Rebels in rule: the wartime origins of tolerance

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Abstract

This comparative study analyzes two rebel groups that ended their respective civil wars through negotiations and came to power in the first post-war elections. The two cases being the African National Congress in South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe. Specifically the thesis examines rebel institutions and behaviors during armed conflict to assess in what ways they were tolerant or intolerant. The reason for the focus on tolerance and intolerance is that it is viewed as an important factor in how these two parties have related to political opposition after the war. This study shows that there are several similarities in terms of the presence of intolerance in the two cases, which leads to the conclusion that levels of tolerance during the armed conflict can not, on its own, explain the diverging paths of the two cases in the post-war period.
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Introduction

At the beginning of this thesis project President Robert Mugabe was still in power, counting 37 years of uninterrupted rule of Zimbabwe and thus qualifying as one of the continent’s longest ruling leaders. The question of succession of the 92-year-old president created tensions within the party that finally led to Mugabe being disposed by the armed forces and replaced by Emerson Mnangagwa. Mugabe had tried to eliminate Vice President Mnangagwa by relieving him from office, in order to give room for the President’s wife Grace Mugabe (Burke & Graham-Harrison 2017). In theory revolutionary leaders such as Robert Mugabe enjoy a hero status from the liberation war that make them virtually immune to internal dissent, external pressure or military coups (Levitsky & Way 2013, 9-10). Yet when Mugabe had a plan for the future of Zimbabwe that went at odds with the wishes of the military elite he was forced to step down, glorious liberator of the people of Zimbabwe or not. Levitsky and Way (2013) theorize that as time passes and the generation that lived through and remember the civil war are diminished the social and political capital of the leadership erodes. Perhaps this explains the fate of Robert Mugabe. The successor Mnangagwa was a member from the party’s inception and formed a small group of cadres that based on military training abroad lay the foundations for the armed wing of ZANU (Bhebe 1999, 29). He was also imprisoned together with the party leadership (Chung & Kaarsholm 2006, 156-157). Rather than bringing change to Zimbabwe the new leader will ensure that the legacy of Mugabe and the influence of the armed forces remains intact. Mnangagwa is part of the same political and military elite that formed within the party during the war for independence it is fitting to more closely examine the legacy of war.

The study of political parties with a legacy of armed struggle takes place at the intersection of the study of civil war and the theory on the organization and development of political parties. Cases of rebel parties can be found across the globe and exhibit great variation as to their war legacy — from the warlord insurgency of Charles Taylor in Liberia, Marxist reform movements in Nepal, El Salvador and Guatemala to the secessionist wars of Sri Lanka and Sudan. Rather than viewing cases of ex-rebels turned politicians as outliers or deviant cases, in the general study of political parties, this phenomenon has grown quite common (Sindre & Söderström 2016).

Why then should the fate of rebel groups after civil war be of interest to scholars and policy makers? The role of armed rebel groups in the settlement of armed conflict and their role in the period following the end of hostilities, leading up to multi-party elections and beyond, has great
importance for durable peace to be sustained. If the rebel group has a stake in the political future of the country the barriers to pursuing a political career are lowered and the opportunity cost of returning to the battlefield is increased. Thus the correlation between the path of the rebel group and the probability of war recurrence is clear: rebel political parties that are able to enter and sustain their presence in the political arena will increase the chances of sustainable peace (Stedman 1997; Marshall & Ishiyama 2016). But these new political parties are also of interest from the point of view of developing competitive multi party systems and democracy. Evidently these new parties will impact on the national party system and political culture through their interaction with political competitors, the electorate, political institutions and civil society. Not only is the subject of this thesis of interest to students of civil war dynamics and democratization but it is also of value to research on political parties. Empirical studies of “new” parties in Sub Saharan Africa can build on the rich existing literature on parties and party systems in that specific regional context.

In the period of 1990 to 2009 127 different rebel groups were identified as having formed political parties after the end of a civil war (Manning & Smith 2016). Kovacs and Hatz (2016, 995) find 93 rebel groups that signed a peace agreement terminating a civil war in the period of 1975 to 2011. Out of the 93 groups just above one third are judged to have successfully transformed into political parties (Kovacs & Hatz 2016, 1000). The post conflict paths of these parties of course show great variation. Some parties adapted extremely well to the new competitive environment and captured government power in the first multi-party elections creating powerful one-party states. In cases of rebel victory in the war this also, in some instances, gave way to strong one-party rule (Lyons 2016a). Others struggled to capture enough votes to gain any kind of political representation on a national or local level (i.e. the RUF in Sierra Leone). We have also seen examples of how rebel parties have become the main political opposition to the government party (i.e. Renamo in Mozambique), and in an African context often struggling with the asymmetry of resources between the incumbent and the opposition (Van de Walle 2003).

In recent years there has been an increase in the attention to rebel governance and to rebel groups governing captured territory together with its population, during wartime (Mampilly 2011; Arjona et al. 2015; Huang 2016). Rebel governance is interesting both because it challenges notions of war as total disorder and peace as orderly and because of its potential effects on political order after the war. Building on Huang (2016, 9) I view rebel governance as a specific
political strategy employed by insurgents in war. Mampilly (2011) argues that in a minimalist definition of the concept the rebels have to be able to liberate territory from the government and guarantee the safety of the civilians to be able to provide public goods. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, by disqualifying rebel groups that are not able to hold territory due to the asymmetric power relations in the war there is a risk of missing interesting cases. Both the rebel groups in South Africa and Zimbabwe were cast against mighty government military machines, and even though they operated from other countries in the region they were able to cultivate relations to their populations both domestically as well as abroad, in refugee camps. Thus this thesis will show a different perspective on rebel governance, compared to Mampilly and Arjona who specifically study rebel governance in liberated zones in the country where the civil war is taking place.

Scholars of rebel-to-party transformation have devoted much energy towards shedding light on the explanations behind the more or less successful outcomes of the process, in particular regarding cases of negotiated peace settlements. By adding such a great focus on the transformative phase including war termination, peace negotiations and consolidation there is a lack of interest in the development and function of these parties in the long-term (Ishiyama 2011; Sindre & Söderström 2016). It could be argued that even though the end of the conflict and negotiations with the government entails many challenges the later consolidation period should be at least as challenging. To run the daily operations of a party organization and assure its survival is a demanding task perhaps even more so than convincing the parties of the peace agreement and the demobilized fighters to change tactics. Furthermore the transformative focused studies tend to neglect how war time practices condition what type of political actor that is developed.

Most of the studies that have been done so far have involved cases where the political party is in opposition, a more common political position for many rebel parties. This thesis will for that reason not study opposition parties but instead turn to parties in power or in the words of Levitsky and Way (2010) “revolutionary regimes”. Lyons (2016a) has sought to widen the knowledge of rebels in politics by considering cases where rebels won the war, but this thesis will study two cases of negotiated settlements where the rebels won the post war elections. Rebel parties that gain access to state power should exhibit different characteristics than opposition parties since they do not have to adapt to the arduous opposition role that often involves financial pressure in combination with little political power. Access to the resources of the state
brings many advantages to a revolutionary movement that needs to appease rebel officers, soldiers, interest groups and constituents. Since the dynamics of government power differ from that of political opposition it is fruitful to explore these rebel rulers and contribute to widening the scope of the “rebel-to-party” scholarship.

This thesis will examine two cases of armed rebel groups that have formed political parties after the civil war, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe. The relationship under study is that between the type of rebel governance during the war and what type of relation the party keeps with the political opposition after the war. I will examine the period of 1961 until 1989 for the ANC and the period of 1963 until 1979, but this thesis will not include the pre-war legacies of the two movements. That legacy is probably one of the components of the character of these parties today, but as I seek to assess the importance of what happened during the war these older legacies do not have a place in this study. To be clear this thesis will not analyze the time period after the respective peace agreements were signed, yet how these parties develop after the war is the outcome that I seek to explain.

The ANC won a great victory in the first multi-party elections in South Africa in 1994 and has since then managed to stay in power. ZANU-PF also won a great victory in the 1980 multi-party elections and the party with its supreme leader Robert Mugabe has ruled since then. While Mugabe used the position of incumbent to crack down on its wartime rival ZAPU and later on suppressed the political opposition led by Morgan Tsvangirai (Southall 2016, 103-105) the ANC has allowed opposition parties to compete for power and formed a coalition government with its former enemies of the Inkatha Freedom Party (Southall 2016, 110). Is it possible to trace the roots of the ANC’s more tolerant and the ZANU-PF’s more intolerant behaviors back to behaviors, institutions and structures during the civil wars?

The research question is as follows:

Does the type of rebel governance that was established during the war, in the cases of the ANC the ZANU-PF, create more tolerant or intolerant ways of relating to their political opposition after the war?

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1 The abbreviations ZANU-PF and ZANU are used interchangeably in this thesis, referring to the same organization.
These two cases of armed rebel movements will be examined in the form of a comparative case study. The cases have been chosen according to the strategy of “most similar cases”, which means that the cases are similar in terms of those variables that are believed to have an impact on the outcome that is to be explained, namely the tolerant or intolerant relations to political opposition. Thus both organizations waged an armed struggle for the liberation of the African population from white minority rule, they both had military opponents that had powerful and efficient security forces that did not allow them to hold liberated territory, they both fought wars through their armed wings and they both built institutions of rebel governance during the war. A within-case analysis will be performed using an analytical framework consisting in operationalized indicators of the concepts of tolerance and intolerance. Throughout the analysis I will seek to place different behaviors, institutions and organizational structures on the scale of tolerance/intolerance.

The outline of the thesis is as follows. In the theory section I will place the study of my two cases in the larger context of rebel-to-party transformation. This section also includes the analytical framework that is used to examine tolerant and intolerant institutions and behaviors. We will then move on to methodological considerations concerning the case selection strategy, performing a structured focused comparison and source criticism. The analysis is divided into thematic sections: organizational structure, coping with internal dissent, building relationships with members and civilians and finally relating to political opponents. For each of the thematic sections I will assess if the party has proven to be more tolerant or intolerant. The thesis will end with a discussion of the conclusions reached throughout the study and suggestions for future research.

**Theory**

The fall of the iron curtain brought an end to numerous civil wars across the globe and paved the way for the research program on rebel groups turned political parties. With the fall of the Soviet empire proxy wars, fought between the capitalist West and the communists through the sponsorship of insurgents, came to a halt. The 1990's produced a stream of peace agreements, (i.e. in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique) and since there were in many cases special provisions in the agreements for the establishment of political parties these rebel parties multiplied.
The early works in this research strand consisted of single and comparative case studies in order to help theory building on the subject (Manning; Söderberg Kovacs 2007; 2008 De Zeeuw). In more recent years there have been attempts at taking a larger perspective on the population of cases and thus performing quantitative analyses (Marshall & Ishiyama 2016; Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz 2016; Manning & Smith 2016) on a large number of armed conflicts dating back to the 1975. Studies have been made across a wide geographical area ranging from Latin America to Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

Many of the early pioneering studies focused on the outcome of the transformation process, and often in cases where the rebels were parties to a negotiated settlement. Typically, the research question in focus was how successful the rebels were in managing to switch from armed actor to political party. Studies have shown that rebels that have built a highly cohesive organization, show strong levels of popular support and are supported from international actors such as donors and multilateral organizations have a higher chance of successfully moving its organization across the threshold of the peace agreement and in to the consolidation period as a viable political party (Söderberg Kovacs 2007, 8).

Manning and Smith (2016) produce a dataset of 127 different rebel groups that have created political parties in the period of 1990 to 2009. They find that in just over half of the analyzed cases the rebel group did create a political party (Manning & Smith 2016, 973). The most important finding of the authors is that political experience and particularly electoral experience that predates the civil war is highly correlated with successful transformation. (Manning & Smith 2016, 981-982) Both comprehensive and partial peace agreements also show positive correlation. (Manning & Smith, 982-983) An interesting hypothesis launched in this article is that highly violent wars may be positive for party formation. (Manning and Smith 2016, 976) The argument for this is that the more violent a conflict is the more polarized society becomes and these deep cleavages can be turned into party organizations with a strong sense of unity and a strong supporter base. (Manning and Smith 2016, 976) This proposition is counterintuitive. However, the more violent the war has been the less likely it is that there will be a transformation. (Manning & Smith 2016, 983)

A puzzling result is that the type and quality of the political and electoral system do not seem to have any significant explanatory power (Manning & Smith 2016, 982). In other words there was no support for the hypothesis that a political environment that is characterized by fairness,
transparency and the rule of law together with a low threshold for new parties to gain political representation. From this result the authors infer that regardless of the fairness and openness of the political system and the rules of the game the rebels will still participate in elections (Manning & Smith 2016, 982). The explanation for this is that it is not the prospect of winning an election that is the most important, but rather there may be benefits connected to just participating as an electoral candidate. The benefits being the ability to use the elections as a forum to build alliances with other parties by showing that the rebel party is a viable political actor. (Manning & Smith 2016, 982) Another explanation launched by Manning and Smith is that the intuitive argument that a small rebel based party would fare better in a proportional electoral system may not be valid (Manning & Smith 2016, 982). The reason for this being that a single member district system could be of advantage to a rebel group that has a clear territorial domicile (Manning & Smith 2016, 982). The study concludes that contexts that feature weak political institutions, few strong political opponents and possibly donors that view the political participation of the rebels as important for peace will lower the costs of creating a political party as well as raising the opportunity cost of not going in to politics (Manning & Smith 2016).

In the case of Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador its support in the first post war elections was found to be greater in areas where the rebels had strong presence during the war (Allison 2010, 121). In these areas of strong rebel presence the FMLN developed a system of rebel governance and this system increased the support for the rebels after the war (Allison 2010, 121).

Wittig (2016, 138) is critical of the linear studies of rebel-to-party transitions that rest on the dichotomy between war and peace, violence and non-violence and rebel group and political party. Rather than viewing these transitions as unidirectional and linear they should instead be seen as multidirectional and circular (Wittig 2016, 138). Violence is one method available to the rebels and it is used when it can best forward the goals of the movement, the same is valid for the method of peaceful cooperation (Wittig 2016, 153). The case of Burundi is used to show how hybrid politico-military organizations fail to fit into a linear understanding of rebel to party transformation (Wittig 2016, 153).

Rebel groups that win civil wars are believed to differ in their organizational post war development as opposed to those armed groups that participate in a negotiated settlement of the conflict (Lyons 2016a, 1027). The rebels in the civil wars of Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda all
share the fact that they won against the incumbents which they were fighting. Interestingly not only are the rebel groups of Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda war winners but they have also created strong authoritarian parties, and have captured government executive and legislative power in the post war period (Lyons 2016a, 1028). The legacy of armed struggle includes a hierarchical organization with strong leadership. In order to efficiently execute military operations there needs to be a clear hierarchical chain of command, not leaving room for factionalism and internal democracy. Military opponents are cast as mortal enemies which makes it difficult to accept political opposition. Fighting protracted wars also lead to high levels of cohesion and solidarity within the movement, as identities and kinships are forged under the harsh conditions of war.

In the cases of Ethiopia and Uganda, and to a lesser extent in Rwanda, the experience of rebel cadres in the administration and governance of liberated territories is another strong feature of the war legacy. The governance structures of liberated territories become the basis of state administration, the hierarchical military structure of the rebel group forms the basis of a party organization and the soldiers and officers populate party offices. The explanation, according to Lyons (2016b), that connects the wartime characteristics of these movements is path dependency. However, Lyons (2016b) does not argue for how path dependency locks the organizations unto a certain path from which it becomes increasingly harder to deviate. One argument would be that organizations have large start-up costs, which makes it more costly to leave an organization in which one is heavily invested in. Drawing on Harmel and Janda (1994) political parties are conservative organizations that will not change unless an internal or external crisis forces them, and this could account for the lock-in effects of the war experience.

Whether insurgents win the war or partake in negotiations it is argued that the specific legacy of armed rebellion creates a certain type of political party. Authoritarian parties that are founded on armed conflict have shown great resiliency in the face of great internal and external pressure. These parties tend to be more stable and enduring, less sensitive to military coups and less sensitive to defections than authoritarian parties that lack the legacy of armed struggle. The special features of these revolutionary political parties are the ability to destroy independent power centers, cohesiveness and control over and use of the security apparatus. The destruction of independent power centers involves eliminating political opponents, institutions of the old regime and religious institutions. Revolutions tend to create strong and cohesive political parties that reach across the nation through a large supporter base and supporter networks. Levitsky and
Way (2013, 8) as well as Lyons argue that the hierarchical military organizations from the war often tend to live on in the form of a strong political party. The strong ties forged during battle lead to a high level of loyalty to the movement which together with the hero status of the revolutionary leaders makes it difficult to defect by oneself or as a group. Disloyalty is viewed upon as a severe crime based on the reasoning that those who are not the supporters of the party are its enemies.

Thus there are arguments in favor of correlating armed revolutionary movements with autocratic regimes. One of the core components of an autocratic regime is the fear of ideas and values that counter and threaten the belief system of the regime, in other words intolerance. An interesting question then is why some regimes are more tolerant than others and how levels of tolerance and intolerance are developed in societies. I will examine how these rebel movements increased levels of tolerance or intolerance in the context of war both by analyzing structural and agency based explanations. The argument that the extent to which the leadership allows critique to be aired is

Dyrstad (2013) has shown that the experience of war leads individuals and groups to a stronger orientation towards political authoritarianism and intolerance. This process unfolds in at least two ways. The first explanation is that exposure to violent conflict will make people more inclined to substitute liberal freedoms for security, and this prioritization is more compatible with authoritarianism than liberalism (Dyrstad 2013, 1222). The other explanation centers on how “insecure group identities” breed authoritarian values and norms (Dyrstad 2013, 1222). Great dependence on in-group identification and group cohesion will increase conventionalism, authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression within the group (Duckitt 1989, 70). What this means is that in contexts where cohesion and group identity is strong, i.e. war-torn societies, this will make groups more inclined to adhere to the institutionalized norms of the group (conventionalism), increase obedience and respect for the authority of the leadership (authoritarian submission) and finally the group is more likely not to accept and to punish those who deviate from the group norms (authoritarian aggression) (Duckitt 1989, 70). Thus authoritarian group identities will increase levels of intolerance and for this reason I will draw on the understanding of authoritarian groups when I model the concept of intolerance. It should be noted that the concepts that I operationalize are to be seen as ideal types, which means that I do not think that I will find that an actor is either fully tolerant or totally intolerant. Rather the concepts are used as analytical tools to be able to judge whether specific behaviors are more tolerant or more intolerant.
Another way of highlighting the specific characteristics of rebel parties in government is by comparing them to ruling political parties that lack a history of armed struggle (Muriaas et al. 2016). A history of armed struggle gives the party greater political capital, both administrative and ideational capital, to be used to create powerful party organizations (Muriaas et al. 2016, 177-178). Arguing in the same vein as Lyons (2016a) protracted wars usually mean that the rebel group creates institutional structures for the cause of the struggle, and these institutions can be used after the war as administrative capital (Muriaas et al. 2016, 179). The rebels also have an important resource in soldiers from the war but also women and youth who were involved in carrying out tasks for the rebels during the war (Muriaas et al. 2016, 180). These groups can be incorporated into the party, both to secure their support and their loyalty by providing positions and salaries in the party organization. (Muriaas et al. 2016, 180). Thus rebel parties are more likely to be more institutionalized than other parties, i.e. a peaceful pro-democracy movement.

What are the implications for the development of tolerant or intolerant relations to political opposition? Building solidarity and unity based on a glorious war effort, drawing on ideational capital (Muriaas et al. 2016, 188), could have a polarizing effect. Even though many people would subscribe to the values connected to the independence struggle it rests on a rhetoric of “us-and-them” that could have negative impact on tolerance.

How important is dissent and political opposition for the consolidation of democracy? When the political opposition in a political system is weak both in terms of its low internal capacity and the lack of structural opportunities for dissent political parties have a hard time performing their democratic functions.

It can be of value to look beyond the first elections after the war and examine how rebel parties organizationally cope with their new predicament (Ishiyama & Batta 2011, 370). Ishiyama and Batta (2011, 372) develop an argument based on political party members being driven by either benefit seeking (attracted to ideology) or office seeking behavior (attracted to holding political office). Since rebellion is a high-risk activity with low chances of payoff this should mean that rebel parties to a large extent should be populated by benefit seekers since the office seekers would have deemed the cost of participation too high (Ishiyama & Batta 2011, 370). These members will have impact on the direction of the party as either programmatic or electoral (Ishiyama & Batta 2011, 370). Benefit seekers will generally favor political program over winning elections. How power is distributed within the organization is another key internal factor that will
shape the party. Is power centralized with a few members of the party elite or is it decentralized in a way that the party executive more has a role of coordinator (Sindre 2016, 502-503)? Even though rebel parties tend to be highly centralized there could also be strong regional power centers, which would make the party more decentralized along the lines of the *stratarchical* party (Sindre 2016, 503). Highly centralized party organizations are generally more exclusive in the sense that the number of people involved in decision making are very few, they make key decisions by themselves and the membership is not actively participating through policy discussions (Sindre 2016, 503). An important factor affecting the power distribution is how candidates are nominated within the party (Ishiyama & Batta 2011, 370). It will be easier for the leadership to centralize its power if it has total control over the nomination of party candidates.

It has been common practice in the earlier study of civil war to view war as a state of disorder as opposed to the order during peace, when a state of “business as usual” is believed to apply. But as Lyons (2005) notes, war reshapes social and political orders and creates new types of institutions. History has shown that in the absence of institutions, routinization of norms and behavioral patterns, these have been established from below or imposed from above in order for groups and societies to be more efficient (Arjona et al. 2014, 1361). Daily life carries on in a war zone despite violent conflict and the rollback of the state from certain areas, as it is challenged by rebels. Rebels create institutions both for reasons of efficient resource extraction from civilians but also as part of a military strategy where institutionalized relations to civilians enables easier control of the population and less reliance on coercion (Arjona et al. 2014, 1361-1362). Based on this Arjona et al. (2014, 1375) creates a typology where rebel governance is determined by the scope of the rebel intervention in society and the existence of a social contract between the parties. The social contract signals whether there is some agreement on that the rebel institutions are to be seen as the rules of the game (Arjona et al. 2014, 1375). Empirical data also shows that rebel governance, in terms of the scope, tends to be either wide or narrow. If a rebel group for example has intervened heavily in terms of legal institutions then it is more likely that intervention in other fields is equally deep.

Another take on the rebel governance phenomenon is to examine how it shapes the type of regime that emerges after the war. Huang (2016, 96) finds a robust correlation between rebel reliance on the civilian population as an income source during civil war and postwar democracy. The relationship between rebel governance and postwar autocracy shows correlation but the results are not as statistically significant as shown in the relationship above. According to Huang
rebels governance either has no statistically significant effect on regime outcome after civil war or it has an “autocratizing” effect (Huang 2016, insert page). Thus the statistical results of the impact of rebel governance are ambiguous, yet the relationship between rebel governance and autocracy merits further investigation. Lyons (2016b, 170) argues in favor of the “autocratizing” effect based on the argument that civilians in liberated territories are not constituents to which the rebels are accountable, rather the people are resources that can be used, controlled and politicized to serve the armed struggle. After the war is over the relationships built with the people are placed within the authoritarian state, in the cases of rebel victory (2016b, 170).

This study (Huang 2016) is based on a dataset of 127 civil war episodes and assessed for each of them what the extent of rebel governance was during the war, looking at the primary rebel group in cases where the are several parties on the rebel side of the conflict. The operationalization of this variable is the existence of the following formal institutions: rebel executive command, a legislature or regional councils, legal system, tax system, mandatory boycott of state taxes, police, education system, healthcare system, humanitarian relief, media and foreign affairs. This operationalization has its strengths and weaknesses. It is a parsimonious approach that lends itself well to empirical research, yet it gives equal weight to all of the institutions mentioned. The problem is that some of the institutions that are indicators of rebel governance are in fact prerequisites for a functioning governance system. For example, it is difficult to provide collective goods without a rebel executive command, and it is more demanding to create a police force that guarantees safety than to publish rebel propaganda through different media channels. Yet with these deficiencies in mind Huang’s (2016) operationalization is satisfactory for the purposes of this thesis.

**Analytical framework**

In order to see if and how the character of rebel governance in each of the two cases has promoted tolerance or intolerance we need an operationalization of the concepts. Tolerance, in its essence, is the ability to accept views and values which one does not support and to accept the supporters of these values (Gibson 1992, 562). Inversely, intolerant actors will not accept these competing expressions of views and values. An important component of intolerance is threat perception, thus actors who view opponents as a threat are more likely to be intolerant (Gibson 1992, 569). Therefore intolerant actors can not accept expressions of ideas and values that are
different from their own and these expressions are seen as threatening and challenging to the actor's system of belief. Political tolerance, then, is the ability to extend full political rights to one’s political opponents, which is a narrower concept than that of social tolerance (Kirchner 2011, 204). Social tolerance goes beyond only the recognition of political rights to include other people’s and groups lifestyles and behaviors (Kirchner 2011, 204-205). In this thesis I will apply both of these dimensions of tolerance since it is difficult to separate the concepts without missing factors that could affect the outcome of the two cases.

How do the concepts of tolerance and intolerance fit into the study of these political parties? Levels of tolerance will be affected by interactions within the party both between the leadership and members as well as between members. Interactions range from how the party leadership sanctions its’ members to how party members and soldiers relate to civilians. But the interactions and behaviors are also conditioned by institutional arrangements (Kirchner et al. 2011, 210-211), specifically through the concepts of inclusion, universality and fairness. The design of the institutions will decide what incentives and disincentives there are for tolerant behavior. Inclusive institutions guarantee the representation of various interest groups and minority groups, and when there is no fear that one’s status position will be challenged there are incentives to be tolerant (Kirchner). Universality refers to an institution being comprehensive, including all of the people on the same conditions (Kirchner). When an actor delivers public goods to the population this will create equal opportunities which will eliminate the threat of other people or groups reaping benefits from asymmetries in the system (Kirchner). Institutions that are characterized by fairness will be transparent and uphold a set of norms and sanction those who violate those norms (Kirchner).

In order to decide which areas of the cases that will be analyzed in terms of tolerance I will use variables developed by Huang (2016). The variables are the different rebel institutions: rebel executive command, a legislature or regional councils, legal system, tax system, mandatory boycott of state taxes, police, education system, healthcare system, humanitarian relief, media and foreign affairs. Out of the above the institutions referring to tax collection, police, media and foreign affairs are not included in the analysis. When it comes to tax systems there is no obvious impact on tolerance. The media of the rebels is not relevant in itself, however it does provide data for analysis in order to examine other institutions. The foreign affairs department of the rebel movements could be of interest in terms of how cooperation with foreign governments and
organizations functioned and how potential conflicts were mediated. But I judge it to be less important than the other institutions that have been chosen, and for this reason in combination with the restrictions of time and text space this institution is not included. In neither of the cases was there a police force established by the rebels, which excludes this institution. This leaves us with the following areas of research: rebel executive command, legislature or regional councils, legal system, education system, healthcare system and humanitarian relief.

These institutions will then be analyzed in four thematic areas: organization, interactions with members, internal dissent and finally political opponents. Table 1, below, gives an overview of indicators of tolerance and intolerance for each of the thematic areas.

Organization
This area of analysis investigates how the organization promotes tolerance or intolerance through its organizational structure.

Relations with members and civilians
In this area I will analyze both specific party or party leadership behaviors as well as institutions created by the rebels.

Internal dissent
This section specifically deals with how internal dissent has been treated in the party. I will look closer at events in the parties’ history where conflicts of interests occurred and assess how these conflicts were mediated by the organizations.

Political opponents
Finally I will analyze how the ANC and ZANU-PF have related to political opponents during the war. Have there been cooperation or conflicts with other parties, organizations or rebel movements? It is of particular interest to see how the two parties have related to opponents who have different values and political programs.

2 Both parties had political representation abroad, and ZANU-PF had a diplomatic presence in Sweden, which was one of its largest donors.
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<th>Tolerance</th>
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<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
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<td>• Lack of channels to express dissent</td>
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<td>• Formalized process of drafting policy through membership participation</td>
<td>• Policy is drafted among the leadership elite without transparency or popular participation</td>
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<td>• Elections of leadership</td>
<td>• Leadership positions are appointed by the party executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relations with members and civilians</strong></td>
<td>• Inclusive institutions with interest representation in terms of ethnic groups and minorities</td>
<td>• Exclusive institutions represent elite interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Universality in the sense that institutions grant equal rights and responsibilities to all (i.e. public goods provision)</td>
<td>• Rights and responsibilities are unevenly distributed which gives some individuals advantages over others</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fairness in the form of a transparent system of norms and those who violate these norms are sanctioned</td>
<td>• There is no transparent system of norms that regulates actions and behaviors. Sanctions are issued arbitrarily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pluralism when it comes to ideas and values</td>
<td>• There is only one truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal dissent</strong></td>
<td>• Executive leadership tolerates critique and dissent among members</td>
<td>• Critique and dissent are viewed as a threat to party discipline and is strictly forbidden</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Does not respond to dissent with sanctions primarily but tries to mediate conflicts through deliberation at party conferences or other fora</td>
<td>• Members are heavily sanctioned, regardless of the severity of the violation, to maintain discipline, loyalty and obedience</td>
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<td>• Sanctions against members who violate party policy are proportional and moderate</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political opponents</strong></td>
<td>• Political opponents with differing values and beliefs are viewed as legitimate political actors.</td>
<td>• Political opponents are regarded as enemies that pose a risk to the survival of the organization. The threat of political actors with differing views and values must be repressed.</td>
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Table 1
Methodology

This thesis has an exploratory focus, in that it attempts to build theory on rebel groups in politics through the use of case studies, and according to Gerring (2004, 349) the case study is a good choice for an exploratory study. By exploring cases of rebel rulers we can gain greater insight into the different trajectories of armed movements that enter politics with a legacy of civil war.

First I will perform a within case analysis of the two cases, followed by a cross case comparison. I will use the method of structured focused comparison for the examination of the two cases (George & Bennett 2005, 67). It is a structured comparison of the cases, in the sense that the same set of questions are raised for both of the cases, and the study has a clear focus in that the cases are examined only with respect to the research question at hand (George & Bennett 2005, 67). By asking the same set of questions to the cases it is possible to receive data that is comparable across the cases (George & Bennett 2005, 69). There is a vast amount of data available for both of the cases but the demands of a focused study means that we must be selective of what data is interesting (George & Bennett 2005, 70).

Cases and data

Case selection

I have chosen to study the cases of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe. A case in the context of this thesis should be understood as an “instance of a class of events” (Bennett & Checkel 2014, 8). Since this thesis attempts to explain the behavior of two cases of this particular kind of political party, it is important to remember which larger population that the two cases fit in to. By being specific about the universe of cases that we are selecting cases from this will build a good basis for systematic comparison (George & Bennett 2005, 69).

The two political parties ZANU-PF and ANC are investigated as cases of the greater class of events of political parties based on armed rebel movements. The time period to be analyzed for the ANC starts in 1961 when the ANC was declared illegal in South Africa, and its armed wing
was formed, up until the cease fire in 1989. For the ZANU-PF the period of investigation will be the time period coded as civil war by Gleditsch et al. (2002).

The case selection strategy employed in this thesis is a “most similar case” design (Seawright & Gerring 2008, 304). The similarities between the cases will be explained in the following paragraphs. First of all, these are two cases of armed insurgents engaged in civil war against the government. In the Uppsala Conflict Data Program the conflict between the ANC and the South African government is coded as a civil war between 1981 to 1988 (Gleditsch et. al. 2002). Thus the height of the South African conflict was in the 1980's but as Muriaas et al. (2016, 177) point out, the military operations of the MK began already in 1961. 1961 being the year that the movements armed wing was formed (Williams 2006). The conflict in Zimbabwe is coded as a civil war between 1967 until 1979, however this also includes ZAPU as a party to the conflict (Ibid.).

Secondly based on Huang’s (2016) dataset on rebel groups both of these cases are coded as relatively high “institutionalist rebels” scoring 7 wartime institutions out of 11. It should be noted that the mean of the population of 127 conflicts in the dataset is around 3 institutions. This means that the two cases that are selected are civil wars in which the rebels constructed a wartime political order in their interaction with the civilian population.

Thirdly, their opponent in both cases were white settler governments, built on the oppression of the black African population. This means that the two rebel groups share the same type of grievances, on which they formed their struggle.

Fourthly, the ANC and the ZANU-PF experienced similar competitive environments during the war and were not able to control and hold territory, as did the EPRFD in Ethiopia or the NRM in Uganda (see Lyons 2016). Both the apartheid government and the Rhodesian Smith government had efficient and powerful security apparatuses at their disposal, and their regimes proved difficult to defeat in military terms. Since the ZANU-PF did not have a safe haven where they could seek protection from government forces they waged a guerilla war, through its armed wing ZANLA, from neighboring Mozambique (Southall 2013, 45). The ANC was banned from working as a political party in South Africa and fought a war through the use of an armed wing, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK).
In terms of the ideological underpinnings of the liberation struggles both of these movements had Marxist-Leninist theory as guiding principles.

What is intriguing is the path that the liberation movements have taken after the independence from colonial rule. Here the cases show a great dissimilarity. Whereas both have created strong political parties that have managed to capture government power systematically in all elections since independence, blurring the lines between party and state, Zimbabwe has moved in an authoritarian and repressive direction while South Africa is classified as a democracy.

The ANC did not wage the kind peoples war that unfolded in Rhodesia and this implied that the rural population was not politically mobilized as a military strategy. The reason for this was the economic structure of South African society. Large white owned farms employed black workers but there was no large rural peasant population on which to build the basis of a guerilla style peoples war (Barrell 1993, 37). Thus demographics and economic structure of society were quite different in the the cases of South Africa and Rhodesia.

Data and source criticism

One of the most challenging dimensions of this thesis is the relation between the researcher and the data. The study of civil war is complicated by the fact that reliable information is scarce, since both the government and the rebels have incentives to present a picture of reality that serves their own cause. Thus there is often no unbiased institution that records objective information on the conflict. In these two particular cases the conflicts are not new but are instead historical events that can be studied through archives, interviews and secondary sources. As I rely for the most part on secondary sources it becomes important to critically assess the authors relationship with the conflict. Is the author a former party member? Is the author still an active member? If it has left the movement what were the reasons for leaving? Answering these questions and others will allow us to understand what weight an account of certain historical events should be given (Teorell & Svensson 2007, 104-106).

In the case of South Africa the regime has been more open towards its war legacy which means that there is more data available through valuable sources as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This commission investigated in detail accusations of human rights violations perpetrated by the ANC during the armed conflict and the extensive descriptions of the ANC as
an organization would have been difficult to access in other ways. The government in Zimbabwe was more welcoming towards scholars who wished to do field work and archival research in the country right after independence, but as time passed restrictions became harder (Kriger 1992, 43). There is no equivalent of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in Zimbabwe, which is explained by the lack of interest of the regime to delve in to its violent past. This means that many potential human rights abuses and war crimes are left uninvestigated and in a war that claimed up to 40 000 deaths (Kriger 1992, 4) and displacing tens of thousands people from their homes I will hypothesize that the crimes committed by ZANU-PF during the war should at least correspond to the acts of the ANC.

The official journals that were published during the armed conflicts, Sechaba in the case of the ANC and Zimbabwe News in the case of ZANU-PF, are used as data for the thesis. It is evident that these publications are part of the propaganda machine of the organizations yet they are still important sources. I will hypothesize that the rebels want to appear as tolerant in front of a domestic audience but also in front of an important international audience consisting of political allies and donors, such as Sweden. According to Ellis (Ellis 2012, 307-308) the more party propaganda that paints the picture of unity and peace the more the reason to expect abuses. Appearing as tolerant internally in the organization and externally towards other actors should grant the rebels greater legitimacy for their cause. Thus when in fact intolerant views are expressed in these publications they should be given significant weight in the assessment of tolerance and intolerance.

Analysis

Organization

This section will look more closely at the organizational structure of the two parties and how these structures shaped levels of tolerance.

ANC

The history of the African National Congress dates as far back as 1912. But it was not until 1961 that the ANC decided to form an armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), that would forward the movements goals through armed struggle (Williams 2006, 18-19). The armed wing formation
should be viewed against the backdrop of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) declared illegal by the government in 1961 and the Sharpeville massacre of the same year, where peaceful protesters were gunned down by the government.

The organizational structure of the ANC was clearly hierarchical and centralized, with the National Executive Committee (NEC) being the highest decision-making body. The NEC was in turn elected by the national conference (African National Congress 1958). There were also provincial, regional and branch committees to organize the grassroots throughout the country. The ANC was declared illegal in 1961 (Williams 2006, 9), and with most of the top leadership arrested in 1962 and 1963 the remaining ANC leaders were forced to rebuild the organization abroad (Ellis 1991, 443). Headquarters were established in Zambia and military camps were located in Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania (Ellis 2012). For example the decision to form an armed wing was taken by the National Executive Committee, prepared by the ANC working committee, in a secret meeting (Ellis 2012, 23-25). The fact that the ANC was a clandestine movement made transparency of the organization difficult (Barrell 1993, 101). Regarding Howard Barrell his past as an active ANC member gives him greater access to the interview subjects that form the basis of his PhD thesis, yet his proximity to the object of study also contributes to the risk of bias in the research. This potential bias can be overcome by using multiple sources. Professor Stephen Ellis is not affiliated with the ANC which gives him an advantage in terms of bias, however accessing sources should prove harder for the very same reason.

The NEC created the revolutionary council in 1969 as responsible for all operations, both in South Africa and abroad (Barrell 1993, 79). Why? After the party conference in 1969 the external organization opened up to non-african membership, which had not been allowed up until then. This meant that the ANC opened up to allied parties such as the South African Indian Congress and the South African Communist Party. For example the Revolutionary Council included several non-african members, who also happened to all be members of the South African Communist Party (Barrell 1993, 80), however the NEC was still only open to Africans.

The secrecy together with the dispersion of the organization both across Africa and beyond impaired lines of communication (Barrell 1993, 101). Discontent with the internal democratic procedures of the party led to a split between the ANC and 8 senior members, who were expelled from the party (Barrell 1993, 100-101).
The ANC constitution states that every member has the right to criticize both the policy of the party but also party officials and the criticism should be aired in a meeting that is appropriate (African National Congress 1958). Members also have the right to participate in the drafting of party policy. The constitution also grants the decision-making bodies of the party the right to discipline other party organs and individual members in the instance that they have committed a breach against the rules of the constitution (African National Congress 1958). Importantly the one who is being accused has the right to stand before a tribunal and argue for one’s innocence or guilt in the matter (African National Congress 1958).

ZANU

ZANU was created in 1963 as an offspring from Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) (Mazarire 2011, 571). The revolutionary council presided over the ZANU organization and over its military wing ZANLA, and was instituted in 1965 after the arrest of a large portion of the party leadership (Pandya 1988, 66). The arrested party elite included the President of ZANU, Ndabaningi Sithole. The chairman of the council was Herbert Chitepo, acting as the exiled leader at the party headquarters in Zambia.

The party structure rested on village committees that composed branch, district and provincial committees and at the top the Revolutionary Council (later the Dare Re Chimurenga) (Pandya 1988, 64-65). Disciplinary committees were present at the village level and on the branch, district and provincial levels one of their functions was to discipline members who misbehaved (Pandya 1988, 64-65).

In 1967 the military planning committee was created, according to Bhebe (1999) this was a way of increasing the power of the military wing vis-à-vis the party. This meant that the military branch was separated from the party through this committee. All but the chairman of this committee were guerilla soldiers. In 1973 the committee, renamed as the military high command, managed to replace the civilian chairman with a military officer, Tongogara, who took over the chairmanship and the role of Chief of Defense (Bhebe 1999, 32-33).

In the 1969 party conference the revolutionary council was replaced by a new executive body, the Dare-Re-Chimurenga (the Dare), whose members were elected, which had not been the case for the revolutionary council (Mazarire 2011, 573). Also in 1969 a military High Command was
created to oversee military operations, but as opposed to the Dare this body was not elected but appointed by the Dare, more specifically by the Secretary of Defense (Mazarire 2011, 575).

Democratic centralism, a Leninist political concept centered on consensual decision making, was the guiding principle of the party. Officially, decisions were discussed by the members until a consensus was reached, and once a decision was taken all members were to abide by it (Mazarire 2011, 575). Criticism and self-criticism was also an important feature of this model of consensual decision making, meaning that the membership was supposed to air grievances against the leadership and the leadership was also supposed to reflect on their own deeds (Mazarire 2011, 575).

There was an official code of conduct, inspired by Maoist political thought, which ZANLA soldiers had to follow (Pandya 1988, 109). It stressed among other things that civilians had to be treated well, that it was forbidden to steal and that captured enemy soldiers were to be treated well (Pandya 1988, 110). According to Pandya captured Rhodesian soldiers were not executed, as was the case with ZANLA soldiers caught by the regime, and gives examples of a number of Rhodesian soldiers who attest to having been well treated by ZANLA (Pandya 1988, 111).

Comparison

Both parties were hierarchical organizations where power was centralized in the executive. However they did appoint the party leadership through popular elections. Both parties were declared illegal by the regime which forced them underground and into exile. In the case of the ANC its 1958 constitution gave members the right to participate in the process of drafting policy and to criticize the leadership. Thus on paper the ANC was rather inclusionary with a structure allowing members political voice. In the case of ZANU-PF historical documentation is more scarce, and a party constitution is not available, however Mazarire (2011) argues that democratic centralism was a guiding principle for the party. There was a code of conduct in place to instill discipline into the party’s soldiers. While both parties were highly centralized and hierarchical the available evidence suggests that the ANC was organizationally more inclusive.
Internal dissent

In this section of the thesis I will examine how the two movements acted in cases of internal dissent, criticism and violations of party policy. This will shed light on how the leadership managed internal conflicts which will give indications of the levels of tolerance within the leadership and whether their actions were promoting tolerance or intolerance.

ANC

Running military camps in Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique presented the party with many challenges. The camp living conditions were tough for the soldiers and many of the recruits had signed up to be deployed as soldiers in South Africa, but sending troops back to South Africa was logistically difficult. This meant that soldiers were either stationed in military camps waiting for deployment or that they were deployed in other conflict zones such as in Rhodesia. Against this background discontent spread among the soldiers of the MK.

Due to the need to ensure discipline and ideological commitment as well as to prevent infiltration of enemy agents into the party a party security apparatus, National Security or NAT, was created in 1969 (Ellis 2012, 152-155). A special detention centre, “Camp 32” or “Quatro”, was established in Angola in 1979 and in practice it functioned as an ANC prison. A spy network was revealed in 1981 and in the aftermath of this arrests were made and ANC members were placed in detention. Torture was a common method used in interrogations to reveal infiltrated enemy agents (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 361). In 1984 a mutiny broke out in the Angolan Viana camp, which resulted in the imprisonment of 32 soldiers out of which two died in prison. In Angola in the same year another rebellion took place in the Pango camp, which was suppressed by military means. There are reports of some of the detained rebels being tortured and seven of the mutineers were executed. Several of those being arrested during the rebellions of 1984 spent several years in prison without receiving a trial. (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 348-349)

Military tribunals were put in place to try the cases of suspected traitors and at these trials the accused were not allowed legal representation (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 354-355). These tribunals were convened on an ad hoc basis, which points in a direction of these not being part of the ANC organizational structure. Yet members from the Revolutionary Council,
the executive body in the ANC exiled movement, were present on the tribunals. (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 354). It is noteworthy that the final decision on executions of those tried by the tribunal were in several cases in fact taken by the National Executive Council (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 355). This lends support to the theory that extra-legal military courts were able to adjudicate cases of criminal offences and to issue death penalties with the support of the top leadership of the ANC.

ZANU

The Nhari rebellion in 1974 was an attempt by a faction within the military wing of the party ZANLA, led by Thomas Nhari, to overthrow the Military High Command (Pandya 1988, 112). The grievances are believed to be based on the soldiers’ dire living conditions on the ZANLA war front in combination with accusations of corruption within the political and military leadership (Mazarire 2011, 576). Thomas Nhari begun by expressing his criticism to the Dare Re Chimurenga, as an attempt to use the established procedures resting on democratic centralism (Mazarire 2011, 576). The Dare Re Chimurenga saw Nhari’s airing of grievances as an example of poor discipline and thus responded by downgrading the military ranks of Nhari and his colleague to ordinary soldiers (Mazarire 2011, 577). The demotion of Nhari led to an escalation of the conflict pushing him to kidnap members of the military leadership to force the Dare Re Chimurenga to listen to his grievances (Mazarire 2011, 577). As Nhari’s strategy had been fruitless he performed a takeover of a ZANLA military camp in Zambia and in the process he was responsible for the death of 70 soldiers (Mazarire 2011, 577). Nhari was killed in the recapturing of the military base (Mazarire 2011, 577). Up until the Nhari insurrection the Dare Re Chimurenga had not had the need to rule on any disciplinary cases since the elections to this body had served as a way of maintaining party discipline and sorting out those who did not favor the party line (Mazarire 2011, 576).

A commission was set up to investigate the Nhari rebellion and to punish those who were responsible (Mazarire 2011, 577). The commission was chaired by the chairman of the Dare Re Chimurenga, Herbert Chitepo (Mazarire 2011, 577). The commission decided to suspend several of those involved in the mutiny, awaiting trials (Mazarire 2011, 577). However a member of the military high command chose to execute one of the suspended mutineers, who was a senior member of the Dare Re Chimurenga (Mazarire 2011, 577). At the trial of the rebels Chitepo, who acted as the chairman of the court, ruled that the soldiers were to be downgraded in military rank
and handed over to the authorities in Mozambique (Mazarire 2011, 578). However, members of the High Command executed the rebellious soldiers without the blessing of the Dare (Mazarire 2011, 577). This is an example of how the armed wing of the party on several occasions established itself as the power holders vis-à-vis the political leadership (Mazarire 2011, 572).

Comparison

Both parties responded to dissent and mutiny with heavy repression in the form of executions. In the case of the ANC torture was a common method for the security apparatus of interrogating suspects. It can be concluded that both parties used strong and severe sanctions to ensure discipline and loyalty within their armed wings. Regarding the parties’ relations with opponents during the liberation wars both had problematic relations with political movements that they perceived as countering and betraying the liberation struggle. In the case of ZANU-PF its first leader is.

Relationships with members and civilians

ANC

In the later part of the 1980’s the apartheid regime’s ability to uphold their monopoly on violence in the black townships was severely obstructed. In the beginning of the 1980’s civil unrest spread through the black townships, beginning in the area of the Vaal Triangle, south of Johannesburg (Price 1991, 192). The violent uprising in the townships led to the establishment of liberated territories where government forces could no longer safely operate. Hence the governance structures of the apartheid state started to be replaced by local popular systems of rule. The townships were organized in to street committees that in turn elected representatives for an area committee. Area committee councils were responsible for the delivery of public services and law and order (Price 1991, 206). This “street bureaucracy” operated according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus only severe crimes were dealt with at the highest level, area committee councils, while conflicts in daily life were settled at the level of the street committee (Price 1991, 206). The committee system was advanced especially interesting from the point of view of tolerance are the control and judicial functions that were performed.

The predecessor to the street committees were the areas overtaken by the young comrades of the townships (Price 1991, 207). These were groups of youth activists that supported the liberation
struggle but that were not necessarily organized through the ANC. In these areas where the state had withdrawn the comrades overtook control of crime and justice, and both apprehended criminals as well as gave out punishments (Price 1991, 207). So called people’s courts, consisting of groups of comrades, were instated that normally sentenced those guilty of minor offences to community service while more severe crimes were punished by corporal punishment (Price 1991, 209). The courts also handled cases of traitors or informers, and there are reports of violent deadly assaults. There are no indications of those accused having defense lawyers or other means of defending themselves from the court.

These alternative local governance structures were fashioned through a concerted effort both from the grassroots but also driven by the leadership of the United Democratic Front (UDF) (Price 1991, 202-203). The UDF was created in 1983 and was an umbrella organization that brought together a wide variety of civil society movements (Barrell 1993, 309). There was also an overlap between the UDF leadership and the ANC, with several people being members of both organizations (Barrell 1993, 310). Both the national secretary and national publicity secretary had connections to the ANC (Barrell 1993, 310). This strengthens the argument that there was an alliance and coordination between the UDF and the ANC (Barrell 1993, 310). This alliance is important because it explains the central role of the ANC in the popular uprisings in the townships.

The UDF met with the ANC leadership in Stockholm in 1985 and at this meeting the ANC pushed for the UDF to expand the movement for liberation and what was called “people’s power” (Seekings 2000, 166-168). Since the ANC was a movement in exile it could not direct the struggle on the ground in South Africa, apart from the military operations of the MK, and thus it had an opportunity to operate through other allied organizations such as the UDF, who had a greater presence in South Africa. Although the ANC had a limited presence inside South Africa, in the form of underground cells. Thus several scholars (Simpson 2017; Barrell 1993) argue that the popular uprisings were not orchestrated by the ANC or the UDF. Rather they are described as a movement from below. According to Barrell (1993, 426-427) the ANC grabbed on to events on the ground evolving in the townships and fitted these in to its discourse on national liberation.

Yet even though the ANC did not have operational control of either the popular armed struggle in the townships or the street bureaucracy they were responsible for the political and ideological basis of the idea of people’s power. Thus, peoples power was performed in the name of the ANC
but without its operational guidance. This view is supported by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998, 347):

…the commission finds that the ANC is morally and politically accountable for creating a climate in which such supporters believed their actions to be legitimate and carried out within the broad parameters of a ‘peoples war’ as enunciated and actively promoted by the ANC.

The national presence of the ANC through its underground was weak and this also meant that communications between operational units in the country was difficult during the township revolts (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 340). Yet the report states that there was “a dedicated core of activists inside the mass movements who owed loyalty to the ANC” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 340). In this context of informational asymmetry the activists acted according to what they interpreted to be the strategy of the ANC, but also creating their own strategic choices to which the ANC had to adapt (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 340).

It was as if “…the ANC was taken by surprise…” (Barrell 1993, 384) when the violent struggle in the townships, that it had advocated, finally reached a national scale. This suggests that the people’s war that the ANC had propagated for so many years was not under ANC central operational control. How does this popularly driven war fit into the tolerance framework? The substitution of the colonial administration with street committees must be viewed as inclusive institutions as they were fashioned from below in the townships. The committee system was universal in that it provided public goods to the people. The weaker component is that of fairness.

Yet at the same time as violent struggle and governance through people’s power grew from the masses there was little in the form of accountability. Since the ANC had failed to take command of the battle in the streets angry mobs of young men were allowed to roam free and cause havoc. There were neither any checks and balances on the street committees, save for their appointment through popular elections, that regulated behavior and actions. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has recorded that ANC supporters committed human rights violations by choosing and attacking targets, collaborating with the regime, at will (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 339). These ANC supporters lacked any official order from the ANC to attack their targets but they have argued that they were in fact acting according to ANC policy.
Killings of these target sometimes involved the method of “necklacing” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 339).

*Education and healthcare in exile*

The Soweto uprising of 1976 led to an exodus of young revolutionaries, some wanting to join the armed struggle of MK. It is against this background of a flow of exiled South Africans together with the need to supply the revolutionary struggle with well-trained cadres that lay behind the decision of the ANC to operate a school in Tanzania in 1978 (Morrow et al. 2004, 15). The school had an overtly political goal which was to supply the ANC with well-trained members in service of the liberation struggle (Morrow et al. 2004, 18). Thus it was quite clear that the aim was not to only raise the education level of the South Africans but primarily to ensure the success of the revolutionary struggle (Morrow et al. 2004, 18). The choice of the ANC to open a department of education should be seen as a political strategy of replacing the structures of the ancien régime. Therefore it is interesting to see what kind of relationships the party develops with the recipients of education. An ANC department of Education was created in 1978 (Morrow et al. 2004, 17). Education committees in the exile network of the ANC contributed to the project of the school by among other things raising funds, producing learning material and discussing policy (Morrow et al. 2004, 16). A hospital was opened in 1984 (Morrow et al. 2004, 26). A department of health was created in 1977 (Morrow et al. 2004, 24).

Education committees spread out in the ANC exile organization were responsible for policy development with the London committee acting as the hub for policy and curriculum among other areas (Morrow et al. 2004, 16). The National Education Council (NEDUC) included representatives of different educational committees. The debates within the council suggests that there was a number of different views on the political role of education and that conflicting views were allowed to be expressed and discussed (Morrow et al. 2004, 17-19).

The ANC department of health arose in 1977 from the need to address the health situation of MK cadres in exile. Though the department was to service the military wing of the movement it was organizationally separated from MK, and it was subordinated to the External Coordinating Committee which in turn was under the jurisdiction of the NEC. Evidence suggest that as the department developed it was not restricted to service the military needs of the movement but also to have a humanitarian focus (Armstrong 2017, 299). This meant that the health services
were not only directed towards military personnel but also geared towards the civilians in exile. Examples of this is the health center (the flagship of the ANC health services) constructed to service the SOMAFCO school in Tanzania and the center in Angola (Armstrong 2017, 299). The inflow of donor funding for the work of the department of health contributed to its organizational independence (Armstrong 2017, 299).

ZANU

As in many other liberation wars ZANU’s military wing ZANLA engaged in guerilla warfare. The Rhodesian government and its armed forces was a strong opponent and it took quite some time for the guerillas to increase their numbers in order to be able to challenge the government militarily. ZANLA depended heavily on civilian logistical support in order to supply money, food, clothing and intelligence on government forces (Kriger 1992, 116). But the material dependence on civilians was not the only cause for engaging the population, also ZANU was guided by Maoist ideology (Harber 1985, 166). In Maoist strategy the mobilization of the peasantry was an important part of waging a people’s war against the state.

As the war evolved, to increase logistical efficiency the rebel-civilian relation was formed into more organized patterns of interaction (Kriger 1992, 116). For this reason committees were formed, on the village level, where married adults and youth were organized separately (Ibid.). The village committees collected money from the peasants, organized the preparation and delivery of food, kept records of peasant contributions and collected intelligence on the enemy forces through an organized administrative system where tasks were divided between administrative officers (Kriger 1992, 118). The administrative officers were appointed through popular elections (Kriger 1992, 118). Towards the end of the war, in 1977 and 1978, these village committees were grouped into larger regional organizations in order to improve efficiency and coordination (Kriger 1992, 118). The organization of civilians varied between geographical areas depending on the degree of penetration of government forces. Thus in areas with strong government presence the organization was centralized into a select number of village representatives, from different villages (Kriger 1992, 120).

Generally the youth were responsible for the tougher work involving reconnaissance work in order to issue warnings of incoming troops as well as delivering messages between guerilla outposts (Kriger 1992, 119).
ZANLA guerilla soldiers also engaged in political education of the peasants. This took the form of village meetings, moraris, in the evenings where soldiers would make speeches and chant political songs (Kriger 1992, 118). At the meetings soldiers would also settle cases where villagers were accused of treason (Kriger 1992, 118). In sum the moraris was an important tool for guerillas to establish and deepen their relations with civilians.

ZANLA relied on both voluntary and involuntary, press-ganging, recruitment of soldiers to its rebel army (Tungamirai 1995, 40-41). The recruitment was performed both in Rhodesia and abroad. Recruiting abroad was basically done on the basis of ethnicity (Tungamirai 1995, 40-41). ZANU, pressed by its host nation Tanzania, had to show that it was capable of building a rebel army in order to be allowed to maintain its bases in the country (Tungamirai 1995, 40-41). For this reason ZANLA launched attacks on ZIPRA bases in order to steal recruits from its opponent (Tungamirai 1995, 40-41). The great increase of refugees to camps in Mozambique also provided fertile grounds for recruitment in to ZANLA (Tungamirai 1995, 42).

ZANLA targeted the infrastructure of the state, as a way of breaking down its enemy’s strength (Bhebe 1999, 98-99). But sometimes the targets were vital to the interests and livelihoods of the peasants, which drove some of the peasants to cooperate with government forces, as the rebels were destroying vital government services (Bhebe 1999, 98-99). Government collaborators were seen as traitors and in these cases punished by death (Bhebe 1999, 98-99).

**Education in refugee camps**

The war between ZANU, ZAPU and the Rhodesian government led to a massive wave of refugees, seeking solace in neighboring states. According to Chung there were 30 000 children together with tens of thousands of adults in need of education in camps in Mozambique (Chung 1996, 141). ZANU built up an education system in the camps and founded a department of education in 1977 in Chimoio Mozambique. (Chung 1996, 141-142). Due to heavy bombardment by Rhodesian government forces the government of Mozambique moved the refugee camps further away from the border, to provide safety. Thus the department of educated operated under difficult conditions both in terms of security and material resources.
Teachers were given teacher training courses, drafted by the research and training team, and there was also research being undertaken examining educational conditions in the camps (Chung 1996, 141). Courses were also held for administrative officers within the education system. Textbooks were produced for the purpose of language studies among other subjects. The technology to print the literature was provided by the UNICEF. Students took exams and all levels from preschool to secondary education were given at the various camps. Soldiers in some military camps also had the possibility to take courses when they were not involved in military training.

How does the ZANU educational system connect to the concept of tolerance? The fact that ZANU took on the great responsibility of educating tens of thousands of refugees under difficult conditions could be viewed as a tolerant mode of engagement with civilians. Giving children, adults and soldiers education is one way of providing them with a basis for evolving their own views on society and politics, thus developing an ability to critically examine and assess information and knowledge. If the goal was to foster intolerance then rather less than more education would be a more efficient way of reaching this goal.

However according to Harber (1985, 169) all of ZANU’s education was in essence political. Ideologically the curriculum and content of the education was characterized by Marxist political thought. At an early age children were schooled in the organization of the party and revolutionary songs and slogans (Harber 1985, 169). The strong political content of the education fits in to a coercive and controlling way of interacting with party members and civilians. Political indoctrination can be a way of ensuring that the party receives unconditional legitimacy. Yet while there was heavy revolutionary indoctrination of the children the teacher’s role was not authoritarian, rather the power relations between teachers and students was more equal (Harber 1985, 169). Furthermore the school system was decentralized with teachers themselves governing the schools through a system of committees (Harber 1985, 169). Weekly meetings were held where there was opportunity to air criticism and discuss (Harber 1985, 169), which is another example of the idea of democratic centralism. The collective was promoted above the individual and sex equality was important (Harber 1985, 169).

Comparison

The ANC and the ZANU-PF were both actively building institutions during the armed struggle, yet the institutions took on different forms in the two cases. ZANU-PF had direct and intensive
engagement with the peasant population and instituted a committee-system appointed through popular elections. Civilians were coerced into the logistical chain of the rebellion and were politically indoctrinated to serve the liberation struggle. The rebels were also involved in providing education, bordering on humanitarian relief work, to thousands of refugees pouring into Mozambique. For the ANC the street committee system that evolved in the townships was more of a popular movement from below, than in the case of Zimbabwe. This meant that it was highly inclusionary as it originated from the grassroots but the lack of coordination and control suggests that the universality and fairness of the system was problematic.

Political opponents

ANC

The ANC worked through a broad alliance of organizations and parties representing minority groups such as Indians, coloured people and labour. This both built an important support base across different social and cultural cleavages of society but also created a tradition of cooperation, deliberation and compromise, which in turn strengthened tolerance. Yet the ANC struggled with relating to the Inkatha movement, a tribal organization that had its support base concentrated to the Zulu people of South Africa (Southall 1981, 454-455). The movements charismatic leader, Gatsha Buthelezi, was a pragmatist often changing positions on cooperation or conflict with the regime (Southall 1981, 453).

Violence between UDF supporters, allied with the ANC, and Inkatha cadres increased in the 1980’s and the ANC is deemed to play a role in this through negative propaganda on Inkatha (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 340-341). The ANC in Sechaba, the official journal of the party, describe Buthelezi as a puppet of the South African regime and as actively undermining the liberation struggle of the ANC and its allies (Sechaba September 1984, 3-11). Buthelezi had betrayed the South African people, including the Zulu, by accepting and taking part in the government system of black homeland territories (the Bantustan system) (Sechaba September 1984, 3-11). There were actual plans by members of MK to assassinate Chief Buthelezi, however this plan was stopped by the military leadership of MK (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998, 341). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998, 345) reach the conclusion that the ANC, MK and UDF are to be seen as responsible in 76 targeted killings of Inkatha members, based on their political affiliation.
ZANU

Ndabaningi Sithole, the first President of ZANU, was arrested by the government in 1964, together with most of the party leadership, and incarcerated in a prison in the capital of Salisbury (Mazarire 2011, 571-572). Sithole continued though to be the official leader of the party through his deputy Herbert Chitepo (Mazarire 2011, 573). One account describes Sithole being turned in to a collaborator by the regime and outmaneuvered in prison by Robert Mugabe (Bhebe 1999, 56). As the leadership was released in late 1974 ZANU announced that Robert Mugabe was the new leader of the party (Chung & Kaarsholm 2006, 86).

The former leader, Sithole, in a matter of years went from being revered as the leader of the revolution, his portrait appearing regularly in the party journal, to receiving a publicly delivered death sentence. In a Zimbabwe News article, the official journal of the party, in 1978 the headline reads “Why Sithole, Muzorewa, and Chirau must die” (Zimbabwe News 1978, 1-2). The former ZANU leader is cast as a traitor for signing the internal settlement with the Rhodesian government: “From the moment their greedy hands signed the “Judas Contract”, they became antagonistic enemies of the People of Zimbabwe.” (Zimbabwe News 1978, 1-2). By entering into an agreement Sithole betrays the liberation struggle and for this crime he must be punished by death (Zimbabwe News 1978, 1-2), together with Abel Muzorewa the leader of the African National Council in Zimbabwe and tribal leader Jeremiah Chirau, who were also negotiating with the government.

ZANU was created through a rift (Bhebe 1999, 12) between factions within Zimbabwe African People’s Union, ZAPU, that drove a group of members to create ZANU. This legacy of division has come to characterize the relationship, with some exceptions. A joint military command was formed between ZANU and ZAPU in 1972 in order to more efficiently fight the government, but also because donors demanded improvement in the conflictual relation (Bhebe 1999, 27).

Through the ZANU propaganda machine ZAPU is accused of discrediting the Sinoia battle (which has a historical place in the ZANU party, celebrating this as liberation day) taking credit for ZANU military efforts, portraying the ZANU President as a collaborator with the regime and falsely reporting on ZAPU military operations as intensifying (Zimbabwe News 1974). This shows that while there were formal mechanisms of cooperation ZANU continued to publish
propaganda describing ZAPU as the enemy of the party. In 1976 the two rebel groups fused their armed wings into one military force, Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) (Bhebe 1999, 61). This joint effort was though rife with conflict as the two armies were not able to fuse but rather maintained separate identities based on the conflict of the past (Bhebe 1999, 62-63).

Comparison

Both the ANC and ZANU had conflictual relationships with political opponents. Through their propaganda machines they tried to delegitimize their opponents. But the fact that ZANU’s first President Sithole, who was deposed in favor of Mugabe, receives a public death sentence in the party journal is a clear example of intolerance.

Conclusion and final discussion

This thesis has examined the African National Congress in South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe. Specifically I have posed the question of how tolerant or intolerant the rebel governance in the two cases were during the armed struggle. The point of this exercise has been to attempt to explain the diverging outcomes of the ANC and ZANU-PF in terms of how they relate to political opposition in the post war context. The underlying argument is that a tolerant regime will accept its political contenders as legitimate political actors even though their core values and political program are diametrically opposed to those of the regime. The political opposition is not a threat to the existence of the regime party since there is a belief in that the democratic institutions will ensure the safety and well-being of different interest groups and minorities.

In order to examine levels of tolerance I have created an operationalization of the concepts of tolerance and tolerance. The concepts have been placed in relation to a number of thematic areas of analysis: the organizational structure, rebel relations with its members and civilians, how the organization has handled internal dissent and finally how relations have been with political opponents.

Organizationally it is not a surprise that both movements were hierarchical and centralized. Since they were declared illegal, had their leaderships thrown into jail and were forced underground and
into exile hierarchy and central command were probably ways of handling the situation. Yet there were procedures for the popular election of the leadership, in the case of the ANC there were official channels of directing critique against both policy and leadership and ZANU-PF was officially guided by democratic centralism. However in practice there is no evidence of functioning institutionalized mechanisms for the settlement of political disputes. In ZANU-PF the mechanism used for coping with factionalism in the leadership was to purge the party of dissent through elections. Thus there is no great difference in internal opportunity for airing critique between the two cases. The most interesting takeaway from this section is that the ANC has developed tolerance out of the very unfavorable conditions to tolerance of secrecy and underground political work. A potential explanation for the differing outcomes of the cases is the pre-war legacy, which has not been a part of this thesis. The ANC has existed 40 years longer than ZANU-PF which could mean that the more intolerant military organization of the armed struggle was only an exception when viewing the history of the ANC as a whole.

The ANC was not able to mobilize the peasantry as in Zimbabwe, mostly because of the economic structure of South Africa where urbanization was greater and the peasant class minimal (Barrell 1993). Also the ANC were quite inapt at establishing a domestic political and military presence, as opposed to their neighbors in Zimbabwe. The result of these differences were that the ANC created a revolutionary ideological framework to structure the grievances of the young and poor proletariat of the townships. For ZANU-PF the revolution was first and foremost the work of the party through an advanced committee system that incorporated the peasants as the base of the logistics of the war machine. While the committee system instituted by the guidance of the ANC was inclusionary it is more uncertain if it can be described as universal and fare. Since the system came from the grassroots, and there was little time to dwell on concepts such as legitimacy or accountability, it sometimes favored the young comrades over others and there was lack in procedure and transparency. The ZANU-PF system had other problems — the system was opposed on the peasants from above in order to serve the soldiers and the armed struggle. The system was less inclusionary, yet since it was based on control and obedience it upheld a clear set of norms contributing to predictable patterns of behavior.

Despite the fact that neither of the rebels were able to liberate territory from the governments they fought they still managed to provide public services and engage in humanitarian relief, in camps based abroad. This activity should be positive for tolerance since it prioritizes the material and social well-being of the people extending public services to those in need, universality,
representing the interests of weaker groups vis-à-vis military interests, inclusion, and upholds a code of conduct where acceptable behavior is separated from rule breaking behavior, fairness. Rebel groups that provide public services to the population are an exception if one looks at the dataset of Huang (2016). Thus it is a specific type of rebel group that engages in this activity and in several cases it seems that they share a type of Marxist ideology as the base of their struggle. Are the rebels preparing the population for the future post war regime where rebels will rule through dialogue and negotiation with the people? Or should the stress on providing education in these two cases be put in the context of the political mobilization of the people for the war effort? For ZANU-PF the tens of thousands of refugees that flowed into ZANU camps in Mozambique this was not only a burden to bear, but a very important channel for recruitment.

The two armed wings experienced internal dissent as the soldiers living conditions were tough. In ANC paranoia was allowed to rule as soldiers were convicted of treason in military tribunals where they had no means of defending themselves. The Nhari rebellion in ZANU was punished by execution, but here there was disagreement between the political leadership and the military command. The greater openness of the ANC regime in to its past has unveiled crucial information that is not available in the case of ZANU-PF. Both movements handled internal dissent poorly, punishing dissent with the death penalty, and in the case of the ANC there were clear examples of disproportionate sanctions as soldiers were imprisoned based on smoking. Thus experiences from the military bases of the ANC and ZANU-PF shows that internal dissent was heavily suppressed.

When it comes to political opponents during the armed struggle there are examples of intolerance in both cases. While the ANC plotted to assassinate the leader of one of its political rivals and engaged in armed conflict with its members ZANU-PF threatened to kill its former President for negotiating with the government and kept a troublesome relationship with its main rival, ZAPU. But what separates the ANC is its extensive cooperation with allied civil and political movements such as the South African Communist Party, South African Indian Congress and the United Democratic Front. This heritage of a democratic alliance stands in stark contrast to the more chauvinist ZANU-PF, with its support base derived from the Shona people of Zimbabwe.

The comparison between the two cases has shown that there are many similarities in how intolerance was able to breed within the organization. For this reason it is not possible to connect
the levels of tolerance within the ANC during the armed struggle with its accepting behavior towards political opposition after it came to power. The explanation for this is probably found in the period preceding the decision of the ANC to wage an armed struggle against the government.

This thesis has built on the existing research that has been done on rebel groups that engage in advanced rebel governance in a war context. It would be fruitful to contribute to further theory building on rebel governance by examining and comparing cases such as the Pathet Lao in Laos, CPN(M) in Nepal and the FMLN in El Salvador, all of which constructed advanced institutions. By performing more case studies we can learn more about the relation between these types of rebels and autocratic political parties and regimes. There also seems to be a correlation between advanced rebel governance and Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideology that merits further attention.
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