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CONTENTS

STEN V. WÅNGSTEDT

Demotische Quittungen über Ölsteuer

Auf demotisch abgefasste Bescheinigungen über Ölsteuer sind − wie aus der unten aufgestellten Übersicht hervorgeht − bisher nur in einer sehr beschränkten Umfassung veröffentlicht worden.

Von den im Folgenden publizierten Quittungen − im ganzen einundzwanzig − gehören neunzehn (Nr. I–XII, XIV–XX) zu der Ostrakonsammlung des British Museum London (DO BM), eine (Nr. XIII) zu der Stockholmer Sammlung und eine (NR. XXI) zu dem Ostrakonbestand der Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin.

Mit Ausnahme von Nr. XIV, welche in Abydos gefunden wurde, dürften die übrigen aus Theben herstammen, und alle datieren vom 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.

Der Steuertermin ist in der Mehrzahl der Quittungen ein Monat. In fünf Dokumenten ist die Steuer für ein Jahr, in einem für zwei Monate und in einem anderen für 33 Tage erlegt. In zwei Dokumenten fehlt die Zeitangabe.

Von den hier vorgelegten Bescheinigungen sind sieben von einem Schreiber namens Esmin (*Ns-Mn*) ausgefertigt. Noch acht von mir bekannte Ölsteuerquittungen, welche im Besitze des Metropolitan Museum sind, tragen die Unterschrift des Esmin. Der Name seines Vaters ist auch in diesen Dokumenten nicht angegeben. Alle sind frühptolemäisch, und datieren vom Jahr 36–38. In einem Dokument ist das Datierungsjahr beschädigt, weshalb es 31 oder 39 sein kann. M. E. kann es kaum ein Zweifel darüber obwalten, dass alle Esmin-Dokumente von demselben Depot herrühren.

Die Ölfabrikation was seit dem 27. Regierungsjahr des Ptolemaios II. Philadelphos ein Staatliches Monopol, und die Auslieferung von Öl zum Verkauf wurde von Königlichen Beamten bewerkstelligt.

In einigen Bescheinigungen ist die Steuer für *p3 nḥḥ* ,,das Öl'' (τὸ ἔλαιον) erlegt, in anderen für *swn nḥḥ* ,,Wert des Öles'' (τιμὴ ἐλαίου). Nach WILCKEN handelt es sich in den ersterwähnten Quittungen um Leute, welche das Öl einkaufte um es ihrerseits zu verkaufen. Sie waren m. a. W. Vermittler oder Zwischenhändler, während es sich in den letzteren Quittungen um Abnehmer der Zwischenhändler handelt (Griech. Ostraka I, S. 189).

Die Geldbeträge wurden an den Staatlichen Beamten zur Weiterbeförderung an die Königliche Bank abgeliefert, wo die Beträge quittiert wurden.

I. (DO BM 5741)

I. DO BM 5741. Grösse: 8,1×6,5 cm. Theben. Jahr 258/57 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ns-Mn s3 Pa-n3(?) ḳt 1/3 swn nḥḥ*
2. *⟨n⟩ ḥ3.t-sp 28 sḫ Ḥr(?) ibt-2 šm sw 9*

Übersetzung

1. Esmin, Sohn des Pana(?), 1/3 (Silber)-Kite; (der) Wert des Öles
2. (im) Jahr 28. Es hat geschrieben Hor(?) am 9. Payne.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Die Schreibung des zweiten Namens ist unklar, aber ich kann keine andere Entzifferung vorschlagen. Die Lesung *Pa-n3* ergibt sich auch aus der gemachten Ergänzung (ʕ ʕ). Vgl. die ähnliche aber deutlichere Schreibung in Nr. XIV/1. – Zu *swn nḥḥ* „Wert des Öles", als Bezeichnung des vom Staate festgesetzten Preises, welchen der Konsument dem Ölverkäufer zu zahlen hatte, vgl MATTHA, Demotic Ostraka, Nr. 106/1, Anm. und S. 52, (31).

   Z. 2. Jahr 28 dürfte Ptolemaios II. Philadelphos 28 (= Jahr 258/57 v. Chr.) sein. Das Datierungsjahr könnte auch „27" gelesen werden, aber der Schreibung der letzten Ziffer nach scheint mir jedennoch die Lesung „acht" am nächsten zu liegen.

II. (DO BM 19518)

II. DO BM 19518. Grösse: 9×5,3 cm. Theben (Karnak). Jahr 254/53 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *P₃-šr-Ḥnsw s₃ ... kt 1/3 1/12 swn nḥḥ n*
2. *ibt-3 pr sw 17 ⟨r⟩ ibt-4 pr sw 20 sḫ Ḥr(?)*
3. *n ḥ₃.t-sp 32 tpj šm ...*

Übersetzung

1. Pshenchons, Sohn des ... 1/3 1/12 (Silber)-Kite; (der) Wert des Öles
2. vom 17. Phamenoth (bis zum) 20 Pharmuthe. Es hat geschrieben Hor(?)
3. im Jahr 32, am ... Pachons.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1–2. Die Lesung des zweiten Namens ist mir nicht geglückt. Die zwei Zeichen vor dem Götterdeterminativ könnten *p₃ ḥrt* sein und die davorstehende Gruppe eine nachlässige Schreibung für *Ḥr*. Für den Namen *Ḥr-p₃-ḥrt*, Harpekhrat (griech. Ἁρποκράτης) kann ich − aus von mir bekannten demotischen Ostrakontexten − jedoch keinen Beleg vorbringen. Ausserdem scheint mir die Schreibung des ersten Namensbestandteils kaum die Lesung *Ḥr* zuzulassen. − Zu *swn nḥḥ* „Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem. − Die Lesung des Namens des Schreibers ist sehr unsicher (bgl. Nr. I/2). Der Schreibung des Namens nach liegt es näher *P₃-mm* zu lesen. Ich kann aber keinen Beleg für das Vorkommen dieses Namens beibringen. Dagegen sind mir drei Belege für den Namen *P₃-rmt-mm* („der Mann der Dumpalme") bekannt {THOMPSON, Theban Ostraca D 82/1, URSULA KAPLONY-HECKEL, Die demotischen Tempeleide, Nr. 1/3 und DO Uppsala

III. (DO BM 19338)

1307/1 [(ↄↄↄↄↄ) Haussteuer(?). Ptol. Unveröffentlicht.]}. Da diese Schreibung (ↄↄↄ) auch in Nr. I vorliegt, kann daus Auslassen des Zeichens Ⴐ *rmt* in dem Personennamen *P3-rmt-mm* kein Versehen seitens des Schreibers sein.

   Z. 3. Jahr 32 = Ptolemaios II, Philadelphos 32 (= Jahr 154/53 v. Chr.).

III. DO BM 19338. Grösse: 8,3×4,8 cm. Theben. Jahr 254/53 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *P3-šr-Thwtj s3 Hr-bk kt 1/4*
2. *n swn nhh sh Thwtj-ìr-rh=s*
3. *n h3.t-sp 32 ìbt-2 šm sw 9*

Übersetzung

1. Pshenthoth, Sohn des Harbek, 1/4 (Silber)-Kite,
2. als (den) Wert des Öles. Es hat geschrieben Thotharreches
3. im Jahr 32, am 9. Payne.

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. Zu *swn nhh* ,,Wert des Öles'' vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem. – Die Schreibung des Wortes *nhh* ,,Öl'' ist stark abgekürzt, so auch in Nr. VII/1[1]. – Der Schreiber *Thwtj-ìr-rh=s* erscheint in noch drei Steuerquittungen, Jahr 34, 36, und 37 datiert[2].

   Z. 3. Zur Datierung vgl. Nr. II/3, Bem.

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[1] Vgl. ferner DO Metropolitan Museum Cgx+22 (Datierung mangelt), Cgx+28 (Jahr 31), Cgx+13 (Jahr 36) [ⴋ,ⴋ,ⴋ]. Alle unveröffentlicht.

[2] DO Metropolitan Museum Cgx+31 (Salzsteuer), Cgx+19 (Saltzsteuer), Cgx+3 (Steuerart mangelt). Alle unveröffentlicht.

IV. (DO BM 5726)

IV. DO BM 5726. Grösse: 6,5×5,8 cm. Theben Jahr 252/51 (?) v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Imn-ḥtp mw·t =f . . . ḳt 1/4*
2. *swn nḥḥ ⟨n⟩ ibt-3 pr*
3. *sḫ Ns-Mn ⟨n⟩ ḥȝ.t-sp 34 (?)*
4. *ibt-3 šm sw 12*

Übersetzung

1. Amenhotep, seine Mutter (ist) . . ., 1/4 (Silber)-Kite;
2. (der) Wert des Öles (für) Phamenoth.
3. Es hat geschrieben Esmin (im) Jahr 34(?),
4. am 18. Epiphe.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Die Lesung des Namens der Frau ist mir nicht geglückt.

   Z. 2. Zu *swn nḥḥ* ,,Wert des Öles'' vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.

      Z. 3. Jahr 34(?) = Ptolemaios II, Philadelphos 34 (= Jahr 252/51 v. Chr.),

V. (DO BM 5713)

V. DO BM 5713. Grösse: 5,8×5,2 cm. Theben. Jahr 252/51 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ns-Mn sꜣ Pꜣ-tj-nfr-ḥtp ḳt 1/4*
2. *swn nḥḥ ⟨n⟩ tpj pr sḫ*
3. *Pꜣ-šr-Imn ⟨n⟩ ḥꜣ.t-sp 34*
4. *ỉbt-2 pr sw 10*

Übersetzung

1. Esmin, Sohn des Petenefhotep, 1/4 (Silber)-Kite;
2. (der) Wert des Öles (für) Tybe. Es hat geschrieben
3. Pshenamun (im) Jahr 34,
4. am 10. Mechir.

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. Zu *swn nḥḥ* ,,Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.
  Z. 3. Jahr 34 = Ptolemaios II, Philadelphos 34 (= Jahr 252/51 v. Chr.).

VI. DO BM 5754. Grösse: 6,7×5,7 cm. Theben. Jahr 251/50 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ns-Mn sꜣ [Pꜣ]-tj nfr-ḥtp(?)ḥt 1*
2. *swn nḥḥ ⟨n⟩ ỉbt-4 šm*
3. *sḫ Pꜣ-šr-Imn ⟨sꜣ⟩ (?) ...*
4. *⟨n⟩ ḥꜣ.t-sp 35 tpj pr sw 28*

VI. (DO BM 5754)

Übersetzung

1. Esmin, Sohn des [Pe]tenefhotep, 1 (Silber)-Kite;
2. (der) Wert des Öles (für) Mesore.
3. Es hat geschrieben Pshenamun, (Sohn) des ...;
4. (im) Jahr 35, am 28. Thoth.

Bemerkungen

Z.1. Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich hier um denselben Steuerzahler wie in Nr. V, und der nachfolgende Name ist Petenefhotep. Der Schreibung nach ist der Name *Pa-nfr-ḥtp* zu lesen, eine Konstruktion, welche m. E. wenig wahrscheinlich ist. Zweifelsohne liegt ein Verschreiben vor. – *ḥt* in der Bedeutung *ḥt-ḳt* „Silber-Kite". Zur Schreibung vgl. MATTHA, a. A., Nr. 110/1. Wahrscheinlich liegt eine übertriebene Hervorhebung des *ḳt*-Zeichens vor.

Z. 2. Zu *swn nḥḥ* „Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.

Z. 3. Ist der letzte Name vielleicht *Pꜣ-ḥrt.ṭ,* Pekhrat, zu lesen? Pshenamun erscheint in noch einer thebanischen Ölsteuerquittung und seine Unterschrift lautet ſ·ɪ·ɪʊɪʳɪ (ɪʲɪʌɪ . (DO Metropolitan Museum Cgx-20. Unveröffentlicht.).

Z. 4. Jahr 35 = Ptolemaios II, Philadelphos 35 (= Jahr 251/50 v. Chr.).

VII. (DO BM 20124)

VII. Do BM 20124. Grösse: 9×8 cm. Theben. Jahr 250/49 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Pȝ-šr-nȝ-ntr.w sȝ Pa-nfr ḳt 1/3 swn nḥḥ*
2. ⟨*n*⟩ *tpj šm sḫ Ns-Mn* ⟨*n*⟩ *ḥȝ.t-sp 36 tpj šm sw 26*

Übersetzung

1. Pshenenter, Sohn des Panufe, 1/3 (Silber)-Kite; (der) Wert des Öles
2. (für) Pachons. Es hat geschrieben Esmin (im) Jahr 36, am 26. Pachons.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Zu *swn nḥḥ* ,,Wert des Öles'' vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.
  Z. 2. Jahr 36 = Ptolemaios II. Philadelphos 36 (= Jahr 250/49 v. Chr.).

VIII. (DO BM 5690)

VIII. DO BM 5690. Grösse: 7×6,1 cm. Theben. Jahr 250/49 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ta-bꜣ ꜣ rmt.t* [*Ns-Mn ḳt 1/4(?)*]
2. *swn nḥḥ ⟨n⟩ ỉbt-4 šm sḫ*
3. Ns-Mn ⟨n⟩ḥꜣ.t-sp 36 ỉbt-4 šm sw 17

Übersetzung

1. Taba, die Frau des [Esmin 1/4(?) (Silber)-Kite];
2. (der) Wert des Öles (für) Mesore. Es hat geschrieben
3. Esmin (im) Jahr 36, am 17. Mesore.

Bemerkungen

Z. *1*. Der Name des Gatten der Taba geht aus Nr. X hervor. − Der erlegte Betrag ist wahrscheinlich 1/4 (Silber)-Kite.

Z. *2*. Zu *swn nḥḥ* ,,Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.

Z. *3*. Zur Datierung vgl. Nr. VII/2, Bem.

IX. (DO BM 25281)

IX. DO BM 25281. Grösse: 8,5×7,5 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert(?) v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ḥr-s3-Is s3 Imn-ḥtp ḳt 2 n* (sic) *p3 nḥḥ n ḥ3.t-sp 37*
2. *sḫP3-šr-Imn-ḥtp s3 Tḥwtj-stm*
3. *sḫ Ḥr s3 Pa-rṭ*

Übersetzung

1. Harsiese, Sohn des Amenhotep, 2 (Silber)-Kite für Öl im Jahr 37.
2. Es hat geschrieben Pshenamenhotep, Sohn des Thothsotem.
3. Es hat geschrieben Hor, Sohn des Paret.

Bemerkungen

Z. *1.* Die Präposition *f* „für" ist in Gestalt eines schrägen Striches. − Jahr 37 ist entweder Ptolemaios II, Philadelphos 37 (= Jahr 134/33 v. Chr.) oder Ptolemaios VIII. Euergetes II. 37 (= Jahr 249/48 v. Chr.). Im ersten Falle könnte vielleicht die abweichende Handschrift durch die Anwendung einer anderen Feder erklärt werden.

X. (DO BM 5696)

X. DO BM 5696. Grösse: 7×5,5 cm. Theben. Jahr 249/48 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ta-bꜣ tꜣ rmt.t Ns-Mn ḳt 1/4(?)*
2. *swn nḥḥ ⟨n⟩ ỉbt-3 šm*
3. *sẖ Ns-Mn ⟨n⟩ ḥꜣ.t-sp 37 ỉbt-4 šm sw 12*

Übersetzung

1. Taba, die Frau des Esmin, 1/4(?) (Silber)-Kite;
2. (der) Wert des Öles (für) Epiphe.
3. Es hat geschrieben Esmin (im) Jahr 37, am 12. Mesore.

Bemerkungen

Z. *1.* ḳt *1/4(?)* „1/4(?) (Silber)-Kite". Die Schreibung des Bruches ist sonderbar, aber die Lesung 1/4 scheint mir am nächsten zu liegen.

Z. *2.* Zu *swn nḥḥ* „Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem. — *ỉbt-3 šm*, Epiphe. Die Einzahlung bezieht sich auf einen bestimmten Monat. Diese ist im Mesore geleistet, weshalb der betreffende Monat nur Epiphe sein kann.

Z. *3.* Jahr 37 = Ptolemaios II. Philadephos 37 (= Jahr 249/48 v. Chr.).

XI. (DO BM 5698)

XII. (DO BM 5701)

XI. DO BM 5698. Grösse: 8,2×5,3 cm. Theben. Jahr 248/47 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ta-bꜣ ꜣ rmt.t Ns-Mn ḳt 1/3 swn nḥḥ ⟨n⟩*
2. *ibt-3 pr sẖ Ns-Mn n ḥꜣ.t-sp 38 ibt-3 pr ṣw 21* (supra lin.)

Übersetzung

1. Taba, die Frau des Esmin, 1/3 (Silber)-Kite; (der) Wert des Öles
2. (für) Phamenoth. Es hat geschrieben Esmin im Jahr 38, am 21. Phar-
muthe (supra lin.).

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Zu *swn nḥḥ* „Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.
   Z. 2. Jahr 38 = Ptolemaios II. Philadelphos 38 (= Jahr 248/47 v. Chr.).

XIII. (DO MME 1965: 18)

XIII. DO BM 5701. Grösse: 5,5×4,3 cm. Theben. Jahr 248/47 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ta-bȝ ȝ rmt.t Ns-Mn ḳt 1/4*
2. *swn nḥḥ ⟨n⟩ ỉbt-4 pr sḫ*
3. Ns-Mn ⟨n⟩ ḥȝ.t-sp 38 tpj šm sw 2

Übersetzung

1. Taba, die Frau des Esmin, 1/4 (Silber)-Kite;
2. (der) Wert des Öles (für) Pharmuthe. Es hat geschrieben
3. Esmin (im) Jahr 38, am 2. Pachons.

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. Zu *swn nḥḥ* ,,Wert des Öles'' vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.
   Z. 3. Zur Datierung vgl. Nr. XI/1, Bem.

XIII. DO MME 1965: 10. Grösse: 5,7×5,7 cm. Theben. Jahr 248/47 v. Chr.

Transkription

1. [. . . *Pa*]-*ḥj ḳt 1/4 swn nḥḥ*
2. [. . .]*sḫ Ns-Mn n ḥȝ.t-sp 38*
3. [. . .]

Übersetzung

1. [. . . Pa]chi 1/4 (Silber)-Kite; (der) Wert des Öles
2. [. . .] Es hat geschrieben Esmin im Jahr 38
3. [. . .]

XIV. (DO BM 66257)

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Zu *swn nḥḥ* ,,Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.
  Z. 2. Zur Datierung vgl. Nr. XI/2, Bem.

XIV. DO BM 66257.[3] Grösse: 8,5×5,4 cm. Abydos. 3. Jahrhundert(?) v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *ìn Pa-nꜣ sꜣ Pꜣ-ḥtr*
2. *tbꜥ 2 ⟨n⟩ pꜣ nḥḥ ⟨n⟩ ìbt-2 ꜣḥ sẖ Ns-pꜣ-bj(?)*
3. *⟨sꜣ⟩ Pꜣ-wr-5 ⟨n⟩ ḥꜣ.t-sp 1.t ìbt-2 ꜣḫ(?) sw 20*

Übersetzung

1. Es hat bezahlt Pana, Sohn des Phatre,
2. 2 Obolen (für) das Öl (für) Paophe. Es hat geschrieben Espebai,
3. (Sohn) des Puertiu, (im) Jahr 1, am 20. Paophe(?).

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[3] In der Kenotaph des Seti I. in Abydos gefunden. Früher veröffentlicht in Egypt. Expl. Soc., Mem. 39: 2, Pl. 93: 5.

XV. (DO BM 25287)

Bemerkungen

Z. 3. Auf welchen Ptolemäerkönig nach Ptolemaios II. Philadelphos sich das Datierungsjahr bezieht ist unmöglich mit Gewissheit festzustellen. – Statt *ỉbt-2 ꜣḥ*, Paophe, möglicherweise *ỉbt-3 ꜣḥ*, Athyr.

XV. DO BM 25287. Grösse: 6,8×6 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert(?) v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ḥr-sꜣ-Is sꜣ Imn-ḥtp ḳt 2.t*
2. *n pꜣ nḥḥ sḫ Pꜣ-šr-Ḥnsw*
3. *n ḥꜣ.t-sp 2 tpj ꜣḥ(?) sw 16(?)*

Übersetzung

1. Harsiese, Sohn des Amentoep, 2 (Silber)-Kite
2. für das Öl. Es hat geschrieben Pshenchons
3. im Jahr 2, am 16(?) Thoth(?).

Bemerkungen

Z. 3. Zur Datierung vgl. Nr. XIV/3, Bem. – *tpj ꜣḥ(?)*, Thoth(?). Eine sichere Bestimmung lässt sich schwerlich machen, aber die erhaltenen Zeichenreste deuten m. E. darauf hin, dass der betreffende Monat Thoth sein kann. – Statt ,,16" ist die Lesung ,,6" auch möglich.

XVI. (DO BM 5722)

XVI. DO BM 5722. Grösse: 8,5×5,3 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert(?) v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Tȝ-šr.t-Imn-ḥtp ḳt*(?) *1/2* ⟨*n*⟩ *pȝ nḥḥ*
2. ⟨*n*⟩ *ỉbt-3 pr*(?)*sḫ Pȝ-tj-Mnṭ*
3. ⟨*sȝ*⟩ *Ij-m-ḥtp* ⟨*n*⟩ *ḥȝ.t-sp 4 tpj šm sw 1*

Übersetzung

1. Tshenamenhotep 1/2 (Silber)-Kite(?) (für) das Öl
2. (für) Phamenoth(?). Es hat geschrieben Petemonth,
3. (Sohn) des Imhotep (im) Jahr 4, am 1. Pachons.

Bemerkungen

Z. 2. Das Zeichen ⌐ erscheint hier teils als Verbum (*sḫ* ,,schreiben''), teils als Namensbestandteil (*Pȝ-tj* in *Pȝ-tj-Mnṭ*).

Z. 3. Zur Datierung vgl. Nr. XIV/3, Bem. – Der senkrechte Strich in der Ziffer 4 kann auch *tpj* in *tpj šm* sein

XVII. (DO BM 26522)

XVII. DO BM 26522. Grösse: 8,7×6,8 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Tȝ-šr(.t)-Mn* ⟨*ḳt*⟩ *1/4 pȝ nḥḥ* ⟨*n*⟩ *ỉbt-4 šm(?) sḫ(?)*
2. *Pȝ-Ḥr(?) tpj ȝḥ(?) sw 6*

Übersetzung

1. Tshenmin 1/4 [(Silber)-Kite]; das Öl (für) Mesore(?). Es hat geschrieben
2. Pahor(?) am 6. Thoth(?).

Bemerkungen

Z. 1. Der die Monatsangabe abschliessende lange schräge Strich ist *sḫ* „schreiben"; ich kann keine andere Erklärung geben. – Statt *ỉbt-4 šm*, Mesore, ist die Lesung *ỉbt-4 pr*, Pharmuthe, möglich.

Z. 2. *Pȝ-Ḥr(?)*, Pahor(?). Diese Schreibung mit best. Art. als Präfix kommt ab und an vor [vgl. URSULA KAPLONY-HECKEL, Die demotischen Tempeleide, Nr. 201/2; DO Pisa 432/2 (SCO 19–20, S.361, Pl. I/2); OrSu 17, Nr. 21/2 und Nr. 28/3]. Was Die Lesung unsicher macht ist die Schreibung des Horus-Namens. – *tpj ȝḥ*, Thoth, oder *tpj šm*, Pachons, wenn der in Zeile 1 angegebene Monat *ỉbt-4 pr*, Pharmuthe, ist.

Das Auslassen der Zeitangabe sowie das Auslassen der Münzeinheit muss als Ungenauigkeit seitens des Schreibers betrachtet werden.

XVII. (DO BM 43584)

XVIII. DO BM 43584. Grösse: 9,7×8,8 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *in . . . ḫt-ḳt 1/2 swn nḥḥ ḥr*
2. *ibt-3 pr ibt-4 pr sḫ Pȝ-tj-Imn-nsw-tȝ.wj*
3. *sȝ Pa-tȝ.wj pȝ ḥrj(?)*

Übersetzung

1. Es hat bezahlt . . . 1/2 Silber-Kite; (der) Wert des Öles für
2. Pharmuthe (und) Phamenoth. Es hat geschrieben Petemestou, Sohn des Patou, des Obersten(?).

Bemerkungen

Z. *1.* Die Entzifferung des Namens ist mir nicht geglückt. − Zu *swn nḥḥ* „Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.

Z. *3.* *pȝ ḥrj* „der Oberst" oder „der Vornehme". Zur Schreibung des Wortes *ḥrj* vgl. ERICHSEN, Demot. Glossar, S. 324.

Das Dokument ist undatiert.

XIX. (DO BM 5689)

XIX. DO BM 5689. Grösse: 5,8×5,1 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Ta-b3 t3 rmt.t Ns-Mn*
2. *ḥnꜥ t3j=s šr.t ḳt 1 . . .*
3. . . .
4. *ibt-3 šm sw ꜥrḳj*

Übersetzung

1. Taba, die Frau des Esmin,
2. und ihre Tochter, 1 (Silber)-Kite . . .
3. . . .
4. am 30. Epiphe.

Bemerkung

Z. 2. Die Art der Steuer lässt sich wegen Beschädigung der Aufschrift nicht feststellen. Es ist aber wahrscheinlich, dass das Dokument zu der Sammlung von Ölsteuerquittungen gehört, welche der Schreiber Esmin ausgefertigt hat. Die Hand scheint darauf hinzudeuten. Dies ist übrigens das einzige Dokument, in welchem die Tochter der Taba erwähnt ist.

XX. (DO BM 5748)

XXI. (DO Berlin P 6263)

XX. DO BM 5748. Grösse: 6,1×5,7 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.

Transkription

1. Ḥrbs ⟨ḳt⟩ 1/4 swn
2. nḥḥ ⟨n⟩ ỉbt-2 pr
3. sẖ Ỉj-m-ḥtp ...

Übersetzung

1. Kherbes 1/4 (Silber)-Kite; (der) Wert
2. des Öles (für) Mechir.
3. Es hat geschrieben Imhotep ...

Bemerkung

Z. 1–2. Zu *swn nḥḥ* „Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem.

XXI. DO Berlin P 6263. Grösse: 6,5×4,7 cm. Theben. 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.

Transkription

1. *Tȝj-ꜥw tȝ rmt.t Tḥwtj-îw ḳt 1/2 n swn*
2. *nḥḥ sẖ Pȝ-šr-Mn n ḥȝ.t-sp 11*
3. *îbt-3 pr sw 22*

Übersetzung

1. Tiou, die Frau des Thetheu, 1/2 (Silber)-Kite als (den) Wert
2. des Öles. Es hat geschrieben Pshenmin im Jahr 11,
3. am 22. Phamenoth.

Bemerkungen

Z. 1–2. Zu *swn nḥḥ* „Wert des Öles" vgl. Nr. I/1, Bem. — Das Dokument ist im Jahr 11 ausgefertigt, und wenn die Steuerzahlerin mit der in DO Berlin P6253 (Quitting über Schleier(?)-Steuer. Jahr 254/53 v. Chr.[4] erwähnten Frau *Tȝj-ꜥw* (*rmt.t Tḥwtj-îw*) identisch ist, datiert die vorliegende Urkunde vom Jahr 11 des Ptolemaios III. Euergetes, d.i. vom Jahr 237/36 v. Chr.

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[4] MATTHA, Demotic Ostraka, Nr. 208.

	Steuerzahler[a]	Betrag[b]	Termin	Ort	Jahr
I	M	1/3 K	Jahr	Theben	28
II	M	1/3 1/12 K	33 Tage	,,	32
III	M	1/4 K	Jahr	,,	32
IV	M	1/4 K	1 Monat	,,	34(?)
V	M	1/4 K	,,	,,	34
VI	M	1 K	,,	,,	35
VII	M	1/3 K	,,	,,	36
VIII	F	1/4(?) K	,,	,,	36
IX	M	2 K	Jahr	,,	37
X	F	1/4(?) K	1 Monat	,,	37
XI	F	1/3 K	,,	,,	38
XII	F	1/4 K	,,	,,	38
XIII	?	1/4 K	–	,,	38
XIV	M	2 Ob	1 Monat	Abydos	1

	XV	M	2 K	Jahr	Theben	2
	XVI	F	1/2 K(?)	1 Monat	,,	4
	XVII	F	1/4 (K)	,,	,,	−
	XVIII	⸢m⸣ꜣs	1/2 K	2 Monate	,,	−
	XIX	F+T	1 K	−	,,	−
	XX	M	1/4 (K)	1 Monat	,,	−
	XXI	F	1/2 K	Jahr	,,	11
MDO[c]	106	M	1 1/2 Ob	1 Monat	Theben(?)	−
,,	107	M+F	1/4 K	,,	Elephantine(?)	−
,,	108	M	1/3 K	,,	,,	16
,,	109	M	1/4(?) K	,,	Theben	39
,,	110	M	30 1/4 K(?)	Jahr(?)	Elephantine	5
DOL[d]	7905	M	1/3 K	Jahr(?)	−	−
,,	7264	M	2 K	Jahr	−	4
,,	8108	M	1 K	Jahr(?)	−	12
,,	Bil. ohne Nr.	M	1/4 K	1 Monat	−	30
,,	,,	M	1/4 K	,,	−	30

[a] M (Mann). F (Frau). T (Tochter)

[b] K (Silberkite). Ob (Obol).

[c] MATTHA, Demotic Ostraka.

[d] REVILLOUT, Mélanges etc., S. 202 (DO Louvre).

OTTO F. A. MEINARDUS

Eine koptische Darstellung des Sündenfalls

Das in diesem Aufsatz zu beschreibende polychrome Fresko des Sünden-
falls befindet sich im Koptischen Museum zu Alt-Kairo, im Erdgeschoß an
der Westwand des Saales IX, und trägt die Inventarnummer 3962 und die
Seriennummer 83. Das Fresko, das eine Größe von 2,19×1,72 m hat, wurde
bei den Ausgrabungen der italienischen Archäologen unter der Leitung von
Gilbert Bagnani in ʿUmm al-Bereget bei Tebtynis, am Südrand der Fajum
Oase, gesichert[1]. Eine kurze Beschreibung des Freskos wird in dem Führer
zum Koptischen Museum von MARKUS H. SIMAIKA PASCHA gegeben:
,,Fresco representing Adam and Eve before and after the Original Sin. To
the right, they are seen naked before partaking of the forbidden fruit which
they still hold in their hands. To the left, driven out of Paradise, they are
dressed in fig-leaves and Adam, judging by the movement which he is mak-
ing with his right hand, seems to be reproaching Eve for being the cause of
their misfortune"[2]. Sowohl SIMAIKA PASCHA als auch RAOUF HABIB haben
die Entstehungszeit dieses Freskos in das 11. Jahrhundert gelegt[3].

Bildliche Darstellungen des Sündenfalls sind in der koptischen Kunst
nicht unbekannt. So sind z.B. Adam and Eva mit der Schlange in der
Kuppel der Kapelle des Friedens in der Nekropole der Oase al-Bagawat dar-
gestellt, eine mit Eleganz und Harmonie ausgeführte Malerei aus dem 4.
Jahrhundert, die sich auf hellenistische oder frühbyzantinische Vorbilder
stützt[4]. Dasselbe Thema erscheint in der Kuppelmalerei in der Exodus-
Kapelle von al-Bagawat, die in den gleichen Zeitraum anzusetzen ist,
obwohl der Malstil einer völlig anderen Richtung angehört. Die Gestalten
sind teilweise mißgebildet, unkörperhaft und flächenhaft, ihr Ausdruck
einfach, primitiv und naiv[5].

Für die folgenden Jahrhunderte haben wir in Ägypten keinen Beweis einer
künstlerischen Darstellung des Sündenfalls. Die mönchische Kunst, die die
Kirchen und Kapellen der Wüstenklöster schmückte, wird es auch bewußt
vermieden haben, Darstellungen von nackten Gestalten zu verwenden,

[1] BAGNANI, G., ,,Gli scavi di Tebtunis", Bollettino d'arte, XXVII, 1933, 119–139.
[2] SIMAIKA PASHA, M. H., A Brief Guide to the Coptic Museum and the Principal Ancient
Coptic Churches of Cairo. Cairo, 1938, 46–47, Tafel LVI.
[3] HABIB, RAOUF, The Coptic Museum. A General Guide. Cairo, 1967, 40, Tafel XXVII.
[4] DU BOURGUET, Die Kopten. Baden-Baden, 1967, 98, Tafel 89.
[5] WESSEL, KLAUS, Koptische Kunst. Die Spätantike in Ägypten. Recklinghausen, 1963, 174,
Tafel VI b.

denn jegliche Form der körperlichen Entblößung wurde als ein krasser Widerspruch zum asketischen Lebensstil empfunden. Die hellenisch-römische Freiheit bezüglich des nackten Körpers, wie wir sie z. B. noch in dem christlichen Kalksteinrelief der mit dem Kreuz geschmückten Sirenen[6] oder in dem Kalksteinrelief der zwei nackten Engel, die ein Kreuz in einem Kranz stützen[7], erkennen, wurde aufgrund der asketischen Frömmigkeitsvorstellungen schon spätestens im 6. Jahrhundert aus der christlichen Kunst im Niltal verbannt. Um so bemerkenswerter ist das im Fajum freigelegte Fresko des Sündenfalls, das ganz eindeutig die sexuelle Komponente des biblischen Ereignisses wiedergibt, in sofern als die körperlichen Merkmale vor und nach dem Fall entsprechend vertuscht oder dargestellt worden sind.

Zur Beschreibung des Freskos

Das Fresko zeigt das erste Menschenpaar, links nach dem Sündenfall, rechts vor dem Sündenfall, und in der unteren rechten Ecke ein reiterloses, gezäumtes und gesatteltes Pferd. Über dem Fresko ist ein zum Teil zerstörter, schwer lesbarer vierzeiliger koptischer Text zu erkennen:

,,Über das Gesagte ... sie aßen es ... Adam hörte der Schlange zu, er aß es, und so auch Eva ... Gott (sandte) sie aus dem Paradies ... sie aßen ... Paradies, Adam und Eva ..."[8]

Auffallend an diesem Text ist die Rolle, die Adam spielt. Im Genesis-Bericht des Jahwisten sprach die Schlange zum Weibe (Gen. 3,1,4). Der Apostel Paulus dagegen macht Adam für die Übertretung verantwortlich (Röm. 5,12–14), denn ,,gleichwie sie in Adam alle sterben, so werden sie in Christus alle lebendig gemacht werden" (1. Kor. 15, 22). Der Autor des 1. Timotheusbriefes bezieht sich wiederum auf die Schuld des Weibes, ,,Adam ward nicht verführt, das Weib aber ward verführt und ist der Übertretung verfallen" (1. Tim. 2,14). In dem zitierten koptischen Text werden bewußt die Rollen bezüglich der Übertretung vertauscht. Adam, und nicht das Weib, hört die Schlange; Adam aß von der Frucht, bevor das Weib (Eva) die Frucht erhielt. Es ist eindeutig Adam, der das Weib zur Sünde, zum Ungehorsam, anleitet. Wird hier etwa das paulinische Bild von der Verantwortung des Sündenfalls in den Genesis-Bericht eingegliedert? Oder haben sich in dieser Darstellung gewisse koptisch-gnostische Glaubenselemente aus dem 4. oder 5. Jahrhundert erhalten, wie wir sie z. B. in den Versionen des *Apokryphon des Johannes*, im Zweiten Kodex, finden, wo es

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[6] WESSEL, K., op. cit., 50, Tafel 44.

[7] EFFENBERGER, ARNE, Koptische Kunst. Ägypten in spätantiker, byzantinischer und frühislamischer Zeit. Leipzig, 1975, Bild 25.

[8] Für die Entzifferung des koptischen Textes bin ich Frau Dr. Leslie MacCoull der Société d'Archéologie Copte in Kairo zu Dank verpflichtet.

heißt: ,,Herr, war es nicht die Schlange, die Adam zu essen lehrte? Der Heiland lächelte und sprach: 'Die Schlange lehrte sie zu essen aus einer Zeugungsbegierde, Schlechtigkeit, des Verderbens' . . .''[9] Eine endgültige Antwort auf diese Frage kann zur Zeit noch nicht gegeben werden.

Die vier Gestalten, Adam und Eva vor und nach dem Sündenfall, sind frontal gemalt. Sie befinden sich in einem Garten mit üppiger Vegetation. Die fünf baumartigen Pflanzen mit den runden Früchten ähneln den ägyptischen Sykamoren, die Pflanze ganz rechts ist eine Papyrusstaude, das Emblem Unterägyptens. Zur Rechten stehen Eva (links) und Adam (rechts), der Letztere leicht der Eva zugewandt. Die primären Geschlechtsmerkmale fehlen bei beiden Personen, und Mann und Weib sind lediglich durch das lange Kopfhaar bei Eva und den Bartwuchs und den Schnurrbart bei Adam gekennzeichnet. Der Gesichtsausdruck des Weibes läßt eine gewisse Unschuld erkennen. Dem koptischen Text entsprechend ißt Adam von der Frucht, die er mit seiner rechten Hand zum Mund führt. Mit seiner linken Hand umfaßt er eine weitere Frucht. Seine dunklen Augen sind auf das Weib gerichtet, die ebenfalls in beiden Händen eine Frucht hält.

Zur Linken sind Adam und Eva nach dem Sündenfall dargestellt, nachdem ,,ihnen beiden die Augen aufgetan, und sie gewahr wurden, daß sie nackt waren, und zusammen Feigenblätter flochten und sich Schurze machten'' (Gen. 3,7). Wiederum steht Eva links von Adam, der mit Zeige-

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[9] KRAUSE, M., LABIB, P., Die drei Versionen des Apokryphon des Johannes im koptischen Museum zu Alt-Kairo. Wiesbaden, 1961, 169.

und Mittelfinger seiner rechten Hand auf Eva weist, und sie dadurch des Ungehorsams beschuldigt. Mit seiner linken Hand hält er ein sechsblätteriges Feigenblatt, um seine Scham zu verbergen. Eva hält ihren linken Arm erhoben, als weise sie die Anschuldigung Adams zurück. Mit ihrer rechten Hand hält sie ein großes sechsblätteriges Feigenblatt, mit dem sie ihre Scham verbirgt. Ihre kleinen hängenden Brüste zeigen die anatomische Veränderung des Weibes nach dem Sündenfall. Die weit offenen Augen Adams und Evas entsprechen dem biblischen Bericht, in dem es heißt: ,,Da wurden ihnen beiden die Augen aufgetan".

Unverständlicherweise erscheint in der oberen linken Ecke, links neben dem Weib *nach* dem Sündenfall, eine Schlange mit offenem Maul, die wir im Zusammenhang mit dem Menschenpaar *vor* dem Sündenfall erwarten sollten. Hat hier der Maler sich die künstlerische Freiheit genommen, um eine stilistische Balance zu dem reiterlosen Pferd in der unteren rechten Ecke des Freskos zu bewirken?

In der unteren rechten Ecke des Freskos steht ein kleines gesatteltes Pferd mit Zaumzeug und Zügel, jedoch ohne Reiter. Die Zügel sind über den Ast einer Papyrusstaude gehängt. Das gesattelte reiterlose Pferd wirft Fragen nach dem Reiter auf. Die Vorderbeine des Pferdes sind verdeckt durch zwei schwer erkennbare Klostertürme, einen größeren Turm mit einem Fenster und mit Zinnen, und einen kleineren Turm. Vor dem größeren Turm steht eine durch schwache Linien erkennbare Person, die nach rechts blickt und beide Arme ausgebreitet hält. Obwohl die Linienführung dieser miniatürlichen Darstellung wesentlich feiner ist als bei den Hauptfiguren, gehört das reiterlose Pferd wohl zu der ursprünglichen Malerei. Eine auffallend ähnliche Darstellung eines Pferdes ist uns in einer Miniatur der hll. Theodor und Merkurius in einem bohairischen Manuskript vom 11. Jahrhundert überliefert[10].

Darstellungen von Pferden sind in der koptischen Großplastik[11], Malerei[12] und Textilkunst[13] nicht unbekannt, obwohl wir eher Esel und Kamele als Reittiere erwarten sollten. Das Sandsteinrelief des reitenden, falkenköpfigen Horus, der in kaiserlicher Feldherrntracht mit seiner Lanze ein Kroko-

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[10] CRAMER, MARIA, Koptische Buchmalerei. Illuminationen in Manuskripten des christlich-koptischen Ägypten vom 4.–19. Jahrhundert. Recklinghausen, 1964, 74, Nr. 81. 82.

[11] z.B. die Friesplatte mit dem heiligen Reiter aus Akhmîm (Panopolis) aus dem 7. Jahrhundert. Koptisches Museum, Inventarnummer 8011.

[12] Siehe die Vielzahl der Ikonen und Wandmalereien von Reiterheiligen, dazu, MEINARDUS, O., ,,The Wall-Paintings of the Church of St. Antony in the Eastern Desert: The Martyria of Saints", Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies (Leiden), 1972, 311–343.

[13] Der Recklinghäuser Reiter, Fragment eines Wandbehanges, Wollwirkerei auf Leinen. WESSEL, K., op. cit., 215. Armelfragment einer Tunika mit Reitern aus dem 9. Jahrhundert. EFFENBERGER, A., op. cit., 186.

dil tötet, veranschaulicht den Kampf des Guten gegen das Böse. Horus ist hier der Rächer seines Vaters Osiris, der von Seth, dem im Krokodil verkörperten Bösen, getötet worden war[14]. Das ägyptische Christentum übernahm interessanterweise den göttlichen Reiter. Das Kalksteinrelief des Berliner ,,reitenden Christus" aus dem Weißen Kloster, Dair al-Abiad, bei Sohág in Oberägypten zeigt den Heiland auf einem Pferd bzw. Maulesel von zwei Engeln geleitet, im Damensitz, seine Rechte zum Segen erhoben[15]. Zu diesem Motiv gehört ein schöner Elfenbeinkamm aus Dair Abû Hinnis aus dem 6. Jahrhundert mit einem reitenden Christus in einem Siegeskranz, der von zwei Engeln gehalten wird[16]. Der auf einem Pferde reitende Christus bleibt für mehrere Jahrhunderte in der Vorstellung der Kopten, wie wir es in einer Miniatur des ,,Einzug Christi in Jerusalem" aus dem 12. Jahrhundert sehen[17].

Sollten wir in dem reiterlosen Pferd vielleicht eine Anspielung auf Gott oder auf den Engel Gottes sehen, der auf einem Pferde reitend sich dem Paradies näherte, und, ,,als der Tag kühl geworden war, in den Garten ging . . . und Adam rief und sprach 'Wo bist du'?" (Gen. 3,8,9)? Wir haben gezeigt, daß dem christlichen Ägypten das Bild des göttlichen Reiters wohl vertraut war. Warum sollte durch das reiterlose, gesattelte Pferd nicht der durch das Paradies schreitende, bildlose Schöpfergott dargestellt werden? Da in der koptischen Kunst zu dieser Zeit aber der Schöpfergott, die erste Person der Heiligen Dreifaltigkeit, nicht gemalt wurde, ergab sich keine andere Möglichkeit, Gott bzw. den Engel Gottes darzustellen, als dem Beschauer durch das reiterlose, gesattelte Pferd Seine Gegenwart zu vermitteln.

Es verbleibt die Erläuterung der kleinen Türme, die die Vorderbeine des Pferdes verdecken. Von der Architektur her, erinnern diese Gebäude an die Wehrtürme der koptischen Wüstenklöster im Wâdî 'n-Natrún. Die kleine Person vor dem Turm ist möglicherweise entweder der Stifter oder der Maler des Freskos, der in diesem Falle ein koptischer Mönch wäre. Die Darstellung der kleinen Wehrtürme unter dem Pferd erinnert an die Wandmalereien aus dem 13. Jahrhundert in der Klosterkirche des hl. Antonius im Dair Anbâ Antûnîûs am Roten Meer, wo kleine Modelle der Märtyrerkirchen der Reiterheiligen unter den Pferden zu erkennen sind.[18]

Die rechte obere Ecke des Freskos ist bedauerlicherweise zerstört, denn es wäre interessant zu wissen, wie der Maler diesen Freiraum gestaltet hat.

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[14] Aus Antinoë (Schech Abada), 5. Jahrhundert, Paris, Musée du Louvre, Collections Coptes, Inventarnummer E 77.

[15] WESSEL, K., op. cit., 21, Tafel 15.

[16] Koptisches Museum, Alt-Kairo, Inventarnummer 3655. STRZYGOWSKI, J., Bulletin de la Soc. Arch. d'Alexandrie, V, 1902, 23.

[17] Berlin, Frühchristlich-byzantinische Sammlung, Inventarnummer 11295.

[18] MEINARDUS, O., loc. cit.

FRITHIOF RUNDGREN

Principia Linguistica Semitica

On taking up my studies in the field of Semitic linguistics again after some years of administrative work, it strikes me, in retrospect, that my previous contributions to the study of the Semitic languages show, in their more important manifestations, an intrinsic, organic coherence. Like so many Semiticians before me, I was early fascinated by the mysteries of the Semitic verb. Comprehensive studies in this difficult field resulted by and by in my work entitled "Intensiv und Aspektkorrelation" (1959), in which I not only drew the outlines of a generally applicable theory of aspect but also touched upon the origin of the aspectual category, as such, in man's conception of certain fundamental phenomena of nature.[1] This work, I think, had a certain effect. As a matter of fact, a good many aspectual studies have had their starting-point in this book, in which the relevant literature on the subject was gathered together and more or less exhaustively discussed. In 1961, I published the first monograph on the category of aspect,[2] and this also came to exercise a great influence on aspectual research in general, as did my dissertation on the renewal of aspectual systems.[3]

These studies of aspect led me deeper and deeper into the structure of Semitic. It became clear to me that what in Indo-European are called diatheses or *genera verbi* correspond in Semitic in the first place to the primary, aspectual stem-forms (cf. pp. 88, 92) *qatal, qatil* and *qatul,* implying a rigorous grammaticalization of "natural" modes of action, as well as their subsumption in two main categories, the stative and the fiens, to borrow

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[1] It should be pointed out that B. JOHNSON does not give a correct picture of the state of the art in his book "Hebräisches Perfekt und Imperfekt mit vorangehendem *wᵉ*" (1979), p. 11.

[2] Das althebräische Verbum. Abriss der Aspektlehre, cf. D. W. THOMAS, The Society for Old Testament Study, Book List (1963), p. 73.

[3] Erneuerung des Verbalaspekts im Semitischen (1963), cf. W. FISCHER, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. X/1965, p. 95 (especially the "nichts" of the conclusion); cf. Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris, 74:2/1979, pp. 62 ff.

terms advanced long ago by FRIEDRICH BÖTTCHER.[4] It appears very probable that, from a certain stage of its development, Semitic in these categories copied, so to speak, certain phenomena to be observed in the natural environment of man (cf. p. 34). Later on, these insights were to lead me to the genetically orientated theory of the linguistic sign or morpheme, developed in my paper "Integrated Morphemics. A Short Outline of a Theory of Morphemics" (1976).[5] In the present study, I shall look upon the origin of this type of sign as a result of processes of incorporation around a primeval, structural nucleus, roughly corresponding to what the ancients called ἡ πρώτη θέσις,[6] or, as I call it, "the naming situation" (pp. 70f.). I would like this structural nucleus to be understood in the light of the lucid exposition given by JEAN PIAGET in Théories du langage, théories de l'apprentissage (ed. M. PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, 1979, pp. 53 ff.).[7]

As we know, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, the greatest scholar in general linguistics, said: "dans la langue il n'y a que des différences" (Cours de linguistique générale, 1949, p. 166). This statement is, in its context, still valid. On the whole, DE SAUSSURE has, over the years, become greater and greater. This will become clearer in the future, as the "re-writing business" of certain famous structuralists is unmasked, despite its often seducing verbal disguises. Language symbolizes in principle by means of differences, e.g. of the type *qatal/qatil/qatul*, that is, here by *a/i/u/*. Now the doctrine of aspect permits us also to see what it was that was symbolized by this gradual opposition, representing different degrees of the stativic category, namely *qatil* = accidental stative and *qatul* = permanent stative, while *qatal* indicated fientic stative, which, in the main, is the same as a *participium activi*, in the sense of something that participates in the *genus activum*, which may be transitive or intransitive (IA, p. 101). Moreover, in the light of this primeval scheme, it was easy to understand why precisely the type *yaqtul* combined with *qatal* to yield, in certain verbs, the aspectual opposition stative/fiens. But the nature of this scheme allowed us also to understand the occasionally occurring factitive-causative function of *qatal*. In this stem-form, "actionality" was grammaticalized and when this *qatal* was opposed to the type *qatil*, the factitive-causative function arose within the scope of an integrated opposition transitive/intransitive, a phenomenon which in Akkadian has its easily understandable counterpart in the type

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[4] Ausführliches Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache. Ed. F. MÜHLAU I (1866), II (1868), *passim*.

[5] A copy of this paper was available in the library of the M.I.T. in December 1976; cf. Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris, 72: 2/1977, p. 416.

[6] Cf., e.g., Porphyrii in Aristotelis Categorias, ed. A. BUSSE (1887), p. 58, 1–2.

[7] Cf. also PIAGET, The Principles of Genetic Epistemology, 1977, pp. 1, 6, 9, 10, 56, 65.

damiq/udammiq. This rather subtle mechanism was touched upon in OS 12/1964, pp. 99 ff., and in "Die Sprache" 12: 2/1966, pp. 133 ff.

With reference to § 10 of IM, I would like to add the following remarks. If we consider the opposition *qatal/qatil, qatul* as a specific Semitic "découpage" performed upon the phenomena of "motion" and "rest", as perceived in the natural world surrounding man, we may vaguely sense the great intellectual achievement in the evolution of man that lies behind mappings of this kind. Perceived absolutely and in themselves "rest" and "motion" appear as phenomena fundamentally different from each other. An important step in the intellectual development is taken when actual occurrences of the co-existence of these phenomena are interpreted as involving a relationship of some kind (cf. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénoménologie de la perception, 1976, pp. 114 ff.). If both phenomena were observed in the same object, they could by and by be understood as two states of the object, the difference being interpreted as meaning something (cf. J. MEPHAM, The Structuralist Sciences and Philosophy, in Structuralism: An Introduction, ed. D. ROBEY, 1979, p. 116). "Meaning" based on the relation of difference being also the main semantic principle of language, one may perhaps say that this principle "copies", in patterned sound-material, man's thinking about the world as he perceives it. Translated into a sign system of radicals (technemic, lexemic, phrasemic and textual radicals), the perceived world obtains in the oppositions between such radicals (cf. below) the counterpart of natural difference. Of course, we could then say that *-a-a-* has the value which *-a-i-* and *-a-u-* do not have and vice versa. "Mais dire que tout est négatif dans la langue, cela n'est vrai que du signifié et du signifiant pris séparément: dès que l'on considère le signe dans sa totalité, on se trouve en présence d'une chose positive dans son ordre" (Cours, p. 166; cf., however, J. CULLER, Jacques Derrida, Structuralism and Since, ed. J. STURROCK, 1979, p. 166). Consequently, we could say that *qatal* had the value it had (e.g. transitivity) because *qatil, qatul* had the value or values they had (e.g. intransitivity) and vice versa, the concept of opposition being then also logically transformed in some way: dans la langue il n'y a que des transformes.

Moreover, the study of grammaticalized modes of action and of diatheses led quite logically to the insight that what had hitherto been designated as "apophony" was actually to be regarded as apothematism, so that the verb has, from a certain stage of the linguistic development, been, in principle, aspectually inflected by the alternation of stem-forms. In other words, there was no fundamental difference between, e.g. Arabic *qatala/ yaqtulu* and *kitābun/kutubun* (cf. OS 13/1965, pp. 48 ff.). The great importance of Semitic apothematism also for the appreciation of the apophony of Indo-European was elucidated in OS 14–5/1966, p. 65 and p. 67, in Studia

Classica et Orientalia Antonio Pagliaro oblata I/1969, pp. 177 ff., and in
"Integrated Morphemics", p. 9. The great gain from the discovery of the
predominantly apothematic nature of the "apophony" lies in the fact that
it also discloses, indirectly, the reason why, for instance, a form like *kutub-*
serves as a plural of *kitāb-*, *dūr-* as a plural of *dār-*, *xurūǧ-* as an infinitive
of *xaraǧa*, etc., and also the reason why precisely *yaqtulu* can serve as a
cursive aspect of *qatala*. On the other hand, phenomena of this kind seem
to confirm the old opinion concerning the stem-form *qatul* as a form ex-
pressing more or less permanent qualities (OS 21/1973, pp. 66 ff.).

Thus, the doctrine of aspect, together with the doctrine of the mainly
apothematic character of apophony, gives us new insights into the nature of
the internal inflection, as expressed by the vocalism. Linguists have long
spoken of this internal inflection, mostly without being able to indicate what
it was that was expressed by this kind of inflection. Let me therefore
quote the formula by which DE SAUSSURE tries to illustrate the relation
between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions of language (Cours,
p. 180):

$$a\,n\,m\,a$$
$$v$$
$$d$$

Now, in a unit like *qatal*, one consonantal and one vocalic syntagm, i.e.
q-t-l and *-a-a-*, are integrated in one single stem-form (p. 88), thus con-
stituting, together with *qatil* and *qatul*, the following pattern:

$$q\text{-}a\text{-}t\text{-}a\text{-}l$$
$$\text{-}i\text{-}$$
$$\text{-}u\text{-}$$

From this paradigm of the ideomorpheme (pp. 37, 87) *qtl*, which *per se* here
shows "linear" inflection (*q-t-l*) within the scope of its own field of identi-
fication (p. 57), it appears that the inflection *-a-a-* is characterized by a
repetition of the element *a* in the syntagmatic dimension, a repetition
which could historically be interpreted as *qatl* > *qatal*, that is, action as an
adjective (IA, p. 101), this value being a result of the opposition to *qatil*,
qatul. Since language symbolizes by difference in opposition, it seems
reasonable to juxtapose the opposition *-a-* (*qatl*)/*-a-a-* with that of *-t-*/*-t:-*
in *qatala*/*qattala*, the vocalic quality of the radical a_2 (pp. 59 ff.) then symbo-
lizing, in contrast to *-i-*, *-u-*, the diathesis (actionality) and the distribution
symbolizing the stativic category as such (cf. language as "a moving equili-
brium" in MERLEAU-PONTY, On the Phenomenology of Language; Pheno-
menology, Language and Sociology. Selected Essays of M. MERLEAU-
PONTY, ed. J. O'NEILL, 1974, p. 84). The repetition *-a-a-* can thus be said

to have been a morphological expression of "intensity", and it is this dia-
thetic intensity that is renewed in the type *qattala*, which then, by analogy
with the opposition *qatal/qatil*, could also, in opposition to *qatala*, be felt
to be a "double transitive", an opposition in which the marked term can
be realized as a causative (cf. OS 16/1968, pp. 108 ff.; Actes du premier
congrès international de linguistique sémitique et chamito-sémitique, 1974,
pp. 197 ff.). In virtue of its clear, transparent structure, which permits us
sometimes to observe positively some of the main principles of language,
the Semitic language type may be said to be to general linguistics what the
fruit fly is or was to genetics or the crystals to physics. For in Semitic the
macrostructure of a phenomenon is sometimes quite directly a reflection
of the underlying microstructure.

However, I would like to quote a statement made by the Semitician
E. ULLENDORFF on a serious occasion.[8] Mr ULLENDORFF wanted, at the
time, to explain the meaning of "language", the meaning of this term being
according to him "a system of communication by sound operating among
members of a given community, by which human experience is analysed
and segmented into units which possess phonic expression and semantic
content. These vocal symbols have, of course, wholly arbitrary con-
ventional meanings." Can there really be any objection to such a clear
statement? For my part, I think that most scholars would agree with Mr
ULLENDORFF here. However, this statement may also, in its banality, seem
to be next to meaningless. But it is not. Being often repeated, such state-
ments are, mainly on account of their "one-dimensionalness", rather mis-
leading and this in a very serious way.

As is the case with many other important phenomena, the question of
language is in the last resort a question of chance and organization.
To begin with, what are "wholly arbitrary conventional meanings"? As it
stands, this expression may almost convey the impression that "arbitrary"
and "conventional" are synonyms. However, in the realm of linguistic
convention, nothing is arbitrary: everything is not only necessary but also
"natural" (p. 66). Moreover, language is not "a system of communication
by sound" but a system of signs, the phonic material being of no relevance
in this specific connection. And, language being a highly complex system
of hierarchically ordered levels, what sense can there be in stating that the
vocal symbols have meanings? As a matter of fact, the level-bound linguistic
signs have in themselves "meanings" quite apart from the "meaning"
intended by this definition, which is, of course, quoted here only *instar
omnium*, as representing an unfortunately very widespread opinion or for-

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[8] Presidential address delivered to the Society for Old Testament Study, meeting at Oxford
on 6 January 1971, with a reference to M. PEI, Glossary of Linguistic Terminology (BSOAS
1971: 2).

mulation. Viewed in the light of "chance and organization", language is also the fascinating, evolutional story of how noise could become the "Faust" of Goethe, and this is a very, very long story.

This being so, it was only to be expected that my intense preoccupation with the aspectual alternations of the stem-forms and the establishment of the "root" as an ideomorpheme (Oriens 23–4/1971, p. 472) should lead me also to the complicated problems of the morphological structure of language as a whole and thus also to the problem of linguistic form, this term taken roughly in the sense given to it by DE SAUSSURE (Cours, p. 169) but as defined in IM, p. 1. For, as the immortal CHARLES DARWIN[9] said of natural morphology: "This is the most interesting department of natural history, and may be said to be its very soul" (On the Origin of Species, p. 415).[10] The same could be said of the artificial and yet natural morphology of language, conceived of as developed in "Integrated Morphemics".

Having taken this direction, my studies compelled me, unfortunately, also to investigate the validity of the doctrines of the "morpheme" circulating in the numerous introductions to what is called "general linguistics". The result of this investigation was extremely distressing. Current morphemics turned out to be rather unrealistic and thus also unscientific. For nothing could be more unjustified today than the statement that linguistics is a science "which has achieved both the formulation of an empirical method and an understanding of the nature of the data submitted to its analysis" (C. LÉVI-STRAUSS, Structural Anthropology, 1979, p. 31). Here I would like to refer the reader to the excellent paper by P. K. FEUERABEND in The Philosophy of Science, ed. P. H. NIDDITCH (1977), pp. 12 ff.[11]

To begin with, it seemed to me quite natural to consult a book with the promising title of "Fundamentals of Language" (1956) by the world-famous linguists R. JAKOBSON and M. HALLE. According to these authors, "Linguistic analysis gradually breaks down complex speech units into morphemes as the ultimate constituents endowed with proper meaning ..." (pp. 3–4). Here the adverb "gradually" no doubt suggests a series of previous, careful, analytic procedures to be carried out before arriving at what the authors call "morphemes". However, of such procedures we hear nothing here. Let me first state that "speech", as belonging to "la parole", cannot directly be "broken down" into morphemes, since speech is only a highly casual

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[9] For a new appreciation of Darwin the reader is referred to K. POPPER, Unended Quest, 1980, pp. 167 ff.

[10] Ed. J. W. BURROW, 1977.

[11] Cf. H. PUTNAM: "When we come to the notion of a morpheme, however, it is more difficult to know what to say. Speaking for myself, I should say that I have never seen a satisfactory definition of this concept in either semantical or nonsemantical terms." (Mind, Language and Reality, II/1980, pp. 100 f.)

representative of morphemic systems which belong to "la langue", a morpheme being a linguistic sign, a threefold, relational co-articulation of the constituents "expression", "content" and "metareferent" (p. 43). Moreover, in relation to what can the morpheme, as defined by these authors, be said to be an "ultimate constituent"? To this question, no answer is to be found here, the less so as, according to the authors, "two levels of language and linguistic analysis are to be kept apart: on the one hand, the semantic level involving both simple and complex meaningful units from the morpheme to the utterance and discourse, and, on the other hand, the feature level concerned with simple and complex units which serve merely to differentiate, cement and partition or bring into relief the manifold meaningful units" (p. 4). Since the authors, in speaking of meaningful units, make those units go "from the morpheme to the utterance", one has to ask, on the one hand, why they use the term "utterance", which is in principle "open-ended" and in any case belongs to "la linguistique de la parole" in parallel with "morpheme", and, on the other, why they consider only certain "minutest semantic vehicles" of "the semantic level" to be morphemes? Obviously, the reason for this remarkable presentation of facts is the idea that the two aforesaid levels should be kept apart in analysing language. However, language is also a highly integrated system of signs, and these signs are all signs of something, namely "text", "phraseme", "lexeme", "word", "radical", and "phoneme". The hierarchic order governing this complicated semantic system precludes the analyst from keeping apart, in the way the authors do, these thoroughly integrated levels; already the "text" has, of course, its "features" (cf., for instance, also the quotation from DERRIDA's "Positions" in J. CULLER, Jacques Derrida, in Structuralism and Since, ed. J. STURROCK (1979), p. 164).

Being from the beginning also a classical scholar, I decided to take a look, this time with some confidence, also at "Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre" (1977) by the famous Latinist M. LEUMANN. However, what I found here in pages 260, 263–4, 405 and 589 did not help me at all, the morphemics of the author being rather conventional and his remarks not always to the point. So I took up a Swedish manual, one that has certain pretentions and is also used at the Swedish universities, namely B. SIGURD, Språkstruktur. Den moderna språkforskningens metoder och problemställningar (1967). To SIGURD, the morpheme presents itself as "something small", e.g. "the various small parts" of the utterances (p. 20), as well as "the smallest parts carrying a meaning" of a word (p. 48). In accordance with this somewhat curious idea, he defines the morpheme as follows: "recurring unit (consisting of one or more sounds), the meaning and form of which is the same wherever it occurs" (p. 48). It is characteristic of this kind of morphemics that only a "word" is adduced as an example, in

this case *oundvikligt* ("unavoidable"), which is said to contain five mor-
phemes, *o-und-vik-lig-t*. Even in its logical form, this definition is remark-
able. If, for instance, we compare the phraseme *kriget var oundvikligt* with
the phraseme *viken låg klar,* we realize that neither *-vik-* I nor *vik-* II can
be morphemes according to SIGURD's definition; they would deprive each
other of the possibility of being thus classified. SIGURD is probably trying
to tell us that, if a unit of the kind he has in mind has the same form and
meaning in a number of occurrences, the unit in question is a morpheme.

Now, he is also of the opinion that such a morpheme consists of one or
more sounds. As I have already pointed out, the question of material is
irrelevant in this context. Otherwise, the two segments *vik* I and II would
constitute the same unit. For, as sounds, *v, i,* and *k* are undoubtedly re-
curring units, having the same form and meaning (= the sound or phoneme
v etc.) wherever they occur. Let me therefore immediately state that in
morphemics there can be no question at all of sounds or even phonemes,
only of radicals, words, phrasemes, etc. (cf. IM, *passim*).

Later on, it becomes, unfortunately, still more difficult to follow SIGURD's
exposition. For here he maintains that, from the "semantic" point of view,
we can classify his morphemes in two categories, (*a*) grammatical mor-
phemes and (*b*) semantic morphemes or "roots" (p. 57), as if grammatical
morphemes were not "semantic". Finally, he proclaims that in the Semitic
languages roots are as a rule "bound" (p. 57), without asking himself if
the term "root" has, on the whole, any linguistic significance. How should
"root" be defined within the framework of scientific morphemics? For my
part, I must confess that I find it difficult to accept such expositions of
morphemics. As a matter of fact, what we are observing here is what I
would call the "re-naming business", often practised also in Sweden and
carried to extremes by A. ELLEGÅRD in his booklet entitled "Prefix och
suffix i latinska lånord" (1967); the kind of tautological "one-dimensional-
ness" that is presented here can hardly be accepted.

With this kind of general linguistics, I shall now compare the kind re-
presented by J. LYONS in his excellent book "Introduction to Theoretical
Linguistics" (1968). This author does not take language in function as his
starting-point in defining the morpheme but only an isolated word, in this
case *unacceptable,* which, according to him, contains three morphemes,
namely *un, accept,* and *able.* These elements are said to be "minimal units
in the sense that they cannot be analysed further into distributionally-
classifiable units of English" (p. 170), which is not correct, since such an
analysis is undoubtedly possible, both in phonemes and in radicals. How-
ever, what above all makes this kind of morphemics unrealistic and thus
also unscientific is that it is "one-dimensional", and the analysis based on
such methods does not pay due attention to the structure of the linguistic

sign nor to the hierarchic structure of language as a whole. As a matter of fact, this kind of morphemics damages the object under analysis, i.e. human language (cf. Nordic Linguistic Bulletin, Vol. 2: 3/1978, p. 32).

In IM, p. 2, I made the following statement: "In the synchronic perspective, the genetic history of language is reflected in the 'transformational history' of the respective languages, established by integration and level, which may be the most important notions in the concept of *la langue*". I would like to elucidate this passage further. We should, I think, distinguish more clearly between "organization" and "system", on the one hand, and between "element" and "constituent", on the other. The statement that certain elements constitute a "system" is not in itself particularly interesting. The interesting thing is to make out how they could be said to constitute a system. This we can only get to know if we consider the system as an organization. For while "system" is a static term, "organization" is a dynamic one. There is every possibility of describing a system without the description, as such, leading to any deeper understanding of how the system is organized, that is, of what kind of elements the organization consists. For, as members of an organization, the elements of a system appear as constituents of the organization. However, it would certainly be a mistake to think that it is only the relations between the constituents and not also the constituents themselves that are significant. From the genetic point of view, it is the term "evolution" that is to be used in trying to describe, let me say again, the development from noise to the "Faust" of Goethe. In the same way as modern diachrony is established by comparisons between states of language, linguistic evolution accounts for the development from one organization to another. This kind of development is to be understood as a transformation implying also a structural transubstantiation of the elements involved and thus also affecting their signification. Consequently, we should speak of a significative interaction between relation and element.

Now, unfortunately, the observable objects, the human languages, are the results of an enormous, complicated evolution implying a chain of integrations of elements. These results must primarily be studied as "texts" determining in the last resort also the organization of every single phoneme. For the phoneme is also to be considered as an organization of elements functioning, in their capacity as "phones" (OS 23–4/1976, p. 221), as the constituents of their organization. When a sound or noise is transformed into a phone, the change brings about a transubstantiation, that is, a change in the functional quality of the sound or noise. Functioning as "distinctive features", the phones may be called the "microradicals" of the phonemes. Thus, even on this inferior and derived level, there can no longer be any question of "sound" or "noise". For patterned noise is form, not just

material. Consequently, the organization determines the quality of the constituents. This is the place to quote DARWIN on taxonomy: "The importance, for classification, of trifling characters, mainly depends on their being correlated with several other characters of more or less importance. The value indeed of an aggregate of characters is very evident in natural history. ... The importance of an aggregate of characters, even when none are important, alone explains, I think, that saying of Linnaeus, that the characters do not give the genus, but the genus gives the characters; for this saying seems founded on an appreciation of many trifling points of resemblance, too slight to be defined." (On the Origin of Species, pp. 401–2.) Here DARWIN is, I think, being kind to the great Linnaeus, who seems to me to be, to a certain extent at least, dependent also on the Isagoge of Porphyry. Precisely, in defining the *species linguae* of the *genus communicationis,* we shall have to recall—*mutatis mutandis*—this "aggregate of trifling characters, too slight to be defined".

Even though an inherited, conventional artefact like language functions as if it were the natural expression of communication, it is only "natural" *de jure* but not *de facto,* to borrow the terms used by LÉVI-STRAUSS in his splendid discussion of the Critique de la raison dialectique by JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (cf. LÉVI-STRAUSS, The Savage Mind, 1966, p. 246). Now, it is mainly this functional naturalness *de jure* within the language community that presents us with the problem of understanding the process of language acquisition and of the linguistic faculty as such. A prerequisite for speaking and understanding a language is a "denaturalization" of this functional, "cultural" naturalness. Otherwise, we would never be able to use language as we do. Language must be, at the same time, open-ended and closed. The tension between these two qualities constitutes what I call a "dialectic" trait of language, reflected in the functioning of the morpheme, the linguistic sign, as conceived of in IM.

For the truly linguistic sign is obtained by a further denaturalization of already denaturalized speech (parole). Here I may cite some reflections of MERLEAU-PONTY, although they were given in another context: "Even though only *Abschattungen* of the signification are given thematically, the fact is that once a certain point in discourse has been passed the *Abschattungen,* caught up in the movement of discourse outside of which they are nothing, suddenly contract into a single signification. And then we feel that *something has been said*—just as we perceive a thing once a minimum of sensory messages has been exceeded, even though the explanation of the thing extends as a matter of principle to infinity." (On the Phenomenology of Language, Selected Essays of M. MERLEAU-PONTY, ed. J. O'NEILL, p. 88.)

This view of the function of language recalls certain traits of the semio-

tics of CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, as I recognize them from the article entitled "A la recherche de l'essence du langage" by R. JAKOBSON (Problèmes du langage, Collection Diogène, 1966, pp. 23 ff.). However, the three types of *representamina* advanced by PEIRCE, namely "icone", "indice", and "symbole", will have to be reinterpreted in linguistically relevant terms. If we wish to, we may use the term "symbolon" in its "etymological" sense of "something thrown together". Thus, we can say that the morpheme is a linguistic sign into which three elements are "thrown together", that is, three structurally ordered relational elements, "expression", "content" and "referent". Consequently, we may call the morpheme as a linguistic sign a "symbol", and here we are now confronted with the old problem of the "word" (cf. A. MARTINET, Le mot, in Problèmes du langage, Collection Diogène, 1966, pp. 39 ff.), the more so as I have myself designated the word as the "cell" of language (IM, p. 7).

Let us now take § 11 of IM as our starting-point. Here I am speaking of the element *häst* as a linguistic sign, the "complementary content" of which is said to be "the word *häst*", and pragmatically or in the actual case "häst" ("horse"), thus suggesting that also the level of the sign is indicated at the same time. In "the word *häst*", constituting what I here call the "referential form", the element "the word" may be considered as "die Abschattung einer Abschattung" (cf. MERLEAU-PONTY above). As we know, Plotinus said to Amelius, who was urging him to allow a portrait of him to be made: Ζωγράφου[12] δὲ ἀνασχέσθαι ἢ πλάστου τοσοῦτον ἀπηξίου ὥστε καὶ λέγειν πρὸς ᾽Αμέλιον δεόμενον εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι ἐπιτρέψαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ φέρειν ὃ ἡ φύσις εἴδωλον ἡμῖν περιτέθεικεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδώλου εἴδωλον συγχωρεῖν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦν πολυχρονιώτερον καταλιπεῖν ὡς δή τι τῶν ἀξιοθεάτων ἔργων; (Porphyry, On the Life of Plotinus, 1, 5 ff.).

In a similar way, this "the word" is only a shadow of a shadow of a generalized picture, the iconic element of which has been reduced to a "relation", and we have thus to ask "A relation to what?". As we saw, I called the content a "complementary" one, because the sign *häst* was here said to be "an indissoluble unit of two morphemes", one "referential", and one "grammatical". Now, the concept of "level" being essential to the theory developed in IM, I was faced with the problem of the level of the Saussurian sign as composed of an indissoluble unity of "signifier" and "signified". At the same time, I had to pay due attention to the opinion of DE SAUSSURE that "la langue" is "forme", an opinion that I had long taken seriously.

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[12] Cf. Studia Orientalia in memoriam Caroli Brockelmann (1968), p. 164. It may be added that, according to O. SZEMERÉNYI, also MParth. *zxrwb* "painter" reflects a ζωγράφος (JAOS 70/1950, pp. 232 ff.).

Unfortunately, the genius of DE SAUSSURE did not allow him to take the last step—to interpret his double sign in terms of what he somewhat enigmatically called "form" and to establish this unity as "une unité située de forme". This failure is probably the reason why he never felt justified in regarding the "word" as "une unité de la langue". The Saussurian sign remained thus hanging in the air, without a fixed place within the system "où tout se tient". Considering now the unit *horse*/*ho:s*/ as a complementary unity of linguistic form, that is, *horse ~ HORSE* or *HORSE ~ horse*, I equated the signifier *horse* with grammatical form and the signified *HORSE* with referential form, in accordance with the isomorphic equivalence existing here between the syntagmatic expression and the paradigmatic content, a functional equivalence making it necessary to divide the unity as such, which means a division into radicals, only represented by phonemes (cf. Cours, p. 157):

$$\text{H \quad O: \quad S}$$
$$\text{h \quad o: \quad s}$$

Thus, the Saussurian sign was interpreted in terms of form, which means that this sign had to be considered as being composed of two morphemes (signifier and signified) which are at the same time the constituents of the sign as an organization, that is, within this organization the constituents in question are transformed into what I call "word ~ lex" = phonetic representation ~ conceptual picture of radicals. In this paper, I am now simplifying the terminology by designating every level-bound sign as a morpheme (with two complementary morphemic sides). It is, however, important to stress the fact that the morpheme, being a linguistic sign, is a purely relational entity. Consequently, I can, in virtue of the complementarity of this morpheme *horse,* also maintain that it means "the lex *horse*", but "lex" means here only "picture" as a relational element, that is, what I also shall call the metareferent, indicating the pictorial or iconic level of the sign. All this means, as a matter of fact, that the "meaning" of a morpheme is always its "level". It is the ability to produce and interpret linguistic communication by identifying it as consisting of such morphemes that constitutes the very essence of the linguistic faculty as such. Considered as such "imprintings", units like *horse, car, house, go,* etc. are all the same type of morpheme, that is a threefold co-articulation of syntagm ~ paradigm ~ level = expression ~ content ~ metareferent, or word ~ lex ~ picture.

Let us now finally compare the morphemics developed in the IM and further expanded above with those set forth in a diligent and quite new exposition, this also intended for the Swedish universities, namely P. LINELL, Människans språk (1978), pp. 124–8, in which the author deals

with what he calls "linguistic signs" (språkliga tecken).[13] LINELL declares that language can be said to possess the following types of signs: morphemes, word forms, phrases, clauses, sentences, sequences of sentences or texts (of various extent). These types of signs are, according to him, classified as different categories with regard to extent and linguistic level. However, verbalizations of this kind are, unfortunately, of little help to the student. For he never obtains any information on the undoubtedly important question of how this classification is to be carried out. What he is given is a kind of tautological re-naming of the old stuff, a summarized, one-dimensional account of a rather disparate nature. In a book like this, the author should never speak of signs without being able to define them, and it is of capital importance for the student to be able to distinguish between speech forms and linguistic form. On the whole, we have here a rather conventional, mechanical description of language and not an exposition of language as a system of linguistic signs, a system "où tout se tient".

Consequently, it should be stated in the first place that a linguistic sign *eo ipso* is a morpheme and not only a certain type of such signs. All units which make *la langue* what it functionally is, namely "une forme", should be called "morphemes". It is, however, of the greatest importance to know what the signs in question are signs for. This we can never get to know if we do not take the living language as our starting-point. For the goal of language in function is communication, and this is an extremely important fact, implying, *inter alia,* that what is called the "first articulation" should denote the linguistically highest level of communicative behaviour, including all the relevant pragmatic elements. As a matter of fact, it is this level that integrates all the subsequent levels, which in this respect are to be considered as "derived" (pp. 40, 46). Within the framework of the textual behaviour and interpreted in terms of the communicative goal of this behaviour, the expressional form of the text is segmented into minimal units, the function of which is to convey a "message". This function constitutes a "value", and the unit in question should be called a "texteme", that is, a unit whose expression is its own content and whose content is its own expression, the sign or morpheme being at the same time its own referent (="message"). Like a kinship system, the text is to be regarded as a kind of network, the structure of which is built up around the linguistic sign *par excellence* on this level, namely the texteme, a unit which may then be designated as a "textual radical" of this network. But the actual content of the message, that is, the pragmatic referent, is, on this level of the analysis,

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[13] As a matter of fact, "språkliga tecken" in LINELL's book is rather to be rendered by "speech signs".

quite irrelevant. The important thing is to understand that it is precisely within the texteme as an organization and as a representation of the latter that the sequence *themanhittheball* constitutes the specific, qualitative properties of the phraseme *theman-hittheball,* while the "sentence" *the man hit the ball* does not at once constitute a texteme. It is therefore also impossible for me to agree with N. CHOMSKY when he says that "by the 'grammar of a language' I mean the theory that deals with the mechanisms of sentence construction, which establish a sound-meaning relation in this language" (Selected Readings, ed. J. P. B. ALLEN and P. VAN BUREN, 1971, p. 6), but I am quite willing to agree with him when he says that "it seems to me that the substantive contributions to the theory of language structure are few, and that, to a large extent, the concepts of modern linguistics constitute a retrogression", if I may leave out the following words: "as compared with universal grammar" (op. cit., p. 5). I shall return to this point later.

Moreover, it is also important to consider the implications of the terms "expression" and "content" when used of the linguistic sign which is in principle "form". Consequently, the terms in question must always, according to the level, be transformed into categories of linguistic form. According to LINELL, the Swedish word *bil* ("car"), for example, is a morpheme, a term which he defines as "språkets minsta tecken med både innehåll och uttryck" (the smallest signs of language with both content and expression) or "the smallest meaning-carrying elements of language" (språkets minsta betydelsebärande element), while the components of the unit, *b-i:-l,* do not present themselves to him as signs "in the sense we have in view here" (p. 127). However, here the student may be allowed to ask what kind of signs it is then that the author has in mind if the components in question are not also deemed worthy of being considered as signs. According to LINELL, "every sign has a certain *content* (meaning, function) and a certain *expression* (linguistic form)" (p. 124). Here we are, unfortunately, confronted with a certain lack of clarity. For, on the one hand, the sign, as such, is already a linguistic form in the Saussurian sense, consisting of a threefold co-articulation of expression, content and metareferent (cf. the "referential form" in IM). On the other hand, a unit like *bil* is a sign because it means something, namely "bil" (IM § 4, p. 6). Now, when LINELL maintains that "the individual phonemes don't correspond to definite parts of the meaning" (p. 127), he is only, I think, increasing the confusion of his exposition. For it is quite clear that there is a complete isomorphism between the linguistic expression *bil* and its linguistic content *BIL,* so that *b-* corresponds to *B-,* *-i-* to *-I-,* and *-l* to *-L.* For the meaning of *bil* in the sense of the pragmatic referent (p. 49), "bil" is one thing and the meaning of the referential form *BIL,* that is, the content of the sign *bil,* is another, that is, the "lex" *bil,* which is the meaning = content

of *bil* as a unit of linguistic form, is, in the exposition, being confused with the speech form *bil* = "bil".

As I have more than once pointed out, it is extremely important to realize that human language functions as if it were a natural language in the true sense of the word. Thus, it makes no real sense to speak of "phonemes" in this connection. The phonemes, as such and as derived entities, are only "differentials" and cannot, as such, participate in the signification in a positive sense (cf. Nordic Linguistic Bulletin, Vol. 2/1978: 3, p. 32). It may be appropriate to consider, in this connexion, a statement made by LÉVI-STRAUSS: "comme les phonèmes, les termes de parenté sont des éléments de signification; comme eux, ils n'acquièrent cette signification qu'à la condition de s'intégrer en systèmes; les 'systèmes de parenté', comme les 'systèmes phonologiques', sont élaborés par l'esprit à l'étage de la pensée inconsciente" (Word 1/1945, p. 36 = Structural Anthropology, 1977, p. 34). It is not quite clear what the author wants to say here, but it is completely clear that he is speaking of phonemic systems as such, in which the phonemes obtain their "signification". However, the statement seems then to presuppose that the phonemes could exist as such outside of a system. This is, of course, impossible. Outside a system, we have only to do with sounds, and an explicit phonemic system has hitherto and practically always been abstracted from words, that is, from the lexic level, according to the function of its units of differentiating words, an extremely important fact. Thus, a phoneme is a derived entity, as is also the whole phonemic system. Taken *per se,* a phonemic system is a semantic world of its own, each single phoneme being only a difference in relation to other phonemes. As a linguistic sign within a given phonemic system, each phoneme constitutes a purely functional co-articulation of expression, content and metareferent. Thus, the distinctive features, in the sense of the full relativistic articulation, constitute on the sign-level the expressional element. Let us take *p,* for instance. We may say that this *p* is a unity, the articulation (= expression) of which is its own difference (= content), the *p* being at the same time its own referent, that is, "a different element", and the pragmatic referent "the different element *p*". Although the feature level is defined negatively, each phoneme is, as a sign within the system, "une chose positive dans son ordre" (p. 34). Thus, the phoneme *p* can be compared with a "stroke" to be used in different ways in different words, thus creating the "otherness" of the radical *p* on the lexic level (cf. IM, pp. 4 ff.).[13 a]

[13 a] If we consider the signs *c d e f g a h,* representing the fundamental tones, as the basic alphabet of the piano, we may be allowed to call these elements the phonemes of music. However, these phonemes are bound in a scale and thus defined by their frequences in a fixed way.

Now, in a linguistic sign like *bil*, that is, *bil* ~ *BIL*, we have to do with an organization of the elements determined by its specific, integrated level, transforming the elements into its own "immediate constituents" (cf. IM, § 1, p. 2).[14] The phonemes now function as radicals with the value of technemes (cf. IM, *passim*), and it is in their capacity as such radicals that they can participate in the signification. For it is quite clear that from the viewpoint of signification the *i:* of *bil* is not the same *i:* as in *pil* ("arrow"). They are different radicals, although the same phoneme. This **functional otherness** is constituted by the different positions of the *i:*, that is, *b-i*/ *p-i* (cf. IM, §4, and § 12). Consequently, there is no fundamental difference between *b, i, l* in *bil* and the *bil* itself, as regards their morphemic status. All four units are morphemes. The actual difference is reduced to a question of level, that is, of **organization**.

Moreover, it may also be stated at once that there is no fundamental difference either between the unit *car* and the unit *the man hit the ball*. For if we designate "the smallest meaning-carrying elements" as "morphemes", what about the bigger and biggest minimal meaning-carrying elements? They are, of course, also morphemes.

Now, a unit like *bil* presents itself to LINELL as a sign having 'a certain content and a certain expression', a rather pointless statement. For it is the relation between the elements "content" and "expression" that really matters here, and this relation is one between the constituents of an organization. As Mr JOHN STURROCK points out, apparently with good reason, a definition of the linguistic sign is "exceedingly difficult" (Structuralism and Since. From Lévi-Strauss to Derrida, ed. J. STURROCK, 1979, p. 6). The reason why this important task really is a difficult one was explained in the IM. Although LINELL may be, to some extent, influenced by my own contributions to the subject, he too fails to make it clear what is meant by a linguistic sign, i.e. a morpheme.

It is important to realize that we are not justified in considering the sign as a mere conglomerate of "a certain content" and "a certain expression", interpreting this content as "meaning, function" but the expression as

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In music the phoneme is at the same time its own morpheme. Now, taking the next higher octave $c_1 d_1 e_1$ etc. into consideration we find a reproduction of the same configuration, but on another level of frequence. This kind of isomorphism is fundamental to the functioning of the language of music, a language without pragmatic referents in the purely linguistic sense. On the contrary, by the aid of its morphemic referents (tones), constituted also by isomorphic levels like c-c_1 etc., music c r e a t e s its own pragmatic referents, partly individual, partly formal-conventional, constituting thus the "meaning" of music; cf. D. R. HOFSTADTER, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, 1979, p. 626.

[14] It is therefore impossible to accept the exposition of Å. PETTERSSON in "Språket i blickpunkten", ed. B. LOMAN, C. I. STÅHLE, etc. (1971), p. 150; cf. *to lektón* of the Stoics.

"språklig form", by which LINELL obviously means "speech form" (*bil* etc.). For the speech form *bil* is only a representation of the sign *bil*, that is, *bil* ~ *BIL*, constituting two morphemic sides of linguistic form, that is, expressional form and "contentual" form, the linguistic meaning of the whole sign being its metareferent, that is, here "word ~ lex" and "picture" respectively (cf. IM, *passim*), completely parallel with the relation between phoneme and radical. The actual content of the lex, e.g. *bil* = "bil", is irrelevant on this level of the analysis.

Let us now return to the "sentence" *the man hit the ball*. It is, of course, obvious that this unit is a sign, in the sense that it has the meaning it actually has and thus constitutes the sign "phraseme" (cf. IM, § 4, p. 6). Then we are speaking of the unit not only as a "speech sign" but also as a morpheme, a linguistic sign. Generalizing, analogically, the concept of isomorphism, we now realize that the expression *the man hit the ball* is only one of innumerable, actual and also as yet unheard-of representations of the phraseme, considered as a certain morpheme type integrated in the texteme, considered as yet another morpheme type. It is then also perfectly clear that the "parts" of the expression, that is, the phrases *theman* and *hittheball*, correspond to certain parts of the phraseme, constituting the texteme ~ message-sign and being at the same time integrated by the latter morpheme. For the referential "meaning" of the sign is here precisely "phraseme". It is only by supplementing and extending the Saussurian doctrine of the linguistic sign, as it was preliminarily developed in IM, that we can hope to understand, gradually, how human language can function as it really does.

Thus, scientific morphemics ought always to be relativistically orientated. The analysis should be made throughout all the relevant levels of language, from the "text" to the phoneme or vice versa, and a morpheme should always be defined as an "unité de la langue" in the sense of the Saussurian "form", i.e. as a true linguistic category. If this is done, we shall also realize that, for instance, the Hjelmslevian idea of the "figurae" as being "non-signs" is unfounded,[15] as is also ULLMANN's opinion of the phoneme[16] (cf. Nordic Linguistic Bulletin, Vol. 2: 3, p. 32).

Also in this difficult field, a deeper study of the Semitic language type, as such, has led to new insights. In "Integrated Morphemics", I presented the discovery of the radical as a level-bound, functional unity (cf. OS 23–4/1976, p. 221), a concept of fundamental importance to general linguistics in its true sense. The notion of the radical helps us to understand the analogical generalization of the phenomenon of linguistic isomorphism

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[15] Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (1961), p. 46.

[16] The Principles of Semantics (1963), p. 31.

(p. 55). In the present article, I am concluding these specific studies. As especially important issues, I would like to point out the specification of the concept of the referent in metareferent and pragmatic referent, as well as the specification of the "text" as a linguistic sign, all within the scope of the integrated morphemics developed in IM. The ultimate consequence of these studies is the definition of "la langue" in its capacity as "form" (Cours, p. 169), as "a specific behaviour which is its own expression and an expression which is its own behaviour and which is at the same time its own referent in the sense of the metareferent" (= "communication"). This means the ultimate generalization of my definition of the linguistic sign *par excellence,* the "word" (IM, p. 7).

Whoever occupies himself intensely with such studies must inevitably ask himself: what is the relationship between language considered as an inherited social artefact and the linguistic faculty as such? Since the "natural language" ought, in some way, to reflect its microstructure in its macrostructure and since the former cannot be discovered with the aid of more or less one-dimensional methods of the type mentioned above, I had to form my own opinion of the nature of this important question, taking as my starting-point the results presented in "Integrated Morphemics". Being unable to accept certain renewed hypotheses concerning what are called "innate ideas", hypotheses based on a curious idea of the nature and structure of human language but nevertheless propagated around the world, I came eventually to the preliminary conclusion that the linguistic faculty, as such, is to be found in the genetically conditioned capacity to receive and interpret what are, in principle, nothing else than "imprintings". In other words, the phenomenon of imprintings to be observed in certain animals is to be regarded as the primeval basis also of the enormous, neural evolution of the brain and thus also of the language faculty of man, and there can therefore be no question of the existence of a set of innate, more specific categories of the type vaguely indicated by certain modern "innéistes". I touched upon this conclusion in OS 23–4, pp. 220f., and it is also the basis of the exposition in the IM.[17] The neural system of such developed imprintings reflected in my theory of the morpheme is a complicated one, but it is perhaps possible to regard the linguistic faculty,

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[17] I agree with E. LEACH when he says: "All animals—including man—communicate with each other by means of complex stimulus-response mechanisms." There are, however, degrees of complexity, and I cannot agree with Mr LEACH when he continues, contradicting himself: "There are some behaviourist psychologists of the school of B. F. Skinner who have managed to convince themselves that ordinary human speech is itself a mechanism of this sort." Moreover, I cannot with Mr LEACH equate "the linguists" with Chomsky, although I personally consider Mr Chomsky a great American citizen. (Cf. E. LEACH, Structuralism in Social Anthropology, in Structuralism. An Introduction, ed. D. ROBEY, 1979, pp. 41f.)

as such, *inter alia*, also as the faculty to receive and produce informational quanta, reflected, in principle, in the types of structure defined in this paper. What the speaker really produces and the hearer understands is precisely such quanta reflecting the structure of their knowledge of the language in question. To describe a language as a system of integrated, morphemic organizations is to describe the internal and internalized code of this language. Language acquisition means the identifying of this code of the language through the manifold representations of this code in speech. The faculty of acquiring this code constitutes the fundamental ability to learn a language as easily as the child really does. The basic foundation of this function is the possession of the threefold, co-articulated morpheme. What one really "knows" *a priori* is, in the first place, the biological code, that is the biological counterpart of what I would like to call "the morphemic principle".

I have mentioned the structure of language. Even the study of the macro-structure of the various languages shows a good many regularities, usually also recorded in conventional grammars. Now, the macroscopic approach allows us to "measure" and "quantify" various phenomena. This state of affairs has given rise to one of the mightiest concepts of our time, what is called operationalism, advanced particularly by P. W. BRIDGMAN. According to this doctrine, a concept is synonymous with the corresponding series of operations. Well-known formulations like "Syntax is the study of the principles and processes by which sentences are constructed in particular languages" or "Syntactic investigation of a given language has as its goal the construction of a grammar that can be viewed as a device of some sort for producing the sentence of the language under analysis" may ultimately be considered to be a kind of operationalistic slogans,[18] resulting, in the case in point, in attempts at establishing a kind of system of rules allowing us to reconstruct the result from which the rules have been derived. However, as the result which this kind of linguistics takes as its starting-point consists of a lot of "sentences" isolated from the hierarchically organized language as manifested in "texts", the starting-point of the whole procedure represents only secondary realizations in "la parole" of categories of "la langue".[19] Consequently, the linguistic reality of rules discovered in this way must be highly dubious. It goes without saying that

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[18] J. LYONS, Noam Chomsky (1975), p. 34; H. PUTNAM, Mind, Language and Reality (1980), pp. VII ff.

[19] I am, I must confess, astonished to read, now, the following statement: "the problem for linguistic theory ... is to elaborate in detail what we may call, in traditional terms, the general *form of language* that underlies each particular realization, each particular language" (The Philosophy of Language, ed. J. R. SEARLE, 1979, p. 73). Cf. R. ANTTILA's important paper in Festschrift Szemerényi, I/1979, pp. 35 ff.

concepts like "transformation" and "deep structure", as far as they are based on this kind of linguistic analysis, are rather unrealistic.[20] As a matter of fact, only a genetically orientated "constructivism" of the kind I have tried to develop could teach us anything valuable about transformation and deep structure. Moreover, with regard to the fact that linguistics can, at least to a certain extent, be said to be the foremost behavioural science, I would like to call attention also to the well-grounded criticism directed by KONRAD LORENZ against such operationalistic tendencies, which are made possible only by lack of knowledge of the nature and genetic history of the objects studied, in this case human language (Proceedings of the Fourteenth Nobel Symposium, 1970, pp. 385 ff.; Die acht Todsünden der zivilisierten Menschheit, 1973, Chapter VIII).

The theory of my integrated morphemics is relativistically orientated and not deterministic, and it leads to the rejection of the transformational devices of the Chomskyan type as being not based on a valid interpretation of linguistic data. It should, however, be pointed out that my theory does not lead to the rejection of transformational linguistics as such and in the true sense of the word. On the contrary, a "computational paradigm" must account for the integration and transformation of "descriptional levels" based on the theory as such (cf. S. ALLÉN, Nysvenska Studier 55–6/1976, p. 12; 57/1977, pp. 5 ff.) In this connection, the hermeneutical concepts of "interpretation" and "understanding" as elaborated by HEIDEGGER and GADAMER are of great interest. Every individual act of interpretation is to be considered as the result of a realization of "understanding", conceived of as "form", that is, an organization of elements, originating in the borderland between the "world" and the individual consciousness. This kind of understanding is a shared understanding, determined by language as "une institution sociale". And, as such an understanding it goes beyond the conventional subject–object scheme, integrating and transforming this into constituents of the existential medium of man as interpreting the world and its objects.

As an "institution sociale", human language requires a description that not only mentions this important fact but also makes it one of its guiding principles. Consequently, such a description must, first of all, be a description of a verbal behaviour in its capacity as an "institution sociale". This implies a socio-linguistically orientated exposition in the true, structural

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[20] If structuralist social anthropologists really maintain, as E. LEACH says that they do, that what he calls "codes" are languages, it must be strongly emphasized that they are wrong. The languages are only the various, contingent representations of the code, that is, in the last resort, the human aptitude for reacting "linguistically" on social stimuli (OS 23–4/1976, p. 220); cf. LEACH, Structuralism in Social Anthropology (Structuralism. An Introduction, ed. D. ROBEY, 1979, p. 39).

sense of the term. If we choose to call such a description "grammar", this designation must mean a description of a socially determined, verbal behaviour, thus redressing the balance of what is happening between the sender and the receiver of "texts" (in the Hjelmslevian sense), not a description of "sentences". For, within the framework of this social, verbal behaviour, there can, primarily, be not only a question of producing or "generating" sentences but also of responding to various stimuli by a textual behaviour, symbolizing "messages" and determined by social rules more or less perfectly known to the receiver in his role as a listener. The last-mentioned viewpoint is important, recalling what was said above about "chance" and "organization". For both the sender and the receiver are completely conditioned by the speech habits of the linguistic world in which they happen to live (OS 23–4, p. 220). In this world, the sender and the receiver are, as participants in its verbal behaviour system, transformed into actors in a specific, verbal, behavioural play. It is this kind of play that is "open-ended", in so far as the incessantly changing situations of the "life-play" can never be predicted or foreseen. It is a drama without a fixed plot and without a fixed set of lines. By contrast, the verbal behaviour system of morphemes is in principle a closed system, in that the phonemes, etc. of a language constitute a closed system of differences. It is the organization of the system of morphemes that explains why, superficially, very different textual forms can be identified as belonging to the same type of expression. The length of a text is in principle unlimited, but there is also a minimal length of text, corresponding to the minimal content of a message. This minimal unit I call, in its capacity as a morpheme, a "texteme". In terms of the "phraseme", the main purely linguistic properties of the texteme were described in OS 23–4, p. 218.

However, since the phraseme can only exist as a text in a social context, a realistic morphemics must account also for this fact and consider the phraseme as integrated in texts representing "the first articulation", so to speak, of the communication. For a unit like *The man hit the ball* is not in itself and as an isolated "sentence" a communication transmitting a message. Only as a text can it have this function.

Being thus primarily actors in a play like this, their being designated as "sender" or "speaker" and "receiver" or "listener" respectively appears to be too much influenced by the medium of this specific behaviour, that is, the natural language. It is true that the properties of this type of behaviour are based on the "speech apparatus", on the ear and on the eye. But the role of the listener, for instance, is not that of a passive receiver but that of an active interpreter, although the action of understanding may seem automatic or unconscious to us. The same holds true for the eye. And it is certainly due to the selective work of human evolution that lungs, teeth,

tongue, etc. have been co-ordinated to fulfil the secondary function of a physiological system of a speech apparatus integrated by a neural organization constituted by visual, acoustic and phrastic elements,[21] corresponding to the microbiological co-organization of a biological camera, a biological pick-up, and a biological phrastic apparatus, the co-function of which is genetically programmed as a general aptitude for producing and interpreting texts with the value of "messages" with the aid of a behavioural system of morphemes, thus representing an enormous development of the primitive "imprinting" mechanisms of certain animals.

Now, my paper "Integrated Morphemics" starts from language conceived of as "a genetically determined system of symbolic behaviour" (p. 1), a formulation in which every word has its full significance. Here, too, the linguistic foundations for a study of the genetic history of language were laid (cf. p. 2). For only after we have learnt to discern the mechanism behind the macrostructure of the system of the behavioural symbolism of language will this history become accessible to us.

What does this mechanism look like? We shall find a starting-point for the investigation of this problem in what in IM I called "the referential form", a key concept here. If we start from a "message" and thus from a text as something given, as is also the case in the example *the horse runs* (IM, p. 1), it follows from this fact that this utterance must be integrated in the text as a phraseme, that is, the kind of "sentence" defined in OS 23–4, p. 218. The "phraseme" then constitutes the value of the utterance as an "unité de la langue" or as a linguistic category. Thus, it is an inadmissible simplification to maintain that only *the horse runs* is "what is meant", that is, what is called the referent ("the horse runs"). To simply maintain this would be to isolate the unity in question from its structural context. For, as we have seen, language is a system of symbolic behaviour, symbolizing what is meant within the scope of a system of linguistic signs articulated in each other and thus also constituting a system of levels (cf. OS 23–4, p. 218). However, it is quite as unjustified to assert that a "sentence" is a "level" if one is not able to indicate, at the same time, how the system is organized in which it is a level. Embedded in its pragmatic surroundings, language is in principle a closed system of organizations, a higher one "transubstantiating" a lower one (p. 40). There can be no phraseme without a "text".

By presupposing that the unit *thehorseruns* constitutes a "message", we have introduced a pragmatic indication that the unit is also a text. And it is only as a text, that is, in a "situation", that the unit in question can be a message, not *per se* or isolated from every situation (as, for instance,

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[21] Cf. LYONS, op. cit., p. 15.

in the hackneyed "S > 'the man hit the ball'"). Living language is only to be found in texts or as "text", a circumstance that allows us to establish the text as a linguistic sign within the framework of "communication" in a wider sense (cf. OS 23–4, p. 218). It is then as such a sign, as a real morpheme, that the unit *thehorseruns* articulates and integrates the discrete unit *the-horse-runs*, in the first place as a complex morph indicating the structural mode of existence of the "texteme" (pp. 44 ff.) and thus also constituting what I would like to call the "substance" of the form of the specific textual sign. For I consider the practice of designating the actual "instance" of a morpheme as a "morph" as quite pointless in scientific morphemics (cf. OS 21/1973, p. 69); this practice can only have some relevance when we are dealing with speech forms, that is, with the representations of linguistic morphemes. I have tried to describe what is happening in this kind of transformation as an interaction between a higher degree of articulation and a lower one (IM, p. 12). It is as an articulated, complex morph that the unit is transformed into a phraseme, a sign symbolizing by its own referent, i.e. precisely the value "phraseme". Thus, we find that it is in the first place by the "referential form", i.e. "the phraseme *the horse runs*", that "what is meant" is symbolized, the metareferent being like a "shadow" following the actual content (cf. Nordic Bulletin, Vol. 2:3, p. 32). And this "shadow" cannot be neglected by the linguistic analyst. It is the important thing, the invisible representative of "la langue" as a function (pp. 44, 49). For structure is here not of the order of directly observable facts. On the other hand, if the morphemes, as such, were something more than "values", having a "meaning" of their own, the language could not function as it really does. In this case, the metareferent is only "a kind of sentence", and the pragmatic referent, the actual content "the horse runs", is integrated in the higher sign of the "texteme".

From all this, we may draw an important conclusion. The interpretation of the content of a linguistic sign as "referential form", i.e. as a complex type of form, allows us to define the linguistic sign, as such, as a pure value of relations. Every unit which has the function of such a sign should be called a morpheme. Thus, I shall say that a morpheme is "a minimal linguistic unit the expression of which is, on its specific level, its own content and the content of which is its own expression, and which, at the same time, is its own referent" (p. 43). This definition, depending, as it does, on a generalization of the isomorphic principle underlying the sign *häst ~ HÄST* in IM permits me to state that the morpheme in itself, as a kind of linguistic cell (OS 23–4, p. 219; IM, p. 7), constitutes a threefold, co-articulated unity, built up of the structural relations between the elements "expression" (syntagm), "content" (paradigm), and "referent" (level), thus constituting a specific linguistic form, i.e. an organization of elements

(IM, p. 1). It is of the greatest importance to understand this extension of the isomorphism of the word to other levels of language. This phenomenon means that the isomorphism changes character according to the level to which it refers.

Here it may be appropriate to consider the term "isomorphism" a little. This term may *per se* indicate that something has the s a m e form as something else or that something is e q u a l in form to something else. However, this is not the place to deal with the further semantic implications of the double meaning of this term. I shall only speak of the specific kind of parallelism that exists between the two sides of the morpheme *horse* ~ *HORSE* and their relation to the pragmatic referent "horse" (cf. IM, §§ 2 ff.). The unit *horse* being, according to the convention, the "natural" expression of "horse", we may say, if we wish to, that there is here a natural isomorphism between the "horse" and its expression. However, as we know, from our experience of the arbitrariness of language, that θέσις here only functions as φύσις, I shall say that there is in reality a relation of functional isomorphism between "horse" and its expression, borrowing a term from H. PUTNAM (Mind, Language and Reality, Vol. 2/1980, p. 291). Nevertheless, returning to the "natural isomorphism", I shall at the same time maintain that the relation between *horse* ~ *HORSE* is one of structural isomorphism, in the sense that the expression and the content are completely assimilated to each other. This means that, in speech and writing, the unit *ho:s* ~ *horse* represents both sides of the morpheme, that is, they have here the same speech form, the conceptual picture *HORSE* being assimilated to the acoustic and visual picture *horse* and vice versa. Thus, both sides have here "substantially" the same form but "relationally" only "equal" form. Both *horse* and *HORSE* manifest themselves substantially in the same category of linguistic form that is constituted by the phonemic substance used as material. This phonemic substance is then already, as form, an organization of physical, phonetic events. For, in the world of language, what one calls "substance" is always, in some way, form (IM, p. 1). Now the positive fact of being a linguistic sign implies that the basic relations of the sign, the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions, have been isomorphically adapted to each other, the conceptual sound-picture *HORSE* being assimilated with *horse,* its phonemic substance (used as material), while in turn this linearly organized substance has been assimilated with the p a t t e r n of the conceptual sound-picture, that is, the order of relations of the radicals within the relevant permutational field (IM, § 12). However, what on the speech-plane appears as a complete structural isomorphism is on the language plane to be considered as a case of functional isomorphism, since the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions reflect different types of organization. Consequently, we are here entitled

to speak of an integration of different types of isomorphism, creating a remarkable kind of complementarity. "Form" and "substance" are here relative and complementary notions. On the one hand, "form" and "substance" are only two sides of the same "thing", according to the point of observation; on the other, "form" is what it is only in relation to its substance and vice versa (on "substance" from the ontological point of view, cf. pp. 76, 82).

As regards what PUTNAM calls the "natural building-blocks" of language, it should by now be clear that these are to be identified with the textemic, phrasemic, lexemic and phonemic morphemes, the respective structural features of which always constitute the "input", quite sufficient for the easy acquisition of a language (cf. PUTNAM, Mind, Language and Reality 2, pp. 102 ff.). Thus, if we now for a change consider the phraseme *the-horse-runs* as a text of some kind, it is possible, with the aid of analogical, functional isomorphism, to define this unit as a texteme, except that the referent of this morpheme then becomes "message". From this we can draw two further conclusions. Firstly, that every one of these structural morphemes, on its specific level, by its own referent "speaks about itself" and ought thus to be designated as the metareferent or the true linguistic referent, in contrast to the pragmatic referent or the speech-referent, that is, what the expression means in the particular case. Secondly, that it is the meta-referents of the total system "où tout se tient" that constitute this famous "hierarchy" of language, about which people speak so readily but which they have so seldom been able to make understandable (pp. 79 ff.). Let me also finally declare that the genetically orientated "constructivism" of my integrated morphemics seems to complement the psychological constructivism of JEAN PIAGET in a most fruitful way (cf. also "Théories du language. Théories de l'apprentissage", ed. M. PIATTELLI-PALMARINI (1979)).

After these *prolegomena*, I shall treat of the Hebrew *xlq* in its capacity as an ideomorpheme, presupposing what has been said above and commenting later on certain points in a special section. I shall then deal with some verbal and nominal stem-forms in which this ideomorpheme manifests inself in the Old Testament.

I. The Permutation *xlq*

A. The ideomorpheme *xlq*

The realizations of the permutation *xlq* to be mentioned in this paper seem all to be recorded in the Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament by W. GESENIUS and F. BUHL. As is the case in IM, the use of the terms

"permutation" and "faculty" is also here only a neutral, mechanical device by which I obtain a background, so to speak, against which categories like "dictionary" and "grammar" stand out more clearly in their mutual relationship, disregarding the fact that these concepts may be of help to us in trying to appreciate the total structure of a language (cf. OS 21/1973, pp. 69 ff.).

From the "Handwörterbuch", it appears that the units $x...l...q$ (conventional alphabetic order) identify three ideomorphemes (pp. 37, 87) out of six possible permutations, namely xlq, lqx and qlx, the permutations xql, lxq and qxl being "cenems" in Old Hebrew. On the analogy of the true linguistic sign, as described in IM, we may now consider the unit xlq as a sign in the linguistic sense, despite the fact that this unit only exists when integrated in what are called "stemforms" (pp. 32, 92). Consequently, we shall have to admit that, by using this abstractional device, we damage the object of our investigation. However, we can avoid this difficulty by changing our point of observation, regarding xlq precisely as an ideomorpheme and thus transporting ourselves to the level of thought. On this level, we can then regard the unit xlq as a "thought-sign", as a "degree" of "imprinting" in the sense given to this term above (pp. 49 ff.), serving as an aid to the linguistic consciousness (pp. 85 ff.) in organizing the field of concepts (pp. 87 ff.). Regarding the unit in question as a "thought-sign", we can posit a $xlq \sim XLQ$, the notation xlq then representing the syntagm and XLQ the paradigm.

Here an etymological problem should be mentioned. Studies of comparative Semitic philology have suggested that we ought to posit two different ideomorphemes xlq in Hebrew, represented by the verbal forms $x\bar{a}laq$ I "to divide" and $x\bar{a}laq$ II "to be smooth" respectively. We are thus confronted with a case of homonymy to be judged according to IM, p. 8; the problem of etymology will be dealt with on pp. 97 f. As the reader has already observed, I have avoided designating a unit like xlq as a "root". (cf. pp. 39, 56). Moreover, I have avoided the term "consonantal root", as having no empirical content on the level of language we are concerned with here (cf. pp. 85 ff.).

B. The ideomorpheme xlq in its inflectional field

Within the ambit of its position in its own field of identification (3!, "faculty 3") and as a section of the total field (cf. IM, § 12, p. 15), there is formed around the unit xlq as a kind of "articulator" (p. 90) a "plasmatic" inflectional field consisting of $x\bar{a}laq/yax^a loq$, $xel\ddot{a}q$, $x\ddot{a}lq\bar{a}$, $x^a luqq\bar{a}$, $max^a loq\ddot{a}t$, etc. These units can then be said to constitute a paradigm of words of xlq, that is, the ideomorpheme is inflected as various types of

words, the semantic structure of this paradigm of words being governed by the hierarchy of derivation in the conventional sense.

If we now regard the forms *xālaq, xāləqā, xālaqtā* etc., we find that these units, considered as isolated syntagms, all belong to different permutations, although they constitute one grammatical paradigm (in the conventional sense). The conflict deliberately brought about by introducing the concept of permutation, that is, the conflict between the syntagmatic and paradigmatic dimensions, is settled if we consider the different permutations (*xālaq, xāləqā* etc.) as variations of *xālaq* or, better, as variations of each other. Through this transformation of the concept of permutation, the elements -Ø, -ā, -tā, etc. come to assume the character of inflectional forms of a stem *xālaq*- identical with what might be called the synchronic root or word-root, were it not that the notion of "root" can have no claim to justification even on this level of language (pp. 85 ff.). For *xālaq* is a stem-form, in apothematic relationship to another stem-form, *yax^{a}loq*, and vice versa, stem-forms constituted by a consonantal element and two vowel-stems, -*a-a*- and --*o*- respectively, the concept of syllable being thus relevant (*x-l-q~-xl-q* pp. 90 f.), that is, we ought also to posit t w o consonantal stems.

The case of apothematism just mentioned represents a kind of word-inflection typical of the Semitic language type as such. In the living language, the ideomorpheme is thus inflected in "words". As a pure ideomorpheme, *xlq* is its own inflection, so to speak. Now, if, following THOMAS S. KUHN, we maintain that *xālaq, xāləqā, xālaqtā* is a paradigm "because it displays the pattern to be used in conjugating a large number of other ... verbs" (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions², 1970, p. 23), we can use the corresponding, isolated permutations as a device to illustrate a pre-paradigmatic stage in the evolution towards conventional grammar (cf. IM, § 4, p. 7).

C. The relationship between *xālaq* and *xilleq*

If we want to discuss this subject more in detail, we shall have, to begin with, to realize the origin of the type *qiṭṭel*. The prevalent opinion seems to be that this type, in so far as it is deverbative, is derived from the corresponding stem-form of the Qal, *qāṭal*, just as Arabic *qattala* is derived from *qatala* (H. BAUER and P. LEANDER, Historische Grammatik der he-bräischen Sprache des Alten Testaments, 1922, § 38 g). The development is generally imagined to have taken place in the following way: **qáttala > *qaṭṭál(a)>qaṭṭal>qiṭṭal* (op. cit., § 12 r and 14 v), thus presupposing that the Tiberiensic type has been influenced by the type *yəqaṭṭel* (op. cit., § 45 f.). However, the Piʿel can no doubt also sometimes reflect a **qaṭṭil*, in consonantal apothematic relationship to a *qāṭel*, as, e.g. in *kābed*:

kibbed. In any case, the whole question must be dealt with in the light of the general doctrine of aspect, as well as in that of the doctrine of apothematism. The prerequisites for a solution of this important problem have been given above (pp. 33, 35 f.).

As regards the function of the Pi'el, BAUER and LEANDER speak of "Intensivstämme, d.h. Formen, die eine grössere Intensität, Energie bei der Ausführung der Handlung ausdrücken" (op. cit., § 38 g), which is probably correct, at least in principle. For, as we shall see, *xilleq* is precisely characterized by such an intensity in terms of mode of action. However, the statement should be modified in accordance with the results of new research. Thus, we shall have to distinguish between various types of actionality, namely actionality in terms of mode of action and actionality as action as such, that is, in opposition to non-action, which is roughly the same as action as a diathesis. From the formal point of view, a Pi'el is, in relation to the Qal, of course, "intensive", in so far it shows "consonantal apophony", i.e. consonantal apothematism *t* > *t:*. But this fact does not imply that also the function must always be "intensive" in a derivational, deverbative sense. As for the factitive-causative function, the parallelism between *nāšā* "forget"/*niššā* "make forget", on the one hand, and *gādal* "be big"/*giddal* "make big", on the other, was clear to BAUER and LEANDER, though they admitted that they could not explain the connexion between intensity and causativity (op. cit., p. 292 and p. 293; cf. my treatment of the question in OS 12/1964, pp. 103 ff.) To the explanation of this phenomenon given there, the following demonstration may be added.

Let us suppose a Pi'el that is, precisely as an "intensive", derived from the Qal. We have then every reason to ask why this derivation has been realized at all. To a question of this type, we can, to begin with, give a general answer. As means of communication in the service of social behaviour (pp. 67 ff.), languages often renew expressions of especially frequent functions if changes in the linguistic system have brought about a weakening of the expressions of such functions. As I have tried to show, this is exactly the case with the types *qattala, qittel,* etc. (cf., e.g. OS 13/1965, pp. 59 ff.).

At a certain stage of the linguistic development of Semitic, the diathetic opposition represented by the Arabic type *fariḥa* "to be glad"/*faraḥa* "gladden" did not, for some reason, serve, in a sufficiently distinct way, the socially conditioned behaviour which is the goal of language but was replaced by the opposition *fariḥa/farraḥa*, the old form *faraḥ-* surviving afterwards as a verbal noun to *fariḥa*. Since it is clear that this verbal noun formally belongs to the type *qatala*, its use as an infinitive should be explained—as far as possible. From the historical point of view, the type *qatala* is nothing but an aspectually inflected derivation from an old participial equivalent to the types *qatil-* and *qatul-*, and this *qatal-* probably once

meant something like "killing-he", "he is killing", that is, the action *qatl* as a state (cf. IA, pp. 93 ff., and above, p. 35). Having been reconstructed, under the influence of *qatil*, to *qātil*, the old form *qatal* could be used as an infinitive to *qatil*- (cf. OS 13/1965, p. 75, n. 1).

As a verbal noun, the type *farah*- had in principle two main functions, namely (1) the fact that one is glad (syntactical derivation) and (2) the joy as such (lexical derivation) (cf. *qatl*- "the fact that one kills or is killed" and "the killing" as such). Thus, it is worth observing that in Hebrew the verbal noun is represented by two types, *qətōl* and *qātōl*, the first of which is connected with the fientic forms *yiqtol* and *qətol*, while the second belongs to the stativic *qātal*. It would appear that we have here—*mutatis mutandis*—a counterpart to the phenomenon I have tried to point out in the distinction between the Indo-European types **ed-tu-* and **pŏ-ti-* (Studia Classica et Orientalia Antonino Pagliaro oblata I/1969, pp. 183 ff.), that is, *qətol* has formal reference to the fientic and *qātōl* to the stativic mode of action or diathesis. Originating in a **qatāl*, this kind of derivation would then denote the action as such. Being an apothematic form of **qatal* and thus ultimately identical with *qātal*, it shows us how the type *qatal*- came to function also as a verbal noun, in this specific case to the type *fariha*, associated, at least formally, with *yafrah-, ifrah*. Here it is appropriate to compare *bi-šfal qōl ha-ṭṭax^a nā* "when the sound of the grinding is low" (Qohälät 12,4).

There is no need to pursue the analysis further. *qatal*- (as a component of a periphrastic construction) having been replaced in its "intensive" function by the type *yaqtul* (in its older, cursive function), it became less suited for the function as a factitive-causative to *qatil*-. Consequently, the "intensity" had to be restored with the aid of consonantal apothematism (*qatal-* > *qat:al*). We must, however, interpret this kind of intensity in a linguistically relevant manner.

As I have already pointed out (above, p. 59), it is not in its intensive function, in the sense of the mode of action, that *qatal*- has served as a factitive-causative to *qatil*-. It is not that the actionality is more intensive here but that it is the actionality as a diathesis that in the qualitative sequence *-a-a* has obtained a formal expression appearing to the *sentiment linguistique* as a repetition of the element *a* and thus as a phonemic, "linear" intensity (p. 35). In the function of an active-transitive diathesis, this *qatal*- was organized together with the type *qatil*, which in itself was intransitive, to yield an opposition active-transitive *farah-*/intransitive *farih-*. Within this organization, the type *farah-* was realized as a factitive-causative of *farih-*, and it is this function that was later renewed in *farraha* (OS 12/1964, pp. 104 ff.).

As we have seen, it is important to understand the kind of "intensity"

that was renewed in the type *qattal-*. This we can, at last, only understand if we interpret the stem-forms *qatal-, qatil-* and *qatul-* in terms of grammaticalized, primary modes of action, thus already implying a linguistic organization of the representation of "rest" and "motion" as "stative" and "fiens", articulated further as gradual variants of stativity (above, p. 33) and then also as the opposition *qatal/qatil, qatul*. For language is articulations of articulations (IM, p. 12). Here the vocalic stem-form -*a-a*- (pp. 35 f.) "copies", so to speak, the stem-forms *qatil* and *qatul* in their stativic function, the value of adjective and stative respectively being always dependent on the organization of which the units are constituents. Thus, it is important to realize that, if we say that the repetition -*a-a*- is an intensive expression of actionality, this actionality is the result of a transformation of fienticity within the framework of a new organization, articulating a previous one and yielding at last also the diathetic function of "active" within yet another organization. For language can also be said to be organizations of organizations.

The fact that Semitic has, in *qatal-,* so clearly grammaticalized "actionality" in various functions is not really surprising in a language-type that is so fundamental for our knowledge of the category of aspect. Moreover, our investigations will enable us also to understand the deeper reasons for the fact that *qatal-* in the west has come to serve as one of the expressions of constative aspect, while in the east the same type was used as the basis for a formation expressing cursive aspect (**yi-paras* > *iparras*), also a form of the "intensive" type but then in an aspectual sense (cf. IA, *passim*). Thus, we have to distinguish carefully between intensity resulting in a quite new verb with a mode of action different from that of the basic stem-form and the kind of intensity which only emphasizes the activity, as such, in an aspectual sense, being thus compatible with a denominative origin as well as with a factitive-causative function. Every scientific treatment of the Piᶜel form has to pay attention to such distinctions. It is not sufficient to produce statistics and more or less subjectively or intuitively pursued investigations of the "usage". One has also to know, in the first place, what one is investigating, and in order to be able to understand this, one is obliged to know what is meant by a human language on the whole. But who knows that? In the state of crisis in which the general linguistics now finds itself,[22] the only practicable way, it seems to me as a Semitician, is to state my own opinion, which means presenting an elaboration of the statements already made in IM.

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[22] Cf. L. HJELMSLEV, Sproget (1963), p. 7.

II. Principia linguistica

A. Language as an immanent structure and the question of its origin

In another place, I have maintained that glottogony is the most beautiful flower of linguistic science (OS 12/1964, p. 102), and nobody, I think, could deny that such a judgement is completely justified. The highest goal of linguistic science is to gain as deep an insight as possible into the very essence of language. This is, indeed, a higher goal than that at which historical and comparative linguistics is aiming today. For this latter discipline has as its main object the study of linguistic change, ultimately with the view to reconstructing the different "primeval" language states, Proto-Semitic, Proto-Indo-European, etc. as far as this is possible in each case.[23] However, the specialist knows the obstacles to be surmounted in reaching such a goal, quite apart from the fact that many of these reconstructions must remain uncertain for want of decisive documents. It goes without saying that in this way we shall never be able to penetrate to the origin of a language in an absolute sense, simply because there is no such origin. Nevertheless, this type of linguistic research will retain its importance, not least in view of what it can, after all, teach us about the language in the languages.

However, if we concentrate, from the very beginning, on this language in the languages, on the *language,* so to speak, the term "glottogony" will take on quite another significance than that which it has by tradition within the scope of historical and comparative linguistics. For, from now on, it will be a question of what I would like to call "the genetic history of language", a discipline the foundations of which were laid in "Integrated Morphemics".

Every human being living today carries within himself in his language a function which, in its very structure, conceals a piece of history, manifesting itself anew in every generation as a very specialized form of behaviour. This kind of history has its roots far, far beyond our oldest literary documents. In the general structure of this form of human behaviour which we call "language", there are traces imprinted which, if rightly interpreted, can provide us with a wonderful opportunity of discerning the main stages of the true glottogonic evolution, of the genetic history of language, a history leading to what FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE called "la langue", that is, the linguistic function as such, if I may say so in this connection.[24]

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[23] Cf. TH. BYNON, Historical Linguistics (1979), pp. 1 ff.

[24] It is, of course, not difficult to agree with the fairly general statements made by R. A. CHASE, in The Genesis of Language (1970), ed. F. SMITH and G. A. MILLER, p. 265.

Thus, if we succeed in detecting and describing this general structure of "la langue" as a function, we shall also be able to draw some important conclusions concerning the relations constituting language as an immanent structure or, more specifically, the structure of the very nucleus of the *systema linguae,* that is, the linguistic sign *par excellence,* the word, "ce terme décrié—et irremplaçable" (E. BENVENISTE, Problèmes de linguistique générale, 1966, p. 123). In order to accomplish such a task, we shall have to establish a scientific morphemics.

The exposition of such a morphemics must start from principles appearing as functions of a more general theory of the nature of language. Obviously, such an exposition cannot be restricted simply to a tautological re-naming of phenomena like "root", "stem", "ending", etc. by calling them "morphemes" (pp. 39, 44). Moreover, one has to consider the difference between the speech forms of a certain language in the conventional, macroscopic sense (cf. above, pp. 45 ff.) and "form" as a scientific principle. In this general sense, linguistic form is "an organization of elements" (IM, p. 1) and, as such an organization, the form also has a structure. Now, this structure can be said to constitute in turn a relational configuration of some kind, and then it has itself a certain form. Since such a thing as "absolute form" cannot really exist, we shall have to consider form and structure here as complementary concepts, in the sense that they are to be regarded as two sides of the same "thing" (p. 56). Form in this sense is its own structure, and structure is its own form, the "meaning" of this logical isomorphism, that is, its "referent", being a function manifesting itself as "value". This is also the most general definition of the linguistic sign. One should not even try to define structure in linguistics without paying due attention to the notion of "form" (cf. BENVENISTE, Problèmes de linguistique générale, p. 96). My structure is thus always "une structure située", and this seems to yield, also *in abstracto,* a three-dimensional "model" (cf. however LÉVI-STRAUSS, "Les limites de structure en ethnologie" in Sens et usages du terme 'structure', ed. R. BASTIDE[2], 1972, p. 42). According to P. CAWS, the same author seems to have said somewhere: "form defines itself by opposition to a content which is exterior to it; but structure has no content: it is itself the content, apprehended in a logical organization conceived as a property of the real" (Claude Lévi-Strauss: The Anthropologist as Hero, ed. E. NELSON HAYES and TANYA HAYES, 1972, p. 203). I am not quite sure that I understand this.

If we consider language only as an immanent structure in a purely synchronic sense, it will not disclose to us any of its deeper secrets. But, even so, we can achieve important results, as was shown in IM. From the general concept of "chance", I derived the important concept of linguistic arbitrariness as a prerequisite for the functional naturalness of language

(OS 23–4/1976, p. 221; IM, p. 10). Moreover, within the framework of this functional naturalness, the concept of the radical received its due place, thus revealing the true nature of what is called—and misunderstood as— "the double articulation" (OS 23–4, p. 221; IM, §4ff.; cf. p. 74). However, the whole mechanism of the integrated morphemics expounded in IM must also be studied as a result, as was also clearly indicated there. But here the conventional, diachronic methods will not be sufficient (IM, p. 2). We shall have to consider this subtle structure in the light of what I call its genetic and biological history, as it still appears in the transformational mechanism reflecting the "transformational history" of language (IM, p. 2).

From a synchronic point of view, this transformational history stands out as a kind of logico-causal history, the historical element emanating from the causal one conceived of as "before–after". It is as if we were to write the history of a machine, starting from its functioning. Quite apart from how the machine was built in practice, we could imagine its being designed according to a logico-causal plan, regulating the order in which the different units were assembled. Thus, we could speak of the organic history of the machine, of its "genetic" evolution towards a more and more complicated function. It is as such an organic history that we shall have, in the first instance, to look upon the transformational history of language, and this kind of history reveals itself primarily through the existence of two important phenomena, integration and level (IM, p. 2), reflecting, in its own way, also the transformational history of the human mind.

Human language being thus a result of a very long evolution, we have *a priori* good reason to assume that language, as it appears in historical times, in its very structure consisting of levels with integrative and articulative functions (IM, p. 2), has developed through successive incorporations of certain traits to be found in the "objective reality", as interpreted by man, an important addition. For, as everywhere else, this reality is also here the reality of man. Nature is always the nature man comprehends. The relation between nature as comprehended by man and "nature in itself" is still today a great question, quite apart from what one thinks about the attitude of Kant and the post-Kantians to this problem. For the human apparatus of apperception, in the widest possible sense of the word, is no doubt imprinted by natural selection, by the surrounding nature, including later also primeval communities of the human species. Perhaps one may say, after all, *nihil est in homine quod non prius fuerit in natura*. A striking example of the way in which language, in its very structure, reflects ideas of certain natural phenomena has already been mentioned (pp. 33 ff.). Other such instances are the categories of person and tense. Phenomena of this kind already give us a hint as to the direction

of linguistic evolution, as well as of language as resulting from processes of incorporation.

However, we penetrate much deeper into the history of the birth of language if we choose to consider the linguistic sign itself—in the sense of DE SAUSSURE (Cours, pp. 97 ff.)—as a result of similar, only more fundamental processes of incorporation, stages in the long history of linguistic evolution, by which certain external relations have been systemologically internalized in language, thus constituting a system of levels articulating suireferential signs. Thus, for instance, the Latin word *arbor,* considered as a "word-sign" (IM, p. 15), reflects, *inter alia,* also a primitive naming-situation representing ἡ πρώτη θέσις.[25] Furthermore, the speech-situation, in the sense of the dialogue constituting the bidirectionality as well as the suireferentiality of the sign, that is, the peculiarity that the sign is able "to speak about itself", is a prerequisite for its being used in the function of a "message", a function constituting, as a matter of fact, the real "first articulation" (p. 44). From the fact that a unit like *arbor* is a linguistic sign in this sense, it follows that the category represented by this unit is, in its way, the result of an evolution leading to the genesis of a threefold co-articulation constituting linguistic form, that is, an organization of elements (IM, p. 1), in this case "expression", "content", and "metareferent". Likewise, from all this it follows that *arbor* as a "word-sign" does not, from a linguistic point of view, mean just "tree" but "the word-lex *arbor*", designating a "tree" (cf. on referential form, pp. 42, 45).

As we have seen, it is here a question of a "historical", genetic interpretation of the sign, more exactly, so that ἡ πρώτη θέσις, the naming-situation, is given priority. The reason for this is that it is this stage in the evolution that guarantees the structural in variance which is the prerequisite for a further development of the sign from a unit of pure nomenclature to a complementary sign and, finally, to the threefold co-articulation already mentioned. It is clear that this kind of glottogony is highly meaningful. For the genesis of the symbolic mechanism of the linguistic sign must be regarded as the most important achievement in the spiritual history of man. But this is not all. The field of linguistic science which was introduced in "Integrated Morphemics", namely "genetic linguistics", gives us an opportunity of studying, in a scientific way, the evolution of the linguistic faculty as such (pp. 49 ff.). The indubitable connection existing between language as a system of signs and the linguistic faculty as such allows us to speak of a kind of parallelism between the systematic factor of language (as conceived of in IM) and the physiological mechanism of the linguistic faculty as such. Thus, the question to pose will be: what kind of

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[25] Cf. n. 6.

structure is it that produces the results that we can observe in the various "natural languages" on earth? However, and this is very important, everything depends on the interpretation of the concept of parallelism here.

In the first place, we have to consider a point of view of a more general character—what is today called "the unity of science". This has long been a non-committal phrase, a slogan without a concrete content. In the field of linguistics, DE SAUSSURE and TROUBETZKOY heralded a new era in their concentration on the concept of system in its relativity. However, every system has an organization of its own, and when it really comes to the study of the structure of such organizations, general linguistics has unfortunately not been so successful, while natural science has, in this very respect, experienced days of glory. Thus, the application of the notion of parallelism in the field of linguistics has to take into account the fact that natural history and physiology have coalesced in modern biology (cf. F. JACOB, La logique du vivant, 1970, p. 320), a fact of great importance also for the study of the language in the languages. Here it may be appropriate to recall the statement of N. CHOMSKY mentioned above (p. 45) concerning the alleged retrogression of the concepts of modern linguistics, as compared with the universal or philosophical grammar of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the light of the history of biology, this statement appears to be a rather sweeping one. The old deduced universality is, indeed, not the same thing as the modern kind of universality, inferred, as it is, from a combination of natural history and social physiology (pragmatics) of language.[26] One may be tempted to say that in this statement "furiously sleep ideas, green, colorless".[27]

In this connection, also another question of great importance should be mentioned, namely the question whether the "natural languages" should really be considered as natural or as artefacts;[28] I shall return to this subject below (pp. 76 ff.). Here only the following view-point may be emphasized. What DE SAUSSURE has to say about "l'arbitraire de signe" (Cours, pp. 100 ff.) is in principle very important. However, we must distinguish between the fact that a phonetic sequence, such as *arbor*, cannot be a natural expression for the object "tree" and the function of this linguistic unity. For, as far as the function is concerned, we must admit that neither the "imposé" of DE SAUSSURE nor the "nécessaire" of BENVENISTE hits the mark. The decisive thing is that, within the Latin speech community, *arbor* functions as if it were the natural expression for the object in

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[26] E. H. LENNEBERG's important paper "The Natural History of Language" does not deal with what I call so (The Genesis of Language, 1970, ed. F. SMITH and G. A. MILLER, pp. 219 ff.).

[27] Cf. H. PUTNAM, Mind, Language and Reality (1980), pp. 85 ff.

[28] Cf. D. CRYSTAL, What is Linguistics? (1968), p. 34 (a fine booklet).

question (OS 23–4, p. 221; IM, p. 10). Thus, we have also here to distinguish, on the one hand, between form and function and, on the other, between chance and organization.

B. The genesis of the *species communicationis* "lingua" by the way of natural selection

The phenomena of nature have no names; only God and possibly Maxwell's daemon can be imagined to know the names of nature, that is, its denominations φύσει, so to speak. However this may be, let us start from Genesis 1–2. After God (*ʾᵉlōhīm*) had created the light and found that it was good, he called it "day". The darkness on which he did not here pronounce any value judgement he called "night" and the gathering of waters "sea". Here it is God who names these fundamental phenomena. However, when it comes to certain living creatures that God, according to this text, has also created, it is Adam who gives them their names, although under the superintendence of the Creator, who, characteristically, from 2,4 on, is no longer called "God" but "Yhwh God" after the God of the Israelite people. God wants to see what Adam will call the beasts of the field and the fowl of the air, for so they should be called. Finally, Adam appears also as an etymologist, naming his wife *ʾiššā* "maness", since she has been taken from the man (*ʾīš*) in the form of a rib. Disregarding this latter case, in which we have to deal with a popular *paronymicum*, we can say that here we have the Biblical counterpart to what the Greeks called ἡ πρώτη θέσις.

The Biblical exposition of the "naming-situation" is of a certain interest to us also from the point of view that it shows the primitive idea of the genesis of language which forms the starting-point of the brilliant chapter entitled "Nature du signe linguistique" in Cours, pp. 97 f. As is well known, DE SAUSSURE here criticizes the popular view of language as being essentially a "nomenclature", "une liste de termes correspondant à autant de choses". His first argument against such a view is that it presupposes "des idées toutes faites préexistant aux mots". But he also calls attention to the fact that such a simplified view can teach us that "l'unité linguistique est une chose double, faite du rapprochement de deux termes". However, for several reasons, it is doubtful whether his first argument is valid, and what matters in this connection is that even the conception of the nomenclature implies a structural relation between the perception of a "tree" and the word *arbor* (Cours, p. 97), a relation that in any case presupposes "des choses toutes faites préexistant aux mots". It is exactly in the primitive way of looking at things that *arbor* is "une chose double", and it is this "une" that constitutes the relation of identity guaranteeing the invariance of the relation "arbor" ~ *arbor*, an invariance only existing as an

organization of the units in question within the area and during the time the convention in question is valid.

As an organization of two elements, the perception "arbor" and the phonetic sequence *arbor*, this item of the nomenclature is a form (IM, p. 1). Now, it is important to realize that, within the framework of the formal invariance, these elements are transformed into constituents of the form, which at the same time is integrating them as such constituents. Here it is a question of the phenomenon that the ancients were trying, in the field of the sentence, to express by using the term συμπλοκή.[29] In a popular way, we may say that the unity here is something "more" than the sum of its parts. This is the reason why we cannot derive a form, in this case a unit of a functioning nomenclature, directly from the elements "the perception 'arbre'" and the phonetic or phonemic sequence *arbor*. For these elements have not *per se* and on this lower level, so to speak, the properties they have when integrated and thus existing on a higher level. In IM, I have expounded how units like "arbor" and *arbor*, as constituents of the linguistic form that is the sign *par excellence*, change their properties exactly within this organization. This means that *arbor* is no longer a sequence of phonemes but an organization of phonemes. Within this organization, the phonemes are not phonemes any longer but radicals in a conceptual sound-picture, the fact that the "material" is sound being of no importance here (pp. 36, 39). It is the picture that is essential here, and articulated sound is form. Consequently, we have to deal with one single articulation of two elements, that is, *arbor* (syntagm) ~ *ARBOR* (paradigm) > *arbor*, a unity the paradigm of which is its own syntagm and vice versa. This unity is divisible into the radicals *a-r-b-o-r* (cf. LYONS, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (1968), p. 54).

We may now ask what it is that has produced the simple and yet so complicated structure that we have been dealing with above. The answer is: natural selection in the interests of survival. Let us also consider one of DARWIN's famous propositions, namely "that there is a struggle for existence leading to the preservation of each profitable deviation of structure or instinct" (On the Origin of Species, p. 435). Moreover, let us set against this an example of an unprofitable deviation of structure, namely Judges 12,5–6: "Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him."[30] From the following information that 42,000 Ephraimites were slaughtered, since they pronounced *š* as *s*, we get a proof of the survival value of an adaptation to the requirements of the environment.

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[29] Aristotle, The Categories, 1a, 16f.

[30] In this paper, I shall quote from the King James Version.

This is, of course, a very drastic example, but it shows *in nuce* one of the driving forces behind linguistic selection. There is no doubt that linguistic behaviour has been of immense value for man's survival, even at very primitive stages of culture. However, the way to the isomorphically co-articulated sign of the type *arbor ~ ARBOR,* from which I started in IM, was surely a very long one, and before returning to the nomenclature as a more primitive sign system, I shall now further illustrate the role of natural selection with a fabricated but clear example.

As is well known, DE SAUSSURE also speaks about the relation between thought and sound as a relation between "le plan indéfini des idées con-fuses (A)" and "le plan non moins indéterminé des sons (B)" (Cours, pp. 155–6). This ideal parallelism has its advantages when it comes to mak-ing clear the mutual adaptation of the two planes. However, he apparently takes it for granted that no ideas worthy of the name were possible before the genesis of the articulated language, and this I cannot admit, for the "idea" also ought to have its "natural history".

Let us imagine a still, in our sense, "speechless" human being, who day after day goes out of his cave in order to get food. As we may readily understand, this has required a very large number of insights, such as knowledge of the local topography, of dangerous and non-dangerous human beings and animals, of a lot of edible and in-edible herbs and plants, etc. This kind of knowledge man has acquired by having learnt to read in the book of nature, and from father to son this knowledge has been transmitted, increased and refined, the hard struggle for life having sharpened the senses of vision, hearing, smell and touch.

Let us now also imagine that such a human being passes a big tree day after day. He learns to recognize the tree, to remember it, and also to associate with it a certain direction that he should take if he wants to reach a goal of some kind. One day he carves, from memory, on a rock wall a picture of the tree and also of an animal he has often watched in the vicinity of the tree. Between the perception of the tree and the conception of it, there has been created, by repetition and active reflection and with the aid of memory, a relationship of invariance, a relationship that in turn now constitutes a frame of reference for everything in nature that he interprets as "tree", "animal", etc. Is this not mental activity? Is it not order and continuity? It certainly is. It is a question of a highly developed "sense-thinking", a different thinking, early supported by symbolic sequences of sounds and expressive gestures.[31] Thus, all the prerequisites are there for

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[31] However, my savage has not so much the "logic" of LÉVI-STRAUSS as the "wisdom" of PIAGET (Insights and Illusions of Philosophy, 1971, pp. 215 ff.)

the struggle for life driving on, gradually, the genesis of the articulated language. Let us now, in outline, imagine how this could have happened.

When our man was carving, from memory, his idea of the tree on the wall, he was devoting himself to an activity which had, gradually, become so well known among the members of the tribe that they had started to name it, to begin with, rather vaguely and in a personal manner. Now attempts are being made to develop an invariable relationship between the activity of "carving" and a certain phonetic sequence, e.g. *kadb, gatp, k'atb, katb,* etc. (cf. Cours, p. 156 "B"). Then these names all refer to the same activity of "carving", an activity which, by the "sense-thinking", is understood as a namable unity, of which it is also possible to form a picture in the mind, a conception. From a genetical point of view, it is then hardly correct to say that the idea of "carving" did not exist before it was named, this idea which, in any case, could be optically as well as by touch sufficiently precise in the "consciousness", that is, the complicated function we are designating in this way. It is rather that the phenomenon of the carving is named from the moment man feels the need of its being named as such, a need arising in what I would like to call "the sound-community", a predecessor to "the phonemic community". The elements of this naming-situation are the following: one or more instances of "carving", as optically and by touch "rich" individual impressions (I), the individual, poorer, selective memory-pictures of these impressions, forming the ideas of them (II), and the various phonetic sequences mentioned above (III).[32]

Now, one can imagine that the need which is felt as especially urgent by the community is the need for its members to be able to talk about certain things, e.g. in order to organize work and war. However, let us concentrate on our special case. In trying to talk about the phenomenon of the carving, the members will have to start, not from the different, concrete instances of carving (I), but from their individual memory-pictures of these instances (II), although not so "rich" but more "general" than (I). Between factors (II) and (III), a primary relation of invariance is then established, in the sense that factor (III) as a still-fluctuating designation of (II) ought always to refer to (I). While the relation of invariance between (III) (sound) and (I) (object) represents the stage of the more primitive nomenclature, this new relation between (II) and (III), representing the situation of the dialogue, adds a new dimension to the primary relation between (I) and (III), so that (III) now names not only the object (I) but also the idea of it (II). This kind of double naming leads to a re-organization of the three elements, an extremely important step in the genetic development towards

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[32] Cf. IM, §3.

the linguistic sign, causing a change in the relations of the elements to each other.

As we have seen, there still exists, at the stage of the primitive nomenclature, a certain vagueness in the sound expressions, perhaps corresponding to the different kinds of "carvings" the community has experience of. Thus, misunderstandings can arise when one only talks about a carving without having, at the same time, a vision of an instance of a carving (What is this? This is a carving). The conventional correspondence between (III) and (I) now functions as if (III) were the natural expression for (I) and also attracts (II), as the more general representative of (I), so that (II) now functions as the natural meaning of (III). Through this process, the object (I) has, so to speak, been incorporated with the structure (III ~ II), which afterwards, as a complementary sign, refers to the object (I) in a double way, that is, at the same time naming it and being the content of the denomination and, let me add this, being at the same time also its own referent. All this means that an original naming of the two elements (I) and (II) has been transformed into a designation referring to (I) in a double way, that is, (III) naming (I) and (II) > (III ~ II) referring to (I), but then always as indicated by the metareferent (word, sentence, text).

As will be readily understood, it is this development that also entails the complete formal adaptation of (III) to (II) and of (II) to (III). The biological goal of language being ultimately social communication, as favouring the species, the demands for inter-intelligibility made by the environment enforce the creation of differentiated, precise expressions for all the phenomena the community is in need of. The force of evolution thus entails the development of a unified expression (III) of a general idea (II). A successive, mutual process of adaptation, probably parallel with the development of the sign as described above, leads to the selection of one single, psychologically relevant variant and to the complete elimination of the other variants, that is, in the present case, to the selection of the isomorphically co-articulated sign *katb ~ KATB*, referring to "carving". This genetically orientated model I would like to substitute for DE SAUSSURE's deliberately ahistorical model, that is, the "deux masses amorphes A ~ B" (Cours, p. 156).

Let us now stop here and consider the result of this no doubt very long development. If we regard the nomenclature as a primitive "institution sociale", we can say that, within this area, the phenomenon of "carving" is called *katb*, while *katb* in turn names the phenomenon in question. Here we introduce also the concept of "simultaneousness". At the same time as the phonetic sequence *katb* is naming the phenomenon as *katb*, this is also called *katb*, that is, the denomination is its own meaning or the expression its own content and vice versa. Thus, I have called the Swedish word *häst*

"a phonetic ideogram", that is, an ideogram that is its own pronunciation (IM, § 2, pp. 3 f.). Now we can add: and a pronunciation that is its own ideogram. In IM, I have made clear this type of isomorphic co-articulation of expression and content with the aid of a model like *katb* (= expression) ~ *KATB* (= content), and it is this co-articulation that constitutes the linguistic sign *par excellence,* the "word" which thus may also be said to be a "name" which is its own meaning and vice versa.

Let us now consider the following famous statement of DE SAUSSURE: "La linguistique travaille donc sur le terrain limitrophe où les éléments des deux ordres se combinent; cette combinaison produit une forme, non une substance" (Cours, p. 157). In accordance with what has been said above, we are thus able to explain and to elucidate this somewhat enigmatic statement. According to the doctrine expounded in IM, a syntagm like *katb* is a morpheme, the morph of which, that is, its structural form of existence (OS 21, p. 71), is *k-a-t-b,* an organization of elements. I have stated that it is in the morph that an interaction takes place between a higher and a lower articulation (IM, p. 12). What does this imply in more rational terms? Let us, in order to get a point of departure, start from *katb* as a unity, e.g. within the field of identification constituted by 4! (p. 57). Now, it is exactly as such a unity that *katb* integrates its elements. Considering then the properties of these elements as such, that is, *a, b, ...k, ...t* (alphabetical order), we find that *a* is what it is, *inter alia,* because it is not *b,* while *b* is what it is because it is not *a* etc., that is, *a,* etc. is what the other units of the system are not. As phonemes, these elements are only differentials (p. 46), with "negative elementary loading", so to speak. But, integrated in the unity *katb,* they appear in an organization within which they obtain quite other properties, namely in the first place, the property of being radicals (IM, § 4 ff.), constituting then in turn the unity *katb.*

What kind of unity is constituted by the four radicals *k-a-t-b?* We have found that *katb* is a unity naming a certain phenomenon *katb,* at the same time as it is the meaning of the denomination, that is, *KATB.* Thus, the unity comes to refer to the phenomenon "katb", the so-called "referent", in a double way, an important fact revealing not only the organization of the linguistic sign *in vivo* but also the genetic history of the organization. Let us begin with the former.

If we ask, "What is this?" and get the answer; "This is a tree", we find that the answer is in a d i r e c t way denominating the object, thus "tree" = *tree.* Here we can observe what I call the "naming-situation" in its simplest form: the object = the phonetic sequence. If we then ask, "What does *tree* mean?", getting now the answer; "It means 'tree'", we find that the inquirer is u s i n g the phonetic sequence, while the answer understands this as *TREE*; thus, *tree = TREE.* Here an item of a pure nomenclature

("tree" = *tree*) has been used in the other direction, the object "tree" being, so to speak, incorporated with *TREE* which now represents the object in the meaning of the phonetic sequence. But, already within the scope of the primitive nomenclature, the phonetic sequence is transformed into a "denomination", that is, a "name" of an object. By being used in the situation of a dialogue, the name then becomes its own meaning and the meaning its own name, which was my preliminary definition of the "word". The fact that a phonetic sequence like *tree* = *t-r-i:* has developed into a "word" is a rather remarkable phenomenon,[33] established by the organization of elements such as "the possible world" (OS 23–4, p. 220), sounds and their mode of existence within the organization in question.

Between a phonetic sequence like *katb* and the phenomenon of "carving", there is in principle no natural connection. The connection is, in a way, a question of pure chance. Considering the circumstances in all the languages of the earth, we find that such a coincidence is to be found in a certain Semitic linguistic community. In consequence of this accidental connection, a relationship arises between the phonetic sequence and the phenomenon, a relation of "identification", which, to begin with, we may imagine to be unidirectional. Within the scope of this primitive organization, the quality of the two elements is now changing. As a constituent of such an organization, the phonetic sequence obtains a non-phonetic, "objective" phenomenon as its "meaning", itself then assuming the character of an expression of the phenomenon in question.

Let us now change the structure of the organization so that it becomes bidirectional, making also a détour *via* the script and letting the phenomenon be represented as a class by a pictogram. The phonetic sequence will now appear as the pronunciation of the pictogram. Let us now arrange these two elements according to the principle of isomorphism, so that the pictogram is translated, so to speak, into a picture in writing, in this case, *ktb*, a unit functioning now as a pure ideomorpheme with the pronunciation *katb*:

$$ktb = \text{picture in writing}$$
$$k\text{-}a\text{-}t\text{-}b = \text{phonetic sequence}$$

When the more or less figurative pictogram is translated into a non-figurative picture in writing of the alphabetical type, the phonemes *b...k...t* (alphabetical order) become elements of quite another organization, being no longer units in a phonetic sequence. As elements of a non-figurative picture in writing, the phonemes have the function of being constituents of a picture, a *Gestalt*. How has this been possible? In consequence of the integration of the organization of the "naming-situation" into the organiza-

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[33] Cf. IM, § 3.

tion of the situation of the dialogue, a new relation of mutual referentiality arises between the phonetic sequence and its meaning. That is why we can define *katb* as a unity which denominates an object, at the same time as it is the meaning of the denomination. In this connection, I must, however, touch upon certain circumstances.

It is true that *k-a-t-b* as a phonetic sequence is also a series of events. However, this "second articulation" being integrated in the "first articulation", here designated as *KATB*, the elements change their character of phonemes into that of morphophonemes or radicals (IM, p. 1 and p. 16) in a sound-picture in which they have the function of technemes. This sound-picture is organized on the isomorphic principle, which means that we are dealing with a picture which is its own sounds, these sounds constituting their own picture.

Here we have to notice something important. It is not the material that is changing but the organization of the material. The material is always sound, primarily organized to form pictures, that is, picture-sounds (technemes) constituting sound-pictures. Living language being in principle a system of meaning, it is pointless in this connection to speak of phonemes, analyzing, e.g. *katb* into four such phonemes. The unity *katb* consists of four technemes functioning as the constituents of the sound-picture *KATB* (OS 23–4, p. 219). Whoever maintains that the "double articulation" implies that a linguistic sign, e.g. *katb* ~ *KATB*, should be interpreted, on the one hand, as the phonemes *k-a-t-b* and, on the other, as an indivisible *katb* (= *KATB*) has only shown that he is unable to understand the real meaning of the "double articulation", that is, the isomorphic co-articulation (cf. IM, *passim*; for the text as representing the "highest" first articulation, cf. p. 52).

Thus, what I have been trying to describe is the natural history of the sign, its genetic development by means of selection or a kind of selection. The analysis of the "double articulation" has shown that this is a uniform structure. However, even so, considered as an immanent structure, this kind of articulation reveals to us its "transformational history", the key notions "integration" and "level" showing us the direction of linguistic evolution. For it is in the nature of evolution to have a direction, to be orientated. But it is also in the nature of evolution to advance, by way of selection, towards more and more complicated organizations yielding many times integrated levels of articulation; it is of great interest in this connection to read the exposition of E. WOLFF in "Sens et usages du terme 'structure'" ed. R. BASTIDE, 1972, pp. 23 ff. A development of this kind requires first the establishment of a primary level, and in this connection it is appropriate to recall DARWIN's "proposition" quoted above and especially the word "preservation" (p. 68). After a relation has been established by way

of repetition, it is a matter of preserving it as an invariance, thus, e.g. the repeated connection between an object like "tree" and a phonetic sequence *tree*. If we ask why this relation has been an object of repetition, the answer is obvious: natural selection, enforced by the need of being able to name the thing in question and to talk about it.

Here the demands of the "naming" situation are decisive for the structure of the primary relation; Question: What is this? with a gesture towards the "tree". Answer: This is a *tree!* The object already exists, as sense impressions and as "sensorial knowledge", and thus the need "leads" the relation from the object to the denomination: "tree" > *tree*. Through repetition, this unidirectional relation becomes an "invariance", a fixed equivalence. But such a primary invariance does not create any adequate organization until it can be used also in the opposite direction: *tree* > "tree". As we have already seen, the requirements of communication enforce the creation of an organization corresponding to relevant needs, and within the scope of this organization, its elements, that is, the object and the phonetic sequence, change character. They become constituents of the organization, the phonetic sequence and the object being now transformed into "expression" and "content" respectively. The principle of the organization being then bidirectionality, the expression is combined with the content in accordance with the principle of isomorphic co-articulation. Within the scope of a "vertical" or "columnar" organization[34], that is,

<div align="center">

TREE

tree

</div>

a complete, mutual adaptation of the paradigm *TREE* and the syntagm *tree* is brought about, the radicals *t-r-i:* of the phonetic picture corresponding now completely to the technemes *T-R-I:* of the conceptual picture, that is, the paradigm functions hereafter as its own syntagm and the syntagm as its own paradigm. For it is in the nature of the principle of isomorphism to make elements of different order ontologically consubstantial with each other, even though we may also sometimes speak of various kinds of functional consubstantiality (cf. pp. 40, 82). A sound or a phoneme and a pictorial unity cannot, so to speak, be directly "crossed". The phoneme has first to be transformed, that is, transubstantiated into another ontological state or structure (the radical). DARWIN emphasized that "the almost universal sterility of species when first crossed forms so remarkable a contrast with the almost universal fertility of varieties when crossed" (On the Origin of Species, p. 436).

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[34] Only a visualizing device, of course.

Now we are also in a position to define "ontology" in terms of form. Ontology is here not an absolute concept but a relative one. Ontology is, on the one hand, the doctrine of τὸ ὄντως ὄν and, on the other, ὁ τοῦ ὄντος λόγος, "the logic of being". That which "is" is in this connection always "form", that is, an organization of elements, not something "material". Thus, that which "is" always is in a certain, fixed manner, and this manner of material existence of the form is the substance of the form, if I may be allowed to re-introduce a concept rejected by modern philosophy. Thus, the radical is the substance of the techneme, the phoneme that of the radical, and the phones that of the phoneme (IM, p. 12), form and substance being in such cases complementary concepts (p. 43). The reader should compare this exposition of the subject with J. LYONS, "Structuralism and Linguistics" (Structuralism. An Introduction, ed. D. ROBEY, 1979, pp. 11 ff.).[34a]

Let me therefore state that a linguistic sign like *katb* ~ *KATB* is, from the ontological point of view, to be considered as a conceptual sound-picture, in which a conceptual picture and an acoustic picture condition each other (OS 23–4, p. 220). For we are here also dealing with an incorporation and systematization of the "conditioning" situation as such. The common factor is the "picture", and the isomorphic principle implies that the phonetic picture *katb* is being translated into the conceptual picture *KATB* and vice versa. The principle in question appears here as a double order of relation between the elements, that is, the radicals and the technemes respectively. Thus, as a linguistic sign, the unity *katb* ~ *KATB* can also be defined as a unity which is a phonetic picture which is its own phonetic expression, the unity itself being at the same time its own referent (="word-picture"), that is, "lex".

C. The naturalness of language

It has been customary, in recent linguistic literature, to speak of our languages as "natural languages", in contrast to languages constructed for certain ends, e.g. Esperanto, scientific meta-languages, and computer languages, which may be said to be artificial. However, there is every reason to consider more closely the term "natural language", the more so as I have already more than once maintained that the "natural languages" only function as if they were natural expressions of the reality of man (pp. 46, 66). Is this functional naturalness actually of a kind that entitles us to

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[34a] Ontology is not only concerned with the question of "what there is" but also with the question "how something is", cf. QUINE, From a logical point of view (1963), pp. 1 ff.

speak of natural languages? Human language being based on the principle of "l'arbitraire du signe", would it not be better to give up the use of the term "natural language"? This is a question of great importance to the subject I am dealing with, and I shall now try to elucidate its deeper meaning.

In so far as, by using the term "natural language", one wants to stress the fact that language has developed "in a natural way" in various linguistic communities, one is in fact considering the question from a diachronic point of view. However, from this point of view, the languages appear also to be socially transmitted, conventional systems of behaviour. It is here appropriate to recall the following statement of DE SAUSSURE: "En fait, aucune société ne connaît et n'a jamais connu la langue autrement que comme un produit hérité des générations précédentes et à prendre tel quel" (Cours, p. 105). How can we call a "produit hérité" a natural object?

It is obvious that the whole question has up to now generally been dealt with in a hardly satisfactory way. Especially two factors have to be considered here, namely the question of heredity and the criteria of "natural" and "artificial". What is biologically inherited is the language faculty as such, that is, the faculty of linguistic behaviour. This is what is "natural" in language, and this faculty also has a genetic history, about which the *per se* artificial languages can give us a certain amount of information. For, as a "produit hérité", language has to be considered as an artefact, but this fact is not in itself a ground for agreeing with DE SAUSSURE when he draws the following conclusion: "C'est pourquoi la question de l'origine du langage n'a pas l'importance qu'on lui attribue généralement. Ce n'est pas même une question à poser." (Cours, p. 105.) On the contrary, I have already pointed out the existence of a genetic history of language, that is, the history of the linguistic system as such.

When it comes to our possibilities of distinguishing clearly between a natural object and an artefact, there are certain limitations. Let us, however, with J. MONOD select the qualities "regularity" and "repetition" as pertinent criteria of artificial objects (Le Hasard et la nécessité, 1970, p. 18). Thus, we should have to range our languages in the category of artefacts. Every language has a finite number of phonemes, which guarantees a fundamental "regularity". Within the scope of the text as an integrating linguistic level (p. 52), both the sentences and the phonemes, in consequence of the completely articulated organization of language, can be reproduced as the same signs within a given linguistic community, a fact which appears to satisfy the demand for "repetition". As has already been pointed out, the language in the languages always constitutes a system of structures which is variously reflected macroscopically in the morphology and syntax of the different languages, being always more or less "regular".

However, although language may incontestably be said to be a socially inherited artefact, it is likewise indisputably being produced by human beings, that is, by living and therefore natural objects. Now, the activity by which man produces (and understands) his language is almost automatic and unconscious (p. 52). Is there, then, not a contradiction in considering the result of the automatic activity of a natural being as artificial? In answering this question, we have first to state that man himself, according to the criteria mentioned above, should be considered as an artefact of the most consummate kind. However, the structure of a living creature is the result of a process completely different from that of which the macroscopic structure of a real artefact is the result. For the structure of a living creature is the result of morphogenetic interactions within the organism itself. Man is "a machine that constructs itself" (MONOD, op. cit., pp. 23–4).

Thus, we can here make out an automatic and a conscious kind of production, an important distinction with regard to the concept of "plan". A true artefact is produced with the plan of fulfilling a purpose. But the production of languages was said above to be automatic and unconscious, a fact which may seem to suggest that linguistic behaviour is not produced according to a certain plan. Nothing could be more wrong than such an opinion. For it is quite clear that the appearance of such a completely organized system as linguistic behaviour must have been brought about by natural selection. I have already defined "la langue" as being in its form an organization of elements, that is, phonetic and conceptual behaviour of such a type that these elements, as constituents of this organization, yield a function which may be characterized as a behaviour which is its own expression and an expression which is its own behaviour, the function itself being at the same time its own referent, that is, "communication". This may suffice as a general description of the function as such, the "machine". Moreover, this function, this "natural artefact", so to speak, reflects in its functioning a fundamental quality of all living creatures, namely "celle d'être des *objects doués d'un projet* qu'à la fois ils représentent dans leurs structures et accomplissent par leurs performances (telles que, par exemple, la création d'artefacts)" (MONOT, Le hasard et la nécessité, p. 22). Thus, the function defined here, that is, "la langue", represents in some way in its structure of linguistic relations the genetic structure of the linguistic faculty as such. It can, I think, be taken for granted that "la langue", considered as the representative of the structure of the linguistic faculty as such, could be used also for the reconstruction of an at least approximative model of the organization of this faculty (pp. 49 ff.). If we then designate "la langue" as the organizational category characterizing the species "lingua" of the genus "communication", we can in turn designate the different languages in their capacities as various *species orationis* as realizations in "la parole"

of the *genus linguae*, that is, the human linguistic function. It is, by the way, possibly along these lines that we may have to reformulate the old problem of the monogenesis or polygenesis of the languages of the world.

D. The hierarchy of referents

An almost obligatory ingredient of the rhetorical logorrhoea which too often takes up much space in the numerous "Introductions to Linguistics" of today is not the concept but rather the word "hierarchy". In order to give an idea of what the term in question really implies in the world of language, I shall now give a short account of the simple and yet complicated structure of the *Systema linguae*, in connection with the exposition given in IM. We shall see how, within the scope of the total organization, one single unit can appear in a great number of "parts", according to the standpoint taken by the observer. In this way, I shall also try to make clear the relativity inherent in the system. However, before going into details, I would like to say something about the "content-form" of L. HJELMSLEV.

This term is closely related to what Hjelmslev calls "the purport". For instance, *I do not know* and *je ne sais pas* have one factor in common, namely the "purport" or, as he says, "the thought itself" (Prolegomena, p. 50). However, HJELMSLEV is here referring to a comparison between isolated speech forms, and then *I do not know* appears as a specific, English content-form of the thought in question, that is, the fact that "I do not know", this content-form being said to form this "purport" into a "content-substance" (Prolegomena, p. 52); U. ECO seems to accept this way of looking at things (cf. ECO, Social Life as a Sign System in Structuralism. An Introduction, ed. D. ROBEY, 1979, p. 62). I shall return to this question in discussing the concept of the ideomorpheme further below. For the moment, I only want to point out that in my morphemics I am talking of the linguistic "purport" of *I do not know* and that this is a much more general "purport", allowing us to grasp, to a certain extent at least, how language is possible at all. I am speaking of the invisible structure of language, making so many kinds of speech possible. I agree with R. GANDY when he says: "It is as if certain *forms* of programme were built in" (cf. GANDY, 'Structure' in Mathematics, in: Structuralism. An Introduction, 1979, p. 153). What is built in is the biological counterpart to "la langue", conceived of as a function (pp. 62 ff.), that is, a form = an organization of elements. The linguistic purport of the unit *I do not know* is, of course, a "text" constituted by a single texteme based on the phraseme *I do not know*. Thus, HJELMSLEV is talking of the pragmatic purport, I of the "meaning" of the linguistic purport as a value of the sign itself. Such a sign is always "une unité située de la langue" (p. 43). Language is like a struc-

tural hologramme, consisting throughout of the same three-dimensional structure, repeated on different levels. I may cut off one single phoneme, e.g. a *p*, or reproduce the text *I do not know*, but in both cases I shall find the same recurring organization: expression, content, and metareferent. This means that one can reconstruct the principle from one single phoneme but that one cannot predict the phoneme from the principle as such. Consequently, we must make a clear distinction between morphemics and morphology. Scientific morphemics is metamorphology.

By his behaviour, man can communicate with his environment in various ways. Among these species of the *genus communicationis*, the species "lingua" holds the most prominent position. Let us now imagine a Roman, saying or writing *Arbor*, so that it becomes clear from the situation that he intends "Arbor" as the title of some piece of prose or poetry. Thus, the pragmatic situation implies that the unit in question is virtually a "text", that is, a unit communicating a message to the receiver(s), something like "what I am now going to communicate has a 'tree' as its subject". Thus one single morpheme can constitute a "text" (cf. Latin *i!*, that is, one single radical constituting, in its capacity as a phraseme, a text). Since a morpheme is the smallest unit the expression of which is, on its specific level, its own content and vice versa, the unit, as such, being at the same time its own referent, it follows that a "text" is, as a minimal unit, a morpheme integrated by a level to be designated as "communication", a concept to be placed, in the last resort, within the wider domain of the social relations of man in their totality and as compared with those of animals. One could, indeed, maintain that all social relations between living creatures include, along the whole *scala naturae*, elements of communication, conscious or unconscious. This being so, the way is open to establish a kind of natural, genetic history of social zoology, including, of course, social anthropology. Then we shall be in a still better position to appreciate the relations between man and animals, as well as the transition from "nature" to "culture", parallel, in a way, with the transition of the inorganic world to the organic one. Then we shall also be in a position to see "nature" as "culture" and culture as nature. From this elevated vantage-point, we could then also write the natural, genetic history of "social structure", manifesting itself on various levels as "transformational history" in the sense of IM. I would here refer the reader to the first chapter, entitled "Nature et culture", in LÉVI-STRAUSS's "Les structures élémentaires de la parenté"[2], 1968, pp. 3 ff.

Now, when we say that the unity *Arbor* is, in its quality as a textual morpheme, also a sign which is its own referent, this means that the sign as such "speaks of itself". What this "metareferent" is then signalling is exactly the value of the sign on a certain fixed level, and this value has

here the function of being a "message". This value the metareferent pos-
sesses, in the last resort, because the producer of the sign has the intention
of communicating a message in this specific situation. By producing this,
in itself artificial, phonetic behaviour *Arbor*, a "plan" is in fact realized,
a plan being represented, in some way, in the genetic structure of the
linguistic faculty of the producer. Thus, it appears appropriate to designate
such a minimal communicative unit of a larger text as a "texteme"; in this
case, the text and the texteme coincide. Moreover, since *Arbor*, in its
function as a message, must have a morph or form of structural existence,
manifested in its substance (that is, here formally virtual or Ø), I shall say
that its morph is a phraseme, a complex unity which is, in its turn, inte-
grated as a morpheme. Considering now the elements of the textual mor-
pheme, we find that these include also "the sender", "the receiver" and a
certain place. These elements constitute, together with the utterance, the
substance of the morpheme in the sense of the "material" of the sign.
However, we cannot derive, directly, from the elements taken *per se* the
properties constituting the textemic sign. The elements have to be trans-
formed into "textemic radicals". This transformation takes place within the
organization constituting the structural mode of existence of the substance
in question (cf. OS 21/1973, 71). This phenomenon of syntactical and
paradigmatical interaction, constituting the morph in the sense of IM is the
real sense of the term "organization" here. It is due to the "morph" that
the elements are transformed and thus also transubstantiated into "per-
former", "listener", "place of audience" and "message" respectively (cf.
p. 52). The elements appear now as the immediate constituents of their
organization.

As a phraseme, the unit *arbor* is also a morpheme, that is, a sign the
virtual content of which is its own virtual expression and vice versa. In
what way can it then be said that also this kind of sign refers to itself?
The answer is: by its function as a predication in the *casus rectus* (OS 23–4,
p. 218); as an assertion, the phraseme is in the *modus indicativus*. Here I
must also touch upon another important phenomenon. It would presumably
be an exaggeration to maintain that the metareferent of the phraseme has
the value it has because of the direct "will" of the producer. What the
producer "wills" is primarily the message, as such, and thereafter it is the
message or the "system" that "wills". Within the scope of the system in its
totality, a hierarchy of the linguistic referents has been constituted.

As a morpheme, also the phraseme must have a morph. The morph of
the explicit phraseme is always complex, consisting in phrases as a kind of
phrasemic radicals (cf. IM, p. 13), of which *arbor* here is one ("the title
is 'Arbor'"). In this connection, it is appropriate to touch upon another
question, namely the question of transformation. Let us then, for the sake

of clarity, replace the morpheme *arbor* in its function as a texteme and as a phraseme by a formally more complete morpheme, e.g. *arborvirescit* (OS 21, p. 72), a morpheme which can, of course, constitute a texteme as well as a phraseme of a text. Here it is likewise appropriate to consider the ontology of the morpheme (cf. above, p. 76), ontology and transformation being closely linked together. If we then regard the unity *arborvirescit* as a texteme, it is obvious that this unity cannot *per se* and in a purely linguistic way give us the information "texteme" about itself. This kind of referential information is due to an interplay between the linguistic unity and a certain "situation"; this situation may then be symbolized by a certain extralinguistic behaviour on the part of the speaker or be suggested supra-linguistically by the writer, e.g. by arranging the unit as a title ("Arbor virescit").

Thus, it is within the framework of an organization of elements that the category of the texteme exists, and we have to investigate how this specific organization is constructed. The phonetic component of the organization, that is, the sequence *arborvirescit*, ought apparently to have such a structural mode of existence that, except for the actual content of the message, it can also symbolize the intrinsic value of the sign as such, that is, the value "message". I have already mentioned "a certain behaviour" on the part of the speaker, and we can now add also the existence of receivers, an audience. This means that the phonetic sequence in question here appears as organized in a communicative situation of the kind that is also apt to symbolize the metareferent of the sign, that is, "message". In linguistic terms, the morph of the morpheme *arborvirescit* then becomes also of a pragmatic nature, the transmission of sound-waves from the sender to the receiver being here organized in a communicative situation of a specific kind, constituted by the element "possible linguistic world" (the Latin language, OS 23–4, p. 220), and a socially determined communicative situation, including and determining also the situation of the receiver who derives his interpretation of the sound-waves also from this situation (cf. pp. 53 f.).

Now we also understand the implications of the term "transformation". This kind of transformation implies a change in the ontological status of a unit. A phenomenon which in one ontological state is materially to be considered as a sequence of sound-waves is now, in another ontological state, to be regarded as a sequence of information waves. Thus, transformation means transubstantiation. As I have already pointed out in IM, p. 1, linguistic "substance" is itself nothing but linguistic form, that is, a certain form (cf. above, p. 55). The term "substance" should always be defined structurally as "the mode of material existence" of the elements of the organization in question, its immaterial materiality being also the basis of

the morph, that is, the structural mode of existence of the whole morpheme. After this fundamental statement, we are now in a position to determine the organizational construction of the unit *arbor* and of the unit *arborvirescit* as textemes. They consist of information waves organized in a certain communicative situation, integrating these waves as a syntagm of isomorphic information quanta, consubstantial with the content of the message: paradigm = "Arborvirescit" = conceptual information picture ~ syntagm = *arborvirescit* = information quanta. What is intended in the case in point, that is, the pragmatic referent, is then "the texteme, the message *arbor-virescit*". As a syntagm of informational quanta, the unit *arbor-virescit* is isomorphically co-articulated with the content of a message which permits the segmentation in *arbor-virescit*. These segments are here to be considered as primary, informational quanta corresponding to the two technemic constituents of the informational picture, *arbor* and *virescit*, the constituents giving us by the specific nature of their combination an informational picture of the "message" kind. Now we can define the texteme as "a minimal unit, the content of which is its own expression and vice versa being at the same time its own referent", i.e. "information". The meaning of the texteme, that is, "the message *arbor-virescit*" is then to be considered as a realization of what in IM, pp. 1–2, I call "referential form", constituting the full content of the grammatical form, that is, the phraseme *arbor-virescit*. We are thereby leaving the level of direct communication, and the information that we get hereafter emanates from the system as such.

In order that the syntagm in question may be apt to express a message, it must be organized in informational quanta of a certain kind. These quanta constitute a grammatical form, the phraseme. Now, as such a grammatical form, the phraseme is in its turn a morpheme, the syntagm of which must be organized in such a manner that its elements can constitute a predication in the *casus rectus*, the grammatical content of the phraseme. If we now consider the elements which, as constituents of the phraseme, form the syntagm of the "message", that is, the units *arbor* and *virescit*, we must call these elements phrases. It is in their capacity as such phrases that they constitute the complex morph of the phraseme as a morpheme, that is, its mode of existence, based on the substance of the syntagm, that is, in this case the specific organization of words as phrases. For the immediate constituents of the phraseme are not to be regarded as the lexemes *arbor* and *virescit* respectively but just as phrases that are parts of the phraseme (cf. IM, § 2, p. 2). In the same way as a phoneme is not, *qua* phoneme, able to express a techneme, a lexeme cannot, *qua* lexeme, serve as an expressional element in a sentence. It must first be transsubstantiated into a phrasemic radical, i.e. a phrase. Otherwise, the lexemes could not be used as informational quanta.

As has already been pointed out, we are no longer dealing, beneath the level of the text, with the primary function of language, which is to communicate messages, but only with its secondary function, which is to give us information of itself. This phenomenon is based on the fact that language is by nature "an organism consisting of integrating and integrated levels of linguistic form" (IM, p. 2). Language being thus, by its very organization, able to speak about itself, we can interrogate it and it will then give us "indirect" messages. If, for instance, we ask: "What is a phraseme?", we get the answer: "The minimal unit, the content of which is its own expression and vice versa and which is at the same time its own referent, i.e. an independent predication".

Having now left the level of the sentence, it is important to recall the fact that the phrases no longer have on a lower level the qualities which they possess when integrated in the organization of the phraseme (p. 53). Thus, a phrase like *arbor* integrates only one single unit, but then as a class, a class of one of the parts of the phraseme. Being integrated as such a class, the unit *arbor* is thus, on the other hand, not yet to be called a "lexeme". Moreover, in the state of—artificial—disintegration, the lexeme *arbor* cannot yet be called a "word", because this term applies only to the still further disintegrated unit *arbor*, representing now the iconic level of language and as such the class "word", in contrast to the other morpheme classes, phoneme, phraseme, and texteme. But just as the phoneme can only function as a radical, the word can only function as a lexeme.

As we have seen, in defining the various units, we are dealing, on the one hand, with "self-expressing" meanings and with "self-meaning" expressions respectively and, on the other, also with "the minimal unit", a delimitation which is especially important for the primeval c e l l of language, that is, the "word" as a syntagmatic measure of the scope of the "lex", the sound-picture (IM, §2, p. 3; §4, p. 7). This delimitation is the prerequisite for the fundamental isomorphism characteristic of this linguistic sign *par excellence*. It may perhaps be compared with the membrane of the biological cell, which is necessary for its autonomy. The phrasemic and textemic isomorphism may then be regarded as analogous extensions of the isomorphic principle as such (p. 48).

From the special kind of descriptivism and, above all, from the constructivism which characterizes the morphemics developed here and in IM, I hope that it will be clear that language is characterized also by a profound relativity, which is fundamental to our understanding of language as a social artefact regulating an automatic behaviour, experienced as "natural" and produced by natural objects, i.e. human beings. This is the special relativity of language. The general relativity of language can only appear within the scope of the total fields of semantic combinatorics (IM, p. 5),

valid for all the different languages (cf. OS 21/1973, p. 72). As I have pointed out in IM, § 1, p. 3, the special relativity teaches us that the term "immediate constituent" is always "immediate" only within the specific organization to which it belongs. Moreover, I hope that the reader will have seen that the genetically orientated constructivism of my morphemics corresponds, in a certain, highly interesting way, to the psychological constructivism of JEAN PIAGET (p. 56).

E. The linguistic consciousness and the "root" of Semitic

There can be no question here of making a contribution to the general debate on "consciousness". I shall deal exclusively with the specific linguistic consciousness as "une somme d'empreintes déposées dans chaque cerveau, à peu près comme un dictionnaire dont tous les exemplaires, identiques, seraient répartis entre les individus" (Cours, p. 38). These "empreintes" represent, in a way, language as being learnt as a social artefact, the constancy of which is guaranteed by memory. Otherwise, the conditioning could not yield the socially desirable, behavioural results. Thus, the named world is in my head as one great *a priori*, and with the aid of this linguistic consciousness and its categories, I interpret the world and speak about it. The whole mechanism functions as if this consciousness were an innate one, a natural consciousness of the world. However, as we know, this consciousness is an acquired one, a completely casual consciousness, based on an organization of patterned noise. Thus, this "as if" is important, since it sheds some light on the problems of all "innéisme" of the post-Kantian type. However, our dictionary of "empreintes" seems also to include the basic grammar of language, conceived of as a hierarchic system of morphemes representing the linguistic faculty as such. I have already mentioned how I would like to imagine the corresponding biological organization (p. 53). Perhaps the Semitic language type may now make a contribution to the clarification of some of these difficult problems through the peculiar structure of the Semitic word.

We should first consider the doctrine of the morphemes of Semitic presented in "An Introduction to the Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages" (1964) by S. MOSCATI, A. SPITALER, E. ULLENDORFF, and W. VON SODEN, pp. 71 ff., which unfortunately does not contain any discussion of the concept of the morpheme, let alone a definition of it. According to this "Introduction", the Semitic languages exhibit "a system of consonantal roots ..., each of which is associated with a basic meaning range common to all members of the root, e.g. *ktb* 'to write', *qbr* 'to bury',

qrb 'approach', etc." (p. 71). In what way such units of consonantal pho-
nemes may be said to constitute "a system" we are not told, and the ex-
pression "basic meaning range" clearly shows its origin in a highly con-
ventional form of historical linguistics, in which notions like "Grund-
bedeutung" etc. played and still play a great role (cf. Studies on Semitic
Lexicography, ed. P. FRONZAROLI, 1973, p. 154). But can we be so sure
that, for instance, an Arabic *maktab* "school" was or is always associated
with a "root" *ktb* in the sense of "to write"? And is it quite right to main-
tain that this *ktb* meant, from the beginning, "to write"? I do not think so.

    Thus, it is consonantal skeletons like *ktb* that the authors designate as
"roots", that is, a term borrowed from the vegetable kingdom receives
here, without ceremony, a place in morphemics. Moreover, these "roots"
are said to constitute "a fundamental category of lexical morphemes" (p.
71). Here we have the view of DE SAUSSURE that the consonantal root of
Semitic contains the truly lexical element (Cours, p. 315). However, DE
SAUSSURE was perfectly clear on the morphological status of the "root"
(Cours, p. 255) and, in dealing with the exposition in the "Introduction",
one must no doubt ask which linguistic level it is that the authors are
speaking of when they call, e.g., *ktb* "a lexical morpheme". Unfortunately,
we get no information whatsoever on this important question. It is quite
clear that the term "lexical" ought to refer to *lexis* "word", but *ktb* is not a
word, only *kataba, kitāb-*, etc. are words (OS 13/1965, p. 55).

    Although the authors of the "Introduction" thus designate a purely con-
sonantal syntagm as a lexical morpheme, they immediately afterwards say
that "the task of lexical individualization (lexical morphemes) is assumed
by vowels and by affixes (prefixes, infixes, suffixes)" (p. 71). According
to this somewhat unclear exposition, an *a*, as in *katb*, would then imply a
"lexical individualization" and "a lexical morpheme" respectively. In this
way, we obtain two different degrees of "lexicality", a fact which in itself
arouses suspicions as to the scientific value of this kind of morphemics.
As a matter of fact, we are dealing, on the whole, with a re-naming of con-
ventional categories (cf. p. 39). How can a syntagm of consonants be said
to constitute a lexical morpheme? How can the term "consonant" be used
here at all, without reference to its necessary complement, "vowel"? It
should be clear by now that in scientific morphemics there can be no
question of calling the elements of *ktb* "consonants". On this purely noetic
level, we are still dealing with radicals in a technemic function (cf. above,
and IM, *passim*). I may add that, according to P. LINELL, one can "hardly
avoid" considering Arabic *ktb*, the "root meaning 'to write'", to be "the
root morpheme (unless one adopts some new definition of 'morpheme')"
(Psychological Reality in Phonology. A Theoretical Study, 1979, p. 233).
However, there is no such thing as "a root meaning 'to write'", and the

term "root" is not, unless duly defined, to be used in morphemics; on LINELL's definition of the morpheme, cf. above, p. 44.[35]

First of all, it should be stated that it is always the words, as they appear in texts, that constitute, in this connection, the primary facts, the "roots" being only purely mechanical abstractions, for which the concept of morpheme is not, without further notice, valid. For it is quite clear that the term "root" cannot *per se* be a linguistically relevant notion. It could become one, but only on condition that the term is duly defined within the framework of a realistic morphemics. In order to reach a satisfactory definition, we must then, above all, see to it that the abstraction is properly made. The first thing to be stated about *ktb* is that this unit is a sequence of elements recurrent in a series of words, thus constituting a formally common element in these words, as, for instance, in Arabic *katbun* "a writing" (the fact of writing or being written), *katbatun* "a single act of writing", *kitbatun* "a certain manner of writing", *kutubīyun* "bookseller", *maktabun* "school", etc. As a matter of fact, the element *ktb* has in every one of these words its own, specific, semantic function, and it is highly doubtful if, from a synchronic point of view, we are—even theoretically— entitled to speak of the unit *ktb* as associated with a basic meaning range "common to all members of the root" (cf. above, p. 85). Such an opinion seems to me to be unduly influenced by diachronic considerations. In the living language, it is not the words that are "members" of a root in the sense of the "Introduction". On the contrary, this root is a member of many different words, and it derives its semantic status, however this is to be understood, from this important fact.

The reality of the Semitic root is constituted on quite another level of language, and this is a highly interesting fact, of importance also in the discussion of the linguistic consciousness. Let us recall the following words of DE SAUSSURE: "La racine est donc une réalité pour la conscience des sujets parlants" (Cours, p. 256). However, DE SAUSSURE's concept of the root is quite different from that of the Semiticians, being based on words and thus also taking account of the vowels. As a pure ideomorpheme, the Semitic root is probably of greater help to the linguistic consciousness than the root in most other languages. But the concept of the ideomorpheme should not be misunderstood. Its primary function is to identify a unit as a "word" in a given language (IM, § 4, p. 6). This function the ideomorpheme would not be able to fulfil if it had in itself a more specific "Grundbedeutung" (cf. the relationship between "phoneme" and "radical"). In the

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[35] According to this author, Arabic *kattaba* means "he wrote a lot" (*ibidem*, n. 19). As far as I know, it means "to write (down), to provide with letters, group in squadrons, patch together", and in Modern Arabic also "to make someone write".

Semitic ideomorpheme, language manifests itself as thought, not as concept, which means that "thought" is in fact the metareferent of the ideomorpheme (cf. pp. 37, 87).[36]

Consequently, it is of the greatest importance to consider how the "root" is to be abstracted. If we analyze a unit like *katbun* as a word, we find that we are dealing with two elements, *katb-* and *-un*, that is, a word-stem and its ending. If we now abstract the element *k-tb-*, we obtain the consonantal part of the word in question, which is not the same as the "root" of the word, and "roots" must, of course, be primarily abstracted from existing words. On the other hand, if we abstract the same element from the stem *katb-*, we obtain the consonantal part of the stem, which is much more interesting. For the unit *katb-* is not only a word-stem but at the same time also a representative of a specific class of words constituting the stem-form *faʿl*, in itself a grammatical category (cf. Cours, p. 315). Between the pure ideomorpheme *ktb* and the consonantal part of the word *katbun*, that is, *k-tb-*, there is thus the concept of "stem-form", an extremely important fact. For it is clear that the unit *katb*, considered as such a stem-form, ought to be analyzed as *k-a-tb*. This means that the consonantal stem is *k-tb*, the vowel-stem being then C-a-CC. Between these two kinds of stems, there is a relation of distribution constituting the stem-form *katb*, to which the word-stem *katb-* belongs. Thus, the unit *katb* is to be considered as the result of an integration of two stems, C-CC and $-a$--, the sequence CCC being inflected in the pattern $-a$--, which is then itself inflected in the pattern C-CC. As a matter of fact, this crosswise inflection, if I may say so, is a manifestation of the apothematic principle (cf. below).

In this analysis, I have reached the point where the Semitic language type, as such, lets us see clearly another trait of the relativity of the linguistic system (pp. 79, 84). The balance between dictionary and grammar which appears in a unity like *k-a-tb* shows us, in its way, the relativity of the terms "lexical" and "grammatical". As I have tried to show in IM, § 4, p. 7, it is here, finally, a question of the level of the analysis, a question of macroscopy and microscopy (IM, § 7, p. 9).[37]

As an isomorphically co-articulated unit, *katbun* constitutes, on its level, a linguistic sign taken out of its context. Within this context, *katbun* is a phrase in a phraseme, and as a phrase it is also a lexeme and thus also a lex (OS 23–4, pp. 218 ff.; IM, pp. 1 ff.): *katbun* ~ *KATBUN*, i.e. a morpheme in which three elements are co-articulated, namely expression (*katbun*), content (*KATBUN*) and the referent "lex", that is, the unit as the general

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[36] In this connection, Hjelmslev's doctrine of the "purport" may be of some interest (cf. above, p. 79).

[37] Cf. J. LYONS, Semantics II/1977, pp. 423 ff.

concept *katbun* representing the lexical morpheme *par excellence*. On the contrary, the pure ideomorpheme *ktb* belongs to quite another level of language, the language of thought, on condition, of course, that we allow it to have any level at all. Here we are moving in the borderland of language, where we may talk of "the grammar of thought" in contrast to the grammar of thinking constituted by logic. Here it is also appropriate to recall a famous statement of DE SAUSSURE's: "Psychologiquement, abstraction faite de son expression par les mots, notre pensée n'est qu'une masse amorphe et indistincte. Philosophes et linguistes se sont toujours accordés à reconnaître que, sans le secours des signes, nous serions incapables de distinguer deux idées d'une façon claire et constante. Prise en elle-même, la pensée est comme une nébuleuse où rien n'est nécessairement délimité. Il n'y a pas d'idées préétablies, et rien n'est distinct avant l'apparition de la langue." (Cours, p. 155.) How I look on the validity of such an opinion I have made clear on p. 67. Nevertheless, in the light of these words, the doctrine of the ideomorpheme takes on a special interest.

I have already pointed out the possibility of analyzing the ideomorpheme by analogy with the purely linguistic sign (p. 57). Moreover, it must be realized that this ideomorpheme does not exist in any sense whatsoever before the words in which it appears. It owes its existence and its semantic function completely to these words. However, the specific structure of the Semitic word permits us to isolate the radicals. But it is important in this connexion to make clear the difference between the "radicals" of Semitic philology, i.e. the consonants belonging to a "root" in the conventional sense, and the radicals in a truly morphemic sense. Thus, Latin *arbor* has five radicals and the stem-form *katb* four radicals. The unit *katb* may also be said to be a morpheme which is its own inflection and an inflection which is its own stem-form. It is this structure of the unit that makes it possible to se para te the four technemic radicals so that we obtain the pattern *k-a-tb*. By this separation, we obtain two groups of radicals, materially coinciding with the subdivision into consonants (*k-tb*) and vowel(s) (*-a- -*) but functionally implying that the radical *a* here assumes the character of a "determinative". The analysis thus presented means a repetition, on another level, of the analysis of the six radicals of *katbun* into two groups of radicals, *katb-* and *-un*, according to IM, § 7, p. 11.

As has already been suggested, the unit *katb*, considered as a stem-form, is a kind of equivalent, in a single word, to the apothematism in, e.g. *kitāb-/kutub-*. I have tried to show that it is probable (OS 13/1965, pp. 53 f.) that the nominal pattern *faʻl* was once attached to lexemes of a certain kind and thus came to constitute a specific "class of meaning" of which the *-a-* was then regarded as the formal expression, in contrast to *fiʻl* and

fu'l. In consequence of this grammaticalization of the vocalism, the consonants came automatically to stand out as if they were the only real carriers of the lexical element of the word. It is understandable that such a subtle structure had difficulties in surviving. In any case, the prerequisite for its survival is that the vocalism is kept intact, as was the case in Old Arabic. However, even under ideal circumstances, structures of this kind run the risk of being exposed to analogical levellings, which then conceal from us the original state of affairs. For my present purpose, it is sufficient to state that it is this kind of monolexemic apothematism that has given the consonantal radicals also their specific "articulative" function in relation to the vocalic radicals. And it is precisely from this articulative function that we should start in considering the linguistic status of the ideomorpheme *ktb*.

As such an "articulator", the sequence *ktb* constitutes a unit, the expression of which is its own inflection and the inflection of which is its own expression, that is, the dictionary is here grammar and vice versa, but in the domain of thought. Let us here recall yet another statement of DE SAUSSURE's: "La pensée, chaotique de sa nature, est forcée de se préciser en se décomposant" (Cours, p. 156). For my part, I believe this to have been possible "avant l'apparition de language", within the scope of what I have called "the sense-thinking" (p. 69). Nevertheless, the words of DE SAUSSURE are of great interest. Whether the completely articulated language was once based directly on such sense-thinking or not, it remains in principle "une institution sociale", a social artefact. Thus, it is of considerable interest to see how "the Arabic thought" has been compelled to "se préciser" under the pressure of the social community. Starting from the ideomorpheme *ktb*, we obtain the following six permutations:[38]

> *ktb*, cf. *kataba*
> *kbt*, cf. *kabata*
> *tkb*
> *tbk*
> *bkt*, cf. *bakkata*
> *btk*, cf. *bataka*

These six permutations can be considered as a specific part of the total field (OS 21/1973, p. 72). From the purely formal point of view, one could say that the unit *ktb* receives its value as a "plereme" within the scope of the field of identification constituted by the six segments, two of which are "cenemes". But since the semantic functions of the ideomorpheme only exist by virtue of the lexemes in which it occurs, the semantic field to

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[38] I may here have overlooked some cases, but this is of no great importance.

which it belongs comes, in the living language, to appear in quite another way. The most interesting thing in this connexion is the words of DE SAUSSURE quoted above (p. 87) on the root as a "réalité pour la conscience des sujets parlants". For the Semitic languages teach us that it is in its capacity as an ideomorpheme with "articulative" functions that the "root" has this kind of reality, and this may also justify the method of analyzing the ideomorpheme particularly as a "thought-sign", a noetic sign. An analysis of this kind may possibly also have some methodological importance in the field of linguistics which is called "componential analysis".

In the same way as the purely linguistic sign *katb* ~ *KATB* refers to "what is aimed at", that is, "the lex *katb*", in a double way, by naming it and by being at the same time the content of the denomination, we can also imagine that the purely noetic "sign" *ktb* ~ *KTB* refers to "what is aimed at", that is, "the thought *ktb*", in a double way, by articulating it *ktb* and by being at the same time the content of the articulation, an ideomorpheme. Perhaps this "sign" could serve as a structural model valid for the "noosphere", namely as a linguistic model for "la pensée-concept" by analogy with "la pensée-son", i.e. in the field of "noology" and likewise "sur le terrain limitrophe où les éléments des deux ordres se combinent" (Cours, p. 157). Copying, in the noetic domain, the stem-forms of the living language, we can say that the variants *kt-b*, *k-tb* and *k-t-b* all represent, in the consciousness, the thought *KTB*. As a shadow of "la langue", the linguistic consciousness (as a function), as "un terrain limitrophe" between a more general "thought", delimitated to *KTB*, and its conceptual variants (here symbolized by *kt-b*, *k-tb*, *k-t-b*), copies within the "noosphere" the isomorphic structure of the purely linguistic sign: *kt-b* ~ *KT-B* etc.

In conclusion, I would like to quote the unforgettable BERTRAND RUSSELL: "I think that what has permanent value in the outlook of the behaviourists is the feeling that physics is the most fundamental science at present in existence. But this position cannot be called materialistic, if, as seems to be the case, physics does not assume the existence of matter. The view that seems to me to reconcile the materialistic tendency of psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics is the view of William James and the American new realists, according to which the "stuff" of the world is neither mental nor material, but "neutral stuff" out of which both are constructed." (The Analysis of Mind, 1961, Preface, pp. 5 f.). I would like to call this neutral stuff "form" in the sense of an organization of elements. I have not, it is true, been able to show, in detail, how physical events like noise can be transformed into the "Faust" of Goethe, but I have stressed the importance of the fact that such a transformation has taken place. Now, what is called matter is nothing but a system of organiza-

tions of physical events and thus "form", the events being the constituents of the organization in question, that is, particular, atomic and molecular levels, determined by gravitational "messages" of some sort. In this sense, matter could be considered as a "logical construction". Moreover, it appears from the linguistic transformation mentioned above that physics as a science is derivative. Relativity and form constitute the key concepts of what is called physics. Physics deals with theories about morphemic systems, and linguistics, in the sense of integrated morphemics, can, in its way, contribute to the foundation of that science which RUSSELL (The Analysis of Mind, 1961, pp. 287 ff.) believed to be "the true metaphysics", the science of psycho-physics.

III. The ideomorpheme *xlq* in some verbal stem-forms

A. The stem-forms *xālaq*/*yax*ᵃ*loq*

It is high time, I think, to introduce a more suitable terminology in the field of the Semitic verb. In this chapter, I shall, however, confine myself to what should be called the "stem-form". Among others, BAUER and LEANDER, under the influence of some tradition, has retained the usage of calling the Qal "der Grundstamm" (p. 279), but we should certainly not stick to this usage any longer. For the Qal, that is, the grammaticalized mode of action thus named, is represented quite as much by the form *yiqtol* as by the form *qātal*. That this is so appears clearly enough from the doctrine of aspect. Moreover, a unit like *qātal* is not to be properly designated as a "verbal stem"; only *qātal-* is one. As we know, the term "stem" usually means the inflexional stem (e.g. *kitāb-un*) or the derivational stem (e.g. *kutub-īy-un*). In such cases, we have to deal with the units *kitāb* and *kutub* when used as stems in the Indo-European sense of the word, as is the case, of course, also in *qātal-tā* and *ti-qtol*. However, it is certainly not from the point of view of their function as inflectional stems in this sense that the verb forms in question are of special interest to us.

Likewise, it is not correct to speak of, e.g. Arabic *qatala, qattala, ʾaqtala,* etc. as a "system of verbal stems"; only *qatal-* and *q-a-t-a-l-* etc. are stems. From my analysis of the Semitic word, it appears that the latter is in principle to be characterized as the product of two stems constituting a stem-form: $q\text{-}t\text{-}l + CaCaC > qātal$. This is what I call the principle of monolexemic apothematism typical of Old Semitic (p. 88).

I would like to state the following, introductory facts concerning the ideomorpheme *xlq*, as it appears as a mode of action in the Qal. From the historical point of view, the Qal is represented by two such stem-forms, **xalaq* and **x(a)luq*, functioning as aspectual stems in the verbal stem-

forms **xalaq-ta/*ta-xluq(u)*, constituting the expression of the two basic, aspectual categories of Old Hebrew, the constative *xālaq* and the cursive *yaxᵃloq*, representing the more fundamental categories of the stative and the fiens, to use the terminology of BÖTTCHER, and in accordance with the historical interpretation of the linguistic evolution given by me in different books and in numerous articles. This being so, it makes no difference whether we begin with the one form or the other. Let us begin with *xālaq*.[39]

wa-yyiwwātərū bi-bnē Yiśrā'ēl ᵃšär lō'-xāləqū 'ät-naxᵃlātām šib'ā šəbāṭīm "And there remained among the children of Israel seven tribes, which had not received their inheritance" (Joshua 18,2). Starting from the section "Negation und Aspekt" (EV, pp. 92 ff.; cf. OS 21/1973, p. 68), I shall comment briefly on the aspectual value of the stem-form *xālaq* here.

The somewhat curious opinion has been put forward that the use of the Qal in this place implies "dass der Blick ... auf dem Teilungsvorgang ruht, nicht dagegen auf der in separate Teile zerfallenden Teilungsmasse" (E. JENNI, Das hebräische Pi'el, 1968, p. 127). Moreover, since it is also pointed out that the action in question "noch nicht vorgenommen wird", one has, indeed, some difficulty in understanding how "der Blick" could possibly rest in this remarkable position. We must certainly also be allowed to ask the following question: Whose "Blick" is it that "ruht"? In the first instance, it can only be the "Blick" of the sender, a pragmatic fact of great importance to hermeneutics. Now it is clear from the position in a relative clause and from the mode of exposition, as such, that the aspectual value of the negative constative is neutral, only the lexical value of the category being relevant. This, of course, prohibits the curious interpretation of the Qal given by Jenni (op. cit., pp. 126 ff.). It goes without saying that one has to distinguish between what is expressed in the speech-act as such—considering also the relevant pragmatic circumstances—and what is expressed in a verb form as a linguistic category of some kind. And one has, of course, to beware of confusing the necessarily subjective inter-pretations of speech-acts with the value of the linguistic categories (OS 13/1965, p. 48, n. 1).

ū-fän-tiśśā 'ēnākā ha-ššāmaymā wə-rā'ītā 'ät-ha-ššämäš wə-'ät-ha-yyārēᵃx wə-'ät ha-kkōkābīm, kol ṣəbā ha-ššāmayim wə-niddaxtā wə-hištaxᵃwītā lāhäm wa-'ᵃbadtām ᵃšär xālaq *Yhwh ᵘlōhākā 'ōtām lə-kol hā-'ammīm taxat kål-ha-ššāmāyim* "And lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun, and the moon, and the stars, *even* all the host of heaven, shouldest be driven to worship them, and serve them, which the Lord thy God hath divided unto all nations under the whole heaven" (Deuteronomy 4, 19). On this passage, JENNI remarks: "von der

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[39] Cf. n. 30.

Zuteilung an *alle* Völker ist generell die Rede, nicht im Hinblick auf da-
durch entstehende Teilmassen" (p. 127). Thus, he once again informs us of
what the form *xālaq*, according to him, does not mean. The constative
xālaq has also here a neutral, aspectual value, and the special nuances
which the author is speaking of emanate from the speech-act, including
the verb as a mode of action, not from the category as such. The trans-
lation "zuteilen" is a way of rendering the realization in question; whether
or not it is the right way may perhaps be discussed.

*wa-yyēləkū wa-yya'abdū ⁱⁱlōhīm ᵃxērīm wa-yyištax^ᵃwū lāhäm ⁱⁱlōhīm
ᵃšär lō'-yədā'ūm wə-lō' xālaq lāhäm* "For they went and served other gods,
and worshipped them, gods whom they knew not, and *whom* he had not
given unto them" (Deuteronomy 29,25). The three *coniunctivi aoristi*, as
well as both constatives, are aspectually neutral, and there can be no ques-
tion of interpreting the category *CāCaC* here as indicating something like
"Aktualis", which, besides, is another term for the cursive aspect (OS 9/
1961, p. 87, n. 1). In this connection, it may be appropriate to consider
also II Chronicles 23,18: *ha-kkōh^ᵃnīm ha-lwīyīm ᵃšär xālaq Dāwīd 'al-bēt
Yhwh* "the priests the Levites, whom David had distributed in the house of
the Lord". The neutral constative is to be interpreted according to example
no. 2, and the passage is thus not similar (ähnlich) to I Chronicles 23,6
(JENNI, op. cit. p. 128).

The correctness of the form *xālaq* in II Chronicles 28,21 is disputed:
*kī-xālaq 'Āxāz 'ät-bēt Yhwh wə-'ät-bēt ha-mmäläk wə-ha-śśārīm wa-yyitten
lə-mäläk 'Aššūr wə-lō' lə-'äzrā lō* "For Ahaz took away a portion *out* of
the house of the Lord, and *out* of the house of the king, and out of the
princes, and gave *it* unto the king of Assyria: but he helped him not."
According to JENNI, "wird *xlq* meistens zu *xlṣ* pi. emendiert und scheidet
damit (!) aus der Diskussion aus" (p. 128). However, the Targum has
mṭwl d-plyg, palleg being the usual translation of *xālaq*, and the Pəšīṭtā
šəqal seems to be influenced by the LXX; my Kittel has not recorded
such an emendation. Moreover, *xilleṣ* is a rather rare verb. And now the
last example, Job 39,17: *kī hiššāh ⁱⁱlō^ᵃh xåkmā wə-lō'-xālaq lāh ba-bbīnā*
"Because God hath deprived her of wisdom, neither hath he imparted to
her understanding". Here the aspectual value is to be judged as in the other
cases.

Thus, we are in a position to state that all the quoted cases of the con-
stative are neutral with respect to the aspectual opposition cursive/punctual.
It is easy to see why this must be so. In four of the cases, the form in
question stands in a relative clause, while the other two forms stand in a
kī-clause. In neutral position, it is only the lexical element of the cate-
gory as such that is relevant, that is, *CāCaC* defined as fientic stative
("divides", "divided", "has, had divided"), tense being a matter of prag-

matics in Old Hebrew. The important thing is to observe that in the quoted cases the action is never represented as actually taking place in an aspectual sense. The action is only stated.

We may now proceed to the other stem form of the Qal, namely *yax*ᵃ*loq*, in which two types have coincided, the old expression for the cursive aspect **yaxluqu* and the non-cursive **yaxluq,* both being fientic to their nature. Now, even in this state of the language, the old cursive could apparently also be used in a neutral position (general present and preterite, future), which led, at least to a certain extent, to the renewal of the ex-pression of the cursive aspect with the aid of the type *qōṭēl* (cf. Aramaic). The old, non-cursive type was reserved for the "syntactic subjunctive" *wa-yyiqṭol,* the *coniunctivus aoristi,* and prosodic model for *wǝ-qāṭaltā,* and perhaps also for the negative imperative (EV, pp. 93 ff.). Later on, I shall deal with the "text" as a network and as an aspectual field.

The old cursive, but in the function of a general present, we find in Job 27,17: *yākīn wǝ-ṣaddīq yilbāš wǝ-käsäf nāqīy yax*ᵃ*lōq* "He may prepare *it,* but the just shall put *it* on, and the innocent shall divide the silver", and Proverbs 17,2 is also to be understood in the same way: *ʿäbäd-maś-kīl yimšol bǝ-bēn mēbīš ū-bǝ-tōk ʾaḥ(ḥ)īm yax*ᵃ*loq nax*ᵃ*lā* "A wise servant shall have rule over a son that causeth shame, and shall have part of the inheritance among the brethren", cf. JENNI "ein kluger Sklave wird ... in-mitten der Brüder das Erbe teilen" (op. cit., p. 127), in which case the inter-pretation of the Qal as "Aktualis" appears the more absurd in that the verbal content of the *tempus futurum* is not real. We find a similar case in I Samuel 30,24: *kī kǝ-xeläq ha-yyōrēd ba-mmilxāmā ū-kǝ-xeläq ha-yyō-šēb ʿal-ha-kkēlīm, yaxdāw yax*ᵃ*lōqū* "but as his part *is* that goeth down to the battle, so *shall* his part *be* that tarrieth by the stuff: they shall part alike". Here, too, should "der Blick auf dem teilenden Subjekt und auf dem Teilungsvorgang ruhen, nicht dagegen auf der in separate Teile zerfallenden Teilungsmasse" (p. 127); these are, as already stated, quite irrelevant view-points. And now II Samuel 19,30: *ʾattā wǝ-Ṣībā taxlǝqū ʾät-ha-śśādā* "Thou and Ziba divide the land". Here one may discuss whether we have formally to deal with the aorist or the neutralized cursive, but, essentially, this question does not matter, and in any case JENNI's comment 'Die Handlung ... wird den Partnern geboten ... dargestellt' (p. 127) does not help to solve the problem.

As I have already remarked, the cursive aspect can incidentally be renewed with the aid of the participle. However, as in Aramaic, even the renewed form may appear in a neutralized position. A case in point is Proverbs 29,24: *xōlēq ʿim-gannāb śōnē' nafšō* "Whoso is partner with a thief hateth his own soul", cf. JENNI "wieder mit Betonung der Partner und ohne Nennung des Objekts" (p. 128), in this connection a somewhat point-

less remark; the interesting thing is that *xālaq* is here used in the "absolute" function.

Of all free finite forms, it now only remains to mention that in Joshua 22,8: ... *xilqū šalal-'ōyəbēkäm 'im-ʾªxēkäm* "... divide the spoil of your enemies with your brethren", and here it may suffice to refer to EV, p. 95. The rest of the finite forms appear as *coniunctivus aoristi*, i.e. as the type *wa-yyaxªloq* (< *wa-yaxluq*). Since all cases seem to be preterital, we have only the choice between punctual and neutral preterite. Let us begin with Joshua 14,5: *kaʾªšär ṣiwwä Yhwh 'ät-Mōšä kēn 'āśū bənē Yiśrä'ēl wa-yyaxləqū 'ät-hā-'āräṣ* "As the Lord commanded Moses, so the children of Israel did, and they divided the land". Here the following opinion has been advanced: "Im Abschnitt über die Inangriffnahme der Landverteilung steht *xlq* parallel zu *'śh* und bezeichnet somit die Handlung in ihrem Vollzug (Aktualis); sachlich kommt der überschriftartige Satz beinahe einer inchoativen Aussage gleich ("und gingen daran, das Land zu verteilen")", cf. JENNI, op. cit., p. 127. It should be unnecessary to refute such an opinion. Unfortunately, experience shows that it is not.

From the standpoint of the context, we have to make out how the conjunctive *wa-yyaxləqū* should be properly integrated, that is, within the scope of the speech-act to which it belongs. It appears from the pragmatic context in which the speech-act is integrated that the receiver ought to understand the passage as preterital. The syntagm in question is then, precisely like a conjunctive, determined by *kēn 'āśū*, and indirectly also by *kaʾªšär ṣiwwä*. In consequence of the nature of the pragmatic context, it seems natural to understand the syntagm as a concluding expression, put before the mentioning of the distribution of the land (14,1–4). It follows that the constative *'āśū* here has a neutral, aspectual value, and this is the reason why also the conjunctive is to be considered as neutral. Within the framework of the aspectually neutral context, the syntagm *wa-yyaxləqū* can then also be realized or at any rate interpreted as a *modus obliquus* (OS 23–4, p. 218): "and they divided thus" > "so that they divided" or "when they divided". The verbal content being in neither of the cases aspectually actualized, there can, of course, be no question at all of a "Handlung in ihrem Vollzug", "Aktualis" or of an "inchoative Aussage" (which presupposes punctual value); a subjective feeling of inchoativity emanates from an interpretation of the speech-act as such, not from *wa-yyaxləqū* as a linguistic category. One must be able to distinguish between *faits de la parole* and *faits de la langue*.[40]

Let us now consider I Chronicles 24,4: *wa-yyimmāṣə'ū bənē-'Äl'āzār rabbīm lə-rāšē ha-ggəbārīm min-bənē 'Ītāmār wa-yyaxləqūm: li-bnē*

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[40] Cf. F. LEEMHUIS, The *D* and *H* Stems in Koranic Arabic (1977).

ʾĀlʿāzār rāšīm lə-bēt-ʾābōt šiššā ʿāśār wə-li-bnē ʾĪtāmār lə-bēt ʿᵃbōtām šəmōnā "And there were more chief men found of the sons of Eleazar than of the sons of Ithamar; and *thus* were they divided. Among the sons of Eleazar *there were* sixteen chief men of the house of *their* fathers, and eight among the sons of Ithamar according to the house of their fathers". Concerning this passage, the following opinion has been advanced: "Das Gewicht liegt jedenfalls auf dem Einteilungsvorgang und -modus, auf der Einweisung in bestimmte Gruppen, nicht auf der 'Verteiltheit' der bisher zusammengehörigen Priester bzw. Leviten" (JENNI, op. cit., p. 128). However, such a comment is quite pointless. The objective content of the passage is a change of organization, being here only mentioned. This kind of content finds expression in the speech-act as such. It is, then, inevitable that "das Gewicht" objectively lies on the fact being thus mentioned. The real question is how this state of affairs is being represented linguistically, that is, whether it is being described as a "Vorgang" or only stated as a fact. The Qal, as a mode of action *per se,* is, of course, indifferent to such distinctions and can as such never "stand" "für die Handlung während ihres Vollzuges" (op. cit., p. 126). Our only concern here is the aspectual value. In view of the pragmatic structure of the speech-act (or its stylistic contour), we shall have, I think, to consider this value as neutral, that is, the fact is only stated, not described or related as a stage in a continuous narrative. The same interpretation holds true for the following *wa-yaxləqūm* (24,5). Neutral is also the aorist in Nehemiah 9,22: *wa-ttitten lāhäm mamlākōt wa-ʿᵃmāmīm wa-ttaxləqēm lə-fēʾā* "Moreover thou gavest them kingdoms and nations, and didst divide them into corners". Thus, this passage cannot be used to support the opinion of JENNI.

There remains only Nehemiah 13,13: *wa-ʿᵃlēhäm la-xᵃlōq la-ʿᵃxēhäm* "and their office *was* to distribute unto their brethren", a passage which has likewise been the object of a rather curious treatment: "ihnen sollte daher das Amt obliegen, die Verteilung an ihre Brüder zu besorgen", "mit dem Gewicht auf der Kompetenz und nicht auf dem Ergebnis der Handlung" (JENNI, op. cit., p. 127)—a completely subjective interpretation that in no way contributes to the understanding of the Qal. In the infinitive *xᵃlōq,* the cursive/punctual opposition is, of course, abolished, and there can be no question of a "Gewicht" on the one or the other circumstance.

We have now investigated the 17 cases of Qal in which the ideomorpheme *xlq* has been realized with the meaning of "divide, distribute, assign", according to the demands of the context. As I have already pointed out (p. 57), one also usually assumes the existence of a homonymous *xlq* "to be smooth, slippery", e.g. *xālaq libbām* Hosea 10,2. It should, however, be mentioned that NYBERG translates this passage "weil ihr Herz geteilt war", thus presuming that we are here dealing with a *xāleq* "to be divided"

(Studien zum Hoseabuche, 1935, p. 72). Unfortunately, there is no such verb in the Old Testament, and the expression *'itpəleg libbəhōn* of the Targum can be understood as reflecting a *xullaq* or the like. Let us instead return to an old master, BÖTTCHER, who for *xāləqū* Psalm 55,22 posits a **xāleq* "glatt sein", considering the form *yax^aloq* to be originally a kind of factitive to this *xāleq*, in the sense of "macht gleich" > "teilt" (Ausführliches Lehrbuch der hebr. Sprache § 909 = II (1868), p. 107). However, this suggestion cannot solve our problem immediately, for from a synchronic standpoint we shall have to look upon *xālaq* I "to be smooth" and *xālaq* II "to divide" as homonyms. But, from a diachronic point of view, it may very well be that there is an etymological connection between *xlq* I and II.

In Akkadian, *xalāqu(m)* means, it is true, "to disappear, vanish; to become missing or lost, perish, escape, flee" (CAD 6/1956, p. 36 b). According to VON SODEN, this word is to be connected with Arabic *hlk* (Akkadisches Handwörterbuch, Lief. 4/1962, p. 310 b; cf. Lief. 1/1959, p. 31 b). However, since this etymology is, of course, quite impossible, we shall have to take another road. Let us first consider Hebrew *'āzal* "go away, vanish", Aramaic *^azal, 'ezal*, to which also Arabic *'azal-* "eternity" belongs (< "that which has gone away").[41] This *'zl* is to be connected with Arabic *zalla* "slip", *zāla, yazūlu* "go away". Thus, I would like to posit for Akkadian *xalāqu(m)* the original meaning of ***"glide, slip" > "disappear", connecting it with *xālaq* "be smooth, slippery", cf. Old Swedish *glīdha* "set out". It is probable that this *xālaq* goes back to a **xāleq* (cf. BÖTTCHER above). Here belongs also Arabic *xaliqa* "be smooth, equable, even", *xalaqa* "make smooth", also "bring into existence according to a certain measure or proportion and so as to make it equal to another thing", for *xalq-* means "the act of measuring, of determining the measures, proportion or the like of a thing" (LANE), cf. Hebrew *xālaq* "divide", *xeläq* "share" < **xilq*, perhaps < "likeness, equality, proportion". Roughly, one may thus

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[41] Arabic *'azal-* seems thus to be "Vergangenheit" > "ancientness, eternity"; cf. *'abad-* "eternity" to *'abada* "took fright and fled, ran away". In a similar way, we have probably also to understand the original meaning of Hebrew *'ōlām* "long time, eternity", which seems, in some way, to be connected with **'ālūm* "hidden", *nä'lam* "to be concealed", perhaps < "that which has gone away, passed"; cf. Latin *perītus* "er-fahren, be-wandert", possibly to a **perior* from *per* "beyond, across", and Arabic *'alima* "to know", perhaps < "having experience". Arabic *qidam-* "eternity" is also connected with a verb of motion: *qadama lqawma* "he became before the people, preceded them" (LANE 2985 b). For *qidam-* LANE has "oldness, antiquity" and "existence", "duration, time without beginning" (2986 a), which betrays the influence of Greek philosophy, cf. ἀρχή "beginning", ἄρχω "lead the way"; the main passage is Phaidros 245 d. The etymological treatment of *'ōlām* in E. JENNI, Das Wort *'ōlām* im Alten Testament (1953), pp. 3–6, is somewhat narrow.

maintain that Arabic *xalaqa* is to Arabic *xaliqa* approximately what Hebrew *xālaq* "divide" perhaps once was to *xālaq* "be smooth", while in Akkadian the meaning "be smooth" developed in another direction, > "disappear". In Hebrew, there is no longer any living connection between *xlq* I and II in the sense that *xālaq* "divide" would be a direct factitive to *xālaq* = **xāleq* "be smooth", cf. instead *häxᵃlīq* "make smooth".[42] But there is nothing to prevent us from assuming that *xālaq* is to be considered as a denominative to *xeläq*. Such an origin is compatible with a certain intensity in the function of *xilleq* in comparison with the Qal, although there is also the possibility that the Piʿel may represent a different type of denomination from *xeläq*, perhaps a dialectal variant.

IV. The text as a network

In my work "Intensiv und Aspektkorrelation", I coined two important phrases, "syntactic conjunctive" (pp. 111 ff.) and "aspectual clause" (p. 117). In the morphemics developed above, the "text" is regarded as the highest, purely linguistic level, integrating all subsequent levels. It is then also clear that we shall first have to establish certain basic facts about the Hebrew text as a network of utterances in a certain pragmatic environment. As we know, the characteristics of the normal Hebrew prose text are its paratactic organization and the alternation between verbal clause and nominal clause. As a matter of fact, it is these two structural elements that formally constitute the text as a network, a term which can be said to represent the syntagmatic dimension of the textual level.

Let us now consider the first chapter of the Book of Judges. Here we find that practically all the verses begin with *w-* "and"; the only exceptions are vv. 30, 31 and 33. However, the monotony of this "linear" mode of representation is partly apparent. To some extent, it is outweighed by the different functions this *w-* can have, and it is here that also the alternation between nominal and verbal clause enters into the picture. For it is mainly with the aid of this alternation that the Hebrew text creates an

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[42] There is no reason to consider here also Arabic *ḥlq*. Let me only state that *xlq* I and *xlq* II seem to have been etymologically connected, as is probably also the case with *xäsäd* I "shame" and *xäsäd* II "solidarity, etc.". The point of departure seems here to be an expression for an emotion, e.g. "wish, desire, love", represented in Arabic by *ḥasadahu ššayʾa, ʿalā ššayʾi* "he wished that the thing might depart from him and be transferred to himself" (Lane 567 b–c). This means that Arabic *ḥasad-, ḥasd-* "envy" is *die Ab-gunst* (privative), and *xäsäd* II *die G-unst*, to *gi-unnan* "to favour", the difference then being founded on a different usage and construction; *ḥasadahu ššayʾa* is, approximately, **einem etwas ab-lieben*, so to speak, Swed. *av-undas någon något*. To "Abgunst" belongs *xäsäd* I "shame", Syriac *xesdā* "ignominia", and F. SCHULTHESS, Homonyme Wurzeln im Syrischen (1900), p. 32, is therefore wrong; cf. NÖLDEKE, Neue Beiträge (1910), p. 93.

effect of perspective depth, thus breaking the linearity of the representation.[43] In trying to illustrate such features of the textual network, it may be appropriate to take Judges 1,1 as a starting-point: *wa-yhī 'ax^{a}rē mōt Yəhōšū^a^{c} wa-yyiš^{ʾa}lū bənē Yiśrā'ēl b-Yhwh* "Now after the death of Joshua it came to pass that the children of Israel asked the Lord". Let us first, with reference to OS 14–5/1966, pp. 63 ff., consider the expressional type *wa-yhī ... wa-yyiš^{ʾa}lū*, cf. the Septuagint καὶ ἐγένετο μετὰ τήν τελευτὴν Ἰησοῦ καὶ ἐπηρώτων A=B (A. Rahlfs), the Targum *wa-h^{a}wā bātar də-mīt Yəhōšū^a^{c} u-š^{e}īlū* (Sperber) = Pəšīṭṭā: *wə-min bātar də-mīt Īšō^c bar-Nōn ʿabdeh də-Māryā ša^{ʾ}elw* (Urmia & London 1913). Here we may ask how this *wa-yhī* should be interpreted. Did it really have here the ingressive function that the καὶ ἐγένετο seems to imply?

Firstly, it should be observed that the lexemic relation between γίγνεσθαι and γενέσθαι is not the same as that between εἰμί and ἦν, their modes of action being different (cf. M. S. RUIPÉREZ, Estructura del sistema de aspectos y tiempos del verbo griego antiguo, 1954, pp. 113 ff.). Greek εἰμί and Hebrew *hāyā* being in the last resort etymologically nothing but verbalizations of the "copula", that is, the old, deictic, pseudo-personal pronoun **s-* and **hū'-* respectively (OS 27/1969, pp. 109, n. 2), their verbal content has been affected by this fact. As a matter of fact, the syntagm καὶ ἐγένετο could here be interpreted as a neutral aorist, serving the purpose of rendering the neutral *coniunctivus aoristi wa-yhī:* "And it was after the death of Joshua, and they asked", constituting two separate textemes within the textual network. Within the framework of the text as a kind of organization, the relation between the two textemes is changed, the textemes being now transformed into two phrasemes constituting one single textemic unit indicating an opening message: "And it was after the death of J. that they (once) asked". This transformation could be said to imply an emphasizing relativization of two textemes, slightly recalling the function of the "second tenses" of Coptic (EV, pp. 88 f.). According to the phenomenon of the *consecutio aspectuum*, the unit *wa-yyiš^{ʾa}lū* is then also neutral, a possible feeling of "durativity" (cf. LXX ἐπηρώτων) emanating from the content of *šā'al* as a lexeme. Only then does the narrative begin with *wa-yyōmär* in verse 2 (punctual). A similar case is to be met with in v. 14: *wa-yhī bə-bō'āh wa-ttəsītēhū li-š'ōl ... wa-ttiṣnax mē'al ha-x^{a}mōr;* another variant is v. 28 *wa-yhī kī-xāzaq Yiśrā'ēl wa-yyāśäm ...* Only in v. 7 do we have compound nominal clause: *wa-yyōmär 'Ădōnī-Bäzäq: šib'īm məlākīm ... hāyū məlaqqətīm taxat šulxānī* "And Adoni-bezek said, Threescore and ten kings ... gathered *their meat* under my table". As an aspectual clause, the nominal clause indicates here a general state

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[43] Cf. IA, pp. 28 ff.

of affairs that once prevailed, when seventy kings used to pick up food from under his table. The verbal expression is neutral, and the interpretation of NYBERG is misleading: "voro plockande = lågo och plockade", that is, cursive aspect (Hebreisk Grammatik, 1952, § 86 cc).

A fairly interesting case is v. 9: *wə-'axar yārədū bənē Yəhūdā lə-hillā-xem ba-kKəna'ănī* "And afterward the children of Judah went down to fight against the Canaanites".[44] A **wa-yyērədū bənē Yəhūdā 'axar* would not have given the same emphasis to *'axar*, and it is thus probable that the construction implies something like "And it was only hereafter that Banū Yəhūdā went down", corresponding to a **wa-yhī 'axʰrē-kēn wa-yyērədū*, interpreted as in 1,1. Perhaps one could regard the type *wə-'axar yārədū* as a kind of nominal clause with copula Ø and an adverbial predicate, *yārədū* then being an asyndetic relative clause, or one could say that the type has the function of such a construction (deep structure). However this may be, this kind of expression gives a special contour to the exposition, a nuance of emphasizing addition, of special mentioning, cf. *wə-hā'ām lō' nāsaʿ 'ad-hē'āsef Miryām. wə-'axar nāsə'ū hā'ām* "and the people journeyed not till Miriam was brought in *again*. And afterward the people removed" (Numbers, 12,15–16).[45] It is typical that the type introduces Exodus 5: *wə-'axar bā'ū Mōšā wə-'Ahʰrōn wa-yyōmərū*.

In the same way, we find the constative in a nominal clause like Judges v. 16: *ū-bənē Qēnī xōten Mōšā 'ālū ... wa-yyēläk wa-yyēšäb 'ät-hā-'ām* "And the children of Kenite, Moses' father in law, went up ... and they went and dwelt among the people", that is, "As for the children ... they etc.", cf. vv. 29, 30, 31 f. and 33. With the type *wə -'axar*, I would like to

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[44] As for *kəna'ănī*, I would like to point out that in this chapter we have *'āšērī* (v. 32) along with *'āšēr* (v. 31), and *naftālī* (only thus). According to BROCKELMANN, the ending *-īy* of Semitic indicates "Zugehörigkeit, zunächst zu einer menschlichen Gemeinschaft, einem Stamme, Volke oder einer Stadt". He considers this ending as "aus der ursemit. Genetiv-endung hervorgegangen" (Grundriss I, p. 397). Although BROCKELMANN is, I think, on the right track here, the phenomenon needs some clarification. Formally, it is true, we have here to deal with the genitive, but then of the plural, that is, we have to start from the collective plural, *-ū*, cas. obl. *-ī* (OS 17/1969, pp. 115 ff.) However, it is not in the function of a genitive that this *-ī* is used here but as the common collective ending *-ī* (cf. Hebrew *-ī-m*, Aramaic *-ī-n*, Arabic *-ūna, -īna > -īn*, Akkadian *šarrū, šarrī > šarrī*, and Ethiopic *'ahgūr-ī-hōmū* etc.). Thus, we have, at least originally, to do with a collective **kina'nī* "the inhabitants of **Kina'n-* *> ha-kkəna'ănī*. When the ending *-ī* was enlarged by the *-m* (*kəna'ănīm*), the old form *-ī* was felt to be a singular, in the sense of "a representative of" (cf. Hebrew *rəbī'ī* "fourth" < "the representative of 4"). This is *in nuce* the story of the so-called Nisba ending *-īy*, which is thus a derivation from the collective ending *-ī*.

[45] With the use of the constative here, we should compare the syntactic conjunctive *'ʰlē ... wə-hālaktī* Judges 1,3, and *'ʰšär-yakkā 'ät-Qiryat-Sefär ū-ləkādāh* ("and, on that occasion, takes it") 1,12 (cf. IA, pp. 113 ff. and p. 112).

compare, structurally or at any rate functionally, v. 32 *kī lō' hōrīšō* and v. 34 *kī-lō' nətānō*.

We have now considered the text, in its capacity of a network, as the highest level of linguistic behaviour. Already the ontologic transubstantiations to which the textemes are exposed within the framework of the text as an organization—transubstantiations which are to be considered as important elements of the grammar of the text, fundamental to text linguistics —constitute, of course, elements of style.

Moreover, our text as such is also transporting the receiver to a "world" the structure of which is dependent on the "horizon" or hermeneutical situation of the receiver. AUGUST BÖCKH, the greatest philologist of the nineteenth century, has formulated one of the most important tenets of hermeneutics thus: "Die Philologie sei die Erkenntniss des Erkannten. Unter dem Erkannten seien auch alle Vorstellungen mit einbegriffen." These "Vorstellungen" belong to the "world" of the receiver and the sender.

Now, the actual content of a text creates, to a certain extent, its so-called literary *genre* and thus also the organization of the texteme within the network of the text. However, considered as a purely formal network the text is pure syntax, textemes in different case-forms following on behind other textemes. But in consequence of the semantic properties of the textemes the text obtains a "discursivity" of its own which is purely expressive and comparable to a piece of art. This supratextual discursivity is the language of the text as such, a language, which, re-using the textemes as new symbolic signs, constitute signifiers of style. This kind of language, based on differences of the textemic combinations, is, like music (pp. 46 f.), devoid of pragmatic referents in the usual linguistic sense of the word, but it creates them within the framework of the emotional life of the receiver. As far as the metareferent of this purely formal language of style is concerned, it can be compared to that of a piece of art. A piece of art can be said to constitute a unity the form of which is its own content and the content of which is its own form, being at the same time its own metareferent, that is its own expressional value. This kind of expressional value is to be kept apart from the pragmatic referent, that is, the content of the piece of art in a concrete, pictorial sense.

LOUIS CARDAILLAC

Morisques et Chrétiens dans l'Espagne du XVIᵉ siècle

L'Espagne du XVIᵉ siècle et du début du XVIIᵉ est une grande puissance. Elle étonne le monde par sa splendeur. Son empire est fabuleux, il comprend, entre autres possessions, les Indes Occidentales et les provinces du Portugal — dont le Brésil — lorsque Philippe II, en 1580, devient également roi du Portugal. Sur cet immense empire « le soleil ne se couche pas ».

Par ailleurs, le XVIᵉ siècle est pour L'Occident catholique le siècle marqué, aux alentours des années 1550, par le Concile de Trente : l'Espagne, par ses théologiens s'y est présentée comme un champion de la catholicité. Elle est le porte-drapeau de l'unité religieuse. L'Escorial, ce palais proche de Madrid, est la forteresse symbole de résistance à l'hérésie. Philippe II déclarait qu'il préférait perdre ses états que de gouverner sur des hérétiques. L'Espagne considérait qu'il était de son devoir de défendre l'orthodoxie contre le péril protestant; mais elle avait aussi un autre problème dans le domaine religieux : depuis 1492 continuait à vivre en Espagne une minorité importante, officiellement convertie au catholicisme mais qui en fait continuait à avoir conscience d'appartenir à un autre monde et à adhérer dans le secret de son cœur à une autre religion, l'Islam. Il s'agit de la communauté morisque.

En Espagne, le problème morisque est apparu dès les premières décennies du XVIᵉ siècle, lorsque, à la suite de diverses péripéties, les anciens « mudéjares » durent, selon la volonté des gouvernants, se convertir au christianisme. On donne précisément le nom de Morisques à ces nouveaux convertis qui conservaient au fond d'eux mêmes la foi de leurs pères et qui officiellement étaient considérés comme des Chrétiens. La coexistence avec les Chrétiens dura jusqu'en 1609–1610, date des décrets d'expulsion signés par le roi Philippe III. Tout au long du siècle précédent, la politique officielle avait consisté à essayer d'assimiler la minorité morisque, mais en vain. C'est sur ces faits et sur le sentiment religieux des Morisques d'Espagne que nous allons réfléchir.

Les Morisques sont présents dans toute l'Espagne (au moment de l'expulsion ils seront environ 300 000). Ils sont surtout nombreux en Andalousie, Castille, Valence. Leurs conditions de vie sont différentes selon les provinces: en Castille, par exemple, ils étaient noyés dans la masse des chrétiens. A Grenade, ils conservèrent longtemps leur langue, leurs chefs, et une organisation sociale propre. A Valence et en Aragon, ils

étaient très nombreux et soumis à des seigneurs propriétaires terriens qui, à l'occasion, se faisaient leurs défenseurs face au pouvoir central.

C'est en tenant compte de ces différences que l'on a pu dire qu'il n'y avait pas en Espagne un problème morisque, mais des problèmes morisques. Néanmoins je voudrais insister aujourd'hui non sur ces nuances d'appréciation de la question morisque selon les provinces, mais sur ce qui fait la spécificité de la communauté morisque dans son ensemble, sur ce qui lui donne son unité, son âme, et qui est l'attachement aux valeurs de l'Islam.

Les sources de ma documentation sont doubles : d'une part, les écrits morisques, livres d'instruction religieuse ou de polémique, d'autre part, les témoignages faits à propos d'eux au cours des procès d'Inquisition.

A partir du moment où les Morisques reçoivent le baptême de force, la société qu'ils constituent va se convertir en une immense association semi-occulte; ainsi va naître un crypto-islam.

Les morisques, tout au long de leur présence en Espagne, auront le sentiment d'avoir été trompés. Ils ne comprennent pas qu'on ait voulu par de simples décrets annuler ainsi comme d'un trait de plume des traditions séculaires. Ils n'oublieront pas que dans les Capitulaciones de Granada (Accords de Grenade), les Rois Catholiques s'étaient engagés à tolérer leur foi pour toujours. Un Morisque, captif de l'Inquisition, affirme même que la reine catholique Isabelle est en Enfer pour s'être parjurée et avoir institué contre eux l'Inquisition, qu'il appelle « dolama », déformation hispanique du mot arabe avec son double sens de ténèbres et d'injustice.

Une telle situation ne pouvait que susciter la dissimulation vis-à-vis des Chrétiens. Concrètement pour les Morisques, le problème se pose sous cette forme : comment faire pour rester musulman dans un milieu hostile. Cela se manifeste très tôt en Espagne dès que les Morisques de Grenade, en 1501, sont obligés de se convertir au Christianisme. Précisément, un manuscrit aljamiado (ms en langue espagnole mais transcrit en caractères arabes) conservé à la Bibliothèque de l'Académie de l'Histoire de Madrid, est la réponse d'un Mufti d'Oran aux Morisques de Grenade, qui l'interrogent au sujet de la pratique de la religion. Cette fatwa du Mufti Ahmed ben Juma est datée au début décembre 1504 (recheb 910). Ce manuscrit n'est que la copie aljamiada d'un manuscrit arabe qui se trouve à la bibliothèque vaticane. D'autres copies tant aljamiadas qu'espagnoles, nous montrent l'importance d'un tel texte et sa diffusion aux XVIe siècle.

Le contenu de cette fatwa est double : nous y trouvons d'abord un rappel des grands principes fondamentaux de l'Islam présentés non de façon théorique mais en référence à la pratique en milieu chrétien. Il y est rappelé la croyance en l'unicité de Dieu et la reconnaissance de Muhammad comme prophète, l'obligation des prières rituelles, de l'aumône et des

ablutions, l'interdiction du vin et du porc ainsi que la défense faite aux musulmanes d'épouser des Chrétiens.

On en vient ensuite aux problèmes des rapports entre Musulmans et Chrétiens : que devra faire le Morisque chaque fois qu'il sera mis dans l'obligation de renier sa foi ou de professer celle qui n'est pas la sienne? De nombreux cas sont envisagés et chaque fois, une réponse est apportée : si les Chrétiens, par exemple, obligent les Musulmans à injurier le Prophète, ils devront alors prononcer son nom comme Hamed et penser non à l'envoyé de Dieu mais à Satan, ou à une personne portant ce nom.

Pour ce qui est des prières, lorsque le Morisque sera forcé à se rendre à l'Eglise à l'heure où précisément il devrait faire sa prière musulmane, il sera dispensé de celle-ci, et son culte lui sera compté comme s'il avait accompli la prescription coranique. De même, s'il est empêché de faire sa prière de jour, qu'il la fasse de nuit.

L'ablution rituelle pourra également être remplacée : suivant les circonstances, on se plongera dans la mer, ou l'on frottera son corps avec une substance propre terre ou bois. Si l'on est obligé de boire du vin ou de manger du porc, on pourra le faire, mais en sachant que c'est un acte impur, et en réservant son intention.

Enfin, problème essentiel, si les Morisques sont forcés de renier leur foi, ils devront essayer d'être évasifs, et si on les presse, ils devront intérieurement nier ce qu'on les oblige à dire : « Si l'on vous force à renier et qu'il vous soit possible de dissimuler, alors faites-le, et que vos cœurs restent inébranlables dans votre foi, et qu'ils nient les paroles que vos lèvres seront obligées de prononcer. » Nous avons donc là un ensemble de règles, casuistiques, qui donnent aux Morisques toute facilité pour conserver leur foi.

Les Morisques s'efforcèrent donc de conserver les pratiques religieuses compatibles avec leur situation en milieu chrétien; dans quelle mesure y parvinrent-ils?

Si les ablutions leur étaient difficiles, par contre l'usage de la prière coranique fut constant : de très nombreux formulaires de prières circulèrent tout au long du XVIe siècle. Il va sans dire que ces livres circulaient dans le plus grand secret, sous le manteau. Les Morisques récitaient souvent la *fātiḥa*. Le verset suivant « Dirige nous dans le chemin droit, le chemin de ceux que tu as comblés de bienfaits; non pas le chemin de ce qui encourent ta colère ni celui des égarés » est parfois commenté dans les textes morisques sous cette forme : « Délivre nous du chemin des maudits juifs et des chrétiens qui vivent dans l'erreur. » De cette façon, les morisques affirmaient plusieurs fois par jour leur appartenance à une communauté distincte de celle des Chrétiens.

La pratique de Pèlerinage à la Mecque, *al-ḥaǧǧ*, est attestée à travers

un témoignage exceptionnel intitulé « Les strophes du pèlerin de Puey Monzon ». Puey Monzon était un petit village d'Aragon. Il s'agit d'un récit en vers d'un pèlerinage à la fin du XVIe siècle. L'auteur nous y rapporte les difficultés d'une telle entreprise. Les obstacles étaient tels que bien peu furent les Morisques qui accomplirent un tel voyage. Néanmoins les traités morisques qui énumèrent les obligations religieuses des Musulmans mentionnent et développent même celle du pèlerinage au même titre que celles de la prière, du jeûne et de l'aumône.

Par contre, ils conservèrent tout au long du siècle les grandes fêtes musulmanes qui, selon les témoignages que nous en avons, étaient pour eux au nombre de quatre : la première, qu'ils appelaient « alaghat Asçagher », c'est à dire *al-ʿīd aṣ-ṣaġīr,* durait trois jours, et était la fête de la charité; on devait ce jour-la faire l'aumône aux pauvres. La deuxième était « ahetelquivir », c'est-à-dire *al-ʿīd al-kabīr.* Cette fête, que les Morisques appelaient « Pâque », commémorait le sacrifice d'Abraham, l'immolation des moutons se faisait selon un rituel très précis, dont on trouve mention dans plusieurs traités religieux morisques. La troisième était « Lalaaçora » (*ʿāšūrāʾ*) et se célébrait quarante jours après la seconde. Les traités morisques précisent que l'on commémore les grâces que Dieu à pareille date avait accordé à plusieurs de ses prophètes. Enfin, trois mois après, c'était la dernière de ces quatre fêtes, elle s'appelait « atheucia ».

C'était là des moments privilégiés pour la communauté morisque qui prenait alors conscience de l'esprit de groupe et aussi de son opposition au milieu environnant.

Les procès d'Inquisition nous apprennent qu'ils célébraient aussi selon leurs possibilités le Vendredi. Ce jour-là, ils avaient coutume de changer de linge et de s'habiller proprement. La nuit, à tour de rôle, ils réunissaient parents et amis pour chanter, danser, et manger leurs nourritures préférées. En 1538, par exemple, le Morisque Juan de Burgos sera traduit devant le tribunal de Tolède parce qu'il organisait chez lui des réunions où l'on venait la nuit jouer des instruments de musique, danser des « zambras » et manger du couscous. Il lui sera reproché ainsi qu'à ses invités de vivre comme en terre d'Islam, de chanter des mélodies arabes et d'utiliser leurs noms musulmans.

Ainsi les Morisques nous apparaissent comme ayant une double vie : l'une officielle et chrétienne, l'autre intime, islamique. Cela apparaîtra dans les grands moments de leur vie, où vont se juxtaposer deux rites.

Au moment de la naissance de leurs enfants, les parents morisques ne pouvaient refuser de les faire baptiser; mais chez eux, le soir même, ils organisaient une réunion amicale en guise d'antidote contre la cérémonie de l'Eglise : on récitait les versets du Coran, on imposait au bébé un nom musulman, qui, pour les familiers, se substituait au nom du baptême. De

même, la robe blanche, pour cette veillée, était remplacée par des atours typiquement morisques.

De même, vivre maritalement sans avoir reçu la bénédiction nuptiale est chez le Morisque un signe d'hérésie. Aussi la plupart se plient-ils à cette norme, et lorsqu'ils le peuvent, ils échangent leur consentement devant un cadi.

Au moment d'enterrer l'un des leurs, les Morisques juxtaposent leurs propres rites à la cérémonie chrétienne. Avant même d'appeler, ils auront suivi leurs propres traditions : ils ont d'abord fait la toilette funèbre avec des eaux de senteur, telles que les eaux de laurier, de romarin et de fleur d'oranger. Après la toilette, on habille le défunt avec ses plus beaux habits. Au cimetière, pendant ce temps, lorsque cela est possible, on prépare la tombe en suivant des rites : on y a porté les mets préférés du défunt, de plus, si le fossoyeur est morisque, on lui demande de creuser très profondément pour que le cadavre soit recouvert ainsi de terre non bénite.

Ainsi les Morisques vivant avec les Chrétiens ont senti le besoin de multiplier les rites religieux, qui sont donc souvent par conséquent des « contre-rites ».

Face à l'instruction religieuse que les Chrétiens veulent donner aux Morisques, ceux-ci, pour maintenir vives leurs croyances musulmanes, organisent eux-mêmes leur propre enseignement. Dans la culture religieuse des Morisques, il faudra distinguer plusieurs niveaux : celui du peuple illettré, qui assimile à sa façon la doctrine reçue clandestinement, celui des gens qui savent lire, et qui transmettent cette culture, et enfin, celui des *alfaquis* et des personnes savantes qui écrivent ces textes.

L'Inquisition, suivant en cela l'exemple des Rois Catholiques, qui firent brûler de nombreux livres arabes, après la conquête de Grenade, pourchassaient livres et manuscrits susceptibles de transmettre le dogme islamique. Divers décrets ordonnèrent aux morisques de les remettre aux autorités, mais les Morisques gardèrent leurs livres et l'Inquisition alors les poursuit. Il était méritoire de conserver de tels livres, car la condamnation pour ce motif comportait de graves peines : en 1564, un Morisque reçut ainsi 200 coups de fouet, et dut passer 5 ans aux galères. Cette sentence comportait en tous les cas la confiscation des biens pour hérésie et apostasie.

Les livres religieux et les textes de prière circulaient de main en main; ceux qui savaient lire les lisaient et les commentaient aux analphabètes. D'autres fois, des familles conservaient chez elles les divers textes religieux qu'elles recueillaient et les réunissaient en un volume qui servait à l'instruction religieuse de la famille. De génération en génération, le volume grossissait. Ainsi l'Inquisition d'Aragon saisit-elle en 1567 chez un certain Rodrigo el Rubio un manuscrit de ce genre, écrit de diverses mains. Cer-

taines pièces sont du XVe siècle et d'autres du XVIe; dans les textes les plus anciens, l'écriture est de type maghrébin, et dans les plus récentes, elle est anguleuse et mal formée. Certaines pages sont écrites en arabe, et d'autres en aljamiado. On y trouve surtout des extraits coraniques et des sermons du Vendredi. Ce manuscrit est conservé à la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris. Autre découverte peu après l'expulsion, en Castille, à Ciudad Real : dans la cavité d'un mur furent trouvés 14 liasses qui furent remises à un interprète, qui en fit l'examen et en dressa le catalogue. La liste qui nous en est restée est très instructive car elle nous permet d'apprécier l'enracinement des Morisques dans leur communauté islamique. Ces manuscrits, dont certains sont en arabe et d'autres en aljamiado, peuvent être classées en quatre catégories : 1° des transcriptions coraniques; 2° des livres religieux : hadith du Prophète, sermons recueils de prières; 3° des livres d'organisation sociale à partir des préceptes coraniques; 4° des livres de culture scientifique (l'Almageste de Ptolémée) ou médicale (soins à donner en cas de différentes maladies).

Ces traités religieux d'endoctrinement sont donc écrits spécialement pour les Morisques; malheureusement fort peu sont parvenus jusqu'à nous, puisque l'Inquisition les brûlait. Ils se présentaient parfois sous forme de dialogue entre un *alfaqui* et un Morisque qui posait des questions. L'Inquisition de Tolède saisit à plusieurs reprises de tels livres. D'autres fois ces textes étaient de simples traductions de textes arabes antérieurs. C'est le cas de nombreux textes aljamiados. De tels textes présentaient l'avantage de pouvoir être lus directement à un auditoire. En effet, d'après les renseignements que nous avons, il apparaît que dès 1540 en Castille, la masse des Morisques ne connaît plus l'arabe, ne le comprend plus et n'en a gardé que des formes figées, les formules de prière par exemple.

Il faut répéter que cette instruction religieuse se faisait dans le plus grand secret. Ceux qui savaient lire et possédaient un Coran organisaient chez eux des veillées; ils lisaient le livre et le traduisaient en secret à leurs amis. Les prosélytes seront particulièrement recherchés et châtiés par l'Inquisition. Certaines personnalités, du fait de leur science, de la sainteté de leur vie, du prestige dont elles jouissent dans la communauté, assument le rôle de propagateur de la foi. Il est à noter qu'il s'agit parfois de quelqu'un qui a la réputation d'être devin ou mage, et qui transmet en même temps que les préceptes coraniques des superstitions populaires. En 1540, à Tolède, l'un de ces devins s'était acquis une certaine célébrité; et sa maison était un lieu de réunion très fréquenté. A son nombreux auditoire, il prétendait qu'il faisait des miracles et qu'il était en rapport avec l'au-delà. Mais l'instruction religieuse restait néanmoins le but premier de ces réunions.

Cette conscience d'appartenir à une communauté a donc une base essen-

tiellement religieuse. Elle développe une grande solidarité entre les Morisques, un esprit de corps qui se manifestera dans les grandes circonstances, au moment des soulèvements par exemple. Le Morisque a conscience au plus profond de lui-même, qu'il appartient à une société différente de celle dans laquelle on veut l'inclure. Il est non seulement d'un monde différent, mais même d'un camp opposé. Ce sentiment est manifeste dans les cas de fuite vers les terres d'Islam. Les archives d'Inquisition sont remplies de procès intentés à des gens que l'on a fait prisonniers alors qu'ils essayaient de s'enfuir vers le Maghreb. Pour rejoindre la terre de Barbarie, il y avait trois chemins possibles : le premier passait par l'Aragon et la France et conduisait généralement en Tunisie, le deuxième passait par Carthagène où l'on s'embarquait de nuit pour Alger. Si l'on se dirigeait vers le Maroc, on empruntait alors la troisième route, et on prenait le départ sur la côte sud de l'Andalousie. Cette conscience d'appartenir à « l'autre camp » sera encore plus grande dans les années qui précédèrent l'expulsion. On peut en voir la preuve dans ce chant répandu parmi les Morisques d'Aragon et de Castille dans la première décennie du XVIIe siècle : « On dit que nous devrons abandonner cette terre pour en rejoindre une autre, où l'or et l'argent se trouvent en abondance; partons tous retrouver nos frères, vers cette terre ou se trouve tout notre bien. » Ce chant exprime bien l'espérance qui habitait le cœur des Morisques : retrouver leurs frères et cesser enfin d'être une minorité qui se pare à leurs yeux de toutes les couleurs du merveilleux; la terre d'Islam est pour eux une terre promise, qui leur sera d'autant plus douce qu'ils pensent y trouver ce dont ils sont privés en Espagne.

Cette séparation de deux communautés à l'intérieur même de l'Espagne représente bien l'opposition de deux mondes : cela apparaît dans les discussions sur les événements politiques contemporains : si le Chrétien se félicite des succès remportés par les troupes espagnoles sur « l'infidèle », le Morisque s'en attriste; inversement, il se réjouira lorsque ceux de l'autre camp auront à déplorer une défaite.

Ainsi en 1542, l'année qui suivit l'échec de l'expédition de Charles V contre Alger, plusieurs Morisques seront poursuivis pour avoir pris parti dans une conversation en faveur des Turcs. L'issue de la bataille de Lépante les attrista, par contre, la prise de Tunis et de la Goulette par les Turcs en 1547 réjouit les Morisques. Dans les villages les plus reculés d'Aragon et de Castille, ils commentent ces événements, qu'ils suivent avec le plus grand intérêt. Un rapport de l'Inquisition de Saragosse du début de 1575 note que dans de nombreux villages aragonais les Morisques manifestent ostensiblement leur joie.

Nous venons de souligner les interférences qu'ont entre eux le fait religieux et le plan politique. Cela va apparaître encore dans le dernier

point que nous allons traiter maintenant : prophétisme et messianisme tout au long du XVIᵉ siècle.

Tout au long du siècle circulèrent de nombreux textes qui prophétisaient pour les Morisques une victoire prochaine et la venue d'un libérateur. De tels textes stimulaient la foi et l'espoir des Morisques. Dans ces prophéties apparaissent les deux aspects propres à ce genre d'œuvres : l'espérance d'une conquête politique et la foi dans la victoire de l'Islam. L'un de ces textes dit : « Les Turcs iront avec leurs armées jusqu'à Rome, et d'entre les Chrétiens ne seront sauvés que ceux qui se convertiront à la loi du Prophète; les autres seront capturés ou tués. » Le prophétisme est pour les Morisques un fait religieux. L'essentiel de ces prophéties se rattache au Coran ou au prophète, et, dans tous les cas, se veut d'inspiration co-ranique.

On y précise d'abord que le Coran est l'accomplissement des promesses contenues dans la Thora et dans la Bible. Sans doute le Prophète est-il présenté dans tous les textes morisques comme le sceau des prophètes, celui qui vient conclure et parfaire toutes les prophéties. Néanmoins, le peuple a la conviction intime que de nombreux prophètes surgissent dans leurs communautés pour leur expliquer le sens caché des prédictions coraniques, ou même pour leur dévoiler leur destin de peuple de Dieu.

Nombre de prophéties trouvent donc leur origine dans Muhammad, qui aurait prédit plusieurs siècles à l'avance les malheurs et les épreuves qu'auraient à supporter les Morisques. Selon ce texte, saisi par l'Inquisition de Tolède, le Prophète se mit un jour à pleurer. Ses disciples lui ayant demandé les raisons de sa peine, il répondit : « il viendra un temps où les nôtres conquerront un territoire sur les Chrétiens et ensuite viendra un autre temps où les Chrétiens reprendront cette terre, et, après avoir repris Grenade, les Chrétiens convertiront par la force les fidèles de l'Islam, et ils les soumettront même à la peine du feu. Mais les Morisques doivent savoir que maintenant que toutes ces prophéties sont accomplies, ils sont au bout de leurs souffrances. Muhammad en effet a terminé sa prophétie en leur promettant un libérateur, à eux de savoir le reconnaître. »

Ce prophétisme et ce messianisme apparaîtront dans plusieurs procès d'Inquisition, et cela à différentes époques et en différents lieux. Il semble que ce fut en effet une constante de la psychologie morisque et l'expression de son espoir en un destin meilleur, et de son opposition à la société chrétienne.

Ainsi à Tolède plusieurs morisques se réunissent chez l'un d'eux qui les encourage par des prophéties à rester fidèles à leur foi. Il affirmait que 30 prophètes allaient se répandre dans la Chrétienté pour prêcher l'Islam. Toujours en Castille, à Talavera, à la veille de l'expulsion, un Morisque annonce aux siens la venue d'un grand seigneur qui doit les prendre sous

sa protection. A Grenade, en 1569, un texte circule, qui annonce que le salut est proche et qu'il viendra d'Afrique du Nord : Bougie, Oran et Ceuta seront d'abord reconquis, ensuite une nouvelle invasion de l'Espagne aura lieu, en suivant la route de Tariq, miraculeusement ouverte. Nous trouvons le même phénomène en Aragon et à Valence. En 1574, un homme de Constantinople parcourait les villages d'Aragon en lisant une prophétie. Quelques années plus tard, un certain Alexandre Castellano, morisque de Calanda, est revenu de Turquie où il avait fui en 1560, il dit être mandé par le Turc pour vérifier si certains signes contenus dans une prophétie sont maintenant réalisés. Il dit que le temps de la conquête de l'Espagne par les Turcs est maintenant venu, car il a pu constater que tous ces signes sont maintenant accomplis.

Nous voyons donc que, si ces prophéties expriment une espérance religieuse, elles affirment bien aussi la foi en un destin politique précis. Au désir d'universalisme de la Chrétienté répond la même affirmation à un universalisme musulman. Chez les Chrétiens avaient cours des prophéties analogues, qui, à l'inverse, prévoyaient la victoire de la Chrétienté sur les Turcs et la conversion de ces derniers au christianisme.

En guise de conclusion de notre exposé, quelques remarques s'imposent : L'œuvre morisque écrite qui nous reste nous offre un abrégé de ce que fut l'histoire de cette minorité : après les manuscrits arabes on trouve des manuscrits aljamiados qui sont le signe d'une dégradation culturelle, en même temps que celui de l'attachement à cette même culture; les manuscrits en langue espagnole témoignent eux, d'une certaine assimilation. Après l'expulsion, les auteurs vont se replonger dans la culture islamique; ils commenceront par traduire en Espagnol des œuvres arabes, puis, leur connaissance de l'arabe augmentant, ils écriront directement dans la langue du Coran. Le cycle sera alors terminé.

Autre remarque : il est nécessaire de replacer cette étude dans son contexte historique. Les croyances, les rites des Morisques ne sont pas tous d'une grande orthodoxie musulmane : de par leurs conditions de vie en milieu chrétien, ils arrivent même d'une certaine façon à calquer leur vision religieuse sur celle des Chrétiens, en lui donnant un signe contraire.

De par leur acculturation, imposée par les gouvernants, nombreux sont ceux qui relâcheront leurs liens avec l'Islam. Mais il y a toujours dans leur religiosité un désir de se sentir solidaires d'une communauté, même si cela se situe à un niveau culturellement peu élevé. Dans ce XVIe siècle, nous sommes loin de l'apogée culturelle qui fit la gloire du califat de Cordoue au Xe siècle. Mais le mérite des Morisques ne fut-il pas précisément d'avoir réussi à garder intacte leur personnalité, qui les fera reconnaître pour des frères par les maghrébins au moment de leur expulsion, même si leurs particularités pourront parfois les choquer.

HEIKKI PALVA

Characteristics of the Arabic Dialect of the Bani Ṣaxar Tribe

1. The tribe

1.1. The present tribal area (*dîraʰ*) of the Bani Ṣaxar (adj. and n. unit. *ṣxari*, plur. *ṣxûr*) extends from the southern suburbs of ᶜAmmān to the wells of Bāyir about 150 km south-west of the capital. In the west the border of the area follows the line Wād es-Sīr–Mādaba–Ḍībān. The tribe is divided into two subtribes, aṭ-Ṭwaga and al-Ćaᶜābna, and its paramount sheikh is ᶜĀkif Miṭgāl al-Fāyiz. It is difficult to estimate the number of members of the tribe, but about forty thousand persons may be a realistic figure. Many of them have received a good education in Jordan or abroad and hold important posts in the cultural, economic, and political life of the Hashemite Kingdom.

1.2. The Bani Ṣaxar are traditionally looked upon as an *’aṣîl* tribe, i.e., "pure of origin and blood".[1] Up to the 19th century they were mainly camel breeders and sheep raisers, but at the turn of the 20th century the leading clans, first Fāyiz, then also Xrēša and Zebn, became interested in cultivation, and settled down in the fertile areas south of ᶜAmmān.[2]

The Bani Ṣaxar moved to the area between Wādi Sirḥān and the cultivated lands of Transjordan mainly during the 16th and 17th centuries. They came from al-Ḥiğāz, where they had wandered between Tēma, al-ᶜUla and Madā’in Ṣāliḥ.[3] The tribe claims to be descended from the Ḥarb, who, during the first Islamic centuries, lived in the south of al-Ḥiğāz.[4] According to OPPENHEIM, this tradition is, however, recent and not based on historical fact; rather, there is a connection between the Bani Ṣaxar and an older tribe with the same name, which belonged to the Ṭayyi’, but the consciousness of this relation has been lost, because the leading section of aṭ-Ṭwaga is of another origin.[5]

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[1] About the *’aṣîl* and non-*’aṣîl* tribes, see DICKSON, The Arab, p. 111f.

[2] For descriptions of the Bani Ṣaxar, see OPPENHEIM, Die Beduinen, II, pp. 232–250; PEAKE, Jordan, pp. 215–219; MUSIL, Arabia Petraea, III, pp. 112–119.

[3] OPPENHEIM, Die Beduinen, II, p. 232; MUSIL, Northern Neğd, p. 129, footnote 74, with references to al-Hamdānī, Ṣifat ğazīrat al-ᶜarab (ed. Müller), I, p. 131, and Yāqūt, Kitāb muᶜğam al-buldān (ed. Wüstenfeld), III, p. 638.

[4] PEAKE, Jordan, p. 215; for the tribal legends, see MUSIL, Arabia Petraea, II, p. 116; JAUSSEN, Coutumes, p. 107f.; OPPENHEIM, Die Beduinen, II, p. 240.

[5] OPPENHEIM, Die Beduinen, II, p. 232; CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 236f.; RABIN, AWA, p. 194c.

2. Studies on the dialect

2.1. During his field studies in the villages of Ḥōrān, JEAN CANTINEAU met a member of the Bani Ṣaxar in the guest-room of the sheikh of the village Sāl in northern ᶜAǧlūn in the autumn of 1936. With this informant he made a direct grammatical inquiry which was, however, disturbed by the presence of local peasants. Consequently, the result was, in Cantineau's words, "fort médiocre" and therefore in need of checking and further study.[6]

On the basis of the inquiry, Cantineau classifies the dialect of the Bani Ṣaxar (henceforth BṢ) as belonging to a group called by him Group Bc, i.e. dialects of the Šammari type (Group B), but with many similarities to the dialects of the Syro-Mesopotamian sheep-rearing semi-nomads (Group C). Group Bc comprises, among the dialects studied by Cantineau, those of the ᶜUmūr, Ṣlūt, Sardīye, Sirḥān, and the Jordanian branch of the Bani Xālid. Despite insufficient material there are, according to Cantineau, enough facts to indicate that BṢ undoubtedly belongs to the same group.[7]

2.2. While working with the sedentary dialects in the districts of al-Balqā' and al-Karak in October–November 1976, I also visited Bedouin tribes of the adjacent areas. I spent the last days of October among BṢ in the village of al-Lubban south of ᶜAmmān as a guest of the Abu Ǧnēb clan.[8] During the visit I made a short systematic inquiry about the dialect of the tribe and recorded conversations, stories and poems. The main informants were two men, about 30 and 40 years of age, but I could make observations of the idiolects of 15 more persons representing both sexes and different ages. This material agrees with my observations made during contacts with other members of the tribe in January 1970 and January 1979 (the Xrēša and Fāyiz clans).

A comparison of the results with CANTINEAU's data showed some significant differences. Cantineau does not mention the clan to which his informant belonged, and therefore the divergencies could be attributed to actual differences between the vernaculars of different clans. It is, however, more probable that most of them are due to the circumstances in which Cantineau had to make his inquiry. I am, of course, very well aware of the shortcomings of my inquiry and the insufficiency of my material in many respects, but I wish nevertheless to be able to confirm

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[6] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 121.

[7] Ibid., p. 232.

[8] I am much obliged to the Jordanian Ministry of Culture and Information and the Jordanian Television Company for all the generous help extended to me during the study. I also wish to express my warmest thanks to the members of the Abu Ǧnēb clan, especially to Mr. Fawwāz Abu Ǧnēb (Jneib) and his family, for their great hospitality.

many details in Cantineau's study, and to correct and complement some others.

2.3. The aim of this paper is to put together the data given by Cantineau for BṢ and the results of my inquiry, and on the basis of selected typologically important features to define the main characteristics of the dialect. A more comprehensive study is—as pointed out by Cantineau—highly desirable, and I hope that this short study will give some hints of the problems implied.

3. Phonetics and phonemics

3.1. *Consonants*

The consonant phonemes of BṢ are, in the Arabic alphabetical order, ', *b, t, ṯ, ǧ, ḥ, x, d, ḍ, r, z, s, š, ṣ, ḍ, ṭ, ᶜ, ġ, f, g, k, ć, l, m, n, h, w,* and *y.*

The glottal stop ' occurs mainly post-pausally followed immediately by a vowel, and, besides, often in the pre-pausal position after a vowel, e.g. *ǧa/ǧâ* 'he came' in the middle of a breath group, but *ǧa'/ǧâ'* pre-pausally.

As in all the Bedouin dialects studied to date, the older interdentals *ṯ* and *ḍ* have been retained. The two old Arabic phonemes in Classical Arabic represented by the graphemes § ḍ § and § ẓ §, have merged into one, *ḍ.*

The most frequent reflex of *ǧīm* is *ǧ* [dʒ], but [gʸ], which is often difficult to distinguish from [g], also occurs.[9] The distribution of the two allophones does not seem to be phonetically conditioned. Thus, they can most plausibly be regarded as free variants. The use of the two variants also vacillates noticeably in one and the same idiolect.

The reflexes of *qāf* and *kāf* are *g* and *k* respectively; in the contiguity of front vowels they can, but need not, be realized as affricates *ǵ* [dz] and *ć* [ts] respectively, e.g. *ǵâᶜid* [dza:ᶜed] 'sitting, having sat', but *nyâg* [nya:g] 'she-camels', *'inćân* ['intsa:n] 'if', but *kân* [ka:n] 'he was', *râćib* [ra:tseb] 'riding, having ridden', but *mâkil* [ma:kel] 'eating, having eaten'. Thus the variants, strictly speaking, do not occur in complementary distribution. Of the affricates, *ǵ* is always a phonetically conditioned combinatory variant and cannot therefore be regarded as an independent phoneme, whereas, in some cases, *ć* occurs irrespective of the phonetic environments, and has thus been developed into a phoneme, cf. the minimal pair *'abûk* 'your (sing. m.) father' vs. *'abûć* 'your (sing. f.) father', and, on the other hand, *'ana nâsîk* 'I have forgotten you (sing. m.)' vs. *'ana nâsîć* 'I have forgotten you

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[9] If *gʸ > ǧ*, at least one more variant should occur, viz. *dʸ*, because *g > gʸ > dʸ > ǧ*; see CANTINEAU, Cours, p. 57. If *dʸ* does not occur, this could imply that *g/gʸ* is the old genuine Šammari variant, whereas *ǧ* has been borrowed from dialects of Group C.

(sing. f.)'. Since the number of the minimal pairs is very limited, the phonemic status of *č* is still of marginal character.

In a final, especially pre-pausal, position some consonants (the resonants *r*, *l*, *m* and *n*, and the *t* of the plur. f. morpheme /-āt/ in st. abs.) show a tendency to be weakened, e.g. *'axa^r* 'another', *gâ^l* 'he said', *yammaka^m* 'with you (plur. m.)', *ʿuyû^n* 'eyes', *ṭayyibâ^h* 'good (plur. f.)'. The phenomenon occurs most frequently after a long vowel.

As far as the dialect typology is concerned, it can be noticed that the dialects of the Syro-Mesopotamian sheep-rearing Bedouin (Group C) have:

(a) The reflexes *g*/*ǧ* and *k*/*č* of *qāf* and *kāf*, respectively.
(b) The *ǧ* reflex of *ǧīm*.
(c) No tendency to weaken the final *r*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *t*.

On the other hand, the dialects of the camel-rearing tribes belonging to the ʿAnaze (Group A) and Šammar (Group B) confederations have:

(a) The reflexes *g*/*ǵ* and *k*/*ć* of *qāf* and *kāf*, respectively.
(b) The reflexes *g*, *g^u*, *d^u* of *ǧīm*.
(c) In Group B, a tendency to weaken the final *r*, *l*, *m*, *n* and *t*; in Group A, no such tendency.[10]

As to criterion (a), the consonant system of BṢ is no doubt characteristic of the latter type. CANTINEAU, on the other hand, proposes the Group C characteristics for the tribe.[11] This is probably due to the disturbances during the inquiry; it is, of course, possible but hardly likely that some clans of the tribe actually use the affricates *ǧ* and *č* for *qāf* and *kāf*, respectively, in the genuine dialect.

The reflex of *ǧīm* in BṢ is a very intricate problem. CANTINEAU has only attested the reflex *ǧ* for BṢ, however, by way of reserve: "peut-être ... si mon enquête de Sāl a été bonne sur ce point, ce dont je doute".[12] The reservation bears upon the possibility that the genuine reflex might actually be *y*, as reported by WETZSTEIN.[13] In my opinion, the question

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[10] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 230; JOHNSTONE, Affrication, pp. 210–241; see also id., EADS, pp. 2–6 and Map 2.

[11] Ibid., p. 141.

[12] Ibid., p. 136.

[13] WETZSTEIN, Zeltlagern, p. 138, gives *y* for the Sardīye, Bani Ṣaxar, Fḥēl, aš-Šarārāt, and the sedentaries of Tēma, al-Ǧōf, Ǧubba, and Ḥā'il, as well as for some tribes of Lower Euphrates. CANTINEAU could attest the *y* reflex only for the Sardīye, Sirḥān and al-Ǧōf, Nomades, I, p. 24 f., II, pp. 136–138. The occurrence of the *y* reflex is discussed by JOHNSTONE, The Sound Change J > Y, pp. 233–241. His conclusions are, mutatis mutandis, presumably applicable to the occurrence of other reflexes as well: (a) the sound change *j* > *y* is not conditioned by phonetic context, (b) in a number of common words *ǧīm* is not pronounced *y*, (c) the process is apparently reversible at will, though such reversal is unusual with the commonest words, (d) this feature cuts across the normal dialect boundaries, p. 241.

is not one of the reflex of *ǧīm* in the dialect, but rather of its reflexes and how they are distributed. In my material two reflexes occur, *ǧ* and *g/g^y*, seemingly phonetically unconditioned, the former being the more frequent variant. My Šammari material from Tēma, on the other hand, shows only non-affricated *g/g^y* reflexes in all phonetic environments, e.g. *harga* 'talk', *ragol* 'man', *gamb* 'beside', *gûwa* 'inside', *gîna/g^{y}îna* 'we came', *nigi/nig^{y}i* 'we come', *lagil* 'because of', *laglinni* 'because I'.[14] ABBOUD, however, gives only the affricate *ǧ* (*j*) for the Šammari dialect of Ḥāʾil.[15] Thus, the available data display a great variation, and therefore it would be fallacious in the case in question to use the reflexes of *ǧīm* as conclusive criteria for typological classifications.[16]

Criterion (c), the tendency to weaken certain consonants in final position, is typologically fairly conclusive evidence. Among the North Arabian dialects it can be regarded as a hallmark of the Šammari type (Group B). WETZSTEIN ascribes the feature to *ʾahl aš-šimāl*, i.e. the Sardīye, Bani Ṣaxar, Fḥēl, and Sirḥān, as well as to the ʿAnazi tribes.[17] CANTINEAU could not, however, observe it in the ʿAnazi dialects of the Wild ʿAli and ar-Rwala which were included in his inquiry. In Group Bc he found a weakened final *t* of the feminine plural morpheme /-āt/ in the dialects of the ʿUmūr, Ṣlūt and Bani Ṣaxar, and a weakened final *n* in the first-mentioned dialect, but in Group B the weakening tendency of final *r*, *l*, *m*, *n*, and *t* appeared to be of common occurrence.[18] In the Šammari dialect of Ḥāʾil, the allo-

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[14] These data suggest that the *g* reflex does not occur in contingency with front vowels. The material is, however, too limited to justify such a conclusion.

[15] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 4.

[16] BLANC, Negev, p. 116: *ǧ, ž, d^y*.

[17] WETZSTEIN, Zeltlagern, p. 176f. His note is probably based on correct observations about the dialects of the tribes which he calls *ʾahl aš-šimāl*. The pre-pausal /-āh/, /-āy/ allomorph at the ends of verses is a common feature in Bedouin poetry, and this might have caused Wetzstein to attribute it to the ʿAnazi dialects, too.

[18] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 20, II, pp. 129–136. It is interesting to note that Zamaxšarī, Mufaṣṣal (ed. Broch, Christiania 1879), p. 176, § 690, citing the grammarian Quṭrub, reports that the Ṭayyiʾ dialect had this feature: *kayfa l-banūna wa-l-banāh, kayfa l-ʾixwatu wa-l-ʾaxawāh*. The Šammar are alleged descendants of the Ṭayyiʾ, and a hallmark of the dialect of this tribe was, according to Lisān al-ʿarab X, 159, the *quṭʿa*, a violent shortening of words in the vocative, a phenomenon which, as RABIN supposes, was perhaps not restricted to the vocative, and which might have been parallel with the weakening of certain final consonants in the Šammari dialects, AWA, pp. 194f. and 207; cf. CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 21, II, p. 236. The theory is supported by the fact that the Ṭayyiʾ tribe was of Yemenite origin, and the same phenomenon has been attested for some Yemenite dialects, see ROSSI, Appunti, p. 236; id., Ṣanʿāʾ, p. 4 (*m, n, l*); GOITEIN, Jemenische Geschichten, p. 166f.; DIEM, Skizzen, p. 24 (Yasīʿ, N. Plateau, unvoicing of the final *l, m, n* after a long vowel or a diphthong: *gâl* 'he said', pre-pausally *gâʾ*), p. 40 (S. Plateau), p. 78 (SW mountain range).

morph of the feminine plural morpheme occurring pre-pausally and before words beginning with a consonant is /-āy/.[19]

3.2. *Vowels*

3.2.1. The short vowel phonemes of BṢ are /a/, /i/ and /u/. The contrast between the latter two phonemes tends to be neutralized in most positions. They are relatively stable in unstressed closed final syllables where they are realized as [e] and [o], respectively; /i/ is very frequent in this position, whereas /u/ occurs in a few cases only, e.g. in the suff. pron. for sing. 3. m. /-uʰ/ and in the imperfect and imperative of some verbs in Form I, e.g. *yaktub*, *ʾuktub*. Although minimal pairs showing the phonemic contrast between /i/ and /u/ are rare, it is important to note that they are not inter-changeable in this position, and, on the other hand, that the vowel quality here does not depend on *i* or *u*-colouring environments. In the minimal pair /yagᶜud/ 'he sits' vs. /yigᶜid/ 'he awakes', /u/ vs. /i/ is not, of course, the only phonemic contrast, but it is the most pertinent one, since the /i/ of the prefix of the latter form is the result of the vowel harmony and thus depends on the quality of the stem vowel.

In unstressed open syllables, /i/ and /u/ are either dropped or reduced and do not form contrasts. In such a case the contrast between the stem vowels /i/ and /u/ in some verbal forms can be neutralized, and the contrast is maintained in the closed stressed initial syllable only: *ʾugᶜ(u)du* 'sit (imperat. plur. 2. m.)' vs. *ʾigᶜ(i)du* 'awake (imperat. plur. 2. m.)'. The /i/ of the imperfect prefix is usually also preserved when occurring in an unstressed open syllable, but in free variation with zero, e.g. *yigûl ~ ygûl*, *tigûl ~ tgûl*.

/a/ is retained in most positions thus contrasting with the diffuse vowels /i/ and /u/. There are, however, several cases where /a/ is also dropped, e.g. the /a/ of the feminine morpheme /-at/ before pronominal suffixes as well as the first /a/ in the sequence CaCaCV-, whereas the second /a/ is either preserved or changed into /i/ or /u/ depending on the phonetic environments; see 3.3. below.

In the perfect of Form I the first /a/ in the older CaCaC- vowel pattern has been centralized and then changed to /i/ or /u/ depending on the adjacent consonants, e.g. *kitab*, *miša*, *ruma*. The /a/ of the initial syllable is however preserved when C_1 is a pharyngal or a pharyngalized ("emphatic") consonant, or when C_2 is *n*, *l*, or *r*, e.g. *ḥaᶜa*, *ḍarab*, *gara*.

3.2.2. BṢ has five long vowel phonemes: /ā/, /ī/, /ū/, /ē/, and /ō/, the last two of which are as a rule monophthongized older diphthongs. In some cases the monophthongization is stable, e.g. *wên*, *ᶜalê-*, *garêt*, *sôlaf*,

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[19] A possible exception is *-â* plus pron. suff. for sing. 3. m. if CANTINEAU's transcription *ġadâᵉ* 'his lunch' is correct, see Nomades, II, p. 181.

galôli, haḍôla, but most often it is unstable, e.g. *bêt ~ beyt, yôm ~ yowm,* the monophthongized variants occurring far more frequently, however. All vowels in final position in words are phonemically long, but /ē/ and /ō/ do not occur in this position.[19] Long vowels are normally, but not always, phonetically shortened in unstressed final syllables. Thus, items such as *mánhū* 'who?' and *wišínhū* 'what?' are usually pronounced with a long or half-long final vowel. The allophonic range of the long vowels is rather narrow. Apart from the normal flattening of all vowels immediately after pharyngals or pharyngalized consonants, only slight allophonic variation occurs in /ā/, depending on the phonetic environments.

3.2.3. The information available on the vowels does not provide many criteria for classification of Bedouin dialects of the North Arabian dialect area. The reflexes of the older final *-ā* seem, however, to follow certain dialect boundaries. According to CANTINEAU, 'imālized (front) reflexes are frequent in the dialects of Group C, whereas Group A and Group B totally lack this feature.[20] Neither does BṢ have 'imālized reflexes, cf. the forms *ḥinna, -na, -ha* below. This agrees with the data given by Cantineau, who has noted the phenomenon in the dialects of the Sardīye (Bc), Bani Xālid (Bc) and Sirḥān (Bc) as well.[21] For the allomorphs of the nominal feminine morpheme in the singular, see 4.3.1. below.

3.3. *The syllable structure*

When a pronominal suffix beginning with a consonant follows the sequences CVCC or CV̄C, an /a/ occurs before the suffix, e.g. *widdana* 'we want', *ʿindaham* 'with them, in their (m.) house', *fakkahin* 'he set them (f.) free', *yammakam* 'near you (plur. m.)', *ǧibtaham* 'I brought them (m.)', *gâlahin* 'he uttered them (i.e. the words)', *bênaham* 'between them, among them (m.)', but usually not between two identical consonants, e.g. *bênna* 'between us', *ʿurbânna* 'our Bedouin'. This feature is reported for BṢ by CANTINEAU as well, who gives 24 instances, all of which are nouns in the plural, e.g. *rûsᵃna* 'our heads', *ᶜᵒyûnakâm* 'your (plur. m.) eyes', but *ᵓᵃdânna* 'our ears', *xwânna* 'our brothers'.[22] This syllable structure is called "tro-

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[20] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 44 f., II, p. 148 (exc. the Mawāli); cf. MONTAGNE, Contes, p. 75.

[21] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 44 f., II, p. 148.

[22] Ibid., II, pp. 159–161. He sees here a preserved inflectional vowel ("conservation d'un ancien *-a-*, voyelle de flexion, en syllabe ouverte, et après une syllabe longue"). BROCKEL-MANN, Grundriss, I, p. 213, gives the same explanation for the Egyptian Arabic vowels in the same position, e.g. *ʿandeha, ʿamaltaha.* This is also SCHREIBER's opinion as far as the Meccan equivalents are concerned; see Mekka, p. 16 f. He also notes that the older inflectional vowels /i/ and /u/ have been replaced by /a/ in all positions. In the Šammari dialect of Ḥāʾil, the quality of this vowel is the same as the vowel of the suffix: *šiftaham* 'I saw them (m.)', *šiftihin* 'I saw them (f.)', *killaham* 'all of them (m.)', *ʿaddihin* 'he counted them (f.)', ABBOUD, Najdi, pp. 83, 32, 67.

chaic" by Cantineau, who found it characteristic of groups A, B and Bc, which in this respect contrast with Group C of which the syllable structure is "atrochaic".

As pointed out by CANTINEAU, the /a/ of the nominal feminine morpheme /-at/ is preserved under similar phonetic conditions in groups A and B, e.g. *nâgöti* 'my she-camel', as well as in several dialects of Group Bc (ᶜUmūr, Ṣlūt, Bani Xālid, Sirḥān), whereas some Bc dialects (Mawāli, Bani Ṣaxar, al-Ğōf) have the structure typical of Group C, e.g. *nâgti*.[23] The same observation can be made on the basis of my material for BṢ, e.g. *ćilmtên* 'a couple of words (or verses)', *ghawtak* < *gahwtak* 'your (sing. m.) coffee', but *middatin ṭawîla*[h] 'a long time', where the vowel is preserved in order to prevent the assimilation of /dd/ into the following /t/. In this detail BṢ seems to deviate from the trochaic syllable structure of groups A and B and to follow that of Group C. The actual state of affairs is, however, much more complicated. Thus, the dialect of Ḥā'il which undoubtedly represents Group B, has the same bipartition as BṢ, e.g. *haggana* 'ours (sing.)', *haggâtana* 'ours (plur.)', but *zêntin* 'pretty (sing. f.)', *sāᶜtên* 'two hours'.[24]

Other important features of syllable structure are the developments CVCaCV- > CCVCV- and -aXC- > -XaC- (called the *gaháwah* syndrome by BLANC, Negev, p. 125) if X is one of the consonants *ḥ, ᶜ, x, ġ,* or *h,* both of which are characteristic of all dialects of the North Arabian dialect area, the ᶜAnazi type Gulf dialects included.[25] Examples from the dialect of BṢ are *fgara* 'poor (plur.)', *zlima*[h] 'a man', *bduwi* 'a Bedouin', *bgara*[h] 'a cow', *frusi* 'my horse', *ktibat* 'she wrote'; *ṣxari* 'member of the Bani Ṣaxar', *ghawa*[h] 'coffee', *nᶜaǧa*[h] 'a ewe', *txarab* 'it (f.) was broken', *rḥamt guftân* 'the late Guftān'.

Thus, BṢ has the same syllable structure as the North Arabian dialect group as a whole. Only one sharp typological contrast is to be found, viz. the trochaic syllable pattern which BṢ has in common with groups A, B, and Bc as against the atrochaic pattern of Group C.

4. Morphology

4.1. *Pronouns*

4.1.1. The independent personal pronouns of BṢ are:

Sing.	1. c.	*'ana, 'âna*	['ana], ['a:na]
	2. m.	*'int*	['ɪnt]

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[23] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 59, II, p. 156f.

[24] ABBOUD, Najdi, pp. 75, 34, 89.

[25] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, pp. 61–65, II, pp. 164–170; JOHNSTONE, EADS, pp. 6–9; a fair description of the syllable structure of a Šammari type dialect, with much comparative material and references is JOHNSTONE, ᶜAnaiza.

	2. f.	*'inti*	['ınti]
	3. m.	*hû*	[hu:]
	3. f.	*hî*	[hi:]
Plur.	1. c.	*ḥinna*	[ḥinna]
	2. m.	*'intam, 'inta*[m]	['ıntåm], ['ıntå[m]]
	2. f.	*'intin*	['ınten]
	3. m.	*ham*	[håm]
	3. f.	*hin*	[hen]

The use of the two variants of sing. 1. depends on tempo and intonation. In the following example, *'âna* has a noticeably higher pitch level than (*w-*)*ana:'âna ṣârli middatin ṭawîla*[h] *w-ana* [c]*indakam w-la* [c]*umrak š*[a]*hattan* 'I have lived a long time among you (plur. m.), but you (sing. m.) have never visited me (at my home)'.

The set of forms is practically identical with that given by ABBOUD for the Šammari dialect of Ḥā'il (*ana, int, inti, huw, hiy, ḥinna, intåm, intin, håm, hin*).[26] CANTINEAU gives only three forms for BṢ, viz. *'âna/'ana, ḥönna* and *'öntom/'äntom*, all typical of groups A and B.[27] Among the dialects studied by him in Nomades I, the forms given for the Sirḥān and classified by him as belonging to Group Bc (*'âna*, sing. 2. m. not given, *'önt*[h]*e*[i], *hû, hî, ḥenna, 'önto*[m], *'öntän*[n], *hom, hen*[n]) are the ones most closely related to those of BṢ. It can, however, be noticed that Cantineau only gives the forms *'âna/'ana, ḥönna*, and *'öntom/'äntom* for Group B.[28] If these data are complemented with Šammari forms from Ḥā'il, it is obvious that the independent personal pronouns in BṢ are characteristic of the Šammari type (Group B).

4.1.2. The pronominal suffixes in BṢ are:

After nouns ending in C				After nouns ending in V̄	
Sing.	1. c.	*-i*	*glumi*	*-y*	*'abûy*
	2. m.	*-ak*	*glumak*	*-k*	*'abûk*
	2. f.	*-ić*	*glumić*	*-ć*	*'abûć*
	3. m.	*-u*[h]	*glumu*[h]	*-*[h]	*'abû*[h]
	3. f.	*-a*[h]	*gluma*[h]	*-a*[h]	*'abwa*[h]
Plur.	1. c.	*-na*	*galamna*	*-na*	*'abûna*

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[26] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 16.
[27] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 173.
[28] Ibid.

2. m.	-*kam*, -*ka^m*	*galamkam*, *galamka^m*	-*kam*, -*ka^m*	*'abûkam*, *'abûka^m*
2. f.	-*ćin*	*galamćin*	-*ćin*	*'abûćin*
3. m.	-*ham*	*galamham*	-*ham*	*'abûham*
3. f.	-*hin*	*galamhin*	-*hin*	*'abûhin*

After verbs the patterns are the same, with one exception: the pronominal suffix for sing. 1. after C is -*an* (*ḍruban* 'he hit me', *ᶜarfan* 'he recognized me'), after V̄ -*ni* (*ḍrubôni* 'they hit me', *ᶜarfôni* 'they recognized me'). On the latter point my material is, however, scanty and therefore suspect.

All the sing. 2. and 3. forms seem to have developed similarly, i.e. from older suffixes with short vowels (*-*ka*, *-*ki*, *-*hu*, *-*ha*) which first assimilated the inflectional vowels (*-*aka*, *-*iki*, *-*uhu*, *-*aha*) and then, having become morphologically redundant, were dropped. The object suffix /-an/ in sing. 1. is probably the result of the loss of a short /i/: *-*ani* >-*an*.[29] The older short final vowels were also dropped in the forms used after V̄; in sing. 3. f. this would, however, have led to neutralization of the gender contrast, this being why the form /-a^h/ was generalized and introduced after V̄ as well.[30]

Here again, the patterns are practically identical with those given by ABBOUD for Ḥā'il: C-*i*, -*ak*, -*ić*, -*uh*, -*ah*, -*na*, -*kam*, -*kin*, -*ham*, -*hin*; V-*y*, -*k*, -*ć*, -*w*/-*h*, -*h*, *na*, -*kam*, -*kin*, -*ham*, -*hin*, the most conspicuous difference being the absence of affrication in plur. 2. f. in Ḥā'il.[31] According to CANTINEAU, groups A and B have no affrication in this morpheme, except the hesitation between -*ken^n* and -*ćen^n* in the ᶜAnazi tribe of Wild ᶜAli, whereas groups Bc and C have affrication.[32] For BṢ he gives only singular forms, viz. *'abûi*, *ġadâi*, *kursîyi*, *bê^itak*, *bê^iteč*, *'abûk*, *'abûć*, *ba^itọ*, *ġnömọ*, *d^öwâ°*, *'abû^h*, *ġadâ°* 'his lunch', *ġadâ^h* 'her lunch', *'abwa^h/'abwah* 'her father'.[33] These are not contradictory (except *č:ć*) to my material, and they complement it as far as the sing. 3. suffixes after /ā/ are concerned.

If my data are correct, BṢ has the object suffixes C-*an* and V̄-*ni* in sing. 1., which CANTINEAU has attested for Group Bc (ᶜUmūr, Ṣlūt, Sirḥān, and "peut-être ... Bani Ṣaxar", whereas Group B has C-*an* and V̄-*nan*, and Group C always -*ni*.[34]

BṢ thus has two features typical of Group Bc, the affrication of *k* in the

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[29] Cf. CANTINEAU, Pronoms suffixes, pp. 156–158; JANSSENS, Stress, pp. 145–148.

[30] For the development *ū* > *w*, *ī* > *y*, *ay* > *y*, see JANSSENS, Stress, p. 150.

[31] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 16.

[32] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 185.

[33] Ibid., pp. 174, 177, 181, 183, 210, without an explicit statement that the forms were attested for BṢ.

[34] Ibid., pp. 175 f., and I, p. 73.

pronominal suffix for plur. 2. f., and the allomorph *V̄-ni* of the pronominal suffix for sing. 1. after a verb. Both are found in Group C and absent in Group B.

4.1.3. Demonstrative pronouns

'this'	m. *hâḏa*	f. *hâḏi*
'these'	c. (?) *haḏôla*	
'that'	m. *haḏâk*	f. *haḏîć*
'those'	m. *haḏōlâk*	f. *haḏōlîć*

I have not been able to attest any feminine form for 'these', which might sound surprising in comparison to the distinctive feminine form for 'those'. The most sedentary dialects of the neighbouring area have no feminine forms in the plural, whereas the dialects of Group C are insufficiently known in this respect. It is interesting to note that CANTINEAU has not given both the masculine and the feminine forms for 'these' in Group Bc (m. *hāḏôle,* ᶜUmūr, Sirḥān, f. *hāḏôle* Bani Xālid), whereas different masculine and feminine forms have been attested by him for 'those' (m. *hāḏōlâk* ᶜUmūr, Bani Xālid, Sirḥān, f. *hāḏōlîč* Sirḥān).[35] For the Šammar and ᶜAnaze, no demonstrative pronouns are included in Cantineau's material, but ABBOUD reports the Šammari forms used in Ḥāʾil: *hâḏa, hâḏi; haḏôla, haḏôlin; haḏâk, haḏîć; haḏulâk, haḏulinć,*[36] i.e. only the feminine plural forms differ from BṢ. That the dialects of Group B are not very homogeneous in this respect is evident from the Šammari forms recorded by me in Tēma: *hâḏa, hâḏi; haḏôlam, haḏêlin; haḏâk, haḏîć; haḏōlamk, haḏēlinć.*

4.1.4. Interrogative pronouns

'Who?' is *man/min,* but it occurs infrequently without an enclitic personal pronoun; the most frequent forms are *mánhū, mánhī, manham, manhin.* These can also be used as copulae, when 2nd persons occur: *mánhū/manhû* 'who is he?', *mánhī/manhî* 'who is she?', *manint, maninti, manham,*

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[35] Ibid., I, p. 107. For Group C, some feminine plural forms are given: *hâḏan* 'these' Raqqa, *hâḏenⁿ* id. Nᶜēm, *hāḏannîč* 'those' Raqqa, *hāḏennîč* id. Faḍl, ibid.

[36] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 15.

manhin, manintam, manintin. The vowel of *man* is susceptible to regressive assimilation to /i/: *mánhī/mínhī,* especially when the following syllable is stressed: *manhî/minhî, manint/minint, manintam/minintam, manintin/minintin.* The vowel tends to become /i/ in a proclitic position, e.g. *miḍ-ḍarrâbu^h* 'who's the man who hit him?'

'Whose?' is *'il-man* and *manhûlu^h, minhîla^h.*

The Ḥā'il forms given by ABBOUD are *min,* with enclitic personal pronouns *minhuw/manhuw, minhiy/manhiy, minham, minhin.*[37] CANTINEAU reports two forms only, viz. *mänhû* for Raqqa and *men hóm* for the Sardīye,[38] which renders it difficult to make comparisons between different North Arabian dialect groups. That not only *min,* which is attested for Ḥā'il, is a genuine Šammari form, is confirmed by the fact that *man* also occurs in my Šammari material from Tēma.

The adjectival interrogative pronoun 'which?' is *'ayy, 'ayya, 'ayyât,* used without gender and number distinctions. This is not found in CANTINEAU, Nomades, and ABBOUD, Najdi, but occurs e.g. in Gulf dialects.[39]

'What?' has two forms in BṢ, a shorter *wiš/wuš* and a longer *wišínhū* (*wiš* + *tanwīn* + enclitic personal pronoun). 'What is this?' is rendered by both *wiš hâḍa* and *wišínhū hâḍa.* For Ḥā'il ABBOUD gives the free forms *wiš* and *êš,* the bound form *š-,* and the longer forms *wiššuw, wiššiy, wiššam,* and *wiššin.*[40] From a Šammari informant in Tēma I have recorded *wiš, wiššū* and *wišínhū.* CANTINEAU's Group B forms are *weš, weššū, weššā* and *wešnōh,* Group Bc forms *wušenhû, wušenhî* (Bani Xālid), *wušenhû* (Sirḥān), *uš, ušnû* (Ṣlūt), *šnû* (m.), *šnîu* (f.) (ᶜUmūr).[41] For BṢ nothing is given. My BṢ forms thus resemble those reported for Group Bc, but can also be regarded as genuine Šammari forms.

4.1.5. Other pronouns

The relative pronoun usually has the form *'alli;* the indefinite pronoun for 'one, someone' is *wâḥid/wâḥad(in),* in negative clauses *'aḥad;* 'all', 'every', 'whole' is *kill(in),* always pronounced without affrication of *k.* All these are forms characteristic of the whole North Arabian dialect area. The same is true of the BṢ definite article *al-* and the demonstrative article *hal-.*

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[37] Ibid., pp. 17 and 85.

[38] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 108, II, p. 206.

[39] JOHNSTONE, EADS, p. 68.

[40] ABBOUD, Najdi, pp. 17, 54, 86.

[41] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 206f., I, p. 108.

4.2. The verb

4.2.1. The strong verb

4.2.1.1. In the perfect of Form I there are three different vowel patterns: CaCaC, CiCaC and CiCiC, which are inflected as follows:

Sing.	3. m.	ḍarab	kitab	širib/širib
	3. f.	ḍrubat	ktibat	šarbat
	2. m.	ḍarabt	ktibt	šribt
	2. f.	ḍarabti	ktibti	šribti
	1. c.	ḍarabt	ktibt	šribt
Plur.	3. m.	ḍrubow	ktibow	šarbow
	3. f.	ḍrubin	ktibin	šarbin
	2. m.	ḍarabtow	ktibtow	šribtow
	2. f.	ḍarabtin	ktibtin	šribtin
	1. c.	ḍarabna	ktibna	šribna

A comparison of the types CaCaC and CiCaC shows that the only major difference is the disappearance of the short /i/ in unstressed open syllables in the latter pattern. The short /a/ of the initial syllable of the CaCaC type is dropped only in three persons, i.e. when the personal morphemes begin with a vowel. The first two syllables are then short and open, which is an incompatible syllable pattern in BṢ: *ḍarabat, *ḍarabow, *ḍarabin yield, according to the CVCaCV->CCVCV- rule, ḍrubat, ḍrubow, and ḍrubin, respectively. The same holds true of ktibat (< *kitabat), ktibow (< *kita-bow), and ktibin (< *kitabin). These two types contrast sharply in the three persons with the CiCiC pattern, which actually displays two different phases of historical development: the forms šarbat, šarbow and šarbin derive their origins from *šaribat, *šaribow, and *šaribin, respectively, whereas the rest of the forms can be traced back to a later vocalism: širib < *šarib, šribt < *širibt < *šaribt etc. The pattern has not been conformed by analogy, as is the case e.g. in the most sedentary dialects of the adjacent areas, which have the type CiCiC through the pattern.[42] The plur. 3. m. and 2. m. morphemes have a diphthong identical with the partially monophthongized diphthong aw, but more stable. CANTINEAU does not give forms other than plur. 2. m. for BṢ, which, according to his informant, has the morpheme /-tom/: ketabtom, rečebtom.[43] On the other hand, my data agree almost completely with the Šammari inflection as given

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[42] An exception in this respect is the dialect of al-Karak, which, according to my observations, has a non-assimilated CaCiC pattern: šarib, šarbet, šaribt, šaribti, šaribt, šarbu, šarbin, šaribtu, šaribtin, šaribna.

[43] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 185.

for Ḥā'il by ABBOUD (*-Ø, -at/-ih, -t, -ti, -t; -ow/-aw, -in, -tow, -tin, -na*),[44] the only differences being the two allomorphs *-ih* (sing. 3. f.) and *-aw* (plur. 3. m.). The *-ih* allomorph in the sing. 3. f., used in pause and before words beginning with consonants, actually seems to be a salient feature of the Šammari dialects; cf. the forms *któba*ᶦ and *šérbe*, given for Šammari by CANTINEAU, and the pre-pausal Šammari forms *enhag*ᵘẹ, *ṣedderẹ*, *fezaᶜẹ*, *šâle*, *ǧâb*ʷẹ, and *nesiyé*, cited by Cantineau from MONTAGNE's texts.[45]

4.2.1.2. The imperfect is inflected as follows:

Sing.	3. m.	*yaḍrib*	*yaktub*	*yašrab*
	3. f.	*taḍrib*	*taktub*	*tašrab*
	2. m.	*taḍrib*	*taktub*	*tašrab*
	2. f.	*taḍr(i)bîn*	*takt(i)bîn*	*tašrabîn*
	1. c.	*'aḍrib*	*'aktub*	*'ašrab*
Plur.	3. m.	*yaḍr(i)bûn*	*yakt(i)bûn*	*yašrabûn*
	3. f.	*yaḍr(i)bin*	*yakt(i)bin*	*yašrabin*
	2. m.	*taḍr(i)bûn*	*takt(i)bûn*	*tašrabûn*
	2. f.	*taḍr(i)bin*	*takt(i)bin*	*tašrabin*
	1. c.	*naḍrib*	*naktub*	*našrab*

The long suffixes /-īn/ and /-ūn/ are characteristic of the whole North Arabian dialect area with a few exceptions.[46] In this respect there is a sharp typological contrast between this dialect group and the Bedouin dialects of the Negev and Egypt as well as of the Bani ᶜAṭīye and al-Ḥwēṭāt.[47]

The prefix vowel /a/ may have been preserved for morphological reasons.[48] Thus, according to ABBOUD, there is a morphological contrast in the dialect of Ḥā'il between *yaftaḥ* (act.) and *yiftaḥ* (pass.), corresponding to two different perfect forms *fitaḥ* (act.) and *ftiḥ* (pass.).[49] My inquiry has not been adequate in this respect, and I cannot find finite passive forms in my recordings. A more thorough study might, however, disclose cases where contrasts between active and internal passive forms are to be found. In Nomades I, CANTINEAU gives imperfect prefixes with /a/ only for the ᶜUmūr and Ṣlūt, both of which belong to Group Bc, but in Nomades II

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[44] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 18.

[45] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 185 f.

[46] Such an exception is e.g. the dialect of el-ᶜAǧārma, see PALVA, ᶜAǧ. Studies, p. 32 f.

[47] For the Negev, see BLANC, Negev, p. 136, for Egypt, MATAR, Sāḥil Maryūṭ, p. 152; the dialects of the Bani ᶜAṭīye and al-Ḥwēṭāt: own observations. For /-īn/, /-ūn/ in Iraqi and Persian Gulf dialects, see BLANC, CDB, p. 64; JOHNSTONE, EADS, p. 11.

[48] For the earlier development of the prefix vowel in the imperfect, see BLOCH, Imperfect preformatives.

[49] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 20.

two different inflectional patterns of this type are given, viz. *yakötbûn,*
yákötbän, takötbûn, tákötbän (ar-Rass), and *täšrab^(w)în, yäšṛabûn, yắšṛabän,*
täšṛabûn, tắšṛabän (ar-Rass, Mawāli); *takt'b^(w)în, yakt'bûn, takt'bûn,*
yáktöbän, táktöbän ("les autres parlers ... nouvellement étudiés", i.e.
Šammari and ᶜAnazi in the first place).[50] Thus, no distinctive typological
criteria could be found between groups A, B and Bc.

4.2.1.3. The imperative

Sing.	2. m.	*'iḍrib*	*'uktub*	*'išrab*
	2. f.	*'iḍr(i)bi*	*'ukt(u)bi*	*'išrabi*
Plur.	2. m.	*'iḍr(i)bu*	*'ukt(u)bu*	*'išrabu*
	2. f.	*'iḍr(i)bin*	*'ukt(u)bin*	*'išrabin*

As pointed out by CANTINEAU, the imperative has no diphthong in the
masculine plural morpheme.[51]

4.2.1.4. The participle

Active			Passive
Sing.	m.	*kâtib, kât(i)bin*	*maktûb, maktûbin*
	f.	*kât(i)ba^h, kât(i)batin*	*maktûba^h, maktûbatin*
Plur.	m.	*kāt(i)bîn, kāt(i)bînin*	*maktūbîn, maktūbînin*
	f.	*kāt(i)bât, kāt(i)bâtin,*	*maktūbât, maktūbâtin,*
		kāt(i)bâh	*maktūbâh*

The pattern has many similarities with that given for Ḥāʾil by ABBOUD:
gâḍbin, gâḍbitin; gāḍbînin, gāḍbâtin.[52]

4.2.2. Some weak verbs

4.2.2.1. Verbs C₁*w. wiġif* 'to stand' and *wiṣil/wuṣil* 'to arrive' are inflected
in the perfect like *širib* (see above); *wigaᶜ* 'to fall' follows the inflection
of *kitab*. In the imperfect there are no less than three basically different
patterns:

Sing.	3. m.	*yiġîf*	*yâṣal*	*yigaᶜ*
	3. f.	*tiġîf*	*tâṣal*	*tigaᶜ*
	2. m.	*tiġîf*	*tâṣal*	*tigaᶜ*
	2. f.	*tiġîfîn*	*tāṣalîn*	*tigaᶜîn*
	1. c.	*'aġîf*	*'âṣal*	*'agaᶜ*
Plur.	3. m.	*yiġîfûn*	*yāṣalûn*	*yigaᶜûn*

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[50] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 83, II, pp. 186 f.

[51] Ibid., p. 187.

[52] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 13.

3. f.	*yiǵîfin*	*yâṣalin*	*yigaᶜin*
2. m.	*tiǵîfûn*	*tāṣalûn*	*tigaᶜûn*
2. f.	*tiǵîfin*	*tâṣalin*	*tigaᶜin*
1. c.	*niǵîf*	*nâṣal*	*nigaᶜ*

In this connection, the two long-vocalic patterns are most interesting. The type with a long stem vowel is attested by CANTINEAU for the Bedouin dialects of groups A and B, e.g. *iǵîf*, as if from **ǵâf*, for the Rwala (A), and Hsane (A), *yeǵîf* for the Wild ᶜAli (A), and *yiǵîf* for the Šammar (B), whereas groups Bc and C only have short-vocalic stems.[53] The imperfect of *wiṣil/ wuṣil*, on the other hand, has a long prefix vowel /a/, as if from **'aṣal*,[54] in groups A (Hsane, Wild ᶜAli, Sbaᶜa) and B (Šammar), as well as in Group Bc (Sardīye, Bani Xālid, Sirḥān), but for BṢ only short-vocalic forms are given: *yőṣöl, tőṣöl, yiṣᵊlûn*.[55] This would, of course, be a Group C feature in BṢ, but I have not been able to attest it; on the contrary, BṢ here, as in the whole inflection of the C₁*w* verbs, follows the same patterns as groups A and B.

The imperatives follow the imperfect patterns: *ǵîf/waggif, 'âṣal, 'igaᶜ*. The active participles are regular: *wâǵif/wâǵ(i)fin, wâṣil/wâṣ(i)lin, wâǵiᶜ/ wâǵ(i)ᶜin;* I have no material for passive participles of this verb type.

4.2.2.2. The older C₁' verbs *'akal* 'to eat' and *'axaḏ* 'to take' normally have, in the perfect, the patterns *kala, kalat, kalêt*, etc., *xaḏa, xaḏat, xaḏêt*, etc., in the imperfect *yâkil, yâxiḏ*, in the imperative both short-vocalic and long-vocalic forms: *kil, kili/kûli, kilu/kûlu, kilin/kûlin; xiḏ, xiḏi/ xûḏi, xiḏu/xûḏu, xiḏin/xûḏin*, forms also attested for BṢ by CANTINEAU (*kála, xáḏa, yâkel, yâklûn, yâkölän, kél, kûlu, xöḏ, xûḏu*).[56] These forms are characteristic of the North Arabian Bedouin dialects except Group A.[57]

The active participles are *mâkil/mâk(i)lin* and *mâxiḏ/mâx(i)ḏin;* the passive participles do not occur in my material. On the basis of the form *âxeḏen* in MONTAGNE's MŠx XII, 9, CANTINEAU supposes that the active participle in Šammari is *âxeḏ*.[58] Forms with *m-* occur, according to him, in

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[53] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 195; I, p. 90.

[54] This imperfect pattern (*yâǵaf, yâṣal, yâǵaᶜ*) modelled after C₁' verbs is, according to my notes, used consistently for all C₁*w* verbs in the dialects of the Bani ᶜAṭīye and al-Ḥwēṭāt which do not belong to the North Arabian dialect type. This pattern already occurred in some early Qais dialects, e.g. *yâǵalu, yâǵaᶜu*, see RABIN, AWA, p. 158, and his references to Sībawayhi and Anbārī; BROCKELMANN, Grundriss I, pp. 248 and 597; az-Zamaxšarī, Mufaṣṣal (ed. Broch, Christiania 1879), p. 178, § 701.

[55] = footnote 53 above.

[56] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, pp. 192–194.

[57] The same type occurs in the majority of North African dialects, see e.g. MARÇAIS, Tlemcen, p. 71; id., Ûlâd Brâhîm, p. 87.

[58] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 194.

the dialects of the ʿUmūr (Bc), Nʿēm (C) (*mâkel*), Faḍl (C), and Manāḏre (C) (*mâčel*).[59] Since ABBOUD, however, gives *mâčil* for Ḥāʾil,[60] it is plausible to assume that the BṢ forms with *m-* are not loans from dialects of Group C, but genuine Šammari forms.

4.2.2.3. The C₂*wy* verbs have a quantitative alternation in the imperative: *gum, gûmi, gûmu, gûmin; gil, gûli, gûlu, gûlin* (cf. *kil, kili/kûli*, etc.), which are in accord with those found in MONTAGNE's Šammari texts: *gel, gūlu, reḥ, rōḥū, gem, gûmʷi*, but also occur in Bedouin dialects of other types, cf. *xef min allâh* (Rwala, Group A).[61]

4.2.2.4. In the perfect, the C₃*y* verbs follow the well-known pattern *ḥaća, ḥaćat, ḥaćêt*, etc., *ruma, rumat, rumêt*, etc., *miša, mišat, mišêt*, etc., *gara, garat, garêt*, etc., but *nisi, nisyat/nisat, nisêt, nisyu;* the imperfects are *yḥaći, yarmi, yamši, yagra,* and *yansa*, respectively. In the imperative, short and long forms occur side by side in sing. 2. m. of some verbs with the stem vowel /i/: *ʾaḥć/ʾaḥći, ʾirm, ʾimši, ʾigra, ʾinsa;* fem. *ʾaḥći, ʾirmi, ʾimši, ʾigri, ʾinsi*. The short forms are regarded by CANTINEAU as 'un archaïsme remarquable', comparable with the Classical Arabic imperative forms with a short final vowel, which has later been dropped. Such forms are well attested for the Šammar, but they apparently occur in the other North Arabian dialects as well.[62] The occurrence of forms of this type is not, however, exclusively a North Arabian feature but it has been reported for some other Bedouin dialect groups, too.[63]

4.2.2.5. The verb 'to come' has preserved the Old Arabic pattern rather well; it is, however, uncertain whether the /ʾ/ in the perfect sing. 3. m. *ǧaʾ* can be regarded as a reflex of the older third radical of *ǧāʾa*. For one thing, I have only noted it in the perfect, i.e., after /a/, but not in the imperfect. Its occurrence also seems to be restricted to the pre-pausal position, whereas the context form is *ǧâ*. The remaining forms of the perfect are sing. 3. f. *ǧat*, 2. m. *ǧît*, 2. f. *ǧîti*, 1. c. *ǧît*, plur. 3. m. *ǧaww*, 3. f. *ǧin*, 2. m. *ǧîtow*, 2. f. *ǧîtin*, 1. c. *ǧîna*. The imperfect has as a rule a short prefix vowel: sing. 3. m. *yiǧi*, 3. f. *tiǧi*, 2. m. *tiǧi*, 2. f. *tiǧîn*, 1. c. *ʾaǧi*, plur. 3. m. *yiǧûn*, 3. f. *yiǧin*, 2. m. *tiǧûn*, 2. f. *tiǧin*, 1. c. *niǧi*. However, it is sometimes very difficult to decide whether the prefix vowel is short or long, especially when the first syllable of the word has a high pitch level. As in

[59] Ibid., I, p. 88.

[60] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 78.

[61] MUSIL, Rwala, p. 240, cited by CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 196; cf. also BLANC, Negev, p. 137, and PALVA, ʿAǧ. Studies, p. 37.

[62] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 91 f., II, p. 197.

[63] BLANC, Negev, p. 137: C₃*y* verbs with stem vowel /i/ have an alternative m. sing. form, in which *-iy* is dropped: *imš, iǧir*; this holds true for the derived forms as well. See also PALVA, Further notes.

most Arabic dialects of the eastern type, another verb base is used for the imperative: *taʿâl, taʿâli, taʿâlu, taʿâlin (ǧây)* 'come!', 'come here!'

4.2.3. Derived forms

Forms II and III follow the well-known patterns, e.g. *ʿallag,* imperf. *yiʿalliǧ* 'to suspend', *râfag,* imperf. *yirâfiǧ* 'to accompany'. Form IV is productively used, a feature typical of North Arabian Bedouin dialects, e.g. *ʾagʿad,* imperf. *yigʿid,* imperat. *ʾigʿid,* part. act. *migʿid* 'to wake up', *ʾakram,* imperf. *yićrim/yikrim,* imperat. *ʾićrim/ʾikrim,* part. act. *mićrim/mikrim* 'to honour', *ʾaʿṭa,* imperf. *yaʿṭi/yʿaṭi,* imperat. *ʾaʿṭi/ʿaṭi,* part. act. *miʿṭi* 'to give', *ʾaṭlaʿ,* imperf. *yiṭliʿ,* imperat. *ʾiṭliʿ,* part. act. *miṭliʿ* 'to drive away', *ʾankar,* imperf. *yinćir,* imperat. *ʾinćir,* part. act. *minćir* 'to deny', *ʾaʿlag,* imperf. *yiʿliǧ,* imperat. *ʾiʿliǧ,* part. act. *miʿliǧ* 'to light a fire'. In C_1w verbs the monophthongization of the initial diphthong in Form IV is often only partial, e.g. *ʾowǧah/ʾôǧah,* imperf. *yowǧah/yôǧah,* imperat. *ʾowǧah/ʾôǧah,* part. act. *mowǧah/môǧah* 'to head', 'to arrive', *ʾowǧaʿ,* imperf. *yowǧaʿ* 'to pain'. The older Form IV of C_2wy verbs has, however, already developed into a lexicalized variant in Form I, cf. *gâm,* imperf. *yigûm* 'stand up', imperf. *yigîm* 'to take away', 'to lift'; *râd,* imperf. *yirîd* 'to want'; *zâd,* imperf. *yizîd* 'to add'; *dâr,* imperf. *yidûr* 'to go round', imperf. *yidîr* 'to turn'.

Forms V and VI have preserved the older short vowel in the reflexive morpheme in the perfect and imperative, i.e. the forms are based upon taCaCCaC and taCāCaC, and not upon (ʾi)tCaCCaC, (ʾi)tCāCaC respectively, as is the case in the sedentary dialects of the Syro-Mesopotamian area. Thus, BṢ has e.g. *tigadda* 'to have lunch', *tiwaddar* 'to hide', *tiḥâbab* 'to kiss each other', *tinâwal* 'to obtain', 'to reach'. In the imperfect and participle the vowel is dropped in rapid speech, e.g. *yitġadda, mitġaddi, yitwaddar, mitwaddir, yitḥâbab, mitḥâbbîn, yitnâwal, mitnâwil,* but only reduced in careful speech: *yitiġadda,* etc.

All the suffixless forms of Forms VII and VIII have the stress on the initial syllable, e.g. *ʾínfataḥ, yínfitiḥ* 'to be opened', *ʾíštaġal, yíštiġil, ʾíštigil, míštigil* 'to work'. Form IX follows the pattern of $C_2=C_3$ verbs in Form I, e.g. *ʾiḥmarr, ʾiḥmarrat, ʾiḥmarrêt* etc. 'to blush'. Form X usually begins with the consonant cluster *st-* in the perfect and imperative, e.g. *staʿǧal* 'to hurry', *staġrab* 'to find strange'.

On the basis of the available material no major typological differences are to be found between different North Arabian dialect groups as far as the derived verbal forms are concerned. Some data in ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 20, suggest, however, that in Šammari dialects there are many insufficiently known categories of the verbal morphology, e.g. *ṭâradaw* 'they pursued', *ṭîrdaw* 'they were pursued', *ytaṭâradûn* 'they pursue each other', *yintṭâradûn*

'they can be pursued', *fitaḥ* 'he opened', *ftiḥ* 'it was opened', *infataḥ* 'it was opened', 'it could be opened'.[66]

4.3. *Nominal morphology*

4.3.1. The feminine singular morpheme has the following allomorphs: /-ah/, /-aʰ/ in free forms (st. abs. without *tanwīn*), /-t/ in bound forms (st. cstr. and pron., further before *tanwīn* and the dual morpheme), /-at/ in st. cstr. before a consonant, /-it/ in st. pron. before a consonant, e.g. *nᶜaǧaʰ* 'a ewe', *nᶜaǧat gaṣīruʰ* 'his neighbour's ewe', *nᶜaǧitkam* 'your ewe', *nâgtin ṭayyibah* 'a good she-camel', *nāgtên* 'two she-camels', *nâgtuʰ* 'his she-camel', *nâgt al-gaṣir* 'the neighbour's she-camel', *nâgat gaṣīrilluʰ* 'the she-camel of a neighbour of his', *mᶜazzibithin* 'their (f.) hostess'. After /īy/ the vowel of the feminine marker is dropped before /t/: *raᶜît al-bêt* 'the mistress', *mît marraʰ* 'one hundred times'.

The feminine plural morpheme has two facultative allomorphs in free forms, /-āt/ and /-āh/, /-āʰ/, in bound forms only /-āt/, e.g. *nᶜaǧât* or *nᶜaǧâʰ* 'ewes', *nᶜaǧâtana* 'our ewes'.

The allophonic range of the /a/ of the feminine singular morpheme in BṢ is not very wide; this was also noted by CANTINEAU, who mentions that the *'imāla* here is less distinct in BṢ and Sardīye than in the Group C dialect of the Mawāli. Citing instances collected from MONTAGNE's texts, he establishes a distinct *'imāla* as a feature characteristic of the Šammari dialects.[67] This tallies with ABBOUD's data for Ḥā'il, where the allomorphs are /-ih/ prepausally or before a word beginning with a consonant, and /-at/ elsewhere.[68] In this respect BṢ deviates from the Šammari type and resembles those Group C dialects which do not have a distinct *'imāla* in the feminine singular morpheme.[69] The plural morpheme in BṢ is, on the contrary, typical of Group B, and virtually one of its most conspicuous characteristics.[70]

4.3.2. *Tanwīn.* A typologically prominent feature is the use of *tanwīn* in certain cases, viz. (a) in an indefinite noun followed by an adjectival attribute: *'âna ṣârli middatin ṭawîlaʰ w-ana ᶜindakam* 'I have lived a long time

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[66] For more details on the subject, see PETER F. ABBOUD, The Verb in Northern Najdi Arabic, in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XLII: 3 (1979), pp. 467–499, which I got a couple of weeks after the present paper was finished. ABBOUD's data show the capital importance of studies in the modern Bedouin dialects, especially as far as comparative and diachronic studies are concerned.

[67] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, pp. 148–150; cf. I, p. 45 f. In the feminine /-a/ of the *'afᵣal* and -*ān* patterns, this is not the case in the dialect of Ḥā'il, ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 12.

[68] ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 10.

[69] E.g. the dialect of el-ᶜAǧārma, PALVA, ᶜAǧ. Studies, p. 54.

[70] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 133; for Group Bc: ibid., I, p. 20; ABBOUD, Najdi, p. 11.

among you', *hûlu^h šal^cat nyâgin ṭayyibâh* 'he has a herd of good she-camels', (b) in an indefinite noun followed by a prepositional phrase: *wlêdin mn-i^cyâla^h* 'one of her little sons', *ḥaggtillana* 'of ours', *gaṣîrillu^h* ' a neighbour of his', *hal-beyt alli ǵâ^cdinbu^h* 'the tent in which he was sitting', (c) in a participle governing an object: *min sâbrin ib-hal-xarbûš* 'who would search in a miserable tent like this?', *'ana nâsin alla w-nâsîk* 'I have forgotten both God and you', (e) in a nominal predicate followed by a verbal clause or a prepositional phrase: *u-mšarrǵin yagḍîlu^h hâg^ya^h* 'and he has gone into the inner desert to take care of a matter', *killin yigûl* 'everybody says', *u-hû wâǵfin ^cala râsu^h* 'while he was standing close by him', (f) in a nominal predicate followed by a nominal clause: *u-farwa^h ḍa^cîfin hâšmin nafsu^h* 'and Farwa is a miserable man, broken in spirit'.

CANTINEAU gives only one example of *tanwîn* in the nomadic dialects he studied in Nomades I: *ḥalâlän četîr* 'much cattle' (^cUmûr, Bc).[71] My data for BṢ correspond well with the general picture given by BLAU on the basis of information collected from scattered sources.[72] It is probable that BṢ here follows the structure of groups A and B, and deviates from that of Group C.

It is worth mentioning that the *tanwîn* is used after dual and plural masculine morphemes as well, i.e., it is not only a survival of the Old Arabic *tanwîn*, but its use has been generalized to comprise all indefinite forms of nouns in certain positions.

4.4. *Numerals*

No important typologically distinctive features could be found in the numerical system. The older feminine /-t/, which in many modern dialects is only used as a connective between numerals and a restricted number of quantified words beginning with a vowel, seems to be absent in many idiolects, e.g. *sab^ca 'îyâm~sab^cat îyâm* 'seven days', but always *sitt-îyâm* 'six days'. The numerals 11–19 follow the pattern of the North Arabian dialects, where *-ar* is dropped in all positions. In *hdâ^cš* 'eleven' one of the

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[71] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 102; in Nomades, II, pp. 203–205, he gives the following instances occurring in pre-pausal position in the dialect of the Sba^ca (Group A): *mrôtän* 'a woman', *zlômtän* 'a man', *zôlmän* 'men', and classifies instances collected from SOCIN's, MUSIL's and MONTAGNE's texts. Both this and additional material is discussed by BLAU, see next footnote.

[72] BLAU, Emergence, Appendix III Vestiges of Tanwîn in Judaeo-Arabic and in Modern Bedouin Dialects, pp. 167–212, and references there. For the use of *tanwîn* in the Šammari dialect spoken in Ḥā'il, see ABBOUD, Najdi, pp. 10 and 13. For different theories about the etymology of *tanwîn* in the modern Bedouin dialects, see BLAU, Emergence, p. 188, WALLIN, Probe, p. 6, id., Bemerkungen, p. 673 f., WETZSTEIN, Zeltlagern, p. 113, SOCIN, Diwan, III, pp. 100–105, CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 102, II, pp. 203–205.

pharyngals has been dissimilated to the laryngal /h/ as in most Bc and C dialects according to CANTINEAU.[73] In *ṭnâᶜš* 'twelve' the initial older inter-dental has become the equivalent post-dental stop and then been pharynga-lized, most likely under the influence of /ᶜ/.[74] The numerals 13–19 are also influenced by the same pharyngalization.

4.5. Particles

4.5.1. Adverbs

Some high frequency adverbs used in BṢ are as follows:

b-hâḏa, hân 'here'
min hâḏa, min hân 'from here'
b-haḏâk, hanâk 'there'
min haḏâk, min hanâk 'from there'
ġâd 'over there, yonder'
ḏilwân 'now'; I have also noted *ha-l-ḥîn, hassâᶜ* and *hassaᶜ*, which are prob-ably genuine and denote 'right now'
'al-yôm 'today'
'ams 'yesterday'
'al-bâriḥ 'yesterday evening, last night'
'awwal ams 'the day before yesterday'
bâčir 'tomorrow'
baᶜd bâčir 'after tomorrow'
há-s-sana 'this year'
'al-ᶜâm 'last year'
'al-ᶜâm al-awwal 'two years ago'
'al-ġâyaʰ, 'al-míġiblaʰ 'next year'
wên 'where?'
min wên, mnên 'from where?'
l-wên 'where to?'
čêf, šlôn, wišlôn 'how?'
mita 'when?'
čam 'how many?' (adj.)
ġaddêš 'how much?'
dayman 'always'
baᶜdên 'thereafter'

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[73] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 105.
[74] CANTINEAU, ibid., has attested only *ṭnâᶜš* for the Ḥadīdīn, ᶜUmūr, Nᶜēm, Manāḏre, and Bani Xālid.

badri 'early'
hîč 'thus, this way'
balki, balči, yiǧûz 'perhaps'
čiṯîr 'much'
bass 'only'
duġri 'straight'

Of these, CANTINEAU gives a few forms for BṢ: *hân, hanâk, ḏölwân, méta*.[75] The forms *'ams, el-bâreḥ, bâčer/bấcer, čêf/čéf* occur in all the dialects studied in Nomades II; *leih* 'why?' is taken from a Šammari text published by MONTAGNE. All these notes correspond well to the data found in my material. The same holds true in a broad sense of the Ḥā'il forms found in ABBOUD's Najdi: *ams, hnâk, bâčir, wên, šlôn, mita, čam, lêš*. For 'always' he gives *dâyim*, which I have recorded for al-Ḥwēṭāt (*daym*), for 'now' there are several adverbs of which Abboud gives *hal-ḥîn* 'now' and *has-sâčih* 'immediately'.[76] The forms *hassâč* and *hassač*, which in most dialects of Group C—as well as in some neighbouring sedentary dialects, e.g. Salṭi and Karaki—denote 'now', are used for 'right now, immediately' in BṢ, whereas *ha-l-ḥîn* and the characteristic BṢ item *ḏilwân* denote 'now, at the present'. The latter form is attested by CANTINEAU both for the BṢ and Wild ᶜAli.[77] The forms *b-hâḏa, b-haḏâk* etc. have so far almost exclusively been attested for another type of Bedouin dialect. Thus, BLANC gives *fihâḏa* side by side with *hniy, hniyyih, hniyânih*, and *hniyâtih* for the tribe Ḍullām in the Negev.[78] I have noted *hân/b-hâḏa* and *hanâk/b-haḏâk* for al-Ḥwēṭāt, *fi hâḏa* and *fi haḏâk* for the Bani ᶜAṭīye, the dialects of which have much in common with the dialects spoken in the Negev and Sinai. It is, however, possible that the forms are also genuine in Šammari and ᶜAnazi, cf. MONTAGNE: *b-hâḏa ṭâreš* 'il y avait là un voyageur', and LANDBERG: *entum èǧᶜedum bihâ̄ḏa* (sc. *makân*) 'vous resterez ici'.[79]

4.5.2. Some characteristic conjunctions

The adversative conjunction *mâr* [mɑːr] 'but', 'but then', 'in that case' is typical of BṢ as well as of most dialects of the North Arabian dialect area. 'Either–or' is usually rendered by one *yâ* only, i.e., the conjunction

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[75] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 207 f.; he also gives the etymology for *ḏölwân:* demonstr. *ḏö-* + def. article + *wân* (cf. Cl.Ar. *'ân*).

[76] ABBOUD, Najdi, pp. 21, 40 f., 93.

[77] CANTINEAU, Nomades, II, p. 208.

[78] BLANC, Negev, p. 146.

[79] MONTAGNE, Contes, XII, 3; LANDBERG, ᶜAnazeh, I, 8.

is dropped before the first member, e.g. *hîč yâ hîč* 'either like this or like this'; 'or' is *walla*. Characteristic of the Bedouin dialects as a whole is also *yôm, yômin, yōminn-* 'when'; instead of the last-mentioned, *nhārinn-* is sometimes used. Other characteristic conjunctions are *'inčan, 'inčann-* 'if', *ᶜahwinn-* 'because', and *yama* 'until'. The comparative material is too scattered to allow a typological comparison in this respect.

4.5.3. Some prepositions

As in the majority of Bedouin dialects in the North Arabian dialect area, *fî* is only used in *fîh* 'there is, there are' and *mâ fîh* 'there is not, there are not'; in other cases, *b-* is used.[80] 'After' is both *baᶜd* and *ᶜug(u)b*, 'behind' both *wara* and *gafa*, 'under' both *taḥat* and *taḥa*, the latter variant being mainly used as an adverb; with suffixed pronouns only the form with *-t* can be used: *thata^h*, i.e. the disappearance of the *-t* seems to be a purely phonetic feature, cf. 3.1. above.

The /n/ in the preposition *min* is not doubled when followed by suffixes beginning with a vowel: *minu^h, mina^h, minak, minič, mini*. 'Without' is *min ġeyr, bala* or *blîya*. *ᶜind* always has a vowel (cf. 3.3. above) before suffixes beginning with a consonant: *ᶜindana, ᶜindakam*. The vowel of *maᶜ* 'with' is /a/ only with the suffixed pronouns for sing. 2. m. and 3. f.: *maᶜak, maᶜa^h*, i.e., when the initial syllable is opened and the suffix begins with /a/; otherwise the vowel is assimilated or centralized: *miᶜi, miᶜič, miᶜu^h* [məᶜoʰ], *miᶜna* [məᶜna], *miᶜkam* [məᶜkåm], etc.

The preposition *l-* has the following forms when used with suffixed pronouns: *lîya, lak, lič, lu^h, la^h, lana, lakam, lačin, laham, lahin*.

Here again, the available material does not allow a typological comparison between different North Arabian dialect groups.

4.5.4. Presentative particles

The demonstrative pronoun *hâḏa* can also be used as a presentative: *hâḏa hû ǧây* 'now he is coming', 'look, he is coming'. Another presentative is *harᶜ-*, which I have attested with sing. 3. persons only: *harᶜu* 'there he/it is' and *harᶜi* 'there she/it is',[81] i.e. the suffixes are not suffixed pronouns but enclitic personal pronouns, cf. Ṣlūt *herᶜu, herᶜi, heraᶜhåm, heraᶜhen*.[82] The presentative *'aṯri* implies uncertainty: *'aṯrîhū* 'perhaps it is him' (I have attested the same form for al-Karak and aṭ-Ṭafîle, too).

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[80] See CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 109.
[81] For the etymology and occurrence in different dialects, see FISCHER, Dem., pp. 193–195.
[82] CANTINEAU, Nomades, I, p. 107.

4.6. *Selected nouns*

'abb 'father' has in BṢ the bound (st. cstr. and pron.) form *'abū*, plur. *'ubbahât;* 'mother' is *'umm*, plur. *'ummahât;* 'brother' *'axx*, bound form *'axū*, plur. *'ixwân;* 'sister' *'uxt*, plur. *xawât*. The older biradical *yad* 'hand' has been lengthened in two different ways: *yadd* is the free form, *'îd* the bound: *'îdi, 'îdak*, etc. 'my hand', 'your hand', in dual *'idên*, bound form *'idên* + V, *'idê* + C: *'idêni, 'idêk, 'idêċ, 'idêʰ, 'idênaʰ, 'idêna, 'idêkam, 'idêċin, 'idêham, 'idêhin*. The form *yad* is the one given by CANTINEAU for the ᶜAnazi and Šammari dialect groups, also with pronominal suffixes; however, the dual form is also *'îdên* in these dialects. For al-Ǧōf and BṢ he gives forms in total agreement with those I have recorded: *ál-yed, 'îdi, 'îdäk*, dual *'îdên*.[83] In this respect BṢ seems to be mildly influenced by dialects of the Syro-Mesopotamian sheep raisers (Group C).

'iṭim 'mouth' is also a lexical item in BṢ and is characteristic of Group C, whereas the camel-breeding tribes usually have *fam(m)* (Group A) or *'afam* (Group B).

mayy [måy:], *mayyaʰ* 'water' (**muwayyah*) is an additional Group C form occurring in my BṢ material. But side by side with them there are several cases of the non-diminutive forms identical with those given by CANTINEAU for groups A and B, viz. *mâ'* and *ma*.[84] In my recordings these always have the definite article and occur in different positions, *ál-ma* in context, *'al-mâ'* in the pre-pausal position.

Conclusion

As mentioned above, Cantineau classified the dialect of the Bani Ṣaxar as belonging to Group Bc of the North Arabian dialects studied by him. i.e., dialects having a basically Group B (Šammari) structure, but displaying several features typical of Group C (sheep-raising nomads of the Syro-Mesopotamian area). It is interesting to see to what extent the Group Bc characteristics as defined by Cantineau are attested in my material of the Bani Ṣaxar dialect.

Group B features in Group Bc:

(a) *Weakening of certain consonants (especially r, l, m, n, t) in final position*. Of these, only the weakening of the final *t* in the feminine plural morpheme /-āt/ was attested by Cantineau for BṢ. In my material the whole

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[83] Ibid., II, p. 200.
[84] Ibid., I, p. 99f., II, pp. 131 and 200f. I have noted *'afam, 'afámi* etc. also for al-Ḥwēṭāt, *'afam, 'afamak* but *famî* for the Bani ᶜAṭīye, *'uṭum* for the Šammari in Tēma.

group of consonants which Cantineau assumed to be weakened in BṢ, attestedly shows a weakening tendency in final position.

(b) *So-called trochaic syllable structure.* My material tallies here with Cantineau's data. A feature reported for BṢ by Cantineau, which I also observed, was the dropping of the *a* of the feminine singular morpheme in the same position where reflexes of older inflectional vowels are retained. I cannot, however, conclude—as Cantineau did— that the feature diverges from the Group B type. New material published by Abboud for Ḥāʾil shows that this feature can scarcely be considered as alien to Group B.

(c) *The pronominal suffixes |-ọ| and |-äʰ| for sing. 3. m. and f. respectively.* The suffixes are probably the same in BṢ and Group B as a whole. Cantineau did not hear a final *h* in the masculine suffix, whereas I do hear it in my recordings, as does Abboud in his Group B material. In cases where the suffix is immediately followed by a word beginning with a vowel, the final *h* is especially clearly audible in tape recordings.

(d) *Different stems for plural masculine and feminine in the imperfect inflection of C_1-pharyngal verbs in Form I (e.g. iᶜarfûn: iᶜárᵒfän).* In my material there are no cases of this type, and no comparison is therefore possible.

(e) *kala, yâkil and xaḏa, yâxiḏ are inflected similarly in Group Bc and Group B.* This is also the case in BṢ according to my material; even the active participles *mâkil, mâxiḏ* which occur in my material seem to be genuine in Group B, where they have been attested by Abboud for Ḥāʾil. Cantineau attributes the pattern *māCiC* to Group Bc but not to Group B.

(f) *A characteristic conjugation of the C_3y verbs (with e.g. short imperfect forms ʾiC_1C_2).* This feature also occurs in my BṢ material.

(g) *Use of tanwīn in certain cases.* Cantineau has no examples for BṢ, but he attributes it to the dialect of the tribe. This is confirmed by my material. The use does not seem to differ from that in Group B.

The results are conclusive: BṢ undoubtedly has those features of Group Bc that are typical of Group B. In this respect my material agrees with that of Cantineau and confirms his presumptions on some important points.

Group C features in Group Bc:

(aa) *The ğ reflex of ğīm.* According to my material *ğ* is a reflex of *ğīm* in BṢ, but not the only one. I have also attested *gʸ* and *g*. The reflexes seem to occur in free variation.

(bb) *The affricated variants of g and k are ğ and č respectively.* In my material this is definitely not the case, but the variants used in BṢ are *ǵ* and *ć*, i.e., the same as in groups A and B.

(cc) *Strong ʾimāla of final -ā,* attested in Group Bc by Cantineau for the ᶜUmūr and Ṣlūt only, was not found in BṢ by me, either.

(dd) *The personal pronoun for plur. 1.* *'öḥne*, given by Cantineau for the ᶜUmūr and Ṣlūt but not for BṢ, does not occur in my BṢ material, either. The BṢ *ḥinna* is identical with that in groups A and B.

(ee) *The pronominal suffix for plur. 2. f. /-čenⁿ/*, attributed by Cantineau to the whole Group Bc, was attested by me for BṢ (/-ćin/).

(ff) *The items 'ȯṯȯm, 'îd (BṢ al-yed, 'îdi), and mwåyye*, by Cantineau given for the whole Group Bc, were partially attested by me in BṢ (*'iṯim, yadd/'îd-, mayy, mayyaʰ, 'ál-ma, 'al-mâ'*).

The comparison shows that the most important criteria, (aa) and (bb), do not conform with my material for BṢ. Since (cc) and (dd) do not occur in BṢ either, only (ee) and partially (ff) remain as Group C features found in BṢ. The deviations must therefore be considered too few and too slight to justify a classification of BṢ as a typical Group Bc dialect.

All differences between Group B dialects and BṢ are, however, not indicated above. The most important of these is probably the suffixed pronoun for sing. 1. V̄-*ni* after verbs in BṢ. Taking into consideration the divergencies between the Group B dialects studied by Cantineau and the dialect of Ḥā'il described by Abboud, it seems that the divergencies between Group B and the dialect of BṢ are hardly greater. It is beyond doubt that BṢ has the basic structure of Group B. The Group C features found in it can perhaps best be defined as a kind of koine forms integrated in some idiolects but still felt as borrowings by many speakers.

The dialect of the Bani Ṣaxar is still insufficiently known. There are several important features of Bedouin dialects of the Šammari type which deserve further study based upon extensive material. Such features are, e.g., the distribution of the reflexes of *ǧīm*, *qāf* and *kāf*, the pre-pausal features, the accent, the use of internal passive voice, the use of *tanwīn*, and the women's idiolects.

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RUTH WALLDÉN

Hidden Indo-European and/or Indo-Aryan 'Loanwords' in Old Tamil?

II

With a view to continuing the work begun in a previous paper[1] I would like to discuss a few items some of which were partly under review there. They all have the phonetic characteristics required for the purpose, and they will be examined from a phonetic and a semantic point of view. Finally their occurrence or non-occurrence in OTa. will be determined as far as possible.

It is hoped that this investigation too may help to clarify a few obscure points as regards the problem of 'loanwords' in Old Tamil.

Our first item is Ta. *piṭi*.

In DED we find this under item No. 3412 Ta. *piṭi* 'to catch, grasp, seize, clutch ... carry, keep back, understand, make a handful ... be pleasing ...'; *n.* 'hold, seizure by the hand, comprehension, fist, closed hand ... handful ...'. In the numerous Dravidian languages mentioned, the first wowel alternates between *i* and *u* and the second consonant between *ḍ* and *ṛ*.

For additional meanings and some references to the Tamil literature, cf. TL.

The fact that so many different meanings are assigned to this word makes us suspect different origins, and in my previous investigation I tried to explain the TL meaning No. 14 of the noun *piṭi*, 'measure of length being the width of the hand' with a reference to Skt. *pṛtha-*, which could be suggested also for meaning No. 12, 'handful ...', and possibly for the TL meaning No. 22 of the verb *piṭi* 'to make a handful'.

For some of the meanings, e.g. TL meaning No. 6 'to obtain, take possession' and the rather general meaning 'to get hold of' it would be tempting to adduce the Skt. root *spṛś-*. With the regular loss of initial *s* before a

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[1] RUTH WALLDÉN, Hidden Indo-European and/or Indo-Aryan 'Loanwords' in Old Tamil?, I, Orientalia Suecana Vols. XXVII–XXVIII, Uppsala 1978–1979, to which I refer for reference works quoted, abbreviations used, terminology etc. (Loanwords I).

stop[2], the vocalic *r* becoming *i*[3] and the *ś* possibly appearing as *ṭ*,[4] the alternations would be accounted for.

For Skt. and MIA cf. MW under *spṛś*- and DIAL under items Nos. 13815, 13816, and 984. To the MIA information could be added what is presented in the Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary[5] under *Phusati* and *Puṭṭha* as well as the reference mentioned under the last item viz. § 311 in PISCHEL, R., Comparative Grammar of the Prākṛit Languages.[6] From the Prakrit Text Society Series No. 7., Pāia-Sadda-Mahaṇṇavo[7], finally, we gather the items *piṭṭha*- [*spṛṣṭa*] . . . *puṭṭhava*- [*spṛṣṭavat*], *puṭṭhi*- [*spṛṣṭi*].

EWA deals with *spṛś*- under *spṛśati*, which see. The discussion there which points to the Skt. root *mṛś*- is complemented by the EWA item *mṛśati*. As we shall see presently, this may be of interest also in the Tamil field.

In TL under the item *muṭṭu* one of the meanings given is 'to grip, grasp'. DED, under item No. 4043, Ta. *muṭṭu*, also offers some information in this connection. It would seem that the *spṛś-/mṛś*- phenomenon in Skt. might have a correspondence *piṭi-/muṭṭu*- in Tamil.[8] [9] [10]

While discussing this item I would like to call attention also to Skt. *muṣṭi*- 'fist' and Ta. *muṭṭi* id. Cf. EWA *muṣṭiḥ* 'clenched hand, fist' with a reference i.a. to WP II, p. 255 *meuk̂*- "kratzen, ritzen", where *muṣṭi*- is mentioned. In WP II, p. 84 we find another item which might be of interest in this connection, viz. *pṇsti*- (oder *pṇqsti*-, *pṇqᵘsti*-?) "Faust".[11]

For the MIA material DIAL provides us with ample information under 10221 *muṣṭi*-. From the overwhelming number of languages quoted which possess this word it becomes evident that it must be regarded as an all-

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[2] VAIDYANATHAN, S., Indo Aryan Loanwords in Old Tamil. Madras 1971, p. 141.

[3] ibid. p. 66.

[4] ANAVARATAVINAYAKAM PILLAI, S., The Sanskritic Element in the Vocabularies of the Dravidian Languages. Dravidic Studies No. III University of Madras 1974, p. 124 ff. The regular alternation is *ś* > *ḷ/ṭ*, and MIA too points rather to *spṛṣṭa*-.

[5] Ed. by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and W. STEDE. London 1947–1949 (PED).

[6] Transl. by SUBADHRA JHĀ. Delhi 1965.

[7] SHETH, H. D. T. Varanasi 1963.

[8] For the initial *p/m* alternation, cf. Loanwords I, p. 170, note 37.

[9] The TL meaning 'to strike against' for the item *muḷucu* has a reference to *muṭṭu*. This fact should be noted; it adds to our knowledge of the use of the different cerebrals.

[10] Cf. MW *pṛkti*- 'touch, contact' only found in lexicon. Cf. also *piṣ*- 'to crush, grind, rub' vs. *mṛd*- 'to crush, rub, touch' or *pṛd*- 'to delight' vs. *mṛd*- 'to delight'. Surely even these few examples make us wish for a thorough and comprehensive investigation regarding the initial labials already in Skt. This should include the initial *v* as well, on account of the many indications of a bilateral pronunciation. See further below.

[11] WP II, p. 272 gives another, semantically, if not phonetically related item, *mə -r-* . . . *mṇtos* "Hand" . . .

India word. DIAL finishes by saying that it possibly derives from or is influenced by Dravidian, and refers to DED 4041 Ta. *muṭṭu* 'to dash against ...' with, in turn, numerous quotations from Dravidian languages. The last sentence runs: "Cf. Skt. *muṭ-* to crush, grind, break." This reference to the Skt. verb *muṭ-* could be complemented with the EWA information under *moṭati, muṭati, moṭayati* 'crushes, grinds, breaks' also *modati, muntati* are mentioned; according to EWA all items are from Dhātupāṭha. These last items could, I think, reasonably be associated with Skt. *mṛd-*, in which case the IE/IA connections are very probable, cf. WP II, p. 278 under *mer-d-*. If so, the development *r > u > o* in the first syllable is evident already in IA.

The TL item corresponding to Skt. *muṣṭi-* is *muṭṭi,* which latter is there said to derive from the Skt. word. Fourteen different meanings of the word are given, beginning with 'fist', but there is nothing to prove that the words *muṭṭu* and *muṭṭi* belong to OTa. vocabulary, although it is said that *muṭṭi* with its meaning No. 3, 'a gesture with one hand in which the four fingers are closed tightly and the thumb is pressed over them ...' is present in Cilappatikāram.

While *spṛś-* could not be traced back to IE, *mṛś-* apparently could be derived from IE *merk̂-* "fassen, ergreifen", *merqᵘ* id., cf. WP II, p. 283.

Although nobody, as far as I know, has ventured to connect Skt. *mṛś-, mṛṣṭa-* with *muṣṭi-,* surely it would be natural to associate the Ta. words *muṭṭu* and *muṭṭi* with each other; possibly also with IE/IA *mṛś-*.

To return now to Ta. *piṭi:* we find this word in IPN with the meanings 'grip', 'hand's length/breadth' and *piṭittu* 'having gripped', which shows that the words are OTa. words.

As mentioned above, Skt. *pṛtha-* could reasonably account for the first meaning quoted from the IPN. The verb *piṭi,* the ordinary meanings of which could perhaps be said to be 'to catch, seize, understand' among others, seems to be a more elusive item, and for the time being we could not point to any sure IE/IA connections for this word. Instead we will just quote CALDWELL, R., A comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South-Indian Family of Languages, London 1913, p. 621, where the author says, under the heading 'Section III.-Scythian Affinities':[12] "*piḍ-ú,* to catch. Comp. Finnish *pidan,* to catch." Whether CALDWELL is right or whether the verb *piṭi*[13] should be regarded as an original Dravidian word has yet to be decided.[14][15]

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[12] For CALDWELL's "Scythian", cf. Loanwords I, p. 163, note 13.

[13] The *-u* must be a misprint; there is no such Ta. root.

[14] It was mentioned in Loanwords I, p. 169, that Skt. *prati-* is sometimes taken over into Ta. under the form *piṟati.* In some cases as e.g. in Ta. *piṭivātam* 'obstinacy, stubbornness' and

Only a few, admittedly vague suggestions can be made here. For TL meanings Nos. 7, 'to contain, hold', 9, 'to bear, carry, support', and *intr.* 6, 'to find room, go in' of the verb *piṭi,* Skt. *bhṛ-* offers a possible common base. Cf. MW under *bhṛ-.* This would present no difficulties from a phonetic

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piṭimāṇam '... Fondness ... liking ... pertinacity ...' Skt. *prati-* possibly corresponds to Ta. *piṭi-.* Cf. Skt. *prativāda-* 'contradiction ... refusal ... rejoinder ...' or Skt. *prati-bādh-* '... to beat back, ward off, repel'; *-bādhin* 'obstructing; m. an opponent'. Cf. also Skt. *prati-man-; -mānayati* in MW. While Skt. *prati-* becomes Pali *paṭi-* or *pacc-* and Prakrit *paḍi-* DIAL provides us with interesting information under item No. 8540 *prati,* where it says "... In cmpds. with *prati-,* Si. forms with *peḷe-* are inherited, those with *piḷi-* are loanwords from Pali: H. Smith JA 1950, 186." DIAL 8553, *pratigṛhṇāti,* becomes Si. *piḷigannavā.* It would be tempting to connect Ta. *piṭi(kka)* with Skt. *prati-gṛh-* from a semantic point of view; also the meaning 'to accept, approve', otherwise difficult to explain, could then be reasonably accounted for. However, there is nothing much to support the idea that a phonetic development parallel with the one in Singhalese should have taken place in Tamil, at least not as far as our present knowledge goes. Cf. however MW *pratiru-* 'to cry or call to ...' with Ta. *piḷiru* 'to sound ...'. An investigation on a possible and probable mutual influence between Tamil and Singhalese would certainly be of great interest.

These remarks may be regarded as just touching upon a problem not hitherto mentioned or dealt with, viz. a presumable group of 'loanwords' where a possible, perhaps very much changed appearance in an original prefix as well as the fact that the accent in Tamil words tends to rest on the first syllable, so changes the appearance and the pronunciation of a word, that an identification becomes very difficult. For the last-mentioned case cf. e.g. VAIDYA-NATHAN, op. cit., p. 81, Skt. *vi-dhā-* 'to create' and OTa *viti* CAM. 2: 12, 'to construct'. The phenomenon of "verschliffene Präfixe" has been known for a long time, cf. e.g. the MW items under *api-.* The term was recently used by KÖLVER, B., Verschliffene Präfixe im Altindischen. Abh. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. Bd XLII, 3. Wiesbaden 1976.

Without venturing to comment on the phenomenon I would also call attention to the Skt. use of acc. + *prati* meaning 'on account of, with regard to, concerning' vs. Ta. acc. + *paṟṟi* with identical meaning.

If only to point out how many problems remain unsolved in the lexical relations between Indian languages I would like to adduce here two entries and a curious note from WINSLOW's lexicon, viz. *kirpu,* 'action, act, performance (*seykai*); (*fig.*) 'bondage, restraint' (*aṭimaitta-ṇam*) ..., and *kiṟṟal,* 'being made or effected (*seytal*), 'being bound, confined, restrained' (*aṭimaittiṟamuṟal*). "Note. *kiṟu, kirpu, kiṟṟal, kiṟṟu, kiṉ,* and *kiṉṟu* seem to be the surviving paronyms from some obsolete Tamil root, which, in sound and meaning, might have been equivalent to the Sanscrit *Kru,* to do: hence, *naṭakkiṟāṉ* and *naṭakkiṉṟāṉ,* mean 'he *does* walk.' *kirpu* and *kiṟṟal,* as verbal nouns, and *kiṟṟu* and *kiṉ,* as participles are now obsolete." (In an attempt to explain the 'bondage, being bound' meaning I would refer to MW under *kārā* 'a prison ... binding, confinement ...', the suggested derivation of which is Skt. *kṛ-,* although with a question mark.) The WINSLOW note has not been taken up for serious discussion as far as I am aware, and this is certainly not the place for doing so. In our *piṭi-* dilemma, however, cf. Skt. *pṛtha-/spṛṣṭi-/mṛṣṭi-/kṛ-* vs. *piṭi(kka)/muṭṭu(kka)*! For a recent discussion of the present tense morph in Tamil, cf. ZVELEBIL, K., The Present Tense Morph in Tamil. Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. 91, No. 3, 1971, pp. 442 ff.

[15] Once we have come to know more about the 'rules' of sound changes etc. in this field, we might also find a connection between the verb *piṭi* and the verb *paṟṟu* with almost identical meanings, cf. DED 3320.

point of view; that the *bh* becomes *p* is a regular feature, the vocalic *r* often becomes Ta. *i*, and Skt. *t* > Ta. *ṭ*, especially when the word has "passed through" MIA. Cf. VAIDYANATHAN, op.cit. pp. 83 and 103. However, there are a number of meanings that could not be accounted for in this way. From a semantic point of view it would be possible to adduce in this connection Skt. *vṛ-*,[16] *vṛt-*[17] and more especially *vi-dhṛ-*.[18] But although a change IE *u* > Skt. *v* > MIA *b* > Ta. *p* would be natural, if not regular, we would need evidence from MIA on these particular items. Such evidence is not available, and so we may have to leave it at that.

As regards what CALDWELL terms a more "direct influence" from IE and with reference to the WP item *merk̂-* quoted above, I would like to call attention to the fact that Greek correspondences to IE *mer-* are given as μάρ(πτω)/βρα(κεῖν)[19] (Skt. *mṛś-*); *μροτός, μορτός/βροτός (Skt. *mṛ-*); to IE *mel-* e.g. Greek μολ(εῖν)/βλώσκω; *μλωθρός/βλωθρός (Skt. *mūrdhā-*); *μλάπτω/βλάπτω (Skt. *mṛc*). See WP II under *mer-*, *mel-*, further WACKERNAGEL, op. cit., p. 181 ff., and SCHWYZER[20] with literature. Could these initial alternations—dialectal or otherwise—be a factor in the initial *p/m* change which we have noticed in a number of cases in Skt. and also in Tamil? For other initial alternations earlier touched on, viz. *b/v*, *v/m* vide e.g. WACKERNAGEL, op. cit. pp. 183 and 197.

Whereas *piṭi* 'hold' etc. shows the expected centralization of the first vowel within the Dravidian languages, *piṭi* with the TL meaning No. 15, 'female of elephant', does not. Since the TL literary reference is to Tolkāppiyam, it is an OTa. word. In DED we find it under No. 3413, where the alternations of the second consonant are given as *ṭ/r/ḍ*. Whether this word could be connected with Skt. *pīluḥ* and its cognates in other languages or not—cf. EWA—I would not venture to decide. I would only point to the fact that a Skt. *l* sometimes corresponds to a MIA *ḷ*[21] which, in turn, frequently alternates with *ṭ/ḍ*;[22] a Skt. *l* also sometimes corresponds to a Ta. *ḷ*[23] which, in turn, could alternate with other cerebrals with or without a supposed "passing through" MIA. It should be added that Skt. *pīluḥ* is Pkt. *pīlu* according to SHETH, op. cit., p. 601.

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[16] E.g. for TL meanings Nos. 3, 'to capture, ensnare, entrap, catch ...', 10, 'to keep back, deduct, detain, withhold', and *intr.* 2, 'to be agreeable, attractive, pleasing ...'.

[17] E.g. for TL meanings Nos. 5, '... to depend on ...', 8, 'to assume, as a form', 13, 'to take on, as a colour', 14, 'to grasp, understand, comprehend', and *intr.* 5, 'to take place, occur'.

[18] Cf. p. 142, note 14.

[19] Cf. *paṟṟu*, p. 143, note 15.

[20] SCHWYZER, E., Griechische Grammatik ... (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft) I. München 1934, 1939, p. 277.

[21] PISCHEL, op. cit. §260.

[22] ibid. §240. Cf. also ibid. §§225 and 226.

[23] VAIDYANATHAN, op. cit., pp. 84 and 127.

If the words are at all connected, we have to suppose that they are 'gemeingut', as it seems impossible to decide who borrowed from whom. Note also that the Ta. word designates a female elephant, whereas the Skt. and the Pkt. words are both masculine in gender. Finally there is the meaning 'elephant' for the Skt. word *pṛdāku-*, only found in lexicon according to MW, but this item is an uncertain and a controversial one; cf. EWA with ample discussion.

Our next item is *piḻai* with a variety of meanings. It is found in DED as their Nos. 3442 and 3443. Under No. 3442 we find *piḻai* 'to be emancipated from sin and births, obtain salvation, escape from evil or danger, live, get on in life'; *piḻaippu* 'escape, life, livelihood'. The alternations in the first vowel within the Dravidian languages accounted for are only between *i* and *ī*, and in the second consonant between *ḻ* and *s/ss*. Under No. 3443 we have *piḻai* 'to do wrong, fail, die, be missing, lost; *n.* 'fault, crime, defect, mistake'; *piḻaippu* 'mistake, failure'. There is no change in the first vowel; the second consonant appears as *rs* or *r* in some languages. From TL we gather the following information: "*piḻai* ... *v.* cf. *pīḍ* ... *intr.* 1. To do wrong; ... 2. To fail; ... 3. To die; ... 4. To be missing, as a child; to be lost, as an article; ... 5. To be emancipated from sins and births; to obtain salvation; ... 6. To escape, as from an evil or a danger; ... 7. To live; ... 8. To get on in life, subsist; ... *tr.* 1. To stop, cease; ... 2. To miss, as an arrow ... *piḻai* ... *n.* 1. Fault, misdemeanour, crime ... 2. Defect, want; ... 3. Mistake, error, inaccuracy; ..." That the words are OTa. is confirmed by IPN which gives i.a. the following items: "*piḻaittu* = it which was wronged ... *piḻaittoor* = they who wronged ... *piḻaippin* = if (it) escape(d) ... *piḻaippu* = the act of failing ... *piḻaiyaa* = who without blemish ...".

The TL reference to Skt. *pīd* (it should be *pīḍ*) does not seem quite appropriate as regards the meanings, cf. MW.[24] Instead we have in OTa. *pīli*, verb, and *pīlai*, noun,[25] and in Middle Tamil *piḻi*, verb (this last one only in the TL meaning No. 2 'to fail'), which correspond phonetically[26] as well as semantically to Skt. *pīḍ-* and its possible cognates.

In my article Loanwords I, p. 171 ff., I suggested the possibility of deriving Ta. *viḻu/vīḻ* 'to fall, fall down' from Skt. *bhṛś-* and perhaps from IE

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[24] For *pīḍ-* cf. EWA with literature and discussion, KUIPER, F. B. J., Rigvedic Loanwords. Studia Indologica, Festschrift für Willibald Kirfel. Bonn 1955, p. 174, and OLSSON, EVA, Sanskrit and Prakrit words in the Tamil language. Uppsala 1933. (Ms., unpubl.), p. 28.

[25] Cf. ANAVARATAVINAYAKAM PILLAI, op. cit., p. 125, VAIDYANATHAN, op. cit., p. 100, and OLSSON, EVA, op. cit., p. 28.

[26] For the Skt. *ḍ* > Ta. *ḻ* change, cf. VAIDYANATHAN, op. cit., p. 83. Differently OLSSON, EVA, op. cit., p. 28.

bhre(n)k̂. For the 30 different meanings of *viḻu* I have to refer to TL. TL meaning No. 8, 'to die' corresponds to TL meaning No. 3 for *piḻai* 'to die', and TL and DED *vīḻccai* has the meaning 'fault, defect' just as *piḻai* means 'a fault, a failure'.

These facts as well as the phonetic characteristics present[27] lead us to suspect that *piḻai* too may have a cognate in Skt. *bhṛś-*, and a glance in MW under *bhraṃś-* reveals remarkable semantic correspondences. Cf. also MW under *bhraṃśa-* and *bhraṣṭa-*. It could reasonably be argued that so many correspondences speak for a common origin, but there is no material to prove a "passing through" MIA for *piḻai*, just as there is none for *viḻu/vīḻ*.[28]

Apart from the TL meanings of *piḻai* which correspond to the MW meanings of *bhraṃś-*, i.e. the major part, we would, with great caution, adduce Skt. *vṛt-* for TL meanings Nos. 7, 'to live', 8, 'to get on in life, subsist' and possibly *tr.* No. 1, 'to stop, cease'.

Out of the many meanings of *viḻu/vīḻ* in TL there are—apart from those possibly derived from Skt. *bhṛś-* —a number which perhaps could be derived from IE/IA. Only a few possibilities can be mentioned here, viz. TL *viḻu* meanings Nos. 11, 'to settle, be fixed', 13, 'to be allotted, fall to one's lot or share', and 15, 'to appear, be formed, come out'; these might be connected with Skt. *viś-*. Nos. 10, 'to fall into desuetude', 16, 'to take place, happen', 17, 'to pass, pass away', 20, 'to fall into position', 21, 'to devolve', and 23, 'to issue, proceed from, as speech' could derive from Skt. *vṛt-;* Nos. 18, 'to rush, as against a person', and 24, 'to become detached' possibly from Skt. *vi-sṛ-*.[29]

Note that TL itself suggests for meaning No. 19, 'to exhibit desire', Skt. *vṛ-*[30] and refers e.g. *viḻu*, 'excellent, sublime' to Skt. *vara-*, and *viḻu*, 'Equinox' to Skt. *viṣu*.

As in the case of *piṭi* these are only suggestions. There are no serious difficulties neither from a phonetic nor from a semantic point of view, but in the absence of supporting MIA material we cannot prove a "passing through" MIA.[31]

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[27] For the initial *p/v* alternation, cf. Loanwords I, p. 170, note 37. Skt. *bh-* > Ta. *p-, v-;* cf. VAIDYANATHAN, op. cit., p. 84. Skt. *ś* > Ta. *ḻ;* cf. ANAVARATAVINAYAKAM PILLAI, op. cit., p. 124.

[28] Cf. Loanwords I, p. 170.

[29] Cf. p. 143, note 14.

[30] Cf. WP I, p. 294, 2. *u̯el-*.

[31] This statement was made in Loanwords I, p. 170 also, when it was mainly based on the quoted DIAL material. Cf., however, SHETH, op. cit., pp. 567–568, where he derives *piṭṭa-* and *piḍḍa-* 'to fall down' and, p. 624, *phuṭa-, phuṭṭa-, phuḍa-, phuḍḍa-* 'being lost' from *bhraṃś-*.

As regards a possible "direct influence" from IE in the case of *viḷu/vīḷ* and/or *piḷai,* most of the above suggestions lead to IE sources. Naturally there may be other possibilities as well, cf. e.g. FRISK, Hj., Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch, Heidelberg 1954–60, under σφάλλω (σφάλμα) (and (ἀπο)λύω with meanings very closely related to those of our items. FRISK refutes the Skt. *skhal-* correspondence for σφάλλω mentioned in WP II, p. 599; he also finds few semantic correspondences between λύω and Skt. *lū.* Cf. also the discussions in BUCK, C. D., A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms in the Principal Indo-European Languages, Chicago 1949, p. 1185, regarding σφάλμα/*bhrama-, bhrānti-* and pp. 766 and 767 regarding another Greek verb, viz. ἀπόλλῦμι/*bhraṃś-.*[32]

Our next item is one which CALDWELL, op. cit., p. 593, has taken up under the heading "Extra Sanskritic or West Indo-European Affinities", viz. "*kiḷ-ei,* a young branch. Comp. Ossete *kalius;* Servian *galusa;* Greek κλάδος (*klados*), a young shoot, a branch. The theme of the Greek word is κλά-ω (*kla-ô*), to lop, to break; and the Tamil *kiḷ-ei,* considered as a verbal theme, means not only to sprout, but also to pluck off. *kiḷḷu,* to pinch to pluck, is a collateral theme."

In Loanwords I the words *kiḷai/kiḷḷu* 'to dig' etc., DED 1321, were discussed; here the meaning of the word *kiḷai* is different, cf. TL "*kiḷai . . . v . . . intr.* 1. To ramify, branch out; . . . 2. To multiply, increase in number, as families; . . . 3. To be close, to throng; to crowd, grow thick or close, as the beard, boughs, herbage, grain . . . 4. To come into being, appear; . . . 5. To abound, to be copious, plenteous; . . . *kiḷai . . . n. . . .* 1. Branch, bough; . . . 2. . . . Sprout, shoot, bud; . . . 3. Bouquet, bunch of flowers; . . . 4. Kindred, relations; . . . 5. Section, division; . . . 6. Class, group, herd, flock, shoal, company, family, horde, race; . . .". In DED *kiḷai* with this meaning is one of the items under 1317 Ta. *kiḷar* 'to rise' etc. and under 1678 Ta. *kēḷ* 'kindred' etc. If these items belong together we could state that the alternations are: in the first consonant *k/kr/kl/g,* in the first vowel *i, ī/e, ē/a* and in the second consonant *ḷ/l/r/j/p/ṇ/n/m* within the Dravidian languages accounted for. IPN bears evidence that *kiḷai* and many related words are OTa.

When CALDWELL adduces Ta. *kiḷḷu* 'to pinch, to pluck'[33] as a "collateral theme" (in TL the verb *kiḷai* does not have the meanings given by CALDWELL), he obviously connects the word for 'branch' with a verb meaning 'to pluck'. This, of course, is quite reasonable from a semantic point of view—cf. e.g. BUCK, op. cit., p. 523—and so he points to Greek κλάδος, κλάω 'a young shoot, a branch', 'to lop, to break' respectively, as possible

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[32] For *bhram-/bhraṃś-* cf. EWA under *bhramati,* and the note there.
[33] Cf. DED 1322 and ibid. 1321.

correspondences. Cf. FRISK, op. cit. under κλάω with references, WP II, p. 590 ff. *(s)quel-* "schneiden" and WP I, p. 436 ff. *qel-, qelā* "schlagen ... abbrechen", both with references.

Even if we would associate *kiḷai* 'branch', 'to ramify' etc. with the meaning 'to sprout, shoot forth' etc. as DED seems to do, the same Greek words might serve the purpose, cf. FRISK ibid. Although some points remain to be clarified, it is safe to state that there are IE connections in the case of the Greek words adduced by CALDWELL, who seems to infer a more "direct influence".

Should *kiḷai* derive from a Ta. verb root meaning 'to tear, rend, cut, pluck' we may have to take into consideration not only *kiḷḷu*, DED 1322, but also *kīḷ*, DED 1351, 'to rend, tear, split ...' *n.* 'part, portion, section'; possibly others as well.[34]

DIAL has under No. 3202 *kīla-* m. 'stake, peg ...' ... **kīḍa*, and under 3461 **kēḍa-* 'stick, twig' ... H. *kērā*, m. 'tender twig, sapling'—cf. WP I, p. 544 *ǵei- : ǵī-* "keimen, aufbersten, aufblühen"—but otherwise it seems difficult to find MIA links here.[35] As could be seen an *i/e* alternation is present in the DIAL material.

As already mentioned, DED does not connect *kiḷai* 'branch' etc. with the meaning 'to break, pluck' etc., but rather with the meaning 'to shoot up, sprout' etc. To the words already adduced by them when dealing with *kiḷai* we would add a reference to other words from TL, e.g. *kiḷaimai* 'relationship', *kiḷamai* id. (DED 1647), *kuḷai* 'sprout',[36] 'to cause to sprout or shoot', *kūḷi* 'company, multitude, family', *kūḷiyar* 'friends', *keḷi* 'friendship' (DED 1647), *keḷumu* 'to be abundant, spring up, shoot forth', perhaps also *koḷuntu* 'tender leaf, shoot, sprout'.

If we look once again at the TL item *kiḷai* and its different meanings quoted on p. 147, we can find yet other Ta. words, seemingly related both phonetically and semantically, e.g. *kuḷāal* 'flocking together', *kuḷu*,[37]

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[34] E.g. DED 1316 Ta. *kiḷi* ... 'to tear, rend, split, cut ...', DED 1353 Ta. *kīru* 'to slit, tear, rend, cut ...', DED 1544 and DED Supplement 1544 Ta. *kurai* 'to cut ... pluck' and 'piece, section' respectively. Cf. also TL: "*kīḷ* ... To rend, tear; *kiḷittal*." For possible IA correspondences we have to refer here to Skt. *kr̥t-* and to Skt. *kr̥ṣ-* respectively with IE cognates, cf. EWA and WP with references. Cf. also Loanwords I.

[35] DIAL 3495: *koṭayate* 'breaks'. Cf. further TL *kīlakam* 'pin, bolt, wedge' and *kīlam* 'nail, pin, spike'.

[36] Cf. also BURROW, T., Loanwords in Sanskrit. Transactions of the Philological Society, London 1946 (1947), p. 18.

[37] Cf. also BURROW, op. cit., p. 23 and Collected Papers on Dravidian Linguistics. Annamalainagar 1968, p. 64, further EMENEAU, M. B. & BURROW, T., Dravidian Borrowings from Indo-Aryan. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962, p. 25, and KUIPER, F. B. J., Proto-Munda Words in Sanskrit. Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen. N. R. LI. Amsterdam 1948, pp. 54–55.

kuḷumpu with about the same meaning, *kuḷumu/kuḷuvu* 'to crowd', *kuḷumal* 'assembly, crowd', *kuḷḷu/kūḷ* 'to crowd together' but also e.g. *kūṟṟam* 'species, class, division', *kūṟu* 'part, portion, division'.[38]

As could be seen from the above examples of words—if not all, in any case many of them related—there is a great variation both in the first vowel and in the following consonant.

The *semantic* correspondences for *kiḷai* 'branch' etc. in Skt. would be e.g. *śākhā-* 'branch' in all its meanings, also 'division, subdivision', *śakala-* 'splint, log', *śalākā-* 'small stick, rod, twig, sprout, shoot', *śālā-* 'a large branch', *kiśala-* 'leaf-bud, sprout', and *skandha-* 'shoulder' but also 'branch, division, section'. Cf. MW and EWA with references.

DIAL has *śākhā-* 'branch' as its item No. 12376, where we find an *l*-extension mentioned in Prakrit and in a few NIA languages; *śakala-* 'chip . . . log' we find under No. 12243, *śala-* under 12343 meaning 'staff', both with few correspondences from MIA and NIA. *Śālā-* does not appear with the meaning 'branch' at all, and *śalākā-*, 'any small stake or stick' under No. 12349, has many correspondences in MIA and NIA languages but none very helpful for our purpose. No. 3189 *kiśala-* 'sprout', finally, is the only one the first syllable of which could *phonetically* correspond to the Ta. word, but the information from MIA and NIA—also from Skt.—is very scanty here. Cf. also DIAL *skandha-*.

Looking at these IA items we would like to make two observations. 1. Although we might feel that there exists some kind of phonetic resemblance between them and Ta. *kiḷai*, we could not show, except in the case of *kiśala-*, a real phonetic correspondence without resorting to haplology, methathesis etc. 2. There is no definite and generally accepted etymology for the words.[39]

The great variation in the first vowel and in the second consonant in all the Ta. words presented which, among themselves, bear a resemblance both phonetically and semantically; the fact that quite a few of them could be found also in Skt.—see below—and further the difficulty in finding

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[38] It is also to be noted that e.g. *kāl, kala, kalai, kaḷai, kuccu* (DED 1369), *kulam, kulai, kulakku, kuluṅku,* and *kottu* (DED 1741) have meanings in common with *kiḷai*.

[39] Apart from the Greek words already adduced by Caldwell one might perhaps venture to point to a couple of others with just as uncertain an etymology, viz. χλόη—on the assumption that the meaning is something like "grünen, frisch wachsen", cf. Frisk, op. cit., and WP I, p. 627 *ghleu-* . . .—or κράδη "Baumwipfel, Zweigspitze, Zweig", the original meaning being rather connected with "schwingen", cf. Frisk, op. cit., WP II, p. 567, and EWA under *kūrdati,* or again *κόρος "Schoss, Schössling, junger Zweig . . .", cf. WP I, p. 408 *ḱer-* "wachsen" with references, and Skt. *kāṣṭha-* 'piece of wood, stick', cf. WP I, p. 436 ff. and EWA with discussion.

convincing etymologies—all these features make us suspicious as to their respective origin.

To return to the *verb kiḷai* and its different meanings given in TL: meaning No. 1. 'to ramify, branch out' has already been discussed, and we do not seem to get any further at present. For meaning No. 2. 'to multiply, increase in number as families' we might perhaps adduce Skt. *guṇa-, gaṇa-,* derivatives of which show semantic possibilities, cf. MW. EWA does not have this meaning for *guṇa-,* but the discussion under both items is of great interest. The possibility that one or both could derive from IE *gī̆-,* just as ϰλάδος could derive from IE *ql-,* is a point to be noted.[40][41]

Meaning No. 3 is 'to be close, to throng; to crowd, grow thick or close ...'. But for the prefix both *saṃkīrṇī* (*kṛ-*) and *saṃkuḷī* (*kṛ-*) could be adduced. Both items are referred to Skt. *kṝ-,* although the latter one with a question-mark, by DIAL under item No. 12828. Cf. also the DIAL discussion under No. 1012 *ākula-.* Even for meaning No. 5 'to abound, to be copious ...' the same Skt. root might be taken into consideration. See further EWA under *saṃkula-.*

The TL meaning No. 4 for the verb *kiḷai* is 'to come into being, appear'.[42] Here some references in DIAL may be of a certain interest, viz. 3838 **khalati²* 'rises' ... Ty. pal. *kiḷăr* 'climbs'; 3857 **khasati²* 'rises' and 3882(1) **khiḍ* 'be open, expand', (2) **khiḍḍ* (3) **khiṇḍ* (4) **khil* (5) **khill* (6) **khēḍ* 'open up, plough'. The roots under No. 3882 certainly have different origins; cf. for (1–5), where the meanings are often given as 'to scatter, spread', Skt. *kṝ-, kirati,* for (6) *kṛṣ-, kṛṣati,* whereas items Nos. 3838 and 3857 would point rather to Skt. *kāś-, kāśate.* Cf. EWA.[43]

The TL meanings Nos. 1 and 2 of the noun *kiḷai* were already discussed. Nos. 3 and 5, 'bouquet, bunch of flowers' and 'section, division' respectively, might be connected with Skt. *gulma-;* Nos. 4 and 6 'kindred, relations' and 'class, group, herd, flock, shoal, company, family, horde, race' respectively with Skt. *kula-.* Cf. EWA, where a possible Dravidian origin is mentioned.[44][45]

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[40] In MW *kuṭṭ-* 'to crush ... pound' also has the meaning 'to multiply'.

[41] Vide KUIPER, PMW, pp. 54–55.

[42] While DED 1317 contains both *kiḷai* and *kiḷar* with related meanings, WINSLOW's lexicon connects *kiḷar* with a word *kiḷa* of the same meaning. This last item could not be found in TL nor in DED.

[43] The TL meanings Nos. 7 and 8 probably have to do with 'hollow', if so, possibly ~ Skt. *kṛṣ-,* see Loanwords I.

[44] Cf. BURROW, Loanwords, p. 23 and KUIPER, PMW, p. 55, but also EMENEAU & BURROW, op. cit., p. 25.

[45] Under item No. 1368 Ta. *kuccu* 'cluster ...' DED says: "Cf. Skt. *kūrca-* bunch ...; *guccha-* bundle, bunch ...; *guñja-, guluccha-, guluñc(h)a-, gutsa-* bundle, cluster ..." Cf.

It is sometimes said that the vowel alternations in the first syllable of a word belonging to Indian 'gemeingut' indicate a Dravidian origin of the word. It seems to me that this may present too easy a way out of the dilemma. It has become clear, I think, that such words often *appear* in Dravidian, but also that they may have quite a different origin. It should be borne in mind again that they may even have "passed through" Dravidian and been "borrowed" back into IA in a different shape.

We have seen some of the possibilities which an IE/IA vocalic *r* in the first syllable of a word offers, possibilities that are only touched upon and far from fully investigated as yet. Now, DIAL has as its item 3334 **kulati* 'hurts' and continues: "*kṛnāti*, °*nōti* 'hurts, kills' Dhātup., *kṛnvati* Naigh.— *kṝ²*". DIAL item No. 3421 is **kṛta-* 'mat' [... *kṛt²*], where we find IA words accounted for with *ki-* in the first syllable, e.g. *kirī* f. 'reed hut'. DIAL 3340 *kulaya-* ... 'woven texture, web, nest', on the other hand, is mentioned as having a Dravidian origin,[46] but here too Skt. *kṛt-*, *kṛnatti* would seem to be a plausible cognate.

Just a few observations and suggestions could be added.

EWA refutes the suggestion made in WP I, p. 421 that *kuṭi-, kuṭī* "Hütte" corresponds to **kṛtī* and suggests a Dravidian origin for these words and for others belonging to the same semantic group. But just as we have had reason earlier to point to Skt. *kṛt-, kṛntati, kṛ-, kirati*,[47] *kṛṣ-, kṛṣati* etc. when looking at some of the words mentioned in connection with our item *kiḷai*, here one would suggest further investigation into Skt. *kṛt-, kṛnatti* too.[48]

As mentioned on p. 147 DED has *kiḷai* under its No. 1317 *kiḷar* 'to rise ... shine , .. be exalted' ...; *n.* 'light', cf. TL *kēḷ* ... 'light, lustre, brilliance ...'. It is very tempting indeed to refer the noun *kiḷar* 'light, lustre, brightness, splendour' and the verb *kiḷar* with TL meaning No. 4 'to shine, to be conspicuous, resplendent' to Skt. *śrī-*, cf. further MW, WP I, p. 478 *k̑rei-* ... "hervorleuchten, sich hervortun", and EWA.[49] Cf. also note 42.

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also e.g. *kūrcaḥ, gucchaḥ, gutsaḥ* in EWA. All these items show certain phonetic and semantic correspondences and their respective etymologies are controversial; nobody would venture to call them 'loanwords', instead 'gemeingut' probably is the appropriate term here.

[46] Cf. BURROW, Loanwords, p. 25, and Collected Papers, p. 64, note.

[47] WHITNEY, W. D., The Roots, Verb-forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language, Leipzig 1885, repr. 1954, suggests under *kuṭṭ-* 'divide, crush' a possible derivation from Skt. 1. *kṛt-*, and under *kṛ-* 'scatter' a possible derivative *-kula*, the latter with a question-mark.

[48] For Skt. *kula-* WP I, p. 517 points at *qu̯el-* "Schwarm ..." Greek τέλος; this is being discussed in EWA, which see. My own suggestion as to the 'gemeingut' word *kula-* 'race, family, residence of a family' etc. would be to refer this word to WP I, p. 608 *ĝherdh- gherdh-*, Skt. *gṛha-*. This might well have developed into e.g. Ta. *kula-* and returned into Skt. in this shape. It is now more or less an all-India word.

[49] In Loanwords I a suggestion was made that Ta. *kēḷ* 'hear' be referred to Skt. *śru-*, IE *k̑leu-*. In DED under item No. 1677 we find i.a. *kiḷa* 'to express clearly, make special mention of,

The word *kiḷai* 'kindred' etc. is found in DED also under No. 1678, *kēḷ* 'kindred ...'. Here we might point again, I think, to WP I, p. 408 *k̑er-*, if not to WP I, pp. 358–359 *k̑ei-*, cf. the discussion in EWA under *śrīḥ*.

We have had occasion to highlight the interchange between the different cerebrals when constituting the second consonant of the first syllable of a Tamil word with the phonetic characteristics given here. DED 1678, *kēḷ* etc. mentioned above may offer yet another example of this; *kēṇmai*—with a perfectly regular euphonic change—means, just as *kēḷ*, also 'friendship', 'kindred', 'relationship'. This is also one of the meanings of *kiḷai*, as we have just seen. When, under No. 1647 in DED, we find i.a. *kiḷamai* with the meanings 'friendship alliance, relationship' and in TL *kiḷaimai* with the meaning 'relationship', this should underline the risk of being too sure also of what cerebral may have developed from a particular IA sound/symbol. Other items under the same DED entry point in the same direction.

For *kiḷamai* there are other meanings as well, and we will take this word as our next item. CALDWELL, op. cit., p. 592, has taken it up under the heading "Extra Sanskritic or West Indo-European Affinities" in the following way.

"*kiṛa-mei* (base *kiṛa*), a week, literally property, possession, each portion of a week being astrologically regarded as the property or inheritance of some planet. Comp. Ossete *kuri*, *kôre*, a week; Georgian *kuire*. Possibly these words are derived from the Greek κυρι-ακή (*kuri-akê*), Sunday, the Lord's day; but whence is the Greek word derived? From κύρι-ος (*kuri-os*), a lord, a possessor, the base of which may perhaps be allied to the Tamil *kiṛa*, possession? The ultimate root of *kiṛa* is doubtless *kir*, ordinarily lengthened to *kîr*, beneath; hence *kiṛa-mei* means that which is beneath one, under his power, in his possession."

If we begin with *kiḷamai* with the meaning 'week' according to CALDWELL, I have found this meaning only in WINSLOW's lexicon, where *vāram* is given as a synonym. In KUMĀRACUVĀMIPPIḶḶAI, A., Ilakkiyaccollakarāti, Madras 1914–15, *vāram* is also given as a synonym. (There is no English translation.) But *vāram* also means 'day of the week', cf. TL and WINSLOW, just as *kiḷamai* does, according to TL meaning No. 6.

The corresponding item in DED is found under No. 1647,[50] viz. *kiḷamai* ... 'day of the week, as related to each of the seven planets', a translation identical with that of the TL. This is doubtless the usual meaning of the word in this connection. In TL there is a reference to Cēntaṉ Tivākaram

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state specifically' and *kiḷavi* 'word, speech, language'. Even these two items could, I think, be referred to the same root, cf. MW under *śru-*, especially the causative *śrāvayati*, and WP I, pp. 494–495, especially "ai. ç*ravas-* n. 'Ruhm', av. *sravah-* n. 'Wort'" etc.

[50] DED 1647 begins with Ta. *keḷuvu* (*keḷuvi-*) 'to unite, embrace' n. 'friendship'; *keḷumu* (*keḷumi-*) 'to attain, join, unite'. Cf. MW under 2. *śliṣ* and EWA under *śliṣyati*.

(probably some time before A.D. 850); there is nothing to prove that the word with this meaning is OTa.[51]

Skt. *vāra-* in MW has the meaning 'turn of a day (under the regency of a planet), a day of the week'. It is difficult to know exactly what was meant by *kilamai* originally in this connection, but it seems reasonable to assume that Skt. *śani-vāra-* and Ta. *sani-kilamai* might correspond semantically, especially as *sani-vāram* is given as a synonym for the Ta. word, cf. WINSLOW. CALDWELL, as we have just seen, gives the meanings as '... property, possession, each portion of a week being astrologically regarded as the property or inheritance of some planet'. The interpretations 'regency, property, possession'—possibly also 'dominion, abode'—justify us in indicating a whole complex of Ta. words as possible cognates of Skt. *kṣi-* and derivatives.

As regards the phonetic changes which may seem unusual at first, we find in ANAVARATAVINAYAKAM PILLAI, op. cit., p. 129, the statement: "When *ṣ* occurs either at the beginning or in the middle of words in combination with voiceless stops, particularly the velar *k*, it is either assimilated or undergoes some other change." Examples are i.a. Skt. *kṣaṇa-* 'an instant' Ta. *kaṇam; kṣēma-* 'well-being' *cēmam/ēmam.* But there is also another example which is of the greatest interest to us, viz. Skt. *kṣaya-* 'a disease in general'; Ta. *kayam*, 'consumption'; Malayāḷam *kilayam.* On p. 130 the author discusses this and says: 'The change of S. *kṣaya-* into *kilayam* in Malayāḷam is peculiar. Bishop Caldwell says: '*ṣ* is sometimes, though rarely, converted in Tamil into *l.* Dr Gundert supplies me with some instances of this in Old Malayāḷam, e.g. *kṣaya*, Sans. 'loss' is in old Mal. written *kilayam*, ...' In this change, *kṣaya* must have first got the anaptyctic *i* for facility of pronounciation and then *ṣ* became *l* as in several similar cases."

Keeping this in mind let us start from Skt. *kṣaya-* in MW which as derived from 1. *kṣi-, kṣayati* 'to rule, govern' etc. means 'dominion', and from 2. *kṣi-, kṣeti* 'to dwell, reside, inhabit, go, move' etc. means 'abode ... seat, house'. pw gives as meanings for *kṣi-, kṣayati* i.a. "besitzen, verfügen über; beherrschen ...". For further information see pw, MW and EWA.

Should there be any uncertainty about the age and true meaning of the word *kilamai* 'day of the week', there can hardly be any doubt as regards other meanings of the word according to TL, viz. No. 1. 'claim, right, propriety'; ref. to the Kuṟal, 2. 'relation, connection; no ref., 3. 'friendship, alliance'; ref. to Cīvakacintāmaṇi, 4. (Gram.) 'relation of one thing to

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[51] In PPI, however, we find *kilamai* 'a system of ālāpana or rendering of a tune' with a reference to Paripāṭal which shows that the word with this meaning is OTa.

another as denoted by the possessive case . . .'; ref. to Naṉṉūl,[52] 5. 'quality, property, attribute' ref. to Tivākaram. For kiḻavaṉ 'owner' the ref. is to Kuṟaḷ; for 'lord, master, husband' to Tolkāppiyam just as for kiḻavi 'wife, mistress'.[53] For kiḻavatu 'that which pertains to' reference is made to Tolkāppiyam. Cf. also TL kēḷ 'to come under the control of' (DED 1678) and kēḷvaṉ 'husband, master, lord, companion, friend'.

CALDWELL, op. cit., p. 592 also discusses the following item: "kiṟa, old (not by use, but with respect to length of life); ultimate root kiṟ, beneath, that which has gone down. Comp. Sans. jar-as, age, but especially the Greek words signifying age, aged—viz. γῆρα-ς (gêra-s), γηραι-ός (gêrai-os), γεραι-ός (gerai-os), γέρ-ων (ger-ôn). See also the Scythian affinities of this word." These are found on p. 617: "kiṟa, old, aged. Comp. Hung. kor; Oriental Turkish chari;[54] other Turkish idioms, kar, kart; Wotiak keres; Lesghian heran . . .".

In TL we find kiḻam 'old age, senility, decrepitude', 'aged person, aged animal or thing; used as a term of contempt'; kiḻamai 'old age', kiḻavu id., kiḻavaṉ, kiḻavōṉ 'aged, old man', kiḻavi 'old woman' and kiḻampaṭu 'to grow old; to become worn out or useless by age'. Most of these are given in DED under No. 1315, where we find that there is a change i/e in the first vowel within the Dravidian languages covered. In TL we also find kuḻaivu 'fading, languishing' and koḻai-paṭu 'to dwindle, decrease'.

There is nothing to prove that the above words are OTa.; the earliest reference I could find is one to Tēvāram (after ca. 700 A.D.) in TL.

Let us look again at MW under kṣaya-[55] which as derived from 4. kṣi-, (kṣayati), kṣiṇōti, kṣiṇāti 'to destroy . . . be diminished, decrease, wane (as the moon), waste away, perish . . . pass . . . weaken . . .' means 'loss, waste, wane diminution, destruction, decay, wasting or wearing away (often ifc.) . . . consumption, phthisis pulmonalis . . . sickness in general . . .'. Cf. also e.g. dina-kṣaye 'at the end of the day', jīvita-kṣaye 'at the end of life' with Ta. kiḻa-maḻai 'rain about to cease'.

For the MW 1., 2., and 4. kṣi- there seem to be IE cognates, cf. WP I, pp. 504–505. In Greek the initial kṣ- in these cases are represented by κτ, κτ, and φθ respectively. In MIA kṣaya- appears as khaya-, which could hardly be the immediate origin of Ta. kiḻa-.

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[52] Cīvakacintāmaṇi is regarded as later than Tivākaram, viz. ca. 900 A.D.; Naṉṉūl ca. 1200 A.D.
[53] These items are also found in DED under 1647.
[54] Cf. RADLOFF, W., Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialecte. II. 's-Gravenhage 1960, 1669 and 168; further CLAUSON, G., An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish. Oxford 1972, p. 644.
[55] The fact that we have taken kṣaya- as the point of departure in this discussion does not at all mean that this is the form underlying the Ta. words. This is an issue that I would not venture to decide yet.

The origin of Skt. initial *kṣ-* has obviously presented problems to the scholars, cf. WACKERNAGEL, J., Altindische Grammatik. I. Göttingen 1896, p. 239 § 209 ff., further WP, and EWA with literature. In DIAL quite a number of items are given where *kṣ- ~jh-*, which, in turn, sometimes is supposed to equal *j-*. Cf. e.g. items Nos. 5395, 5397, 5405, 5410, 5411. DIAL item No. 5149, *járatē*, 'praises, addresses' (RV), on the other hand, is referred to the Skt. root *gr̄-;* see also EWA under *grṇāti, grṇīte* 'calls, invokes, praises'.[56]

Scholars have treated the realization of the initial sounds/symbols in the Skt. words quoted and in related words. There seem to be considerable differences of opinion, and it is beyond the scope of this article to go into this problem in the IE field. A question of great interest to us in this connection, however, would be whether there is a bridge, dialectal or otherwise, between *kṣ-* and *j-* in other cases just as there seems to be one in e.g. Skt. *kṣam-* (IE *gdh-;* Greek χθών), *jmas*, cf. WACKERNAGEL, op. cit., p. 241 § 209. Cf. WP I, p. 662 *ĝhđem-, ĝhđom-, ĝhđm-* "Erde . . .".[57] [58] Whatever the answer may be, we have to state that the Ta. words seem more closely related to the *kṣ-* and/or IE initials than to those with an initial *j-*.

When CALDWELL points to the possible connection between Ta. *kila*, Skt. *jara-* and 'especially the Greek words signifying age, aged' he is supported in this by DEVANEYAN, N., Vaṭamoḻi varalāṟu. (1902). Madras 1967, p. 120, who, however, regards Tamil as the original source. Considering that Skt. *jara-* is in WP I, p. 599 referred to IE *ĝer-, ĝerē-* "morsch, reif werden, altern", I feel justified in making the following suggestion: IE *ĝ- ~* Skt. *j-* (Greek γ-) *~* OTa. *k-*,[59]—keeping in mind the limitations of the Ta. alphabet earlier discussed—this to be compared with the suggestion in Loanwords I that IE *k̂- ~* Skt. *ś-*[60] (Greek ϰ-) *~* OTa. *k-*. Cf. WP I, p. 575 *ĝembh-, ĝṃbh-* "beissen, zerbeissen", *ĝombhos* "Zahn", Skt. *jambha-* 'tooth, tusk', Greek γόμφος, Ta. *kompu* 'horn, tusk'.

The above suggestion *could* provide an explanation—although perhaps not recognized by him at the time—for CALDWELL's observations regarding *kila-* 'old' etc.; cf. EWA *jāraḥ* 'becoming old' (<*jr̄-*); possibly also for DED

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[56] Cf. also MW 3. *gr̄-* (=3. *kr̄-*) 'to know, make known . . .'.

[57] Cp. e.g. MW *kṣaj-* 'to go, approach' Dhātup., DIAL id., with WACKERNAGEL, op. cit., p. 161 § 137 *jarate* "sich nähern", EWA *jarate* 'moves', MW *jr̄-* 'to come near, approach'; also, perhaps, MW 1. *kṣi-* with *jināti* and 4. *kṣi-* with *jināti*. Cf. EWA under *jināti*.

[58] Cf. SCHINDLER, J., Die Sprache 13. 1967, pp. 191–205, and ibid. 23,1. 1977, pp. 25–35.

[59] The regular alternation is given as Skt. *j-* > Ta. *c-* in VAIDYANATHAN, op. cit., p. 83.

[60] As is well known there is already in Skt. a certain alternation between *ś-* and *k-*, e.g. *śru-/karṇa-; śrṇāti/krṇāti; śram-/klam-*, cf. WACKERNAGEL, op. cit., p. 228 § 201. 'Rules' for this are not clear as yet, nor has a bridge been found between e.g. *śram-/klam-* and MW 4. *kṣi-*, although they seem close enough semantically.

1647 *kēḷvaṉ* 'husband, companion, friend', cf. EWA *jārah* 'suitor, lover' (<*jṛ-*?).[61]

The material presented seems to suggest the following conclusions:

either: the Dravidians have been in touch with IE "centum"-language-speaking people(s) before they were influenced by "Sanskrit"; this should have taken place before Indo-Iranian time.

IE	OTa.	(Greek)
$\hat{k}$-	k-	χ-
$\hat{k}p$-	k-	κτ-, φθ-
$\hat{g}$-	k-	γ-
$\hat{g}d$-	k-	χθ-

or: "Sanskrit" has within itself experienced a variation/differentiation.

IE	Skt.	(Greek)
$\hat{k}$-	*ś- ~ k-*	χ-
$\hat{k}p$-	*kṣ- ~ j-*	κτ-, φθ-
$\hat{g}$-	*j- ~ g-*	γ-
$\hat{g}d$-	*kṣ- ~ j-*	χθ-

Tamil has then "chosen" the *k-*, *kṣ-* alternative, and MIA could hardly have played a rôle here.

The observations, suggestions and discussions in this article and in the earlier one on 'loanwords' are, it seems to me, sufficient to prove that there are yet possibilities to establish new 'rules' for the alternations of e.g. initial consonants as well as of the first syllable vowels, especially before so-called retroflex consonants, of quite a number of words in the linguistic field under review here, thus enabling us to identify with greater certainty what is usually called 'loanwords' or 'gemeingut'.

If my articles should incite scholars to scrutinize more closely these possibilities—hitherto largely overlooked—of, in this particular case, the lexical connections between IE and old Dravidian material, they have served their purpose.

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[61] This might also make WP I, p. 544 *ĝēi-* : *ĝī-* "keimen, aufbersten, aufblühen" more interesting in connection with the discussion on *kiḷai* 'branch' etc.

Book Reviews

HERMAN WOHLSTEIN, *The Sky-god An-Anu, Head of the Mesopotamian Pantheon in Sumerian-Akkadian literature*. Jericho, New York 1976. 186 pp.

Although the Mesopotamian pantheon was actually headed by the Sky-god, known as An in Sumer and as Anu(m) in Babylonia-Assyria, a number of other deities surpassed him in popularity and practical importance. Likewise, a considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to several of these gods, whilst the supreme deity An/Anu has not been subject to a separate monograph prior to the present investigation by the Rabbi, Dr HERMAN WOHLSTEIN (Malmö, Sweden).

Thus, already in 1909 H. ZIMMERN published his study on Tammuz, the son and lover of Ištar (Der babylonische Gott Tammuz [Abhandlungen der Philol.-Hist. Klasse der Königlichen Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 27: 20], Leipzig; cf. lately, TH. JACOBSEN, Toward the Image of Tammuz and Other Essays on Mesopotamian History and Culture, ed. W. L. MORAN [Harvard Semitic Studies 21], Cambridge, Mass., 1970, pp. 73–103). Similarly, Inanna/Ištar, the heavenly queen and the goddess of war and fertility, was treated by E. BRIEM in 1919 (Studier över moder- och fruktbarhetsgudinnorna i den sumerisk-babyloniska religionen, Diss., Lund), followed by J. PLESSIS in 1921 (Étude sur les textes concernant Ištar-Astarté. Recherches sur sa nature et son culte dans le monde sémitique et dans la Bible, Paris), by W. W. HALLO–J. J. A. VAN DIJK in 1968 (The Exaltation of Inanna, New York), by G. FARBER-FLÜGGE in 1973 (Der Mythos "Inanna und Enki" unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Liste der m e [Studia Pohl 10], Diss., Rome), and by W. R. SLADEK in 1974 (Inanna's Descent to the Netherworld, Diss., Baltimore; for further references, see Reallexikon der Assyriologie und vorderasiatischen Archäologie, ed. E. EBELING–B. MEISSNER–E. F. WEIDNER–W. VON SODEN [RLA], 5: 1, Berlin 1976, pp. 74–88). Even Enlil (Ellil)/Bel, the mountainous god of the winds and the atmosphere, was studied in 1927 by F. NÖTSCHER (Ellil in Sumer und Akkad, Hannover; see further RLA 2, Berlin 1933–38, pp. 382–386). In the following year, 1928, H. SCHMÖKEL devoted a thesis to Dagan, the originally Amorite god whose sphere of activity is under dispute (Der Gott Dagan, Ursprung, Verbreitung und Wesen seines Kultes, Diss., Heidelberg; see further RLA 2, pp. 99–101). In another doctoral thesis, published in 1960, Å. SJÖBERG dealt with the Moon-god Nanna/Sin (Suen) (Der Mondgott Nanna-Suen in der sumerischen Überlieferung, Diss., Stockholm). Yet another thesis, appearing in 1969, was written by A.-H. A. AL-FOUADI on Enki/Ea, the god of the ocean of fresh water as well as the god of wisdom (Enki's Journey to Nippur. The Journeys of the Gods, Diss., Philadelphia; cf. also G. FARBER-FLÜGGE, *op. cit.*, 1973). Likewise, Nergal, the god of war, death, and the netherworld, was studied in a monograph by E. VON WEIHER in 1971 (Der babylonische Gott Nergal [Alter Orient und Altes Testament 11], Neukirchen-Vluyn). In addition, two works published after the appearance of H. WOHLSTEIN's work under review are worthwhile mentioning, *viz.* H. BEHRENS, Enlil und Ninil. Ein sumerischer Mythos aus Nippur [Studia Pohl, series maior 8], Roma 1978; F. POMPONIA, Nabû. Il culto e la figura di un dio del Pantheon babilonese ed assiro [Studi semitici 51], Roma 1978.

It is immediately obvious that the recent monograph by H. WOHLSTEIN is the result of several decades of studies on the Sky-god An/Anu. The majority of the sources and literature referred to stems from a time before the 1940's, intimating that the basic research work was carried out earlier than 1950 (a supposition strengthened by a reference to a book by F. BAETHGEN from 1888 as having been written "more than 60 years ago", p. 175, n. 23). On the other hand, a later revision is discernible in occasional references to works published in the 1950's (e.g. p. 37, n. 50; p. 56, n. 54; p. 131, n. 55; p. 142, n. 1; p. 144, n. 28; p. 150, n. 74), and even in the 1960's and 1970's (e.g. p. 1; see also the bibliography, pp. 179–186).

In its present shape as a somewhat revised investigation from before 1950 Dr WOHLSTEIN's study is still of considerable value and impact. The author basically pursues a chronological method in presenting his results. Thus he depicts in successive chapters the rôle attributed to An/Anu in the "Early Sumerian Period" (ch. 2, pp. 25–30), the "Old Akkadian Period (Dynasty of Akkad)" (ch. 3, pp. 31–45), the "Late Sumerian Epoch" (ch. 4, pp. 46–71), the "Old Babylonian Epoch, First Dynasty of Babylon" (ch. 5, pp. 72–84), the "Middle Babylonian Epoch" (ch. 6, pp. 85–91), the "Neo-Babylonian Period" (ch. 7, pp. 92–97), the "Late Babylonian Period" (ch. 8, pp. 98–124), and the Assyrian Periods, "Anu in Assyria" (ch. 9, pp. 125–141), and "Texts Stemming from the Library of Ashurbanapal" (ch. 10, pp. 142–165). The author rightly stresses the difficulties involved in such a chronological method, particularly the fact that "the original time of the composition of many sources, extant only in transcriptions, is still very uncertain, as is the case, for example with many texts from the library of Ashurbanipal" (p. 2; the form "Ashurbanapal" is used in ch. 10). A further difficulty is due to the meagerness of the source material older than *c*. 2000 B.C., a consequence of which has been that the author has collected all source evidence concerning the "Myths of Primordial Times" in a certain introductory chapter (ch. 1, pp. 3–24), comprising texts "On the Creation of the World", on "The Time Immediately after the Creation of the World (Pre-Diluvian)", on the "Time of the Deluge", on "The Epic of Gilgamesh", "The Myth of Adapa", and "The Myth of Etana".

In a concluding chapter, "General Survey of the Deity An-Anu" (ch. 11, pp. 166–178), Dr WOHLSTEIN summarizes the results achieved in the preceding sections. Opposing E. BRIEM's thesis, according to which Anu is of Akkadian-Sumerian origin (Proceedings of the 5th International Religious History Congress in Lund, Lund 1929, pp. 159 ff.), the author asserts "that the Sumerian Anu-cult must have already been known in the pre-Semitic time" (p. 167), and "that before the rise of the great Semitic empire of Akkad under Sargon, Anu was the empire-god of the northern 'countries' grouped around the capital Kish and that the title 'King of the Lands' for Enlil in Lagash and Anu in Uruk can first be explained with the establishment of the independent city-states in central or southern Babylonia" (p. 167). The author further claims that "an official position of the dyad, Anu-Enlil, in the pantheon of the empire is noticeable for the first time in the dynasty of the old Babylonian king Hammurabi" (p. 168), whilst the triad Anu-Enlil-Ea appears more often than this dyad in the subsequent development of the Assyrian history of religion; he also underlines that Anu, although being of Babylonian origin, "undergoes essential transformation in Assyria" (p. 169), which is evident already from "the significantly more copiously elaborated mythic material in the Assyrian tradition concerning him" (p. 169). Dr WOHLSTEIN likewise opposes the conviction of J. HEHN (Die biblische und die babylonische Gottesidee, Leipzig 1916, p. 23) and others that Anu was conceived in an "abstract" manner and turned away from the world, by pointing

to the character of the late-Babylonian Anu-cult; as regards HEHN's opinion that exactly this "abstract" nature of the Babylonian conception of Anu was the main reason why the Babylonians never arrived at a clear monotheism, WOHLSTEIN remarks that abstract features in the conception of a deity as such are not at all bound to lead away from a monotheistic faith (cf. ancient Israel), but in the case of Anu "it is rather the absence of pronounced ethical features in Anu that hindered this development" (p. 172). In a concluding section "Excursus" (pp. 172–178) Anu's state as an original high god is stressed.

Dr WOHLSTEIN's monograph on An/Anu is a testimony to many years of endeavours. His work clearly reveals a deep entering into the Sumerian and Akkadian literature. However, it is a decided weakness that the textual material made available in the later decades only to a very limited extent has been taken into consideration (for a survey of this source material, see spec. Catalogue des textes hittites, ed. E. LAROCHE, Paris 1971, pp. 47–53; 145–148; R. BORGER, Handbuch der Keilschriftliteratur 1–3, Berlin–New York 1967–1975). The same remark also applies to a number of the highly relevant philological tools made accessible in later years (thus merely a strictly limited use is made of the modern Sumerian and Akkadian grammars and lexica; for references, see e.g. A Basic Bibliography for the Study of the Semitic Languages, ed. J. H. HOSPERS, 1, Leiden 1973, pp. 4–18; 38–45). Moreover, a parallel deficiency is discernible as regards several recent standard works in the field of the history of religion (abundant references are found in e.g. Encyclopédie de la Pléiade. Histoire des religions, ed. H.-CH. PUECH, 1, Paris 1970, pp. 154–249; Handbuch der Religionsgeschichte, ed. J. P. ASMUSSEN–J. LAESSØE–C. COLPE, 1, Göttingen 1971, pp. 375–462; J. H. HOSPERS [ed.], *op. cit.*, pp. 20–23; 28–30; 53–73; 79–81; R. BORGER, *op. cit.*, 3, 1975, pp. 64–70; 147–150; 159–161; see in addition e.g. J. J. M. ROBERTS, The Earliest Semitic Pantheon. A Study of the Semitic Deities Attested in Mesopotamia before Ur III, Baltimore–London 1972; I. NAKATA, Deities in the Mari Texts. Complete Inventory of all the Information of the Deities Found in the Published Old Babylonian Cuneiform Texts from Mari and Comparative Evaluation thereof with Regard to the Official and Popular Pantheons of Mari, Columbia 1974, with comprehensive bibliography, pp. 494–521; after the publication of H. WOHLSTEIN's monograph e.g. H. W. F. SAGGS, The Encounter with the Divine in Mesopotamia and Israel, London 1978, appeared). One further point of complaint may be mentioned: on the technical side the thesis suffers from a bibliographical incompleteness even in relation to the works actually cited in short form in the running notes; it also suffers from a fairly rich amount of misprints, including a *consequent* misspelling of "ö" into "o" (e.g. already on p. 1: "Schmokel" instead of "Schmökel", and "Sjoberg" instead of "Sjöberg", *bis*).

Since these points of criticism have been adduced, it is not less urgent to acknowledge a profound indebtedness to Dr WOHLSTEIN, particularly in view of the vasteness of the source material penetrated by the author, further of the care with which he has strived to distinguish the different stages in comprehension of An/Anu, as well as on the whole of his far-reaching exposé of this theologically greatly significant high god now available to the scholarly and general public.

Uppsala   *Tryggve Kronholm*

Andrews University Seminary Studies, Berrien Springs, Michigan, vol. 13, Autumn 1975, No. 2, pp. 101–298; vol. 14, Spring 1976, No. 1, pp. 1–264; Autumn 1976, No. 2, pp. 265–328.

Andrews University Seminary Studies (AUSS) is the journal of the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary of Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan. Appearing in two annual issues the journal contains papers and short notes in English, French, and German on Biblical linguistics and its cognates, textual criticism, exegesis, Biblical archaeology and geography, ancient history, church history, theology, philosophy of religion, ethics and comparative religions. The articles of the journal are indexed, abstracted or listed in Book Review of the Month, Elenchus Bibliographicus Biblicus (Biblica), Index to Religious Periodical Literature, International Bibliography of the History of Religions, Internationale Zeitschriftenschau für Bibelwissenschaft und Grenzgebiete, New Testament Abstracts, Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, Orient-Press, Religious and Theological Abstracts, Seventh-day Adventist Periodical Index, Subject Index to Periodical Literature – Mosher Library, Theologische Zeitschrift, and in Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft.

The first two of the three issues of AUSS received by the Editor of Orientalia Suecana mainly contain a series of reports from the third and fourth archaeological campaigns to Tell Ḥesbān in 1973 and 1974 respectively. Tell Ḥesbān, situated about 25 road kilometers south-west of ʿAmmān in Jordan and traditionally associated with the Old Testament Heshbon (*ḥæšbōn*, Num. 21: 25–28, 30, 34; 32: 3, 37; Deut. 1: 4; 2: 26; 3: 2, 6; 4: 46; 24: 30; 29: 6; Josh. 9: 10; 12: 2, 5; 13: 10, 17, 21, 26; 21: 37; Judg. 11: 19, 26; Isa, 15: 4; 16: 8 f.; Jer. 48: 2, 34, 45; S. of S. 7: 5; Neh. 9: 22; 1 Chron. 6: 66), as well as with the Greco-Roman Esbus, was excavated for the first time in 1968 under the sponsorship of Andrews University (a preliminary report by R. S. BORAAS and S. H. HORN, *et al.* in AUSS 7/1969, pp. 97–239; later studies are listed in AUSS 14/1976, p. 1, n. 3). In the 1971 season there followed a second campaign (a similar, preliminary report by R. S. BORAAS and S. H. HORN, *et al.* in AUSS 11/1973, pp. 1–144; further studies are mentioned in AUSS 14/1976, *loc. cit.*).

In AUSS 13/1975, No. 2 (pp. 101–247, 16 plates), the third campaign to Tell Ḥesbān—conducted from June 20 to August 14, 1973—is likewise reported. A general survey is given by R. S. BORAAS and S. H. HORN concerning the organization of the campaign, its aims, and its accomplishments (in the latter section the new material found for each of the periods involved is summarily described, *viz. Iron I*, 1200–900 B.C.; *Iron II/Persian, c.* 700–500 B.C.; *Early Hellenistic*, 332–198 B.C.; *Late Hellenistic*, 198–63 B.C.; *Early Roman*, 63 B.C. – A.D. 135; *Late Roman*, A.D. 135–324; *Early Byzantine*, A.D. 324–491; *Late Byzantine*, A.D. 491–640; *Umayyad*, A.D. 661–750; *ʿAbbāsid*, A.D. 750–969; *Ayyūbid-Mamlūk*, A.D. 1174–1516, pp. 106–116). This introductory survey is followed by more detailed descriptions, including numerous drawings, of the particular finds in the different areas of the site; thus area A, on the summit of the acropolis, is treated by B. VAN ELDEREN (pp. 117–132), area B (and Square D.4), on the shelf below and south of the acropolis, by J. A. SAUER (pp. 133–167), area C, on the western slope of the *tell*, by H. O. THOMPSON (pp. 169–181), area D, covering the remains of the ascent to the summit from the south, by L. T. GERATY (pp. 183–202), the Roman-Byzantine cemetery (area F), on the western slope of Tell Ḥesbān, as well as the several soundings made at different places on the *tell* and in a cave at its western slope (designated as area G), by D. M. BEEGLE (pp.

203–211; 213–215). The report material is concluded by a topographical survey by S. D. WATERHOUSE and R. IBACH, JR. (pp. 217–233), and a preliminary report of the anthropological work, by Ø. and A. S. LABIANCA (pp. 235–247). The AUSS 13/1975, No. 2 issue finally contains three other articles of general nature (J. J. C. COX, Prolegomena to a Study of the Dominical *Logoi* as Cited in the *Didascalia Apostolorum*. Part I: Introductory Matters, pp. 249–259; W. L. RICHARDS, The Present Status of Text Critical Studies in the Catholic Epistles, pp. 261–272; D. S. SPELER, Hypocrisy: An Exploration of a "Third Type", pp. 273–279), and ultimately a section of each "Book Reviews" (pp. 281–296), and "Books Received" (p. 297 f.).

The issue AUSS 14/1976, No. 1, includes a report of the fourth campaign at Tell Ḥesbān, from June 26 to August 14, 1974. As in the preceding issue, the preliminary report is introduced by a general survey over the sponsorship organization, aims, and accomplishments of the campaign (by R. S. BORAAS and L. T. GERATY, pp. 1–15). This survey is followed by a number of special reports concerning the various areas, *viz.* area A (by B. VAN ELDEREN, pp. 17–28), area B and Square D.4 (by J. A. SAUER, pp. 29–62), area C (by W. H. MARE, pp. 63–78), area D (by L. G. HERR, pp. 79–99), area E (Tombs 4–6) and area F (Caves 19–23), on both sides of the Wadi el-Majarr to the west and south-west of the *tell*, and also area G.10 (by J. H. STIRLING, pp. 101–106), area G.5 (by L. G. HERR, p. 107 f.), area G.6, 7, 9 (by W. H. MARE, pp. 109–112), and area G.8 (by R. IBACH, JR., pp. 113–117). This first report on the fourth excavation of Tell Ḥesbān is concluded by a series of various studies connected with a particular genre of finds or observations at the *tell* (*viz.* R. IBACH, JR., Archaeological Survey of the Ḥesbân Region, pp. 119–126; S. M. GOLDSTEIN, Glass Fragments from Tell Ḥesbân, pp. 127–132; A. TERIAN, Coins from the 1973 and 1974 Excavations at Heshbon, pp. 133–141; L. T. GERATY, Heshbon Ostracon X, p. 143 f.; F. M. CROSS, JR., Heshbon Ostracon XI, pp. 145–148; J. J. C. COX, A Rhodian Potter's Date-Stamp, pp. 149–155; J. KRITZECK, Two Early Arabic Glass Weights, pp. 157–162; E. NITOWSKI, An Inscribed Mamlūk Sherd, p. 163 f.; H. E. JAMES, JR., Geological Study at Tell Ḥesbân, pp. 165–169; P. CRAWFORD, The Mollusca of Tell Ḥesbân, pp. 171–175; P. CRAWFORD–Ø. S. LABIANCA, The Flora of Ḥesbân, pp. 177–184; P. CRAWFORD–Ø. S. LABIANCA–R. B. STEWART, The Flotation Remains, pp. 185–187; Ø. S. LABIANCA, The Village of Ḥesbân: An Ethnographic Preliminary Report, pp. 189–200; J. H. STIRLING, Human Skeletal Remains from Tell Ḥesbân, 1974, pp. 201–204; Ø. S. and A. S. LABIANCA, Domestic Animals of the Early Roman Period at Tell Ḥesbân, pp. 205–216). The No. 1 issue of AUSS 14/1976 contains in addition to this report material two general articles (R. DEDEREN, Karl Rahner's *The Shape of the Church to Come*, pp. 217–225; H. W. SHEA, Esther and History, pp. 227–246), as well as some "Book Reviews" (pp. 247–261), and a section of "Books Received" (pp. 262–264).

In connexion with these reports from the fourth campaign at Tell Ḥesbān in 1974, it should be mentioned that a further (fifth) campaign to Ḥesbān was conducted in 1976, of which an account is presented in AUSS 16/1978 (pp. 1–303) as "a full preliminary report in which field supervisors not only give for their respective Area the results of the 1976 season ... but also incorporate their interpretation of all previously-excavated relevant loci from their respective Area for the preceding four seasons. Thus, in large measure, this last preliminary report can serve as the expedition's final report until these volumes appear" (from the introductory article by R. S. BORAAS–L. T. GERATY, p. 2; the other reports and studies are written by B. VAN ELDEREN, J. A. SAUER, W. H. MARE, S. TH. PARKER, L. G. HERR, J. J. DAVIS, D. H. WIMMER, R. M. BROWN, B. M. BLAINE, J. LAWLOR, R. IBACH, JR. [two

articles], S. H. HORN, J. C. GROOT, Ø. S. LaBIANCA, J. H. STIRLING, J. BOESSNECK – A. VON DEN DRIESCH, and M. K. ALOMÍA).

The AUSS 14/1976, No. 2 issue contains exclusively general articles (D. AUGSBURGER, Sunday in the Pre-Reformation Disputations in French Switzerland, pp. 265–277; J. M. BERECZ, Towards a Monistic Philosophy of Man, pp. 279–288; D. MCADAMS, Riots as a Measure of Religious Conflict in Seventeenth and Eigteenth Century England, pp. 289–300; W. L. RICHARDS, The New Testament Greek Manuscripts of the Catholic Epistles, pp. 301–311), in addition a number of "Book Reviews" (pp. 313–326) and "Books Received" (p. 327 f.).

Uppsala   *Tryggve Kronholm*

JOUKO MARTIKAINEN, *Das Böse und der Teufel in der Theologie Ephraems des Syrers. Eine systematisch-theologische Untersuchung.* Åbo 1978. (Meddelanden från Stiftelsens för Åbo Akademi Forskningsinstitut, Nr 32.) 204 pp.

Scholarly interest in various aspects of the Syrian Church Father Ephrem's (306–373 C.E.) theology, exegesis, and apologetics has increased greatly in later years, partially stimulated by the appearance of the new edition of Ephrem's Syriac original works by E. BECK, L. LELOIR, and R.-M. TONNEAU in the Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium (CSCO), Louvain 1955 ff.

The study by J. MARTIKAINEN under review, recently presented as a doctoral thesis at the Academy of Åbo (Finland), is basically carried out as a *systematical-theological* investigation of the concept of Evil and the Devil in the theology of Ephraem Syrus, and as such it constitutes an accomplishment of a longly felt *desideratum* (cf. the reviewer's *Motifs from Genesis 1–11 in the Genuine Hymns of Ephrem the Syrian with Particular Reference to the Influence of Jewish Exegetical Tradition* [Coniectanea Biblica, Old Testament Series 11], Lund 1978, p. 89 f., n. 11).

To be sure, the *theological* views of the Syriac Father have been subject to scholarly attention previously. Thus a few works on Ephrem's theology in general have appeared (mainly A. HAASE, S. Ephraemi Syri theologia, Halle 1869; C. EIRAINER, Der hl. Ephräm der Syrer. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Abhandlung, Kempten 1889; G. RICCIOTTI, Sant' Efrem Siro. Biografia—Scritti—Theologia, Turin–Roma 1925; cf. also C. BRAVO, Notas introductorias a la noematica de San Efrem, excerpta ex dissertatione ad lauream, Roma 1956). Further two related investigations, confined to one certain *opus Ephraemi*, have been undertaken (*viz.* E. BECK, Die Theologie des hl. Ephraem in seinen Hymnen über den Glauben [Studia Anselmiana 21], Romae 1949; IDEM, Ephraems Reden über den Glauben. Ihr theologischer Lehrgehalt und ihr geschichtlicher Rahmen [*ibid.* 33], Romae 1953). In addition some other domains of Ephrem's theology have been treated from a systematical point of view, in particular his *mariology* (L. HAMMERSBERGER, Die Mariologie der ephremischen Schriften. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung, Innsbruck 1938; E. BECK, "Die Mariologie der echten Schriften Ephräms", Oriens Christianus [OrChr] 40/1956, pp. 22–39; I. ORTIZ DE URBINA, "La Vergine nella theologia di S. Efrem", "Symposium Syriacum" 1972 [Orientalia Christiana Analecta (OCA) 197], Roma 1974, pp. 67–104), his concepts of *Paradise* (for references, see the reviewer's "Paradiset hos Ephraem Syrus", Religion och Bibel 37/1978, pp. 44–54), his views on *baptism* (E. BECK, "La baptême chez Saint Éphrem", L'Orient Syrien [OS] 1/1956, pp. 111–136), his comprehension of *death, heaven, and*

hell (J. Teixidor, "Muerte, Cielo y Seol en San Efrén", Orientalia Christiana Periodica [OrChrP] 27/1961, pp. 82–114; Idem, "La thème de la descente aux enfers chez Saint Éphrem", OS 6/1961, pp. 25–40; Idem, Muerte, Cielo y Seol en San Efrén, Valentiae 1962), further his *angeology* (W. Cramer, Die Engelvorstellungen bei Ephräm dem Syrer [OCA 173], Roma 1965), his *christology and ecclesiology* (R. Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom, *Rāzē d^ec̄ettā wadmalkūtā*. A Study in Early Syriac Tradition, Cambridge 1975), and finally his *cosmology* (N. El-Khoury, Die Interpretation der Welt bei Ephraem dem Syrer. Beitrag zur Geistes-geschichte [Tübinger Theologische Studien 6], Mainz 1976). It is amazing, then, that no coherent monographic study has been devoted to Ephrem's ideas concerning Evil—especially his satanology and demonology—prior to the present study by Martikainen. Thus it is all the more regrettable that this thesis decidedly lacks the general qualities, the accuracy, and the minuteness prerequisite to make it a reliable standard work on the subject.

As regards the sources and literature listed (pp. XIX–XXXIII), it is evident that on the whole the author has taken the necessary pains to acquaint himself with the editions and studies of significance on the subject (among the exceptions of impor-tance are e.g. E. Beck – D. Hemmerdinger-Iliadou – J. Kirchmeyer, "Éphrem le Syrien", Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique 4, Paris 1960, pp. 788–822, with numerous references; J. Teixidor, *op. cit.*, OrChrP 27/1961, pp. 82–114; Idem, *op. cit.*, Valentiae 1962; N. Séd, "Les hymnes sur le Paradis de Saint Éphrem et les traditions juives", Le Muséon 81/1968, pp. 455–501; E. Beck, "Iblis und Mensch, Satan und Adam (Der Werdegang einer koranischen Erzählung)", Le Muséon 89/1976, pp. 195–244).

In his first chapter, "Einleitung" (1–14), the author justifies his choice of subject by pointing to the general status of Ephrem's work as being a "relativ unbe-arbeitetes Gebiet" (p. 1, obviously following S. Hidal, *Interpretatio Syrica ...* [Coniectanea Biblica, Old Testament Series 6], Lund 1974, p. IX; cf. reviews by F. Rundgren, in Orientalia Suecana 25–26/1976–1977, pp. 150–153, and by the present writer, in Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok 44/1979); Martikainen also notes the not especially noteworthy fact that "es bei Ephraem für dieses Thema eine Fülle von Material gibt" (*loc. cit.*); and on the basis of his own previous study of this material (The Concept of the Devil in the Theology of Ephraim the Syrian, unpublished dissertation, Åbo 1972) the author finds himself able to state: "Auf Grund der dort erzielten Ergebnisse kann man für diese Studie die allgemeine Arbeitshypothese aufstellen, dass gerade der Problemkomplex vom Bösen und vom Teufel für die Entfaltung der Theologie Ephraems entscheidend ist" (*loc. cit.*). Although there is every reason to underline the importance of the theme under consideration, the "hypothesis" in question is *per se* of no more significance than parallel prejudicial ideas concerning e.g. the rôle of Ephrem's cosmogony, anthropology, christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, eschatology etc.

After having devoted half a page to justify his "Themawahl", the author treats the problem of "Textkritik" on approximately one full page—actually a presentation of the most well-known editions of Ephrem's works—leading to the conclusion: "Des-wegen gehört die Textkritik, wenn man die Anschauungen Ephraems erfassen will, organisch zum methodischen Ansatz" (p. 2). This absolutely unobjectionable at-titude is however almost entirely suppressed throughout the course of the study, since the author in principle quotes the Syriac original works of Ephrem in the—ad-mittedly admirable—*translations* by E. Beck (*in German*, e.g. pp. 16 f., 19–22, 24, 32, 36, 38, 43 f., 46, 52, 54 f., 58 f., 63–66, 69, 72, 74, 77–97, 102–104, 106–108,

112–114, 116, 118–126, 128, 145–147, 149 f., 152–164, 166–175, 177–181, 183–189), by
F. C. BURKITT (*in English*, e.g. pp. 18, 26 f., 33 f., 144, 146, 148, 155–160, 162 f., 176
f., 184), and by R.-M. TONNEAU (*in Latin*, e.g. pp. 24, 60, 148–151, 165, 168–170, 182
f.; curiously, Ephrem's commentary on Genesis–Exodus is quoted once, not in
TONNEAU's Latin version, but in N. EL-KHOURY's German rendering, without
mention of reference; see p. 153; quoted from N. EL-KHOURY, *op. cit.*, Mainz 1976,
p. 80). Moreover, the author nowhere clearly states that he is dependent on these
translations throughout the whole study. It is *not* enough to merely list these
translations in the bibliography, nor to make a casual reference to them (cf. p. 146
f.); a full acknowledgement should be made from the very beginning. Although the
author now and then quotes the Syriac original in transcription (full of errors), and
occasionally even discusses philological problems or offers new interpretations (e.g.
pp. 143, 146 f., 156, 158, 165), the basic impression that he is almost absolutely
dependent on the translations remains. Besides, the literally quoted sections contain
numerous deficiencies and misprints (a first checking gave the result of c. 125 errors
only in the reproduction of the quotations, not to make mention here of the mass of
misprints in the author's own discussions or in the transcribed Syriac words). The
noted dependence on the translations of other scholars—including a "Textkritik" in
the sense of recurrent changes in the correct text of the translations of the Syriac
original—tends to make the phrases: "Zum methodischen Ansatz gehört organisch
die Textkritik dazu. Als Quellen benutze ich *nur* (my italics, T. K.) jene in syrischer
Sprache überlieferten Werke, deren Echtheit gesichert ist" (p. 12) nothing but *pia
desideria*.

The introductory chapter contains also a section devoted to the "Heutiger Stand
der Forschung", in which one would have expected to find a survey of previous
fragmentary scholarly treatment of Ephraem's views concerning Evil and the Devil;
instead, the author has chosen to deal with some studies regarding Syriac Bible
translations and Ephrem's "Interpretatio Syriaca", as well as others on Ephrem's
relation to "Syrisches Asketentum" and previous systematical-theological investiga-
tions, without putting any of these spheres of interest in any particular relation to the
subject of the thesis. Moreover, these small sections are full of astonishing state-
ments and inexactitudes. Thus the author states for instance: "Man meinte damals
(*scil.* in the latter half of the 19th century, T. K.), bei Ephraem spiele die allegorische
Deutungsmethode nur eine geringe Rolle" (p. 3), although this is an undisputed
conviction even to-day. Similarly he states: "Nach den von Jansma aufgestellten
Grundsätzen har (read: hat, T. K.) der schwedische Forscher STEN HIDAL ge-
arbeitet" (p. 4), without mentioning which these "Grundsätze" are. He further notes
that "der Umstand, dass wir noch keine kritische Ausgabe der Pešitta haben,
erschwert den Fortschritt in der Erforschung . . ." (p. 4 f.), obviously being ignorant
of the appearance in 1977 of The Old Testament in Syriac . . . edited . . . by the
Pershiṭta Institute, Leiden, Part I: 1, Genesis–Exodus, *viz.* the part most relevant to
MARTIKAINEN's study.

The introduction is concluded by some very elementary comments on "Frage-
stellung und Methode".

The second chapter, "Das Böse und die gebundene Natur der Geschöpfe" (pp.
15–50), is subdivided into two sections, one with "Einleitende Bemerkungen", the
other on "Kosmologische Frontstellungen". In the first section, introduced by some
general remarks on the not particularly remarkable fact that "Ephraem urteilt . . .
nicht nach den Massstäben der modernen wissenschaftlichen Akribie" (p. 15), MAR-
TIKAINEN discusses the "Argumentation Ephraems gegenüber den Herätiker", main-

ly the coherence of the heretical systems (in reality confined to the views of the Marcionites), and Ephrem's apologetical arguments from the creation and the Bible (where occasional mention is made also of Bardaiṣan and Mani). It is however immediately evident that the author has no real knowledge as to the different "heretical" systems discussed (true as regards Bardaiṣan he knows the important contributions H. J. W. DRIJVERS, Bardaiṣan of Edessa [Studia Semitica Neerlandica 6], Assen 1966; IDEM, "Het image van Bardesanes van Edessa", Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 24/1969–70, pp. 260–262; T. JANSMA, Natuur, lot en vrijheid. Bardesanes, de filosoof der Arameeërs en zin images [Cahiers bij het Nederlands Theol. Tijdschrift 6], Wageningen 1969; IDEM, "Bardesanes van Edessa en Hermogenes van Carthago", Nederlands Theol. Tijdschrift 24/1969–70, pp. 256–259; but he has not observed the excellent survey of "Bardesanes-Forschungen" by C. COLPE in H. H. SCHAEDER, Studien zur orientalischen Religionsgeschichte, Darmstadt 1968, pp. 265–273; nor H. J. W. DRIJVERS, "Mani und Bardaisan. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Manichäismus", Mélanges d'histoire des religions offert à Henri-Charles Puech, Paris 1974, pp. 459–469; as to Mani, MARTIKAINEN has noted the recent book G. WIDENGREN [ed.], Der Manichäismus [Wege der Forschung 168], Darmstadt 1977, with its valuable, select bibliography, but not the more comprehensive references found in H. JEDIN [ed.], Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte 1, Freiburg–Basel–Wien 1962, p. 298 f.; H.-CH. PUECH [ed.], Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, Histoire des Religions 2, Paris 1972, pp. 636–645; E. BECK's Ephraims Polemik gegen Mani und die Manichäer im Rahmen der zeitgenössischen griechischen Polemik und der des Augustinus [CSCO 391/Subsidia 55], Louvain 1978, appeared too late to be considered by MARTIKAINEN; as regards Marcion, the author is conversant only with A. VON HARNACK, Marcion ... [Texte und Untersuchungen 3: 15: 45], Leipzig 1921; for further references, see H. JEDIN [ed.], *op. cit.*, p. 218; the Arian, "Chaldean", and Jewish adversaries of Ephrem are not discussed; cf. the reviewer's Motifs ..., 1978, pp. 28–31). Now, since MARTIKAINEN's knowledge of the "heretical" systems is fragmentary, since he does not adduce any "heretical" sources whatsoever, and since his own argumentation is obviously unclear, his conclusions as regards Ephrem's views in relation to these systems are of almost no significance ("Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Natur, weil sie, wie Ephraem gegen Markion argumentiert, eine so hervorragende Rolle spielt, ihm deswegen auch gute Voraussetzungen für eine tiefgreifende Auseinandersetzung mit seinen anderen Gegnern, die nich nut [read: nur, T. K.] biblisch argumentieren, geben sollte. Auch diese Gegner wollten Naturerscheinungen deuten, und dadurch ist die Natur das gemeinsame Thema eller [read: aller, T. K.] an dieser Diskussion Beteiligten", p. 20).

From several aspects a similar criticism applies to MARTIKAINEN's treatment of the "Schöpfungstheologische Ausgangspunkte Ephraems", where he first deals with some "Zentrale Begriffe", like ʾītūtā, ʾītjā, šᵉmā, qᵉnōmā, šᵉrārā, and kᵉjānā, in order to "ob es möglich ist, Becks vorgeschlagene Deutung weiter zu führen" (p. 21, with reference to BECK's Die Theologie ..., 1949, pp. 5–22, and Ephraems Reden ..., 1953, pp. 1–20, but *not* to his important contributions "Ephraems Brief an Hypatios", OrChr 58/1974, pp. 76–120, which is known to the author, cf. p. 153; and IDEM, "Ephräms Rede gegen eine philosophische Schrift des Bardaisan, übersetzt und erklärt", *ibid.* 60/1976, pp. 24–68, which came to the author's notice "erst nach dem Abschliessen des Manuskripts", p. 145). However, it never comes to a real discussion with E. BECK, and this is not to be deeply regretted, since Prof. Beck would scarcely find any new, substantial and convincing textual analyses here, but

mainly some elementary remarks on a number of quotations—sometimes misquotations—from his own translations. On the whole it never comes to a real thorough analysis of all the *loci* within a well defined field, although the author eloquently speaks of "die obigen semantischen, kosmologischen (sic!) und theologischen Analysen" (p. 29).

Likewise the treatment of Ephrem's "Kosmologische Grundsätze", *viz.* that "Gott ist sich selber Raum", that "Gott hat einen *qnoma* aus eigener Kraft", and that "Gott hat alles aus dem Nichts geschaffen" (p. 33), is utmost superficial. From whence exactly these three pillars are taken cannot be ascertained, and why such basic ideas as the unity of the Creator and the intermediary rôle of his Firstborn have been omitted can similarly not be found out—and the final "conclusions" are hardly anything but a heap of unprecise words ("Diese Erörterungen bringen 'Einleitenden Bemerkungen' dieser Studie zum Abschluss. Ihrer Intention nach wollen sie die Art und Weise, wie Ephraem in seiner Polemik argumentiert, einleiten und ein Bild von seinem theologischen System entwerfen. Dabei hat es sich herausgestellt, dass schon einige zentrale Begriffe bei Ephraem die innere Gliederung seiner theologisch durchreflektierten, fast geschlossenen Gedankenwelt zum Ausdruck bringen. So ist es z. B. für das sachgemässe Verständnis der *qnoma*- und *kjana*-Begriffe unentbehrlich, den ganzen schöpfungstheologischen und kosmologischen Hintergrund des Denkens Ephraems in Betracht zu ziehen", p. 37).

In the second subsection, "Kosmologische Frontstellungen", MARTIKAINEN concentrates on four problems, *viz.* Ephrem's conviction that nature is no mixture of good and evil, his view that (spiritual) darkness and Hyle consequently derive from the Evil One, further his opinion that Evil is no original part of a created body or soul, and finally his stress on the Fall and Evil in creation as deriving from the will of Evil or the Evil One—four problems which to the reviewer's mind only represent various angles of one and the same question, *viz.* that of the relation between the unity of the Creator and the existence of Evil in creation. Although the author here points to a number of significant, though already familiar facts, his discussion suffers greatly from incompleteness and inclarity.

In his third chapter, "Der Teufel und die Freiheit des Menschen" (pp. 51–76), MARTIKAINEN enters on his subject by making some statements in general on the problem of the freedom of will, e.g. that "die Freiheit und der Wille des Menschen haben in der östlichen Tradition im allgemeinen und bei Ephraem im besonderen eine viel elementarere Stellung in der theologischen Anthropologie als in der westlichen Tradition" (p. 51)—a statement that is a pattern of lack of precision, nothing in the context revealing even what is meant by eastern and western tradition, much less, of course, by "viel elementarere Stellung". Maybe that the author only wants to give expression to the well known fact that the conviction of *liberum arbitrium* is fundamental in Ephrem's theology; if so, he is right.

A first subsection is then devoted to the question of man as "geschaffener Gott", a contribution which contains several correct and valuable observations, although nothing essentially fresh comes out. MARTIKAINEN stresses that to Ephrem "die Gottesebenbildlichkeit des Menschen besteht vor allem darin, dass er ein vernunftbegabtes Wesen ist, aber auch darin, dass Gott mit eigenen Händen nur den Körper des Menschen geformt hat" (p. 52); he also underlines that "vor allem aber besteht bei Ephraem die Ebenbildlichkeit in der Freiheit des Menschen" (p. 53; cf. p. 56)—two statements that, though not incorrect, are at least seemingly contradictory and not particularly well formulated.

A second subdivision on "Der Teufel und sein Gefolge" is introduced by some

"Terminologische Erläuterungen", e.g. on *sāṭānā, bīšā, bᵉᶜeldᵉbābā, 'ākelqarṣā*, but amazingly the author of this monograph confined to the problem of Evil and the Devil does not present a thorough investigation even of the *loci* in which these basic terms occur (a project which would have been considerably facilitated through the commendable indexes in the new edition of Ephrem's works). But MARTIKAINEN's observations remain elementary and incomplete; in addition he does not in this context point out that Ephrem clearly makes a difference between the Evil One (*bīšā* etc.) and the Serpent (*ḥewyā* etc.), the latter being a created, natural animal, merely the instrument (*mā'nā, CH* XI,7,*5; CNis* LVII,6,*1*) and the harp (*kennārā, CH* XX,1,*9*) of the Evil One ("Ephraem schmückt gern den Teufel mit bildhaften Beinamen. Unter diesen kommen am häufigsten folgende vor:*ḥewja*, die Schlange ...", p. 59; on p. 70, however, the author writes:"Ephraem macht einen Unterschied zwischen dem Teufel und der Schlange").

A similar superficiality characterizes also MARTIKAINEN's treatment on the "Herkunft des Teufels und seine Funktionen"; especially weak is his discussions on the functions.

In the third subsection, "Der Sündenfall", MARTIKAINEN first describes in utmost brevity the "Topographie des Paradieses", regrettably without knowledge of N. SÉD's thorough above-mentioned investigation (Le Muséon 81/1968, pp. 455–501; for other minor studies not noted by MARTIKAINEN, see the reviewer's article hinted at above, Religion och Bibel 37/1978, pp. 44–54). He continues with a few words about the rôle of the tree of knowledge (for further references, see the reviewer's "The Trees of Paradise in the Hymns of Ephraem Syrus", Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute 11/1977–78, pp. 48–56). More rewarding is the author's treatment of the motifs behind the diabolic seduction of the first human couple, where he correctly notes "wie sehr die Deutung des Sündenfalles bei Ephraem mit seinen asketischen Idealen verbunden ist" (p. 72), whereas the two concluding paragraphs on "Sünde und Tod" and on "Erbsündenlehre bei Ephraem?" as well as the last subsection regarding the "Anthropologie Ephraems und die Funktionen des Teufels" are painfully unrewarding.

The fourth chapter, "Der Teufel und das Messiasgeheimnis Christi" (pp. 77–100) is subdivided into four sections. The first deals with "Inkarnation und die Versuchungen Christi"—in fact Ephrem's views on the incarnation would be worthy of a monograph of its own—but from MARTIKAINEN's strongly limited "analysis" nothing essentially new is extracted; it only causes some astonishment to find that the author has avoided to point out the obvious parallel between the anti-typical relationship Adam–Christ and that between Eve and Mary (cf. the reviewer's Motifs ..., 1978, pp. 85–134, with references). In a following discussion of the "'Zwei Naturen' Christi und die Ratlosigkeit des Teufels" as well as in the subsequent section "Niederfahrt Christi zum Totenreich" MARTIKAINEN curiously divides the whole of his source material into the two groups "Carmina Nisibena" and "Andere Schriften", without giving the reader any clue as to why; a look into the accompanying notes reveals, however, that the reason is not so much that the source material itself recommends this division, but rather that the author has earlier written "Some Remarks about Carmina Nisibena as a Literary and Theological Source" (OCA 197, Roma 1974, pp. 345–352)—truly a disputable reason for such an arrangement of the material (in addition MARTIKAINEN does not reveal any knowledge of two of the studies on the subject by J. TEIXIDOR mentioned above, *viz.* in OrChrP 27/1961, pp. 82–114; and the thesis published Valentiae 1962). The chapter is concluded by a survey over "Die Taktik des Teufels und die Heilstrategie Christi", in which the

author succeeds in treating his subject over three pages with only one source reference.

The fifth chapter, dealing with "Der Teufel, der Tod und die Wiederherstellung des Paradieses" (pp. 101–130), is introduced by a few remarks on "Ephraems Heilsverständnis", revolving around another curious "Arbeitshypothese":"Im Lichte der bisherigen Ergebnisse kann man schon begründet die These aufstellen, dass die Wiederherstellung einen wichtigen Leitfaden, wenn nicht sogar den Kern des soteriologischen Denkens, bei Ephraem ausmacht" (p. 101). As a result of a concluded investigation such a "thesis" may very well defend its place, whilst it as an introductory "hypothesis" is of no significance.

In a second subdivision on "Die 'Bekehrung' des Todes, die Umwandlung der Scheol und die Unbussfertigkeit des Teufels" the author commences by saying:"Oben wurde festgestellt, dass das umfassende Phänomen Tod bei Ephraem aus vier Teilen besteht: geheimer Tod, offener Tod, Scheol und Mörder" (p. 101). That "Scheol und Mörder" are related to the phenomenon of death cannot, of course, be denied, but that they should represent something from which this phenomenon "besteht" is utmost disputable. Furthermore, in the "Oben" referred to (p. 76) the same four parts are mentioned with the addition:"die unten ausführlich dargestellt werden"; however, no such detailed treatment of each of these "vier Teilen" is given. The author confines himself to discuss the difference between the "conversion" of Death and the "impenitence" of the Devil—a discussion which contains some valuable observations, though one might wonder for instance why the treatment of Christ's victory over Death as concerning humanity in its totality (p. 105) has not been brought into connexion with Ephrem's precondition for this idea, *viz.* that Adam's defeat brought Death over the whole of humanity (see e.g. *Azym* I,10,*l*; *Nat* I,62,*l*).

The third subdivision contains the excursus "Hat CNis II den Sitz im Leben bei der Ostertaufe?"; in the fourth are found some very elementary remarks on "Der Teufel, die Völker und die Kirche" (obviously inspired by R. MURRAY's recent, scholarly investigation in *op. cit.*, 1975, pp. 41–68); in the fifth some pages on "Das wiedergewonnene Paradies" (far from the depth of E. BECK's previous analysis, e.g. in Ephraems Hymnen über das Paradies [Studia Anselmiana 26], Romae 1951, pp. 34–36; cf. also R. MURRAY, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–262, and the reviewer's Motifs ..., 1978, pp. 128–134); in the sixth some pages on "Die neue List des Teufels gegen den wahren Glauben: die Disputierer" (confined to a few *loci* on the Arians, disregarding the fact that according to Ephrem *all* the "heretics" are enemies of the true faith, inspired by the Evil One, and testimonies to the diabolic activity inside and outside the Church); in the seventh, finally, some notes on "Die Gehenna, der Teufel und der zweite Tod" (extremely limited, but containing an expression of the author's readiness to, "wenn es die äusseren Bedingungen erlauben", undertake a special study of Ephrem's view concerning the "Dauer der Verdammnis" (p. 129, and *ibid.*, n. 4, p. 189).

The concluding chapter is entitled "Ergebnisse und Zusammenfassung" (pp. 131–137). However, since no full and thorough investigation of the whole of the material to be considered has been accounted for in the preceding chapters, the results and conclusions are by necessity of very limited significance. The actual character of the conclusions drawn might best be illustrated by the introductory result presented: "Aus dieser Analyse ergab sich, dass Ephraems Denken nicht als naiv zu bezeichnen ist" (p. 131). Moreover, the formulations of the vague results achieved are stuffed with an equally vague theological terminology, tending to make

even some valuable conclusions exceedingly obscure. Thus, on dealing with the "Begriffskomplex, in dem Begriff/Name (*šma*), sein Gegenstand (*qnoma*) und die Wirklichkeit (*šrara*) eine Ganzheit bilden" (p. 131), the author states: "'Name', *šma*, existiert und existiert nicht, d. h. seine Existenzweise ist paradox; er, *šma*, hat aber den Deutungsprimat, 'Gegenstand', *qnoma*, dagegen Substanzprimat: *šma* und *qnoma* bilden zusammen die 'Wirklichkeit', *šrara*, die nicht nur das Vorhandene ist, sondern für den Menschen die geprüfte Wirklichkeit, d. h. die Wahrheit, ausmacht" (p. 131 f.)—a conclusion which primarily does not greatly concern the subject of the thesis, secondly most probably would have been entirely uncomprehensible even to Mar Afrem himself, thirdly raises the question: What kind of a result is this? Is it more than words, words, and words, lacking the basis of a solid, consequent, and thorough investigation? Regrettably, critical objections of this nature are arisen throughout the "Ergebnisse und Zusammenfassung".

JOUKO MARTIKAINEN's thesis on the concept of Evil and the Devil in the theology of Ephraem Syrus is not devoid of all qualities. The author has doubtlessly made great effort to aquaint himself with his sources and the relevant literature, and many of his observations are sound, although not essentially new. However, due to the absence of a full and complete investigation of a well defined subject, due to the author's partial unfamiliarity with his Syriac source material and his parallel dependence on other scholars' translations, due to his unsatisfactory knowledge of the various "heretics" fought by the Syrian Father, due to his painful inexactitude as regards quotations and transcriptions, and due to his bombast, verbose, and pretentious theological "Wissenschaftersprache" badly in harmony with his often non-scholarly approach and his most unpretentious results, this monograph and its writer can hardly claim any real comparison with previous studies on Ephrem the Syrian by scholars such as e.g. E. BECK, J. DANIÉLOU, F. GRAFFIN, T. JANSMA, L. LELOIR, R. MURRAY, or A. VÖÖBUS.

Uppsala   *Tryggve Kronholm*

Acta Iranica II–III. Commémoration Cyrus. Hommage universel. Rédacteur en chef: J. DUCHESNE-GUILLEMIN. Édition Bibliothèque Pahlavi. Théhéran-Liège 1974. II. 413 pp. + 16 plates; III. 444 pp. + 19 plates.

This is a collection of papers consisting of the transactions of the congress held in Shiraz in 1971 and other papers, some of them having been printed before in other publications.

II. 1. A. Pagliaro, Cyrus et l'empire perse (pp. 3–23). 2. W. Eilers, Le texte cunéiforme du cylindre de Cyrus (pp. 25–34). 3. A. Netzer, Some Notes on the Characterization of Cyrus the Great in Jewish and Judeo-Persian Writings (pp. 35–52). 4. P. Lecoq, La langue des inscriptions achéménides (pp. 55–62). 5. G. Liebert, Indoiranica: v.-p. *vazraka-*, av. *vazra-*, v.-ind. *vájra-* (pp. 63–90). 6. H. Lommel, Les espions de Varuṇa et de Mitra et l'œil du roi (pp. 91–100). 7. F. Regourd, Le rôle de l'élite perse dans la formation de l'armée et de l'état achéménides (pp. 101–107). 8. M. N. Bogoliubov, Titre honorifique d'un chef militaire achéménide en Haute-Égypte (pp. 109–114). The author explains the obscure word *hpthpt'* in the Brooklyn Papyri (8, 2, ed. Kraeling) as **haptaxʷa-pātar* "gardien d'une des sept"; for *swknn* (p. 114), cf. the present writer, Studia Linguistica

11/1957, pp. 58 ff. 9. G. Gnoli, Politique religieuse et conception de la royauté sous les achéménides (pp. 117–190). 10. J. A. Delaunay, A propos des "Aramaic ritual texts from Persepolis" de R. A. Bowman (pp. 193–217). A discussion of Bowman's results; p. 196 *slg* should be *plg*; "Ethtaphal" should be *'iṯpaʿʿal* (p. 202). A form like *palīg* is impossible in Aramaic (p. 204). The derivation of *sr(w)k* is hardly convincing. 11. J. A. Delaunay, L'araméen d'empire et les débuts de l'écriture en Asie Centrale (pp. 219–36). An interesting survey strongly emphasizing the importance of the Achaemenian empire for the introduction of various writing systems into Central Asia. 12. H. Humbach, Aramaeo-Iranian and Pahlavi (pp. 237–43). The author tries, in connection with Henning, Handbuch der Orientalistik 1, 4:1/1958, pp. 30 ff., to establish "the way in which Late Imperial Aramaic was transformed into Early Pahlavi" (p. 237), which is a forlorn hope; cf. the present writer in Orientalia Suecana 16/1968, pp. 226 ff.; Oriens 23–4/1970–71, pp. 475 f. 13. J. C. Greenfield, Iranian Vocabulary in Early Aramaic, pp. 245–6. 14. M. Wheeler, The Transformation of Persepolis Architectural Motifs into Sculpture under the Indian Mauryan Dynasty (pp. 249–61). 15. J. Auboyer, Les Achéménides et l'art de l'Inde Ancienne (pp. 263–67). 16. J. R. Hinnells, Iranian Influence upon the New Testament (pp. 271–84). 17. G. Pugliese Caratelli, Les doctrines sociales de Bundos et de Mazdak (pp. 285–90). The author assumes that Bundos was influenced by western communist doctrine and, polemizing against Altheim (Geschichte der Hunnen 3/1961, pp. 61 ff.), he arrives at the following result: "ainsi, plutôt qu'à travers la cosmologie et la théologie de Porphyre, la pénétration en Perse de théories d'origine platonicienne paraît s'être faite à travers la révolution mazdakite. Et ce fut là peut-être le premier germe de l'intérêt pour les idées non iraniennes qui a caractérisé le règne de Khosroès I Anoshirvan" (p. 290). Cf., however, the present writer, "Über den griechischen Einfluss auf die arabische Nationalgrammatik", pp. 140 ff. (Acta Societatis Linguisticae Upsaliensis, 2: 5/ 1976). 18. M. N. Bogoliubov, L'inscription pehlevie de Constantinople (pp. 291–301). The author tries to read and translate this important tomb inscription, tackled also by Nyberg, among others. Of great interest is the suggestion according to which *xvāštārīh kardan* should here be understood as "étudier", to *xvāstār* "a seeker, one who strives for something", here possibly < σπουδάζων. A. Syriac "mḥassayē" is impossible, it must be *məxassəyä* or *məxassayyā*. 19. R. Ghirsman, Chapour Iᵉʳ, Valérien, Lactance—et Holbein (pp. 303–06). 20. A. Bausani, Iran, Islam e Italia nel Medioevo (pp. 309–20). 21. Moh. Ali Jazayery, On the Nature of a Cultural History of the Languages of Iranian Culture (pp. 323–35). 22. Z. Telegdi, Remarques sur les emprunts arabes en persan (pp. 337–45). The author tries to specify the character of the Arabic loan-words in Persian with the aid of a concept that I would describe as "culturally conditioned diglossia". One is somewhat astonished to find that the author does not even mention P. Humbert, Observations sur le vocabulaire arabe du Châhnâmeh (1953). 23. A. Bausani, Notes sur les mots persans en malayo-indonésien (pp. 347–79). 24. W. Eilers, Le caviar (pp. 381–90). The author explains the word "caviar" as an Iranian *xāv-dār* "egg-holder" = "sturgeon"; to German *Fisch-Milch* etc. may also be added Swed. *mjölke*. The author quotes from Nyberg, Hilfsbuch, II, 106 Pahlavi *hāyīk* "egg"; there is no such word in Pahlavi, only *xāyag*. 25. J. Kuryłowicz, Les éléments persans dans le fonds lexical européen (pp. 391–7). A survey of the Persian loan-words and the ways by which they have wandered to Europe, with special reference to Polish. Startling is the following statement: "Quant à la langue sogdienne, il n'y a guère que des éléments épars qui nous en soient parvenus sous forme du

dialecte *yagnobi*" (p. 392). 26. D. Heinz, Die persischen Teppiche im Öster-reichischen Museum für angewandte Kunst (pp. 401–13). In 1864, "Das K. K. Österreichische Museum für Kunst und Industrie" was founded, and on this occasion also the famous, imperial, silken hunting-carpet was exhibited. This event was the beginning of Vienna's hey-day as a centre of research on Oriental carpets. The author mentions the exhibitions in Vienna in 1891 and in Munich in 1910; in connection with the notice about "der seidene Mamlukenteppich" (p. 407), the cooperation of the great Georg Jacob may be mentioned (cf. Th. Menzel, *Litterae Orientales 51/1932, pp. 6f.*).

III. 1. W. Eilers, The Name of Cyrus (pp. 3–9). A summing up of the large study of 1964, "Kyros. Eine namenkundliche Studie". 2. J. Duchesne-Guillemin, Le dieu de Cyrus (pp. 11–21). To the much-debated question of whether the Achaemenians were Zoroastrians or not, the author gives the following answer: "Les Achéménides ont du avoir une façon bien à eux d'adhérer à la religion zoro-astrienne" (p. 20). 3. P. Lecoq, Le problème de l'écriture cunéiforme vieux-perse (pp. 25–107). A thorough, abundantly documented study. Lecoq arrives at the result that "l'écriture vp. a connu une extension considérable sous le règne de Darius, mais elle existait avant lui" (p. 102). 4. Alois Closs, Vorzarathustrische Religionen in Iran und in den Randgebieten als Hintergrund des zarathustrischen und des späteren Mazdaismus (pp. 111–21). The author stresses, *inter alia*, the influence of the Elamite culture (a mother goddess and a snake); from the west, the eagle and the sun's disk. Nyberg is called "Hendrik" and is said to be also a "lutherischer Theologe" (p. 117); Ringbom is designated as "ein Skandinavier". The paper may be seen as a complement to III, 2. 5. M. Lorenz, Zarathustras Friedensbotschaft (pp. 123–32). Lorenz tries to define more closely the notion of *aša*, maintaining that this expression refers to "eine ganz bestimmte Gesellschaftsordnung". 6. J. Kellens, Les formules du type *hubərəta- bar* en avestique (pp. 133–47). An im-portant phraseological study, in connection with the line taken by Wackernagel. 7. J. Kellens, Un nouveau trait du vocabulaire daevique (pp. 149–56). Kellens consid-ers *ātara-* as a form of the indefinite pronoun "other" > "böse" (cf. E. Tengstrand, Studia Neophilologica 37/1965, pp. 382 ff.). 8. J. Wolski, Arsace Ier, fondateur de l'état parthe (pp. 159–99). A critical review of the sources for the study of the origin of the Parthian empire. 9. H. Humbach, Bun-xānag et Ka'ba-ye Zardust (pp. 203–208). Humbach takes as his point of departure *bun-kadag*, interpreting *bun-xānag* as "maison de base". 10. Ṣadeq Kia, Sur quelques termes de "Xosrow et son page" (pp. 209–19). The author deals with twelve Pahlavi words in this work, mostly with the aid of Ṯaʿālibī's translation. In his "Texte zum mazdayas-nischen Kalender" (1934), p. 24, Nyberg has in his text a *n'hyk*, var. *nhyk*, Paz. *vahī*; he reads this word as *nahīk* and thinks that this is the word for "Steinbock". However, H. F. J. Junker, Das Frahang i Pahlavik (1955), p. 25, has *vahīk* "Stein-bock" and MacKenzie, A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary, *wahīg* "kid; Capricorne" (p. 86). Without mentioning this, the author now corrects Nyberg's reading to *vahīk*, this time with the help of alBīrūnī, Al'ātār albāqiya (ed. Sachau), p. 193: *alğadyu = bhy /bāhi/*, cf. MacKenzie, l.c. "N *bahī*". 11. M. F. Kanga, Kingship and Religion in Iran (pp. 221–31). 12. M. J. Dresden, On a "working" Dictionary of the Khotanese Language (pp. 233–39). 13. A. Schimmel, Turk and Hindu. A Literary Symbol (pp. 243–8). 14. G. Morrison, Flowers and Witchcraft in the 'Vis o Ramin' of Fakhr ud-Dīn Gurgānī (pp. 249–59). 15. G. M. Wickens, The Imperial Epic of Iran: A Literary Approach (pp. 261–75). 16. J. M. Fiey, Les communautés syriaques en Iran des premiers siècles à 1552 (pp. 279–97). An interesting survey;

one cannot, however, find any mention of B. Spuler, Die nestorianische Kirche; Die westsyrische (monophysitische/jakobitische) Kirche (Handbuch der Orientalistik I, 8: 2/1961, pp. 120–216). 17. W. J. Fischel, The Contribution of the Persian Jews to Iranian Culture and Literature (pp. 299–315). Fischel confines himself to the Muslim epoch, and he has here much of interest to communicate. Also in pre-Islamic times, Jewish influence must have been considerable. It is not impossible that Jews played a great rôle in creating the various writing systems of the Achaemenian chancery. An important contribution, but, in such a difficult field, a bibliography would not have been out of place. 18. R. Walzer, Al-Biruni and Idolatry (pp. 317–23). Walzer tries to fill in the background to the attitude of alBīrūnī to the idolatry of the Hindus by defining more precisely his position within the tradition of Muslim philosophy. 19. J. A. Boyle, The Evolution of Iran as a National State (pp. 327–38). 20. M. Barkeshli, Recherches des degrés de la gamme iranienne à partir de la sensation subjective de consonance (pp. 339–60). A highly technical paper. 21. I. Shokurzade, Souvenirs de l'Iran Ancien dans le folk-lore du Xorasan (pp. 361–78). 22. Isā Ṣadīq, Le rôle de l'Iran dans la renaissance (pp. 381–95). 23. F. Machalski, La littérature de l'Iran en Pologne (pp. 397–410). 24. L. de Matos, Les relations entre le Portugal et la Perse (pp. 411–17). 25. G. Scarcia, Venezia e la Persia tra Uzun Hasan e Tahmasp (1454–1572) (pp. 419–38). 26. Addendum à l'article de J. Delaunuy (pp. 439–444). Cf. above II, 10.

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J.-M. VERPOORTEN, *L'ordre des mots dans l'Aitareya-brāhmaṇa*. Paris 1977. Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres". 438 pp. (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Fascicule CCXVI.)

The author of this work concludes on p. 408 that "on dira que les recherches sur l'ordre des mots apportent à ceux qui les entreprennent une familiarité inégalée avec les textes, et, à ceux-ci, une vie renouvelée". This remark applies also to his reader. Anyone who peruses this study will feel, in the end, quite familiar with the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa, and VERPOORTEN is a reliable guide to all the mysteries of this archaic document. His study is very extensive; he has covered the question of how the words are ordered in the Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa by treating the parts of every sentence of the text from almost every possible aspect.

VERPOORTEN's main inspiration has been DELBRÜCK's and MINARD's treatises on the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, but in his approach to the subject he has also shown that the methods of linguistic observation can be constantly renewed. In addition, he has even considered the typological views on word order that were introduced by GREENBERG (in Universals of language, 1966²). These views are described in the introduction to the work (p. 28) and are mentioned throughout the study in footnotes, and finally some general results of the investigation are combined with the universals postulated by GREENBERG in the summary (p. 408, § 707). Although this approach by no means dominates the work, there is a general interest in the fact that this individual study of a certain text belonging to a certain stage of an individual language is thus translatable into terms applied in general linguistics.

This review which appeared in the Orientalia Suecana, Vol. XXVII–XXVIII (1978–1979) in an unsatisfactory manner is here now reprinted.

Each individual study of word order may in fact contribute to the discussion of the theory of universals and language types and this is true of VERPOORTEN's study. His investigation prompts questions like the following important one: do the deviations from the expected features of the SOV type, which is assumed for the language of the treated text, actually depend on some process of change in the language or are the arrangements of the subordinate universals of GREENBERG's system, or perhaps the way of putting the statistics, to blame when facts disagree with the strict typological pattern? It becomes clear that, when GREENBERG's method is applied, the personal judgment of the scholar who deals with a particular text and a particular language constitutes an important factor. It seems likewise to be an inescapable primary fact that word order is used either as normal or as deviating from a standard. When the rate is 80/20, the judgment as to what is typical does not look too arbitrary, while a rate of 55/45 makes the probability look different. The number of examples is also important; it is certainly not a matter of rule and exception when one has three examples of the rule and two of the exception, as, for instance, in § 337. In fact, VERPOORTEN very seldom adduces figures and on this point he makes it necessary for the reader to rely on his corpus and to believe that his judgments actually produce some figures which correspond to his very varying expressions both about normal word order ("presque toujours", "la position favorite", "régulière", "normalement", "ordinairement", "de règle"), and about all the deviating constructions ("exceptionelles" or even just "peuvent apparaître"). In fact, the DELBRUCK method of constantly discussing habitual and occasional word order recurs in this study, and the reader has to make his own diagrams of the given material in order to compare the figures and make them reveal something more than VERPOORTEN has told in his general judgments. He implicitly provides figures of deviating structures, since, as a rule, he accounts for all such passages, but he seldom gives even approximate figures or totals for the regular structures.

It is impossible to discuss here how VERPOORTEN deals with the individual passages treated in the book. I have, of course, found certain translations to question and a large number of interesting passages to discuss, but few serious mistakes which would affect the discussion of the main topic of the book. A general point is that the translations are often quite free; the grammatical basis given in the Sanskrit text is not closely followed, as, for example, in 103/3 (III 46 6) *tasyāsti vāmadevyasya stotre prāyaścittiḥ*, "Le vāmadevyastotra en constitue l'expiation". Why not mark the locative form also in the translation?

The following are some critical remarks on certain details of some of the translations.

4/1 (V 23 8) *gachati prakāśaṃ | ya evaṃ veda*, "Il va vers la lumière, celui qui sait ainsi". The context supports KEITH's translation (Rigveda Brahmanas: The Aitareya and Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇas of the Rigveda, 1920), "He is revealed who knows thus".

5/2 (VIII 5 2) *sūyate ha vā asya kṣatraṃ | yo dīkṣate kṣatriyaḥ san.* VERPOORTEN takes *sūyate* as the passive form of √*sū* (*sūte*) and translates "est engendrée"; KEITH's translation, "is consecrated", is based on √*sū* (*suvati*); the passive form of √*su* (*sunoti*) has just the same form and this interpretation could be discussed, as the passage refers to the *rājasūya*.

5/6 (IV 15 7) *gachati vai vartamānena | yatra kāmayate.* From the following context, it is clear that this passage has a more complex syntax; it proceeds *tat svasti saṃvatsarasya pāram aśnute ya evaṃ veda.* Perhaps *ya evaṃ veda* may be referred to both of the preceding statements, the second of which explains the first, and *yatra*

kāmayate may be directly subordinate to *gachati*. If so, the initial position of the verb would not be "inexplicable", as it is due to *ya evaṃ veda*.

In 92/1 (I 25 15) *upasadāṃ kila vai tad brāhmaṇe*, the preceding phrase *tad u ha smāhopāvir jānaśruteya* may furnish the necessary explanation. The simple translation by KEITH, "Now as to this Upāvi Jānaśruteya used to say, that is in his explanation of the Upasads", is not mentioned in the discussion in 111/2 about the subsequent difficult passage, where a very debatable interpretation by SCHRAPEL is discussed.

102/2 (III 24 7) *prativādinī hāsya gṛheṣu patnī bhavati*, "Son épouse se montre désobéissante à la maison". Since the passage proceeds *yatraivaṃ vidvān*, the part quoted must refer to a desirable consequence of knowledge and would better read as *aprativādinī; asya* might just as well or even better be referred to *gṛheṣu*, not to *patnī*.

147/1 (I 30 6) *sa sūnṛtam eva tad yajñam karoti*. An explicit subject *sa* is by no means necessary; would not the reading *sasūnṛtam* be more probable?

193/1 (VII 27 4) *teṣāṃ hottiṣṭhatām uvāca* is followed by *api nu rājann itthaṃvidaṃ veder utthāpayantīti*. The doubts expressed by OERTEL (The Syntax of Cases in the Narrative and Descriptive Prose of the Brāhmaṇas I, 1926, p. 127) must be taken seriously: *teṣāṃ* may adhere as genitive attribute to *itthaṃvidam*, in which case *uvācāpi* must be considered an insertion.

295/5 (V 30 1) *tābhyām eva tat samvatsaram eti sa / yo 'nudite juhoti* is judged to be "inexplicable" if *sa* is enclitic; why maintain this difficult phrasing when the most probable reading is given in 572/1, where the *sa ya* ... is brought to the following *yathā*? The passage would seem to belong rather to § 550.

404/4 (II 33 5; wrongly 35) *prajāpatir vā idam eka evāgra āsa*, "Au commencement, Prajāpati était tout seul ici-bas". VERPOORTEN follows KEITH in translating *idam* as a localization. Another phrasing is possible: "Prajāpati was this (the world), he was just alone in the beginning".

407/3 (II 15 15) *yadā vā adhvaryur upākaroti / vācaivopākaroti*, "C'est seulement quand l'adhvaryu amène (la récitation) qu'il l'amène à haute voix". *eva* is here often taken as a sentence particle, not as emphasizing one single word only. This passage is a case in which the context would have been better accounted for if the translation really referred *eva* to *vācā*: "when, in fact, *adhvaryu* begins, it is with the aid of voice he begins".

540/2 (III 45 7) *tasmād upavasathe yāvatyā vācā kāmayīta / tāvatyānubrūyāt*, "Voilà pourquoi, durant la vigile, il peut réciter l'invitande avec le volume de voix qu'il veut". The word "invitande" in the translation is not evidently inherent in the Sanskrit verb *anu√brū*: does VERPOORTEN really mean that *prāyaṇīyo yajñaḥ* from the beginning of the 45th chapter is still an issue here?

584/2 (VI 15 2) *yad eva panāyyaṃ karma / tad etad abhivadati* is preceded by *atha* (alternative reading: *athaitat*) *traiṣṭubham acchāvako 'ntataḥ śaṃsati saṃ vāṃ karmaṇeti*. It is not certain that the *yad*-part of the passage is the first part of a "diptyque"; on the contrary, it may have been attached to the quotation marked by *iti* and *tad etad* thus resumes this *iti* and introduces the verb of saying.

The chapters sometimes treat of parts of speech (or even the case forms of the nouns) and sometimes of syntactic units. Moreover, in certain chapters, for example those about the particles, the main point is rather a classification of different interpretations of the particles than the mere recording of their position; in Chapter XX, it is, in fact, the nesting of sentences that is discussed. It may appear unsystematic to abandon a logical arrangement, but it is not necessarily a shortcoming. In many

cases, the richness of the material is well shown by the actual arrangement. However, I wish to point out, chapter by chapter, certain particulars whose relation to the main theme may be further discussed.

The first chapter, "Place du verbe", is totally convincing. The same may be said about the discussion on the position of adverbs (especially clear owing to the table given in § 222) in Chapter XI and on absolutives in Chapter XV. Also Chapter XVIII, on prepositions, is clear and easily accessible; it is perspicuous that preceding prepositions are closer to an adverbial state than are the virtual "postpositions" in this language. Chapter XIX, on negation, is also quite clear.

In Chapter II, "Place du prédicat", some suppositions are made about nominal sentences; the main one is that subject and predicate are identifiable and that there is a P-S or an S-P order in nominal sentences. Could not the order in nominal sentences be recorded according to the form of the elements (more or less adjectival elements, attributes, pronouns, particles, etc.)? Would not the application of some more formal criteria than "le contexte et la logique interne du raisonnement" (§ 38) also in the case of nominal sentences shed new light on the word order? VERPOORTEN is throughout bound to the view of the nominal sentence as having a "verbal" structure; thus, he defines the few occurrences of genitive-case forms as members of nominal sentences as "génitif adverbal" and, more specifically, "génitif d'appartenance" (p. 131). The corpus of this type could be enlarged if the cases in § 174 were recategorized. Perhaps the investigation of order in nominal sentences may be tied more closely to the investigation of order in appositional phrases and constructions and also discussed in contrast with predicative and attributive relations. Such relations are dealt with in Chapters VII and XII!. Chapter X is also of interest here, since it treats what are commonly called semi-nominal sentences. Actually, VERPOORTEN finds that appositions and predicatives preferably follow their nucleus and there is no question of the order P-S, which is the one which he assumes for nominal sentences. Chapter X, on the *-ta* participles, has obviously to be referred to the discussion about the structure of verbal sentences versus nominal sentences; in reading this chapter, one comes to a crucial point in the very peculiar statement in § 213: "Mais cet ordre normal est plus rare que le suivant . . .". To sum up, it seems as if the same position is predominant for both predicative qualifications (§ 142), gerundives (§ 18), past participles (§ 134) and present participles (§ 200), namely, the position after the noun qualified, but for the attributive qualification the position before the noun qualified seems to be normal (§ 343).

The inconsistency in the terminology of Chapter III between the functional term "sujet" and the formal term "accusatif" is deliberate and is expressly defended in § 55. One óbjection is that one gets no information as to whether there is actually any difference in the position of an "objet direct" and a "complément circonstanciel de direction ou de but".

The order of Chapters IV–VI and VIII–IX, on case forms, is annoying, as is also the insertion of Chapter VII, on appositions; VERPOORTEN finds no defence for it himself (p. 29). Some of the case forms are observed in a general manner, merely in their functions as adjuncts of the sentences, but certain different syntactic (or semantic) functions (such as instrument, agent, adverbial function for the instrumental case, etc.) could perhaps have been sorted out in the same way as VERPOORTEN has distinguished between "datif exprimant le but" and other types of dative, thus relating the dative forms to other items of the sentence as well as to the sentence as a whole. It certainly seems to be difficult to present syntactic reasons for the position of case forms. VERPOORTEN makes one observation which has not been

made by DELBRÜCK and which, if he is right, may have a general bearing. Concerning the position of genitive forms, he states (§ 177) that "La position antérieure serait la marque de la possession, de l'appartenance; la position postérieure celle de l'attribution". The subsequent discussion of the material does not seem to me to confirm this statement at all.

The topic of pronouns, treated in Chapter XII, is a vast one. At the beginning of the chapter (§ 287), VERPOORTEN mentions the often quoted *kārikā* about the meaning of the four pronouns *idam-adas-etad-tad* (cf. SPEIJER, Sanskrit Syntax, 1886, p. 202, footnote 1). It is difficult to understand exactly why he interprets this *kārikā* (with a reference to a footnote by MINARD) by telling us that "*etat* s'oppose à *tat* comme la proximité à l'absence, et à *adaḥ* comme aujourd'hui à autrefois". He has, in fact, not considered the general meaning of the pronouns very much and he rather treats them as formal words without making any systematic approach to their syntactic state, for example, their definition as attributive or appositional or their state as anaphora. For example, the material would perhaps have been differently arranged if "sa initial en fonction de ligateur" (p. 191) had been accepted as appearing not only in "diptyques", i.e. in relative constructions, but also in the use shown by DELBRÜCK (Altindische Syntax, 1888, pp. 212 ff.): "*tá* im anaphorischen Gebrauche". It may also be worth while, as regards the discussion of word order, to differentiate the material of *ayam/idam* according to nominative and oblique forms, as the latter are in fact mostly enclitic.

Some particles are dealt with in Chapter XVII but special attention is paid to the particle *eva* in the extensive Chapter XVI. The first part (§§ 391–420) is called "La position de *eva*", but, strictly speaking, this is the main topic only in § 419. Instead, VERPOORTEN has started with the assumption that "sa position est fonction de celle du vocable qui précède" (§ 391). The correctness of this assumption could perhaps have been the real main line of investigation for the author of a book on word order? Furthermore, he interprets *eva* mostly as if it were a sentence particle and not of a merely emphasizing value (for example, § 395) in passages which, it seems to me, might be interpreted in the same way even if *eva* were lacking. The second part of this chapter treats of *eva tat*. This phrase looks rather like an interesting idiomatic expression in this text and deserves attention. However, perhaps the recording of its position should have been more closely connected with the discussion of *tat* (§ 504), which also seems to be particularly frequent in this text. The use of *etat*, *eva tat* and *eva etat* (§ 432) seems to suggest some common notion of the function of the *e*-element in *eva* and *etat*, which is well worth a closer study.

When the relative constructions are discussed, the real topic is not separate syntactic elements but nesting of sentences. The conjunctional forms, i.e. adverbial uses, of *ya*-forms are discussed separately in Chapter XX and the relative pronominal uses of *ya*- in Chapter XXI. For *yat*, the interpretations according to this main distinction may perhaps be disputed in certain cases. In 509/2 (IV 30 15), *yad vai yajñe samānaṃ kriyate / tat prajā anusamananti* ("Puisque l'action sacrificielle est identique, les créatures, à cette image, respirent de la même façon"), the *yat* should probably not be interpreted conjunctionally but only as correlating to *tat* (KEITH: "through that which is performed the same in the sacrifice, offspring breathe together"). *yat* provides the object of *anusamananti* which probably *anu*-presupposes; the real effect is expressed in the following *tasmāt samānam āgni-mārutaṃ bhavati*. VERPOORTEN has questioned other examples in the following paragraphs, although he translates *yat* as a conjunction. On the other hand, in an instance like 552/1 (III 22 4), *yad evaitad avocāma / akarat tad* (the *akarot* printed

here is not in the MSS.), may, according to the contents, be interpreted as offering a conjunctional *yat* ("as we said this, he made it"). Is there furthermore any real difference between a *yat* in a nominal *pratīka* (for example, 521/1) and a "*yat* appositif" (§ 575, for example, 583/3)?

In Chapter XXI, on "ya- et son référend", the anaphoric state of this pronoun is often used to improve the interpretations. The only table of figures in the book appears in this chapter (§ 576); the position of *eta-* is, however, not significant of just the "ya- . . . en construction non-verbale" but must be referred to the position of *eta-* in general. The chapter is very rewarding and all the careful observations of individual cases form a basis for general discussions on the relative mode of expression in old Sanskrit prose. Further arrangements of the material may be suggested according to the post- or anteposition of the relative group, confronted with, for example, the presences (or absences) of combined demonstrative pronouns, with verbal and nominal relative constructions, and—as mentioned above—with *ya-* versus *yat*, etc. If certain things happen in certain cases and this is statistically clear and significant, such observations may yield far richer conclusions than those given in § 601.

In Chapters XXII–XXIII, VERPOORTEN has treated the positions of certain verbs of saying and of quotations; the result is rather vague, and even though he finds in Chapter XXII that verbs of saying precede the assertions "d'ordinaire" (§ 636), the material is in fact rather indecisive; in this case, accurate figures would have been very opportune for the reader's judgment. From these chapters it is also evident that the discussion of typology of language and word order could not be based only on observations of the position of SOV and adherent items in the sentence; also such notions as the apposition of and transitions between phrases must be taken into consideration.

Two chapters which VERPOORTEN has already told us on p. 29 are "aux confins de la syntaxe et de la stylistique" conclude the investigation, one about ellipses (which are delimited from syntactic ellipses and confined to ellipses of certain repetitions that a strict logic of contents would require) and the other about variation. These last two chapters point towards a well-founded definition of the language and style of the Brāhmaṇa texts, for which this whole investigation on word order provides a very good basis. This book turns out to be very substantial and definitely more than the summary in the final "Conclusion" should be read.

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