoted message is the "mood" of the *texteme*, in the sense of "degree of literarity".

Now I said, tentatively, that "preciosity" is the "content" of the new sign the expression of which is constituted by the *whole texteme* *Faites avancer les commodités de la conversation*. Here we are confronted with two questions. 1. What is to be understood by the term "content" of this secondary sign, so to speak? 2. Is "preciosity" here to be regarded as a real value of *la langue*? As far as the first question is concerned it is obvious that "content" cannot here mean the same as the content of the ordinary linguistic sign (morpheme). For just as the modal speech forms of the verb are only representations of variants within a verbal paradigm, in a corresponding way the degrees of "literarity" are, structurally, to be considered as a kind of modal variants of the *texteme*. The content of a linguistic sign has one pragmatic referent, observable in *la parole*, and one metareferent indicating the morphemic intuition on various levels. Since "preciosity" is only observable in *la parole* it can here be a question of individual fluctuations in the appreciation of this preciosity. Therefore I prefer to consider the sense of preciosity here as a result of a realization in *la parole* of the value "literarity", being then a kind of counterpart to the metareferent of the ordinary linguistic sign. This kind of metareferent constitutes the purely technemic level, indicating the expressional-stylistic value of technemic combinations, e.g. *qamišu rrağuli / qamišu llayli* (p. 112). The concept of the purely technemic level has, of course, also full application to the network of *textemes* constituting the text. We must never forget, however, that the language of the text in Barthes' sense, i.e. the supratextual discursivity, is based on a re-using of the representations of the *whole* linguistic sign as a signifier, the expression of *new* signs of linguistic art, i.e. "literarity". This phenomenon is of great importance to the scientific appreciation of rhetoric devices within the framework of general aesthetics.

4. CONCLUSIONS

With this paper the thinking of the present writer—during a decade—on language as a representation of an underlying structure of behavioural universals, the

morphemes, is brought to an end.⁵⁰ In the first place, it was my pedagogical activities as a Professor of Semitic languages that gave rise to this specific kind of thinking. I was confronted with the task of explaining to my students what ought to be meant by the term "morpheme", a term widely used nowadays also in Semitics, cf. e.g. W. Fischer, *Grammatik des klassischen Arabisch* (1972), pp. 33 ff.;⁵¹ *Principia*, p. 39. But I soon felt that I could not manage that. My thinking over the whole problem ended first with my getting a presentiment of the central place of the morpheme in linguistics, and then with my "beholding", so to speak, as in a *θεωρία*, intuitively the structure of human language.

At midnight before the battle of Jena (1806) Hegel completed the manuscript of "Phänomenologie des Geistes".⁵² The nineteenth century becomes the century of epistemology. Kant's natural-scientific subject-object orientation subsists in the main. However, the *creative* power of the great conceptions grows, in fact, weaker and weaker. This is an old story. Despite his aspirations Plato did not succeed in becoming the state-philosopher of his time; instead he was, much later, to become the philosopher of the state of God.⁵³ The medieval scholastics, Christian and Muslim, took, for their purposes, charge of the *Organon* of Aristotle. Hegel, the admirer of the French revolution, became the state-philosopher of Prussia. Society mostly picked up only that which it could profit by, thus ignoring the deepest parts of philosophic and scientific thinking, and the attitude of society determined in turn the outlook of man. For like politics, science too has its army of opportunists. They have long lain hidden under the guise of "specialists", applauded by their peers, the so-called experts, and by the black magic of the press (Karl Kraus). The theory thus became *method*. "Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum", Mephistopheles says to the student, asking hesitatingly for advice concerning his studies (Faust I, Studienzimmer). But, alas! Mephistopheles does not tell the truth even here. The true theory is the golden moment of science: Grau ist nur die Methode. Plato has the vision of the cave, and the doctrine of the ideas is born.⁵⁴ Newton sees the apple falling, and the idea of gravitation arises in him.⁵⁵ Hegel beholds in Napoleon on horseback in Jena the incarnation of the "Weltgeist".⁵⁶ However, it is mostly certain, more immediately useful methodological manipulations or tricks, extracted from their philosophies, that become the more general property of science, and the so-called theory of science, succeeding the epistemology of the older type, is called by J. Habermas "eine im szientistischen Selbstverständnis der Wissenschaften betriebene Methodologie" (*Erkenntnis und Interesse*, 1975, p. 13). In this connection we may also call attention to K. Popper's "Logik der Forschung", aiming, with the help of falsifiability as a "criterion of demarcation", at letting a kind of positivistic, scientific empiricism stand out as the only valid form for scientific work. In other words, science has become its own problem, but once again in a narrow, one-sidedly methodological way. It is, likewise, characteristic of the time that J. Piaget, in his booklet on structuralism, refuses to see in this movement anything else than a method, a way of work.⁵⁷

Now, all methods determine, to a certain extent, the direction of research, and the *language* of the method dominates the thoughts of the scientist. A method too rigorous can easily cause some qualities of an object of research to disappear.

This holds, especially, true of the definitions of the *morpheme*, which all seem to be based on a positivistic empiricism, confusing the casual representation of the truly linguistic categories with these categories themselves, which are *behavioural universals*, constituting the system of values of *la langue* and being the basis of the "intuition" texteme, word, phoneme.

In a report from a conference held in 1961 and published by J. Greenberg 1963 and 1966 under the title "Universals of Language" it is—quite correctly—pointed out that linguistics is a behavioural science, but also that "The area of sound symbolism might be selectively indexed since an exhaustive body of data would obviously include all the morphemes of all the languages of the world." (p. XXVI). This statement shows us that the authors of this report are, on the whole, still hopped in L. Bloomfield's definition of the morpheme in "Language" (1957), p. 161. However, the morphemes are to be considered as relatively few underlying structures which should be, as indicated, regarded as linguistic behavioural universals. One understands this fairly well considering the generally rather limited number of phonemes. The opinion that the morphemes, unlike the phonemes, should be much more numerous units is based on grave misunderstandings. Moreover, the phonemes *are* morphemes although in a certain, derived sense.

The misconception in question depends mainly on two circumstances. 1. Insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that de Saussure had a real *θεωρία*, a true intuition of what language is and what it is not, an intuition based on certain tenets such as "la langue est une forme et non une substance", "la langue est un système où tout se tient" etc. 2. Nevertheless, it was his famous dichotomies which attracted the interest and were often, without further ado, used as methodical tricks. But, it was, after all, a true *θεωρία*, a "Gesamtschau" which lay behind these dichotomies and of which they were only the more spectacular and immediately comprehensible features. We must not forget that de Saussure had started from scratch. We can see that from his letter to Meillet of January 4th, 1894 (E. Roulet, Saussure. Cours de linguistique générale, 1975, p. 4). Far more important for future research than the methodical trick *la langue / la parole* are the numerous reflexions made by de Saussure on the implications of this dichotomy and of which only a few are mentioned here.

When Benveniste says: "nihil est in *lingua* quod non prius fuerit in *oratione*" (Problèmes I, p. 131) he is only condensing in this *dictum* the content of Cours, pp. 35 ff. Let us start from the words: "historiquement, le fait de parole précède toujours" (Cours, p. 37). However, I would like to widen the perspective here, re-interpreting the "historically" in terms of "genetically" (Principia, pp. 62 ff.). I would like to re-interpret the following statement in the same way: "Il y a donc interdépendance de la langue et de la parole; celle-là est à la fois l'instrument et le produit de celle-ci. Mais tout cela ne les empêche pas d'être deux choses absolument distinctes." (Cours, pp. 37–8). The way in which these two things are completely different, and how this interdependence has been brought about are shown in "Principia", pp. 69 ff. It is particularly important to realize that a *change of quality* has taken place when *la langue* is developing from *la parole*, which *in statu nascendi* should not, strictly speaking, yet be called "la parole",

which already presupposes "la langue" and *vice versa*, being both the result of a change of quality.

That which de Saussure calls "la parole" originates in what I call the "sound-community" (Principia, p. 70). My formula of the *genetic evolution of the linguistic sign* is: $I \sim III > (II \sim III) = "I"$ (Principia, pp. 70-1), and this formula implies, on the one hand, that the "object" and the "name" and the "name" and the "object" respectively enter into a relation as the *elements* I and III and III and I respectively, the elements being now qualitatively transformed into *constituents* of the relation, which in turn integrates these elements as parts of a practical identity between "object" and "name", and on the other, that the "name" (III) also becomes the name of the *idea* (II) of the object (I), whereby the name, from having been a *nomen proprium objecti*, is transformed to a *nomen appellativum* in the traditional sense. Thus this genetic formula sheds some, perhaps unexpected, light on the theory of proper names; one may compare the exposition of Bertrand Russell in "Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits" (1961), pp. 87 ff. with that of Björn Collinder in "Nysvenska Studier" 58/1978 pp. 6f.⁵⁸ As we shall see, the formula also illuminates the strange relationship existing between "la linguistique de la langue" and "la linguistique de la parole", so brilliantly expounded in "Cours", pp. 36-9.

But the most important thing is that the formula allows us to understand the phenomenon of *qualitative change*, intimately connected with the concept of form, and here we approach one of the most controversial figures of the newer philosophy, namely Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

There can be no question here of making a contribution to the exegesis of Hegel's philosophy. I shall only confront the genetic formula with some statements in "Phänomenologie des Geistes". Hegel says: "Das Wahre ist das Ganze." (p. 21) = "The truth is the whole." (p. 81). If we now consider a phonetic sequence like Arabic *faras* (III) and the object "horse" (I), we cannot find any connection between these elements. If however, we consider the first stage of the genetic formula, $I \sim III$, we can maintain that this formula, as indicating a relation, also indicates "ein Ganzes". Now Hegel continues: "Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen." (p. 21) = "The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development." (p. 81). In our case "die Entwicklung" is represented by the appearance of a relation of invariance between "horse" (I) and *faras* (III), functioning principally as stimulus (I)—response (III), as well as by a further development—in consequence of $I R III$ (R =relation)—to a corresponding relation of invariance between *faras* (III) and "horse" (I), likewise functioning as stimulus (III)—response (I). An important step in the mental evolution of man is taken when $I R III$ and $III R I$ are *identified* with each other, the bidirectional relation $I \sim III$, that is, $I R III = III R I$, being then established.

Speaking of "die Worte des Göttlichen, Absoluten, Ewigen" etc. Hegel now says: "Was mehr ist als ein solches Wort, der Übergang auch nur zu einem Satze, enthält ein *Anderswerden*, das zurückgenommen werden muss, ist eine Vermittlung. Diese aber ist das, was perhorresziert wird, als ob dadurch, dass mehr aus

ihr gemacht wird denn nur dies, dass sie nichts absolutes und im Absoluten gar nicht sei, die absolute Erkenntnis aufgegeben wäre." (p. 21) = "Whatever is more than a word like that, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a form of mediation, contains a process towards another state from which we must return once more. It is this process of mediation, however, that is rejected with horror, as if absolute knowledge were being surrendered when more is made of mediation than merely the assertion that it is nothing absolute, and does not exist in the Absolute." (p. 82), cf. A. Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (1976), pp. 529 ff. It is obvious that in the relation I ~ III the object "horse" is no longer an "object" and the phonetic sequence *faras* no longer a phonetic sequence. For as *immediate constituents* of the *sign* these elements are here illustrating an "Anderswerden", implying a transformation of the elements "object" and "phonetic sequence" to "content" and "expression". This ontological phenomenon is of the greatest interest, showing us how also the concepts "stimulus" and "response" are here undergoing a qualitative change. In "horse" = stimulus and *faras* = response it is still a question of a conditioned reflex of a more primitive kind, but already in *faras* = stimulus and "horse" = response not only is I R III presupposed, but, through the mutual integration of I R III and III R I to the primitive sign III ~ I, the stimulus becomes its own response and *vice versa*, whereby this new entity has become a complex stimulus in the formula (III ~ II) = "I" or (*faras* ~ FARAS) = "faras". The "object" has, as content been incorporated with the sign, being then transformed to a *general idea* of the object, while outside the sign—but not outside language—it appears as the function of the sign I am calling the "pragmatic referent". It is obvious that (I) is a conditioned reflex of a more complex kind. Thus, the genetic formula shows us that linguistic behaviourism can only be interpreted in terms of *ontological structuralism*.

I have tried to sketch some steps in the mental development of man as reflected in the genetic evolution of the linguistic sign. An outline of such steps is necessary if we wish to utilize language in order to support hypotheses of corresponding steps in the evolution of the human brain. The way to the symbolic linguistic behaviour, as it appears condensed in the formula (III ~ II) = "I", has been long. The main problem was always to organize the object and the name so that the name became the name of the object and the object the *content of the denomination* (cf. *Principia*, p. 71). One can easily imagine the existence of populations of *homo erectus* that were not capable of such an organization of these social elements and thus perished or became the slaves of the tribes capable of symbolic linguistic behaviour; the speechless was, so to speak, the illiterate of remote prehistorical times.

In his large work "Semantics" (1979) J. Lyons uses now and then the term "language behaviour". Now, this kind of behaviour exists in reality only as *textual behaviour*. In order to be able to speak, one must, according to this author, dispose of "a richer set of innate propensities for cognitive development than the radical behaviourist at least would normally postulate" (*Semantics*, II, p. 571). I do not know what this is supposed to mean, but take it to be a last desperate attempt to save at least a residuum of the essentially pro-Chomskyan

attitude of the author, to σώζειν τὰ φαινόμενα or “sauver les apparences”, so to speak. According to H. Putnam, the so-called innateness hypothesis implies that “the human brain is ‘programmed’ at birth in some *specific* and *structural* aspects of human natural language” (Mind, Language, and Reality, II, p. 107). However that may be, *textual* behaviour is the normal kind of linguistic behaviour, and e.g. *Faras!* “It is a horse!” implies in the first place that one understands that “something has been said”, i.e. that one has to do with a communication. The faculty of recognizing such a pattern is based on the formula (III ~ II) = “I”, and this pattern is identical with what I call the *metareferent* of the *texteme*, which integrates the relatively few other derived metareferents there are. Thus, I cannot see any reasons why a behaviouristic attitude, of some complexity, to the problem of language should necessarily be wrong. “La langue”, in a general sense, is in the main to be explained just as “integrated morphemics”; on the so-called “creativity”, cf. above, p. 74f.

In his “Questions contemporaines” (1929), still today worth reading, Ernest Renan says: “L’Université de France a trop imité les jésuites, leurs fades harangues, leurs vers latins; elle rappelle trop les rhéteurs anciens de la décadence. Le mal français, qui est le besoin de pérorer, la tendance à tout faire dégénérer en déclamation, une partie de l’Université l’entretient par son obstination à mépriser le fond des connaissances et à n’estimer que le style et le talent.” (p. V). On reading J.-M. Benoist, *La révolution structurale* (1980), one is no doubt reminded of these words. We are here dealing with a modern variant of this kind of sophisticated “déclamation”; an American variant we can now study in N. Chomsky, *Rules and Representations* (1980), with the “Galilean style” and “along Vicoesque lines” etc., etc. Here I shall only shortly confront some of my results with Chapter III of Benoist’s book, a Chapter carrying the impressive title “Retour au classicisme: nature humaine et structure chez Lévi-Strauss et Chomsky”, pp. 97–167 (to my mind the best part of this very “talented” book), confining myself only to some points concerning Chomsky.

Apriorism was, in general, hitherto rejected by philologists and linguists. These were, at least in their own opinion, always only adhering to the famous “Tatsachen”, “jeder Spekulation abhold”, “Meinungen nicht duldend” etc., etc.; this attitude did not of course prevent them from cherishing their own “Meinungen”. The more interesting it is, then, to observe that the aprioristic “innéisme” preached by Chomsky is now greeted with *esteem* and *respect*. Thus Benoist is speaking of “la révolution accomplie par Chomsky dans le champ linguistique”, and it is also maintained by this author that “L’enjeu épistémologique de Chomsky est la lutte qu’il mène sur le double front des thèses behavioristes et empiristes aussi bien que structuraliste du langage: par là, il a ouvert un nouveau champ à la linguistique, celui du détour théorique par un a priori.” (p. 142). This is, to my mind, unmitigated rubbish. For language manifests itself only as *textual behaviour*, and a struggle against empiricism is, in the last resort, always doomed to failure. Moreover, structuralism has come to stay. The kind of behaviourism, empiricism, and structuralism Chomsky is combating was, I think, never taken to seriously by true scholars in Europe, and this should have been pointed out in the first place. The fact that all languages have phonemes, words

and phrasemes is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of linguistic universals, but these universals are *behavioural*. The opinion that grammar is "a device of some sort for producing the sentences of the language under analysis" is dealt with by Benoit in a way which I must consider as somewhat misleading (p. 143). The important thing is to point out that "grammar" should be understood as a behaviouristic term, and that "sentence" can, at the utmost, be used only as a designation of the content of the texteme. We have to distinguish between the integrating and integrated grammar of the morphemes, the true behavioural universals, and the grammar of the various morphological representations of these morphemes, the link between these two kinds of grammars being found in the concept of the *radical*.

One of the merits of the book "An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions" (1964) by J. J. Katz and P. M. Postal is that it clearly points out the necessity of re-emphasizing the importance of the Saussurean distinction between "language" and "speech" (p. IX). However, the authors also say: "A language is a system of abstract objects analogous in significant respects to such a cultural object as a symphony. Speech is the actual verbal behavior that manifests the linguistic competence of one who has learned the appropriate system of abstract objects. Thus speech is analogous to the performances of a symphony in just the sense in which the language is analogous to the symphony itself. But just as symphonic performances are not invariant realizations of a symphony, so speech performances are not invariant realizations of the abstract objects that comprise the language." (ibid.). The reader may here think that the comparison with the symphony is an ingenious invention of the authors. Referring this reader to R. Anttila (Festschrift O. Szemerényi I/1979, pp. 35 ff.) and to "Principia", p. 33, I would like to recall the following words of de Saussure: "Sous ce rapport, on peut comparer la langue à une symphonie, dont la réalité est indépendante de la manière dont on l'exécute; les fautes que peuvent commettre les musiciens qui la jouent ne compromettent nullement cette réalité." (Cours, p. 36; F. de Saussure is missing from the bibliography). Now, there are no doubt two kinds of what the authors call "abstract objects", namely the morpheme as a behavioural universal and the specific conventional representation of the morpheme. Thus the unity *horse* is on the one hand a syntactic structure constituting the morpheme "word ~ lex" and on the other the specific representation of this kind of morpheme. As a representation of such a morpheme it is, likewise, an "abstract object" insofar as it is only a collective, general idea of the real "object", understood by the receiver in the form of the pragmatic referent. Moreover, the diagram 2.1 on p. 7 is misleading, implying what Benoit calls "retour au classicisme". "Sentence", "nomen", "verbum" etc. are not genuinely linguistic terms, and the morphemes are not "terminal elements" but the true deep structures: *John loves truth* is a texteme, a kind of *συμπλοκή*, cf. *Principia*, p. 68.

Now, according to Katz and Postal "a linguistic description of a natural language consists of three components: syntactic, semantic, and phonological" (op. cit., p. 1). Moreover, they maintain that "there are no theoretically significant relations between the semantic and phonological components, since these components perform independent operations on quite different features of the

structures generated by the syntactic component" (p. 2). It is here of the utmost importance to distinguish between the components of a *linguistic description* performed by an analyst belonging to a certain school and the true components of natural language. Since language is a system "où tout se tient" a linguistic description must, in some way, account for this peculiarity of language. The fact that the syntactic, semantic, and phonological components appear as fairly *integrated levels* of linguistic form is sufficient to discredit the author's basic approach. For integration always implies transformation and thus also ontological transubstantiation. This state of affairs affects also the nature of what the authors call "operations". There can, in fact, never be a question of completely independent operations. An integrated theory of linguistic descriptions can only start from the phenomenon of integration inherent in language itself.

Now, the authors also maintain that this characteristic of their "integrated" theory "is the formal analogue of Saussure's dictum that the connection between form and meaning is arbitrary" (p. 2); cf. N. Ruwet, *Introduction à la grammaire générative*² (1968), p. 321. That de Saussure never taught such an absurdity has already been pointed out (p. 82). Let me conclude this section of the conclusions by quoting Benoist once again, namely the following tirade: "Ce retour de la culture au grand sommeil de la nature naturante et naturée, ce grand triomphe du spinozisme à l'issue d'une orbe structurale où s'affirmait l'antiréductionisme de la structuralité, il nous faudra le confronter avec ce qu'affirme Lévi-Strauss dans le finale de *l'Homme nu*: 'Le fait de la structure est premier.'" (op. cit., p. 105). Although I have no pretensions to understand this completely I nevertheless stubbornly insist that in the beginning was "chaos" and "chance", chance being the principle of "form", and that only then it can be a question of the structure of "nature" in our sense, cf. above, p. 99 and "Principia", p. 80 and pp. 91 f.

I have, several times, stressed the fact that between e.g. *faras* = expression and *FARAS* there is a relation of complete isomorphism. This means that we are dealing with two sides of the same thing, namely with the *sign* "faras". This being so, the method of disintegrating the sign into a phonological and a morphological level in order to obtain an "objective" foundation of an *aesthetic* criterion seems to me highly problematic. The opinion that *f-a-r-a-s* as *phonemes* should appeal, especially, to the emotions of the receiver, I cannot really believe. When Ibn alMu'tazz chooses a word like *haṭṭālun* he chooses it just as a *word*, the expression of which is not to be considered as composed of phonemes. An expression and its phonological representation are qualitatively quite different things. *h-a-ṭ:-a:-l-u-n* is a sequence of *radicals* in the function of technemes. The radical being a link between morphemics and morphology, we have always to start from the technemic function of a sequence of such radicals, participating, by virtue of the phenomenon of integration, also in the "mental" form of the expression, that is in the content. So I shall contend that it is always the whole word *haṭṭālun* which appeals to the *understanding* of the receiver, including of course also his emotional life. However, if we want to give a special place, within the *structure* of language, to the phenomenon intended by Jacobi we will have to consider the *whole sign*, (*haṭṭālun* ~ *HATṬĀLUN*), as an expression of what

could be called the suprallexemic content of this *new* sign. It is the *impression* of the content of this new sign that could possibly be said to appeal more specifically to the emotional life of the receiver, but then only as an element of what I call the supratextual discursivity (Principia, p. 102).

As has been mentioned above (p. 83), de Saussure has replaced the unity (concept ~ image acoustique) by the unity (signifié ~ signifiant) while I have myself been using (content ~ expression). This replacement of de Saussure's was, indeed, a judicious one, for the term "concept" could easily give rise to the idea that the content of the expression is a concept in the philosophical sense (cf. p. 93 f.). If this were the case one could object to my model

F-A-R-A-S
f-a-r-a-s

in IM and Principia (p. 43), that while the expression *faras* permits an analysis in the phonemic sequence *f-a-r-a-s* it is not possible to analyse the content *faras* in a corresponding way, since we would then be atomizing a *concept* in phonemic units, which would no doubt appear as a rather odd procedure. Let us then first of all state that the content *FARAS* is obviously nothing but a casual *representation* of what we call "concept". The sign *faras* being—as a representation of a morpheme—in the first place a representation of linguistic form, in this case the "intuition" word ~ lex, it is likewise obvious that we are entitled to divide, even *vertically*, this representation—as an "entité psychique à deux faces"—in accordance with what I call the principle of isomorphism, that is, a division into *radicals*:

F	A	R	A	S
f	a	r	a	s

On the contrary, this division into radicals, participating in the relevant properties of both sides of the sign can give us a clue to what is to be understood by the so-called "concept" from a psycholinguistic point of view. It is, then, unavoidable to comment here also upon a modern Swedish manual dealing with our problem, namely B. Malmberg, Teckenlära (1973), p. 49.

According to this in many respects meritorious manual, the so-called "double articulation" implies that "both halves of the minimal (uncomposed) sign are divisible independently of each other". Then one would like to know *how* the contentual side is divisible in a minimal sign like *häst* "horse". We receive here the answer: "The content 'häst' is indivisible, in any case in smaller signs",⁵⁹ which could, I think, be considered as a contradiction. On the other hand, it is maintained that "the expression / hest/ in Swedish decomposes into four phonemes each of which without a meaning of its own but with the function of distinguishing the signs from each other". However, the phoneme could never have fulfilled this function had it not a meaning of its own, namely the meaning of being a *value* (cf. p. 80). Moreover, disregarding the fact that the expression in question also in New Persian "decomposes into four phonemes" (/hest/ "it is") we must ask for *whom* it decomposes in this way. The answer is: for the phonologist. For within the framework of a realistic morphemics (IM, § 1, p. 3) it

appears wholly impossible to deal with "both halves of the sign" from *different* points of view *at the same time*. In consequence of the nature of the sign, expression and content are completely integrated, and it is in fact the phenomenon of integration that constitutes "le lien" in the sense of "opération" mentioned above p. 83 f.

Now, in spite of the fact that the point of departure of the exposition is the minimal, uncomposed sign, the manual in question offers as the only example a composed sign, namely *hästar* "horses", which is analysed and commented as follows:

häst|ar
/hɛ|star/

Here the unit 'häst' is called "the semantic element" and "-ar" "the morphological one", and this "division in signs" is said to show that it does not correspond to "the division of the expression in syllables and phonemes (which are both expressional units)". My first question here will be: If this analysis were correct could one then speak as easily as one really does? The answer is "no". My second question is: How can one speak of a "division in signs", that is, *häst-ar*, within the sign, and at the same time of a division in "syllables and phonemes" within the scope of one and the same sign? The answer is: one ought not to do so. My third question is: How can one, in this connection, designate *häst* as a semantic element and *-ar* as a morphological one? Is not *häst* also a morphological element, and is not *-ar* also a semantic one? We must answer in the positive, and it is therefore hardly possible to describe the contentual side of the sign in this way. My fourth question is: How is it possible to maintain that syllables and phonemes are "expressional units" and at the same time that they are meaningless "as such"? To my mind this statement is somewhat misleading insofar as these units never occur in living language "as such". However, disregarding the syllable, the linguistic reality of which appears to me unclear, I shall contend that a phoneme as an "expressional unit" is no longer only a phoneme but "a phoneme + position" which is quite another thing, namely a *radical*. As a sign the unity *hästar* is, in the first place, a morpheme, i.e. a sign for a "word" in the Swedish language. In this capacity it is a Swedish representation of the word as a behavioural universal having thus also a content, i.e. the lex (*HÄSTAR*). It is obvious that language would never be able to function if the expressional and the contentual side of the sign were not integrated. This reciprocal integration not only permits, but *necessitates* a division of the sign *as a whole*, and this division must be one into radicals. Thus, if we let *hästar* represent the whole sign (*hästar* ~ *HÄSTAR*) this representation should, in the first place, be divided into the six radicals *h-ä-s-t-a-r*, the radical being a complementary unit which participates in the relevant properties of both the expression and the content, that is, *h-~H-* etc. However, this *hästar* is, at this level of the analysis, only a variant of *häst* as a representation of the morpheme "word" (cf. above, p. 100). Unfortunately, nothing is said in the manual of what the unity in question is a sign *for*, in *la langue*, the system of linguistic *values*, only that it *is* a sign (cf. the author's opinion of the morpheme, Teckenlära, p. 31). A unity like *hästar* can, of course,

only occur in a *texteme*, and this fact is, as we have seen above, also of primary importance for a correct analysis of the sign in question.

Within the framework of the concept of "literarity" I have tried to define the concept of "style" with the help of a gradual privative opposition, in analogy with that which has been established for the category of mood. I have coined the term "supratextual discursivity" for the metareferent of the new sign using the whole of a sign as the expressional side of the new one. This point of view can also be applied to larger units, as a poem, a letter, a short story, a novel etc. since such units are always texts. Fundamental to my theory of language is, on the one hand, the insight into the *relativity* of the morphemic values, finding expression in the tension between 'sameness' and "otherness", and, on the other, into the *derivative* character of the levels beneath the morpheme of the texteme. It is always of the greatest importance to distinguish between the morphemes and their morphological representations.

NOTES

1. Due to, *inter alia*, terminological confusion the following statement is misleading: "Ändå vet vi alla att människor inte meddelar sig med hjälp av enskilda satser. Vi uttrycker oss med hjälp av yttranden som består av texter som i sin tur ofta innehåller flera med varann sammanhängande satser. Visserligen kan en enskild sats ibland fungera som en hel text, men vanligare är texter som består av flera sammanhängande satser i monolog eller i dialog." (N. E. Enkvist, Från sats till text och från text till värld, Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens Årsbok, 1981, p. 175). Language manifests itself, in the first place, as *textual behaviour*, the immediate constituents of which are the textemes, constituting a network (Principia, p. 99 ff.). An isolated sentence can never function as a text since the concept of "sentence" has no real linguistic relevance (cf. Fenno-Ugrica Suecana 5/1982, pp. 235 ff.). But a texteme can function as a text. According to the author of the article in question it is nowadays "the sentence, not the phoneme or the morpheme that is in the focus of the theory" (ibid.). I have some difficulty in looking at things in this perspective. For the phoneme *is* a morpheme, and so is the phraseme ~ texteme. Needless to say that I cannot accept the following slogan: "We may think of a language as a set of sentences, each with an ideal phonetic form and an associated intrinsic semantic interpretation. The grammar of the language is the system of rules that specifies this sound-meaning correspondence." (N. Chomsky—M. Halle, The Sound Pattern of English, 1968, p. 3), cf. Principia, passim.
2. Cf. the interesting dissertation "Roman Jakobsons poetik" (1979) by Anita Boström Kruckenberg.
3. Études de linguistique arabe (1960), pp. 178–9.
4. Cf. Die Welt des Islams, XX/1980, p. 222.
5. For the term "texteme" cf. also W. A. Koch, Vom Morphem zum Textem, 1969.
6. Cf. IM, p. 2.
7. S. Ullmann, Semantics (1964), pp. 7f. De Saussure is the father of modern structuralism; according to Edith Kurzweil it is C. Lévi-Strauss, cf. Kurzweil, The Age of Structuralism (1980), cf. Principia, p. 33.
8. Reprinted in "Readings in Linguistics II" (1966), pp. 216 ff.
9. For want of something better I have here deliberately chosen this rather vague expression for what could be called a kind of "intuition".
10. To N. E. Enkvist the morphemes are still today "orddelar" (op. cit., p. 175), cf. n. 1.
11. The behaviouristic frame of the act of speech, i.e. $S \rightarrow r \dots s \rightarrow R$ (L. Bloomfield, Language, 1957, pp. 22 ff.) should, in the first place, be understood as $S \rightarrow r = \text{text(eme)} \rightarrow s = \text{act of understanding} \rightarrow R$. The text is not simply "sound-waves generated by the utterance" (Ullmann, Semantics, 1964, p. 12) but exactly a text, in the sense of textual behaviour with all that this implies; the

- sound-waves are, in this connection, to be regarded as the transmissional-technical material of *informational quanta* (Principia, p. 50), cf. below, p. 77.
12. On Benveniste's "catégorème" cf. below, p. 82.
 13. Useful reading is here Benveniste's instructive article "La phrase nominale" (Problèmes, I, pp. 151 ff.). By the way, his reflexions (pp. 152 ff.) on the alleged opposition "procès"/"objet" hardly hit the mark if we fail to consider also the question of what *kind* of opposition we are dealing with here. If we regard "process" as the marked term of a privative opposition we obtain the values "non-process" = "static" and "neutral" (on "motion" and "rest", cf. Principia, pp. 33 ff.; IM, pp. 14 f.). However, on the level of the texteme this aspectual difference between "fienticity" and "stativity" has its neutral counterpart in the value "something has been said" (cf. n. 9), with complete indifference to the notions in question. From this follows that one is certainly not here "constraint d'envisager dans leur ensemble les rapports du verbe et du nom" (p. 152). It is, on this level of analysis, always a question of subject phrase and predicate phrase (cf. below, p. 102).
 14. Poetik och lingvistik (1974), p. 252.
 15. According to Anita Boström Kruckenbergh, the Saussurean signifier "stands for the material side of the sign, the sound mass or text picture" while the signified is said to "stand for the spiritual side of the sign, its meaning and its being rooted in the world of concepts" (Roman Jakobsons poetik, p. 24; cf. above, n. 2). However that may be, we are hardly entitled to speak of a material and a spiritual side of the sign. For, on the one hand, the spiritual side must, in the last resort, also be material in some way, on the other, it is not as a sound mass in a material sense that the signifier is of interest to us in this connection, but as the expressional side of the sign, implying quite another *ontological* status.
 16. Cf. G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (1971).
 17. Cf. C. K. Ogden—I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (1972), especially the verdict passed upon de Saussure, pp. 4–5.
 18. Cf. K. Brugmann, Griechische Grammatik (1900), p. 1: "Von Plato und Aristoteles wurde betont, dass nicht im einzelnen Wort, sondern nur in der Verbindung der Wörter zum Satz Wahres oder Falsches liege. Dies führte dazu, dass man die Sprachwissenschaft in den Dienst der Logik stellte. Man schied die Elemente des Urteils und bestimmte die Rede- oder Satzteile (μέρη τῆς λέξεως)." However, the phrases of the phraseme are no "Elemente des Urteils", the term "sentence" being thus inadequate.
 19. One should perhaps not speak of "la théorie binaire du signe", neither the theory nor the sign being "binary" in the modern sense of the word (M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses, 1966, p. 81).
 20. Ernout-Meillet, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine (1959), p. 614.
 21. Cf. n. 18.
 22. Cf. *Wa lā yanbaḡī, an yuḡanna, anna ssawādayni fī maḡhallayni mutamāṭilāni min kulli waḡhin, li'anna hādā fī maḡhallin wa ḡākā fī maḡhallin āxara, wa hādā yūḡibu ttamayyuzā, wa lā ssawādāni fī waḡtayni fī maḡhallin wāḡhidin mutamāṭilāni muṭlaqan, li'anna hādā fāriqū ḡālīka fī lwaḡti, fa kayfa yusāwīhi min kulli waḡhin, wa idā qulnā: ssawādāni miṭlāni, 'anaynā bihi fī ssawādāyati muḡāfan ilayhi 'alā lxuṣūṣi, lā 'alā Piṭlāqi* "And it must not be believed that two blacks in two places are similar in every way, since the one is in one place and the other in another place, and this necessitates their being different. Nor are two blacks at two time-points in one single place absolutely similar, since the one is separated from the other in time. Thus, how can the one be similar to the other? For when we say: The two blacks are similar, we mean by this 'with special regard to blackness', not in a general sense." (alĠazālī, *Tahāfut alfalāsifa*, ed. M. Bouyges, 1927, p. 38, § 31). In the same way we can say that in *faras* the two *a*:s are similar with regard to "phonemicity" but not "in a general sense", that is here, in function. For *a*₁ and *a*₂ are different to their *maḡall* "syntactic place".
 23. It is quite right to say that language "in the abstract" is not directly accessible to the observer, but it is at least misleading to add: "except through the artificial medium of the dictionary and the grammar book" (Ullmann, Semantics, 1964, p. 11). The linguistic sense of "language in the abstract" should be understood within the framework of the morphemic re-interpretation of the Saussurean sign as expounded in "Principia".
 24. It is difficult to follow the opinion of A. Martinet concerning the double articulation in "Éléments de linguistique générale"² (1961), §§ 1–8; 1–9. According to this author an "énoncé" like *j'ai mal*

à la tête or a part of such an "énoncé" making sense, like *j'ai mal* or *mal*, are called a linguistic sign implying "un signifié, qui est son sens ou sa valeur" (i.e. of the sign) and "un signifiant grâce à quoi le signe se manifeste". We must, however, be able to distinguish between the *value* of the sign and the *sense* of its morphological representation. How could *ž-e-mal-a-la-tet* possibly give us the intuition of being a sign, and thus also a sign for something, if this sequence were not at the same time "une unité située de la langue" the value of which is exactly "énoncé" in the sense of a texteme? As a representation of the textemic morpheme the sequence *ž-e-mal-a-la-tet* has the sense "j'ai mal à la tête" (= the pragmatic referent). Moreover, this sequence can only occur as a texteme in a textual network, and as a morphological representation of a *specific* morpheme it should be analysed in the phrases *ž-* and *-emalalatet*, consisting of eleven radicals, represented by seven phonemes. Thus, the double articulation implies, in the first place, the co-articulation of "mental" form and phonemic form resulting in the phrasic radicals *ž-* (= *ž* ~ *Ž*) and *-emalalatet*, according to the principle of functional isomorphism (Principia, pp. 54 ff., and p. 75; Fenno-Ugrica Suecana, 5/1982, p. 245). This means also that the term "monème" as defined by Martinet (op. cit., p. 20) should be avoided, cf. OS 21/1973, p. 72!

25. Cf. D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism, I/1980, pp. 4 ff. What the author has here to say of words like "belief" and "statement" is of great interest also to the linguist. For the linguist the ambiguity is rooted in language itself. It is to him a question of derivation. On the one hand, we have the fact that someone "believes" something (I), corresponding to Armstrong's "belief-state", on the other, we have the quality of believing (II), corresponding to Armstrong's "belief-content", that is, what someone really believes. To the linguist (II) appears as being derived from (I). However, the possibility of this derivational hierarchy seems to be rooted in the "word" itself, as a class-word (Principia, p. 84), expressing as such only a general idea.
26. Cf. above, p. 68 f.
27. Cf. n. 24.
28. Genetically and historically the word ought to be prior to the lexeme, i.e. the word as a class-word is prior to the word class (lexeme).
29. Cf. H. C. Hony, A Turkish-English Dictionary (1950), p. vi.
30. Cf. A. Kastler, Cette étrange matière (1976); this important book is only accessible to me in the excellent translation by Professor Nanny Fröman: "Denna underliga materia" (1981).
31. Cf. J. Merleau-Ponty, Cosmologie du XX^e siècle (1980), p. 17.
32. Cf. W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (1962), pp. 147 ff.
33. According to H. Gunkel, Schöpfung und Chaos (1895), p. 23, n. 2. Hebrew *bārā'* means, in this connection, "durch das Wort ins Dasein rufen". This interpretation can be supported by etymology. Arabic *bari'a* is "to be free (from)", and *bārā'* "create" may very well be an old factitive-causative from a **bārē'* "to be free". Thus, God freed, delivered the world from chaos, matter = non-existence. Taking the "primeval soup", in the sense of D. Barash, "The Whisperings Within" (1979), as our point of departure we can say that chance is also the principle of "life" being, structurally, form. In Man life, i.e. the blind force of reproduction, becomes aware of itself—a natural miracle—, and the so-called "life" of a human being might, in a way, be called the "dreams" of the principle of life: *La vida es sueño* (Calderón).
34. Cf. n. 25.
35. Problèmes du langage. Collection Diogène 51/1966, p. 54.
36. Cf. Fenno-Ugrica Suecana, 5/1982, p. 246, where "morphological variation" refers to the different representation of the same phraseme.
37. Cf. A. Bloch, Asiatische Studien. Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Asienkunde II: 3–4, pp. 106 ff. "Die Qašiden waren also Reiselieder" (p. 124). This interpretation is based on what Bloch thinks to have been the original function of this kind of poetry. But what was the meaning of *qašida* as a rhetorical term? A poem in which the poet had reached (*qašada*) the perfect form for his thoughts?
38. According to A. F. Mehren, Die Rhetorik der Araber (1853), p. 186, *aṭṭard wa l'aks* is "die Vorwärts- und Rückwärtsbewegung". However, the example quoted by him, namely *lā ya'šūna llāha mā 'amarahum wa yaf'alūna mā yu'marūna* (Sura 66,6) is to be considered as a kind of expression *per merisum*.
39. "Betraktom språken: hvad visa de oss? Ett galleri af förbleknade metaforer. Nästan hvarje ord,

som nu betecknar ett begrepp, var fordom en bild." (1819, partly from Jean Paul: "Jede Sprache ist ... ein Wörterbuch erblasseter Metaphoren", 1804).

40. Cf., p. 63.
41. Cf., p. 99.
42. Cf. my paper "The Computational Paradigm" (Fenno-Ugrica Suecana 5/1982, 245).
43. Cf. below, p. 126.
44. Cf., however, Jacobi, op. cit., p. 49.
45. The author is speaking of "main clause" and "subordinate clause", p. 46.
46. *Langages* 12/1968, pp. 92 ff.
47. These examples are taken from Hans Larsson, *Poesiens logik* (1899/1966), p. 36. In the French translation by E. Philipot (1919), p. 97 the Swedish text (in the edition available to me) is adapted for French readers, and thus our *stavarlltiggare* does not appear here, only *gångare/häst* being preserved as *coursier/cheval*. From the French translation of this, in Sweden, famous booklet I will quote the following passage: "Si l'on y regarde de près, les conditions exigées au point de vue théorique dans le choix des mots sont au nombre de deux: 1^o Il faut que le mot soit *adéquat*; 2^o Et en outre aussi *suggestif* que possible. En tant que suggestif il a le pouvoir d'amener à la conscience la représentation immédiatement désignée ainsi que d'autres représentations connexes. La représentation immédiatement désignée est le contenu *appellatif* (ou *dénotatif*) du mot; les représentations accessoires survenues par association forment son contenu *associatif*. Le mot désigne, dénomme appellativement un certain objet ou un groupe d'objets. Associativement, il évoque dans la conscience diverses représentations qui, au point de vue appellatif, n'ont rien d'essentiel. Par exemple, *coursier*, *cheval* et *rosse* ont la même valeur appellative, mais un contenu associatif très différent." (*La logique de la poésie*, p. 94)."
48. Cf. M. S. Ruy Pérez, *Estructura del sistema de aspectos y tiempos del verbo griego antiguo* (1954), p. 15.
49. Cf. Barthes, *The Rhetorical Analysis*, in: *Littérature et société. Problèmes de méthodologie en sociologie de la littérature* (1967), pp. 31 ff. (available to me only in a Swedish translation in K. Aspelin—B. A. Lundberg, *Form och struktur* (1971), pp. 269 ff.).
50. Cf. p. 124 f.
51. Cf. now also J. Hartmann, *Amharische Grammatik* (1980), p. 474.
52. Quoted below from *Philosophische Bibliothek*, Band 114, ed. J. Hoffmeister, 1952 and from "The Phenomenology of Mind", transl. by J. B. Baillie, 1967.
53. Cf. F. Rundgren, *Aristoteles hos araberna* (*Religion och bibel* 23–4/1965, pp. 57 f.).
54. Cf. especially J. E. Raven, *Plato's Thought in the Making*, 1965.
55. According to Voltaire.
56. A. Koyré, *Etudes d'histoire de la pensée philosophique* (1971), pp. 147 ff.
57. *Le structuralisme* (1968).
58. Cf. Collinder: "The entire mechanism of language consists in, or at any rate is based upon, an available supply of words as expressions of general ideas. If this were not so, the vocabulary of language would only include *nomina propria*." (*Finnish-ugrische Forschungen* XXIX/1946, p. 7); cf. also H. Putnam, *Mind, Language and Reality II* (1980), pp. 203 f.
59. How could it be divisible in signs bigger than itself? And what is the meaning of "signs" in this connection? According to the author the content constitutes only the half of the sign in question.

héläk—“miserable”, and *hīn*—“strength” and “supplication”

On the Use of Biblical Words in Medieval Hebrew Texts

KARIN ALMBLADH

In the *Tokheḥa* that concludes Bahya's *Duties of the heart*, it is said about the body *baḥōšāk bā' ūbaḥōšāk yēlēk dal 'ābyōn 'ānī wāhéläk*. Turning to the popular ethical work *Sefer ha-Yashar*, the anonymous author asks *'ēk yaššīg g'eḏullat bōr'ō 'ānoš nibzā w'héläk*.¹ The chronicler Joseph ha-Kohen, in his *'Emeq ha-Bakha*, writes apropos of an event in 1552 *wayyar' yūli'ō ha'appif'ōr tārām h'āyōtō 'ab h'amōn goyyīm nā'ar dal w'hālāk*.² In either case we have here *héläk* or *hālāk* in a sense, different from its sense in BH. The word is found twice in the Old Testament, viz. 1 S 14:26 and in 2 S 12:4. In the first instance it is usually interpreted as “flowing (of honey)”, although the text might be wrong there, while it in the second place means “traveller” or “visit”.³ Neither of these meanings fits in the places quoted here. The natural meaning here is in either case “miserable, poor”. The simplest explanation is that the Biblical word has here been influenced by the Arabic *hālaka*, which, though related to the Hebrew *hālak*, rather means “perish, die miserably”. Another point to be made here is that *héläk* is an adjective in the examples quoted. This is peculiar, as in BH nouns *qatl* and *qitl* do not have this usage. Also this might be due to Arabic influence, where such examples are found.⁴ Such an Arabic influence can quite well be expected here, as the authors of the works cited directly or indirectly belong to the Sephardic tradition.

Still another point can be made on the use of the word in the examples quoted. In either case the meaning of the word can be established, independent of any etymological discussion, by a resort to the context. The word is used as a B-word in something that for want of a better word can be called parallelism. In this way medieval Jewish authors were able to, as here, use a Biblical word in a sense different from its usual sense in the Bible, or to use Biblical words of an obscure meaning. An example of the latter case in *hīn* in Hi 41:4 *ūd'bar g'eḏūrōt w'hīn 'ārko*. Appearing in a description of the crocodile, the word is generally interpreted as “grace”, although this perhaps does not fit very well into the context. This was also the usual interpretation in medieval Jewish exegesis and lexicography.⁵ There were, however, other views, as two examples picked at random in the above-mentioned works show. In *Sefer ha-Yashar* it is said about God *b'rā'anū lkbōdō ūl'har'ōt tōqāf g'eḏūrātō w'hīn 'ārko*.⁶ Here Hi 41:4 is quoted *verbatim* with the important alteration of *d'bar g'eḏūrātō* into *tōqāf g'eḏūrātō*. This was, no doubt, done in order to give the sense “strength” to *hīn*, a sense recommended by Ibn Janāḥ in his dictionary.⁷ Bahya also uses the word in his poem, but his use is more ambiguous. He writes:

naḥšī °ōz *tidr*^e*kī*⁸ *w*^e*šūrēk* *bār*^e*kī*⁹ *w*^e*ḥīn* *l*^e*fānāw* *ta*^a*rki*¹⁰ *w*^e*šihā* *l*^e*nāgdō*
*šifkī*¹¹

On the surface it is possible to see *ḥīn* as parallel and synonymous with °ōz and meaning “strength”, *i.e.* Ibn Janāḥ’s interpretation. Baḥya was, however, a more clever poet than the anonymous author of *Sefer ha-Yashar*. Both were versed in the technique of *musiv*, *i.e.* the technique of weaving Biblical passages and allusions into the text, but Baḥya was also a great artist. *ḥīn* is, indeed, B-word to °ōz but it is also A-word to *šihā*. The sense of °ōz is furthermore determined by *bār*^e*kī*, *i.e.* it means here “praise”, where one is reminded of passages like Ex 15:2 °āzzī *w*^e*zimrāt yāh*. *ḥīn* is then the antithesis to °ōz and explained by *šihā*, “complaint” and means rather “supplication” (*cf.* here *t*^e*ḥinnā*). The passage should then be translated

My soul, tread forth with praise and bless thy rock
direct supplication for Him and pour out complaint to Him.

Returning to *hélāk*, “miserable”, this was a sense that never gained ground. In any case it seems to have passed rather unnoticed and it has not entered the standard dictionaries. Instead another word was used that is similar to it and that also is rooted in Biblical usage, *viz.* *hélāk*. In Ps 10 occurs the word *ḥelkā*. Though as yet unexplained it is generally understood to mean “poor, miserable”. So it is translated in the Targum, and so it is also explained in the medieval Jewish commentaries. Thus David Kimḥi in his commentary on Ps 10:8: *l*^e*ḥēlkā* *k*^e*mō* *ḥélāk* . . . *ūfērūšō* *l*^e*ānī*: It was furthermore also felt to be inconvenient to have two, so quite different, meanings as “traveller” and “miserable” for one and the same word, all the more as it belonged to such a common verb as *hālak*.

NOTES

1. *Sefer ha-Yashar*, p. 5.
2. Joseph ha-Kohen, *Emeq ha-Bakha*, p. 81 (Hebrew section).
3. BDB, Ges.-B. *s.v.* *hélāk*.
4. GVG, I: 339 f.
5. So *e.g.* Ibn Ezra, *comm. ad loc.*
6. *Sefer ha-Yashar*, p. 3.
7. Ibn Janāḥ *apud* Ben-Juhuda *s.v.* *ḥīn*.
8. Jdc 5: 21.
9. Ps 18: 47, 144: 1.
10. Hi 41: 4.
11. Ps 102: 1.

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Hebrew and Aramaic ^ʔlōqīm

MATS ESKHULT

In Targum Ps. Jonathan we meet as the general word for God—not ^ʔlōhīm, but ^ʔlōqīm, pronunciation according to J. Levy, *Chald. Wörterbuch*,² 1924. This manner of spelling occurs throughout in the Brit. Mus. MS Add. 27031, edd. M. Ginsburger 1903, D. Rieder 1974.

The present writer will in this paper present a plausible explanation of the origin of the form ^ʔlōqīm. According to the prevalent view this form is a corruption “aus Scheu vor dem Gottesnamen entstanden” (Levy). A similar corruption is found in the forms ^ʔlōdīm, ^ʔlōdī, which are current in Jewish prints, and in the case of the Tetragrammaton *ywdw* as well. These forms obviously are mere scribal traditions.

Is, however, the alteration *hē* > *qōf* to be explained as a pure graphic corruption? The utter consistency of the manuscript in this case gives evidence against such a conclusion. Neither the letters *hē* and *qōf* exhibit such a resemblance as to make a corruption likely. The latter statement can easily be illuminated by examples from S. Birnbaum, *The Hebrew Scripts*, Leiden 1971. A more likely proposal is that the explanation of this phenomenon should be sought within the framework of a theological interpretation of the concept of God on the part of the Targumist(s), or rather his (their) calling attention to a certain attribute of God.

In Targum Onqelos ^ʔlōhīm is throughout turned into the Tetragrammaton, concerning exceptions—in the foremost place after *yhwh*, cf. E. Brederek's concordance. (As to ^ʔlhym = idol, cf. P. Churgin, *Targum Jonathan to the prophets*, New Haven 1907, p. 113.) A. Marmorstein, in his book ‘The Old Rabbinic Doctrine of God’, vol. I, London 1927, pp. 49, 50, maintains that Onqelos' way of using, or not using, ^ʔlhym gives evidence of the distinction made by Philo and the old Palestinean Rabbis, according to whom ^ʔlhym = Measure of love, and *yhwh* = Measure of judgement. This state of affairs should then, consequently, be the reason why Onqelos sees the Tetragrammaton in ^ʔlhym. Marmorstein further points out that in the middle of the 2nd century this scheme was changed the other way about as an answer to the gnostic conception, according to which it seemed natural that *kúrios* = *yhwh*, the God of the Jews, should be interpreted as the God of vengeance and rigid judgement. (Against this view of Marmorstein, cf. E. E. Urbach, *The Sages*, Jerusalem 1979 pp. 452f.)

If, consequently, Targum Onqelos renders ^ʔlhym by *yhwh* owing to theological considerations about the concept of God, and, perhaps, trying to delimit ^ʔlhym = the true God from the idea of God among the heretics and the “epicureans” (see Targum Onqelos to Genesis by M. Aberbach & B. Grossfeld, *Ktav* 1982), then it is quite possible that ^ʔlqym in Targum Ps. Jonathan is a way of offering another theological interpretation, namely ^ʔlhym = ^ʔēl qayyām, ‘the last-ing, living, eternal God’.

The word *qayyām* occurs in the oath-formula *qayyām* ²*nā*, Nu 14,21,28; Dt 32,40 and *qayyām hū* ²*ywh*, Jdc 8,19; Jer 4,2 & *passim*. Above all one ought to pay attention to the expression ²*lāh qayyām* in Jos 3,10 and ²*ammeh da*²*lāhā qayyāmā* in Hos 2,1 and *hū* ²*lāh qayyām* in Jer 10,10 (ed. Sperber). All of them have the Hebrew counterpart ²*el-hay* or ²*lōhīm ḥayyīm*, showing that *ḥay* in Hebrew as an attribute of God is rendered by *qayyām* as far as the Targums are concerned. This statement is also supported by Ps 42:3 *la*²*lāhā taqqifā ḥayyā wəqqayyāmā* (in Hebrew *lē*²*lōhīm lə*²*el ḥay*) and Ps 84:3 *libbī ūbāsārī mārannēn la*²*lāhā qayyām*, ed. P. de Lagarde, Hagiographa Chaldaice 1873 (1967), here vocalized.

An important link between the Masoretic O.T. and the Targums is Dan 6,27 *dī-hū* ²*lāhā ḥayyā wəqqayyām lə*²*ālāmīn*. Here we have the two roots *ḥyy* and *qwm* within a parallelism.

Essential for our study is also the current epithet *toû theoû (toû) zōntos* (ho zōn theós) in the Gospel of St. Matthew and in the epistles of St. Paul—also in Hebrews. Cf. Mt 16,16; 26,63; Rom 9,26 (quotation from Hos 2, 1); Hebr 10, 31 & *passim*. And not unexpectedly ²*lōhīm ḥayyīm* occurs as a name for God in the Rabbinic writings (see Marmorstein p. 72), to be accurate, in the Babylonian Talmud, Erubin 13b and Aboth de Rabbi Nathan, ed. Schechter, Vienna 1887 (New York 1945), i, ch. 1, p. 1. Even more, the expression 'the living God' is current in the intertestamental literature. W. Bousset—H. Gressman, *Die Religion des Judentums*,³ Tübingen 1926, p. 311, adduces about twenty instances. Upon examination one will find that in only some of these passages the participle *zōn* modifies *theós*. The following instances, however, are quite sufficient: Dan 5, 23 (LXX) *bis*, 6, 21 (Theod); Bel and the Dragon 5,24,25; Tobit 13,1; Jubilees 1,25; 21,4; The Sibylline Oracles III: 763; Additions to Esther, add. E 16; III Maccabees 6, 28.

Thus we have seen that the expression 'the living God' occurs in the O.T.; it becomes more frequent in the intertestamental literature among other circumlocutions for the Supreme, and there are many instances in the N.T. as well. We have also seen that the Aramaic counterpart of this expression is, in the Targums, ²*lāh qayyām*, even if ²*lāhā ḥayyā* does occur.

If, however, ²*lqym* is to be read ²*el qayyām*, one could raise the objection that ²*el* is Hebrew, and its only Aramaic counterpart is ²*lāh*. Nevertheless we find ²*el* in both Targum Onqelos and Targum Ps. Jonathan in the composition ²*el šadday*, Gn 17,1; 35,11; 48,3 and in ²*el* ²*lāhā dāyśr*²*l*, Gn 33,20. ²*el* ²*illā*²*ā*, Gn 14,18 ff., occurs in Targum Onqelos only.

Before bringing this paper to a close the reasons for another proposal on the pronunciation of ²*lqym*, closely akin to the one given above, is worthy of notice, namely that ²*lqym* = ²*el qayyām*. The word *qayyām* or *qiyyām* (ed. Sperber) is a rendering of the Hebrew *berīt*, see for instance Gn 15,18; Ex 24,8; Dt 5,2. In this connection cf. also Syriac *qayyām inter alia* 'statute, covenant'. Drawing from the O.T. the reading ²*el qayyām* is supported by Jdc 8,33 *bə*²*el qayyām*¹ (= *ba*²*al berīt*). *ba*²*al berīt* does also occur in Aboth de Rabbi Nathan i. 17,66 (Marmorstein p. 78) in the meaning 'Confederate', i.e. another name of God.

But how to treat those instances where ²*lqym* is in the singular or in the

suffixed state, e.g. Targum Ps. Jonathan ^{ʾlq} Ex 20,5; 34,14; ^{ʾlqʾ} Ex 34,6; ^{ʾlqy} Dt 4,5 ^{ʾlqwn} Gn 43,23. Such forms must, according to the present writer, be regarded as secondary analogical formations, which have arisen when the origin of the spelling ^{ʾlqym} had been completely forgotten.

The point is, in order to sum up, that ^{ʾlhym} owing to theological reasons was read ^{ʾēl qayyām} (or, though less likely, ^{ʾēl qayām}) and thus spelt ^{ʾlqym}. Especially the reading ^{ʾēl qayyām} suits well in the number of circumlocutions for God, which increased in the intertestamental period and are abundant in the Rabbinic literature.²

NOTES

¹ Sperber has a deviating vocalization, perhaps *qiyām*.

² After I had finished this paper the editor drew my attention to similar expressions in the Koran, namely 2, 255 *Allāhu lā ilāha illā huwa ṭhayyu lqayyūmu* = 3,2 and 20, 111 *wa-^canati luwǧūhu lilḥayyi lqayyūmi*.



The 'World Upside Down' in Hebrew

E. GUTWIRTH

The theme of the world upside down, one which, as Grant¹ and Ciocchini,² amongst others have emphasized, has had a remarkable longevity, despite the attention it has been receiving in the last few decades,³ seems to have gone almost unnoticed by students of Hebrew literature.

This does not reflect a total absence of the theme in Hebrew. Indeed some of the examples of its use might be traced ultimately to the Hebrew Bible. Hanna's prayer (I Sam. 2/1–11) composed, as it is, of variations of the theme of mutation became the starting point for expressions of the world upside down notion as a vehicle of social criticism,⁴ particularly through its nachleben in Luke 1/53 and the Magnificat. Is. 24/21; 'and the Kings of the earth upon the earth' seems to have inspired the radicals of Cromwell's age studied by Hill in his 'The World Turned Upside Down'.⁵

Not these obvious passages, however, but Zeh. 14/6 is the basis for the closest approach to the theme in the Talmud:

And it shall come to pass in that day that there shall not be light but heavy clouds and thick. What does heavy and thick mean? Said Rabbi Eleazar this means the light which is precious in this world yet is of little account in the next world. Rabbi Johanan said this refers to Negaim and Ohalot which are difficult in this world yet shall be light in the future world. While R. Joshua b. Levi said this refers to the people who are honoured in this world but shall be lightly esteemed in the next world. As was the case of R. Joseph the son of R. Joshua b. Levi who became ill and fell into a trance. When he recovered his father asked him 'what did you see?' I saw a world upside down the upper ones underneath and the lower on top. He replied: my son: you saw a clear world. And how are we situated there? Just as we are here so are we there.

TB, Pesahim 50a

TB, Baba Batra 10b⁶

It may be no coincidence that this saying is associated with the 3rd century Palestinian Rabbi known for his ideas of sympathy with the humble, tolerance of Christians and opposition to the established leadership of the patriarchate.⁷ As opposed to the first appearance of the theme in European literature, where Archilochus laments the possibility of a world upside down now that Zeus had darkened the sun (referring to the elipse of 6/4/648 BC),⁸ the world upside down is seen as an ideal providing a vehicle for criticism. That this criticism seemed unpalatable to later generations might be inferred from the Geonic attempt (recorded by R. Hananel b. Hushiel⁹ as a tradition 'from Rabbi to Rabbi') to reinterpret the passage as referring to R. Samuel who in the other world had to sit at the feet of his pupil.

The identity of the unnamed 'Upper ones' and 'lower ones' was the problem which confronted medieval glossators. R. Gershom (Mainz 960–1028) saw the gradation in terms of scholars versus the rich. The former will be honoured in the

world to come, (BB 10b)—not an unexpected view from one of the heads of the Mainz Talmudic Academy. Solomon B. Isaac, who often shows an affinity with the ascetic pietistic movement of social reform of his age—the Haside Ashkenaz¹⁰—sees the passage in unambiguously social terms of reference: the lower ones are the poor ‘who amongst us are humble but there are important’. (BB 10b ad oc.)

The sublimation of the criticism by projecting it to a Utopian ‘other world’ has affinities with some of the descriptions of the Messianic age where, for example, forbidden foods will be permitted.¹¹ These dicta would later provide a basis for radically antinomian reinterpretations in the xviii c. Sabbataian movement.¹² There is another aspect of the world upside down theme, i.e. the conservative fear of change. This might, perhaps, be said to be apparent in the descriptions of the age preceding the coming of the Messiah in which ‘truth will be absent, the young will put their elders to shame, the great ones will stand up before the small ones, children will disgrace their fathers, the daughter will precede her mother and the daughter in law will precede her mother in law’ (Sot. 49b Sanh. 97a). But this tacit recognition of a well ordered hierarchy in the real world which should be preserved is probably not as common as the idea that the true order is one which reverses the visible, worldly set of values and which exists in the world to come. This is expressed time and again in medieval Hebrew paremiology. “A divorce of this world is the marriage to the world to come.”¹³ “Those who are naked in this world will be clothed in the world to come.”¹⁴ Allied to this thought is the topsy turviness of this world in terms of an ideal order: “This world is like a balance which lowers the worthy and raises the worthless.”¹⁵

The chaotic, disordered view of this world within the framework of reference of an ideal ‘world to come’ is expressed in epigrams which are variations on the theme of the volubility of fortune (hazeman): “Perform pious acts for fortune changes, one moment it brings the honoured low (chastens) at another it raises the servants.”¹⁶ Perhaps the common feature of these Hebrew examples of the *mundus inversus* motif is their explicitness and didacticism. There is no stringing of impossibilia nor is there a desire to amuse, nor the creative expanding on an idea. Impossibilia from the animal world are, however, in use in Hebrew poetry. Sheiber¹⁷ pointed to their existence in a line of ibn Khalfun (first half xith c.) and one may add that Samuel Hanagid’s retort expands on the theme. In ibn Khalfun’s lines: ‘have you ever seen a roaring lion or hungry bear torn to pieces by a goat’ and ‘(the world’s) men are like its women and valiant men run into hiding as do the weak’ the stringing of impossibilities is a device for expressing the absurdity of his situation: he wishes to divorce his wife and is persecuted by his father in law. Samuel Hanagid uses the same device to pacify him: “if the princes are like the feet you are like the head”.¹⁸ The development of the subject of absurdity is the occasion for other examples of the use of impossibilia. Moshe ibn Ezra, when he wishes to expand on the futility and absurdity of trusting men of the world, mere mortals, uses the device of listing impossibilia; can the bird fly without wings? can the bow shoot without its cord? can the door stand with no sill?¹⁹

The poet who wished to express chaos or absurdity could use images denoting

the alteration of order if he wished to expand on the theme or merely allude to it by saying that the world was upside down, as in the opening lines of the poem: "I have seen a world upside down, therefore the law is slacked" (Hab. 1/4).²⁰ Closely related to the 'world upside down' as a weapon of social criticism is the view of an inversion of ideal or normal relationships brought about by the destructive power of money. Indeed within the genre of medieval venality-satire there is a sub-theme, widely popular in the Middle Ages, which consists of satirical generalizations on the power of money. In literature this is characterized by its form, money is loosely personified: Dan Deniers, Meinherr Pfennig, Lady Meed; the sardonic epigrams on its power are connected as in a litany. The most popular example would be in the Benediktenbeuren Carmina Burana and the longest Godfrey of Cambrai's De Nummo. The theme spread into French, German, Spanish vernaculars.²¹

In Hebrew poetry echoes of this theme might be found in a passage of ibn Shabtai's *Minhat Jehuda* (1188–1208) which consists of rhyming stanzas beginning with the word money (or the third person singular pronoun referring to it) and an elaboration on the theme of its power at the level of inversion of natural characteristics: It makes the deaf hear, the blind see, the fool wise.²²

The expression entered common usage and at times appears as an idiom unaccompanied by the features usually associated with the literary exploitation of the motif. A xiith c. Egyptian Jew returning from a safe sea voyage to find a perilous situation on dry land (the community had hidden to escape the tax-collectors) naturally uses the phrase: 'and I found a world upside down'.²³ A xviith c. Italian Jew, Abraham Catalano, trying to find a title for the chronicle of the plague in Padua in 1631 can do no better than 'the world upside down'.²⁴ A xxth century scholar, writing at a time when modern Hebrew was in the making, found the idiom particularly apt to describe his contemporary political scene after the Russian Revolution.²⁵

Some ramifications of the use of the phrase go deeper than mere idiomatic quaintness. The mentality which found the uses of the motif in Hebrew poetry aesthetically acceptable and metaphorically apt belonged to the same 'universe of discourse' in which other expressions of symmetrical topsy turviness appear in a non-literary context. Of these one may mention the myth of the child-prophet who teaches his elders—the *yenuqa*—the best known example of which is probably the 'Prophecy of the child' which appeared in the xvth century with the commentary of Abraham ben Eleazar Ha-Levi;²⁶ the enthronement of the student king on Purim at the Yeshivot; the idea of the duplication of the visible universe in the realm of evil, e.g. the demonic children procreated by onanism which accompany a man's coffin at his burial.²⁷

The classical statements of the topos in Hebrew poetry belong perhaps, to xvth century Spain. In his study of Spanish poetry of satire and invective Scholberg stressed how extensive the use of the topos was in the xvth c.²⁸ Hook and Williamson pointed to its use in the Spanish Dance of Death.²⁹ Against this background and that of thematic coincidence between Spanish and Hebrew poetry of the period one may place Solomon Bonafed's poem 'The World Upside Down'.³⁰ The poem is divided into two parts combining the 'world upside down' with the

'contempt of town and praise of country' themes. The latter is also to be found in xvth c. Spanish poetry.³¹ The 'topsy turviness' is carried through at various levels. There is the title which prepares the reader and sets the mood. There is then the conventional stringing of impossibilia: horses running in the sea, ships in the marketplace and so the theme is developed; inanimate objects, animals and finally men are said to have inverted their characteristics. The tailor thinks himself capable of vanquishing giants with his needle, his thread is, to him, sweeter than honey. The weaver thinks his beam as important as a lyre and his web as good as the knowledge of a Talmudic tractate: The tanner, traditionally regarded as the least sexually appealing of artisans is sought after for his kisses.

In line with the pride in technical achievement and poetic virtuosity of the late middle ages in general and in Hebrew poetry in Spain in particular the topsy-turviness is carried through to the use of homophones which have, in the context of the poem opposed meanings e.g. *masekhet*: treatise/web: '*anaqim*: giants/necklace-threads of cotton.

The social ideas of contempt for the artisan are in line with the opposition to artisan participation in Saragossan communal government expressed at various times in the century particularly in the years immediately following the Tortosa disputation (c. 1417) and in the forties, near the date of composition of Bonafed's cycle of poems against the 'honourables' of Saragossa.³³

In this cycle Bonafed returns to this theme and exploits it at intervals throughout the poem. Saragossa was the 'joyous city' till Joshua came and turned it into a 'tohu wabohu' a city of 'darkness and shadows' (Schirman, p. 17, lines 62-3) even axioms are only temporarily true (ibid., p. 20, lines 126-7), he turns everything upside down even in sexual intercourse (ibid., p. 16, lines 36-41). The laymen are heads of the Sanhedrin (ibid., p. 15, lines 11, 12).

To the same social circle belonged Vidal Benvenist.³⁴ He wrote a poem to an anonymous poet who had asked his advice. The poem essentially develops the subject of the absurdity of the request through the device of impossibilia familiar from the world upside down motif. Does the lion go to the sheep to ask for an estate? Does the whelp go to a kid with such a request? Do the sick go to the faint for cure? Does the dweller among lakes go to the desert to quench his thirst? Both Benvenist and Bonafed use *adynata* from the animal world and use the universe as the setting of a metaphoric topsy-turviness which extends to stars, seasons and the course of planets.

Abarbanel, no doubt schooled in the reading of such writings, uses, later in the century, a similar device in a less frivolous but still rhetorical manner. He is describing his fall from grace at the Portuguese court and says that a rival courtier sent word that the king had ordered him to be present at a certain place. When reaching it he was told that his life was in danger, that he should flee and save himself and he exclaims: "I saw a world upside down, there is no truth, no mercy, no fear of the Lord in the land", those who were powerful and without guilt had to flee and lose their wealth and might.³⁵

The above mentioned examples to which, no doubt, more could be added (especially if we think, with Cocchiara, that the portrayal of animals performing human functions belongs in this category), might justify the claim that there exists

in Hebrew, as in other literatures, a not inconsiderable body of instances of the use of the World Upside Down. These, when compared with their non-Hebrew counterparts, might yield interesting insights into the nature of Hebrew use of such universal themes. The initial and obvious impressions; the tendency to accumulate images rather than to develop one, the technical displays of verbal virtuosity depending on sound rather than on conceit, a sternness which precludes fantasy for its own sake; all these might well be qualified by a more thorough analysis than has been attempted here.

NOTES

1. 'Un Aleluya erótico de Federico García Lorca y las aleluyas populares del s. xix', *Actas del primer congreso internacional de hispanistas* (1962), Oxford 1964, 307-314; idem, 'El mundo al revés' in *Hispanic Studies* . . . Joseph Mason, Oxford 1972, 119-136; idem, 'Images et gravures du monde a l'envers dans leur relation avec la pensée et la littérature espagnoles', in (ed.) J. Lafond and A. Redondo, *L'Image du monde renversé et ses représentations littéraires et paralittéraires de la fin du xvie siècle au milieu du xviii*, Paris 1979, 17-33.
2. H. Ciocchini, *El sendero y los días*, Bahía Blanca 1973.
3. With the notable exception of the two images mentioned in A. Scheiber's 'Parallels from world literature to medieval Hebrew poetic similes' (Hebrew), *Festschrift* . . . A. M. Haberman, Jerusalem 1977, 319-321, and, to some extent, in G. Cocchiara's chapter on the Bible in *Il mondo alla rovescia*, Torino 1963.
4. Cf. e.g. J. T. D. Hook and J. R. Williamson, 'Pensastes el mundo por vos transtornar: The world upside down in the Danca general de la muerte', *Medium Aevum*, xlviii, 1979, 90-101, 90.
5. Christopher Hill, *The world turned upside down*, London 1973.
6. A similar use of the motif in Midrash Ruth Rabba, iii/i (transl. L. Rabinowitz, London 1939, 41-2): 'R. Measha grandson of R. Joshua, was unconscious for three days on his sick bed. After the three days, he regained consciousness. His father said to him, Where were you? He answered 'I was in a mixed world'. He said to him: 'And what did you see there?' to which he replied I saw there in disgrace many men who are held here in honour. When R. Johanan and Resh Lakish heard of this they went up to visit him and the father said to them: 'Did you hear what this youth said? they said: 'what?' and he related to them the incident. Resh Lakish commented: Is there not an explicit scriptural verse to this effect 'Thus saith the Lord God the mitre shall be removed and the crown taken off; this shall be no more the same, that which is low shall be exalted and that which is high abased' (Ezek. xxi/31).
7. cf. *EJ* sv. Joshua b. Levi.
8. v. 'Verkehrte Welt' in Ernst R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*, Bern 1954, 104-108.
9. R. Hananel's commentary to *BB* 10b.
10. cf. F. Baer, 'The social tendency of the Sepher Hassidim' (Hebrew) *Zion*, 3, 1938, 1-50. For the motif of the 'poor who take the place of the rich' in the xiiith c. *carrus moralis*, cf. Ciocchiara, op. cit. p. 17.
11. On the idea cf. e.g. J. Rosenthal 'The idea of the annulment of the commandments in Jewish eschatology' (Hebrew), *Sepher Waxman*, Jerusalem 1966, 217.
12. G. Scholem, *Sabbetai Sevi*, London 1973, 11-12, 162-167, 837, In Smyrna Sabetai Sevi used to have his bed upside down, *ibid.* 175.
13. I. Davidson, *Osar Hapitgamim*, Jerusalem 1957, 2882.
14. *ibid.* 2915.
15. *ibid.* 2897.
16. *ibid.* 1499, cf. also 1479.
17. op. cit. in n. 3.
18. cf. A. Saenz Badillos, 'Cinco poemas de Semuel Ha-Nagid', *Sefarad* xxxvii, 1977, 317-326.
19. D. Jarden, *Sephune Shira*, *Medieval literature and secular poetry*, Jerusalem 1967, 27. Elsewhere

- (p. 25/30) he also uses impossibilia: one may believe in one's fortune as one can cut down mountains without an axe.
20. I. Davidson, *Thesaurus of Medieval Hebrew poetry*, Phila. 1930, vol. 3 p. 255, No. 179 from Isaac Belinfante MS written 1768.
 21. J. A. Yunck, *The lineage of Lady Meed*, Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1963. The satire against the power of money in the *Libro de Buen Amor* and its relation to its antecedent, the *In terra summus rex est hoc tempore nummus* of the Carmina Burana is discussed by F. Lecoy, *Recherches sur le Libro de Buen Amor* (with supplementary material by A. D. Deyermond), Farnborough 1974, 237 ff.
 22. H. Schirman, *Hebrew Poetry in Spain and Provence*, vol. 2, Jerusalem-Tel-Aviv 1956, lines 47-51.
 23. J. Mann, *The Jews in Egypt*, 2nd ed., New York 1970, 301 (from T-S 13j20.3).
 24. C. Roth (ed.), *Qobets al Yad*, xiv, iv.
 25. A. Kaminka, 'Poetry and Rhetoric by Solomon b. Reuven Bonafed' (Hebrew) *Hasofe*, 1926, x, 288. Other modern Hebrew writers have exploited the resonances of the phrase for readers familiar with its Aggadic usage. Mendele (Devir, Tel Aviv 1947 p. 103) did so ironically when writing 'I saw a world upside down in the room, everything was in a mess' where the humour is achieved by the contrast between the cosmic dimensions of Aggadic usage and the domesticity of Mendele's scene. Elsewhere it is used as symptomatic of dream like experiences, again achieving depth by the unconscious association. Bialik uses it as well as an introduction to a poetic vision of sublime beauty where the associations with dream and a superior reality echo the Talmudic passages. (cf. his *Zohar*, x, 6 and *Ha-berakha*, i, 5.)
 26. cf. G. Scholem, *KS*, ii, 1925, 101-141, 269-273.
 27. G. Scholem, *On the Kabbalah and its symbolism*, New York 1972, 155. For the Purim King cf. I. Davidson, *Parody in Jewish literature*, New York 1907, 30. S. Clark, 'Inversion, Misrule and the meaning of witchcraft', *Past and Present*, 87, 1980, 98-127, explains the patterns of thought which produced the peculiar descriptions of demonic behaviour in terms of the tendency to inversion obvious in literature.
 28. K. R. Schollberg, *Satira e invectiva en la España medieval*, Madrid 1971, 229. The Barcelona poet, Ramon Saravall, wrote a poem, 'De mal saber—ab verinos coratge' in which he uses the town/country dichotomy, criticizes artisans and maintains that every thing is upside down and that those below wish to equal those above. Villasandino, a Castilian poet and contemporary of Bonafed, uses the motif of the world upside down to criticize his contemporaries. His lines 'ya los inorantes andan disputando las glosas e testos de Santo Agostin/e los aldeanos fablan buen latin' or 'non precian al bueno sy non al malsin' (*Cancionero de Baena*, 97) have their counterpart in Bonafed's poem (cf. below) and similar treatments of the theme are present in ibn Shabtai's poem 'The writ of excommunication' (ed. I. Davidson, *Eshkol*, vi, 1909, 165-175, 167, ii, 'they call a boor a wise man'). In Bonafed's 'The World Upside Down' (cf. below) we find the line 'Wisdom . . . is the sport of babes and infants' (line 6); the superscription contains an idea similar to that expressed by ibn Shabtai.
 29. art. cit. in n.4. It may be noted that the image of the seasons running out of course which is very fully developed in the Spanish Dance of Death is also present in Bonafed's poem: 'Nor should you marvel that the world is turned topsy turvy and the seasons have strayed out of course' (cf. below) especially if 'itim' is translated as seasons rather than the vager 'times'. For nature as participating in the 'sconvolgimenti che alterano l'ordine' cf. Cocchiara, op. cit. 15.
 30. A. Kaminka, *Ha-Sofe*, x, 1926, 290/291; H. Schirman, *Hebrew Poetry in Spain and Provence*, Tel-Aviv, 1956, vol. 2, 290/291; and now T. Carmi includes the poem (without the superscription) in *The Penguin Book of Hebrew verse*, 1981, 430-431. Bonafed used the motif in other poems as well; in a poem written on the occasion of the death of Maestre Dolç Selomo, he uses the image of death as turning things upside down: 'Death has changed sweet (Dolç) into bitter for the rest of our lives . . .' A. Kaminka, loc. cit. 294, line 1.
 31. For the fortuna of the Horacian *Beatus Ille* in Spain cf. Menendez y Pelayo, *Horacio en España*, Madrid 1885, t. 1, 6-7 where he traces to the Marques de Santillana's *Comedieta de Ponza* the beginning of the renaissance of the theme in Spain. The *Dezir* of Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza (J. Ma. Azaceta, 'El pequeño Cancionero' *Estudios* . . . Menendez Pidal, vii, i, Madrid 1957, 88/9) is

- also an example of the contempt of town and praise of country motif. For its French currency in the late Middle Ages cf. J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, Pelican 1955, ch. x: 'The Idyllic Vision of life'.
32. cf. Grant, loc. cit. 111, for the image of ships in the hills and 109 for the salmon who sings in the street. Cf. also H. Popper, *German Studies*, xii, 1979, 184-186.
 33. The brief of Alfonso V, empowering Vidal de la Cavalleria to reorganise the aljama (29/3/1417) of Saragossa, makes mention of the reigning situation at the time and says: 'los menestrales e de los menores ... havían tomado ... carga de regir e ordenar la cosa pública de la dita aljama por la qual razón toda la dita aljama y es en tanto desorden ...' (F. Baer, *Die Juden im Christlichen Spanien*, Berlin 1929, i, 839). The brief seems to echo a report by Vidal de la Caballeria a member of a family close to Bonafed's circle. The poems by Bonafed have been edited by Schirman, *Qobes al-Yad*, xiv, 1946, 15 ff.
 34. v. D. Yarden, 'A new song of Vidal Benvenist', *Sepher Shalom Siwan*, Jerusalem 1980, 371-374, lines 1-7.
 35. Introduction to his *Commentary on Prophets 1 a*. My thanks to Helen Grant for many conversations on the subject and to Mr. Paul J. Smith of Trinity Hall, Cambridge for his suggestions.

The Vale of Tears

*Remarks on the new edition of Joseph hakkohen's Sefær
‘Emæq habbākā*

TRYGGVE KRONHOLM

On May 29, 1981, the following doctoral dissertation was defended at the Department of Semitic Languages (Institute of African and Asian Studies) at the University of Uppsala: Joseph ha-Kohen, *Sefer ‘Emeq ha-Bakha (The Vale of Tears) with the chronicle of the anonymous Corrector*. Introduction Critical edition Comments by Karin Almladh (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, *Studia Semitica Upsaliensia*. 5. Editor: Frithiof Rundgren). Uppsala 1981. 128 pp. (Hebrew section), 78 pp. (English section), and 6 plates. *Infra*: E A.

I

It is immediately obvious that the Jewish physician, philologist, and historiographer Joseph hakkohen (1496–1577?) was inspired by Ps 84: 7, when he chose the title of ‘*Emæq habbākā* (The Vale of Tears) for his special chronicle of the sufferings of his people ‘from the day of Judah’s exile from his land until the present day (*mywm glwt yhwdh m’l ’dmtw ‘d hywm hzh*, E A, p. 2, line 3). In terms of a laconicism the author presents his choice of book title by saying: ‘I have entitled it “The Vale of Tears”, for it [truly] corresponds to its name’ (*w’qr’h šmw ‘mq hbkh. ky kšmw kn hw’*, E A, p. 2, line 6). Accordingly, in his chronicle Joseph hakkohen has recorded a series of calamities befalling the Jewish people from the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. up to a number of painful events occurring in the time of the author himself: fragmentary notes of misfortunes and disasters, of persecutions and deportations, of massacres and *autos-da-fé*, of humiliation and slander, of forced baptism and compulsory disputations etc.

The primary aim behind Joseph hakkohen’s compiling a particular chronicle of Jewish sufferings was evidently to supply a text-book suitable to be read at the annual celebration of the 9th of Ab—the day on which the Synagogue commemorates the destructions of Jerusalem, and, moreover, the life and death of all Jewish martyrs (see e.g. M. Ydit, Av, the Ninth of, *Encyclopædia Judaica*, Jerusalem 1971 ff., vol. 3, cols. 936–940, with references). In pursuit of this aim the record was composed in Biblical Hebrew as developed in the liturgy and Bet Midrash instruction.

The personal experiences of Joseph hakkohen’s far from tranquil life, which have given both the incitement as well as a considerable amount of material to his chronicle, actually turned out to form a miniature model of the general Jewish Vale of Tears mirrored in his work. The family of the author—in the introduction of ‘*Emæq habbākā* presenting himself with the full name of Joseph b. Joshua b. Meir b. Judah b. Joshua b. Judah b. David b. Mose (E A, p. 2, lines 1f.; a similar

chain of forefathers is found twice more in the production of Joseph hakkohen; see R. S. Weinberg, *Yōsef ben Y^ehōšū^{ac} hakkōhen w^esifrō Maššib g^ebūlōt ʿammīm*, Sinai 62/1973, p. 339, spec. note 4)—had formerly been living in Spain, but his parents were forced to share the fate of all those Jews who were expelled from the Iberian peninsula towards the end of the 15th century. Joseph hakkohen was born on December 20, 1496, whilst his family was residing in Papal Avignon (E A, p. 67, lines 24 ff.). Five years later we find the family in Italy, in the region of Genoa (E A, p. 67, line 24). Here young Joseph received a solid traditional Jewish education. In addition he achieved a remarkable amount of knowledge in several profane sciences, such as history, literature, philology, and, in particular, medicine (for details, see spec. I. Loeb, *Josef haccohen et les chroniqueurs juifs*, *Revue des études juives* 15/1887, pp. 28–56. 211–235; 17/1888, pp. 72–95. 247–271, particularly 15/1887, pp. 29–51; Joseph hakkohen, *Sefar Dibrē hayyāmīm . . .*, ed. D. A. Gross, vol. 3, Jerusalem 1955, pp. 3–26). Like his father, Joseph hakkohen became a physician by profession, and in due course he occupied a venerated position in his Italian society. However, his Jewish descent made it impossible to receive any permanent quiet essential for his work. In Italy, as in several other European countries, the Jews of those days were recurrently driven from place to place, from district to district, being the objects of ecclesiastical zeal or of Christian envy and hatred, often accused of blasphemy and black magic (see e.g. C. Roth, *The Jews in the Renaissance*, Philadelphia 1959; M. Shulvass, *The Jews in the World of the Renaissance*, Leiden 1973). Thus, in 1516 the Jews—and amongst them the family of Joseph hakkohen's father Joshua hakkohen—were expelled from Genoa (E A, p. 69, lines 1–4). Two years later Joseph ben Joshua was living in Novi, where he was joined in marriage to Lady Paloma, the daughter of one of the most outstanding rabbis of Renaissance Italy, R. Abraham b. Mose hakkohen (E A, p. 69, lines 4 f.; see further, I. Loeb, op. cit., 15/1887, p. 42, with reference). In spite of his esteemed social status and his fame as a physician and scholar of humanities, Joseph hakkohen had to live and work in constant disquietude. Accordingly, in 1533 he appears to be residing in Voltaggio in the vicinity of Genoa; five years later he evidently settled in Genoa proper, where he obviously remained until 1550, when he once again moved to Voltaggio (Joseph hakkohen, *Sefar Dibrē hayyāmīm*, ed. Sabbioneta 1554, pp. 166b–167a. 219b. 250b [= E A, p. 74, lines 23 f.]. 309ab [= E A, p. 79, line 21–p. 80, line 10]). The cause of the last-mentioned transfer was a decree ordering the Jews to leave Genoa (for particulars, see C. Brizzolari, *Gli ebrei nella storia di Genova*, Genova 1971, pp. 71 ff.). In 1567 another edict of expulsion was issued, and although the inhabitants of Voltaggio made interventions and applications on account of Joseph hakkohen, he decided to accompany the Jewish groups leaving for Monferrato (E A, p. 95, lines 17–24). Obviously he later resettled in Genoa (see I. Loeb, op. cit., 15/1887, p. 44), but it remains unknown where and when he ended his restless wandering. In the colophon of an autograph copy of some of his poems we come across the date May 20, 1577 (I. Davidson, ed., *Sefar Ša^{ca}šū^cim* by Joseph Zabara, New York 1914, p. cxix). This is Joseph hakkohen's ultimate sign of life, as far as we know.

It is significant of the situation of Italian Jewry of the Renaissance that Joseph

hakkohen, collaterally with his activities as a physician and a scholar, found himself obliged to devote much of his energy to the support, release and rehabilitation of a series of Jewish compatriots, who had fallen victims of Christian hatred towards the Synagogue and consequently had fallen into captivity and other kinds of affliction (see e.g. I. Loeb, op. cit., 15/1887, pp. 46–49).

However, Joseph hakkohen has gone to posterity particularly on account of his contributions in the field of literature. His first historical work was entitled *Sefær Dibrē hayyāmīm l^e malkē Šār^efat ūl^e malkē bēt ʿOttōmān hattōgār*, i.e. a chronicle of the kings of France and of the kings of the dynasty of Othman, the Turk. The first part of this work deals with the period from the fall of the Roman Empire up to 1520, and special attention is devoted to the epoch of the Crusades. The second part covers the span of time between 1520 and 1553. At a later stage of the author's life even a third part appeared, treating the years 1554–1575. The first two parts were concluded in November 1553 and were published in Sabbioneta as early as 1554 (cf. *supra*). According to our knowledge, this *editio princeps* of *Sefær Dibrē hayyāmīm* is the only literary work by Joseph hakkohen which was printed in his own lifetime. A second edition of the initial two parts of *Dibrē hayyāmīm* appeared in Amsterdam in 1733. The concluding part of the work was not published until 1955 (ed. D. A. Gross, Jerusalem; cf. *supra*). This chronicle, which through its title of *Dibrē hayyāmīm* is affiliated with the literary genre of Biblical chronicles, might be characterized as a general historical survey of the periods under treatment, but contains, moreover, a number of fragmentary accounts of various persecutions of the Jews. It is typical of the indefatigable research ardour of Joseph hakkohen that his *Sefær Dibrē hayyāmīm* was subjected to revision by his own hand at least two times. The first one seems to be represented by his autograph MS. British Library Or. 10387, in which the revision of the initial two parts of the work is said to have been concluded on March 25, 1556 (a third part, evidently concluded in 1574, appears to be a draft for the subsequent complete autograph). The second one is the complete autograph MS. British Library Or. 3656, which, although lacking a colophon, most probably was concluded in 1574, since the chronicle brings the events up to, and partly include, that year (exactly as the third part of the MS. previously mentioned). It is the text and material of this *Sefær Dibrē hayyāmīm* in its first revision (of 1556) which in due time will be employed as the skeleton of the material collected in *ʿEmæq habbākā*. As is well known, the historical accounts given in *Dibrē hayyāmīm* were later to find considerable usage in a number of subsequent Jewish chronicles (e.g. Gedaliah ibn Yahya's *Šalšælet haqqabālā*. Venezia 1587; David Gans, *Zæmaḥ Dāwīd*. Amsterdam 1692). It is of note, finally, that the *Sefær Dibrē hayyāmīm* only once has been translated in full into a European language, viz. the severely criticized English translation by C. H. F. Bialloblotzky (The Chronicles of Rabbi Joseph ben Joshua ben Meir, the Sphardi. Translated from the Hebrew [Published for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland]. 1–2. London 1835–36; as regards earlier attempts at translating the work, see L. Ferrand, *Conspectus seu synopsis libri hebraici qui inscribitur Dibrē hayyāmīm . . .*, Luteciae 1670, p. 7; F. Wilken, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*, vol. 3, Leipzig 1817, pp. 5 ff.).

Apart from the two historical works *Dibrē hayyāmīm* and *‘Emæq habbākā* a number of other books by the hand of Joseph hakkohen are known, dealing with geography and history, philology and medicine. Thus, three important translations by Joseph hakkohen have been preserved: *Sefær Maššib g^ebūlōt ‘ammīm* (a translation—completed June 23, 1555—of J. Boemus, *Omnium gentium mores, leges et ritus*. Augsburg 1520; extracts of the text were published in 1973 by R. S. Weinberg, op. cit.), *Sefær hā’Indī’ā* and *Sefær Fernando Cortez*, also known as *Sefær Mexico* (completed on February 28, 1557, and on July 4, 1557, respectively—together forming a translation of the Spanish work “La Historia general de las Indias” by Francisco López de Gomara, 1552; Antwerpen ²1554; in Italian, Venezia 1557), and finally the medical *opus Meqīš nirdāmīm* (an expanded version—prepared in Genoa in 1546—of the *Sefær R^efū’ōt* by R. Meir Alguadez, d. 1410; see recently D. Margalit, *Yōsef ben Y^ehōšūa^c hakkōhen ūk^etab hayyad Sefær Meqīš nirdāmīm*, *Qorot* 5/1973, pp. 533 ff.). The most important contribution by Joseph hakkohen in the field of philology is his *Sefær Pælæs haššemōt* (dealing with the ‘balance’ of nominal gender in Biblical Hebrew), which was composed in Voltaggio in 1561. It is worthwhile mentioning, finally, that comprehensive collections of letters as well as of poems by Joseph hakkohen have come down to our days in manuscripts (some of his poems were included in I. Davidson’s edition of the *Sefær Ša^{ca}šū^cīm* by Joseph Zabara. New York 1914; as regards the collection of letters, see spec. I. Loeb, op. cit.; see further *Sefær Dibrē hayyāmīm*, ed. D. A. Gross, vol. 3, Jerusalem 1955, pp. 9–15).

II

Having thus established the character of the life, education, and literary activities of the author of the *Sefær ‘Emæq habbākā*, we are henceforth to concentrate on this particular chronicle. We have already seen that the work was composed in order to serve as a suitable text-book for the 9th of Ab. We also know that the bulk of the material of this special chronicle of Jewish sufferings has been taken over from the author’s *Sefær Dibrē hayyāmīm*. In one of the MSS. of *‘Emæq habbākā* (MS. British Library Add. 27122, fol. 1a; see further *infra*) we further receive the information that the work was written in Voltaggio in the year 5318 (= 1557/58). It is, however, not possible to certify exactly which events or which literary works that have given Joseph hakkohen the idea to compile his ‘Vale of Tears’. According to a traditional opinion, first advanced by Samuel David Luzzatto in his preface to the *editio princeps* (ed. M. Letteris, Wien 1852; see *infra*), Joseph hakkohen was initially inspired by the appearance of Samuel Usque’s pious and comforting description of Jewish sufferings, *Consolaçam ás tribulaçoens de Israel* (first published in Ferrara in 1553). The recent editor of *‘Emæq habbākā*, K. Almladh, prefers to regard the composition of the work ‘against the background of the gradually deteriorating situation of the Italian Jewry during the reign of Pope Paul IV, culminating in the *autos-da-fé* in Ancona in 1556 and their aftermath’ (E A, English section, p. 20). In default of further evidence, the problem cannot be definitely solved at present.

The 'Emæq habbākā chronicle invites us to some considerations as regards the treatment of source material and the historical method employed. Admittedly, Jewish historiography in general is unique in that on the one hand it has a long pedigree, being fairly developed already about 3000 years ago and displaying the ability to place the forefathers, tribes and people of Israel within the framework of an Ancient Near Eastern context, whilst on the other hand it appears to be exceptionally young, since an objective Jewish historiography in a modern sense of the term hardly took shape until the beginning of the 19th century. At that time it is raised to autonomous life through the violent storms emanating from the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*—storms vehemently breaking down the barriers of Jewish particularism, the entrenchments of religious traditionalism, and the paralysing fright of profane source criticism and rational view of history, and at the same time fostering such giants of a relatively unconditioned scholarship as L. Zunz, S. J. L. Rapaport, S. D. Luzzatto, N. Krochmal, Z. Frankel, A. Geiger, S. Muck, M. Steinschneider, I. M. Jost and their followers (see e.g. B. Dubin, *Wissenschaft des Judentums, Encyclopædia Judaica, Jerusalem 1971 ff.*, vol. 16, cols. 570–584).

The historiography of Joseph hakkohen might naturally be described as having received all its deeper inspiration from Jewish traditionalism. Nonetheless a number of minor specific features—often of a personal nature—betray the influence also of the profane literature of European High Middle Ages with its analysis of historical reasons and consequences, of causes and results, and of the complex character of history.

Previous research in the actual sources of Joseph hakkohen's 'Emæq habbākā has been carried out by preeminently S. D. Luzzatto (published in 'Emæq habbākā, ed. M. Letteris, Wien 1852, pp. v–xii; see *infra*), M. Wiener (in the notes to his German translation of 'Emæq habbākā, Leipzig 1858, pp. 148–220; see *infra*), I. Loeb (op. cit., 1887–88), G. Gelbart (in his translation of "A Consolation for the Tribulations of Israel by Samuel Usque", New York 1964, *passim*), and, in particular, P. Leon Tello (in her Spanish translation of 'Emæq habbākā, Madrid–Barcelona 1964, *passim*; see *infra*). In her introduction to the new edition of *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* K. Almbladh supplies an elucidating summary of the results of these source studies (E A, English section, pp. 20–28). Special mention is here made of the influence of the Latin adaptation of Flavius Josephus' works, known as *Josippon* and probably written in the south of Italy in 953 (see D. Flusser, *Josippon, Encyclopædia Judaica, Jerusalem 1971 ff.*, vol. 10, cols. 296–298; see also H. Schreckenberg, *Die Flavius Josephus Tradition in Antike und Mittelalter [Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums. 5]*, Leiden 1972; not noted in E A). Mention is also made of the influence exerted by Abraham ibn Daud's compilation of traditions, the *Sefar haqqabbālā* (published in Mantua 1513), as well as by Eliezer b. Nathan of Mainz' chronicle of the persecution of Jews during the First Crusade and the corresponding work as regards the time of the Third Crusade by Ephraim b. Jacob of Bonn—two works which Joseph hakkohen must have utilized in manuscript form. In addition mention is made of a few other traditional Jewish works of the Middle Ages, being of either historical, didactic, or halachic nature.

Particular significance is rightly attributed to the third part of Samuel Usque's *Consolaçam* (Ferrara 1553).

It is, however, also to be underlined (more than is the case in E A) that the canonical Biblical books, the liturgy of the synagogue, and the classical literature of Rabbinical tradition play an important rôle in the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā*. A profound indebtedness to these traditional sources compels the author to employ an archaizing Hebrew—ininitely distant from the everyday language of 16th century Italy—as his literary medium. A related traditionalism has clearly offered a framework for the outer shape of the chronicle—ultimately inspired by the style of Biblical chroniclers. The same background also explains the fact that the rationally and empirically determined pattern of cause and result in the historiography of *'Emæq habbākā* is recurrently broken through by the scheme obedience–prosperity and wickedness–punishment—richly represented in the Biblical historiography by the Deuteronomist and the Chronicler (cf. e.g. R. Smend, *Die Entstehung des Alten Testaments* [Theologische Wissenschaft. 1]. Stuttgart–Berlin–Köln–Mainz 1978, pp. 111–125, 225–229). All this is to say that the traditionalism of the historiographer Joseph hakkohen is to be considered much more profound than the immediate impression given by his chronicles might suggest.

On the other hand there are in the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* a number of features partially connecting it with the development which in due time was bound to materialize in the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. Through his removals and journeys, through his profane studies and translatory tasks, and through his literary correspondence and personal contacts with non-Jewish people among his contemporaries, Joseph hakkohen received important pieces of information and also a considerable number of impulses, which in combination give his admittedly traditional history of sufferings not merely a personal and vivid stamp but also an admirable tendency towards objectivity and, moreover, a certain distance to his own account.

We have already seen that the indefatigably busy author of *Sefar Dibrē hayyāmīm* revised his works more than once. Likewise, several revisions of *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* are known. After the initial compilation of the work—which according to the introduction of MS. British Library Add. 27122 was carried out in the year 5318 (1557/58) in Voltaggio (see *supra*)—the first revision traceable is represented by MS. British Library Or. 12348, the colophon of which is dated Elul 1, 5320 (= August 23, 1560). A third version of the work is represented by the MS. Alliance Israélite Universelle, Paris, H 40 A, on which S. D. Luzzatto and M. Letteris based the *editio princeps* of *'Emæq habbākā* (Wien 1852, p. x; see further *infra*), in which Joseph hakkohen's own revision was concluded on Kislev 6, 5324 (= November 22, 1563). The last revision of the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* is according to the colophon found in MS. British Library Add. 27122 to be dated Tammuz 21, 5335 (= June 29, 1575). It is possible—also probable—that the text was revised even once or several times more (thus, K. Almladh claims that 'Ca 1565 another version was finished, ending with the rescue of the Jews of Mantua in 1562' (E A, English section, p. 21))—a supposition based on MS. Jewish Theological Seminary Mic. 3563, which is clearly a

strongly blurred copy, the colophon of which is dated Tishri 9, 5320 (= September 10, 1559), a date which, according to K. Almbladh is incorrect (see further *infra*). In some of the MSS. to *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* we also find a continuation of Joseph hakkohen's own chronicle by an anonymous writer presenting himself as The Corrector (*hmgyh [hammaggiah]*, E A, p. 98, line 1), who brought the chronicle of Jewish sufferings up to the year 1605.

The *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* was not printed at the time of its compilation or revisions, but circulated in manuscript form. Since it was once composed as a text-book for reading at the annual celebration of the 9th of Ab, and moreover since it was not gradually brought up to date after 1605, the work apparently fell into a progressive oblivion. However, the *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* was far from entirely unknown in 19th century Italy, and through the initiative of S. D. Luzzatto an *editio princeps* of the text was prepared. It was formally edited by M. Letteris (*Emek habaca. Historia Persecutionum Judæorum comprehendens periodum ab anno p. Ch. n. LXX usque MDLXXV a Josepho Hacoen. ... Juxta opus ineditum, in Bibliotheca Caesareo-Regia Vindobonensi reservatum, alioque manuscripto collatum. Cum notis criticis ed. Dr. M. Letteris. Wien: J. P. Sollingers Witwe, 1852*). A reprint of the *editio princeps* was published in Krakow in 1895 (see E A, English section, p. 73), a second reprint appeared in Jerusalem (Lewin-Epstein) in 1945 (according to the Catalogue of the Library of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), and a revised Hebrew edition was issued in Jerusalem (Epstein & Co.) in 1956 (see the English translation of *'Emæq habbākā* by H. S. May, the Hague 1971, p. 140; further *infra*). The second actual edition of the *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* is that by K. Almbladh of 1981 under review.

As already intimated, Joseph hakkohen's *'Emæq habbākā* was translated into German in 1858 (*Emek habacha von R. Joseph ha Cohen. Aus dem Hebräischen ins Deutsche übertragen, mit einem Vorworte, Noten und Registern versehen und mit hebräischen handschriftlichen Beilagen bereichert von Dr. M. Wiener. Leipzig*), into French in 1881 (*La vallée des pleurs. Chronique des souffrances d'Israël depuis sa dispersion jusqu'à nos jours. Publié pour la première fois en français avec notes et textes historiques par Julien Sée [Les chroniques juives. 1]. Paris*), into Spanish in 1964 (*'Emeq ha-Bakha de Yosef ha-Kohen. Estudio preliminar, traduccion y notes por Pilar Leon Tello [Biblioteca hebraicoespañola. 8]. Madrid-Barcelona*), and into English in 1971 (*Joseph hacohen & the Anonymous Corrector. The Vale of Tears (Emek habacha). Translated & with critical commentary by Harry S. May. The Hague*). Two more translations of the *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* are said to be in existence, one from 1935 (according to the catalogue of the University Library of Jerusalem: *'mq hbk? . 'yl b' 'yy dylws ywrrws. pwr ywsp hkhm mydyqw dy 'bynyywn 1575. tryzlp'd' dw pwr šm s'lwnyqw 1935*; for this piece of information I am indebted to Dr. G. Larsson, Swedish Theological Institute of Jerusalem), and one undated translation (according to H. S. May, *op. cit.*, p. 140: 'Hacohen, Joseph, *Emek Habacha* in Latin by Bibliotheca Caesareo-Regia Vindobonensi'. This statement may, however, be due to a misunderstanding of the Latin title of the *editio princeps* of the Hebrew text, Wien 1852; see *supra*).

Leaving the mention of the 8 MSS. of the *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* to the

subsequent discussion of the editory principles employed by K. Almladh, it seems that the previously delineated background would suffice to introduce a critical examination of Almladh's new edition.

III

In her introduction to the new edition of the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* K. Almladh notes her grounds for preparing again a full edition of the work in spite of the existence of the Luzzatto–Letteris edition of 1852, which was reprinted as late as in 1956. Pointing to the considerable impact of 'Emæq habbākā on the files of Jewish historiography, K. Almladh states: 'Because of this and because of the obvious shortcomings of the first edition, it merits a new edition. Therefore Joseph ha-Kohen's text, copied by himself in 1575, is presented here' (E A, English section, p. 15). This remarkable linking of the question of the eventual need of a new edition of 'Emæq habbākā with the problem of the choice of a basic manuscript for the edition is apparently due to a logical slip.

Turning first to the actual need for an entirely new edition of the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā*, this is hardly to be seriously questioned. The *editio princeps* of 1852 leaves much to be desired as regards the completeness of the manuscript material presented as well as concerning editorial method, scholarly discussion of textual criticism, and the exactitude of the work. The Luzzatto–Letteris edition supplies an eclectic 'Emæq habbākā text. The registration of variant readings is deeply unsatisfactory. Moreover, according to K. Almladh, the *editio princeps* is built mainly on three MSS. (MS. British Library Add. 27122; MS. Alliance Israélite Universelle H 40 A; MS. Bodleian Library Opp. Add. 4^o 180; see E A, English section, p. 37). This statement—whether correct or not (on MS. VIII, see *infra*)—intimates the omission of in particular two MSS. (MS. British Library Or. 12348; MS. Jewish Theological Seminary Mic. 3563; see further *infra*), and consequently reveals an additional reason for a new text edition. It appears, though, a bit bold to prepare a new edition of 'Emæq habbākā without consulting the two latest versions of the previous edition (Jerusalem 1945 and 1956 respectively), particularly since the last one is said to be a revised edition (cf. E A, Bibliography, English section, p. 73). However, the task of undertaking the preparation of a second fully fresh 'Emæq habbākā edition is unquestionably justified.

The other problem intimated, viz. that of the manuscript base of the new edition, will be the main question to be discussed subsequently, for it is exactly at this point that the scholarly ability of the editor is to be displayed. It is, admittedly, an exacting task to introduce and comment upon a text edition in an adequate and minute manner. However, as far as the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* is concerned, the present editor was in the position of being able to proceed from a number of earlier comprehensive investigations of the text, in particular by S. D. Luzzatto (in the *editio princeps*, 1852), I. Loeb (op. cit., 1887–88), P. Leon Tello (op. cit., 1964), as well as from a number of previous studies on the life and literary works of Joseph hakkohen, especially those by Luzzatto (op. cit.), M. Steinschneider (Catalogus librorum Hebraeorum in Bibliotheca Bodleiana, Berlin

1852–60, pp. 1498 ff.), E. Wiener (op. cit., 1858), I. Loeb (op. cit.), D. A. Gross (op. cit., 1955), P. Leon Tello (op. cit.), and J. Kessous (La 'Chronique' de Joseph ha-Cohen, Archives Juives 13/1977, pp. 45–53. 56–75), not to mention the modern standard encyclopedias. The same indebtedness to previous research also applies to the analysis of the contents of 'Emæq habbākā in the commentary section, since earlier detailed studies by in particular Luzzatto, Wiener, Gelbart, and Leon Tello have put the editor in need of confessing: 'Thanks to these previous studies, it is possible to ascertain most of the direct sources, and further investigations yield therefore at best a new and more accurate footnote' (E A, English section, p. 26). Thus, although no negative criticism is to be passed on the editor for making abundant use of the works of her predecessors, when introducing, elucidating, and commenting upon the text of 'Emæq habbākā, this remark is merely to point out that the preeminent independent contribution of the editor is to be found in her discussion of the manuscript material and her conclusions as regards the construction of the new edition. Therefore, the subsequent examination of K. Almladh's edition will focalize on the fundamentals and editorial principles displayed in the work.

IV

We have already noted in passing that the fragmentary motivation of the choice of basic manuscript for the new edition of the *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* intimated in combination with the reasons advanced for the preparation of the edition itself (E A, English section, p. 15) is far from satisfactory. Naturally, this is not the only place in the work, where the question of the fundamentals of the edition is subjected to treatment; on the contrary, the problem is discussed in full in a special chapter (E A, English section, pp. 33–42).

The editor starts out by supplying a condensed presentation and description of the 8 MSS. of the *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* which are known to her: MS. British Library Or. 12348 (designed as MS. I), MS. Jewish Theological Seminary Mic. 3563 (MS. II), MS. British Library Add. 27122 (MS. III), MS. Alliance Israélite Universelle, Paris, H 40 A (not 'M 40 H', as stated by the editor, English section, p. 35) (MS. IV), MS. Bodleian Library Opp. Add. 4° 180 (MS. V), MS. Preussische Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, Or. 4° 1551 (MS. VI), MS. Bibliotheca Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Budapest, Kaufmann Collection N° 356 (MS. VII), and MS. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Wien, Hebr. 124 (MS. VIII). Of these 8 MSS. at least 4 were utilized in the preparation of the *editio princeps*, viz. MSS. III, IV, V and VIII (see further *infra*), whilst MS. VII is merely a late copy (1831) of MS. V. MS. I was brought to light by I. Loeb (op. cit., 1887–88). MSS. II and III have been described by D. A. Gross (op. cit., 1955, pp. 9–15) and P. Leon Tello (op. cit., 1964, pp. 36f.). It is to be noted, finally, that MS. VI ('copied by one hand, possibly in the 18th century' [E A, English section, p. 36]) is of a most disputable text critical value; see *infra*.

I wish to point out from the beginning that when the various descriptions of MSS. supplied by K. Almladh are carefully scrutinized, a number of serious

difficulties arise. These difficulties increase considerably, when the descriptions under discussion are compared with those given by D. A. Gross and P. Leon Tello. When, in addition, the manuscripts themselves are brought into the discussion, the problems turn out to be almost insurmountable. The true relationship between the MSS. of the *Sefar* 'Emæq habbākā is more complicated and thrilling than the plot of a detective novel by Mrs. Dorothy Sayers!

The fundamental problem partly concerns the actual choice of a basic manuscript for the new edition. K. Almladh has decided to utilize for this purpose Joseph hakkohen's ultimate, autographical version of the text from 1575 (= MS. III). The motivation for this choice might not be to everybody's satisfaction: 'As it is the only complete autograph, it is the base of the present edition of 'Emæq ha-Bakha' (E A, English section, p. 35). For it is a remarkable fact, clearly admitted also by the present editor, that this MS. was known already at the preparation of the *editio princeps*. How should it be explained that one of the most prominent scholars of Jewish studies in the 19th century—S. D. Luzzatto—failed to base his 'Emæq habbākā text on this MS. and preferred to use another MS. which included the chronicle of The Corrector as the foundation of his edition (see further *infra*)? This is an intricate question which the new editor avoids formulating.

It might, however, be possible to disentangle this problem by means of one of the editor's own footnotes (E A, English section, p. 21, note 19). On dealing with the various versions of the *Sefar* 'Emæq habbākā prepared by the author himself, the editor notes that the original text was composed in the year 5318 (= 1557/58; with reference to the introduction of MS. III) and that the first revision was concluded on Elul 1, 5320 (= August 23, 1560; with reference to the colophon of MS. IV). For the second revision of the 'Emæq habbākā text the editor refers in the aforementioned footnote to a text 'dated 6 Kislev, 5324 (= November 22, 1563)'; reference is made here to E A, p. 93, line 7. But this line only contains the words *twdh P'lhym* ('thanks to God'), and constitutes the end of the treatment of the year 5321 (= 1561) in the text of 'Emæq habbākā. Mysteriously, the exact date Kislev 6, 5324, is nowhere to be found in the source material reproduced in the new edition. It is hard to believe that this particular date is pure imagination.

Let us go a bit behind K. Almladh's edition and take a closer look at some of her secondary sources. Thus, the date Kislev 6, 5324, actually turns up in P. Leon Tello's description of a MS. of *Sefar* 'Emæq habbākā said to be preserved in the Collegio Rabbinico Italiano in Rome; her presentation of this MS. runs: 'De Luzzatto. Llega esta copia hasta el 6 kislew 5324 (22 de noviembre de 1563), y después se añaden relatos de sucesos hasta 1605, por un anónimo que se llama a sí mismo "el Corrector", y que anota también diversas observaciones sin importancia. Este manuscrito, con el de Girondi (= MS. V, T. K.) y Almanzi (= MS. III, T. K.), sirvió de base para la primera edición. Lo tiene ahora el Colegio Rabínico italiano de Roma' (op. cit., 36f.). The source of Leon Tello's description of this MS. is the corresponding presentation supplied by D. A. Gross, starting: 'ha^ctāqā zō nistayy^emā h^akānātāh b^ec^eśrīm ūš^enayim b^enōbæmbær 1563 ...' ('The preparation of this copy was concluded on November 22, 1563

...', op. cit., p. 11, with notes, p. 87, where it is again stated that the MS. is in the Collegio Rabbinico Italiano in Rome.) The ultimate source of this important exact date is, however, given by no less an authority than S. D. Luzzatto himself, who in his introductory words included in M. Letteris' preface to the *editio princeps* of 'Emæq habbākā sketches a background of Joseph hakkohen's compilation of the work and continues: 'ʔāz hithīl R. Yōsef hakkōhen liktōb hassefær hazzæ . . . w^ehišlimō bayyōm w' kislew šk'd (sōf 1563)' ('Then R. Joseph hakkohen started to write this book . . . and he concluded it on Kislev 6, 5324 [the end of 1563]', op. cit., p. x).

From this evidence the conclusion seems unavoidable that the exact date of Kislev 6, 5324, mentioned only in a footnote by K. Almladh without any reference (E A, English section, p. 21, note 19) actually derives from MS. Collegio Rabbinico Italiano in Rome, which once was employed as the basis of the *editio princeps* of the *Sefær* 'Emæq habbākā but which the present editor has not succeeded in tracing, merely stating on presenting the MSS. at her disposal: 'To these should possibly be added a MS, said to be in Collegio Rabbinico Italiano in Rome and recorded by D. A. Gross, who states that it is a copy of Corrector's text, once belonging to S. D. Luzzatto. Unfortunately it has not been possible to get further information concerning this MS' (E A, English section, p. 33).

However, the mystery reaches a climax, when the present reviewer herewith is able to certify that the MS. Collegio Rabbinico Italiano in Rome does not exist! After considerable efforts to get in touch with the Unione delle Comunità Israelitiche Italiane (Lungotevere Sanzio, 9, I-00153 Roma) I received the following amicable and clarifying reply, dated November 13, 1981 (Prot.n. 2046/350 AL/cds): 'Egregio Professore, a seguito della Sua richiesta alla biblioteca del Collegio Rabbinico di Roma in ordine al microfilm del manoscritto di Joseh Ha Koen [sic! T. K.] "Sefer Emek ha-Bakha", Le posso confermare che non c'è. E' risultato infatti che anche in passato il manoscritto sia stato richiesto da qualcuno e che fosse emerso un errore di citazione alla fonte. Pertanto sarebbe utile poter verificare il riferimento stesso del volume. Con un cordiale Shalom. Il Segretario (Dr. Alberto Levy).' In accordance with this message the non-existence of the MS. in question is now publicly confirmed, and the incorrect information supplied by D. A. Gross and P. Leon Tello corrected. Nonetheless, what about the exact date Kislev 6, 5324, given by S. D. Luzzatto?

Once again the recent editor has had the key in her hand but has failed to find the keyhole. In a footnote to the unsatisfactory statement that she has not been able to get further information as regards the alleged MS. Collegio Rabbinico Italiano of Rome (E A, English section, p. 33), she propounds haphazardly that this MS. possibly 'is identical with MS IV, which, according to Schwab, 1904 (Manuscripts et incunables hébreux, Revue des études juives 35/1904, pp. 270 ff., T. K.) has belonged to Luzzatto'. But if this proposal actually should turn out to correspond to facts—which the reviewer is convinced it does—and if, accordingly, the *editio princeps* of *Sefær* 'Emæq habbākā really was prepared solely on the basis of MS. III, IV, and V (and VIII), then these MSS. must contain a colophon dated exactly Kislev 6, 5324! However, the *editio secunda* of 'Emæq habbākā,

which is worked out with an admitted access to these MSS., does nowhere in the text or apparatus render an account of such a colophon. On the contrary, the editor states that MS. III is furnished with a colophon dated Tammuz 21, 5335 (= June 29, 1575), that MS. IV has 'no date of copying' (E A, English section, p. 35), and that MS. V has 'no date of copying' (E A, English section, p. 36). All these statements appear to be correct. Regrettably, this information is incomplete. It is true that MSS. IV and V do not contain any 'date of copying', but they do both—which the editor fails to observe—contain colophons supplying the date of the respective *Vorlage*. Thus, at the end of the 'Emæq habbākā text proper of MS. IV (fol. 63a) we find the following colophon, which astonishingly has been left out of the edition (E A, p. 93, line 7, apparatus, where it is quite incorrectly stated that MSS. IV and VI 'end here'): 'ʔmr ywsp br' yhwš^c hkhn z'l ʔbrk ʔt h' y^cšny lhbr ʔt hḥbwr hqṭn hzh hkwll rwb ht^lwt whmhwmwt ʔšr 'brw 'lynw mymy hḥwrbn 'd hywm hzh k'šr hšygh ydy z^cyr šm z^cyr šm. wthy hšlmtw ywm b 'w' kslw šk'd 'l h'lp hḥmyšy. kn j'zrny h' brḥmw tmyd. wyzky lktwb by'ʔt gw^llynw [read: gw^llnw, T. K.] wyqwym bnw pswq šyšw ʔth mšwš kl hmt^lblym 'lyh ʔmn w^lmn' ('Joseph b. Joshua hakkohen, of blessed memory, says: "I bless thee, YHWH, [who] hast guided me to compose this booklet, which contains most of the hardships and troubles that have afflicted us from the days of the Destruction [of the Second Temple in 70 C.E.] until the present day, as far as I have been able to and in brief form. And it was concluded on Kislev 6, 324, of the 5th millennium [= November 22, 1563]. May YHWH in his constant mercy help me, and may he make me worthy to write about the advent of our Redeemer, and may the verse be fulfilled on us: 'rejoice for joy with her [scil. Jerusalem], all ye that mourn for her' [Isa. 66: 10b]."''). In MS. V, which the present editor—for reasons which are difficult to justify (see *infra*)—has excluded from the edition of the 'Emæq habbākā text, we find the very same colophon in almost identical wording (the only exceptions being: ʔšr y^cšny instead of y^cšny, hḥrbn instead of hḥwrbn, bywm instead of ywm, kslyw instead of kslw, and gw^llnw instead of gw^llynw, fol. 40a), and consequently including the same date as that found in the colophon of MS. IV, moreover in both the MSS. at exactly the same point of the 'Emæq habbākā text (see *supra*). It is of minor interest to note that S. D. Luzzatto in his supplement to MS. IV immediately following the above-mentioned colophon (fols. 63b–66a) has reproduced the end of MS. III including its colophon, dated Tammuz 21, 5335 (= June 29, 1575; see further *infra*).

These facts—almost entirely concealed in the *editio secunda*—supply an answer to the seemingly astonishing fact that Luzzatto–Letteris did not employ MS. III as the basis of their *editio princeps*, although they had the MS. at their disposal. The answer is that they had access to two MSS. (IV and V) containing the 'Emæq habbākā text as concluded on Kislev 6, 5324 (= November 22, 1563), and since these two MSS. represent the work at a considerably older stage than MS. III (containing the 1575 version of the text) the first editors deemed it appropriate to base their edition on the older version of the text, although admitting that the textual form of MS. III was in superior condition (cf. *editio princeps*, p. 124, note).

When this has been clarified, it is nonetheless possible to defend the choice of

MS. III as the basis of the new edition of the *Sefær ʿEmæq habbākā*. For regarding a work of the character of *ʿEmæq habbākā*—a work that was rewritten and revised several times by the author himself—an editor might either find it most appropriate to establish a text as original as possible (then a particularly close study of MSS. I and II—both unknown at the time of the preparation of the Luzzatto–Letteris edition—would recommend itself; see *infra*), or he might arrive at the conclusion that the edition ought to represent the final shape of the text as ultimately revised by the author himself (in that case MS. III would be the basis chosen). Accordingly, no objection is to be raised against basing the new edition of *ʿEmæq habbākā* on MS. III, which is generally held to be an autograph of Joseph hakkohen, written a few years before the death of the author.

The basic MS. of the *editio secunda* of the *Sefær ʿEmæq habbākā*, designed by K. Almladh as MS. III, is subjected to a short description in the introduction to the new edition (E A, English section, pp. 34f.). This MS. (now MS. British Library Add. 27122) was earlier described by S. D. Luzzatto (in M. Steinschneider, ed., *Hebräische Bibliographie* 4–6/1861–68, vol. 5, p. 144), when treating the Joseph Almanzi collection of Hebrew MSS. (MS. Almanzi 229); later by G. Margoliouth (*Catalogue of the Hebrew and the Samaritan Manuscripts in the British Museum*, vol. 4, London 1915, p. 152). It has also been briefly characterized by D. A. Gross (op. cit., p. 11, with note, p. 87f.), and by P. Leon Tello (op. cit., p. 37). K. Almladh transmits the traditional opinion that in this MS. ‘the works by Joseph ha-Kohan [sic! T. K.] are copied by the author’ (E A, English section, p. 35). If this claim is correct—and it appears plausible, although the editor does not question or discuss the traditional view—it is not difficult to see that the MS. was written by an aged Joseph hakkohen. At the conclusion of this MS. the author should have been 78 years old (not 79, as stated by S. D. Luzzatto in the *editio princeps*, p. XI), and the handwriting testifies to a certain lack of firmness in comparison with the alleged autographs of Joseph hakkohen from some 15–20 years earlier (cf. MSS. I and II). Nonetheless, the handwriting is clear and comparatively easy to read. The MS. also contains a few minor notes by S. D. Luzzatto’s hand. It is not merely, as K. Almladh cautiously states, ‘not unlikely that this later hand belongs to S. D. Luzzatto’ (E A, English section, p. 35), but it could be certified, e.g. with reference to the characteristic way of forming the letter *šin* in ŠaDaL (see e.g. the reproduction of his initials on the cover of S. D. Luzzatto, *Mābō lʿmahzōr bʿnē Rōmā*, ed. E. D. Goldschmidt, Tel Aviv 1966). As regards the basic MS. of the new *ʿEmæq habbākā* edition, it is only to say in conclusion that K. Almladh has succeeded in reproducing the MS. text in appropriate minuteness, thereby establishing a very useful main text of the work.

As regards the other preserved MSS. of the *Sefær ʿEmæq habbākā* the state of matters is, however, in several respects even more complicated. It is only to be regretted that the recent editor has not contributed to a *definite* clarification of the exact relationship between the *ʿEmæq habbākā* MSS. Doubtlessly, the editor ought to have listed all previous descriptions of the MSS. under consideration, compared the various facts stated there, dismissed every piece of incorrect information, and confirmed and supplemented all accurate facts necessary for a

thorough understanding of the characteristics of each singular MS. as well as for a clear distinction between the various MSS. confused in earlier literature.

Let us, therefore, undertake a gradual investigation of the problems involved, starting with MS. I (MS. British Library Or. 12348), as presented by K. Almladh (E A, English section, pp. 33f.). Already in the MS. itself there is a serious difficulty, to which the editor correctly draws attention, viz. that the title page of 'Emæq habbākā (fol. 1 a) states: 'I started to write the book called The Vale of Tears on Marḥeshwan 1, [5]322 [= October 11, 1561]' (hḥlwtw lktwb ʔt hspr hnqrʔ 'mq bkʔ bywm rʔ šwn lḥdš mrḥšwn lšnt škb [read: škʔb, T. K.]), whilst, according to the colophon, the manuscript was finished on Elul 1, 5320 (= August 23, 1560). From this painful state of affairs the editor concludes: 'It is also likely that the title-page does not belong to this MS.' (E A, English section, p. 34). Although the editor's supposition might very well be correct, there is actually the theoretical possibility also of a reversed explanation (an idea that might be illustrated by the example offered in MS. IV, where we have a clearly secondary colophon written by S. D. Luzzatto; see *infra*). However, a close examination of the handwriting found on the title-page makes it probable that it is identical with the handwriting found in the bulk of the MS. Concerning this actual copyist behind the MS. K. Almladh remarks: 'The first hand has written the bulk of the text, making numerous errors and omissions' (E A, English section, p. 34). She also notes the activity of a second scribe: 'The second hand, which beyond doubt belongs to Joseph ha-Kohen, has corrected several of the errors in the margins and also written the last lines and the colophon as well as the poems' (*ibid.*). If the impression that the title-page derives from the same hand as that of the main copyist turns out to correspond to facts, it might be possible to explain the intricate difference between the two dates of the MS.: The date of the title-page in that case represents the day on which the copyist commenced his work, whilst the date of the colophon may be part of the author's personal signature to the confirmation of the copy and in conformity with the conclusion of an earlier revision of 'Emæq habbākā (dated Elul 1, 5320 = August 23, 1560; cf. again the secondary colophon of MS. IV). It is not unlikely that the colophon was directly taken over from the revision of the work carried out the previous year, whilst the actual text (on which the copyist began to write on Marḥeshwan 1, 5322 (October 11, 1561)), brings the chronicle up to and includes the year 5320/1560 (ending at E A, page 92, line 13). The real intrinsic difficulty, however, reveals itself, when the MS. description by K. Almladh is compared with that of her predecessors. Thus, the editor claims that MS. I is in the British Library of London (which is confirmed by the microfilm), whereas D. A. Gross (op. cit., p. 11, and p. 87, note 37), and, following him, P. Leon Tello (op. cit., p. 36, spec. note 53) state that the MS. is preserved in Paris, in the Library of l'Alliance Israélite Universelle. Both writers refer to this MS. as N° 128 of the Rabbinowicz collection (M. Rabbinowicz, Catalogue, Paris 1886, p. 10; Leon Tello also refers to I. Loeb, op. cit., and to M. Schwab, op. cit., p. 278). Moreover, K. Almladh claims that there are 55 fols. in the MS. (which again is in agreement with the microfilm copy), whereas Leon Tello states: 'Consta de 86 folios' (op. cit., p. 36). Against this background it is particularly puzzling that Gross, Leon Tello, and Almladh are

unanimous in stating that the MS. was concluded on Elul 1, 5320 (= August 23, 1560). It is embarrassing that the recent editor has not commented on this most curious relationship between the three descriptions of MS. I (on dealing with MS. I it might also be remarked in passing that the editor has been unable to read the name of one of the previous owners of this MS., Samuel *Trywvs*; cf. E A, English section, p. 33. It might be suggested that the family name is to be read as 'Treves', although it is not uncommon to find this name spelled *Tr^cw^cs*. The Treves family was well known in Medieval Italy; from the end of the 15th century one branch of the family emigrated to Turkey, whilst somewhat later another branch settled in Russia; see e.g. Sch. Ochser–F. T. Haneman–I. Broydė, 'Treves', *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, New York–London 1901–06, vol. 12, pp. 243–248; Y. Horowitz–G. Romano, 'Treves', *Encyclopædia Judaica*, Jerusalem 1971 ff., vol. 15, cols. 1376–1379. In the course of time this family name developed a number of variant forms, like Dreyfuss, Dreifuss, Trefus, Trevis, Trivash, Tribas; see B. C. Kaganoff, *A Dictionary of Jewish Names and their History*, New York 1977, p. 144).

Turning from the problems of MS. I (see further *infra* on MS. IV) to those of MS. II (MS. Jewish Theological Seminary Mic. 3563; first described in the 'Catalogue of Hebrew Manuscripts in the Collection of Elkan Nathan Adler', Cambridge 1921, p. 45, N^o 1449), the situation is not much better. Already the microfilm (from University Microfilms) rightly signals that MS. II in fact is a 'blurred copy'. It is obvious that at least two hands have worked on the MS. According to the recent editor, Joseph hakkohen wrote minor parts of the MS. (viz. fols. 1a–3b, which contain a copy of the *Scroll of Antiochus*, the copying of which was concluded on Ab 19, 5319 = July 23, 1559; fols. 9a–10b and fols. 57b–60b, containing parts of the 'Emæq habbākā text, including a colophon, dated Tishri 9, 5320 = September 10, 1559; and finally fols. 61a–63b, on which a number of Joseph hakkohen's own poems are found). The rest of the MS. was evidently written by another, anonymous copyist. Like MS. I, MS. II represents a serious problem of dating. We found that the colophon was dated Tishri 9, 5320 (again the editor wrongly writes *šk* instead of *š''k*), on which K. Almbladh comments: 'Most likely the date in the colophon on fol. 60b is wrong as the last event to be related took place on September 22, 1562. As Joseph ha-Kohen probably was living in Voltaggio when the MS was made, it is likely that it was copied between September 1562 and October 1567' (E A, English section, p. 34). To start with, no argument is advanced in support of the statement that Joseph hakkohen at the time of the copying of the text of 'Emæq habbākā was living in Voltaggio. In all probability this idea is derived from the fact that the copy of the *Scroll of Antiochus* ends with the following words: 'I, Joseph hakkohen, wrote this Scroll, and it was concluded in Voltaggio . . .' (ʔny Ywsp hkhn ktby ʔt hmglh hzʔt wnšlmh ph wwʔ'gw . . ., fol. 3b). But, of course, the fact that even the copying of the *Sefar* 'Emæq habbākā is likely to have been carried out in Voltaggio, constitutes no argument in favour of a dating 'between September 1562 and October 1567'. On the contrary, the colophon of the *Scroll of Antiochus* from July 1559 makes it extremely probable that the subsequently adherent copy of 'Emæq habbākā was concluded in September the same year. According to the

reviewer's opinion, the colophon of the 'Emæq *habbākā* copy is correct. It is, moreover, absolutely clear in the MS. Now, as the editor herself has noted, there is a change of handwriting at fol. 57b, and so the explanation presents itself that the colophon concluding fol. 60b is nothing but a transcript of the colophon which in an earlier MS. was placed exactly at the point of the 'Emæq *habbākā* text corresponding to fol. 57b, i.e. at the point, where the new hand (probably that of Joseph hakkohen himself) commences. It is to be observed that the events described immediately before the change of handwriting occurred in 5319/1559, shortly before the date mentioned in the colophon, which thereby fits into the picture exactly. Thus, it seems that the original version contained in MS. II ended at a place corresponding to E A, p. 88, line 22 (note that the text on the subsequent lines, viz. 23–30, is missing in MSS. I, IV, and VI!). Then the new hand, commencing on fol. 57b most evidently started by re-writing the concluding lines once written by the first hand and forming the end of fol. 57b of the earlier text. Thereafter he supplemented the previous text with an account of the proper events from the years 1559–62, and finally copied the original colophon. Ironically, P. Leon Tello has felt herself compelled to date the MS. to 1563 (without any discussion), i.e. she was forced to undertake a logically deduced dating on the basis of the contents of the MS. It seems, thus, that we might be allowed to conclude that the present colophon of MS. II, though not incorrect, is secondary in relation to the final form of the MS. (as might, in fact, be the case also as regards the colophon dated Kislev 6, 5320, preserved in MSS. IV and V; see *supra*). This furnishes us, however, with the information that we have to reckon with another version of the *Sefar* 'Emæq *habbākā* in addition to those previously mentioned, i.e. apart from the revision of September 1559 testified to by the secondary colophon of MS. II. A new revision appears to have taken place some time after September 1562, and this revision was undoubtedly undertaken by the author himself, the result of which is preserved in MS. II on fols. 57b–60b (supplemented by fols. 9a–10b, the original text of which might have been damaged or lost in the interval 1559–62).

The most puzzling difficulties are connected with MS. IV (described by K. Almladh in her English section, p. 35f.), which to-day is preserved in the Library of l'Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris (cf. *supra*). The editor states that the MS. bears the class-mark M 40 H, whereas the microfilm makes clear that the correct class-mark is H 40 A. Almladh says that this MS. was earlier described by M. Schwab (op. cit., p. 278) and B. Chapira (Les manuscrits de la Bibliotheque de l'Alliance Israélite, Revue des études juives 105/1940, p. 74). As we have seen above, D. A. Gross and P. Leon Tello incorrectly state that this MS. is preserved in the Collegio Rabbinico Italiano of Rome (it is to be noted that in Leon Tello's description of the 'Emæq *habbākā* MSS. there is furthermore an almost total confusion in the remarks on MS. I, to which certain features of MS. IV are attributed, and she refers to exactly the same description by Schwab for the manuscript concluded on Elul 1, 5320 = August 23, 1560 [i.e. the MS. which Almladh calls MS. I] as that to which Almladh refers as a description of the MS., which *she* calls MS. IV!). Now, according to the microfilm copy from l'Alliance Israélite Universelle of Paris, the MS. under discussion contains 88

fols., of which the 'Emæq habbākā text covers fols. 2a–66a, accompanied by the chronicle of The Corrector on fols. 67a–88a (the editor has not drawn attention to the fact that fols. 54b–56a are missing). The bulk of the text was written by an unknown scribe, who has simply taken over the colophon of his *Vorlage*, dated Kislev 6, 5324 (= November 22, 1563; for the text, see *supra*). Remarkably, the editor makes no attempt to discuss the age of these major parts of the MS. (although considerable aid could have been obtained e.g. from S. A. Birnbaum, *The Hebrew Scripts*. 1. The Text. Leiden 1971. 2 The Plates. London 1954–57; nor is she conversant with the list of 'Jewish Scribes in Medieval Italy' by A. Freimann, in the Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume, New York 1950, pp. 231 ff.). Naturally, it should be admitted that it is extremely difficult to specify the age of the copy. Nevertheless, it seems to be immediately clear that the MS. is written in a comparatively late Italkian cursive (which is suggested e.g. by the way in which the letters *zayin* and *lāmæd* are formed; cf. S. A. Birnbaum, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, N° 308, as compared with N° 307; vol. 1, cols. 293 f.). As we have already noted, the 'Emæq habbākā text proper as copied by this anonymous scribe ends on fol. 63a bottom (i.e. at the conclusion of the chronicle of the year 5321/1561, corresponding to E A, p. 93, line 7, followed by the colophon regrettably omitted from the new edition). Immediately thereafter there is an insertion into the text by a second hand on fols. 63b (not 64a, as stated by Almladh) as far as to and including fol. 66a (corresponding to E A, p. 97, line 33). This insertion, the writer of which is doubtlessly S. D. Luzzatto (cf. *supra*), has evidently been copied directly from the corresponding parts of MS. III, including its colophon (dated Tammuz 21, 5335 = June 20, 1575). In this way MS. IV turns out to contain two colophons! As a pendant to this last-mentioned conclusion of the 'Emæq habbākā text from MS. III, the introduction of MS. III has likewise been copied by Luzzatto on fol. 2a of MS. IV, including the date mentioned in the beginning of MS. III (see *supra*)! After this insertion by the hand of Luzzatto on fols. 63b–66a, the first hand returns, supplying the text of The Corrector's chronicle (corresponding to E A, p. 98, line 1, as far as p. 125, line 10). In all probability this curious MS. is identical with the one which once belonged to S. D. Luzzatto personally (cf. the *editio princeps*, pp. xf.) and later was mentioned incorrectly by D. A. Gross and P. Leon Tello as being preserved in Rome (see *supra*; on dealing with MS. IV it is to be noted, in conclusion, that the text of the main scribe's title-page on fol. 3a [not 2a, as stated by Almladh, English section, p. 35] naturally shows a suffixed form of the verb *hibber*, and not simply *hibber*, as the editor has read, which in addition would render an incorrect Hebrew. Thus, the text should commence: 'zh spr 'mq hbk' 'šr hybrw hrwp' r' Ywsp hkhn z'l' ['This is the book The Vale of Tears, which the physician R. Joseph hakkohen, of blessed memory, composed']).

As regards K. Almladh's treatment of MS. V (E A, English section, p. 36), viz. MS. Bodleian Library Opp. Add. 4° 180, the impression of unclearness remains. The MS. was earlier described by A. Neubauer (*Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library ... [Catalogi Codd. MSS. Bibliothecae Bodleianae pars XII]*, Oxford 1886, col. 1129), by D. A. Gross (*op. cit.*, p. 11, and p. 88, note 44, although he treats MS. 'Ghirondi' and MS. 'Bodleian

Library' as two different MSS., asking as regards MS. 'Ghirondi': 'ūlām hēkān māšūy kayyōm?' ['but where is it found nowadays?'], p. 87, n. 42), and by P. Leon Tello (op. cit., p. 37). Altbladh mainly states that the MS. 'is copied by one hand some time after 1648 and is unvocalized' (English section, p. 36). This dating probably derives from the fact that the MS. after the text of the *Sefær 'Emæq habbākā* (fols. 3a–40a, ending at exactly the same point as MS. IV; cf. *supra*), followed by The Corrector's chronicle (fols. 40b–53b), also contains two more works, viz. the *Ma^{ca}šē Y^ešūrūn* by Aaron Kohen Ragusano?, being a history of blood accusation at Ragusa on the first day of Sukkot in 5383/1622 (fols. 54a–59b) and finally some extracts from the Kabbalistical work *'Emæq hammælæk* by Naphtali b. Jacob Elḥanan, according to the Amsterdam edition of 1648. From this state of affairs it can, however, only be derived that the MS. was copied after 1648, but in no way that it was written 'some time after 1648'; it could very well have been copied long after that time. In addition, the notion that the MS. was 'copied by one hand' is open to doubt, since in particular fols. 16a and 17a most probably were written by another hand than that of the main scribe.

From a text critical point of view there is, however, a more serious objection as regards K. Altbladh's treatment of MS. V (as well as of MS. VI, MS. Preussische Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, Or. 4^o 1551, probably an 18th century manuscript). Concerning MS. V, the editor notes that its 'text is close to MS IV, also having many errors common with it', but also 'full of new corruptions, because of which it has been excluded from the edition of *'Emeq ha-Bakha*, although it has been used for the edition of the chronicle of Corrector and his notes' (E A, English section, p. 36). Thus, regarding MS. VI, Altbladh remarks that its text appears to be fairly close to that found in MSS. IV and V, even sharing a number of errors with these MSS., though adding several new ones. From these facts the following conclusion is drawn: 'Despite this it has been used for the edition of *'Emeq ha-Bakha*' (E A, English section, pp. 36f.). It is to be remarked first, in passing, that the editor ought to have said: '... for the edition of *'Emeq ha-Bakha* and for the chronicle of Corrector', since in reality MS. VI has been employed for both these parts in the new edition. However, a more essential question concerns the reason for excluding MS. V—with reference to the considerable amount of errors in the MS. text—from being used for the edition, whilst making use of MS. VI, which is found to have not merely many errors in common with MS. V but in addition 'numerous new errors and adaptations [sic! T. K.]' (E A, English section, p. 36). If the editor really found that the number of errors in MS. V surpasses that of MS. VI, this ought to have been pointed out clearly. But is this really the case? The employment of MS. VI and the rejection of MS. V for the new edition of the *'Emæq habbākā* text proper seem arbitrary, partly because both these MSS. are used indiscriminately for establishing the text of the chronicle of The Corrector, partly—and this is more serious—because the textual relationship between MS. V and MS. IV has not been satisfactorily discussed. Only a fully convincing demonstration of the secondary character and textual lack of value of MS. V could justify the exclusion of this MS.—playing a significant rôle in the establishing of the text of the *editio princeps* (cf. p. xi)—from the *editio secunda*.

Regarding the MSS. VII and VIII there is no need to waste many words on them: The editor is entirely justified in excluding them from being used for establishing the text of the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā*—MS. VII, viz. MS. Bibliotheca Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Budapest, Kaufmann Collection N^o 356 (see M. Weisz, *Katalog der hebräischen Handschriften und Bücher in der Bibliothek des Professors Dr. David Kaufmann, Frankfurt am Main 1906*, p. 113) was copied from MS. V as late as in 1831, and MS. VIII, viz. MS. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Wien, Hebr. 124 (see J. Goldenthal, *Die neuerworbenen Handschriften hebräischer Werke der K. K. Hofbibliothek zu Wien*, Wien 1851 [not 1951, as stated in E A, English section, p. 76], pp. 53 f.; A. Z. Schwartz, *Die hebräischen Handschriften der Nationalbibliothek in Wien* [Museum. Veröffentlichungen aus der Nationalbibliothek in Wien. Abhandlungen. 2]. Wien—Praga—Leipzig 1925, pp. 84 f.) was concluded on Kislev 2, 5604 (= October 26, 1843) and based on MS. III, MS. IV, and MS. V, accordingly comprising the text of the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* as established by S. D. Luzzatto. It would, however, have been valuable to find a reproduction of each one of these two late MSS. among the plates in the new edition. Particularly the statement that MS. VIII 'was copied for the benefit of S. D. Luzzatto and comprises the text established by him from MSS III, IV and V' (E A, English section, p. 37), leads one to wish that this MS. had been included in the discussion of the true character of, in particular, MSS. IV and V.

The new edition of the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* with the chronicle of the anonymous Corrector as prepared in accordance with the principles discussed above has after all—provided that the principles are accepted—turned out to be a fine piece of work. On the basis of recurrent sample tests from a comparison between microfilm copies of the 6 MSS. employed for establishing the text and the final text of the edition, the reviewer has arrived at the conclusion that the editor has produced an excellent piece of scholarly handicraft as regards the minuteness with which the text of the various MSS. has been represented (the most serious mistake being the absence of the colophon of MS. IV discussed above). Only in a very few cases of comparatively little significance have minor errors entered the text or the apparatus (thus, for instance, on p. 1, after the end of line 17 the MSS. I, II and III add the word *tm . . .*, which is not noted; in the apparatus on the same page, on line 13, it is stated that MS. I reads *js²wp* instead of *js²p* in the text; the reading *js²wp*, however, is found also in MSS. II or III; on p. 125, line 5 the text reads *ly²w*, whilst the MSS. actually read the correct name form *ly²wn* (*lē²ōn*, i.e. the Pope Leo XI)). In occasional instances the editor did not notice that the MS. text had been corrected by a later hand (e.g. p. 84, the apparatus on line 23, where it is stated that MSS. IV and VI have the corrupt form *l^cynyhm* instead of *l^cynykm*, whilst it is not mentioned that a second hand had corrected the text of the respective original hands). Rather often the editor has recorded a MS. text which is illegible or almost illegible, (on the basis of a clear text in another MS.), without drawing attention to this fact. However, it is to be admitted that various minor parts of some of the MSS. have suffered damage to such an extent that remarks like 'illegible', 'unclear' etc. actually would have been repeated into absurdity. In all essentials, the reviewer congratu-

lates the editor on having reproduced her MS. material with appropriate care (although her discussion of the MS. material remains open to serious criticism).

V

An important part of the editorial task is, moreover, to supply the reader with information concerning the *contents* of the work published. Joseph hakkohen's *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* with the subsequent chronicle of The Corrector constitutes a comprehensive text, which under a certain aspect transmits glimpses of a historical material covering one and a half millennium. It is a matter of course that the task of adequately commenting a text of this nature lays considerable claims to a sound judiciousness upon the editor. What items of knowledge are to be found in a commentary of the abovementioned character? Is it most useful to supply an analysis of the various historical sources employed by the author? Is it possibly more valuable to undertake an examination of the author's terminology, in particular of the historical context of this terminology, by means of philological investigations? Is it essential to represent as much as possible of the secondary literature on each separate historical scene? Is it desirable to establish all actual quotations from biblical, liturgical, and rabbinical tradition? Is it worth wishing for even an examination of the effects of various sections of the work on subsequent books of similar nature, especially on Jewish historiography of the 17th and 18th centuries? Approaching the commentary by K. Almladh, it is not easy to find out exactly which principles have been guiding her work. In fact, we find in the notes a little of everything, although, it should be admitted, most of the information supplied turns out to be highly instructive (the editor is not to be blamed that most of these pieces of information are to be found in previous works by e.g. Luzzatto, Wiener, Loeb, Gross, Gelbart, Leon Tello etc.). But the editor ought to have used a few lines of her introduction to point out exactly what she intended to focalize on in her comments.

Starting with the exterior of the commentary (E A, English section, pp. 43–72), it is once again to be established that K. Almladh has accomplished a careful piece of work. The printing errors are few and generally of minor significance. A bit more disturbing is the inconsistency as regards the reference to Hebrew works in Hebrew types and in transcribed form respectively (to take but one among numerous examples, see the reference to Ḥayyim Galipapa's work *'Emæq r^efā'im*, in transcription on p. 27, and in Hebrew types on p. 54). The reviewer would for several reasons (for instance those of æsteticism, economy, and clarity) have preferred a consistent transcription of all Hebrew book titles. It is often confusing to find book titles in Hebrew types juxtaposed with quotations from the Hebrew text (a good example is offered by the sentence: 'מדרש עשר גלויות, as printed in *SHQ M: אלה אדריאנוס ... והגלה אותם לאספמיא*, p. 43, bottom; in this very case, moreover, there ought also to have been a few references concerning this *Midraš 'esær gāluyyōt*, since it is scarcely known to the average reader; e.g. to J. Theodor, *Midrashim, Smaller, The Jewish Encyclopedia*, New York–London 1901–06, vol. 8, p. 574; M. D. Herr, *Midrashim, Smaller, Encyclo-*

pædia Judaica, Jerusalem 1971 ff., vol. 16, col. 1516, with information concerning the various text editions of the work).

In establishing Joseph hakkohen's and The Corrector's historical source material the editor has succeeded in supplying a fairly consistent and complete analysis (admittedly to a considerable extent on the basis of the investigations of her predecessors). Doubtlessly, it appears much more difficult to certify the dependence of the chronicle on biblical, liturgical, and rabbinical traditions. Thus, it becomes immediately clear that the text of the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* contains many more biblical quotations and allusions than indicated in the commentary (taking only two examples of a frequent phenomenon, we read already on p. 2, lines 6f.: *wkl hqwr² bw yšwm wyš²p yhd*, which constitutes an indisputable allusion to the phrase *ʿaššom w^eʿaš²af yāhad* of Isa. 42: 14—an allusion noted by e.g. P. Leon Tello [op. cit., p. 49] and H. S. May [op. cit., p. 1]; likewise, on p. 4, line 4 the expression *ʿm ʿl bnym* is taken directly from Hos 10: 14, as remarked by both Leon Tello [op. cit., 52] and May [op. cit., p. 3]). It should, however, be acknowledged that there are considerable difficulties involved in analyzing a language so full of biblical words and phrases as the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā*. A parallel difficulty applies also as regards quotations from and allusions to the traditional literature of antique rabbinical Judaism, a literature which the Medieval Jewish writers to a prominent extent had in their veins; a well known feature of this literature is, then, that a certain subject or a particular tradition not infrequently is subjected to transmission and discussion in several places—a fact which is apt to complicate any analysis of source references to this literature (to illustrate this difficulty by means of only two examples, let us start with the comment of E A, p. 2, lines 13f., where it is said: 'For the tradition, cf. B. Soṭ 48b' [English section, p. 43]; although this reference to *Talmūd Babli* is correct, it ought to have been mentioned that the same tradition is preserved also in an earlier work, viz. in the *Tosefta*, Sōṭā XIII, 4; a similar problem is involved in the comment on E A, p. 73, line 19, where it is said that Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah—prominent figures in the tale of Daniel—gradually were 'regarded as models in time of persecution' [English section, p. 60], with a single reference to b P^esāhīm 53b, whereas, as is commonly known, these figures play a related rôle in a number of traditional texts; see e.g. the references given in L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, translated from the German Manuscript by H. Szold. 1–6. Index by B. Cohen = vol. 7. Philadelphia 1909–38 [reprint: 1968], vol. 4, pp. 326–331; vol. 6, pp. 413–421; cf. also R. Mach, *Der Zaddik in Talmud und Midrasch*, Leiden 1957, p. 242; on the general aspect of the problem, see also R. Rosenzweig, *Solidarität mit dem Leidenden im Judentum* [Studia Judaica. 10]. Berlin–New York 1978, *passim*, with a critical review by P. Schäfer, in *Journal of Jewish Studies* 32/1981, pp. 104–107). Like the dependence of Joseph hakkohen (and The Corrector) on biblical and rabbinical tradition, the related indebtedness to the synagogue liturgy is apt to give any commentator on the *Sefar 'Emæq habbākā* some problems. For an orthodox Jew of the Middle Ages—like Joseph hakkohen (regardless of a certain Kabbalistical bent)—the liturgy had gone into the very marrow of the personality, as it had been recurrently repeated since earliest childhood every Sabbath and Festival in great variety and richness and

every week-day in shorter form. In this way the language of the liturgy came to form an important part of the language of every pious Jew, however educated. Therefore, the task of discriminating what echoes from the synagogue liturgy that assisted in shaping a text like that of the *Sefar 'Emaq habbākā* requires deep insights into the liturgical rite in question. In the case under consideration the commentator might have found some introductory assistance in the bibliography by J. J. Cohen, in S. D. Luzzatto, *Mābō l' Maḥzōr b'e nē Rōmā*, ed. E. D. Goldschmidt, Tel Aviv 1966, pp. 111–137 (the desirability of references to a particular *siddūr* or *maḥzōr* might be pointed out on the basis of two examples from the commentary: In the notes on E A, p. 88, lines 11–13, it is stated that the text is taken 'From the end of the prayer *hpwth jd*' [p. 64]; similarly, commenting on E A, p. 124, lines 4 ff., it is noted that the text represents 'A combination of the end of *šwprwt* and the end of *'mydh*. This prayer forms the end of the main part of Corrector's chronicle' [p. 71]; these pieces of information, valuable though they are, clearly need the supplement of an exact reference to the texts of a particular liturgical rite).

A problem of extensive scope in commenting on a text like the *Sefar 'Emaq habbākā* is connected with the task of doing justice to the overwhelming mass of secondary literature of significance, whether major surveys or specialized investigations. It is not to be denied that K. Almladh has made great efforts to acquaint herself with this literature; she also demonstrates her ability to give numerous helpful references. There is, however, no doubt that many important studies have not been represented. Partly this is only natural and unavoidable, partly, though, it might have been done better. It is, of course, not possible to mirror the secondary studies relevant to each separate problem in any greater extensiveness, but a few notes on recent contributions to the contents of the various sections might have been of considerable value to the reader (a few examples may illustrate this more principal *desideratum*: In the comments on E A, p. 43, 5–45, 19 it is stated that the source of the section is Samuel Usque's *Consolaçam* III, 16 [English section, p. 53]; it is also made clear that the text contains a relation of the so called Shepherd's persecutions in Spain and France in 1320; however, in the whole of the commentary on this relation, there is given no single reference to a scholarly discussion of the events recorded. Which were these events? What were their significance? What other Medieval, and particularly Jewish, historiographers have treated them? Are the historiographers' view unanimous with the picture given by Joseph hakkohen? Etc. In this particular case, it might have sufficed with a few adequate references, e.g. to S. Grayzel, *The Confession of a Medieval Jewish Convert*, *Historia Judaica* 17/1955, pp. 89–120; Y. H. Yerushalmi, *The Inquisition and the Jews of France in the Time of Bernard Gui*, *Harvard Theological Review* 63/1970, pp. 317–376. To take another example, the comment of E A, p. 65, 6 ff. [English section, p. 58] deals with the Lisbon Massacre of 1506; again it is noted that the source is S. Usque's *Consolaçam* III, 29, this time in combination with Joseph hakkohen's own *Sefar Dibrē hayāmīm*, but even in this case all references to scholarly studies are wanting. Thus, it would have been possible to refer the reader to e.g. J. C. Branner's English translation of A. Herculanos' famous "History of the Origin and Estab-

lishment of the Inquisition in Portugal", New York 1972; and to Y. H. Yerushalmi, *The Lisbon Massacre of 1506 and the Royal Image in the Shebet Yehuda*, Cincinnati 1976, with further bibliographical informations [parenthetically it might be noted, speaking on the work *Šebəṭ Yehūdā* by R. Salomo ibn Verga, that there is a more recent edition of this text than the ed. M. Wiener of 1856, reprinted 1924, which K. Almladh has used, viz. *Sefər Šebəṭ Yehūdā*, ed. A. Shohat, with an introduction by I. Baer, Jerusalem 1947]).

The examples given above are only adduced in order to demonstrate the difficulties connected with writing a commentary on a Medieval Jewish historiographical text. After all, the preparation of a commentary of the kind discussed remains a question of good judgement. How much space is at one's disposal? What types of information are most necessary for the elucidation of the text? Etc. In most essential respects it seems to the reviewer that the comments given by K. Almladh testify to a sound discernment, although it would have been advantageous, if the editor in the introduction to her work had clearly defined the aim and limits of her commentary section. In addition the commentary would have been even more useful—without being necessarily much more comprehensive—had the editor more frequently given adequate references in short form to recent secondary literature of significance. Thereby the reader would have been enabled to find his way backwards to older investigations.

It would, finally, greatly have facilitated the study of the new edition, if a name-index had been included.

It is natural that a review article mainly concentrates on the defects of the work under discussion. An open discussion and criticism is salubrious to scholarly research. It is, however, a matter of sound criticism to point out also the merits of a work. Accordingly, it must not be concealed that the new edition of Joseph hakkohen's *Sefər 'Eməq habbākā* with the chronicle of the anonymous Corrector from many aspects constitutes a scholarly accomplishment. Its most obvious shortcoming appears to be that a few questions as regards MSS. IV and V have not found a fully acceptable solution, as on the whole the relationship between the *'Eməq habbākā* MSS. cannot be said to have been subjected to an absolutely satisfying treatment. Nonetheless, aside from these points of criticism as well as some *desiderata* in regard to the comments, the edition by K. Almladh stands out as a commendable piece of work, impressed by a genuine humanistic spirit and a striving towards a correct representation and understanding of the text. The edition mirrors—with a few exceptions—in minuteness the MS. material utilized by the editor. The introduction to the work is concentrated, clear, and essentially reliable; the same applies to the commentary. Thus far, the *editio secunda* of the *Sefər 'Eməq habbākā* is solid enough to form a link in the genuine and strong chain of old and modern *Studia Semitica Upsaliensia*.



Aramaica IV

The Renaissance of Imperial Aramaic

FRITHIOF RUNDGREN

In this paper I shall develop further some viewpoints on certain features of the specific Jewish form of Imperial Aramaic, viewpoints already advanced by me in various periodicals. To begin with, I shall register the official letters, either quoted or only mentioned, in the book which, in our Bibles, is called "Ezra".

(1).1,2-4: *kō ʿāmar Korāš mālāk Pāras* etc.¹ Here Cyrus appears performing the function of a kind of *xalīfat rasūl Allāh*. What verbal form he has given to the measures alluded to in this Chapter we do not know. The authenticity of the passage is questioned even by many scholars who accept the authenticity of the Aramaic document Ezra 6,3 ff. (cf. J. Bright, *A History of Israel*, 1967, p. 343). As is typical of all historical writings edited by priests, in the Old Testament, it is said here that *hēʿīr Yhwh ʿāt-rūʿx Korāš mālāk-Pāras wa-yyaʿabār-qōl bə-kāl-malkūtō wə-gam-bə-miktāb lēmōr* "the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus king of Persia, that he made a proclamation throughout all his kingdom, and put it also in writing, saying" (1,1 King James Version).² We are here confronted with an expression of Jewish ethnocentrism, well known from the Old Testament and fanned, as always, by the priests, but, in this connection also with a moving declaration of religious faith. It is now that the foundations of later, spiritual Judaism are laid. This is another kind of Judaism than that of, for instance, the Book of Judges, Chapter I. After all, how worth considering, especially to scientific humanism, is the following statement by the unforgettable Bertrand Russell, made in his old age: "My views on religion remain those which I acquired at the age of sixteen. I consider all forms of religion not only false but harmful" (R. W. Clark, *The Life of Bertrand Russell*, 1978, p. 791).³ From a political point of view our Chapter bears, above all, witness to the greatness of Cyrus.

Thus we learn here that Cyrus has made his decision to be proclaimed orally, as also in writing. In both cases it is, in the first place, a question of Persian and Aramaic. Consequently the passage 1,2-4 presents itself as a Hebrew "version" of an Aramaic edict from the chancellery of the king, which also appears from some features of the *Hebraitas* of the passage in question, e.g. *pāqad* in the sense of "order" and *malkūt* "kingdom", in its territorial dimensions, a linguistically secondary and—therefore later—lexical derivation from *malkūt* "the fact of being a king" (cf. e.g. 4,6) > "kingdom" in an abstract sense, a so-called syntactical derivation, i.e., from "he is a king";⁴ cf. also 1,7 *wa-yyittānēm bə-bēt ʿalōhāw*, possibly on the pattern of the type *pat . . . (bē)dātan* "deposit" and its Aramaic counterpart.

(2). *ū-bə-malkūt ʿAxašwērōš bi-txillat malkūtō kātəbū šitnā ʿal-yōšəbē Yəhūdā wīrūšālāyim* "And in the reign of Ahasuerus, in the beginning of his reign, wrote

they unto him an accusation against the inhabitants of Judah and Jerusalem” (4,6). According to Esdras II (Rahlfs) *šitnā* is = ἐπιστολή, cf. ἐπιστολήν καὶ ἐναντίωσιν (Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt, ed. F. Field, 1875, p. 762 b) = VS *xetyānā* = Vulg. *accusatio*. Thus it is obvious that the word means an “indictment” of some kind; in Jewish Aramaic *šitnā* is = *Šātānā* (< Hebrew *šātān*), i.e. < **šatnā* < **šaṭanā*, cf. also Aramaic *satnā* = *sātānā*. We can, however, go further here. What is the meaning of Hebrew-Aramaic **šaṭan-* from an etymological point of view? In answering this question we can obtain some help from Matthew 22,15: Τότε πορευθέντες οἱ Φαρισαῖοι συμβούλιον ἔλαβον ὅπως αὐτὸν παγιδεύσωσιν ἐν λόγῳ where the new Swedish translation may not be adjudged completely successful: “Då gick fariseerna bort och kom överens om att försöka få fast honom för något han sade”, cf. “Then went the Pharisees, and took counsel how they might entangle him in *his* talk”, with an added “his” instead of “by talk”. I prefer here the translation of Delitzsch: *wa-yyēlākū ha-pṣrūšīm wa-yyityā^{ca}šū ʾēk yakšilūhū bā-dābār*, cf. *hāyḏān ʿezalw pərišā nāsabw melkā d-aykannā nāšūdūnāyhy bā-mellātā* “Then the Pharisees went away and deliberated how they might entangle/snare him by words” (Brockelmann translates here *nāsab melkā* correctly by “deliberavit”, *Lexicon Syriacum*², 1928, p. 432 b). By using the verb *šād* “hunt, fish, catch” the Syriac version links up with the metaphorical sense of παγιδεύειν here, cf. Syriac *māšīdā* “net”. For the meaning of this verb is “lay a snare for, entrap”, corresponding to Swedish “snärja” (to *snara*), used today also in the sense “to snare by words”. In the same way παγιδεύειν is used here of the Pharisees who in the Gospels are described, in this respect, as rather diabolic persons, and it is here Hebrew *šātān* < **šaṭan-* comes in. In **šaṭan-* we are confronted with the old Semitic participle “one who catches, with ropes, snares, nets”, cf. Arabic *šaṭanahu* “he bound him with a *šaṭanun*”, i.e. a rope, especially a large one (Lane, 1552 a). This acceptance is important because it establishes a connection with Arabic *šaṭana*, *yašṭunu*, *šuṭūnun* (< **šuṭun-* < **šaṭun-*, formally like Accadian *qatun*) “he was or became distant or remote”, ‘*anhu*, while *šaṭana fi Parḏi* means “it entered into the earth”, as *rāsixan* or *wāḡilan* (Lane, 1551 c), i.e., “far away into the earth”, cf. *šaṭanahu*, *yašṭunu*, *šaṭnun* “he turned away in opposition to him” (Lane, *ibid.*). From all this we can reconstruct a **šaṭun* “is elongated”/**šaṭan* “makes stretched in length” > Arabic *šaṭan-* = *mašṭūn-* “stretched in length” > “rope”.

Now we return to the Devil about whom Leszek Kolakowski thinks he knows a great deal. However, the Devil is very clever. Not seldom he appears as the representative of “the good”, i.e., of what is good for some groups of society. Thus, the Pharisees represent, in their own eyes, “the good”, but in the eyes of Jesus they are using the methods of the Jewish figure *Šātān* “the snarer, the entangler by words”, instead of by nets, made of ropes or cords. However, we should all be aware of the fact that the cords used by Satan for his verbal nets have always been greatly stretched; otherwise he would not have been able to appear as a representative of “the good”. The evil very seldom appears as the Evil one.

After this exposition of the linguistic story of the Devil we also understand

what mode of writing is meant by the *šitnā* in Ezra 4,6: it is a kind of *παγίδευμα* “snare, enticement”, inspired by the *Παγιδεύων par excellence*, the *Šātān*, cf. Ecclesiastes 7,26: *ū-mōšā ʔanī mar mi-mmāwāt ʔāt-hā-ʔiššā ʔāšār-hī ʔmāšōdīm wa-x^arāmīm libbāh, ʔāsūrīm yādāhā: ʔōb li-fnē hā-ʔlōhīm yimmāleṭ mimmānnā wə-xōṭē ʔyillākād bāh* “And I find more bitter than death the woman, whose heart is snares and nets, and her hands as bands: whoso pleaseth God shall escape her; but the sinner shall be taken by her”,⁵ cf. VS *w-eškaxet də-marrir men mawtā ʔattātā də-hī ʔitāh paxxā wa-mšidṭā lebbāh ʔesrat ʔidāh men də-ṭāb wə-man də-ṭāb qədām ʔAlāhā meštawzab mennāh wə-man də-xāṭā mettaxed bāh*⁶ (as far as I understand, the dittography *mn dṭb mn dṭb* has here resulted in the reading *men də-ṭāb*, leading in turn to the change of *ʔessārā* into *ʔesrat*),⁷ cf. LXX ἤτις ἐστὶν θηρεύματα καὶ σαγήνη καρδία αὐτῆς; according to K. Hyvärinen we have here *mšwd = θήρευμα (ο’), παγίδευμα (α’)* (Die Übersetzung von Aquila, 1977, p. 98). Thus *šitnā* is a “satanic”, i.e. snaring accusation.

(3). *ū-bīmē ʔArtaxšaštā ʔkātab bi-šlām Mitrədāt Ṭābʔēl ū-šəʔār kənāwōtw ʔal-ʔArtaxšaštā ʔmālāk Pārās ū-kātāb ha-nništawān kātūb ʔrāmūt ū-maturgām ʔrāmūt* “And in the days of Artaxerxes wrote Bishlam, Mithredath, Tabeel, and the rest of their companions, unto Artaxerxes king of Persia; and the writing of the letter was written in the Syrian tongue, and interpreted in the Syrian tongue.” (4,7). Above we have come across two expressions for “writing”, the more general *miktāb* and the more specific *šitnā*. In the passage just quoted we find, likewise, one more general expression, *kātāb*, and one more specific, *ništawān* “letter” (also 7,11). According to H. H. Schaefer the latter is falsely vocalized and should be **ništawānā < ništā-van-*, to *ni-štā-* “instituire” (Iranische Beiträge I/1930, p. 67/265). Nyberg apparently considered the form *ništawānā* as correctly vocalized and posits a **ni-šta-vāna-* (Hilfsbuch des Pehlevi, II/1931, p. 162). According to Rosenthal the word in question means “written order” and goes back to **ni-šta-van*, Ossetic *nystwan* (A Grammar of Biblical Aramaic, 1961, p. 59). Now, as for Ossetic, I would like to recall here, in the first place, forms like *nyf-fyssyn* “write down”, from East Ossetic *fyssyn* “write”, to Old Persian *nipištanaiy* (R. G. Kent, Old Persian², 1953, p. 194). For, although a *nštwn* “document” is attested already in Cowley 17,³⁸ I prefer to start from *ni-pišt-*. I have pointed out the importance of the existence of the alternation *pa-lfa-*, *ta-lṭa-* etc. in Old Iranian for a correct appreciation of the double pronunciation of *kpt*, *bdg* in Imperial Aramaic (OS 22/1974, pp. 186 ff.). As a Persian loan word a form like *nipišta-* could thus in the Aramaic of the Imperial chancellery easily come to be pronounced *nifišta* as a kind of hyper-Achaemenian pronunciation. Thus, when an Aramaic derivation with the help of the suffix *-ān* was formed from such a *nipišta-* the pronunciation of a *npštān* could have been **nifšātān > *niwšātān > ništawān* “litterae”—if *-ān* was interpreted as a stat. abs. fem., cf. VS *kātābā d-eggartā* (4,7). However, a *ništawānā* could also be interpreted as a formation like Jewish Aramaic *kātābānā* “scribe”. Perhaps such an interpretation could explain the curious φορολόγος “tax-gatherer” in Esdras II,4,8: ἔγραψεν ὁ φορολόγος γραφήν Συριστί καὶ ἡρμηνευμένην (scil. Συριστί) < *wə-kātāb ha-nništawān* (= Aramaic *ništawānā*) *kātūb* (= γραφήν) etc. In any case I prefer K. Marti’s comparison with New Persian *noveštān* “write” (Kurzgef. Grammatik

der biblisch-aramäischen Sprache², 1911, p. 81) to the—completely unfounded—etymology given by Nyberg; cf. also H. Bauer–P. Leander, *Grammatik des Biblisch-Aramäischen*, 1927, § 15, p. 56 (metathesis).

Another problem arises from Esdras II,4,7 *ἔγραψεν ἐν εἰρήνῃ Μιθραδατη Ταβηλ σὺν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς συνδούλοις αὐτοῦ* where *šlām* is interpreted as being in the stat. constr., i.e., “in agreement with M.” (cf. *pace tua dixerim*), whereby *knwtw* (-*āw* or possibly -*ō* on the pattern of Aramaic *kānāwāteh*) becomes understandable. However, such a meaning of *šlām* is, unfortunately, unknown to me as is also the corresponding Greek construction. Here the Syriac version gives us an opportunity of explaining *kātab bi-šlām* as an abbreviated expression, possibly inspired by an Iranian usage of the type *nibišt pad drōd* *ō* = Aramaic *kātab bi-šlām* *‘al* (cf. New Persian *pādrūd* “leave, dismissal, farewell”, *be-drūd* “health”). For in the Syriac Version we find *kātab wa-š’el ba-šlām Mhrdt w-Tb’yl wə-šarkā d-akwāteh*, and *šə’el ~ šel ba-šlām* means “salutare”. Our text mentions that one has written to the king, a fact here expressed through the phrase *kātab bi-šlām* *‘al*, cf. 5,7: *lə-Dārəyāwāš malkā’ šlāmā’ kōllā’* (that is, *har drōd*). Thus we can cancel the name Βεσλεμιος (Esdras I, 2, 12) and *Beselam* (Vulg. 4,7) respectively. However, the opinion of W. Rudolph, according to which *bšlm* is “eine Verstümmelung von *bīrūšālēm* ‘gegen Jerusalem’”, must, I think, be rejected (Handbuch zum Alten Testament, herausgeg. von O. Eissfeldt. Erste Reihe 20/1949, p. 34).

Thus the letter in question was written in Aramaic and recited in Aramaic (*legebatur*, Vulg.), for it is this that *maturgām* primarily means here. Moreover, could then such a letter, written in Aramaic, be recited in some other language? Yes, in Persian. The Aramaic of the kind of documents alluded to here, issued by the chancellery of the king, I have designated by the term *lišān mitxurti*, in the sense of an “Entsprechungssprache”,⁹ i.e., one wrote a document of this kind in Aramaic, and the text could then be read as Aramaic, or as Persian. For, to every Aramaic word there was in such cases in principle a certain Persian equivalent. This practice led to the usage of writing Persian with Aramaic letters instead of the writing in cuneiform, whereby a great many Aramaic logograms were later retained from the *mitxurtu*-function of the Aramaic of the Achaemenian chancellery. A result of this later development we can observe in Middle-Iranian (cf. *Oriens* 23–4/1971, 476).

Now a specific kind of Aramaic, in principle identical with Old Aramaic, was used as a *lingua franca* within the Achaemenian empire. This Imperial Aramaic possessed several Persian loanwords but was intended to be read only as Aramaic. This use of Aramaic was much more practical than the rather rigid use of Aramaic as a pure *lišān mitxurti*, as a kind of “selftranslating” Aramaic reserved probably for certain kinds of documents which, for some reason, had to be understood in a bilingual way. However that may be, the very conception of a *lišān mitxurti* is important to our subject. For even if we would have to imagine this function mainly as a technical model, used by the scribes in translating Persian documents as literally as possible into Aramaic, this very way of using Old Aramaic is of the greatest importance to us because the whole Targumic practice seems to go back, in some way or another, to the *mitxurtu*-practice in the

Achaemenian chancelleries. This practice, involving a literal translation of an Old Persian document into Old Aramaic constitutes the *fons et origo* of the Targumic practice, the model for the Jewish use of this so-called Imperial Aramaic as the original language of what they called "Targum". Thus, one has for ritualistic reasons read the Torah in Hebrew, thereby using Aramaic as a *lišān mitxurti*, laying stress on a literal and simultaneous translation into Aramaic. One could almost maintain that the Jews had the text in Hebrew, read it in Hebrew, but understood it in Aramaic.

From all this two significant conclusions can be drawn. 1. From the beginning the Targum is no paraphrasis but a literal translation according to the *mitxurtu*-principle. 2. The Targum, in this sense, has its origin in the East, which appears also from the fact that this very word, *targūm*, is, in the last resort, connected with Old Assyrian *targumannu*, to *ragāmu*, *irgum*, *iraggam* (<*yi-ragam*) "cry, speak; accuse", cf. Arabic *qurʿānūn*, later used as an infinitive of *qaraʿa*, but perhaps from the beginning, a collective noun from a *qirāʿ* = Jewish-Aramaic *qārāʿ* (cf. Hebrew *qārāʿ* "cry, shout", but *qaraʿa*—in the times of the *ahl alkitāb*—already "read"; Die Welt des Islams 22/1980, p. 224). Thus, one could say that, from the beginning, the Targum means *de jure* the reading of the Hebrew text as *mäturgām*.

Here it is appropriate to decide on Nehemiah 8,8: *wa-yyiqrəʿū ba-ssefār bə-tōrat hā-ʾlōhīm məfōrāš wə-šōm šākāl wa-yyābīnū ba-mmīqrāʿ* "So they read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading". In this connection, I shall deal with the text as it stands now, leaving out of consideration what might have been its wording "vor dem Eingriff des Chronisten" (Rudolph, op. cit., p. 147). Thus I am not inclined to change—with Schaefer, Iranische Beiträge, I, p. 7/205, n. 2—*wa-yyiqrəʿū* into *wa-yyiqrā*; cf. VS *wa-qraw ba-ktābā dā-nāmōsā dā-māryā kad pāris w-ettāpīsw beh w-estakkalw bə-qeryāneh* where *kad pāris* supports *məfōrāš*, whatever its meaning may be, as against the proposed *məfārēš* (cf. Kittel). If now, as Rudolph maintains, the expression *šōm šākāl*—"als Gerundium"—belongs to *məfōrāš* ("indem sie vom Blatt weg übersetzen und (dadurch) Verständnis bewirkten"), we must object that "als Gerundium" it must belong to *wa-yyiqrəʿū* but, as a passive participle, a *šūm šākāl* "given the sense" may very well be coordinated with *məfōrāš*. Thus I prefer the translation: "And they read in the book, in the law of God (the Hebrew text), being (at the same time) interpreted and (thus) given the sense, and by the reading (this kind of reading) they made (them) understand", or, "and by this kind of reading they understood", or, "and they understood this kind of reading" (cf. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 147).

In Old Iranian Indo-European **dō-* "give" and **dhē-* "put, make, create" had coincided in *dā-*, and thus also *dādan* "to create" and "to give" could both later be rendered by *YHBN-tn*. On the other hand, *dā-* "give" seems to have influenced Aramaic *šīm* "to put": *šām šākāl* "give understanding = *uzwārišn*,¹⁰ sense", "explain". Accordingly *məfōrāš wə-šūm šākāl* seems to be a fuller expression for *mäturgām*, cf. Talmūd, Məgillā 3 a: *wa-yyiqrəʿū ba-ssefār bə-tōrat hā-ʾlōhīm. zā miqrā, məfōrāš. zā targūm. wə-šōm šākāl, ʿellū ha-ppəsūqīm*, or, according to L. Goldschmidt: "Sie lasen in dem Buche der Lehre Gottes, das ist

die Schrift; *deutlich*, das ist die Übersetzung; *mit Angabe des Sinnes*, das sind die Verstrennungen" (Der babylonische Talmud neu übertragen, 4/1931, p. 8).

It is here fitting to insert some words on Arabic *ʿabbara*, causative of *ʿabara*, *yaʿburu*, *ʿubūrun* "cross" and "explain", infinitive *ʿibārat* "explanation" = ἔρμηνεία. Junker has *BRWN-tn = vitartan* "hinübergehen, verscheiden" (Das Frahang i Pahlavik, 1955, p. 2), i.e. *widardan*, to Old Persian *vi-tar-* "go across", cf. Aramaic *ʾaʿbar* "trañstulit" > Arabic *ʿabbara*, *taʿbīr*, cf. Pahlavi *widārdan* "cause to pass". While the Arabic expression could be a translation from Aramaic, in the sense of μεταφορά, to μεταφέρειν τοῦνομα κατὰ τὸν λόγον "transfer the word to its literal meaning" (Aristotle, Topica, 112 a, 32), in the first place, *wizārdan* "separate" and "explain", "interpret" comes into consideration for Aramaic *prš*, cf. Junker *PRŠWN-tn = vicārtan* (op. cit., p. 34). However, the basic idea is similar, since *vi-čar-* means "get through", of which *vi-čārtan* is a causative. Now Sanskrit *vicarati* also means "traverse, pervade", and if Iranian *vičārtan* "translate" belongs here the semantic development resembles that of Aramaic *ʾaʿbara*. Moreover, one can agree with Schaeder when he maintains that Hebrew *pāreš* does not provide us with the proper nuances for *māfōrāš* (= Iranische Beiträge, I, p. 6/204) which seems to be influenced by Jewish Aramaic *pāreš* "explain". The result of what has been said above would then be that *māfōrāš wə-šūm šākāl* is equivalent to *məturgām*.

(4). The next writing is cited in Ezra 4,8–16, where the terms *ʾiggārāh* (4,8) and *paršāgān ʾiggartāʾ dī šəlaxū* (4,11) should be noticed. In 4,17 the *pitgāmāʾ* of the king is mentioned, and 4, 18ff. its content follows. Here especially the words *ništəwānāʾ dī šəlaxtūn ʿalānāʾ māfāraš qʾrī qādāmāy* are of interest to us, i.e. the writing which was in Aramaic has been read as *məturgām* in Persian according to the *mitxurtu*-practice (cf. above, p. 176), cf. VS: *wə-kad menʿat ʾeggərātā də-šaddartōn ləwāty šarrirāʾit qəraw qədāmāy*; with *šarrirāʾit* the expression *ba-šrārā = pad ostīgānīh* may here be compared. Later on, in 4,23, we read: *ʾadayin min-dī paršāgān ništəwānāʾ dī ʾArtaxšaštʾ malkāʾ qʾrī qʾdām-Rəxūm wə-Šimšay sāfərarāʾ*, where the *māfāraš* is lacking because the copy of the letter was in Aramaic and also read in this language, cf. on 4,7 above, p. 176. From this we can infer that the exact meaning of *paršāgān* is "duplicate" or something similar (cf. below).

(5). In 5,5 a new letter is mentioned by the words *wə-ʾadayin yətibūn ništəwānāʾ ʿal-dənāh* "and then they should send back a letter about this", i.e. after having received a letter from the king. In 5, 6 their own letter is mentioned as *paršāgān ʾiggartāʾ dī-šəlax ... ʿal-Dārəyāwāš malkāʾ*, and in 5, 7 we read: *pitgāmāʾ šəlaxū ʿalōhī wə-kidnāh kətib bə-gawwəh: lə-Dārəyāwāš malkāʾ šəlāmāʾ kōllāʾ* etc. (cf. above, p. 176).

(6). In 6,6–12 we have then the king's answer, based on a *məgillāh*, found *bə-ʾAxmatāʾ bə-bīrətāʾ dī bə-Māday mədīntāh*, after investigations in *bēt sifrayyāʾ dī ginzayyāʾ məhaxʾtīn tammāh bə-Bābāl* (6,1–2).

(7). In 7, 11 a letter to Ezra from Artaxerxes is mentioned with the following words: *wə-zāʾ paršāgān ha-nništəwān ʾašār nātan ... lə-ʿĀzrā* etc., and in 7,12–26 the content of the letter follows. Here we are confronted with *paršāgān* in a Hebrew context, and are probably dealing with a hebraization of the Aramaic

paršəgan; on the other hand, the specific Hebrew form has penetrated into Aramaic, in the variants *ptšgn*, *patšəgan* (cf. below). Since there is between our *pršgn* ~ *ptšgn* and the difficult *patšəgar* Esther II,7,10 "Zweiter" (Dalman, Handwörterbuch, p. 357) a connecting link in the notion of *mišnā* I would like to call attention to my paper "Ein iranischer Beamtenname im Aramäischen" (OS 12/1964, pp. 89–98). On this paper, in its entirety, Henrik S. Nyberg gives his opinion by the interjection "Oh!" (A Manual of Pahlavi, II, 1974, p. 48a). This compels me, unfortunately, to make a digression in order to scrutinize the methods used by this modest scholar in this, indeed, very difficult field.

According to Nyberg Pahlavi *bītaxš*, i.e. *bidaxš* "viceroy", is in its oldest form attested in Armenian *bdeašx* (Manual, II, p. 48), a word which according to Hübschmann goes back to a **bidiaxš*, "nach armenischen Lautgesetzen" (Armenische Grammatik, I/1895, p. 120). To judge from Syriac *ᵚp̄taxšā*, Πιτιάξης as well as from the Georgian forms, this **bidiaxš* is according to Hübschmann "aus **patiaxša-* entstellt"; Hübschmann was not able, he says, to explain this reconstruction etymologically. Now Benveniste says: "Le terme 'deuxième' se retrouverait dans le titre si discuté Πιτιάξης aram. *pytxš*, arm. *bdeašx*, etc. si l'initiale contenait l'ordinal *bītiya-*. Mais cette interprétation ne s'accorde pas avec la plupart des transcriptions étrangères et elle est repoussé avec raison par W. Eilers, *Indo-iran. Journ.* V, 1962, p. 20" (Titres et noms propres en iranien ancien, 1966, p. 65, n. 2). An Aramaic *pytxš* is, unfortunately, not known to me, but I know of Syriac *p̄taxšā*, *ᵚp̄txšʔ*, *ᵚp̄tkšʔ*, *pdksʔ*.

According to Nyberg Armenian *bdeašx* arose from **bidiaxš* < **btiaxš* to an Old Armenian **bītiya-axšī-* "the second eye" (of the king, cf. Manual II, p. 48), where the forms with an initial *p-* are left out of scientific consideration. Moreover, what was the phonemic status of the *-t-* of the reconstructed **btiaxš* when borrowed by the Armenians? And what about the *-ī-* of "bītaxš". Now, forms like Syriac *ᵚp̄txšʔ* presuppose an intermediary stage *p̄taxšā* while Syriac *p̄taxšā* seems to reflect a **p̄itaxšā*. In this connection it is appropriate to recall Lagarde's opinion of Latin *vitaxa*. Lagarde considered this form as reflecting a βιτάξα (Gesammelte Abhandlungen, 1866, p. 187). This means that an Iranian *b-* had here, in the first place, to be reproduced by a Greek π: **πιτάξα* cf. OS 12, p. 91. Moreover, a Greek τ corresponding very often to an Aramaic *ṭ*, a Syriac *p̄taxšā* can very well reflect a form like *πιτάξα*, cf. Armazi *bṭhš* = Πιτιάξης instead of **βιτιάξης* /*vitiaksis*/. This being so, Armazi *pythš* too may have been influenced by its Greek equivalent (OS 12, p. 91). While according to Eilers and Benveniste the forms with *p-* exclude interpretations like that of Nyberg (**bītiyaxša*, Eranos 44/1946, p. 237, n. 2), I have myself in OS 12, p. 91 pointed out certain phonological circumstances making it possible to explain the π as a secondary restitution of the plosive β which had become *v*, thus perhaps explaining *de facto* also Iranian *pythš*. One could think then that Nyberg, who had himself made some mistakes in the field of Pahlavi, should have been grateful for this support to the first part of the word as containing a *bītiya* "second", the more so as in OS 12, p. 95 I demonstrated the existence of the idea of the "second" next to the king in the following expressions: *mišnā*, *tenyānā*, *tinyān*, *ptšgr*, *p̄tšgr*, *ᵚlqptʔ*, διάδοχος, δευτερεύων and ἐκ δευτέρου!

However, it becomes still worse. Advancing his explanation of *bit-*, he rejected, in the same breath, A. Pagliaro's interpretation of *bitaxš* as composed of *patay-* "signore" and *axš-* "occhio" (RSO 12/1929-30, p. 165) as "peu convaincant". Nevertheless, there was nothing to stop him explaining later, without further ado, Pagliaro's interpretation of *axš-* as "eye" as correct (Manual II, p. 48). Corroborated, by the exposition in OS 12, p. 89 ff., in his belief in a *bitīya-* he now reconstructs a **bitīya-axši-* "the second eye" (of the king).

Now "the second" is in Pahlavi *dykl*, according to Nyberg to be read as *ditīkar* while MacKenzie reads *dudīgar*. If we start from a *dvitīya-* > *bitīya* + *gar-* > **bitīgar* "the second" we may be allowed to venture a mere guess that the enigmatic Aramaic *pṭšgr*, *pṭšgr* = *tinyān* could, after all, simply be the result of a transformation exactly on the pattern of Aramaic *pətaxšā*, ²*pṭkš*² to *pṭkšr* > *pətašgar*, the starting-point being then a *btygr* "the second" which was not understood; cf. Old Syriac *pdkšar* "titulus muneris in Aula Persica" (Payne Smith, Thesaurus, Col. 3038).¹¹ Since our *pətaxšā* is the equivalent of *πιτιάξης* re-made from a **βιτιάξης* (cf. above) we may ask ourselves if this does not, in fact, reflect a Parthian *bitīya-xšāh* "the second king", the *ἀντικαῖσαρ* (OS 12, p. 92), going back, in the last resort, to Old Persian **dvitīya-xšāyathīya-* "The Grand Vizier". If this suggestion is justified we must reject the second half of Nyberg's explanation, retaining however the first half. Thus Nyberg could have learnt much from OS 12, and so could also Benveniste. I return now to Semitic *patšägän*, *paršəgan* "duplicate".

In this case too there is every reason to scrutinize the lucubrations of Nyberg. For according to him "copy" is in Pahlavi *pačēn* which he compares with the Armenian loanwords "pačēn", "pačean", and *pačik* without indicating the source, which had been of interest in this case (Manual II, pp. 147 and 271!). Now already La Croze compared our *patšägän* with Armenian *patčēn* = *ἀντίγραφον* "duplicate, copy" (Lagarde, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, p. 79), which Benveniste fails to mention. As regards the element *-čēn* Benveniste starts from a Manichean *p²tčynny* which he reads *pātčaynē* translating it "réponse".¹² To this word corresponds, according to him, a Christian-Sogdian *p²čyny*, read *pāčaynē*, and what Armenian *patčēn* is to Pahlavi *pačēn* the aforesaid forms are to each other. Thus we are here confronted with Armenian *patčēn* (JA 225/1934, 183), borrowed, of course, from Hübschmann who registers *patčēn*, *patčean*, *pačik*, and *pačik*, of which the two last-mentioned were not clear to him (Armenische Grammatik I/1895, p. 224). To me only the form *patčēn* comes into consideration, and since this form must have been borrowed from an Iranian *patčēn* or the like, one should, I think, at least—with MacKenzie—posit a Pahlavi *pa(č)čēn* (A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary, 1974, p. 62), corresponding, as we shall see, to an Aramaic **paššəgan*.

According to Benveniste Aramaic *par-* must here be "une altération de hébr. *pat-*" (JA 225, p. 181). His opinion that a *pat(i)-č-* "a pu en effet se différencier en" *par(i)-č-*, "en partie probablement sous l'influence des nombreux emprunts commençant par *pari-*" (ibid.) is not altogether clear. Thus, one has some difficulty in understanding the sense of this "en partie", presupposing also another factor than the analogical. And this factor must be then a phonetical one. Let us now take a look at some Aramaic forms.

In "Das Targum zu Josua in jemenischer Überlieferung" (1899), p. 17, Fr. Praetorius has *paršəgan* ʾōrayətā dā-Mōšah (8,32) = Sperber, who from *d* and *o* gives the variant *ptšgn*; cf. Hebrew *mišnē tōrat Mōšā* from which we obtain the equation *paršəgan* = *mišnā*; LXX 9,2c (Rahlfs) τὸ δευτερονόμιον, νόμον Μωυση; VS *paršagnā* dā-nāmōseh dā-Mūšā. Another example is Deuteronomy 17,8 *paršəgan* ʾōrāyətā hādā where Sperber from *v*, *SV*, and *c* has the variant *patšəgan* (vocalized by Sperber); cf. Neophyti: *tnyy* ʾwryth *hdh*, where *tnyy* = *paršəgan*; cf. Targum Jonathan (Rieder) *pršgn* ʾwrytʾ *hdʾ*; VS *paršagneh* dā-nāmōsā hānā; LXX τὸ δευτερονόμιον τοῦτο = Hebrew *mišnē ha-ttōrā ha-zzōt*; in Lagarde's Esther *patšəgān* is rendered by *dytgmʾ*.

Thus in Jewish Aramaic we find stat. constr. *paršəgan*, var. *ptšgn*, while VS has *paršagnā*, *paršagneh*. According to Nyberg *paršagnā* contains an "inorganic -r- < -t-" (Manual II, p. 147). However, the only form of "inorganic" explanation admissible here is that of an analogical formation on the pattern of Aramaic words with *par-* (Persian loanwords, cf. Benveniste above). But in our case the -r- is fairly "organic": *patšəgan* > **paššəgan* > *paršəgan*, the form *patšəgan* then reflecting Iranian **pat-čagn-*, while *paršəgan* presupposes a *paššəgan*, corresponding to Iranian **paččagn-*, cf. Pahlavi *pa(č)čēn*.

But what is this -čagn- ~ -čayn-? S. Telegdi starts from an Old Iranian **pati-čayana* finding Semitic -g- ~ OP -y- "surprenant". "On en peut", he says, "conclure peut-être que, dès l'époque achéménide, le *g* avait entre voyelle une prononciation spirantique" (JA 226/1935, p. 253). This ought, one may think, to have led him to posit a **pati-čagana-* or the like. However, starting from a **pāti-cagnya-* "reproduction" and stating that the groupe -agn- would have given an -ān- in Pahlavi Benveniste reconstructs a **pati-čagna-* to a "root" *čag-* "accorder, assurer, offrir", and thus literally "Wieder-Gabe" (op. cit., p. 84), that is, AiWb 575-6: *čagəd* "bietend, während", *čagəman-* "Geschenkk", and *čag-vah-* "bietend, während". What kind of Indo-European root this *čag-* represents I do not know, nor does Nyberg who has, without further ado, taken over a **paticagniya-* (Manual II, p. 147).

As Imperial Aramaic, in the proper sense of the word, Aramaic was used on the one hand as a *lingua franca*, on the other as a *lišān mitxurti* in a technical sense, primarily in the Achaemenian chancelleries. An important indirect proof of the function of Aramaic as a language of the *targūm* to Persian documents is the existence of a specific linguistic phenomenon, familiar to us from Biblical Hebrew, as we know this from the Masoretic text including Biblical Aramaic, as well as from Old Syriac. I mean the double pronunciation of *kpt*, *bdg*. The existence here of this, in principle completely un-Semitic, phenomenon has given rise to the following statement: "That the Masoretes introduced a double pronunciation of the BGDKPT, a pronunciation of which nothing was known in the most authoritative Jewish circles of previous centuries. The Masoretes may have here followed the Syrians who had created special signs to indicate this double pronunciation which they observed in their spoken language." (P. Kahle, The Cairo Geniza², 1959, p. 186).

Thus, according to Kahle, the double pronunciation of *kpt*, *bdg*, which we also find in the traditional pronunciation of the Syriac literary language, would reflect a peculiarity in the spoken Eastern Aramaic on which this literary language was

originally founded. It is generally held that this spoken language was, in the main, identical with the local dialect of Edessa.¹³ What do we know about the pronunciation of the phonemes in question in this vernacular? Obviously not much. Moreover, we have every reason for assuming that the so-called "people" of this area was illiterate. When the translation of the Torah into Syriac was made it was primarily for the benefit of the Christian Aramaic-speaking population; they must be able to understand the recited Biblical Texts. This they could only do if the language of the Church was founded on the language spoken by the people.

Now, as regards this Edessenian vernacular, we must ask ourselves whether it is really to be expected that e.g. an Aramaic *yiktub* would have in Edessa sounded *nektob̄* instead of *nektob*. No, from a general Semitic point of view such a pronunciation should be considered highly remarkable. Moreover, if this had been a specific trait of the spoken language of Edessa and surroundings we should certainly expect to find an equivalent of some kind to this phenomenon also in Modern Eastern Aramaic. In this connection we should, however, consider the following circumstances. 1. *Das Neusyrische ist nicht geradezu die Tochter des Syrischen* (Th. Nöldeke, Grammatik der neusyrischen Sprache, 1868, p. XXXV). This important statement implies that Modern Eastern Aramaic must, also in this respect, be treated in principle as a separate entity. 2. Obviously, this language has long been under the influence of the Old Syriac of the Church, and this influence may also have been extended to the pronunciation of *kpt*, *bdg* (cf. Acta Orientalia 38/1977, p. 357). 3. We know nothing of the pronunciation of these phonemes in earlier times, for instance during the period when the dialect of Edessa was transformed into a literary language.

On the other hand, what we really know is that there has been a Jewish influence on the Old Syriac translation of the Torah. This influence may very well have extended also to the double pronunciation of *kpt*, *bdg*. Nay, I shall contend that the double pronunciation of these phonemes of Old Syriac was introduced by Jewish scribes, and that this double pronunciation originates in Jewish circles which had then already incorporated this kind of pronunciation into what is later called the Targum Onqelos, thereby linking up with the use of Aramaic in the Achaemenian chancelleries, the Imperial Aramaic *par excellence*, cf. the present writer in OS 29/1981, p. 172. I have already called attention to a case like Aramaic *ništawānā* which I did not hesitate to derive, ultimately from Old Persian *nipišta-*, thus assuming an intermediary, facultative pronunciation **nifišta-* on the part of the Aramaic translators in the Imperial chancellery: > **niwšətānā* > *ništawānā*. On the other hand, a Persian public official could very easily pronounce an Aramaic *katab* as *kātab* (OS 22/1974, p. 187). Such tendencies of pronunciation gradually became a pronunciation of prestige of Imperial Aramaic in a narrower sense. It was this kind of "imperial pronunciation" that the Jewish scribes wanted to apply to the Aramaic versions of the Torah, the Hebrew text of which "war (mindestens) seit der Zeit Ezras . . . abgeschlossen" (H. L. Strack, Einleitung in Talmud und Midraš⁵, 1921, p. 6). This opinion of Strack's is, I think, primarily valid for the consonantal text. The double pronunciation of *kpt*, *bdg* is due to the work of later Jewish scribes who wanted to create an Aramaic language of prestige, in the first place, for the Targum of the Torah, but then also

for other Jewish writings. Of course, already Ezra may have tried to introduce also this kind of "imperial pronunciation" in the West. It is, however, a more plausible assumption that this kind of pronunciation was regulated only at the time of the redaction of the Targum Onqelos, being then later adopted and rigidly systematized by the Masoretes of Tiberias. This assumption would lead us to the times of the Sasanids. And it is also to this epoch that I would like to ascribe the origin of what I call "the Renaissance of Imperial Aramaic", in the sense of a specific Jewish phenomenon. The reign of the Sasanids implies, as we know, *per se* a restoration of many cultural features of the Achaemenian Empire.

When studying certain Targums and Midrāšīm one observes not seldom, as specific features, Biblical-Aramaic orthography, words and phrases, being in a peculiar way mingled with genuinely Jewish Aramaic expressions. The Aramaic of Ezra and Daniel was apparently considered to have prestige, and thus the editors of later texts delighted in adorning their language orthographically, lexically and syntactically with such "flowers". This very phenomenon I would like to describe as reminiscences of what I here have called the Renaissance of Imperial Aramaic, to the epoch of which the final redaction of the only authoritative Targum, the Targum Onqelos, belongs. This Targum may have had its origin in the West, where Ezra introduced the Targumic principle from the East, or, in the East and introduced later into the West; it was in any case finally edited in Babylonia and then in a language that may be called Jewish Imperial Aramaic, a socio-linguistic term which accounts for several peculiarities of the Targum Onqelos (Acta Orientalia 42/1981, p. 111). The most prominent phonemic feature of this specific Jewish language of prestige was the re-use of certain tendencies in the pronunciation of Aramaic *kpt*, *bdg* existing already in the Achaemenian chancelleries, as well as the modification of these tendencies to rules, first in the Babylonian schools and later on in the Masoretic school of Tiberias. From the editors of the Targum Onqelos this feature spread also to Old Syriac, the language of the Christian Church. The intrinsic credibility of this outlook is, at least to some extent, corroborated by the fact that several terms for "write", "letter" etc. are of Persian origin; some of them have been studied above. The very concept of "Renaissance" can shed some light also on the hermeneutical status of the fact that the language of the Book of Ecclesiastes and Phoenician have some expressions in common. Such expressions are not to be taken as indications of an early date for the book in question (cf. Festschrift Spuler, 1981, p. 360) but are rather due to what I would like to call the Phoenician romanticism, constituting a kind of suggestive "framework" conformable to the specific kind of wisdom preached by the author of the book of Ecclesiastes.¹⁴

NOTES

1. If we take *Kwrš*, *Krš* conceived as a formation from *kurš-* we are not allowed to pronounce the name *Kōrās*, only *Korās*. However, according to Nöldeke, we have to start from *Kūruš*, and in this case a *Kōrās* is justified, for **Kūrōš* (cf. Nöldeke, Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte, 1887, p. 14). On the phonemic and semantic interpretation of Old Persian *Ku-u-ru-u-š* cf. W. Eilers, Kyros (Beiträge zur Namenforschung, 1964: 2, pp. 192 ff.).
2. This version is used throughout this paper.

3. However, religion in itself, as being the expression of one of the deepest needs of man, is neither false nor harmful. This could be said only of the various so-called religions, and it is one of the most urgent duties of scientific humanism to make this more clear than it is today. Here also the Semitician can be most helpful. In some religions God is said to be almighty. But, as Lord Acton put it: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Moreover, in some religions God is said to be "love" although it would be more appropriate to say that love is God, from the blind force of reproduction to the most sublime expressions of human love.
4. This analysis seems also to provide us with an explanation of the *k* of *malkūt*, cf. ^c*abđūt* and *yaldūt*. For there is an affinity between the collective-abstract noun and the so-called plural, and it is on this affinity that an analogical explanation should be founded. When Proto-Hebrew *-ū-m*, *-ī-m* coincided functionally in *-īm* the old collective plural *-ū* became reserved for the function of a collective, but then in the enlarged form *-ū-t*, on the pattern of *-at > -ā*. Thus a *malk-ū-t* in a collective-abstract sense received the *k* on the pattern of *malākīm*, *malkē*, cf. OS 28/1981, p. 101, n. 44. According to W. von Soden Accadian *mal(i)ku(m)* is "sem. ausser äth." (Akkadisches Handwörterbuch, Lief. 7/1966, p. 595). What is Old Ethiopic ²*amlāk* "deus" then? The pluralis maiestatis of a ^{*}*mal(ə)k*.
5. T. Kronholm, who differs slightly from this translation, renders *məšōdīm* by "snara" (Fem bibelböcker, 1979, p. 107).
6. The edition of the Trinitarian Bible Society, London 1913.
7. S. Lee has the correct ²*essārā*.
8. Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (1923), p. 53.
9. With me, *lišān mitxurti* is used as a *terminus technicus* in its own right, whatever it may have meant in Accadian. Persian and Aramaic are contrasting languages (*mitxurtu* = contrast). However, in the kind of Aramaic I have in mind here there was to every word a Persian equivalent, and, inversely, there was in Old Persian, used for specific purposes, to every word an Aramaic equivalent (*mitxurtu* = correspondence). It is as if one had written Sumerian and read Accadian, and, of course also Sumerian. In this way, peoples of contrasting tongues could address one another in Sumerian which as a *lišān mitxurti* could also be read as Accadian. The Sumerograms of Accadian may be regarded as the traces of the earlier existence of such a *mitxurtu*-practice. Thus, I am inclined to agree with Å. Sjöberg who interprets *eme-xa-mun* as "Sprache der Harmonie, der gegenseitigen Entsprechung" (Der Mondgott Nanna-Suen in der sumerischen Überlieferung I/1960, p. 145), but then in my sense, of course.
10. To *uz-wār* "understand", cf. Latin *aperio* "open, detect", if from ^{*}*ap-verio*.
11. However, Hoffmann wanted to change this to *pdškw* = New Persian *pēšxor*.
12. Cf. I. Gershevitch, A Grammar of Manichean Sogdian (1954), § 674.
13. The name of this town is not clear to me. In Syriac we have ²*Ōrhāy* = Arabic *arRuhā²u*, perhaps to ῥορή, while Edessa could be a ^{*}*Wed-essa* "rich in water". How Ὀρροηνή ~ Ὀρροηνή is to be connected with this I cannot say, cf. E. Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik, I/1939, p. 829.
14. Cf. O. Eissfeldt, Taautos und Sanchunjatón (1952).

Book Reviews

Language and Linguistics in the People's Republic of China edited by Winfred P. Lehmann. 168 pp. University of Texas Press, Austin and London 1975.

This book contains the field observations on the linguistic situation in China in late 1974 that were made by an American linguistic delegation consisting of fourteen members. The delegation paid a study visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC) between October 16 and November 13, 1974, in return for the visit paid by the Chinese delegation of the English Language Study Group to the USA between November and December 1973. The observations made by the members of the delegation have been compiled in this book by one of their number, W. P. Lehmann.

In spite of the fact that the duration of the delegation's stay in China was short (less than one month), the extent of the linguistic field observed is quite large and varied. Thus, the book contains descriptions of various linguistic activities, ranging from the practical work of language-teaching down to the identification of national minority languages. The information conveyed is of lasting value, and the book still deserves special attention, even though it came out 6 years ago. It may serve excellently as a work of comparative reference for making a historical review of the linguistic activities that have taken place in the PRC in the past 30 years. When the linguistic activities of the mid and late fifties are compared with those reported in the book, one can easily see that the predominant direction of interest in linguistic research has been affected by the changes in the socio-political situation that are taking place. The new leadership of the PRC is mainly concerned with the rapid development of *science* and *technology*, which makes up one of the four modernisations (sìgè xiàndàihuà)¹ (1) constituting the present, overall, national goals, and linguistics is included in *science* and *technology*. In the Chinese linguistic monthly journal, *zhōngguó yǔwén*, (2) in the mid and late fifties, for instance, the theories and works of the Soviet linguists were both intensively and extensively introduced. This linguistic activity reflected the socio-political reality of the time when cultural relations between Soviet Russia and the PRC were closest. The linguistic theories or works of western Europe and America were at that time introduced indirectly through the agency of the Soviet linguists, because they were referred to in the latter's works. Judging from the articles which appeared in the journal in this period, it is certain that the theories and methods of Soviet linguistics available at the time were taken into consideration in connection with the implementation of language reforms and the identification of national minority languages. The late Luó Cháng-péi's (3) article on the contributions made by G. P. Serjuchenko, (4), the Soviet specialist on the minority languages, mentions this situation (*Zhōngguó yǔwén*, no. 65, 1957, pp. 10-13). No information is given on the outcome of the scientific cooperation that once existed between the Chinese and Soviet linguists in the present book. The total silence on this point is a significant feature in studying the development of linguistic activities that has taken place in the PRC in the past 30 years.

The linguistic situation observed is reported under nine different headings: introduction, common language, language reform, teaching of Chinese, teaching of English and other foreign languages, lexicography, national minority languages, language pathology (experimental research) and language theory.

In summary, it is in the fields of the standardization of the common language (CL), the simplification of the writing system, the development of the romanized alphabet (*Pinyin*) (5) and the reform of the national minority languages that China has great achievements to show, while in the fields of pure linguistic research China has not yet shown any appreciable achievements. The only pure research project mentioned in the book is the split-brain experiments (commissurotomy), which were conducted by a group of four neuro-anatomists and medical researchers in Shànghǎi (6). In contradistinction to American neurolinguistic research, in which linguists actively cooperate, no mention is made of any such cooperation between linguists and neurosurgeons in the PRC.

¹ The Arabic figure within parentheses after each Chinese term refers to the number in the list of Chinese characters.

Most of the activities and achievements which are indicative of the unique features of the linguistic experience that China has had in the past 30 years are mentioned *in grosso modo* without any explanation of the mutual relation between the achievements and their historical background, so that a coherent picture of the linguistic activities and achievements is hardly obtained. In the following pages, therefore, I have tried to describe the four main achievements in terms of their mutual relations and historical background. The examples used to illustrate the linguistic changes in the CL have been mostly derived from other sources than the present book, from which only a few have been taken. In the exposition of the situation of the national minority languages, I have also supplemented the information given with fresh information on the linguistic situation of Korean, one of the national minority languages, which I collected in the Korean autonomous region during my short visit to the PRC in September 1978.

1. *Character simplification*

It is, above all, three language reforms (standardization of the CL, simplification of the writing system and popularization of the romanized alphabet) and the language policy as regards the national minorities which are the most remarkable achievements that have been made by China in the last 30 years. This may be due to the fact that they are closely related to one of the most urgent national goals, the abolition of illiteracy. As a unified nation, China needs a single spoken language. This need has, in its turn, led to the creation of the CL. A unified script has existed in China for several thousand years, but, because it is constructed in a complicated way, it is a time-consuming task to learn to make use of it. In the pre-Liberation period (before 1949), the knowledge of it was confined to the small ruling class, who could afford to spend much time in acquiring this knowledge. Because no nation-wide, educational method for the popular acquisition of a working knowledge of the writing system had been worked out, it was necessary after the Liberation to devise a method of teaching the people how to acquire this working knowledge. This method was thus not designed to help the people to learn the extant forms of the characters, but to simplify these characters, so that they could be easily learned within a shorter period of time than before. A little more than 2000 characters with high frequencies of occurrence were selected to be simplified. After a plan for the character simplification (*Hànzì jiǎnhuà fāng'àn cǎo'àn*) (7) had been published by the committee on script reform in January 1955, the work of character simplification was carried out, and gradually the present, fixed number of 2294 simplified characters in the 1964 list was achieved.

2. *Pinyin*

As a means of facilitating the teaching of the CL, a phonemically based, romanized alphabet (*Pinyin*) of 26 letters (representing six vowels, 18 consonants and two semivowels) was published in November 1957, though a draft of it had been made public as early as February 1956. Among the reasons which were put forward in favour of introducing *Pinyin*, the following are worth noting, because they indicate some of the far-reaching objectives of the language policy: (a) *Pinyin* is expected to help to popularize the CL and at the same time to make the teaching of the characters easier, (b) *Pinyin* can serve as the basis of new writing systems for the national minorities which have not yet got their own writing systems, and (c) *Pinyin* may help foreigners to learn the CL, so that international understanding may be easily promoted. It goes almost without saying that the *raison d'être* of the character simplification and of *Pinyin* is the assumption that all the people will thereby have access to a single spoken language (CL).

3. *The common language (pǔtōnghuà)* (8)

The common language (CL) is descriptively defined as being made up of the phonological system of the Běijīng (9) dialect, the grammar of the modern, northern-Chinese dialect and the vocabulary of modern Chinese literature (p. 11). The modern, northern-Chinese dialect or *guānhuà* (10) ('Mandarin') is well represented by the Běijīng dialect, while Mandarin itself makes up one of the several dialectal zones, whose definitions differ from linguist to linguist. They are defined here as constituting eight zones (p. 48). Each of these main dialectal zones can be further subdivided. Thus, Mandarin is often subdivided into six different subdialectal zones: Běijīng, North-eastern and shāndōng (11), North-western, húběi (12), jiāngxìà (13) (in the lower region of the Yángzi River (14)) and South-western Mandarin. The Běijīng dialect, which forms the essence of the CL, has been used as the

language of common communication for the past 700 years, ever since Běijīng was made the capital city of China by Kublai Khan (15) in 1264. The modern Chinese literature which makes up the main literary source of the vocabulary and expression of the CL is well represented, above all, by the writings of Máo Zédōng (16), Lǚ Xùn (17) and other recognised revolutionary writers. Since the proletariat have become masters of the country, the style of expression of the working people has gained in prestige. It is characterised as direct, straight-forward expression in comparison with the indirect, roundabout expression of the old bourgeois writers.

As the declarations of the party leaders show, every Chinese official is required to learn to speak the CL. In 1958, for instance, Máo declared that all cadres must learn to speak the CL (p. 49). This means that every Chinese official is required to be bilingually competent in the CL and his own regional or local dialect in his practical life. It is clear from general linguistic experience that this official requirement can help to popularize the CL and at the same time it can cause linguistic changes in the CL too. For when the local revolutionary cadres become leaders of the central government and party, they will bring with them their local dialectal expressions quite unconsciously. It is possible that their dialectally-coloured expression of the CL may gain in prestige, even in the central government or party organs, on the strength of their position. This assumption is well justified by the fact, reported in the book, that in each region there is a recognised regional standard, which stands between the CL and the local dialects. The relation between the CL, the regional standard and the local dialects is said, however, not to be of a hierarchical but of a horizontal, both formal and informal dimension (p. 11). The above-mentioned description of the horizontal, formal and informal, dimensional relation between the CL and the local dialects is indirectly supported by the fact that the social dialects of the old, feudal, ruling class are disappearing or being replaced by common expressions. The old social dialects were representative of the vertical or hierarchical social dimension of the bourgeois society.

As characteristic features of the vocabulary of the CL, the book gives a few examples of the new words which reflect the new social realities that have been created in the PRC (pp. 28–29). The number of examples given seems, however, neither to be large enough to give the entire picture of the new social reality nor to show sufficient variety to characterise the method of word-formation which is unique to the CL. In order to bring into relief the nature of the vocabulary which is characteristic of the CL, I have made a statistical analysis of the meanings of the words which make up its basic vocabulary, *The List of the Three Thousand Usual Words* (pǔtōnghuà sānqiān chángyòng cíbiāo) (18). This analysis shows that the basic vocabulary is made up of words referring to production, the military, security, medicine, politics, etc. and that very few words refer to private life. The overall picture drawn from this statistical analysis is that in the PRC the people's life consists largely of political experience. It is also interesting to note that the old linguistic mechanism is still actively working in the creation of the new words which reflect the new or changing social realities. A good number of new words have been created either by replacing the meaning(s) of an extant word of a partially synonymic nature by a new meaning or by adding a new sense to the extant word; this method of word-formation was one of the most productive. It increases the number of meanings of one word (polysemic word) but not the number of character forms (or written forms) of the word. The word *zàofǎn* (19) is one of the words in the basic vocabulary that was most frequently used during the Cultural Revolution. It had a *negative* meaning ("rebellion against the establishment") in the old society, but during the Cultural Revolution it was used to refer to a *positive* revolt against the superior authority that was made on the basis of correct ideology. The negative meaning of the word was replaced by a positive meaning on account of the change in the social outlook. On the other hand, the word *fùbì* (20) had the positive sense of "(the Ruler) recovers the throne lost" in the old society, while it is now used in a negative sense to refer to "recovering from something undesirable". As a result, the two morphemes become polysemic morphemes, historically speaking at least.

Some linguistic changes have been recognised in the CL. Their extent is, however, not so great in comparison with the length of time (30 years) for which the CL has been used as the standard language. This may be due to the fact that the cultivation and popularisation of the CL are matters of national concern.

As reported in the book (p. 37), it is probably the nasalisation of the pre-nasal vowels and the loss of final nasals which are the characteristic phonological changes of the CL. When they are compared with the *Běijīng* phonology, the difference becomes clear: for instance, *yuyan* (21) ("language") is

said to be often heard of as [yǎyē], while it is pronounced [yüyén] in the Běijīng dialect. In the same way, *sanlou* (22) ("third floor") is said to be heard as [sālóu], while it is pronounced [sānlóu] in the Běijīng dialect. In the book, no mention is made of either the morphological characteristics of the CL or the possible changes of the CL morphology. This is probably because the morphological changes which I have identified in the CL are mostly of a free variational nature and their identification may consequently be subject to various interpretations. Because of their free variation, the "morphological changes" identified by me may be taken for idiolectic changes. However, my identification is based upon the fact that there are some differences between the CL and the Běijīng grammars in the passive, potential, interrogative constructions and other constructions. These differences are to be found in some of the CL texts, published in the seventies. In the passive construction of the CL, for example, the morpheme *gēi* (23) is used to indicate the "agent" function, instead of the morphemes *jiào* (24) or *bèi* (25), which are used for this function in the Běijīng dialect. The occurrence of the morpheme *gēi* in the CL is still free-variational. In the construction of a potential, interrogative form of the reduplicated type *néng bù néng* (26, 27) (in which the potential morpheme *néng* is repeated after the negative, adverbial morpheme *bù*), the position of the main verb of the potential, interrogative form differs as between the CL and the Běijīng grammars, that is to say, the main verb occurs after the last member of the reduplicated, potential morphemes in the CL, while it occurs between the first member *néng* and the negative, adverbial morpheme *bù* in the Běijīng grammar.

It is important for understanding the development of the CL to take note of the strong influence that the direct and straightforward expression of the working people has exercised upon its morphology and syntax. When the morpheme *dào* (28), for instance is used together with the verbs of direction (*qù* "go" (29), *lái* "come" (30)), it occurs as a preposition before the words of destination and the verbs of direction in the Běijīng grammar, while the morpheme *dào* is omitted and at the same time the verbs of direction occur before the words of destination (inversion) in some of the CL texts published in the seventies. An expression of the type "Do you go to Yan'an or to Shanghai?" is usually constructed as [nǐ shì dào Yán'ān qù, háishì dào Shànghǎi qù?] (31) in the Běijīng dialect, while the same expression is given as [nǐ shì qù Yán'ān, háishì qù Shànghǎi?] (32) in the CL. Compared with the Běijīng expression, the CL construction is simpler and more direct in its way of communicating the idea. Because of the inversion which has taken place between the words of destination (Yán'ān, Shànghǎi) and the verbs of direction (*qù*) in the CL construction, the grammatical function of the verbs of direction can be considered to have changed from intransitive to transitive. It is also interesting to note that the ambiguity of meaning which is usually caused by the presence of polysemic words (i.e. the words of double function, which can occur as verb or noun) is eliminated by the way in which the polysemic word is split into two monosemic words according to its meaning and one of the two monosemic words is given a new morpheme. In such a hypothetical expression as [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn xiáng-xì-dì diào chá . . .] (33) (concerning or for this affair detailed or in detail *investigation* or *investigate* . . .) (the italicized word is the polysemic word, which is translated into two different words "investigation" and "investigate"), for example, the meaning of the entire sentence is *ambiguous* and depends upon how the polysemic word *diào chá* should be identified. If *diào chá* is identified as a noun, the whole sentence must mean "a detailed *investigation* concerning this affair", while if it is identified as a verb, the whole sentence must mean "(one) *investigates* in detail this affair". As far as the written form of the expression is concerned, there is no formal sign for eliminating the ambiguity of meaning caused by the presence of the polysemic word. In order to eliminate this kind of ambiguity therefore, the verb-function (or meaning) of the polysemic word *diào chá* is given a new verbal phrase *zuò diào chá* (34) ("do investigation"), so that the ambiguity of meaning of this hypothetical expression can be easily eliminated by splitting *diào chá* into *diào chá* ("investigation") (noun) and *zuò diào chá* ("do investigation" = "investigate") (verb): [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn xiáng-xì-dì diào chá ("as for this affair a detailed investigation = a detailed investigation on this affair") and [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn zuò xiáng-xì-dì diào chá (35) ("on this affair (one) *does* a detailed *investigation*" = "on this affair (one) *makes* a detailed investigation"). The form *zuò diào chá* is similar to the form used in Sino-Korean and Sino-Japanese to solve the problem. In the oral utterance of the above-mentioned hypothetical expression [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn xiáng-xì-dì diào chá . . .], however, the ambiguity of meaning can be eliminated by the presence or absence of an internal pause between *diào chá* and the preceding word. The utterance with an internal pause [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn xiáng-xì-dì # diào chá . . .] tends to be taken to mean "on this affair, (one) *investigates* in detail . . .",

while the utterance without an internal pause [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn xiángxì-dì diào chá . . .] tends to be taken to mean ‘‘on this affair a detailed investigation’’ = ‘‘a detailed investigation concerning this affair . . .’’.

The morphological and syntactical differences which have been shown above between the CL and the Běijīng dialect can be illustrated in tabular form as follows:

Point of difference	Dialect	
	Common Language	Běijīng
‘‘Agent’’ morpheme in the passive construction	gěi dòuzhēng-dì guǒ-zi gěi tā chī diào-la (36) ‘‘The fruit of the struggle was eaten by him’’	jiào ~ bèi dòuzhēng-dì guǒ-zi jiào (bèi) tā chī diào-la (37) ‘‘The fruit of the struggle was eaten by him’’
Position of the main verb in the potential, interrogative form of the type <i>néng bù néng</i>	After the last <i>néng</i> nǐ néng bù néng lái? (38) ‘‘Can you come?’’	After the first <i>néng</i> nǐ néng lái bù néng? (39) ‘‘Can you come?’’
Prepositional <i>dào</i>	Non-occurrence (and inversion) nǐ shì qù Yán’ān háishì qù Shànghǎi? ‘‘Do you go to Yan’an or to Shanghai?’’	Occurrence nǐ shì dào Yán’ān qù, háishì dào Shànghǎi qù? ‘‘Do you go to Yan’an or to Shanghai?’’
Words of double function	Splitting <i>diào chá</i> (noun) [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn xiángxì dì diào chá . . .] ‘‘detailed investigation on this affair . . .’’ <i>zuò diào chá</i> (verb) [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn zuò xiángxì dì diào chá . . .] ‘‘One investigates in detail on this affair . . .’’	Non-splitting [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn xiángxì-dì diào chá . . .] [duì yú zhè-ge shìjiàn xiángxì dì diào chá . . .]

4. National minority languages

The construction of the vocabulary of the CL also demonstrates that the language policy of the New China is dominated by an egalitarian spirit or outlook. This egalitarian outlook is especially well shown by the change in the linguistic behaviour of the Han Chinese (40) toward the national minorities. Historically speaking, this change constitutes a revolutionary departure from the traditional, Chinese, ethnocentric outlook.

In one source, it is said that there are 52 different, national minorities in the PRC, while in another source it is said that there are 58 such minorities (the word-list of Chinese and German of 1978). In view of the fact that these statistics are not supported by any scientific classification or identification of the national minorities, I am inclined to assume that they mean that the work of identifying the national minorities is still going on. According to the official census, the total population of the known national minority regions is said to amount to ca. 67 millions, which represents only 6.7% of the total population of the PRC. In the old society, the national minorities were named by the Han Chinese on

the basis of their ethnocentric outlook. The peoples other than the Han who were living in the regions surrounding China were called barbarians, in the sense that they were outside the sphere of Chinese culture. As they were at the centre of the country, the Han Chinese divided the non-Han people into four different, geographical groups (East, West, South and North). Each of the four groups was given a binomic, collective name, made up of the name of the geographical direction and a term connoting the Han Chinese characterisation of the non-Han people concerned. The common connotation given by the last term of each binomic, collective name was that the people concerned were outside the cultural sphere. These four collective names, which have been known in Han Chinese history since before the Christian era are: *dōng-yí* (41) (Eastern-*yí*), *Xī-róng* (42) (Western *Róng*), *nán-mán* (43) (Southern *Mán*) and *běi-dí* (44) (Northern *Dí*). As far as the written evidence goes, this grouping of the non-Han peoples took place before the end of the so-called Warring States Period (ca. 200 B.C.). The above-mentioned assumption that the four collective names had pejorative connotations is well justified by the following historical facts. (1) The two terms *yí* and *dí* (as in *dōng-yí* and *běi-dí*) were included in the list of ethnic words whose use was forbidden in 1733 by the *Qīng* (45) dynasty, which was founded by the Man. (2) One of the national minorities living in the provinces of *Yúnnán* (46), *Guìzhōu* (47) and *Sichuān* (48) is called *Yí* and its name was indicated by the same term *yí*, as in *dōng-yí*, in the period prior to the Liberation (1949), but this was replaced by a homophonous, compound character of positive meaning *yí* (49) ('ritual vase') after the Liberation. All the pejorative names of the national minorities given by the Han Chinese have now been replaced by names chosen by the national minorities themselves after the Liberation.

The languages spoken by the above-mentioned 52 or 58 national minorities have been classified in four families (Altaic, Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan and Austro-Asiatic) in the book. The criteria for the typological classification of the languages are, however, not given, even though the above-mentioned classification is generally accepted by the specialists in the minority languages. It goes almost without saying that several other classifications have been put forward in the past. For instance, G. P. Serjuchenko, who worked as advisor for 33 months (1954–57) to help to classify the minority languages in China, classified these languages in five different families, in which Korean was identified as an independent family (*Zhōngguó yǔwén*, no. 69, 1958, pp. 129–133).

As a result of the egalitarian policy pursued in relation to the national minorities, many of the minority languages which did not have any written traditions were provided with new orthographies and some of the extant orthographies of the national minorities also underwent reforms. These new and reformed orthographies are mostly based upon the romanisations. In the autonomous areas where the national minorities live, newspapers and text-books are published in the national minority languages. However, in most cases, newspapers with the same contents are published in two languages, the CL and the national minority language in each autonomous area. Though instruction in the CL is not obligatory in the national minority schools, it is necessary in reality. A minority student can do without any knowledge of the CL as long as he can afford to remain in his autonomous area. If he wants to work in the Han Chinese area after his studies, he has to learn the CL. In the summer of 1978, when I paid a visit to the Korean autonomous region, I was told about this situation by the teachers of the *Yánbiān* (50) University in the Korean autonomous region, which is situated in *Jilin* (51) Province in north-eastern China.

Judging from my impressions of the language situation in the *Yánbiān* autonomous area and from what I was told about the other autonomous areas, it seems that the language situation in the autonomous areas is multi-lingual. This is because the autonomous areas are mostly populated by more than two different, national minorities with their own languages and, in addition, Han Chinese are present in almost all the autonomous areas, even though their number varies from one area to another. Another autonomous area, *zhēlimù-měng* (52), situated in the same *Jilin* Province, for instance, has been characterised as Mongolian, simply because the Mongolians make up the majority of the population. I was told that there are also Manchu, Korean and Han peoples in this autonomous area.

The predominance of the CL over the minority language in each autonomous area is secured *a priori* by the official status of the CL as the standard language. The degree of predominance that is enjoyed by the CL, however, differs from one area to another, depending upon the socio-cultural standard of the national minority which makes up the profile of the autonomous area and its population. In the *Yánbiān* area, for instance, there are also Mongolians, *Xībó* (53) and *Zhuàng* (54), in

addition to Koreans and Hans, so that the language situation of the area is also multi-lingual. Because the Koreans and the Hans make up the majority of the population of the area, the languages of the other minorities are given less public notice. From my conversations with the *xibó* women who work at the largest department store in the capital city of the area, *Yanji* (55), I learned that they speak the *xibó* language at home and Korean at the department store. At the moment, the Korean language is maintaining its predominance over the CL in the *Yánbiān* area simply because the Koreans form the second majority of the population, the majority of the public leaders are Koreans and the Korean language is taught in the schools. The population ratio between the Koreans, the Hans and the other minorities is said to be 48 : 50 : 2. One of the most important factors which contributes to the use of the Korean language is that the Koreans who make up the majority of the present public leadership of the area belong to the generation who were born before the end of the Second World War (1945). In the administrative and production organizations the chief and deputy-chief positions are mostly occupied by Korean and Han nationals. For the sake of descriptive convenience, the Koreans of this generation are here called Koreans of the old generation and those who were born after 1945 are called Koreans of the younger generation. Because the area was occupied by Japan in the period before 1945, the old generation of Koreans was not given any official opportunity of learning the *Běijīng* language, which is the parent dialect of the CL. Dialectologically speaking, the Korean used by the old generation of Koreans is a typical *Kando* dialect (*jiāndǎo* (56)), which consists of an eclectic mixture of the North-eastern dialect and the Seoul standard Korean which was conveyed through publications. Among the Koreans of the younger generation, however, the CL is said to be gaining in prestige and to be preferred to Korean. This new tendency may be ascribed to the following socio-linguistic factors: (1) A good knowledge of the CL provides the young generation of Koreans with better opportunities of finding jobs or positions outside the autonomous area. (2) There is no emotional attachment to Korea among Koreans of the younger generation; "Korea" is nothing but an abstract concept to them, devoid of all real and concrete meaning. (3) From the mid sixties onward, when the Cultural Revolution took place, the CL was introduced as the language of instruction also in the Korean schools, so that the Koreans of the younger generation had greater opportunities of learning it. Before the Cultural Revolution, the language of instruction in the Korean schools was Korean, even though the CL was also taught. At present, the languages of instruction are Korean and the CL.

At the time of my visit (September 1978), all kinds of cultural activities were beginning to recover their vitality after the suppressive Cultural Revolution. The translation of the medieval Chinese novels and the resumption of publication of the monthly literary magazine *Yánbiān wényi* (57) (*Yanbian Literature and Art* = *Literature and Art in Yanbian*) were characteristic literary activities at the time of my visit. *Sānguó zhiyǎnyì* (58) (*The Three Kingdoms Story*), *Shuǐhūquánchuán* (59) (*All Men are Brothers*) and *Hónglómèng* (60) (*The Red-Chamber Dream*) have been translated into the CL and Korean. According to one of the Korean translators, the novels were translated into the *Kando* dialect, in order to meet the wishes of the Koreans in the area. The Korean used in the propaganda publications which are issued in *Běijīng* is said to be based upon the standard Korean used in North Korea. Each of the three translations is said to have been published in editions of around 30–50,000 copies. The exceptionally large number of copies is indicative of the high cultural standard of the *Yánbiān* autonomous area, which is also indicated by the fact that the number of higher educational institutions is exceptionally large in comparison with the total Korean population of the autonomous area, which is estimated at ca. 700,000. There is a university of liberal arts and social sciences (*Yánbiān Dàxué*) (61), a college of agriculture, a college of medicine, and several other vocational institutions on a level intermediate between college and high school. In addition to the several district hospitals in the autonomous area, one of the three large regional hospitals in *Jilin* Province is attached to the medical college as the university hospital, while the remaining two regional hospitals are located in *Chángchūn* City (62) (the capital city of the province) and *Jilin* City. It is said that the Korean writers write in Korean, while the Han writers write in the CL. I was told that there is a very small number of bilingual Korean writers who can write in both CL and Korean, but there do not seem to be any bilingual Han writers. In the period prior to the Cultural Revolution, for example, the Korean writer *Lǐ Gēn-quán* (63) published a novel in the CL which was entitled *Lǎo hūlǐzì* (64) ("The Tiger Stone"—a place-name in the autonomous area). The overwhelming influence of Korean is also reflected in the vocabulary of the CL which is used in the *Yánbiān* area. The *azalea* is called *dùjuānhuār* (65) in *Běijīng*, while it is called *jīndáláihuār* (66) in the CL of the area, which is a direct

loan from the Korean word for the azalea, *zindalai*, i.e. *jindáláihuār* < *jindalai* (Korean) + *huar* (CL). It is given as a synonym of *dùjiānhuār* on p. 775 of the *Cháo-Hàn Cidian* (67) ("Korean Han Language Dictionary") of 1974, which was compiled by the scholars of the *Yánbiān University*.

In addition to the direct loans from Korean, there are also some cases of translational loans from Korean in the CL of the area. For instance, the word *píngguō-lí* (68) is used to refer to the apple produced in the *Yánbiān* area. This is the Chinese translation of the Korean composite *sakwa-pai* "apple-pear" (*sakwa* "apple" + *pai* "pear"). The Korean word is, in its turn, a descriptive term for the fruit whose appearance is similar to that of the apple but whose substance is similar to that of the pear. It is therefore called *Yánbiān-lí* (69) (the pear produced in the *Yánbiān* area) in the CL of *Běijīng*.

List of Chinese characters

- | | |
|--------------|-----------------|
| 1 四个现代化 | 19 造反 |
| 2 中国语文 | 20 复辟 |
| 3 罗常培 | 21 语之 |
| 4 格·彼·谢尔久琴柯 | 22 三楼 |
| 5 拼音 | 23 给 |
| 6 上海 | 24 叫 |
| 7 汉字简化方案草案 | 25 被 |
| 8 普通话 | 26 能 |
| 9 北京 | 27 不 |
| 10 官话 | 28 到 |
| 11 山东 | 29 去 |
| 12 湖北 | 30 来 |
| 13 江下 | 31 你是到延安去还是到上海去 |
| 14 扬子 | 32 你是去延安还是去上海 |
| 15 忽必烈汗 | 33 对于这个事件详细的调查 |
| 16 毛泽东 | 34 做调查 |
| 17 鲁迅 | 35 对于这个事件做详细的调查 |
| 18 普通话三千常用词表 | 36 斗争的果子给他吃掉了 |

- | | | | |
|----|---------------|----|-------|
| 37 | 斗争的果子叫(被)他吃掉了 | 54 | 僮 |
| 38 | 你能不能来 | 55 | 延吉 |
| 39 | 你能来不能 | 56 | 间岛 |
| 40 | 汉 | 57 | 延边文艺 |
| 41 | 东夷 | 58 | 三国演义 |
| 42 | 西戎 | 59 | 水浒传 |
| 43 | 南蛮 | 60 | 红楼梦 |
| 44 | 北狄 | 61 | 大学 |
| 45 | 清 | 62 | 长春 |
| 46 | 云南 | 63 | 李根全 |
| 47 | 贵州 | 64 | 老虎碰子 |
| 48 | 四川 | 65 | 杜鹃花儿 |
| 49 | 彝 | 66 | 金达莱花儿 |
| 50 | 延边 | 67 | 朝汉词典 |
| 51 | 吉林 | 68 | 苹果梨 |
| 52 | 哲里木盟 | 69 | 延边梨 |
| 53 | 锡伯 | | |

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Choi Ŭng-gu, *Cosǎnǎ muncheron (On the Korean syntax)*. Liaoning People's Publishing House, Shenyang, China, 1979. In Korean. 309 pp. Y0.97.

Choi Ŭng-gu, *Cosǎnǎ dhuiiron (On the Korean glossary)*. Liaoning People's Publishing House, Shenyang, China, 1980. In Korean. 235 pp. Y1.00.

The first of the two books under review (the title of which is here abbreviated to CMR) is concerned with the syntactical formation of Modern Korean, while the second (the title of which is here abbreviated to CER) is concerned with the formation and usage of words in Modern Korean. The Modern Korean used in these books is actually the *munhwa-%* (cultivated language), the standard language of North Korea. Linguistically speaking, the *munhwa-%* was formed from the language of

the working class of North Korea, with the dialect of Pyongyang as its main ingredient, in the past 33 years. The spelling of Korean which is used is similar to that practised in North Korea, and Chinese loan characters are completely absent. In South Korean texts, however, a limited number of characters are now allowed to be used.

CMR is a descriptive analysis of the formation of Modern Korean phrases and sentences. It has five parts, each of which is subdivided into several chapters. It is, however, the fourth part (Classification and characterisation of Korean sentences, pp. 217–271) which is important for understanding the characteristic features of Modern Korean syntax. The remaining parts are concerned mostly with the general problems related to the classification of sentences and the syntactical composition, etc. In the fourth part, the Korean sentences are divided into four different styles, according to their purposes, i.e. according to whether they are official documents, scientific or technical papers, reports and newspapers, or literary works (fiction).

When the Modern Korean sentences in the book are compared with those in South Korean texts, the difference between them is evident. One of the features which characterise the Modern Korean sentence is the total absence of the roundabout expressions which are so abundant in South Korean texts. This may be due to the fact that the formation of sentences is primarily conditioned by the speaker's desire to express himself concisely and accurately. In other words, the straightforward expression and the "to the point" spirit are characteristic of the speech habits of the working class of North Korea, where Modern Korean was formed. Each of the four different styles mentioned above is analysed in detail and the characteristics of each are well illustrated by the compositional analysis. The sentences in documentary style, for instance, are said to be characterised by the higher frequency of occurrence of the new technical words referring to the new socio-political situations which have been created in the past 33 years (for example, [chongbisə] 'general secretary of party'), and of the complex bound morphemes which are formed from the combination of bound morphemes and verbal phrases. The additional verbal phrase appears to be prompted by the desire to strengthen the function of the preceding morpheme.

The instrumental case morpheme [-ro] or [-uro] 'with ...' is often followed by such verbal phrases as [-hajogum] 'doing with ...' in the sentences in documentary style as a means of strengthening the instrumental function of the morpheme [-ro] or [-uro] (p. 223). The interdependence which exists between the higher frequency of occurrence of certain types of free and bound morphemes and the desire or intention of the speaker (or writer) is clearly indicated by the ample examples given.

As regards the history of the Korean language after Korea was divided into two parts, however, the Korean language of the present book is the standard language of North Korea (= munhwa-ə) (as I said above). As regards the language materials which are used for the analysis and the linguistic methodology employed, however, the present book differs from the books on similar subjects which are published in North Korea. The language materials are mostly based upon the Korean translations of the Chinese texts, and the author has taken into consideration not only Chinese linguistic methodology but also North Korean and Western methodology. For studying the syntactical problems of the South Korean language, this book can serve as an excellent, contrastive reference.

In order to understand the position of their language in the concept of "Korean language", the Chinese citizens of Korean origin (that is, of Korean nationality) must distinguish the three quite different dialectal zones, namely the South Korean dialectal zone, which includes the standard language and dialects of South Korea, the North Korean dialectal zone, which includes the standard language and dialects of North Korea, and the Yanbian dialectal zone, which also includes its sub-dialects. The Yanbian dialectal zone is the zone which is dominated by the dialect of the Yanji and Longjing-zhen, which have been the cultural centers of the Yanbian area (which was formerly called *Buk-Kando* 'Northern Gando'). This Yanbian dialect is, so to speak, the standard dialect for the Koreans in China. Historically speaking, the Yanbian dialect is an amalgamation of the dialects of the thirteen provinces of Korea which has been formed, taking the standard language of South Korea as its model, in the past 100 years. Before Korea was liberated from the Japanese colonial occupation in 1945, Korea was divided into thirteen provinces. In the course of more than 100 years, different waves of Korean immigrants came from different provinces of Korea into the Yanbian area. Around 733 028, out of the total Korean population of 1 763 870 in China, are living in the Yanbian area. The area served as the first point of entry into China for the Korean immigrants. From this area the Korean immigrants spread to different parts of China. The earlier waves of Korean immigrants mostly

came from the north-eastern parts of Korea, which are situated in the neighborhood of the Yanbian area, so that their dialects are assumed to make up the lowest substratum of the Yanbian dialect. One of the factors which contributed to the formation of the Yanbian dialect was the strong feeling of in-group solidarity which existed among the Korean immigrants. Immigrants who came from one and the same province often formed their own community and intermarried with the people from the same province, so that their provincial dialect could be kept alive in the same community for a long period from generation to generation. Because more frequent contact between the language of the home country (Korea) and the language of the community could not be maintained continuously, the present dialectal forms which are found today in such rural communities represent the older forms of the province in question. The present form of the Yanbian dialect has been formed from these different provincial dialects, which were kept alive in the communities located in different parts of the Yanbian area. These dialects were amalgamated into the present mixture or hybrid through such intermediaries as the public markets in the big cities of the Yanbian area, Korean publications, Christian churches and Korean private schools where the Korean language was taught. In the public schools, which came under the supervision of the Japanese occupation authorities, however, the teaching of the Korean language and Korean history was forbidden. In the private schools where the Korean standard language was taught, however, the most important teaching materials were the Korean publications from Korea. In other words, the Korean standard language taught was mainly the written language. The Yanbian dialect is therefore still well cultivated by the Koreans in the Yanbian area whose education extended to the middle school or above, while the majority of the less well educated Koreans still speak their provincial sub-dialects. Judging from the Korean which has appeared in Korean publications at different periods of the past, one can say that the Yanbian dialect *par excellence* began to manifest itself as a unique and independent dialect as early as the beginning of the 1930s.

CER is a descriptive study of the word formation of Modern Korean (= munhwa- α). It contains three chapters (Words and their classification, Historical changes in word formation, and The usage of words). According to the author, the main purpose of the study is to make clear the laws and rules which govern the formation of words (p. 2). What is new in the book is the section on the formation of neologisms, especially the new words which have been formed from the loan-transfers and loan-translations from Modern Chinese. The neologisms are also useful for a historical study of the Chinese loans in Korean. It is interesting to note that the process of transposition shown in the formation of new words did not differ from that known from the history of the Chinese loans in Korean. In this sense, CER is a good contribution to understanding various aspects of word formation in Korean.

Now that the violent tide of the Cultural Revolution has ebbed away, one can see that the spirit indicated by the famous slogan of 1956, "baihua qifang, baijia zengming" (let the hundred flowers blossom and the hundred schools compete with each other) is gradually reviving in the intellectual life of China. It is certain that the two books under review compose one of the "hundred flowers".

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S. Cho

Annemarie von Gabain, *Einführung in die Zentralasienkunde*. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt 1979. X, 187 pp. + 3 maps + 7 illustrations.

The immense region which is called Central Asia has for more than 100 years been the subject of intensive scientific research both in the humanities and science. This is specially valid for the core of Central Asia which often is called Inner Asia or, with an almost dramatic touch, Innermost Asia. Russia and China were the dominating powers in this vast expanse of land called Central Asia which also—although not always—was considered to include the peripheral country of Afghanistan. The amount of scientific literature on Central Asia is enormous and is continually welling forth all over the world. I have often felt the need of a comprehensive Bibliography of Central Asia, a task which could only be undertaken by a team of bibliographical research workers with a thorough knowledge of all the languages in which this literature is being published. Today the Soviet Union and The People's

Republic of China are the main producers of reports on Central Asian scientific research. Gone are the days when European and Japanese scholars could freely search for archaeological riches along the Silk Roads of Innermost Asia.

Annemarie von Gabain has taken upon herself the task of synchronizing and systematizing the results of Central Asian humanistic research up to the present in a book which she humbly calls an "Introduction" to our knowledge of Central Asia—*Einführung in die Zentralasienkunde*. Let me from the outset say that her book as soon as possible ought to be translated into English in order to give this excellent handbook the widest possible distribution all over the English-speaking world.

Annemarie von Gabain is eminently qualified to write a treatise of this kind. For half a century she has conducted research work on the linguistic and archaeological materials from the finds of German expeditions in different sites along the northern Silk Road of Sinkiang. The list of her publications in this field is most extensive and also includes studies of the religions of this area, above all Buddhism.

After a short description of the geography of the region, the author turns to those ancient peoples of Central Asia who are recorded in the literature. She gives us a critical evaluation of the existing literary sources. These sources are divided into two categories: extraneous sources (Chinese, Muslim, Armenian, Syrian, Byzantine, and travellers' accounts) and indigenous sources (inscriptions, manuscripts, and block prints). There follow short notes on the peoples of the area of to-day. A section deals with the religions of the area, namely Buddhism, Christianity, Manikeism, religions of Iranian origin and primitive, popular religious elements, and finally Islam. Then comes a chapter on philology in which the author gives comprehensive information on writing-materials (inscriptions on stone, clay tablets, coins, leather, paper, palm-leaves etc.), the different forms of documents and books, the script and alphabets used in them, and remarks on the texts in the different languages of the Central Asian find-places. The most extensive part of her book Annemarie von Gabain devotes to the archaeology of Central Asia, including the Graeco-Bactrian, Kushan and Gandhara epochs. In a very systematical way the author analyses the different forms of Central Asian architecture both in its profane and religious application. A chapter of special interest is dedicated to the plastic and pictorial arts of the archaeological finds of the area. Finally Annemarie von Gabain has a short but very useful section on the complicated problems of chronology.

It is not surprising that Annemarie von Gabain, full of vitality and productivity as she is, concludes her Introduction with some remarks on the future aims, tasks, and methodology of Central Asian humanistic research. She visualizes 19 different areas of study and research which ought to be given special priority in order to achieve a total picture of the culture and history of Central Asia. It is a list of items that will make great demands on its researchers. One can only wish that her visions come true. She states that to date we have no institute which embraces all the different fields of Central Asian studies. Such an all-embracing institute may never come into existence. But a first step might be the stream-lining—to use a modern word—of Central Asian humanistic research. And this task Annemarie von Gabain already has begun by writing her admirable Introduction to a part of the world which is of the greatest importance to the history of our civilization.

Stockholm

Gunnar Jarring

N. A. van Uchelen, *Psalmen* (De Prediking van het Oude Testament). Deel I (1–40), 275 pp. Deel II (41–80), 313 pp. Nijkerk. G. F. Callenbach N. V. 1971–77.

Normally, Scandinavian theologians do not take the pains—admittedly not to be underestimated—to acquaint themselves with the original works of their Dutch colleagues but mainly restrict themselves to those studies occasionally translated into English, German, or French. Though partially understandable, this is much to be regretted, since, doubtlessly, Holland by tradition occupies a prominent position in the field of theology in general, and in the exegetical discipline in particular—a position intimately bound up with the remarkably high standards of philological scholarship in Holland.

Thus, the new exegetical series, *De Prediking van het Oude Testament*—being a set of theological commentaries under the editorship of Drs A. van Selms, A. S. van der Woude, and C. van

Leeuwen—certainly deserves the attention of Scandinavian biblical scholars. The contributors to this Old Testament series (which has a pendant in the corresponding *De Prediking van het Nieuwe Testament*) include a number of internationally known exegetes: Drs M. A. Beek, W. Beuken, H. A. Brongers, J. W. Doeve, I. H. Eybers, F. C. Fensham, A. R. Hulst, C. J. Labuschagne, B. Maarsingh, K. Roubos, L. A. Snijders, E. W. Tuinstra, N. A. von Uchelen, Th. C. Vriezen, and A. H. van Zyl.

In outline and scope this new commentary series appears to take an intermediate position between the most exhaustive and comprehensive standard series, such as *The International Critical Commentary*, ed. S. R. Driver—A. Plummer—C. A. Briggs (Edinburgh), *Kommentar zum Alten Testament*, ed. E. Sellin, New Series, ed. W. Rudolph—K. Elliger—F. Hesse (Gütersloh), *Biblischer Kommentar, Altes Testament*, ed. M. Noth—S. Herrmann—H. W. Wolff (Neukirchen-Vluyn), and *La Sacra Bibbia*, ed. S. Garofalo, *Antico Testamento*, ed. P. G. Rinaldi (Torino—Roma) on the one hand, and on the other hand the more condensed, scholarly series, like *Zürcher Bibelkommentare*, ed. G. Fohrer—H. H. Schmid—S. Schulz (Zürich), *Das Alte Testament Deutsch*, ed. V. Hertrich—A. Weiser (Göttingen), *The Interpreter's Bible*, ed. N. B. Harmon (New York, Nashville), and *The Old Testament Library*, ed. G. E. Wright—J. Bright—J. Barr—P. Ackroyd (London). Consequently, the recent Dutch series seems especially comparable to exegetical commentaries like *Commentaire de l'Ancien Testament*, ed. R. Martin-Achard *et al.* (Neuchâtel—Paris), *The Anchor Bible*, ed. W. F. Albright—D. N. Freedman (New York), and *The New Century Bible Commentary*, ed. R. E. Clements—M. Black (Grand Rapids—London).

The first two parts already published of Dr van Uchelen's exposition on the Book of Psalms decidedly represent a new approach to the task of commenting on *Sefer T^hhillim*, based on a structuralistic and ergo-centric comprehension of Biblical poetry. (As regards the various epochs of 18–20th centuries Psalm studies, a full *Forschungsgeschichte* has not yet been written. See, however, in particular J. Becker, *Wege der Psalmenexegese* [Stuttgarter Bibel-Studien. 78], Stuttgart 1975; and P. H. Neumann, ed., *Zur neueren Psalmenforschung* [Wege der Forschung. 192], Darmstadt 1976, pp. 1–18, with references to earlier specialized surveys by M. Haller, J. Hempel, J. J. Stamm, A. S. Kapelrud, and E. Gerstenberger, on p. 2, note 1. The most exhaustive, up to date bibliography is that included in H.-J. Kraus, *Psalmen* [Biblischer Kommentar, Altes Testament, XV/1–2], Neukirchen Vluyn ⁵1978, pp. 117–129.)

Accordingly, Dr van Uchelen's approach is far remote from the various kinds of the *zeitgeschichtlich* poëto-centric psalm interpretation prevalent in the romantic and positivistic period (roughly the latter part of the 18th century and the major part of the 19th century), the exponents of which were pre-eminently the commentaries by de Wette (⁵1856), Ewald (³1866), Hupfeld (³1888), and Hitzig (1863–65). It also deviates fundamentally from the various types of genetic interpretations in the subsequent period of *Geistesgeschichtlichkeit*, as represented by in particular Gunkel (1904 ff.; see W. Klett, *Hermann Gunkel* [Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments. 100], Göttingen 1969), Mowinckel (1921 ff.; see e.g. J. Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–23), A. R. Johnson (*Sacral Kingship in Ancient Israel*, Cardiff 1955; *La regalita sacra—The Sacral Kingship*, in *Supplements to Numen* 4, Leiden 1959), and S. H. Hooke (ed., *Myth and Ritual*, London 1933; *The Labyrinth*, London—New York 1935; *Myth, Ritual, and Kingship*, Oxford 1958) and their respective schools. Thus, in van Uchelen's recent commentary all questions regarding authorship, relative dating, *Sitz im Leben*, *Ort*, *Form* and *Gattung* (according to the Gunkel—Begriff conception), as well as the search for parallels in Ancient Near Eastern religion and sacral kingship etc., have strictly and consistently been driven into the background, so as to focalize entirely on the individual psalm itself as an independent literary unit. One consequence of this is that no specific cultic institution—e.g. an Enthronement Feast of Yahweh (Volz, Mowinckel *et al.*) or a Royal Festival of Zion (Kraus *et al.*)—can be regarded as a more or less *general* element behind the Psalm collection. On the contrary, in the surprisingly short introduction to his commentary (I, pp. 5–8), van Uchelen clearly defines the two principles of his ergo-centric approach: 'Het eerste uitgangspunt is, dat elke psalm *een vanzelfsprekende eenheid* vormt' (p. 5) ... 'Het tweede uitgangspunt is, dat elke psalm *een van zichzelf sprekend geheel* is' (p. 6).

If these two principles at a first glance appear to represent only a modern application of the rabbinical *tōrā mittōk tōrā* or the patristic *scriptura scripturae interpres*, a study of van Uchelen's treatment of the individual psalms makes it evident that his commentary most correctly is characterized as a specimen of the modern *Dichtungswissenschaftliche Psalmenauslegung* or *Neue Stilistik*,

once favoured by M. Buber and F. Rosenschweig (*Die Schrift und ihre Verdeutschung*, Berlin 1936; see K.-J. Illman, 'Martin Buber som bibelöversättare', *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift* 54/1978, pp. 158–164) and somewhat later scholarly applied on a number of Psalms (12, 23, 114, 124, 131) by L. Strauss (*Studies in Literature*, Jerusalem 1939, pp. 66–94, in Hebrew). More generally the new method flourished from the beginning of the 1960's, the most prominent work being L. Alonso Schökel's investigations of the Ancient Hebrew poetry, especially that of Isaiah (*Estudios de poética hebrea*, Barcelona 1963; the major parts of which are available in German: *Das Alte Testament als literarisches Kunstwerk*, Köln 1971). In Alonso Schökel's spirit—although often independent of him, 'denn die Sache lag in der Luft' (J. Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 124)—a number of scholars undertook to apply a *dichtungswissenschaftliche Methode* on the Book of Psalms or on single Psalm texts (the more prominent works by L. Krinetzki, M. Weiss, N. H. Ridderbos, M. Palmer, J. Muilenburg, and H. W. Jüngling are mentioned in the surveys of J. Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–125; P. H. A. Neumann, *op. cit.*, 16f.; in the latter publication M. Weiss' fundamental study 'Wege der neuen Dichtungswissenschaft in ihrer Anwendung auf die Psalmenforschung [Methodische Bemerkungen, dargelegt am Beispiel von Psalm XLVI]' from 1961 is reprinted, pp. 400–451; to the aforementioned studies might be added e.g. H. Graf Reventlow, 'Der Psalm 8', *Poetica* 1/1967, pp. 304–332; and H. Gese, 'Psalm 22 und das Neue Testament', *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 65/1968, pp. 1–22).

Van Uchelen's indebtedness to the methods of this *Dichtungswissenschaft* is actually intimated by the author himself in his condensed introduction, and his subsequent comments on Psalms 1–80 appear to form the first consistent full scale Psalm interpretation in accordance with the method of *Dichtungswissenschaft*, although it is noteworthy that the emblematic stress on the *artistic* features of the literary work does not play a major rôle in van Uchelen's exposition.

Dr van Uchelen's treatment of every individual Psalm is arranged in four sections: 1. *Vertaling*, viz. a Dutch rendering, which follows the Hebrew original closely; 2. *Inleiding*, in which the literary structure and the main conceptions of the respective Psalm are discussed; 3. *Uitleg*, where we find a more traditional commentary section in conformity with the structure worked out in the *Inleiding* and essentially consisting of *tôrâ mittök tôrâ* elucidations; 4. *Aantekeningen*, which form a series of running notes to the *Uitleg*, notes in which the author demonstrates his commendable ability to combine his strictly immanent comments with a profound knowledge of the actual scholarly literature, whether philological or exegetical.

In order to give an intimation of the character of the practical treatment of single psalm texts, it might be worthwhile to concentrate first on one particular psalm, chosen arbitrarily.

The well known Ps 8 is rendered in the *Vertaling* in the following way:

- 1 Voor de koorleider. Op de Gittith. Een psalm van David.
- 2 Heer, onze heerser,
wat machtig is uw naam op de hele aarde!
- 3 Gij, wiens majesteit aan de hemel bezongen wordt
door de mond van kinderen en zuigelingen;
Gij hebt met sterkte gegrondvest vanwege uw tegenstanders,
om vijand en wraakgierige aan hun eind te brengen.
- 4 Wanneer ik uw hemel zie, het werk van uw vingers,
de maan en de sterren, die Gij hebt bevestigd –
- 5 wat is de mens, dat Gij hem gedenkt,
en het mensenkind, dat Gij hem beschouwt.
- 6 Gij laat er immers weinig aan ontbreken, dat hij goddelijk is,
want met eer en luister kroont Gij hem;
- 7 Gij doet hem heersen over de werken van uw handen,
alles legt Gij onder zihh voeten.
- 8 Al het kleinvee en de runderen
en ook de dieren des velds;
- 9 de vogels van de hemel en de vissen van de zee,
wat trekt door de paden der zeeën.

10 Heer, onze heerser,
wat machtig is uw naam op de hele aarde!

In the subsequent *Inleiding* Dr van Uchelen accounts for the structural conception underlying the translation (in this particular case, the author readily confesses his indebtedness to the thorough treatment of the stylistic character of Ps 8 undertaken by H. Graf Reventlow (*op. cit.*)). He finds that this Psalm, opening and concluding with an outcry of admiration and thank (vv. 2 a, 2 b, 10), is made up of four 'strophes' containing four 'periods' each ('vier strofen van elk vier versgedeelten', I, p. 56). It would have been advantageous, if the author had given a short discussion of the terminology employed as regards the various parts of the rythmical system, e.g. like the condensed survey given by O. Kaiser (in his *Introduction to the Old Testament. A Presentation of its-results and problems.* Translated by J. Sturdy, Oxford 1975, pp. 320-323, with references, p. 319). The first strophe consists of vv. 2 c-3; the second of vv. 4-5, the third of vv. 6-7, and the fourth of vv. 8-9. Dr van Uchelen defines the structure of the Psalm as a 'wisselwerking tussen de onderdelen en het geheel' (I, p. 55), in which the central theme is 'de hemel en de aarde als blijken van Gods machtige naam' (*ibid.*), clearly expressed in the beginning of the Psalm (vv. 2 b, 2 c) and at the end (vv. 9 a, 10 b), the same thought being pursued in the circumlocution for 'heaven' in v. 4 ('het werk van uw vingers') and for the 'earth' in v. 7 a ('de werken van uw handen'), the enthusiasm of the poet being put into words through the thrice recurring *mā* (vv. 2 b, 5 a, 10 b). Such a comprehension of Psalm 8 is truly of an immanent nature and is hardly to be fundamentally questioned. It seems, however, that it is possible—even for a *Dichtungswissenschaftler*—to go a bit further and point out, for instance, the significance of the rather unique (cf. Ex 15: 1-18) style of hymnic address to YHWH which is a peculiar stamp of this Psalm (without necessarily employing either the classical Gattung term 'Hymnus' [H. Gunkel-J. Begrich, *Einleitung in den Psalmen*, Göttingen 1933, *passim*] or the neo-conservative Gattung term 'Loblied' [*r^hillā*; H.-J. Kraus, *op. cit.*, 204f.]); further to point out various traits of *ḥokmā* (cf. e.g. W. H. Schmidt, 'Gott und Mensch in Ps 8. Form- und überlieferungsgeschichtliche Erwägungen', *Theologische Zeitschrift* 25/1969, pp. 1-15, spec. pp. 9f.); likewise to note the remarkably 'royal' stamp of the terminology employed in the Psalm, particularly evident in expressions like the verb *ʿittē* (v. 6; cf. *ʿatārā*, 'crown'; further H. Donner-W. Röllig, *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften*. 1-3. Wiesbaden 1962-64, N° 60, lines 1f.), and the nouns *kābōd* (cf. spec. Ps 21: 6) and *hādār* (cf. Ps 21: 6; 45: 4f.; Prov 14: 28 of the earthly king; Ps 96: 6; 104: 1; 111: 3; 145: 5.12 of God as king; these examples are adduced in H. Ringgren, 'Psalm 8 och kristologin', *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok* 37-38/1972-73, p. 19).

In the *Uitleg* following the *Inleiding* Dr van Uchelen supplies a detailed comment on separate sections worked out in the preceding analysis (vv. 1, 2 a-b, 2 c-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10), although in considerable concentration. The comment is mainly a strict *tōrā mittōk tōrā* elucidation of elect keywords or key-expressions in the text by means of pointing out biblical parallels.

Of minor philological notes included in the comments, a special attention is devoted to the classical problem of *ʿšr tnh*, which according to the Masoretes is to be read as *ʿašar tⁿnā* (v. 2 c). Dr van Uchelen, who—in agreement with several exegetes—does not pay any regard to the Masoretic *sillūq* with *sōf pāsūq* at the end of v. 2 but treats vv. 2 c-3 as a separate unit or strophe, tries to preserve the consonantal text but reads *ʿašar tunnā*, and he interprets the *pu^cal tunnā* in the light of Judg 5: 11 (*ʿtannū*) and 11: 49 (*tannōt*), in which the *pi^cel* (though the text of Judg 5: 11 is dubious) is commonly taken to mean 'sing, celebrate in song' (so e.g. W. L. Holladay, *A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament*, Leiden 1971, *s.v. tnh*, p. 392). It is to be noted that this sense of *tnh* is open to doubt even as regards Judg 11: 49, where the versions take it to mean 'to lament'. Van Uchelen does not observe that a possible *qal* parallel is found in Hos 8: 10: *jīnū*; cf. also the *hiḫ^fil hitnū*, Hos 8: 9 of uncertain meaning). The comprehension 'bezongen wordt' is supported by the Septuagint (ἐπιῳδῆ) and advocated by a number of modern scholars (e.g. J. Morgenstern, 'Psalm 8 and 19A', *Hebrew Union College Annual* 19/1945-46, p. 492; N. H. Ridderbos, *De Psalmen*, vol. 1, Kampen 1962, p. 22; E. J. Kissane, *The Book of Psalms*, Dublin 1964, p. 34; C. Schedl, 'Psalm 8 in ugaritischer Sicht', *Forschungen und Fortschritte* 38/1964, pp. 183-185; A. Maillot-A. Lelièvre, *Les Psaumes*. Traduction nouvelle et commentaire, Paris 1966, vol. 1, p. 59). The reviewer is inclined to agree with Dr van Uchelen that none of the actual emendations suggested appear convincing (pre-eminently the *qal* perfect *nāattā* [supported by the Peshitta, the Targum, and Jerome; recently

defended by H.-J. Kraus, *op. cit.*, p. 203 f.; possibly rather *tattā*, as in 2 Sam 22: 41], or another form of the verb *nin* [*nītān*, *nāt'nā* etc.]; or the *qal* cohortative ³*āsīrā-nnā* [from the root *šyr*; first suggested by B. Duhm; reconsidered by H. Donner, *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 79/1967, pp. 324 ff.]; or the 'energetic' *pi^cel* imperfect ³*āsār^ctannā* [from the root *šrt*, 'to serve, worship, adore', as suggested by M. Dahood, *Psalms*, vol. 1 (The Anchor Bible. 16), New York 1966, p. 49; considered 'reasonable' by A. A. Anderson, *Psalms (1-72)* (The New Century Bible Commentary), Grand Rapids-London 1972, p. 101]; or even ³*āsērātenū* ['our asherah', orally proposed by I. Engnell; see H. Ringgren, *op. cit.*, p. 17]; for further examples, see F. Crüsemann, *Studien zur Formgeschichte von Hymnus und Danklied in Israel* [Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament. 32], Neukirchen-Vluyn 1969, p. 289). Nonetheless, although van Uchelen's understanding of ³*šr tnh* seems preferable to any of the emendations proposed—though the reviewer would rather regard *tnh* as a *qal* passive (cf. H. Ringgren, *loc. cit.*; cf. also J. Blau, *A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew* [Porta Linguarum Orientalium, NS 12], Wiesbaden 1976, § 23.1-2)—it ought to be underlined that the expression ³*šr tnh* remains crucial. The impression is not easily ruled out that a really convincing explanation is to be sought for along quite new lines, including a consideration of whether or not there may have been a serious textual disturbance (*lacuna*) in the opening of the psalm text proper.

The subsequent *Aantekeningen* contain the scholarly discussion on main problems touched upon in the *Inleiding* and *Uitleg*, for instance recurrent references to H. Graf Reventlow's previously mentioned analysis of the stylistic character of Psalm 8 (1967), some notes on the contextual meaning of the word *m^{cc}at* (v. 6), on the New Testament comprehension of various details in the psalm (spec. v. 3a; 6f.), on the impact of the crucial preposition *min* (v. 3), on the already noted classical *crux interpretum* ³*šr tnh* (v. 2), on the significance of the expression ^c*ōl^clīm w^cyon^cqīm* (v. 2), on the terms *ysd* and *kwn* (v. 3b, 4b), on the noun ^c*oz* (v. 3), on the correct understanding of ³*nōš* and *bæn^c-ādām* respectively (v. 5), on the various possibilities of rendering ³*lōhīm* within the frame of Psalm 8 (v. 6), on the purport of the verb *mšl* (v. 7), on the concluding list of *Naturlehre* (v. 8f.) etc. The *Aantekeningen* are, moreover, filled with useful references to biblical parallels, to renderings of the ancient versions and the rabbinical literature, and, in particular, to modern studies. In the special case of Psalm 8 a number of important contributions have appeared since the publication of the first volume of Dr van Uchelen's commentary (1971); of pre-eminent importance are those by J. A. Soggin (1970-71), E. Otto (1971), R. Tournay (1971), V. Hamp (1972), H. Ringgren (1972-73), J. du Preez (1973), W. Beyerlin (1976), and W. Rudolph (1977); for details, see H.-J. Kraus (*op. cit.*, p. 203). It is understandable that the *Aantekeningen* cannot possibly mirror and discuss the relevant secondary literature except to a limited extent. However, a few special investigations in addition from before 1970 would have been advantageous to the treatment of the problems entered upon by Dr van Uchelen, e.g. on dealing with the hymnic character of the psalm (R. Martin-Achard, 'Remarques sur le psaume 8. A propos de l'hymnologie israélite . . .', *Cahiers théologiques* 60/1969, pp. 71-85), on the text of vv. 1f. (M. Tanner, 'Ps 8, 1-2 . . .', *Theology* 69, London 1966, pp. 492-496), on the expression *bæn^c-ādām* (A. Gelston, 'A Sidelight on the "Son of Man"', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 21/1968, pp. 189-196), and, finally, on the New Testament interpretation of Psalm 8 (B. S. Childs, 'Psalm 8 in the Context of the Christian Canon', *Interpretation* 22/1968, pp. 20-31). On the whole, however, it is immediately evident that Dr van Uchelen is fully conversant with the recent scholarly discussion, and this gives a particular emphasis and even complement to his strictly followed method of *Dichtungs-wissenschaftlichkeit* in his *Uitleg*.

A glance at his approach to further psalm texts makes it clear that Dr van Uchelen is extremely consistent in his ergo-centric treatment. Thus, commenting on for instance Psalm 22, the author demonstrates his familiarity with the prevalent opinion that—in the wording of H.-J. Kraus (*op. cit.*, ⁵1978, p. 323)—'Es ist bereits um die Mitte des vorigen Jahrhunderts festgestellt worden, dass Ps 22 sich aus zwei verschiedenen Stücken zusammensetzt'. Nonetheless, Dr van Uchelen in consistency with his general approach opens up by stating: 'Hoewel de psalm duidelijk uit twee delen (vs. 2-22 en 23-32) bestaat (eventueel drie, namelijk vs. 28-32 als een apart stuk) en men misschien ook wel allerlei op zichzelf staande "Erweiterungen" en "Neuformulierungen" (Kraus, p. 177 [reference to the edition ²1961, T.K.]) op het spoor kan komen, is het zinvoller deze psalm allereerst te nemen voor wat hij is' (p. 148). If this immanent approach as such is acceptable, it appears a bit questionable to argue for the unity of the Psalm by pointing to terminological coincidences between vv. 2-22 and vv.

23–32 (e.g. the root *hll* employed in vv. 4 a, 23 b, 24 a, 26 a, 27 b; *bzh* in vv. 7 b, 25 a; *spr* in vv. 18 a, 23 a, 31 b), since arguments of this nature might as well be turned in the opposite direction, claiming that exactly this occasional verbal coincidence was a reason for uniting two originally separate psalms into one. It is to be noted, however, that this objection only affects the argumentation, not the basically immanent first approach. Turning to the following psalm (Ps 23), we find again that Dr van Uchelen skilfully depicts the various scholarly opinions as regards the *Bildkreise* of the psalm, viz. the view that the shepherd motif (or *Weidewechsel-Metapher*) is dominant throughout the psalm (e.g. J. Morgenstern, 1946; L. Köhler, 1956), or the view that vv. 1–4 are stamped by the shepherd motif, whilst vv. 5–6 are dominated by the idea of YHWH as the generous host (e.g. N. H. Riddebos, 1962; H.-J. Kraus, 1978), or, ultimately, that there are three main *Bildkreise*: that of the shepherd (vv. 1–2), that of the guide (vv. 3–4), and that of the host (vv. 5–6) (e.g. C. A. Briggs–E. G. Briggs, ⁴1927; cf. A. Weiser, ⁶1963). Dr van Uchelen, though, takes as his point of departure the character of the ‘poëtische taalgebruik’ (p. 159), and states: ‘Met andere woorden, de suggestie die opgewekt wordt door het gebruik van bepaalde woorden in de laatste vier verzen is, dat door de hele psalm hen het beeld van de herder een rol speelt’ (p. 159). The ultimate unity of the strongly varying poetical terminology of the psalm is advocated by Dr van Uchelen with reference to Ezek 34 in particular (spec. vv. 12–15, 27–30). The central theme is, accordingly, the manifold activities of the shepherd, ‘die zorgt voor voedsel, veiligheid en vreugde’ (p. 159). Similarly, in his analysis of Psalm 51, Dr van Uchelen finds a main unifying theme, viz. that the ‘psalmist zich in weerspanningheid en onoprechtheid misgaan heeft tegenover zijn God (vs. 5–6, ook 7)’ (II, p. 82), a theme which consequently reduces the various strophes of the psalm into a thematic unity, although, admittedly, in rich poetical variety (strophe 1: vv. 3–4; strophe 2: vv. 5–8; strophe 3: vv. 9–11; strophe 4: vv. 12–14; strophe 5: vv. 15–19 [sic!]; strophe 6: vv. 20–21, the latter strophe being regarded as a ‘eschatologiserende herinterpretatie van de psalm’, and the superscription, vv. 1–2, likewise as a ‘historiserende herinterpretatie van de psalm’, II, p. 83). In this way Dr van Uchelen in his investigation of the structure of the various psalms concentrates on the correspondence between the ‘centrale gedachte’ (e.g. II, p. 82) and the different minor ‘gedachteneenheden’ (= strophes, e.g. II, p. 226). There is no doubt that he thereby supplies a considerable help so as to enable the student of the psalms to grasp a reasonable model of inherent structure. There is, furthermore, no doubt that such a ‘neo-conservative’ primary elucidation of the final psalm text is a commendable way of approach, in order not to let the literary analysis be influenced by extraneous considerations. It might also be of some interest to note the parallelism—*mutatis mutandis*—between the ‘neo-conservatism’ discernible in the program of *Dichtungswissenschaft* as practically applied by Dr van Uchelen and the ‘neo-conservatism’ revealing itself in for instance H.-J. Kraus’ revision of the Gunkel–Begriff *Gattung* concept underlying the first four editions of his well known commentary on the Book of Psalms (‘War BK XV in den Auflagen 1–4 noch wesentlich bestimmt und geprägt von der Gattungsforschung Gunkels, so erwies es sich bei der vorliegenden Neuauflage als unerlässlich, die Prinzipien und Voraussetzungen, vor allem aber die Grundbegriffe der formgeschichtlichen Forschungen Gunkels und Begriffs zu überprüfen’, [op. cit., ⁵1978, p. 38], which in reality means that ‘Die “neuen Wege”, die in diesem Kommentar im Bereich literaturgeschichtlicher Forschung geschritten werden, beginnen mit einer Besinnung auf die ureigenen Bezeichnungen im hebräischen Psalter’ [p. 40], viz. terms like *ʿhillā*, *ʿfillā*, *šir Šiyyōn* etc.).

As much as ‘neo-conservative’ traits of this nature testify to a sobriety in the field of modern Psalm exegesis, it appears not less important to point out the dangers of an absolute and isolated approach of this character. To the reviewer it seems that a commentary of the kind that Dr van Uchelen has written is highly commendable for its strict application of the principles of *Dichtungswissenschaft*. It is, in fact, by means of this strictness that a clear and concentrated conception of the respective psalms evolves. Nonetheless, this conception—basical as it is—*doubtlessly needs the supplement of a relative element*, for all kind of human knowledge is relative in so far that every fact is a fact in relation to another fact. This relative element is partly to be found in complementary use of the actual, various methods of exegetical criticism (as condensed e.g. in G. Fohrer *et al.*, *Exegese des Alten Testaments. Einführung in die Methodik* [Uni-Taschenbücher. 267], Heidelberg ³1979), and partly (and primarily) in a simultaneous consideration of the elucidation supplied by the *Religionsgeschichte* of the Ancient Near East.

Uppsala

Trygve Kronholm

René Dagorn, *La Geste d'Ismaël d'après l'onomastique et la tradition arabes*. Genève, 1981 (Centre de recherches d'histoire et de philologie de la IV^e Section de l'École Pratique des Hautes Etudes, II, Hautes Etudes Orientales, 16).

The Abraham of the Bible, the Ibrāhīm of the Qur'ān, is the figure that unites the three monotheistic religions. The ancestor of Israel who received the promise of the land of Kanaan is for the Muslims the founder of the monotheistic cult at the Ka'ba. Through his son Ismā'īl he is also the ancestor of the Arabs. In the Qur'ān, Ibrāhīm is a prominent figure whose role becomes increasingly accentuated in the later sūras. Ismā'īl has a more obscure place but grows in importance in the later Medinan sūras as the assistant of his father at the reconstruction of the Ka'ba. There is a discussion going on concerning the interpretation of certain passages in the Meccan sūras. Some maintain that—induced by the conflict with the Jews at Medina—Muhammed's idea of Ibrāhīm as *ḥanīf* and the first Muslim didn't take form until after the Hīgra. This view is upheld by C. Snouck Hugronje in "Het Mekkaansche Feest" and is taken up by W. M. Watt in his "Muhammad at Medina". Another view maintained by E. Beck in "Abraham in der Entwicklung Muhammeds" is that Muhammed had this idea already at Mecca in opposition with his opponents there. According to the view of E. Beck this idea was developed further under the pressure of the opposition of the Jews and the Christians at Medina. And it is at this point, according to him, that the figure of Ismā'īl obtains its prominent role as the ancestor of the Arabs. Similarly, R. Paret does not exclude the possibility of a certain acknowledgement of the role of Ismā'īl already in the Meccan sūras (see below). The author of the book under review takes up this question in Chapter IV, without mentioning, however, this discussion but the wider question that has intrigued R. Dagorn and given birth to his investigation is the extent to which the preislamic Arabs themselves were conscious of this relation to Ibrāhīm through Ismā'īl. The author formulates the aim of his study as follows: "de savoir si les Arabes avant l'Islam avaient conservé le souvenir d'une attache quelconque avec le Patriarche biblique, attache s'exprimant par la conviction d'une descendance charnelle à travers son fils aîné Ismaël, et, en cas contraire, quand et dans quelles conjonctures cette conviction avait vu le jour chez eux, quand et comment elle s'était progressivement développée et finalement affirmée" (p. 3^o). He goes about this problem by studying the onomastic tradition of the Arabs during different periods. He makes a thorough investigation of a very vast material that reflects onomastic use and habits: genealogical lists, ṭabaqāt-literature, etc. He bases his investigation on the fact that the giving of names is not arbitrary in human societies, but conforms to certain habits and follows certain rules, family tradition, etc. A study of the onomastic material in a society should therefore give valuable information about that society. As a base for his study of preislamic names the author takes three genealogical works namely those of Ibn al-Kalbī, al-Zubayrī and Ibn Ḥazm. He creates some confusion by quoting the first of these as Ibn al-Kalbī (for ex. p. 45), as Hišām b. Muḥammad al-Kalbī (p. 38), as Hišām b. al-Kalbī (p. 44) or, finally, as Ibn Hišām! (pp. 44 and 46). An exhaustive study of these sources presented in tables gives the unambiguous result that the names of Ibrāhīm, Iṣḥāq and Ismā'īl did not exist in the onomastic tradition of the Arabs before Islām. There is, for the period before Islām, only one Ibrāhīm mentioned in the three works, namely the father of the prophet's wife, Mary the Copt, thus an Egyptian. There is no Iṣḥāq, no Ismā'īl. The epigraphic material concerning the same period, however, gives the name Ismā'īl a number of times. The author sees this as due to Jewish-Christian influence, and he maintains that Ismā'īl as well as Ibrāhīm and Iṣḥāq was considered a foreign name not belonging to the Arab heritage. Otherwise, it would have appeared in the genealogical lists of Arab names. The investigation of the *kunā* in Chapter III yields the same result: "En conséquence l'idée de la tradition monothéiste héritée d'Abraham et qui se serait historiquement maintenue dans le monde arabe jusqu'à la naissance de l'Islam s'avère absolument dénuée de fondement et incompatible avec la tradition vivante que l'on rejoint à travers l'onomastique. L'Islam se réclame évidemment d'Abraham, mais le monothéisme arabe a été introduit en Arabie par les Juifs de la diaspora et par les Chrétiens nestoriens, monophysites, ou autres et la vénération de l'Islam à l'égard d'Abraham n'est pas un patrimoine légué par les ancêtres arabes" (p. 124). However, while this conclusion suggests itself, the material, or rather lack of material, does not in my view permit the categorical statement made by the author on p. 377 that this idea of Ibrāhīm as the ancestor of the Arabs through Ismā'īl could not have occurred before Muhammed. The scantiness of the material concerning the period before Islām should make us a little reluctant to draw such positive conclusions. M. Rodinson takes also this view in his long and

interesting preface to the book (p. XIX). Anyhow, the author looks for the origin of the tradition of Ismā'īl in the Qur'ān itself. In Chapter IV he discusses among other evidence the sūra 37, 101 (99)–113 which I quote according to A. J. Arberry: "Then We gave him the good tidings of a prudent boy; and when he had reached the age of running with him, he said, 'My son, I see in a dream that I shall sacrifice thee; consider, what thinkest thou?' He said, 'My father, do as thou art bidden; thou shalt find me, God willing, one of the steadfast.' When they had surrendered, and he flung him upon his brow, We called unto him, 'Abraham, thou hast confirmed the vision; even so We recompense the good-doers. This is indeed the manifest trial.' And We ransomed him with a mighty sacrifice, and left for him among the later folk 'Peace be upon Abraham!' Even so We recompense the good-doers; he was among Our believing servants. V. 112: Then we gave him the good tidings of Isaac, a Prophet, one of the righteous. And We blessed him, and Isaac; and of their seed some are good-doers, and some manifest self-wrongers." The author sees an anomaly in the arrangement of the verses 112–113 which he wants to place before v. 109 considering them as a specification concerning the son that has been announced v. 101 (99) namely Ishāq. But as R. Paret has pointed out (EI², art. Ismā'īl), the words "a prudent boy" can very well indicate Ismā'īl which would imply that the arrangement is perfectly natural and that the tie linking the Arabs with Ibrāhīm through Ismā'īl was present in the mind of the prophet already at Mecca. The author, thus, without taking up a discussion, aligns himself with C. Snouck Hugronje and W. M. Watt against E. Beck. The difference of the two theories lies chiefly in the attitude towards Muhammed's achievement. When R. Dagnon uses expressions like "l'ingéniosité, le génie qui sait habilement saisir la chance", etc. one easily gets the impression that this idea was the result of a conscious calculation on Muhammed's side. Is it not possible that this idea of Ibrāhīm and Ismā'īl as the ancestors of the Arabs and founders of the true monotheism which Muhammed is now called upon to renew, that this idea came to Muhammed as a revelation rather early and then imposed itself slowly under the pressure of the information received during the discussions with Jews and Christians? This, of course, is a question that the author does not propose to study here (see p. 4°). Nevertheless, the very choice of words suggests a psychological interpretation that is not called for by the material at hand.

The author's further study of the onomastic material gives positive evidence of the development of the legend of Ismā'īl in the Islamic tradition. The name Ismā'īl does not become commonly used until the time of the Umayyads and afterwards and then especially within the prophet's family represented by the descendants of 'Alī and Fāṭima. It is also within that circle that the reconstruction of the religious past of the Arabs takes place. In the history of the sanctuary at Mecca, for example, members of the prophet's family are given a privileged role. The author follows this development closely, taking into account not only the onomastic material but also *ḥadīth*, historical sources, *adab* works and ancient poetry. The richness of the material presented so extensively makes heavy demands on the reader. Here I have only been able to touch upon a few of the many questions treated in the book. The author arranges his material chronologically according to the events that it reflects. The difficulty with such an arrangement is that it prevents the reader from getting a clear picture of the evolution of the central theme of the study, namely the development of the Arabs' consciousness of their origin and the legend of Ismā'īl, there being often a great distance in time between the sources and the periods that they treat. It would perhaps have been easier for the reader had the author begun with the eldest witness, the Qur'ān. The author is well aware of the dilemma but does not really argue for the method that he has adopted. The book is introduced by a preface by Maxime Rodinson and the *avant-propos* by the author. The titles of the chapters are: I. Recherche d'une dimension historique, II. Les généalogistes arabes, III. Le témoignage des *kunā* et autres composantes du nom, IV. Révélation d'Ismaël dans le Coran, V. Ismā'īl sous les califes Rāšidūn et les premiers balbutiements de la geste, VI. Les Umayyades de Damas et le début des 'Abbassides, VII. L'élaboration de la légende, VIII. L'énigmatique tribu des Ġurhum, IX. Agar et la famille ismaélienne, X. Le Blason d'Ismaël, Conclusion. Every chapter is followed by notes. There is a general bibliography comprising mostly Arabic sources. The author does not discuss research done by other western scholars in the field, his aim, stated on p. 4°, being to draw directly upon the Arab tradition. The text is followed by an analytical index and a table of contents. Finally some critical remarks: a few typing errors are inevitable in a book of this size, 427 pages. Most of the time they do not impede the reading, thus p. 15, the end, Gotthelf Bergsträsser has become Gottehle Bergstrasser. The reference p. 164, n. (62) is incomplete: "remarque *in fine*" for "remarque a. *in fine*". The wording of the author p. 100, 1.4 ss is

misleading. The figure "105,000 individuals" out of which one single Ibrāhīm is found, represents the names from all periods, naturally including a number of Ibrāhīms, Ishāqs, etc. The author makes it sound as if there were 105,000 names registered for the preislamic time only.

R. Dagorn has drawn upon a vast material of Arabic sources for this investigation and his use of the onomastic material for tracing the development of "La Geste d'Ismaël" from its origin has proved extremely fruitful. The book is a valuable contribution to serious historical research into the origin and development of Islām and speaking with M. Rodinson (p. xxiii): "De toute façon, la conclusion de R. Dagorn reste fermement établie: les Arabes n'avaient aucune idée de leur prétendue descendance d'Ismaël si ce n'est là où juifs et chrétiens les en avaient persuadés, c'est-à-dire dans des régions périphériques et à une date tardive."

Uppsala

Eva Riad

Josef Hartmann, *Amharische Grammatik*. (Äthiopische Forschungen, herausgeg. von Ernst Hammerschmidt, Bd. 3.) Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1980.

This is, at first sight, a very impressive work, reminding us of another great German achievement in this difficult field, namely "Die amharische Sprache" by Franz Praetorius (1847–1927). In the book of Hartmann, an outstanding expert on the Amharic Language, we have now a real "Lehrgebäude", explaining to the student everything worth explaining. A salient feature of this grammar is the keen interest the author has taken in linguistics. The book turns out to be also a real manual of linguistics; for his method of description cf. the "Vorwort", p. 35. Below the present reviewer will discuss some linguistic points at some length. But first the contents of the book.

Inhaltsverzeichnis, pp. 5–32. Geleitwort des Herausgebers, pp. 33–4. Vorwort des Verfassers, pp. 35–6. Verzeichnis der Abkürzungen und Zeichen, pp. 37–45. Phonologie, pp. 47–60. Lautveränderungen, pp. 61–81. Morphologie, pp. 83–366. Syntax, pp. 367–461. Register, pp. 463–507. The book is beautifully printed, a feast for the eye. The presentation of grammatical facts is clear and exhaustive. However, since the author indulges in general linguistics in a most unusual way, it is, indeed, appropriate to consider his guiding principles, his view of language, so to speak.

Hartmann's grammar is highly analytical, and we have thus to ask the serious question whether its author also knows what he is analysing. For, as Leonard Bloomfield said: "The most difficult step in the study of language is the first step. Again and again, scholarship has approached the study of language without actually entering upon it" (Language, 1957, p. 21). This problem does not seem to exist for the author, and one might think, then, that he is of the opinion that he has taken the correct first step. The present reviewer must, however, apologize for having some doubts in this respect. For according to him we shall have to start from the Amharic language in function and as a specific form of textual behaviour. A positivistic atomism, without the necessary ontological justification, cannot be accepted here. I shall elucidate this with help of an example taken from the "Morphologie".

According to the author the Amharic verb is "morphologisch" composed of the following five obligatory elements: die Wurzel, das Typformativ, das Stammpräformativ, das Basisformativ, and das Personalaffix. Since every analysis of Amharic must start from language as being textual behaviour we must ask: How are such analytical terms to be understood as "entities by abstraction", derived from textual behaviour as an expression of human culture? In other words: what are the scientific foundations on which such an atomistic analysis as that of Hartmann is based? What is, to begin with, the linguistic reality of the term "verb"? Let us state that we are here confronted with the important problem of what has, in language, to be looked upon as a unit, a linguistic unit being always also a unity and an entity (in the ontological sense). The term "verb" appears, then, as a completely artificial designation for what only can be an entity by abstraction within the framework of what I would like to call the linguistic universe, constituted by the various morphological representations of the real morphemes, the behavioural universals. Here we are concerned with the Amharic representation of such morphemes, and a phonemic sequence like *näg: ärä* is, on the one hand, only the directly observable and measurable expression of a variant of a derived sign, the mental content of which is *NÄG: ÄRÄ*, and, on the other, it appears to us, in reality, only as a constituent of a composite sign, namely as a phrase of a phraseme, i.e. the expression of a texteme. As such a constituent, the unit in

question is no "verb" but a predicate phrase. Moreover, the texteme itself is only part of the text, i.e. the network of textual behaviour. Thus, we shall have, firstly, to present the grammar of Amharic textual behaviour, segmented in textemes.

Thus, what is called "verb" is here only a derived entity, composed of its variants *näg: ärä*, *näg: äräč*, *yänägr*, *tänägr* etc. For these items are all representatives—of equal standing—of the same unit, being only variants of textual behaviour at a certain level. Moreover, there is no such thing as "die Wurzel NGR sprechen" (p. 83), and we should, therefore, not speak of "Wurzelkonsonanten" (p. 85). It goes without saying that the term "consonant" has no relevance at the level of a mere representation of an ideomorpheme like *ngr*, for this entity belongs to the level of thought (cp. OS 29/1981, pp. 85 ff.) A speech form like *näg: ärä* consists of six radicals, materially expressed by four phonemes.

It must, unfortunately, be said that the author is dealing with his material more like a conventional scholastic than as a linguist in contact with modern scientific thinking. He indulges in divisions, subdivisions and artificial terms, several of which seem to be rather unnecessary or of dubious pedagogical value. The exposition of the verb begins on p. 83, but only on p. 144 the student gets, at last, to know how an A-verb like *näg: ärä* "speak" is inflected. By the way, here we notice that the author registers the form *näg: äräč* but not *näg: äräč:*, the only form given by Leslau (Amharic Textbook, 1967, p. 65) while for *näg: ärh* he gives the variant *näg: ärk* and for *näg: ärhu* the variant *näg: ärku*. In this connexion he calls *näg: ärnä* for *näg: ärn* "ein veraltetes Allomorph" (p. 144); Leslau has also *säb: ärän*. It is then appropriate to decide on Hartmann's definition of the morpheme, and here I would like to refer the reader to OS 29/1981, p. 37, n. 11.

On p. 474 we read: "Morphem: kleinste bedeutungstragende Einheit eines Sprachsystems. Diese Einheit kann entweder uniform (gleichbleibend, unveränderlich) sein oder durch verschiedene Varianten, sogenannte Allomorphe, repräsentiert werden." This is, indeed, a curious definition. For stating that the author analyses *näg: ärä* as a "Perfektbasis *näggär*" + *ä* ("grammatisches Morphem", cf. p. 485) we must ask: What is the relation between "Basis" here and "morpheme"? If we consider the paradigm *näg: ärä* etc. as a "system" we must no doubt ask ourselves whether the throughout "gleichbleibende Einheit" *näg: är-* is not also to be regarded as "eine kleinste bedeutungstragende Einheit" within this system. Unfortunately, the author never defines "Sprachsystem" in his "Erklärung der grammatischen Fachausdrücke" (pp. 365–85), and thus he can never obtain a realistic point of departure for scientific morphemics. He seems not to be aware of the fact that every human language is a system of organizations, and, consequently, his exposition of the Amharic representation of such a system is all in the air. The "first step" was obviously not the right one.

Let us now also state that the "kleinste bedeutungstragende Einheit" is, primarily, "bedeutungstragend" only at a certain level. From this it follows that one must decide upon a highest purely linguistic level and realize that the underlying levels are hierarchically integrated in this highest level. However, the question of the highest linguistic level is much more difficult than one generally thinks. For the border-line between "linguistic" and "extra-linguistic" is after all not so easily drawn. In the last resort all depends here on the sense given to the term "linguistic". Let us consider a text like *Säwoč wädä gäbäya yähedallu, dägmo-m yämmälläsallu* "The men go to the market, and then they return" (Ġaläta Ġafäro, *Yamaränña manbäbiya*, 3, p. 21). This is, to begin with, a piece of Amharic textual behaviour, embedded in a social context, implying a specific relational enmeshment. This kind of enmeshment concerns also what is to be called "culture". Now, it is as "literature" the text functions as an expression of culture, and this state of affairs necessitates an ontological viewpoint, of primary importance to the very architecture of linguistic theory. For the introduction of the functional level of "literature" gives us the opportunity of speaking of a specific form of existence of the text within the sphere of culture. The formal expression of literature, in this sense, we have to see in the existence of rhetorical devices of various kinds or in the lack of such devices. This kind of ontological, semiotic structuralism allows us also to specify, closer, the concept of *literaturnost* "literarity". For the concept of literarity obtains its linguistic signification only if we establish literature as a functional level of textual behaviour. Moreover, this type of ontological hierarchization allows us also to define the notion of "style" within the framework of a general linguistic theory and thus also to appreciate textual behaviour as "art". The text quoted above has of course also a "style", but there is no section in Hartmann's book dealing with "Stil" or "Stilistik", let alone then a definition of this important concept.

Now, in dealing with our Amharic text we have to remember that language, in its full significance, belongs both to nature and to culture. It is obvious that language as an expression of the nature of man belongs to natural science in the sense that this expression is made possible by the existence of what I call the linguistic faculty as such, common to all the peoples of the earth, while the formal representation of this faculty belongs to culture, which varies among the peoples of the earth. Since the various languages in their capacity as formal expressions of this linguistic faculty as such—manifested in the morphemes, the intuitional, behavioural universals—reflect language as “une institution sociale” this means that a general linguistic theory—of which every description of a language should be a function—contains a constant element (morphemics) and a variable element (morphology); in Hartmann’s “Liste der grammatischen Morpheme” etc. (pp. 485–91) we are confronted with what I have called the “re-naming business” (OS 29/1981, p. 39).

Thus it is, for instance, from a text like *Säwoč wädä gäbäya yähedallu, dägmo-m yämmälläsallu* that we shall have to start, disregarding, however, in this connexion, its function as “literature”. As a linguistic concept the text is, in principle, a sign the metareferent of which is just “communication”, while, in our case, the pragmatic referent is this specific “Amharic textual behaviour”. The next step in the analysis will then be to consider the Amharic representation of the text as it appears to us, as a phonemic chain of speech. However, to such a speech-act corresponds an act of understanding, including all relevant elements, such as the situation in which the speech-act appears to the receiver as an utterance. It is in the nature of the act of understanding *par excellence* to imply “the understood” as something independent, that is, as giving in itself a “meaning” of some sort. This kind of meaning presupposes always a hermeneutical horizon against which it stands out as a value of a specific kind. Conceived of as such a value a sequence like *säwoč wädä gäbäya yähedallu* should not simply be equated with a “main clause”, a concept based on artificial schoolgrammar. “Independent” must here always be understood within the framework of a textual situation. Thus, such an entity is only relatively, not absolutely independent, just as little as a so-called “subordinate clause” can be imagined without a main clause. An act of understanding, in this sense, I call “the intuition that something has been said”, and it presupposes always a context. Thus, the minimal segment of a text which constitutes such an intuition should be called a “texteme” since it is a unit of a text, participating in the property of the text of being integrated in a larger cultural context, however this context might be described. It is this property that constitutes the specific pattern of relation or configuration of form which distinguishes the texteme from the so-called “sentence”, a term to be avoided in scientific descriptions of language.

In terms of the grammar of Amharic textual behaviour we have thus here to deal, in the first place, with two textemes, *säwoč wädä gäbäya yähedallu* and *dägmo-m yämmälläsallu*, corresponding to two different acts of understanding, or, in short, two units of “communication”. In this technical, linguistic sense, the concept of communication implies a phraseme as *communicans* and a texteme as *communicatum*, that is, the expression and the content of the sign as such or *in abstracto*, so to speak. The two phonemic sequences just quoted are two Amharic representations of the morpheme “texteme”. Now, Hartmann uses the term “Satz” and gives the following definition: “Satz: kleinste relativ selbständige Redeeinheit zum Ausdruck einer Mitteilung oder Feststellung, eines Gefühls, einer Aufforderung oder einer Frage, die zugleich die grösste grammatisch zu beschreibende Einheit eines Sprachsystems darstellt. Die nächst grössere sprachliche Einheit nach dem Satz ist ein Text, der aus einer Verbindung von mehreren (oft vielen), dem Sinn nach zusammenhängenden Sätzen besteht” (p. 480). Here we observe, on the one hand, a confusion between *la langue* and *la parole*, and, on the other, the idea of the text as “die nächst grössere sprachliche Einheit”. However, if the text is to be considered as a linguistic unit it ought also to be possible “grammatisch zu beschreiben”, namely in terms of the grammar of textual behaviour. Moreover, while it is quite possible to derive a so-called “sentence” from the level of the text, it is not possible to maintain that the text is composed of sentences. This is a question of information, in the scientific sense of the word. The minimal segmentable unit of the text is integrated by the text and, at the same time, an immediate constituent of this text. It is this pattern of relation that constitutes the texteme as a morpheme, giving us a specific kind of information, differing from the information obtained by a further step in the analysis. For it must be remembered that every step downwards brings about a loss of information about the relations obtaining between—materially—the same units at higher levels: *säwoč wädä gäbäya yähedallu* = a texteme integrated in the text > *säwoč/wädä gäbäya yähedallu* = subject phrase +

predicate phrase, constituting a phraseme > *säwoč + wädä + gäbäya + yhedallu* = lexemes, derived from their functions within the phraseme. On the other hand, all these lexemes are "words", and a word is the expressional side of a sign, the mental content of which is a "lex". The relation between the word and the lex is one of complete isomorphism, and, therefore, every division of such a unit must take the phenomenon of integration into consideration. This means that a unit like *gäbäya* "market" must be divided into elements which can be regarded as immediate constituents of the unit in question. These constituents are the radicals *g-ä-b-ä-y-a*. The material side of the radical is, it is true, a phoneme. However, it is not as material the phoneme is of interest to us, but as the substance of the radical as being linguistic form, that is, the expression of a "techneme" in the conceptual sound-picture *gäbäya ~ GÄBÄYA*. This may suffice to give the reader an idea of the general linguistic outlook of the author. The Amharic material is, to an astonishing extent, taken over from other *amharisants*. The present reviewer has the intention to deal with this grammar in a series of minor papers, and he therefore stops here for the time being.

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F. O. Hvidberg-Hansen, *La déesse TNT. Une étude sur la religion canaanéo-punique*. I. Texte. II. Notes. Copenhagen 1979. G. E. C. Gad's Forlag. 149, 207 S.

In wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten, in denen punische Religion behandelt wird, wird die Göttin TNT als die neben Ba'al Ḥammōn am meisten verehrte Gottheit, besonders in Karthago, hervorgehoben. Ausser K. Preisendanz in Pauly-Wissowas Realencyclopädie 1931 hat doch bisher keiner dieser Göttin, über deren Identität und Namen die Ansichten geteilt sind, mehr als etwa eine Druckseite gewidmet.

Was die Identität der Göttin TNT betrifft, folgen die meisten Forscher immer noch S. Gsell, der 1920 (*Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*, t. 4) vermutete, TNT sei eine afrikanische Form von 'Astarte', so G. Contenau, *La civilisation phénicienne*, Paris 1949, S. 96 f., D. Harden, *The Phoenicians*, 2. ed., London 1963, S. Moscati, *World of the Phoenicians*, London 1968, S. 138 f., und H. Ringgren, *Religions of the Ancient Near East*, London 1973, S. 143 f., und noch A. Parrot, M. H. Chéhad & S. Moscati, *Die Phönizier*, München 1977, während H. Gese (in *Die Religionen Altsyriens* ... Stuttgart etc. 1970) in ihr „eine 'astarte-ähnliche Göttin' sieht, „bei der einiges an 'Anat' erinnere aber mehr noch an 'Astarte'“.

Nach G. Charles-Picard, *Les religions de l'Afrique antique*, Paris 1954, und G. & C. Charles-Picard, *Vie et mort de Carthage*, Paris 1970, ist TNT nicht mit 'Astarte' identisch, eher mit Atīrat, aus deren Kultus der von TNT sich entwickelt haben könnte.

M. H. Pope & W. Röllig (im Wörterbuch der Mythologie, 1, Stuttgart 1965) und H. Donner & W. Röllig (in *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften*, 1-3, 2. Aufl., Wiesbaden 1966-69) und W. F. Albright, *Yahweh and the gods of Canaan*, London 1968, identifizieren die Göttin mit 'Anat'.

G. Picard, *Le monde de Carthage*, Paris 1956, geht von der Benennung der Göttin als TNT PN B'L aus und fasst sie als einen „reflet du dieu Ba'al Ḥammōn“ auf (wie schon F. de Saulcy in *Revue archéologique* 3/1846: 629 ff. „manifestation de Ba'al“). Ähnliche Auffassungen vertreten M. Leglay, *Saturne africain, Histoire*, Paris 1966, der TNT und Ba'al Ḥammōn als eine Dyade ansieht, und F. Barreca, *La Sardegna fenicia e punica*, Sassari 1974, S. 109 f., der die beiden als einen Gott mit zwei Gesichtern sieht.

Auch über die Etymologie des Namens herrschen verschiedene Ansichten. Griechische Transkriptionen deuten laut einigen Forschern auf eine Aussprache Tinnīt, aber Charles-Picard 1954 und Moscati 1968 betrachten die in griechischer Schrift überlieferten Formen als spät und provinziell, eine Auffassung, gegen die Donner & Röllig 1968 sich wenden. Man hat einen afrikanischen Ursprung des Namens vermutet (Charles-Picard 1954, Pope & Röllig 1965, Donner & Röllig 1968, Moscati 1968, Gese 1970 und D. Wachsmut, Art. Tinnit, *Der Kleine Pauly*, 5, München 1975), während Picard & Picard 1970 es unwahrscheinlich finden, dass der Name der vornehmsten Göttin aus dem Substrat geholt worden sei. Diejenigen, die eine semitische Etymologie vertreten, haben verschiedene Vorschläge: Šifman 1960 (referiert in F. L. Benz, *Personal names in the Phoenician and Punic inscriptions*, Rom 1972) sieht im Namen das Piel von *tnh* „celebrated“, „glorious“, Leglay 1966 übersetzt

nach Dossin 1958 „la neuve“, „la fiancée“ ohne weitere Erklärung. M. Delcor in OA 7/1968: 213 f. will (mit Hinweis auf Clermont-Ganneau 1906) den Namen in Verbindung mit der Wurzel *ntn* „geben“ bringen, wie früher Albright, der 1968 doch lieber *tennī* < *tannī* < *tabnī* „structure, form, brilliance, glory“ vorschlägt. F. M. Cross (in Erets-Israel 8/1967: 8* f.) denkt an *tannīn* „dragon“, und so tun auch Picard & Picard 1968 „Dame du Dragon ou du Serpent de Mer“ mit Hinweis auf Sznycer, der doch selbst unsicher ist (Sznycers Besprechung in Karthago 15/1969: 107 f.) und nach Picard & Picard 1970 mit „une racine méditerranéenne TN“ rechnet. Barreca 1974 bleibt mit seiner Übersetzung „distributrice di doni“ bei der Wurzel „geben“.

Da also die Ansichten über die Identität der Göttin TNT und die Deutung ihres Namens weit auseinandergehen, ohne dass die verschiedenen Ansichten auf nähere Untersuchungen bauen, muss Hvidberg-Hansens Habilitationsschrift über die Göttin TNT als sehr willkommen bezeichnet werden.

Verf. geht in der Einleitung von der Hypothese aus, dass TNT eine phönizische Göttin ist—obwohl der Name afrikanisch beeinflusst sein kann – die auf eine der Göttinnen Aṭirat, ‘Anat oder ‘Attarte zurückgeführt werden kann.

Es folgt eine Übersicht über die Forschung, zuerst nach F. Münters Religion der Karthager, Kopenhagen 1816 (2. Aufl. 1821) bis zu S. Gsells „Histoire ancienne de l’Afrique du Nord“ (t. 4, 1920) und dann nach den Ausgrabungen in Salammo mit den Funden in Nordafrika und im westlichen Mittelmeergebiet. Es ist nicht gelungen, diese kronologischen Rahmen ganz einzuhalten: so wird S. 18 Fn. 83–85 und S. 20 Fn. 120 Literatur aus den 1950–1970-er Jahren herangezogen.

Dieser erste Abschnitt bis 1920 endet mit einer Summierung unter fünf Punkten von der Natur TNT’s (kriegerisch, artemisähnlich, Himmelsgöttin, Mutter und Jungfrau, Paredros von Ba‘al Ḥammōn und wie dieser Fruchtbarkeits- und Stadtgott), bisher vorgeschlagenen Etymologien des Namens TNT (ägyptisch, von *šny* mit der Bedeutung „strahlend“, *tnt* „Spender“, *TNN* das Seeungeheuer im Alten Testament, unbekannt Etymologie) und der Identifizierung Gsells von TNT mit Astarte, nebst einem Exkurs über die Kenntnisse über Astarte um 1920 (kriegerisch, Himmelsgöttin, Muttergöttin, Stadtgöttin; Etymologieversuche).

Der nächste Abschnitt wird mit den Funden aus Salammo 1920–1921 eingeleitet, unter denen Kinderknochen die Zeugnisse antiker Autoren von Kinderopfern bestätigen. Berichte über die Funde in Hadrumetum und El-Hofra beenden den nordafrikanischen Abschnitt, wonach die Funde aus dem übrigen Mittelmeergebiet beschrieben werden.

Im zweiten Kapitel werden die drei ugaritischen Göttinnen behandelt, die für eine Identifizierung mit TNT in Frage kommen, und Verf. Sucht vom Textmaterial aus die Eigenschaften jeder Göttin, die mit denen der Göttin TNT übereinstimmen könnten, zu systematisieren. Auch wenn Verf. für die Deutung der Textstellen den Ugaritologen folgt, unterzieht er ihre Deutungen doch einer kritischen Prüfung. Manchmal wird Verf. von seinen Vorgängern aber aufs Glatteis geführt – besonders wenn die Bedeutung eines anderen semitischen Wortes mit denselben Radikalen wie das dunkle ugaritische ohne weitere Prüfung übernommen wird. Ich will später mit einigen Beispielen zeigen, mit welcher Vorsicht man die Wörterbücher für die Deutung ugaritischer Texte benutzen muss.

In einem Exkurs über ‘Anat und Artemis nimmt Verf. Th. H. Gasters Darstellung in „Ba‘al is risen“ (Iraq 6/1939: 111–143) als Ausgangspunkt, die er ergänzt, erweitert und modifiziert. Für jede Göttin werden endlich ihre charakteristischen Züge zusammengefasst. Bei der Etymologie des Namens jeder Göttin wird eine verdienstvolle Vorsicht wahrgenommen.

Im dritten und letzten Kapitel werden nun die charakteristischen Züge der drei ugaritischen Göttinnen mit denen der Göttin TNT zusammengestellt, was zu dem Schluss führt, dass der Charakter von TNT die grösste Ähnlichkeit mit dem von ‘Anat aufweist. Damit wird die grösste und wichtigste Frage, die Verf. sich gestellt hat, beantwortet, und zwar, wie mir scheint, überzeugend, obwohl einige der Argumente weniger gut begründet scheinen – darauf komme ich gleich zurück.

Das dritte Kapitel enthält zwei Exkurse: über den Namen Ḥammōn und über die Verbindungen Kana‘an–Cypern–Karthago, und wird mit einer Darstellung über den Namen TNT abgeschlossen. Nach einer Übersicht über bisherige Etymologien des Namens, steuert Verf. eine neue bei aus dem Namen ‘Anat, dem ein nordafrikanisches, feminines *ta*- präfigiert werden sollte. Dabei wäre der Vokal nach ‘ gefallen und ‘ an dem folgenden *-n*- assimiliert worden, wobei eine vorhergehende Entwicklung ‘ > > offensichtlich vorausgesetzt wird. Der Vokal *-i*- in der letzten Silbe wird endlich als Ergebnis einer phönizisch-punischen Entwicklung (wie *anāk* > *anec* bei Plautus) oder mit Hinweis auf die arabische *imāla* erklärt. Diese Etymologie, an sich schwach begründet, gewinnt verglichen mit

bisherigen Deutungen eine gewisse Stütze durch die vom Verf. dargelegten Identifikation mit 'Anat. Man muss dem Verf. doch beipflichten, wenn er abschliessend das Rätsel des Namens TNT als noch nicht gelöst erklärt.

Das Werk beschliessen eine sehr reichhaltige Bibliographie, die Überblick und Belesenheit bezeugt, und wertvolle Indizes.

Nach dieser Inhaltsübersicht möchte ich einige Probleme anschnitten. Das erste bezieht sich auf die Eigenschaften der Göttin TNT, die für ihre Identifikation mit 'Anat benutzt werden. Die aus Salambo bezugten Kinderopfer können kaum benutzt werden, um die Natur der Göttin als „barbare et sanguinaire“ (S. 36) darzustellen. Wie Verf. selbst hervorhebt (S. 35) besagten diese Opfer, dass die Lebenskraft durch die Kraft des Blutes gestärkt und erneuert wurde. Nach Leglay 1966 (S. 328 ff.) war das Zugeständnis der Eltern notwendig, das geopferte Kind gewann Seligkeit oder gar Göttlichkeit, Unglück der Menschen und des Landes wurde abgewehrt, und die Kraft der Götter wurde gestärkt. Im Hinblick darauf können die damaligen Menschen die Göttin kaum als grausam und blutdurstig aufgefasst haben (um einen aktuellen Vergleich zu ziehen: jedes Jahr werden in der Welt zwischen 30 und 50 Millionen Abtreibungen ausgeführt – man mag diesen Massenmord ungeborener Kinder wie man will beurteilen, aber auch hier können Grausamkeit und Blutdurst nicht als Beweggrund angenommen werden, heute wie damals dürfte die Sorge für die eigene Person und Gesellschaft ausschlaggebend sein). Es wird somit schwieriger, die Ähnlichkeit zwischen den karthagischen Opfern an TNT und dem „blutigen Kampf“ 'Anats im ugaritischen Mythos zu sehen, wenn nicht auch das von 'Anat ausgegossene Blut als lebenserneuernd aufgefasst wird (um El neue Kraft zu geben), wobei das Grausamkeitsmoment auch hier wegfällt. Dieselbe Einwendung gilt der Vorstellung (S. 97 und Fn. 238) von al-'Uzza als eine grausame und blutdurstige Göttin. Man hat übrigens sehr wenige Überlieferungen von Menschenopfer an al-'Uzza, und jedenfalls Ps.-Nilos, der Fn. 173 zitiert wird, muss als eine sehr unsichere Quelle gelten.

Auch die Auffassung von TNT als Mutter- und Fruchtbarkeitsgöttin scheint da etwas schwach begründet zu sein, wo sie (S. 44 und 65) darauf gestützt wird, dass die Göttin in „matronenhafter“ Gestalt auf einigen Bildern aus Hadrumetum und Spanien thront. Bedeutungsvoller für das Verständnis dieser Bilder wäre vielleicht eine Analyse der begleitenden Symbole: Altar, Diskus, Halbmond, Globus – diese sind doch kaum Fruchtbarkeitssymbole?

In der Zusammenfassung S. 65 wird ein Fund aus Spanien mit unsicherer Deutung (näher diskutiert auf S. 53) benutzt, um zu zeigen, dass TNT auch im Mittelmeergebiet als Stadtgöttin mit der Benennung GD aufgetreten sei. Auch in dem abschliessenden Vergleich scheinen mir einige Argumente vielleicht etwas unsicher – z. B. S. 119, dass das Epitheton PN B'L/ΦΑΝΗΒΑΛΟC an sich die kriegerische Natur der Göttin bezeichnen sollte, weil es auf Münzen aus Askalon vorkommt, die eine kriegsgerüstete Göttin zeigen. Es scheint mir also, als ob Verf. in seiner Bestrebung, Ähnlichkeiten zwischen TNT und der entsprechenden ugaritischen Göttin mehr Argumente für seine These benutzt, als das Material es erlaubt.

Andererseits scheinen mir auch manchmal Argumente, die gegen die These sprechen, allzu leichtfertig abgetan zu werden. S. 13 wird die erste Inschrift zitiert, die der Forschung den Namen der Göttin bekannt machte, eine griechisch-phönizische Inschrift aus Athen, die den Namen 'BDTNT enthält, in der griechischen Version ΑΡΤΕΜΙΔΩΡΟC wiedergegeben. Aber es wird hier nicht erwähnt, dass der Träger dieses Namens auch das Epitheton ΣΙΔΩΝΙΟC hat. In Fn. 100 heisst es, „les parents du dédicant sont de Sidon“ – nach der griechischen Version ist er es selber (aus der phönizischen geht nicht hervor, ob er oder der Vater aus Sidon kommt), und Donner & Röllig finden in ihrem Kommentar der Inschrift, dass es auffallend sei, dass ein Sidonier einen Namen trägt, der den Namen einer fremden Stadtgöttin enthält. In derselben Fussnote 100 wird auch erwähnt, dass man in Sidon ein Ostrakon mit dem Namen GRTNT gefunden hat. Erst Fn. 350, am Ende der Fussnote in Klammern, wird der Gedanke zurückgewiesen, dass man aus diesen Namen schliessen könnte, dass die Göttin schon in ihrem kanaanäischen Ursprungsland den Namen TNT getragen hätte, und zwar ohne weitere Argumente als einen Hinweis auf Fn. 233, die doch diese beiden Inschriften nicht behandelt, sondern eine andere Inschrift, wo TNT möglicherweise in Verbindung mit dem Namen Libanon erwähnt wird, und einige arabische Ortsnamen, die auf *-tanū* enden. Und S. 51 heisst es apodiktisch „venant incontestablement de Carthage“. Aber wenn gezeigt werden könnte, dass TNT diesen Namen schon im Mutterlande getragen hat – welche Bedeutung hätte dies für die These des Buches? Diese Frage verschärft sich, wenn nach Fertigstellung des Buches bekannt wird,

dass der Name TNT (falls richtig gedeutet) in einer Inschrift im Tempel zu Sarepta gefunden wurde (J. B. Pritchard, *Recovering Sarepta*, Princeton 1978, S. 20).

S. 27 and Fn. 223 (und Fn. 176) gibt Verf. eine Etymologie des Names TNT wieder, nach der das Wort „strahlend“ bedeuten sollte. Dazu sagt Verf., es sei wahr, dass hebr. *šānā* mit der Bedeutung „ändern“ und „Jahr“ aus arab. *sanā* „strahlen“ stammen könnte, aber dass es von *šānā* „ein zweites Mal tun“ und „zwei“, arab. *ṭanā* und aram. *t'nā*, wozu TNT gehören sollte, getrennt werden muss. Ich glaube aber nicht, dass es mehr als eine Wurzel *šānā* gibt – „ändern“ und „ein zweites Mal tun“, „zwei“ und „(neues) Jahr“ haben wahrscheinlich die Grundbedeutung „wiederholen“ (so auch Koehler-Baumgartners *Lexicon*). Dass „Jahr“ auf arabisch *sana* mit *s* und nicht mit *t* heisst, kommt wohl daher, dass es ein Lehnwort ist – das südsemitische Wort für Jahr ist *ām*. Dann kann hebr. *šānā* nicht mit arab. *sanā* verglichen werden, das ausserdem nicht „strahlen“ bedeutet, sondern „hoch sein“ von einer Flamme oder einem Blitz, II. „besteigen“, IV. „heben“.

S. 36: Im Zusammenhang mit den Opfern wird der Ausdruck מלכאמר ausführlich behandelt. „Agnum pro vicario“ gibt Ersatzopfer an, aber Verf. nimmt die Frage nicht auf, inwieweit angetroffene Tierknochen wirklich Ersatzopfer darstellen – kamen Tieropfer, die keinen Ersatz für Menschenopfer darstellten, nie vor? O. Eissfeldts Deutung des Ausdrucks מלך אדם (in Molk als Opferbegriff . . . Halle 1935) wird nicht vollständig wiedergegeben: nebst „Versprechen, Opfer eines Menschen“ (also entweder Versprechen oder Opfer, nicht „Versprechung eines Opfers“, wie Verf. es hat) hat Eissfeldt auch die alternative Deutung „Opfer, das ein Mensch darbringt“, also mit אדם als Genitivus subjectivus. Eissfeldts Deutung setzt also nur bedingt Menschenopfer voraus, „falls אדם gen. obj. ist“. Wert zu erwähnen wären auch, dass R. de Vaux, *Les Sacrifices de l'Ancient Testament*, Paris 1964, S. 71, es vorzieht, אדם als Gen. subj. aufzufassen, wie auch die weitgehenden Zweifel, die R. Charlier, *Karthago 4/1953: 12, 16f.* (vom Verf. nicht zitiert), und A. Berthier & R. Charlier, *Le sanctuaire punique d'El-Hofra à Constantine*, Paris 1952–55, Nr. 55, in diesem Zusammenhang ausdrücken. Die Deutung J.-G. Février, referiert in Fn. 331, von אדם als „Blut“ mit כ als Radikal wird nicht in Molchomor, *RHR 143/1953: 8f.*, vorgelegt, wo Février von prosthetischem *'alaf* spricht, sondern erst in *Essai de reconstruction du sacrifice Molek*, *JA 1962: 1f.*, nach Kritik von Hoftijzer.

S. 46 Fn. 436: das hebr. Wort כנה ist isoliert und unsicher, es ist nicht einmal erwiesen, dass es ein Nomen ist, siehe LXX und die Emendationen zu Ps. 80: 16.

S. 56f. erwähnt Verf. aus Sardinien einen Eigennamen, der den Namen TNT enthält, auf einer Bronzeplatte aus dem 4.–3. Jh., und den Namen der Göttin auf einer Vase – richtiger: auf einem Vasenfragment – aus derselben Zeit. In Fn. 84 könnte zu dieser Inschrift auch M. G. Guzzo Amadasi, *Le iscrizioni fenicie e puniche . . .*, Rom 1967, Nr. 25, S. 104, mit Hinweis auf weitere Arbeiten, erwähnt werden. Nach Abschluss des Buches wurde noch eine Inschrift mit dem Namen TNT aus Tharros veröffentlicht (von M. L. Uberti in *Rev. di studi fenici 4/1976: 53–55*).

S. 59: Falls die vom Verf. erwähnten Reste von Kinderopfern in Motya vorkarthagisch sind, falls also Kinderopfer schon vor Einführung des karthagischen Kultus stattgefunden haben, hätte die Bedeutung dieser Tatsache vielleicht dargelegt werden sollen.

S. 62: Wenn Verf. das Vorkommen des Terminus מלכאמר auf Malta aber das Nichtvorkommen von Resten von Kinderopfern feststellt, vermisst man die Angabe, ob die epigraphischen Zeugnisse von „Ersatzopfern“ durch Vorkommen von Resten von Tieropfern bestätigt wurden (G. Garbini in *MAIM 1963: 95*, wozu Verf. in Fn. 141 hinweist, erwähnt „la grande quantità di osse di piccoli animali“). – Der Genauigkeit wegen sollte vielleicht hinzugefügt werden, dass in einer der beiden Inschriften, die B^cL H^mN erwähnen sollen, das Wort H^mN unleserlich ist. Sehr undeutlich ist auch die S. 62 unten Fn. 149 erwähnte Inschrift – Garbinis Deutung wird von Guzzo Amadasi als „poco probabile“ beurteilt. Deshalb stimmt es in dem Zusammenhang S. 64 nicht ganz, dass die Göttin im Mittelmeergebiet überall zusammen mit B^cL H^mN auftritt – einige der Inschriften auf Malta können Ausnahmen darstellen (wie vielleicht die in Sarepta).

S. 70 oben und Fn. 8: Das Ugaritische wird hier einen kana'anäischen Dialekt genannt, und Verf. verweist auf Literatur, die diese Klassifikation stützt, und auf einen Aufsatz von Cantineau, der das Ugaritische statt dessen als vorkana'anäisch betrachtet. Cantineau ist aber nicht der einzige, der diese Auffassung vertritt: sie wurde schon in den 1930:er Jahren von H. Bauer verfochten und hat später in Friedrich und Moscati ihre Anhänger gehabt. Die zum Ugaritischen zitierte Literatur ist nicht erschöpfend – noch erwähnt werden könnten J. Aistleitner, *Zur Frage der Sprachverwandtschaft des Ugaritischen*, *AO 7/1957: 251–307*, *8/1958: 51–98*; M. Dahood, *The linguistic position of Ugaritic . . .*

Sacra Pagina 1/1959: 269–279; A. Goetze, Is Ugaritic a Canaanite dialect, Lang. 17/1941: 127–138; E. Uliendorff, The position of Ugaritic within the framework of the Semitic languages, Tarbiz 24/1954–55: 121–125.

S. 72 und Fn. 19 wird ug. *ltpn* mit „clément“ übersetzt mit Hinweis auf arab. *laṭafa* „être doux, clément“. Wahrscheinlich ist diese Bedeutung im Arab. doch sekundär. Das Adj. *laṭīf* bedeutet „fein, penetrant, scharfsinnig“ (vgl. syr. *lʿtaf* „polieren, schleifen“), und wenn es im Koran als Epitheton zu Gott steht, parallel mit *ḥabīr*, hat es eher die letztgenannte Bedeutung – Paret übersetzt „der Mittel und Wege findet“ und meint, dass es später die Bedeutungen „vorsorglich“ und dann „gütig“ bekommen hat (R. Paret, Der Koran, Kommentar und Konkordanz, Stuttgart etc. 1971, zur Sure 12: 100). Die Bedeutung „clément“ kann auch nicht unbedingt aus einem parallelen *dpʿid* = arab. *ḍū fuʿād* „aimable“ (so Verf. Fn. 89, vgl. F. Løkkegaard, Fs. Pedersen 1953, S. 232 und Fn. 126 „gracious“ bzw. „compassionate“, siehe auch G. R. Driver, Canaanite myths and legends, Edinburgh 1956, Glossary S. 159, 162, und J. Aistleitner, Die mythologischen und kultischen Texte aus Ras Schamra, Budapest 1959, S. 99; der vom Verf. zitierten Virolleaud fasst die Ausdrücke als Eigennamen auf) hergeleitet werden, da arab. *fuʿād* nicht nur „Herz“ sondern auch „Verstand“ bedeutet (wie das synonyme *lubb*, vgl. hebr. *lēb*).

S. 72 und Fn. 26 (wie Fn. 8 zu S. 81) wird ug. *ysm* mit „beau“ übersetzt mit Hinweis auf arab. *wasāma* „Schönheit“. Diese Etymologie ist zweifelhaft, weil die Grundbedeutung der arab. Wurzel WSM „Marke“ ist, erst sekundär „Gesichtszüge“ und „Schönheit“. Die Wurzel ist wohl mit (*i*)*sm* „Name“ verwandt, dem auf Ugaritisch eher ein *yśm* oder *wśm* entsprechen hätte.

S. 74 Fn. 42 erwähnt der Verf., dass die Bedeutung von *mīpləṣəṭ* I. Kōn. 15: 3 unbekannt ist, aber dass die rabbinische Tradition das Wort als Bezeichnung eines Phallosymbolos auffasst. Diese Auffassung stützt vielleicht etymologisch, dass die Wurzel des Wortes, PLṢ, wie die verwandte Wurzel PRṢ, die Bedeutung „eindringen“, auch im sexuellen Sinn, haben könnte (Rez., Die Wurzel PRṢ im Hebräischen, Orientalia Suecana 21/1972: 73–86).

S. 75 Fn. 54: Zu der Vorstellung von den zwei Meeren im Koran könnte H. Grotzfeld, Die „beiden Meere“ im Koran, Proceedings of the VIth congress of Arabic and Islamic studies 1972, S. 129–135, erwähnt werden.

S. 75 Fn. 60 heisst es vom ug. *dr*, übersetzt „Familie“, dass die Wurzel DWR im NWSemit. = arab. DHR (*dahr*, eig. „Zeit“ – unbegrenzte, im Gegensatz zu *zamān*) mit arab. *dār*, hebr. *dōr* „Wohnort“ gemischt worden sei. Die Frage ist wohl eher, zu welcher der beiden Wurzeln die Bedeutung „Generation, Familie“ gehört: sind es Menschen desselben Wohnorts“ (so wohl TWAT „Kreis von Personen“, nebst anderen Deutungen and Literatur) oder „Menschen desselben Zeitabschnittes“ (so G. Gerleman im THAT)?

S. 77 Fn. 89 gibt Verf. für die Wurzel GZY als Bedeutung im Arab. „das Auge schliessen“ an. Im übertragenen Sinne bedeutet das Verbum aber „ein Auge zudrücken“, d. h. etwas passieren lassen, was man missbilligt. Davon scheint es ein weiter Schritt zu sein zu J. Aistleitners „gütig stimmen“ (Wörterbuch der ugaritischen Sprache, Berlin 1963, s. v.) und C. H. Gordons „entreat with gifts“ (Ugaritic textbook, Rom 1965, Glossary S. 463, Nr. 1958 dagegen keine Etymologie). G. R. Driver übersetzt „beseech“ (Canaanite myths and legends, Glossary S. 142, vom Verf. als dän. „besøge“, „rendre visite“, missverstanden), mit einem rätselhaften Hinweis auf arab. *rajā*. Die Wurzel MGN wurde von W. von Soden im Jaarb. . . Ex Or. Lux 18/1964: 339–344 behandelt.

S. 78 Fn. 112: Für *ʿly* als Bezeichnung für Baʿal könnte an den Gott ʿAl in H. S. Nyberg, Studien zum Religionskampf im AT, Archiv für Religionswissenschaft 35/1938–39: 329–387, erinnert werden.

S. 83 Fn. 27 übersetzt Verf. *ksl* mit „Bogensehne“ mit Hinweis auf arab. *kisl*. Damit wird aber keine Bogensehne bezeichnet sondern die Sehne eines bogenähnlichen Werkzeugs, mit dem die Baumwolle gekrempelt wird (Wörterbuch der klassischen arabischen Sprache I: 194 a). Die gewöhnliche Bedeutung von KSL im Arab. ist „Trägheit, Faulheit“.

S. 89 Fn. 97 wird „Bogen“ als mögliche Bedeutung von *qṣʿt* diskutiert mit Hinweis auf Aistleitners Wörterbuch und seinen Hinweis auf äthiop. *qasʿa* „krümmen“. Aber *qasʿa* bedeutet „beugen“ in dem übertragenen Sinne von „demütigen“ (eig. „unterdrücken“, arab. *qaḍaʿa*, weil es auch für das Planen eines Weges benutzt wird, also eigentlich der Vorstellung von etwas Gebogenem entgegengesetzt). In dem arab. Ausdruck *qaws farʿ* ist *farʿ* Epitheton: ein Bogen, der „Spitze“ ist (eigentlich die herausragenden Äste eines Baumstammes) – das Epitheton ist dann selbständig benutzt, wie so oft im Arab. Eine entsprechende Bedeutungsentwicklung kann für das ug. *prʿ* kaum vorausgesetzt werden.

S. 92 Fn. 173 f.: Über Menschenopfer bei den Arabern – übrigens sehr spärlich belegt – siehe auch J. Henninger in *Anthropos* 53/1958: 721–805 und als Fruchtbarkeitsritus I. Lichtenstaedter in *Israel Oriental Studies* 5/1975: 54–61.

S. 94 Fn. 196: Für eine andere Etymologie des Namens Atargatis siehe F. Rundgren in *Ex orbe religionum*, Fs. G. Widengren, I, Leiden 1972, S. 77.

S. 95 Fn. 210: Der Zusammenhang zwischen ug. *drk* und hebr. *darak* Hos. 10: 3 ist unsicher und umstritten (siehe W. Rudolphs Kommentar zur Stelle, KAT 13: 1).

S. 99: Verf. gibt als Bedeutung der Wurzel RHM nur „Barmherzigkeit“ an. Könnte hier nicht die Bedeutung „Mutterleib“ (so H. Gese in *Die Religionen Altsyriens*, . . . , S. 81, zitiert vom Verf. Fn. 275, „ein besonderer Aspekt *Ajirats*“, aber ohne Gese's Übersetzung „der vergöttlichte Mutterleib“) auf die Rolle ‘Anats als Mutter- oder Fruchtbarkeitsgöttin hindeuten? A. S. Kapelrud, *The violent goddess* . . . , Oslo 1969, S. 37, meint doch, dass die Identifizierung von Rhm/y/ mit ‘Anat nicht ausreichend erwiesen worden sei. Vgl. jetzt auch A. Deem in *JSS* 23/1978: 27.

S. 100 Fn. 296 übersetzt Verf. ug. *ybm* mit „Stamm/mutter“ und vergleicht die Wurzel mit arab. *ʔāma* (nach A. Guillaume). Der Wechsel zwischen B und W ist aber unsicher, ausserdem gibt es die Wurzel *ʔYM*, und zuletzt bedeutet das arab. Wort „ledig, Witwe/r sein“, eine Bedeutung, die kaum an Mutterschaft denken lässt, besonders wenn sie mit hebr. *ʔēmā* „Schrecken“ verknüpft wird, das nach P. de Lagarde, *Übersicht über die Bildung der Nomina* (1888) 1972, S. 28**, eigentlich das Gefühl vollständigster Verlassenheit bezeichnet. Die Übersicht bei A. Kapelrud, auf die Fn. 296 hinweist, kann mit M. H. Pope & W. Röllig im *Wörterbuch der Mythologie*, 1: 240 s. v. ‘Anat, „verwitwete Gemahlin des Fürsten“, ergänzt werden.

S. 100 Fn. 309: Zum Namen Gad und seiner Bedeutung gibt es moderne Literatur, wie Köhler-Baumgartner, 3. Aufl., s. v., *TWAT* s. v. und M. Höfner im *Wörterbuch der Mythologie*, 1: 426 f. und 438 f.

Was ich mit diesen Bemerkungen vor allem beleuchten wollte, ist, dass Verf. bei seiner Deutung des ugaritischen Materials manchmal frühere Deutungen unkritisch übernommen hat – z. B. auf Grund später, sekundärer und für das Arab. ganz spezieller Bedeutungen, die in Ugarit zweitausend Jahre früher wiederzufinden man kaum erwarten kann.

Vielleicht hätte auch die Unsicherheit angedeutet werden können, die einem Vergleich zwischen den Vorstellungen der Bevölkerung von Ugarit im 14.–13. Jh. vor Christus und denen der Punier im 5. Jh. vor Christus überhaupt anhaften muss, wenn man den räumlichen und zeitlichen Abstand und unser mangelhaftes Verständnis des Ugaritischen bedenkt.

Die Darstellung folgt der Forschungsgeschichte und liefert der Wissenschaftsgeschichte dadurch einen wertvollen Beitrag. Gleichzeitig führt sie, nicht ohne ein gewisses Mass der Spannung, konsequent zur Identifizierung der Göttin, einer Identifizierung, zu der bisher wenig Wissenschaftler, und dann ohne weitere Begründung, gelangt sind. Was durch diese Darstellungsweise verloren geht, ist die eigene Geschichte der Göttin, soweit sie sich verfolgen lässt, und die gegenwärtige Forschungslage. Dass die gegenwärtige Forschungslage nicht ausführlicher beleuchtet wurde, hat dazu beigetragen, dass auch der Einsatz des Verfassers nicht ganz zur Geltung gekommen ist.

Man vermisst eine Karte, die die Ausgrabungsplätze zeigt und die Verbreitung des Kultus der beiden Göttinnen TNT und ‘Anat veranschaulicht hätte, und eine Notiz über das Umschlagsbild (CIS 1: 183), beschrieben in Fn. 44 und S. 22 und zu sehen in der *Bibliothèque Nationale*.

Abschliessend kann festgestellt werden, dass hier die erste Monographie der karthagischen Stadtgöttin und ihres Kultus auf Grund von epigraphischem, ikonographischem und anderem Ausgrabungsmaterial aus Karthago und der übrigen Mittelmeerwelt vorliegt mit einem Vergleich der Göttin TNT mit den ugaritischen Göttinnen, der auf eine gründliche und umfassende Durchnahme des ugaritischen Textmaterials mit Ausblicken auch nach griechischer, römischer und weiterer semitischer Mythologie baut. Wie Verf. selbst hervorhebt, ist damit nicht das letzte Wort über die Göttin TNT gesagt – mehrere Probleme sind noch zu lösen. Aber das Material ist zusammengestellt, der Grund gelegt und ein natürlicher Ausgangspunkt für die weitere Forschung ist mit diesem gelehrten Werk geschaffen.

Ibn Ḥazm al-ʿAndalusī, *Kitāb al-ʿaxlāq wa-s-siyar* ou *Risāla fī mudāwāt an-nufūs wa-taḥqīb al-ʿaxlāq wa-z-zuhd fī r-raḡāʾil*. Introduction, édition critique, remarques par Eva Riad (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis *Studia Semitica Upsaliensia*. 4. Editor: Frithiof Rundgren). Uppsala 1980. 110+165 pp.

Ibn Ḥazm al-ʿAndalusī vécut et travailla dans l'Espagne islamique. Il naquit à Cordoue en 994 AD et mourut à Manta Lišam en 1064. Son héritage littéraire est extrêmement vaste et couvre la plupart des genres littéraires arabes. Mais c'est surtout par ses écrits sur l'éthique et le *fiqh*, qu'il a été connu. Ses théories dans ces domaines ont influencé le système juridico-religieux qui servit de fondement à la dynastie almohade, que la remarquable figure du mahdi Ibn Tumart créa au Maroc 75 ans plus tard.

La doctrine *zahirite*, *al-maḏhab aẓāhiri*, prit la forme du programme d'école à l'est. C'était le lieu même où, Dāwūd ibn Xalaf, le fondateur de cette doctrine avait vécu environ cent cinquante années auparavant. Ibn Ḥazm fut en gros le seul représentant de cette conception du droit en Espagne. Mais il eut d'autant plus d'influence dans les provinces de l'ouest de l'Espagne et le Magreb. De nombreux passages, dans son interprétation du droit, témoignent chez Ibn Ḥazm de positions plus libérales que celles que faisaient présenter ses adhérents dans l'école établie à l'est du pays. Il contribua avant tout à donner à celle-ci une atmosphère plus humaine et plus pédagogique. Tous, et pas uniquement ceux qui étaient versés dans le droit, *al-Fuqhāʾ*, devaient par l'*iḡtihād* atteindre à la compréhension du *ʿamru-llāhi*. « Chacun doit être son propre *faqīh*. »

Ce livre sur *al-ʿaxlāq*, Les caractères et leurs traitements, est un parfait exemple de l'art de la présentation suggestif d'Ibn Ḥazm. Comme nous l'apprend l'étude du Dr Riad, ce livre a été publié et imprimé plusieurs fois auparavant. Les éditions antérieures, ainsi que leurs révisions ultérieures méritent à peine qu'on leur consacre un compte rendu scientifique. Elles sont de surcroît d'un accès extrêmement difficile, quand, du moins, elles sont accessibles. Le Dr Riad a entrepris la tâche de faire une édition érudite ainsi qu'une étude complète de tous les matériaux accessibles. Son travail témoigne de sa grande compétence et mérite toute notre reconnaissance. Il lui revient le mérite d'avoir réussi à avoir accès à tous les manuscrits connus. Deux d'entre eux, par exemple, ceux qu'elle désigne par les lettres D et E, n'ont jamais figuré auparavant dans un établissement du texte.

Le Dr Riad a montré beaucoup de compétence à établir la relation interne entre tous les manuscrits, qu'elle a mise en évidence par un stemma à la page 29. Par là, elle a pu établir une version plus personnelle du texte, plus longue et plus détaillée, représentée par le manuscrit A, et une plus courte, représentée par les autres manuscrits. Le ms A se trouve à *al-Azhar*, qu'elle a personnellement étudié sur place. Ce ms, auquel elle a fait subir quelques modifications sert de base à son édition. Par ce procédé, elle présente une image claire et expressive de l'œuvre d'Ibn Ḥazm. Le caractère alternatif des deux titres correspond aux principales preuves des deux versions, le ms A et le ms B. La seule réserve que l'on pourrait émettre sur le rapport de l'éditeur concernerait l'affirmation qui y ait faite que le copiste du ms B aurait collationné son manuscrit à partir du ms A (comparer le stemma et la p. 30). Les preuves pour cela sont trop minces et sujettes à discussion. Au contraire, les preuves qui vont à l'encontre de cette affirmation sont infiniment plus nombreuses et indiscutables. La relation entre le ms A et le ms B est complexe, ce qui d'ailleurs ressort de l'explication de l'auteur aux pp. 24 et 57. Si nous prenons un exemple, pourquoi le ms B n'a-t-il pas rectifié la leçon particulière à la p. 71. 6 dans le texte arabe, *waʿayḍan sūʿi ṣuḥḥin*, qui est une faute de copiste que tous les manuscrits comportent à l'exception du ms A, ce que d'ailleurs l'éditeur mentionne dans sa remarque.

Il est à remarquer que les éditions antérieures sont, comme il a été mentionné plus haut, extrêmement difficiles d'accès. L'éditeur n'a pu parvenir à consulter un couple d'entre elles. Cependant elles ont toutes été imprimées au vingtième siècle, et la dernière, très récente, date de 1978. Quant à la présentation de l'auteur des impressions antérieures, la notion d'édition est quelque peu flottante. Dans plusieurs cas, il est seulement question de copies et de publications récentes, qui ne sont établies à partir d'aucun des manuscrits qui existent. Ainsi l'auteur dit elle-même de l'édition qu'elle désigne par la lettre *k*: « Ce sont des extraits de l'édition de N. Tomiche. » Il est dit de *d* qu'elle « est une fidèle reproduction de l'édition première *a*. » *f*, qui est très incomplète, est également établie à partir de l'édition *a*, et à son tour, *g* est établie à partir de *f*. On pourrait apporter d'autres exemples où la limite est incertaine entre l'édition, dans son sens technique, et la réimpression. Il n'en demeure pas moins que le compte rendu de toutes les impressions antérieures et les relations entre elles, de même que les traductions existantes, est d'un grand intérêt et d'une grande valeur.

Les éditions faites par le passé qui sont établies à partir d'un ou de plusieurs manuscrits arabes sont celles désignées par les lettres *a*, *c*, *h*, et *i*. Il se peut que la mention, à la p. 12, des années d'impression de *c* induise le lecteur en erreur en lui faisant croire qu'elle a été imprimée trois fois. Les impressions datant de 1908 AD et de 1325 H sont cependant une seule et même impression. Il ressort donc assez clairement à la p. 16 que l'édition *c* n'a été imprimée que deux fois.

Les fautes d'impression de la transcription de mots arabes attirent plus l'attention que d'autres pour des raisons évidentes. On lit, en effet, à la p. 19 que, dans le ms B, le *sin* peut s'écrire comme *šād*, mais cela n'est pas applicable pour ce qui concerne la citation p. 51. On y cite l'œuvre d'Ibn Ḥazm, *Mulaxxaš* (imprimée à Dimašq en 1960) et on trouve là *wannāšixi walmansūxi* au lieu de *wannāšixi walmansūxi*. A p. 28, on trouve en deux endroits *ṭabīʿatun* au lieu de *ṭabīʿatu*. A p. 69 (Remarque sur le texte arabe p. 16 l. 11) on trouve *yaʿḍiraka* au lieu de *yaʿḍiraka*.

L'érudition de l'éditeur dans ce domaine lui a permis de mettre l'œuvre d'Ibn Ḥazm dans un contexte plus large, et avant tout d'établir la relation avec d'autres œuvres relevant du domaine de l'éthique, entre autres celle de Miskawayh ou encore les œuvres de la sagesse grecque et persane. On doit spécialement relever les excellents chapitres dans lesquels elle nous donne une présentation des vertus et des vices dans *Kitāb al'axlāq wassiyar* en comparaison avec l'œuvre de Miskawayh, et où elle replace l'œuvre d'Ibn Ḥazm dans la perspective zāhirite.

L'édition du texte arabe est faite à tout prendre avec précision et minutie, et donne un bon aperçu du sujet. Travailler sur cinq manuscrits qui de surcroît représentent deux versions différentes rend la tâche difficile. Nous nous contenterons de faire peu de remarques.

Les notes de la p. 61. 14–15 et de la p. 56 l. 13–14 (dans le texte arabe) montrent des omissions dues au saut du même au même. Conformément à l'usage – et conformément à la psychologie du copiste qui est la raison de telles omissions – j'aurais rendu compte de ces omissions avec, respectivement *ṭalaba ... waʿinnamā* et *yalbasu ... wamaratan*. L'éditeur a elle-même suivi ce principe admis par l'usage à d'autres endroits (ex. p. 4 l. 7–8, p. 10 l. 12, p. 51 l. 1–2, p. 56 l. 4 et l. 12).

Ce n'est que parce que j'ai eu accès aux manuscrits que je puis signaler que la note de la p. 7 l. 7 est superflue. Le ms A comporte lui-même en effet *ʿau*. Je puis également signaler qu'à la fin de la note de la p. 35 l. 16 *fšʿ* dans le ms D a été discrètement aboli. Le texte doit assurément être compris comme le début d'une dittographie, que le copiste a lui-même trouvée. Puisque dans le ms D la lettre *Fā* manque de point diacritique, cette faute de transcription est certainement l'origine de la leçon particulière *wašalli* du ms E. On aurait aussi peut-être pu remarquer que *mālika* a été ajouté plus tard dans le ms E. A la p. 67 l. 3, après *ʿuyūbuhu*, le ms B comporte une curieuse dittographie qui, de la même manière, a été discrètement abolie, et qui – logiquement peut-être – n'a pas été notée. Peut-être le ms B commet-il une dittographie également à la p. 19 l. 16 (dernier mot).

Peut-être devrait-on signaler, pour qui s'intéresse à l'orthographe, que le mot *falyatadārak* p. 67 l. 15, du ms B a été divisé en deux lignes. Il aurait peut-être été intéressant, orthographiquement parlant, de savoir que *hātayni* p. 21 l. 4 du ms A – qui est ici le seul manuscrit – s'écrit avec *alif*.

La note de la p. 88 l. 4 renvoie à *ʿallā*, que le ms B comporte (en réalité *ʿan lā*). Mais dans le texte, on trouve *ʿan* en conformité avec les autres mss. Peut-être l'éditeur a-t-elle dès le début été enclin à suivre la leçon du ms B, ce qui dans ce cas aurait été compréhensible. Ce passage du texte est en effet difficile à expliquer pour ne pas dire incompréhensible, surtout si l'on considère que tous les manuscrits comportent *min zulmika* au lieu de *lizulmika* à la l. 5. La correction de l'éditeur et sa proposition d'interprétation sont une solution de rechange.

On peut trouver un sujet d'irritation dans le fait que l'éditeur, dans son renvoi aux mots du texte qui commencent par *wa-*, laisse tomber ce *wa-* dans l'apparatus criticus, ex. p. 9 l. 6, p. 16 l. 4, p. 34 l. 7 (le ms E comporte lui aussi *wa-l-ḥazzi*), p. 56 l. 11 (note venant de la l. 6). La note p. 87 l. 7, ajoutée comme correction, *muṣtaḡalun*, renvoie à *muṣtaḡalatun* que les manuscrits comportent.

Dans l'édition du texte manque le renvoi aux différents folios des manuscrits. Les renvois de paragraphes dans la marge ne sont d'aucune aide pour trouver dans les mss. Afin de ne pas surcharger la marge de trop de signes, il aurait été pratique, selon moi, de renvoyer seulement aux folios du principal manuscrit A, mais, dans le chapitre sur la constitution du texte, de faire un tableau qui établisse une relation entre les folios des différents mss et les pages de l'édition du texte.

Je voudrais cependant insister sur le fait que ces annotations ne doivent pas porter ombrage à la bonne impression d'ensemble qui se dégage de ce travail. Le Dr Riad a accompli une éminente prestation. Il n'a pas été du tout facile de démêler ce fouillis de manuscrits, d'éditions, de versions et

de leçons. Le *Kitâb al-axlâq wa-s-siyar* se trouve désormais édité dans une bonne édition scientifique pourvue d'une excellente présentation française et de remarques critiques qui témoignent de la grande connaissance que l'auteur a de ses matériaux.

Lund

Gösta Vitestam

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<i>Peterson, Bengt</i> : Über Altertümer in Nubien	44
<i>Hummel, Siegbert</i> : Tut-ench-Amun auf dem Leoparden	65
<i>Hjärpe, Jan</i> : The Holy Year of the Harranians	68
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Das Muxtašar min Kitāb al' Axlāq des Galenos	84
<i>Johanson, Lars</i> : Das tschuwaschische Aoristthema	106
<i>Sjöberg, Åke W.</i> : Miscellaneous Sumerian Texts I	159
<i>Eimer, Helmut</i> : Die Gar log-Episode bei Padma dkar po und ihre Quellen	182
<i>Walldén, Ruth</i> : Contributions to the Study of the Pronunciation of <i>i</i> - and <i>e</i> -sounds in Tamil, especially before retroflex Consonants V	200
<i>Book Reviews</i>	210
<i>Works Received</i>	227

Vol. XXV–XXVI, 1976–1977

<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Demotische Ostraka: V Aria I	5
<i>Almblad, Karin</i> : On 'Emeq habbakha 20,9 sqq.	42
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Aramaica III. An Iranian Loanword in Daniel	45
<i>Grotzfeld, Heinz</i> : Der phonologische Status des tafxīm in diachronischer Sicht	56
<i>Lewin, Bernhard</i> : Le verbe arabe <i>a'taba</i>	68
<i>Löfgren, Oscar</i> : An Arabic Recension of the "Vitae Prophetarum"	77
<i>Johanson, Lars</i> : Die Ersetzung der türkischen <i>-t</i> -Kausativa	106
<i>Book Reviews</i>	134
<i>Works Received</i>	166

Vol. XXVII–XXVIII, 1978–1979

<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Demotische Quittungen über Salzsteuer	5
<i>Peterson, Bengt</i> : Ein kuschitischer Osiris	28
<i>Peterson, Bengt</i> : Ein Besucher in Tell el Amarna 1837	31
<i>Witakowski, Witold</i> : The Origins of the Jewish Colony at Elephantine	34
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Avicenna on Love	42
<i>Johanson, Lars</i> : Die westoghusische Labialharmonie	63
<i>Baitchura, Uzbek</i> : Word intonation in Udehe according to instrumental-phonetic data	108
<i>Nilsson, Birgitt</i> : Definiteness and Reference in Relation to the Turkish Accusative	118
<i>Colpe, Carsten</i> : Die griechische, die synkretische und die iranische Lehre von der kosmischen Mischung	132
<i>Gren-Eklund, Gunilla</i> : An <i>upaniṣad</i> of <i>sāman</i>	148
<i>Walldén, Ruth</i> : Hidden Indo-European and/or Indo-Aryan 'loanwords' in Old Tamil?	159
<i>Skræp, Poul</i> : Some characteristic features of Pūrṇasarasvatī's Meghadūta-commentary, Vidyulātā	176
<i>Book Reviews</i>	211
<i>Works Received</i>	223

Vol. XXIX, 1980

<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Demotische Quittungen über Ölsteuer	5
<i>Meinardus, Otto F. A.</i> : Eine koptische Darstellung des Sündenfalls	27
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Principia Linguistica Semitica	32
<i>Cardaillac, Louis</i> : Morisques et Chrétiens dans l'Espagne du XVI ^e siècle	103
<i>Palva, Heikki</i> : Characteristics of the Arabic Dialect of the Bani Šaxar Tribe	112
<i>Walldén, Ruth</i> : Hidden Indo-European and/or Indo-Aryan 'Loanwords' in Old Tamil	140
<i>Book Reviews</i>	157
<i>Works Received</i>	179

Contents

<i>Wångstedt, Sten V.</i> : Demotische Ostraka. Varia II	5
<i>Riad, Eva</i> : Šafā ^ʿ a dans le Coran	37
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : The Poem “Dayr ʿAbdūn” by Ibn alMuʿtazz	63
<i>Almblad, Karin</i> : hēlāk—“miserable”, and ḥīn—“strength” and “supplication”	133
<i>Eskhult, Mats</i> : Hebrew and Aramaic ʾāloqīm	137
<i>Gutwith, E.</i> : The ‘World Upside Down’ in Hebrew	141
<i>Kronholm, Tryggve</i> : The Vale of Tears	149
<i>Rundgren, Frithiof</i> : Aramaica IV	173
<i>Book Reviews</i>	185
<i>Works Received</i>	216