Educating Conflict

The Role of Educational Structures in Conflict Mobilization

Elias Gröön

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Department Peace and Conflict Research
Uppsala University
Advisor: Espen Geelmuyden Rød
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**Introduction**

Education is often seen as exclusively a force for good. However, studies have found evidence on “two faces” of education in relation to civil conflict occurrence. Education could have both constructive and destructive impacts, meaning that the educational initiatives could work as peace-building or peace-destroying (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 7). Also, studies on the relationship between educational inequality and occurrence of civil conflict (Bartusevičius, 2014; Østby, 2008) does not sufficiently explain why some groups initiate conflict mobilization while others do not. The need for a better understanding of the relationship between education and civil conflict is therefore essential. This study aims to answer the question on how educational structures can affect the likelihood of conflict mobilization.

Although a relationship has been found between educational inequality and civil conflict in previous research, no studies have been done to examine how educational structures affect the collective action in conflict mobilization that causes civil conflict. Therefore, this study will use a qualitative method to allow for a closer examination of different parts of the educational structures, to find evidence of how educational structures affect occurrence of conflict mobilization. In addition to a closer look at educational structures, this study will use extended measurements of educational inequality. The study will examine how education that is statuated as free and compulsory, which means that it should be provided to all citizens in the proper age, can also entail a form of educational inequality. The educational inequality is not a result of the state providing education for some while not for others, but inequalities within the educational structures. In previous research, educational attainment has been used as the only measurement for educational inequality.

The overall purpose of this study is to better understand the causes of conflict mobilization, and why conflict mobilization occurs in some countries while not in others. The study aims to understand how educational structures can cause both motives and opportunities for conflict mobilization. The main theoretical argument is based on two main parts within educational structures that can affect the occurrence of conflict mobilization. First, the theoretical framework suggests that repressive and discriminatory structures can create motives for conflict mobilization via cultural repression in education, content and history manipulation in education, and educational segregation. Second, structures of free and compulsory education can create opportunities for conflict mobilization via increase in communication skills, increase in cooperation skills, and increase in peoples’ social networks. To sum up the argument, when
education is free and compulsory, at the same time as the educational structures are repressive and discriminatory, motives and opportunities for conflict mobilization can increase. An increase in the risk of conflict mobilization increases the risk of civil conflict. The study is conducted on two cases in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana and Uganda, where conflict mobilization is apparent in Uganda while not in Ghana. The study examines if there is a difference in the educational structures in the two cases that can explain the difference in occurrence of conflict mobilization. The study finds that the cultural repression in the educational structures of Uganda has been more severe than the cultural repression in the educational structures of Ghana, especially the language policy in the educational structures differs in the two cases. The language policy in the educational structures of Uganda has contributed to the cultural repression, which has had a destructive impact on minority culture. The difference in magnitude of cultural repression found in this study could explain the difference in occurrence of conflict mobilization.

The study proceeds as follows. The next part will discuss previous research and gaps in previous studies, along with a presentation of the theoretical framework. In the presentation of the theoretical framework, the important parts of the educational structures will be described, and how they can affect the occurrence of conflict mobilization. Part three of this study will describe the research design. First, the methodological approach of across case comparison will be presented. Then follows a discussion of the selection of cases, and the structure of empirical study, using standardized questions guided by the theoretical framework. Then follows a brief description of the sources used in the empirical analysis. Part four will present the results of the study, and an empirical analysis of the results. The fifth and last part will draw conclusions of the study, along with suggestions of policy implications and interesting areas of future research.

Theory

Previous Research

One of the main areas of focus in the field of peace and conflict research is trying to explain why conflicts occur. A brief review of previous research in the field will put the importance of this study into light. According to Hegre et al. (2001) the regime type in a state can affect the risk of civil conflict. Their research shows that what they call semi-democracies, or intermediate
regimes, experience higher risk of civil war. The reason for the increase in risk of civil war is a political contradiction with a partly open, but at the same time somewhat repressive state. The repression leads to grievance which induces people to act, and the openness allows people to organize. According to their study, this is a situation that invites protests and rebellion.

There has also been extensive literature on economic factors that affects the risk of civil conflict. One of the most debated economic factor is the effects of economic inequality. One of the most prominent theories on how economic inequality affects risk of civil conflict is one launched by Gurr (1970) on relative deprivation, explaining the mobilization of the unprivileged in society by unfulfilled aspirations that have them discontent with their social situation. When people feel that they are deprived of something they think they are entitled to, they get frustrated and the frustration could lead to rebellion. Later studies have however not found a relationship between inequality and occurrence of civil conflict (Collier, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 20). Collier (2009) has in later work moved the theoretical arguments away from factors of motivations to factors of feasibility, explaining that where rebellions are feasible, they will occur. His argument focuses on structures of opportunity instead of historical structures of grievance.

In response to findings that disconfirm the relationship between inequality and risk of civil conflict, research in the specific field have also shifted towards studies on horizontal inequality instead of vertical inequality (Cederman et al. 2011; Østby, 2008; Stewart, 2001). Research on horizontal inequality focus on group-based inequality rather than inequality between individuals, since group-based inequality causes collective grievance within a group, and collective grievance can lead to collective action. The literature argues that since a rebellion against a state is a case of collective action, the occurrence must be explained by factors of collective grievance, not grievance among individuals (Østby, 2013).

The literature on inequality and civil conflict has also expanded from focus on economic inequality to focus on social inequality. In her article, Østby presents how horizontal inequality can take the form of discrimination in educational and occupational opportunities. Inequality in educational and occupational opportunities are signs of systematic group discrimination, which leads to collective group grievance. The research by Østby provides evidence on a relationship between social inequalities and risk of civil conflict (Østby, 2008, p. 155). Further research on educational inequality and risk of civil conflict by Bartusevičius (2014) confirms the relationship, but finds that risk of civil conflict drops at extreme levels of educational inequality. The research finds a quadratic relationship between educational inequality and risk of civil conflict, with an inverted-J shaped curve, suggesting that the risk of civil conflict increases until
a certain point, where the risk instead decreases with higher levels of educational inequality (Ibid, p. 43). The theoretical framework used in the research of educational inequality have not sufficiently explained this relationship. One study that does try to explain how attained education can lead to contentious behavior is research on education and propensity to participate in terrorist activities. The study explains that education with a particular political and religious message increases the risk of the educated to engage in terrorist activities. The study also explains that education leads to improved reasoning, which makes the educated more prone to understand moral and religious justifications used by terrorist groups. This can lead to a stronger awareness and aggravation of injustice, which could increase the risk of participation in terrorist activities (Berrebi, 2007, pp. 7–8). The previous study is however limited to terrorist activities, and does not explain other contentious behavior like conflict mobilization.

This study questions the validity of measurement on educational attainment because there could be other inequalities hidden within the educational structures, even if education is attained. This study argues for three main areas within the attained education where the structures can be used for repression and discrimination against minority groups. These educational structures do not only reflect discriminatory and repressive structures of the state, but are also used as an instrument to maintain such structures. The extended measurement will include structures of cultural repression within education, which can be used to create a power sphere where only certain cultural values are accepted. This allows the dominant majority group that is in control of the power to stay in power. It will also include measurements of manipulation of history and content in educational structures, which can be used by a state to control their dominance over specific ethnic groups or normalize oppression (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001). The measurement will also include segregation of education, allowing certain groups inferior education and creates ethnic polarization. For example, segregated education was used in South Africa to sustain the apartheid system (Graham, 1991). In addition to the extended measurement, the theoretical framework also provides explanation on how free and compulsory education can create opportunity for conflict mobilization where motives exist. This addition combines literature on grievance and feasibility, and examines how they together can increase the risk of conflict mobilization.
Structures of Educational Repression and Discrimination

The research objective of this study is to examine how educational structures can affect the occurrence of conflict mobilization in a country. Before going further into how variations in educational structures can have a causal relationship with the occurrence of conflict mobilization, the definition of conflict mobilization used in this study will be explained. In this study, the definition of conflict mobilization will be “civil unrest where a group uses violent contentious tactics against the state”. A period of contentious behavior from a group increases the risk of the situation spiraling into civil conflict (Regan & Norton, 2005, p. 327). Since this study is done on a country-level, the civil unrest with use of violent means must also be done on a national level against the state. Later parts in this study will further explain how variation in conflict mobilization will be measured.

In the first part of the theoretical framework, it is important to establish how an educational system can be used by a state to work for the rulers’ benefit. The section on previous literature has described how educational systems can be used by the regime of a state as an instrument for indoctrination and social control. The educational system has in that way been used to create structures of obedience and cultural hegemony of the ruling elite, to benefit the regime and their interests (Friedman et al., 2011). Using the educational system to create such structures is effective because formal education has a very high ability to shape understandings, attitudes and behaviors in children and young adults. The ability of formal education to shape understandings, attitudes and behaviors are often used with a socially constructive purpose, but can also have a socially destructive impact (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 9). A problem in previous literature is that education has been seen as a monolithic force, looking only at educational attainment believing that educational attainment will solve all. The ability of an educational system to shape understandings, attitudes and behaviors is however related to many different parts (Bleck, 2015, p. 4). The most important parts of educational structures that can have socially destructive impacts on the formation of understandings, attitudes and behavior, and in that way cause motivation for conflict mobilization, are (1) cultural repression, (2) manipulation of history and content, and (3) educational segregation. The next section will go further into the three different parts of repressive and discriminatory educational structures, and how they can cause motivations for conflict mobilization.

First, educational structures that are culturally repressive can cause motivations for conflict mobilization. The reason why a state would culturally repress minority groups that are
not part of the elite is because it can be strategically practiced by the ruling majority group to maintain political command and control (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 10). Repression of culture can be used as instrument to maintain power because ownership of cultural capital is important to get access to power spheres, and educational structures that promotes certain cultural values while others are rejected can therefore be seen as very contentious (Breidlid, 2005, p. 251). When educational structures are culturally repressive, the repression can go to the extent where school children who do not share cultural heritage with the dominant majority group become estranged of their own cultures, which has been described as “ethnocide” (Stavenhagen, 1996).

In Sudan, following the educational reforms when Muslim Arabs took power over the state, the educational structures became more culturally repressive towards non-Muslims. The educational structures of Sudan have since the reforms been led by an Islamic discourse, only recognizing Muslim values and education based on the Quran. This has created a hegemonic Muslim Arab culture, where other ethnic groups are in risk of forgetting their own culture (Breidlid, 2005, p. 259).

One of the most powerful forms of cultural repression is to impose a dominant language in the educational structure, because maternal languages are essential for maintenance of cultural and ethnic identity (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 11). Literature on ethnic assimilation provides evidence for both positive and negative effects of a national language, but for resulting in positive effects, the development towards a national language must be natural. Coercion of assimilation via a dominant language in educational structures can cause dissent since minority groups can feel deprived of their right to a maternal language (Stavenhagen, 1996, p. 194). In South Africa, ethnic groups have struggled with getting their indigenous languages recognized within the educational structures for decades. Both the Afrikaans Medium Decree in 1974, that ruled all Bantu education must be taught in Afrikaans, and later with English being the dominant language within the educational structures have been acts of cultural repression (Boddy-Evans, 2017). The coercion of a dominant language in educational structures have in that way served the interests of the privileged who speak Afrikaans and English, on the expense of those who speak indigenous languages (Greenfield, 2010, p. 520).

Second, educational structures can cause motivations for mobilization via manipulation of history and educational content. One way states have used the manipulation of educational content is the construction of a false history to maintain ethnic dominance or legitimize repressive behavior (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 15). The educational structures of National Socialist Germany are infamously known for manipulating the history of the “Germanic race”. The historical doctrine of National Socialist Germany emphasized the greatness of the
Germanic people and the importance of preserving their species. Manipulation of the educational content was in that way used as a “spiritual weapon” by stressing the triumph of the strong, and justifying elimination of the weak in order to reach human progress (Blackburn, 1985, p. 35). That kind of manipulation in educational content have extensive effects on students’ understandings of history, and on understandings of the present and the future. Another way of manipulating educational content to maintain ethnic dominance is using negative ethnic stereotypes (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 13). Classroom teaching in Rwanda leading up to the genocide in 1994 differentiated the Hutu and the Tutsi as unequal and opposed to each other. Lessons on physical and behavioral stereotypes of the Hutus and Tutsis were held, and focus was given to the negative traits of the Tutsi (K. King, 2014). Educational content manipulation that is used to glorify nationalism and risk to create cleavages within the society is correlated with an increase in risk of violence (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 14).

Third, educational segregation can cause motivations for conflict mobilization. Within the concept of educational segregation, both separated education that is unequal in quality and separated education that is equal in quality can affect the creation of motivations for conflict mobilization. First, the educational structures can be set up in a way that allows the ruling majority group to attain a better-quality education than other minority groups (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 15). Other groups receive a separate, inferior education, as in the case of educational structures in South Africa during the apartheid, where the racially segregated education were central to maintain the apartheid system (Thomas, 1996, p. 330). The segregated education is in that way used by the elite to monopolize on quality education and will therefore lead to them maintaining the political power (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 15). According to literature on horizontal inequality, if people that are deprived of good education, and therefore deprived of chances to advance the socio-economic status for themselves and their children, the risk of violence increases. The risk of violence is especially high if the deprived are convinced that the discrimination is deliberately done by those in power (Østby, 2008, p. 215). Segregated educational structures can also create sharper ethnical distinctions, even if the education is equal in quality, and cause alienation of discriminated ethnic groups. This can cause the minority group to see themselves as inferior, or at least the conviction that the elite sees them as inferior. It can also cause the elite to see themselves as superior. Both of the causes can in that way plant a seed for ethnic division and conflict (Bush & Saltarelli, 2001, p. 15).
Free and Compulsory Education

Although repressive and discriminatory educational structures can create motives for conflict mobilization, literature on conflict mobilization widely argues that for a mobilization to occur there is a need to overcome collective action problems. Actions against a state by individuals themselves, even though they might be highly motivated, is not rationally explainable since both success rates are very low, and costs are very high (Goldstone, 1994, p. 139). So how can educational structures create opportunities to overcome collective action problems? Even though an educational system is built by repressive and discriminatory structures, free and compulsory education provides opportunities to acquire communication skills and cooperation skills that are vital to overcome collective action problems, and increase peoples social networks, which also heightens the probability of overcoming collective action problems (Dahlum & Wig, 2017, p. 8).

First, the ability to read and write is important to successfully process and distribute information, which will make it possible for people to learn about others’ opinions and intentions (Ibid, p. 9). Information exchange and the ability to express facts and opinions are also linked to higher degree of civic participation (Glaeser et al., 2007, p. 82). Acquiring communication skills and learning how to read and write will also allow for people to become aware of inequalities, which heightens probability for collective action (Sanborn & Thyne, 2013, p. 777). Second, education will also provide opportunities to acquire cooperation skills, and the ability to work together in a group is a very important attribute of organizing in collective action (Dahlum & Wig, 2017, p. 9). The skills that socialization in education brings to successfully and productively interact with others increases the probability, and success rate, of collective action (Glaeser et al., 2007, p. 82). Third, along with communication and cooperation skills, education also allows for an increase in peoples’ social networks, which affects the probability of engaging in politics. Bigger social networks allows information to flow even faster, and can strengthen group mentality (Dahlum & Wig, 2017, p. 9). An increase in group size also lowers the costs of conflict mobilization, and increases the chance of success (Goldstone, 1994, p. 140). The opportunities of increasing social networks are therefore opportunities of overcoming collective action problems.
Drawing upon the theoretical framework presented above, if people are given the opportunity of education via free and compulsory education, at the same time that the educational system contains repressive and discriminatory structures, education can increase both motivations and opportunities for conflict mobilization. If motivation and opportunities for conflict mobilization increases, the risk of civil conflict outbreak will increase.

**Hypothesis:** When education is free and compulsory, an increase in repressive and discriminatory structures of education can cause an increase in the risk of conflict mobilization.

**Research Design**

This study is set up to examine how educational structures via the parts highlighted in the theoretical framework affects the selected outcome variable, conflict mobilization. To examine the parts of the theoretical framework that is interesting for the study, the method of structured focused comparison will be used on two cases, Ghana and Uganda. The method uses a set of standardized questions that reflects the research objective and the questions are asked of each case to collect comparable data for the study. The questions are aimed at the theoretical focus of importance, and will therefore only capture certain parts that is intended by the research objective (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 67). The set of standardized questions that will be used in this study will be presented later in this part, after a presentation of the design. The method of structured focused comparison will allow for a theoretical focus appropriate for the intended
research objective, and the study will therefore be guided by the theoretical framework (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 70). The theoretical focus in this study will be on the important parts of educational structures described in the theoretical framework, to examine if educational structures that are repressive and discriminatory can cause motivations for conflict mobilization.

Since educational provision and educational structures are products of national policy, and the outcome variable also reflects mobilization against the state, the study will be conducted through a country-level analysis. The study will conduct a controlled comparison of two cases, with variance in the outcome variable. The variance in the outcome variable will be variance in conflict mobilization, and the study will then examine if educational structures can account for the difference in conflict mobilization. Here it is of importance to specify the definition of variance in the outcome variable (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 79).

To measure the variance in the conflict mobilization, I will use the Minorities at Risk rebellion scale, which is a 7-point scale from political banditry and sporadic terrorism to civil war. In accordance with the definition of conflict mobilization used in this study, for a measurement of conflict mobilization occurring the MAR rebellion scale would have to reach point 4 (small-scale guerilla activity) or higher, because that would place the collective action towards the state and is therefore a measurement of country-level conflict mobilization. For no occurrence of conflict mobilization, the measurement would have to be point 3 (local rebellions) or lower, because although this point of the scale could include collective actions, the actions are not on a country-level against the state. No occurrence of conflict mobilization would therefore also include point 2, campaigns of terrorism, point 1, political banditry and sporadic terrorism, along with point 0, none reported.

Table 1 MAR rebellion scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>LABEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>None reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Politic banditry and sporadic terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Campaigns of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Local rebellions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Small-scale guerilla activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Intermediate guerilla activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Large-scale guerilla activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Protracted civil war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using the MAR rebellion scale limits this study to the MAR dataset, which is not a limitation of great importance since the data is very extensive and reflects the behavior of minority groups, which is of importance in relation to the theoretical framework. Using the MAR dataset to measure the outcome variable is in that way in line with the theoretical objective of this study, since the framework provides reasoning about behaviors and structures of minority groups. In the study, the latest updated variation of the MAR dataset will be used in order to conduct research with an up-to-date dataset. The latest version of the MAR dataset has measurements of minorities at risk between the years 2004 and 2006, which are the years the outcome variable will be measured. While the outcome variable is measured with data from the MAR project, limiting the measurements to the groups registered by the MAR project, the empirical analysis will study the educational structures as a whole, since all groups in the countries are effected by the structures. The empirical analysis will therefore not be limited by the MAR data. The empirical analysis will be conducted on the educational structures before the measured years of the outcome variable, and after the years of independence in the two cases. Ghana gained their independence in 1957 (Berry & Library of Congress, 1995, p. 30), while Uganda gained independence in 1962 (Ssekamwa, 1997, p. 164). The controlled comparison of two cases with variance in conflict mobilization will examine how the educational structures can cause motivations for conflict mobilization when the education is free and compulsory.

Case Selection

Using the MAR rebellion scale to measure the variation in the outcome variable, both the selected cases are registered as countries with groups that are classified as minorities at risk by the MAR dataset. The population of cases related to this study would therefore consist of all countries that are registered in the MAR dataset. Although both cases are countries with registered minorities at risk groups, it is of importance that there is variation in the indicator for conflict mobilization. When the value of the dependent variable is constant, nothing can be learned about the causes of variation in the dependent variable (G. King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 129). Since the objective of this study is to find an explanation for the difference in values of conflict mobilization, and to examine the validity of the provided hypothesis, the variation in the dependent variable will be at the highest possible level. This is to provide maximum leverage to classify the possible outcomes relevant to the hypothesis (Ibid, p. 119).
Since the research objective of this study is to examine the structures within free and compulsory education and how they might affect the occurrence of conflict mobilization, it is of importance that both cases are cases of countries that have statuated free and compulsory education. Also, to be able to compare cases against each other, and to examine how the independent variable might have caused the difference in occurrence of conflict mobilization, the selection of cases will be done strategically, to control for other intervening variables that might have an effect on the outcome (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 81). When conducting a small-n study, selection must be intentional and consistent with the research objective (G. King et al., 1994, p. 139).

During the selection of cases, three intervening variables are identified as having a possible effect on the outcome, and will therefore be held constant in the selection of cases. The first intervening variable is per capita GDP. Evidence is provided for a correlation between civil conflict and low per capita GDP by Collier et al., and reasoned by explanations of lower opportunity costs of joining rebellion when a country is poor and that a state is less likely to hold power over its territory when a country is poor (Paul Collier et al., 2009, p. 7). Second, population size has had a proven correlation with risk of civil conflict. Reasons for the relationship is explained by the pool of possible rebels becomes larger with a larger population. The bigger a rebel group gets, the risk for individuals becomes smaller, which makes rebellions more attractive (Regan & Norton, 2005, p. 329). Third, the type of regime in a country can influence the risk of civil conflict. According to Hegre et al. (2001), what they call “intermediate regimes” experience a higher risk of civil conflict. The correlation is explained by the contradictions within a regime that is not fully autocratic, and not fully democratic. When a regime is somewhat repressive, the repression creates grievance and motives for mobilizing against the state, and the partly open part of an intermediate regime allows people the possibility to organize against the regime (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 33).

Selecting cases on a range of values on the dependent variable will allow this study to provide causal inference (G. King et al., 1994, p. 141). If high or low values in conflict mobilization occurrence is associated with high or low values in repressive and discriminatory educational structures, that allows this study to provide some evidence for the plausibility of a causal relationship. A problem with selecting cases strategically on the dependent variable is the possibility of selection bias, where cases are selected intentionally to confirm the hypothesis (Ibid, p. 128). To minimize the possibility of a biased case selection, it is crucial to select cases without knowledge of the value in the independent variable (Ibid, p. 141). Since this study have selected cases on variation in the dependent variable, the value of the independent variable will
therefore be unknown. The only known factor of the educational structures during the case selection will be whether the structures are free and compulsory or not, while the value of repression and discrimination within the structures are unknown. Examination of the value in the independent variable will be the objective of the empirical analysis. It is also of importance that the selected cases are representative of the population, since this will allow the results of the study to be generalizable (Ibid). The MAR dataset used in this study has a total of 882 observations categorized in six different regions; Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Post-communist States, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Democracies and Japan.

Table 2 MAR Regions and Number of Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-communist States</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Democracies and Japan</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For this study to be conducted within the timeframe allowed, the case selection procedure was narrowed down to be done on one of the six regions. The region most representative for the population was decided to be the region with most observations in the MAR data set, which is by far the Sub-Saharan Africa region. After selecting the region, the countries in that region registered in the MAR dataset was ordered in a table where the values for the control variables where plugged in. Values for the GDP per capita variable was collected with data from the World Bank. The value is collected of year 2003, which is the year before they are registered on the MAR data set. Value for the population variable was also collected with data from the World Bank, and also of year 2003. Value for the regime type was collected from the Polity IV dataset on “Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions”. This value was also collected from one year before the registration on the MAR data set. The Polity IV data set ranges the variable for “level of democracy” between -10 and 10. After this step in the procedure, the sample consisted of 30 countries from the region.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>GDP/capita (USD)</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Polity IV Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>391.79</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>642.77</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>528.58</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>512.65</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>370.19</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>263.76</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>373.28</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>512.65</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>824.87</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>512.65</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>292.59</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>998.10</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>173.92</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>238.00</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>436.69</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>323.07</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>112.85</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>212.66</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>819.96</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>118.87</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>232.79</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>779.47</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>429.16</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>453.35</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3775.61</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2482.37</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4163.07</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To narrow down the sample further, and to keep cases that are representative for the population, cases that have values in the control variables that are representative for the region was selected. The values that are representative for the regions based on the previous sample are countries with middle sized population (10-30 million in total population), low GDP per capita (below 1000 USD), and a Polity IV score that is within the frame of semi-democracy (-6 to 6). This resulted in a sample of 11 cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>GDP/capita</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Polity IV Regime type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>12,0</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>20,4</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>16,5</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>26,6</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>18,2</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>11,4</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>29,4</td>
<td>Semi-democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the narrowed down sample, Uganda, Angola and Sudan had values of the dependent variable that indicated occurrence of conflict mobilization, while Mali, Niger, Ghana, Cameroon, Zambia, and Zimbabwe had values that indicated no occurrence of conflict mobilization. According to data from the Education Policy Data Center, of the 11 countries in this sample, only Zimbabwe did not provide free and compulsory primary education, and was therefore excluded from the sample. Since the objective of the study is to examine how educational structures can explain variation in the occurrence of conflict mobilization, the difference in value of the dependent variable is best to be as high as possible, in order to maximize the leverage among the relevant outcomes. Therefore, Uganda with a value of 6 in the dependent
variable will be selected as the case that has had an occurrence of conflict mobilization. To find a case that is comparable with Uganda, a variable for the size of the MAR group population was plugged into the sample table. Although the variable for total population is highly relevant, it is also of importance when conducting the empirical comparison of the two cases that the cases are comparable in the population of the MAR group. Since the reasoning behind studies of correlations between population size and occurrence of civil conflict is based on possible number of recruits, the MAR group population is an important variable because that is the population where the possible recruits are. The MAR group population variable will allow for a selection of comparable cases when conducting the empirical analysis. The MAR group population variable was collected from the MAR dataset, the year for the population estimates was 2004, since that is the first year of observation in the used data set. In the last sample table, other cases other than Uganda that indicated occurrence of conflict mobilization were excluded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MAR group Population</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Primary education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>887281</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free and Compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1071003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Free and Compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>5899947</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Free and Compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>9786196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Free and Compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5773536</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Free and Compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4340962</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Free and Compulsory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When taking the MAR group population into account, the two most comparable cases, that fulfills the requirements of the research objective that have been presented above, are Uganda and Ghana.

**Structure of the Empirical Analysis**

To keep the empirical analysis theoretically focused, the study will collect data by operationalizing the important parts of the educational structures in standardized questions. The questions will be in line with the important theoretical aspects for a valid measurement of the
independent variable, and to collect comparable information of importance for the intended research objective. The questions will be specific enough to allow comparison across cases, along with enough openness to capture variation in the different cases (Brosché, 2014, p. 54).

To recap the theoretical focus of the framework explained in chapter 2, educational structures that are repressive and discriminatory can create motivations for conflict mobilization via (1) cultural repression, (2) manipulation of history and content, and (3) educational segregation. The increase of motivations for conflict mobilization, and opportunities via the provision of free and compulsory education. The educational structures could therefore increase the risk of conflict mobilization.

To collect comparable data of repressive and discriminatory educational structures, the following questions will be posed to each case:

- **Cultural Repression.** Do the educational structures repress certain cultural values? Is certain cultural heritage promoted in the educational structures? Are maternal/indigenous languages repressed? Has there been a coercion of a dominant national language within educational structures?
- **Manipulation of history/content.** Has there been a promotion of a false history within the educational structures? Has there been use of negative ethnic stereotypes in educational content? Has nationalism been promoted in educational content?
- **Educational segregation.** Have the educational structures been segregated along ethnic lines? Has educational quality been excluded for only the dominant ethnic group?

**Sources**

In addition to the MAR rebellion scale, this study used the MAR project qualitative data to elaborate on the dependent variable in the empirical analysis. The MAR project tracks 284 politically-active ethnic groups in the world from 1945 to the present, and data from the MAR project have been used up to 2006, which is the last year of relevance for this study. The qualitative data used is the Minority Group Assessments, which consists of risk assessments and analytical summary of the groups. The data analyzes the groups risk of rebellion.

For the empirical analysis of the independent variable, several edited books have been used as sources of empirical material. The books are written by different scholars from both
within and outside of the countries that are being analyzed, which gives the material a better chance of painting an unbiased picture. The empirical analysis is complemented by NGO reports and newspaper articles. A problem with the sources during this study has been the comparability of the material gathered, since different information has been available for the two different cases. This has prevented the empirical analysis from making comparisons between the cases in some parts of the independent variable. This will be further explained in the next section.

Results and Analysis

In the next sections, the material gathered via the standardized questions will be presented. The material will be presented in the same order as the questions are categorized, starting with material on cultural repression, then manipulation of history and content, then segregation. Before the material for the questions on the independent variable is presented, material on the dependent variable is elaborated shortly. Although the dependent variable is measured with data from the MAR project, making the data specific to the groups registered by the MAR dataset, the data collected by the empirical analysis of the independent variable will include data on several ethnic groups in the countries.

Ghana

Conflict Mobilization

In Ghana, there are two groups registered by the MAR dataset. The registered groups are Ashanti and Ewe. Both groups do not have any registered acts of rebellion, which means that no groups in Ghana have mobilized in conflict behavior against the state. The Ashanti were opposed to the Rawlings government that took over power in 1981, but no clashes were reported. The Ashanti have not been involved in any organized militant protest in the years that are relevant for this study (MAR Project, 2006b). According to MAR data, there is no existence of conflict between the Ewe and other ethnic groups in Ghana. The Ewe have been involved in
minor protests in previous years, but there is no militant activity reported in the years that are relevant for this study (MAR Project, 2006c).

Cultural Repression

Because of the colonial history in Ghana, the educational structures in Ghana today is a product of an educational system that was introduced by western missionaries. Ghana has therefore had a history of western-style education, and even today western-style schools are prioritized. Muslim schools have therefore had a lower standing in Ghana, and Muslim learning has not been funded by the state, but is seen as a solely religious practice funded by private actors (Owusu-Ansah, Iddrisu, & Sey, 2012, p. 65). This has created a structure where Muslim culture is less prioritized within education. The history of western-style education also created a new elite in Ghana in the years after the colonial period. The participants of the western-style schools attained social status and wealth in a way that was not possible for those who did not participate in the schools. The new elite in Ghana, that participated in the first western-style schools, created new institutions in society that were only available via formal education. The new power-sphere resulted in development of a new value system that differentiated from the traditional values. The new values contained urban attributes and values of modernization. Although new social institutions were created by the educational system that differentiated between urban and traditional values, structures in society has allowed the two to live successfully side-by-side and dependent on each other (Berry & Library of Congress, 1995, p. 95).

The languages in Ghana can be categorized in two subfamilies of the Niger-Congo language family. The first language group is Kwa, which consists of many further language subfamilies that is spoken by 75% of the population. The second language group is Gur, which also consists of many further subfamilies. Altogether, more than 100 different languages are spoken by different groups in Ghana. Many of the languages are closely related to ethnic identity and cultural values. Although there are more than 100 local languages, the colonial history of Ghana has made English the official language. English has long been the official language for both government officials and the main language of instruction in education. The 1962 constitution in Ghana required all members of parliament to use English as the working language. Those rules changed in the 1992 Consultative Assembly of the Constitution, stating that parliament members no longer was required to use English as working language. This was done to increase “grassroots participation”, and the use of local languages in primary education.
was encouraged. The 1992 Consultative Assembly of the Constitution therefore increased the significance of local languages (Berry & Library of Congress, 1995, pp. 81–82). After primary education, English is still used as the main language of instruction (Ibid: p 120). As for the Muslim schools, they resisted much of the curriculum from the secular educational system, but the introduction of English as a second language was well received. The introduction of English in the Muslim schools was therefore not a coercive act, but a proposition that was accepted by the leaders of Islamic educational institutions (Owusu-Ansah et al., 2012, p. 82).

Manipulation of History and Content

Kwame Nkrumah, who lead Ghana to independence in 1957 has been a major source of conflict and consensus in Ghanian history. The period between 1966 and 1981 was a turbulent period in Ghanian history, where a total of six coups tried to overthrow and erase memory and legacies of Kwame Nkrumah. The people who were trying to take over power blamed Nkrumah for his autocratic military regime, while the legacy of Nkrumah has later been used to justify autocratic regime. The coup lead by Jerry Rawlings in 1981 used the memory and legacy of Nkrumah to take over power. Policies implemented after the coup by Rawlings consisted of, among other things, renaming of the Science and Technology University in Nkrumah’s name, and textbooks were used to glorify the legacy of Nkrumah in educational reforms. The Nkrumahnist propaganda was used within the autocratic framework of Rawlings regime, and constructed a culture of political silence. The use of ideals from Nkrumah’s legacy resulted in a period of political stability. There have been two competing narratives in educational content concerning the history of the memory of Nkrumah that have been adjusted to suit and support the political traditions of the ruling regime (Sefa-Nyarko, 2015, p. 23).

In later years, however, the curriculum of education in Ghana have been adjusted to better suit the ethnic and lingual diversity in the country. The use of a single national curriculum was rejected as inappropriate because of the vast diversity in Ghana, and was therefore changed to local curriculums that matched the local students and the surrounding communities (Osei, 2009, p. 26). In 2000, the Ghana Education Service also introduced an educational syllabus that made more space for secular curriculums. To make space for the new secular curriculum, subjects of religious and moral education was dropped. The Ghana Education Service provided the explanation that secular content in national education policy was more relevant for national development (Owusu-Ansah et al., 2012, p. 135).
An important educational tradition in Ghana is the flag ceremony. The flag ceremony is a tradition that celebrates the unified and uniform Ghana, and has been important in creating a national identity. The flag ceremony is also a product of the Nkrumah legacy, and has been used to transfer loyalty from local traditions to those promoted by the central government. The creation of a national identity was important to Nkrumah in the aftermath of the colonial period, and is used in schools today to support nation building and promoting patriotism. The use of such a ceremony in the educational institutions is productive according to its purpose since there is a big audience in schools that can be affected (Osei, 2009, p. 71).

**Educational Segregation**

In Ghana, there is a separation between Christian and Muslim schools. Although there have been good relations between Christians and Muslims in the society during the 1990’s, education for Muslims are at a lower quality than Christian education. The difference in quality of education can explain the gap in technological and economic advances between the Christian and Muslim population in Ghana (Berry & Library of Congress, 1995, p. 107). Although there is a difference in Christian and Muslim education, the administrative regions are built with heterogeneous principles, which makes ethnic mixing normal in most sectors. Especially the educational structures in Ghana have a multi-ethnic composition (Ibid, p. 81). The government in Ghana have been committed to equitable access to education, and have constructed policies to enable equitable access. Some of the policies have been the elimination of fees, provision of textbooks, providing school feeding and a focus on deprived districts to allow access to education (World Bank, 2010, p. 92).

**Uganda**

**Conflict Mobilization**

In Uganda two groups are registered by the MAR data set, the Acholi and the Baganda. The Baganda have no reported acts of rebellion, while the Acholi are registered for large-scale guerilla activity in the relevant years of this study. According to the MAR project, there are several factors that put the Acholi at risk for rebellion. Some factors are territorial concentration, recent past rebellion and repression by the government (MAR Project, 2006a).
In Uganda, there has been a limited awareness of ethnic minority rights. Especially in the educational system has there been lack of recognition for ethnic minority pupils to enjoy their customs and traditions. There has been no effort in teaching minority pupils about their culture, history or traditions (Asiimwe, Agaba, & Nampewo, 2012, p. 24). The educational structures in Uganda threatens the cultural rights of minorities, in constricting them in their way of expression. Such constrictions have been put on forms of expression such as dress, dance and eating habit. The constrictions have created a gap between the old, who are still practicing cultural traditions, and the young who are at risk of losing their cultural identity, and the preservation of the culture will be lost (Musinguzi, 2016).

Uganda consists of a rich and varied ethnic and cultural diversity. In the country, there are four major ethnic groups which are Bantu, Hamites, Nilo-Hamites, and Nilotics. Among these four major ethnic groups, more than 60 dialects can be identified, but the majority in Uganda is the Bantu-speaking population (UNESCO, 2015, p. 6). Today, there are two official languages in Uganda, English and Kiswahili. The colonial history of Uganda has made English the official language. English has been the main language of instruction since the Colonial Office educational policies from 1925. The Uganda Protectorate administration however brought in Kiswahili, a language not native for the people of Uganda, but a language that is common in other countries in the region. The language was introduced in efforts to keep up with the development in the region of East Africa. During the colonial period, there were intense debates over which language should be used as language of instruction in primary education. The Colonial Office, along with missionaries in Uganda suggested that primary education should be built on local languages to the extent possible. They promoted the use of Luganda, a language from the region of Buganda, which is a native language for many Ugandans. The Uganda protectorate government claimed that dependency on one of the local languages, and raising one of the local languages to the status of national language of instruction could cause grievances among people in Uganda who does not have their roots in Luganda tradition. They promoted the use of Kiswahili, since it was not a local language to any specific group in Uganda. People opposing the use of Kiswahili, especially missionaries in Uganda, felt that Kiswahili was too closely related to Islam, and should therefore not be used. They also pointed out that Kiswahili belonged to no people in Uganda. They stressed the importance of preserving African culture by preserving local languages (Ssekamwa, 1997, pp. 127–135).
The lingual history of Uganda has been complex and full of opinions, but the fact is that no one in Uganda is an indigenous speaker of either of the two official languages. The National Language Policy envisages primary education in Uganda to be bilingual, teaching in both local languages and in English, but in practice the medium of instruction in the educational system is highly monolingual. A bilingual medium of instruction is only used in some pre-primary schools, where “area languages” are taught as local language. There are six different “area languages” taught in these schools specific to the certain areas, that have been selected by the government (Mulumba & Masaazi, 2012, p. 437). Although area languages are taught in pre-primary schools, these six different “area languages” does not cover the 60 different dialects that are spoken in Uganda. This results in pupils learning a new language in pre-primary schools that is not their maternal language. The concentration of the lingual diversity can result in some of the languages going extinct (Musinguzi, 2016). Also, in later educational institutions, such as primary school and secondary school, English is the only medium of instruction. English has been reported to not provide students with the possibility to express themselves during the learning process, or completely and successfully communicate with each other. There have also been reports that students are punished if they use other languages in school than English. Caning, and having to wear an animal skull around the neck have been punishment for speaking their maternal languages in school (Mulumba & Masaazi, 2012, p. 444).

Manipulation of History and Content

Materials on manipulation of history and content in the educational structures of Uganda have not been found during the collection of data in this study. Although materials suggesting manipulation of history, and materials on nationalistic values and propaganda have been available, the information that have been found during this study does not give any insight in how these have been used in the educational structures. This does not mean that there have been no manipulation of history and content in the educational structures in Uganda, only that information about this is not available. In lack of data, the questions for this section of the study could not be answered.
Educational Segregation

In Uganda, the situation for minority groups are presented as “unsatisfactory” in relation to access to basic education. In some minority group areas, the access to basic education is very low. In these areas, the minority groups have been isolated because they have been shunned from neighboring communities by predominant tribes, and the isolation have contributed to the low access of education (Asiimwe et al., 2012, p. 21). The minority group Batwa in south-west Uganda have few opportunities for education, and the lack of educational opportunities have resulted in very high unemployment rates for adults. The low access of education is a direct contravention to the National Objection XIV, that is supposed to guarantee all Ugandans the right to access of basic education (Asiimwe et al., 2012, p. 26).

Analyzing the Results

When it comes to cultural repression in educational structures, there is a difference in how students have been allowed to express cultural traditions between the cases. In Ghana, there has been some form of cultural repression in how education for different students have been prioritized, where some cultural values have been prioritized over other. However, in Uganda there is evidence of direct repression of certain cultural values and traditions, which could have caused motivations for conflict mobilization. One of the major differences in how the repression of culture have taken form is the language policy in educational structures. In Ghana, the language policy has moved away from being repressive, and a focus have been put on the availability of maternal languages as medium of instruction in primary education. In Uganda, there has been a history of extremely coercive language policy in educational structures. The study has provided evidence that the language policy has had effects that threatens the survival of certain cultures. The cultural repression that the evidence suggests have been present in the educational structures of Uganda has had destructive impacts on minority culture in the country, and the threat of cultural extinction in Uganda could have caused motivations for conflict mobilization in the country.

In Ghana, there is evidence of manipulation of history and content within the educational structures, along with nationalistic propaganda. However, no comparable material has been found in the case of Uganda, which makes a comparison of this part impossible. Educational segregation has been evident in both cases. There is a small difference in the
magnitude of the segregation since the evidence suggests that the segregation in Uganda has been more severe. The evidence on educational segregation in Uganda suggests that educational access have been limited for certain minorities, which, according to the theoretical framework, could not lead to an increase in the risk of conflict mobilization since access to education is needed for an opportunity to mobilize.

This study has examined the differences in educational structures of two cases, but the mechanisms leading from educational structures to conflict mobilization has not been examined. The research design of this study focused on different aspects of the independent variable, but it could have been interesting to have a more direct focus on the mechanisms leading from educational structures to conflict mobilization. Although this study has found a slight covariation between some parts of educational structures and conflict mobilization, the mechanisms explaining causation have not been answered empirically. A change in the research design that would make the study more focused on the causal mechanisms would increase the internal inference of the study. The most important weakness of the research design that was revealed when conducting this study was the failure to isolate for previous conflict in the case selection. Uganda has had previous conflict prior to the relevant period for this study, and that could have affected the results in this study. Previous conflict in Uganda could also serve as an alternative explanation, being the factor that caused the conflict mobilization examined in this study. However, the educational structures of Uganda could well have explained the occurrence of conflict mobilization in previous conflicts as well.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this study has been to understand causes of conflict mobilization, and to examine how educational structures can affect motivations for conflict mobilization. The study has examined three areas within educational structures that can cause motivations for conflict mobilization; cultural repression, manipulation of history and content, and educational segregation. The empirical analysis found evidence that high level of cultural repression in the educational structures correlated with a high value of conflict mobilization. Especially repressive language policy in educational structures had destructive impacts, and were a threat to cultural extinction, which could cause motivation for conflict mobilization. This is where this study could also suggest policy implementations. Since this study has found evidence on
how important language policy is for groups sense of cultural identity, and possible destructive impacts of such policy, language policy in education can be important to avoid possible conflicts. Language policy that focus on maternal languages in primary education is therefore suggested to have peacefully constructive impacts on society.

For future research, an interesting area would be to examine how education for girls can affect the conflict propensity in countries. In most countries where free and compulsory education recently have been statuated, one of the major impacts is that education becomes more accessible for girls. Of course, getting 50% of the population into schools who have not previously had access to education must have huge impacts on the society. Previous studies have found that increased female participation in parliament correlates with states that are less likely to use force (Patrick M. Regan & Aida Paskeviciute, 2003). A study that examines the impacts of increased access to education for girls on the risk of civil conflict would therefore be interesting. Empirical research on possible mechanisms that can causally connect cultural repression in educational structures and risk of civil conflict would also be interesting. Researching how cultural repression affects cultural identity in groups via education, and how this is connected to motivations arising in civil conflicts. In studying the causes of civil conflict occurrence, structural impacts of education might be the way forward.
References


