“We the people...”
A case study into Arab Monarchies during the Arab Spring

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 – Introduction...........................................................................................................3-4

2 - Theory
   2.1 - Previous Research..........................................................................................5-10
   2.2 - Theoretical Claim...........................................................................................10-14
   2.3 - Concept Definitions.......................................................................................15-18

3 - Research Design
   3.1 - Case Selection...............................................................................................19-21
   3.2 - Scope Conditions...........................................................................................22-23
   3.3 - Time Period....................................................................................................24
   3.4 - Operationalization .......................................................................................25-28
   3.5 – Validity and Reliability ...............................................................................29-30
   3.6 - Method Chosen.............................................................................................31

4 - Results & Analysis
   4.1 - Findings..........................................................................................................32-48
   4.2 – Interpretations of results...............................................................................49-50
   4.3 – Discussion ......................................................................................................51-52

5 - Summary & Conclusions.....................................................................................53-54

6 – References...........................................................................................................55-63

7 – Appendix.............................................................................................................64-65
1. INTRODUCTION

Looking at the list of Arab countries that experienced protests during the Arab Spring, a majority of them happened to be republics. While monarchies have inherently seen less violence than their republican counterparts\(^1\) - to which some scholars\(^2\) have argued was due to a norm of traditional legitimacy, oil wealth or geopolitics – little research is undertaken to understand what made monarchies choose to concede. In order to better understand the measures taken by monarchies, this study has found it relevant to look into the Kingdoms of Jordan and Bahrain, to which it posits the research question “Why do some monarchies concede to protests while others do not?”.

The “silent spring” that occurred in the Arab monarchies passed by fairly unnoticed. Even though the incidents that occurred in Bahrain would later be classified as an armed conflict,\(^3\) the international system has been more interested in following the cause and effect that the Arab Spring has had on the republic states. What was it about Jordan that allowed for concession? Why did Bahrain not concede?

This study builds on the work carried out by Almond & Verba\(^4\) as well as Putnam\(^5\) in so far as to argue for the importance of civil society and its influence on democracy, arguing that monarchies characterizing higher levels of a civic culture are more likely to hold strong democratic institutions which allows for concession. Previous research has focused on reasons for monarchical stability, citing that oil rentier monarchies like the Gulf States have seen larger periods of stability due to the petro-wealth enjoyed by their citizens while countries such as Jordan or Morocco rely on statecraft - promise of reforms or constitutional change to maintain popular support.

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\(^1\) Möller F., 2016  
\(^3\) See UCDP definition of an armed conflict  
\(^4\) Almond & Verba, 1963  
\(^5\) Putnam, Robert D., 1994
Scholars such as Yom, Lucas or Gause contribute to the discourse by explaining how monarchies take advantage of statecraft, oil wealth and political concessions in order to maintain in power.\(^6\) The evident gap stands that no research to the best of this author’s knowledge, on the societal level within monarchies has been conducted. Specifically, looking into the civic culture in authoritarian regimes, and to what role human agents play in monarchies conceding power. By answering this question, this study wishes to contribute to the current discourse on monarchical survival - not only addressing why MENA\(^7\) monarchies have remained in power - but to what extent the mobilization of the human agency within monarchies can influence concessions. This study seeks to contribute to the research on civil society active within the region, namely, the implications it may have on society as well as governance.

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\(^7\) Please note, MENA is short for Middle East and North Africa
2. THEORY

2.1 Previous Research

Previous research looking into the study of Arab monarchies as well as republics has often times explained their resilience to a number of different factors depending on which type of regime the researcher is studying. These factors may include: levels of statecraft implemented by the regime, oil rent, geopolitics, foreign aid or a mixture of the above mentioned. These theories will be discussed further below. However, before looking into the theories it is important to classify the type of monarchies found in the Arab world, once classified, the reader should begin to understand the relevance of their classification when contrasted to the theories that these monarchies implemented during the Arab Spring to secure their rule. There are three different types of monarchies:

- Dynastic
- Linchpin
- Hybrid

Dynastic monarchies are those ruled by the monarch family, in which the highest state offices are monopolized by the royal family,\(^8\) where they may hold government positions like that of the Bahraini Prime Minister or Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister. Another factor that dynastic monarchies share in is oil rent – all dynastic monarchies enjoy black gold as the natural resource while linchpin monarchies do not. The countries of Jordan and Morocco are labelled as linchpin monarchies as they tend to distance themselves further from the state than countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – linchpin monarchies govern by encouraging social pluralism and political participation.\(^9\)

Linchtie monarchies otherwise known as Hybrid monarchies is that of the Sultanate of Oman.\(^10\) Oman is a mixture of both dynastic and linchpin as it shares in both the presence of the natural resource as well as low levels of royal family members in decision making.

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\(^8\) Herb M., 1999
\(^10\) André Bank et al., 2014, p.6
positions.

The main theories behind the survival of monarchies are:

- Geopolitical support
- Traditional legitimacy
- Oil Wealth
- Statecraft
- Foreign Support

Victor Menaldo argues that MENA monarchies are resilient due to the norms that they have created that protects their stability.\textsuperscript{11} It has been studied that monarchies are less likely than non-monarchs to experience several types of political conflict\textsuperscript{12} and introduces an interesting argument that monarchies have developed strategic use of constitutions, formal political institution, Islamic principles and informal norms to hold on to power.\textsuperscript{13}

By promoting cohesion between the ruling family and political elites, as well as ensuring the rights of private property and economic development, monarchies in power have enjoyed political stability as well as legitimacy.\textsuperscript{14} Nuri Yesilyurt makes an argument that the survival of the Jordanian regime was a result of endogenous and exogenous factors.\textsuperscript{15} His main claim on the survival of this linchpin monarchy was its use of continuous cabinet reshuffling to quell protesters which also portrayed him – King Abdullah II – as a pro-reform figure.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, increased assistance of foreign aid to Jordan as well as military assistance from the US and even Israel, coupled with the dissuading effects of the region proved to be a positive effect, in that the monarchy itself was seen as a much needed entity.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{11} Menaldo, 2012, p.709
\textsuperscript{12} Menaldo, 2012, p.722
\textsuperscript{13} Menaldo, 2012, p.709
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
\textsuperscript{15} Yesilyurt, 2014, p.169
\textsuperscript{16} Yesilyurt, 2014, p. 186
\textsuperscript{17} Yesilyurt, 2014, p. 180-2
Sean Yom however does not entirely support the claims made by Menaldo and Möller and has instead argued that while traditional legitimacy may be important, exogenous factors in the form of geopolitical support and oil wealth carry greater weight when it comes to monarchy survival.18 Yom’s argument places greater importance on American foreign policy, arguing that they have been resilient due to the diplomatic, economic and military leverage these monarchies hold in relation to US interests.19 Eva Bellin takes it a step further and points to several factors arguing that civil society within the MENA is weak and thus an ineffective champion of democracy, the economy remains in state hands, high levels of illiteracy coupled with inequality, as well as the MENA region being geographically remote from the epicentre of democratization.20

The link between concessions and regime stability is not as clear cut as one would hope – not only for the MENA monarchies – yet other forms of governance such as: anocratic, autocratic or democratic.

Concessions alone do not ensure regime stability, neither would repressive tactics. Regime stability can be seen as an ongoing symbiosis between diversion – repression – concessions. Being able to use these tactics in partnership with each other is important for the survival of a regime whereas the inconsistent use of repression or concession can fuel protests.21 Makara argued that King Hussein’s use of both concession and later on repression was due to domestic and regional factors – the King of Jordan had only conceded to the PLO as the political climate at that time demanded solidarity with the Palestinians and the Palestinian cause.22 However what happened thereafter was an uprising by the PLO to take control of Jordan which ultimately led to the conflict known as “Black September” which saw the PLO and its sympathizers removed from the country.23

While the Black September incident took place many decades ago, it still provides an important contribution to the research on concessions and regime stability. A recent study by

18 Yom S., 2012.  
20 Bellin E., 2004; 139-141  
21 Lichbach Irving M; 1987  
22 Makara M., 2016; 392  
23 Makara M., 2016; 398
Graeme Davis found that the international environment affects both the policy choices and the level of instability in the state.\textsuperscript{24} However, Davies’ study goes further in researching policy selection in the face of instability and highlights that there are three tactics a state may use to subvert instability: diversion, repression or concessions.\textsuperscript{25} Each tactic or a mix of multiple tactics depends on the type of state itself.

Repression works well for anocratic and autocratic regimes by reducing instability, yet in a democracy repressions are counterproductive.\textsuperscript{26} Concessions, on their own will tend to signal regime weakness and foster further instability that is why autocratic states tend to use repression after making concessions – to demonstrate strength and control.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, it convinces people that their participation in collective action is more likely to achieve a collective good – this increases the probability that people will join in mass actions.\textsuperscript{28} The study on the Iranian revolution conducted by Karen Rasler shows that concessions have a direct effect on increased frequency of protests – which forced more concessions from the government as well as encourage protest behaviour indirectly via positive influence on spatial diffusion.\textsuperscript{29}

The literature on concessions and its link to regime stability is far smaller and harder to find – this statement is further argued by Davies – that most of the literature focuses on concessions impact upon dissent within the state.\textsuperscript{30} However, finding previous research on how concessions are influenced by the civic culture in anocratic or autocratic states proved to be much harder.

Few scholars such as Rasler, Lichbach, Shellman and most recent Davies look into the effect of concessions on regime stability,\textsuperscript{31} yet there hasn’t been an in-depth study focused on the direct link between concessions and the civic culture. What can be seen through previous research is that concessions on their own increase regime instability, this is due to people

\textsuperscript{24} Davies G A M; 2016; 118
\textsuperscript{25} Davies G A M; 2016; 119
\textsuperscript{26} Davies G A M; 2016; 135
\textsuperscript{27} Davies G A M; 2016; 134
\textsuperscript{28} Rasler K; 1996; 145
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid
\textsuperscript{30} Davies G A M; 2016; 121
rebelling if they become convinced that the government is weak and dissent will achieve the collective good. In other words, if the value of the collective good is combined with a high expectation of success, people are likely to participate in mass actions.\textsuperscript{32}

Being able to predict if concessions on their own can be seen as a prerequisite to regime change is near impossible to surmise due to the uniqueness of each case – its size, strength and capabilities – as well as the regime itself with how it deals with the protests since regimes’ response are adaptive – responses are altered out of necessity and shift towards more effective measures.\textsuperscript{33} There are however some indicators that help predict certain factors of protests such as protest size, level of dissent or regime reactions to name a few.

The literature on concessions with regard to the MENA monarchies, is not available. Reasons being that no Middle Eastern monarch to date has conceded total power to the people. The events of the Arab Spring sparked a new chapter in the region's history to which much of the discourse has focused on stability. However, by looking into the reasons of their stability we can find possible explanations as to why Jordan and Morocco conceded while the remaining Gulf monarchies did not. Linchpin monarchies such as Jordan and Morocco that do not share in the wealth of their dynastic neighbours (natural resources) led campaigns of political change and constitutional reform with regard to the monarch's power in order to calm protestors.\textsuperscript{34} Whereas dynastic monarchies on the other hand, which are ruled by the royal family, could not. The theory behind their reluctance to absolve parliament or some of their ministers in countries like Bahrain or Saudi Arabia was due to the royal member's position within government. Linchpin monarchies can afford to give away power while retaining their sovereignty, the same cannot be said about dynastic ones.\textsuperscript{35} Instead, dynastic monarchies focused primarily on sharing the wealth made from oil rents.\textsuperscript{36} Following the protests, the Arab monarchies increased their wealth distribution among the citizens in hopes it would quiet them down.

\textsuperscript{32} Rasler K., 1996; p. 134
\textsuperscript{33} Yuen & Cheng; 2017; p. 3
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid
\textsuperscript{35} Gregory G., 2013, p. 18-20
\textsuperscript{36} Lucas Rusell E., 2014, p. 205
This study does recognize the theories brought up by previous scholars mentioned above however, it will instead focus on the gap within the research and study the role of civic culture within a state, and its possible influence on concessions.

2.2 THEORETICAL CLAIM

The theoretical claim this study will examine is the effect that a civic culture (within a society) has and its influence on the regime conceding to protests. In reviewing previous research, there has been little study on the role that the civic culture plays within authoritarian regimes. Though several scholars like Barari, Lucas and Yom\(^{37}\) all theorize about the monarchies themselves and their importance to international systems and others such as Davies, Rasler or Shellman\(^ {38}\) look at concessions and regime stability, less research has been placed on the societal level importance within the MENA monarchies. It is important to point out that this research is not only applicable to monarchies in the Middle East, nor just republics – however it can be generalized to include a larger scope of countries. The interest this paper has towards monarchies is twofold. First, how they managed to survive the Arab Spring wave while republics fell, people in monarchies were similarly relatively deprived – one can argue more so in some monarchies. Second, being the last continent where rule is in the hand of the monarchy, the Middle East remains an interesting area of research both on the societal level as well as governance.

If the constructivist argument can be made about the nature of the international system, and how it is largely shaped by the character of its members\(^ {39}\), then so too, can the argument be made that higher levels of a civic culture within society can influence concession to protests. This paper does not suggest that monarchies in the Middle East embody pure democratic ideals – whereby the people have control over their governance – however defining a monarchy as either being democratic or not, is not applicable. The reason being, not all countries that are authoritarian lack democratic values, on the contrary there are some


\(^{39}\) Morgan in Collins, A., p. 35
regimes that hold an illiberal form of democracy – which combines authoritarianism with regular elections.40

This paper hypothesizes that: monarchies characterizing higher levels of a civic culture are more likely to contain strong democratic institutions which allow for concession to protests.

Civic Culture → Democratic Institutions → Concession

The term culture describes the ideational and institutional structures that enable social co-operation.41 Building upon that definition, the civic culture refers to the political and societal sphere within a society, absorbed and transmitted by exposure and behaviour through each generation.42 Through each generation, the citizen’s perception of their own influence is reinforced – through social cooperation, adjustments in societal and political norms, or new means of expression - at the same time this adjusts the level of civic culture in order to meet the new ‘demands’ as it prepares individuals for intervention in the political arena.43 Furthermore, it creates a political environment by which citizen involvement and participation are more feasible.44

Robert Putnam has argued that a civic culture consists of four pillars45:

- Political Equality
- Civic Engagement
- Solidarity, Trust & Tolerance
- Social Cooperation

40 Hay; 2005; p. 134
41 Ney & Molenaars; 1999; p. 492
42 Almond & Verba; 1963; p. 499
43 Almond & Verba; 1963; p. 482-484
44 Almond & Verba; 1963; p. 482
45 Putnam et al; 1994; 87-88
Civic culture is an ideal, a means to measure the level of engagement on a societal level. Putnam as well as Almond & Verba developed this theory with democratic countries in mind: showing that countries with high levels of a civic culture had stronger democratic institutions. This study has taken the foundation of their theory however, rather than test it in a democratic system; it will be tested on an authoritarian one. As mentioned above, the research gap observed was a lack of study into the levels of civic engagement not only in Middle Eastern monarchies yet republics. This study, theorizes that the presence of a strong civic culture which demands accountability and accepts open disagreement - while reinforcing the individual's perception to what their influence can achieve - sustains democratic institutions.46

This is because government institutions receive inputs from their social environment and produce outputs to respond to that environment.47 Yet how would democratic institutions influence concession?

Democratic institutions are influenced by the level of citizen participation within public affairs.48 In other words; the civic culture plays a strong role in influencing the political environment. A country with strong levels of democratic institutions is more likely to contain a system of proportional representation by which citizens engage themselves through political parties or interest groups.49 These political parties are held accountable by its members in ensuring that those within branches of government carry out the wishes that the citizens have chosen.50 When faced with protests, calls for a change in government or new elections, the regime is left with two choices; meet the demands of the protestors or to ignore. Government officials in a country resembling democratic governance accede to the demands of the protestors because they fear the loss of confidence the people have in them or that they consider them legitimate actors to make such demands51. James Bryce argued that “an essential ingredient of a satisfactory democracy is that a considerable proportion should

46 Putnam et al; 1994, p. 88-89
47 Putnam et al; 1994; p. 8
48 Almond and Verba; 1963; p.10
49 Christiano in McKinnon; 2012; p. 92
50 Dahl R., 2000; p. 93
51 Almond and Verba, 1963, 181
have… small self-governing groups, whether in connection with local government, trade unions, cooperatives or other forms of activity”\textsuperscript{52}

In a country with an active civic culture, the individual is not only seen as a “subject” yet as a citizen with political influence as well.\textsuperscript{53} In a state with democratic ideals, the individual is offered the opportunity to partake in the political decision-making process as an influential citizen while in the totalitarian state; they are given the role of a participant subject.\textsuperscript{54} Almond and Verba claimed to identify three broad types of political cultures, to which they dedicate several chapters in their book, \textit{The Civic Culture}.

Unfortunately, due to the length of this paper going through the entirety of political cultures and sub-cultures would take up too much space. However, in order to present the argument clearly to the reader a small passage has been quoted.

“A participant is assumed to be aware of and informed about the political system in both its governmental and political aspects. A subject tends to be cognitively oriented primarily to the output side of government: the executive, bureaucracy, and judiciary. The parochial tends to be unaware, or only dimly aware, of the political system in all its aspects.”\textsuperscript{55}

This is not to state that a political culture can only be participant, subject or parochial – however, the ‘citizen’ is a mix of all three orientations. Citizens in countries with high levels of a civic culture, and thereby orientated towards an active participation in politics maintain democratic ideals by the continuation of norms that demand accountability, freedoms and proportional representation. Thus, when faced with protests, the government adheres to these norms as a result of the civic culture that the country has been exposed to throughout its past and passed down through each generation. Alternatively, in a country with low levels of a civic culture (Political Equality, Civic Engagement, Solidarity - Trust & Tolerance, and Social Cooperation) the citizens are treated and identify themselves as a “passive subject”, thereby having no ability to enforce a change and are given no legitimacy. As a result, when

\textsuperscript{52} Bryce J., 1962, p. 132
\textsuperscript{53} Almond & Verba; 1963; p. 77-79
\textsuperscript{54} Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 4
\textsuperscript{55} Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 79
faced with protests or calls of regime change the government does not see the polity as politically competent – that the individual can exert influence – nor are they viewed as subjectively competent – that the individual believes they can exert such influence.\textsuperscript{56}

Almond & Verba argue that the ability to exert political influence is significant even if the individuals rarely use it.\textsuperscript{57} Should the ordinary citizen perceive government policy as being far outside their sphere of influence they are unlikely to attempt to influence that policy – thereby the government is unlikely to worry about the consequences that they might bare.\textsuperscript{58}

In order to influence concessions, the civic culture must embody the four pillars mentioned by Putnam: - Political Equality, Civic Engagement, Solidarity - Trust & Tolerance, and Social Cooperation\textsuperscript{59} – not only from the government yet on a societal level. For the belief in the ordinary man to participate may have significant consequences for the political system – should the individual believe they have influence, they are more likely to participate.\textsuperscript{60}
Therefore in order for the civic culture to influence concession, it must consist of a polity of active citizen participation within the four pillars rather than act as passive subjects.

\textsuperscript{56} Almond & Verba, 1963, 181
\textsuperscript{57} Almond & Verba, 1963, 182
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid
\textsuperscript{59} Putnam et al, 1994; p. 87-89
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid
2.3 CONCEPT DEFINITIONS

Civic Culture

Almond and Verba argue that a civic culture is a “pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it”.\(^{61}\) The civic culture, can be seen as a product of modernization mixed with traditionalism, in that the by-product is significant change yet not change that can be seen as too drastic as to cause polarization within society.\(^{62}\)

While the theories mentioned above by previous researchers carry great weight in explaining why monarchies survive, this study views the individual as holding greater power to influence change. Individual attitudes such as the belief of the self within the political system\(^{63}\), the role of the self in influencing political decisions as well as positive feelings towards the system and a trust in other citizens largely affects the survival of democratic institutions.\(^{64}\)

As culture has many definitions, Almond and Verba underlined what they meant by culture as being “a psychological orientation towards social objects”.\(^{65}\) A civic culture prepares the individual for intervention within the political system, and more importantly it sets the foundation in building the proper environment by which citizen involvement and participation are more feasible.\(^{66}\) How does one see civic culture? What are the beliefs behind a civic culture?

Building on the work of Putnam et al, in their book *Making Democracy Work*, they define civic culture by a combination of four pillars: - Civic engagement – Political equality – Solidarity, trust and tolerance – Social structures of co-operation.\(^{67}\)

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\(^{61}\) Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 10

\(^{62}\) Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 7

\(^{63}\) Almond & Verba, 1963 p. 13

\(^{64}\) Muller & Seligson, 1994, p. 635

\(^{65}\) Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 14

\(^{66}\) Ibid

\(^{67}\) Putnam et al, 1994, p. 87-89
Civic Engagement

Niccolo Machiavelli once said that “there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things”. The term civic engagement echoes in his statement. Civic Engagement here is perceived as the ability of the citizen to engage themselves within public discourse in pursuit of public good, and is marked by public engagement within public affairs.68

Political Equality

The second pillar of a civic culture is Political Equality. The argument is made that higher levels of political equality will lead towards a community with higher levels of civic culture, through the allocation of equal rights towards the people.69 Thus citizens in a community are bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, they interact as equals not patrons.70

Solidarity, Trust and Tolerance

Putnam et al argue that the levels of trust, how helpful citizen are and the respect they hold for one another form an important block of civic culture.71 A civic culture must hold respect and tolerance to the other even though citizens might have different views on public issues.72 “Equality and equal respect are owed to all people and we are forced to consider their ideas about the world impartially”.73 Thus a civic culture, must consist of tolerant values.

Association: Social Structures of co-operation

Associations help influence the effectiveness and stability of a democratic government, by the internal effects it has – on individual members and the external effects – on the wider

68 Putnam et al; 1994, p. 87
69 Putnam et al; 1994, p. 88
70 Ibid
71 Ibid
72 Putnam et al; 1994; p. 89
73 Aguila; 2005, p. 268
Almond and Verba further stress the importance of societal structure, arguing that the civic culture is transmitted through social institutions such as family, peer group or workplace and through this transition, with each generation, the civic culture is carried onwards through the political attitudes and behaviours by the previous generation.

**Democratic Institutions**

Democracy is an idea chased by governments that allows for the rule of law under effective citizen participation in the governing process. These governments have a constitution, within the constitution we can find laws guaranteeing the rights of free speech, press, religion, freedom of assembly, equal protection under the law, right to due process and private property rights. Democracy is a very broad concept, yet an important pillar of democracy is liberal values. Stating a Middle Eastern country as being liberal is a bold statement to make, while this study acknowledges no Middle Eastern country is truly representative of a liberal society, it does hold that some countries in the MENA region are more democratic than others.

In stating a country is becoming more democratic, one can quickly infer that these inalienable rights that are evident in all democracies are starting to blossom in a country moving from un-democratic ideals towards democratic. Dahl makes the argument that there are certain pre-conditions required for democracy to grow; control of law enforcement by elected officials, democratic beliefs and civic culture, a modern market economy and society and weak subcultural pluralism. Dahl argues that democratic institutions are more likely to flourish in a culture that is fairly homogenous, using example of religion, language, educational equality, discrimination between one group and the other and the position the government takes in supporting religious institutions.

Whereas instrumental rights play an important role through political freedoms and civil rights – it is the constructive role that carries more weight. Political freedoms allow for debate,

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74 Putnam et al; 1994, p.89
75 Dahl R., 2000, p. 37
76 Newton, K., and Deth, W. V. J., 2016, p. 41-2
77 Dahl R., 2000, p. 149-150
78 Ibid.
criticism, open discussion which in turn affects our values and priorities.\textsuperscript{79} What role does constructivism play in contrast to democratic institutions or the civic culture?

Identity is an important pillar in social constructivism, it tells us who actors are, what their preferences might be and how these preferences might influence their actions.\textsuperscript{80} As Berger and Luckmann would argue, “identity is formed by social processes”.\textsuperscript{81}

In turn, this takes a role in forming the culture one is accustomed to, both in the evaluative standards – which is that of norms – or the cognitive standard – such as rules and models, which in turn defines how social actors exist, how they operate and relate to one another.\textsuperscript{82}

What does this article infer when viewing democratic institutions? The European Union has a set of criteria that countries must possess should they wish to join. Democratic institutions, in the view of this study is seen as the presence free and fair elections, a transparent judiciary, a cabinet or parliament ensuring the rule of law is enforced as well as transparent and accountable government bodies.\textsuperscript{83}

Learning from the examples of Switzerland and the Netherlands, Dahl further backs the argument that consensus is a vital part of democratic institutions, insofar that decisions take place in a form of cabinet or parliamentary rule which is facilitated by proportional representation through electoral systems.\textsuperscript{84}

\textbf{Concession}

The Oxford Dictionary defines concession as a “gesture made in recognition of a demand or prevailing standard”.\textsuperscript{85} This paper views concession in that light, by which the monarchy recognizes the demands of the protestors and offers a gesture in response to their demands.

The gesture that this study is interested in looking at would be of the acceptance by the monarchy, of the demands made by the protestors.

\textsuperscript{79} Sen A., 1994, p. 152-3
\textsuperscript{80} Agius in Collins, 2013. P. 88
\textsuperscript{81} Berger and Luckmann; 1991, p. 194
\textsuperscript{82} Katzenstein, P.J., 1996, p. 6
\textsuperscript{83} European Commission – democratic institutions
\textsuperscript{84} Dahl R., 2000, p. 153
\textsuperscript{85} Oxford Dictionary, 2017
3. RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this section is to look into the relevant cases chosen for the study as well as provide a level of background information that will help the reader understand these cases in more detail as this paper progresses. Furthermore, sections on methodology chosen as well as how the variables are addressed is further brought up concluding with issues of validity and reliability ending with the material sources used to conduct the study.

3.1 CASE SELECTION

By asking the question why do some monarchies concede to protests where others do not, the number of cases to choose from becomes smaller. Having said that, the Arab Spring provides the most fruitful source of data available. The effects of the Arab Spring are still seen today in countries such as Yemen – which arguably can be termed a failed state and a humanitarian disaster, or the civil war of Syria entering its seventh year. Though this study cannot assign random cases to the experiment, case selection dwindles down to a few.

Despite the fact that a majority of monarchies experienced some form of protest only three monarchies stand out – the Kingdoms of Jordan, Bahrain as well as Morocco. All these monarchies experienced protests, however only two conceded while one remained vigilant and managed to crush the protest movement with the help of foreign troops. Since this study is taking a Most Similar System Design (MSSD) these cases had to be as similar as possible to which Jordan and Bahrain were chosen.

A certain norm of traditional legitimacy has kept monarchies in the Middle East in power. Jordan claims a traditional legitimacy – that the monarchy is a direct descendent of the prophet Mohammad – while Bahrain claims a tribal legitimacy. Protesters took to the streets, in Jordan, on January 14th 2011 demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister and better economic conditions\(^{86}\).

In Bahrain, the wave of the Arab Spring hit one month later in February 14th 2011, demanding similar grievances to Jordan and other countries experiencing protests. Bahrain saw its first causality on the same day, as the result of one sided violence. At the height of the Bahrain protests, over 100,000 people rushed to Pearl square demanding better rights, a considerable number, given that it equated to roughly 10% of the population. Not only did the Bahraini government refuse to concede they also allowed the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to send in reinforcements to help eliminate the protests. Both Jordan and Bahrain are monarchies, with rule resting in the monarch. In Bahrain, the King appoints a cabinet of ministers in which a large proportion come from the ruling monarch family, including the Prime Minister. While Jordan practices a form of constitutional monarchy, however the Prime Minister and ministerial posts are elected by the King. Bahrain does not allow its citizens to change their government while in Jordan it does – with limitations. It is relevant to point out that Jordan and Bahrain have colonial history, with regard to Great Britain. The current monarchs were both educated in the UK and the US, which helps eliminate the variable of western influence one monarch may have had, with regard to the actions taken by the regime during the protests.

Selecting Jordan over Morocco was done for several reasons. The Kingdoms of Jordan and Bahrain are fairly new monarchies, Jordan was established in 1946 while Bahrain in 1971. Both countries had been granted independence by their colonial power, Great Britain. King Abdallah II of Jordan as well as King Hamad of Bahrain both ascended to the throne in 1999. Morocco on the other hand, has had the Alaouite dynasty in power since 1666.

87 Rogin, J., “In Bahrain, Valentine’s day is a day of struggle”, foreignpolicy News, 2013
88 The Guardian News, “Bahrain’s young people mark the fifth anniversary of Arab Spring”, 2016
89 Ibid
90 Department of State Report Bahrain 2010
91 Department of State Report Jordan 2010
Whereas all three countries are of the Muslim faith, the Moroccan culture stands out from Jordan and Bahrain. This is because Morocco has been largely influenced by its former colonial rulers France and Portugal. Furthermore, being geographically situated at the edge of Africa, exposure to different cultures and to religions has had an influence. As this study is focused on the civic culture, choosing Morocco over Jordan – which shares in the same cultural heritage of Bahrain – would allow for bias in the results. Since Morocco differs from its Middle Eastern counterparts in aspects of culture, language as well as its geographic location, it was omitted from the case selection.
3.2 SCOPE CONDITIONS

When looking at the scope conditions of the cases, reflecting on issues such as the domain in which the theory is set to operate in is important. The field of interest for this study are monarchies, an important variable to note are protests and the success protesters had in having their demands met. Both cases chosen are Middle Eastern monarchies that experienced protests as a result of the Arab Spring wave that began in Tunisia. Jordan and Bahrain both justify their rule as being inherited by a traditional legitimacy (Jordan) as well as tribal (Bahrain). Further, they are ruling monarchies which means that the King holds supreme power. Jordan and Bahrain have been classified by Freedom House in the year 2010, as being not free – not a surprising classification – yet in the years 2006-2009 both countries were classified as partly free. This study does acknowledge that the persons active in protests in Bahrain were from the majority religion Shia who have felt themselves relatively deprived in contrast to the ruling minority however as this study is focused on answering the question of why the regime conceded to protests and not why protests emerged, the research does not face internal validity problems by not addressing this. Instead the focus is placed on democratic institutions and civic culture.

As highlighted upon earlier in this paper, the decision to focus on MENA monarchies was done for several reasons. Where other neighbouring countries fell during the Arab Spring wave – the MENA monarchies remained relatively stable (with the exception of Bahrain) throughout, their rule continues to this day. Focusing specifically on monarchies within the MENA region does not take away from generalizing the theory. In fact, the theory in itself can be broadened to examine a wide range of countries. Operationalization of the variables ‘civic culture’ and ‘democratic institutions’ as seen in the following section, does not limit itself within the scope of the MENA region and can be replicated to a number of other countries. The decision to focus on the MENA region lies in its very uniqueness in contrast to modern day rule across the globe.

92 Powner Leanne C., 2015; p. 24-5
93 Chulov, M., “Saudi Arabian troops enter Bahrain as regime asks for help to quell uprising”, The guardian news, 2011
Prior to the Arab Spring, the MENA region on the whole had not seen any significant change in democratization since 1972.94 Further, MENA monarchies have inherently seen less violence compared to republics95 yet hold similar methods of governance – with regard to the freedoms given to their people – all the while its citizens remain accepting of monarchical rule, and did remain accepting throughout the Arab Spring wave.

This paper cannot answer the question of why this occurred yet it seeks to contribute to the research on the civil society within authoritarian states and its influence on democratic institutions in hope to shed further light on civil society within such regimes in order to better understand the impact it may have within.

94 Bellin, E., 2004, p. 139
95 Möller, F., 2016
3.3 TIME PERIOD

The time period of this study is a period of 5 years, between 2006 and 2011. However data collection will only concern itself from the years 2006 – 2010. This was chosen as it strengthens the study by controlling for alternative explanations mentioned by previous researchers such as the use of Statecraft and Geopolitics – which was touched upon earlier in this paper. Should the paper include the year 2011 or following, there might run a risk of validity problems due to some regimes implementing change to secure their rule. Therefore limiting the scope to 2010 insures to an extent that the hypothesis tested measures what this paper’s argument posits – that concession was brought about by the influence the civic culture has had on democratic institutions.

The reason for including the year 2011 within the scope conditions is to measure the dependent variable, *concession*. As the protests began in-between 1 month of each other; in January and February respectively, including data after the protests emerged would leave the test accountable to bias. Furthermore, data collection on authoritarian regimes in context of the variables chosen is not consistent, thus limiting it to a 5 year span affords the best data results without risking sporadic gaps in the research.
3.4 OPERATIONALIZATION

Independent Variable

As was highlighted upon earlier, this study has chosen to build on the work of Almond and Verba\textsuperscript{96} however it has been operationalized through the four pillars by Putnam that defines a civic culture\textsuperscript{97}. These pillars are: civic engagement, political equality, solidarity & trust & tolerance and social structures of cooperation. A benefit of qualitative research is being able to conduct a thorough analysis on the cases chosen. As such the IV, civic culture, will be measured by providing in-depth knowledge on all four pillars.

Each pillar has been assigned question(s) accompanied by a set of thresholds that one would use to see if the indicator is present or absent. The questions and threshold levels are presented in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Thresholds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(IV – Civic Engagement)</td>
<td>Active – Slightly Active – Not Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent is the level of citizen participation active in society?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IV – Political Equality)</td>
<td>High – Medium – Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are political rights respected in the country?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IV – Political Equality)</td>
<td>Yes – Slightly – No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the government allow for freedom of the press?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IV – Solidarity, Trust &amp; Tolerance)</td>
<td>Tolerant – Slightly Tolerant – Not Tolerant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent is the society religiously tolerant?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IV – Solidarity, Trust &amp; Tolerance)</td>
<td>Not Discriminated – Slightly Discriminated – Discriminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are non-nationals discriminated against?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IV – Social Structures of Cooperation)</td>
<td>High – Medium – Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would the levels of societal structures of co-operation be classified?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{96} Almond & Verba; the Civic Culture, 1963
\textsuperscript{97} Putnam; Making Democracy Work, 1994
In order for the theory to be supported, the indicators above should show a positive effect. In interpreting the results, this author acknowledges that neither Bahrain or Jordan hold strong levels of a civic culture or democratic institutions in contrast to countries as Great Britain or Sweden. However as this study hypothesized earlier, it is interested in the degree to which these variables are scored. In order for the theory to be supported, Bahrain or Jordan should show higher levels in the respective indicators chosen. This author does give way that interpreting the thresholds are subjective and might be criticized for bias. However, by ensuring a well-documented research paper with a thick description of the analysis and strong data collection – affording study replicability – issues of bias can be mitigated.

**Causal Mechanism**

The European Union, as mentioned earlier in this study, requires that countries have free and fair elections, a strong role of civil society within politics, a transparent judiciary, a cabinet or parliament ensuring the rule of law is enforced as well as transparent and accountable government bodies\(^98\) - to which they deem are attributes of a country having democratic institutions. This research paper has built upon their classification to conceptualize the causal mechanism.

Data has been taken from the Economic Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) index in order to operationalize this concept. This was chosen when considering the data that they had collected, the EIU captures the years that this study limits itself to. Furthermore, as being a reliable source this data can be replicated without faulting towards the indirect bias that a researcher might bring when interpreting the results. The results range from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest).\(^99\) The EIU looks at 5 fields in determining the levels of democracy within the country. These indicators are: - Electoral Process and Pluralism, Civil Liberties, Functioning of Government, Political Participation and Political Culture.

\(^98\) The European Commission – Democratic Institutions

\(^99\) The EIU measurement explained
Four indicators all measure an institution within government, though the EIU uses the cumulative score of all these variables to measure the level of democracy, this paper is interested in the democratic institutions themselves. As such, the scores of each variable will be recorded to make an informed decision by taking the average across the years to which this paper limits its scope. For the purpose of this paper, the indicator of Political Culture has been omitted from measuring the concept democratic institutions. This has been done because Political Culture, as a whole does not measure a democratic institution, rather a democratic ideal held by the people.

Though the scoring of the EIU places both Jordan and Bahrain into the category of Authoritarian Regimes – to which this paper does not dispute – this study is more interested in the levels of democratic institutions themselves. In order for the theory to be proven, the levels should be higher in one country than the other. Since the theory argues that higher levels of a civic culture will lead to higher levels of democratic institutions, the IV and CM must relate to each other in terms of the expected direction the variables take. A country with high levels of civic culture and low levels of democratic institutions, or vice versa, will not support the theory.

The decision to measure the causal mechanism by statistical data and not qualitative analysis was done for several reasons. First, lack of bias in the research – arguably qualitative analysis is subjective to the researcher, a benefit of statistical data allows for strong empirical information not subject to unconscious bias. Second, authoritarian regimes lack detailed reports or analysis, often times making the research gathering much harder or acting as a hindrance by the lack of available information present – thus choosing to use data collected by large independent agencies provides reliability as well as validity when comparing cases. This author found it important to maintain high validity and reliability when measuring democratic institutions rather than run the risk of incomplete or missing data when scoring these indicators.
**Dependent Variable**

In operationalizing the dependent variable *concession*, this study will assess the demands of the protesters and contrast it with the response of the regime. As this paper's main study is why some monarchies concede to protests while others do not, this variable will look at trusted news sources in answering the question, if the regime conceded to demands set by the protestors or not. It will be given a YES, if the protesters' demands were reached and a NO if they were not.
3.5 VALIDITY & RELIABILITY

Validity and reliability refer to the indicators chosen that measure the concepts in this paper. A valid indicator is one that captures the concept that is of interest and nothing else, while reliability refers to its replication, if the indicator can be replicated again by future scholars using the same measurement rules giving similar results, it is deemed as reliable. 100

**Independent Variable**

**Civic Engagement**

As Putnam argued, civic engagement is seen by the ability of the citizens to engage themselves within public discourse and affairs. 101 Measuring the levels of civic engagement by looking at how active NGOs are, community outreach programs as well as voter turnout showed high validity when measuring this pillar as it reflects the level of civic engagement within a society.

**Political equality**

This was measured by looking at the political rights as well as the freedom of the press. The allocation of equal rights towards the people reflects the level of political equality within a country. 102 Freedom of the press is a cornerstone of democracy, it acts as a bridge between the government and the people, a free press mirrors the level of rights the people are afforded in the country. Thus measuring this indicator through political rights and a free press has high validity as it grants the researcher a unique observation in the levels of political equality within the country.

**Solidarity - Trust & Tolerance**

Putnam argues that a civic culture must consist of tolerant values, how helpful citizens are and the respect they hold for one another form an important block of civic culture. 103 Thus religious tolerance and discrimination are valid measures in capturing this pillar.

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100 Powner Leanne C., 2015, p. 48-9
101 Putnam et al; 1994, p. 87
102 Putnam et al; 1994; p. 88
103 Ibid
**Social Structures of Cooperation**

Putnam states that associations help influence the effectiveness and stability of a democratic government by the internal effects it has on individual members, as well as the external effects on the wider polity. ¹⁰⁴ This proved to be a challenging concept to measure largely due to the lack of available information in each country. One had to make an informed decision for both countries based on the level of knowledge the researcher was exposed to as well as some statistical data in regard to numbers of active associations, level of memberships. Thus, validity – whether the indicator was measured correctly might be called into question as one might give way to the indirect bias that may have influenced the results.

**Causal mechanism**

Measuring the levels of democratic institutions, the results proved to be both of high validity and reliability as all measurements were taken by an established set of indices that was available for both countries. Looking at democratic institutions: the electoral process, functions of government, levels of participation of citizens with politics and civil liberties were used to measure this concept. These indicators were found valid, as all these four pillars capture a vital block of democratic institutions. This article does give way that there are several more indicators, however these were chosen as they were deemed to be the strongest. Overall, the reliability of these indicators is judged to be very high as data on both these countries used the same index. Using mixed sources and indices on the same indicator for each country would have given a biased result. Furthermore this data shows strong reliability as it is based on statistical observations – limiting any indirect bias brought by an individual's judgement of the research material.

**Dependent Variable**

Measuring if the country conceded to protests or not, trusted news sources such as Al-Jazeera, BBC, the Guardian as well as government statements and actions were used in coming to an informed decision.

¹⁰⁴ Putnam et al; 1994, p. 89
3.6 METHOD CHOSEN

This study takes on an approach of qualitative analysis, by choosing a between case design as the research question is posited, to why some monarchies concede to protests where others do not, a between case design is best suited for this study. Among the various methods available in between case designs, this study will make use of the Structured Focused Comparison (SFC). A structured focused comparison method takes a small number (small-n) of cases comparing them with each other by pre-established set of questions to both cases. This is called a comparative case study analysis, as we are studying two cases. Case studies are used to answer the how and why of a question, directing our attention on the explanatory factors. Choosing this study has some advantages, as it adds to the importance of developing explanations as well as testing theories of political phenomena. Some disadvantages are that researchers cannot control the context or environment, nor manipulate the independent variable, as would be the case in an experimental design. However, this is not necessarily a weakness. By allowing the researcher to choose cases with similar environments and by having a theory tested in the real world without a control, it allows for greater reliability if the theory is proven to work in a real situation allowing it to be more readily accepted. Cases are chosen for the presence or absence of factors that a political theory has indicated are important. The method applied in this study is the Method of Difference, by John Stuart Mill. If two or more situations are similar, but the phenomenon exists in only one of them, then the arguments holds that the causal factor must be related to a difference. As this study is looking into the causal explanation, the method of difference is the preferred tool of choice as the cases chosen follow Mills' Most Similar Systems Design. MSSD looks into cases that share many similarities yet, differ on the outcome.

105 Power Leanne C; 2015; p. 105
106 Johnson and Reynolds; 2012; p. 196
107 Ibid
108 Johnson and Reynolds; 2012; p. 197
109 Newton, K., & Deth, V, W, J., 2016; p. 385-7
110 Johnson and Reynolds; 2012; p. 198
111 Ibid
112 Newton and Deth; 2016; p. 388
113 Newton and Deth; 2016; p. 388-9
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Findings

This section will discuss the findings of this study, it will address the research gathered in two sections – one section for each country. Concluding, the study will present a table with the answers and results to the questions posited.

In order to capture the civic culture, the concept itself had to be divided between 4 separate pillars each measuring parts of a civic culture. The diagram presented below will help simplify the concept.
Civic Engagement

The level of civic engagement in Jordan is encouraging. The government takes on a proactive role in promoting youth integration within society since 70% of the population is under the age of 30 - providing opportunities for youths with the aim of promoting a more active citizen participation is key.\textsuperscript{114} Civic society within Jordan faces several challenges, most of which are internal. A report by the Brookings Institute argued that many NGO face internal governance problems such as holding fair board elections, transparency, corruption and lack of coordination.\textsuperscript{115} All Jordanians have the right to form organisations within the boundaries of the law, yet recent legislation in 2007 saw to curtail the powers the NGOs have on society. Organizations need to acquire permits before holding events of public interest, rallies or demonstrations – often times these permits are refused by the government.\textsuperscript{116} Yet with the restraints placed on NGO and public associations they still continue to thrive. Social activism is on the rise in Jordan with many NGOs starting with the aim of a better community outreach like “Ibdaa”, “Zikra”, “Ruwwad” which works at grassroots levels to enhance community and youth empowerment.\textsuperscript{117}

The parliamentary elections of 2007 barred international observers from taking part, this was met by criticism by the opposition groups however the elections held in 2010 saw a large improvement in anti-corruption and fair elections.\textsuperscript{118} In the most recent election of 2010, voter turnout in Jordan was 53%.\textsuperscript{119} In answering the question:

1. To what extent is the level of citizen participation active in society? Active

\textsuperscript{114} OECD Report 2010  
\textsuperscript{115} Brookings Institute report 2009  
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{117} Matadornetwork 2010  
\textsuperscript{118} Ryan Curtis R., “Déjà vu all over again, Jordan’s 2010 elections”, Foreign Policy News, 2010  
\textsuperscript{119} ElectionGuide.org Jordan
Political Equality

The decision by King Abdullah to dissolve parliament and delay new election until late 2010 was seen by Freedom House as an attempt to manipulate the political process of Jordan, as a result Jordan went from being classified as “partly free” to “not free” in 2010. Yet, measuring the indicator of political equality purely on empirical material and statistics would not provide the in-depth knowledge and possibly new information that might offer diverse results.

A report by Freedom House in 2009 cited a deteriorating free press in Jordan, with journalists continually being harassed and detained. Criticism against public officials, religious or culturally sensitive topics is either prohibited or extremely limited – with more authority granted to the security services and courts to detain or withhold publications until these items of interests were removed. In 2007, Jordan passed the “access to information” law – arguably the only country in the Arab world to allow such a law – that allows any person to access information, however, journalists have stated that government officials reluctantly provide information when asked.

With regard to the citizens of the country, the internet is monitored by the security services for online blogs and publications that they would deem unacceptable. In 2008, the Ministry of Interior stated all Internet Cafes must install cameras, and record the names and times of persons using the facilities. Civil society participation in public affairs as of 2007, was made more difficult with the passing of a new law that allows greater control by the government to investigate, manage or close any NGO they see fit.

Furthermore, any demonstrations or public meetings as of 2004 must now seek the approval of the governor, to which they may deny without justification – however HRW reports that nearly all groups seen as the opposition tend to be denied the permit.

120 Freedom House Report – Jordan 2010
121 Ibid
123 Freedom House Report – Jordan 2010
124 Ibid
125 HRW Executive Summary – Jordan 2007
126 Ibid
Reports of government backtracking on promises of reforms is widespread, namely the new law on political parties that requires names of 500 members coming from 5 different governorates, furthermore, parliamentary seat allocation has not been altered to allow for a fairer proportional representation.\textsuperscript{127} The parliamentary elections of 2007 did not allow for international observers nor NGOs to be present although many instances of election fraud had occurred.\textsuperscript{128}

Political equality with regard to women and gender rights sees Jordan as more progressive than many Arab countries. An analysis conducted from 2008-2010 stated that the government had placed women’s rights at the centre of their reform process allocating greater seats to women in parliament, greater presence of women in public servant positions as well as increasing microfinance loans to women entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{129} A latest study in 2010 noted that women occupy roughly 50% of public servant positions within government, with roughly 12% holding position of senators.\textsuperscript{130} Women enjoy the same political rights as men, they may vote or run for public office however they are discriminated against with regard to divorce, inheritance or child custody – yet this is due to cultural and not political restrictions as the issues mentioned fall under the jurisdiction of Sharia courts.\textsuperscript{131} Religious freedom is respected in the country with other dominations allowed to practice their faith without hindrance.\textsuperscript{132} Freedom of association and assembly are granted under the constitution however remain restricted, requiring permission from the governor or a council before such events take place.\textsuperscript{133}

Based on the research conducted the results have been coded as such.

1. To what extent are political rights respected in the country? \textbf{Medium}
2. Does the government allow for freedom of the press? \textbf{Slightly}

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid
\textsuperscript{128} Phillips C., “Autocracy – Lite in Jordan”, The Guardian News 2010
\textsuperscript{129} Situational Analysis Report Jordan 2010
\textsuperscript{130} UNDP report 2010
\textsuperscript{131} State Department report 2010
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid
\textsuperscript{133} Freedom House country report Jordan
Solidarity, Trust & Tolerance

This pillar was measured by looking at the level of religious tolerance as well as the presence of discrimination within the country.

With over 90% of the Jordanian population registered at Sunni Muslim, religious tolerance is fairly high, other faiths such as Christianity and Judaism are recognized and believers of the religions do not face discrimination from the government. Officially, Christians make up 6% of the Jordanian population, are represented in parliament under government quotas. Peaceful coexistence between both religions has become the norm within Jordanian society, although interfaith marriage remains frowned upon. Quotes from the Jordanian government websites deem Jordan as a “tolerant, Islamic state that welcomes all religions”. This view is reiterated by the government, in which the Prime Minister chairs an interfaith committee as well as statements made by the King, promoting interfaith harmony and coexistence. However while it may seem that Jordan is a safe haven for all religions, underneath, the story is different. While many Jordanians of both faiths work together, have strong family and personal friendships the issue shifts upon questions of religious freedom or interfaith marriages. Neither side allows it, based on interviews conducted by a NCR senior reporter, both religions don’t like interfaith marriages let alone religious conversion. For a Christian converting to Islam, they risk losing parts of their civil rights, family disownership. While a Muslim converting to Christianity as one interviewee put it, “would be killed”. In light of the data observed, the research has been coded as such.

1. To what extent is the society religiously tolerant? Tolerant

134 State Department Country Report, Jordan
135 Ibid
136 Minorityrights.org Country Report, Jordan
137 Jordanembassyus.org
138 State Department Country Profile, Jordan.
140 Ibid
Over half of the Jordanian population are of Palestinian origin. In the absence of religious discrimination, societal rife are brought up between the East Banker’s (Jordanian Origin) and West Banker’s (Palestinian Origin). There is a growing tension between the Jordanians and Palestinians, both on the governmental and on a societal level. Many Jordanians, with the draft of new election laws that allowed for larger seats in areas predominantly Palestinians, fear marginalized - fearing loss of their identity, as well as their power and capacity within the state.\textsuperscript{141} When East Bankers joined the army, or public service - as is custom in Jordanian society, the Palestinians turned to the private sector or work overseas which allowed for a socioeconomic gap between both sides to form.\textsuperscript{142} There is a heavy fear between native Jordanians and a “loss of their country”, by Jordanians of Palestinian origins due to what one interviewee stated as favouritism by the regime on behalf of the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{143} On the governmental side, many Palestinians feel marginalized in representation. Although the new draft law allows for more seats in parliament, should a Jordanian of Palestinian origin win in elections, Palestinians are still underrepresented.\textsuperscript{144} 20\% of senators appointed by the King are of Palestinian origin, while Palestinians also have less than 16\% representation in parliament.

2. To what extent are non-nationals discriminated against? \textbf{Slightly discriminated}

\textsuperscript{141} Middle East Research and Information Project, 2010
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid
\textsuperscript{143} Assaf, D, “The revolt of Jordan’s military veterans”, Foreign Policy News, 2010
\textsuperscript{144} Minorityreport.org, “Palestinians in Jordan”, 2010
Association: Social structures of cooperation

Based on a 2010 report by Civicus, there are currently over 5,700 organisations with more than 1.5 million members in Jordan – these civil society organisations range from teachers clubs, environmental to athletic.\textsuperscript{145}

Due to limitations in finding relevant research on associations within the Arab world – neither from HRW with regard to societal structures of co-operations, World Bank databases or World Value Survey the study will take the results of the Human Freedom Index with regard to the indicators “association, assembly, & civil society” as well as “expression and information” in order to shed some light on this pillar.

In regard to “association, assembly & civil society” Jordan scored a 2.6/10 and in “expression and information” it received 6.7/10. In contrast, Sweden scores 10/10.\textsuperscript{146} Thus the scoring of this pillar has been coded as such:

1. How would the levels of societal structures of co-operation be classified? \textbf{Medium}

\textsuperscript{145} Civicus, p 27
\textsuperscript{146} Human Freedom Index 2008 & 2010
Dependent Variable

Jordan experienced protests January 14th 2011, after rising price of foods and unemployment calling for the resignation of the then Prime Minister Samir Rifai and his government claiming that the Prime Minister and been personally profiting from the sales and investments of corporations within the private sector. Furthermore, the protestors demanded that the Prime Minister, which is elected by the King, instead be elected by the people.

In response to this, the government had granted fuel and food subsides, however the Arab Spring wave had caught on, and the people were firm to their protest arguing that the government to step down. After 3 weeks of protest, the King accepted the resignation of the government and instilled a new one by February 9th, calling for swift social, economic and developmental change. Throughout the protests leading up to the dismissal of the government, there had been no reports of casualties by the security services. In the coming months Jordan will see the dismissal of its government several times due to continued protests which were permitted, and not held back – the security forces even provided food and water to the protestors during their marches.

This paper finds that Jordanian government did concede to protest demands, and awards it YES.

147 Sandels A., “Jordan: thousands of demonstrators protest food process, denounce government” LA times 2011
149 Ibid
150 Hybels A., “Protesters in Jordan demand political, economic reform” CNN News 2011
151 Kadri, R & Bronner, E., “King of Jordan dismisses his cabinet”, NY times 2011
152 NPR News, “In a rough neighbourhood Jordan clings to its stability”, 2011
Causal Mechanism

Democratic Institutions was measured by looking at four pillars of what would constitute a country with strong democratic institutions. These pillars are: - Electoral process and pluralism, functions of government, political participation, and civil liberties.

The table below shows the combined results of the data taken from EIU. While both countries share roughly the similar amount of Civil Liberties, and Electoral Process and Pluralism, they differ in the levels of Political Participation, where Jordan scores 1.29 points higher than that of Bahrain. The second pillar to look into is the level of Function of Government, where Jordan scores 0.5 points higher than that of Bahrain.

(Source: EIU)
Civic Engagement

The more restrictive a country is, the harder the hunt for data becomes. Unlike Jordan, World Values Survey for Bahrain is not available – such data would have provided complementary research to this analysis. Bahrain is one of two states within the GCC with a politically active parliament. With no formal political parties allowed in the country, people instead are allowed to form political societies to which they nominate their members for election in the council of representatives.

Given that these societies are voluntary, one can see them as a civil engagement by the populous, thereby shedding some new information on this pillar. The largest political society “Al Wefaq” has control over 17 seats out of 40 in the Bahraini parliament with more than 80,000 members while other parties such as “Asala”, “Minbar al Islami” and “Mustaqbal” have 8, 7, 4 seats respectively. Al Wefaq is the largest political party in Bahrain, grounded in religious Shia ideology. Having attained around 46% of the seats in parliament, civic engagement for the Shia populous is active, while Asala, Minbar al Islami and Mustaqbal are Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood or pro government parties carrying less votes. Complementing this data with figures of voting statistics, Bahrain had a 38.78% turnout in the elections of 2010. With regards to NGOs in Bahrain, the government places heavy restrictions on their powers, with the ability to close down any NGO they view as illegal. However, this has not stopped civil engagement in such organisations – there is an active presence of charities, women’s shelters and NGO within the country such as raising awareness for migrant worker rights, women rights and human rights. Based on the research conducted of the data available, this pillar has been coded as such:

To what extent is the level of citizen participation active in society? **Active**
Political Equality

Freedom of the press in Bahrain is more restrictive than in Jordan. Whereas Jordan passed the law of freedom of information, no such right is given in Bahrain.\textsuperscript{159} All news cooperation’s are privately owned in Bahrain, however the government maintains a tight hold on what they may publish. In 2009, a journalist was suspended for writing a news article about the protests in Iran for example, while another was suspended and taken to court for voicing criticism on government officials.\textsuperscript{160} Freedom house gave Jordan 63 points on their index whereas Bahrain was given 71 – in contrast, Sweden scored 10 points.\textsuperscript{161} Journalists practice self-censorship, any articles or critical columns against the King or the state carries jail sentences and heavy fines.\textsuperscript{162} Further, all online content is heavily tracked by the government and censored accordingly.

The Sunni led minority government prioritizes citizens of the Sunni religion while the Shiite majority is heavily discriminated against. Shiite’s face discrimination in education, job opportunities and public services – furthermore, they often wait decades to be granted citizenship in Bahrain – non Bahraini nationals are perceived as second class citizens.\textsuperscript{163} Only Sunni citizens hold posts in government or public security – the largest employer in Bahrain – while Shia citizens are often delegated to other forms of labour.\textsuperscript{164} Religious discrimination in Bahrain is evident – this can be seen by the naturalization process of attaining citizenship, the districts Shia and Sunni live in as well as the access of education.\textsuperscript{165}

Gender rights are strongly influenced by culture and religion even though these rights have been improving since Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa took the throne in 1999.\textsuperscript{166} Women continue to be under-represented in daily life with only 1 woman being elected to the council of representatives and 2 women made government ministers.\textsuperscript{167}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[159] Freedom House Country Report 2010
\item[160] Ibid
\item[161] Ibid
\item[162] State Department country profile 2010
\item[163] Bahrainrights.org
\item[164] State Department country profile 2010
\item[165] Ibid
\item[166] Ibid
\item[167] State Department Country Profile Bahrain 2010
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
While all Bahraini citizens have the right to vote and run for elections, freedom of assembly is heavily restricted.

More surprising, citizens are not allowed to attend workshops, conferences or such events overseas if the subject matter discusses Bahrain’s political, social or other national interests.\textsuperscript{168} Formal political parties in Bahrain are illegal to create, as such the people are allowed to set up societies or political group which may nominate people to run for elections in the council of representatives.\textsuperscript{169}

Due to the tense relationship with the GCC states and Iran, the Shia majority in Bahrain is kept on a tight leash – should conflict arise between Iran, it is more than predictable that the 70\% of the Shia population in Bahrain will revolt against the Sunni rulers.\textsuperscript{170} In 2007 & 2008 the government initiated a crackdown on Shia opposition groups critical to the government, a prominent human rights activist was taken into custody and reports of torture unlawful detainment was evident.\textsuperscript{171}

Political rights for Bahraini nationals of Sunni religion are respected, however when looking at the country as a whole including nationals of the Shia religion the answer changes drastically.

Based on the research conducted the results have been coded as such.

1. To what extent are political rights respected in the country? \textbf{Low}
2. Does the government allow for freedom of the press? \textbf{No}

\textsuperscript{168} HRW Bahrain Events 2009
\textsuperscript{169} Freedom House country analysis Bahrain 2010
\textsuperscript{171} Freedom House Bahrain analysis 2010
Solidarity, Trust & Tolerance

The ruling al Khalifa family of Bahrain are part of the minority religion, which favours the minority Sunni Religion.\textsuperscript{172} About 70\% of the Bahraini population are Shia, labelled, ironically, as the “minority group” in the country.\textsuperscript{173} The majority of Shia faithful are not entitled to the same economic freedoms as the Sunni minority such as housing and employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{174} Due to the intricacy of the societal discrimination, it is not the origin of citizens that matters, yet to what religion they practice, Sunni or Shia. Many Bahraini nationals that have waited decades to receive citizenship - 15 years for Arabs and 25 years for foreigners - are often overlooked, and instead other persons are brought from overseas, granted citizenship and offered fair employment all because they happen to be of the Sunni religion.\textsuperscript{175} Many foreigners of the Shia religion are denied a visa to the country, or have their application delayed.\textsuperscript{176} Furthermore, Bahraini Shia are denied the right to serve in the armed forces or hold high positions within government, they face economic disparity as well as lack of civil rights.\textsuperscript{177} Migrants working in Bahrain form roughly 60\% of the workforce, usually workers Asia that travel to Bahrain to support their families back home.\textsuperscript{178} Numerous reports from Amnesty International to Bahrain Observatory of Human Rights publish the high levels of inhumane treatment workers are subject to.

Much of these abuses are due to the \textit{Kafala} system, which translates to sponsorship, which dictates that the employee is tied to the employers, giving the employer nearly all power to dictate their lives.\textsuperscript{179} Although the Bahraini government has since suggested measures to raise foreign workers rights’ they have failed to implement these rules and the system of Kafala is very much active in Bahrain today.\textsuperscript{180}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{172} Slackman M., 2011
  \item \textsuperscript{173} Lulu T., “The real story of Bahrain’s divided society”, the Guardian News, 2011
  \item \textsuperscript{174} Sadeghi S., “Intricacies of Bahrain’s Shia-Sunni Divide” 2011
  \item \textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{176} Ibid
  \item \textsuperscript{177} Lulu T., “The real story of Bahrain’s divided society”, the Guardian News, 2011
  \item \textsuperscript{178} State Department Country Report, Bahrain 2010
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Murray H., 2012: 462-58.
  \item \textsuperscript{180} State Department Country Report Bahrain, 2010
\end{itemize}
The data presented leads to research being coded as such:

1. To what extent is the society religiously tolerant? **Not tolerant**
2. To what extent are non-nationals discriminated against? **Discriminated**

**Associations: Social structures of co-operation**

In 2004 the Bahraini government shut down the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights after the president of the NGO criticized the Prime Minister.\(^{181}\) NGOs have long been seen as a place where citizens can meet and take part in an active discourse given that the government places heavy restrictions on civil societies and seeks to curb their influence in Bahraini interests.\(^{182}\) Citizens in Bahrain have the right to join and start associations – as stated in the constitution – however, in reality the government places heavy restrictions and intervenes in the activities of these associations.\(^{183}\)

There are over 45 clubs and associations in Bahrain, however the statistics for the number of active members is not available.\(^{184}\) Looking at the research collected on the pillar of civic engagement, one can see that many political societies are active in Bahrain – not only the licensed, yet unlicensed societies. These societies form social structures of co-operation and as a result, are taken in consideration when answering the question on associations.

Furthermore, as with Jordan, the results of the Human Freedom Index with regard to the indicators “association, assembly, & civil society” as well as “expression and information” will complement this data in order to shed further information.

\(^{181}\) HRW 2013 Essay  
\(^{182}\) Ibid  
\(^{183}\) Arab Institute of Human Rights Report  
\(^{184}\) Bahrain Yellow Pages
In regard to “association, assembly & civil society” Bahrain scored a 5.3/10 and in “expression and information” it received 5.4/10. In contrast, if one would compare a full democracy like Sweden, it would score 10/10.\textsuperscript{185}

The statistical analysis shows that Bahrain has larger freedoms in association, assembly & civil society than Jordan. However, I question the validity of the results presented by the Human Freedom Index in light of the research presented on the treatment of Bahrain’s Shia population. It may be true that Bahraini citizens enjoy higher levels of association, assembly & civil society however, the Shia population does not enjoy similar freedoms. As the pillar of social structures of cooperation looks to a steady recognition of the public good\textsuperscript{186} this indicator will instead be classified as low-medium after taking in consideration the Shia population in Bahrain.

Thus the scoring of this pillar has been coded as such:

1. How would the levels of societal structures of co-operation be classified? \textbf{Low-Medium}

\textsuperscript{185} Human Freedom Index 2008 & 2010
\textsuperscript{186} Putnam et al; 1994; 88
Dependent Variable

Bahrain experienced protests February 14th 2011, calling for the release of political prisoners, an elected government and freedom from corruption. The protestors were met with force, which resulted in several deaths, this only fuelled the protest even further. After a month of protest, Bahrain allowed troops from the GCC to enter, in order to stop further protests, the first time any Arab nations has called for reinforcements by inviting another sovereign into their territory.

There has been countless reports by medical staff, that many of the protestors that came into the hospitals had been injured by bullets and excessive force, throughout the country protesters were met with violence by the Bahraini security forces as well as the armies of the GCC states. Persons that attended pro-democracy protests, human rights activists, football stars and persons that attended rallies were rounded up, including a 12 year old girl who had read a poem calling for pro democratic rule of law- after 3 months of torture, the girl among other activists appeared on state TV repenting for their actions during the protests, many persons did not return from their detentions. By May 2011, the Bahraini government with their GCC states’ security forces had managed to quell the protestors without ever having to concede their government.

This paper finds that the Bahraini government did not concede to protest demands, and awards it NO.

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187 BBC News -b, 2011
188 Al – Jazeera
189 BBC News -c, 2011
190 CNN News
191 Shouting in the Dark Documentary – Al Jazeera
192 Ibid
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(IV – Civic Engagement)</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
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</thead>
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<td>To what extent is the level of citizen participation active in society?</td>
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<td>Does the government allow for freedom of the press?</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<table>
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<td>To what extent is the society religiously tolerant?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent are non-nationals discriminated against?</td>
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<td>How would the levels of societal structures of co-operation be classified?</td>
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<td>Low - Medium</td>
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<th>(Causal Mechanism)</th>
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</tr>
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<td>What are the levels of democratic institutions?</td>
<td>Electoral Process &amp; Pluralism: 3.11</td>
<td>Electoral Process &amp; Pluralism: 2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Function of</td>
<td>Function of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government: 3.88</td>
<td>Government: 3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation: 3.88</td>
<td>Participation: 2.59</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 3.82</td>
<td>Civil Liberties: 3.62</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Dependent Variable)</th>
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<th>Bahrain</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concede to protests</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS

Starting with the case of Jordan. On the whole the pillars of the civic culture had better results in Political Equality, Association as well as Solidarity, Trust & Tolerance than Bahrain. The pillar Civic Engagement scored similar to Bahrain while Social Structure of Cooperation was classed as slightly better, given that Bahrain scored low-medium and Jordan medium. Furthermore, when looking at the causal mechanism – levels of democratic institutions – Jordan had scored better. Yet how would this relate to the theory?

As mentioned in the research design, the civic culture and the pillars were designed to be tested on democracies. The fact of the matter is neither Bahrain nor Jordan are democratic states, the theory thus argued that countries showing higher levels of a civic culture would have higher levels of democratic institutions which in turn would influence concessions. Jordan did concede to the demands of the protesters whereas Bahrain did not. In contrast to Jordan, Bahrain fared worse off in Political Equality and Solidarity, Trust & Tolerance as well as Social Structure of Cooperation, whereas the causal mechanism – democratic institutions – scored less as well. Relating to the previous thresholds mentioned earlier, it was stated that countries with higher levels of a civic culture would have stronger levels of democratic institutions that would allow for concessions should protests arise. Absolute levels were never intended to be evident in these countries that are classed as authoritarian regimes, which is why this paper stressed the importance of the degree to which these countries hold civic culture as well as democratic institutions.

In so far as the theory is concerned, the hypothesis has not been disproved – however, it cannot be stated that the research fully supports it either. Looking back at the thresholds, the civic culture in Jordan on the whole is positive in comparison to Bahrain. Civic Engagement is active, society is religiously tolerant and cooperative, the press is not as restricted as was observed in Bahrain, societal structures of cooperation scored better and nonnationals face slight discrimination however not nearly as was seen in Bahrain towards the Shia population.
In turn, it was observed that the democratic institutions in Jordan scored better than they did in Bahrain. Still, the indices in Bahrain with regard to democratic institutions were not far off from Jordan.

A possible explanation as to why this was observed could be the active levels of civic engagement as well as a slight resemblance to the societal structures of cooperation within the country, which scored close to Jordan. Yet having only tested this theory with two cases, this author cannot fully state that the hypothesis was fully supported. Analysis of the results are promising, however being limited to two cases they are not definitive. While Jordan did show higher levels of a civic culture, in turn higher levels of democratic institutions whereas Bahrain had lower levels, limiting this study to two cases can be seen as a limitation as more cases would have provided more conclusive results as to whether a direct correlation between civic culture and the levels of democratic institutions are present. With regard to concession, Jordan did concede to the demands of the protestors after 3 weeks of peaceful protests whereas Bahrain did not. The added benefit of conducting a qualitative analysis allows the researcher to dig deeper into the data, rather than base the results on purely statistical measurements – one such example is the pillar of Social Structure of Cooperation, had the researcher concluded that the statistical data was sufficient without looking deeper Bahrain would have scored differently.
4.3 DISCUSSION

This study does give way to potential objections on the research design, such as the validity of the results regarding societal structures of cooperation that can be argued as lacking. In weighing the pro’s and con’s before embarking on a societal study within authoritarian regimes the lack of available data was foreseen. However, the contribution this paper makes is placing importance on understanding the culture of the oppressed. As the civic culture within democracies consists of several pillars, perhaps future research can further look into measuring the civic culture within authoritarian regimes in hope of understanding what people within these regimes prioritize more. This study has contributed to the rather small literature on civil society within authoritarian regimes by looking deeper into the influences of democratic norms within these cultures. More work is still needed in order to highlight this yet to be programmed tool to the populous. In order to answer these questions as well as look deeper into the civil society, further work must be placed on data collection.

An alternative explanation as to why Jordan conceded whereas Bahrain did not is looking at the ruling monarchy itself. In reviewing previous research, a gap within the study of monarchies was evident – that of the monarch itself. The argument goes – as Khong argued\textsuperscript{193} – that statesmen have consistently turned to the past in dealing with the present.\textsuperscript{194} With that in mind, a similar argument can be made: - if humans rely on knowledge structures to make informed decisions about the present a similar argument can be made about the ‘culture’ that the monarch has been made privy to would work in a similar Foucault-ian way. Does the monarchs past, shape their country’s future? Unfortunately, such research was too dense and complex for this type of paper.

However, future research should look into the culture and values learned throughout life by the monarch in order to better understand the decisions they make in the present which may help predict the decisions they will make in the future.

\textsuperscript{193} Khong, 1992, p. 13
\textsuperscript{194} Khong, 1992, p. 3
The world that we live in is dialogical, the actions we take and how we lead our lives are largely influenced by the persons within our life who continue to leave an imprint on us long after they have passed. Why did Bahrain use violence? How would understanding the culture that the King experienced throughout his life help predict the actions he will make in the future?

195 Taylor in Farrelly, C. 2004 pp.269-281
5. CONCLUSION

This study set out to answer the question why some monarchies had conceded to protests while others did not. The countries of Jordan and Bahrain were chosen as they were the only monarchies that had experienced considerable protests, where one had conceded while the other did not. Previous scholars had debated theories of geopolitics, oil wealth or the use of statecraft by the regime. However, this study has chosen to research how a civic culture, within the monarchy could influence a concession to protest. The civic culture in itself was hypothesized to have a positive influence on democratic institutions. Thus, should protest arise the government would be more inclined to concede rather than to crush the protesters. The study had built on previous work conducted by Almond and Verba published in 1963, however their work was strictly limited to democratic systems while this research has studied authoritarian systems. Unlike Almond & Verba, that focused their research on US-EU cities or Putnam with his work on Italian villages and the link civic culture has to democracy, this study theorized that the presence of strong democratic institutions within authoritarian regimes was the result of an active civil culture. This led to the hypothesis that countries exhibiting higher levels of civic culture would more likely concede due to the positive influence the civic culture has on democratic institutions.

The results, this author would argue, gave partial support to the theory. Civic Engagement was active in Bahrain to the same degree as in Jordan. Yet the remaining pillars of the civic culture in Bahrain scored worse. A possible explanation as to why this was observed could be the active levels of civic engagement as well as a slight resemblance to the societal structure of cooperation within the country Bahrain had to Jordan. As a result, democratic institutions scored less in Bahrain than in Jordan, however they were not considerable worse. Future research should look into the relationship civic culture plays with regard to democratic institutions in order to shed further light on the importance these pillars may have on a societal level.

197 Almond & Verba, the Civic Culture, 1963
198 Putnam et al, Making Democracy Work, 1994
As Amartya Sen once argued, when faced with political freedom or fulfilling economic needs, the people would choose the later\textsuperscript{199}, so too must a similar question be raised here. Do people within authoritarian regimes accept less freedoms such as assembly, association and religious tolerance if they are granted more recognition and engagement within politics? Furthermore, future research should look into the years after the Arab Spring, and how the Arab Spring has influenced the civic culture within a country. Have weak democratic institutions now been strengthened and sustained by the emergence of a stronger civic culture?

The decision to limit the scope to the years of 2006-2011 although collecting data on the variables up to 2010 was chosen to control for outside factors such as the use of statecraft by a monarch in an attempt to maintain power, oil wealth by which the monarchy could bribe its citizens to keep them happy or geopolitics in relation to outside influence.

With regard to the data available on these countries, it was challenging to collect. In order to better understand the civic culture within authoritarian regimes more research should be conducted in collecting data about these countries. Future research should look into formulating data sets, surveys and polls in order to ensure reliability that would allow researchers to test the relationship the civic culture plays within authoritarian regimes. There is a great need to understand the culture within the domain that people are ruled, if the Arab Spring has taught us anything it is that power ultimately rests with the people. However, much like an un-programed stem cell within the human body, this power has yet to be activated.

\textsuperscript{199} Sen A; 1999; p. 148.
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European Commission on democratic institutions http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-

**Economist Democracy Index** – 2007

**Economist Intelligence Unit** Measurement 2010


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**Freedom House Report** - freedom of the press, 2010
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Reports%202010%20final%20for%20website.pdf


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### Human Freedom Index for Bahrain between 2008 & 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>Procedural Justice</th>
<th>Civil Justice</th>
<th>Criminal Justice</th>
<th>Security &amp; Safety</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Women’s Rights</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Society</th>
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<tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
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#### Notes
- **Rule of Law**
- **Procedural Justice**
- **Civil Justice**
- **Criminal Justice**
- **Security & Safety**
- **Human Rights**
- **Women’s Rights**
- **Economy**
- **Society**
### Human Freedom Index for Jordan between 2008 & 2010

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<th>2009 Score</th>
<th>2010 Score</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
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