People's Republic of China’s Performance in the UNFCCC

- A Comparison of China's Position at COP15 Copenhagen to COP22 Marrakech

Lovisa Sommerholt

Subject: Political Science
Level: C
Credits: 15 ECTS
Ventilated: HT2017
Supervisor: Charles Parker
Department of Government, Uppsala University

Word Count: 13 575, 40 pages
ABSTRACT

Since the US election in the fall of 2016, China have been looked towards to fill a leadership position in climate change negotiations. This essay focuses on determining China's efficiency in the COP15 and COP22 negotiations in establishing its ambitions and policy objectives. The results show that China was very effective in achieving their policy aims both at COP15 and COP22 even if the negotiations had different aims. The overall performance of China has affected the COP outcomes and helped its establishment of a leadership role within the group of developing countries in the UNFCCC. This essay also shows that the prior expectation for a UNFCCC climate negotiation might be a better explanatory factor than institutional goal in determining policy objectives in effectiveness studies.

KEYWORDS

China, UNFCCC, Climate Negotiations, COP15 Copenhagen, COP22 Marrakech, Effectiveness Dimension.

ABBREVIATIONS

Conference of the Parties (COP), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol (KP), Members of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP), Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), Climate Action Tracker (CAT), China’s Five Year Plan (FYP), Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), Greenhouse Gas emissions (GHG), Group of countries including: Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV), Group of developing countries (G77), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) or Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), Least Developed Countries (LDC), Group of Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC).
Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 4
   1.1 Purpose of Study .................................................................................................................. 5
   1.2 Research Question ............................................................................................................ 6
   1.3 Case Selection ................................................................................................................... 6
   1.4 Essay Outline .................................................................................................................... 7
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ............................................................................................................. 7
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................. 9
   3.1 Chosen Method ...................................................................................................................... 9
   3.2 Applicability of Framework ............................................................................................... 12
4. MATERIAL .................................................................................................................................. 14
5. ANALYSIS OF COP15 COPENHAGEN ................................................................................. 15
   5.1 Quality of China’s Policy Objectives .................................................................................. 16
      5.1.1 In Relation to UNFCCC’s Aim .................................................................................... 16
      5.1.2 In Relation to other Groups and Nation-States .......................................................... 17
   5.2 China’s Extent and Type of Engagement ......................................................................... 19
      5.2.1 China’s Fit of Engagement ....................................................................................... 21
   5.3 China’s Level of Goal Achievement ............................................................................... 23
6. ANALYSIS OF COP22 MARRAKECH ................................................................................... 24
   6.1 Quality of China’s Policy Objectives .................................................................................. 25
      6.1.1 In Relation to Other Groups and Countries ............................................................... 25
   6.2 China’s Extent and Type of Engagement ........................................................................ 28
      6.2.1 China’s Fit of Engagement ....................................................................................... 29
   6.3 China’s Level of Goal Achievement ............................................................................... 30
7. DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................................ 31
8. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 33
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 34
1. INTRODUCTION

The perception of China’s climate contributions in the international setting of UNFCCC has changed over time. After the COP15 Copenhagen meeting Nicolas Sarkozy and Ed Miliband stated that China was to blame for the COP15 result\(^1\). China was also blamed by some media for obstructing the negotiation. For example; in the Guardian `How Do I Know China Wrecked Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the Room`\(^2\), in the Time Magazine `Frustration Mounts in Copenhagen As Talks Stall` which describes the slow progress at the COP15 and the disagreements between US and China\(^3\) and in Der Spiegel `How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit` which castigates China for the failed negotiation\(^4\). According to Zhongxiang Zhang `China’s Role in Climate Change Negotiations- Perspectives for COP21` this critique hurt the Chinese international reputation to such a degree that China would hence take pains to live up to the international community’s ideals\(^5\).

During the COP22 Marrakech China’s contribution to the international community and negotiations are more positively referred to. At UN’s webpage `Marrakech: Deepening South-South Cooperation Driving Climate Action among Developing Countries`, China is described as a leader in the South-South cooperation, in advancing funds and contributing to sustainable development in developing countries\(^6\). The Economist `Is China Challenging the United States for Global Leadership` writes that `China was one of the main obstacles to a global climate agreement 2008, but now its words are the lingua franca of climate-related diplomacy.`\(^7\) Another example is The New York Times `China and India Make Big Strides on Climate Change` focusing on the better climate friendly reputation of China and India than the US\(^8\). Also, the Guardian published `China Emerges as Global Leader in Wake of Trumps Triumph`\(^9\).

---

\(^3\) Walsh, Bryan. `Frustration Mounts in Copenhagen As Talks Stall`. The Time Magazine.
\(^4\) Rapp, Tobias, and Christian Schwägerl, and Gerald Traufetter. `How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit`. Der Spiegel.
\(^6\) United Nations. `Marrakech: Deepening South-South Cooperation Driving Climate Action among Developing Countries`.
\(^7\) The Economist. `Is China Challenging the United States for Global Leadership`.
\(^8\) The New York Times. `China and India Make Big Strides on Climate change`.
where China’s policy objectives according to the article de facto have changed, mainly driven by domestic factors. The rhetoric used in these articles suggest that China takes Climate Change seriously and contributes to the negotiation processes. According to these media examples, China seems to have changed their policies in the international debate on climate.

In literature however, it is not obvious that China has changed its international policies and if so why. ‘The Critical Decade: Global Action Building on Climate Change’ from the Climate Commission finds that China has made much effort in reducing its emissions growth and the carbon intensity of its economy. But the efforts mentioned in the report are mostly made domestically. There is also literature that suggests that China has made relatively few modifications in their policy objectives, this during a change from a non-Annex I country in the Kyoto Protocol (KP) to China’s possibly leadership position today. Björn Conrad claims in ‘China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the “Beijing Climate Revolution” and the “Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy”’ that the Chinese stance remains the exact same compared to previous decades. Moreover, Conrad argues that the domestic and international stances on climate change are completely disconnected. Then how important are policy objectives in positioning in the UNFCCC? A leadership position is in general legitimized by a widely recognized changed policy. If there is no such perceived policy change then what has changed in the UNFCCC negotiations? Understanding China’s position in the UNFCCC over time should help an understanding on this issue.

1.1 Purpose of Study

Analyzing China’s position encompasses more therefore than just policy objectives. It is also necessary to take into account the more complex dynamics of the negotiation processes. Therefore, this paper aims to look at the overall performance of China. In order to critically assess China’s performance in the UNFCCC negotiations, this paper will use the effectiveness dimension as presented by Sebastian Oberthür and Lisanne Groen. The effectiveness

---

9 The Guardian. ‘China Emerges as Global Climate Leader in Wake of Trump's Triumph’. 
10 ‘The Critical Decade: Global Action Building on Climate Change’ from the Climate Commission, 2013
dimension maps the different steps in a negotiation process by determining the actual ambition and ultimately level of effectiveness. But it also takes into account the relative positioning to other nation-states. It is a more all-encompassing approach suitable to map China's position in a broader scope and over time.

1.2 Research Question

The theory of the Effectiveness dimension developed by Oberthür and Groen can be found in their article 'The Effectiveness Dimension of the EU’s Performance in International Institutions: Toward a More Comprehensive Assessment Framework' used over different international institutions. The focus in this paper will be on the UNFCCC as the single institution; and use two different negotiations in time. China’s performance will be looked at in the COP15 and COP22, where the perception of China has changed. Oberthür and Groen points out that before their theory development on the effectiveness of an actor in international negotiations the focus was simply if a policy objective was being met or not. This simplification of international negotiations disregards the engagement itself in the process. According to Oberthür and Groen there should instead be an assessment framework based on input, process and outcome where the aspects of international institutions and negotiations are part of the assessment. The research question is therefore; How effective has China been in the COP15 and COP22 negotiations?

1.3 Case Selection

The COP15 Copenhagen is renowned for its outcome resulting in the Copenhagen Accord. There was a general expectation on China that their leadership in renewable energy would lead to them step up in the UNFCCC negotiation. The blaming of the COP15 on China makes this conference a natural choice for a comparative study on expected change in China's policy objectives and positioning. The most recent COP, at the time of writing, is the COP22. International media reported already at the COP21 Paris that China together with the US was the reason for its successful outcome, the Paris Agreement. The reason for choosing COP22 Marrakech is to capture China's positioning over as long time-period as possible and where the positioning is as recent as possible in order to draw more valid conclusions. In Oberthür and Groen's method one of the aspects to analyze is the current international context of the

---

13 Ibid. pp. 1320
14 Ibid.
negotiation taking place. It helps to draw still valid conclusions if the international context is as recent as possible. In between COP21 and COP22 there were already changes in the international political setting, best exemplified by the US-election, where the President elect Donald Trump was reportedly against the Paris Agreement. If China strengthened a possible leadership position at COP21 this would logically only have matured at the COP22.

1.4 Essay Outline

This essay will start by discussing previous research on effectiveness in international negotiations and the purpose with such studies. The theoretical framework is the section where the method that is used is discussed and criticized as well as somewhat amended to suit the case of China. After this follows the analysis of the COP15 and the COP22 which are divided into three sections for each conference according to the chosen method on effectiveness for this paper. This is followed by a discussion of the results and what conclusions could be drawn. This is followed by a conclusion.

2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Studies on effectiveness is divided into different study focus. In a broader sense regime effectiveness is related to public policy evaluation16. In international relations on the environment, it has been used focusing on international environmental regimes or the EU as an actor in negotiations within international environmental regimes. These are the two most common fields of effectiveness studies. In `Global Warming and China's Environmental Policy’, 2008, Yu Hongyuan describes China’s environmental policy and international policy prior to the COP15. When effectiveness is mentioned in this book it is centered on the effectiveness of the UNFCCC17. There is a gap in previous research on investigating nation-states as the studied actor.

According to Steinar Andresen’s ‘The Role of International Courts and Tribunals in Global Environmental Governance’ the effectiveness studies commenced in the 1990’s after some maturation of international environmental regimes when it became necessary to study their actual positive effects.18 Carsten Helm’s and Detlef Sprinz’s ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of

---

International Environmental Regimes similarly brings up the question of how, in the research of international regimes at that time, their existence actually mattered. The focus in Andresen (2016), Helm and Sprinz (2000) is on the environmental regime. The actor is not the EU but the international institution itself, which is a typical direction of effectiveness studies concerning and deals with the legal/political structure of the institutions. Instead, this study will focus on the process of the international negotiations following many studies on effectiveness of the EU. In this essay, the actor is not an environmental regime or the EU but will apply the logic of political entities to include nation-states or any group/actor at the negotiation table.

Sebastian Oberthür and Lisanne Groen’s `The Effectiveness Dimension of the EU’s Performance in International Institutions: Toward a More Comprehensive Assessment Framework´ deals with how to determine effectiveness in international negotiations. Their study focuses on EU as the actor. The framework that is developed is based on three aspects; 1) input, 2) process and 3) output. Louise van Schaik `EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations’, defines effectiveness for EU as the extent to which its main goals and position are reflected in the end result of the international negotiation. The study on effectiveness concerns the degree of goal attainment for an actor. This effectiveness can also be a dimension to understand leadership. In `The EU as a Global Leader? The Copenhagen and Cancún UN Climate Change Negotiations´, Lisanne Groen, Sebastian Oberthür and Arne Niemann study leadership and use the factors goal attainment and direction. Direction refers to setting a goal for a collective purpose. If an actor in an international negotiation attain their goal/aim this is enough for this actor to emerge a leader.

Both van Schaik (2013), Oberthüer and Groen (2016) focus on the process dimension of international negotiations. The goal attainment is controlled for in the stages of the process and in prior ambition for the negotiation. The process dimension both reveals how well an aim is followed through and help legitimize a goal attainment. Andresen uses a similar three-

---


21 Louise van Schaik, `EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations´, 2013. pp. 36

22 Lisanne Groen, Arne Niemann, Sebastian Oberthür `The EU as a Global Leader? The Copenhagen and Cancún UN Climate Negotiations´, Volume 8, Issue 2, 2012. pp.1
dimensional approach to Oberthüer and Groen when investigating the effectiveness in international negotiations from output, outcome and impact. Andresen claims that the simple dimension of goal attainment as an indicator of effectiveness is not enough because these two conditions are often not met, goal attainment is no longer used by most analysts. Oberthür and Groen similarly point out the difficulties with only a dichotomy goal attainment indicator. Adding Andresen’s three dimensions to Oberthür and Groen, the entire effectiveness chain of a nation-state’s climate action with an international perspective is then five-dimensional: input, process, output, outcome and impact. The question of outcome and impact has little to do with the actual negotiations and are therefore not included in this study.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Chosen Method

A three-dimensional approach was adopted by Oberthür and Groen to investigate goal achievement of EU policy objectives in international institutions. In previous research the EU ‘effectiveness’ only focused on the goal achievement being met or not. As different agendas and power constellations meet in international negotiations, a single focus on nationally determined international policy objectives is insufficient. Often the interaction explains the outcome better than the dichotomy of one party’s successful or failed national policy aim. Robert D. Putnam in ‘The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 1988, calls this engagement/interaction a two-level game where national policy objectives and international policy aims combine and create a separate and specific setting.

The three dimensions; input, process and outcome are defined as (1) quality of policy objectives, (2) engagement and (3) goal achievement. The quality of policy objectives evaluates a party’s position in relation to the institution’s overall aim and to other parties. This assessment becomes a measure on relative ambition. Investigating China’s policy objectives can in this way also provide a link to research that focuses on explaining progressive or ambitious international policies. In explaining the link between policy objectives and ambition.

---


Oberthür and Groen raise the issue that normative assessments `may be inevitable in an assessment of performance`\textsuperscript{26}. Helm and Sprinz (2000), argue that this relative comparison can lead to a misunderstanding of high effectiveness when in reality a nation-state only follows the minimum requirements set out in the institution’s overall aim\textsuperscript{27}.

The (2) engagement concerns the process itself. At a later stage, connecting engagement to the international level outcome makes it possible to employ a simple counterfactual analysis of the effect a party have had.\textsuperscript{28} This could help explain alternative factors or ascertain specific outcomes by exempting the independent variable (the party in question). Helm and Sprinz (2000) refer to this as the no–regime counterfactual. What would have been the result if China had not been part of this negotiation? Inherent in a close study of engagement is the issue of possibly over- determining a single party’s importance in a certain result. The risk of over–determining diminishes when accounting for engagement compared to previous research which Oberthür and Groen describe where policy objectives prior to the conference is the sole factor. The risk of over- determinacy would also logically be lower for a larger or more powerful actor in negotiations such as China. But since this dimension steps away from the so called `linear outcome performance´ there is the risk of over-determination inherent in the way this dimension is formulated. The spurious correlation of the party’s policy objectives and the international level outcome is such an example. The opposite with a low level of goal achievement but a high level of engagement is also possible. To limit the possibility of over-determination, the dimension of engagement is based on two separate variables that Oberthüer and Groen claim control for each other.\textsuperscript{29}

The first variable is to what extent and what kind of engagement the party has. This is determined by looking at participation in meetings, the making of proposals and submissions, as well as engaging in outreach to other parties. The second variable is how this engagement matches with the party’s position in the international constellation of interests and power. This

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid. pp. 1321  
concerns the type and strategic approach of engagement that should be considered. Different coalitions usually require some concessions or compromises. It becomes possible to identify issues within party constellations and facilitate the understanding of a party’s ambition.

Drawing from ‘bargaining theory’ Oberthüer and Groen use categorizations and distinguish between reformist and conservative positions. The positions range from 1) strong-conservative, 2) weak-conservative, 3) strong-reformist, 4) weak-reformist. Oberthür and Groen explains that reformist positions require a higher level of proactive engagement and therefore stand a lesser chance of success. This could argue for a theory in international negotiations where the international level outcome will always be the lowest common denominator. Conservative positions therefore stand a greater chance of success. It is according to this logic always easier not to change the status quo.

The third dimension is (3) goal achievement which refers to the reflected policy objectives of the party’s in the outcome (despite any actual influence). This goes back to the party already having established a successful or effective policy objective. To be able to attribute an achievement it becomes necessary to go back to the (2) engagement dimension. The focus in this broad analysis is to identify the party’s main policy objectives with respect to the major agenda items of the international negotiations in question. This can be found in official documents such as for example EU council conclusions or policy papers. This means that the analysis is of a broader kind mapping out objectives and aims throughout a negotiation. Oberthür and Groen also quantify the managed goal achievement in the categorization of low, medium or high.

---

30 Ibid. pp.1322 - 1323
31 Ibid. pp. 1324
32 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Assessment criterion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Policy Objectives</td>
<td>- Degree of alignment of the actor’s policy objectives with objectives of the international institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Degree to which the actor is more or less ambitious than other parties (reformist-conservative).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>- Extent and type of engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fit of actor’s engagement with its position in the international constellation of interests and power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal Achievement</td>
<td>- Degree to which actor’s objectives have been achieved in the international institution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Applicability of Framework

Oberthür and Groen’s Effectiveness dimension is focused on the field of EU studies. The method they propose is in their study used for EU in the context of international negotiations on the environment. The international negotiations that Oberthür and Groen look at in their study is the Nagoya Protocol and the International Climate Policy for the EU between 2007-11. Instead of an EU-focus this study intends to apply this method on China in UNFCCC negotiations. This leads to two possible implications in applying the effectiveness dimension in this study. A possible critique on the interchangeability of EU and China as well as deciding if the measurements Oberthür and Groen use are appropriate for normative categorization in the case of China.

The EU is in Oberthür and Groen a one–voiced actor. This is however, different from the literature on bargaining theory that Oberthür and Groen refers to; Sophie Meunier, ’Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations’, 2005 and Mark

---

33 Based on Oberthür and Groen removing ’EU’ from their table as found on pp. 1324
Rhinard and Michael Keading, ‘The International Bargaining Power of the European Union in “Mixed” Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’, 2006; EU is internationally one actor or sometimes a group of countries in disagreement. In other words, there is already an assumed two-level game which is disregarded in Oberthüer and Groen’s study. As Oberthüer and Groen do not make a distinction in the case studies they have chosen on divided opinions within EU, it speaks for the interchangeability of the actor in their method. In the way that Oberthüer and Groen have used their method it would make sense to replace the EU for China or any other nation-state as the actor.

Limiting the study’s focus to China’s international stance should however be made clear. The Effectiveness dimension is limited by Oberthüer and Groen to the negotiation setting at the international level but Meunier, Rhinard and Keading do not make the same limitation. Meunier, Rhinard and Keading illustrate the sometimes conflicting national and EU policy objectives. For China, there is the possible issue of how its national goals not always coincide with their international engagements. Zhang, Zhongxiang. ‘China’s Role in Climate Change Negotiations, Perspectives for COP21’, 2015, writes that; ‘…there is a discrepancy between its domestic actions and its simultaneous reticence to act at the international level’.

This could lead to a difficulty in the analysis to determine an accurate level of ambition. According to Oberthüer and Groen the first dimension is a measurement of ambition. But a measurement of ambition is arguably incomplete if its domestic and international level cannot be assumed to be the same. This is also where the issue of normativity which Oberthüer and Groen relates to come into question. Assessments that are based on relativity do not necessarily imply subjective reading or assumed norms. For effectiveness studies, the overall aim is not to measure ambition but rather investigate what the ambition was and use as a control factor for the other stages of the negotiation. Ambitious policy objectives can on the other hand be explained by domestic level ambitions. In China's case, a study that focus only on its international policy objectives fail to take into account a more ambitious stance on

---

climate domestically. This essay will follow the limitation which Oberthür and Groen use in solely focus on the international level. And in doing so following the purpose of this paper which concerns China's position in the UNFCCC. The analyses of this essay are therefore limited to the international level.

Although Oberthür and Groen analyze the relation between policy objectives, nation-states and institutions they also use different categorization or grading for the different dimensions. In the first dimension, there is the use of: very conservative, moderately conservative, very reformist, moderately reformist. They are effectively used in the study only as conservative or reformist. The categorizations in themselves do not say that much.

In the second dimension, the categorizations that are used are strong-conservative, weak-conservative, strong-reformist, weak-reformist. In their second case study however, they instead use the term weak-medium for defining EU’s engagement and otherwise use the categorizations entrenchment and coalition-building. The more explanatory categorizations are entrenchment and coalition-building and the second case study is the one concerning the UNFCCC negotiation. In the third dimension, the goal achievement is measured in low, medium and high. The categorizations are not uniformly used in Oberthür and Groen which might make it questionable in what they could add to the analysis. The relative level of ambition, defining China's engagement and goal achievement is already put in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations in question. The purpose of all of the categorizations seems to be to provide for a general overview to understand an actor's position. It seems unnecessary for this analysis.

4. MATERIAL

The material and sources that will be used is based on available information in English and in Swedish. This essay aims towards neutrality regarding the selection of material. For the COP15, there are many sources highlighting a negative influence of China. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Peter Christoff and Anders Turesson were present at the negotiations inside the

---


38 Ibid. pp. 1323, 1326

39 Ibid. pp. 1329
COP15. Their validity could therefore be regarded as high. As COP22 was a conference on more technical matters, the sources are, out of necessity, mostly institutional such as the UNFCCC webpage, the World Resource Institute and International Institute of Sustainable Development.

5. ANALYSIS OF COP15 COPENHAGEN

The COP15 in Copenhagen was also the meeting for Member of Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (MOP5). The ambition at the time was to replace the KP\(^{40}\) for another legally binding agreement with hopes of encompassing all countries including US and Canada that left KP in 2001 and 2011.\(^{41}\) This explains the international community’s interest in this COP especially. The COP15 gathered 40,000 people from government officials, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, faith-based organizations, media and UN agencies\(^{42}\). In comparison, there were 10,800 participants at the COP13 in Bali, 2007\(^{43}\). The COP15 was attended by an unprecedented number of participants and the political pressure was high.\(^{44}\) Per Meilstrup in ‘The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15 The UN Climate Change Conference’ describes the summit as ‘the culmination of more than three years of intense preparation…’ and ‘…an unprecedented political and diplomatic effort’\(^{45}\).

The COP15 is often analysed from an EU-perspective. According to Anders Turesson, Sweden’s Chief Negotiator during the years 2001-2010 ‘Förhandla om klimatet -12 år med klimatförhandlingarna’ the COP15 have been mistakenly labelled as EU’s negotiation. Instead Turesson writes that this was US and China’s negotiation to deliver and prove themselves in.\(^{46}\) The COP15 failed to produce a top–down legal instrument such as the KP. Instead the outcome was the Copenhagen Accord, which essentially launched a bottom-up approach and was not

\(^{40}\)Per Meilstrup ‘The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15 The UN Climate Change Conference’, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, pp.115

\(^{41}\)CNN, ‘Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts’.

\(^{42}\)International Institute for Sustainable Development. ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP15’, pp.1

\(^{43}\)International Institute for Sustainable Development. ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP13’, pp.1


\(^{45}\)Per Meilstrup ‘The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15 The UN Climate Change Conference’, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, pp.113

\(^{46}\)Anders Turesson ‘Förhandla om klimatet -12 år med klimatförhandlingarna’, pp. 79
legally binding. The Accord was taken note of but the parties did not unanimously agree on it and it was therefore not adopted as a UNFCCC document.\textsuperscript{47}

According to Oberthür and Groen the central issues in the negotiations was if there should be a legally binding treaty or not, what the mitigation commitments would be and what exactly climate finance should encompass.\textsuperscript{48} According to Peter Christoff `Cold Climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP15´, 2010: the questions for the conference to solve were if the KP should be extended with a legally binding agreement, what the `effective stabilization goal´ should be, what the Annex 1 mitigation targets should be, what commitments from the developing countries there should be and under what scrutiny and lastly what the adaptation funding for developed countries should be and under what terms.\textsuperscript{49} This summarizes the central discussions during the COP15.

5.1 Quality of China’s Policy Objectives

5.1.1 In Relation to UNFCCC’s Aim

The UNFCCC is founded on the 1992 Rio Convention. In the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted in Rio de Janeiro, Article 2 describes the objective of the UNFCCC. It is established that;

`The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.´ \textsuperscript{50}

The aim of the UNFCCC is reflected in Article 2. But there are also `any related legal instruments´ … `the Parties may adopt´. The definition of a legal instrument is that it must be legally enforceable such as the KP which was agreed on within UNFCCC in 1997 and commits

\textsuperscript{47} International Institute for Sustainable Development. `Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP15´, pp.29
\textsuperscript{49} Peter Christoff `Cold Climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP15´, 2010, pp. 638
\textsuperscript{50} United Nations Framework on Climate Change. `United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change´.
its Parties to internationally binding targets. According to CNN, the KP mandated that 37 industrialized nation-states and the European Union cut their GHG emissions. Developing nation-states were asked to comply on a voluntary basis. China is therefore part of the MOP meetings but do not have any obligations under the treaty.

The part of the Convention that is interesting from a perspective of China is the focus on economic development which concerns the historic common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities principle (CBDR-RC) arguments. It is an important position that China holds which have been constant throughout the UNFCCC negotiations. The definition in UNFCCC discussions was adopted in 1992 when China became part of the group of developing countries (non-Annex 1 countries). The objective of this differentiation was to facilitate for countries that faced critical issues for their population e.g. poverty, overpopulation, food scarcity and could at the time therefore not be considered developed in an economic sense.

There is also a focus in the convention on reasonable time for adaptation which is expressed as the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC. With the Convention in mind all nation-states taking part in the negotiations can be said to share the UNFCCC aim. The aim is too general to draw any conclusions on any specific nation-state. Helm and Sprinz (2000) use the article 2 in the UNFCCC as an example of vague institutional goals that are made vague on purpose to ensure its acceptance by all parties.

5.1.2 In Relation to other Groups and Nation-States

Prior to COP15, China teamed up and created the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) group to secure an advantageous deal. Early on, BASIC seemed to want an ambitious deal. The COP15 was expected to create new carbon intensity goals where their pollution by economic growth in relation to BNP was to diminish. Media reported that Brazil pledged to cut their emissions with 36-39% by 2020 and India would lower their carbon intensity by 20-

---

51 United Nations Framework on Climate Change. ‘Kyoto Protocol’.
52 CNN, ‘Kyoto Protocol Fast Facts’.
53 United Nations Framework on Climate Change. ‘Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change’.
55 Per Meilstrup ‘The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15 The UN Climate Change Conference’, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, pp. 119
56 Ibid. pp.127
25% below 2005 levels. China pledged to cut their carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 relative to 2005 levels. According to the New York Times, however, China's pledge would not decrease its amount of emissions in 2020 compared to 2005. Oberthür `The EU as a global leader? ´ writes that it was obvious that the US and China CO2 emission reduction targets were less ambitious than the EU’s. For example, the US emission reduction target was 17% by 2020 from 2005 levels. EU’s reduction target on the other hand was to cut 20% by 2020 compared to 1990. Interestingly enough, none of the BASIC countries tabled these media reported pledges at the conference.

The BASIC's policy objectives are more clearly drawn up in what was a counter draft to the Accord, meant to be presented at a late stage in the negotiation. The Times of India `Copenhagen Conference: India, China plan joint exit´ describes the BASICs policy objectives and how China had prepared a counter draft for BASIC. The policy objectives follow the arguments of CBDR-RC in demanding an extension of the KP to a second commitment period. This would not give the developing countries any obligations but pursue efforts for the developed countries. The BASIC argued for developing countries to be allowed to reduce emissions voluntarily and to take national appropriate measures instead of accepting legally binding emissions. BASIC did not want to accept any mitigation actions without it being supported by funds and technology from developed countries. The group was also against any Measuring, Reporting and Verification Mechanisms (MRV). According to Gloria Jean Gong `What China Wants: China's Climate Change Priorities in a Post-Copenhagen World´ the most important policy objectives for China is to avoid external oversight and binding emission targets. The G77/China which includes BASIC and developing countries were heavily influenced by BASIC according to Dimitrov (2010). G77/China wanted a second KP where the

---

57 Radoslav S. Dimitrov `Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance`, Global Environmental Politics 10:2, May 2010 pp.19
59 Ibid. pp.9
60 Ibid. pp.12
61 Radoslav S. Dimitrov `Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance`, Global Environmental Politics 10:2, May 2010 pp.20
Annex 1 countries would have stringent binding commitments and the developing countries would have voluntary commitments. The group also wanted technology and finance assistance and no MRV into national policies.\textsuperscript{64}

China also supported a 2°C target\textsuperscript{65} for temperature increase and not 1.5°C which was advocated by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)\textsuperscript{66}. The Umbrella group which includes US, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Japan, Iceland, Norway, Ukraine, New Zealand, Australia and Canada also supported a 2°C target, where all nation-states would act according to its own national abilities. The Umbrella group also advocated for financing to assist developing countries post-2012.\textsuperscript{67} Concerning a new treaty there were different ideas from the different nation-states in the group. Japan were against a second KP and wanted a new treaty. The Russian Federation wanted a bottom-up approach where achievement of targets would be rewarded but there would be no penalties if the targets were not complied to.\textsuperscript{68}

Comparing the policy objectives to the aim of the conference in terms of policy questions, China did not want a legally binding agreement but did want to extend the KP and stress the Annex 1 parties mitigation targets. For the developing countries, China did not want a legally binding global stabilization goal or commitments under MRV. Mitigation actions should instead, for developing countries, be on the condition for adaptation funding and technology from developed countries. In terms of relative ambition, AOSIS and EU were more ambitious in their policy objectives. China's level of ambition was closer to the Umbrella group nation-states in that most of them did not want strict binding targets under a second KP for themselves, and advocated strongly for funding and transfer of technology as well as a 2°C target.

5.2 China’s Extent and Type of Engagement
Although China formed the BASIC and kept up its advocacy for financial redistribution from developed to developing nation-states the coalition-building that was done was directed towards other developing nation-states. The Earth Negotiations Bulletin describes the


\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. pp. 800

\textsuperscript{66} International Institute for Sustainable Development. ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP15’, pp.16


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid. pp. 804
conference as characterized by `deep divisions and ill will'. Both the G-77 and the BASIC made statements against how the Accord had been produced. China noted in the negotiations that the procedure had not been transparent. But Dimitrov points out that China, Brazil and India never made a statement in the final Plenary which would show that they were content with the result.

In the negotiation, Papua New Guinea noted that some G-77/ China parties sent `public servants` to negotiate the Accord instead of their Heads of State or Government, and that these officials were to blame for `striking a lot of substance out of the document`. According to Christoff the procedures were delayed by China so that working groups and plenaries did not take place that could have advanced negotiations using the example of how Premier Wen was not present at the high-level segment with Obama and other national leaders. The Copenhagen Accord was the outcome of a discussion between Barack Obama and the BASIC leaders according to Christoff. The idea of an uncooperative China is also supported by the article `How Do I Know China Wrecked Copenhagen Deal - I Was in the Room`. The US and the BASIC both held conservative negotiation positions but China supposedly distinguished itself diplomatically.

China held a fixed and conservative position in the negotiations and were not interested in coalition-building. At China`s Embassy webpage, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang respond to what is called media allegations that the COP15 was not transparent and that the result was secretly agreed between US and the BASIC. Qin calls these comments `...untrue and irresponsible...` and `made out of ulterior motives`. What is clear is

---

69 International Institute for Sustainable Development. `Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP15`, pp.29
70 International Institute for Sustainable Development. `Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP15`, pp.26
71 Radoslav S. Dimitrov `Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance`, Global Environmental Politics 10:2, May 2010 pp.21
72 International Institute for Sustainable Development. `Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP15`, pp.8
73 Peter Christoff `Cold Climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP15`, 2010, pp. 647
74 Ibid. pp. 639
76 Lisanne Groen, Arne Niemann, Sebastian Oberthür `The EU as a Global Leader? The Copenhagen and Cancún UN Climate Negotiations`, Volume 8, Issue 2, 2012. pp.13
77 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Denmark. `China`s Position and comment on COP15`.
that China did not change its position during the COP15\textsuperscript{78}. This means that there were no new proposals or outreaches to other parties. China's position remained stable and in line with developing nation-states arguments.

5.2.1 China's Fit of Engagement

The group of G77/China encompasses 134 countries\textsuperscript{79} and refers to the developing countries in the UN framework. As a group, they were first established 1964 in the trade negotiations within United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).\textsuperscript{80} As an emerging economic superpower China was not as easy to categorize as a developing country\textsuperscript{81}. China perceived itself as a speaker for developing countries and the G77\textsuperscript{82} and exerted a leadership position in demanding climate finance from developed to developing countries. Christoff also points out how China in the negotiations represented itself as demanding transparency, respecting CBDR, extend the KP and championing that all states should be included in the UNFCCC negotiations.\textsuperscript{83} This might not necessarily be a misrepresentation but an account of how China exerted leadership for developing countries.

The 1.5°C discussion split China from the AOSIS and LDC's in the group of developing countries. At the critical stages later in the conference, US under President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton promised more climate financing if MRV mechanisms were put in place. The US announced that it would establish a $100 billion fund to help poor and developing countries if all other major nations would commit emissions reductions for transparent verification in a binding agreement.\textsuperscript{84} An improved transparency was not in China's interest and seen as external meddling.\textsuperscript{85} This created a split between developing countries and China, as China argued for more climate finance for all developing nation-states but did not

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79} The Group of G77 at the United Nations. ‘The Member States of the Group of 77’.

\textsuperscript{80} The Group of G77 at the United Nations. ‘About the Group of 77’.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{83} Peter Christoff ‘Cold Climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP15’, 2010, pp. 647

\textsuperscript{84} John Lee. ‘How China Stiffed the World in Copenhagen’. Foreign Policy.

want to give in to MRV mechanisms.\textsuperscript{86} In the end, China's policy objectives did not overlap with all of the G77 nation-states agenda. Among the developing parties, there were also disagreements that could not be solved.\textsuperscript{87}

The Chinese position in climate change negotiations was developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), which considers climate change to be a foreign policy issue and use it to assert leadership among developing countries.\textsuperscript{88} Among bilateral and multilateral projects on climate change mitigation there were the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate that was launched in 2006, the Australia-China Partnership launched in 2003, and the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change from 2005. These partnerships are outside of the UN framework but according to Sjur Kasa, Anne T. Gullberg, Gørild Heggelund \textit{`The Group of G77 in the International Climate Negotiations: Recent Developments and Future Directions´}, China's position as a member of the G77 gives it legitimacy and at the same time a possibility to form new agreements that can meet its development ambitions.\textsuperscript{89} As a leader of G77, China holds a strategic position not only in the UNFCCC but can also position itself as a key player through their development ambitions or trade. According to Charles F. Parker, Christer Karlsson, Mattias Hjerpe, Björn-Ola Linnér \textit{`Fragmented Climate Change Leadership: Making Sense of the Ambiguous Outcome of COP-15´}, 2012 China also affected African countries behavior at the conference. China's leadership role at the conference was helped by their trade and investments in African countries.\textsuperscript{90}

Much of the COP15 is said to have displayed trust issues between the developed and developing parties. The entrenchment position that China held came at the cost of its international reputation. In terms of China’s interest and power this conference displayed China's power in more or less leading the G77 group in the negotiation. China did not see themselves as part of the international community and had decided that their own goals and

\textsuperscript{86} John Lee. \textit{`How China Stiffed the World in Copenhagen´}. Foreign Policy.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. pp. 120
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid. pp.121
\textsuperscript{90} Charles F. Parker, Christer Karlsson, Mattias Hjerpe & Björn-Ola Linnér. 2012. \textit{`Fragmented Climate Change Leadership: Making Sense of the Ambiguous Outcome of COP-15´}, Environmental Politics, 21:2, pp. 282
targets had nothing to do with other states or parties.\textsuperscript{91} In international climate negotiations this is a recurring theme where China stress their independence and sovereignty. There is also an ambivalence in where China positions itself as a developing country and where it is as a part of BASIC, a major emitter and powerful international player. The part of this problem concerns the original definition of developing countries. A more current definition would be non-historical emitters.

5.3 China’s Level of Goal Achievement

In the aftermath of the COP15 in Copenhagen the outcome was blamed on China. China had vetoed several suggestions but also withdrew their own proposed national targets in the discussions. Through the different actions at the conference China’s negotiators were seen by many developed nation-states as less helpful than others which severely damaged the Chinese international reputation.\textsuperscript{92}

At China’s Embassy webpage, the COP15 summits end result are commented on. The Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang said that `...important and positive outcomes were achieved at the meeting’. The comments focus on how the CBDR-RC was upheld, that developed countries mandatory emissions engagement was furthered and developing countries voluntary mitigation actions were pronounced. Consensus was reached regarding technology and financial support, transparency and long-term goals. Qin also comments that the COP15 `is not an end but rather a new beginning’.\textsuperscript{93} The Independent also reported that the Chinese Climate Envoy at the COP15 said they achieved their goal.\textsuperscript{94}

China’s level of goal achievement was high. There were no strict MRV rules in the outcome. The MRV that is mentioned in the Accord is to be implemented and reported from the domestic level and the only finance that is subjected to international MRV is the financing that comes from outside the nation-state. Most of the Indian and Chinese mitigation actions are excluded


\textsuperscript{93} Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Denmark. `China’s Position and comment on COP15’

\textsuperscript{94} Zhou Xin and Simon Rabinovitch, Reuters. `China Says it Achieved its Goal in Copenhagen Climate Deal’. The Independent.
from MRV because they would be unsupported\textsuperscript{95}. How much of the result that was dependent on China is difficult to ascertain using the no-regime counterfactual. There were divisions between not only developed and developing nation-states but rather between nation-states that wanted a top-down or bottom-up approach, or integrating developing countries more firmly etc. The bottom-up approach was for example also supported by some nation-states in the Umbrella group such as Russia and the US. The result of the negotiations does mirror China’s position in the negotiations.

6. ANALYSIS OF COP22 MARRAKECH

22 500 participants were present at COP22 Marrakech in 2016\textsuperscript{96}. The COP22’s aim was to operationalize the Paris Agreement. The COP22 Marrakech was also the first meeting under the Paris Agreement (CMP1). Much attention during this conference was focused on the US election and how to keep up the Paris Agreement obligations if the US dropped out. Earth Negotiations Bulletin wrote that there were two aims for the conference; externally showing that the ‘…UNFCCC could contribute to the momentum generated post-Paris…’ and internally to make the Paris Agreement implementable\textsuperscript{97}. COP22 Marrakech was more technical than COP15 Copenhagen. The COP22's aim was to solve details around already agreed pledges. The end date for a full implementation scheme was set for 2018. The outcome of the COP22 was therefore not a finished package.

According to the World Resource Institute the key topics to implement the Paris Agreement concerned the global stocktake, transparency, climate finance, loss and damage, capacity-building, cooperative mitigation and technology development\textsuperscript{98}. For a global stocktake it would be necessary to decide on common time-frames, how to account emissions and the emission reductions, what reporting requirements there would be and developing methodologies for the nationally determined contributions (NDC’s).\textsuperscript{99} In the Paris Agreement the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage was made permanent but it had not

\textsuperscript{95} Peter Christoff ‘Cold Climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP15’, 2010, pp. 642
\textsuperscript{96} International Institute for Sustainable Development. ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP22’, pp.1
\textsuperscript{97} International Institute for Sustainable Development. ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP22’, pp.1
\textsuperscript{98} Eliza Northrop and Melissa Krnjaic, ‘After COP21: 7 Key Tasks to Implement the Paris Agreement’, World Resource Institute.
\textsuperscript{99} Yamide Dagnet, David Waskow, Cynthia Elliott, Eliza Northrop, Joe Thwaites, Kathleen Mogelgaard, Melissa Krnjaic, Kelly Levin and Heather McGray. ‘Staying on Track from Paris: Advancing Key Elements of the Paris Agreement’, World Resource Institute. May 2016, pp. 2
been decided on more exactly how to best support nation-states that will go through unavoidable effects of climate change. There was also the question of how to scale up finance, how it was to be tracked and reported as well as detailing the annual $100 billion in climate finance. Another question concerned how technology- and fund transfer to developing countries would be intertwined. What was also needed was to research capacity gaps and make a clear roadmap for the developing countries. Transparency was another issue where the verification processes, reporting guidelines and accounting principles would also need built-in-flexibility for developing countries in light of their capacity.\textsuperscript{100}

Spokespeople from civil society groups called out after the Bonn conference on what would be important matters for the COP22 Marrakech to settle; the quick implementation of the Paris Agreement, more finance for supporting adaptation and addressing loss and damage as well as ensuring renewable energy effectiveness, access and efficiency in developing countries.\textsuperscript{101}

The COP22 is considered successful in that it did achieve its aim of showing that the Paris Agreement could be implemented without the US. It also made important contributions to the future implementation of the Paris Agreement. In total, 35 decisions were adopted: 2 under the CMA1 and 25 under COP\textsuperscript{102}. In the CMA, 2018 was decided as the deadline for finishing up the operationalization of the Paris Agreement. There were `guiding questions or elements to structure further discussions´ concerning mitigation, adaptation, global stocktake, transparency, implementation and compliance.\textsuperscript{103} There were also clear-cut decisions being made such as the use of the adaptation fund under the Paris Agreement\textsuperscript{104}.

6.1 Quality of China’s Policy Objectives

6.1.1. In Relation to Other Groups and Countries

The COP22 Marrakech also served as the CMP1 under the Paris Agreement and the aim of the COP22 was as mentioned above to decide on implementation details of the Paris Agreement. China’s position at COP21 Paris therefore shows its ultimate policy objectives which should correspond to the COP22. According to the INDC that China handed in to UNFCCC for

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid. pp. 3
\textsuperscript{101} Christian Aid. ‘Paris Climate Agreement under Pressure as Talks End in Bonn’. oneeworld.org.
\textsuperscript{102} Earth Negotiations Bulletin. ‘Summary of the Marrakech Climate Change Conference’.
\textsuperscript{103} International Institute for Sustainable Development. ‘Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP22’, pp.37
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid. pp. 1
COP21, China’s position for the Paris meeting concerns mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support. In mitigation, developed countries should take ambitious actions for quantifiable reduction targets by 2030 and developing countries with support from the developed countries should enhance their mitigation actions. In adaptation developed countries should support developing countries in their needs for their own national adaptation plans and the Warsaw International Mechanism of Loss and Damage should be strengthened. In financing, the developed countries should provide a roadmap for quantifiable targets and how to achieve them. The scale of financing should increase every year beginning at 100 billion US dollars from 2020 (this should primarily come from public finance). In technology development and transfer of technology, developed countries should transfer technologies and provide support. In capacity building developed countries should provide support. In transparency of action and support developed countries should enhance their transparency within already existing report and review systems. Developed countries should also support developing countries to enhance their transparency of enhanced actions in a way that is ‘non-intrusive, non-punitive and respecting of national sovereignty’.105

As for China's relative ambition, the Joint US-China Climate Statement means that China is committed to cap its carbon emissions around 2030 and try to peak early as well as increase non-fossil fuel use to around 20% by 2030. The Statement goes through pledges by state in US and by regions in China. China have in effect promised to cap its total emissions. This ambition level is however too low according to some experts in making sure that the temperature rise does not exceed a 2°C level. Joseph E. Aldy, William A. Pizer and Keigo Akimoto ‘Comparing Emissions Mitigation Efforts across Countries’, June 2015 writes that ‘it is unclear whether China's INDC will be more specific than its announced emissions peak’106. As a recognized policy, however it was a big step forward in climate negotiations. This may be why the COP21 Paris succeeded in bringing about an international agreement finally encompassing all nation-states. As much of the success of COP21 Paris concerned the joint leadership of US and China, the election of President Donald Trump meant that the leadership momentum for this Paris Agreement naturally falls on China. The US in terms of policy objectives could not continue negotiate without a clear mandate from its national government.

105 UNFCCC Submissions. ‘China’s INDC’.
The INDC's of nation-states that were handed in for the COP21 is found on the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions webpage where they are listed in a comparison table\textsuperscript{107}. China intends for its emissions to peak and to reduce 60-65\% in carbon intensity based on 2005 levels by 2030. The EU's target is 40\% from the base year 1990 unto 2030, India's in reducing carbon intensity is 33-35\% based on year 2005 levels by 2030 and Russia's 25-30\% from the base year 1990 to be achieved in 2030.\textsuperscript{108} The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) also compare the nation-states INDC's in what their current emissions targets would mean in rise of temperature. According to CAT there are 6 categorizations and the highest, `Role Model´ is not used for any nation-state. The only nation-state to fall under `1.5°C Paris Agreement Compatible´ is Morocco. China falls under `Highly Insufficient´ and the EU is deemed as `Insufficient´. The US falls under `Critically Insufficient´.\textsuperscript{109} The Paris Agreement is supposed to let nation-states decide and continuously increase their policy commitments. The CAT representation is therefore not a fair representation of what all nation-states will do but it shows what the policy objectives would lead to if they stayed the same and it also nicely sums up the relative ambitions on policy objectives.

In `Transparency Battle to Dominate Marrakech Climate Summit´ by Megan Darby, Chinas position prior to the conference is described as not wanting any interference on their sovereignty in regards to reporting or verifying its NDC's. China did not want common accounting rules. The group of Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) which includes India, China and oil producing nation-states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran want the NDC's to be wholly determined by the nation-states themselves. According to Darby, the LMDC's want most rules to be differentiated where the developed countries want a common framework. China is referred to as having stated `The transparency framework should be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty and avoid placing undue burden on Parties´. It was also decided at COP22 that the global stocktaking should be done within the UNFCCC and IPCC. The LMDC argues that the national submissions are more important and to achieve adaptation and mitigation more funds are needed.\textsuperscript{110} Darby and the closing statement suggests that there is still a rift between developed

\textsuperscript{107} Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. `Comparison Table of Submitted INDC's´.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Climate Action Tracker. `Rating Countries´.
\textsuperscript{110} Megan Darby. `Transparency Battle to Dominate Marrakech Climate Summit´. Climate Change News.
and developing countries. Financing and the Chinese reluctance towards transparency are still key issues in the negotiations.

6.2 China’s Extent and Type of Engagement

In the Earth Negotiations Bulletin Marrakech Highlights China pressed on the issues of NDC framework, global stocktake and the Adaptation Fund. In the conference China highlighted that NDC's would have to be better defined and reflect differentiation in its operational guidance\(^\text{111}\), meaning that the framework for NDC's should be made clearer and that the CBDR-RC principle should be used in this framework too. China also identified what could be potential barriers in implementing a global stocktake. China was also very much in favour of using the Adaptation Fund for the Paris Agreement\(^\text{112}\) which would mean another funding framework to be used for developing countries.

What now defines China is not only its keeping to the Paris Agreement but also the statements it made at COP22 that China's ambition was to keep to the Agreement. China criticized Trumps plan to exit the Paris Agreement were China's climate chief Xie Zhenhua is quoted saying ’I believe a wise political leader should take policy stances that conform with global trends’\(^\text{113}\). At the same time as Zhenhua makes this comment there was news on China's plans to launch a national carbon trading scheme which would be the largest carbon trading market in the world.\(^\text{114}\) Outside of the UNFCCC China is reported as having many ongoing projects as well as investing heavily in renewable energy. And at COP22 the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC Patricia Espinosa acclaimed China's South-South Project which is described on UN's webpage as driving climate action in developing countries. On the webpage, it is said that the South-South Project is becoming an integral part of the international cooperation.\(^\text{115}\)

Earth Negotiations Bulletin mentions the opening of China's cap and trade scheme in their summary over the COP22 summit\(^\text{116}\). In the Agenda for the Chinese Pavilion at the COP, the latest progress of China Carbon Emission Trading Market was presented together among others with National Development and Reform Commission, National Center for Climate Change

\(^{111}\) Earth Negotiations Bulletin. 'Marrakech Highlights'.

\(^{112}\) Ibid.

\(^{113}\) Sue-Lin Wong. 'China Criticizes Donald Trump's Plan to Exit Paris Climate Deal'. Reuters, Nov. 2016.

\(^{114}\) Ibid.

\(^{115}\) United Nations. 'Marrakech: Deepening South-South Cooperation is Driving Climate Action among Developing Countries'.

\(^{116}\) International Institute for Sustainable Development. 'Earth Negotiations Bulletin COP22', pp.36.
Strategies and International cooperation and the World Bank Group. The business practices and experiences of the new market were presented and explained. In ‘Cap and Trade Gains Global Momentum Ahead of COP 22 Climate Conference’ the EU system of its emissions trading market is presented as having failed in some regards to making sure the system is profitable which means that the effective participation of the scheme is low when the incentives are not high enough. It is highlighted in the article that Canada, China, Ukraine and Washington State means to open emissions trading markets. Potentially there was much interest in how China meant to implement a successful cap and trade market. China is seemingly ahead in this field of climate governance.

China also launched 10 low carbon demonstration projects including 100 climate change mitigation and adaptation projects as well as training for 1000 experts and officials. This was outlined by the National Development and Reform Commission where Africa is targeted. China also target funding to Africa under the Lima-Paris Action Agenda in the Renewable Energy Initiative. Furthermore, China has bilateral agreements with individual African countries to help them reduce their carbon emissions. Examples are the Namibia solar and wind energy cooperation and the Sudan nuclear power station framework agreement. According to Xie Zhenhua ‘China will help African countries improve their capabilities in financing and investment’. During the negotiations Xi Jinping’s administration announced that it had invested 580mln yuan of equipment and aid to LDC’s with a particular focus on Africa.

6.2.1 China’s Fit of Engagement
The COP22 labelled itself as the African COP with a specific focus towards developing countries. According to Niall Duggan and Obert Hodzi ‘All-Weather Friendship’: COP22 and Its Effect on Sino-African Relations, China’s focus on responsibilities and rights of developing countries effectively means that it has established a leadership position for the group of developing countries. The head of the LDC’s Tosi Mpanu Mpanu is quoted to have said that ‘China is surprising us daily. Whatever they’ve promised, they’re delivering’. As mentioned above, China also have several bilateral agreements with African countries to aid them

---

120 Renato Roldao. ‘COP22: Insights From the Action in Marrakech’. ICF.
diminishing their carbon emissions. Much of China's support is directed towards Africa but that is where many LDC's are located.\textsuperscript{121} The South-South Project is another example and shows China's support for developing nation-states.

The Earth Negotiations Bulletin sees one of the aims of the COP22 to `carry momentum´. This was seen as important because of the US election. The Marrakech Action Proclamation is a good example of how the momentum was achieved. China was also quick to stand up for the Paris Agreement. The member of the Chinese delegation, Chen Zhihua was quoted `No matter what happens in the new U.S. government, China will continue to constructively participate in the international climate change process´.\textsuperscript{122} This statement makes a point of how China can be seen as reliable, with stable policy objectives and the same agenda which they will not draw back from. Duggan and Hodzi also comments that China in comparison to the US is viewed as a much more reliable actor. It would furthermore show according to Duggan and Hodzi, how China means to cast itself as a global leader on climate governance. The EU after COP22 also view China as a `gatekeeper´ to African countries.\textsuperscript{123} This would support an idea that China have successfully managed to position itself as a leader for developing countries and as such can influence climate governance to such an extent that they will lead the climate action on climate change mitigation and adaptation.

### 6.3 China’s Level of Goal Achievement

In the closing statement of G77/China it is summarized what the group was content with after the COP22 and what they wanted to achieve in the close future. The G77/China want the Doha Amendment to the KP, (the second commitment period) to be ratified by more parties. This would follow the equity arguments where the developing countries want the developed countries to take more responsibility. The COP22 did succeed according to the developing countries with an initial work plan for Paris and an established link between funding and technology via the Committee on Capacity Building. It was also decided that Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage was to have a five-year based framework. After COP22 it still remains to scale up on finance for adaptation. It is argued by developing countries that `There can be no enhanced action without enhanced support.´ The G77/China

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Niall Duggan and Obert Hodzi. `All-Weather Friendship’: COP22 and Its Effect on Sino-African Relations’. China Policy Institute: Analysis, Dec. 22, 2016.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
also wanted more clarity on developed countries obligations in technology, finance and capacity-building. Assurances on the mobilization of funding was still lacking according to the developing countries group. G77/ China wanted the adaptation fund to be used under the Paris Agreement where all means of financing should serve the cause of adaptation. This was also achieved at the COP22.124

Even at the COP22 negotiation, China’s level of goal achievement can be said to be high. One of the aims of the conference China solved almost single-handedly in reassuring progress for the Paris Agreement and that it would still honor its part of the US-China Deal. In terms of policy objectives there were some decisions that were made on climate finance and capacity building which reflected China's position. But not all policy objectives were decided on (and therefore not met) at COP22. It can be argued that China's possible leadership position comes out of the void when US leaves the Paris Agreement. Through the South-South Project and many others focusing on LDC's, China also managed to strengthen its position as a leader of developing countries.

7. DISCUSSION

China’s high level of goal achievement is interesting in the light of the non-negotiable policy aims China holds. These policy aims such as respecting CBDR-RC and developing countries rights and establishing funds and technology for developing countries is making China look reliable. Its reliability depends on its strong positioning in the UNFCCC negotiations. The UNFCCC negotiations themselves seem different in its own right in the sense that the ultimate goal is over a long-time period which leaves room for nation-states to plan ahead in their positioning. Overall the positioning that China uses in the UNFCCC can be traced back to the MoF. It is also interesting to note all the alliances and individual country bilateral agreements that China are part of. In the light of funding and technology transfer especially, China not only helps developing countries in providing funding and help build up technology but also push for developed nation- states to do the same. There are instances where developed nation-states leadership is lacking in effectiveness of climate governance. The US election supports the idea that for the UNFCCC outcomes to be continuous it needs a leadership from a continuous nation-state that would not have different policy aims and goals for every new election or based on internal politics discussions within such groups. In this sense, China is stable in these

---

124 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 'Statement by H.E.Mr. Manasvi Srisodapol, Special Representative of the Chair of the Group of G77 and China for Climate Change'.
negotiations. Perhaps it is this stability that provides China with legitimacy both within and outside of the UNFCCC framework.

The reputation of China does not directly have anything to do with their level of effectiveness in the COPs, which I have already established as high. However, the reputation of China as a climate leader at COP22 can be understood through its extent and type of engagement at this conference. The same can be said of the COP15 although in inversed terms. At COP15 China was seen as a laggard but its engagement in the negotiation helped China achieve its goals. Even if China's policy aims have not changed very much between these conferences, our conception of China's position may have changed. This would support an idea of policy objectives being separate to the understanding of a possible leadership position in the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC is also special as it is a long term and continuous negotiation process. China's performance in the UNFCCC can be described as very active at the both conferences. In the process dimension of the conferences China have successfully established their leadership position for developing countries. China can also be seen as very effective in these UNFCCC negotiations.

China's position at the COP21 as a possible leader was strengthened at the COP22 which confirms the choice of COP22 for my comparative analysis. This choice also highlights another aspect. An issue that Oberthür and Groen have not raised in their article `The Effectivewness Dimension of the EU’s Performance in International Institutions: Toward a More Comprehensive Assessment Framework`, is how the aim of the institution does not always give that much insight in how to measure ambition. It becomes clear when focusing on COP15 that perhaps ambition should be related to expected outcome of the conference or the specific aim of that conference instead of focusing on the institutions more general aim. The COP15 was expected to deliver a new top- down legal document. The COP22 Marrakech had the aim of delivering an implementable scheme to the Paris Agreement. The negotiations are sometimes based on a more specialized aim than that of the institution. There is usually a specified expected outcome for international negotiations. Andresen also considers the aim of the institution to be too broad to draw conclusions from. Perhaps this could be one alternative to determining ambition in the input dimension in the framework.

Furthermore, this essay does not attempt to show what China's level of ambition is in normative terms in the way Oberthür and Groen does. Looking at the CAT's webpage China's INDC's and the capping of its emissions are not enough to align with the goal of the Paris Agreement yet. There is a possible discussion on how China's domestic level targets are more ambitious
than their international. This would leave room for further commitments under the Paris Agreement. Having defended its position as a developing country at the COP15, China can take on a leadership position without the stricter obligations it advocates for developed nation-states. A relative level of ambition in this sense is difficult to judge considering China's climate governance incentives and leadership that shows an effective leadership and not just at the negotiation table.

8. CONCLUSION

Is it possible that effectiveness matters more for a possible leadership position than the actual level of ambition? Effectiveness in this study have been regarded as the degree to which the initial policy aims correspond to goal attainment. In China's case, the goal attainment was high at both conferences in its supporting of CBDR-RC. Developing countries rights are now a vital part of the UNFCCC discussion. China argued for this already at the COP15 as well as the need for more finance directed towards developing countries. China did not give in to MRV at COP15 and did not at COP22 want common accounting rules for GHG emissions. In these matters China's position have been constant and there is a coherence in China's policy objectives over the two conferences. The results show that China was very effective in achieving their main policy aims of supporting CBDR-RC and restrict MRV both at COP15 and COP22, even if the negotiations had different aims. The overall performance of China has affected the COP outcomes and helped its establishing of a leadership role within the group of developing countries in the UNFCCC. This essay also shows that the prior expectation for a UNFCCC climate negotiation might be a better explanatory factor than institutional goal in determining policy objectives in effectiveness studies.
REFERENCES


Dimitrov, Radoslav S. ‘Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance’, Global Environmental Politics 10:2, May 2010


Meilstrup, Per. `The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15 The UN Climate Change Conference´, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010.


Rapp, Tobias, and Christian Schwägerl, and Gerald Traufetter. ‘How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit’. Der Spiegel.


Roldao, Renato. ‘COP22: Insights From the Action in Marrakech´. ICF.


The Times of India. ‘Copenhagen Conference: India China plan joint exit´. indiatimes.com.


United Nations. ‘Marrakech: Deepening South-South Cooperation Driving Climate Action among Developing Countries´. UN.org.


United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. `Statement by H.E.Mr. Manasvi Srisodapol, Special Representative of the Chair of the Group of G77 and China for Climate Change´.

unfccc.int.


