The Securitization of Non-Traditional Security Issues

A study concerning the impacts of securitization efforts on the fight against HIV/AIDS

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Abstract

In their first meeting of the new millennium the UN Security Council put HIV/AIDS on the agenda as a security issue. This was the first time a non-traditional security issue was discussed in such a forum. Based upon the normative discussions raging within the field of securitization theory, this study seeks to analyse the empirical outcomes that the securitization effort, of putting HIV/AIDS on the Security Council agenda, might have had. While many studies argue the normative points of securitization when it comes to non-traditional security issues, this study turns to an empirical case. Based upon the resolution 1308, following the Security Council’s meeting, UNAIDS was chosen in order to uncover the possible outcomes of the securitization efforts. By using bureaucratic theory to develop a framework for the textual analysis of UNAIDS meeting documents from 1998-2005, this study uncovers undeniable changes to the nature and structure of the organization. The positive results yielded in the analysis of UNAIDS highlight that the use of securitization as a practical policy tool in to advance an issue at hand could well be a way forward with similar areas lacking sufficient attention and/or funding.

Keywords: Securitization, HIV, Security, AIDS, UNAIDS, Textual analysis, Bureaucratic theory, UN, Security theory, Formalization.
Table of Contents

Abstract........................................................................................................................................2

1. Introduction................................................................................................................................4
   1.1. Outline..................................................................................................................................5

2. Background and the case at hand..............................................................................................6
   2.1. Securitization efforts and the case at hand.........................................................................9

3. Theory ......................................................................................................................................11
   3.1. Previous research - The current state of securitization.................................................11
   3.2. The foundations of securitization ......................................................................................13
   3.3. Bureaucratic theory and framework ..................................................................................16

4. Methodology .............................................................................................................................20
   4.1. Design - Materials and case selection ............................................................................20
   4.2. Methods..............................................................................................................................21

5. Analysis ....................................................................................................................................24
   5.1. Prior to the securitization efforts.....................................................................................25
       5.1.1. The nature of the missions in UNAIDS .................................................................25
       5.1.2. Decentralization of UNAIDS..................................................................................26
       5.1.3. Organizational drive.................................................................................................27
       5.1.4. Organizational enforcement....................................................................................29
       5.1.5. The division of labour within the organization......................................................30
       5.1.6. Prior to the securitization efforts in summary ......................................................31
   5.2. After the securitization efforts ..........................................................................................32
       5.2.1. The nature of the missions in UNAIDS .................................................................33
       5.2.2. Decentralization of UNAIDS..................................................................................34
       5.2.3. Organizational drive.................................................................................................36
       5.2.4. Organizational enforcement....................................................................................37
       5.2.5. The division of labour within the organization......................................................38
       5.2.6. After the securitization efforts in summary ..........................................................39

6. Discussion and conclusions.......................................................................................................41
   6.1. Future research..................................................................................................................43

References.....................................................................................................................................45
   Theoretical Literature ..................................................................................................................45
   UN & UNAIDS documents.........................................................................................................46
1. Introduction

The first meeting held by the United Nations Security Council in the new millennium, on the 10th of January 2000, was an intriguing event in many ways. It was historic not only due to its place in time, but also in regard to the topic at hand. This meeting of the new millennium came to be the first time the Security Council discussed a health issue as a serious security threat. The Council convened to discuss “The situation in Africa: the impact of AIDS on international peace and security”. The reasoning behind this was clearly stated by the meeting’s president Mr. Al Gore, “we tend to think of a threat to security in terms of war and peace. Yet no one can doubt that the havoc wreaked and the toll exacted by HIV/AIDS does threaten our security” (SC 4087 2000:2). This was a new approach to an issue that had previously only been considered a health issue rather than one concerning security. Thus, we can consider this new approach to be an attempt to securitize the issue of HIV/AIDS by arguing that the matter is a security threat.

The subsequent discussions and considerations that arose from this meeting led the Security Council to adopt resolution 1308 in July that same year. Through resolution 1308 the Council officially recognised that HIV/AIDS could have a devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society. The Council further stressed that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if left unchecked, could pose a risk to the world’s stability and security.

The magnitude of the HIV/AIDS problem is evidenced simply by the fact that it was placed on the agenda at such a high level. The reasoning present was that HIV/AIDS threatened not only human lives but also the development of government, economy, and general political stability in Africa. According to the facts available to the Council over 11 million children had already been orphaned due to HIV/AIDS (SC 4087 2000:5). The crisis was therefore clear and the reasoning as to why the Council brought up the issue was also quite straightforward.

Now one might think that such emphasis put upon the issue of HIV/AIDS, and by such a powerful source no less, would bring about serious change. At the very least one might hope that it helped the matter considerably. However, as will be shown there are many scholars that would argue that considering health issues, and indeed the fight against HIV/AIDS, as
security issues might not have had the desired effect (David 2001, Elbe & Voelkner 2014). Instead it may have risked derailing ongoing efforts by adding an unhelpful layer of bureaucracy to them (David 2001:563).

On the other hand, many scholars would argue that categorising an issue as a security threat would indeed bring with it the attention, effort, and resources needed to tackle it (Brauch 2009, Elbe 2006, Floyd 2008). As will become evident in the following sections, regarding research within the field, there is a large divide between those that argue for or against attempting to securitize issues that are not traditional security issues. This leaves the field thirsting for studies that look at the facts and outcomes of attempts to securitize issues. The overarching aim of this study is therefore to add to the current dearth of literature on how securitization efforts affect issues that are not conventionally seen as matters of security.

As this is an ambitious aim, several restrictions have been put in place in order to allow for a feasible and manageable study. By looking at the security council resolution 1308 from which the securitization efforts stemmed, a key case will be identified on the global level. The case is that of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and their fight against HIV/AIDS. By looking at UNAIDS on a global level a greater insight can be gained. A number of restrictions have to be made in order to limit and to allow for a reasonably sized scope of this study. This is why UNAIDS will be focused upon in particular, because as will soon become apparent UNAIDS lies at the heart of the securitization efforts.

It is, however, essential to bear in mind that the purpose of this study is not to prove that securitization has occurred, but rather to study the outcomes following securitization efforts. This will lead towards the aim of the study which is to add to the body of literature within the field of securitization. The specified research question for this study is therefore: How has UNAIDS changed following the securitization efforts of 2000?

1.1. Outline

First this study turns to the background and the case at hand, seeking to clarify the history of HIV/AIDS and the case of UNAIDS. Then turning to the theory prevalent in this study where the previous research, the foundations of securitization, and lastly the bureaucratic theory underlining the framework of this study will be clarified. In the methodology section the
material and case selection will be clarified, then the methods used will be presented and explained. Following the methodology, the main analysis of this study will begin with the situation prior to securitization efforts and then turn to analysing the situation after the securitization efforts. After the analysis, conclusions and a discussion of the analysis will take place, to be followed by a final section on recommendations for future research.

2. Background and the case at hand

As is to be expected the way of dealing with, or rather attempting to combat, HIV/AIDS has changed over the years. It is to be expected that new information, knowledge, and perspectives take hold and that the field adapts accordingly.

The circumstances of HIV/AIDS origin are somewhat unclear. However, it has become clear that doctors in western Africa could see patients suffering from HIV as early as the 1970s (Knight 2008:9). At this point in time, and indeed for decades after, there was a great deal of stigma attached to the disease and for a long time many did not believe that HIV/AIDS was a problem for the heterosexual population at all. Generally, the notion that HIV/AIDS had the potential to become a global pandemic was considered ludicrous or overtly alarmist. One of the main reasons as to why it was so difficult to uncover the cause of why people were becoming ill, was that it can take up to 10 years or more before a person with HIV develops AIDS-related symptoms (Knight 2008:9).

Very little was done initially in order to prevent or deal with HIV/AIDS. Countries introduced HIV testing for groups that were deemed to have a higher risk of infection and some countries, such as the U.S. and China, did not allow HIV-positive people to enter their borders (Knight 2008:9). As described by one of UNAIDS central actors Lindsay Knight, in an extensive book on UNAIDS history, “the early years of AIDS, in the developed world as well as in developing nations, is a story of wasted time and opportunities, of failure of leadership, of denial and discrimination” (2008:9). The UN did not officially recognise HIV/AIDS until 1983 when the World Health Organization (WHO) held a meeting in Denmark on the topic (Knight 2008:13). However, at the time the WHO’s role was to monitor the development within the field rather than to do something about the dire situation.
During the late 1980s a number of different approaches were used to tackle the HIV epidemic. With both the top-down approach employed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the bottom-up approach adapted by many other donors there were both successes and considerable limitations. The top-down approaches appeared to be useful when it came to packaging and branding replicable strategies such as, behaviour change, communication, and social marketing strategies, while the bottom-up approaches supported more local innovation and ownership. The most notable feature of the late 1980s, however, is how uneven NGO and community responses were around the world, regardless of whether they were top-down or bottom-up, and how the need for assistance and measures was far greater than the actual involvement (Merson et al 2008:482). In short, it appears to have been a ‘free-for-all’ where the efforts of donors and NGOs were directed at rather disparate, ‘ad hoc’ activities without sufficient coordination or intensity (Merson et al 2008:482).

It took five years, and a considerable amount of work from passionate activists until the WHO first requested funds to develop its activities on HIV/AIDS (Knight 2008:14). Despite an initial challenging period, when it was hard to find donors willing to support the WHO activities on HIV/AIDS, the efforts built up momentum. After the Control Programme on AIDS, which later became the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA), was established by the WHO in 1987 they were able to increase funding to 90 million USD in 1990. The original goals of the GPA were to prevent HIV infection, reduce the personal and social impact of HIV infection, and to mobilize and unify national and international efforts against AIDS (Knight 2008:15).

The fact that the UN General Assembly brought up the issue, in late 1987, served to help the GPA considerably when it came to both funding and credibility (Knight 2008:15). A key point of the GPA was to not only tackle HIV/AIDS from a medical standpoint but to also take other means into consideration. This since the Director of GPA Jonathan Mann argued that HIV/AIDS was a social, economic, demographic, cultural and political issue as well as a medical one (Knight 2008:15). Therefore, it follows that in order to effectively combat HIV/AIDS different methods and approaches are necessary. Most of the GPA’s funding was spent on country activities where the priority was to assist states in the creation of national AIDS programs. During his time at the GPA, Mann was also successful in adopting and building upon the language used by activists in order to mobilise support (Merson et al.
This led to the beginning of transnational community and activist networks cooperating with UN programmes and officials.

This approach changed slightly during the 1990s when Jonathan Mann left the GPA. Many argued that the GPA began to focus too heavily on the medical side of HIV/AIDS, and while multi-sectoral approaches were heard of, they were rarely implemented. Another criticism that came about in the 1990’s, which was a common criticism with many development/donor programs in the 1990’s, was that the GPA used a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to countries when developing the national AIDS plans (Knight 2008:18). This would result in ignoring the county specifics such as cultural, historical, or political sensitivities that would need to be unique for each plan. This may very well have led to poorer, or less effective, programs and plans than was necessary.

The GPA was also received a considerable amount of criticism for failing to successfully coordinate UN agencies. The GPA was also accused of not being able to bring about the political will required to spark the response that was desperately needed in affected countries (Merson et al. 2008:482). The criticism eventually led to a UN Task Force being established which was to design a new body for coordinating the work of the UN on AIDS (Knight 2008:21). After over a year of diplomatic discussion and haggling from the donors, UN agencies, and other stakeholders, UNAIDS was established in 1996 (Knight 2008:47). The original six co-sponsors of UNAIDS were UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, WHO and the World Bank (UNAIDS 2001:1). At the time of its inception one of the UNAIDS most important priorities was to explain and prove to world leaders the severity of HIV/AIDS (Knight 2008:48). This led to an extensive amount of efforts being put into advocacy aimed at raising the profile and awareness of HIV/AIDS.

Towards the end of the 1990s it was beginning to become clear that the HIV/AIDS situation was becoming a global epidemic that was out of control. According to Jonathan Mann himself it had also become clear that the response to HIV/AIDS had, by the late 1990s, gone through four different phases. It had evolved from a danger to be alerted about, to a problem of individual behaviour, to a societally contextualized behavioural issue, and finally, to a human rights-linked challenge (Mann et al. 1998:5). Viewing HIV/AIDS as a human-rights linked challenge brings with it the fact that in order to deal with it medical solutions alone will not be sufficient. In order to tackle a human-rights linked challenge a number of different solutions
and approaches will have to be considered. This change in the way the HIV/AIDS response was seen may well have further paved the way for the events that took place in the early 2000s.

Another important factor in paving the way for HIV/AIDS reaching the global agenda in the early 2000s was the sheer size of the epidemic. By the end of 1999 roughly 26 million adults and children were living with HIV, with 9000 new infections occurring every day (Knight 2008:105). It had also become evident that the funding for development programs concerning the HIV response had faltered since the end of the cold war (Merson et al. 2008:482). Something had to be done in order to deal with the situation. For these reasons, and due to the aforementioned efforts by activists and agencies, HIV/AIDS was finally put on the agenda of global leaders.

2.1. Securitization efforts and the case at hand

With HIV/AIDS reaching the Security Council agenda resolution 1308 soon followed. The resolution brought up six points, and a number of recognitions, comprised of important factors related to HIV/AIDS. However, this study will focus on the more practical or goal-oriented points of the resolution. By having this focus, it will be possible to study the aftermath of the goals, which can give an indication of how the securitization effort has affected the fight against HIV/AIDS. In order to give a full picture of the points in the resolution they are presented here:

1. Expresses concern at the potential damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeeping personnel, including support personnel;
2. Recognizes the efforts of those Member States which have acknowledged the problem of HIV/AIDS and, where applicable, have developed national programmes, and encourages all interested Member States which have not already done so to consider developing, in cooperation with the international community and UNAIDS, where appropriate, effective long-term strategies for HIV/AIDS education, prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling, and treatment of their personnel, as an important part of their preparation for their participation in peacekeeping operations;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to take further steps towards the provision of training for peacekeeping personnel on issues related to preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and to continue the further development of pre-deployment orientation and ongoing training for all peacekeeping personnel on these issues;
4. Encourages interested Member States to increase international cooperation among their relevant national bodies to assist with the creation and execution of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling, and treatment for personnel to be deployed in international
peacekeeping operations;
5. Encourages, in this context, UNAIDS to continue to strengthen its cooperation with interested Member States to further develop its country profiles in order to reflect best practices and countries’ policies on HIV/AIDS prevention education, testing, counselling and treatment;
6. Expresses keen interest in additional discussion among relevant United Nations bodies, Member States, industry and other relevant organizations to make progress, inter alia, on the question of access to treatment and care, and on prevention. (SC 1308 2000:2)

By looking at these points this study finds its main case and what to look into further. While the first two out of the six points are more akin to statements rather than goals, the following points are formulated as goals which are desirable to achieve. The fourth point is formulated as a goal but is concerned with the member states’ action/s and as there are so many members it would not fit within the scope of this study to look into them. One option would be to study a few of the member states, however as this study aims to look at the effect of securitization on a higher level than at national level the other points appear to be more suitable. The fourth point is also related to some extent to the third, therefore by looking into the third point, the fourth will to a certain extent also be covered. The sixth, and final point, is formulated as a goal but despite this it will not be focused upon as it is quite general in nature and pertains more to nation states making it more difficult to follow up on. This means that it is points 3 and in particular 5 that will be looked into further in this particular study.

The third point is interesting as there is quite a clear security connection here. Through this point this study can later examine how many personnel actually received training before and prior to the resolution. This can lead to a further illumination of some of the consequences of the securitization effort.

The fifth point however has to do with UNAIDS and sets out the goal that UNAIDS should cooperate further with member states to develop country profiles further when it comes to education, testing, counselling and treatment. This is where the primary focus of this study will lie. By looking at UNAIDS and how the securitization efforts, and the accompanied goals of the Security Council, affected their work, a part of the answer to the enigma of how securitization efforts can affect issues that are not conventionally seen as security-issues can be found.
It can be argued that looking at UNAIDS will only give an answer as to how UNAIDS has been affected by the securitization effort. However, since UNAIDS and the UN system in general is such a significant part of the fight against HIV/AIDS it can give a strong indication as to how securitization efforts can affect a field. In this case that field is specifically the fight against HIV/AIDS. This can be of the upmost importance when it comes to using securitization as a tool for pushing through policy. Also, since research on securitization severely lacks studies looking at how deliberate securitization efforts can actually affect a field in the real world rather than in theoretical situations we can gain insights through this study.

3. Theory

Before proceeding any further, a look at the theoretical foundations of this study is in order. As one might have already surmised security theory and securitization lie at the heart of this study. Therefore, a succinct foray into the premises of security theory and the background as well as the inner workings of securitization is necessary.

Securitization both as a theory and as a framework for analysis has grown to become one of the most influential and applicable perspectives within security studies. The field has expanded and now sprawls across many areas. This makes it somewhat difficult to summarise, so it is important to look into both the previous research in line with this study as well as the foundations on which it stands. By so doing, both the foundations of securitization as well as the necessity of this study will become even more apparent. This will be followed by a section on bureaucratic theory which will lay much of the basis of this study’s framework and the methodology chapter yet to come.

3.1. Previous research - The current state of securitization

The field as it currently stands has taken a new approach where securitization is not only seen as a way to analyse that which has already happened, but also as a way of influencing things in order to achieve a desired result. Thus, one could argue that securitization is being used not only as an analytical tool but also as a policy tool.
A look into securitization as it is applied within the area of environmental studies can give an illuminating view of this shift in the way securitization is used. Within this area, as in the field in general, there are two main camps arguing against each other. One side argues that environmental issues should be securitized and discusses how this might come to pass. On the opposite side, there are those arguing that environmental issues should not be securitized.

One of the scholars arguing for securitizing environmental issues is Hans Günter Brauch. According to him the extraordinary measures that securitization bring with it are essential in order to tackle climate change and to prevent current policy mistakes (Brauch 2009:101). The benefits of securitizing the area being increased political and financial support for the cause. This embodies the new way of looking at securitization. That a scholar would actively suggest using securitization as a conscious tool for making new policy priorities is a considerable development of its application, and Brauch is not alone when it comes to this opinion. These scholars seem to take a stance where they argue that the results are what matter and through securitizing an issue results are more likely to be delivered. In an article examining the theoretical positive and negative aspects of securitizing the environment, Shirley V. Scott comes to the conclusion that it is action that matters most, and if securitization can help initiate action then so be it (Scott: 2012:230). The scholars on this side of the argument regularly seem to take this type of stance where the ends justify the means.

On the other side of the debate, there are scholars arguing that the environment issue should not be securitized. The reason for avoiding securitization is primarily based on the risk of the area becoming disaggregated. If the issue is forced to become a security issue, then nuances may be lost. Such a lost nuance may be the economic perspective of environmental issues and how it harms impoverished people (Floyd 2008:62).

Here a debate regarding whether to use or not to use securitization takes place rather than an analysis of that which has already come to pass. This debate is not only evident within the field of environment, but also within the field in general and in the area that this study aims to explore, namely that concerning health and HIV/AIDS.

The securitization of the health area primarily concerns the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. One of the scholars arguing against the securitization of HIV/AIDS by turning it into a security priority is Marcella David. She believes that if HIV/AIDS were to be
considered a threat then an unhelpful layer of bureaucracy would be added to what already can be considered a well-coordinated international effort (David 2001:563). She thereby takes a somewhat practical position arguing that the benefits of securitizing the area are simply insufficient to motivate a securitization.

In a study considering the downsides of securitizing infectious diseases, Stefan Elbe and Nadine Voelkner use the case of the avian flu to argue that a securitized global response to the avian flu led to the situation that David feared. According to Elbe and Voelkner, securitization ended up unintentionally entangling the existing coordination with a wider set of political disputes, as well as leading governments to subject existing virus sharing arrangements to much narrower calculations of national interest which ultimately may have harmed the efforts (Elbe & Voelkner 2014:306).

However, those such as Stefan Elbe argue that “appealing to the self-interest of states through the language of security can be economically useful in terms of increasing the amount of international attention the AIDS pandemic receives” (Elbe 2006:134). Albeit somewhat cynical this is a fairly commonly held position. This type of discussion makes one wonder what the actual impact of attempting to securitize HIV/AIDS might be. Or indeed what the impact of attempting to securitize an area in general might entail. Here this study will fill in for the lack of empirical evidence prevalent within the field. First this study turns to the foundations of securitization and the relevant definitions within it.

### 3.2. The foundations of securitization

In 1998 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde released their book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. This book is a major piece of work that changed the field of security studies and created what has become known as the Copenhagen school. It may prove useful to keep in mind that, unless something different is specifically stated, when referring to securitization it is this traditional Copenhagen school of securitization that is referred to in this study. The reason for this is because it is the commonly used and referred to definition when it comes to securitization. When other scholars such as those mentioned in the previous research section speak of securitization it is this form to which they refer.
According to Buzan et al. the original motive for the text was to update regional security complex theory due to the feeling, in the mid 1990s, that the post-cold war order was going to be much more decentralized than previously (Buzan et al 1998:1). The idea of expanding security complex theory to include more than traditional military and political sectors had been around for some time and with Buzan’s 1991 book entitled People, States, and Fear it had become clear that a more expansive perspective was needed. To oversimplify slightly there was a gap in field when it comes to security complex theory and Buzan, Waever, and Wilde managed to fill this vacuum.

In order to understand the founders’ theoretical considerations, it is important to grasp their constructivist foundations, foundations on which this study is built upon as well. From their underlying assumptions, it follows that Buzan, Waever, and Wilde take the world of international relations, and indeed the social world in general, to be constructed by those that act within it rather than being determined by other factors such as human nature. They treat the social world as being created by those within it rather than something that is objectively there. In other words, they belong to the constructivist tradition. This is evident as without the assumption that actors construct the social world it would nearly be impossible to explain anything through the use of securitization theory. This assumption is prevalent throughout this study as well, as the attempts or efforts to influence the way HIV/AIDS is regarded can to a certain extent be considered as an attempt to alter the social world. By changing the way HIV/AIDS is fundamentally seen actors hope to be able to solve the problems at hand.

So how does securitization work and what is it exactly? Well, it is no surprise that securitization has to do with security, and according to Buzan et al. security is concerned with survival. It can be the survival of the nation state, the organisation, or whichever body is the point of reference. The central point is that security has to do with ensuring the survival of the entity or body in question. According to Buzan, Waever and Wilde, securitizing something is to pose it as an existential threat, which justifies emergency measures (Buzan et al. 1998:23). This is the way that actors ensure the survival of that they wish to protect. A clarifying example may be in order.

If we look at the political sector, the actors wishing to securitize an issue, say a political party, can do so by presenting, or framing, the issue in such a way that it appears to be an existential threat to the state itself. The actors framing the issue may present the party in question as
being undemocratic and that its very existence is a threat to the state. If this view becomes popularly agreed upon and becomes the norm then the issue has become securitized and extraordinary measures can become legitimate. In this case the party could be banned, as it is commonly seen as an existential threat. Thanks to the securitization the extraordinary measure of banning a party has become entirely reasonable (Buzan et al. 1998:22). This example may not be entirely realistic but it suffices as an example of the basic mechanisms of securitization. It is through the construction of a different social world that previously unwarranted measures can become reasonable or even necessary.

In the case of this study one might consider a process where HIV/AIDS is posed as an existential, or at the very least a serious, threat to mankind or society. If this then becomes the norm, and actors commonly see HIV/ADIS as a major threat, then it follows that extraordinary measures and resources against HIV/AIDS can become legitimised.

The authors, Buzan et al, further elaborated on security as a self-referential practice. Thus, it is in the practice itself that an issue becomes a security issue, not necessarily because a real threat exists, rather that the issue is presented as such as a threat. If an issue is not presented as a threat and not accepted as one then it cannot be considered securitized, “the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al. 1998:25). This has to do with the aforementioned concept of the social world being socially constructed.

Looking into what a securitizing move or effort actually is there are a number of units involved in securitization which can be useful to keep in mind throughout this study. First there is the referent object, which is defined as something that is considered existentially threatened and also as having a legitimate claim for survival. Essentially this is the body or entity that is to be protected, e.g. a state. Secondly, we find the securitizing actors; they are simply the actors that securitize issues by declaring a referent object as existentially threatened. By arguing that a referent object is existentially threatened it is the securitizing actors who make a so called securitizing effort or move (Buzan et al. 1998:36). In this study, the focus does not lie on the securitization but rather on the possible outcomes following the securitization efforts. Nevertheless, it is useful to know the clear definition of securitization and securitization efforts.
3.3. Bureaucratic theory and framework

In order to see how securitization efforts may affect the area of HIV/AIDS, some way of looking at the processes and those involved in them will be necessary. A method for considering what is useful or what may have, to use Marcella David’s terms, added an unhelpful layer of bureaucracy to the work of the involved actors and institutions, will also be necessary. In order to be enabled to find such a method, to consider what is helpful or not, some bureaucratic theories and considerations must be examined.

However, first it is important to clarify why this bureaucratic theory of formalization can fit so well with securitization in this study. Within the constructivist foundations on which this study stands, institutions themselves are built up by the norms, rules, and practices that are prevalent within them. This means that a change in the norms, rules, and practices, which securitization can bring with it, could thereby serve to alter the way in which an institution works and considers issues. Formalization, based on bureaucratic theory, is the degree to which rules and procedures inform the work performed (Adler & Borys 1996:69). As will be clarified, the type of formalization speaks more to the norms and practices in an organisation or institution, i.e. the way in which work is carried out and the character of the institution. By looking at the degree and type of formalization we can thereby see the institution’s building blocks. It follows that a change in formalization equals change in the nature of the organisation itself. Therefore, a change in formalization, which could stem from a securitization effort, would bring about a change in the way the organisation operates.

When it comes to the actors or agents themselves, i.e. the people and organisations that are involved in the securitization, it may prove insightful to clarify how they ought to be seen in this study. Since the theory of securitization rests on constructivist foundations it will not suffice to see the actors as fixed in their standpoints and views. In more traditional rationalist perspectives actors seem likely to be a sum of their experiences, attributes, and properties. However, through a securitization perspective the actors cannot be seen as constantly set in their ways. This is obvious as the securitizing effort brings with it a new way of framing the issue which needs to be accepted in order to become the new norm. The effort changes the way actors consider an issue and changes their modus operandi. Therefore, actors’ attributes or properties change as well, due to the way they think being changed by the securitization efforts.
A helpful way of considering this difference in regards to the study at hand comes from Ludvig Norman. He explains that the difference is that one does not lock in the actors’ behaviour prior to the analysis, instead one should learn about and consider the actors’ positions during the course of the study (Norman 2013:46).

Norman can also be of assistance when it comes to defining institutions in a way that fits well with the constructivist foundations of securitization. He defines them as “a relatively stable set of constitutive and regulative norms, rules, and practices” (Norman 2013:48). This entails that institutions themselves are built up by the norms, rules, and practices that are prevalent within them. A change in the norms, which securitization can bring with it, could thereby serve to alter the way in which an institution works and considers issues. They can change over time and may not always stay the same.

In the case of this study this aptly fits as it enables an open-minded inquiry into how the securitization efforts have affected the institutions. This as an attempt to change the norms surrounding an institution such as UNAIDS or the UN in general is likely to entail a change in the institutions modus operandi which could bring with it extensive change.

Now that some of the relevant definitions and considerations are in place another important theoretical consideration must be dealt with. That is how one ought to consider bureaucracy in the context of UNAIDS and, in particular, what constitutes helpful, or harmful, bureaucracy. This will be important because if this definition is not in place the subsequent analysis will be unfeasible. Looking into theory on bureaucracy can assist when it comes to assessing what the unhelpful bureaucracy Marcella David feared securitization would bring is, or if one is to be more precise, what benefits and drawbacks the various forms of bureaucracy can bring.

Although bureaucracy has a somewhat negative connotation in general there are, obviously, sound reasons as to why it exists. Bureaucracy is after all not meant to be a hindrance for causes or people, it is supposed to aid them.

It is somewhat challenging to define what may be considered helpful. Research shows that people come to find rules and other bureaucracy that they consider “good” to be entirely common sense and taken for granted, while that which they consider to be “bad” they actively
resent (Perrow 1983:24). However, it will not suffice to simply argue that if it is good then it works, and if it is not then it does not work. Some might argue that a common-sense approach would suffice, however common-sense is seldom scientific and can be rather individualistic and thereby not so common at all. Without a clear way to distinguish the “good” from the “bad” the subsequent analysis would be more partial in nature based upon the person performing the analysis preconceptions. With a theory helping to distinguish the good from the bad, the train of thought can be seen more clearly.

Paul Adler and Bryan Borys have presented a theory that can be of assistance in regards to the problems explained in the paragraph above. According to them there appears to be two types of bureaucracy, either enabling or coercive (1996:82). They argue that enabling procedures designed to encourage and support can help committed employees do their jobs more effectively and further reinforce their commitment (Adler & Borys 1996:83). By contrast, the coercive type of procedures are designed to force employees, or in this case actors, to comply to the set rules and goals (Adler & Borys 1996:69).

It is important to mention that Adler and Borys’ study on bureaucracy focuses to a large extent on formalization, i.e. the extent to which work roles are structured by rules, instructions, and procedures in an organization. I would argue that this is a suitable match for looking at UNAIDS, or indeed UN organs in general as they have a clear hierarchy with quite clearly structured rules, instructions, and procedures. This especially in light of the materials and specified research questions presented in the following section.

While Adler and Borys’ research is geared more towards business and companies, rather than organisations, the usefulness of the theories presented by them is somewhat surprising. Using this logic when looking at an organisation such as the UN can prove most beneficial. Obviously, it cannot fit perfectly, but in a highly hierarchical organisation such as the UN it appears to match well. Aside from the concept of enabling or coercive procedures that constitute the type of formalization, it is also relevant to look at the degree of formalization prevalent within the organisation. Adler and Borys present the following figure (1):
While this figure is oversimplified in the sense that it dichotomises dimensions that are not necessarily dichotomies but rather continuous variables it is non the less useful to categorise in order to see how securitization efforts might have impacted the organisation at hand, i.e. the UN/UNAIDS (Adler & Borys 1996:78). Now knowing how enabling and coercive types work as well as what formalization is it follows that organic organisations tend to have enabling structures with a low degree of formalization making the organisation quite adaptable but with somewhat unpredictable outcomes. On the other end, we find mechanistic organisations that have a high level of formalization and coercive procedures aimed at forcing employees to follow the rules, which can work well towards a certain goal but struggle to adapt to change. However, there could also be instances where an organisation has a high degree of formalization but is also enabling. Such an organisation would have clear rules and procedures but enable workers through incentives and persuasion to follow them (Page & Wright 2006:4). An organisation with both low formalization and a coercive type of formalization is labelled as autocratic and is generally ruled by an iron fist in a somewhat unpredictable fashion.
These categories will prove useful in the following sections and will be returned to later during the analysis and attempt to uncover the way in which securitization efforts affect non-traditional security issues. In other words, this theory will act as the basis or framework for the analysis.

4. Methodology

4.1. Design - Materials and case selection

The case selection has to a certain extent been presented already, however for the sake of clarity some of its limitations will be further explained. As is obvious with the limitation of looking into UNAIDS and the effect of securitization efforts when it comes to HIV/AIDS, it is not possible to generalise to the entire securitization field and the effects of securitization efforts. However, with this study constituting one of the few looking at the effects of securitization efforts it can add to the body of research and lead us one step further to explaining them and their effects. There may also be issues of causality at hand where it is hard to attribute all change to the securitization efforts.

With this in mind it is important to note that this is not a study attempting to prove that securitization has occurred and its outcomes, rather it studies the outcomes of the established securitization efforts. This means that the securitization effort of putting HIV/AIDS on the Security Council agenda and thereby raising the issue on a global level is the centre of attention. By studying the practical outcomes and real-world implications of the securitization effort, this study will add to the body of literature and help uncover how securitization efforts affect issues that are not conventionally seen as matters of security.

The material used in this study is relatively straightforward and to a certain extent obvious, since the UNAIDS has extensive documentation from their governing body, the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB), meetings. These meetings usually take place once or twice a year and last for a number of days of extensive discussion and decision-making. The PCB itself has representatives of 22 governments from all regions of the world, the eleven UNAIDS Co-sponsors, and five nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as associations of people living with HIV (UNAIDS PCB 2017:1).
A common problem for researchers, as described by Bryman and Nilsson, is that they lack the necessary documentation to perform their studies (2011:496). In this case the UNAIDS documentation should prove to be more than sufficient as there are thousands of pages of PCB meeting protocols and reports including attached background information. All this must be analysed because if this study is to reach its aim then it follows that the material must span from before the securitization efforts until after them.

There may be a slight bias prevalent within the documents as UNAIDS may not be willing to criticise their own work. However, in such a large organization as UNAIDS, especially with its extensive monitoring activities and attention from outside the organization, it is highly unlikely that UNAIDS would overemphasise their work to an unreasonable degree. Nonetheless this could be useful to bear in mind throughout the study, and especially when performing the analysis, in order to diminish the risk of this possible bias.

The resolution came early 2000, therefore by looking at monthly PCB meetings from January 1998 until December 2005 this study should be able to capture the potential change in UNAIDS. The reason for going so far past the securitization effort around 2000 is to ensure that the possibly slow moving organisational change is captured. Otherwise the study risks looking at UNAIDS before the institutional change took hold, which could take some time in such a large organisation. As noted above meetings take place once or twice a year with roughly 500 pages worth of documents accompanying each meeting. This substantial amount of material and the methods explained below will make for a solid analysis.

4.2. Methods

By way of a qualitative textual analysis of these documents before and after the securitization efforts, the type and degree of formalization, and how the efforts have affected the organisation can be seen. Through these documents it should also be possible to see whether the peacekeeping forces received training in line with point 3 of the security council’s resolution 1308. However, as previously mentioned it is the fifth point of the Security Council resolution on HIV/AIDS, which sets out the goal that UNAIDS should cooperate further with member states to develop country profiles further when it comes to education, testing, counselling and treatment, that will be analysed in depth. In order to do so a number
of questions must be set up prior to the analysis so that the focus is clear. Without these questions, the textual analysis will be somewhat arbitrary and risk a high degree of confirmation bias. Therefore, dealing with methodological considerations and tools of this study is relevant.

There is always the risk that when doing such an analysis that the interpretations might become unreliable. In order to decrease the risk of having low reliability, the logic behind the categorization in regards to formalization and the questions put forth to the material shall be explained as clearly as possible. Despite this, the reliability will by default be lower than in a more straightforward approach, such as counting words. One could for example count words which are deemed to be more or less formalizing and sum up the totals. This method would not be sufficient in this case as the analysis must be more complex than counting words in order to find the truth of the matter. In other words, it is worth offering some reliability in order to ensure validity and that the aim of uncovering how securitization efforts affect non-traditional security issues is fulfilled. The more open analysis suits this study well, as while the questions serve to guide the study they are not so strict as to disallow unexpected results or finds.

As outlined in the theory section, this study will look at the type and degree of formalization when studying the material at hand. In order to guide and make clear that which needs to be derived from the textual analysis, the following questions will help put UNAIDS in one of the four previously outlined categories (organic, autocratic, enabling bureaucracy, mechanistic). By so doing, the study can uncover the impact that the securitization efforts have had on UNAIDS. These questions are in part derived from Alder and Borys’ bureaucratic research (1996:81).

1. **What is the nature tasks, missions, or duties? Are they of a routine or non-routine nature?**

   This will help look into the degree of formalization or how formalized procedures are. By looking at the routineness of the work the aim is to see how “locked in” work is or whether there is flexibility and adaptation. If the organization’s activities are extremely specified and routine-like it is not likely that actors within the organization are able to adapt or improvise to a great extent, as is consistent with highly formalized
organizations. An added advantage is that if the organization’s procedures are routine-like then it is likely they will be reoccurring throughout the years and most likely will be found in the material.

2. **To what extent is decision-making and the work in general decentralized?**

   Studying the level of decentralization can help bring insight to both the form and degree of formalization. This because decentralization or delegation of decision making would mean that there is a less coercive, top driven, style or form of organizational structure. In organizations with an extremely decentralized structure the type of formalization is often more enabling as it would allow for the decentralized units to govern themselves to a greater extent.

   This can also help determine if there are a lot of rules and formalization coming from the top of the organization entailing a high degree of formalization. If the organization is highly decentralized then the degree of formalization is likely to be low.

3. **How is the organization driven? By rules, orders, or goals?**

   This will help give insight into the degree of formalization within the organization. It follows that organizations driven by direct orders or rules rather than general goals are formalized to a higher degree. The more formalized rules or orders would serve to directly specify the work which is to be done, as opposed to general goals guiding the progress in a less formalized nature.

4. **How are the rules, orders, or goals enforced?**

   If the rules, orders, or goals are heavily enforced it is likely that the organization has a more coercive type of formalization. On the opposite side of the scale, if the monitoring in place serves to help operatives, or activities themselves, and guide them rather than coerce them into acting in accordance it is likely that the type of formalization is more enabling in nature. This is likely to be seen in the follow-up and evaluation of projects etc. but could also be seen in the text in general.
5. **Is the division of labour or tasks strictly specified?**

An extremely specified allocation of tasks etc. could indicate that the organization is more coercive in nature. Where each division, body, or individual is supposed to stick to their own area and not take initiatives of their own. The division of labour itself does not need to be coercive in nature, it could be enabling if it allows for actors to take initiatives etc. in their area. Although a higher degree of formalization can be seen through a more clearly emphasised division of labour.

Through the use of these questions, the PCB meetings and accompanying documents will be analysed. It is important to note that these questions do overlap slightly but that is by no means a problem as they all aim to capture the degree and type of formalization. As previously mentioned, based on Norman’s ideas, this study is somewhat open in nature allowing for other unexpected finds to make their way into the study. However, these questions will help guide the analysis and give insight into the analyst’s starting point ahead of the analysis. By using quotations and clearly clarifying the analysis this process should be simple to follow, or even replicate if one wishes to do so. These are the questions to keep in mind in the upcoming analysis section when this study begins to shed light on how securitization efforts can influence non-traditional security issues.

5. **Analysis**

In an attempt to make the following analysis section as clear as possible it will be divided into the two parts previously mentioned. That is before and after the securitization efforts of 2000. This means that the pre-securitization efforts section will analyse 1998 and 1999, while the post-securitization efforts section will cover 2000-2005. Since the first meeting of the Program Coordinating Board in the new millennia was in the middle of 2000 and the Security Council meeting on HIV/AIDS took place in the beginning of the year there is no problem including the year 2000 in the post-securitization efforts section of this study. The pre-securitization efforts period will help set the tone so that it can be compared to the post-securitization efforts period in the discussion and conclusions section once the analysis has become clear. While the primary focus is on the fifth point of the security council resolution, concerning UNAIDS, the third point regarding peacekeeping personnel will be examined in
the post-securitization efforts section in order to shed further light on the outcomes of the securitization efforts.

5.1. Prior to the securitization efforts

Prior to the securitization efforts, the Program Coordinating Board was clear that UNAIDS advocacy efforts needed to be increased. In a PCB meeting in 1999 the protocol clearly stated that “the Board urged UNAIDS, the Cosponsors and other UN organizations to strengthen their advocacy in that regard and to press for greater involvement of sectors other than health.” (UNAIDS/PCB E 1999:8).

The push for greater involvement and a more engaged UN system in general was deemed necessary in order to make sure that it would be possible to tackle the significant challenge that HIV/AIDS posed. However, in 1999 UNAIDS simply lacked the necessary funds and support to deal with the situation at hand. Reports by the UNAIDS stated plainly that “there is no way to win this battle without adequate political, financial and technical resources” (UNAIDS/PCB A 1999:39).

Although UNAIDS lacked the resources which their governing body, the PCB, felt that they needed, the organization was of a substantial size already before the securitization efforts. Namely it was an organization with its own character or institutional mannerisms. Through the following analysis of the organisation it should be possible to look into the degree and type of formalization present in UNAIDS.

5.1.1. The nature of the missions in UNAIDS

With HIV/AIDS being widespread, the organisation focused upon projects related to a number of thematic priorities (UNAIDS/PCB C 1998:9). The use of the thematic priorities appears to have made the work somewhat free in nature so long as it fell within the purview of the outlined priorities. The priorities themselves were broad in nature e.g. young people, strengthening policy and programme interventions, and increased advocacy and support for the development of an HIV vaccine (UNAIDS/PCB C 1998:9). The use of thematic priorities across a broad spectrum of projects and programmes could differ considerably in regards to actor involvement and composition as well as when it comes to the nature of the missions.
The various parts of UNAIDS work would appear to have had varying degrees of routineness. For example, the UNAIDS secretariat which had a more strategic nature would deal with a wide variety of issues on a less tangible level than specific projects or monitoring activities and would therefore be less routine-like than other parts of the organization (UNAIDS/PCB D 1998:4). This was the case when it came to most parts of the organization. Due to the wide variety of missions and activities prevalent within the organization it is to a certain extent difficult to give an exact verdict on the routineness of the tasks. One could argue either way as the variety of the missions and the wide scope would indicate that the organization is quite adaptable to various situations and types of missions, while on the other hand one might argue that the use of thematic priorities may lock in the organization into a set of routines.

In the end, the general overview can only be that the organization was, despite being focused on a number of thematic areas, so mobile and flexible when it came to the implementation and fulfilment of those aims that the general level of routines within the organization was, as one might have expected, quite low. With the broadness of the thematic priorities and their adaptability in mind it seems that the level to which the work within UNAIDS was routine-like in nature is likely very low indeed. This would indicate that the degree of formalization within UNAIDS prior to the securitization efforts was quite low, however several areas yet remain before a final verdict can be cast.

5.1.2. Decentralization of UNAIDS

Turning to the issue of UNAIDS decentralization and how top driven the organization is, as was mentioned in the section above, the PCB put in place thematic priorities which guided the work. However, UNAIDS had no administrative mechanism at country level, which left them depending on the existing mechanisms of their co-sponsors, such as WHO, UNICEF etc. (UNAIDS/PCB A 1998:9).

The PCB clarified that at an early stage in the process of a project it is important to decide which of the co-sponsors will be the executing agency and thereby be overseeing the project. Despite this the so-called Theme Group, monitoring the thematic priorities, would be involved in the monitoring of the project (UNAIDS/PCB A 1998:9). This would give an
indication that the decentralization was rather low when it came to UNAID during this period prior to the securitization efforts.

Even with the thematic priorities in place and co-sponsors engaged on a country level, UNAIDS emphasised the importance of tailoring support in accordance with the specific needs and context of the countries (UNAIDS/PCB C 1999:6). Meaning that the specific programming of projects etc. was left to the country level actors. However already in 1999, the PCB was displeased with the slightly lacking level of decentralization as it was hoped that the co-sponsors would strengthen their capacities and leadership in the areas in which they had a comparative advantage in. They believed that by doing so the overall outcomes could be improved as the whole could become greater than the sum of its parts.

By allowing each actor to focus more on their strengths, the UNAIDS secretariat would increasingly be able to focus on its more catalytic and coordinating roles, in such areas as policy analysis, strategy development, advocacy, political and social mobilization, best practice documentation, technical resource development, and evaluation and monitoring (UNAIDS/PCB E 1999:7).

From this it would appear that despite the PCB wishing the organization to be more decentralized with more country level ownership prior to the securitization efforts it was not overly decentralized and quite a lot of guidance was coming from the centre or top of the organization. With responsibility of projects etc. being put on the co-sponsors on the country level there was still a lesser degree of formalization as these co-sponsors did not seem to be awash with rules coming from the PCB and UNAIDS. The rules or rather goals that were in place such as the thematic priorities were to be followed but due to their broad nature it seems likely that they were not coercive but rather more enabling in nature. In effect, allowing the co-sponsors to take charge of projects without being overburdened by the PCB.

5.1.3. Organizational drive

Even though this subject has been touched upon before through the mention of the thematic priorities prevalent within the organization there is still some insight to be gained by the analysis made. Although it is quite clear that the main objectives and the organizational drive
came primarily through goals rather than direct orders or rules the specifics can yet be unravelled further.

With resources, scarce in relation to the massive need in countries the PCB struggled slightly in optimising them. As stated by the PCB it is essential that “resources are utilized in such a way as to ensure maximum effect in achieving the Programme’s objectives” (UNAIDS/PCB A 1998:3). In order to do so it was deemed necessary that strategic decisions were made in regards to the type of activities to which UNAIDS allocated their resources, the level of such allocations, and the countries to which resources were allocated. Resources in this case referring to both UNAIDS staff and funds (UNAIDS/PCB A 1998:3). Without a certain level of prioritization, it would simply not have been possible to deal with all the issues at hand. Instead of spreading too thin and risking being ineffective, focus was put on a number of key issues that could be prioritized.

These strategic decisions came through a prioritization process which was in line with the thematic priorities that were set to work after. The objective of the prioritization process was to arrive at a broad categorization of countries which could guide the allocation of resources (UNAIDS/PCB C 1999:3). As was made clear by the PCB the prioritization process was supposed to be guided by needs-based and opportunity driven assessments (UNAIDS/PCB C 1999:1). Looking at where the need and the opportunity for impact was the greatest the prioritizations guided the level and location of resource allocation by dividing countries into the different categories of varying need and opportunity (UNAIDS/PCB C 1999:1). Doing so would allow the organization to identify where the scarce recourses could be best used and where they were needed the most.

Despite the categorization it was made clear that the model would be applied “with flexibility, and that the categorization of countries would be reviewed periodically to allow for re-classification as countries’ needs and capacities changed” (UNAIDS/PCB E 1999:17). This allowed for flexibility and reprioritization if the need occurred or if the opportunity arose. This added level of adaptability gave the organization a lesser degree of formalization than an organization driven heavily by rules.
5.1.4. Organizational enforcement

When it comes to the enforcement of the aforementioned goals and categorizations it is, as one might expect in an organization with so many projects performed to a large extent through the use of monitoring and evaluations. While there is no specific hard enforcement the monitoring and evaluations serve to make sure that the goals are accomplished. The monitoring was done through the use of a specific comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan (UNAIDS/PCB B 1998:8). A large portion of the reviewing was delegated to the so-called thematic groups which took charge of the evaluations. These groups were designed to give guidance and help the various projects in the areas which the monitoring showed were lacking.

The PCB emphasised that measures to improve the effectiveness of the thematic groups should be taken when necessary (UNAIDS/PCB D 1999:2). This due to the (in some cases) lacking level of monitoring prevalent within the organization. It also meant that the thematic groups themselves would be monitored by the UNAIDS secretariat and when necessary extra support would be given. This is a common trend when it comes to the enforcement with UNAIDS as the same would apply for projects when monitored, the intention was to make sure they were able to fulfil their intended purpose. Rather than being a slightly threatening process where projects were shut down if they did not follow the rules, the monitoring focused more on making sure that the projects reached their goals (UNAIDS/PCB D 1999:2).

The structure of evaluations and monitoring seems to have been slightly underdeveloped with a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan being a fairly newly implemented, and perhaps to a fault overly complicated, document within UNAIDS (UNAIDS/PCB B 1998:8). However, further emphasising their complexity and explaining their specific modus operandi would not serve to see their coercive or enabling nature any more than the explanation above, especially considering that many areas still seemed to lack monitoring by the thematic groups and the monitoring plan itself was not fully implemented (UNAIDS/PCB B 1998:8).

In short, the evaluation process cannot be considered overtly coercive, even with its somewhat complex nature. Rather the process seems to have enabled projects to fulfil their objectives in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The lack of monitoring and development of monitoring systems in some cases would indicate a seemingly low degree of formalization.
5.1.5. The division of labour within the organization

As mentioned in the previous section, the monitoring and evaluation was not yet fully in place which led to the PCB being unsure as to roles and responsibilities of all parties involved in monitoring and evaluation. The PCB emphasised that integrated work plans, with monitoring and evaluation components, at global, regional and country levels would be necessary in order to make the monitoring efforts sufficient (UNAIDS/PCB E 1998:7). The idea being that each actor or part of the organization would be able to bring with them their competencies in order to make the end result greater than the sum of its parts. This thinking seems to have been prevalent in much of the reasoning when it came to the division of labour within the organization.

When it came to UNAIDS and its secretariat, their work was clearly aimed at supporting UN staff in countries working in the area of HIV/AIDS by providing better guidance and technical support, as well as through appropriate and regular staff development activities (UNAIDS/PCB A 1999:15). Here the division of labour is quite clear in theory although the PCB wished that the secretariat could increase its supporting role. Even if the division was clear on paper the secretariat found themselves having to deal with tasks outside their core missions, such as being involved in projects themselves.

In regards to a strategic document on a programme in place in large parts of Africa, the PCB emphasised that “better coordination among partners, building on the comparative advantages of the actors in the partnership, is required. (UNAIDS/PCB B 1999:4). The idea being that the co-sponsor, or actor with a comparative advantage within a certain area should take charge of that area or activity. However, this was not done entirely without the countries in question. According to the PCB, African governments would need to play a full part, mobilizing all possible support within their own countries. This country level ownership was deemed to be somewhat lacking and greater efforts were considered necessary in order to strengthen the projects (UNAIDS/PCB E 1999:14). It would seem that although the division of labour was quite clear and to a certain extent strict the division was quite enabling in nature, encouraging actors to take charge of areas within their comparative strengths. This leads one to believe that the degree of formalization was higher when it came to the division of labour although with an enabling type of formalization.
5.1.6. Prior to the securitization efforts in summary

Summing up the UNAIDS organization prior to the securitization, a fairly clear picture presents itself. When it came to the nature of the missions the degree of formalization was quite low, the decentralization led one to believe that the degree of formalization was low with an enabling type of formalization, the organization drive came mostly from goals implying that a low degree of formalization was present, the enforcement of those goals was deemed mostly enabling in nature, and finally the division of labour did indicate that the degree of formalization was higher but with an enabling type.

Now these are not iron clad categorizations but do give a helpful insight. Recalling figure 1 from page 19 concerning the typology of organizations it would be fair to say that UNAIDS prior to the securitization efforts would fall somewhere between an organic organization and an enabling bureaucracy. Although UNAIDS leaned more towards being an organic organization at this point due to the lack of formalization in certain areas, the quite high degree of formalization present in the division of labour drives it slightly towards being an enabling bureaucracy. Balancing on the edge but leaning towards being an organic organization would be a fair assessment of the organization prior to the securitization efforts. Placing UNAIDS in the matrix from page 19 their position could be approximately as visible in the figure (2) below:

*Figure 2. Prior to the securitization efforts*
This will be important to bear in mind ahead of the conclusion section, however first this study turns to the period after the securitization efforts.

5.2. After the securitization efforts

As mentioned before the situation in the late 1990s was critical in regards to HIV/AIDS. This led to UNAIDS in early 2000 arguing that “the need to mount an extraordinary response is thus overwhelming. Current national AIDS activities in Africa must be expanded dramatically to make an impact on the epidemic” (UNAIDS/PCB A 2000:3). Through the securitization of an issue extraordinary measures can be mounted, and in the case of HIV/AIDS they seem to have been mounted following the securitization efforts in early 2000.

But before turning to the analysis of the developments in UNAIDS after the securitization efforts, the analysis has uncovered the outcomes of the Security Council’s third point in resolution 1308, which related to peacekeeping personnel and their training. It is to these outcomes we now briefly turn.

According to a report made by the executive director for the PCB the UNAIDS Secretariat established an initiative on HIV/AIDS and Security, strengthening coordination and partnerships to advance HIV/AIDS as a security issue (UNAIDS/PCB A 2001:30). Through this UNAIDS was able to create the UNAIDS Office of AIDS, Security and Humanitarian Response (SHR), which developed an extensive programmatic partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other UN stakeholders for effectively integrating HIV/AIDS education activities into all UN peacekeeping operations (UNAIDS/PCB C 2005:4). By 2005 a series of tools developed by SHR had successfully integrated HIV and AIDS prevention and care into all UN peacekeeping operations. Together with UNAIDS, the DPKO developed a standardized generic training module on HIV and AIDS. (UNAIDS/PCB C 2005:11).

As is quite evident the securitization efforts clearly led to action in regards to the third point where all peacekeeping personnel received HIV/AIDS education as a mainstreamed part of their training. This extraordinary response triggered by the securitization efforts can easily be chalked up as an extremely positive outcome, speaking in favour for the use of securitization
as a tool for enabling strong and effective responses. However, how the securitization efforts have affected the more complex organisation of UNAIDS remains to be seen in this section. Perhaps securitization efforts are only successful if they are concise with a clear goal, such as the training of peacekeeping personnel. When looking into the period of time following the “quantum leap in the scope and scale of national and international responses to HIV/AIDS” which took place around 2000 the answer to how securitization efforts can affect the work within a non-traditional security issue, in this case in UNAIDS can be found (UNAIDS/PCB A 2001:1).

5.2.1. The nature of the missions in UNAIDS

The nature of missions in UNAIDS after the securitization efforts took place have to a large extent been contingent on being able to scale up projects with the available funds. The PCB held that scaling up pilot projects that proved effective and developing them into national programmes was a priority (UNAIDS/PCB D 2000:6). However, pilot projects were still deemed necessary in areas where country-level activities were only just beginning. These pilot projects could take different shapes and forms based upon strategies tailored to the facts on the ground, meaning that although the process of scaling up was in place the organization appears to have remained adaptable to new situations (UNAIDS/PCB C 2000:14). The goal would appear to be to scale-up from the bottom-up based upon the facts on the ground and the best practices gathered.

Alongside these efforts the PCB urged national governments to bring HIV/AIDS on as a cross-cutting thematic issue that should be incorporated in socio-economical plans (UNAIDS/PCB D 2002:3). Through this UNAIDS was able to work from the bottom-up through the projects scaling up and from the top-down in cooperation with national governments and other international actors.

In general, UNAIDS seems to have developed more cooperating partners both within the public and private sector, which forced UNAIDS to enhance their efforts to plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate the scaling up of various projects (UNAIDS/PCB A 2004:4). Taking on the role of being more guiding, the routineness of UNAIDS operations might have increased, this as the emphasis shifted further to scaling and harmonizing efforts. However, even with the scaling up being a priority, the necessity of new pilot projects within a broad spectrum of
areas and locations would lead one to believe that the work of UNAIDS was still multifaceted in many ways.

With more resources available and a broader political interest, new partners and cooperating actors became involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS, leading to a broader scope of projects. Even with this development, UNAIDS itself was growing in size allowing it to facilitate support for the projects and give assistance if deemed necessary. By the sheer diversity the work would not appear to be routine-like, however with the focus on more of a specific role for UNAIDS one could easily argue that the work after the securitization efforts was far more routine-like in nature than prior to them. This would indicate that there is a higher degree of formalization present than prior to the securitization efforts. Although, it would be an exaggeration to state that the degree of formalization seems to have become considerably higher than before, rather it is a slight increase due to the growth of UNAIDS and the role played by the organization.

5.2.2. Decentralization of UNAIDS

The decentralization that was already a strong feature of UNAIDS pre-2000 seems to have continued to take hold after the securitization efforts took place. The PCB clearly stated that “it is at the community level that the outcome of the battle against AIDS will be decided” (UNAIDS/PCB C 2000:8). Therefore, it followed that the PCB strongly urged an increase in efforts when it came to increasing local capacity. A key in the development on a local level was a higher degree of ownership and cooperation with the nation states, and with the people or groups within them. An illuminating quote on the importance of the securitization efforts resulting in this increased cooperation is as follows:

“The prominence of HIV/AIDS in sub regional, regional and global political forums – including the United Nations Security Council – has contributed enormously to strengthening political commitment and solidarity among national leaders. With improved communication and political solidarity, common ground is increasingly replacing the ideological divides that often hampered earlier efforts” (UNAIDS/PCB C 2000:8).

With a greater cooperation, it was possible to achieve a larger degree of local ownership. In the case of an action plan presented concerning Africa the major guiding principles were
African ownership and leadership at all levels, including country and community priorities to drive the action, with implementation plans based on local priorities and contexts (UNAIDS/PCB A 2000:4). This was thought to allow for more effective projects as the facts on the ground could be accounted for to a greater extent than previously.

As mentioned in section 5.2.1. above, UNAIDS itself moved more towards a supporting role, aiming to increase support to government, civil society, community-based organizations, the private sector, and international actors. The goal was to include support for approaches intended to increase participation, improve connectedness of efforts, and strengthen the various actors’ capacity for action (UNAIDS/PCB D 2002:4). In order to facilitate this support, UNAIDS increased its presence at country level in terms of staff. (UNAIDS/PCB C 2002:8). These staff consisted in part of country programme managers tasked with the job of facilitating the aforementioned assistance and guidance.

A clear example of the trend of decentralization can be found in the World AIDS Campaign project. In 2004 the campaign transitioned from a UNAIDS-led to a civil-society-led project. During 2004, UNAIDS continued to support the campaign financially and technically while the campaign’s governance was transferred to a group of civil society representatives (UNAIDS/PCB B 2004:4). This decentralization was in line with the UNAIDS ambition of moving towards a more supportive role.

Despite this progress, a number of issues remained when it came to the growing UNAIDS and the decentralization, which perhaps took place at too rapid a rate. The coordination between the country-level actors was deemed insufficient as the growing number of actors involved led to a less coordinated approach (UNAIDS/PCB A 2005:8).

In summary, the decentralization appears to have increased to a certain degree, although perhaps too fast as coordination issues seem to have come about. The type of formalization can be considered enabling as actors appear quite free to work within the purviews of the principles prevalent within UNAIDS. The degree of formalization seems to have lessened slightly with actors on a local level being able to take charge. However, the push for decentralization has come from the top of the organization indicating a slightly higher degree of formalization. All in all, the formalization has increased in some senses and decreased in
others, depending on how one views the situation. Therefore, the degree of formalization can be chalked up as more or less unchanged if not slightly decreased.

5.2.3. Organizational drive

In an effort to deal with the coordination issues mentioned in the aforementioned section, the PCB requested that the secretariat developed a UN System Strategic Plan and a Global Strategy Framework in broad consultation with UN system and other partners (UNAIDS/PCB B 2000:8). The strategic plan was guided by the thematic priorities or objectives which had been an important part of the organizational drive since before the securitization efforts took place (UNAIDS B 2001:24). The strategic plan was an extensive document to which all parts of UNAIDS and their co-sponsors needed to adhere. These new plans resulted in considerable change in the yearly budgets and work plans of UNAIDS.

While the first budgets and work plans for UNAIDS, 1996-1997 and 1998-1999, were primarily concerned with the activities implemented by the UNAIDS secretariat, the new so-called Unified Budget and Work plans (UBW) covered a wider area. The UBWs covered UNAIDS separate secretariat activities, the co-sponsors own activities, and joint activities in the same work plan and budget (UNAIDS/PCB B 2002:2). The aim of these plans was to increase cooperation and avoid unnecessarily overlapping activities. Through the UBWs the wide-spanning UNAIDS-cosponsor operations could be guided more effectively. The UBWs themselves seem to have developed into becoming more and more focused over time as the thrust of the 2004-2005 UBW was on implementing the decisions of the PCB, which stressed the importance of scaling up the response to HIV/AIDS at country level (UNAIDS/PCB A 2003:1).

Even the goals themselves seem to have become slightly stricter and less up to interpretation, e.g. “improve the scope and quality of UN support to national partners”, even if they still left room for the actors involved to go about accomplishing this in the way they deemed to be most effective (UNAIDS/PCB B 2005:10). This flexibility would imply a lesser degree of formalization or if one compares with the pre-securitization efforts period an unchanged degree of formalization. However, the substantial amount of new goals and aims brought to the table after the securitization efforts seems to beg to differ.
The organizational drive seems to have come through slightly more specific goals and the number of guiding documents definitively increased. With the organization growing it was simply deemed vital to ensure that the coordination worked efficiently. Considering that priority and the weight of the documents that it resulted in, it is safe to state that the degree of formalization increased in regards to the organizational drive of UNAIDS.

5.2.4. Organizational enforcement

As was the case in the years prior to the securitization efforts the enforcement of existing rules and follow up of priorities was done primarily through monitoring the development and, if necessary, taking action based upon the results of the monitoring activities. However, the monitoring was far more developed than in the previous years.

The UN System Strategic Plan mentioned in the section above, 5.2.3., was designed to include a monitoring and evaluation component to track progress and ensure accountability. The inclusion of this component was highly recommended by the PCB (UNAIDS/PCB D 2000:5). The monitoring would then give feedback so that decisions could be made on which activities could or should be scaled up. In theory, this would also give ample feedback when it came to UNAIDS’ gathering of best practices.

At the national programme level, indicators were identified in order to monitor progress in nine different areas. For example, HIV policies and programmes in the workplace; life-skills based HIV/AIDS education; and adoption of safer behaviours among injecting drug users, were a few of the areas monitored. UNAIDS did however recognise that while the indicators might not be equally relevant to all countries, they were deemed applicable in countries with generalized epidemics. In countries where epidemics were more concentrated or low in prevalence a decision could be made to select or create applicable country specific indicators (UNAIDS/PCB A 2002:5).

Despite the monitoring from UNAIDS, individual co-sponsors would implement their own monitoring and evaluation resulting in the now familiar problem of lacking coordination between the involved actors. The PCB specifically noted the need to harmonize and strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems. This due to “the multiplicity of monitoring and
evaluation indicators and systems … contributing to fragmentation and hindering efforts to obtain a clear picture of the epidemic” (UNAIDS/PCB D 2005:21).

Through the increase in monitoring it would appear that the degree of formalization increased on par with the development and implementation of indicators etc. Even with the substantial increase in monitoring, the monitoring process itself can still not truly be considered coercive in nature, the objective remained to help improve activities rather than to force them into a box. That being said, the mere fact that more specific indicators were in place may have led to a narrowing in the type of endeavours which were undertaken. All in all, an increase in the degree of formalization is clear, and a minor shift towards a slightly more coercive type of formalization seems to have occurred.

5.2.5. The division of labour within the organization

As touched upon before a structural realignment embarked upon within the Secretariat aimed to allow UNAIDS to focus on its core roles of supporting expanded country activity, fulfilling its policy and political functions, and generating strategic information (UNAIDS/PCB D 2000:5). The realignment was ultimately deemed necessary in order to make sure that UNAIDS could devote their full attention to the more strategic role they developed over time.

With the role of UNAIDS itself becoming more cemented the division of labour between other actors was clarified as well. In a plan aimed at following up on the Security Council Resolution 1208 adopted in July 2000 more specific objectives, including financial targets, targets on care and access to treatment, and goals related to the social and economic policies that countries and the international community are expected to attain were implemented (UNAIDS/PCB D 2000:18). Following the Security Council resolution, having a clear division of labour not only for the UNAIDS secretariat themselves but also for cosponsors and even states was deemed a key factor in achieving the goals at hand.

With the number of participating organizations increasing, the division of labour was important to include in the aforementioned UN System Strategic Plan, through this each organization received a clear mandate which was based upon their area of expertise (UNAIDS/PCB C 2001:1). The clearer division was also supposed to help when it came to the coordination issues which arose due to quickly scaling up activities. However, it would seem
that the division of labour, although stricter, was not overly specific in many cases. The PCB itself made clear that “it is vital that the individual cosponsors in each country focus on their value-added contribution and comparative advantage”, thereby leaving some leeway when it came to the specifics of each cosponsors tasks (UNAIDS/PCB A 2004:4).

In 2003 UNAIDS developed a partnership agreement with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The partnership was a welcome cooperation which could lead to positive results and greater cooperation within the fight against HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS/PCB B 2003:1). The PCB was clear that this partnership, as well as other new cooperation efforts, would entail further harmonizing and coordinating through “a clear division of responsibilities between the UNAIDS Secretariat and Cosponsors, as well as by coordinating its efforts with national and global stakeholders” (UNAIDS/PCB E 2005:4).

It has become evident through the analysis that the division of labour has increased substantially, although in some cases it is not as much as the PCB might have wanted. The increasing number of cooperating organizations and involved actors led to the stricter division of labour being necessary. However, the division was still not overly specific in nature and can thus not be seen as particularly coercive in nature, albeit slightly more coercive than before the securitization efforts. The increased division of labour does however indicate that an increase in the degree of formalization has occurred.

5.2.6. After the securitization efforts in summary

The development within UNAIDS has been substantial and the executive director of UNAIDS describing it as a “quantum leap” is certainly no exaggeration (UNAIDS/PCB A 2001:1). The rapid development left UNAIDS struggling in certain aspects but despite this the overall picture is quite clear. The way in which to deal with the growth and increased efforts brought about by the higher level of focus on HIV/AIDS appears to have been to formalize to a greater degree.

When it came to the nature of the missions, the degree of formalization was deemed slightly higher than before, the decentralization led one to believe that the degree of formalization was still low with an enabling type of formalization. The organization drive seemed to have increased from the top due to the growth etc. resulting in a higher degree of formalization. The enforcement seems to have increased slightly leading to a higher degree of formalization.
and a slightly more coercive type of formalization, and finally the division of labour clearly indicated that an increase in the degree of formalization was higher but with an enabling type.

Bearing in mind that the categorizations are not cast in stone but do bring a helpful insight UNAIDS can, after the securitization efforts, be considered more as an enabling bureaucracy. While the coercive type of formalization has increased it cannot be said that it has increased so much as to force UNAIDS into being a coercive type of organization as the actors within are still able to act in a flexible manner. However, it is clear that the degree of formalization has increased considerably after the securitization efforts. With this increase in formalization, the organization has become an enabling bureaucracy.

Building on the matrix, from figure 1 on page 19 and figure 2 on page 31, the placement of UNAIDS before and after the securitization efforts can now be visualised on the same figure (3) for the sake of clarity:

*Figure 3. Before and after the securitization efforts*
As is evident from the matrix, based upon the analysis, UNAIDS had become an enabling bureaucracy with a slightly more coercive nature than prior to the securitization efforts.

6. Discussion and conclusions

There are a number of interesting points that the analysis has brought to light which are worth discussing and considering further. Beginning with the rather clear-cut outcome of the Security Council’s third point in resolution 1308 concerning peacekeeping personnel. The goal to implement and mainstream HIV/AIDS training in the peacekeepers’ training was clearly accomplished as the training now constitutes a part of all missions and training. In this case it is clear that the securitization efforts led to a positive development for the field. However, it does make one wonder whether using securitization efforts as a policy tool to reach results is not better in these specified cases where there is less room for disaggregation. In other words, if securitization efforts are more suited to straightforward goals and targets rather than raising the level of a field in general.

The financial gains brought to the field after the increase attention HIV/AIDS received are undeniable. However, the difficult part to consider is whether the securitization efforts might have led to complicating the field. As researchers such as Marcella David have argued the securitization efforts might bring an unhelpful layer of bureaucracy (David 2001:563). In order to look at this a plunge into the waters of bureaucratic theory was necessary. This led to the theories of formalization in organizations which have followed through, and guided, the rest of the study. Through the use of bureaucratic theory this study has been able to uncover the type and degree of formalization prevalent within UNAIDS before and after the securitization efforts.

The analysis of the period before the securitization efforts led to UNAIDS being categorised as an organic organization leaning slightly towards becoming an enabling bureaucracy. An organic organization is characterised by its relatively low degree of formalization and enabling type of formalization. This allows the organization to be flexible and adaptable to new situations at hand. It also entails that the organization is less hierarchical than an enabling bureaucracy. However, the lack of hierarchy and overtly clear guidance can make the outcomes somewhat unpredictable. The major weakness of such an organization would be that they are likely to have issues when it comes to coordination of efforts and dealing with
increased scope or growth in general. As we could later see, UNAIDS struggled with these issues shortly after the securitization efforts and the organization’s growth.

The analysis of the period after the securitization efforts led to UNAIDS being categorized as an enabling bureaucracy. While losing some of its adaptability an enabling bureaucracy has its strengths in generating more predictable results and clear guidance while still allowing for some flexibility due to its enabling nature. Through the clearer guidance of the organization the risk of disaggregation is also likely to be diminished.

With both before and after viewed together as in figure 3, on page 40, it is important to bear in mind that the positions are relative to each other. This means that UNAIDS can be considered an enabling bureaucracy compared to what it was before and as an organic organization in comparison with what it became after the securitization efforts. If one was to compare with another organization UNAIDS might not be as enabling or formalized, however the point of the analysis has been to see the development of UNAIDS itself before and after the securitization efforts. Therefore, since the contrasts are clearer and relative to each other they can be placed on the matrix as visualised in figure 3 and explained as above.

Through the analysis it has become clear that an increase in formalization has occurred. The securitization efforts seem to have added a layer of bureaucracy to the organization. However, it is not certain that the layer of bureaucracy has been unhelpful in nature. Rather the development could be seen as a natural development when so many more staff and collaborators become involved in the organization. While more bureaucracy has certainly been added it is most definitely possible to argue that the bureaucracy has had a positive effect on the organization by allowing its structures to work.

The analysis has shown that while the increased attention and resources left the field somewhat fragmented with activities and actors overlapping, the bureaucracy of UNAIDS has served to diminish the overlap and increase cooperation. This can surely not be considered unhelpful bureaucracy as its enabling nature has still allowed for specialised responses to the situations on the ground. While remaining engaged on nearer to ground level and remaining sensitive to local specifics, e.g. in the formulation of goals etc., UNAIDS has managed to make the bureaucracy work for their purposes as opposed to hindering them from reaching their goals.
While scholars’ fears that a field affected by securitization efforts would become disaggregated seem to have come true in the case of UNAIDS, it is the increased bureaucracy that has served to deal with the problem of disaggregation. Certain scholars’ fear of entanglement and disputes over the course of action such as that of David, Elbe and Voelkner seem to have, also, been solved through the enabling bureaucracy of UNAIDS. Therefore, the conclusion based upon the analysis of UNAIDS is that while adding funds and attention led to certain issues such as a lack of coordination, the securitization efforts followed by a layer of bureaucracy have helped UNAIDS to remain effective and grow further.

This would imply that securitization could prove a useful policy tool not just for straightforward goals, such as increasing training, but also for more complex issues. Using securitization as a practical policy tool in order to advance an issue at hand could well be a way forward with issues lacking sufficient attention and/or funding, such as the environment or other similar issues.

However, it is important not to take the results of this study, based on the fight against HIV/AIDS, too far. More work needs to be done when it comes to following up on the outcomes and practical implications of securitization efforts. This study alone can obviously not provide a full answer as to how securitization efforts affect all fields. With that in mind what this study can do is to deepen the body of knowledge slightly in this still relatively uncharted territory of securitization efforts and their possible outcomes.

6.1. Future research

There are exciting times ahead for the field of securitization and much remains to be uncovered and researched thoroughly in order to amass a body of research concerning securitization as a conscious policy tool. Studies similar to this one would be interesting to carry out in other areas within health or epidemics, e.g. the fairly recent Ebola outbreak and the response to it could soon be studied. This especially considering that more time may be needed for a threat to be dealt with and for an organization to adapt to the increased attention and funding that follows. Even if UNAIDS was adaptable, this was over a 5-year period. A study into a shorter spanning outbreak or epidemic may be truly enlightening.
These studies could serve to further explore the effects of securitization efforts and how it might be used as a policy tool. However, areas such as migration or environment, especially with the seemingly increasing frequency of natural disasters, would be interesting to look into from a securitization perspective.

In regards to migration it would be interesting as the securitization of migration, by linking it to terrorism, seems to already have occurred to a certain extent. In the case of migration, securitization may well be more problematic than in this study due to migration, in some ways, being even more complex than the fight against HIV/AIDS. Meaning that securitizing migration could lead to human rights related issues regarding migrants. It is likely that it is more controversial to hold migration, and thereby to a certain extent migrants, as a security threat in comparison with arguing that a disease or epidemic is a threat.

There is also more that could be done within the area of HIV/AIDS and securitization, for example a look into the causality concerning the case which I have presented may be possible based upon the findings presented here. Perhaps in comparison with another area one could draw conclusions regarding the differences when it comes to the potential securitization. This would have been interesting to include in this study but due to the scope of this study, the causality of the case has not been the main focus.

As complicated and at times mind-boggling the field of securitization may be, there is nevertheless a clear value in the pursuit of its workings both from a practical and theoretical perspective. Using securitization as a policy tool may well be the solution to dealing with under prioritized issues. While more research into the effects of securitization are needed, this study makes a contribution to the field using a non-theoretical example, and by so doing, I believe, has accomplished its main goal.
References

Theoretical Literature


