Establishing a Culture of Migration
The Spatial, Economic, and Social Planning of
Philippine-Korean Labour Migration

By
Jesper Alkarp

2018

MASTERUPPSATSER I KULTURANTROPOLOGI
Nr 75
Establishing a Culture of Migration

The Spatial, Economic, and Social Planning of Philippine-Korean Labour Migration

Jesper Alkarp

Supervisor: Mats Utas
Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University
Abstract

Since the second half of the 20th century the Philippines have supplied the world with migrant workers. Today, almost one tenth of the population is residing abroad. Labour migration has become an important source of revenue to both state and private actors through remittances, for the Philippines, and a source of cheap labour battling labour shortage, in the receiving countries. Today, the global labour market is a distinct and important part of what we call globalisation. This is portrayed in this thesis through the lens of Philippine-Korean labour migration.

The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the emergence of migrants as a commodity for export, the institutionalised creation of migrants, the normalisation of labour migration, and containment of migrants through legal and spatial constraints, in Manila and in Seoul.

This thesis look at the ways in which labour migration, as an economic policy, is internalised and transformed into a culture of migration. I argue that the effects of a culture of migration is felt not just by the labour migrants themselves, but also by their families and by the Philippines as a whole. As such, the reliance on remittances as a source of income has transformed domestic and global infrastructures as well as norms and social behaviour. Moreover, this thesis aims to add to the discussion on migration and remittances by exploring social dimensions and consequences of the globalisation of the labour market.

Keywords: labour migration, the Philippines, Korea, globalisation, transnationalism, transnational families, ethnic enclaves, remittances.
Acknowledgments

Above all I wish to thank all of my informants, gatekeepers, and friends, who were with me in the field. Those of you who agreed to be interviewed, hang out, and guide me through Manila and Seoul; you made my fieldwork possible and kept me sane in the process.

My fieldwork was realised with the help of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency’s scholarship for Minor Field Studies.

I would like to express my gratitude to all of my fellow students and to my professors at Uppsala University and Yonsei University who have read, commented, questioned and complained. Further, I am more than grateful for having had Mats Utas as my supervisor. Mats remained calm, constructive, and supportive, throughout – only ever panicking over my usage of em dashes –.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter I – Introduction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose and Research Question</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fieldwork and Method</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situating the Thesis in Anthropological Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapters</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter II – A Supply and Demand of Migration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Human Commodity on the Global Market</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotation, Circulation, and the Dual Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines – The Push Factor</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea – The Pull Factor</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter III – Discipline and Heroes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxed in in a Box – Transnational Familyhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants and Discipline</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating Migrants – Refining the Filipino Worker</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter IV – A Korean Multiculturalism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Enclaves</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Importance of Blood – Nationalism and Multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containing Little Manila</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter V – Concluding Discussion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>List of References</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I – Introduction

In Makati, a central business area in Manila, the names of avenues and malls suggest a multicultural past. Spanish, Chinese, and American influences has created an identity in which everyone is Filipino and also parts this or parts that. “What are you doing in Manila” my taxi driver asked me while driving past the Ayala Triangle Gardens, a central square in Makati. The answer I could think of, ‘I am looking into why Filipinos migrate a lot’, struck me as rather dumb. Anyone could think of the answer; to build a better life. The driver said “look at all the billboards”. I did, they all offered something, mostly condos and cars, for an investment - “Tired of commuting - get an apartment in Makati”. The driver explained; you need to be able to make an investment - you need to get something which you can make a living out of. Then he said something that would be repeated to me every day; you need to have discipline. In my understanding, he meant that you need to sacrifice. You need to sacrifice so that your family can prepare for the future.

The central square in Ansan, a satellite town of Seoul, greets its visitors with a message; “we are one”. The words, displayed in the form of concrete sculptures, echoes the multicultural and borderless image the town has tried to establish. Behind the sculptures is a large globe situated on top of a staircase which is covered with the phrase “thank you” in multiple languages. Next to the square runs a street better known as the multicultural food street, which hopes to attract Seoulites looking for authentic foreign food. This is the home of multicultural pioneers, and the town is not shy to tell you so. Ansan, or more specifically a part of Ansan called Wongok-dong, is a special multicultural zone with an unusually large
amount of foreign residents. So much so that the area has become a symbol for a new and modern multicultural Korea, which is the source of a great debate and dilemma. An official status, multiculturalism is both a label and a goal in the multicultural zone.

One hour and nineteen minutes away from Ansan, 33 stops on the metro, one has arrived in central Seoul. Here lies a different type of multicultural zone; Little Manila, the market which survives without the help of artificial, official, planning. Here, following Sunday mass in the nearby church, Filipinos gather to eat, talk, and shop. The small area is filled with people and stalls, but for how long? The market is part of a discussion on opening a new multicultural zone, which would relocate and contain the market into an area far from the social context that the Sunday mass has provided.

Migration has become a prime source of income for the Philippines. The government promotes its people as ‘able hands, able workers’, an educated body of labour which can be used to combat shortage of affordable labour anywhere in the world. Migration has grown so big that it flows through politics and everyday life, making it a constant ‘option’ on one hand, and an important political target, on the other. During the 2016 presidential election, migrants’ rights became an important topic. Migrants which have been called ‘national heroes’ and who are given certain rights, like the ability to send goods tax free to their families back home.

In Korea (hereinafter, Korea either refers to South Korea or pre-division Korea), the 20th century saw a shift from a negative net migration rate to a positive one. In what has been known as the ‘Hermit Kingdom’, discussions are now centred around the idea of a multicultural Korea - a concept which is highly racialized. The Korean homogeneity, a nation-state understood as one-blood, one country, has ironically been challenged for as long as the post-feudal state has existed. Since Korea began to open its borders in the late 19th century it has been the battleground of other states’ interests. The Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars made Korea a Japanese colony - The end of the Second World War made a divided Korea into a proxy conflict between China, Russia, and the U.S. Now, it seem, Korea’s self image is yet again changing with a changing demography – in what ways are, or aren’t, migrants being integrated into Korean society.
Purpose and Research Question

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Philippines has emerged as one of the foremost exporters of labour. In what has been an ambition of the state, Filipinos have been educated to fill up the vacant positions of countries as varied as the U.S, Saudi Arabia, Norway, and Korea. Through active engagement with migrant recruiters, the Philippines has built a complex network which, on the one hand, enables, facilitates, and promotes labour migration but which also, on the other hand, limits, regulates, and restricts the migrants’ freedom of movement. Consequently, whereas migration has become a permanent political and social issue in the Philippines, the path of a migrant is paved with time restrictions, visa applications, and social obligations which serve to both increase the potential migration and to further control it. Although temporary migration has a long and diverse history, including guest worker-programmes in Western Europe and the increase in temporary migration to ‘settler type-countries’ such as Canada and Australia, it has typically been a process where policies are imposed by the receiving country. In contrast, the Philippines have actively been engaged in keeping the Filipino migrants connected to the Philippines.

During the second half of the 20th century the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea (from hereon referred to simply as Korea), experienced a massive economic growth. The so-called Miracle on the Han river made Korea into one of the world’s largest economies, a success story which took the average Korean from poverty to relative affluence. The miracle which grew out of factories, steel mills, and shipyards, found itself short of labour - largely due to the increasing demands of the now relatively wealthy Korean middle class - and turned towards other, foreign, sources of labour. Much like the Philippines have regulated and enabled migration, Korea managed migration flows with well-defined visas, migrant programmes, and time-restrictions. Conversely, Korea increased its pull-factor by being amongst the first Asian countries granting equal labour rights to migrant workers.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between the migrant and the infrastructure of migration - the lived consequences of a global labour market in two societies, one which is dependent upon remittances and one which is dependent on cheap labour. I intend to do so by answering the following questions; how are globalised labour markets managed and implemented politically? How are these policies affecting migratory infrastructures, and how are the political ambitions thought of? This thesis will then move to link the political with the social, the global with the local, by examining how migration policies are experienced and lived and what effect they have on Filipino culture and society. And perhaps the most pressing issue; why is migration lived and experienced as it is?

The increased importance of migrants as a resource has left Korea and the Philippines with a need to develop strategies to produce a domestic, as in the Philippines, population who can consider a life as a migrant, as well as strategies to contain migrants, as in Korea. The intrinsic nature of migration, i.e. the separation from the social security offered by the family and the community, puts the potential and current migrant into situations of uncertainty. It is, as is argued in this thesis, an obstacle which is, on the one hand, shaped and, on the other hand, made possible to overcome by political institutions. It is the aim of this thesis to account for the experience of navigating through the infrastructure of global migration - an infrastructure which is both political, social, and geographical.

The political aspect of global labour flows is characterised by the impact of government policies which in particular takes it shape in how migrants are (i) limited both spatially and by time frames and (ii) how policies are developed to facilitate certain aspects of migrants’ lives. The social aspect is concerned with (i) the social benefits and (ii) the social obligations of a migrant. In other words, it is how remittances (or so-called balikbayan boxes, a type of remittance which will be introduced in chapter III) shape the social status of the migrant. The geographical aspect is at play through both (i) the local, in the Philippines and in Korea, and (ii) the global. At a local level migrants find themselves relating to home, a nostalgia in the diaspora which is reproduced in local institutions in Korea. At a global level distance becomes both a liberator, for some, and a displacement, for some. For the displaced, being a migrant is also being in a very precarious situation.
Fieldwork and Method

Notes on the Field

The fieldwork which this thesis builds upon was conducted, first, in Metro Manila and, secondly, in metropolitan Seoul. Manila, the capital and largest city of the Philippines, combines shanty towns with modern skyscrapers, congested traffic with Spanish colonial architecture. Manila is, also, a destination for many migrants. Although twice as big, internal migration has often been overshadowed by international migration - an issue which apparently (also in this thesis) draws and receives much more attention. Nevertheless, to understand Manila as a field site I believe it to be important to understand it as a site of drastic ongoing demographic change, as well as a place with drastic demographic challenges. The observations and interviews which are used in this thesis have taken place in quite varied settings; some have been made at educational centres, others in offices, and more than anything they have been made on the streets of Makati, the central business district of Manila, Quezon City, the largest city of Metro Manila, and the city of Manila itself. Further, I have stayed in touch with many of my informants through social media. As such, this has allowed both me and my informants to verify and add information to the ethnography; i.e. my writing and their reading of the ethnography has been a part of the fieldwork process.

Because of the prevalence of Philippine migration, finding material was never an issue. However, the amount of sources became haystack in which finding the right material proved more difficult than expected. At first I searched for information in the formal institutions handling migration. This became problematic due to lack of access, Manila being a city in which most doors are kept shut by security guards. To be allowed in I always had to schedule appointments, meaning that I could most often only meet officials and not the future or former migrants themselves. After some time I found that a much better approach to finding informants in Manila was through acquaintances, social gatherings, bars and restaurants etc. That way I managed to be allowed more informal meetings, and also being allowed into the social life of some informants. In a similar manner I also found an invaluable
source of information in talking to doormen, cab drivers, and waiters. Understandably so, they knew more than most what role migration has in Philippine life.

The aim of this fieldwork, to explore the attitudes and motivations behind Filipino migration, led to my informants having fairly similar socioeconomic backgrounds. For the four million slum dwellers and the many homeless, international migration is an unachievable task. On the other side of the spectrum, the wealthy Manileño enjoy international possibilities and opportunities which also exclude them from the focus of this study.

The second fieldwork took place some 6 months later, and coincided with a longer stay in Seoul. Seoul has been a centre of power on the Korean peninsula since, at least, the start of the Joseon dynasty, when Seoul became the capital city. The city, much like the rest of Korea, experienced periods of drastic social, economic, and cultural change during the 19th and 20th century. During the Japanese rule of Korea, 1910-1945, Seoul grew to become a major city, a growth which continued at a rapid pace after the Korean War 1950-1953. The area which received most attention during my fieldwork, the borderless village in Ansan, is one of many satellite cities built around Seoul to accompany the newly established industrial zones after the War. As factories began to employ foreign labourers, this area also became an early example of ethnic pluralism in Korea. Of the other field sites, the Filipino market Little Manila is the most notable one. The market is located next to a Catholic church which today caters to, although not only, Filipino church goers. The market itself is located on the sidewalk in between a roundabout and a college campus, not far away from the historical Great East Gate of Seoul.

In Ansan, my fieldwork became spatially well defined. Not only because the borderless village is, in itself, finite, but also because it is a very commercial area; i.e. restaurants, banks, remittance bureaus, a so on, were located side-by-side. Since I had already tried scheduling meetings in Manila, with marginal success, my approach to Ansan was more organic. In other words, the informants were almost never expecting me. However, save for language barriers and lack of time, I never found it hard to talk and discuss the topic of this thesis with inhabitants and employees working in Ansan. The Filipino Market was of course also encircled, in a way. But if anything, it was a lot more concentrated and most importantly; the sidewalk was a social space. In other words; the social spaces in coffee shops and
restaurants, in Ansan, were located in a, however multiethnic, area which was foremost a commercial area. In contrast, the market was in itself a space where people were open to talk.

Before going to Manila I had already scouted quite a large amount of institutions, places, offices, and centres where I wanted to make observations and interviews. However, after arriving in Manila I quickly found out that it would be harder for me to access these places than I had expected. *The first obstacle*, and perhaps the most concrete obstacle, was that I simply was not wanted. The most clear example of this issue was a Korean education centre, aimed towards preparing migrants pre-departure, which simply did not allow me back after my first day there. *The second obstacle*, which was more of a bottleneck than an obstacle, was that Manila at times felt very inaccessible. On one hand it is a city where the roads are not enough, and for me to travel from one city of Metro Manila to another neighbouring city could take one or even two hours - i.e. I was practically limited to just a part of the city. On the other hand, it is also a city with high social, economical, and political inequality and I could simply not blend in in certain areas. *The third obstacle*, which was also a methodological realisation, was that interviews, which can be a good source of some information, simply did not add much to my *ethnography*. Consequently, I had to rethink the role, or identity, of the informant. At first I had thought of interviewees as informants; in particular those who I had planned to interview and had done so in a structured, or semi-structured, fashion. However, I soon began to realise that ‘the informant’ was a much more diverse role. Here I decided that my definition should be that an informant is a person who knowingly provided me with information to be used in my thesis.

Instead of relying on planned excursions in the field, I embraced being constantly in the field. Having become aware of my close surroundings in Manila, I began to structure my days around hanging out. As is noted by Browne and McBride (2015), ‘hanging out’ is not just an instrument used to gather data but also a “delicate process that plays a crucial role in establishing researcher’s positionality prior to and during fieldwork” (2015: 36). As such, by hanging out the ethnographer can gain trust in sensitive situations. Labour migration being an issue of family relations, personal and family economy, and larger political questions, I often experienced how being ‘trustworthy’ was important when engaging in discussions. Hanging
out, rather than interviewing or being formal in my role as an ethnographer, allowed for me to discuss issues that I and the informants could see as very personal.

James Clifford, in *Routes, travel and translation in the late twentieth century* (1997), developed his perspective on multi-sitedness. Much like Marcus developed his concept of ‘following’ in the field (1995), Clifford shifted from the typical focus on place to a focus on the routes. The critique would not wait long. One year later Clifford Geertz criticised this form of ethnography as a hit-and-run method of acquiring data, suggesting that it is the long term, so-called ‘deep hanging out’, which brings value to a multi-sited ethnography (Geertz 1998). Perhaps a modern variation of participant observation, deep hanging out was first mentioned by Renato Rosaldo as a way of combining the qualities of long-term participant observation with the constant flow of people and places in urban and mobile settings (in Clifford 1997: 57). In my thesis I take the routes into account. Here more than in most cases, globalisation becomes an methodological issue in which static places do not exist – Thus, neither do spatially specific methods (Gille and Riain 2002: 275). Here, the ethnographer’s dilemma becomes the rather existential when we have to decide if we follow things or people (as two of many ‘things’ suggested by Marcus 1995). In reality, I argue , there is a fluidity between the two that is anchored in the relationship between the people we follow and the things they use; the thing as a medium between people (Latour 2005). Thus, my understanding of ‘global connections’ lies not in the distance between ‘here-and-there’ but in a glocal setting where transnational communication is ‘followed’ through objects, humans, and abstract things, which in turn might be local.

As time passed by I had both started to narrow down the places where I made my observations, and I had broaden the area in which these places where found. Traveling within Manila can be somewhat confusing and frustrating. With the exception of two overused light train rail transit lines (the LRT), and so-called jeepneys, WWII era jeeps left behind by the Americans which are now covered in kitsch decorations and run on elaborate DIY solutions, there are not many options for public transport. When the time I spent traveling increased, I also increasingly found myself in the backseat of air conditioned cars - two hours a day in the smog and heat of Manila traffic was simply unbearable in the long run.
During the fieldwork in Manila a simple commute, even within Makati city where I lived, would typically last around 45-60 minutes. Although some of the drivers remained unknown to me, most were very keen on knowing more about me and my stay in Manila. Having read about walking in the field, it occurred to me that I was now driving in the field. Most, if not all, of these drivers had a personal connection to migration and were happy to discuss their feelings and relationship to the phenomena. Further - their narratives were often placed in relation to our surroundings; ‘family members of migrants invest their remittances in these condos’ or ‘my brother could help finance this car after working abroad’. But most of all, they could place the place and migration in relation to social and political struggles, opportunities, and actualities. By moving through the field with an informant, through mundane details and stories, as described by Jo Lee and Tim Ingold (2007), a city or neighbourhood comes to life through the informants biographical accounts.

After I had returned from my fieldwork in Manila, I had to battle the familiar feeling of ‘should have done that-could have done that,’ as well as feelings of ‘if I could have only done that for longer’. Although I don’t consider my fieldwork a failure in any way, many lessons were learned. Seeing that this fieldwork was the first substantial fieldwork I had ever conducted, I took some of these lessons with me into my second field, Seoul. Going ‘into the field’ involves a displacement of the ethnographer, creating an intellectual distance to the people or places observed (Clifford 1997). Simultaneously, an ethnographer is also striving towards an emic understanding which comes not only from extended fieldwork, but also from language studies, knowing the history, and understanding basic social structures. To observe, one must be able to tell the difference between a twitch and a wink, identical movements with different meaning (Geertz 1973). For me, having lived in Korea before, and also doing my second fieldwork over a much longer period of time than in Manila, I found that this basic understanding of Korea made entering the field much easier.

Unlike Manila, observing ‘migrant culture’ wasn’t as readily available - mostly because many areas of Seoul are homogenous and/or have no strong migrant presence - thus I limited my fieldwork to two practices; (i) the situated participant observation and (ii) the situated observation, or hanging out as described above. The first category took place in Filipino community locales, i.e. churches, which is how attending church became a method in
itself. Although these are religious institutions, in direct connection to most of the churches are many profane elements, e.g. markets and social group meetings. I would also argue that since religion is such a basic component of the Filipino way of life, the religious element diminished. However natural religion was to my informants, equally unnatural was my relationship with God. In hindsighted self-reflection, I now realise that it took at least a month or so until my background stopped clouding my judgement. Unlike the observations done within churches, in the borderless village in Ansan I could move within certain framework and borders without being subjected to being the guest, in other words I did not have to distance myself by being the interviewer or the newcomer. I do not know, however, if my western background made me stand out as a foreigner amongst other types of foreigners, who often come from other parts of Asia and Eastern Europe, or if my presence was conceived as that of just another foreigner.

Methodologically speaking I separated my Ansan field site into two categories, both found within as well as surrounding the block mentioned above; the public and the private. The public were the many institutions and people which I could interact with in the same matter as anyone else; in other words the restaurants, stores, culture centres, and information offices etc. The private, on the other hand, I found to be much harder to penetrate, and I am not sure if I did so enough to share narratives with enough certainty that these were not just situational occurrences. As mentioned above, the distinction between who was and who was not an informant was made by introducing people in the field to my thesis and field work. As such, my pool of informants became very diverse and stretches from people visiting markets to people working in restaurants and churches.

Situating the Thesis in Anthropological Theory

Urban and transnational at its core, this thesis is situated within the larger anthropological discourses on urban communities, transnationalism, globalisation, and multiculturalism. Further - the thesis connects the urban and the transnational with the
political, at times taking a biopolitical position. Urban anthropology, described by Ulf Hannerz as a break from the ‘agoraphobic’ anthropology of the first half of the 20th century (Hannerz 1980), emerged during the 1960s and was partly criticized (Fox 1973) and partly seen as a future well-established sub-discipline of anthropology. During the 1960s, e.g. in the works of Mumford (1968) and Hannerz (1969), urban anthropologists began to investigate race, ethnicity, poverty, and migration in the urban space. The urban ethnographer’s field situates itself not just within the urban, but also in the transnational networks that connects the urban with the urban and the urban with the rural. Field sites as varied as the Indonesian island and town of Batam, situated in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle (Lindquist 2009), the run-down Chungking Mansions in Hong Kong (Mathews 2011), and the poverty stricken residential areas of Harbin (Cho 2013), connect the dots between the urban, the transnational, the political, and the economy. This development with the anthropological discourse rejuvenates and challenges long held beliefs (although these are always changing) about the local and the global; two seemingly connected yet dichotomised terms.

Transnational communities has over the last couple of decades developed into a prime target of research within anthropology. Connections were made between the local and the global, the local to the post-colonial, to history, to the market, and to migration, which set aside common notions of the closed and dynamic societies often studied in the past (Marcus 1995: 97). Unlike similar developments in related disciplines, anthropology has approached the global macro-level through the local, finding transnational connections in what have been seen as isolated villages or communities (Friedmann 1994; Hannerz 1996). Further - transnational perspectives on communities have approached communities as relative in relation place. In *Flexible Citizenship, The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (1999) Aihwa Ong explores how global markets and the flow of people, images, and ideas, allows for a transnational Chinese community to whom citizenship, participation, and belonging is increasingly spatially relative. Another focus of transnational studies is the transnational family, and the issues related to families’ social reproduction and economic strategies (Yeoh, Huang and Lam 2005).
In *Flexible Citizenship* Ong develops three critiques against theoretical models on transnational flows; firstly Ong opposes the American centred core-periphery perspective. Secondly Ong suggests that many transnational studies fail to take into account existing power structures, and instead turns to the *imagined*, constructed, and mobile idea of nationality or ethnicity as a primary focus. Lastly Ong criticizes an intellectualist approach in which transnational subjects become part of a political resistance to capitalism. Instead, Ong sees capitalism and the flow of people and of goods as a source of flexible human agency; humans act within, and not as victims who are forced by, structures. Inspired by Ong’s critique of transnational studies, this thesis adopts a concept on *inflexibility*; citizenship as an inflexible marker which both shapes and limits the rational aspects of human agency. The normalisation, through discipline, of migration is a central theme of this thesis. Here, I argue, that power relations between state and citizen condition migration through law, e.g. issuing visas and bilateral labour migration programmes, and forms of discursive and institutionalised suggestions, e.g. education. However, power relations can only steer, or perhaps, limit human agency.

Commonly, migration has been understood through the lens of the nation-state; i.e. whereas mobility within a nation is conceived as normal, mobility across borders has been a regulated exceptionality (Meeus 2012). The regulated, trans-border, migration has typically been divided into a permanent and a temporary category. Whereas the former type was expected to integrate and adopt local cultural models, the latter was expected to, sooner or later, leave. Gaining citizenship, as such, has been conditioned by the ability to integrate (ibid 2012). A consistent feature of labour migration is the idea of a rotating workforce; in other words a rotation of workers doing permanent tasks (Castles 2006). In this thesis I suggests a different approach to the dichotomous permanent/temporary notion of migration. On the one hand there is a temporal element which permeate migrant life in Korea - an intrinsic aspect of time limited visas - on the other hand, there is both a permanent infrastructure built around migrants, as well as a permanent body of migrants. This permanent feature is not, as I would argue, just built to facilitate integration, but is even more so constructed to facilitate interactions with ‘home’ and to strengthen ethnic or immigrant unity.
This thesis looks at discipline as both a term used to describe certain positive personal traits, as well as a theoretical concept to understand the process of internalisation of policies. Internalisation is described as the operation in which external activity is reproduced internally, a “distinguishing feature of human psychology” (Vygotskij 1978: 58). In psychology, internalisation is much debated because the process itself, how something is internalised, is unsettled (Zittoun and Gillespie 2015). In this thesis, internalisation will be used to describe the operation in which an external, in this case political, idea is transformed into a interpsychological norm. Here I argue that a Foucauldian understanding of state-individual power relations can help to describe how migration has become norm. The concept of ‘discipline’, as it was developed in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1991), describes the mechanisms in which control of citizens, distinctive of modern power, functions through institutions. Through surveillance and disciplinary control, a dispositif of institutions and discourses, norms are imposed and normalised.

In this thesis, the construction of a dispositif of migration is linked to a society which, in the case of the Philippines, has either built educational, economic, and social institutions which serve to monitor migration. Consequently, political power is used to construct a physical infrastructure allowing for the creation of migrants and the ‘import’ of remittances, on the one hand, and transnational families and integration of migration into the common national narratives. In Korea, the dispositif of migration is looked at through the construction of ethnic enclaves and multicultural areas which dictates and contain life as a migrant.

Migration as a culture, or the normalisation and internalisation of migration, is connected to the motivations to migrate. In this thesis I will look at both the gain and exchange of economic capital, and the gain and exchange of social capital. Social capital is, in the thesis, seen as an instrumental (see Bourdieu 1977) factor which conditions more than anything the role of the migrant in connection to others (see Putnam 1995); i.e. social capital can be gained through migrating, which is seen as being well-adjusted, on the one hand. On the other hand, social capital is used to create security while abroad.

The construction and management of immigrant communities is conditioned by the discursive formation on multiculturalism. The ‘multicultural ideology’ is often described as an ideology which strives towards inclusion regardless of background, and that the ensuing diversity is of value. However – the meaning of multiculturalism is highly relative. For
example; In a comparative study on multiculturalism comparing Canada and Spain (see Urbiola et al. 2017), the varying historical and current constructions of national identity conditioned said countries’ multicultural ideologies. In other cases, multiculturalism preceded the construction of the term; e.g. Singapore, where Chinese, Malays and Indians are considered ‘founding races’. Thus – the ‘multi-element’ in multicultural refers not to multi-ethnic inclusion, but inclusion of non-founding races (Lian 2016). In Korea, where multiculturalism is a relatively new concept, racial inclusion is discussed using the term *damunhwa*, which is used mostly to refer to multicultural families. As such, *damunhwa* has received criticism for only including some elements of ethnic diversity. To account for the dialectic between multiculturalism and national identity, this thesis will develop a connection between *damunhwa* and Korean nationalism. It is, therefore, important that the reader understands that *damunhwa*, like multiculturalism elsewhere, is not a subjective term. I.e. multiculturalism must be understood as an ideology which is used to meet different ends in different places and different times. To exemplify; the notion of socialism has carried a different meaning to the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Sweden compared to the Workers’ Party of North Korea.

Ansan borderless village, and in the future perhaps also the Filipino market, has been given an official status of multiculturalism. As such, multiculturalism becomes a policy which is practiced through spatial planning.

The relationship *between* the city and the migrant highlights how migrant communities are constructed, structured, and contained, which also links to how *damunhwa* and Korean nationalism conditions the experience of being a migrant. The ethnic enclave – argued to be a consequence of a dual economy; a primary and secondary labour market (Portes 1981) – manifests divisions, power relations and highlights the role of migrant workers in Korea. When indicating globalisation, this thesis aims to describe how social, economic, political, cultural processes transcend the locations where they take place. The global-local, or glocal, perspective describes the connections between locations – the flow of phenomenas cross borders – and enables cross-scale and cross-spatial analysis of global thinking in the local area (Lindell 2009)
Chapters

This thesis is comprised of five chapters, three of which (chapters 2, 3, and 4) are essays highlighting three different aspects of the study, and two (chapters 1, which you are currently reading, and 5) which introduces and concludes the thesis.

The second chapter discusses the historical background and contemporary settings which has and does dictate the development of labour migration from the Philippines and to Korea. Firstly, this chapter describes how migration became an important political issue; in the Philippines, in Korea, and in relation to globalisation. Here, notions of development, economic growth, and increased global flows of people and goods, is juxtaposed with the creation of new global identities and citizenships. This part highlights how migration, through the metaphor of resource export/import, became a source of income. Secondly, this chapter explores the local reactions, in the Philippines and in Korea, to migration, multiculturalism, and the political and social opportunities, tensions, and issues which has followed in its wake. Here I introduce the role of ethnicity in shaping migrants’ opportunities. Central to this chapter is the relationship between a need and a fear of growing globalism and multiculturalism. Thus - the aim of this chapter is to discuss migration as a resource which has both enabled social and geographical mobility, and as a resource which has been closely controlled and steered to fit the economical needs of two states.

The third chapter introduces Metro Manila, and the emergence of a society in which migration is a constant possibility, for some, and an aspiration, for others. This chapter attempts to answer how globalisation, and the very idea of migration, has become internalised. I explore the idea of a Filipino citizenship in which migration is a source of not just financial means but of social capital and status; where a migrant is a hero, breadwinner, pioneer, (temporary) slave, and a disciplined subject, for better and for worse. Consequently – this chapter aims to explore how Filipino migrants reason and rationalise migration. This chapter also introduces the concept of discipline, transnational families and identities through the social dimensions of remittances. Remittances, as something more than an influx of
capital, is discussed in relationship to transnational familyhood, an inevitable outcome of a large part of the population living abroad. Here, *balikbayan boxes*, duty free parcels sent by labour migrants to their family members back home, are discussed as a way of retaining familyhood over distance. This chapter also discusses the construction of a network of institutions, policies, and discourses which shape the social meaning of migration.

*The fourth chapter* follows the migratory flow from the Philippines to Korea, and the construction of a multicultural neighbourhood; a ‘pioneer village’ in the satellite city of Ansan outside of Seoul. This chapter highlights how migrants act within new multiculturalist policies in Korea; policies which draw migrants while also controlling their presence in Korea. The temporary status of the migrant worker is put in relation to the emerging permanent foreign community - a community which represents a new Korean multiculturalism. Further - this chapter discusses how multiculturalism, as a political policy, has built structures which challenge perceptions of Koreanness and which, thus, becomes a socio-political issue, on one level, and a socio-economic issue on another level.

The *last chapter*, the concluding discussions, aims at making connections between the formation of ‘migration as social capital’ and ‘migration as citizenship’ (as seen in chapter 3), the construction of ethnic enclaves, the temporal aspect of guest workers and multiculturalism, and Korean ‘multiculturalism’ (as seen in chapter 4) with the political construction of a global flow of labour (as seen in chapter 2). I argue that global capitalism and global labour markets are promoted by both the government of Korea and the Philippines, which to some extent is internalised (through social capital, in the Philippines, and through ‘Korean multiculturalism’ in Korea) on the one hand. On the other hand, migration policies are merely a set of limitations and regulations which migrants find themselves within; i.e. the concept of national citizenship is inflexible and limits individuals, yet the global markets offer an increasing flexibility which challenges Korean notions of homogeneity.
Chapter II – A Supply and Demand of Migration

The nature of Manila is transnational. Evident by its environment; Manila bay is a natural harbour where not just Filipinos, but Chinese, Spanish, and American influences have taken their toll. Before the Spaniards arrived during the 16th century, Chinese merchants had discovered this natural harbour; starting a long tradition of Manila being a centre of trade. Here, just north of where the Pasig River flows into the Manila Bay, they built what is referred to as the the earliest example of a Chinatown; Binondo. With the arrival of Magellan, the Spaniards built their very own town just south of Binondo; Intramuros – Henceforth, Manila connected Hispanic America with the whole Asia-Pacific … Staring out towards the bay, one can be forgiven not to notice the Eurasian continent emerge in the distant. Even with the right set of eyes, the horizon disappears into the sea with the curvature of the earth. The Philippines share no borders.

The Korean peninsula is surrounded by three of the most influential empires of our modern age. The Dragon Throne to the west, the Chrysanthemum Throne to the east, the Ivory Throne to the north. As opium and gunboats opened borders to trade in all of East Asia during the 19th century, Korea became a breadbasket buffer zone where power was projected. Perhaps a paradox; what was once a Hermit Kingdom became a battleground for foreign empires, religions, and trade conflicts. That the country one century later, and perhaps as a consequence of said conflicts, once again became an ‘island’ is perhaps yet another paradox. Due to the closed border towards the north, (South) Korea is yet again a country which one does not simply walk into.
This chapter will discuss the emergence of migration as a economic, social and political cornerstone in Philippine everyday life. By following the evolution of labour migration – in the Philippines and Korea – and in particular the transformation of migration as a temporary solution to becoming an ingrained part of Filipino life. In the first part of the chapter, this thesis will explore how the reliance on labour export has created a migration based economy. Further – this part of the thesis examines how the Philippine state through various agencies is expanding labour migration into new markets through the commercialisation and commodification of the Filipino worker. In the second part of the chapter the thesis moves on to describe the rationale behind receiving countries, in this case Korea. Central to this chapter is the dissonance between a resistance to, and need for, labour migration in an era in which Korea has become a country suffering from an advanced country syndrome; i.e. migration as the only thinkable solution to labour shortage. The Philippine-Korean labour flow is, in the third part of the chapter, contextualised through the concepts of globalisation, circular/temporal migration, and citizenship.

Following this model, the central argument made in this chapter is that the financial benefits of exporting labour has led to an intrinsic (over)reliance on migration as a source of income. Further – the nature of the bilateral agreements between Korea and the Philippines places the migrant in a precarious position of dual second-class citizenship. I argue that through the commodification of labour migrants they are metamorphosed from individuals into goods providing a utility; low-cost labour. Following market logic, migration is to that end an issue of supply and demand.

The Human Commodity on the Global Market

About 3% of the world’s population, more than 200 million individuals, are today considered as transnational migrants. (A number which would easily be overshadowed by the amount of internal migrants). Migration is in no way a recent phenomena; the history of human migration starts even earlier than the history of homo sapiens. However – the driving forces behind migration do fluctuate. The constant social phenomena, migration, is
conditioned by its time and place in history. As such – the current migration is a microcosm of our time telling us a larger story of our economy, or politics, and our society.

Global economic integration, neo-liberal politics, capitalism, urbanization, and technological advances (Castles 2013; Green 2011; Kathiravelu 2016) are only some out of a few models used to explain what constitutes and embodies contemporary migration. In today’s world; Dubai is enabled to construct cities in the desert using migrant workers, whilst maintaining a high standard of living for its own citizens. In the U.S., Guatemalan migrants become illegal when crossing the border, yet contribute as an invaluable source of cheap labour in Arizona. In East Asia and Western Europe, migrants are sought after as the population is aging and fertility is at its all-time lowest. Consequently – transnational emigration is driven by economic interests. However – on the other hand, destination country markets are driven by the flexible low-cost labour migrants provide.

The growing consumption of labour and the growing participation of Filipinos, as well as the Philippines, in the process of globalisation has, according to Pauline Gardiner Barber (2004), produced four contradictions. The first is that the public has to care to the social and political issues which are growing in the backwash of the increasing reliance on remittance. The second contradiction is the problem posed by migrants giving care, as caregivers, nurses etc, overseas while being unable to provide care at home. The third contradiction lies in the precarious tie between precious remittances and uncontrollable and ungovernable working conditions abroad. As for the last contradiction, the money acquired by migrants is often ‘lost’ in remittances, leaving the migrants short of seeing the benefits of their hard work. Further – migrant activism and support of future migrants serve to normalise migration as an option; leading to a cyclical migration (Barber 2004: 204).

Rotation, Circulation, and the Dual Citizenship

Although temporary labour contracts are, today, characteristic of an ‘Asian-model’ of labour migration, they can be traced back to European programmes which were active up
until the oil crisis during the early 1970s. So-called guestworkers, under temporary migrant worker programmes (TMWPs), were recruited during the 1940s to sustain the need for labour in Western European nations. Germany, in particular, employed a strategy which involved a high degree of state intervention. The suggestion was to limit the time period and restrict labour migrants’ rights, whilst providing low salaries under poor working conditions; “Germany, like other Western European states, was trying to import labor but not people” (Castles 2006: 742). Although the end of TMWPs is accredited to the oil crisis in 1973, the decline of the programmes was also influenced by the lack of control of the inflow of migrants. As migrants were joined by family members and industries finding themselves more and more reliant on migrants’ labour, the idea of having a ‘rotation’ in the workforce proved impractical (ibid 2006: 743).

The idea of temporal, or circular models of, labour migration spread to Japan during the 1980s. Up until then, Japan had insisted on keeping an ethnic homogeneity in the workforce through optimizing the domestic productivity, building on an idea of distinct Japanese ethnocultural qualities (Tsuda 1999). However – by the late 1980s labour shortage threatened the future of Japanese industries. The dissonance created between the ideology of an ‘unique ethnic quality’ and an unstable and unproductive labour market forced the Japanese state to negotiate a ‘safe’ method of importing labour without threatening the conceived homogeneity. Refusing to formally allowing immigration, the government allowed for (not-so) secret shortcuts into the Japanese labour market. One such group allowed to enter were the nikkeijin, members of the Japanese diaspora, who were thought of as ‘not as desperate’ nor poor as e.g. Asian migrants – thus, they were more likely to return to their home countries (of which Brazil has the largest Japanese diaspora). Hence – the nikkeijin were allowed because of their near-Japanese ethnicity and culture, as well as the perceived anticipation that they would eventually return to their homeland (ibid 1999).

The inclusion or exclusion of migrants based on ethnicity comes down to the general idea of citizenship. Suitably enough; this is clear enough if one compares the two states discussed in this thesis. Philippine citizenship and Filipino ethnicity in comparison to Korean citizenship and ethnicity displays fundamental differences in national belonging, which in turn comes down to the interplay between ethnicity and race. In the Philippines there is a recognition of multiple ethnic groups and tribal groups, as well as a colonial legacy of
division into religious and linguistic groups. Further – Filipinos have been described as either Malay or Austronesian, and large portions of the population have a mixed Spanish and/or Chinese background. In Singapore, Filipinos are considered as belonging to an ‘other’ race, in contrast to Malay or Indian or Chinese etc. However heterogenous, the Philippines have developed a multi racial, cultural, religious, and linguistic ethnicity; the Filipino ethnicity.

In contrast, the Korean ethnicity is far from as fluid. Korean is one of few isolated languages, and the country has a long history of centralised rule with little immigration. The conflation of Korean race and ethnicity means that there is little to no room for inclusion of other ethnicities. As is argued in The Cleanest Race (Myers 2010), Korean identity, in this case North Korean identity, is founded on Japanese fascist ideas about ethnicity and race. I.e. the Korean race is a colonial legacy. The idea of racial purity as a North Korean ideology was created by removing Japanese elements from a Japanese ideology following independence with the agenda of unifying citizens, including those in the South, under a race. Further Myers argue that the North Korean variety of racial identity resonates in the South, which of course shares the same colonial heritage. Here Myers argue that Koreans in the South have supported the North Korean regime due to it being more authentic and Korean. The importance of ethnicity, in this case, is of course multidimensional. However one important issue is trust. Social identity theory tells us that we are more likely to trust those who we see as similar to us (Håkansson and Shöholm 2007). E.g. a homogenous society is likely to have higher levels of trust in general, although they are also less likely to trust outsiders.

The Philippines – The Push Factor

Labour migration, within the Asian region and between continents, saw a significant

---

1 As an example of how diverse this identity really is we may take into account that it includes 175 ethnolinguistic groups, and that genetically many Filipinos are closer to a Malagasy from Madagascar than they are to their mestizo neighbors.

2 Korean has been influenced by Chinese languages and can be written with Chinese characters, hanja. However, it lacks any genealogical relationship to any other language, making it a language isolate (Campbell 2010). There are more speakers of Korean than the other language isolates combined.
growth during the 1970s – a process closely linked to the establishment of diplomatic and political relations with industrialised states throughout the postcolonial world; a consequence of urbanisation, industrialisation, and the ‘green revolution’, the new global economic situation quickly made the agrarian labour market increasingly competitive. A process which was further fueled by the “western penetration through trade, aid and investment [which] created the material means and the cultural capital necessary for migration” (Castles 2000; 105).

The paradigmal shift in Philippine migration policy followed the 1973 oil crisis. To battle the financial crisis then president Ferdinand Marcos envisioned temporary migration as a source of income through remittances (Solomon 2009). Further – migrant labour agreements with the booming oil economies of the Middle-East secured access to oil in exchange for labour. Thus, migrant workers would be integrated into Marcos’s desired export-led growth. Although envisioned as a temporary source of income; labour migration would soon secure itself as a staple of Philippine economy. By the 1980s, the Philippine global labour market had not only grown in size, but it had also become progressively more diversified. With the founding of the the Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) in 1982, the Philippine state would now arrange labour opportunities in more countries filling spots in more line of work (ibid 2009: 286).

As the Marcos presidency continued, allegations of kleptocracy, corruption, and human rights abuses were accompanied by an economy on the brink of devastation (Encinas-Franco 2015: 63). In 1986 people took to the streets under the banner of a People Power Revolution, ousting Marcos and replacing him with Corazon Aquino. Not before long, Aquino developed a new discourse on OFWs, overseas Filipino workers; perhaps most famously, her administration evoked the concept of bagong bayani, referring to the overseas workers as ‘the new national heroes’. While verbalizing the migrant as a hero, the rights of the OFWs would now extend to include exclusive economic and welfare rights. As such it created a new image of transnational citizenship (Rodriguez 2002). The migrant-as-hero discourse, whilst evoking an abstract sense of sacrifice and dignity under less than dignified terms, has since the presidency of Corazon Aquino become a model under which the transnational nature of OFW identity and citizenship has been articulated.
The opportunity to migrate from the Philippines is regulated through the issuance of passports, and is as such a matter of which the state has sovereignty; mobility is authorised. Illegal migrants, of which most have overstayed their visa, account for only a small number of OFWs. In Korea illegal OFWs are estimated to around 10,000, a much smaller number compared to before when the migration flow was under less control. Out of the 6,000 Filipinos leaving the Philippines daily to work abroad, less than 2,000 cases of illegal recruitment is reported each year. This does not mean that illegal migration is not an issue, however it indicates that migration is closely monitored and controlled. The authorisation of migration is mainly done through the issuance of visas. In turn, the visa categories are specific for certain types of employment (Rodriguez 2010: 23). The monitoring of migration can therefore be said to serve two purposes; to enable the type of emigration that is wanted, and to limit the type of migration that is unwanted.

**A Migration based Economy**

*Graph 1. Remittance inflow to the Philippines*

![Graph 1. Remittance inflow to the Philippines](source: tradingeconomics.com; Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (2017))

The growth of Philippine emigration, the increase in OFW’s salaries, as well as the declined value of the Philippine Peso, has made remittances a progressively more important part of the Philippine economy. Further – remittances are a relatively stable source of income and foreign capital, in contrast to the more fluctuating income provided by foreign investment
and/or aid. As is argued by Burgess and Haksar (2005), remittances support balance of payments, smooth income and consumption patterns, and is likely not causing a negative impact on the domestic growth. However – some have likened the reliance on export of labour to a ‘Dutch disease’ (see Dudwick 2010). The so-called Dutch disease is “a situation in which an extra wealth from an export boom—such as a discovery of major resource deposits—leads to a contraction of other tradable activities by giving rise to a real appreciation of the home currency” (Kojo 2014: 2). Hence – whereas remittances provide the local economy with a steady cash inflow, remittances also hamper domestic development. Here Dudwick (2010) argues that migration, used by the state as a tool for development, has led to the Philippines ‘outsourcing’ social development and rights.

Marketing Migrants

The process of creating overseas labour opportunities is closely related to the Philippine state’s diplomatic and economic market interests abroad. The Philippine state, through its agencies, prepare (through e.g. TESDA) and deploy (through brokers and bilateral agreements) migrants into selected markets which are seen as lucrative and easy to manage. However, labour opportunities do not necessarily exist prior to negotiation. Rather, Filipino workers are marketed, as the existence of employment contracts in a specific country is dependent upon a willingness to accept foreign labour. Thus, nestled into government agencies is the concept of marketing workers and creating potential markets in which they can be deployed. In other words; the Philippine state is doing its best at ‘selling’ its labour force to overseas economies.

The Filipino worker is marketed as a diligent, well-educated, hard working, English speaking,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,898,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>679,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>662,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>325,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>232,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>209,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>195,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>139,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>130,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (ROK)</td>
<td>63,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>ca 10,290,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission on Filipinos Overseas (2013)
low-cost, well-adjusted employee. By whitewashing a colonial past and its corresponding suffering; the employer of a Filipino worker can be satisfied knowing that workers from the Philippines have an inherent adaptability, religious piety, and wide range of language and occupational skills etc. (Rodriguez 2010: ). Further, the receiving state is promised a model minority; building on already existing structures and stereotypes about race, the Filipino worker is sold as a future member of the Asian model minority.

The Philippines, as a consequence of time – having been a major exporter of labour for several decades – and effort – marketing itself as an exporter of labour – has now come to a point when they are contacted by future, potential, recipients of labour migrants (Rodriguez 2010: 60). In other words; the Philippines is approached for labour, much like e.g. Saudi Arabia would be approached for oil. Inherently; similar to the need for oil in industrial countries, receiving countries of labour migration are characterised by the discrepancy between wealth and a dysfunctional labour market.

Korea – The Pull Factor

Migration to Korea can roughly be divided into three categories (Oh 2015): (i) Marriage migration; so-called mail-order brides who are predominantly from East, Southeast and Central Asia. (ii) Ethnic Korean migration; Korean citizenship builds not only on one’s place of birth but also on ethnic heritage, a legal principle commonly known as *jus sanguinis*. Thus – the large Korean diaspora in e.g. the former Soviet Union, China, South America, and North America contributes to ‘return’ migration to Korea. However – *jus sanguinis* is extended to all ethnic Koreans, including adoptees and North Koreans. (iii) The third category, and the focus of this thesis, is labour migration.

An aging population, declining fertility, and labour shortage are perhaps the most pressing issues which were addressed by introducing migrants to the Korean labour market (Kim 2009). In turn, participation by Filipino workers on the Korean labour market is motivated by lack of job opportunities at home and Korea’s relatively higher salaries (Suplico-Jeong 2010).

Oh (2009) points towards three main features of labour migration to Korea; Firstly, a migrant’s stay is restricted to the length and conditions of an employment contract. Hence –
Korean migration policy omits potential permanent residency status and family reunion visas. Secondly, migrants are predominantly employed as unskilled workers. Unskilled migration outnumbers skilled migration globally. However – the proportion of unskilled labour is particularly high in Korea. Oh’s third feature of labour migration to Korea is the geographical distribution of country of origin, of which almost nine out of ten migrants come from East or Southeast Asia. This, Oh argues, shows how labour migration flow follows in the same trajectory as Korean foreign economic engagements.

Up until the late 20th century, Korea was a typical labour export country. During the 19th century, initial waves of emigration were focused on Manchuria, the Siberian pacific coast and the Kingdom, later Republic, of Hawaii. Following Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, migration flows followed two general trends; (i) farmers, students, and labourers heading towards mainland Japan, Manchukuo, and other Japanese territories, or (ii) political refugees fleeing to e.g. China, Russia, and the U.S. (Eckert 1990; Yoon 2012). Following independence, Korean migration during the 1950s was profoundly shaped by the devastating Korean War (1950-53), which led to war orphans, Korean military wives of U.S. soldiers, and students seeking their fortune elsewhere (ibid 2012). Since the 1960s, Korean migrants have become increasingly skilled and increasingly competitive, eventually breaking the trend of being a labour export country. Contemporary Korean migrants are diverse in background, occupation, country of destination, as well as ambitions.

The Korean shift from an export of labour to an import of labour started during 1980s. Increased standards of living and a reluctance towards taking industrial 3D (Dirty, Difficult, Dangerous) jobs, and an increasing reliance on higher education producing high skilled professionals led to a labour shortage. Today, Kim Wang Bae (2004) argues, Korea suffers from an ‘advanced country syndrome’, in which labour migration is an unavoidable solution “to acute domestic labour shortages” (Kim 2004: 317).
From Trainees to Employees

During the initial phases of immigration to Korea, workers were predominantly drawn from areas with large concentration of ethnic Koreans. The diaspora which was created during the era of net-emigration from Korea was now seen as a potential source from which to draw labour. Thought of as speaking the language and knowing the culture, ethnic Koreans were considered easy to integrate. This is visible in the statistics, in which ethnic Korean Chinese still make up a majority. Ethnic Koreans – who are not only from China – are treated differently from other labour migrants, and enjoy considerable advantages by having access to the so-called H-2 visa; allowing them multiple entries and free access to the labour market. However, most non-ethnic Korean migrant workers hold the E-9 visa and come from one of seventeen countries who have signed bilateral agreements with Korea (Jun and Ha 2015).

In 2003, there were only 300,000 legal labour migrants residing in Korea, out of which 60,000 were industrial trainees (Lee 2004). The industrial trainee system (ITS) was developed during the early 1990s at the request of local Korean businesses, and allowed for
migrants to participate in training, de facto leading to employment (Hahn and Choi 2006). Proving hard to control, the ITS drew criticism for exploiting migrants and for creating a large population of illegal migrants, who in 2003 were almost as many as the legal migrants. Consequently, the Employment Permit System came to replace ITS, leading to migrants holding the legal status of a worker and not a trainee.

Since the early 2000s, the government has allowed for an ever increasing amount of labour migrants, now numbering over 2,000,000. However – under the bilateral agreements which has designed the E-9 visa, migrants from countries such as the Philippines lack the legal opportunity to stay for more than five years, making their presence in Korea temporal, on an individual level, and rotational, on a societal level.

In the near future, labour migration to Korea will increase. The demographic challenges which created a need for labour migration will most likely not change as fertility rates are low at 1.24 births per woman. Further – as the country is increasingly dependent on temporary labour migration, more permanent solutions will be needed and asked for (Park 2017). However, as the demographic challenge related to labour shortage is battled, another demographic issue arises. The issue of ethnic nationalism and a protectionist labour market strategy will be a problem as Korea becomes more and more ethnically diverse. This will be discussed in depth in the fourth chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 China</td>
<td>1,045,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 United States</td>
<td>150,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Vietnam</td>
<td>144,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Thailand</td>
<td>92,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Philippines</td>
<td>54,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Uzbekistan</td>
<td>53,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Cambodia</td>
<td>45,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Indonesia</td>
<td>42,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Japan</td>
<td>41,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mongolia</td>
<td>35,091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Immigration Service (2016)
Labour migration is based upon the idea of rotation of labour. Philippine-Korean labour migration is constructed so that an employment is temporary – i.e. return is structural – making it impossible for the migrant to gain entry to the host country. This is a type of temporality which not just Korea but also the Philippines are encouraging through their bilateral agreements. On one hand, the Philippines have a need to keep their emigrants tied to their home, ensuring remittances. This will be described in more detail in the following chapter. On the other hand, Korea protects its domestic labour market as well as it keeps the cost of migrant labour down by not allowing migrants to integrate fully into Korea. Further, this strategy means that Korean homogeneity is not infringed on.

As such, the OFW becomes a collective of exchangeable members and a commodity which can be exported and imported. On one hand, the Philippines market its citizens to the world, commodifying them in the process. On the other hand, destination countries require employment contracts to be fashioned so that migrants lack the opportunity to root in their host country. Seen as a threat to the domestic labour market, non-ethnic Koreans (and Japanese) workers are systematically kept from integration. The rotation of imported labour means that the presence of cheap employees is constant. This model is securing the future of a homogenous Korea while, simultaneously, providing the Philippines with remittances. Thus, however individuals are rotated; migrants as a source of income remain uninterrupted.

The temporality of OFW’s life means that the Korean society remains at large inaccessible to them, who instead engage in enclaves, peripheral social communities. Therefore – the concept of ‘home’ carries a sense of duality (Bonifacio 2013); remaining in the middle between a home to which they cannot return, and a new home to which they aren’t allowed access. As a response to the uncertainties created by the migrant labour visa the Seoul-Gyeonggi-Incheon Migrants’ Trade Union3 (MTU) was formed as the first labour union catering to the needs of migrant workers in Korea. Their main goal is to stop the crackdown on illegal labour and to exchange the visas from employment visas to working visas; i.e. to allow for family reunion, the right to change employer, and to allow for longer periods of residency.

---

3 Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Incheon are all different provinces, do, which make up the Seoul metropolitan area.
A paradox, it is the very core of labour migration which is the largest issue that migrant workers experience. The support of labour migrants, by the Philippines, is substantial but seems to be directed towards abuses of the body rather than labour rights issues. The government offers its support through its embassies, using the diplomatic immunity in cases where OFWs are in acute need. The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is a government agency which is assigned with the task of protecting OFWs rights. However, it has been argued that the Philippines urge its emigrants to accept bad conditions and submit to the demands of the employer, rather than using their diplomatic power to press the migrants cases (Rodriguez 2010; Groves and Chang 1999).

Concluding notes

By removing the migrant’s individuality, the bilateral agreements create a trade of, not humans but, labour – as a resource, and as a commodity. This chapter has outlined how local and global markets have conditioned how labour migration has and is structured. It has also introduced some of the social factors which are instrumental in the creation of migration policy. The discussion on supply and demand migration often comes down to whether migration is supply or demand determined, i.e. is it a consequence of demand for labour migrants or are richer countries simply tapping in on a supply. Here I argue that there is a demand for labour migration in Korea, which is experiencing labour shortage. However, there is also a demand in the Philippines, which have developed a dependency on migration as a source of income. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, the supply of migration is in fact created through institutions and normalisation of migration. The supply is a consequence of the demand, but the demand is equally present in both states.
Chapter III – Discipline and Heroes

Ninoy Aquino International Airport – My journey into the field took me more than a day. After three flights – all of which were delayed – and a never ending afternoon in a Hong Kong at its coldest since the 1950s, I was not on my toes … Fieldwork could wait. However, as suitcases started to roll in on the baggage carousel I could not help to notice the magnitude of a phenomena I had previously only encountered in books and articles. Large white boxes were flooding the terminal; these were the famous balikbayan boxes. I could only imagine; my flight had carried panda cookies, chocolate ramen, and three seasons of Giordano apparel. A balikbayan is a repatriate, a returning migrant, and their boxes tell the story of both transnational familyhood and migration policies.

Because a transnational family is a family without physical nearness or intimacy, things are said through things. As I will describe below; the balikbayan box has become a medium which is used to express familyhood cross borders. And as such, it is now integrated into normative views of what a migrant should or should not do.

Navigating the streets of Manila is best described as chaotic, the city being unorganized and fragmented. A city with an infrastructure that is perhaps best described as a jigsaw where the pieces aren’t matching – heavily congested and polluted, arriving on time to any meeting or appointment in Manila turned out to be a challenge on its own. Franz Boas famously (perhaps incorrectly?) pointed to the many words for snow found in the Eskimo-Aleut languages. Snow being something as common to his informants as pollution and corrupt politicians were to mine – snow in their eyes was a great many things (Boas 1911). Regardless of if Boas’s Baffin Island observations were correct or not, I dare to say that there is an endless amount of ways to express ‘being late’ in Manila.
An empathetic adjustment to the nature of transportation in Manila, being late has been translated into being ‘almost on time’. It was in this myriad of people never being on time that I realised the literary meaning of the journey being more important than the destination. This way I ended up in places that I never intended to visit. I met and talked to people who I already had something in common with.

A central argument in this thesis is that movement of people is central to the political and social structures of the Philippines. In the case of my fieldwork, I came to understand that it was not just the mobility of migrants – and let us not forget internal migration, which is also an important issue – but of people in general. The difference, and therefore the importance, is manifested in how efficient the government administers transnational movement, and how inefficiently it deals with internal movement.

Because of the lack of alternative routes Manileños are all stuck on the same roads; some sitting behind private drivers, though most in World War II era jeeps which are flamboyantly rebuilt to serve as a mean of public transportation. Belonging to a category of people who, on the one hand, could afford the comfort of an air-conditioned car but who also, on the other hand, could ‘avoid’ that comfort and travel in so-called jeepneys I soon came to realise that my journeys became just as interesting - if not more so - than the meetings I was trying to attend. Although it is not surprising - around one-tenth of the population of the Philippines are living and working abroad - most if not all Filipinos have a story to tell. Talking to commuters and drivers became a source of information which could not be provided in the more structured and formal environment of offices, schools, and NGOs.

In this chapter I will discuss how migration has become a dominant component in the social, political, and financial structures of the Philippines. The chapter will highlight how migration, as a concept (i), shapes common narratives in Manila, how migration, as a source of capital (ii), shapes private and public finances, and how migration, as a possible future (iii), shapes the educational system.

The central arguments of the chapter is that migration is a source of different variations of capital – thus, it is a source of security, as well as a source of social pressure and anxiety. As a consequence – I argue that migration has become internalised into Filipino culture through self-discipline; i.e. migration is not just a possibility but a civic duty which,
hence, offers not only an increased income or adventure, but a social capital. Likewise – ‘to not migrate’ is a source of anxiety or sense of failure to provide for both family and nation.

Boxed in a Box – Transnational Familyhood

During the Marcos presidency balikbayan became a legal concept. OFWs, and especially returnees, were slowly but progressively granted more rights. Through the Balikbayan programme, returning migrants were allowed to bring two boxes, with a total value of 1000 USD duty free back to the Philippines. This programme was a part of Marcos’s attempt to shift the discourse on migration (Rodriguez 2010). What had previously been seen as a brain drain, at best, was now to become a celebrated act of civic duty ... The exemption from paying tax has since only been growing.

2nd time at Ninoy Aquino International Airport – After a quick visa-run I once again arrived in Manila. Unlike the first time I arrived here, I now had friends in Manila who I cared for. Since my last time, I thought I’d learnt at least something about Filipino traveling etiquette … Having spent hours and weeks talking and reading about boxes and remittances and gifts, it turned out I hadn’t learnt a thing. Participation is harder than it seems.

Pasalubong, a concept closely related to balikbayan (returning), is the gifts you bring back with you from over-seas. A pasalubong does not have to be fancy, it does not even require wrapping, but it is an integral part in acknowledging a relationship. I asked; “what would you think if a balikbayan doesn’t return with gifts?” “A balikbayan without a pasalubong is not a balikbayan … Seriously, I’ll feel pity. I’ll pity that person.”

The Philippines is traditionally seen as following a Hawaiian kinship system; i.e. differentiation between relatives is made based on sex and generation. For example; what would be a cousin in Sweden would be a brother or sister in the Philippines. However, much has happened since Lewis Henry Morgan wrote *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family* (1870) and in contemporary Manila people speak of aunties and cousins (if not because of a shift in the kinship system, it could also be due to Filipinos, and especially
Manileños, use about as many English words as Tagalog or Cebuano etc.), however the family-ties are strong and tend to include the extended family. As such, balikbayan obligations stretch further than the nuclear family.

Family members in the Philippines are economically interdependent and the well being of the kin is valued highly, perhaps higher than that of society at large (Alburo 2005). Clan-like structures are also common.

Migration is a family affair. Ian grew up in the Philippines, but growing up in Manila he saw his family members go back and forth to Japan only to come back to be replaced by another family member going abroad. His mother had already been to Japan before he was born, and her siblings followed suit. Now he has cousins and a sibling living in Japan and plans to join them after his graduation. The situation in the Philippines, he says, isn’t easy. Finding work, although possible, is hard and the salaries are low. However, the main reason for him to move to Japan is because of his connection to the country through his family; ‘I want to know more about [the Japanese] culture’. ‘I know enough about the Philippines … I have been here my entire life’.

He keeps in touch with his family members through social media, but written letters are also used to stay connected. However, boxes and packages have a special meaning ‘because it gives you memories [of the person]’. In his family, a box usually contains a mix of everyday items – kitchen utensils, clothes, and food etc. – and more special items such as gifts. The box is usually sent to the oldest person in the household, who then distributes.
The distribution of remittances can at times become an issue. The remitter sometimes returns to the Philippine, only to realise that his or her money has been lost in futile causes. Before Ella returned to Manila she had been told that the money she had remitted had been wisely invested in a hospitality business, and that there were some savings that had been left untouched. The truth however was that the hotel, which a relative had invested in, was merely a costly hobby, drawing no customers, and that the remaining savings were of an inconsiderable amount. Feeling cheated, Ella now aims to once again move abroad. This time she says that she won’t send cash remittances if it is not absolutely necessary. However, she does not intend to isolate herself. By socialising through sending things, instead of money, she can stay close to her family while avoiding feeling like she’s been duped.

As migration is pulling as much as 10% of the Philippine population abroad, transnational relationships is becoming an increasingly problematic issue. As it is; family separation is not just a problem but also the inevitable consequence of solving the problem of a domestic labour market gone wrong. Maintaining family ties becomes a performativity; how does one continue being a mother? As I will argue below, material exchanges have become an integral part of sustaining relationships. Recognized by the state; remittances allow for migrants to exchange social ties through the exchange of things.

Emotional Remittance
The balikbayan box is a different kind of remittance, a tangible case of transnational familyhood which strengthens not only financial ties, but emotional attachments to the family left behind. In the article *Moralizing emotional remittances* Evangeline O. Katigbak (2015) argues that so-called ‘emotional remittances’ are a key factor in understanding how transnational families maintain family ties throughout overseas sojourns. Daniel Miller (2011) argues that the relationship between OFW mothers and their left-behind children is expressed through a positive notion of debt; *utang na loob*, or “a particular kind of debt (*utang*) that is felt to be deep and interiorised” (Miller 2011: 11). Here Miller argues that by sending the wrong type of remittances or things, i.e. sporadic sums of money, mothers distance themselves from their children and their mutual indebtedness.

The moral frameworks of the Philippines, when applied to migrants, conditions the emotional ties between the overseas worker and the family in the Philippines, whose expectations shape actions of family members abroad (Katigbak 2015). Here – the exchange we know as remittances builds upon a complex set of emotions, such as love and guilt. Arguably; sending material goods is in fact a method of sending emotions – A method of balancing obligations that stem from morals.

Lacking any reasonable method of being physically present; the migrant demonstrate his or her family ties through the transaction of things – Inevitably becoming associated with them. As Latour puts it; to be “realistic about social ties … then we have to accept that the continuity of any course of action will rarely consist of human-to-human connections (for which the basic social skills would be enough anyway) or of object-object connections, but will probably zigzag from one to the other” (Latour 2005: 75).

The exchange of goods and the value of things has of course a long history of receiving attention by anthropologists. From *The Gift* (Mauss 1925) through *Argonauts* (Malinowski 1922) to *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (Baudrillard 1976). That things can have a greater social than material value is once again echoed in the exchange of emotional remittances. That the remitter sees a utility in sending remittances is of course the fundamental mechanic behind remittances being sent. From a utilitarian perspective remittances, or self sacrifice, is not only what labour migrants do but what they ought to do⁴.

⁴ As a side note on Philippine utilitarianism: President Duterte has gotten attention for extra-judicial killings, something he has argued as maximising happiness while minimising suffering.
Provided that we consider remittances to be a form of gift, and that we consider that there is a utility in gifts, we can apply other dimensions than the economic dimension to remitting money; i.e. a social and personal dimension. If applying a social dimension, defined by John F. Sherry as “an individual is obliged to give, to receive, and to reciprocate” (Sherry 1983: 158) we can easily identify the giving and the receiving. Reciprocation, that the pure gift does not exist, needs a closer examination. The reciprocation of remittances has been described by Åkesson (2011) and Carling (2014) as the recognition of the sender’s moral standing; i.e. a form of social capital. The personal dimension of giving is the process in which identity is performed in giving, accepting or denying a gift (Sherry 1983). One example of this would be the gendered dimensions of remitting:

Like in all families; transnational family values, expectations, and actions are gendered. As is described by Clement C. Composano (2012); the sending of balikbayan boxes rearranges women into the “emotional economy of the household” (ibid 2012: 83). Visible in the method of remitting; gendered family norms see women more attached to the idea of ‘emotional’ remittances – e.g. the balikbayan box – than men, who are more likely encouraged, by family and on their own accord, to send money. Whereas separation is an unavoidable consequence of migration, the normative role of a woman as being domestic remains (Madianou & Miller 2011). Through the sending of things, migrants continuously perform roles expected of them as family members.

Migrants and Discipline

In this day and age the labour market of the Philippines has arguably been extended past the conventional national borders. Although it is not the focus of this thesis; the step from the Philippine countryside to the city is less well-arranged than the step from the Philippine city to the foreign one. By providing the necessary educational institutions and diplomatic infrastructures, the Philippines have enabled its citizens to participate in a global labour market. These political initiatives have already been covered in previous chapters – Here, I initiate a discussion about the social development which exists in parallel, and
arguably, feeds the freedom of mobility and action. The rational individual, a *Homo Oeconomicus*, is a neo-liberal archetype used to understand political economy. Homo oeconomicus makes rational, well-calculated, decisions based on a presumed universal human desire to maximise utility. The individual’s preferences are subjective and adaptive (Croitoru 2011). Using a subjective concept of rationality, the homo oeconomicus decisions are shaped in accordance to surrounding factors. Thus adapting to not only freedoms, opportunities and restrictions, but she is also adapting herself to society's definition of value; the thing to maximise.

When humans roam the market they become consumers; entrepreneurs who invest in certificates rather than learning (Foucault 2008:229). Thus – in the neoliberal world order the educational system becomes a commodity, a social phenomena integrated into an economic grid. Following the same trajectory; we can also place remittances in the category of a consumer behavior. The practical implementation of remittances as a source of income is a matter of distribution. A senior advisor working with labour migration who I was talking to referred to this as a shift in consumption, with the migrant’s family as the *new consumers*, it is through family members that remittances can be redistributed to the rest of society.

Eugenio drives a taxicab in Manila. I first met him when I had to get back to my apartment on other side of Makati, and as it was late in the afternoon I knew that the few kilometers we would travel would take at least half an hour. Most people who you meet, not just in Manila or the Philippines, become curious as to why someone has an interest in their society. Eugenio, more than most, became intrigued with my fieldwork, the hero-discourse and remittances, and within 10 minutes he had made himself into an informant. As a young man he began working at a company which specialised in airport pickups and corporate customers. After several years he started to notice a downward spiral with decreasing salaries and worsened working conditions. After having brought this up with the company he felt that he got ostracized, unwelcomed. He wanted to start his own taxicab company but this was nonetheless impossible without a quite substantial investment. Through his family he could secure a loan large enough to purchase his own car; money which came from distant relatives. ‘Without family you have no investment to make,’ he said, while explaining that less than half of his customers were his own; most, including me, found him through a global taxi hailing app. Now he needs to find more money to invest in his business, money which he cannot make while he is dependent on finding customers through the app; ‘there is not
enough money in driving for [the global taxi hailing company] ... [to expand and become self-sufficient] I need to find money elsewhere’. Having been a ‘disciplined worker’, to use his term, this was no longer enough to be able to save up money. As I could see my apartment building closing in informant 4 explained – and I believe he tried to conclude by connecting his story to my thesis, which I had told him about earlier – that migrants might or might not be the new heroes, ‘but doing that takes discipline’. Could it be that the migrant as the new disciplined worker, rather than as the new national hero, is a more accurate description? I took his business card, next time I needed a ride I wouldn’t go through the global taxi provider.

As there are considerable individual financial benefits to gain from either migrating or being related to a migrant, the desire to migrate is highly rational one. However – it is one of my main observations that migration as a choice is not only motivated by economic capital but also of social capital. This value, as I will argue below, comes from a, perhaps ideological, understanding of civic discipline within which the rationality of migration is shaped by biopolitical processes. In other words; living in the realm of institutional authority over knowledge.

Talking to informants in the field (migrants-in-waiting, former migrants and current ones, and also those who did not plan to migrate) the discussion would often, almost always, touch upon the concept of self-discipline. Migrating is a way of showcasing discipline. Sometimes the concept of discipline was purely financial; migration as a way to enable oneself and one’s family to invest in property, education, and so on. However – discipline was more often than not talked about as a way of sacrificing oneself for family and nation, following along the lines of the concept of ‘modern day heroes’ discussed in previous chapters.

The history of migration in the Philippines, of which the economical aspect has been discussed at length in the previous chapter, consists of multiple layers. What I would like to refer to as the social layer of migration, is the aspect which has become integrated into Filipino socialisation and culture starting with the Spanish colonization in 1521 (Salazar 1999).
The first large wave of Filipino migration under president Marcos followed a plan to provide the world with industrial, low skilled workers while alleviating domestic unemployment. While encouraging ‘self-sacrifice’, migrants were promised employment and money (Duaqui 2013). This strategy was deemed as too inefficient, leading to a change of discourse under the presidency of Corazon Aquino. Migrants would now be elevated to the status of modern day heroes – an image consisting of two sides; the migrant was not only a mobile individual in search of social mobility and self-fulfillment, she was also a Filipino hero (Tyner 2004).

What could be described as a cellular discipline, pre-20th century migration redistributed individuals through colonial policies. Although there were numbers of voluntary exiles during this era, their displacement can to a large extent be seen as forced (Salazar 1999). On the other hand – the culture of migration in the 20th and 21th century could be described as an organic discipline, i.e. migration as an internalised, or natural, action. This shift in political usage of power over the subject is perhaps best described by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (1991). Here, Foucault describes how the state’s wielding of power and discipline has evolved from focusing on the body, to attempting to enter the mind. In eighteenth century France, a prisoner could expect his punishment to be directed to his body. Public executions and torture allowed the sovereign to exhibit the power of the state over the prisoner’s body – Thus demonstrating the consequences of deviating from the law. Jumping forward to the nineteenth century punishment now focused on disciplining the prisoner. The prisoner would now be introduced to a set of rules and habits; when, what and how to eat. When to pray. When to sleep. What to think. Instead of charging the body of the prisoner from the outside, by boiling, dunking, cutting, slicing, and burning, he should now discipline himself from the inside. By self-monitoring, always being cautious of his actions, he would internalise the habits forced upon him by the correctional institution.

The subjects internalisation of a political agenda is not only to be found in prisons. In the schools, the factories or the monasteries; Foucault argues that discipline was spread through an architecture and technique in which subjects are monitored and shaped in the name of efficiency (ibid 1991: 146-148).
A Dispositif of Migration

The normalisation of migration can not be understood as a simple internalisation of a discourse, but rather the consequence of a full range of material and immaterial institutions and laws and discourses etc; what Foucault regarded as an apparatus or dispositif, “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault 1980: 194). Discourses, such as the migrant-hero, institutions, such as the educational aspect mentioned below, and legal structures interplay in the politics of the body and the creation of knowledge which dictates a culture of migratory opportunities. The dispositif of migration is a formation which is created at a specific time as a response to an ‘urgent need’ (ibid 1980). It is formed because it has function. A regulative function; the ensemble or formation of ideas can serve to regulate space (Pløger 2008) and mobility (Manderscheid 2014). By perpetuating migration, i.e. re-investing into the infrastructure of migration, through the intertwining of the past, the present, and the future, the dispositif or apparatus of migration connects the socio-political and the economic-political.

The OFW as a modern day hero is as ever present in Manila. The image of Flor Contemplacion, a OFW in Singapore who was accused, tried and executed on murder charges, appears in speech, movies and novels. Guilty or not; Flor represents the ultimate sacrifice, an image which is reproduced by politicians\(^5\). On the one hand, OFW belong to a category of national heroes. On the other hand, they are also put in a position of gratitude towards the Philippines and their country of destination. A constant reality to future migrants, being the grateful model migrant is encouraged by labour brokers and throughout training. There, they are encouraged to be satisfied with applying for jobs for which they are overqualified. Values such as subordination (Barber 2013), diligence, which was particularly

---

\(^5\) I conducted my fieldwork during the political campaigns leading up to the presidential election. The amount of political speeches, voter-politician interaction etc. could have been unproportionate to the five years and six months which lack campaigns.
evident amongst Filipino migrants in Seoul, and discipline are taught and repeated. Fueled by high unemployment rate amongst professionals in the Philippines, workers on the global labour market will accept their deskilling and downward mobility. Hence – the opportunities provided through the construction of an infrastructure of migration leaves a recent college graduate with few options but to subordinate to the habits demanded by them.

Even though Ian – who has many family members living in Japan – has a college degree, he is worried about navigating the Philippine labour market; he says that “there’s more opportunity of work out of the country … “. What he means by that, however, is not that there are more opportunities to work in his field abroad. He does not talk about migrating as a professional nor does he refer to ‘elite’ types of migration. Rather, he pictures himself having a low-skilled job; a picture which he paints as positive.

That labour migration has two sides is something which is illustrated here. As some tell me about the hardship of working in the industrial or caregiving industries, others talk to me about these jobs as opportunities; where ‘good is rewarded,’ to quote a former labour recruiter.

Creating Migrants – Refining the Filipino Worker

In the previous chapter I introduced the concept of marketing the Filipino worker. Here I will introduce the idea of the Filipino worker being refined by looking at the Philippine education system. A refining is the process in which an object is purified and/or improved; e.g. crude oil is refined in order to create benzene. This process is done in a refinery; a facility designed to convert raw material into a product of higher value. The education system introduces sets of habits, it is designed to answer to certain needs, and it can enable or hinder certain paths. The power of influence of the education system makes into a crucial institution in shaping the future labour force. In the Lockean tradition and the idea of the *tabula rasa*, the human as a blank slate, Locke argues that education is the pen filling out
the blank; "When he has grown up, it is too late to begin to use him to it; it must be got early, and by degrees" (Locke 1693: §9). Nietzsche described the educational system as utility minded, tricking the masses into believing that they are educated. Culture, in so far that it is even allowed in the education system, is only mentioned pending on it being a source of income (Nietzsche 2014). Others, e.g. Dewey (Dewey 1916; Hansen 2006), argued that education should be planned with the individual student in mind and be used as a democratic tool. Learning was to Dewey an active task. In an almost polemic manner, Dewey criticised the heritage of Plato who, Dewey argues, failed to notice students as anything but members of rigid classes, passively absorbing information.

Education plays a critical role in creating cultural and political identities (Lall and Vickers 2008); reproducing values in the nexus between ideology and socialisation. As is argued by Martha Caddell (in Bénéï 2005); the school becomes a space for mobilising political support. The school plays an active agent in creating, or constructing, citizenship by legitimising narratives and ideologies. Thus, the school is a place where culture is normalised and, as argued by Ernest Gellner, hegemonized (Eriksen 2007). Below I will demonstrate that the Philippine education system has developed strategies vis-a-vis labour migration. Here – Nietzsche’s critique of an utility approach to education, shaping citizens for the labour market, looms, with an approach to learning fitted for a global labour market.

Teaching How to Become a Migrant

Adrian dreams of Korea. As a recent graduate who is submerged in Hallyu, the Korean culture wave consisting of K-pop and K-dramas, Adrian is not the type of labour migrant you would first come to think of. It is not money, nor employment, that pushes him towards Korea, but popular culture. Because of the destination, rather than the occupation, being of interest to him he has started to take classes in Korean, aiming towards passing the EPS-TOPIK (employment permit system - test of proficiency in Korean), without knowing much about potential future employers. Although he would have rather been able to study than work in Korea, he tells me about a new labour exchange programme between the Philippines and Korea which would make it easier for him to get a foot in the door. The
programme, in which labour brokers are bypassed, is purely managed by the two
governments and admission is based on reaching basic requirement, of which the TOPIK
result is mandatory. That the potential employment would be far more simple than any job he
could get in Manila does not seem to bother him. As such, social mobility and spatial
mobility intersect, and one can compromise between the two.

In between what is commonly known as downtown Makati, the financial centre of
Manila, and the Fort, a large and newly built area fashioned on a former American army base
by the Ayala corporation, narrow streets are arched by highways heading towards the Pasig
river, luxury housing mixed with modest three storey apartment buildings. Standing in one
street corner, one could get the impression that we are in a middle class area with quiet streets
and only a few businesses. However, if you turn a corner and walk to the next intersection
you arrive in the midst of offices – skyscrapers appearing in the near distant. Then you turn
another corner and you realise that in almost any Makati neighbourhood one would not have
to look far before finding schools teaching most imaginable languages.

Through further education nurses, doctors, and engineers, broaden their potential
labour market by making themselves eligible for an international labour market. A
consequence of labour shortage at home; it is not ‘being’ a nurse, or a doctor, or a highly
skilled factory worker, that matters – it is to implement their knowledge to access a global
labour market. The global labour market is a target even before these language students get
their degree. As labour migration gets increasingly formalised, with receiving governments
standardising requirements for labour visas, education is one of the most important issues in
enabling global migration. Much like a visa proves freedom of movement, education is
needed in proving, or certifying, skills and competence. Thus – a sound educational system is
in the interest of both the state and individuals, and is as such also of importance to the
private market which aims at making education, training, and certification into a source of
income.

In 2012 the Philippine education system was reformed into a K-12 system. In other
words; the basic education starts at kindergarten level which is then followed by twelve years
of primary and secondary education. This system is an adaption of a standard international
templet found in e.g. the United States, Canada, Korea and so on. In addition to the primary
and secondary schooling, the Philippines offer the conventional types of higher education; i.e.
university degrees and professional diplomas. Of importance to the migration infrastructure is the education offered by TESDA, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority and private institutes. Through TESDA, students are offered work-place specific development of skills.

TESDA was established in 1994 with the ambition to include workplaces, labour and government units in developing the skill sets and professionalism of human resources in the Philippines. Through its mandate, the agency works to standardise skill standards (e.g. through certificates) through technical-vocational education and examination. In practice, this means that they can provide specific skills needed on both the labour market of the Philippines and abroad. The courses geared towards future migrants roughly falls into two categories or a combination of both: (i) language skills and/or (ii) vocational skills. One example would be the TESDA LSI, or Language Skills Institute, which offers courses not only in languages, but specific courses created for specific professions; e.g. the six-month "Preparatory Japanese Language and Culture for Nurses and Careworkers".

**E2E – Enrollment to Employment**

Labour migration is often associated with simple, low-skilled jobs – this is a picture which is far too simplistic is an age where specialisation is needed to fare well on the labour market. Catering to a global and specialized market, private institutes in the Philippines offer courses and programmes at senior high school (year 11 and 12 on the k-12 scale) and college levels for students who, as these schools put it, want to be ‘ready for the world’. The E2E system, promising guidance from enrollment to employment, is one such system. By offering a curriculum designed to teach only ‘what matters’, students are offered opportunities to ‘help their families,’ ‘see the world’ and have a stable job and career. This is promised through a four-stage system of education; firstly, a curriculum is established which is up-to-date with the current labour market. Secondly, the institute promises up-to-date campuses and facilities. Thirdly, the students are offered certifications through programs and internships. Lastly, the institute works with domestic and global partners in assisting students with job placements.
To do so, the institute collaborates with international labour brokers who in turn can influence the curriculum to suit their market.

Private language institutes got an important role in preparing prospect migrants pre-departure. These institutes can be found scattered around Manila, some only offering specific language courses whilst others teach multiple languages. The main purpose of the schools is to facilitate language acquisition for future migrants, and in the case of Korean language courses they follow the standard course of learning related to the TOPIK (Test of Proficiency in Korean). Similar to the TESDA courses, the private institutes makes students more employable by providing TOPIK certificates. Unlike at TESDA institutes, I never came across profession-specific courses at private institutes. However, some courses are designed to make certain visa applicants eligible, as in the case with intensive Korean courses devised for spouse visa applications. Again, this service is provided through a certificate of proficiency.

The value of the certificate is the value of authenticity and validity. It is a form of educational capital which can be bought in exchange for access to the global labour market. In the previous chapter I made the analogy between migrant labour and export of commodities. Certification schemes are increasingly important in the trade of commodities, with customers demanding insight into the commodity chain. For example; so-called country-of-origin markings certify that a product is compliant to a certain set of demands. The *Swiss made* marking on a watch, for example, is an effective marketing tool because Switzerland carries with it connotations of quality and luxury. To make sure that the marking keeps this reputation, Swiss authorities as well as local trade organisations ensure that watches are inspected and up to standard. The effect of country-of-origin markings have been examined in places as varied as on the Chinese wine market (Hu, Li, Xie, and Zhou 2008) and the Turkish automobile market (Emre Alper and Mumcu 2007). The findings are that country-of-origin is among the most influential factors in determining customer behavior.

The previous chapter demonstrated that Filipino labour migrants are marketed to the world, which has now led to other countries approaching Philippine authorities looking to import labour. Marketed for their ability and skill, the certification of migrant workers is of importance in upholding the reputation that the Philippines has gained. Here the Philippines actively locate markets, potential areas where migrant workers could be deployed, educate
and certify future migrants, and then market them. For example the ‘Super Maid’ programme designed in 2006, which was created following the assessment that Hong Kong would be increasingly dependent on Filipino maids (Rodriguez 2010: 57). By investing in emergency health care and CPR training, the maids sent to Hong Kong could be certified and marketed as being ‘super maids’.

**Concluding Notes**

If the previous chapter demonstrated *how* labour migration became important, this chapter describes the process of normalising migration as-an-option; a constant opportunity and quest, and the normalisation of transnational familyhood and citizenship. This model of migration policy can be divided into three parts. (i) The Philippine has adapted its educational system to produce and reproduce migrants. Through the reconstruction of the educational system, Filipino workers become more attractive on the global labour market. Education is structured so to fit existing demands abroad; i.e. a standardised K12 system, visa-centered language education, and professional courses designed with specific destination countries in mind. Of note is that this curriculum is designed in collaboration with private labour brokers, who at the end of the course promise employment abroad. (ii) Through a political discourse, internalised through repetition and state-individual power relations, migration has become a way of achieving social capital. (iii) The Philippines have normalised the transnational family through tax exemptions and the convenience of the *balikbayan box*; enabling emotional attachment and social interaction between migrant and family members in the Philippines.
Chapter IV – A Korean Multiculturalism

Korea is at war. When I was eighteen I received a letter from the Swedish Armed Forces regarding my conscription, becoming the last of many generations of young men being called to serve in the Swedish army. Attached to the letter was a survey asking general questions about my health and suitability, I wanted to be rebellious and refused to answer their questions. After being told that my rebellion could end up with me in jail, I answered the questions … That is where my military service ended; for Korean men, avoiding the military service leads to prison and a life paved with shame. A handicap in every job interview they will ever attend. However, there are uncertainties as to who is considered Korean; who has to fulfill their duty as a Korean man?

Jasmine Lee is arguably the non-Korean immigrant who has reached the highest in Korean society. Born in the Philippines, Lee married a Korean man and moved to Korea in the 1990s. In 2012, she became the first non-Korean representative in the National Assembly. However – this story is not about Jasmine Lee but her son. What Lee Seung Gun is doing now was recently something impossible. As a Korean with a non-Korean parent, Lee is among the first multicultural children to serve in the Korean armed forces. Prior to 2011 mixed-race children were seen as unfit for duty. Their loyalty for their country was questioned and, much like the don’t ask, don’t tell-debate, many voices were raised with the concern that the presence of ‘non-Korean looks’ would lower the morale of other soldiers.

The description of migrant life in Korea has often taken on two varying perspectives; a synthetic perspective which evaluates the role of social capital, community access and their networks on the one hand, and a spatial aspect on the other. Arguably, these perspectives are more intertwined than they are not. Why is it that non-industrial foreign workers settle in
industrial towns, and how come my Filipino informants know no other Korean than their pastor. In this chapter I aim to present how migrant life in Korea is dictated, supported, and delimited by a variety of factors, situating migrant life in relation to communities, state, and local actors.

Korea has often been described as a rare example of an ethnically homogenous state. If you choose to believe this or not is perhaps of secondary importance today, because we do know that Korea won’t be homogenous in the future. The steady increase of migrants living in Korea since the late 20th century, although large, is easily overshadowed by the current and future developments in Korea. As has been discussed previously in this thesis, labour migration to Korea began with the advent of industrial complexes. So called 3D jobs had become too dirty, too dangerous, and too difficult for the now relatively rich Korean population, and labourers were sought elsewhere. Towards the very end of the 20th century, through what is often called the feminisation of migration, workers who arrived in Korea increasingly found themselves working outside of the factories, as caregivers, nurses, cleaners etc. As such, the migrant population of Korea has become increasingly diverse and, presumably, this increase has just begun. The Korean government has planned to issue another five million working visas by 2020, and ten more million by 2030.

This chapter will discuss the structure of Filipino migrant life in Seoul, and in particular it will discuss the relationship between the migrant, or the migrant community, and the governments and policies of the Philippines and Korea. By doing so this chapter continues the discussion seen in the previous chapter; highlighting the impact of political structures and how they frame migrants’ lives. Further, or in contrast, this also highlights how larger political structures and ambitions are avoided or ignored.

This chapter is based upon fieldwork done in and around Seoul and it follows the Filipino community in Korea. Some locations are chosen because of their relevance to the Filipino community in particular, some locations are picked because of their high amount of foreign residents. For the first category, most of my fieldwork has taken place in churches. That church meetings are religious comes as no surprise. However, I made no attempts to study the liturgy or theological content. It was important for me to communicate that I had little interest in the actual mass but rather in the social life surrounding it, as I did not want to be accepted on the grounds of me being a potential future member of the denomination. I did
note, however, that regardless of denomination similar topics regarding migrant welfare were raised at all churches. Regarding the social life surrounding church I discuss the Filipino market below; perhaps the foremost example of a social OFW activity which occurs in connection to Sunday mass. The second category of field sites consists of neighbourhoods, and in particular the city of Ansan outside of Seoul. Unlike the market, Ansan is a designated zone of multicultural experiences.

**Foreign Enclaves**

On an ordinary street in Seoul one would not notice that Korea is building its own version of multiculturalism. With the exception of some university areas and U.S. military bases, most of Seoul remains as homogenous as one is always told it is. It is perhaps therefore I couldn’t easily think of anywhere where I could start my fieldwork. I could easily find embassies, migrant workers’ NGOs and Filipino churches online, but where do migrants live, eat, and sleep in a city where they are rarely seen? One hour and twenty minutes by subway, in Ansan, could be one answer - or at least that was the official answer.

The history of Ansan begins with a political package brought forward by President Park Chunghee in the early 1970s. An authoritarian leader, Park ceased support for light industries and directed attention towards the creation of heavy industries, including the steel and shipbuilding industries. After the construction of the Banwal Industrial Complex south of Seoul, Ansan was developed as a residential and commercial district, designed to serve the needs of the industrial workers. Soon thereafter, the growth of the Korean economy and the increase of standard of living led to a labour shortage towards the end of the 20th century. Through government programmes, e.g. the ‘industrial trainee system’ (ITS) which has been discussed previously in this thesis, Korea started to issue 1+2 year visas to foreign workers. As a result, while the workers in the factories were being replaced by foreign workers, the foreign workers also moved into the Ansan apartments once owned by the Korean factory workers.
Ansan, or more precisely a subdivision of the city called Wongok, would soon become one of two stereotypical foreigner areas of Korea. Whereas the other area, Itaewon, is defined by its military and expat community (in other words; western soldiers, English teachers, students, and professionals – Irish pubs and liberated nightlife) Ansan has been given somewhat of a ‘ghetto-reputation’ (by being associated with non-western workers and crime). Itaewon and Ansan may both be foreign enclaves, however, other than that there are not many similarities. Itaewon is located in between the traditional centre of Seoul and the new downtown area Gangnam; famously described by PSY as noble at daytime, crazy at nighttime. Consequently, Itaewon is surrounded by the city, whereas Ansan is located about as far away as one can go on the subway. The reputation of Itaewon and Ansan shares similarities in that they are both connected to crime and violence. However, the violence associated with Itaewon follows a common narrative in which American soldiers cause problems while drinking. This reputation is based upon the area’s past of which only patches remain, which is evident talking to those who have frequented the area since the 1990s. To them, the area was, and perhaps still is, a space in which rigid Korean norms could be avoided. In what many describe as the days ‘before the subway station’; homosexual men could live their ‘weekend life’ at Homo Hill, young women escaped gendered norms, and it
was in Itaewon Muslims built their first Korean mosque. Hence – the reputation of Itaewon as dangerous grew out of fear of ‘the other’, e.g. American soldiers and Muslims, and the ‘internal other’, e.g. liberated women and queers.

In contrast, Ansan has a reputation which is built on more severe crime stories. In 2007, a Korean girl was found dead lying in a station toilet. She had been killed and dismembered by her Chinese boyfriend who was staying illegally in the country. The violent circumstances and the illegality of the murderers stay caused an uproar in the country, and the image of Ansan as violent and dangerous was strengthened in the public discourse. This case catalyzed opinions about foreigners, and Ansan in particular, which already existed in Korea. As early as 2006, before the murder, attempts to change the image of Ansan had already started with the local government deciding to fight the reputation of Ansan as a foreigner ghetto by promoting the so-called multicultural area of Ansan as a ‘borderless village’ with its own ‘multicultural food street’. Further, the local government began to promote and facilitate migrant life in the area through migrant centres, language education and Korean culture programmes. Today, about two-thirds of the population of Wongok-dong (dong being the smallest administrative unit of a city) is non-Korean, and so are many of the area’s businesses.

Ansan and Itaewon are two examples of spatial othering. The process of imagining communities is, here, not only a process of identity politics as a personal quest, but it is also an imagined identity imposed upon foreigners living in Korea. The spatial aspect, or the geographical containment, of an ‘other’ is the consequence of (i) territorial control as a method of national identity formation, (ii) uneven economic geographies, (iii) and the regional ‘other’ as a contrast that can unify the common national identity (Johnson and Coleman 2012). As Itaewon can manage with its reputation as not-just-bad ‘other’, living up to its reputation of Itaewon Freedom, Ansan is only talked about as industrial, dangerous, and multicultural.

Strikingly ironic, few areas in Korea are as easily geographically defined as the ‘borderless village’ in Ansan. After exiting the subway station, one has to cross the southern border of the area (a large road followed by railroad tracks) through a tunnel. To the east and to the north the village is flanked by parks and wall-like structures. To the west of the area runs a highway. Through the center of the neighbourhood runs the so-called ‘multicultural
food street’ which, like most of the area, is dominated by three types of businesses; restaurants, banks, and telecom stores. Some of the stores and banks are local businesses where the working language and clientele is mostly e.g. Chinese, English, Russian, or Vietnamese, but even the major banks and telecom companies specialise in international transfers and calls. Further, certain public spaces, community centres, and information centres have been designed with immigrants in mind. Therefore, the infrastructure of the borderless village is catering towards immigrants through both the public and the private sector.

*Official map of Ansan Multicultural Village Special Zone highlighting the various ethnicities and their restaurants (Bravo Ansan 2016)*

Within the borderless or multicultural village, ethnic enclaves are constructed within what is already an enclave. Restaurants and stores often share buildings or entire blocks with businesses ran by other migrants of the same ethnicity, an ethnicity which they also share with their customers. Perhaps because of my taste in food I often found myself at an intersection between an Uzbeki and Vietnamese part of Wongok. Here, in between two
Vietnamese restaurants, a telecom store offered services in both Russian and Chinese and across the street another one catered to the Vietnamese. I tried to talk to the cashier in the Uzbeki one, however our rather confused conversation held in a mixture of Russian, English, and Korean pointed towards the store’s raison d’etre, the need for services in the languages spoken in the area.

Unlike the regular migrants in Korea, the owners of restaurants and stores enjoy a much less precarious living. The regular foreign worker in Korea is highly dependent on their visa, which limits the type of work they can do and for how long they can stay. In contrast, those who own their own business do not face as many limitations; hence, they are amongst the few long-term migrants living in Korea. As a consequence, some of these enterprises become institutions in Korea, becoming representatives of their community.

The first time I visited Tashkent, not the city, was before I knew that this family owned restaurant operates at several locations in and around Seoul. Serving Central Asian food, I found Tashkent in a small neighbourhood of central Seoul where immigrants from post-Soviet states had gathered in a small Russian speaking enclave. Restaurants, shops, and cafes. Cyrillic writing, cheap vodka and great food if you like kebab and beetroots. Tashkent restaurant quickly became one of my favourite places to dine in Seoul, and when I stumbled across another one in Ansan I had to enter. The young man who worked in the restaurant seemed a bit surprised about me being there. All the other customers were either Uzbeki lone diners or groups of older men, local and foreign (although one might wonder who counts as foreign here), talking, drinking, and sharing food. The first Tashkent I visited was located in a central ethnic enclave, just a short walk from major transportation hubs and popular activities. Hence, it drew a very mixed crowd. In Ansan, being more of an ethnoburb (Hong and Yoon 2014), an ethnic enclave in a distant suburban area, many of the customers were not only locals but also regulars. I asked the waiter – first about the food, out of courtesy, and then – what type of customers they get; ‘most are Uzbeki’, he said, and continued by showing me a shelf with some pamphlets and a collection box. The restaurant was tied to an ethnic social organisation, of which I did not really grasp the entirety of, which collected money to support fellow immigrants from Uzbekistan. The pamphlets, most of which were in Russian, assisted in everything from finding one’s way around Seoul, to finding one’s way back to Uzbekistan, to informing migrants about their rights. Tashkent has become the
gathering place for the many Central Asian immigrants in Seoul. More than a restaurant, it provides a sort of social security as a provider of information, support, employment, and a sense of community for a group which in other parts of the city would be othered.

The modern day ethnic enclaves in Korea is not an recent or new phenomena as it rests upon similar ideas found during the 19th and 20th century. One of the largest enclaves, the Chinatown in the coastal city of Incheon was formed in the second half of the 19th century. Busan, now the second largest city in the country and one of the world’s largest ports, has been the designated site of Japanese communities since the early 15th century.

Although ethnic enclaves have been discussed in relation to migration since the 1960s, it was not until the 80s that the concept of enclaves became truly theorized through the works of Alejandro Portes (1981; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Manning 1985). Portes saw the ethnic enclave as a continuation of the ‘dual economy’, i.e. the division of the economy into a primary labour market and a secondary labour market. This theory suggests that advanced capitalist societies have a primary market where wages are high and working conditions decent. On the other hand, the secondary market is much less stable, have high turnover rates, and is lacking in opportunities for the workers. Due to the need for unskilled labour, the secondary labour market draws workers from peripheral segments, e.g. immigrants or women (Sanders and Nee 1987). It is in the context of a dual economy that the
ethnic enclave, or the immigrant enclave, becomes an alternative option. The social walls surrounding the primary market and the bad conditions found in the secondary market creates a vacuum within which, as argued by Portes, the enclave offers opportunities for immigrants - here, “[t]he benefits of ethnic enclaves are concrete manifestations of ethnic solidarity” (Xie and Gough 2011: 1296).

Through job offerings, sense of community, and by making the immigrant a part of the norm, ethnic enclaves can provide opportunities. Then again, they also tend to collect and gather social issues relating to the low or peripheral status of immigrants and often lead to increased exploitation and segregation (Johnson 2012). On the one hand, this area offers work and a sense of belonging to those who would otherwise be excluded, on the other hand it also spatially isolates certain groups and their problems, which are often related to lack of documentation and low wages. By the construction of a, in a sense official, multicultural enclave the efforts to facilitate integration in the labour market are more effectively directed to a certain place, just as the issues related to imported labour are isolated to the very same place.

Portes describes the ethnic enclave as an option. An alternative to worse conditions or insurmountable obstacles. However, this does not account for a labour market which is rigidly segregated. When a migrant arrives in Korea, he or she is already on a contract. A typical story, which comes in many shapes and forms, describes how a mistreated worker seeks employment elsewhere only to be deported - not living up to his or her visa requirements. As such, migrant workers exist in a separate labour market, lacking access to either the primary or the secondary one. This division between the native and the foreign is common across the board in Korea, and overcoming the divide is almost impossible. Miscegenation, which is growing in numbers, has resulted in an unavoidable debate on how inclusive the Korean nationality can be - who can become Korean? One such example would be the children born to one Korean and one foreign parent who are reported to face bullying in school and differentiated treatment. Hence - the exclusion of foreign labourers from the primary and secondary labour markets follows a common trajectory in which rigid concepts of ethnicity fails to accommodate a fast growing minority of foreigners in Korea.

The uncompromising Korean concept of ethnicity exists as a problematic obstacle in the, now unavoidable, globalisation process of Korea. As of now, Korea has not had many
issues drawing human labour. But, as mentioned above, Korea needs a lot more workers in the near future which, seemingly, means that more foreigners will have to stay for longer and they, while growing in numbers, would presumably not be happy to be excluded from acts of citizenship. The Korean form of ethnicity has to great extent been part of the development of a Korean nationalism. Korean nationalism has, since liberation from the Japanese empire, been a hegemonic, state imposed ideology (Lee 2012). Developed in relation to anti-colonialism, anti-communism, globalisation, etc. Korean nationalism spread from the elites to the masses through the education system, closely interlinking cultural policies with cultural identity. It served a purpose of mobilising citizens in the rapid development of the country, leaving Koreans with social sacrifices on one hand and the prestige of increasing wealth on the other. The binding factor making the sacrifices worthwhile was the idea of a common bloodline and a common Korean past. The idea of a Korean founding myth especially became a part of the state rhetorics during the rule of Park Chunghee, and it quickly became a part of the collective memory. In 1999, surveys showed that close to 70 percent believed that blood was the most important marker of the Korean nation. This idea also implications outside of the Korean borders, with almost 75 percent in the same survey believed that Korean ancestry is a factor in determining Korean brotherhood, i.e. it includes groups such as Korean-Americans and Korean adoptees. In a later survey this number had been increased to 93 percent (Lee 2012).

The Importance of Blood – Nationalism and Multiculturalism

Without understanding the relationship between Korean citizenship and Korean ethnicity – what we may call a Korean nationalism – it is impossible to understand the role of non-Korean elements in Korean society. In this section of this chapter I will connect the role of Korean nationalism with, what I argue is an, inevitable labour migrant second-class citizenship.

Korean nationalism is for two reasons quite exceptional; firstly, the Korean nation state is homogeneous; i.e. Korea is noted, even in constructivist literature (see Hobsbawm
1990) as a rare example of where ethnic identity and citizenship share a common past. Secondly, it is exceptional due to it being divided. In other words, there are (at least) three types of Korean nationalism; South Korean nationalism, North Korean nationalism, and pan-Korean nationalism. South Korean nationalism founds itself on the principles of gungmin, people of a nation, in which the national identity of Korea is shaped in contrast to external, e.g. Japanese and American, and internal, North Korean, actors (Hart 1999; Kwon 2011). Whereas external actors are described as a threat in South Korean nationalist discourse, North Koreans are discussed as belonging under the umbrella of Koreanness. Connection through belonging to the Korean race, rather than connection to the republic, is the sentiment shared in this discursive formation (Myers 2010). For example; the importance of blood is manifested in how migrants are differentiated based on their ethnic background, i.e. the ethnicization of migration discussed below.

In the west, notions of nationalism is often connected to right wing or authoritarian ideologies. However, nationalism in Korea was shaped by the nation’s history of being colonised and nationalism grew, especially in the diaspora, as a response to Japanese imperialism. Hence – traces of nationalist ideologies and/or historiographies can be found across the political spectrum. The hegemonic, nationalist, view that Koreanness, Korean citizenship, and Korean ‘blood’ are interrelated is one of the most fundamental condition shaping migrants lives.

The ethnicization of migration to Korea frames and highlights some of the most pressing issues of migration policy in Korea. If the Korean labour market is divided into two stratosphere, the migrants’ sphere is equally divided into an ethnic Korean and a non-ethnic Korean part. Here, the Joseonjok, ethnic Korean Chinese, enjoy a higher legal and social status. It has been argued (see Lim 2003; Skrentny et al. 2007) that ethnic Korean migrants pose less of a threat to homogeneity as they are a less disruptive actor on the Korean market. However, Lee et al. (2014) argue that Korean employees sometimes prefer non-ethnic Korean

---

6 In contrast, ethnic identity and the nation state is often said to be a consequence of, rather than a reason for, nationalism; i.e. a construct (see Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983).
7 The Republic of Korea traces its roots to what is commonly known as the Shanghai government, a provisional government in exile.
8 Here I refer to ethnicization of migration, as discussed in the second chapter, as the preference towards immigrants of Korean ethnicity.
9 Joseonjok is one of 56 official ethnicities of China. By far the largest Korean population outside of Korea, the joseonjok is also the largest foreign group residing in Korea. Other large Korean communities include Zainichi or Chosen-jin in Japan and Koryo-saram in the former Soviet states.
employees, who are easier to control. Thus – even when Korean official agencies are promoting Joseonjok employees, Korean employers has been shown to rather hire Chinese and Filipino labour migrants (Kim 2008).

**Damunhwa**

Since the early 2000s, following the rapid growth of the foreign population in Korea, migrants’ NGOs and other agencies have voiced concerns over the manner in which a ‘multi-ethnic’ Korea is discussed and portrayed. Using the term *damunhwa* they created a new discourse on the role of ethnicity and citizenship in Korea. Not before long, the term was adopted by the Korean government, in particular when discussing multicultural families (Jun 2012). Korea was now discussed as a multi-ethnic state and *damunhwa*, as a concept, was evoked by the government as a plea towards Koreans to embrace multiculturalism. However inclusive the meaning of *damunhwa* was intended to be, the application of the term has been criticised for being exclusive. In an interview (Corks 2017), Yiombi Thona, one of few refugees in Korea and professor of human rights and multiculturalism, argue that the official usage of *damunhwa* only includes multicultural families, i.e. families with one (often male) Korean and a foreign spouse. When the concept is evoked, it is in the sense that the foreign wife has to (be given the opportunity to) adopt and integrate into Korean culture. Hence – when *damunhwa*, or multiculturalism, is expressed in Korea it is not used as a parole under which multiple cultures can co-exist side-by-side. Rather – it is an expression of assimilation, the eradication of foreign wives’ culture. In other words; the attempt to create Korean children out of multi-ethnic families.

Korean multiculturalism matters to Filipino labour migrants simply because it does not include them. It is a political discourse directed towards foreign spouses because they, if they integrate, can provide a solution to the declining fertility by producing Korean children. Labour migrants, on the other hand, are a solution to the declining fertility by solving the problem of a labour shortage. As has been the topic of chapter two, migrant workers are

---

10 *Damunhwa* (eng. all culture) is a term which was first used to discuss the cultural differences between North and South Korea following the Cold War. Now it is perhaps best understood as a translation of ‘multiculturalism’. 

64
easier to manage if they are exchangeable. Thus the discourse on multiculturalism doesn’t include them simply because they are not desired as permanent citizens.

Containing Little Manila

The most characteristic part of a society is never the most common parts, but rather the occurrences which differ the most from the observer’s own lifeworld. To me, religion became synonymous with Filipino way of life; not that people are religious, but that religious institutions have absorbed functions which I would usually associate with the state. Therefore, it did not surprise me to find that the function of Tashkent restaurant to the Uzbeki, was something that the Filipino migrants would construct in, and surrounding, churches.

Korea is not a Christian country; however, it has more than a century long history of Christianity being a major religion. Christianity, in the form of Catholicism, Lutheran, Evangelical, and other denominations, makes up about one third of the population of Korea. The spiritual life of Filipinos in Korea is sometimes lived in conjunction with Korean congregational members, and sometimes in churches which are geared towards either international, English speaking, or Filipino, Christians. Either way, the impression I would get from talking to Filipino members of these churches was that a great part of their social life took place here. It was never as easy to be allowed to visit any fieldsite as it was to be allowed to visit Filipino and international churches in Seoul. If the natural, and as welcoming, meeting place for secular (and western) foreigners living in my area was the Canadian bar, the Alley Kat Amber had been replaced by altar wine in other parts of town. At the same time, the welcoming atmosphere put some restraints on my own goal with attending church; to hear about social, not spiritual, issues. The Catholics were – and why this is so I leave to the theologians – in this instance much easier to approach. They were perhaps less welcoming (they seemed indifferent to converting me), but they had a much clearer divide between sacral and social. As a contrast, Protestant denominations tend to integrate religious and civil community. As I will describe below; the Catholics create spaces outside of, but in conjunction to, churches for social gatherings.
Through their religious community, Filipinos living in Seoul can participate in social activities and construct social safety nets. Korean labour unions and labour laws might be intended to protect foreign, and of course domestic, workers. However they often fall short of this purpose. Through second-hand narratives it was hard not to notice a looming presence of labour insecurity; how precarious situations of unemployment and illegality were the consequence of inflexible laws – how someone had to leave because of a employer not filling in papers, or submit to bad conditions in order to keep their employment; sadly, the filling out of papers was sometimes used by employers as a leverage on employees. In these situations ethnic communities become one’s most valuable source of information and security; through information and networking, a safety net which can assist with both tangible and abstract issues is created. Although a fellow migrant couldn’t solve a problem; together, they made up a very knowledgeable body which knew where to go, and who to speak to, if a situation would arise.

Every Sunday a ‘little Manila’ emerges in northern Seoul in the form of stalls selling food, drinks, telephone cards, and more food. Hundreds of Filipinos, if not more, gather here to eat and socialise following Sunday mass in the nearby catholic church. At the market people tell stories about how they finally found the string beans, vinegar or durian (the fruit that god forgot) that they could not find in the Korean markets; ‘once a week I get to feel like I am back home’ a lady buying vegetables told me. The market is more than a place for trade, it is a transnational space where Filipinos deal with, not just tradeable objects but, their food nostalgia. Evoking memories found in the participant's’ sensory biography (Dewey 1922), Filipino food becomes a concrete transnational object to relate to. Always facing eviction; the market is unusually resilient and has become something of a geo-religious-political-cultural battlefield between inhabitants of the area and the market vendors. Here – Filipinos, represented by father Alvin, make their territorial claim. The authorities, however, want to relocate the market and create a new ‘multicultural area’, similar to the Ansan global village.
In Nakwon-dong, the designated host of the new multicultural area, there is fear that the redevelopment could threaten the area’s character. Nakwon-dong, described as ‘the old man’s harbour’, is nestled in between some of Seoul’s more prominent tourist attractions. To the west lies Insadong; a market selling souvenirs and traditional Korean handicrafts. To the south lies Tapgol park with its 15th century pagoda. To the east is the Jongmyo shrine, an UNESCO world heritage. However central the area is, it is also home to the remarkably poor elderly who got caught between modern social welfare and traditional family safety nets. On the sidewalks just north of the park you find elderly men smoking, debating, drinking, and playing baduk. Social issues concerning the elderly are at constant display in Nakwon where old men drink too much and old women known as the bacchus ladies support themselves through prostitution. Trash and vomit, sex trade and passed out ajusshi; this is not the type of area Seoul wants its visitors to come across. Much like the resistance towards the Filipino market, the local authorities looks for ways to reshape Nakwon-dong. Since prostitution is illegal in Korea the bacchus ladies have become the target of police raids. The potential redevelopment of the market and Nakwon-dong targets two unwanted elements of

---

11 Amongst the OECD countries, Korea has the highest amount of elderly people living in poverty (OECD 2017: 236).

12 Commonly known by it’s Japanese name igo or go, baduk is a complex strategical board game.

13 The literal meaning of ajusshi would be akin to ‘uncle’, but the word is used to describe old men in general.
Seoul; it aims to whitewashes poverty amongst the old and to contain the Filipino market within the spatial construction of another multicultural area.

**Redevelopment and Spatial Control**

Through what Foucault refers to as the ‘great confinement’, the construction of built environment is indeed a way of exercising power (Foucault 2006). Beginning with the designing of Seoul as a colonial capital by the Japanese, adjusting the town to a Japanese cultural hegemony (Grunow 2016), the reconstructing following the war and the social redevelopment during the late 20th century, Seoul has been a site of normalisation through architecture. Biopolitics at play in urban planning.

![Several high rise apartment complexes in Seoul. Author: Korean Culture and Information Service (Jeon Han 2012)](image)

“My older brother and his wife live here too … My father still holds financial power, and I am his precious only daughter. As far as I can tell, Sister-in-Law’s situation is similar to
my own. She wants to buy a house and live separately, too” (Pak Wan-sŏ 1974). In Pak Wan-sŏ’s short story *Identical Apartments* Pak demonstrates the rise of materialism in post-war Korea through the new apartment. Pak argues that the redevelopment of villa areas have removed the heterogeneity of families and replaced them with the homogeneity of nuclear family materialism in apartment complexes. The transformation of urban space in Seoul began following the Korean War, which saw the city ruined. During the 1980s, the Joint Redevelopment Programme (JRP) aimed at transforming sub-standard informal housing areas into high-density apartment complexes, leading to a “redevelopment induced gentrification” (Shin 2009). The JRP was essentially a market driven programme supported by the national housing strategy. What Smith (2002) describes as a process in which neoliberal state's urban development strategies favour capitalist production over social reproduction. As a response, some (see Lefebvre 1968) have argued that the *right to the city*, the freedom of the individual inhabitant over his or her area, is a human right which governments should not interfere with. However – the production of social space, like Little Manila or Nakwon-dong, is under threat from the redevelopment schemes of the Seoul government. As is demonstrated by Wu, self-constructed areas become replaced through policy and state action, showcasing the state's power over spatial production (Wu 2016). Here, Wu argues that spatial regulation aims towards maximising profit through ‘neoliberal urbanism’; gentrification in favour of production at the cost of the inhabitants.

### Concluding Notes on Chapter

Filipino labour migrants in Seoul are segregated both by choice and force. The ethnic enclave is supported and promoted on varying levels of government, more so than created by the migrants themselves. However; segregation does lead to some social benefits, and it also makes services needed by migrants more readily available. On the other hand, it isolates non-Koreans from political participation. Further – it is also of note that whatever benefits can be seen in the designated ‘multicultural area’, are also present in the self-made Filipino

---

14 In Korea – 아파트, or *apatu* – an apartment refers to apartment complexes consisting of large amounts of highrises. These highrises are prolific to Korean urban landscapes.

15 In Korea – 빌라, or *billa* – a villa refers to a small residential building of two to five floors. Although technically it consists of apartments, these are not the same as the apartments described above.
market. As discussed in the second chapter and above in this chapter, segregation of migrant workers is systematised through their visa-status and through spatial containment. However, and of note, is the underlying factor of being wrong-blooded. The structural element of ethnic nationalism in Korea conditions policymaking in favour of Korean ethnicity over non-Korean foreigners. Their role is as workers, not as permanent immigrants. If anyone, or more likely anything, Filipino becomes a permanent fixture in Korean society, they are monitored and steered towards manageable areas under the disguise of multiculturalism.
Chapter V – Concluding Discussion

What basketball’s got to do with it

As I was leaving Ansan for the last time I ended up in the same subway car as, what must have been, a small group of foreign basketball players – it was either that or they belonged to the TCI, Tall Club International (yes, it exists). What was just moments earlier, I had talked to people at a cafe in Ansan, most of whom had a year or two left on their contract, after which they’re out. A devoted basketball fan myself, the towering presence of these sportsmen, in contrast to the reality in Ansan, lead me into thinking about the story of Ricardo Ratliffe.

In 2012, Ratliffe didn’t make it in the NBA draft\textsuperscript{16}. Like most who fail to get selected, Ratliffe started to look towards other leagues in other places. That very same year, Ratliffe found himself playing for Ulsan just outside Busan on the southeastern tip of the Korean peninsula. Here, with the Ulsan Hyundai Mobis Phoebus he would become an MVP, winning both domestic and international titles. You might ask: \textit{What has basketball got to do with it?} Soon, his popularity was such that the Korea Basketball Association, in agreement with the Korean Basketball League, turned to the authorities with a plea; could Ratliffe become Korean? Could he represent Korea in international competitions? It is certainly possible; naturalisation of foreign sportsmen is quite common in Korea\textsuperscript{17}.

Ratliffe is the exception that proves the rule. He, unlike other migrants, is considered irreplaceable; an element which Korea benefits from making permanent. In contrast, and which is demonstrated throughout this entire thesis, the migrants in Ansan exist as a permanent group but with replaceable individuals.

\textsuperscript{16} Each year at the end of the NBA season, teams get to select new players from outside the league in what is called the NBA draft.

\textsuperscript{17} For example there are several Canadian-born naturalised players in the Korean men’s national ice hockey team.
Quick summary of research question and purpose

The purpose behind this thesis was to investigate, on different levels, the structuring of Philippine-Korean labour migration. Recognizing a dissonance between the common narrative of migration and what was observed, this thesis set out to explore how the enterprise of low-cost labour is lived and managed. Most importantly – this thesis sought to connect a political discourse with sets of cultural norms. In other words; how did migration as a political project become a personal, internalised issue? Most importantly; why must it be so?

Quick Summary of Chapters and Key Concepts

This thesis follows Philippine labour migration from the economic turmoil in the 1970s to our contemporary, almost hegemonic, culture of labour migration. Here – the chapters of this thesis looks at the relationship between the political and individual, the interdependency between norms and the economy, and the formation of institutions, discourses, laws, and agreements who as a machinery functions to support and facilitate the right type of mobility.

The export of labour has become a prime source of income to the Philippines. As there is an ever increasing demand for cheap labour, the Philippines secure the supply of labour by arranging agreements with soon all states in the world. By collaboration with responding agencies abroad, the internal labour market of the Philippines has opened up and been made global. The motivation behind migrating is a complex issue. As has been indicated in this thesis; the Philippines has developed a rhetoric which has shifted from economic, to social modes of reasoning. The role of discipline and civic duty, through the emotional tie to family and motherland, has trickled down through society. The value of migrating is as such normalised and internalised into Filipino culture.

I have demonstrated the transnational nature of labour migration through a political anthropology which recognizes, and perhaps elevates, the bilateral aspect of the global labour market. Here, in chapter 4, I have demonstrated how ethnic enclaves, under a perceived
doctrine of Korean multiculturalism, act as temporary incubator; enabling the migrant to perform his or her duties as migrants during what is a temporary stay.

The labour migrant is treated as a commodity; refined, marketed, exported and providing remittances in return. To conserve the supply of labour as a resource, Philippine citizens are encouraged to migrate via economic and social incentives. By connecting the act of migrating to an act of heroism, OFWs engage in an act of civic discipline. To further ensure remittances, OFWs find themselves in constant rotation. By design, bilateral labour migration agreements deny labour migrants the possibility to become permanent residents in their destination country. As a structural feature of labour migration, rotation of employees enables the Philippines to uphold the connection between the migrant and their home country, whilst also securing the homogeneity of the Korean labour market.

Findings

The findings of this thesis rests upon the examination of three distinct stages of labour migration, all of which are related through causality. Firstly, there is a cause. On a macro-level, the cause behind a state investing in labour migration is quite easily understood as a project in which remittances are ‘created’, on one hand, and as a project in which issues concerning labour shortage and labour costs are solved by importing cheap labour, on the other hand. However, this is less of a cause and more of an ambition. Thus, if seeking a cause we must assume that the first stage of labour migration is the creation of a body of humans who act within certain frameworks, to solve said issues. Consequently, it is not the construction of labour migration programmes and agreements that cause migration. Neither do they create the type of worker needed in the receiving country. Rather, it is the construction of institutions pushing migration, spatial containment that limits migrants’ freedom, and rigid legal frameworks that cause the labour migration seen today. Here, a dispositif, in a Foucauldian sense, works in a manner in which state power can impose and naturalise certain norms (Foucault 1991); e.g. through education (Lall and Vickers 2008; Bénéï 2005) and the planning of ethnic enclaves which (i) create segregated labour markets (see Portes 1981; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Manning 1985) and containment and control over people (Foucault 2006; Shin 2009).
The second stage of labour migration is seen in the social adoption of political norms, created during the first stage. Remittances are, once again seen from a macro-perspective, the effect, or end result, of labour migration. However, the immediate effect is not remittances. Rather, it is the social reaction to living in a society in which migration is projected by the state as normative. In other words; migration is normalised and internalised into a society through basic societal institutions. This process of normalisation is both interspsychological, i.e. humans adopt to norms imposed in an uneven power relation to the state, and it is also the consequence of an overreliance on labour migration in which other opportunities of individual development are decreased in favour of the opportunity to migrate. In turn, this development model leads to migrating being associated with being a diligent individual which strengthens the image of migration being the choice made by the disciplined and hardworking Filipino. Diligence and subordination (see Barber 2013), through migrant-as-hero discourses (Tyner 2004; Duaqui 2013), leads to self-sacrificing individuals.

The third stage of labour migration is seen in the social and political adaption of the outcome, the effect, of having a substantial part of a state’s citizens living abroad. Here, the habits of migrants are developed in relation to two factors. The first factor, and perhaps it is also the most fundamental aspect of most human interaction, is the connection to family and relatives. The second factor, are the possibilities of interaction granted by the sending and receiving countries of labour migration. Here, expectations of migrants’ actions stay within the possible, i.e. what is allowed. Consequently, labour migrants act within legal frameworks while remaining within family structures. However in this case, the families are transnational and must therefore reconsider expectations of nearness; thus we see the creation of remittances as a new way of social interaction. These remittances are foremost methods of creating and upholding family connections and are not necessarily the type of remittances, namely cash, which the government had expected in the first stage. Thus we see transnational familyhood being lived through things (Latour 2005; Miller 2011; Madianou & Miller 2011).

Thus, labour migration could be seen as a black box in which both states and individuals can transform, increase, and exchange capital. It is a black box in which the input, labour migrants, become an output, remittances and cheap labour. The issue of understanding the role of labour migration is the lack of problematization in our understanding of the transformation of one resource to another. Human resources are not easily exchanged for cash. They are created in a complicated social process.
For those who are in the process of ‘doing’ labour migration, transnationalism is conditioned by (i) inflexible visas, (ii) borders, and (iii) rotational employment policies. In turn, these conditions migrant identities which, consequently, affect migrant lives; on a political level through their Filipino identity, and on an individual level through their identity as members of a family or community. As such, social commitments and civic obligations are intertwined.

*On a civic level:* repatriation is a structural feature of labour migration which strengthens, or even forces, the relationship between the overseas Filipino and the Philippine state. Likewise, the mandatory repatriation is not just enforced by Korean authorities, migrants (and their cultural outputs) are contained in the enclave. In other words, as the Filipino identity is increasingly important, the distance between labour migrants in Korea and Korean society grows, and vice versa.

*On a social level:* remittances have become a structural feature of transnational familyhood. Something, i.e. remittances as a ‘social thing’, which strengthens family bonds; human-to-object, object-to-human (see Latour 2005) but which can also damage social relations (as mentioned by Miller 2011). As such, balikbayan boxes become modes and methods of communicating rather than modes or methods of keeping a transnational family budget. However, as remittances are redistributed through kinship they become vital to family members in the Philippines hoping to secure funds or investments. In other words; remittances are not only social exchanges, but capital managed through the social category of the family.

The infrastructure of labour migration can be understood to be much like any global infrastructure of trade. Labour migration includes packaging, marketing, certifications, and authorisation, and provide an income through the infrastructure within the infrastructure; that of remittances. However migrants are commodified or not does not, after all, indicate that they themselves live as a good. As I have demonstrated in the fourth chapter migrants engage in community building, but are nonetheless also restricted by the doctrine of *dumunghwa*, a politicised multiculturalism. The ethnic enclave is constructed by the Korean state as a form of containment. A storage where the migrant, as a resource, is stored while fulfilling the duties that the Philippine-Korean bilateral agreement stipulates. On the one hand, the ethnic enclave offers the services needed to be able to engage in a transnational familyhood. On the other hand, the ethnic enclave is a spatial containment which segregates Korea from
multicultural Korea. As such this thesis suggests that damunhwa politics are just as much of a restriction as the migrant’s visa status. An institutionalised form of control. Multiculturalism is here used as a tool in containing and steering the life of migrants living in Korea.

Through the findings of this thesis I argue that migration-as-a-culture is naturalised in the Philippines. By exploring the narrative of civic duty and discipline, mobility of humans is put in relation to the motherland and the transnational family. I argue that the concept of labour rotation is of importance not just to Korea, which benefits from the lower income of non-permanent workers, but to the Philippines as well. By not allowing for family reunions, but by allowing for the balikbayan box and tax reductions, the Philippines can ensure that migrants working overseas remain connected to the Philippines. This is the most essential and fundamental aspect of governing a remittance based economy since it ensures that personal development is also a Philippine development. Remittances are of course of no value if they are not sent to, and taxed in, the Philippines.

The task of creating migrants have led to a trajectory which stretches from creating to ‘selling’ human labour. The creation of potential migrants is done through a dispositif of migration, a culture in which migration is a constant options. This has created a willing crowd of future migrants. The prospects are refined through an internationalisation of the primary and secondary education system as well as specific courses targeting those who wish to migrate. In accordance to foreign needs, students are certified to be up to standards. To further facilitate migration institutions also offer labour brokering as a part of the curriculum. The Philippines actively locate markets where Filipino labour is needed. They target the market through marketing and diplomacy. This process is feeding itself, as the educational system is adjusted to match the foreign markets. Where there is a demand, the Philippines supply.

Migration is seemingly an individual quest. The reasons behind migrating are rational and the rationality is only increasing when OFWs rights and opportunities are expanded. However, it is only a rational choice, or even an opportunity, to migrate if it is authorised by the state. The production and expansion of a will-to-migrate puts the Philippines in a precarious situation in which labour, a human resource, could pose issues of which we have seen natural resources produce. The dependence on a human resource for export keeps domestic salaries down, it creates an incentive to not invest in social development, and it puts humans in situations of rights abuse and secondary citizenship status. However, remittances is
still a reliable source of income which is much more resilient than other models of development.

The narrative of this thesis follows the realm of migration from economy, to politics, and into society. Firstly, the thesis situates the role of migration in the global economy. Secondly, it positions how governments manage the supply and demand of transnational labour. Finally, it explains how migration is integrated into Filipino culture and society. By examining the effects of political structures on the choices done by the individual, this thesis can conclude that migration as-a-choice is heavily steered and influenced by subtle, and not so subtle, policies and discursive formations.

Regarding my first research question, seeking the connection between structures and norms, I propose that the answer lies within the normalisation and internalisation of migration. To understand this process, it is crucial that we take into account the dynamics of power relations between state and citizen. As is described in the thesis, Filipinos have what appears to be a rational attitude towards migration which encompases both financial and social reasoning. This manifests itself in the common narrative of migration as a civic duty and, perhaps most importantly, in how migration is described as a personal trait, as a way to showcase discipline. Noticeably – the most valuable source of remitted income comes in the form of hard cash (which is invested and taxed in the Philippines). However, the Philippine state enables, e.g. through the balikbayan box tax-exemption, emotional remittances, which unlike cash can encourage or at least alleviate the burden of transnational familyhood. Through the normalisation of migration, or the creation of a culture of migration, these transnational opportunities settles as normative parts of the social dynamics in the Philippines. The proliferation is what creates a circulation, or rotation, of not only the workforce abroad but amongst the prospective migrants too.

In response to my second research question, why must it be like this?, I point towards an overreliance on migration, and the construction of the Philippines as a source of cheap labour. This question must be answered on two different levels. On the one hand, there are political and economic logics behind labour migration. On the other, labour migrants are motivated by more than just money. Why the Philippines rely on migration as a source of
income is dependent on a complex relationship between the events which define our modern global history; stretching from colonialism, oil crisis, and post-colonial industrialisation to capitalism, neoliberalism, and globalisation. At various points in time different regions have experienced labour shortage. Correspondingly, countries such as the Philippines have suffered from a shortage of employment. The global labour shortage/abundance came of interest to president Marcos who could both increase income and reduce unemployment through labour migration programmes. As the reliance on remittance as income grew, so did the need to produce migrants. By adding a social dimension to the benefits of migrating, the supply of migrants could be increased.

**Epilogue**

When I started writing this thesis I had ideas about the outcome, some of which proved correct and some that proved false. I have, perhaps deliberately, avoided making ideological or moral judgements about labour migration between the Philippines and Korea. However, there are social issues related to migration which we must approach as labour migration is further normalised on a global scale. I approached the field with the assumption that labour migrants are, innately, abused – victims without agency. Although there are issues, their hard work pays of in investments and future opportunities for them and their families. You buy the ticket, take the ride and then return. It is perhaps epicurean, avoiding the politics and taking what is offered. Still, and I believe it is the core of this thesis, that the migrant is not a cynic nor opportunist. To accept the conditions of a foreign worker, more is needed in return than just money. However, you ought not prioritise that which sees you as an option. And like Ricardo Ratcliffe, the migrants in Korea ought to be seen for the individual qualities of which they have. Before then, there is much work to be done in both Korea and the Philippines.

By drawing lines between norms and a globalised modern economy, this thesis contributes to the study of labour migration by avoiding the typical subjective narratives of individual migrants by placing the narratives in a wider cultural and social context, on the one hand, and the generic approach to migration as something which is only driven by financial
reasons, on the other. Following this thesis, I see multiple possibilities towards conducting further research: This study has been limited to labour migrants. A potential field of research would be the marketing, and logic behind marketing, of other categories of migrants. For example; how is the phenomena of foreign wives conditioned by infrastructures, and how are these perceived. Looking at migrants in Korea; there is also a need to situate the relationship between the state and what is often referred to as ‘elite migrants’, as well as migrants from atypical backgrounds. E.g. English teachers and college professors, two such groups which need further scientific attention. Another interesting approach would be towards migrant subjectivities; the resistance to the norms discussed in this thesis.

What will happen now? About one week before finishing this thesis I heard a rumour that Ratliffe will indeed be given a Korean citizenship. The Filipino market, Little Manila, hasn’t gone anywhere, and Ansan is still regarded as unsafe. However more and more seem to appreciate the phở. There will always be places like Little Manila, and there will always be areas like downtown Makati; built on hope and investments. The people will change, the areas will disappear. Yet; as long as there is a market for it, more and more of these places are bound to emerge.
List of References


Barber, P.G. 2013, "'Grateful' subjects: class and capital at the border in Philippine-Canada migration", *Dialectical Anthropology*, vol. 37, no. 3/4, pp. 383-400.


Dudwick, N. 2011, "Migration, citizenship, and the problem of moral hazard", *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 15, no. 3-4, pp. 441-455.

Eckert, C.J. 1990, *Korea old and new: a history*, Published for the Korea Institute, Harvard University by Ilchokak, Cambridge, Mass;Seoul, Korea;.


Jun, E. 2012, ""We have to transform ourselves first”: The ethics of liberal developmentalism and multicultural governance in South Korea", *Focaal*, vol. 2012, no. 64, pp. 99-112.


Lim, T. J. 2002 "The Changing Face of Korea: The Emergence of Korea as a 'Land of Immigration.'" *Korea Society Quarterly* Summer/Fall:16–21.


Locke J. 1693, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, London;


Mathews, G. 2011. *Ghetto at the center of the world: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press


Morgan, Lewis Henry (1997[1870]). *Systems of consanguinity and affinity of the human family*. Lincoln, Neb.: Univ. of Nebraska Press


http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264279087-en


Pak W. 1974 *Identical Apartments*


Rouse, R. 1995, "Thinking through transnationalism - notes on the cultural politics of class relations in the contemporary United-States", *PUBLIC CULTURE*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 353-402.


Suplico-Jeong, L.T. 2010, ""Inday" goes to South Korea: economic causes and consequences of Filipina labor migration to S Korea", *Journal of International Business Research*, vol. 9, no. Sl. 2, pp. 45.


Urbiola, A., Willis, G., Ruiz-Romero, J., Moya, M. & Esses, V. 2017, "Valuing diversity in
Spain and Canada: The role of multicultural ideology in intergroup attitudes and intentions to reduce inequalities", *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS*, vol. 56, pp. 25-38.


Xie, Y. & Gough, M. 2011, "Ethnic Enclaves and the Earnings of Immigrants", *Demography*, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 1293-1315


1. Levin, Ulf: Mayanness Through Time: Challenges to ethnic identity and culture from the past to modernity, June 2005
4. Hajo, Sirin: En länk till Gud i cd-format? Om qawwalimusiken i rorelse och globaliseringskrafter, januari 2005
5. Blum, Rebecca: Service or Violence? Or A Violent Service: A fieldwork based study on change in attitudes towards the use of force within the South African Police Service analysed using the community concept, September 2005
7. Kristek, Gabriela: „We Are New People Now” – Pentecostalism as a means of ethnic continuity and social acceptance among the Wichí of Argentina, September 2005
10. Emilsson, Malin: A Place Made out of Music: An online field study of a forum for record collectors, May 2006
14. Svenfelt, Carina, Going to University, Learning on Campus: On the experiences of being university student and young in today”s Syria, September 2006
17. Rosen, Francisika, At the Crossroads of Subsistence Farming and Development Initiatives: Gender and Organizational Culture among the Ovambos, Namibia, June 2007
18. Lundberg, Arvid, Memory and Imagination of Palestine, December 2007
23. Bergquist, Angela Alcalá, Parallel Perspectives: Children and adolescents in street situation in Colombia – their own views and that of their helpers, January 2010
24. Karlsson, Rebecca, She Walks With a Man: Perception and Practice of Honour Amongst Women in Egypt, June 2010
25. Baruffol, Sofia, Institutionalization and Industrialization of Organic Farming in Sweden and in France: Organic farmers between quest for authenticity and economic sustainability, June 2010
26. Rahbek, Lisa, BIOPOLITICS ON BIRTH: Experiences on Biopolitical use of Biomedicine in the Pregnancy and Birthing Arena. A Case Study from León, Nicaragua, June 2010
27. Andersson, Erika, Israeli Peace Activists; Discourse, Action and Attitudes, September 2010
29. Lindström, Josefine, House of Memories: Tourism and Local Livelihoods on a World Heritage of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, June 2011
32. Thews, Astrid, Imaginations of Egypt and Egyptians in a Private Arabic Language Center in Greater Cairo: Cosmopolitan Imaginations of Others and Selves, September 2011
37. Modin, Maja, “Thank God, Pythagoras was not from Bosnia” A study about the dynamics of categorizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, May 2012
42. Obaid-ur-Rehman, Ethical-Formation of Self In Islamic Discursive Practices Amongst Muslim Youth: An Ethnography of the Uppsala Mosque, June 2013
43. Sanogo, Aïdas, Behind the Scenes: Urban Planning and Resettlement of Displaced People Following the Flooding of the 1st September 2009 in Burkina Faso, September 2013
44. Liggins, Arlena Siobhan, “They Say It Has No Cure”: Illness Narratives of Diabetes Patients in Uganda, September 2013
45. Karcsics, Ann-Marie, “My Friends Are My Safety Net”: Friendship Amongst Young Adults in Sarajevo, Bosnia & Herzegovina, September 2013
46. Baumann, Amelie, OLD AIDS, NEW AIDS: A Study on the Effects of Antiretroviral Treatment on Non-Governmental Support Communities for HIV-Positive People in Germany, September 2013
47. Maurin, Beatrice, “The Filipina is a fighter, a fighter for her rights, a fighter for her freedom to work and freedom to express herself”: An anthropological study about the feminization of migration in the Philippines, June 2014
48. Woldegiorgis, Birhanu Desta, A Blue Print or a Mirage: An Anthropological Study of agricultural and institutional practices, engagements and development discourse in Ethiopia, June 2014

90
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>&quot;It is all about territory&quot;: A study of a segregated group of Roma in Rome, Italy</td>
<td>Provenzano, Fabio</td>
<td>June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>“The way we are speechless doesn’t mean our heads are empty” - an analysis of Rwandan hip-hop and its ambivalences as a youth cultural expression tool in Kigali</td>
<td>Emitsløf, Emma</td>
<td>September 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Male Headship and Gender Equality in Pentecostal Ghana</td>
<td>Källström, Dan</td>
<td>June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>The Beginning of a Redeeming Story in Iceland</td>
<td>Landström, Katarina</td>
<td>June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Accountability, Sovereignty, Friendship: Inter-cultural Encounters in a Ugandan-Swedish Municipal Partnership</td>
<td>Sörner, Sofia</td>
<td>September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Changing food choices in a changing city: Vietnamese youth in contemporary Hanoi</td>
<td>Helmisäari, Tommi</td>
<td>September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>The Rebellion of the Chicken: Self-making, reality (re)writing and lateral struggles in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Caballero, Adelaida</td>
<td>September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Resisting abandonment: an ethnography of oil workers’ resistance to political violence and capital accumulation in rural Colombia</td>
<td>Gómez, Andrés</td>
<td>February 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>“They want to control everything”: discourse and lifestyle in contemporary Turkey</td>
<td>Bädeker, Lars</td>
<td>February 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>of hopes and uncertainties, tactics and futures among Kampalan A-level students</td>
<td>Post, Rosalie A.</td>
<td>February 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>“The proof is in the pudding steak”: Halal food consumption, moral overtones and re-negotiation of categories among Muslim believers in Stockholm County</td>
<td>Campanella, Mariapia Rosa</td>
<td>February 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>adult immigration students’ understanding of the determinants for success in learning Swedish as a second language</td>
<td>McEvoy, Caitlin</td>
<td>February 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>the struggle of the afectadas for a future without debt chains</td>
<td>Azis, Georgios</td>
<td>February 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>a study on the effects of unattainable healthcare and a non-government funded organization in New York City</td>
<td>Garcia, Jennifer</td>
<td>February 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>“Engineers optimize everything” – socialization and control in software development work</td>
<td>Sandberg, Nanna</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>A study about the Making of Coloured Identities in South Africa</td>
<td>Nilsson, Sara</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>A Story of Marginalized Fishing Community in Pakistan</td>
<td>Bilal, Muzammal</td>
<td>August 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>“It’s two things mixed together!” A Baptist missionary nurse and her symbiotic relationship with Ndyuka medicine</td>
<td>van der Bent, Maarten</td>
<td>January 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Between Dark Days and Light Nights: International PhD Students’ Experiences in Uppsala</td>
<td>Mallow, Stefanie</td>
<td>January 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Discourse Surrounding China’s Engagement in Kenya</td>
<td>Ståhlkrantz, Nils</td>
<td>June 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>‘I’m from Barcelona’: Boundaries and Transformations Between Catalan and Spanish Identities</td>
<td>Drew, Liesl</td>
<td>June 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
72. Engberg, Anna, Ecocertifications and quality labels: For whom and why, in the case of Laponia, June 2017
73. Gunnarsson, Malin, Self-care and injury prevention in the Swedish welfare society: An anthropological study on how physical activity and cardio exercise are used to self-care both physically and mentally, October 2017
74. Konde, Patrick, Ra(ce)ising Questions About School: Analyzing Social Structures in a Swedish High School, October 2017
75. Alkarp, Jesper. Establishing a Culture of Migration: The Spatial, Economic, and Social Planning of Philippine-Korean Labour Migration, February 2018