The Need for Speed

Delays in Deployment of UN Peacekeepers and Mission Effectiveness

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1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, United Nations’ peacekeeping operations (PKO’s) have grown substantially, in numbers as well as in size and complexity (Sandler, 2017, p. 1876). Given the nature of many contemporary conflicts, which tend to be internal and take place in poor countries with weak state institutions (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 21), UN PKO’s have in recent decades become increasingly multidimensional, seeking to achieve a multitude of goals ranging from demobilization and disarmament, to reform of the justice sector and economic reconstruction, to name only a few (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, p. 781). The United Nations department of peacekeeping operations describe these multidimensional peacekeeping missions as “operations [which] are typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict, and may employ a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement” (2008, p. 22).

Naturally perhaps, the growth of PKO’s in recent decades has been coupled with a surge in scholarly interest in the topic of peacekeeping (Fortna & Howard, 2008, p. 284). Early contributions to the field by and large addressed the question of whether peacekeeping is an effective tool for halting civil war and laying the foundations for durable peace. While some scholars have claimed that peacekeeping has the unwanted effect of freezing underlying hostilities and thus hindering genuine conflict resolution (see for instance Luttwak, 1999; Greig & Diehl, 2005), more recent studies, both quantitative and qualitative, point to the achievements and successes among many peacekeeping missions (Fortna, 2004; Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014; Howard, 2008). As the literature on peacekeeping has become increasingly optimistic regarding the achievements of PKO’s (Fortna & Howard, 2008, p. 284), recent contributions to the field appear to focus less on whether or not peacekeeping is effective, and more on how the composition and size of operations affect their performance. For instance, scholars have examined the effects of troop diversity (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015), female representation (Karim & Beardsley, 2016), and personnel types (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014) on peacekeeping outcomes. However, one aspect which has as of yet received little scholarly attention is the timing of deployment of peacekeeping operations. Although this factor is often mentioned as important in the UN’s own reports and policy documents (UNDPKO, 2008; UNDPKO, 2017; UN, 2015), it remains unclear to what extent and by which mechanisms timing of deployment impacts mission performance. In order to contribute to existing literature and theories on peacekeeping effectiveness, this study thus
considers the central research question: How does the timing of troop deployment to peacekeeping operation affect mission effectiveness?

The central argument made here is that the period immediately after a peace agreement has been signed by the warring parties offers a certain ‘window of opportunity’, during which peacekeepers have the chance to establish a credible presence and provide reliable security guarantees for the parties. Missions which, through timely deployment, successfully exploit this opportunity will more likely be able to gain the cooperation of the parties and achieve their short-term goals, in particular violence abatement and troop demobilization and disarmament. Missions which experience significant delays in deployment on the other hand, will likely have missed this chance and be met with more suspicion and resistance, and face greater challenges in fulfilling these goals. While it is highly likely that a complete or partial failure in achieving short-term goals of peacekeeping has a bearing also on the long-term effectiveness of peacekeeping, these indirect effects are not discussed in great detail here. Instead, the narrower focus on short-term effectiveness allows for more in-depth insights regarding the direct effects of deployment delays.

The contributions made in this paper are both theoretical and empirical. With regards to the former, it is argued here that not enough attention has been payed to the aspect of timing of deployment to PKO’s as a determinant of mission effectiveness. Without attempting to refute existing theories on the effectiveness of peacekeeping, this paper thus seeks to add to and nuance those existing theoretical frameworks, by exploring the impact of a previously understudied independent variable. Turning to the empirical contribution, the case studies presented in Chapter 5 of this paper shed light on the timing of deployment in these particular cases. In addition, the analysis, in focusing on the indicators relevant for this study, offers a somewhat new reading of these cases which could be seen to challenge the dominant narratives surrounding them.

The remainder of this paper will be structured in the following way. The following chapter will provide a more in-depth discussion of what scholars have previously argued to be the key determinants of PKO effectiveness, concluding that there exists a gap in the literature with regards to the timing of troop deployment. Subsequently, the theoretical argument of this paper is spelled out in greater detail, explaining how deployment delays are likely to affect short-term mission effectiveness. Chapter 4 presents and motivates the research design opted for in this paper, including case selection and operationalization of the variables of interest. The ensuing chapter presents the results and analysis of the two cases of PKO’s compared
here, namely UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, and UNAVEM III in Angola. The findings of the analysis conducted here provide support for the argument that deployment delays have detrimental impacts on mission effectiveness, in particular because such delays inhibit peacekeepers' ability to act as credible security guarantors during the demobilization phase. The final part of this paper responds to potential alternative explanations and objections to the research design employed here, before concluding with suggesting avenues for future research on this topic.

2. Previous Research

To date, a few scholars have proposed comprehensive theories explaining the success or failure of peacekeeping operations. In addition, others have explored the impact of specific independent variables on mission effectiveness. This section will discuss what previous researchers have argued to be the key determinants of peacekeeping operation effectiveness. These determinants have here been grouped into three specific themes; Security Council politics, situational factors, and operation characteristics. The section discusses each of these clusters separately, before moving onto arguing that timing of deployment as a determinant of peacekeeping effectiveness has been largely overlooked in previous research.

To begin, great-power politics has repeatedly been cited as a factor which could influence peacekeeping success or failure (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Koko & Essis, 2012). Specifically, it has been argued that disagreement or conflicting interests among members of the UN Security Council (SC) can make a peacekeeping operation bound to fail before it has even started (Jett, 1999). According to Howard, both the level of consensus among SC members, and the intensity of interest in the conflict case at hand, can impact the outcome of peacekeeping (2008, p. 12). She argues that PKO’s in which the level of SC consensus on the matter is high, and interest moderate (neither very high, nor very low), have the highest chance of succeeding (Howard, 2008, p. 13). A similar argument is proposed by Bratt, who contends that consensus and political commitment by the five permanent members of the SC are important determinants of mission success (1997, p. 52). Not unlike Howard, he also emphasizes the potentially detrimental impact of very strong interests in the conflict by members of the SC (1997, p. 55).
Another dimension which has been argued to greatly impact mission effectiveness is what Howard terms ‘situational factors’. Such factors are largely beyond the control of the UN, as they relate for instance to the conflict context and regional support for an operation (Jett, 1999). Particularly important among situational factors is the consent of the conflicting parties to a peacekeeping mission, a lack of which is often cited as the source of failure of peacekeeping in for instance Somalia (Howard, 2008). According to Bratt, “the parties to the conflict have two key responsibilities: to provide consent to the establishment and mandate of the operation, and to cooperate with the peacekeepers” (1997, p. 47). In fact, both Bratt and Jett claim that the consent and cooperation of the warring parties is the single most important element for the success or failure of a PKO (Bratt, 1997, p. 47; Jett, 1999, p. 115). Furthermore, another situational factor which has been argued to impact the success of peacekeeping is the existence of a detailed peace agreement (Werner & Yuen, 2005; Fortna, 2003). In particular, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) have shown that more power-sharing provisions in a peace agreement is likely to positively impact the durability of peace. Lastly, factors such as the number of parties to the conflict and the level of hostility between them, the number of fatalities, and the duration of the war have been argued to make the peace process more difficult and demanding (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 55).

Finally, certain factors endogenous to the UN and each individual mission have also been shown to influence peacekeeping outcomes. With regards to mission constitution, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon demonstrate that operations which are adequately staffed with military and police personnel are generally more effective in providing protection for civilians (2013, p. 888). Relatedly, greater troop diversity in PKO’s has been seen to affect peacekeepers ability to protect civilians (Bove & Ruggeri, 2015). Turning to the aspect of how the mission operates, a frequently cited factor thought to contribute to successful outcomes is peacekeepers’ adherence to the three so-called ‘principles of peacekeeping’: consent, impartiality, and limited use of force (Bratt, 1997, p. 62; Howard, 2008, p. 13). However, Howard also argues that peacekeeping success is even more dependent on the extent to which a mission is capable of organizational learning, that is, whether it is able to learn both from its own previous failures and those of other missions (2008, p. 2). Lastly, recent studies have suggested that the UN’s capacity for considering local conflict dynamics has a bearing on the success or failure of peacekeeping (Autesserre, 2010; Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2017).
The theories presented thus far undoubtedly make significant contributions to the understanding of the causes of success or failure of peacekeeping, however, the aspect of the timing of deployment of peacekeepers is curiously absent from all the theoretical frameworks discussed. While the issue of deployment timing is often mentioned as an important factor (Hardt, 2014; Howard, 2008; Whalan, 2013, p. 55), there is a lack of studies which systematically explore the relationship between the timing of deployment and the outcome of peacekeeping. Instead, previous research has focused for instance on the timing of peace negotiations in relation to concepts such as ‘hurting stalemate’ (Zartman, 2001; Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991), the reasons behind delayed deployment of peacekeepers (Hardt, 2014), and whether rapid initial deployment is correlated with faster deployment of the bulk of troops (Coleman, Lundgren, & Oksamytna, 2017). Furthermore, the aspect of timing of peacekeeping is brought up by Diehl, who discusses deployment of peacekeepers in relation to four different phases of conflict; before the eruption of violence, during combat, after a cease-fire has been established, and after the warring parties have signed a peace agreement (2000, p. 342). Although Diehl asserts that the last of these phases is in many regards the ideal time for peacekeepers to be deployed (2000, p. 345), he does not discuss in greater detail whether a delay in deployment after a peace agreement can negatively impact the effectiveness of peacekeeping.

A final discussion which ought to be raised here concerns the issue of how to measure mission effectiveness. As asserted by Sandler, there does not exist a universally agreed upon measure of effectiveness in relation to peacekeeping operations, and this issue is made even more complex given the multidimensional nature of most contemporary peacekeeping missions (Sandler, 2017, p. 1890). The majority of existing studies have tended to focus on a single variable, namely the duration of peace, as a proxy for effectiveness (see for instance Fortna, 2004; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild, 2003). However, given the multitude of goals often pursued by contemporary operations, scholars such as Diehl and Druckman (2010) have argued in favor of a multidimensional evaluation framework for judging effectiveness. According to these authors, considerably more attention has been devoted to identifying the determinants of effectiveness, than to identifying effectiveness itself (2010, p. 3).

For the purpose of the present study, it is useful to distinguish between short-term and long-term effectiveness (Diehl & Druckman, 2010, p. 15; Bellamy & Williams, 2005). With regards to the latter of these two types, it is typically conceptualized as the duration and
quality of peace and security following a PKO (Bellamy & Williams, 2005, p. 177). As asserted by both Diehl and Druckman and Bellamy and Williams, there are a few pitfalls involved in assessing the long-term effectiveness of peace operations, especially with regards to establishing causality (Bellamy & Williams, 2005, p. 178; Diehl & Druckman, 2010, p. 16). Turning to the short-term perspective, effectiveness can be seen as referring to the “achievement of goals that occur during the course of a peace operation or in some time frame immediately following the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force” (Diehl & Druckman, 2010, p. 15). This time perspective can be seen as enabling for more straightforward causal connections to be made, and as will become clear in the following chapters, the theoretical and empirical focus in this paper lies primarily on short-term mission effectiveness.

3. Theoretical Framework

In the previous section, it was argued that there exists a gap in the previous literature on peacekeeping effectiveness concerning the timing of deployment of peacekeeping troops. A particularly problematic element of the existing theoretical frameworks presented is that they largely treat situational factors, such as the cooperation and consent of the parties, as a constant factor. In an attempt at nuancing this image, the argument made here is that there exists a certain ‘window of opportunity’ in the immediate post-agreement period, during which peacekeepers can establish the image of the operation and gain the trust of the parties. When deployment to an operation is delayed, peacekeepers are likely to have missed the opportunity to establish credible security guarantees and monitoring, and the cooperation and trust of the parties are likely to have decreased. This is in turn likely to result in decreased chances for the operation to achieve crucial short-term goals, such as the maintenance of peace and the demobilization of the warring parties. Importantly, this theoretical argument rests on the central assumption that warring parties enter a peace settlement in good faith, seeking an end to the conflict. As Werner and Yuen put it; “[c]learly, if the belligerents agreed to the settlement in the first place, they must have believed at that time that the terms of settlement were preferable to continued fighting” (Werner & Yuen, 2005, p. 262). Given this assumption, the success or failure of a peace process can be seen as dependent on the events and dynamics between the parties (including third parties such as peacekeepers) following a peace settlement. The following section is dedicated to spelling out this theoretical argument in greater detail.
To begin, in order to understand how the timing of deployment impacts peacekeepers’ ability to achieve their goals, it is necessary to first understand the critical role peacekeepers play in the aftermath of a peace agreement. According to Walter, the period directly following a peace settlement, when the agreement is to be implemented and parties must demobilize and disarm, is both dangerous and difficult to navigate (2002, p. 20). Specifically, the requirement of demobilization creates a kind of reverse security dilemma, whereby parties feel increasingly insecure and vulnerable the more they agree to disarm (Walter, 1999, p. 134). Third parties, in the form of peacekeepers, thus play the role of reducing such insecurities by monitoring and verifying demobilization, providing protection to demobilizing soldiers, and possibly intervening with force if one or more parties resume fighting (Walter, 1999, p. 137). According to Walter, “groups that obtain third-party security guarantees for the treacherous demobilization period following the signing of an agreement, and political, military, or territorial guarantees, will implement their settlements” (1999, pp. 129-30). Also Hampson contends that third parties are needed to provide enforcement and monitoring mechanisms during the implementation phase (1996, p. 3).

Although Hampson’s and Walter’s theories largely center around how third parties can assist in the negotiation phase of a peace process, they both stress the importance of third party-assistance also in the implementation phase (Walter, 2002, p. 27; Hampson, 1996, p. 222). Of particular importance for the present study, is the argument that the incentives for warring parties to return to armed struggle are at their highest in the early stages after a peace agreement has been signed (Hampson, 1996, p. 11). Specifically, the parties’ security concerns are likely to be at their highest in this stage of the peace process (Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001, p. 184). In fact, Hampson goes as far as to argue that “poorly timed or badly executed interventions can raise tensions and undermine the goals and objectives of the peace agreement and the peacemaking process” (1996, p. 13). This point is further emphasized by Quinn et al, who show that the period immediately following a settlement is when a relapse into conflict is most likely, and therefore urge the international community to act as soon as possible after a peace agreement has been signed (2007, p. 189).

Furthermore, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon contend that the ability of a peacekeeping operation to signal credibility and commitment is crucial for the success of the peace process (2013, p. 878; 2014, pp. 741-2). According to Chesterman, “[t]he first six- to twelve-week period is critical for establishing the basis for an effective international presence; credibility and political momentum lost during this period can be difficult to regain” (2004, p. 13).
view is echoed by the UN’s Capstone Doctrine on peacekeeping operations, in which it is asserted that opportunities lost in the first months after a peace agreement or ceasefire are difficult to regain (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 63). More specifically, Hardt contends that “[d]uring the initial period before an operation commences on the ground, local actors begin to form their evaluations of the legitimacy of an intervention and their perceptions of the operation’s future success. If an operation takes months to come under way, local actors have reason to be suspicious of what is to come” (2014, p. 34).

Aside from a failure to establish a credible presence and signal resolve, a delay in deployment has also been argued to damage the legitimacy of peacekeepers, and their ability to act as credible deterrents of violence, which could result in challenges to their authority (Lindberg Bromley, 2017, p. 16; Chesterman, 2004, p. 13). Not only is delayed deployment likely to produce disappointment and anger directed towards peacekeepers among local actors (UN, 2015, p. 63), it has also been argued to make those peacekeepers already deployed more vulnerable to attack, because they are short-handed (Coleman, Lundgren, & Oksamytna, 2017, p. 6; Lindberg Bromley, 2017, p. 17). Deployment delays are thus likely to impact the level of cooperation with and violence towards peacekeepers, factors which can be expected to impact the effectiveness and success of the entire PKO (Bratt, 1997, p. 47; Jett, 1999, p. 115).

For the reasons presented here, a delay in deployment of peacekeepers is expected to negatively impact an operation’s ability to achieve successful demobilization of the warring parties, maintain the cease-fire, and gain the trust and cooperation of the parties. These three aspects can be seen as indicators of short-term achievements of peacekeepers. Thus, the central hypothesis which will be tested in this paper is that delayed deployment of peacekeepers is likely to decrease short-term mission effectiveness. While it is likely that long-term mission effectiveness (relating for instance to the duration of peace) will also indirectly suffer when deployment of peacekeepers is delayed, the study of such effects will largely be left to future research, and will only be discussed briefly towards the end of this paper. The benefit of the narrow scope of the analysis here is that it allows for more in-depth understanding of the impact of timing on the short-term outcomes of peacekeeping, and as previously mentioned, it allows for more robust causal connections to be made.
4. Research Design

This section will begin by presenting how the independent and dependent variable of this study will be operationalized, before moving onto discussing the technique and criteria which have guided the case selection. Finally, the method to be applied to the cases under comparison will be explained and motivated.

4.1. Operationalization

4.1.1. Independent variable

The independent variable, *timing of deployment of peacekeepers*, will be measured in relation to the peace agreement which is referred to in the mandates of respective operation. It is important to note in this regard that deployment of peacekeepers tends to be phased, over time reaching levels of deployment which approximate the number of troops authorized by the Security Council. Against this background, a problematic aspect of much previous research is that the presence of a peacekeeping operation is often treated as a dichotomous variable, without taking into account variations in this presence. In attempts to remedy this problem, some researchers have recently presented more disaggregated data on deployments to peacekeeping operations, in order to allow for more nuanced analyses (see for instance Kathman, 2013).

On the one hand, the arrival of an initial, small group of UN personnel cannot be seen as a substantive presence of peacekeepers, particularly considering that the personnel arriving first are often tasked with arranging the necessary infrastructure before the bulk of military troops are deployed (Coleman, Lundgren, & Oksamytna, 2017). On the other hand, UN peacekeeping operations often do not reach full authorized deployment at all, and may still be able to operate effectively. Therefore, a measure of when full deployment was achieved might also misrepresent the actual presence of peacekeepers. Considering both these points, and following Coleman et al, timing of deployment will in this study refer to the time after which certain deployment thresholds were reached (Coleman, Lundgren, & Oksamytna, 2017, p. 26). While Coleman et al consider five thresholds, this study will examine the two deemed
most important by the authors, namely the 25th and 75th percentiles. According to Coleman et al., “the first represents a quantification of “initial presence”, a sizable proportion of the mission that is also likely to have a substantive impact. The latter quantifies what may be termed “effective capacity”, a level of deployment high enough to represent a significant contingent, yet low enough to be reached by the majority of UN missions” (2017, p. 27). The joint measure produced is both reliable, in that it is quantifiable, and sufficiently valid, in that it accurately captures when the bulk of peacekeepers were actually deployed.

The observations for this variable will be drawn from Kathman’s (2013) dataset on peacekeeping personnel commitments between 1990 and 2011. The observations for each mission are recorded and compiled in separate graphs, which show troop deployment from the day a peace agreement was signed, and one year forward in time. As Kathman himself argues, the aggregate data he presents is likely to prove highly useful for studies on peacekeeping effectiveness, as it allows the researcher to identify nuances and differences in the capacity of operations, instead of coding presence of peacekeepers as a dichotomous variable (Kathman, 2013, p. 534). Particularly useful for this study is that Kathman’s data is disaggregated into personnel commitments by months, allowing for a detailed analysis of the speed of deployment.

Finally, this analysis considers only the deployment of military troops, and thus excludes other UN personnel such as civilian observers. A number of studies have argued that it is the presence of military troops deployed which is crucial for peacekeeping success (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2014; Coleman, Lundgren, & Oksamytna, 2017). Arguably, this is especially relevant in the early phases of implementation of a peace agreement, when focus lies on maintaining a cease-fire and demobilizing and reintegrating troops of the warring parties.

4.1.2. Dependent variable

Turning to the dependent variable, mission effectiveness, the operationalization of this variable is inspired by the peace operation evaluation framework proposed by Diehl and Druckman (2010). These authors divide indicators of mission success into three categories; core peacekeeping goals, non-traditional peacekeeping goals, and peace-building goals. The first one of these categories include goals such as violence abatement, and conflict containment and settlement (2010, pp. 54-62), while the second one is concerned with aspects
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such as disarmament, democratization, and election supervision (ibid, pp. 84-92). The third category turns to dimensions relating to rule of law, governance, and local security (2010, pp. 116-32).

The operationalization of the dependent variable will focus chiefly on the aspects of mission effectiveness which are expected to be affected by the independent variable, according to the theoretical framework spelled out in the previous section. To reiterate, the focus of this paper lies on short-term peacekeeping effectiveness, which is expected to be negatively impacted by delays in troop deployment. Specifically, three indicators have been chosen here as proxies for short-term mission effectiveness, namely demobilization and disarmament, violence abatement, and cooperation with peacekeepers. These indicators have been deemed relevant as they reflect short-term goals which are widely shared among multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, but also, because they are expected to be affected by delayed deployment according to the theoretical framework.

To specify, the theory put forth in the previous section argues that the presence of peacekeepers is imperative in the early stages of peace agreement implementation, as peacekeepers can provide the crucial monitoring and security guarantees needed for armed actors to be willing to demobilize, and maintain the cease-fire. When peacekeepers fail to deploy swiftly, their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the conflicting parties is likely to decrease, making them more prone to violate the cease-fire and less willing to demobilize, even when peacekeepers do, eventually, appear in sufficiently large numbers. Relatedly, peacekeeping operations which deploy on time are likely to enjoy more cooperation from the conflicting parties, while in cases where deployment is delayed, peacekeepers are likely to have missed the chance for cooperation and be met with frustration and resistance. Thus, the indicators demobilization and disarmament and violence abatement can be seen as pure measurements of the dependent variable, while cooperation with peacekeepers also tests the presence of the theorized causal mechanism. Full disclosure of the questions used to analyze these indicators is found in the Appendix to this paper.

The analysis of these indicators will rely largely on official UN sources, such as yearbooks and mission progress reports by the Secretary-General. Additional sources include NGO reports, academic sources, and articles authored by UN employees heading the missions. It should be noted here that there is an inherent risk of bias in UN sources, which may be inclined to portray their own missions in a predominantly positive light. However, the use of
multiple sources to triangulate the evidence from official UN sources ought to lessen this problem, and increase the reliability of the measurement.

As noted by Diehl and Druckman, existing studies on the topic of peacekeeping operations pay much attention to the independent variables thought to influence the outcome of operations, while the criteria used to evaluate the outcome has received less consideration (2010, p. 1). This shortcoming is perhaps best described as a problem of validity; simple measures of outcomes do not accurately capture the range of factors indicating success of complex and multidimensional peacekeeping missions. Against this background, the strength of the operationalization of the dependent variable in this study is that the validity of the measure is relatively high, because multiple indicators are employed which capture different dimensions of the concept. Jointly, these indicators help produce a thick and fair assessment of this multifaceted variable. Furthermore, the narrow focus on short-term effectiveness in this study allows for a more in-depth understanding of the direct impact of peacekeeping, contributing to higher validity of the study.

4.2. Scope conditions and case selection

To begin, the unit of analysis for this study is individual peacekeeping operations. The distinction between this approach and a country-level unit of analysis is important, as it is not uncommon for multiple consecutive operations to be undertaken in the same country. Since the focus here lies on the performance of individual peacekeeping missions, and not on overall UN efforts in conflict-affected countries, this choice of unit of analysis appears most suitable. Moreover, since the aim here is to study the short-term effects of troop deployment timing, the time-frame for analysis of each mission will be two years from the signing of a peace agreement. This is because it is within this timeframe that a peacekeeping operation should be able to achieve the short-term goals under study here. Relevant long-term effects or observations are addressed in the conclusion of this paper.

The extent to which the results of this study can be generalized to a larger population of cases is limited by a few scope conditions. Firstly, in order to limit the scope of this study, the analysis considers only UN peacekeeping operations. Although the UN is not the only actor which undertakes peacekeeping activities (examples of other actors include the AU, EU and NATO), peacekeeping has over time become closely associated with the UN (Bellamy,
Williams, & Griffin, 2010, p. 42). Secondly, only multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period will be considered. This choice is motivated partly by the fact that the majority of contemporary UN peacekeeping missions are multidimensional in their character, and partly because these missions tend to share similar mandates and characteristics (UNDPKO, 2008, pp. 22-3), making them comparable. Relatedly, the scope conditions for this study are limited to cases in which peacekeeping troops were deployed in the aftermath of a peace agreement, which is most commonly the case for contemporary, multidimensional operations (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 22).

To start, the number of concluded UN peacekeeping operations amount to 56 (UN, 2017). Eliminating all operations which were authorized before the end of the Cold War (1991) results in a remainder of 43 missions. This population of operations in turn can be seen as highly diverse, including both verification missions constituted by 150 UN observers (such as MINUGUA in Guatemala), and large-scale military interventions with close to 30,000 troops (such as UNOSOM II in Somalia). For the purpose of this analysis, cases were selected which are examples of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations, with far-reaching mandates and a substantial military component. The sub-populations of missions are shown in Figure 1, below.¹

¹ Figure not to scale
Out of the remaining population of cases, the selection of cases for analysis was guided by what Gerring terms the ‘diverse-case method’. This strategy involves selecting cases which display a range on variation in the dependent or independent variable, but are as similar as possible in other regards (Gerring, 2007, p. 98). In this case, as the purpose of this study is to explore the effects of different deployment timing on mission effectiveness, cases were selected which display variation in the independent variable. This process resulted in the selection of two UN peacekeeping operations to be analyzed; UNAVEM III in Angola (1995-1997), and UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia (1996-1998). These missions have in common that they were of similar sizes (in terms of maximum authorized strength), lasted for approximately the same amount of time, and took place in the same decade, after the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, according to Howard’s analysis, these two conflict cases enjoyed similar levels of Security Council interest and consensus (Howard, 2008, p. 9), ruling out the possibility that SC politics would have caused both delays in deployment and the degree of effectiveness of the mission. In addition, the two countries had both experienced a relapse into violence after previous UN missions (UNAVEM I and II in Angola, UNPROFOR and UNCRO in former Yugoslavia). Consequently, the countries were in similar situations at the time of authorization of the PKO. Table 1 summarizes the scoring for these key variables.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping operation</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Maximum authorized strength</th>
<th>Security council interest intensity</th>
<th>Security Council consensus</th>
<th>Previous UN mission</th>
<th>Timing of deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM III (Angola)</td>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>7000 troops</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia)</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>5000 troops</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 The observations for 'Security Council interest intensity’ and ‘Security Council consensus’ are drawn from Howard (2008, p. 9). In addition, these variables are discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.4.
4.3. Method

To reiterate, the purpose of this study is to contribute to existing theories on peacekeeping success or failure by examining the impact of deployment timing on this outcome. It can thus be seen as a heuristic comparative case study, in that it attempts to examine the explanatory value of a new, previously neglected, variable (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 75). Specifically, this study will make use of the method of structured focused comparison (SFC), a method which allows the researcher to compare cases in a systematic fashion. The method is structured, in the sense that it requires the same questions for analysis to be asked of each case, and focused, as the questions should be devised to reflect the key variables of interest (George & Bennett, 2004, p. 67). The case study approach is suitable for the purpose of this paper for reasons relating both to empirical factors, and to the goals of the research conducted here.

With regards firstly to empirical considerations, as was elaborated on above, the total population of cases which fall within the scope conditions for this study is rather small. In addition, the population of concluded peacekeeping operations can be seen as highly heterogeneous, a factor which speaks in favor of the case study approach (Gerring, 2007, p. 50; Hopkin, 2010, p. 296). Relatedly, in addition to the fact that UN peacekeeping remains a relatively rare phenomenon (when compared to other phenomena subjected to social scientific inquiry), the amount of variation in the independent variable, deployment timing, is relatively small. In fact, there appears not to exist many cases in which deployment for a multidimensional peacekeeping operation has been achieved within 90 days, as envisaged by the UN itself (UNDPKO, 2008, p. 63). This lack of what Gerring refers to as ‘useful variation’, also motivates opting for a comparative case study (Gerring, 2007, p. 57).

With regards to the research goals, one essential goal of this study is to provide a thick and valid measurement of the dependent variable, short-term mission effectiveness. This is achieved here, through a qualitative assessment of multiple indicators allowed by the case study approach. As previously mentioned, one of the shortcomings of previous research in the field is the tendency to measure the multifaceted concept of mission effectiveness with the use of a single variable, such as the duration of peace. In addition, the comparative case study analysis undertaken here enables for greater insight into the research context, which allows the author to assess the strength of the theoretical argument proposed, thus achieving high internal validity (Gerring, 2007, p. 43). While external validity (i.e. the extent to which results
can be generalized to a wider population) is to some extent compromised, this trade-off is deemed acceptable.

5. Results and Analysis

This section will present the results of the analysis and a comparison of the cases, with focus on the variables of interest. For each case, a brief introduction to the underlying conflict, and previous UN efforts in the country at hand, will be provided.

5.1. UNAVEM III

5.1.1. Background

Between 1975, when Angola gained independence from Portugal, and 2002, the country experienced a protracted and devastating civil war which caused the death of at least half a million people (UCDP, 2016a). With the departure of the colonizers, fighting broke out between three nationalist groups who had previously been struggling for independence, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. Despite sharing the common goal of national liberation, these groups represented different political orientations and ideologies, which soon became a source of conflict. Furthermore, the complexity of the conflict was exacerbated by the involvement of external powers, most notably the United States, the USSR, South Africa and Cuba (Howard, 2008, p. 36). While the FNLA lost external support and consequently disintegrated in the late 1970’s, fighting resumed between the MPLA (which is regarded by the UCDP as the government of Angola for this time period) and UNITA until the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002 (UCDP, 2016a).

UN efforts in the country commenced in 1989, with the authorization of UNAVEM I (United Nations Angola Verification Mission). This small-scale operation consisted of 70 military observers, whose primary mandate was to verify the redeployment and eventual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (UNDPI, 2017). Having completed this task a month before schedule, the mission was largely considered successful in relation to its mandate (S/22678). Following a recommendation from the Secretary-General, the Security Council decided in May 1991 to transition the operation into UNAVEM II, which was mandated with observing
the cease-fire agreed upon in the so-called Bicesse Accords, and the attendant demobilization and disarmament of troops (Krška, 1997, p. 85). However, the operation, with its 350 military observers and 400 election observers, suffered many problems. According to Howard, “the sorely understaffed, under-funded UNAVEM II in effect merely staved off fighting for a time, allowing both sides to regroup and prepare for possible battle if the election outcome was not to their liking” (2008, p. 37).

After renewed fighting in Angola following the elections of September 1992, new negotiations took place in the two following years, which eventually led up to the drafting of the Lusaka Peace Accords in October 1994. The agreement was signed by the warring parties on the 20\textsuperscript{th} of November 1994, and this date provides the starting point for the analysis below.

5.1.2. Timing of deployment

As is shown in figure 2, it took a long time before the third UN peacekeeping operation in Angola was operational.\textsuperscript{3} From the 20\textsuperscript{th} of November 1994, when the Lusaka Peace Accords were signed, it would take almost three months, until February 8\textsuperscript{th} 1995, before the Security

\textsuperscript{3} The orange dashed lines in Figure 2 and 3 represent the 25\textsuperscript{th} and 75\textsuperscript{th} percentiles, respectively.
Council would authorize the establishment of UNAVEM III, with a maximum strength of 7000 military troops (S/RES/976, 1995). The first battalion at the scene would not become operational until mid-May, almost 6 months after the signing of the peace protocol (Hare, 1998, p. 91). At this point, the 25 percent threshold of troop deployment was first reached. While the Secretary-General in his monthly reports to the Security Council repeatedly emphasized the importance of the cooperation of UNITA and the Angolan government if the deployment of UNAVEM troops was to proceed according to schedule (S/1995/177) the leaders of the warring parties also expressed concern regarding the slow deployment (Hare, 1998, p. 92). In the course of the following months, troop deployment proceeded slowly, but it would take until October 1995, close to a year after the Lusaka Accords had been signed, before the 75 percent threshold was reached, and the bulk of UNAVEM troops deployed.

5.1.3. Demobilization and disarmament

In his first progress report on UNAVEM III to the Security Council, issued in March 1995, the Secretary-General described the troop disengagement process as “frustratingly slow” (S/1995/177, §11). Moreover, he stressed that the deployment of UNAVEM troops was conditional on the parties fully disengaging their troops and honouring the agreed upon ceasefire (S/1995/177, §24-5). While disengagement appears to have slowly proceeded in the months which followed (S/1995/274, §12; S/1995/370, §9), the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on the Lusaka peace process argues that the demobilization process did not in actuality take off before February 1996 – one year after the authorization of UNAVEM III (Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 32). Furthermore, UNITA was repeatedly accused of not committing to disengagement, by only turning over their lighter weaponry and not quartering ‘real’ soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp. 32-4). As Paul Hare, the US Special Representative for the Angolan peace process, put it: “Trying to get the parties to carry out their respective obligations was like pulling teeth – a slow, wrenching, and painful process” (Hare, 1998, p. 97).

When confronted by UN officials about the slow pace of demobilization, the UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi repeatedly voiced security concerns (Hare, 1998, p. 101). In particular, Savimbi accused the Government side of launching offensives against UNITA before the arrival of the Blue Helmets, and contended that he could not allow his forces to be quartered under such circumstances (Hare, 1998, p. 68). As argued by Howard, “the delays in UN
deployment created uncertainty for both parties and incentives not to cease fire or disarm” (2008, p. 39). Furthermore, both Savimbi and President Dos Santos reportedly requested the speedy deployment of UN formed units (S/1995/274, §7), however, UN representatives in turn stressed that the parties must implement certain aspects of the Lusaka Protocol before deployment of UNAVEM III (S/1995/350, §7). In hindsight, it appears that the Security Council’s requirement that Government and UNITA forces should be fully disengaged and withdrawn and verification mechanisms set up (to name only two of the requirements) (S/1995/177), before the deployment of peacekeepers was commenced, was highly unrealistic. This case thus lends support to Walter’s argument that warring parties who do not receive security guarantees by third-parties during the demobilization period will struggle in implementing their peace settlements (1999, p. 129).

5.1.4. Violence abatement

In the first months of 1995, the Government and UNITA both accused the other side of cease-fire violations (S/1995/177, §10). According to Howard, the delays in deployment of peacekeeping troops allowed for cease-fire violations by both conflicting parties (2008, p. 40). While the majority of attacks were incidences of localized, small-scale violence, which allegedly did not significantly impact the overall peace process (Hare, 1998, p. 95), the UN nevertheless recorded a total of 1500 violations of the cease-fire in 1995 alone (Human Rights Watch, 1996). However, the number of violations decreased throughout the year, with the majority of attacks taking place in the early months of 1995, before deployment of UN peacekeepers had commenced (Human Rights Watch, 1999). According to the Secretary-General’s October report, “the more rapid induction of UNAVEM’s formed units and their deployment in the various provinces have contributed to the further stabilization of the military situation and stricter respect for the cease-fire” (S/1995/842, 1995, §8).

There is evidence suggesting that the respect for the cease-fire increased in 1996, when UNAVEM III troops had been fully deployed. For instance, the UCDP georeferenced data reports a total of 215 deaths in 1995, and only 75 in 1996 – 73 of which occurred in battles between the Angolan government and FLEC-FAC, another rebel group (UCDP, 2016). In addition, the reports of the Secretary-General from this year indicate that the cease-fire continued generally to hold (S/1996/827, 1996, §11). This goes to suggest that the eventual
deployment of UNAVEM III troops did contribute to the stabilization of the military situation in Angola in the latter half of the analysis period.

5.1.5. Cooperation with peacekeepers

Throughout the mission, lack of cooperation by the parties was often cited as an impediment to UNAVEM III (S/1995/274, §6, Adebajo, 2004, p. 200). For instance, it was noted in the Secretary-General’s first progress report that deployment of UNAVEM troops in certain rural areas had been slowed down as a result of shooting at UNAVEM aircraft on part of UNITA (S/1995/177, §12). Furthermore, two of the mission’s personnel were reported to have been slightly injured in a “deliberate and apparently carefully planned attack by unidentified armed military elements” on a UNAVEM team site in March 1995 (S/1995/274, §11). One particularly noteworthy observation, although it did not in itself include a violent attack on UNAVEM personnel, is that a propaganda campaign was reportedly launched against the mission in a particular region in late 1995. The campaign allegedly enjoyed the support of both the Angolan government and UNITA, and involved a government-controlled radio program urging the local population to “prepare for war” against UNAVEM III (S/1995/1012, §11). Campaigns and attacks against UNAVEM III by UNITA forces reportedly continued and increased in early 1996 (S/1996/75, §11) but the situation appears to have somewhat stabilized later in the year (S/1996/171, §8). According to the UN’s own data on peacekeeper fatalities, only one UNAVEM III employee died as a result of a ‘malicious act’ in 1995, and four in 1996 (UNDPKO, 2017).

5.2. UNTAES

5.2.1. Background

The conflict over Eastern Slavonia was one part of the wars which followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. As the Republic of Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991, tensions arose in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Sirmium (henceforth referred to as Eastern Slavonia), situated along the Croatian border to Serbia, and inhabited by a majority of Croatian Serbs (UCDP, 2016b). In the same year, Eastern Slavonia
became the scene for some of the most devastating fighting in the Croatian conflict, particularly with the battle over Vukovar, in which nearly four percent of the Eastern Slavonian population was killed, and many more injured (Howard, 2008, p. 225). Following the battle, Serb forces managed to seize large parts of Croatian territory, including Eastern Slavonia (Boothby, 2004, p. 37). However, in 1995, an offensive by the Croatian armed forces resulted in the re-take of the Krajina region and Western Slavonia, which brought a large number of displaced Serbs to seek protection in Eastern Slavonia (UNDPI, 1997). With the help of the US ambassador to Croatia and the UN Special Envoy as mediators, a peace accord known as the Basic Agreement was signed by the parties on November 12th, 1995, in Erdut (Klein, 1997, p. 20).

UN involvement in the region commenced with the authorization of UNPROFOR in 1992, a peacekeeping operation which was to ensure the demobilization and withdrawal of troops from Croatian territory, and the security of the local population (UNDPI, 1996). This operation was widely considered unsuccessful, in large part as it failed to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica where over 7000 Bosnian Muslims were killed (Howard, 2008, p. 43), but also, due to its failure in demilitarizing the region of Eastern Slavonia (UCDP, 2016c). In March 1995, UNPROFOR was replaced with UNCRO, an interim operation established to facilitate the negotiation of a peace settlement between the warring parties (UNDPI, N.D.). Following the signing of this document, known as the Basic Agreement, UNTAES was authorized by the Security Council on the 15th of January, 1996 (S/RES/1037, 1996).
5.2.2. Timing of deployment

As can be seen in Figure 3, UNTAES was deployed within a relatively short time after the Basic Agreement had been signed. The 25% deployment threshold was reached just over two months after the signing of the agreement, and the 75% threshold was met three months later. Deployment to UNTAES was reportedly completed on the 5th of May 1996 (United Nations, 1996, p. 319). The fact that the UN already had troops in Croatia which could easily be redeployed to Eastern Slavonia has been cited as one reason for the relatively swift deployment of UNTAES (Howard, 2008, p. 236; Klein, 1997, p. 22). By the end of April, the former UNCRO troops already present in the region had been joined by additional battalions, making for a total of more than 4,500 troops (Boothby, 2004, p. 39). The mission’s Transitional Administrator, Jacques Klein, has argued that the robustness of troop deployment to Eastern Slavonia, in terms of both authorized force and deployment speed, importantly helped the mission achieve its mandate (1997, p. 20).
5.2.3. Demobilization and disarmament

According to the mission timetable, the demobilization process was to start when UNTAES was fully deployed in the region, and was scheduled to take 30 days (S/RES/1037. p. 2). After it had been reported that the military component of UNTAES was deployed, the demilitarization process was to begin on the 21st of May 1996, at 12:00 (United Nations, 1996, p. 321). In a Secretary-General report to the Security Council dated 26th of June, it was noted with satisfaction that complete demilitarization had been achieved within the scheduled 30 days (United Nations, 1996, p. 22). While the demilitarization process was thus generally described as smooth, some problems arose with regards to the withdrawal of Serb paramilitaries (Howard, 2008, p. 239), and the light arms thought to have remained in private hands after demobilization (United Nations, 1996, p. 319; S/1996/622, §16). In order to remedy this problem, UNTAES Transitional Administrators Jacques Klein initiated a ‘weapons buy-back program’, in which the local population was payed for handing in their weapons (Klein, 2003, p. 206). In addition, concern was raised in August of 1996, over the continued presence of Croatian Special Police in the demilitarization zone, despite repeated protests against such presence by UNTAES (S/1996/622, §10).

In general, UNTAES appears to have placed great emphasis on the issue of guaranteeing security to the demobilizing parties. According to Derek Boothby, the Deputy Transitional Administrator for the mission, “[t]he robustness of UNTAES military capabilities was made clear to local Serbs and to the Croatian authorities alike. The force commander made plans with the Serb military to supervise the demilitarization of the Serb forces, and UNTAES patrols were deliberately made more frequent and vigorous to reassure the Serb civilian population that, once Serb troops had left, UNTAES would be there to provide security” (2004, pp. 39-40). The evidence available for this case thus suggests strong support for the notion that the swift establishment of credible security guarantees is vital for successful demobilization and disarmament. As previously mentioned, Transitional Administrator Klein partly attributed the success of UNTAES to the robustness of its deployment, referring both to strength and speed (Klein, 1997, p. 20).
5.2.4. Violence abatement

In August 1996, the UN Secretary-General started reporting on the progress of UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia. The three reports published that year, separated by roughly one month, all describe the military situation in the region as calm and stable, with no incidents to report (S/1996/622; S/1996/705; S/1996/821). The military situation reportedly stabilized rather quickly, allowing UNTAES to focus increasingly on political matters relating to the peace process (Howard, 2008, pp. 235-6). According to Boothby, the fact that the demobilization process was successfully completed only five months after the authorization of the operation enabled for the maintenance of security and stability throughout the remainder of the mission (2004, p. 49). While some increased tensions were reported in the southern part of the region in January 1997 (S/1997/148), the calm appears to quickly have been restored by UNTAES personnel, who also continued to keep a close eye on the sensitive process of returning displaced persons to their homes in Eastern Slavonia (S/1997/487). In the second half of the year, UNTAES started downsizing their forces in the region, and withdrawal of the last military units was reportedly completed on November 14th, 1997 (S/1997/953).

In sum, UNTAES managed to decisively stabilize the military situation in Eastern Slavonia early on, and the calm was subsequently sustained throughout the entire mission. This evidence can be seen to support the notion that the image and achievements of the mission at an early stage are crucial in creating a positive momentum for the peace process. Seen through the theoretical lens provided in this paper, UNTAES was successful in exploiting the window of opportunity following the peace agreement, as the operation swiftly and decisively established a military calm which continued to last throughout the entire mission.

5.2.5. Cooperation with peacekeepers

In his reports on the progress of UNTAES, the Secretary-General repeatedly expressed concern over the lack of cooperation with UNTAES from both conflicting parties. With regards to the Croatian side, the complaints often referred to the fact that the Croatian government was failing to provide the funding for local administration which it had committed to in the Basic agreement (S/1996/622, §22, S/1996/821, §16). In addition, the Croats were reportedly uncooperative in processing applications for Croatian citizenship.
Turning to the Serb side, obstructionist attitudes were reported in some elements of the Serb leadership (S/1996/705, §5; S/1996/821, §17). The Serb side was allegedly somewhat divided, and the lack of cooperation seems to have pertained primarily to some individual Serbs (S/1996/821, §11).

While there is thus evidence of some obstructionism on behalf of the conflicting parties, this non-cooperation was chiefly related to institutional matters, and appears not to have manifested itself in violent attacks on the peacekeepers themselves. According to UNDPKO official statistics on fatalities, one UNTAES peacekeeper was killed in malicious acts in each of the years 1996 and 1997 (UNDPKO, 2017). In his February report of 1997, the Secretary-General acknowledged that one UNTAES member had been killed in an attack by a local resident, who was allegedly mentally unstable (S/1997/148, §10).

5.3. Main findings and extension of the analysis

Table 2. Summary of results of SFC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Timing of deployment</th>
<th>Demobilization and disarmament</th>
<th>Violence abatement</th>
<th>Level of cooperation with peacekeepers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Primarily unsuccessful – pace of demobilization very slow and lack of ‘real’ soldiers and heavy weaponry turned in.</td>
<td>Primarily unsuccessful – frequent cease-fire violations, which decreased during the second half of the time period for analysis.</td>
<td>Low – peacekeeping troops subjected to multiple attacks and negative campaigning by the warring parties and local population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
<td>Successful – minor problems relating to the withdrawal of paramilitaries and the gathering of small arms.</td>
<td>Successful – military calm was established early on and lasted throughout the entire mission.</td>
<td>Moderate – evidence of non-cooperation from both sides and associated paramilitaries. However, non-cooperation did not manifest itself in violent attacks on peacekeepers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of the SFC are summarized in Table 2, above. In general, it can be concluded that UNTAES was generally highly effective in achieving the prompt demobilization of the parties and maintaining the cease-fire throughout the mission (Boothby, 2004, p. 49). Although the mission met with significant resistance, both from the main warring parties and their associated paramilitaries, it was not challenged militarily after it at an early stage of the peace process had established a credible presence in the area. However, as both Boothby and Klein
have argued, much remained to be done in terms of reintegration and reconciliation between Serb and Croat communities after the departure of UN troops (Boothby, 2004, p. 49; Klein, 1997, p. 23). While the process of societal reintegration has proceeded slowly over the years since the end of the UNTAES mandate, the region has not relapsed into war, and the troops of the previously warring parties have remained demobilized (Howard, 2008, p. 257).

In comparison, UNAVEM III continuously struggled with the implementation of its mandate. The situation in Angola following the Lusaka Protocol can be seen to resemble a Catch-22, where the warring parties, in particular UNITA, were in need of security guarantees in order to demobilize, but the UN were unwilling to fully commit to deployment before demobilization was achieved. As acknowledged by Howard, “the UN’s inability to follow through on security guarantees for Savimbi, and the delayed arrival of the UNAVEM III operation, meant that Savimbi could not put his trust in the UN” (2008, p. 42). Although there is some evidence suggesting that the process of demobilization and the status of the cease-fire improved as the number of UN troops in the country eventually increased, the situation deteriorated again in 1997, and the country returned to war again in 1998, after the departure of the UN troops. In the following years, fighting ensued between the Government and UNITA, and the armed conflict did not come to a decisive end until Savimbi’s death in battle in 2002 (UCDP, 2016a).

With regards to the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3 of this paper, the evidence presented here suggests strong support for some aspects of the theoretical argument. On the other hand, it also indicates that some revision of the theory may be necessary. Firstly, the results imply strong support for the notion that peacekeepers are crucial for providing security guarantees for formerly warring parties during the demobilization phase of the peace process.

It has been shown that the presence of such guarantees significantly contribute to the successful demobilization of the parties to the conflict in Eastern Slavonia, and their absence can be seen to have contributed to the failure of demobilization in Angola. Furthermore, the evidence presented here also confirms that timely deployment of peacekeepers significantly increases the credibility and perception of commitment of the operation.

The part of the theoretical framework which requires revision relates chiefly to the cooperation of the parties. While it was asserted in the theory section of this paper that missions which are swiftly deployed are likely to enjoy higher levels of cooperation by the parties, the results presented here carry evidence of non-cooperation of the parties in both Angola and Eastern Slavonia. The timing of deployment instead seems to have primarily
affected the nature and extent of non-cooperation, in particular, whether peacekeepers were challenged in their authority and met with violence by the parties or the local population. With regards to Angola, the evidence from this case includes multiple violent attacks on peacekeepers and active campaigning against the mission. In Eastern Slavonia on the other hand, non-cooperation with peacekeepers appears to have been of a more passive character, manifesting itself in unwillingness to fulfill certain obligations, and, in the case of Serb paramilitaries, initial unwillingness to withdraw from certain designated zones. This observation lends particular support to Lindberg Bromley’s argument, that PKO’s which fail to establish sufficient credibility, for instance through delays in deployment, are likely to be met with greater challenges to their authority (2017, pp. 16-17).

5.4. Alternative explanations

Thus far, it has been shown that UNTAES fared significantly better than UNAVEM III in terms of short-term effectiveness, and it has been argued that a key factor impacting this outcome was the difference in deployment timing between the two operations. However, the following discussion will assess the explanatory power of three alternative explanations to the differing outcomes. It will consider whether the variations in short-term effectiveness can be attributed to differences in the levels of cooperation of the parties, strength of the missions, and SC interests.

To begin, the story of UNAVEM III in Angola is shaped by a dominant narrative which suggests that the lack of success of the operation can be attributed to the lack of cooperation by UNITA, and in particular, Jonas Savimbi (UCDP, 2016a; World Bank, 2005, p. 13; Paris, 2004, p. 68). In much of the literature on the Angolan peace process, Savimbi is seen as a so-called ‘spoiler’; a leader who deliberately undermined the prospects for peace (Stedman, 1997; Greenhill & Major, 2006). Naturally, this perception is supported by the fact that it was when Savimbi was killed in 2002 that the country finally managed to bring the protracted civil war to an end (World Bank, 2005, p. 13). Given that this view of the conflict in Angola and Savimbi’s role is almost taken as a fact in many accounts, it is relevant to discuss here whether the differences in short-term effectiveness between UNAVEM III and UNTAES can be attributed to differing levels of cooperation of the parties.
Importantly, it is not refuted here that the lack of cooperation from Savimbi and UNITA hindered the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, however, it is argued that this behaviour must be understood in relation to the weak commitment of the UN, specifically in terms of deployment delays. This argument is also made in a Human Rights Watch report, which states that “[t]he failure of the Lusaka Peace Process was not only due to the bad faith of UNITA. The U.N.’s strategy […], its lack of transparency, and its failure to implement U.N. embargoes undermined any respect that UNITA or the government had to observe the Lusaka Protocol” (1999, p. 6). It is further argued in the report that these shortcomings could have been avoided had the UN deployed peacekeepers on time (1999, p. 6). Additionally, as previously mentioned, Savimbi repeatedly requested the speedy deployment of UNAVEM troops, and the lack of support of the UN in the implementation of the peace settlement can be seen to have given rise to frustration and non-cooperation on part of UNITA (Greenhill & Major, 2006, p. 21; Howard, 2008, p. 36).

Turning to UNTAES, as the results presented in the previous section suggest, there is plenty of evidence of non-cooperation and obstructionist attitudes from the warring parties also in the conflict in Croatia. In particular, the Serb side housed many potential spoilers of the peace process, both in the form of hard-liners in Serb leadership (Šimunovic, 1999, p. 137), and paramilitaries such as the Scorpions (Howard, 2008, p. 239). However, these cooperation problems were overcome largely because UNTAES was capable of posing a credible enough deterrent to large-scale obstructions of the implementation of the Basic Agreement (Šimunovic, 1999, p. 136). The comparison of these two cases thus suggests that there existed non-cooperative elements both in the conflict in Angola and that in Eastern Slavonia, but that the commitment and credibility of the UN was a key factor determining the extent to which these elements were allowed to influence the peace process.

A second potential alternative explanation to the success of peacekeeping in Eastern Slavonia and the failure in Angola relates these outcomes to the strength of the missions. In various articles, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon put forth the argument that the composition and capacity of peacekeeping operations largely determine the degree of success of such missions (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013; 2014; 2016). Specifically, these authors claim that larger numbers of peacekeepers, in particular military troops, improve the operations’ abilities to achieve their mandates (2014, p. 737). In fact, their argument is closely related to that made in this paper, and the authors even comment on the importance of timing of deployment (2016, p. 235), although it is not discussed in great detail. However, while it is not denied in
this paper that the strength of an operation is crucial for success, it is asserted that in addition to strength, speed also matters. In the words of Lindberg Bromley, “[t]o serve a deterrent function, peace operations must be appropriately staffed (in terms of both authorized and deployed personnel) adequately equipped and deployed without delay” (2017, p. 17, emphasis added).

This point can be illustrated with reference to the cases studied. The maximum authorized strengths for the missions were 5000 troops for UNTAES, and 7000 for UNAVEM III, although the latter operation admittedly covered a significantly larger territory. However, it should be noted that the Secretary-General originally recommended the Security Council to equip UNTAES with 9,300 military troops; almost twice the number the Council went on to authorize (Boothby, 2004, p. 39). In other words, this operation was in fact not at all as strong as it could have been, had the Secretary-General had it his way. Interestingly, Howard argues that one reason why the Council devoted less troops and funding for UNTAES than requested by the Secretariat was because the interest in this conflict was relatively low in comparison with that in Bosnia, but also compared to conflicts on the African continent, for instance in Liberia and Angola (2008, p. 235). Despite this, analysts of UNTAES often point to the ‘robustness of deployment’ as a crucial factor for success (Klein, 1997; Šimunovic, 1999), a term which seems to refer not only to the military strength of the mission but also its ability to exploit a particular ‘window of opportunity’ (Šimunovic, 1999, p. 136). In contrast, UNAVEM III in Angola was in March 1996 reported to be the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world at the time (S/1996/248, §10). This goes to suggest that the mission indeed had significant strength at its disposal, however, the bulk of this strength did not arrive until around a year after the peace settlement in Lusaka, when arguably, all political momentum for the peace process had been lost.

Finally, as described in Chapter 2 of this paper, a number of scholars have previously suggested that Security Council politics have a bearing on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Jett, 1999; Bratt, 1997). Therefore, this section considers whether the differing outcomes of UNAVEM III and UNTAES could be due to different levels of SC interest in the conflicts. To begin, official UN records on voting in the SC inform us that all resolutions concerning both UNAVEM III and UNTAES were adopted unanimously, with no abstentions (UNBIS, N.D.). This goes to suggest that the level of consensus in the Council was high with regards to both of the cases under examination here. However, the level of interest in these two conflicts on behalf of the SC appears to have been
lukewarm at best. As previously mentioned, Howard argues that the interest in the situation in Eastern Slavonia was continuously overshadowed, in particular by the war in Bosnia (2008, p. 235). This state of affairs is further reflected in the decision to grant UNTAES significantly less troops and funding than originally requested. Similarly, the interest in the Angolan conflict is described as ‘low to moderate’ in the time period under analysis (Howard, 2008, p. 39). With regards to financing, the UNAVEM III mission is estimated to have cost approximately $752 million (UNDPI, 1997), and UNTAES approximately $480 million (Howard, 2008, p. 225). Combined, these figures point to the conclusion that the two missions under comparison here enjoyed similar levels of SC consensus and interest, and the differing outcomes of the peace processes can therefore not realistically be attributed in any great scale to this factor.

5.5. Limitations of the research design

The research design which has guided the present study admittedly suffers from a number of limitations. This section begins by discussing the limitations related to the method applied here, before turning to potential objections to the choices made by the author in designing the research.

Firstly, while the advantages of the comparative case study approach were discussed at length in Chapter 4 of this paper, this approach also comes with certain limitations, the most fundamental of which relates to the generalizability of the findings. In particular, the qualitative method applied here allows for thick descriptions and in-depth understanding of the phenomenon at hand, however, this is to some extent achieved with the sacrifice of broad generalizations (Vromen, 2010, p. 249). This trade-off can also be described as one between internal and external validity, where the former type concerns the cases under study, and the latter refers to the larger, unstudied, population (Gerring, 2007, p. 43). As Gerring describes, small-N studies are inevitably weaker with regards to external validity, because the method of case selection does not ensure representativeness of the entire population (2007, p. 43). Therefore, one should be careful in drawing generalizations from the findings of this paper, before they have been supported through other studies.

Secondly, the design applied in this study allows for some insight into the mechanism whereby timing of deployment impacts mission effectiveness, however, it does little in the
way of estimating the strength of the causal effect (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 230). Put differently, it has been demonstrated here that a delay in deployment of peacekeepers has a detrimental impact on short-term mission effectiveness, but it remains unclear how strong this effect is, and how it matches the explanatory value of other determinants of peacekeeping outcomes. Relatedly, while this paper has shown that faster deployment is correlated with higher mission effectiveness, it cannot determine the length of the window of opportunity – the critical time period within which peacekeepers should be deployed. Statistical methods could thus advantageously be used to complement the findings of this paper.

With regards to the cases analyzed here, it could perhaps be argued that the UNTAES case is not representative of the larger universe of PKO’s, for instance because this mission took place on a sub-national level, and because the underlying conflict was the result of a very particular historical episode, namely, the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, it should be noted here that multidimensional PKO’s which experience timely deployment of troops are in fact relatively rare. The UNTAES case thus had the strength of demonstrating somewhat rare variation in the independent variable, while still being comparable in many aspects to the Angolan case, which made the systematic comparison conducted here possible.

Furthermore, the present study could potentially be critiqued on the grounds that it only considers the deployment of peacekeeping troops, leaving out other types of UN personnel. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this choice can be motivated by considering the finding by Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2016), that it is primarily the number of troops deployed to a PKO which impacts the risk for civil war recurrence, and not other personnel types. As demonstrated in their study, it is appropriate to distinguish between different personnel types, however, it was deemed beyond the scope of this essay to consider these different types separately. It should also be mentioned, that in a large-scale multidimensional PKO, military troops by far make up the majority of the total amount of personnel, hence, the inclusion of other types of personnel in the analysis cannot be expected to alter the results more than marginally. For these reasons, the decision to focus exclusively on the deployment of military troops should be deemed acceptable.
6. Summary and Conclusions

To summarize, the purpose of this study has been to investigate how the timing of deployment of peacekeeping troops impacts the effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission. As argued in the initial chapters of this paper, deployment timing has been frequently mentioned in policy documents and academic articles, yet there is a lack of systematic comparative research on the effects of timing. The results of the analysis show that timing of deployment chiefly impacts the ability of peacekeepers to provide security guarantees to demobilizing parties, and to establish an image of credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the warring parties and local population. Deployment timing has thus been seen to affect the degree to which short-term mission goals are achieved. This finding carries important policy implications, in particular, that the UN should pursue the development of strategies which enable for rapid deployment. An example of such a strategy could be the development of closer cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU).

While this paper represents an attempt to address and explore the impact of deployment timing, this interesting topic is rife with opportunities for future research. Specifically, other scholars could investigate further both the determinants and consequences of deployment timing. With regards to the latter, researchers could build on the findings of this paper by investigating the effects of timing on the long-term outcomes of peacekeeping. Moreover, more detailed analyses could be used to evaluate the impact of timing of different types of personnel. Turning to the determinants of timing, more scholarly effort should be dedicated to establishing the causes of slow or rapid timing, and whether UN cooperation with other organizations does in fact enhance capabilities for rapid deployment of peacekeepers.

7. Bibliography


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Appendix: Questions for structured focused comparison

**Independent variable:**

- After how many days was the 25% threshold of troop deployment reached?
- After how many days was the 75% threshold of troop deployment reached?
- What additional observations can be made in relation to deployment timing?

**Dependent variable**

- Demobilization and disarmament
  - Did troops demobilize?
  - Did combatants disarm?
- Violence abatement
  - Was violence still present between the primary combatants?
  - Did levels of violence decrease during the time period of analysis?

**Dependent variable/causal mechanism**

- Cooperation with peacekeepers
  - Did warring parties cooperate with peacekeepers?
  - Were there violent attacks on peacekeepers?

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4 The questions for the dependent variable are drawn from the evaluation framework developed by Diehl and Druckman (2010). The questions for ‘cooperation with peacekeepers’ are inspired by the same framework, but have been partly modified to fit the purpose of this paper.

5 On the one hand, cooperation with peacekeepers can be seen as a measure of short-term mission effectiveness in itself, while on the other, it can also be seen as an indicator of one part of the theorized causal mechanism.