Holistic Peacebuilding
A Qualitative Study Integrating the Macro- and Micro-Scale Peace Process

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Abstract

Political events at the national or international level have often been studied separately from grass root-level, small-scale initiatives aimed at trust and reconciliation amongst individuals. Yet, it is widely known that different aspects of the conflict dynamics are interconnected. Based primarily on social identity theory and relative deprivation, the hypothesis of this study is that national-level mediation and civil society actions are related in such a way that civil society actions compensate for failure on the political level. More precisely, it argues that failure of large-scale mediation efforts increases amount of civil society initiatives for inter-communal trust via a confidence-based theory. The hypothesis is tested in an in-depth analysis of the Cyprus issue, finding enabling conditions to have a larger effect than motivational factors on civil society engagement in the peace process. The study find only minimally support for the theory, but provides insight into the implications for reconciliation of integrating macro- and micro level peacebuilding.

1. Introduction

1.1. Research question

This thesis asks the following research question: what is the relationship between national-level third-party intervention and civil society engagement in the peace process?

1.2. Aim and contribution

As conflicts move away from traditional, interstate wars and intrastate conflicts increase, often characterized by a complex network of groups within the same nation, enemies are no longer separated by a physical distance after the end of a conflict. Co-existence in the post-conflict setting is thus inevitable, which is why understanding reconciliation quickly gains territory as a research field (Bronéous, 2008). To better understand prospects for a peaceful co-existence, it must be studied how different components of a peace process are interlinked.

Reconciliation addresses the psychological aspects of returning to peace, and entails “changed psychological orientation toward the other” (Staub, 2008). While the implications of different types of third-party interventions for peace and conflict resolution have been widely studied, the pre-conditions for reconciliation have often been viewed as country-specific and its implementation allocated to micro-level mechanisms once the political agreements are in place. This distinction creates a wall between macro- and micro level peacebuilding, where civil society actions are treated as an independent phenomenon. Yet, in our social reality made up of complex webs of interconnections,
the constant interaction between political efforts on the national level and civil society efforts should not be ignored.

The emergence of Truth and Reconciliation Committees is a major step in the path to integrate macro-level third party intervention with reconciliation, and designing intervention directly aiming for it. While this is a major development, most surrounding research regards the direct cause-effect relationship of the primary aim of the intervention. Assuming that psychological reconciliation between enemy groups is always a goal in peacebuilding, exploring the indirect effects that national-level, third party intervention has via various detours is crucial in obtaining a holistic understanding of reconciliation. One such “detour” is civil society, which, unlike mediated negotiations, is commonly assumed to have the potential to affect the psychological aspects of peacebuilding. It is therefore interesting to study whether it should indeed be examined as an independent phenomenon, or if fluctuations in civil society engagement in the peace process is an effect of mediated negotiations. Although there are studies showing how, and in which contexts, civil society and first track diplomacy interact, and a growing literature claiming that integrative peace processes have a better chance at succeeding (Bar-Tal, 2000; Michael, 2009; Jarraud et al, 2013; Keren Reed, 2013), the causal mechanism is not fully established. This study therefore aims to explore the causal relationship between mediated negotiations at the national level and civil society engagement in the peace process.

The study emphasizes the importance of a holistic view on peace processes where micro and macro, track I and track II and III, and top-down and bottom-up perspectives meet and levels of analysis are integrated. This adds to the already vast literature on mediation and top down vs. bottom-up approaches in an attempt to merge the fields together and contribute to establishing the complex relationships between them. This is of importance to widen the scholarly debate on inclusive peacebuilding. As for its usefulness in policy, knowledge of what implications different types of large-scale mediation have on local community’s civil engagement and perception of their adversary is of great relevance when designing third-party interventions.

2. Theory

2.1. Previous research/key concepts

Defining peace

Much of the background research that has formed this study is from the literature on reconciliation. Bloomfield, Bronéous, Harth & Schnabel and others have all been vital readings in
understanding the end goal of a peace process. The reconciliation literature has driven this study to adopt a view of a peaceful society as one where reconciliation has come far, thus defining “successful” peace processes as those leading toward a reconciled society. This includes demanding more of peace than a formal agreement; it regards the end of enemy mentality between the conflict parties. For conflict to turn into peace, a transformation must happen on two levels: the instrumental and the psychological. The instrumental level regards agreements, policy and behavior changes, and can be represented by for instance an armistice, a negotiated settlement, or the opening of borders. The psychological level regards changes in attitude and perception, and is manifested in the shift from animosity to goodwill between two enemy groups, regardless of laws and policies. One of them is not enough for a country to be at peace – not if peace entails more than lack of armed conflict.

Macro-scale mediation

The instrumental actions needed to turn a hostile situation around are often addressed in talks or negotiations mediated by a third party. Although there are cases of biased, country-specific third party mediation (US mediation in Israel-Palestine, Norway’s many diplomatic missions, etc.), the most common variant is a neutral, international organization, i.e. the United Nations. National-level negotiation does not have the same opportunity of reaching the psychological level of a population, as “third-party intervention facilitates factual-objective but not emotional-subjective communication between adversaries” (Knowles, 1958). Reconciliation is argued to happen on a social-emotional level. This does in no way insinuate the unnecessity of mediation; the benefits of neutral mediators are many. More than bringing a neutral perspective and facilitate problem-solving, solutions proposed by the adversary are devaluated due to the enemy categorization of identities. Third parties can communicate these without suffering the consequences of identity-based thinking (Ross, 1995; Black & Baumgartner, 1983; Young, 1967; Pruitt & Kim, 2004).

Micro-scale peacebuilding

A key concept in this thesis is civil society engagement in the peace process. The term civil society intends to capture the sphere that exists between the state and the home domain. One rather broad definition is “nongovernmental, private, voluntarily organized associations or institutions of the people, through which they try to secure their needs, desires and objectives” (Deejay, n.d.) Spurk concludes that “civil society is independent from the state and the political sphere, but it is oriented toward and interacts closely with them” (2010:9) Although the focus of civil society varies, its democratic function is often emphasized (Putnam, 2000; Spurk, 2010). The
democratic space of civil society is increased by recent influences of liberal peacebuilding. In essence, liberal values such as open borders and free trade create favorable conditions for interaction between enemy groups. Within the liberal peacebuilding realm is the debated but trending concept of the Local Turn, according to which local ownership of the peace process means “local governments, civil society and people are not just recipients and implementers [of funded development projects] but the drivers behind them” (Kaplan, 2013). This empowers civil society not only in opportunity but also in motivation. The use of liberalization as part of the peace process is vital because of the liberal aspects of democracy such as freedom of expression. That plays a large role here as civil society uses free press and freedom of speech to challenge deeply rooted perceptions of the adversary. This, in turn, is a vital part of the re-identifications process and the reduction of the enemy image.

This emerging field has gained vast attention during the last decade. It represents part of the paradigm shift from the era of UN intervention, where peacekeeping was detected and UN became the dominant power of peace building, to the Local Turn and an era of bottom-up approaches focusing on local ownership as opposed to top-down dynamics (Reese, 2016). World War II spurred the previous paradigm, whereas the post-cold war changes in society marks this shift.

Social Identity
The study rests on a few key theories that are all argued to account for civil mobilization for peace (also put as civil society engagement in the peace process). Firstly, this study finds its analytical perspective in Social Identity Theory (SIT), which has grown to dominate the field of intergroup relations since first presented it 1978 by Henri Tajfel (Brown & Capozza, 2000). This meta-theory can, rather than a theory, be considered a paradigm from which most studies on inter-group relations take their departure. Contrary to e.g. Realistic Group Conflict Theory, holding the instrumental view where groups are rational actors liking or disliking each other based on their interests, SIT refocused to a social-categorization view, including the placing of oneself in an allocated category and thereby forming perception of in- and outgroups. It is especially prevalent in protracted conflicts, because these social identities have been cemented over time, and must be challenged and changed as parties strive to reconcile.

This means it is assumed that people tend to categorize others into groups with whom they either identify or distance themselves from, creating in- and out-groups. This is important for the study because civil society initiative, when taking the form of inter-group encounters, often builds
on shifting these identities and reducing the thick contours of what the in-group consists of, as well as approaching the in- and out-groups. If reconciliation is necessary for sustainable peace, which is here a central assumption, this re-identification process is a significant part of peacebuilding activities and therefore should be strived for in both mediated negotiations and civil society action. Deep-rooted social identity that is cemented with decades of enemy images often occur in, or even perpetuate, intractable conflicts (Kriesberg, 2003). It is thus assumed that failure to address this re-identification process will have consequences for the peace process, and failure to address it on the political level in reflected in the characteristics of civil society actions. Not making any claims on the outcome of the study, SIT is an important background for proper analysis of the cases, as it is suggested to account for failure to implement what is politically agreed upon (Michael, 2009).

Relationship

The famous Benjamin Franklin quote “the friend of my enemy is my enemy” illustrates Volkan’s (1985) finding that groups tend to think of other groups as either allies or enemies, which is in accordance with the Social Identity theory. Therefore, group members’ response to messages conveyed by third-parties are largely ineffective unless the third party has an explicit shared identity to the opposite party, in which case the message is received with a similar reaction as if it had conveyed by the opposite party itself. (Harth & Schnabel, 2014: 678). As this is not the case with the UN, it can be argued that the national-level mediation is less efficient in promoting reconciliation at the population-level. According to the needs-based reconciliation theory by Harth and Schnabel (2004), relationships can be re-established or improved by the perpetrator sending messages that signal empowerment of the victim party, and the victim party sending messages of acceptance to the adversary. However, situations lacking objective victim-perpetrator-dynamic is usually the case in this type of conflict, as the definition of armed conflict suggests that mutually committed atrocities is intrinsic in armed conflicts. Admitting some level of victim status to a group can reduce its reluctance to reconcile (Simantov-Nachieli et. al., 2015), which suggests the needs-based approach can be used in both directions simultaneously.

\[1\] UCNP Definition of armed conflict: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”
The theoretical ground for the frustration described in the causal story (see next section) lies in the classical concept of relative deprivation. Simply put, Pruitt and Kim (2004) describe the phenomenon as an unacceptable gap between expectations and reality, created by a sudden decline in or stagnation of development.

Fig 1: Relative deprivation

Mediated negotiations and civil society initiatives are both inherent parts of most modern-day peace-building processes. Following the trend in research as well as policy, i.e. turn to the local, successful peace-building should be more likely with local ownership over the peace process. Yet, third party intervention is not decreasing neither in percentage of conflicts nor in magnitude (Bauman & Clayton, 2017). Like the local turn, third party intervention is on the way of being an inherent part of any conflict resolution process, where the benefits are so widely agreed upon that they are taken for granted. Although local ownership is not synonym to civil society, it is often the civil society initiatives that show the most of local ownership, as they are not subject to international interests. Civil society’s role as the sphere between households and politics allows it to officially express and act upon the people’s reactions to events on the political arena, in a more powerful way than individual households can do without such organization. This is a significant factor for the larger goal of achieving a peaceful society, as the country is not peaceful until the wider public has reconciled, and inter-personal reconciliation cannot happen with only political means (Knowles, 1958). Mediated negotiations and civil society commitment to the peace process are thus plausibly linked.

To simplify, let us consider political actions as instrumental whereas reconciliation is emotional. Applied to Johan Galtung’s famous triangle of conflict escalation and de-escalation (1980), they represent behavior and attitudes respectively, where the contradiction is represented in the actual obstacle separating the parties. According to this logic, political and civil society efforts should be intertwined and integrated, highly contingent on one another.
2.2. Toward a confidence theory

Causal story

The causal chain can be summarized as follows:

Rupture of official peace talks make civil society lose faith in the official process, sparking a frustration and a desire to undertake their own initiatives. International organizations with a local ownership policy empower civil society to do this by allocating more resources, and level of civil society engagement increases.

Renewal of peace talks does not produce any new frustration leading to elevated civil society engagement, but nor does it restore confidence levels quickly enough to make engagement decrease. Level of civic society initiatives is therefore expected to remain about the same.

Theoretical argument

The intuitive answer to the research question is, perhaps as is intended by the policy-makers, that success in the political arena create a landscape open for local initiatives to thrive. The causal chain would in that case be that an enhanced relationship in the political sphere creates momentum which works in two ways: opportunity, where political agreements open up a landscape where the creation of civil society engagement is possible and allowed; and motivation, where a momentum is built by progress in negotiations that spark a sense of hope, urging civil society to take action because they believe improvement is possible. Yet, a deeper theoretical analysis point to the opposite direction. The liberal peacebuilding-discussion lends itself to ask the question of whether modern peacebuilding interventions involve local actors to a sufficient level, or whether bottom-up approaches is treated as too much of a separate issue. This academic debate is reflected in the empirical world: top-down peace-building efforts such as UN interventions can even hinder local ownership, as the state is upheld by external actors mitigating the social contract between state and population (Newman, Richmond & Paris, 2009: 13).

In this counter-intuitive answer, relative deprivation is key. Ongoing negotiations represent prospects for a solution to the conflict. Given that they are subject to popular support, the population expects the curve of peace prospects to rise. Crashing negotiations, i.e. decreased prospects for peace or settlement, make the curve deviate from the expected path, creating a perceived gap between the expected standard of living (peace) to which the population feels entitled, and the actual standard which is very low prospect. An unacceptable gap thus emerges,
demonstrated by frustration and a sense of injustice. To mitigate this gap and restore peace
prospects, the choice left to civil society is to take own initiatives.

Trust in the national-level peace process is not merely of interest to the population. Lack of trust
in the leaders of a group, regarding both their measures and intentions, has negative impact on
the leader's ability to “delegate and empower decision-making to others within the organization”
(Kourdi, 2004:31). As de-centralizing the mandate to act on any agreement made in official
negotiations is necessary for its implementation, failing to include civil society may even harm the
state in the longer run. This lack of trust might rest in the population as a latent discontent that is
not manifested to the international community (or to research), but may take the form of tangible
actions and efforts to mend the situation.

The democratization function of civil society is often emphasized in scholarly analysis, making
civil society actions contribute to the overarching goal of a reconciled society (Toure, 2002;
Colvin, 2007). This is perhaps particularly prominent in protracted conflicts that are not violent
on an every-day basis and are rooted in hatred and intergroup resentment, provided the entire
population is not affected by strategic interests. It is therefore expected to see, in cases
embodying these characteristics of identity-driven obstacles to reconciliation, a tendency for civil
society efforts to be directed towards measurements of achieving reconciliation. Observing this
would be a strong implication that perception of social identities must shift, something that is not
feasible with only national-level mediated negotiations. Civil society then put pressure on
international agencies (such as UNDP) where inter-communal contact has not been politically
approved enough for local level initiatives to happen (such as bi-communal meetings in Cyprus).
The organizations increase the possibilities for civic action using arguments of local ownership.
Failure in official processes thus drives up the number of CSI’s as an intent to complement the
official process.

This leads to a confidence-based theory. The term “confidence” distinguishes itself from the
term “support for”, as it rather refers to anticipation of success of the peace process than
acceptance of its existence. Civilians can believe the process should exist, thus support the
process, as a constant, whereas anticipating the success of it hinges upon recent events that show
the current status of the process. The key is, that it is easier to lose faith than to regain it. The
implications of this is that there is inverse relationship between national-level mediation set-backs
Holistic Peacebuilding

and civil society engagement. However, when mediating process is restored, the level of civil society engagement does not decrease but stays relatively stable.

2.3. Hypotheses

*Failure of third-party diplomacy co-varies with increased civil society engagement in the peace process, whereas renewed diplomatic efforts do not largely affect civil engagement.*

2.4. Illustration of theory

Figure 2 (above): Causal chain of hypothesis, pt. 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivating factors</th>
<th>Enabling factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure of UN process</td>
<td>Increased amount of civil engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustration in civil society</td>
<td>Increased funds for civil society = more possibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take action on own initiative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith in official process lost</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure on international development society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3 (above): Causal chain of hypothesis, pt. 2

Renewed talks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No acute frustration creating more</th>
<th>Level of commitment remains the same</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Still low trust in official process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Research design

3.1. Case selection

The term “inherited conflicts” sometimes employed for protracted conflicts illustrate the importance of social identity and the urgency of reconciliation. The causal story suggests several attempts at negotiating peace, implying protracted conflicts highly based on strong resistance of the parties to get along. Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland are examples of such intractable conflicts, and the case of Cyprus stands out with its high level of inter-group resentment and long-lasting resistance to agree on a solution. The securitization of the opposite community makes the conflict a textbook example of where this theory could be implemented. It can be considered a most-likely case; if the theory does not gain support here, it is probably not a reasonable one. The Cyprus issue has been one of the most intractable conflicts during the 20th century, and although unique in its case, some characteristics make it valuable to study even for generalizability purposes. For example, the conflict has been said to be “not simply a conflict of substantive issues, such as territory, refugees etc., but mostly a conflict of mistrust, fear and suspicion, rooted in historical hostilities.” (Causeway Institute, 2017) This psychological nature of the conflict is not uncommon among protracted conflicts, as attitudes and social identity are inherited between generations and perpetuated by the polarization of society. It is precisely the psychological aspects that are important, as Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have developed such strong social identities and such animosity that territorial solutions that can be agreed upon in the political arena are not sufficient for the two sides to emotionally reconcile. This problem can be predicted to be of growing importance seeing the trends of modern day conflicts. Not only have the trends shifted from inter-state to intrastate, but they have shifted from strictly governmental or territorial to identity-based or religious (Kaldor 1999; 2013) Using the Cyprus case can therefore be useful in other protracted conflicts based on or perpetuated by social identity.

Within the frame of this conflict, four points in time are selected as cases for analysis. To assess the hypotheses, four instances within the time period under study are selected. Two are cases of onset of top-level negotiations, and two of breakdown. I then study the development of the dependent variable during 1 year after this event.
### IV: Critical juncture of political negotiation

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Number of Civil Society Initiatives</td>
<td>1998 x</td>
<td>2003 x</td>
<td>2005 x</td>
<td>2009 x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 (above): Case selection

#### 3.2. Scope conditions

The population of cases this study applies to is rather broad. It regards primarily protracted conflicts where the adversaries are geographically close. However, it is not limited to civil wars, to prevent cases such as the Israel-Palestine conflict to fall outside of the scope.

The time period studied is 1995 to 2013. This is a choice based both on empirical observations and data availability. The end of the cold war marked a changing landscape in the international community with regards to peacebuilding and civil society became, with grace to the newly created funds from international organizations and NGO’s, a force to be reckoned with. This means that measuring civil society commitment to peace processes prior to 1995 with the same operationalization as in the post-cold war era would decrease the validity of the study, since the concept has changed during that timeframe.

#### 3.3. Operationalization

The critical junctures in third-party mediated official peace process refers to larger events radically changing the dynamic of the ongoing peace process in Cyprus. This may take form in, amongst other examples, the establishment or renewal of negotiations or dialogue, signing of a peace accord or disruption of ongoing talks. In the case of Cyprus, the UN represents the third party as it has the uncompromised position as number one external party/intervenor since the eruption of conflict. UN involvement takes many different forms even within this particular case, and not all of them are related to the theory presented in this study and therefore not relevant to the comparison. The peacekeeping operation is considered separate, as is the United Nations Development Program and any UN organ in the humanitarian sector. These contributions to the process are far from irrelevant for the peace process and will be discussed as alternative explanations, but are not implications of the theory at hand. Instead, intervention is narrowed
down to the diplomatic efforts that consist of mediated efforts to bridge the intractable issues between the political leaders of the two communities. It takes the form of talks and negotiated plans, as well as the discontinuation of these.

Civil society engagement in the peace process is not to be confounded with civil support for the official, UN-led peace process: in fact, quite the contrary. Recall that increased civil commitment is expected to be a result of low faith in the mediated talks. As much as CSI’s are (as theoretically argued for in the paragraph on local turn theory) a necessary complement to the top-down mechanisms at play, that is not a calculated, conscious process but a reaction. Civil commitment to the peace process is here measured in Civil Society Initiatives (henceforth abbreviated to CSI’s). This study adopts the Mahallae coding of CSI’s, where individuals within the affected communities undertake projects aimed at building trust, reconciling the groups. The total number of active CSI’s serves as operationalization for the dependent variable, as it is the most reliable way of measuring determination among the regular population. Had data been available on number of individuals actively working with and/or supporting civil society initiatives, the results would have more precision, but unfortunately such data is rare and in this case not available. There is however one benefit to analyzing number of initiatives over number of individuals: given the difficulties of starting new businesses and long processes of gaining funding, credit and support, starting a new project requires more personal determination than simply taking a position at an existing one.

The initiatives are by Mahallae categorized on two axis: themes and goals. However, in order to come closer to the level of civil commitment and to what ideally would have been number of individuals actively engaged, this study analyses CSI’s at an aggregated level and does not discriminate among cases themed dialogue and diversity or advocacy and policymaking, nor among goals. Themes include Capacity Development, Active Citizenship, Dialogue & Diversity, Knowledge & Innovation, Social Good, Advocacy & Policymaking which all build on characteristics of a reconciliation process and therefore contribute to the overarching goal. Neither does the study differentiate between the goals, as it does not make any claims, theoretically or empirically, of how what measurements of civil society actions are most fit to promote reconciliation.

The number of initiatives are measured with one year’s delay in relation to the corresponding case of critical juncture of UN-mediated peace process. This intends to mirror the timeframe within which civil society analyses the implications the event has for the prospects of peace and reacts to how the situation has evolved. This delay intends to increase the validity of the study, as
measuring the two variables at the exact same point in time would undermine the argument that one is a function of the other.

3.4. Data collection and source criticism

The main source of the empirical data on the dependent variable is the Mahallae tool of civic mapping, which is an extensive index of civil society initiatives and related analyses. Driven by one of the key actors in the Cyprus peace process, and in fact on of the organizations it maps out, it does take an interest in the conflict outcome and is not entirely neutral. However, figures and numbers are objective and quantifiable and the Mahallae tool does not consist of any subjective evaluations of project. It merely states their existence, themes and goals. Naturally, there is, of course a possibility that the mapping is not comprehensive, which would bias the results, but it is the most extensive one available.

The independent variable lacks such a unitary, objective and (as much as can be) comprehensive source. Instead, data is collected from a variety of second- and tertiary sources. First, tertiary-source timelines with very little information have been used for an overview. For the in-depth analyses of each point in time/case, scholarly works evaluating the events from an academic perspective have been used in combination with reports from conferences, participants’ official websites and testimonies. As the processes studied are official, high-level processes involving “important people” with strategic interests in what information to convey, it is not an obvious case to find reliable information on what made a talk fail or what urged leaders to continue them. However, the benefit of the quite long time that has passed since the majority of these events took place has allowed formerly involved actors/individuals to provide information that may not be available when close in time. The main source of insight the political process is Michalis Stavrou Michael’s book Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History (2009) which contains the most comprehensive analysis available of third-party intervention in Cyprus.

One of the major sources of empirical material is news archives containing press releases from Greek and Turkish Cypriot newspapers at the time of the specific event. These give a fairly good estimate of how the public received the news, although it does not quite manage to reflect the micro-level reactions, i.e. how the readers took the news at their kitchen tables. The accessible news archives come mainly from Cyprus News Agency, compiles by the Hellenistic Resource Institute which is a Greece-based news outlet. Conscious of the risk of systematic bias, this study still finds relevant the statements and reflections made in the daily press. Press releases and Cypriot news archives are scanned for important statements and reactions. For events with a key
date, news summaries for the following week are scanned. Admitting there may be public reactions with more than a week’s delay, some indicators of the reception of a given change is expected to show within a week.

3.5. Methodology

This is a within-case analysis of a single conflict, using a comparison of four different time periods where significant changes in the dependent variable were found. It is a Structured, Focused Comparison where each “case” is subject to a series of questions centered around the theoretically identified possible causal mechanism. Although quantitative research on this subject would contribute to the field in another significant way, this phenomenon is part of a very complex piece of conflict resolution with many possible mechanisms playing a role, and intervening variables making the relationships spurious. A systematic, qualitative investigation of the cases is therefore more likely to capture the social reality. It cannot, however, be emphasized too many times that this research aims to simplify; to turn a complex, multi-dimensional web into a comprehensible model or theory. As phrased by King, Keohane and Verba: “The difference between the amount of complexity in the world and that in the thickest of descriptions is still vastly larger than between this thickest description and the most abstract quantitative or formal analysis” (1994: 43). Nonetheless, this simplification and the generalizations it makes possible is what allows policy to form on good grounds, and for us to knit an image of the world that we can comprehend out of the ball of yarn that is social reality. Indeed, this research is probabilistic and potentially victim of bias and mistakes. The ending discussion on alternative explanations is therefore one of the more important parts of this piece, and as far as data concerns, it is triangulated when triangulation is available.

The time adjustment between measuring point of the independent and dependent variables does not mean the problem of time-order is mitigated. The hurdle of time-order (Powner, 2009) is in this case, as in many cases of the social sciences, not easy to clear. Since one of the variables is not a prerequisite of the other, one can only theoretically determine which one precedes or causes the other. In this case, it is indeed a plausible idea that an expansion of civil society initiatives puts pressure on the government to increase the efforts to a negotiated settlement, as their legitimacy in the eyes of their population is at stake. To control for this time-order problem, the structured focused analysis method allows a closer review of the specific cases at each point in time to explore the background reasons for the critical juncture. In attempt to clear the hurdle, the specific UN events are closely examined. What is searched for is the reasons of the change,
whether it is a crash or a new beginning. Indicators of pressure form the civil society are examined, as well as if the pressure comes from political endeavors or setbacks. It is expected, if the theory finds support, that it is political factors or strategic interests rather than pressure from civil society that is the ultimate decider.

Many parallel events take place on the political arena, and UN-led talks are not all that may impact the presence of civil engagement. Accession into EU, changes in domestic politics, breakthroughs in civil engagement or measurable impact on the entire peace process, and many other factors, also play a part. However, this study does not focus on negotiations on the Cyprus-EU question, in order to test the theory at hand and reduce the complexity of the situation. Modelling down a situation is necessary, and although being a qualitative study taking different angels into account, the independent variable is UN-mediated processes and not diplomatic on another dimension.

3.6. Structured, Focused Comparison questions
The structured, focused comparison minimizes bias through running the cases through the same sieve, filtering for common characteristics, significant differences and varying circumstances. It is a theory-driven method, asking questions related to certain aspects based on the proposed theory (George & Bennett, 2004). This in-depth analysis is advantageous over a quantitative study as the present research aims to investigate the causal relationship embedded in circumstances and larger contexts with many phenomena at play. Although establishing the relationship is difficult, theorizing around the causal story contributes to a more holistic perspective on reconciliation as part of conflict resolution processes. The questions reflect the key theoretical features of the causal story, and each one represents a theme with a set of sub-questions that intend to identify plausible alternative explanations.

The first question regards the general characteristics of the critical juncture in the mediated national-level peace process. The data is collected primarily through formal reports of the event.

Q1: What are the basic characteristics of the relevant event?
   a) Who are the main actors?
   b) What kind of event does the change regard?
The primary purpose of the second question is to control for time-order. Indicators that pressure put on the political process by actions in the civil society is a main determinant of the critical juncture falsifies the theory.

**Q2: How was the situation prior to the change?**

a) What dynamics on the political arena showed in the year leading up to the change?

b) What dynamics on the civil arena showed in the year leading up to the change?

The occurrence of external, important events and changed circumstances provide indicators of alternative explanations for the proposed correlation. The third question in combination with the previous one, is thus a safety net intended to pick up on factors external to this theory that might cause a spurious relationship. Such factors can occur on the political as well as civil society arena, and perhaps most plausibly in between. The other side of third party involvement, in this conflict for instance the international organs funding CSI’s, is one such factor. A change in the prospects of funding may very well affect the outcome of the dependent variable.

**Q3: What were the proximate reasons for the change?**

a) Who took the final initiative of the change?

b) Were there any antecedent events constituting direct reasons?

The fourth question traces the first steps of the causal path, as well as control for time order.

Theoretical foundation for the question is the confidence theory.

**Q4: How was the change received?**

a) Did the population meet the news with surprise?

b) Did the population meet the news with content or skepticism?

Fifth, the internal characteristics of the negotiated event are examined. This question reflects the inclusion of “local turn”-policy and strengthens the arguments of the confidence-theory by identifying the level of cooperation between micro- and macro levels. The question is important to detect any pattern between civil inclusion in the political process and CSI’s, which would add explanatory power to the theory by building further on it.

**Q5: What are the internal characteristics of the peace process?**

a) How transparent is the negotiation process?

b) How integrated are civil society actors in the political process?

c) Are there detectable patterns in the goals of CSI’s?
The last question reflects the dependent variable and intends to find both the value at a certain point and informative patterns.

Q6: *What is the value and characteristics of the dependent variable?*

- a) Are there any detectable patterns in CSI’s in the period leading up to the critical juncture?
- b) How did the value change during the year following the juncture?
- c) What is the value of CSI’s one year after?

4. Empirical Analysis

4.1. General analysis of the case

Although being one of the most studied cases in conflict resolution (Michaels, 2009), Cyprus does not live up to the criteria of an armed conflict. Instead, labels such as the Cyprus Issue or the Cyprus Problem have become the standard appellations, which testifies to the difficult nature of the incompatibility. The political and military instability between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in the 60’s and 70’s culminated in the Turkish occupation of the northern part of Cyprus in 1974, after which the society has been divided in two geographically, politically and culturally separated communities; the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The latter is recognized by Turkey only.

Nimetz identified four main reasons as to why the conflict has become so deeply entrenched in Cypriot society, and is considered one of the most intractable conflicts in modern times. First, ethnic nationalism is focused around the protectorate nations rather than Cyprus. Lack of shared experiences, common values etc. led to a nearly complete lack of a common Cypriot identity. Secondly, the first half of the 20th century showed a severe deepening of animosity between the two groups. Thirdly, peacekeeping forces and UN organs has such a vast control of the conflict that a settlement has not been an urgent necessity. Fourth and lastly, the continued influence and the interests of the metropolitan powers (Turkey and Greece) hamper the process (Nimetz quote in Michael, 2009:140, Loizides, 2007). The UN diplomatic efforts have been heavily influenced and affected by international interests, to the extent that the conflict cannot be limited to the primary parties, but operates on the communal (Greek Cypriot vs Turkish Cypriot), sub-regional (Greece, Turkey) and international level (mainly US, Great Britain, Russia, UN, EU etc.).

Dynamics on all these levels affect the diplomatic peace process (Michael, 2009). It is natural that causal effects go in multiple directions between these levels, given the complexity of the situation.
and the multiplicity of group dynamics present within and between all these actors and levels. However, the study intends to map out any outstanding causal relationship between the diplomatic process and civil society on the communal level, i.e. limited to the Island of Cyprus. The impeding conditions outlined above make up an analytical context; a lens through which the theory can be applied to the case. The most relevant obstacles for this study are the first two; those related to social identity and the cultural divide. The presented theory has a heavy focus on the psychological sentiments of deprivation and frustration, and the practical initiatives the empirical part deals with are largely about creating a common identity.

On a scholarly level, Hadjipavlou argued that Cypriot civil nationalism failed to include both Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and that no political agreement could be successfully implemented without “conciliation” (as opposed to reconciliation, where parties have once had a good relationship) and trust-building between the communities. Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Confidence Building Measurements (CBM’s) in the 90’s intended to have this effect (Hadjipavlou quote in Michael p 140 check 1st hand source; Michael, 2009).

An empirical example illustrates the relevance of CSI’s for identity shifts and the needs-based theory: the rebuilding of the Apostolos Andreas Monastery. It is a formerly Greek, Christian monastery build on Turkish, Muslim-dominated territory. The joint restauration project incorporates implicit Turkish-Cypriot acknowledgement that the Greek-Cypriot community has been wronged and deserve re-empowerment – and the Greek-Cypriots in turn signal acceptance by rebuilding it jointly.

4.2. Overview of results

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Number of CSI’s</td>
<td>Approx. 20</td>
<td>200 +</td>
<td>Approx. 150</td>
<td>100 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main characteristics</td>
<td>CBM’s, Set of Ideas</td>
<td>Strive for unification</td>
<td>Public referendum of Annan Plan V</td>
<td>13 technical committees included</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of official process before EU accession

**Background situation**
- Low inter-group trust, nationalism with motherland
- Europeanization of conflict
- Common Vision document, socio-economic factors
- Presidential shift in the TRNC, Turkey’s EU-talks

**Proximate reasons**
- Military threats, EU accession
- Promise of EU accession, united or not
- Negotiated settlement reached
- Presidential shift in the RoC

**Public reaction**
- Not surprised, bi-communal efforts
- Welcome negotiations and prospects for unification
- Turkish Cypriot disappointment,Welcoming new talks

**Internal characteristics**
- Not very transparent
- Lack of communication channels to public
- Political monopolization of peace process
- Inclusive process

Table 2: Summary of results

![Graph showing number of initiatives over time (source: Mahallae Trends)](image_url)
Above is the graph from which the values of the dependent variable are derived. The different colors represent themes, of which the biggest ones are capacity development (pink), social good (green) and dialogue and diversity (blue).

4.3. Case studies

1997: Crash of UN talks

Q1: What are the basic characteristics of the relevant event?
Long-running bi-communal talks led by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General, came to an end. The talks were built on Boutros-Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” and Confidence Building Measures. The main actors were Greek Cypriot leader Clerides, Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, and of course Boutros-Ghali. The US as well as Great Britain had strong influence in negotiations. The negotiations had been in a deadlock throughout 1995-1996, but were pursued on a very low level intensity up until 1997. The critical juncture refers to the statement by Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash that all talks cease until the two sides are treated as equals by the international community. Along with this, all peace-building activities were banned in the TRNC (Jarraud et al., 2013: 49)

Q2: How was the situation prior to the change?
Multiple important events impacted the negotiations. Military tension between Greece and Turkey was reflected in a severe strain between the two Cypriot sides. Although neither side ever fired, airspace was violated on both sides and there was confrontation between Greek and Turkish war planes on Cypriot territory (Migdalovitz, 2005).
Meanwhile, the European Union had put Cyprus on the expansion list, which put pressure on both sides to find a settlement in order for the country to comply with EU standards.
First track diplomacy led by UN depended to a large extent on US support, which proved short-lived one the initial curiosity for the Cyprus problem flagged. Boutros-Ghali struggled with what he called the Denktash Problem, referring to Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash’s nationalism and anti-unification attitude. The time-factor was an additional obstacle, as leaders had paved out different paths over the dragging course of the negotiations. Denktash stepped closer to Ankara whereas Clerides focused on strengthening the military while moving towards EU policies (Michael, 2009: 142). Tensions escalated in 1996 to the killings of two Greek Cypriots, where the shooting was done by Turkish military, but the victim was a civilian engaged in protests (Papademetriou, 2008).
On the civil society arena, the Cyprus consortium started in 1994 their “training for trainers”, who could then assist bi-communal projects and hold workshops and trainings for others (Mahallae Story). Track II and III diplomacy was largely present in the shape of scholarly intervention in the conflict in the 90’s. Scholars of conflict resolution from American universities had taken an interest in the Cyprus issue and conducted studies and workshops developing new strategies of peacebuilding and bi-communal dialogue. Benjamin Broome’s “Interactive Management” led to the creation of the Cyprus Bazaar, which still is a forum for bi-communal projects and dialogue (Michael, 2009: 139; Mahallae Story). The major focus of the workshops was to “un-dichotomize” society; reducing us/them and win/lose dichotomies (ibid). According to Mahallae, these enabling factors were the “seed of the civil society peace building movement in Cyprus”. More people joined the workshops and initiatives, which points to a very important increase in commitment to the peace process. A characteristic for this period is the scholarly focus directed toward the conflict, which (although not reflected in the amount of CSI’s) provided the foundation for future increase in numbers. The focus was on learning the dynamics of mediation and peacebuilding. The 1997 crash reduced availability for bi-communal meetings because the Green Line closed, and many bi-communal activities were interrupted (Mahallae n.d.; Michael, 2009). This called for creative measurements to overcome the obstacles. One crucial step was the establishment of the Friendship House in Pyla village, where bi-communal meetings could be held. The House became a platform for mobilization of civil society, contributing to the formation of many new initiatives.

Q3: What were the proximate reasons for the change?

The final initiative to interrupt negotiations was taken Denktash on Dec 12, 2997, following the EU decision to formally start accession talks with Cyprus. These would exclude the TRNC, only acknowledging the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Turkish response was massive, threatening to annex the TRNC while Denktash reacted by announced that “intercommunal talks have ended,” and that he would only participate in talks between states having equal status” (Migdalovitz, 2005: 40). Another event creating a critical moment consists of military threats in 1997 after the Greek Cypriot side bought missiles reaching southern Turkey, and Greek and Turkish warplanes confronted over Cyprus (ibid).

On the civil society side, the Friendship House in established in 1998 directly affected the possibility of bi-communal interaction, thus facilitating civil society engagement in the peace process (Mahallae Story).
Q4: How was the change received?
Given the stalemate in negotiations during the summer prior to this event, and the threat of a Turkish annexation of the TRNC if the EU continues accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus, there was little surprise when this definitive statement was made (CNA: a). In most Greek Cypriot newspapers, the presidential elections taking place in the RoC during the same time in December 1997 overshadowed the Denktash’s statement that talks were officially over (CNA: b). This implies that the event news was not met with great shock.

The ban of peacebuilding activities in the TRNC and closure of the crossing points along the Green Line abruptly limited and interrupted on-going bi-communal civil society efforts, leading many activists and civil society actors in a position where they had to re-think and re-model their initiatives (Mahallae Story). This indicates discontent, as the initiatives were not willingly terminated but forcefully interrupted. As a reaction, a movement was created in the TRCN where local NGO’s jointly protested Denktash’s unitary stance (Freedom House, n.d.), which clearly indicates mistrust in Denktash’s attitude toward the peace process and strong discontent for his measurement taken against the peace-building processes.

Denktash’s separatist attitude (or the Denktash Problem, which is the label Boutros-Ghali gave the way Denktash’s politics obstructed the peace process) is clearly manifested in a statement he made on the subject of EU accession talks with the RoC despite Turkish Cypriot decision to and negotiations; "...by doing so they are also saving us from that ridiculous thing called intercommunal talks." (CNA: c).

Q5: What are the internal characteristics of the peace process?
US support, upon which the UN mediation was highly dependent, prioritized discussions between leaders on each side over track II and III diplomacy (Jarraud et al., 2013; CNA: a). This led the macro- and micro-level peacebuilding efforts to be rather separated. The scholarly nature of the civil society initiatives is also an indication that the two levels were not highly interactive. The negotiation process severely lacked transparency, which contributed to its failure (Michael, 2009).

Q6: What is the value and characteristics of the CSI’s?
The dynamics on either level are not visibly reflected in the number of civil society initiatives;
very few CSI’s were recorded prior to 1998. The graph shows a nearly flat line consistently around 20 CSI’s up until 1997, where a vague slope increases the value to approximately 30. Particular patterns are not reflected in the color-coded goals of the reported CSI’s, but as previously described, the scholarly and educational pattern stands out. The amount of CSI’s in 1998 extend to approximately 30.

2002: Executive launch of the Annan Plan

Q1: What are the basic characteristics of the relevant event?
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan through his Cyprus advisor Alvaro de Soto launched in 2002 new negotiations within the framework of a plan to re-unite the communities of Cyprus. The initiative had started two years earlier when the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was tasked to create dialogue between the two leaders on Cyprus (UN Resolution 1218) but it was not until 2002 that Denktash agreed to meet directly with Clerides. A plan was drafted where it was decided that negotiations would forego until a comprehensive settlement was reached, and that nothing would be agreed until everything was agreed. It was intended that the country gain access to the European Union as a united island (Michael, 2009).

Q2: How was the situation prior to the change?
The period after 1998 was characterized by a “europeanization” or “EU-ization” of Cyprus (Michael, 2009). The nationalism problem was addressed by attempts at creating a common European identity to complement or even replace the Greek/Turkish nationalist identities. However, the TRNC separatist leadership insisted on distance from EU and increased the proximity to Ankara. Freedom of expression was challenged in the TRNC as journalists from the Turkish-Cypriot newspaper Avrupa were imprisoned and the newspaper fined for “libeling” Denktash (International Press Institute, 2000). Turkish Cypriot civil society mobilized during this period and although few contact point with the Greek side were available, groups and individuals worked intensely to counteract Denktash’s separatist policies. The arresting of journalists met harsh criticism from domestic as well as international forces (ibid).

Since the closing of the green line in 1997, civil society initiatives had been forced to change nature, from mostly consisting of bi-communal projects and scholarly studies to things that could be carried out on one side. Naturally, methods and characteristics of the initiatives changed from joint to parallel, with each side working either on developmental projects on their own side, or conducted bi-communal meetings abroad, although more difficult to organize and demanding.
more resources. The importance of parallel efforts should not be understated, however, as they much contributed for the enabling of future project to take root in both societies, and had the capacity to mobilize and organize engagement.

Q3: What were the proximate reasons for the change?
The ultimate determining factor for the start of the talks was the successful persuasion by Alvaro de Soto and his team for Denktash to agree to meetings. Although not proven, Denktash’s change of heart was likely linked to a visit by an EU official stating that Cyprus would become a part of the EU regardless of whether a unification would have taken place (Suvarierol, 2003).

In August 2002, half a year after the first bi-communal meetings, 83 Turkish Cypriot NGO’s pressure both communities’ leaders to outline criteria for a solution. The main contention of this Common Vision Document was to enter the EU as a united island. (Freedom House, n.d.) The document by the Turkish Cypriot NGO’s was followed by an opening of the Green Line in 2003, enabling CSI’s to flourish and civil society peace-building to utilize bi-communal activities to a larger extent than before.

Q4: How was the change received?
Media coverage of the meeting where the talks were decided on, held 4 Dec 2001, indicates optimism, surprise and relief. Headlines such as “At Last” and “New Page for Cyprus” reflect that the promise of talks was met with hope (CNA: d). The start of the actual negotiations was not until January 2002, at which point media coverage are more focused on the factual course of events than public perception.

Q5: What are the internal characteristics of the peace process?
The formal level of the process at this time lacked adequate communication channels linking the formal negotiations with civil society and individual households. Lack of transparency was therefore an issue, although there is also pertinent examples here of interactions between levels. The interplay between the journalists’ imprisonment, the emergence of the Common Vision Document, and the success in negotiations resulting in the opening of crossing points provide a plausible linked course of events where civil society and political leaders successfully interact.

Q6: What is the value and characteristics of the CSI’s?
The small increase in 1998 was only the start of a steep rise, where the amount is multiplied many times and had by 2003 reached 200+ CSI's. This increase in numbers demonstrate the creativity of civil society as the same period produced such obstacles to bi-communalism. During this time, advocacy and policymaking emerged as a theme, which can be interpreted as the most politically oriented field of civil society commitment. The mediation focus shifted in favor of capacity development, knowledge and innovation, and social good. This development focus is a natural consequence of the closing of borders. Increased funding from the newly established USAID/UNOPS Bi-communal Development Program enabled many initiatives (Michael, 2009). In the year following the critical juncture the amount of CSI’s increased sharply. One of the first major changes that the Annan Plan resulted in was the opening of crossing points along the buffer zone, which allowed project to take a bi-communal form again.

2002, marking the launch of the Annan Plan, is characterized by a stagnation in CSI’s which is followed by another upswing only to reach the highest recorded levels in 2003 (Mahallae).

2004: Rejection of Annan Plan

Q1: What are the basic characteristics of the relevant event?

The Annan plan culminated in a referendum where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots voted on the unification of Cyprus. The ultimate version of the solution to be voted upon was produced by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, along with leaders from both Cypriot communities and the protectorates during a six-week intense conference marking the end of the Annan Plan round of negotiations. The importance of this draft is sharply underscored by the Secretary-General, stating that “the choice is between this settlement and no settlement” (Annan, 2004). However, deciding factor in this critical juncture is the Cypriot people on either side.

Q2: How was the situation prior to the change?

The top-level, political process was by this time highly internationalized. Michael contends that “although UN dependence on U.S./British support was well established prior to the Annan initiative, the new contextual environment integrated this relationship to such an extent that they became virtually indistinguishable” (2009:150). The negotiations were characterized by Denktash’s anti-EU attitude and Clerides openness to unification, but the official process failed to perceive and recognize changes in public opinion (ibid; 182). Greek Cypriots considered themselves superior not only in numbers and welfare but as the indigenous population of Cyprus. Hence, a unification and the establishment of ethnic “equality” did not appeal to many Greek
Cypriots. Such socio-economic issues were overlooked due to the lack of inclusiveness in the negotiation process.

The prospects of EU membership highly affected civil society both tangibly in the form of increased funding and monetary support for peace-building and bi-communalism, and psychologically in the way citizens saw their future. (Mahallae; Michael, 2009). For Turkish Cypriots, it reinforced the motivation for a joint Cyprus, as the segregation kept citizens of the TRNC from taking part of the benefits of the membership. Greek Cypriots, on the verge of entering the EU regardless of unification, were more concerned with not losing or unfairly splitting resources with the Turkish Cypriots (Michael, 2009).

Q3: What were the proximate reasons for the change?

There are two parallel decision-makings here. First, the leaders’ agreement to implement the solution should the vote go through. Second, the people turning the suggestion down.

Greek Cypriots “approached the referendum not as the beginning of a new era of collaboration, peace and prosperity, but rather as a rearguard defense to safeguard their sovereignty and identity” (Michael, 2009: 182).

The Turkish Cypriot, on the other hand, experienced vast mobilization by pro-unification NGO’s prior to the referendum, leading to voting in favor of the unification whilst Greek Cypriots voted against it (ibid).

Q4: How was the change received?

The international community met the news with surprise, and so it seems did the Turkish Cypriots. The relatively large margin which the Greek Cypriots turned the proposal down indicates the rather expected outcome from their side. Although the decision is ultimately taken by civil society, it is a political failure nonetheless, since the referendum equals measuring the support for a certain political solution, which is directly related to the legitimacy of the mandate that implement the political solution.

Regarding the support for the outcome, a segregation between Turkish and Greek Cypriot is important given the result of the referendum. People in the TRNC responded with disappointment. What is striking here is that civil society is rather polarized, with a continued strong force of civil society working for reconciliation and bi-communalism while opposition to uniting is obviously still strong.

Q5: What are the internal characteristics of the peace process?
The Annan Plan lacked channels of effective communication on several dimensions, both horizontally toward politicians not involved in the negotiations and vertically towards citizens. This meant progress that were made in negotiations was not reflected in the greater public’s perception of the adversary, i.e., did not reduce animosity between Turkish and Greek Cypriots enough for them to see the benefits of the unification. This lack of transparency led to a monopolization of the peace process by state participants, creating a “pi-polar siege deterring interactive processes and reinforced state-centric dominance over civil society” (Michael, 2009: 187). Moreover, the communication deficit extends to the actual contents and implication of the intended solution. Come election day, the people had not been sufficiently informed and educated on the positive ways in which implementation of the plan would affect the society. Thus, enemy images and nationalist prejudice prevailed in the Greek part, where citizens did not see the benefit of a joint state but only the consequences of having to share what was theirs and give up their Greek Cypriot sovereignty (Michael, 2009).

**Q6: What is the value and characteristics of the CSI’s?**

For civil society peace-building activists, the opening of the green line in 2003 had been a “major turning point” (Mahallae Story). Although the first look does not offer much change since the previous period, the nature of the CSI’s changed and became more joint projects and less parallel, general development programs. They grew larger during this period: more important, spanning over a longer time and engaging more people through the mobilization of platforms, forums, and groups instead of individual projects. However, this change is not visible in the statistics provided. Instead, the number of CSI’s made a dive in 2004 after having remained static at a high level since 2003. One year after the referendum, the rate of CSI’s amounts to approximately 150.

**2008: Renewal of negotiations**

**Q1: What are the basic characteristics of the relevant event?**

This round of negotiations included 13 newly created working groups and committees of technical issues, consisting of representatives from the political, subject-specific as well as civil society representatives from both communities (Mahallae Story; Napolitano, 2011). This is a way of integrating different components of the peace process to avoid the pitfalls of the Annan Plan. The main actors are then UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet
Ali Talat, and Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias. The new plan took a heavy focus on confidence building measures and the everyday lives of Cypriots (Isachenko, 2012).

**Q2: How was the situation prior to the change?**

TRNC leader Denktash had been replaced by Talat in the presidential elections of 2005. Talat, like his precedent, made an important note of TRNC’s independence but emphasized its independence from Turkey rather than its recognition from other states (Isachenko, 2012). There had been an attempt at negotiations in 2006, which shortly failed due to then-president Papaduopolous “elusive policies” (KKTB, n.d.)

The prospects of the peace process re-emerged as a substantial matter in the campaigns of the candidates of the Greek Cypriot presidential election, which were held in 2008, where the candidate Christofias showed resolve in re-launching the peace process. Christofias’ supporters comprised Greek as well as Turkish Cypriot, indicating that improved diplomacy would have support in both communities (CNA: e).

EU accession was still an important matter, but this time for Turkey. The two negotiation processes were intertwined, as a settlement on the Cyprus issue was one of the criteria for Turkey’s EU accession (Napolitano, 2011). This pressure from Turkey to find a solution along with the presidential shift provided new hope for negotiations, and after a period of very little interaction between the political leaders of Cyprus after the failure of the Annan Plan, the political climate thawed and prospects of a new round of negotiations took form.

Civil society could expand since the opening of the border in 2003, returning the focus to bi-communal activities and bridging the gap between corresponding Greek and Turkish Cypriot sectors. There was a heavy focus on multiculturalism and tolerance after the rejection of the Annan Plan. Civil society was organized and powerful enough by now to be recognized and included informal processes, which led to the committees of the negotiations. This took the form of, for example, the Missing Persons committee that is a bi-communal, civil society initiative from the start but is organized and funded by the government and is an important part of the peace process (The Elders, 2011).

**Q3: What were the proximate reasons for the change?**

The winner of the 2008 Greek Cypriot presidential election, Christofias, pledged to re-open...
peace talks, which was welcomed by the Turkish leader and was the change the UN had been waiting for in order to re-start negotiations (Michael, 2009).

**Q4: How was the change received?**
The results of the presidential election in the RoC show a certain satisfaction with the launch of new talks, given the winning candidate’s vow to re-start dialogue.

**Q5: What are the internal characteristics of the peace process?**
This round of talks offer a much more integrative design than previous efforts; the merging of different sectors of society is here a fact. One of the key features is the thirteen committees of different technical specialties (cultural heritage, etc) of which several are rooted in the civil society peacebuilding movement. Local ownership increased with the inclusion of experts and representatives from civil society. Macro- and micro-level peacebuilding efforts are considerably more integrated than in previous rounds of negotiations. Already on the first meeting, it was agreed to open a crossing point on Ledra street, a symbolic place in the capital (Napolitano, 2011).

**Q6: What is the value and characteristics of the CSI’s?**
Although number of CSI’s remain on quite a high level in 2009, the graph in taking a landslide and numbers decrease sharply over the course of these negotiations.
The different goals categorized and separated by Mahallae show that the civic action is to a vast extent done with the goal of bi-communal contact to heal old wounds (Mahallae; Mahallae Story). In 2009, the number of CSI’s reached slightly over 150, making a dip just to turn upwards again and peaking in 2010, after which it steeply drops.

4.4. Analysis and discussion

Theoretical discussion of results

A recap of the hypothesized causal mechanism is at its place here: Frustration over failed negotiations was expected to lead to reduced confidence in the political process and an increase in civil society engagement. Respectively, engagement was expected to stay relatively static with the renewal of negotiations as confidence is not as quickly restored but no new motivation for engagement to increase is injected. The hypothesis suggested failure
would be followed by an increase and re-launch by a static line. Below is a table showing the relationship between the two variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JUNCTURE</th>
<th>CSI DIRECTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>FAILURE OF 1997</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAUNCH OF 2002</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAILURE IN 2004</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAUNCH IN 2008</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
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Table 3: overview of direction of CSI’s during the year following the critical juncture

The relationship between critical juncture in the mediated negotiations are, as shown in the above diagram, in all cases but the first, not in accordance with the given hypothesis. However, the in-depth analysis provides valuable insights as to why this is the case. It becomes evident that the theoretically proposed causal story in most instances does not find support. Instead, a few other patterns can be distinguished from the empirical results. The main one, falsifying the confidence-based theory, is the prevalence of enabling factors as determinant of civil society engagement, rather than motivational factors.

The first case is where the hypothesis is supported, but the proposed causal story is not. The humanitarian development and the scholarly interest in civil peace-building took place alongside the political negotiations and did not wait until after to start. This reduces the significance of relative deprivation as a relevant factor in the emergence of the 200 + initiatives that were initiated after this juncture. The absence of activity prior to 1997, regardless of fluctuations in political climate, suggests that it is the enabling factors of this scholarly period that mattered. In addition to this, the initiative to start these CSI’s did not come from the communities themselves at this initial stage but from foreign scholars. While providing a foundation for a growing movement, (and it does indeed take some willingness to reconcile for participants to take part of the trainings and workshops), there is no sudden rise in domestic motivation creating these new
initiatives. The second case supports this through the opening of the green line in 2003, which presented enabled conditions for CSI’s to increase in number as well as in magnitude.

The third case, contrarily, does not provide clear support for this. The dive in CSI’s following the rejection of the Annan Plan is interesting from a theoretical perspective and can indeed find explanation in a confidence-based theory. For instance, although hypothesis is not applicable to the decrease in CSI’s after the Annan crash, that case demonstrates is a special circumstance as the people constitutes the deciding factor instead of political failure. The number of CSI’s decreased in the following year despite that not much was changed regarding enabling conditions. The discontent of the people was manifested by the rejection of the plan and does not need to be manifested in new initiatives to make up for lost progress that civil society believed in. This is an example of motivational factor rather than enabling, and relative deprivation can arguably be applied here. Civil society had worked hard for better inter-communal relations and saw a backlash that made many lose hope and motivation, albeit temporarily. Yet, this course of events cannot be accredited to the theory because the critical juncture at hand is not a failure on the political level (in the literal sense: the lack of transparency can indeed be viewed as a political failure). Furthermore, it does not find evidence beyond theorizing.

Nor in case four does the change in CSI’s appear due to motivational factors, but neither for enabling ones. Initiatives are submerged into the political context in the shape of working groups and committees, operating in the same way as civil society initiatives. Theoretically, this can be explained by the fact that there is longer a reason to mistrust the process more than one’s own initiative, since they are now integrated into one another. If CSI’s are submerged into the macro-level process, the graph showing a static line would have meant many new CSI’s were created. No indications of enabling factors changing the number of CSI’s was detected here, but nor any specific motivational factors. In that sense, the confidence theory is not falsified here. Nonetheless, it is not proven either, and the stronger implications from the other cases overshadow any assumptions that can be drawn from this case.

The hypothesis predicted that renewal of negotiations, such as in the second case, would make civil society engagement stay at the same level, and it was argued that this was due to a continued distrust in the political process since the last disappointment. The case does not comply with that, but manifest a different course and a different causality. The Common Vision document demonstrates the increased determination from Turkish Cypriot civil society when Denktash’s
anti-EU policies seemed impenetrable. It does resonate in the theory that frustration over political shortcomings (regarding the prospects of the peace process) foster action in civil society, even if the political shortcoming in this instance was not a crash in the mediated negotiations as was predicted, but repressive policies. The document thus signified trust in the unification process mediated by the UN, and demanded Denktash’s compliance or resignation. This indicates that the public wanted another leader to take part in the negotiations, i.e. shows that distrust in their own leadership is not necessarily related to distrust in the political process as such. The Common Vision Document also indicates a certain reverse causality, or at least double causality between civil society engagement and political process. The document being a reaction to distrust in the leadership and trust in the UN process, the opening of the Green Line in 2003 that followed shortly after was plausibly an effect of the pressure put on the leaders by civil society.

Another interesting finding comes from the fact that Turkish Cypriots voted yes to the Annan Plan whereas the Greek Cypriots turned the proposal down. Data indicated a thirst from Turkish Cypriot side to reconcile and benefit from the “europaenization”, have less polarization and show more readiness to co-exist, whereas Greek Cypriots would not take any solution just to get a solution. This discrepancy stems from Turkish Cypriot distrust in the leadership, and on the Greek Cypriot side from insufficient perceived benefits from unification. This illustrates the need of effective communication between civil society and political leaders, as well as the need for a re-identification process of the enemy group before a settlement can be successfully implemented. Greek Cypriots had not yet changed the idea of us and them into a common Cypriot identity, and were therefore not as inclined to share resources.

Limitation of research design
A pattern made visible is the potential inappropriateness of number of civil society initiatives as operationalization of civil society engagement. This is demonstrated in different ways in the cases. The civil society activities before 1998 can all be considered enabling conditions providing a toolkit to recruit a vastly larger pool of people than had before had the opportunities to participate in such activities. Creating an interest and spreading knowledge of how to engage in the peace process is not visible in this kind of statistics, but should nonetheless be interpreted as an increase in civil society engagement. The in-depth analysis suggests that number of CSI’s might not be the ultimate tool for measuring civil society’s commitment to the peace process. On several occasions along the studied period, commitment was clearly raised but this increase is
overshadowed by other dynamics, such as the joining of multiple initiatives under one umbrella organization, or the increase of people involved, or simply the magnitude of the initiative. With the reasoning that CSI’s decrease due to the integration between levels, nor in case 4 does the number of CSI’s fairly reflect the civil engagement in the peace process, but rather manifests the need for valuable channels and outlets for the engagement that is already present. The qualitative nature of the study allows chance that is not accounted for in the current operationalization to shine through anyway, but the usage of number of CSI’s is doubtlessly a limitation of this thesis. Operationalizing civil society in a different way may capture the phenomenon in a more representative way, although number of CSI’s is very reliable (given the accuracy of the data provided by Mahallae). However, Even if civil society engagement in the peace process had been differently measured, the in-depth analysis shown little support for its theoretically proposed relationship to mediation negotiations.

Key points of empirical discussion

In two of the three cases where distinguishing between motivational and enabling factors was possible, enabling conditions seems to be the determinant factor. These factors leads to the confidence theory gaining very little support. Instead, it seems as if the motivation is there more or less all along, waiting for some catalyst enabling factor for it to turn into real action. Furthermore, the enabling factor does not seem to be the same one which is proposed in the causal mechanism of this theory. Although this study stretches only insofar as to claim it is enabling factors rather than motivating factors that account for changes in civil society engagement, a pattern is that these enabling factors are often related to increased efforts by aid donors and the development sectors of international organizations. Where there is in fact a correlation between critical juncture in the political process and a change in civil society engagement, it may be worth studying the causal nature of the relationship between the macro-level peace process and international development organs. For that, one must reach further back and see what caused the USAID to start its development program and why the scholars took an increased interest in Cyprus at those particular years. If the assumption is still made that civil society action is taken with the overall goal of reconciliation, which is implicitly supported throughout the cases, this argumentation leads to an increased focus on reconciliation feasibility than on willingness to reconcile.

Civil society-level peacebuilding funding from international organizations is highly contingent upon dominating paradigms on aid and peacebuilding. The bottom-up approach gaining territory
is relatively concurrent with the increased funding from USAID, EU and UNDP ACT, which all contributed to the increased influence of civil society in the Cyprus peace process.

5. Summary & Conclusions

This study has empirically examined the macro- and micro-level peace process in Cyprus, finding that critical junctures in the mediated negotiations matter less than enabling conditions stemming from political agreements as well as from changes funding opportunities. Given the description of Cyprus as a most-likely case, the theory can be discarded due to lack of support. However, it must remain stated that in a social reality, complex webs of causal arrows make up our society. This theory as well as its falsification is probabilistic and schematic in order to find general, overarching patterns. That being said, the relationship between the variables in this thesis does provide good insight into the independent power of civil society, its responses to international organization, and to political events. The discussion reinforces the notion that political agreements are crucial for reconciliation in the way that they create or hinder possibilities for bi-communal contact. Altogether, this study contributes to expanding our understanding of the path to a reconciled society, and the conclusions reached represent a relevant addition to the holistic view on peacebuilding.

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