CHINA IN AFRICA: A MODERN STORY OF COLONIZATION?

A case study of China’s engagement in Angola

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ABSTRACT

This study conducts a single descriptive analysis of China’s engagement in Angola and has the purpose of examining if there are any features of Neocolonialism in regards to China’s relationship with Angola from 2000-2017. In doing so, it was required to operationalize Neocolonialism into five main dimensions and use them as sorting tools. These dimensions included factors such as, political interference, economic influence, financial dependence, military appearances, and cultural/educational reinforcement. The material that have been used in this study are academic journals, NGO reports, Chinese ministry press releases, policy papers and various types of other political documents concerning the two countries in question.

The end result based on the established theoretical framework indicate that there are some features of neocolonial tendencies mostly within the economic and financial field of area and that the intensity of these are recognized as being extensive. However, the overall presence of Neocolonialism in Angola is measured as being low as China’s presence in Angola mainly includes only two neocolonial dimensions. Yet, China and Angola’s relationship can today best be understood as being of mutual benefit.

Keywords: China, Africa, Neocolonialism, Angola, Africa Policy, Aid, Resources, Trade
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-African Co-operation</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GRULAC</td>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean Group</td>
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<td>EEG</td>
<td>Eastern European Group</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECI</td>
<td>Economic Complexity Indices</td>
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<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
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<td>R4I</td>
<td>Resources-for-infrastructure</td>
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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

China is today the second largest economy in the world (International Monetary Fund World Economic, 2017). Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms of China’s economic system in 1978 and onwards, the country has lead itself towards market liberation and has undergone great economic growth since then (Huenemann, 2015.) As the Cold War ended in 1991, China became more and more interested in the African continent. They had the desire of becoming Africa’s leading developmental partner by firming up investments and trade with and within different countries in Africa (Tull, 2006:466). Since 1991, there have almost been 900 Chinese companies that have invested in oil wells, farms, factories and retail shops in different parts of Africa (Brautigam, 2009:2). In addition, China decided to create a number of development and aid programs in different parts of Africa. Their foreign policy towards the African continent consists of having an approach that embraces aspects such as mutual partnership, cooperation and mutual benefit. This type of attitude could indicate a win-win situation for both sides, giving them the effect of gaining enormously from this improved interaction (Tull, 2006:466).

However, there has also been in recent years a great amount of articles and officials accusing China of having colonial ambitions in Africa. There has been gasping headlines such as “China Is Africa’s New Colonial Overlord” (International Business time, 2014) and vast articles from the New York Times discussing “Is China the World’s New Colonial Power?” (New York Times, 2017). There have also been scholars in respected and highly ranked research magazines such as “The Diplomat” arguing about “Why Chinese Infrastructure Loans in Africa Represent a Brand-New Type of Neo-colonialism” (The Diplomat, 2017). A German parliamentary state secretary once declared, “Our African partners really have to watch out that they will not be facing a new process of colonization in their relations with China” (Taylor, 2009:2). The former South African president Thabo Mbeki has likewise detected colonial tendencies from China and has many criticized China’s Africa policy. Mbeki once stated, “The potential danger is the emergence of an unequal relationship similar to that which existed in the past between African colonies and the colonial powers. China can not only just come here and dig for raw materials [but] then go away and sell us manufactured goods” (Taylor, 2009:2). Even the former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, whilst in office blamed China of acting out actions of new colonialism in Africa (Bloomberg, 2011). China’s foreign minister Wang Yi did however, respond to these accusations in 2015 whilst in Kenya by denying claims of colonial abuses by stating:
“China absolutely will not take the old path of Western colonists, and we absolutely will not sacrifice Africa’s ecological environment and long-term interests” (Manero, 2017).

According to previous scholarly studies in regards to China-Africa relations, the main factors behind China’s attention in Africa are all based on diplomacy and finances (Taylor, 2004). China’s rapid economic growth and growing middle class have caused the prodigious need for resources. Due to its progression, the country has turned its focus on securing long-term energy supplies. Their search for securing its energy needs such as oil, gas, iron, coal, copper, uranium and other raw materials, as well as having Africa as a market for China’s manufactured goods, has become vigorous for China to sustain and boost its progressive industrial development. These factors are believed to have been the main reasons why China made the decision of turning to Africa in the first place (Dollar, 2016), Albert, 2017).

Usually when discussing a continent like Africa, we would not consider it being a region with a decisive market that has potential much greater than any other modern market production today. In fact, according to an Africa Wealth Cheque Report from 2010, a comprehensive report written by two leading international investment communications and investment groups, Africa Investor (Ai) and The Africa Group (TAG), Africa has an prodigious untapped wealth. It is argued in the report that, “there is no other region in the world with such a vast, open market” and that “a market like this needs just a bit of private investment to get the ball rolling” (The East African, 2010). The report deliberates on Africa having 1.671 trillion dollars of potential wealth and additional production potential in six different key areas: forestry, agriculture, tourism, water, human capital and fisheries. They also mention that Africa has extractable energy resources worth between 13 trillion to 14.5 trillion dollars (Momoh, 2010). With that said, there is no coincidence why China made the decision of turning their focus on the African continent. After all, the China-African trade grew 700% during the 1990’s, revealing their strong and increased relations with each other (Servant, 2005).

When it comes to diplomacy, China perceives Africa as a possible ally in international multilateral forums as well as having allies in the developing world within the context of the international arena (Van der Wath, 2004:75). Scholars claim that giving support to African governments is a tactic that the Chinese government uses to strengthen its soft power abroad (Giry, 2004:22).

There are as previously discussed, a great amount of conflicting opinions regarding China’s presence in Africa. There are those that perceive China’s involvement as a great opportunity for African countries to boost its development and economic growth, especially in productions in
those countries that have a strategic advantage, such as the oil industry in Nigeria or the mining industry in South Africa. (Van der Wath, 2004, Draper, 2006). In fact, since 2000, China has emerged as Africa’s biggest and important trading partner. The value of their trade came up to a total of over 200 billion dollars in 2014 (Manero, 2017) and an extensive number of one million Chinese workers are believed to have immigrated to Africa in recent years, and about 259,000 temporary Chinese migrants have immigrated to Angola, one of China’s biggest trading partners (World Population Review, 2017)

The typical requirements of doing business with China requires African countries to offer big pieces of their natural resources, a factor that not all countries in Africa are willing or pleased in doing so. This can indirectly be a tool for China of choosing to control or influence countries, by altering the behaviour of different African states with different means and thereby “forcing” them to use natural resources as practically the only currency as part of their deals with China. A quote that usually describes China’s method of doing business, given by an anonymous African leader describes China’s methods as: “Their game is clear. They say I'll build you a road, if you give me that mine (Hellström, 2009). In exchange of getting extensive access to African resources, China offers “interest packages” to these countries in form of foreign direct investments, reinforcing their infrastructure, exports cheap manufactured goods and loans out billions of dollars with no strings attached. The no-strings attached approach, which is in plain contrast to the conditions given by western countries, is based on idea that African countries do not have to worry about conditions and factors such as, human rights, labour provisions in trade agreements, democracy or economic stringency in loans (Manero, 2017). An interesting aspect is that China was in fact, the single country that gave more loans and aid to Africa during 2006-2008 than the World Bank (Brautigam, 2009:2).

A consequence based on China’s strategy of doing business is that it can cause identity issues for those African countries that are considered being weak and small in relation to dealing with strong international governments such as China’s. The dynamics behind this is based on the idea of countries that are seen as being weak, often need to comply with the regulations and guidelines of other foreign countries agenda settings, which in return can “force” those weaker states to sacrifice their rights in various matters. This is also one of the reasons why the China-Africa relationship is so difficult to comprehend and why some are blaming China of being a colonizer. Nevertheless, China’s engagement with the African continent has without a doubt led to poverty reduction but also to a faster economic growth throughout the whole region. Although some of
this progress, is likewise due to internal developments where African countries, have reinforced their own macroeconomic policies and political institutions (Dollar, 2016).

Those that fear and perceives China’s economic involvement in Africa as being of great Neo-colonial threat, clarifies that the trade deals between China and different African countries, are often unbalanced where China normally gets to be the big winner in these deals (Taylor, 2004). There is also an issue regarding Chinese manufactured goods that reaches African markets as this has given rise to injuring and shutting down local producers and retailers. The consequence of this progression can be reflected of creating a negative effect on the unemployment rate, but also the labour market (Draper, 2006). This problem has caused frustration amongst the African people where the general attitude towards China’s presence in Africa are based on the argument that, the Chinese are “building walls” around their industries and businesses, making it much more challenging for the local African population to get work in those sectors, even for unqualified positions (Lagerkvist, 2012). This means that Chinese firms are willing to import their labour workers from China rather than employing local labour force. Studies have shown that even those locals that in the end are hired, gets paid a lot less than their Chinese colleagues (Hanauer & Morris, 2014:48). The worrying aspects of having China “knocking out” local businesses are a big issue as African states are by some means, losing territory and control (Hanauer & Morris, 2014).

Other studies, as regards to the China-Africa relations and whether their affiliation and nature of their relationship can be labelled as being of Neo-colonial is as discussed, a complex matter. Another reason why it can be perceived like this has to do with the fact that there are no IR-theories that can decidedly explain the relationship between Africa and China because the activities and actions of China in Africa is per se, not static (Tukumbi, 2011: 258 ). Even though China’s FDI in Africa is slowly increasing, it is not equally spread to all countries in Africa. There are trade-reports that show China is investing in a variety of sectors that is not lacking capital. Many of its investments are in fact, invested in mineral and oil rich countries such as Nigeria, Algeria, Angola and Libya. According to OECD, these countries are also those that receive the most of China’s FDI in the region (Tukumbi, 2011: 255-256).

What has been deliberated so far in the introduction is that the chapter has presented the puzzle with this topic but also explained the overall importance of the global south trade. The relationship between China and Africa is a perfect example of this propensity with reference to international politics. What is going to be discussed in this study is to break apart China’s intentions in Africa. The starting point for this study is therefore to analyse the nature of China’s
relations and presence in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in Angola, based on Diana Haag’s definition and framework of Neo-colonialism. It is against her theoretical framework that the author of this study will evaluate China-Angola relations. **The main aspect of this study is to discover if there are any features of Neocolonialism in China’s relationship with Angola from 2000-2017.** It is vital to understand that it is easier to examine and understand China’s influence when you choose to focus on one specific country instead of focusing on all countries in that particular region i.e. (sub-Sahara). There is unfortunately limited scholarly attention in regards to China’s historical and contemporary relations with Angola and it is therefore important to contribute to this field of studies in anyway as China’s motives in Africa, specifically Angola has acquired much media attention in recent years.

However, there needs to be an understanding of the possibility of not finding any features of Neocolonialism. The way to examine this is to look at different evidence/traces such as various actions, behavior, events, reports, documents, policies, strategies or terms and see if it can fit Neocolonial standards. If it cannot fulfill these standards/dimensions, then there is a possibility that there are no features of Neocolonialism when it comes to China-Angola relations. If we however, find elements that can be linked to Neocolonial standards/dimensions concerning China’s influence in Angola, three out of five neocolonial dimensions must then be fulfilled in order to call China’s actions in Angola for being of Neocolonial nature. There is also the question of studying the intensity of Neocolonialism in the different dimensions. It is the matter of understanding the intensity of these findings by means of being extensive or low.

**1.1 Purpose of the Study**

The main purpose of the study is to explore if there are any features of Neocolonialism regarding China’s relationship with Angola. The aim of this study is therefore to analyze China’s influential power in Angola from 2000-2017.

**1.2. Research Question**

*What features of Neocolonialism exist in China’s relationship with Angola from 2000-2017?*
1.3. Outline of Chapters

The thesis begins with introducing the subject of China-Africa relations followed by presenting the study’s main purpose and research question. Chapter 2 explains the chosen research design, the material that has been collected and how the material has been analysed. There is also a discussion about the limitations of this study and a brief presentation of the main reasons of why the author has chosen to examine Angola. There will also be a discussion about China’s developing country identity. Chapter 3 describes the concept of Neocolonialism and outlines how the Neocolonial framework has been operationalized by introducing its five dimensions. Chapter 4 gives the reader background information followed by, an analysis of China’s engagement in Angola through the notion of Neocolonial aspects in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 ends the thesis with a conclusion and discussion on the study’s main results.
CHAPTER 2

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The chapter begins with deliberating about the chosen research design. The methodology chapter will provide a better understanding of how this study has been conducted and analyzed and at the same time, elaborate about the limitations of the study. This discussion is vital in order to demonstrate the author’s contribution to the research topic.

2.1. Research Design

The study is based on doing a single descriptive case study of Angola were the aim is to analyze and collect data of the issues, practices and policies of China in Angola to determine whether, China’s engagement and practices lead to a win-win situation or if there are any features of Neocolonialism. There is also the question of finding out whether there are elements of Angola becoming more dependent on China. The chosen case should be seen as being a critical case and that the study is characterized as explorative research. A critical case is understood as being the one that allows analytic generalization. Critical cases are understood as, if the theory is not valid for the case, then it will not be valid for any other cases either. It is the characteristics of those specific cases, which mark them as being critical. Critical case sampling is used for the purpose of measuring and finding out if the phenomenon in interest, among other factors/reasons even exists. Eventually, the goal with the critical case approach is to examine the success of the chosen theory in those cases (Patton, 2014). This kind of sampling is useful if you want to explore whether a phenomenon is worth investigating further or not.

The main reasons why Angola should be understood as a critical case is due to several reasons. Angola as well as other countries in Africa, all share the same factors of being highly corrupt states, having large quantity of natural resources, in need of large amount of aid, investments, loans, credits and development, having high rates of unemployment and inequality, being former colonies, in need of better political institutions and being dependent on developed countries.

With that said, if the chosen theory would give the validation of being wrong and unreasonable in regards to Angola, it would then be unlikely that the theory would be true for other countries in Africa as well.

Arguments that are useful to think of in terms of generalizability regarding China’s role are that, China has in the past decades, used a specific Africa policy, which consists of using the same
policy tools and rhetoric towards all countries in Africa. China’s energy needs and their multifaceted strategy in regards of their economic and diplomatic relations with those countries has always been the same and consist of factors such as FDI, loans, credits, investments in various sectors, noninterference in domestic politics, trade, foreign aid and providing debt relief. The other argument is that many countries in Africa share the same circumstances where all of these countries are underdeveloped and in need for all of the mentioned factors above. There is also the aspect of mutual benefit where both Africa and China are benefiting from the south – south relationship. Due to the fact that, a majority of all countries in Africa have something vital to offer in terms of resources that China is in great need for, it is in China’s interest to have a stable and comparable relationship with all of Africa. All of these aspects make it easier for us to understand China’s presence in Angola but also, in other places in Africa.

In terms of understanding case studies, the American political scientist Robert K. Yin defines them as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2013). Case studies are reflected as being a research method that has the aim to analyze specific factors and issues within certain restrictions of a situation, organization or environment. The descriptive angle of this method has the aim of describing, discovering or analyzing different key phenomenon, patterns or impacts of different practices during a certain timeframe (Dudovskiy, 2016). This method can be used for describing behavior or characteristics of a sample you have taken and is also a method that attempts to determine “What is” questions (Ethridge, 2004:24).

Doing a single case study as the author has done, gives us the tools for understanding complex contemporary international relations. There are several reasons for why it is useful of undertaking a single case study for the reason of tackling the critique that exist in regards of China’s involvement in Angola and in other African countries. Single case studies can lead us to reassuring explanations if there is proper evidence available. It is an effective and useful method as it is the intensive study of a single case for the purpose of accomplishing an understanding a larger class of similar units/cases, which in our case can be understood as countries (Gerring, 2013).
2.2. Data Collection

The data collection takes a predominantly qualitative approach where above all, uses secondary data in form of academic literature in form of online journals, academic case studies, NGO reports, individual Chinese ministry press releases, policy papers, political documents and agency websites. The study also utilizes media publication, such as newspaper articles and other related internet articles. It is vital to understand that arguments, facts and opinions in terms of the secondary data, will form a comprehensible understanding and interpretation of the nature of China’s relationship and engagement in Angola.

2.3. Data Discussion

The method used for examining the data is recognized as qualitative content analysis. The benefits of using this type of method is, the author can comprehend the central aspects of his chosen material. This method also provides the benefit of generating high reliability and providing deep insights about the chosen topic. It can also be easier to distinguish certain messages or patterns within the data itself. The author can then analyze these patterns and thereby obtain clear results.

2.4. Limitations

There are several limitations concerning this study. First of all the author has made the decision of focusing on China’s economic, political, financial, cultural/educational and military influences/involvement in one region, i.e. sub-Sahara, concentrating on one African county, i.e. Angola. In doing so, the study can answer the research question based on the chosen theoretical framework and at the same time; provide a clear and deep overview concerning state of affairs within the context of south-south relations.

In terms of the chosen timeframe, the author made the decision of observing the period of 2000-2017. The main reason for this was that the nature and dimension of the international system changed after the ending of communism in Europe and the Cold War. There is also the fact that China’s foreign policy towards Africa changed after establishing the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. Due to this, China’s influence in Angola before 2000, will not be deliberated on in this study.
The nature of the thesis is considered being of qualitative study, which requires the author to interpretive, the available data that exist during the research process. Due to this, there is a possibility of value judgments, biased understanding of different factors or doing a normative analysis of the data. There is also the ability of only using data that are in English. This can influence the study because any valuable extra data or other insights from non-English based sources like for instance, sources in Mandarin or Portuguese are unfortunately, not used in this study. There is also the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China is not always transparent in regards of their actions or reports. There is therefore the general difficulty of gathering information from both China’s and Angola’s government as they do not always officially publish reports or documents made accessible for the public.

2.5. Case Selection

The importance of analyzing a country like Angola is due to several factors. The justification for choosing Angola is due to their economic profile and the fact that the country is seen as one of China’s top debtors and thereby great targets for China’s predatory loans which some claim could lead to Angola becoming a victim of “China’s Neocolonialism”. There has been in recent years a lot of controversy about China’s engagement in Angola as its economy is very much interrelated to China and as China is dependent on Angola in regards to natural resources. Angola is also an interesting country to study in the aspect of that it is in the top five countries including, Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea with the most Chinese workers. These countries are accountable for over 60 % of all Chinese workers in all of Africa, Angola alone being responsible for over 20 % of this (China Africa Research Initiative, 2017)

2.6. China’s Developing Country Identity

There is a great amount of discussion whether China should be seen as either as a developed or as a developing country. The answer to this lies somewhere between these two classifications. Judging by the size of China’s GDP and being the world’s second largest economy, there are those that argue that China is no longer a developing country but a strong economic power. However, as we all know, GDP is only one of several indicators that are connected to our economy (Zhe, 2010). There is also the question of strength. With its increasing power in the world, China now has great amount of influence in many regions, including Africa, Asia, Europa, North America and Latin America. China is becoming the largest trading partner of many nations
including numerous regional powers. There is likewise the fact that the country has adopted and introduced new concepts/unique principles that many say has helped China in its increasing influence in terms of global politics. Many consider that this has to with their security policy and independent diplomacy, as it has never wanted to seek help from any other great power regarding their own security, even during global difficulties. Even during the days of its alliance with the Soviet Union, China wedged with its independent policies and refused requests that could possibly interfere with its international and national affairs (Mengzi, 2011).

The British historian Paul Kennedy states, "China must be judged as a candidate superpower in its own right - not in imitation or emulation of either the Soviet Union or the United States, but as a reflection of Beijing's unique position in global politics" (Kennedy, 1987:457). There is a lot of evidence that justify Kennedy's statement. China has become one of the most central and vital actors in the international arena as they greatly participate in different global summits and other high-level meetings. They have also become members of vital multilateral economic organizations and associations such as BRICS, which is an association of five major emerging national economies including, Russia, India, South Africa and Brazil but also members of The Group of Twenty (G20). G20 is an international forum that gathers the world's 20 leading emerging and advanced economies and is considered being accountably for 85 % of the world's total GDP and two-thirds of the global population (Mustafa, 2017). There are of course many more organizations and associations that China is involved in but the main notion to understand is that they have clearly increased and are increasing their participation in global affairs, thereby having the desire of being perceived as a responsible international actor/regional superpower. After all, ROC was one of the countries that also became a permanent member of the UN Security Council after World War II in 1945 (United Nations Foundation, 2013) which gave them substantial control over international politics. It is therefore safe to say that, there is no doubt, about how great and vital China is within the context of what is labeled as world politics.

On the other hand, China is still seen and perceived as the largest developing country in the world. Both domestically and statistically, the IMF and the World Bank classifies China as being a developing country (Fish, 2014). The highly respected Yiping Huang, who is a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the People's Bank of China and a professor of economics at the National School of Development, China Center for Economic Research at Peking University has stated:

‘There’s no debate that China is a developing country, given its per capita gross domestic product. There are more Chinese people in poverty than the entire populations of Thailand or England. China has all the typical
features of a developing country, including relatively high proportion of agricultural population and relative low level of production technology” (Huang, 2015).

At the same time, China should be observed as a special case in regards of being a developing country due to its size. Huang argues:

“It is unfair to label China a developed country simply because it is big. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to realize its huge effect on the world economy – whatever China buys, becomes more expensive; and whatever China sells, becomes cheaper” (Huang, 2015).

There are though challenges and contradictions with China’s ”taken for granted” identity as a developing country but also the way the Chinese government do business. One of China’s desires in regards of their core foreign principles and diplomatic initiatives has been/is to build South-South relations with other developing countries. In the last decade, China’s South-South strategy has been based on expanding commercial and diplomatic relations with two other southern regions, primarily Africa and Latin America. Countries in these two regions, perceive China as being a different kind of developing country and a different type of “southern” partner. The former president of Brazil and dependency theorist Fernando Henrique Cardoso has stated, “China for many years cleverly tried to frame the relationship as ‘south-south’... that its interest was the same as Brazil’s interest. But China is not the south. China is China, with its own set of interests” (Ferchen, 2014). There are similar concerns from China’s other developing partners in Africa but also when it comes to Chinas neighboring developing countries. Countries like India, Myanmar and the Philippines are concerned about China’s unsustainable and unequal trade but also its investment patterns where the perception is that China is gradually behaving as a regional and aggressive hegemon (Ferchen, 2014). With that said, there are different understandings and perceptions of China’s developing country identity. However, in terms of our case study, it is safe to say that China in relation to Africa is behaving as a developed country. Nevertheless, the main interest in this study is to analyze the power relationship between Angola and China.
CHAPTER 3

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework used in this study is established on using Neocolonialism as a tool to analyse and answer the research question. The dimensions of Neocolonialism will give a better understanding and the opportunity to construct solid arguments about the theory’s central philosophies.

There are alternative theories such as Dependency theory or Neo-mercantilism that could as well possibly explain China’s relationship with Angola. By choosing to merely focus on Neocolonialism, it should not be assumed as rejecting other alternative theories that could possibly likewise analyze and answer the study’s main question. The main reason for choosing Neocolonialism is mainly due to the accusations that China has been receiving from different actors and countries during the past years. Debates regarding China’s growing influence in Africa have usually been characterized and filled with Neocolonial elements and aspects. This was also the reason why it was so important to present the Neocolonial debate on the topic of China in the introduction chapter of this study. Other reasons for choosing Neocolonialism as a theory in this study were that it consists of a mixture of dependency and mercantilist aspects. Finally yet importantly, the author chose a Neocolonial framework as the study is set to evaluate China-Angola relations based on Diana Haag’s definition of Neocolonialism.

3.1. Neocolonialism

The term Neocolonialism is believed to first have been ascribed by Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah, who mentioned it in his foreword at the Organization of African States Charter (OAU) in 1963 but got international attention by publishing his book “Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism” in 1965. What Nkrumah highlighted in his book was to recognize and denounce the existence of an ongoing dependence of newly independent states in Africa. The principle of Neocolonialism according to Nkrumah, consist of states that are officially autonomous but has its political policy and economy dependent and controlled by foreign political and economic influences (Haag, 2011:9, Nkrumah, 1965:7).

The concept and practices of the term was first used officially in Africa in one of the All African People’s Conferences (AAPC) in Ghana 1961. AAPC was during the late 1950’s to early 1960’s, a
movement of different political groups from different African countries that was under colonial rule that held conferences in Accra, Ghana. It was at one of AAPC’s conferences in 1961 that the term Neocolonialism was given its official definition and explanation of it (Afisi, 2017). Neocolonialism as a concept was defined as;

“The deliberate and continued survival of the colonial system in independent African states, by turning these states into victims of political, mental, economic, social, military and technical forms of domination carried out through indirect and subtle means that did not include direct violence” (ibid).

Neocolonialism is a more renewed form of traditional Colonialism, which is to gain, and benefit of those newly weak and decolonized countries with the goal of, achieving cultural, economic and political benefits by giving political power to those that belong to favorable elites (Haag, 2011:9). What actually changes with the modern interpretation of colonialism i.e. Neocolonialism, are the mechanisms that are used to maintain the dependence. With that said, Neocolonialism is the circumstance of having economic control that results in having indirect power over a certain territory/country (ibid, 10). This means economic dependence on primary goods, impact of foreign debt and aid but also economic dominance on multinational companies.

Furthermore, Neocolonialism can be understood as being the “subtle propagation of socio-economic and political activity by former colonial rulers aimed at reinforcing capitalism, neo-liberal globalization, and cultural subjugation of their former colonies” (Afisi, 2017). The main idea of the term is to ensure formal colonial masters that the newly independent colonies/states remain dependent on them for political and economic guidance. The exploration and dependency of the political and socio-economic people of the independent state becomes achievable for the ideological, economic, cultural, political and military benefits of those former colonial powers home states. This is upheld by having indirect control over the political and economic practices of the newly autonomous countries rather than using direct military force as before (Afisi, 2017). In terms of the cultural aspect, the formal colonial rulers want to promote its own culture, media or language in the newly independent colonies/states. By doing so, the former ruler wants to promote is own image and increase its own reputation and popularity. This can be done through propaganda or establishing biased educational institutions (Afisi, 2017).

Within the framework of Neocolonialism, the more technologically advanced states will likewise make sure that their engagement in low income/developing countries should basically break the possibility for those smaller countries to develop and instead have the strong ambition to only benefit the capital gain of the more technologically advanced states (Afisi, 2017, Parenti 2011, 24). This can be done by different means including:
- **Loans**: Lending out capital with high interest from different organizations.
- **Trade**: Unfair trade patterns in regards to primary goods of that developing country.
- **Investment**: Multinational corporations benefiting a few.
- **Tied Aid**: Aid with conditions.

Finally yet importantly, Neocolonialism as a theory and its overall nature is based on being divergent in national power- military, political or economic. This is used unevenly by the dominant country to slightly force the sectors of that underdeveloped country to its command. In the end,

“*The method and praxis of Neocolonialism lies in its guise to enjoin leaders of the independent colonies to accept developmental aids and support through which the imperial powers continue to penetrate and control their ex-colonies. Through the guise of developmental aids and support, technological and scientific assistance, the ex-colonial masters impose their hegemonic political and cultural control in the form of neocolonialism*”

(Serequeberhan in Afisi, 2017).

### 3.2. The Derivation of Neocolonial Dimensions

#### 3.2.1. Economic Influence

Neocolonial governance and its economic power operate by having indirect control over trade, economic and financial polices of global and multilateral institutions but also transnational corporations. Regarding the economic aspect, Neocolonialism operates by investing in multinational corporations that only benefit a few/the elite in that underdeveloped country and at the same time force those countries to become more dependent. This type of investments can be seen as coordinated efforts by the developed countries to inhibit growth in underdeveloped nations and keep them as sources of cheap natural resources and cheap labour. The economic factor within Neocolonialism can be understood as a further development of capitalism that makes it possible for capitalist countries and corporations to control underdeveloped countries by means of international capitalism instead of direct control (Halperin, 2016). There is also the aspect of having a powerful foreign country determining and controlling exports and imports and that the majority of all labour workers in those businesses that are set up by developed nations, uses foreign labour instead of local labour (Dinesh, 2012).
3.2.2. Political Interference

The political aspect of Neocolonialism derives from influencing political decisions makers into doing economic favors for the Neocolonial power. This includes, them disregarding certain local laws that have a negative effect on the economic factors for that dominant nation. All sort of interference in the functioning of that undeveloped country in terms of their political system is viewed as political interference (Tiffen, 2014). This includes political support of external actors for the purpose of maintaining internal control in that country (Willis, 2014). The strategy regarding political interference is to first establish good relationships with the ruling elite of that country and influence their interest by creating different interest packages or offering them different treaties that involves different economic factors such as natural resources. This also involves giving support to leaders that support the interest of the Neocolonial power (Mgina, 2013).

3.2.3. Military Appearances

The military aspects in Neocolonialism include civilian or military interventions/coups done by the dominant power for the benefit of gaining more power over the policies in those underdeveloped countries. The presence of tensions and disputes in those countries that are seen as being underdeveloped are usually insecure which leads to them having the need to secure military equipment and secure arms from powerful countries. Their lack of ability to become autonomous or self-reliant makes these kinds of countries more dependent on dominant countries. The aspect of having dominant states using arm sales or supplying military equipment to different instable and underdeveloped nations is a strategy within Neocolonialism to gain control over countries (Dinesh, 2012).

3.2.4. Financial Dependence

One of the most powerful tools that Neocolonial powers use is providing loans, foreign aid and foreign direct investments to weaken underdeveloped states. Many underdeveloped states are not economically stable and for that reason, they have become financially dependent on other developed nations. These powerful nations use these financial tools as means for acquiring a wanted change in the policies or economy of those weaker states. The donor states will give foreign loans or aid by imposing different conditions and terms. These terms can include forcing the recipient country to buy goods from the donor country, sign agreements for economic
cooperation, giving the donor states the right to secure certain businesses or give them the access to acquire vital natural resources and other goods at low costs. The goal of all of these conditions is to gain control over policies and the economy of that recipient country and thereby make the recipient country more dependent on the donor country. In the end, foreign aid in Neocolonialism should be understood, as being tools of the foreign policy of the donor country as it is never given without conditions and terms (Dinesh, 2012).

3.2.5. Cultural & Educational Reinforcement

The cultural dimension in Neocolonialism enables cultural assimilation of the people that live in underdeveloped nations. The methods used regarding to the assimilation factor is that Neocolonial powers use their own language and tries to establish their own values in the underdeveloped country (Mgina, 2013). Some authors argue that the Neocolonial theory "embraces cultural and educational influence, exercised through the expatriation of teachers and cultural ambassadors" (Haag, 2011:10). Other cultural influences can be biased information/media, propaganda or news as they can endorse and promote a specific culture, values or zeitgeist by the dominating state. The negative side effect also affects those local and regional cultures that exist in that specific country or region. This negative effect applies to the economic and social factors for the local community and for the local culture (Wankel, 2009).

3.3. Operationalizing

*The main reason for this section is to provide a clear structured way of operationalizing Neocolonialism and to make it applicable to the research question. Based on prior explanation of the term, there will now be a presentation of the measurements of the five chosen dimensions that characterizes Neocolonialism.*

As there is no official definition of what the precise principles and mechanisms are of Neocolonialism, as different authors have different visions regarding these, the operationalizing in this study will mainly be based on Diana Haag’s operationalization. The reason behind this choice is that the author consider Haag being the one that he considers being most relatable in the direction of his own understanding of the concept. The Neocolonial principles are based on her contribution in her paper “Mechanisms of Neo-colonialism (2011)”. This ought to be understood as being a part of the analytical tools that can help the author of this thesis, study the presence of Neocolonialism within the selected case. However, the author has rephrased some of Haag’s operationalization so it becomes more suitable for his own study.
Neocolonialism presumes a consolidation of different forms of dimensions such as interference, dependence, influence, reinforcement and appearances. The presence and intensity of Neocolonialism will be determined in the following way:

- Achieving none of these dimensions should be seen as non-existence of features of Neocolonialism
- Achieving 1-2 of these dimensions should be seen as an low intensity of Neocolonialism
- Achieving 2-3 of these dimensions should be seen as an intermediate intensity of Neocolonialism
- Achieving 3-5 of these dimensions should be seen as an extensive intensity of Neocolonialism

The five dimensions are:

3.3.1. Political Interference

Low level of Political Intervening:

- Intervening in the functioning of the underdeveloped country’s political system by:
  
  ● Influencing local political decisions makers by having them do minor favors for the dominant power or having:

  ● The dominant state giving minor political support for external actors and leaders trough different channels for the purpose of, maintaining some internal control but also for the purpose of receiving support from leaders that support the interest of the dominant power.

- Establishing political policies that have, to a low extent the goal of increasing the profits for the dominant country.

- Gaining and taking minor political control over territories in the underdeveloped country.

- Political domination over the underdeveloped country by establishing to a low extent a political administration by the dominant country or having minor presence of the dominant country’s personnel in deciding administrative positions.
**Extensive level of Political Intervening:**

- Intervening in the functioning of the underdeveloped country’s political system by:

  ● Influencing local political decisions makers by having them do **great** favors for the dominant power or having:

  ● The dominant state giving **great** political support for external actors and leaders through different channels for the purpose of maintaining **great** internal control but also for the purpose of receiving support from leaders that support the interest of the dominant power.

- Establishing political policies that have, **to a great extent** the goal of increasing the profits for the dominant country.

- Gaining and taking **full** political control over territories in the underdeveloped country.

- Political domination over the underdeveloped country by establishing **to a great extent**, a political administration by the dominant country or having the **full** presence of the dominant country’s personnel in deciding administrative positions.

**3.3.2. Economic Influence**

**Low level of Economic Influence:**

- The dominant country using to a **low extent (under 50 %)** foreign labour instead of local labour in those businesses that are set up by the dominant country.

- Receiving **minor** beneficial treatment in regards to companies run by the government of the dominant country. These treatments can include providing **to a low extent**, better circumstances and conditions for the businesses of that dominant country rather than for the local businesses.

- The dominant country having **minor control/influence** over trade, economic and financial polices of global and multilateral institutions but also over transnational corporations.
- Having the dominant country affecting to a low extent, exports and imports but also the prices and quantities of these.

- The dominant country investing in multinational corporations that mainly benefit the elite in the underdeveloped country.

- Low trade barriers for the dominant country.

- The dominant country offering foreign direct investments to the underdeveloped state in such way that, the underdeveloped country becomes to some extent in need of the dominant country due to the minor extent of the terms and conditions of those investments.

**Extensive level of Economic Influence:**

- The dominant country using to a great extent (over 50 %) foreign labor instead of local labor in those businesses that are set up by the dominant country.

- Receiving great beneficial treatment in regards to companies run by the government of that dominant country. These treatments can include providing to a great extent, better circumstances and conditions for the businesses of that dominant country rather than for the local businesses.

- The dominant country having great control/influence over trade, economic and financial polices of global and multilateral institutions but also over transnational corporations.

- Having the dominant country affecting to a great extent, exports and imports but also the prices and quantities of these.

- The dominant country investing in multinational corporations that only benefit the elite in the underdeveloped country.

- No trade barriers for the dominant country.

- The dominant country offering foreign direct investments to the underdeveloped state in such way that, the underdeveloped country becomes essentially in need of the dominant country due to the great extent of the terms and conditions of those investments.
3.3.3. Financial Dependence

Low level of Financial Dependence:
- The dominant country being one of many vital actors that is funding and giving large amount of aid and loans to the underdeveloped country. This includes having the dominant country’s aid/loans being responsible for less than one-third of the GDP of the underdeveloped country.

- The dominant power being one of many vital trading partners for the underdeveloped country where a slowdown in the dominant country would have a large negative impact for the underdeveloped country in question. This implies having the dominant country responsible for receiving less than 40% of the total exports from the underdeveloped country.

- The underdeveloped country being to a low extent dependent on having the financial support of the dominant country in case of rising inflation, depreciation of the local currency or decreasing prices of export products of the underdeveloped country.

Extensive level of Financial Dependence:
- The dominant country being the only actor for funding and giving large amount of aid and loans to the underdeveloped country. This includes having the dominant country’s aid being responsible for at least one-third of the GDP of the underdeveloped country.

- The dominant power being the main trading partner for the underdeveloped country where a slowdown in the dominant country would have a large negative impact for the underdeveloped country in question. This implies having the dominant country responsible for receiving more than 40% of the total exports from the underdeveloped country.

- The underdeveloped country being to a great extent dependent on having the financial support of the dominant country in case of rising inflation, depreciation of the local currency or decreasing prices of export products of the underdeveloped country.
3.3.4. Military Appearances

Low level of Military Appearances:

- The dominant state using arm sales or supplying military equipment (Military/defense agreements) to unstable underdeveloped nations to gain \textit{minor} control but also receiving \textit{minor} beneficial treatment in various areas or be given, unique access to various resources.

- The dominant power having (1-2) military bases in the underdeveloped country.

- Civilian or military interventions/coups done by the dominant power for the purpose of \textit{gaining minor influence} over the policies in those underdeveloped countries.

- The dominant country defending \textit{both} the population of the dominant power and the \textit{local elite} instead of the local population in the underdeveloped country.

Extensive level of Military Appearances:

- The dominant state using arm sales or supplying military equipment (Military/defense agreements) to unstable underdeveloped nations to gain \textit{great} control but also receiving \textit{great} beneficial treatment in various areas or be given, unique access to various resources.

- The dominant power having \textit{numerous} (3-5) military bases in the underdeveloped country.

- Civilian or military interventions/coups done by the dominant power for the purpose of \textit{gaining control} over the policies in that underdeveloped country.

- The dominant country \textit{only} defending the population of the dominant power instead of the local population in the underdeveloped country.
3.3.5 Cultural & Educational Reinforcement

Low level of Cultural & Educational Reinforcement:

- **To a low extent** encouraging and promoting the adoption of certain values, language or thought patterns through the expatriation of teachers, cultural ambassadors or institutions. This also includes having the dominant country promoting and providing certain kind of ideology, propaganda or other biased information and news.

- The dominant country making it **difficult** for the local population in the underdeveloped country to practice or learn their own local language/culture or religion.

Extensive level of Cultural & Educational Reinforcement:

- **To a great extent**, encouraging and promoting the adoption of certain values, language or thought patterns through the expatriation of teachers, cultural ambassadors or institutions. This also includes having the dominant country promoting and providing certain kind of ideology, propaganda or other biased information and news.

- The dominant country **not** allowing the local population in the underdeveloped country to practice or learn their own local language/culture or religion.

4. BACKGROUND & CONTEXTUALIZATION

In the following part of the study, there will first be a brief historical overview of the China-African relations as this covers the nature and rhetoric of their early relationship with each other. There will also be a presentation of Africa’s situation and role within the context of the study and a presentation of China’s historical and contemporary relations with Angola. The author has also contextualized China’s Africa policy orientation by giving the reader an overall demonstration of the principles and objectives, which China bases its foreign policy on, in regards to Africa, thereby also highlighting the platform and framework of FOCAC.

4.1. China’s Historical Relations with Africa

China’s engagement with the African continent is nothing new. Several reports from different scholars confirm that their relationship started with trade and that this link goes back as far as the 7th century. However, as more evidence becomes available, there are indications that their trade with each other began a lot earlier than many scholars believed it did (Eisenman et al, 2012:17). During the Tang Dynasty (618-907), trade dominated Imperial China’s relationship with all of Africa’s countries. In spite of this, the first extensive and definitive engagement between Africa and China came during the early fifteenth century under the Chinese military commander Zheng He (Eisenman et al, 2012:17-18). During this time, there was no slave trade between Africa and China, even though there was an active slave trade in eastern Africa conducted by the Arabs. The Imperial China did neither take any land in Africa during this period, which is in great contrast to the later activities of Europeans in Africa (Eisenman et al, 2012:19). It is important to understand that, the interaction between China and Africa did not consist of having a donor/beggar or master/slave relationship. They have instead, enriched each other culturally, commercially and intellectually since the early beginning (Rotberg, 2008, Preface).

The first formal political relations between Africa and China happened in 1955 in Indonesia at the Bandung Conference. The aim of the Conference was to promote Asian-Afro solidarity based on the idea that the two regions, i.e. Asia and Africa, had similar economic and political challenges. This of course gave them the opportunity of collaborating and cooperating with each other within the framework of existing and future challenges. Worth mentioning is that during this period, Africa was undergoing the first movement of African independence and it was after this conference that the first premier of China Zhou Enlai, came up with the idea of promoting China’s policy-framework based on guiding principles in which, China’s relations towards Africa
should be based on (Shelton, 2001:111-112). The main idea of these principles made it clear that China supported:

- *African struggles against imperialism*
- *African non-alignment*
- *African efforts to achieve unity*
- *African efforts to settle disputes through peaceful consultation and*
- *The sovereign independence of all African countries*

(List taken from Shelton, 2001:112).

The decolonization process that was happening in Africa gave China the chance to play a great and vital role by giving African states the support they needed in regards to them reaching independence and liberation. China did this by giving military, medical, food, economic and technical support to different states and liberation groups in Africa (Snow, 1995:286). The reason behind this was that China had the goal of creating a revolution and an international front against colonial and other great powers in Africa (Muekalia, 2004:6). In doing so, the idea was that colonial powers would because of this, lose vital ground, resources and power in Africa, which were factors that later would affect the economies of the great powers in a negative way.

China has since the beginning of their relation with Africa, been a passionate advocate but also a supporter when it comes to the developing world. Their embracement of its developing country identity has served China well, especially when it comes to Africa as they have based their relationship on historical experience and common identity. PRC’s involvement in Africa from the 1960’s has from the start been justified by giving the expression that they themselves also are a part of “the same club”, that being a developing country or belonging to the third world. Another factor is expressing that they share common rivals as in the North, West or Great powers (Snow, 1995:285-286).

On the other hand, China’s attitude towards the African continent began to change during the 1970’s. Their new attitude became affected by the dominating power politics that was happening within the international system. As their activities in Africa during this time were driven by having the goal to fight against the great powers hegemony, Africa became a playground for China’s attempt to increase its own influence and power on the African continent but also within
the international arena. It was during this time that China decided to increase its friendly relations with Africa by presenting an extensive African aid policy and financing different projects in different areas, (Yu, 1988:855). This made China in that sense, a very popular actor in Africa.

These factors similarly had a big impact on PRC restoring its seat in the UNSC in 1971. It was the result of an African bloc at the UN that involved a great amount of African votes, giving support to China restoring a seat at the council. China became the country that would from then represent and give the Third world, a voice within an important international body. This also meant that China acquired an increased role but also greater advantage and power among third world countries, which could/can be seen as both as a positive and a negative side effect (Kornberg & Faust, 2005:16). This evidently led to China increasing its presence and investing in different parts of Africa as their thirst and desire to become a great and vital economic power had just begun.

### 4.2. Africa’s Situation

Africa as we all know has sadly a long history of colonial rule and poverty. However, the continent has enormous expanse of land that is rich on natural resources. The continent has also great potential for development. After all, it was the African people that at last freed themselves from being ruled and dominated by other countries, that won independence and got rid of apartheid and won emancipation. All of these factors are seen as vital contributions concerning elements and progress of development (Cemiloglu, 2015:203-204).

Their pursuit of becoming more developed has since then, always been the goal for all countries in Africa as they seek stability, peace and development by collaborating with domestic and international actors. In terms of the political situation in Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) have been key actors and players in getting Africa to become more stable and getting Africa’s economy constant. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has also been one of the significant actors that have presented an encouraging and revitalizing picture of African development and transformation. African countries are becoming more and more involved in multilateral institutions, playing an increasingly and important role in the international arena. This has made them more confident in actively participating in different joint and cooperation forums.
However, many countries in Africa still have a long way to go in terms of development. They still have many challenges to deal with but with the help of themselves and the international community but also other actors, Africa will continue to be on its way of becoming more powerful than never before in the new century (Cemiloglu, 2015:204).

4.3. China Historical Relations with Angola

In over six decades, Angola’s relationship with China has gone through Cold War dynamics to the politics of colonial struggles to finally, reach the stage of having, growing economic diplomacy with each other (Aidoo, 2013). China’s engagement in Angola goes back as mentioned, to times when many African nations started their anticolonial struggle, as China also often remained the nation that supported such actions and activities in Africa. Angola was no different in regards of such events as the Angolan independence war against Portuguese domination broke out in 1961. Among those liberation movements that took up arms for independence, as China got involved with their struggle by supporting their independence, were the communist group The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and The National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). These events were all happening during the Cold War and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). Nevertheless, in 1963 China agreed to provide FNLA most of their weaponries and in 1964, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA met Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai in China where he received military training and became a supporter of Maoism (Campos & Vines, 2008:2). However, China’s relationship with Angola was at the time, a bit confusing as it was based on both having an ideological conflict with the Soviet Union but also supporting the anti-colonial struggle by backing different liberation movements by different means such as giving them weaponries, military training, arms and other helpful assistance (Aidoo, 2013).

However, in 1975 the Soviet-backed and communist group MPLA came to power and declared Angola independent from Portuguese colonial rule. China refused to recognize Angola’s independence in the beginning due to the power politics between China and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, as many post-colonial countries, Angola was at the time suffering social and economic complications. These factors in the end steered the country a couple of months after their independence, into a 27-year civil war between the liberation movements. Nevertheless, in 2002, the civil war ended as it led to peace negotiations between MPLA and UNITA (Saho, 2015). Yet, during these years, Angola’s relationship with China remained and matured.
The formal and diplomatic relations between China and Angola were in point of fact, officially established in 1983. They signed their first trade agreement in 1984 and a Joint Economic and Trade Commission was created in 1988 (Campos & Vines, 2008:3). It was though in 2002, Angola’s and China’s relationship shifted from a security and defense basis to an economic one containing elements of vast loans and oil. In 2004, China gave Angola the first two-billion-dollar oil backed loan for rebuilding destroyed infrastructure throughout the country. This is seen as being the starting point were the cooperation between these two countries became more and more intense which has resulted in signing various cultural, social, political, economic and diplomatic agreements since then (Campos & Vines, 2008:3).

4.4. China’s Contemporary Relations with Angola

Before discussing China’s contemporary relations with Angola there need to a clarification about how Angola can be labeled as a desired profile for a country like China that have a big thirst and need for getting their hands on natural resources. Angola is today much known for being a petro state as it is the second-largest oil producer in Africa, after Nigeria and a member of OPEC. Angola’s economy is considered being one of the world’s fastest growing as it’s GDP is mainly dominated by the oil sector. The country is also rich in iron, diamonds and phosphate. However, most of its people live in poverty and the mismanagement, the damaged infrastructure but also the corruption in the country has put a strain on their economy (Al Jazeera, 2012).

The contemporary relations between these two countries and its foundation can best be described with the words of Angola’s former president Dos Santos (1979-2017) by stating, “China needs natural resources, and Angola wants development” (Hanson, 2008). Moreover, their relationship is multifaceted and involves mostly economic factors such as trade, loans, agreements and investment ventures. These features are all being used in an effort to get hold on oil and construction trades/agreements but also having Chinese state-owned corporations taking over some of Angola’s other vital resource concessions (Atlamazoglou, 2016). In fact, in 2008, Angola was China’s largest trading partner in Africa (Hanson, 2008) and in 2016, Angola became China’s third-largest oil supplier (Albert, 2017). As China’s economic growth has increased over the past two decades, they have also become more dependent on oil. According to Independent Chemical Information Service, by 2020, China’s dependency on imported oil will be at 70 % (Slav, 2017) and the IEA projects that this dependency will rise to 77 % by 2030 (See Figure 1).
It is safe to say that China is and has been a vital source of FDI in Angola and in other parts of Africa as they give development loans and credits to resource-rich states such as Angola. Since Angola is one of Africa’s top recipients of these loans and credits provided by the China-Africa Development fund, the People’s Bank of China, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, there are indications for risk of a debt crisis (Albert, 2017).

It is important to comprehend the China-Angola relationship from Angola’s point of view, as they see China as the only country that is willing to fund strategic post-conflict infrastructure projects in which western states and donors are not willing to do so. China’s financial offerings give lower interest rate, better conditions but also longer repayment time. This can be, compared to other countries or actors that give African countries high interest rate, a shorter repayment time and loans that are interconnected with a various types of compromising terms that puts pressure on the government of that country (Campos & Vines, 2008:11).

4.5. China’s Africa Policy

“From confrontation to co-operation, from revolution to economic development, and from isolation to international engagement” (Muekalia, 2004:7).

China, which is the largest developing country in the world, is determined to pursue the road to peaceful development by following an independent foreign policy of which is concentrated on solidarity, cooperation and peace. Africa as we all know is a continent that has the world’s largest number of developing nations. Additionally, China has developed a special Africa Policy in which is vital to comprehend and understand before moving on to focusing and discussing a African country i.e. Angola. China’s main goal with their Africa policy is to present different development objectives and measures on how to achieve them but also present the need for cooperation in different fields in which would led to upholding a secure growth of Africa-China relations in the long term but also bringing a new dimension to mutual-beneficial cooperation (Cemiloglu, 2015:203). China therefore claims to be ready to pursue their Africa policy by focusing on developing friendly relationships and collaboration that includes elements such as mutual trust, political equality, cooperation, cultural exchange and economic win-win. China’s objectives and principles in regards of their Africa Policy include:

“The Five principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and consist of:

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence

(Quote from Brautigam, 2009:30).

- Having the independent choice of deciding their own pathway for development and thereby support African countries efforts to develop by unity.

- Common prosperity, mutual benefit and reciprocity: China supports states in Africa in which tries to develop in regards of nation building, economic development, cooperation in various forms and fields such as social and
economic development but also endorsing mutual prosperity of Africa and China.

- **Close coordination and mutual support:** China is going to reinforce its collaboration with Africa in the UN. China will also strengthen its collaboration within other multinational institutions and international affairs. This can be done by supporting each other’s reasonable propositions/demands but also give more focus to issues regarding development and peace in Africa. It is vital to improve intergovernmental consultations and other cooperation mechanisms.

- **Seeking common development and getting knowledge from each other:** China will do its best to cooperate and strengthen its relationship with Africa in fields such as, education, science, health and culture. They will learn from each other in areas such as governance and development. China will also support and work together with African countries in regards of improving capacity building and having agricultural cooperation, resource and energy cooperation, tourism cooperation, press, radio, television and film cooperation and financial cooperation but also in other fields, that can help increase sustainable development in Africa.

(Cemiloglu, 2015:205)

Another vital aspect of China’s IR-policy is that they demand that Africa and regional organizations need to comply with the **“One China Principle”** (Rotberg, 2008:25). This means, if countries want to do business, receive aid/support or have any diplomatic relations with China, they need to recognize that **“The government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing all China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory”** (Leger, 2017). However, China is prepared to establish state-to-state relations with nations that do not have any diplomatic relations with China due to the One-China principle (Cemiloglu, 2015:206).

One important feature of China’s Africa policy is the development of **“Special Economic Zones”**. These zones are areas in which, domestic and foreign companies can invest but also do trade without having similar regulations and control from the Chinese central government in Beijing. These zones or the policy of it was created to boost investment overseas and thereby increase China’s economic growth, which it did (Britannica, 2009). It is clear that China’s overall Africa policy can and should be regarded as prioritizing a kind of economic nationalism were
China’s national goal is economic development, thereby shaping all its policies and priorities to fit and achieve their economic goal setting.

With the end of the Cultural Revolution and the change of the Chinese leadership, China has shifted its focus and foreign policy towards economic development where the notion has become from “economy serving diplomacy” to “diplomacy serving economy” (Rotberg, 2008:22). However, there are those that argue that China’s Africa policy includes a vital strategic element, as their policy is primary and consistently based on geopolitical considerations and factors (Cheng & Wankun, 2002:236). China’s desire to become a great and significant world power is a strong and vital aspect to take in consideration in regards to their overall strategic view concerning international relations and their foreign policy. The Government of China observes Africa from a strategic standpoint where they focus on regions that can become or are strategically vital for China (Snow, 1995:290-291). However, it does not always have to be strategically significant in regards of economic sense. It can very well be strategically important for other reasons. An example of this is Nigeria, which is perceived as being Africa’s largest oil producer making the country of strategic importance to China in regards of securing a source of energy. Another example can be South Africa, which is of political importance for China as for being a vital ally within the developing world in different multilateral institutions.

4.6. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

China’s new and concrete policy for the African continent, which earlier was explained, began with the establishment of FOCAC in 2000 in Beijing. This forum worked/works as a multilateral and integrated platform and framework for Chinese and African policy-makers to strengthen the friendly relationship and cooperation between Africa and China but also, jointly meet the challenges of globalization, endorsing common object and development in areas like economic development, security, prosperity and diplomacy. The first meeting, which was held in October during the same year, gathered over 800 officials from China and 44 African countries. The meeting also gathered 17 vital international and regional organizations as well as business representatives (Anshan & April, 2013:1).

The agenda of actions presented in this forum includes an expansion of investment, trade, joint projects but also increasing cooperation in areas such as medical care, agriculture/food security, infrastructure, poverty reduction, human resources development, capacity building, banking, cultural exchange and exploitation of various natural resources (Anshan & April, 2013:1). The
Government of China had to offer though a series of inducements in their pursuit of speeding up its entry to resource-producing regions of the African continent. These inducements included:

- “Participation in peace-keeping operations in places such as Liberia, DRC and Sudan
- Giving cheap loans linked to infrastructure development
- Targeted debt relief
- Political visits for African leaders to Beijing
- Support for Africa in global forums such as the UN, WTO, IMF and The World Bank
- Competitive military deals
- Political “non-interference” in the internal policies of African countries
- The promotion of “south-south” linkages
- The establishment of parallel funding agencies to institutions such as the IMF and World Bank”

Source: Text from Executive Research Associates, 2009:12

Although FOCAC is perceived as a joint collaboration between Africa and China, the activities of the forum are very much driven and controlled by China’s government. This association is driven by China’s ambition to preserve its natural and economic interest but also by its history and cultural thinking. Even though there are many regional groupings in the world such as the Africa-EU partnership, NAFTA, GRULAC or the EEG, FOCAC has nevertheless, become the most dominant and effective alliance there is. The main reason for this is that FOCAC is very much output-based that has specific and detailed agendas where these are delivered on. These agendas are analyzed every four years, as the goal is to examine the impacts of these (Anshan & April, 2013:3). However, there are those that argue that FOCAC is seen as one of China’s vital tools in terms of Chinese influence in Africa. Yet, FOCAC has been one of the important actors that have made a significant positive impact on the African continent.
CHAPTER 5

5. ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

In the following part of the study, the author has analyzed his case on Angola based on the established framework of Neocolonialism throughout the period of 2000-2017. By reviewing this part, the reader will be provided an understanding but also an answer to the study’s main question.

5.1. The Contemporary Presence of Neocolonialism in Angola

In contemplation of providing evidence about the intensity of China’s Neocolonial influence in Angola from 2000-2017, dimensions and cases of political interference, military appearances, economic influence, financial dependence and cultural/educational reinforcement, are presented and analyzed in accordance with the chosen theoretical frame.

5.1.1. Political Interference

Since 1975, when the Soviet-backed MPLA took power and declared Angola independent, China has not deeply intervened in Angola’s internal political affairs. China’s motto of non-interference, anti-hegemonies and their resistance towards the developed world is still one of China’s fundamental premises, especially in Angola. This factor has actually benefited the oppressive, dictatorial government in Luanda as the elite in Angola very much appreciate China’s stance (Taylor, 2007:90). After all, Angola is very much famous for its inefficiency, corruption and persistent poverty, ranking 164 of 174 on the corruption perceptions index from 2016 (Transparency International, 2016).

On the other hand, a Chinese diplomat has argued that many Chinese state-owned and private companies in Angola that has the goal of accessing domestic development aid projects has in fact, tried to manufacture demand for their services even when it has not being needed, trough contacts with local politicians and other political elites in Angola. This can be a form of intervening, in Angola’s internal policies as one consultant that has been involved in these situations describes this as: “If you do feasibility studies, you may not necessarily get the project, but if you develop relations with the political elites of the government of the country in question, you will get the project without needing to do the feasibility studies” (Corkin, 2012:477). This has also been verified by a MFL official.
and a former Angolan diplomat (Corkin, 2012:478). Feasibility studies refers to studies that analyze the capability of completing projects in a successful way by taking technological, economic and legal scheduling into considerations instead of just starting different projects without knowing the potential of positive or negative outcome of that specific project before investing in it (Investopedia, 2016). Having this said, there are traces of slight Chinese inference in Angola’s domestic affairs, which later could develop into more.

Angola was from 1991-2010 established on a democratic temporary constitution that later in 2012 became, replaced with a constitution that contained dictatorial elements. Since 2012, citizens in Angola could no longer select their president or their vice president as these positions became filled by the party with the biggest majority in the Parliament. The Angolan president, José Eduardo dos Santos from MPLA, who has been president in Angola since 1979-2017, has controlled everything in Angola since he and the MPLA took power in Angola. Due to the change in the constitution in 2012, the country became a one-party state and regardless of constitutions or elections, the democratic development in the country has declined since then. In spite of this, the official press agency of the Chinese government, Xinhua News Agency, described the new constitution as being democratic, modern and positive, thereby supporting the president of Angola, dos Santos despite of being an authoritarian ruler. This can be an indication of China supporting the authoritarian leader, as it can benefit Chinese interest.

Since dos Santos (1979-2017) was the one that principally controlled the entire county’s oil reserves, which is considered being the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa but also, having the biggest natural gas reserves in Africa (Thompson, 2012: 65) there is a notion that argues that China could possibly support whoever that is in control of these vital resources. These resources are, as mentioned earlier in this study, very important to China and are therefore, factors that must be taken, in consideration when discussing China’s support for undemocratic constitutions, institutions or authoritarian leaders.

The intensity of China’s political interference is observed as being low and refers to factors concerning, influencing local political decisions makers by having them do minor favors for China but also China giving minor political support for leaders through different channels.
5.1.2. Military Appearances

The Angolan and Chinese militaries have for a long time since the 1960’s been interacting and continuing their relationship with each other. General Xu Qiliang, China’s vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) has often put great emphasis on the importance of deepening and reinforcing China and Angola’s cooperation in regards of national defense. China is eager to work with Angola in this area and finds it necessary to maintain the exchange of institutional delegations and military information between two militaries (Jianing, 2015). The ambassador of China in Angola, Zhang Bolun said in 2010 that the two countries must and will further strengthen military cooperation in areas of supplying military equipments, military trade and staff training (DefenceWeb, 2010). In fact, in 2015, the Chinese state-owned companies Export Corporation and China Xinxing sold military uniforms and military equipment to a value of US$44.6 million to Angola in 2015 (Macau, 2015). Nevertheless, this is only a small share of Angola’s total military budget, which was 6.8 billion dollars during the same year (Nkala, 2015). There is however, no public information about the contents of their current military agreements.

In regards of military interventions, there have not been any official interventions by the Chinese military in Angola during the analyzed period of 2000-2017.

The intensity of China’s military appearances is observed as being low and refers only to factors such as having China supplying military equipment and being involved in arm sales (military/defense agreements).

5.1.3. Economic Influence

Angola decided in 2005 to take a $2 billion loan from China and the terms of this loan included China holding “The right to 10,000 barrels of oil per day but also 70 % of all the contracts must be awarded to Chinese corporations” (Tukumbi, 2011:257). China’s strategy of lending a great amount of capital is very much linked to further enable the advantage of exploiting Angola’s natural resources and at the same time, boosting its own economic progression (Tukumbi, 2011:256) as the terms of repayments, must be in forms of paying with natural resources or oil. When understanding these features, it becomes easier to understand the reasons, why China is so keen to give out loans to Angola without any preconditions (Tukumbi, 2011:258). It also becomes clear in regards to how Angola could overtake Saudi Arabia in 2010 as becoming China’s biggest supplier of crude oil (Tukumbi, 2011:254). In relation to this, China’s
Export-Import/Exim Bank (a state-owned bank) which provides Angola loans through a bilateral government agreement extended the resource-backed credit lines (R4I) for the government in Angola but also for the benefit of helping Chinese businesses in Angola. These companies were later able to sign their own deals with China Exim Bank with a value of 22 billion dollars in contracts just for 2009 (Worldfolio, 2014). The issue with these credit lines is that it does not encourage local participation. The reason behind this is “due to the nature of ownership not only of the financing mechanism of the infrastructure, but also of the Chinese contractors themselves” (Corkin, 2012:475, 476). Because of this, many Angolan construction firms and professionals feel that Chinese firms are given an unfair advantage due to the policies concerning credit lines (Corkin, 2012:476). This of course leads to inequality and hampering the national development as it affects the country’s competitiveness in international trade thereby giving the consequence of a weakening a country, which makes it easier to control, and influence a country like Angola. This is one of neocolonialism’s main concepts and is systematically organized, by the Chinese state-owned companies as this is done consciously and actively through three stages. The stages below are presented by Horizon Research Consultancy Group, which is in the top 10 of the market research companies in China, and consist of:

1) "Exporting Chinese goods and services directly to the host country i.e. Angola.

2) Investing in industrial chains whereby parts are imported from China to be assembled in the host country i.e. Angola.

3) Establishment of an industrial zone for manufacturing.”

Source: Corkin, 2012:478

It is evident that Chinese companies or contractors whether they are state-owned or private are, less willing to increase local participation in these matters (Corkin, 2012:479). Still, the ownership of the funds, which is China Exim Bank (state-owned) that are used to funding Chinese construction projects is actually the state actor that is responsible for controlling the prospective level of local employment, service and material obtaining rather than those actual Chinese companies in Angola (Corkin, 2012:479). Nevertheless, Chinese companies have a negative reputation in regards of being unwilling to hire local labour and instead use Chinese labour. Due to this, there is increasing discontent among job-seeking people in Angola regarding Chinese companies for the reason that they do not create employment for the people of Angola. This has created great resentment towards Chinese people in general in Angola (Corkin, 2012:479). This very much resembles the attitude that the people of Africa had towards colonial powers during
the colonial era. The systematic isolation of Angola’s local people by a foreign great power i.e. China is in the same manner, linked to neocolonial tendencies. This is considered being one of the big critiques in regards to China’s engagement in Angola and in other African countries. However, the Angolan government plays a big role here as they allow Chinese companies to bring their own labour in order to speed up the infrastructure projects. The government in Angola prefers the short-term outcomes of speeding up the pressure of delivering public goods by bringing in Chinese labor instead of the long-term consequences of employment and skills training for the local population. This can actually be understood, as a method for China to “buy off” or influence the Angolan government in terms of creating economic growth, as this growth will mainly benefit the corrupt leaders in the country and not the people of Angola (Corkin, 2012:481). This can be related to one of neocolonialism’s key tools for economic influence as this significant influence on the government in Angola provides Chinese companies beneficial treatment and making it more difficult for the local population and businesses in Angola to participate in such processes.

As to China’s foreign aid policy, a study from 2007 found that 66% of the Chinese aid contained credit or concessional loans, 5% of this was eligible for debt cancellation or donations and 29% was credited for government investments. The study exposed that 95% of all the aid that came from China was based on the notion and terms that the aid must be used to only hire Chinese workers and to only purchase Chinese products and equipment’s (Tukumbi, 2011:257). This factor can very much be linked to neocolonialism as one of its elements is based on having large control and influence in regards to using only foreign/chinese workers instead of locals. The other factor is related to the neocolonial element of unfair agreements, as China is the actor that is deciding that the aid must be used for only purchasing Chinese manufactured goods, instead of local manufactured goods. Since much of China’s aid is largely concentrated on development projects initiated by China in Angola, there are Neocolonial aspects since China is the one that has direct physical control over these contracts and development plans. The notion of having this control, directly helps China’s interest as they can demand Angola to buy Chinese gods and hire workers from China (Sagoe, 2012). China’s foreign aid policy can be an indirect form of what we call Neocolonialism correlated with Chinese interest. Layton & Nielson (2009) argues that foreign aid is attached, to interest of the donor countries, meaning that the aid that is provided to a country like Angola, does directly aid in areas and places that is of interest for China such as areas concerning natural recourses. In fact, empirical evidence proves that China gives much more foreign aid to oil rich countries in sub-Saharan countries such as Angola than those countries that
are not rich in resources. Half of those top 10 receiving countries that received aid from China in the last decade gave access to various oilfields and contracts concerning first rights to get oil in return (Amusa, 2016). Taking this aspect in account, the roads, railways, tele/transport communications, government buildings, hospitals or other infrastructure or energy sectors that are being repaired and built in Angola (which 70 % of Chinese aid goes to), may also only be in places that are directly linked to Chinese interest but also where Chinese workers, (which local African companies in Angola must hire as this being a part of Chinese conditional aid) are located. This can also lead to inequalities in access to jobs and services between local Angolans and Chinese migrants, which can be related, to the neocolonial feature of developing monopolistic access to within certain areas and businesses. These current Chinese development relations in Angola but also in rest of Africa can end up with maintaining Chinese domination over all of Africa (Sagoe, 2012).

The government in Angola has, as regards to lowering trade barriers for Chinese businesses, provided tax incentives/deduction to 50 Chinese state companies located in Angola through its National Agency for Private Investment (ANIP) as of December 2005. Over 50 % of these Chinese firms are involved in retail business or construction. The purpose of these tax deductions is to promote private investments in Angola by giving foreign countries like China better conditions for investing in Angola (Baah & Jauch, 2009:368). This can eventually lead to Chinese economic dominance of multinational companies in Angola as this would isolate and hinder small local business in Angola. The other consequence of this neocolonial tendency is that it would benefit the corrupt elite in Angola and the Chinese government.

In 2009, the government in Angola took the decision to remove all import duties on construction material that had the purpose of being used in national reconstruction making it duty free. This has led to lowering the cost of all constructions projects in Angola but also making it more difficult for local construction material companies in Angola to develop (Corkin, 2012:481) since, China’s main export to Angola is based on construction related goods or direct construction, the decision has made a great impact on benefiting Chinese companies instead (Sandrey & Edinger, 2010). In relation to this, China has also established a market for selling cheap manufactured goods in Angola, which has led to many local businesses closing down for business as the Chinese market has taken over. This can be linked to the economic dominance within Neocolonialism as it derives from when stronger countries such as China can interfere in a
country’s national economy by maintaining a certain amount of flow of goods, at prices and under conditions that will benefit China.

Selected Chinese companies operating in Angola, *China Sonangol Exploration and Production, China Sonangol Natural Resources, China Sonangol Engineering and Construction* to name a few (Burgos & Ear, 2012:362) has directly ignored basic safety and health regulations, environmental laws and local labour laws without facing any judicial consequences (Power & Alves, 2012:19). This is another example of a negative consequence of China’s economic behavior in Angola as it connected to the neocolonial way of thinking powerful countries can dominate and influence those in power to escape from certain laws and thereby receive beneficial treatment.

“*Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa*”, is a study done by AidData researches from Harvard University, Heidelberg University and the Collage of William & Mary. The purpose of their study has been to follow the pathway of Chinese funding/aid to 50 African states, Angola being one of them, over the period of 2000-2013. The finding of this study showed that African countries that line up with China in regards of voting at the UN General Assembly tend to get more development aid/assistance from China (AidData, 2015). This feature is interrelated to the relationship of donor-recipient aspect where it is in those African states interest as well as China’s to vote in line with the Chinese government.

One of China’s strategies in Africa is based on giving predatory loans to different countries. One of their top eight debtors in Africa is Angola, which has signed for major R4I loans (Resources-for-infrastructure swaps). These loans make it possible for China to take control over their debtors export and trade flowage but also manipulate various markets due to reason that these nations owes the Government of China billions of dollars in natural resources. The other issue is when these loans were granted to Angola, the country had an unranked ECI and junk bond designation by three big credit rating agencies (Fitch’s, Moody’s and S&P). Angola’s ECI declined even more when they decided to do business with China. Due to these factors, Angola became a great target for China’s low-interest and risky loans, which was going to be paid by offering China big pieces of their natural resources and not hard currency, which they have low quantities of. In doing so, it allowed/allows China to take advantage of their great and vital role in Angola by gaining control over Angola’s economy and substantial petroleum reserves instead of assisting Angola in their pursuit of financial recovery (Kelly, 2017).

The intensity of China’s economic influence is observed as being **extensive** and refers to factors that include China offering foreign direct investments to Angola in such way that Angola
becomes essentially reliant on China due to the great extent of the terms and conditions of those investments. There is also the aspect of China using to a great extent (over 50%) foreign labor instead of local labor in those businesses that are set up by China. The result also gives us the features of Angola setting up low or no trade barriers for China but also other factors that include China receiving great beneficial treatment in regards to companies run by the Chinese government. These actions include providing to a great extent, better circumstances and conditions for the businesses owned by China rather than the local businesses. This has resulted in China affecting to a great extent, Angola’s import and export sector thereby also the prices of these.

5.1.4. Cultural & Educational Reinforcement

In 2015, the first Confucius Institute Angola was established in Luanda at the Agostinho Neto University. The Confucius Institute is a platform for local people and students that has the academic goal of learning people Chinese, Chinese culture, history, external relations, and provide vocational training. The institute serves the purpose of promoting cooperation between Angola and China, people-to-people exchange but also mutual understanding concerning these two countries and its people (Hanban, 2015). The institute is controlled and operated by China’s Ministry of Education and is seen as an actor that uses extensive political power. The Institute has however been criticized for being an actor that lack academic freedom and transparency but also for teaching certain values and giving biased views. According to Li Changchun, the former Chairman from 2002-2013, of the Central Commission for Guiding Cultural and Ethical Progress of the Communist Party of China, which also was the head of propaganda during the time, describes the Confucius Institute in a Committee on Foreign Relations report from 2011, as “an important channel to glorify Chinese culture” and is a “part of China’s foreign propaganda strategy” (Volodzko, 2015). Furthermore, China also provides television news in Angola with official Chinese propaganda (Rotberg, 2015). All of these factors could possibly go hand in hand regarding the cultural aspect of neocolonialism, as the neocolonial concept advocates for establishing certain institutes were they promote certain biased values and teaching people biased knowledge.

The intensity of China’s cultural and educational reinforcement is observed as being low and refers to factors that include encouraging and promoting the adoption of certain values (propaganda) or thought patterns (biased information) through the expatriation of teachers, news, cultural ambassadors and institutions.
5.1.5 Financial Dependence

In the case of Angola, there is no strict financial/monetary control through China. Angola has since 1977, its own independent currency (kwanza) and their own independent economic policies. It has also its own monetary reserves (The National Bank of Angola). However, China has a way of indirect influencing Angola’s economic policies. As of 2015, the Angolan currency, the kwanza can and will be accepted in China (Forum China Plp, 2015) This allows Angola to be less dependent on the dollar and thereby making it more possible to import more goods from China. This has resulted into Angola also forming a monetary agreement with China that makes the Yuan the second legal tender in all of Angola (Agence Ecofin, 2015). This means that China has an enormous economic influence in Angola.

However, Angola’s economy is very much dependent and revolves around hydrocarbons (oil & gas) and mining (natural resources) were oil accounts for 30 % of their GDP which is 95 % of their total export and 50 % of what is considered being public revenues. Being oil dependent in aspects of exporting, Angola’s economy becomes much more vulnerable and dependent on the price of this commodity but can very much also lead to the negative economic term, “The Dutch disease” (Muzima, 2017:4). This “disease” refers to the negative side effects of having/discovering large natural resource revenues that would lead to large inflow of foreign currency into Angola through foreign aid, FDI or a large increase of prices on natural resources, thereby affecting other tradable goods sectors. As a result, all of this could have a great impact on that country’s overall GDP and make it enormously unstable if the oil prices drop (Investopedia, 2017).

In Angola’s case, their economy and prosperity is increasingly dependent on China as they are the ones that are both buying Angola’s natural resources but also building its infrastructure. China is today Angola’s biggest trading partner (OEC, 2016) as their trade totaled US$37 billion back in 2014 (Macau, 2015) in relation to their total trade balance during the same year which was, 40 US$ billion (Focus Economics, 2017). This means that a weaker China would also lead to less demand for Angola’s resources such as oil, gas or copper and thereby result in fewer investments from China in Angola’s infrastructure and in other areas. In doing so, China could affect, control and stop Angola’s ability to grow and develop. Any slowdown in China will therefore have disturbing and tough consequences for a country like Angola (Rotberg, 2015).
As to China’s aid policy, “wealthy countries complained that Chinese companies were gaining business by tying aid to exports” (Brautigam, 2009:12). However, China’s strategy can not be understood as being misuse of development aid even if loans and credit in Angola goes to benefiting Chinese companies in Angola. The reason behind this statement is that both countries have agreed upon certain terms that involve Chinese state-owned companies taking over a majority of contracts that are provided and offered. The other problem regarding this factor is that “aid figures remain state secrets. The Chinese government releases only the barest of information about the quantities of aid it gives. There are no official figures on aid allocations to individual countries or regions, no breakdown by sector or purpose. The tradition of secrecy fuels misunderstandings, rumor, and speculation” (Brautigam, 2009:12).

The intensity of China’s financial dependence is observed as being extensive and refers to factors that include China being the main actor that is funding Angola but also being the country that is responsible for at least one-third of the Angola’s GDP. The other factor is China being Angola’s main trading partner where a slowdown in China would have a large negative impact for Angola. This implies having China being responsible for receiving more than 40 % of the total trade from Angola. This leads to Angola also being to a great extent dependent on having the financial support of China in case of rising inflation, depreciation of the local currency or decreasing prices of export products.
6. CONCLUSION

The fundamental principles and dimensions of Neocolonialism, as discussed, based on economic, political, military and cultural tools to influence and control countries. The conclusion of this study will be divided into concise fashion were there will be short discussions about each dimension that is considered being a part of the operationalization of neocolonialism but in in relation to Angola. This should be, understood as a form of a checklist as the purpose is to be able to draw an analytical conclusion about what features of neocolonialism can be found regarding China- Angola relations.

**What features of neo-colonialism exist in China’s relationship with Angola from 2000-2017?**

In regards to political interference in Angola, China has mostly followed through their own concept of non-interference in domestic politics during the analyzed period (2000-2017). However, there are signs of support from China’s side regarding Angola’s authoritarian leader dos Santos and Angola’s new undemocratic constitution from 2012. Nevertheless, it is rather difficult for China, being a one-party state, to push for democracy, transparency, equality or free and fair elections in Angola. Not only is it difficult. It is not in their interest to do so as China favors these kinds of regimes as the author found traces of Chinese companies manipulating local politicians thereby influencing Angola’s domestic affairs. In regards to this, there are low traces of Neocolonial tendencies.

As to China’s economic influence in Angola, there are traces of Neocolonial influences such as systematically controlling and influencing Angola’s labour and local businesses market due to the mentioned factors in the previous part of this study. There are also tendencies of controlling much of Angola’s resources. With this said, we could describe China in this field as using creditor imperialism which means using sovereign debt to turn other states to its will. Having this in mind; it could in the future have many more side effects due to China’s engagement in Angola from an economic point of view.

In terms of military appearances, China has not in any way intervened in any military actions in Angola during the analyzed period. There is however a great and vital emphasis on having deeper cooperation concerning national defense between the two militaries. This includes the exchange
of military information and institutional delegations. There is also the notion of strengthening military trade and staff training between the two countries. In aspects of military appetences, there are no traces of neocolonial tendencies.

Regarding the cultural aspect of China’s influence, there need to be a greater discussion about what role and influence the Confucius Institute has on different countries in Africa. As the institute is used as a channel for China’s foreign propaganda, according to Li Changchun, it is difficult to really study the exact influence it has had on a country like Angola. The other issue is related to the timeframe as it becomes difficult to study the influence of the institute as the first Confucius institute was first established in Angola in 2016. If we however, follow the critique that has been given about the institute, it is then safe to say that the institute provides us with examples of neocolonial tendencies but the intensity of would be recognized as low.

In regards of financial dependence and having a monetary agreement between Angola and China, it has enabled China to influence and making it easier for Angola to import more products from China instead of importing from other countries and being dependent on the dollar, as the Kwanza is now accepted in China and likewise for the Yuan in Angola. Angola is nevertheless still dependent on its natural resources, which makes their relationship with China even more important as China is their biggest trading partner and that they are the ones that are buying their resources and building their infrastructure. China is also their most vital partner in terms of allowing Angola to pay their debts with resources, while China is giving them more capital/loans but also more time to pay back their loans. However, this also means that Angola becomes very much dependent on China as they easily could, control and prevent Angola’s ability to grow and develop.

In conclusion, China is not a colonialist; China is a successful capitalist in Angola. China’s relationship with Angola can best be described through the notion of mutual benefit but with the exception of China’s great economic influence and Angola’s financial dependence that can not be recognized as being neocolonialism based on the established framework. However, their relationship demonstrates and provides us the notion that there are features and traces of Neocolonial tendencies mostly within the economic and financial field as the intensity of this is recognized as being extensive.

China can at times, be also characterized as being not fully transparent with their activities in Angola, which of course has led to mistrust and suspicion against them. China has as any great power, an agenda behind every action they take. In the end, China’s system of organized financial
dependency and economic exploitation in Angola follows a simple pattern. This pattern consist of China giving Angola credit packages, loans, spending a fortune on infrastructure (FDI) and in exchange, receiving valuable natural resources in form of oil and gas but with the negative side effect of influencing the local labour and business market in Angola. China also renegotiates enormous amount of debts and receives in return special/profitable treatment such as beneficial trade deals and influence in that country. The main question that is important to ask is what is China’s endgame in Angola and in other African countries?

In terms of influence, China has used several tools including FDI, infrastructure spending, foreign aid, treaties, summits, loan packages or trade deals. The goal and result of all of this is to have some kind of influence over various natural resources (Kelly, 2017). There are as mentioned, traces that describes that this is exactly what China is doing in Africa. China is involved with every one of those mentioned tools to a certain degree and due to this, it becomes important to understand what future outcome of their increasing influence can be in Angola but also in other places in Africa.

By understanding and getting to know the results of the study, the operationalization of the theory has proven to be useful regarding of finding neocolonial features in Angola.


