UNEXPECTED HEADWIND

A Mexican case study of a policy proposal's failure – and the effects this failure had on subsequent re-mobilisation efforts

By: Stina Wennö
Supervisor: Pär Zetterberg Uppsala University, Department of Government
Bachelor thesis 15 hp Development Studies,
Fall Semester 2017
Word count: 13686
Abstract

The study sets out to contribute to research regarding the failure of a gender equality policy proposal. This case study, drawn from Mexico, examines the proposed legislation on “Violence against women in politics”. This policy proposal was approved in the senate, however later stalled within the Mexican Chamber of deputies, and was therefore never adopted. The study also describes the re-mobilisation efforts that were made due to this failure, in terms of tracing the progress of further policy proposals presented on “Violence against women in politics”. By using theory regarding feminist triangles, veto-players and narratives of how to re-mobilise after defeat, this study finds that the collaboration became more extensive and coherent as subsequent policy proposals on violence against women were presented. Further re-mobilisation also occurred despite some of the specific narratives of defeat suggesting this would not have been the case. However, as this research shows, those collaborations that occurred were not strong enough to achieve the adoption of the bill as a critical veto-player failed to provide the necessary support.

Key words
Violence against women in politics, veto-player, re-mobilisation, policy process, policy failure
Table of contents

1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 4

2. Previous research .................................................................................................................. 5
   2.1 Previous research on “violence against women in politics” ............................................ 5
   2.3 Previous research concerning the policy process .............................................................. 7

3. Theoretical framework ........................................................................................................ 8
   3.1 The stages of the policy process .................................................................................... 8
      3.1.1 Analytical model .................................................................................................. 9
   3.2 The causes of failed policy adoption ............................................................................. 10
      3.2.1 Feminist triangles ................................................................................................. 11
   3.3 Re-mobilisation efforts ................................................................................................. 12
      3.3.1 Narratives of defeat ............................................................................................... 13

4. Research design ................................................................................................................... 14
   4.1 Analytical research strategy .......................................................................................... 14
   4.2 Case selection ............................................................................................................... 15
   4.3 Material ......................................................................................................................... 17
   4.4 Methodology ................................................................................................................ 18

5. Analytical framework .......................................................................................................... 19
   5.1 Collaboration between actors ...................................................................................... 19
   5.2 Veto-players: .............................................................................................................. 20
   5.3 Narratives of defeat ...................................................................................................... 20

6. Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 21
   6.1 Background ................................................................................................................... 21
   6.2 Results of the process-tracing ..................................................................................... 22
   6.3 Results of the process-tracing: Failure to adopt the policy ............................................ 23
      6.3.1 Agenda-setting .................................................................................................... 23
      6.3.2 Policy formation .................................................................................................... 24
   6.3.3 Policy adoption ........................................................................................................ 25
   6.4 Result of the process-tracing: Remobilisation efforts .................................................... 27
      6.4.1 Initial remobilisation ............................................................................................. 27
      6.4.2. Further remobilisation - the fourth proposal in 2015 ........................................... 29

7. Summary ............................................................................................................................... 32

8. Concluding discussion ......................................................................................................... 33
1. Introduction

In the wake of the internationally recognised #Metoo campaign, women are speaking out about sexual harassments both on a psychological and a physical level. In recent years, the government of Mexico has raised “gender alerts” in a large number of municipalities – emphasising the magnitude of problem of violence against women and the need for change (Amnesty International, 2016). In addition, harassments and violence against women, not the least in Mexican politics, is a current problem, where women have been murdered and threatened for their beliefs (INE, 2017:13). Reports also suggest that due to sexist treatment in government, women are prevented from exercising their political power. (Piscopo, 2014:106).

In relation to this, the fifth sustainable development goal presented by the UN is to: “Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels.” (UN Women, n.d.). Mexico has been a successful case regarding implementation of legislated candidate quotas and is a country currently emphasizing “gender mainstreaming” in a significant amount of legislation aimed at empower women (OECD, 2017: 210).

However, when the senator Lucero Saldaña presented a new bill proposal in 2012 that aimed to add elements to a law on political harassments and violence against women in political public life - which would strengthen women’s political rights to live a life free of violence - the legislation was only passed in the senate and later never ratified in the Chamber of deputies (Aztecanoticias, 2013). Since then, an additional seven similar pieces of legislation have been on the agenda by female legislators from different political parties. Even though the outcome was the same for all of them, the failure has given birth to movements amongst female politicians and have been present ever since (Krook and Restrepo Sanin, 2016:131). Furthermore, the legislation that was first presented by Lucero Saldaña was based on a corresponding bill that was passed and implemented in Bolivia months before. This raises questions regarding women’s substantive representation, as well as the existence of gatekeepers within the Mexican government.

This thesis aims to evaluate the reasons why Saldaña’s bill was not adopted and the effect on the ensuing re-mobilisation efforts in relation to activism amongst female politicians. A pattern of failure to adopt a policy and efforts to re-mobilise is discerned in the investigation. It will
also trace how key actors such as the legislators, members of the Chamber of deputies and politicians in the senate construct this specific policy in documents, newspaper articles and interviews before and after the process of attempting to gain ratification. The question that is at the centre of this study is the following:

*Why did the policy proposal fail and how did this failure effect the re-mobilisation efforts?*

Drawing on scholars in the field, I also maintain that it is as crucial to investigate and focus on failed legislations as it is to study legislations that have been adopted. To some extent, the former is being overlooked in today’s research on the gender equality policy process (Bergqvist et al., 2013:281). By analysing failed policy outcomes, we could identify the factors involved when and how legislation is successful and when it is not. If, for example, explanations of why a legislation was adopted also applies to failure to adopt a legislative proposal, then we should pay less attention to the role of these explanations in relation to policy outcomes. When this is done, the research agenda widens and becomes a tool for legislators – and for women’s movements (Bergqvist et al., 2013:291).

2. Previous research

In this section, previous research on proposed bills concerning violence against women in politics and the studies of the overall policy process are examined. This is followed by a presentation of previous studies of gender equality policy reforms, which contribute to forming the theoretical framework, that will be used for this study.

2.1 Previous research on “violence against women in politics”

Previous research emphasizes that the movements to adopt policies on “violence against women in politics” (Volencia política y acoso político hacia las mujeres) exist on a global scale. However, this issue has gained most attention in Latin American countries. Collaborations within politics, civil society and the electoral system have worked to visualise these problems in different contexts, with the aim to criminalize these acts (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:126). Moreover, violence against women in politics is characterised by practices that victimise women, making women move away or resign from politics and their particular role in the political arena (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:127). A central idea in previous studies is also that Latin American countries have been experiencing backlash effects for the
empowerment they have started to gain in the political sphere. This backlash has been manifested in different practices such as violence, sexual assaults and murder of female politicians (Piscopo, 2016:88).

Studies of policy reforms often have a focus on successful rather than unsuccessful reforms. This is the general approach for researching gender equality policy reforms (Bergqvist et al., 2013:281). In relation to unsuccessful legislation proposals on violence against women in politics – the emphasis is on the progress made – thus neglecting why the legislation failed. Unlike Mexico, Bolivia adopted a legislation on violence against women in politics. Why there was a favourable outcome in Bolivia has previously been on the research agenda, even though importance should be attributed to the fact that Bolivia has experienced some setbacks after it was adopted – in terms of getting the responsible persons for the violence convicted (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:146) (UN Women, 2013) (Piscopo, 2016:88).

The study conducted on the factors that led to success in Bolivia points to several factors accounting for the outcome. The main factor identified in the research is that it was one main actor that got the bill through - a congresswoman who organised a discussion on violence against women in the chamber of deputies in the year 2000. When this happened, it was the first time this issue was discussed in Latin America (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:127-8). By extension, this led to the mobilisation of different actors, who together started a movement. In the end, the bill was presented by different actors in civil society, women elected in municipalities and female parliamentarians who demanded a change. It was a joint process between these actors that led to the success according to research (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:127).

On the other hand, it is important to point out that this was seen in Bolivia as a controversial proposal. The main opponents were a group of indigenous women who argued that this was a law against men – and that it would cast false suspicion upon their sons (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:128). However, when a local congresswoman was killed in 2012 - it was clear that there was a crucial need for the bill and this created an overwhelming desire to get it passed to ensure that women could feel safe and be present in the political arena (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:128). Another tool the congresswomen used to get this issue on the agenda was that she obtained testimonies and gathered these in a “statistical information system” (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:128). The group that was created gathered 4000 allegations of
different harassments from women in politics, which gave visibility to the violence in politics. The processes of mobilisation, the statistical information system and the discussions in the Chamber of deputies fostered the successful outcome and policy process. (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:128) (UN Women, 2013).

The adoption process in Bolivia has previously been studied in terms of the different steps in the policy process, which is also done in this case study, regarding the bill on violence against women in politics that was presented in Mexico. Therefore, a presentation of previous research related to the policy process is called for.

2.3 Previous research concerning the policy process

Research concerning the policy process has since long examined and investigated the numerous stages of the process towards reaching a policy goal. Studies have also been investigated the various actors in the policy process and their approaches (Bergqvist et al., 2016:171). Previous research has argued that policy is an extensive process, and to ensure favourable outcomes, several proponents need to convert the problem into public action. One must also distinguish between the concept of policy making and policy process. Policy making focuses on the question of “what”, while policy process is problem-centric - answering the question by explaining ”how” (Biggs and Helms, 2006:537).

The common feature that many scholars emphasize is that the policy process is complex. It has to do with geographical, political and socioeconomic factors and contexts. However, by using theories, data and an analysis of the policy process, there is a greater chance achieving success (Sabatier and Weible, 2014:3). A large number of theories regarding the policy process also have common characteristics such as: “Interactions between actors, institutions, networks, ideas and contexts” (Sabatier and Weible, 2014:382). However, they differ in the way they approach the problem. Examples would include if the theory focusses on a individualistic perspective or in contrast takes several actors and groups into consideration, or if the theory is concerned with institutions or alternatively places greater emphasis on the power of informality (Sabatier and Weible,2014:382).

Studies of policy reforms constitute large field of research. In this area, scholars commonly focussing on gender issues have been doing specific research on the process of gender equality policy reforms. One of the main areas of exploration has been to study how these reforms arise
though female politicians by analysing their actions, as the main actors (Bergqvist et al., 2016:171). Different gender equality policy reforms obtain various state-society relations and work in different contexts (Htun and Weldon, 2010:213).

3. Theoretical framework

In this study, a gender equality policy process is examined - emphasizing where in the process the bill proposal foundered. And how this process reinforced itself and led to a re-mobilisation. To grasp the whole context with gender policy process, the steps of the policy process are examined and conducted within the theoretical framework.

3.1 The stages of the policy process

The first stage in the policy-process is agenda-setting. In essence, a substantial element of what constitutes the policy process. By getting the policy on the political agenda, the policy-makers is to some extent forcing politicians to considerate an issue (Kingdon, 2010:3). Agenda-setting is also connected to support, for by maintaining considerable support and simultaneously excluding politicians that oppose the policy, change could happen and the aim could be met. The policy makers must prove that time and engagement ought to be committed to reach the objective (Princen, 2011: 929). The agenda-setting is crucial when investigating how the policy proposal on violence against women in politics ended up on the political agenda in Mexico and how it has continued to be present on it ever since.

The next step in the policy process is policy formation. This step could be defined by characteristics such as the phase where policies are developed or adjusted. Further definition suggests that: “It is useful to understand policy formation as a social and political process in order to conceptualize how policies are formulated.” (WHO, 2015:4) This step is closely linked to the agenda setting, yet adding the element of conceptualization to the aspects of the social and political process. Questions regarding the actor that is promoting the proposal is central at this stage and the aim of the proposal presented. In addition, this stage emphasises on whom that is being targeted by the policy (WHO, 2015:4).

In Bolivia discussions and a conceptualisation was needed to be made regarding “violence against women in politics”, in order to be criminalise and adopt the act (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:131). The policy had a defined group as a target for the proposal (women in politics). It also had a specific aim when it was presented in the policy formation process. Since
the proposal in Mexico was built on the adopted policy in Bolivia, it arguably makes this step crucial to the context and for this particular case study. Within policy formation arguments and thoughts of the legislation are presented and defined to the specific context.

The third step is the step that is usually analysed regarding research on gender equality policy reforms, namely policy adoption. This step receives most attention from scholars since it is crucial. It is the step where the policy is going to be put into action (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). It is in this step gatekeepers and opponents become most apparent within the political spectrum. Therefore, this step is interesting to researchers on gender equality policy reforms – since it determines if progresses is being taken towards more equality reforms. It also shows what the policy is doing in specific contexts and different societies (WHO, 2015:3-4).

New or adjusted proposals are generally adopted by the cabinet or individual actors without alteration (WHO, 2015:3-4) (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). In Mexico, the proposal must pass through both the senate (the upper house) and the Chamber of deputies (the lower house) to be adopted. The relevant questions to be raised in relation to this step are thoughts such as; what happens if the outcome of a policy stops in this phase? Is this the end for the proposal or how would a re-mobilisation look like? Arguably, it is important to get an understanding of why a policy has different outcomes, to create strategies for proponents and movements to gain political capabilities (Bergqvist et al., 2016:170). By doing this, one also widens the description of gender equality policy adoption, validates traditional thoughts or variegates already settled views (Bergqvist et al., 2013:285).

3.1.1 Analytical model

![Model 1. Analytical model](image)

This model is used later in the analysis of this thesis. The model highlights the different cycles that exist in the policy process and how this loop is created when a policy proposal fails and must re-start. It also demonstrates how the policy process reinforces itself – as in the circumstance of the re-mobilisation process; every time an adoption fails it starts at the stage of agenda-setting again. In addition, the model also stresses the correlation between the causes of
policy failure and effects of the failure in terms of the re-mobilisation efforts of the policy adoption – and the different factors of the policy process.

3.2 The causes of failed policy adoption

In relation to the agenda setting, policy formation and policy adoption, researchers in gender studies and gender equality reforms often deliberate on the impact of substantive representation. Substantive representation is that women in parliament represent women’s issues to a larger extent than men. The consideration is that female legislators focus on “softer” proposals compared to their male colleagues such as issues regarding labour, education and sexual harassment (Wängnerud, 2009:4). Some researchers however argue that it is important to emphasize that women are a heterogeneous group with different intentions (Celis et al., 2008:107) (Weldon, 2002:1157) (Beckwith, 2007:30).

Nevertheless, in a previous case study in Mexico, data showed that most women in parliament were the ones who promoted women’s issues and championed the progressive and feminist agenda. The study also argued that since women occupy seats that are traditionally held by men, reports have suggested that due to sexist treatment women are prevented from taking part in the important meetings and in decision making (Piscopo, 2014:106).

Moreover, the study demonstrated that women in different political spheres and parties were willing to work together to achieve substantive representation for women, the common pattern being that they supported gender equality proposals. In a number of gender equality reform studies, “left-wing” parties are distinguished as those supporting and presenting gender issues and policies most frequently (Piscopo, 2014:105-7). On the other hand, the study shows that even though it was a majority of women from the left-wing parties that tended to raise and support these issues in Mexico, women on the right political sphere still supported and sought collaborations with women from other political parties regarding these issues (Piscopo, 2014:105-7). Such collaborations represent a pattern that has been presented in various case studies – with the objective that female politicians work together to increase equality and stronger representation of women’s issues (Piscopo, 2014:105-7) (Devlin and Elgie, 2008)

In addition to the notion of substantive representation, researchers have found that women in politics and in other sectors tend to build cooperation amongst themselves by creating
coalitions. These coalitions and formations often have a majority of female members even if it there are other constellations too.

3.2.1 Feminist triangles

“Feminist triangles” is a term for explaining women’s movements and cooperation in policy processes. The idea is that cooperation among women in context of policy reforms will foster favourable outcomes for their common goal (Holli, 2008:169-171). These triangles show different ways that collaboration for policy reforms can be conducted to enhance progress in terms of the policy process - with the idea that wider collaboration should foster a greater chance of success (Holli, 2008:169).

The strategic partnership feminist triangle (used in this thesis) refers to collaborations between party members and other politicians, female civil servants and women’s movements on specific issues, which means that female actors on different societal levels with a common goal are fighting for important policy issues and policy improvements. Other variations of triangles exist, with the distinguishing feature that the triangle are pushing for overtly feminist women in policy and public office or that the triangle includes women in academia (Mazur, 2002:190).

Presenting “feminist triangles” is important because collaboration in policy process is diverse and when analysing policy processes, the role of different actors can be used to explain the outcome. With an emphasis on the importance of various actors, the outcome is explained in more detail (Holli, 2008:173).

The conceptualisation of the theory on feminist triangles has been criticized on the grounds that it creates exclusion since its main aim is to illustrate women’s collaborations and to emphasise “actors and characteristics” (Holli, 2008:179). Exclusion is the result of ignoring other crucial groups cooperating in creating polices. On the other hand, by analysing these constellations and the collaboration amongst the actors, the results and numbers of successful adoptions of policies demonstrates the importance of acknowledging the triangle co-operations, as it has had a positive impact on the agenda setting and on the outcomes (Holli, 2008:179). Additionally, attention needs to be paid to: “why, how and where” these movements are being initiated to be able to grasp the whole research area and to analyse specific stages that were fruitful for policy adoption (Holli, 2008:179).
Moreover, when examining the case in Mexico, there was a policy outcome as the adoption never occurred. This raises thoughts on women’s networks, regarding if these collaborations were strong enough or had the right mobilisation in terms of actors. Another thought that is being raised is if the main problem was that the majority in the Chamber of deputies neglected the proposal.

2.3.3 Veto-players
Another factor in terms of potential causes is the idea of “veto-players”- first presented by Tsebelis. Veto-players are actors who determine an outcome and have the power to maintain the status quo in a policy or delay the adoption of a policy. Because of this, veto-players are powerful in determining the future for policy adoptions. These actors have the ability to neglect an issue or postpone a process (Tsebelis and Ha, 2014:335). Such outcomes could both be affected by formal and informal actors – in terms of potential impact on undesirable legislation (Young and Dugan, 2011:21). Veto-players are an essential part of the theoretical framework since this idea is interlinked with legislation proposals and policy adoptions – in effect veto-players become a part of the actors that might have affected the process. The main thrust is to determine how many collective actors or individuals are being classified as a Veto-players and how far their ideological distance is, in relation to the status quo (making a policy change possible or challenging) (Tsebelis and Ha, 2014:335).

The theory of veto-players and feminist triangles is used below in the analysis of the causes of the failed policy adoption. Next, the theoretical framework for the effects of the re-mobilisation efforts used in this study is presented.

3.3 Re-mobilisation efforts
The issue regarding when a legislation fails to get implemented, but remains on the agenda several years later has largely been ignored. The success of continuing mobilisation regarding a specific issue after legislative defeat has also been overshadowed by research highlighting successful movements that caused successful reforms. If failure in terms of re-mobilisations has been studied, it has been from an angle specifically approaching technical errors and unfavourable circumstances (Rosenblum, 1998:11) (Sawyers and Meyer, 1999:201) (Suh, 2001:455).
In Mexico, after Saldaña’s law was not passed, additional legislation continued to be presented by different actors and parties. This contrasts with other case studies where the issues often vanished for some time from the political arena and then re-emerged on a later stage (Bergqvist et al., 2016:181) (Sawyers and Meyer, 1999:201). When conducting the theoretical framework regarding the re-mobilisation efforts, I employ the idea of “Narratives of defeat” developed by Karen Beckwith.

3.3.1 Narratives of defeat

Narratives of defeat are according to Beckwith (2015:5) a strategy of how to view defeat, by emphasizing on previous events that led up to the specific failure. In other words - different tactics and approaches of how to re-mobilise and foster successful outcomes.

This means that different narratives of outcomes are produced depending on the actors involved and thus different knowledge is produced. Narratives of defeat also emphasise the degree of acceptance in the social movements in terms of failure, and how this acceptance is outlined in terms of understanding of why the defeat occurred. In short, the idea is that a narrative of defeat can have mobilising effects if a new opportunity arises (Beckwith, 2015:5). Re-mobilisation is analysed in this study based on this idea and Beckwith’s (2015:6) classification of narratives of defeat in various context. The classification is described below to increase understanding of different re-mobilisation opportunities.

The first one is called “defeat as a learning opportunity” – which, as it implies, is accepting failure and actors are learning from it to succeed better next time through identifying the different causes of previous failure. The second narrative is called “defeat as defiant survival, which like the previous narrative acknowledges failure, but uses this failure as a motivation towards the hope of future success. This is done through paying attention to and by valuing the actual movement and its goals. By emphasizing thoughts such as “dignity” and sayings in accordance “what about next time?”, these two narratives are both “likely to support a re-mobilisation” (Beckwith, 2015:8).

An additional two narratives are highlighted in the classification, namely “defeat as cheating” and lastly “defeat as betrayal”. These two have the approach to validate loss rather than analyse why the failure happened. However, they use causal steps that leads to reasons. They also develop other narratives of defeat, such as if other actors supported the movement, what would
have happened? This points to structural weaknesses within movements (Beckwith, 2015:11). More specifically, “defeat as cheating” views the social movements as an effect of opponents not playing by the rules or the set of norms, in the way that they behave differently in regards to the specific issue - having an idea of “violations of the rules”. Lastly, “defeat as betrayal” considers the actors that should have been helpful in the process, but did not participate. This view emphasises the internal actors in a movement (Beckwith, 2015:12). This narrative claims that the right assistance was not given emphasising those actors that did not give the support that was needed – this is the reason for defeat. The central idea is “what would happen if internal actors acted differently” (Beckwith, 2015:12).

None of the two narratives are likely to support a re-mobilisation. In relation to the Mexican failed proposal for legislation on violence against women in politics, there was a re-mobilisation, and the factors effecting this are examined in the analysis. However, all the narratives are applied in examining and finding the most suitable narrative and explanation. Therefore, there is also an opportunity to elaborate on Beckwith’s narratives by adding elements to her theory of narratives of defeat. For example, if one of the narratives that according to her research does not foster re-mobilisation, other factors may be found in this study. These factors might contradict her thought and new narratives are identified in this particular study.

4. Research design

4.1 Analytical research strategy

This study aims to investigate the bill on violence against women in politics that was rejected in the Chamber of deputies in Mexico and the re-mobilisation that happened right after. Bergqvist et al., (2013:281) have developed steps for analysing failed policy proposals, an area of research that was previously neglected. This analytical research strategy was used when conducting this study - and the three stages they established will now be presented to the case of the failed legislation in Mexico.

The stages in the adoption failure are the following: “(1) specifying and selecting “unsuccessful” cases, (2) focusing explicitly on opponents of reform proposals, and (3) conducting a dynamic analysis that takes into account the strategies of both proponents and opponents and how they impact on each other”(Bergqvist et al., 2013:285).
To be able to analyse unsuccessful empirical cases, it is essential to start identifying the factors that construct this failure. When specifying and selecting the case one must consider the distinction between “failure” and “Status quo”. When specifying and selecting the case, one must consider the distinction between “failure” and “status quo”. Selecting a case that has settled into status quo means that it is harder to identify actors that are pursuing keeping the status quo. By instead analysing a policy that is likely to proceed and fails – “fruitful” explanations of the failure could be found (Bergqvist et al., 2013:286) In this case study Mexico was chosen as an unsuccessful case since research only existed on legislation in relation to success. This was also a case presented by other scholars as a distinct failure, since the policy only passed the senate. However, the reason for this failure has remained unknown ever since then.

The second stage, is to explicitly focus on the opponents of reform proposals. It emphasises the importance of paying attention to various actors at the same moment in time. The opposition to a proposal is often more implicit and hidden. By studying this through empirical material – arguably the “silent resistance” is easier to target (Bergqvist et al., 2013:287). Lastly, the third stage is a combination of recognising the significance of opponents, but also the strategies of proponents – and how these two interrelate. Since it has previously been common to find the distinct features to foster successful gender equality policies in the field, it is important to also do that even if an implementation failed. By focusing on “specific strategies”, “opportunity contexts” and “issues of redistribution or recognition” (Bergqvist et al., 2013:287). Likewise, failed legislation analysis should also be constructed around these strategies, investigating the actors’ opportunities and approaches within their operative structure.

Regarding the second and the third stage, the main actors are defined in the analysis, acknowledging both the opponents and the proponents. The role of these actors and the procedures, their agendas and strategies, were also used when establishing the analytical framework, choosing method and collecting material for this thesis. The analytical tools are presented in the next section.

4.2 Case selection
Arguably Mexico is a country with a solid implementation of quotas and a high representation of women in government. These are essential factors indicating that women’s representation is an important factor for the country’s development (OECD, 2017:70). However, even if these
progressive steps have been taken, a backlash seems to have occurred in relation to the problems with violence against women in politics. This complication counteracts the positive spiral of female legislators in politics and, in many cases, is scaring women off from the political arena (Piscopo, 2014:106).

As previously argued, the reforms on violence against women in politics is a new and unresearched area, and it is also a reform that is quite unusual – at least outside Latin America, since it is here that the movement to establish a reform initially started. To date, research has focused solely on “violence against women”. Therefore, additional research is needed of both unsuccessful and adopted cases, to find patterns of how to reach successful outcomes, so that women can acquire the same political rights and safety as men.

Interestingly, the government of Mexico has implemented similar legislations in the past, a piece of legislation called “General law women’s access to a life free of violence” was passed in 2007 (SRE, 2007:4). The law was meant to prevent violence against women in general and was constructed to increase the cooperation between the federation, state and municipalities to “prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women” (SRE, 2007:4). This law was a progress for women’s rights in Mexico. The legislation analysed in this study, presented by Lucero Saldaña in 2012, was built on this law – adding elements of harassments in regards to women in politics (Krook and Restrepo Sanín, 2016:131). Arguably this makes Mexico an interesting case to analyse, since the senate and Chamber of deputies passed a similar legislation five years before. However, this first law that was passed, aimed to help women in civil society rather than women operating in politics. This implies that the latter had components for reaching a successful outcome even if the adoption was unsuccessful.

In combination with this, the law on violence against women that was proposed in Mexico was almost taken word for word from the adopted legislation in Bolivia. The previously adopted policy in Bolivia and the fact that the senate approved the reform on Violence against women in politics in Mexico, demonstrates that the policy reform had favourable indications to succeed. Researchers argue that when a case obtain these beneficial factors and still fail, the case is presumably going to generate explanations of why this occurred (Bergqvist et al., 2016:173).

The re-mobilisation that occurred after that the legislation failed to pass was also unexpected – since unlike other areas this policy continued to be active on the political agenda and his
remained extant ever since. One could argue that this makes it a fruitful case in regards to the re-mobilisation efforts of the policy as well – since a number of previous studies only distinguish initial introduction and a return of reforms years later, not an ongoing process.

The critical aspects when doing a case study such as this are difficulties concerning isolation and covariance – as with all single case studies (Teorell & Svensson, 2007:64). In this study the aim is to investigate specific features over time and the actual case is at the centre. Therefore, it is easier to avoid such issues, since background causes that affected the outcome are analysed. On the other hand, method criteria such as these still limits the study since the isolation and the covariance in most single case studies are lacking.

4.3 Material
The material used for this study is a combination of protocols, documents, interviews (TV or in newspapers) and national newspaper articles, including documents from key actors and senators being front runners to the legislation. Together with interviews with people within the Chamber of Deputies (TV or newspapers with proponents and opponents), and news articles circulating at the time of the legislation from 2012 and those that have been on the agenda since then are used in the analysis. A triangulation was made through statements and articles from different actors opposing and presenting the legislation and outsiders such as academic researchers.

Different materials from different sources were used to get a nuanced starting point and overview. Furthermore, protocols showing cooperation between organisations and senators together with newer documents with more recent policy proposals were used to identify the re-mobilisation efforts. Potential critical limitations could be the reliability in regards to limited language knowledge. This was considered during the analysis process and fluent Spanish speakers have translated when required. However, it is a potential reliability problem for the result and therefore transparency is important.

The policy regarding “violence against women in politics” has received greater attention in recent years, due to additional proposals. In relation to this, there is a lack of information regarding the first proposal in documents and news articles. Existing sources regarding the proposal in 2012 is therefore taken from sources that were conducted later. This creates questions regarding currency of the source in this thesis (Teorell & Svensson, 2007:104-106).
This potential weakness was however compensated in the analysis by finding different sources discussing the same aspects and facts.

4.4 Methodology
Process-tracing is often used in one-case qualitative analysis. The analysis that is required for this study needs a research design that allows looking at the case over time and place, since actors and events are highly emphasised. Process-tracing is a method that is used when evaluating moments by examining different patterns (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:164). This analysis has its main focus on the policy adoption process and the empirical data of the case itself, and has an explaining-outcome approach. Explaining-outcome in process-tracing is designed to trace the mechanism of the case and outcomes, and can both be “substantively and/or theoretically” realised. This approach is used when the outcome is known, that is, the legislation failed. However, what caused this and contributed to it, remains unknown. (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:164).

The method will both trace the empirical material to find the mechanism that affected this particular case – and at the same time it has the ability to be generate hypotheses in terms contributing to further explanations of the causes of the policy failure and especially the effects of this outcome on the re-mobilisation efforts (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:164). Furthermore, by doing this - the mechanisms displayed in this case study contributes knowledge to the field. This method is useful when trying to get closer to the events and by finding a mechanism, describing a social process in detail, or finding a causal pathway. The method goes back in time to see what caused the outcome (Oxford Reference, n.d.).

Process-tracing allows the study to find mechanisms that link the causes with the outcomes. (George & Bennet 2005:206-7). In this study, two outcomes are analysed – the failed legislation and the re-mobilisation efforts. In this way, different formative moments are analysed, which means that valuable occasions affecting the process–chain are determined. When using process-tracing as a method all the material can give the researcher a clue if the empirical process is valuable (Esaiasson, et.al., 2012:129). However, one must be aware of bias selection when approaching a process-tracing. There can be reasons why certain sources have survived while others have disappeared. Selection bias could also have occurred when selecting secondary sources instead of primary ones (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:124). This was taken into account when conducting the analysis by using triangulation, for example.
In addition, it would have been valuable to do a Minor field study in Mexico – being there in person interviewing people in the senate and in the Chamber of deputies - to grasp the problem at a deeper level. However, by using process tracing as a method and analysing documents, protocols and interviews – features and tactics can still be stressed and analysed, since the purpose is to look at the process over time with actors in mind.

5. Analytical framework

When conducting the analysis, measurement of the cause of the policy failure and the effects this had on the re-mobilisation efforts needed to be completed. To this end, a model of analysis was developed based on the theoretical framework presented earlier in relation to the causes of policy failure and to the theory of veto-players, feminist triangles and the effects of outcome in terms of the different narratives of defeat. The operationalization was undertaken by devising questions regarding the theoretical framework – to measure the impact they had on explaining the causes and effects of the failed legislation and the re-mobilisation.

5.1 Collaboration between actors

*Was there evidence of collaboration between actors?*
Determining if there was collaboration between actors or if actors acted on their own in a process can explain patterns of success, since the theory on feminist triangles claims that the more cooperation, the better the outcome.

*How powerful and what was the nature of the proponent’s roles?*
By identifying the proponent or the proponents and the role of these actors and by emphasizing on two questions - if there was too small a mobilisation behind the first proposal or if he/she/they lacked legitimacy in their role/s - the strength of the collaboration is identified.

*Did the collaboration between the proponents have a common aim and goal?*
Leading back to the idea of the more cooperation on a common goal, the better the outcome. Whether or not the mobilisation and the aim were clear is central here.
5.2 Veto-players:

Were there distinctive veto-players in the policy adoption process?
Finding the potential veto-players in the policy process and classifying the veto-players patterns of status quo or policy delay are important, since these actors often possess the capability to determine the future of policy reforms.

Were the veto-player’s opponents or proponents?
This question is based on the analytical research strategy that is used for this study. By both looking at veto-players as opponents and proponents, specific strategies can be identified in terms of how they operate within the structures of the policy process.

What roles did the veto-players possess?
Determining the roles that the veto-player have. Patterns of why the policy failed to be adopted can be considered.

5.3 Narratives of defeat

Was defeat accepted?
In the different narratives of defeat, presented by Karen Beckwith, the acceptance of defeat is crucial when defining the narrative matching different re-mobilisation processes.

Were the actor or actors presenting the failed proposals supporters or a part of the re-mobilisation process?
When Identifying the narrative of defeat and explanations for the re-mobilisation process it is important to determine which actors that continued to fight for the policy.

Who was to blame for the failed outcome, according to the proponents?
By distinguishing the reasons given by the proponents for the failed outcome the appropriate narrative for it can be found.

Was there an extensive collaboration process made after the defeat?
Analysing patterns of the re-mobilisation and what occurred when the policy adoption failed, and factors regarding the re-mobilisation and its size and impact is central in this question.

6. Analysis

The analysis was based on coding in terms of actors and their roles in the process as proponents or opponents. Furthermore, the role of the actors and how potential collaborations were coordinated and what they looked like were stressed in the coding. The analytical procedure was conducted by coding the veto-players, collaborations and narratives of defeat with different colours, when finding answers of to the analytical questions. When differentiating between the veto-players as either opponents or proponents - proponents were underlined as an analytical tool.

6.1 Background

The political system in Mexico is constructed as follows. The congress consists of a lower and an upper house. In the lower house (The House of Deputies) 500 seats are available. These seats are elected through a majoritarian and a proportional representation system (PR). 200 seats are chosen through the PR system and 300 are chosen through a majoritarian system. In the upper house (Senate) on the other hand, 96 are elected through constituency bases and 32 are elected through a PR system, making it 128 seats in total in the senate.

In 2012, when Lucero Saldaña presented her legislation the Chamber of deputies 38,6 percent were women and 32,8 in the Senate (Piscopo, 2016:499). Both the Senate and the Chamber of deputies have responsibilities when it comes to the discussion and amending of policies. This includes negotiating the ratification of legislation. The congress has two ordinary sessions every year, in which policy proposals are discussed and adopted. Saldaña herself is a senator, representing the largest party in Mexico - Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Her party took back governmental power from The National Action Party (PAN) in 2012. Before this happened, PRI had been in power for almost 70 years, until 2000 (Britannica, n.d.)

PRI was, for a long time, the only party that existed in Mexican politics. It is a traditional social democratic party and since they returned to power in 2012 they have focused a great deal on gender equality politics. However, they have a long-held record of corruption (Baker institute,
2017). Several party members left PRI because of the corruption and created The Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in 1998. PRD is the third largest party in Mexico and compared to PRI and PAN, they are usually associated with having a more progressive agenda, which can be seen in their politics and policy adoption (Baker institute, 2017). The party often proposes pieces of legislation that address welfare issues and has a leftist leaning. PAN on the other hand is considerably more hesitant when adopting policies and intervening in policy implementation. PAN was created as a reaction to leftist politics in 1989. It is a party that has been influenced by the catholic church and the party does not want the government to control or be involved too much in the economy (Baker institute, 2017).

In 2012, PRI had 214 seats in the house of deputies and 56 seats in the senate. In view of this, it is interesting to note that when the policy proposal regarding “violence against women in politics” was passed in the senate, PRI had a majority of the seats. However, the bill was neglected in the Chamber of deputies where PRI maintained 214 of 500 seats (Britannica. n.d.). The legislation has been on the agenda several times since it was passed in the senate and represented by different parties. There has also been collaboration between legislators from different parties to present similar proposals. The common denominator is that all the proposals have been presented by women (García Martínez, 2015).

6.2 Results of the process-tracing

This results section presents its findings based on an empirical material of the policy process. The analysis is based on the formative moments that contributed to the process-chain and later the outcome. The analytical framework will also be applied in this following section.

The process-tracing begins in 2012 and then moves forward until 2013 - when the policy failed to be adopted. After this, the process-tracing will continue with three additional policy proposals, emphasizing the re-mobilisation process - until 2015, when a fourth policy proposal was tabled. This is combined with the following circumstances caused by the fourth proposal.

The process-tracing explains why the bill became stuck and how the procedure reinforced itself in finding the possible explanations of why the legislation failed to be passed. It is important to emphasize that three additional policy proposals have been presented after 2015. However, these are not analysed in this study, since they display the same patterns as the proposals
presented before and therefore do not add any further relevance to this study or its results. The thesis is concluded with a summary and a concluding discussion of the main findings. The concluding discussion will also outline the application of the analytical framework.

6.3 Results of the process-tracing: Failure to adopt the policy

6.3.1 Agenda-setting

Lucero Saldaña presented the legislation on the 13th of November 2012. A similar policy proposal had been adopted in Bolivia in May earlier that year. Therefore, the policy had already started to be discussed in several parts of Latin America. This was a contributory factor in Saldaña presenting her proposal to the senate.

In 2012 Saldaña had an authoritative role as one of the senators in the governing party, when she presented the legislation, even though her party, PRI, was in a minority in the Chamber of deputies (Piscopo, 2016:499). When placing the policy on the legislative agenda, she emphasized that women who were entering politics either in municipalities or in parliaments were defamed, assaulted and threatened by opponents and party colleagues that did not want women to enter the political domain (García Martínez, 2017) (USAID, 2014:9). And in a speech Saldaña gave to the congress when presenting the legislation, she underlined the importance of recognising political violence against women and its existence (Senadores PRI, 2012).

Saldaña was the only actor that presented the legislation to the Congress. She did not have a sponsor for the bill. This suggests that it required a lot of work to spread knowledge to other actors about the reform. In order to capture people’s attention about the policy, Saldaña pointed out that it took a long time to get the issue on the agenda. She needed to raise awareness of the policy and illustrate the fact that many people were concerned about violence against women. It was a new policy that had never been discussed in Mexico before November 2012 (García Martinez, 2017) (Reform proposal, 2012) (Siempre, 2017).

The theory of feminist triangles suggests that collaboration between different female actors will foster favourable outcomes in policymaking (Holli, 2008:169-171). If there had been a greater degree of collaboration between female legislators on this issue, then the chances of pressuring the congress to pass the legislation would have been higher. The fact that Saldaña did not have
such collaborators but acted as an individual might have been one of the factors that contributed to the failure of the legislation.

While sources note that Saldaña had support from other women in the political system who desired change, none of these supporters helped to disseminate information or raise awareness about the policy. (El herald Chiapas, n.d.) (INE, 2016:46).

6.3.2 Policy formation
During the policy formation stage, we can discern new ideas about why the policy failed to become law. Various sources suggested that the legislation failed to properly define how to punish political violence and unacceptable behaviour towards female politicians in 2012 (La Opinión, 2016) (Club jurídico, 2017) (Cerva Cena, 2014:122). Saldaña herself noted that male legislators worried about the term being too nebulous. They asked how political violence was defined and suggested that if her law was passed, simply giving female politicians compliments would be seen as a form of violence (La Opinión, 2016) (García Martínez, 2017). (El independiente, 2015)

On the other hand, Saldaña’s legislation was based on both the legislation in Bolivia and the existing law on “General law on women’s access to a life free of violence” only adding elements of women in politics (reform proposal, 2012) (Cerva Cena, 2014:122). This illustrates that a certain level of clarification already existed regarding the concept at this time.

Furthermore, an academic working on issues related to Mexican policy proposals argued that this “lack of definition” only had to do with the fact that men refused to be sanctioned in the political sphere, since this would restrain their power (Àngel Arroyo, 2017) (Lorena Vasquez, 2016). The fact that this tactic was employed to derail the policy illustrates the importance of collaboration to the passage of legislation. By having more people working on a policy, it will be easier to disseminate information and clarify concerns about a policy. The aim of the policy was presented by a woman in politics - for women in politics. This might explain the fact that the proposal did not reach a broader spectre of the civil society (reform proposal, 2012). This also emphasizes that the collaboration taking place on the policy by Saldaña operated within the triangle of “strategic partnership”, in terms of cooperation between women in the political sphere.
However, the little collaboration that did exist lacked the contribution of the women movement in the civil society and distinct actors and veto-players in the political sector. This problem is particularly clear owing to the fact that violence against women in general had attracted a great deal of attention in Mexican politics in 2012, and yet the policy failed. (Nobels women’s initiative, 2012) (Castillo, 2012). This suggests that by adding “in politics”, the target group became smaller and thus fewer women collaborated and worked together to pass the policy.

6.3.3 Policy adoption
In February 2013, the policy was adopted in the Mexican Senate. The proposal was passed unanimously with 100 votes in favour. This shows that support existed in the Senate for the policy (Aztecanoticias, 2013). Days after the policy was approved, it was sent to the Chamber of deputies to be ratified. It was sent to a specific commission within the Chamber of deputies, called the Gender equality commission. However, the Gender equality commission never discussed the proposal and nor did they send the proposal to be voted on in the Chamber of deputies. This meant that the proposal was never discussed or ratified in the stationary period of the second ordinary session in the Chamber of deputies. This second ordinary session is every year from the 15th of March to the 30th of April. The bill then stalled in the commission and was not passed (Aztecanoticias, 2013).

Moreover, in examining the specific political conditions in 2013, we can discern some important factors that led to the bill facing issues. The empirical findings point to the fact that there was one particularly important veto-player in the policy process. This was a woman named Laura Plascencia Pacheco who worked within the Chamber of deputies and possessed a powerful role as President of the Gender equality commission. She was also a member of PRI, the same party that Lucero Saldaña belonged to (García Martínez, 2017) (SIL, n.d.)

These factors suggest that Pacheco would have been an proponent for the bill. She was a senator in the same party as the person presenting the proposal and the bill aimed to protect her as a high-profile woman working in politics. She is also the President of the Gender equality commission, and Saldaña’s issue was arguably in line with what the commission's aims to foster gender equality (UN Women, n.d.).
However, several actors within the government claimed that she was one of the people that delayed the process, and because of this, made the policy fail. They claimed this as it was never taken up for discussion in the Gender equality commission, nor did this commission put forward the proposal to the Chamber of deputies. (García Martinez, 2017) (El sol del Mexico, 2017) Pacheco informed Saldaña that she was going to bring up the policy proposal in the commission and hopefully pass it through so that a plenary vote could take place. However as illustrated, evidently this never happened. (García Martinez, 2017) (El sol del Bajio, un.n) (Becerril, 2017). Whether Pacheco was affected by other actors or informal structures is not known, as no record can confirm this.

Since one of the main veto-players was a member of PRI, several people have blamed PRI for the failure of the policy (Becerril, 2017) (García Martínez, 2017) (El sol del Bajio, un.n) This seems odd as PRI had the majority in the Senate where the policy passed, and it failed in the Chamber of deputies where they were in minority. On the other hand, PRI and PRD had a majority when working together in the Chamber of deputies in 2012-2013. They had 313 of the seats together. Considering the progressive agenda that the PRD had, the policy would arguably have passed if it had been presented in the Chamber of deputies.

The claims that it was the PRI who failed the policy were presented by actors in PRI and in PAN (Siempre, 2017) (García Martínez, 2017). In the case of PAN, this accusation could be explained by the fact that they may have wanted to gain political credibility and win votes from PRI. That members from PRI accused their own party failing the policy is on the other hand, more unexpected, since parties in general would want to foster policy adoptions of their own party, especially since gender equality in 2013 started to be an important part of the PRI’s political agenda. The government of the PRI did, for example, present a National development plan that year. It featured a gender dimension and this was the first time the gender perspective was presented in Mexican politics (USAID, 2014:8).

Pacheco herself has not commented on why the proposal was not discussed. She has however, in later years, discussed the importance of the “General law on women’s access to a life free of violence” and the “proposal on violence against women in politics” In the Chamber of deputies (Cámara de Diputados, 2016) (TEPJF, 2017). The intention regarding these statements remains unknown, one could only speculate that this again shows that informal actors might have affected her actions regarding Saldana’s policy.
In the information about the agenda-setting, policy formulation and policy adoption of this legislation three formative moments can be distinguished. The first one is the lack of collaboration between women in and outside politics on this policy, which seemed to have created great deal of work for Saldaña. Making it harder for her to define and give information regarding the concept of “violence against women in politics”. The second is that the mobilisation for the proposal was perceived as relatively small and only functioning within in politics. The last formative moment is drawn from the fact that one distinctive veto-player could be found. Whether Pacheco was affected by informal actors is not known, but there are claims accusing her of delaying the process (García Martínez, 2017) (El sol del Bajio, un.n) (Becerril, 2017) (Siempre, 2017).

6.4 Result of the process-tracing: Remobilisation efforts

6.4.1 Initial remobilisation

After the failure to adopt the policy in 2013, a re-mobilisation effort started to develop. This movement was first seen in June 2014, when different political actors such as the Federal Electoral Tribunal, National electoral institute and INMUJERES (The national institute for women) invited leaders from the different political parties to discuss how to enable women to access decision-making positions (USAID, 2014:9). These institutions are very powerful and influential in Mexican politics.

Another campaign occurred in the same period of time related to the Federal Electoral Tribunal (Judical electoral, 2014). This worked as a formative instrument, since its aim was to raise awareness of political violence against women. It targeted electoral and party officials, organizations as well as civil society in general – the community at large became interested in knowing about the mechanisms to combat gender-based political violence (Judical electoral, 2014).

The issue had obtained a place on the political agenda, subsequent to the work of Saldaña. It also showed that the feminist triangle had moved its focus from only including women in politics to including actors outside of politics as well.
This re-mobilisation effort continued in 2014 when a second policy proposal was presented on the 23rd of October. The policy proposal was introduced by the PAN senators Pilar Ortega Martínez and Marcela Torres Peimbert. This occurred only months after the policy proposal presented by Saldaña had failed (reform proposal Ortega Martínez and Torres Peimbert, 2014). Since the time between these legislations was short, the question was already on the political agenda and more actors had started to understand the importance of this legislation. It was fresh in the mind. The legislation presented by Pilar Ortega Martínez and Marcela Torres Peimbert, together with the campaigns by the political bodies, was a part of the re-mobilisation process that began to foster a growing mobilisation outside of the political sphere.

The new policy differed somewhat from the legislation presented by Saldaña. It had similar characteristics and the aims remained the same. However, it added amendments to other laws as well. It differed a little in that it also included wordings about “the general law of institutions and electoral procedures and the general law in matters of electoral crimes” (Reform proposal Ortega Martinez and Torres Peimbert, 2014).

On the 29th of October, only 6 days after, Saldaña presented a new policy that also added the amendments that Pilar Ortega Martínez and Marcela Torres Peimbert emphasized. The reason was that the electoral law had changed (reform proposal Lucero Saldaña, 2014). A new body had been created earlier in January 2014 called National Electoral Institute (INE). This meant that the national and local elections were administrated by the INE which also controlled spending and was meant to prevent corruption (Valverde, 2016:145). This new system meant that Saldaña presented her policy proposal once again. By introducing a new proposal Saldaña showed that she was also a part of the re-mobilisation process and a supporter of the re-mobilisation. Together with the two other legislators and the political bodies running their campaigns.

It is possible then to observe the important concept of “defeat as a learning opportunity” in the re-mobilisation process. This is illustrated by the fact that the first time around, when the legislation failed, defeat was accepted. However, the actors felt a desire to gain success this second time. They evaluated the causes of why the policy had not been adopted and tried again, by acknowledging the specific patterns of failure - for example that the failure was a problem that the Chamber of deputies had contributed to (García Martínez, 2017) (El sol del Bajio, un.n) (Becerril, 2017) (Siempre, 2017).
Or owing to the fact that a new electoral law was established in January 2014 (IEA), the actors arguably thought that this new institution would foster success and reduce the problem. Neither Saldaña nor Pilar Ortega Martinez and Marcela Torres Peimbert looked to highlight anyone as a scapegoat for the failure of the first policy proposal. Even though Saldaña claimed that the President of Gender equality commission, Laura Plascencia Pacheco said that she was going to take the first proposal up for discussion – and this process never occurred (García Martínez, 2017) (El sol del Bajio, un.n) (Becerril, 2017) (Siempre, 2017)

The general idea for the start of the re-mobilisation was that the political bodies also felt a need to informing the public and to raise awareness on the issue of violence against women in politics. (USAID, 2014:9). And the fact that three powerful senators of the biggest political parties (PAN & PRI) proposed practically the same policy only months after the first policy proposal also demonstrates this re-mobilisation process. It can be seen then how defeat became a learning opportunity for different actors in the re-mobilisation of legislation relating to violence against women in politics.

Despite the fact the actors learned from their mistakes, these two new proposals also failed. One factor that was suggested to explain these double “policy failures” was that since several pieces of legislation were presented by different actors almost at the same time – this contributed to a confusion regarding the different proposals (Botello, 2016). It would therefore seem that even though a larger mobilisation occurred this lacked capabilities in terms of collaboration and this reduced their strength. They worked in different ways to gain credibility, however lacked a common goal on how to reach it. A fourth proposal was presented only four months after the two previous proposals were presented and this time several parties got together behind this one proposal as a part of a re-mobilisation process, suggesting again that they learnt from their mistakes. Discussion of this fourth process will now be presented.

6.4.2. Further remobilisation - the fourth proposal in 2015

In March 2015 during a campaign, a candidate for the PRD Aidé Nava González was killed. (Excelsior, 2015). In April that same year, another female politician was killed. A note was found close to the site of the murdered women saying; "women are like shotguns, loaded and in the corner” (El heraldo Chiapas, n.d.) This suggested people were trying to prevent the
participation of women in politics. Moreover, later in 2015 a glut of data came from the special prosecutor’s office for electoral offenses (FEPADE). The numbers that were presented showed that within the year of 2015, 38 cases of political violence against women had occurred. This fuelled the argument that a law was needed to better protect women in politics (Excelsior, 2015).

These acts led to civil society seeing the need for the legislation and for a re-mobilisation movement to get legislation back on the table. The political bodies and political legislators also understood that greater resources needed to be put forward in order to ensure policy adoption.

The fourth and last proposal analysed in this thesis was introduced by several actors from different parties. This policy proposal was presented on the 8th of April in 2015 by Angelica de la Peña (PRD), Diva Hadamira Gastélum (PRI), Adriana Dávila (PAN), and Martha Elena García Gomez (PAN) (Reform proposal, 2015). By this time the policy had been settled on the agenda and the policy formation had been defined and conceptualised by the legislators presenting the proposal. The senators acknowledged the work that the previous legislators had conducted and argued that: “The issue is relevant, because you cannot talk about true democracy, without the representation of women.” (my translation of Reform proposal, 2015).

The interesting factor with this policy proposal is that it was presented by women from different parties, fighting for the same goal, a factor that arguably was lacking in the three earlier policy proposals. According to the theory of feminist triangle and cooperation amongst women, this wider collaboration should foster a greater chance of success.

Furthermore, they learnt from their mistakes realising the necessity to emphasise the importance of having a democratic society. A greater mobilisation was also made in that a larger number of legislators presented the policy. Since the supporters of the three former policies were members of the parties that presented the fourth piece of legislation, it was assumed that they would support this new legislation. This suggests that the previous proposers of the first three pieces of legislation were supporters of the re-mobilisation effort.

Once again, no single actor was blamed for the failure of previous legislation. Instead the proponents claimed that the system in the Chamber of deputies was lacking and the formal procedures were problematic. With these factors in mind, two different narratives are most
applicable for the re-mobilisation of the fourth proposal, “defeat as betrayal” and “defeat as defiant survival”.

“Defeat as defiant survival” is suggested as the previous failures did not stop a new mobilisation effort behind the policy. By emphasizing the three previous policy proposals, failure was acknowledged and became part of the re-mobilisation. The new aim was to pay greater attention to the issue of violence against women in politics, to work for an adoption. The failure was a partial success in terms of a larger re-mobilisation in civil society and in a common political proposal across the political spectrum. The struggle itself had become important for the movement, which is clear in the legislator’s proposal where they write: “Because of the status of our gender, women have not enjoyed the same ability to the right conditions or equality as men, and have had limited access to participation in the field of politics.” (my own translation from Reform proposal, 2015).

The idea of “defeat as betrayal” challenge Karen Beckwith’s theory of the different narratives, since Beckwith claims that this narrative does not recognise or foster re-mobilisation (Beckwith, 2015:8). However, the legislators stressed that the issue needed more recognition and deserved to be discussed in the Chamber of deputies, highlighting the lack of internal participation, especially in terms of the gender equality commission. The idea of defeat as betrayal is essentially the idea that someone else contributed to the failure, and could be blamed for that. Beckwith says that if this narrative is found – no remobilisation is effected and that is the end of a proposal. I however found in this analysis that a re-mobilisation did occur even while the “defeat as betrayal narrative could be discerned. This potentially challenges Beckwith’s theory

As with the three earlier policy proposals, even this one failed to be adopted. The president of the Gender equality commission of the Chamber of deputies, Laura Plascencia Pacheco was again seen as an important player. She was once again blamed for using delaying tactics (Mendéz, 2017) (Senado de la República, 2017) This accusation was made by Angelica de la Peña (one of the proponents of the fourth policy proposal).

She claimed that the reform had been frozen by the Chamber of deputies for a long time and that this was clearly part of a pattern. Pacheco disagreed with this version of events, arguing that they were working on the bill as well as trying to get approval from the senate as soon as possible. The two legislators also argued regarding what specific time the fourth legislation was
received by the Chamber of deputies, with both having different perspectives. (Mendéz, 2017) (SemMexico, n.d.) (Senado de la República, 2017)

There is no concrete evidence on whose perspective is correct making it impossible to say who is correct. It is one actor’s word against another’s. However, one or several actors seems to have affected the stagnation of the proposal. Additional pressure has since been put on the system to achieve approval of the legislation. It would seem that some regard the system as fundamentally flawed. Protocols were created by influential political bodies, seemingly attempting to ensure there is more accountability and a clearer process for how legislation passes from groups like the Gender equality commission to the Chamber of deputies. Three additional proposals on the issue of political violence against women have since been presented, the most recent one in April 2016 suggesting that re-mobilisation attempts are still occurring and that there are still issues within the system (Reform proposal, 2016)

7. Summary

Table 1. Result of the coded analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaboration between actors</th>
<th>Was there evidence of collaboration between actors?</th>
<th>How powerful and what was the nature of the proponent’s roles?</th>
<th>Did the collaboration between the proponents have a common aim and goal?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First policy proposal: Lucero Saldaña was alone when presenting the proposal. In the second and fourth proposal: Yes. Between legislators and political bodies.</td>
<td>Powerful as senators from the biggest political parties in Mexico (PRI, PRD &amp; PAN).</td>
<td>The second and third policy proposal was presented at a similar time. This made the work for the congress complicated. Otherwise yes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Veto-players</th>
<th>Were there distinctive veto-players in the policy adoption process?</th>
<th>Were the veto-player’s opponents or proponents?</th>
<th>What roles did the veto-players possess?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes. Laura Plascencia Pacheco</td>
<td>Opponent.</td>
<td>Gender equality commission in the Chamber of deputies. Party member of PRI.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Saldaña was lone actor when she presented the policy proposal in 2012 and did most of the promoting of and arguing for the legislation. On the other hand, when the second and fourth proposals were presented, the degree of collaboration between legislators and political bodies began to grow and contributed to a more considerable re-mobilisation. Furthermore, the collaboration suggests that the proponents had similar ideas and targets. However, during the periods of the second and third policy proposals the fact that there were two different proposals made it more difficult for either to be adopted. Both pieces of legislation needed more time to be considered in the congress and this slowed down the process.

The policy proposals were presented by senators from the biggest political parties in Mexico. The political bodies that became a part of the re-mobilisation process were also influential and worked as authoritative voices in Mexican politics. When analysing why the legislation failed, one distinctive veto-player emerged, namely Laura Plascencia Pacheco, the President of the Gender equality commission in the Chamber of deputies. As previously noted, she was accused of delaying the policy process and it would therefore be reasonable to consider her an opponent. Moreover, the fact that previous polices had been defeated was accepted and the actors that presented new legislation supported the re-mobilisation. This can be seen when Saldaña presented an additional proposal or because the same political parties presented several proposals. A common pattern was also that greater re-mobilisation was made every time a legislation had failed.

8. Concluding discussion

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the reasons for why the first policy proposal on violence against women in politics was not adopted and to analyse the effect on the ensuing re-
mobilisation efforts in relation to activism amongst female politicians. The question that was at the centre of this study was:

Why did the policy proposal fail and how did this failure effect the re-mobilisation efforts?

The formative moments that were traced in the analysis indicated that the greater the collaboration within and outside politics - the more likely the policy was to succeed. This correlated with the idea of feminist triangles. The more pressure that could be put on legislators and the greater the importance of the issue and information about the definition, the more likely the policy was to be adopted. The fact that Saldaña lacked collaborators when presenting her proposal, combined with the fact that a veto-player apparently influenced the outcome by delaying the process (whether affected by informal actors or not) explains the reason for this outcome. A notable consideration is that even when powerful senators from different parties presented the legislation together in the fourth proposal, this veto-player still had the power to delay the process. To conclude, the first policy proposal failed due to lack of collaboration and because of a veto-player causing the policy to stall.

The effects that this failure had on the re-mobilisation efforts and formative moments of the outcome were that a larger re-mobilisation was made after the first failed policy. The re-mobilisation effort continued to grow with every new proposal that was presented. When additional accusations of violence and murder of women in politics appeared, this fuelled the process even more. Additional legislators, political bodies and actors in civil society became a part of this process. The main tool that was used to keep the policy on the agenda, was to present it several times. Because of this, the issue was constantly updated and pressure was continually put on political institutions to be a part of the re-mobilisation process. Three narratives of defeat were present in the re-mobilisation process. The most startling one was the narrative of “defeat as betrayal”, which in this case contradicts Beckwith’s idea of this narrative type. Beckwith’s argument suggests that no-remobilisation should have occurred in this case. However, a re-mobilisation was clearly made since several attempts to pass the legislation were made. This suggests that her theory can be modified and extended.

This kind of thesis has certain limitations regarding the potential to generalise, since only one quite specific case is analysed. Even if similar legislation has been considered in other contexts, it is challenging to find relevant factors in other cases to compare with, or other cases where
proposals relating to violence against women have been on the agenda. Seeking to address this issue is a progressive stance and has only been attempted in a few countries in Latin America. This is also a factor which makes it difficult to generalise. Future research is needed to find the reasons why other similar legislation proposals have failed, in order to foster more successful outcomes for women’s movements and gender equality reform. Additional research is also needed in terms of positive re-mobilisation, finding new narratives of how different movements re-organise themselves.

Positive re-mobilisation is vital to women as a collective. Women are being harassed for their political participation around the world. This problem is not a problem confined to Latin America. Progressive legislation on gender equality in all areas needs to be emphasised in academia as well as in civil society. Finding the reasons why gender equality policies are failing and how they can re-mobilise is crucial. And should not be neglected by academic actors or influential institutions.
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