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## “No one is born a terrorist”

- A study of Securitization, Human Rights and Terrorism

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# Abstract:

Securitization is the move in which an issue is argued to pose an existential threat to a referent object and has to be resolved with extraordinary measures. Speech acts are considered to be the starting point for the securitization of an issue. This thesis viewed governmental counter-terrorism strategies as potential carriers of speech acts - hence the strategies could constitute the start of terrorism becoming securitized by a government. By using a generic speech act typology created by Holger Stritzel, which combines critical discourse analysis with the securitization theory on Swedish and British counter-terrorism strategies, the thesis identifies a speech act in the most recent British strategy. The second finding is that in the case where the speech act occurred, the human rights discourse was significantly lower, compared to the cases where no speech act occurred. The thesis also provides suggestions for future research on the topic of speech acts.

Keywords: Securitization, Speech Act, Terrorism, Human Rights, Discourse

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Introduction

How should governments handle terrorism? This question is more or less on every contemporary governments agenda, both in democratic and non-democratic countries. Terrorism as a tactic has the ability to strike deep into the hearts of countries, by using unconventional means to spread death and threat of violence. Terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon to the world. It is heavily intertwined in mankind's history and has both been a weapon of the oppressed and of the oppressor. Contemporary terrorism is commonly associated with Al Qa'ida and the 9/11 attacks – leading to the War on Terror. This war is characterized by borderless warfare against a complicated enemy, shrinking privacy and human right abuses. However as global events unfold, new players entered the fray. The inception of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the following terror attacks all over the world, especially in Europe, reminded us of how lethal terrorism can be. This in combination with increased political polarization all over the world but especially in Europe, which has given rise to rightwing and leftwing terrorist groups indicates that governments, in the name of security have to navigate carefully in order to strike a balance between fundamental rights and freedoms. This thesis will examine the contemporary European security landscape to see how recent terrorist attacks has affected countries counter-terrorism efforts and human rights.

## 1.2 Research Problem, Aims and Research Question

Even though the number of attacks is statistically declining, the terrorism threat level in Europe remains high, with newer groups replacing older. The Islamic State has replaced Al Qa'ida, with which most Western countries long associated modern terrorism. Another worrying trend is that countries previously spared from long-term terrorist activities now are being targeted. In 2017, Sweden was successfully attacked by a terrorist claiming to be affiliated with ISIS.<sup>1</sup> This in combination with countries such as Great Britain, which as a long-standing history of being targeted by different terrorist groups, now have since 2010 experienced reignited cycles

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<sup>1</sup> Ohlin, J, Lässker, M, Åstrand, Y. The terror attack in Stockholm – This has happened. *SVT Nyheter*. 2017-04-10. <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/stockholm/terror-attack-in-stockholm> . [accessed 19 Apr. 2018]

of terror.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, this thesis will analyze Sweden and Great Britain's governmental strategies on counter-terrorism in order to see how the governments have responded to the terrorist attacks to protect themselves and their citizens from terrorism, and how the counter-strategies incorporate human rights.

With both Sweden and Great Britain having experienced terrorist attacks in recent years, the thesis will examine how this potentially has affected Sweden and Great Britain's strategies on counter-terrorism, more specifically if there are indications of terrorism becoming securitized by the governments. Two counter-terrorism strategies from each country will be examined in order to see if they have changed over time. The Copenhagen School's Securitization theory will be used for the analysis. The Securitization theory suggests that an issue can be elevated from a politicized phase into a securitized phase if the issue can be argued, through a 'speech act' to be an existential threat to a referent object, usually the state. In the securitized phase, normal political rules do not apply, and the dangerous nature of the issue allows for extraordinary measures which can be unconventional and sometimes dwelling in the murkier waters of law.

My suggestion here is that the governmental strategies could be viewed as carriers of speech acts in accordance with the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework. As mentioned before the process of securitizing terrorism and opening up for extraordinary measures, can potentially serve as an incubator for restrictive policies which could clash with democratic values, civil rights and ultimately human rights. The Securitization framework offers a way to analyze such security moves and offers plausible explanations of why and how the moves were made and in reference to what. The thesis aims at contributing to the field of human rights and security studies, by shedding light on both contemporary and future issues connected to human rights and counter-terrorism and the implications when both are in the fold.

The primary aim of the thesis is to test the theoretical framework of Securitization, more precisely the speech act, which is considered to be the starting point for any securitization. By analyzing each strategy as a potential speech act and comparing the results, within and against each other, the thesis hopes to answer whether the countries have attempted to securitize terrorism and more importantly, how the speech act is discursively constructed. The comparative angle aims to identify potential similarities and dissimilarities between the two countries. The framework originally consists of different sectors of analysis, but my

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<sup>2</sup> BBC News. Timeline of British terror attacks. (2017) Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40013040> . [Accessed 19 April. 2018.]

contribution here is to limit the sectors of analysis into one sector, the Political-Military. This will be developed upon in the theoretical chapter.

The secondary aim is to identify how each potential speech act positions increased security to the issue of terrorism in relation to human rights. As implied earlier, human rights can potentially become just another casualty in counter-terrorism efforts, even though countries are bound to follow and respect human rights obligations. It is natural that governments seek new ways of protecting themselves and their citizens when posed by a deadly threat, however research also shows that terrorism is sometimes linked to other issues which democracies face. In many Western countries in the aftermath of 9/11, migration was linked to terrorism, thus leading to governments enforcing more restrictive asylum and migration policies.<sup>3</sup> Security from the threat of terrorism could with this in mind have implications on human rights. In order to answer the research question, the thesis will use a model building, both upon the securitization framework and critical discourse analysis, to capture the essence of a speech act. The model will be presented in the methodology section.

With the aims in mind the research question for the thesis becomes the following:

*In what way could the counter-terrorism strategies of Sweden and the United Kingdom be interpreted to constitute speech acts and do the discourses on securitization differ?*

### 1.3 Case Selection, Delimitations and Material

The chosen cases are Sweden and the United Kingdom and were selected on the basis of the following criteria. The first criterion, was simply that the government had public strategies on counter-terrorism and that the strategies was in English. The second criterion was the cases needed to be European governments. The motivation for this is simply that the thesis explores counter-terrorism in a European context. The third criterion was that the countries needed to have been attacked by a terrorist group, at least once, between the timespan of 2010 and 2018. The reasons for the timespan is that the thesis aims at analyzing strategies in a modern European context, and many European countries have been attacked of late. Terrorist attacks naturally put security on the agenda for governments and they accordingly take precautions to protect themselves. As the thesis aims of being grounded in contemporary events, especially with

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<sup>3</sup> Lazaridis, Gabriella & Dimitrios Skleparis. Securitization of Migration and the Far Right: The Case of Greek Security Professionals, *International Migration*, vol. 54/no. 2, (2016), pp. 181

regards to recent developments in activity connected to both terrorism and counter-terrorism, it was important to establish a realistic, yet extensive timeframe for the governmental strategies which could also provide the comparative angle of the research question.

The last criteria ties into the former, the selected cases must be facing an increased threat from terrorist groups. The number of selected cases is limited to two, with respect to the aims and length of the thesis. The criteria make the analysis of Sweden and the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategies contemporary relevant for the study, since these represent the voice of the government on the issue and will accordingly serve as the primary material for the thesis. The strategies will be closer introduced in terms of content and composition in the methodological section.

The most evident delimitations of the thesis are the number of cases selected, which are limited to two. The most significant implication of this is that generalizations cannot be made. In order to make generalizations a larger population of cases will be needed. This was a conscious choice given the qualitative nature of the research aims and question. Another delimitation is that the selected cases are European governments, which also has implications generalizations. But as previously stated this is also a conscious choice since the thesis geographic interest of study is counter-terrorism in the European context.

The chosen Swedish governmental strategies are the following;

- Government Communication 2011/12:73 Responsibility and commitment – a national counter-terrorism strategy, published in 2012.<sup>4</sup>
- Government Communication 2014/15:146 Prevent, preempt and protect – the Swedish counter-terrorism strategy, published in 2015.<sup>5</sup>

The chosen governmental strategies from the United Kingdom are the following:

- CONTEST The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism, published in 2011.<sup>6</sup>
- CONTEST The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism: annual report for 2015. Published in 2016.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.government.se/49b75c/contentassets/68b06b9ece124c8e88df0d943ce4ecd7/swedens-national-counter-terrorism-strategy-skr.-20111273>

<sup>5</sup> [https://www.government.se/4a80d6/contentassets/b56cad17b4434118b16cf449dbdc973d/en\\_strategi-slutlig-eng.pdf](https://www.government.se/4a80d6/contentassets/b56cad17b4434118b16cf449dbdc973d/en_strategi-slutlig-eng.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/539684/55469\\_Cm\\_9310\\_PRINT\\_v0.11.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539684/55469_Cm_9310_PRINT_v0.11.pdf)

These four strategies will be the primary material of the thesis. They are found on each government's website in English (see footnotes above). The strategies are legitimate and credible since they are created and published by the Ministry of Justice in Sweden and the Home Department in the United Kingdom. They represent the government's voice on counter-terrorism and are therefore of relevance for the research question and aims. Naturally, it would be in the best interest of the thesis to have strategies published this year, since counter-terrorism are developing on a year to year basis. However, I was not able to find any strategies from this year (2018) and consequently had to settle with the strategies presented above.

The secondary material on the other hand consists of printed and digital publication on the topics of terrorism, securitization, discourse analysis, each relevant for the research topic, previous research, the theoretical framework and methodology. In terms of source criticism, the chosen secondary material was chosen from the most prominent and renowned academic journals and literature in each topical field. These sources are usually subjected to scientific peer review, meaning that other experts in each field scrutinize the research before publication. A couple of news articles concerning terrorist attacks in Sweden and the United Kingdom have also been used. Finally, a Europol document was used to define the threat level to European countries in order to reinforce the relevance of choosing to study counter-terrorism in the European context.

## 1.4 Outline

Section one provided an overall introduction to the reader along with the aims and research question. Section two will introduce the previous research on the topics of securitization and terrorism. Section three will introduce the Securitization framework and the key concepts. The section will focus on the speech act and the Military-Political sector. Section four will introduce discourse analysis and Stritzel's speech act model used as operationalization for the thesis. The analysis and discussion will follow in section five. The conclusions, main findings and suggested future research areas is presented in section six. Section seven will provide the bibliography.

## 2 Previous Research on terrorism and securitization

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon to the world, but has been a common occurrence throughout our history and has as modus operandi proved to be both deadly and effective for drawn-out struggles in the pursuit of political objectives. Those targeted by terrorism share an equal struggle in finding and implementing strategies or policies in order to contain and combat the terrorism. History has proved that rulers and governments all over the world have experienced and witnessed the demise, emergence and re-emergence of numerous terrorist groups who, with the use of terrorist tactics and strategies, caused tremendous loss of human lives and spread fear. As a technique, terrorism has adapted over time to changes in the world and the aims and objectives of the groups engaged in terrorist activities usually vary from group to group, depending on underlying motives.<sup>8</sup>

At its core, terrorist groups are engaged in a psychological warfare directed to those opposing the group's objectives and the violence is thus used to generate fear into a target audience in order to achieve the preset goal(s).<sup>9</sup> Civilians are often targeted simply because they are more vulnerable than security forces, and the groups has found democratic countries more vulnerable and preferable because the security tends to be weaker due to democratic checks and balances – limiting large-scale monitoring capabilities of the state.<sup>10</sup> This is of course not to say that terrorist groups do not operate in non-democratic states or armed conflict environments, but the publicity tends to be larger in democratic states due to generally fewer restrictions on media outlets which help the group reaching its target audience.<sup>11</sup> Lutz presents a general and relatively neutral definition of terrorism which captures the essence of most terrorist groups of today by suggesting that the phenomena rests upon the following six fundamentals;

(1) The use of violence or threats of violence; (2) by an organized group; (3) to achieve political objectives. The violence; (4) is directed against a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims, who are often innocent civilians. Further (5), while a government can be either the perpetrator of violence or the target, it is considered an act of terrorism only if one or both actors not a government. Finally, (6) terrorism is a weapon of the weak.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Lutz, Brenda & Lutz, James. *Terrorism*. In *Contemporary security studies*, Collins, Allan (red.). 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2016). pp. 312-313

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 314

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 314-315

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 315

<sup>12</sup> Lutz, J. M. and Lutz, B. J. *Global Terrorism*, 3rd edn, London: Routledge. (2013). pp. 8-9

All groups engaged in terrorism cannot be encompassed by Lutz's definition but it provides a simplistic, yet exhaustive insight in core functions of any terrorist group. It should also be noted that attempts on an international level to adopt a multilateral agreed definition of terrorism has so far failed due to potential political implications coming with the definition.

The implications could range from governments in the developing world aiming to avoid future situations where anti-colonial struggles are viewed as terrorism or other governments striving to avoid having to extradite or punish political dissidents residing in their countries.<sup>13</sup>

The motives and aims of each group typically, but not necessarily, rests upon whether they are motivated along religious, ethnic, nationalistic or ideological lines, such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS being one of the most contemporary infamous religious motivated terrorist groups or the lone wolf right-wing ideology driven Anders Breivik claiming to be part of larger network of neo-crusaders.<sup>14</sup>

Governments all over the world constantly formulates new strategies in order to contain and limit terrorist groups capabilities to attack and thus tries to stay one step ahead. Security measures are often conceptualized as counter-terrorism and can encompass elements of prevention and response, or both depending on how each government decides to tackle it by defining terrorism as related to war, crime or as part of a disease.<sup>15</sup> Prevention counter-terrorism strategies and efforts is usually associated with terrorism being treated as war and crime and includes bolstering overall security for the concerned state, where governmental security forces strives to eliminate or arrest terrorists before or after an attack by using with mixture of police and military measures – these measures are often associated with great costs which means other lost economic opportunities for the society.<sup>16</sup> Responses to attacks also depends on the chosen perspective for terrorism, if treated as war, deadly military retaliations and pre-emptive strikes against actors associated with terror usually becomes the norm and when treated as a crime arrests and trials demonstrates the state's commitment to deter future attacks.<sup>17</sup>

The implications of increased counter-terrorism measures in democratic countries can become seriously harmful especially with regards to civil liberties, and ultimately human rights since democratic countries are founded upon certain values and constitutional rights and

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<sup>13</sup> Lutz, Brenda & Lutz, James. Terrorism. In *Contemporary security studies*, Collins, Allan (red.). 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2016). pp. 322-323

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. pp. 312-313

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. pp. 320

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. pp. 320-321

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. pp. 321

cannot routinely engage in torture and massive surveillance operations, while non-democratic countries can do so more freely.<sup>18</sup> Governments may adopt extraordinary measures and laws in reaction to a threat or attack which could dwell in the murkier waters of national or international law. When such adoptions of extraordinary measures are made in reference to upholding security for the state and its citizens it is of great importance that such laws should be temporary and subject to frequent review in democracies.<sup>19</sup> Even though the number of successful terrorist attacks has declined since 2014 according to Europol's 'EU terrorism situation and trend report', the threat level to member states of the EU still remains high. The largest threat comes from 'violent Jihadist groups', but also from both the leftist and far-right movements.<sup>20</sup> With the threat level so high, governments all over Europe are thus more or less forced to prioritize counter-terrorism in order to maximize security on a national and regional level. Security, especially in regard to terrorism is once again of great relevance to study and the academia which long have struggled to explain the inner workings of how security becomes conceptualized and then put into strategies or policies receives new angles to research.

During the Cold War-era, security or traditional security in the fields of international relations and security studies was understood in narrow military-terms, marked by the bipolar world order of two superpowers and the strive for each state's survival. Here, national security rested on the pillars of an absence of, or protection against, an existential threat to the state by other states and the policies to uphold national security was usually grounded in the notion of identifying and employing means to protect the state from threats.<sup>21</sup> Constructivists, on the other hand, understand security as intersubjective as it becomes what "actors make of it".<sup>22</sup> Political constructions of security dictate measures taken by policymakers which in turn generate implications on political order.

The Copenhagen School drew on both these approaches when it constructed its Securitization framework.<sup>23</sup> Securitization suggests a widening of the previously narrow definition of traditional security which was prominent during the Cold War-era. The framework

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. pp. 323

<sup>19</sup> Wilkinson, P. *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, 2th ed, London: Routledge. (2006). pp. 62

<sup>20</sup> Europol. *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017*. 2017. [Accessed 2018-04-18]. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/tesat/2017/trends.html> . pp. 5,8

<sup>21</sup> Brauch H.G. Introduction: Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century. In: Brauch H.G. et al. (Eds) *Globalization and Environmental Challenges*. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, vol 3. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. pp.29

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. pp.28

<sup>23</sup> Emmers, Ralf. Securitization. In *Contemporary security studies*, Collins, Allan (red.). 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2016). pp. 169-170

has been used to explain how an issue can be moved into a securitized domain through a speech act. This act is essentially when an actor argues why a phenomenon pose an existential threat to a referent object, usually the state, and cannot be solved with the regular rules of politics, but has to be solved with extraordinary measures.<sup>24</sup> The framework draws on both traditional understandings of security and survival, while also drawing upon constructivism's 'intersubjectivity' in regard to the speech act, where an actor articulates security. In many ways, the securitization approach shares similarities with the human security approach – both gained prominence and were the cause of academic and political debates during the mid-1990s when calling for an expansion of the concept of traditional security. The advocates of human security also conceptualized security in sectors, but put the individual at the center of the security spectrum, in contrast to where the securitization usually puts a collective.<sup>25</sup>

The Securitization framework has been criticized, leading to a second generation of securitization scholars, who argued that the process of securitization often is more empirically complex and that the initially provided “conceptual vocabulary” by Copenhagen School was too abstract or undertheorized.<sup>26</sup> The second-generation scholars includes Stritzel and Vuori. Both have made significant theoretical contributions to the field, especially in regard to the speech act, which has been a subject of criticism in the Copenhagen school's securitization framework. Stritzel's research suggests that speech acts “need to be related to and analyzed within the context of specific social settings and textual fields, as well as broader historical sequences and continuities”. This has led to a development away from “single speech acts and abstract grammar of security” to contextual and dynamic understandings of articulation of security and the process of authorization in discourse.<sup>27</sup>

Vuori's contributions to the field include the construction of a model for illocutionary logic of securitizing speech acts, in which the act is sequenced into three components (i) Claim (ii) Warning (iii) Request – these three components are reinforced by propositional content, usually in support or proof to the claim or warning.<sup>28</sup> Vuori used this model to examine securitization processes in a non-democratic setting and found that our

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid. pp. 169-170

<sup>25</sup> Floyd, Rita. Human Security and the Copenhagen School's Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a securitizing move. *Human Security Journal*. Vol. 5 (2007) pp. 40-41.

<sup>26</sup> Stritzel, Holger and Sean C. Chang. 'Securitization and Counter-Securitization in Afghanistan', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 46/no. 6, (2015), pp. 550

<sup>27</sup> Stritzel, H. Securitization, power, intertextuality: Discourse theory and the translation of organized crime. *Security Dialogue*, 43(6), pp.553

<sup>28</sup> Vuori, Juha A. 'Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol 14/no. 1, (2008), pp. 76-77

understanding of securitization in various political and social contexts (democratic and non-democratic) is vital for the tasks set out for securitization studies.<sup>29</sup> Further, he suggests that even if the speech act is modelled as precisely as possible, it does not mean that other relevant aspects of the entire social process should be or have to be neglected – securitizations are after all linguistic and social process.<sup>30</sup> With the previous research now established, the thesis will introduce the Copenhagen School's Securitization framework.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. pp. 94


<sup>30</sup> Ibid. pp. 94

### 3 Theoretical Framework

#### 3.1 Securitization

Issues related to security would according to the Copenhagen School have to be “staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind”.<sup>31</sup> Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics – the move can thus be seen as process where an issue can be elevated from politics into the domain of securitization in order to be resolved by emergency measures and non-conventional means.<sup>32</sup> The move is illustrated bellow.

Securitization spectrum:



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A politicized issue is often open, involves different choices and some sort of accountability and responsibility from the deciding part. Securitization on the other hand presents an issue as urgent and existential, thus rendering normal political haggling obsolete and reinforcing the notion that the issue only can be dealt with decisively by top leaders with the emergency

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid. pp. 5

<sup>32</sup> Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, (1998). pp. 23

<sup>33</sup> Emmers, Ralf. Securitization. In *Contemporary security studies*, Collins, Allan (red.). 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2016). pp. 170

measures of a securitized phase.<sup>34</sup> The main argument of why a certain issue should take absolute precedence over other issues at hand and become securitized, is grounded in the logic of survival, which is the idea that “we will not be here or will not be free to handle the issue in our own way if the issue is not handled with extraordinary means.”<sup>35</sup>

The survival logic shares similarities with other perspectives on power politics embedded within different strains of realism. Theoretically, realism views security and survival as deeply intertwined due to survival being grounded in some version of security which in this theoretical framework is international security.<sup>36</sup> The logic of survival in the case of securitization is as followed; emergency measures can be legitimized and adopted when an issue is presented as an existential threat to a designated referent object, which traditionally is the state but could also be another object. Hence, the invocation of security from a state representative serves as a key for special measures deemed necessary to counter the threat and thereby ensuring survival.<sup>37</sup> The criteria and definition of securitization is based on an intersubjective establishment of an existential threat, which distinguishes itself by having significant political ramifications. The securitizing actor embeds the ramifications in both discourse and rhetoric in order to argue why a phenomenon should be securitized.<sup>38</sup>

### 3.2 Security Move and Speech Act

An act of securitization is a two-stage process, where the first stage is a *security move*. This move portrays certain issues, be it individuals or entities as existential threats to referent objects.<sup>39</sup> Traditionally, the referent object has been the state, and more specifically the state’s sovereignty, but within the securitization framework anything can become a referent object by a securitizing actor, as long as the connection to survival of a referent object is made.<sup>40</sup> According to the theory, different actors can initiate the move for instance non-state actors, but a security move tends to be made by powerful actors from the state or other elites from

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<sup>34</sup> Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, (1998). pp. 28–29

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. pp. 24

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. pp. 21

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. pp. 21

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. pp. 25

<sup>39</sup> Emmers, Ralf. Securitization. In *Contemporary security studies*, Collins, Allan (red.). 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2016). pp. 171

<sup>40</sup> Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, (1998). pp. 36

privileged positions with a capital of power and influence.<sup>41</sup> The securitizing actor then, is an individual or individuals who has the capacity and power to perform security through a speech act as well as the capacity to declare what the referent object is and why its existence is existentially threatened.<sup>42</sup> These actors can be politicians, lobbyists, governments or even companies and are usually basing their argument for an act of security on the need to defend the survival of a state, nation, a principle or other large communities.<sup>43</sup> The move and the ensuing process is intersubjective and socially constructed and rests on legitimacy, meaning an actor has to discursively initiate a *security move* concerning a phenomena which is presented and positioned as an existential threat to a referent object. But the move also, at least in democratic societies, has to be consented and accepted by an audience.<sup>44</sup> Consequently, the use of language, or more specifically language related to security, is key as its use enables securitizing actors to articulate a problem in security terms to persuade and condition the audience.<sup>45</sup> This is primarily used during the second stage of securitizations, *the speech act*. The act is considered to be the starting point of an issue becoming securitized and the actor utilizes language and discourse to condition and persuade the audience (public opinion, politicians, elites or military leadership) of the existential threat to the security of the referent object which has a legitimate claim to survival.<sup>46</sup>

The securitizing actor speaks security through the speech act to attempt to successfully legitimize the securitization of an issue which endangers the survival of a referent object. The speech act comes from the academic field of language theory and serves as an negotiation between the securitizing actor and the relevant audience, whom the actor must rhetorically persuade of the existential threat to a referent object's survival, and thereby gain legitimacy to use special measures.<sup>47</sup> It is important to note that the success of a securitization does not rest upon the securitizing actor, but on whether the audience of the speech act accepts something as existentially threatened – hence, security does not rest on objects or with the subjects but within the interplay of subjects, the actor and the audience.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Emmers, Ralf. Securitization. In *Contemporary security studies*, Collins, Allan (red.). 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2016). pp. 171

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, (1998). pp. 40

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. pp. 40

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. pp. 25

<sup>45</sup> Emmers, Ralf. Securitization. In *Contemporary security studies*, Collins, Allan (red.). 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2016). pp. 171

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. pp. 171

<sup>47</sup> Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, (1998). pp. 26

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. pp. 31

By now, the reader probably associates the speech act with a politician addressing the nation, declaring why an issue constitutes an existential threat and therefore has to be dealt with by using extraordinary measures. My argument is that a speech act is not limited to classical setups with a political leader with power speaking either directly or indirectly to an audience but can be found in written texts as well. These texts or written documents can be “potential carriers of speech acts” containing the same security discourse and language found in a regular speech while also representing the voice the government on a certain issue. Consequently, I argue that the Swedish and British governmental strategies on counter-terrorism therefore should be viewed as potential carriers of speech acts, since the discourse and language within represents each government’s stance of the issue of terrorism and sets out objectives and measures to combat it.

Accordingly, the thesis will on the basis of the governmental strategies view the governments as the securitizing actors, with the power to initiate a speech act, which could, if accepted result in terrorism becoming a securitized issue. The thesis will not make any claims to whether the speech acts are accepted or not as that is decided by the audience. It will instead strictly examine the speech act-dimension to identify potential carriers of speech acts.

### 3.3 Political-Military sector of analysis

The theoretical framework of securitization consists of different sectors of analysis. For the purpose of this thesis, the sectors used for analysis are the political and military, but combined into one sector, the Political-Military sector. The military sector’s most common referent object is the state or the state’s territory, but can also be political entities or in extreme circumstances the armed forces themselves.<sup>49</sup> Modern states are defined by the principle of sovereignty, in which each state has the right to claim self-rule over a specific territory and the population residing there. This also means the state has the right to assert and defend their claim against internal and external challengers, for instance other armed forces or non-state actors such as terrorist groups.<sup>50</sup> Interlinkages can be found between the military and political sector even though they are largely distinct. A democratically elected government in power has the ability to use force to claim and enforce sovereignty over the state, but can only do so if the governance is consented by the larger population. The securitizing actors of the sector usually entails state

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid. pp. 22

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. pp. 49–50

representatives, meaning representatives in the government bureaucracy with the power and influence especially in matters concerning national security.<sup>51</sup>

Referent objects in the political sector are typically the sovereignty or ideology of a state, but can also be much larger collective systems such as the EU or western states sharing values, sovereignty and ideological standpoints.<sup>52</sup> The existential threats could severely question or challenge the recognition, legitimacy or governing authority claiming sovereignty over a territory or an ideology on which a system of states base its values and norms and thereby pressing the political system to action.<sup>53</sup> The threats in this sector are therefore normally directed to the internal or external legitimacy of the state and its political units or institutions.<sup>54</sup> Internal threats typically challenge the legitimacy of the political units, the government or institutions by contesting political values, government policies or ideologies on which the state is defined.<sup>55</sup> Political external threats then, are the opposite and involve threats concerning external recognition of the state and its legitimacy. It does not necessary have to be directed at a state's sovereignty but can be a challenge to the internal legitimacy.<sup>56</sup> The main security actors in the political sector are usually the government which in democracies have a legitimate claim to rule over its sovereign territory, the government thus acts as the legitimate agent of the state and its claims are an open subject to public scrutiny.<sup>57</sup>

The thesis will use a combined sector of analysis, the Political-Military sector, since terrorism as a phenomenon has both an armed, often violent element and a political. The relevancy of military sector is due to most terrorist groups having the capacity and intent to use violence in order to achieve an objective. The target of the violence is usually civilians or non-combatants, who are unarmed and easier to target compared to security forces and by attacking them the group often gains publicity to spread their larger objective. The attacks are often conducted on the target's sovereign territory, in the heart of their perceived enemy. The military sector's main referent object is the state or its sovereign territory, and threats or direct attacks from terrorist groups are therefore seen as an attack or threat on the targeted state's sovereignty – thus reinforcing the relevancy of the military sector. The larger objective of each terrorist group usually differs, but generally the objective is fueled by an ideology in direct conflict with that of the target's or political aim which stands in stark contrast with the

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid. pp. 55–56

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. pp. 23

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. pp. 22-23

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. pp. 143–144

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. pp. 144

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. pp. 144

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. pp. 144

target's. The group is thus usually prepared to use terrorism violence as a means to an end, which is to force its objective on the target. My argument is therefore that we should in the context of securitization understand terrorism as an issue dwelling in the political and military domain, due to the duality of core functions in terrorism which are to through armed violence achieve a political objective which often is incompatible with the target's.

The speech act could therefore involve a combination of referent objects and existential threats from both the political and military sector. Also, since the emergency embedded within a potential speech act's call for extraordinary measures could entail extended counter-terrorism powers, it could have potential implications for human rights. For instance, the governments could consider increased surveillance of public areas with CCTV-cameras, or increased electronic surveillance and data collection. Each of these measures could threaten or downright violate human rights in its own way if not used properly with clear checks and balances government by rule of law. Another possibility is that the governments could, contrary to the extraordinary measures in a securitization, instead call for counter-terrorism efforts within the confines of the politicized sphere and adhere to the regular rules of the game in politics.

## 4 Methodological Framework

With the theoretical framework now explained, the thesis will turn to how a potential speech act can be identified and analyzed. The act is as previously stated, considered to be the starting point of an issue becoming securitized where an actor utilizes language and discourse to condition and persuade the audience of the existential threat to the security of the referent object, which has a legitimate claim to survival. The thesis will use Stritzel's model, which combines the theoretical framework from securitization with critical discourse analysis, more specifically Fairclough's discourse analysis and concept of 'intertextuality', to identify a potential speech act. This section will first introduce the field of discourse analysis. It will then explain central concepts of critical discourse analysis. Stritzel's model on Speech acts will then be presented and operationalized to fit the aim and answer the research question of the thesis. Finally, an introduction to the primary material will be presented.

### 4.1 The Field of Discourse Analysis

Discourse as a concept is the idea of our language being structured by various patterns in how we express ourselves in different domains of social life, for instance political discourse. Discourse analysis is when we analyze these patterns. While hard to clearly define, Jørgensen and Philips suggest a preliminary definition of "discourse as a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)".<sup>58</sup> By analyzing discourses in policy statements, speeches and so on, the analyst is allowed to denaturalize the categories assumed in political analysis into units of interests, strategies and power in a qualitative fashion.<sup>59</sup>

The philosophical starting point of discourse analysis is that "Our access to reality is always through language and "with language we create representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality."<sup>60</sup> The shared philosophy thus views language as more than ways of communicating behavior or facts about the world, the ascription of meaning in discourses works to constitute and change the

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<sup>58</sup> Jørgensen, Marianne, and Louise Phillips. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, 1st ed, Thousand Oaks, Calif; London; Sage Publications, (2002). pp. 1

<sup>59</sup> Katharina T. Paul (2009) Discourse analysis: an exploration of methodological issues and a call for methodological courage in the field of policy analysis, *Critical Policy Studies*, 3:2, pp. 241

<sup>60</sup> Jørgensen, Marianne, and Louise Phillips. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, 1st ed, Thousand Oaks, Calif; London; Sage Publications, (2002). pp. 8-9

social world – changes in discourse becomes means by which the social world is changed.<sup>61</sup> This means that depending on the context of an issue, multiple different discourses can be at play, each pointing to alternative courses of action by either constituting or changing the social world.

The language inherent in the discourses does not only convey information about the world, it generates and as a result constitutes the social world – changes in the discourse thus becomes changes in the social world through the struggles between discourses engaged in changing or reproducing the social reality. This understanding of language as a system, independent of the reality to which it refers is derived from the structuralist linguistics thoughts from Ferdinand de Saussure, who argued that social conventions and not the world itself, dictate how we connect meanings with sounds or words.<sup>62</sup> According to his argument words are part of a structure of other words, each with their own meanings, thus giving the word its meaning from everything that it is not.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, Saussure views the structure as a social institution which can be changed over time because of that the correlation between language and reality is arbitrary – the meaning we attribute to each word is not inherent but a result of social conventions.<sup>64</sup> As mentioned before both structuralist and poststructuralist approaches draw upon Saussure's thoughts, but diverge on a couple aspects. Contrary to Saussure's notion of the meanings of words being changeable over time, structuralist thought rests on the assumption of language being fixed which causes problem for the approach to explain and understand change.<sup>65</sup> Poststructuralists on the other hand, assume that structures exist, but in a temporary and not consistent state, thus giving different meanings the ability to shift in relation to one another while also believing that in concrete language use, structure is created, reproduced and changed.<sup>66</sup>

Speech acts for instance, can draw upon the structures, but can simultaneously challenge the structures and suggest alternative ideas.<sup>67</sup> While discourse analytical approaches may not share all of the assumptions of post-structuralism, they do all share the notion of language not being a reflection of a pre-existing reality and that language is structured in patterns or discourse and that different meanings can be found in different discourses.<sup>68</sup> There

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid. pp. 9

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. pp. 10

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. pp. 10

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. pp. 10

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. pp. 10

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. pp. 10

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. pp. 11

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. pp. 12

is also a consensus on discourse patterns being maintained or changed through discursive practices and that the patterns should be analyzed in the specific context in which the language is in action.<sup>69</sup>

## 4.2 Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis

Moving on to Fairclough's critical discourse analysis framework which will be used for this thesis. What makes critical discourse analysis in general, and Fairclough's framework, stand apart from poststructuralist discourse theories is that discourse can be constitutive and constituted. The dialectical relationship between discourse and other social dimensions in Fairclough's approach gives discourse the ability to, as a social practice, reproduce and change knowledge, identities and social relations while simultaneously being shaped by other social practices and structures.<sup>70</sup> The concept of social structures are explained as social relations in society as well as within specific institutions, relevant for the discursive practice which consists of both discursive and non-discursive elements.<sup>71</sup> It is important to understand that Fairclough view the relationship between discursive practice and social structures as complex and variable, changing over time which is a clear divergence from other approaches of critical discourse analysis views the relationship more stable.<sup>72</sup> Fairclough positions his approach closer to poststructuralism than structuralism with the claim of discourse practice besides from reproducing existing discursive structure also challenges the structure by using words to denote what may lie outside of the structure.

The most central concept of relevance for this study is Intertextuality which is found in Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis. Intertextuality is a condition where the use of a text always is situated within and against other texts, which in turn are situated within and against other texts and meanings and so on indefinitely.<sup>73</sup> These links of intertextuality can according to Fairclough contribute, in situations of historical change, to discursively continuity and change. A sentiment not shared by some poststructuralists who instead view the concept as a manifestation of great instability and changeability.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid. pp. 12

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. pp. 65

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. pp. 65

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. pp. 66

<sup>73</sup> Stritzel, H. Securitization, power, intertextuality: Discourse theory and the translation of organized crime. *Security Dialogue*, 43(6), pp. 553

<sup>74</sup> Jørgensen, Marianne, and Louise Phillips. *'Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method'*, (1st ed, Thousand Oaks, Calif; London: Sage Publications, (2002). pp. 74

### 4.3 Stritzel’s Model for Speech Acts

As stated in the theoretical chapter, securitization is a change in which an issue is transferred from the politicized domain into the securitized domain where extraordinary measures are enabled to resolve the issue. As asserted earlier, the speech act “is considered to be the starting point of an issue” becoming securitized. The speech act is, thus central to the transfer where the securitizing actor has to use security language and discourse to argue why an issue constitutes an existential threat to a referent object and persuade the audience of the need to use extraordinary measures to combat the threat. Thus, the speech act is central to the success of any securitization where the discourse is marked by a clear change to security discourse to better fit the actor’s motives. In order to answer the research question, the thesis will utilize Stritzel’s model for dissecting securitizing speech acts into;<sup>75</sup>

Generic speech act	Securitizing speech act	Contextualization (empirical)
<i>Claim</i>	Something is dangerous (potentially an existential threat)	Contextualized description of the danger
<i>Warning</i>	If something is not done, the danger/threat will be realized	Contextualized description of the consequences of inaction.
<i>Demand</i>	Something should be done	Contextualized description of an action plan

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<sup>75</sup> Stritzel, H. Securitization, power, intertextuality: Discourse theory and the translation of organized crime. *Security Dialogue*, 43(6), pp. 555

<i>Propositional content</i>	Proof or reasons in support of the claim/warning	Contextualized presentation of proof and/or reasons
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Stritzel's model draws upon Fairclough's concept of intertextuality where meanings of the texts are thus in a constant state of change and are never entirely fixed and can be affected by other social practices.<sup>76</sup> This line of reasoning is also suitable for both the research questions and the aims of the thesis, especially to compare how political discourse in different strategies may change over time and the consequences for human rights. Furthermore, Stritzel draws upon Fairclough's and the critical discourse analysis approaches in general and includes the aspect of contextualization, defined as 'a mode of speaking about the subject that adapts to the specific institutional environment in which the speaking subject is handled.'<sup>77</sup> Stritzel's framework of analysis uses a generic sequence of *claim, warning, demand and propositional content* to capture the speech act process of securitization and the politics of intertextuality<sup>78</sup> The generic sequence is based on the contributions on speech acts made by Juha Vuori, but Stritzel modified it to include the dimension of intertextuality within the context of securitization.<sup>79</sup>

The *claim* will be used on the strategies to determine whether terrorism is designated as an existential threat to a referent object with regards to the Political-Military sector. The *warning* will be used to identify how each government describes the consequences of inaction. The *demand* will be which measures or plans for action each government presents to overcome the existential threat. These are often referred to as 'measures' in the analysis and discussion section. Lastly, the *propositional content* serves as proof or reasons in support of the claim and warning. During the analysis, propositional content will be included under the headings of claim and warning.

Discourse analysis will be used to compare and analyze the strategies on counter-terrorism for Sweden and Great Britain, since I argue that the inherent discourse in each one, especially on a level of comparison, could indicate whether the strategy is a potential carrier of a speech act, which if accepted could lead to a securitization of terrorism. As previously asserted, the thesis will make no claims to whether the process of securitization is successful or

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid. pp. 553

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. pp. 555

Stritzel, H. Securitization, power, intertextuality: Discourse theory and the translation of organized crime. *Security Dialogue*, 43(6), pp. 553

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. pp. 554

not, since that is the task of the audience. The purpose is to examine if the strategies are in fact speech acts, containing discourse on referent objects, existential threat and calls for extraordinary measures. Discursive changes of interest could be how governments view the threat level from terrorism or the nature of the measures put forward to combat terrorism. If the measures purposed go beyond the politicized domain, they may very well be part of a securitization move.

By applying the model on each governmental strategy and comparing the results, possible intertextual links can be identified. Discursive changes could indicate that a securitization is taking place and a potential shift is of interest to answer the research questions. Furthermore, the discourse on human rights are of interest to identify and compare, since the extraordinary measures embedded in securitizations could collide with human rights obligations.

It is also important to note that one does not necessary aspire to achieve great validity in discourse analysis. The reason for this is simply that discourses are grounded in our understanding of the reality, and not in how we measure it. Put more precisely, discourse is about how we interpret reality and there can exist multiple interpretations of reality which is represented in different discourses.

#### 4.4 Introduction to the material

A brief introduction to the primary material will be given before continuing into the analysis section. As mentioned in section on Case Selection, Material and Delimitations, the primary material consists of two Swedish strategies on counter-terrorism from 2012, respectively 2015 – as well as two strategies from the government of the United Kingdom from 2011, respectively 2016.

Starting with the Swedish strategies. The oldest was published in 2012 and is called ‘Government Communication 2011/12:73 Responsibility and commitment – a national counter-terrorism strategy’. The strategy consists of 46 pages and special focus has been on the sections called ‘A national counter-terrorism strategy’ (section 2), ‘Threats to Sweden’ (section 3), ‘Starting points in the fight against terrorism’ (section 4) and lastly ‘Objectives and measures’ (section 5).

The most recent Swedish strategy from 2015 is called ‘Government Communication 2014/15:146 Prevent, preempt and protect– the Swedish counter-terrorism

strategy', published in 2015. It consists of 46 pages and special focus has been on the sections called 'A new counter-terrorism strategy' (section 1), 'Three areas of counter-terrorism work' (section 2) and finally 'Managing the consequences of a terrorist attack' (section 3).

The chosen governmental strategies from the United Kingdom are the following. The oldest Strategy from the government of the United Kingdom was published in 2011 and is called 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism'. The strategy is consisting of 125 pages and a special focus has been on the sections called 'Foreword', 'Introduction', 'Strategic Context' and finally 'our response'.

The most recent strategy from the United Kingdom was published in 2016 and is called 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy For Countering Terrorism: annual report for 2015'. The strategy consists of 32 pages and a special focus has been on the sections called 'Introduction' (section 1) and Our response (section 2).

The material is vast, especially when it comes to the measures in the strategies. In order to stay as true as possible to the material I have chosen to include every measure I determine to be worth mentioning. However, in the discussions and comparisons, I have chosen to only include measures of importance to the research question and aims.

## 5 Analysis

Stritzel's Generic speech act typology which encompasses claim, warning, demand and propositional content will now be applied on the strategies. The Swedish strategies will be analyzed and discussed first and the United Kingdom's strategies last. A comparison will then follow, discussing similarities and dissimilarities between Sweden and the United Kingdom.

### 5.1 Government Communication 2011/12:73 Responsibility and commitment – a national counter-terrorism strategy

#### Claim and Propositional Content

The Swedish government's main claim is that the threat of violent extremism posed from groups adhering to white power, left-wing autonomous movements and violent Islamic extremism is low. Although persons within these groups are posing as threats to Swedish citizens and may be capable of inflicting serious crimes.

“Violent extremism in Sweden is often divided into three different types of environments: white power, left-wing autonomous movements and violent Islamic extremism. At present none of these three environments is a serious threat to the democratic system in Sweden. However, persons operating in these environments do subject individuals to threats or serious crimes.”<sup>80</sup>

The strategy provides propositional content to the claim by repeatedly referring to the terrorism situation in Europe and indicates that most attacks in Europe are planned and executed by “European actors that are driven by other political ideologies than those inspired by Al-Qaida. Further propositional content to the claim are presented as groups which “regularly commit attacks” usually are anarchists or left-wing extremists.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, carried out attacks and thwarted plans for attacks have shown that there is a real risk of terrorist attacks in Sweden and

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<sup>80</sup> Sweden's national counter-terrorism strategy. Government Communication 2011/12:73. (2012) Stockholm: Ministry of Justice.

<http://www.government.se/49b75c/contentassets/68b06b9ece124c8e88df0d943ce4ecd7/swedens-national-counter-terrorism-strategy-skr.-20111273> . pp. 6

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. pp. 6

on Swedish interests. The strategy also indicates that individual terrorists, inspired by larger group's ideologies pose an increased danger to Sweden and its interests since these attacks;

“(..) may involve perpetrators who are allied to established terrorist organizations but who make a conscious choice to act alone so as to avoid discovery. They may also involve individuals acting on their own initiative without any real interaction with other groups or networks. The risk of attacks by individuals acting mainly on their own makes the threat picture more complex and difficult to assess”.<sup>82</sup>

### Warning and Propositional Content

The increased problem of individuals who travel to conflict areas from Sweden and other parts of the western world, where they receive training in armed combat, is contributing to the increasing difficulty of assessing threat profiles of individuals.<sup>83</sup>

The government also warns of “terrorism threatens our [Sweden's] fundamental rights and freedoms” and that terror constitutes as one of several threats directed “at human life and health, property, the capability of society to function and ultimately, national security and our[Sweden's] fundamental values”. The strategy adds that it is up to every responsible state to assume responsibility for security over its own territory.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore the government declares that all counter-terrorism measures must be in accordance with the rule of law and be conducted with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms and not outside of it;

“Respect for and the defense of these rights and freedoms, including the human rights expressed in several international commitments, are a precondition for effective counter-terrorism, an obligation for the state and an explicit will in our [Sweden] country. The fight against terrorist crime sometimes means striking difficult balances between different interests and objectives.”<sup>85</sup>

### Demands

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid. pp. 6

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. pp. 5–6

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. pp. 4

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. pp. 7

Although the government indicates of Sweden's counter-terrorism capabilities being effective and working at the time, the strategy presents several demands under the categories of preventing, pursuing and preparing. The measures under the category of preventing are focused on the emergence and countering of the driving forces behind terrorism and typically "goes beyond traditional law enforcement measures" by actors "in society such as schools, social services and municipalities as well as by voluntary organizations and the research community".<sup>86</sup> The government argues that free access to internet and mobile networks are important tools for open and democratic societies, to counter and withstand anti-democratic and extremist views and efforts to spread propaganda and misleading information.<sup>87</sup> The strategy presents plans for a national action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism, with the intent to strengthen democracy in the long term and making society more resistant to violence-promoting extremism. One measure contained within the action plan is tasking the National Board for Youth Affairs of funding civil society organizations, so they in turn can carry out democracy promoting activities directed to young people and defectors to prevent the recruitment opportunities by extremists.<sup>88</sup>

The strategy also calls for the Police authority and the Swedish Security Service to maintain long-established dialogue and contact promoting activities "to build trust and good relations". Furthermore, the two agencies will "maintain a visible presence in contexts where there may be particularly young people, who are drifting into circles where violence is advocated as a means of changing society."<sup>89</sup> The government tasks the Swedish Prison and Probation Service with developing capacities to "identifying people, groups and phenomena that are signs of ongoing recruitment to violent extremism in the prison and probation service environment". Other adopted measures includes the power to restrict prisoners contacts with the outside world if the prisoner risking being complicit in a terrorist offence.<sup>90</sup> The government also view Sweden's governmental agencies continuing role on the international arena in combating poverty, developing stable democracies, strengthening human rights and the establishment of rule of law, as important measures to prevent terrorism.<sup>91</sup> The government therefore view the participation of the Swedish Armed Forces and civilian agencies in

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid. pp. 9

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. pp. 9

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. pp.10

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. pp.10

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. pp. 12

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. pp. 14

international peace-support operations as important to prevent terrorism, especially the mission to Afghanistan.<sup>92</sup>

The ‘pursuing category’ of demands put forward by the government is aimed to increase capabilities to discover and reduce threats, and stop ongoing attacks. The strategy calls for increased resource and inter-agency collaboration to enhance national capabilities of discovering, investigating and stopping terrorist attacks in Sweden and on Swedish interests.<sup>93</sup> The strategy aims to enhance collaboration and cooperation between governmental agencies, where resources such as the police’s National Task Force, can be used by other agencies, for instance the Swedish Security Services. The government also want agencies in the Counter-terrorism Cooperative Council to increase the levels of information exchange.<sup>94</sup> Another demand in this category that the government wants to allow the Swedish Security Service and the police to be given the possibility of “targeting signals surveillance by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)” which would enable the authorities to “map phenomena, strategic conditions with respect to terrorism and other serious cross-border crime that can threaten important national interests”.<sup>95</sup> The Swedish government also asserts that “Sweden has undertaken not to be a sanctuary where terrorist crime can become established” which includes not giving asylum or residence permits to individuals who intend to support terrorism.<sup>96</sup>

Under the preparatory demands, the strategy calls for measures directed to prepare and protect the Swedish society and its interests, in the event of a terrorist attack with good early warning capabilities obtained through intelligence, inter-agency collaboration and capabilities to “return to normality to reduce the effects of a terrorist attack”.<sup>97</sup> The government deems collaboration based on responsibility principle between emergency services to function well and with the formation of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in 2009, the civil emergency preparedness was strengthened, “but with respect to the management of the consequences of a terrorist attack there is scope to further develop cooperation”.<sup>98</sup> The government has tasked MSB with preparing a national strategy for the protection of installations and functions necessary for crisis management and upholding public security in the event of a disaster and or attack.

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid. pp. 14

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. pp. 17

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. pp. 18–19

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. pp. 22–23

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. pp. 24

<sup>97</sup> Ibid. pp. 29-30

<sup>98</sup> Ibid. pp. 31

## 5.2 Government Communication 2014/15:146 Prevent, preempt and protect – the Swedish counter-terrorism strategy

### Claim and Propositional Content

The government's main claim is that the threat in Sweden today "foremost comes from actors inspired by Al-Qaeda or the ideologies of closely related organizations". The government judge violent Islamic extremist movements to have the capability to carry out terrorist attacks, but only a few of the groups have developed the intent to commit them.<sup>99</sup> Individuals who travel to and return from areas of conflict;

"where individuals have participated in terrorist training or committed acts of violence which means that the number of people in Sweden with capabilities to carry out attacks or other types of ideologically motivated crime, such as threats and acts of violence, is increasing."<sup>100</sup>

Propositional Content to the claim found in the strategy presents the use of internet and social media as key tools "of the global movement inspired by al-Qaeda in spreading propaganda and for radicalization and recruitment". There are signs of the rhetoric used by Al-Qaeda and ISIL being normalized "even among very young people in Sweden".<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, the attacks in Copenhagen and Paris are evidence of individuals deciding to act in the future, due to past perceived grievances. Recent attacks have also targeted countries involved in the US-led coalition's military intervention in Iraq – hence Sweden's military involvement in areas of conflict may influence the view of Sweden as a target in the future by violent Islamic actors.<sup>102</sup> Lone attackers are increasingly threatening to Sweden since they also can act without group affiliations or networks along with different ideological motives.<sup>103</sup> The government strategy asserts that the majority terrorist attacks still are made outside the European borders by Al-

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<sup>99</sup> Sweden's national counter-terrorism strategy. Government Communication 2014/15:146. (2015) Stockholm: Ministry of Justice

[https://www.government.se/4a80d6/contentassets/b56cad17b4434118b16cf449dbdc973d/en\\_strategi-slutlig-eng.pdf](https://www.government.se/4a80d6/contentassets/b56cad17b4434118b16cf449dbdc973d/en_strategi-slutlig-eng.pdf) . pp. 4

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. pp. 4

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. pp. 4

<sup>102</sup> Ibid. pp. 4–5

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. pp. 4–5

Qaeda and the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant.<sup>104</sup> Left-wing and right-wing extremist movements in Sweden, on the other hand, are likely to have the capabilities to carry out attacks but according to the strategy “there is no explicit intention to carry any out at this current time”.<sup>105</sup>

### Warning and Propositional Content

The main warning of the government’s new strategy is that terrorism could harm the;

“openness and respect for human rights and for the fundamental values of democracy. People must be able to move freely and safely, and be free to assemble, express their opinions and wear religious symbols without fear of threats of violence. Terrorism threatens these fundamental values and we [Sweden] must continue to combat it.”<sup>106</sup>

The warning is supported by propositional content stating that “we cannot protect ourselves against everything but we must do everything we can to protect ourselves”. Additional propositional content to the warning presented in the strategy is the reference to the attacks in Paris and Copenhagen along with the statement of “the fact that terrorist attacks continue to be committed in the world shows that we [Sweden] need to do more, which sets new demands for work to counter-terrorism”.<sup>107</sup>

### Demand

The government strategy also clearly positions how the Swedish government aim to combat terrorism with “No one is born a terrorist, the aim must be to identify radicalization processes as early as possible in order to counteract further radicalization of these groups or individuals and prevent them from ultimately committing terrorist acts”.<sup>108</sup>

By focusing on preventative measures, the government hope to prevent more people from developing “an intent and capability to commit terrorist attacks in the longer

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid. pp. 4

<sup>105</sup> Ibid. pp. 4

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. pp. 3

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. pp. 3

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. pp. 5

term”.<sup>109</sup> However, while favoring the preventative approach the government also recognize the need for a balance between preventative and repressive measures from the Swedish state;

“The purpose of preventative measures is to reduce violent radicalization and recruitment to terrorist groups. Repressive and controlling measures are necessary to deflect immediate terrorist threats. Effective counter-terrorism therefore requires both preventative and repressive measures that complement each other.”<sup>110</sup>

Central to the counter-terrorism measures in the Swedish government’s strategy, both proposed and already implemented is the fundamental premise of that human rights and the principles of the rule of law are respected and terrorism may only be countered by means that are appropriate in an open, democratic society governed by the rule of law – principles which “are at the heart of the Government’s counter-terrorism work in Sweden and internationally.”<sup>111</sup> These elements are ultimately characteristics and fundamental values of an open and democratic society which terrorism threatens as seen in the government’s main warning.

The current Swedish strategy on counter-terrorism presents measures situated within four categories (where the former had three); Prevent, Preempt (previously pursuing), Protect, and Managing the consequences of a terrorist attack - the measures within the categories are the demands of the governmental strategy.

The main objective of the measures in the ‘Prevent’ category is, according to the government, to identify and develop methods and measures to prevent radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism while also encouraging and streamlining collaboration between different actors involved in prevention.<sup>112</sup> One measure the government implemented in 2014, was appointing a National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism (hereafter, National Coordinator). The National Coordinator area of focus is to “improve the cooperation between agencies, local government and organization at national, regional and local level”. The government furthered the National Coordinators instructions in 2015, to launch a pilot scheme with a “national telephone hotline, which relatives, local government and organizations can contact to obtain information, advice and support on issues concerning

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid. pp. 6

<sup>110</sup> Ibid. pp. 5–6

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. pp. 6

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. pp. 9–10

violent

extremism.<sup>113</sup>

On the issue of increased spreading of propaganda and material glorifying and encouraging violence on internet and social media by extremists and terrorist groups, the government reasserts that “the Swedish Constitution provides powerful protection for freedom of expression” . Sweden’s best way of tackling propaganda from violent extremism and terrorism is be equipped to tackle anti-democratic messages “by providing knowledge”.<sup>114</sup> An example of this is the ‘No Hate Speech Movement’, aiming to increase media awareness among children and youths by strengthening their ability to “use freedom of expression and respect human rights”, while simultaneously increasing their participation in democracy and source-criticism.<sup>115</sup> Another demand from the government on the preventative side of the strategy is to increase information sharing between the Security Service and the Police authority, in order to identify areas showing signs of radicalization, and initiate measures to stop the process. These measures could range from supporting people wishing to leave extremist environments to the addressing of push and pull factors to extremist environments.

The preemptive demands of the strategy concerns measure to provide law enforcement authorities with “appropriate tools” to preempt attacks and counter funding of terrorism by improving the concerned actors opportunity to act with access to and sharing of information.<sup>116</sup> The government reinforces the importance and encourage the continued use of the ‘Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council’ as forum for information sharing and collaboration between the concerned agencies<sup>117</sup> The government also requires a deepened cooperation between the Security Service and Police Authority, especially concerning sharing local information between the two agencies and international counterparts since “terrorism is often a cross border-crime”.<sup>118</sup> The government recognizes the need for coercive measures, for example bugging as “a necessary element in the ability of law enforcement authorities to keep pace with criminality”. New permanent statutory provisions on coercive measures was introduced in 2014 and these measures will be closely monitored by the government in regard to how personal privacy is protected.<sup>119</sup>

The main objective of the demands in the protect-category of measures is to make Swedish society safe by making it more difficult for people with an intention and capability of

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid. pp. 9–10

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. pp. 10–11

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. pp. 11

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. pp. 15

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. pp. 16

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. pp. 16

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. pp. 17

committing a terrorist attack, to enter Sweden and to remain here. On the other hand, the government will also keep protecting individual rights and freedoms “such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion”.<sup>120</sup> The government want Sweden to strive for an open and transparent society with a “humane asylum policy and be a refuge for those fleeing persecution and oppression”. The strategy assesses that no initiatives should be taken at the current time to amend regulations on citizenship which now rests upon a cooperation between the Migration Agency and the Security Services to identify security related obstacles.<sup>121</sup>

The protection of places and functions in society connected to exercising rights and freedoms in a democracy, such as buildings of the Riksdag and the Government, polling stations, media headquarters and premises used by religious communities “are subject to greater danger than others” according to the strategy.<sup>122</sup> This in combination with upholding public security leads the government to conclude;

“...In this context, measures to ensure safety may include providing adequate surveillance of public assemblies. It is also very important that information that can be passed on to the public about the current threat scenarios or risk of terrorist attacks is communicated in a claiming manner that is easy to understand.”<sup>123</sup>

This serves as an indication of the government considering increased surveillance measures due to the threat of terrorism, and a clear change from the previous strategy. In terms of privacy and integrity such measures mark a clear restriction for individuals residing on Swedish territory. The measures under managing the consequences of a terrorist attack mainly consists of establishing the roles of each agency needed to manage an attack. The government is positive of the entered agreements between the Police Authority and Security Services, stating which organization the various responsibilities should be assigned to in the event of an attack. The strategy clearly dictates that the Police Authority has the intervening responsibility, mainly with the Counter-Terrorism Unit to stop an ongoing attack or planned attack. The Police Authority also supports and assists the Security Services in events where the latter is responsible for measures. There is also a system in place called the ‘Atlas Network’, where national intervention units from EU and Norway work to combat cross-border terrorism. The Swedish

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid. pp. 21

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. pp. 22

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. pp. 25

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. pp. 25

government and its counter terrorism unit can request support, in the event of a terrorist attack, from other EU Member state's counter-terrorism units through the invocation of the system's mechanism called the Atlas Decision – which indicates a degree of international cooperation between states.<sup>124</sup>

The Swedish government also clearly demand that the Swedish capabilities are influenced and improved on other governments experiences with terrorism, especially Norway. The government refers to a Norwegian Commission report following the attack, which reveled “major vulnerabilities” and want Sweden to take the commission's findings into account when developing Swedish preparedness for terrorist attacks. The work to counter the threat from terrorism should be characterized by a whole society approach with the “All actors in the society must jointly, within their respective area take responsibility for and improve the security of society and managing the consequences of a terrorist attack”. The Swedish capacity to handle societal outcomes in the event of a terrorist attack should be “developed on the basis of the fact that attacks seek to disrupt Sweden's social order and create obstacles to an open and democratic society with a great degree of freedom.

### 5.3 Discussion on the Swedish counter-terrorism strategies

My interpretation is that the referent object in the 2011 Swedish strategy on counter-terrorism from 2011 is the combination of the democratic system, fundamental rights and freedoms, the state and its interests. Terrorism is described as one of several threats to the referent object, but the overall threat from groups adhering to Left and rightwing extremism and violence Islamic extremism. It is discursively evident that terrorism is not viewed as an existential threat to the government, but a threat all the same, with the potential of developing into something more serious. The discourse and language used is therefore not securitized, but focuses instead on solving the issue of terrorism within the normal confines of politics. However, the government view trends of terrorist attacks in Europe combined with individuals travelling to conflict areas and lone-wolf terrorist, as concerns to the Sweden. The government therefore take action to improve Sweden's counter-terrorism capabilities.

The government emphasize that all counter-terrorism measures put forward must follow rule of law and be implemented with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms – including human rights obligations. This line of reasoning of counter-terrorism being

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid. pp. 29–30

intertwined with rights and freedoms translates into a clear indication of terrorism still being treated as a politicized issue, and not as securitized issue. The preventative measures are designed to combat root causes to extremism and ultimately terrorism. Instead of restricting the citizens of Sweden in order to combat terrorism, the government views liberties and openness, and other fundamentals on which democracies are built upon as ways of countering terrorism. This is why the strategy views access to internet and mobile networks as important tools in countering violent propaganda and antidemocratic ideas. Moreover, the government view the Swedish contributions to peacekeeping missions and global development to combat poverty and strengthen human rights, as important preventative measures.

There are measures aimed to enhance law enforcement agencies ability to identify and disrupt potential terrorist attacks and plots. The suggestion of allowing the police authority to use capabilities of the National Defence Radio Establishment for targeting signals surveillance can be viewed as controversial. If not treated within rule of law, with respect for freedoms and rights. The measures put forward rarely included any kind of military involvement, instead most measures are situated within policing, democracy building and making society safer. No terrorist group is discursively portrayed as an existential threat either and therefore there are no calls for extraordinary measures. Thus, terrorism is in the sphere of politicization, and will be handled within the confines of politics. There are also clear references to human rights. All counter-terrorism measures must be taken in accordance of rule of law and Sweden's human rights obligation. Finally, the first strategy cannot be viewed as a speech act.

In most recent strategy from 2014, the discourse is more security oriented and this is intertextually shown. Where the former proclaimed that threat from terrorism was overall on a low level, the recent strategy instead states that Sweden is clearly threatened by Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. In comparison, the previous strategy explicitly stated that Al-Qaeda posed a low threat to Sweden. According to the military-political sector the existential threat here is Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. Likewise, the recent strategy intertextually builds and improve on the former, when defining in a greater detail the referent object and what terrorism is explicitly threatening. Terrorism is threatening the democracy of Sweden and its openness and respect for human rights and fundamental values. The warning is that inaction could potentially result in the harming of the values enabling people to move freely and safely, and be free to assemble, express their opinions and wear religious symbols without fear of threats of violence.

Left-wing and right-wing groups are again described to have capabilities to act, and could pose a future threat. But the government views no present intentions of willingness

to act from the groups. Al-Qaeda's reach is amplified by the group's use of internet and social media to recruit, radicalize and spread propaganda which are viewed as distressing developments. Furthermore, the strategy refers to attacks in Europe committed in retaliation to the US-led coalition's military intervention in Iraq. This means that Sweden could potentially be targeted for its involvement in areas of conflict by violent Islamic actors in the near future.

The Swedish government's counter-terrorism efforts are focused on striking a balance between preventive and repressive measures to better complement each other. Discursively, the Swedish government is of the opinion that no one is born a terrorist, consequently the focus is on preventive measures with the aim of addressing root causes to terrorism in order to counteract radicalization and thereby reducing future risks of individuals developing an intent to commit an attack. Intertextually, the strategy draws on the previous, by again reinforcing the principle of all counter-terrorism activity must be conducted in accordance with fundamental rights and freedoms and human rights obligations. The government clearly positions terrorism as a politicized issue by stating that it can only be countered by means appropriate in an open, democratic society government by rule of law. There are no calls for extraordinary measures, indicating terrorism is still politicized. Many of the measures called for revolves around strengthening ideas of democracy to counter anti-democratic messages in vulnerable areas and fostering human rights. The Swedish constitution provides powerful protection for freedom of expression and this is why the government decide to combat propaganda and anti-democratic messages with targeted measures directed to vulnerable groups, to improve knowledge of democracy, human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms.

The appointment of the National Coordinator is a clear shift from the 2011 strategy and could be interpreted as the Swedish government's dedication to preventative measures within rule of law. There is no explicit development on former strategy's proposal to let the Police collaborate with the FRA. However, the government has recognized the law enforcements agencies need for certain covert coercive measures such as bugging, and will monitor how personal privacy is protected in these measures. Another clear change is the considering of increasing surveillance of public assemblies to ensure public safety from the threat of terrorism. In terms of privacy and integrity such measures could potentially mark a clear restriction of public spaces for individuals residing on Swedish territory.

In terms of speech act, the discourse is more security oriented compared to the previous strategy. Al-Qa'ida is represented as an existential threat to the referent object, which is the Swedish state, its values and respect for fundamental rights. However, the measures called

for can in some regards be argued resemble extraordinary measures, such as covert coercive measures and increased surveillance of public spaces. But these measures are still taken within confines of rule of law. Instead, the strategy implies that the focus for Sweden's counter-terrorism efforts will be on preventative measures, aimed to combat the existential threat by addressing the root causes to radicalization, violent extremism and antidemocratic ideas. Consequently, the second strategy cannot be viewed as a speech act.

## 5.4 CONTEST: The United Kingdom's strategy for countering terrorism

### Claim and propositional content:

The government of the United Kingdom main claim is that terrorism is “one of the highest priority risks to UK's national security”. Although many terrorist groups threaten the UK and are mentioned in the strategy, “the most significant terrorist threat to the UK as a whole continues to come from Al Qa'ida and those terrorist groups and individuals associated with it”.<sup>125</sup>

The strategy provides a timeline showing four terrorist attacks on the UK and its interests. These attacks came from Al Qa'ida and affiliated groups and Northern Ireland related terrorism during 2010-2011.<sup>126</sup> Propositional content to the claim is that the “threat level from international terrorism has been SEVERE for much of the period (2009-2011), meaning that we judge a terrorist attack in the UK to be ‘highly likely’.”<sup>127</sup>

The fact that Al Qa'ida and its affiliates, other terrorist groups and lone terrorists have been active in the UK over the past two years, serves as propositional content to the claim. The greatest threat to the UK comes from terrorist groups based in Pakistan where “British nationals are training or operating, some intend to travel to Afghanistan”. Although, the British government assess Al Qa'ida as weaker than before 9/11, they still will not “underestimate the resilience of Al-Qa'ida. The group and its affiliates are sustained and empowered by long term factors such as fragile and failed states, technology and radicalization.”<sup>128</sup> Additionally, the threat to the UK and its interests has increased significantly from terrorists in Yemen and

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<sup>125</sup> The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Contest (2011) London: Home Department [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf) pp. 40

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. pp. 25

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. pp. 26

<sup>128</sup> Ibid. pp. 37

Somalia. UK citizens are traveling to the countries to fight, and return to plan and conduct operations. Northern Ireland related terrorism attacks are also on the rise, according to the government and threatening the ‘Good Friday agreement’ as well as the national security of the UK. The strategy also mentions extreme right-wing terrorism as much less widespread and capable due to;

“People involved in extreme right-wing groups have not received the same training, guidance or support as those who have engaged with Al Qa’ida or Al Qa’ida influenced organizations. Nor have they ever aspired or planned to conduct operations on a scale of those planned by Al Qa’ida”.<sup>129</sup>

#### Warning and propositional content:

The warning stems from the assessment of terrorist attacks to the UK are highly likely, especially from Al Qa’ida, its affiliated groups and individuals associated with the organization. Recent attacks show that groups possess both capabilities and intent to carry out attacks to the UK and its interests. The focus of the government is thus to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas so that “people can go about their lives freely and with confidence”.<sup>130</sup> Propositional content to the warning is presented with;

“The UK continues to face a significant threat from terrorism. This is reflected in the number of people we are arresting and then convicting and in the number of plots which have been disrupted. The number are higher than in most other countries in Europe.”<sup>131</sup>

#### Demand:

All measures, which are translated into demands, put forward in the CONTEST strategy are based on principles of proportionality and transparency. The strategy explicitly states that all counter-terrorism measures must be proportionate to the risks and necessary to reduce those risks to a level judged acceptable. Further, the strategy should also be transparent wherever possible and the government will seek to make more information available about the threats

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid. pp. 29-30

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. pp. 40

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. pp. 6

faced, the options and responses decided on.<sup>132</sup> The counter-terrorism strategy reflects the UK's fundamental values and its commitment to protect its people and its interests overseas, consistent with the UK's commitment to human rights and rule of law.<sup>133</sup>

Measures put forward under Pursue-category are “intended to stop terrorist attacks in this country and against our interests overseas”. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest stage possible, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those responsible. The UK has according to the strategy, continued to identify far more people engaged in terrorist-related activity than they can successfully prosecute and convict. As a remedy for the issue, the government want to improve prosecution rates by adopting new legislation allowing the use of intercepted communications as evidence in courts.<sup>134</sup> Internet has transformed how terrorist operates, and organizations use it for propaganda, radicalization and recruitment, communications, attack planning and cyber-attacks.<sup>135</sup> The strategy presents a range of measures to limit how terrorist groups operate on the internet. Besides from identifying and disrupting terrorist related activity, the government want to make it more difficult to find internet material useful for planning attacks. To reduce radicalization and recruitment, the government aims of limiting access to harmful content online and to ensure that measures is taken to remove unlawful and harmful content from the internet, regardless if it is hosted in the UK or abroad.<sup>136</sup>

The collection and use of data concerning communications, travels and money transfers, is viewed as essential to counter-terrorism, since helps to identify people engaged in terrorism activity. The government wants to “establishing a legal basis for developing access to data”, including from the private sector. The strategy also emphasizes that “data concerns people, its collection and use must be subject to proper oversight to ensure individuals' privacy is protected and be both necessary and proportionate to the crime which is being investigated”.<sup>137</sup>

The government will also seek to improve deterrent non-prosecution measures, including deportation and proscription. The government's stance on deportation is the belief “that as a matter of principle foreign nationals who have been engaged in terrorist related

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid. pp. 40

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. pp. 10

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. pp. 50

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. pp. 73–74

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. pp. 76

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. pp. 52

activity here should be deported, where they cannot be convicted or after they have served a sentence”. Therefore, the government will “continue to seek ways of deporting people who have engaged in terrorist-related activity in a way that is consistent with our obligations under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights”.<sup>138</sup>

Measures under Prevent-category is a key part of the strategy, as the government is of the understanding that terrorism cannot be resolved by arresting and prosecuting more people. Preventative measures will now “address radicalization to all forms of terrorism” by challenging and responding to extremist ideologies in a wide range of sectors.<sup>139</sup> The aim of the measures is to empower and mobilize communities, making them more resilient to terrorist ideology and foster a stronger sense of belonging and citizenship for people vulnerable to radicalization. The government views faith institutions as important actors in preventative activity, since terrorist groups have tried to legitimize their activity “by reference to theology”. The institutions often have authority and credibility not available to the government and can help build a society which recognizes the rights and contributions of different faith groups, endorse tolerance and rule of law.<sup>140</sup> The strategy promotes law enforcement action when faith groups or institutions are supporting terrorism. The government will also issue challenges and debates when institutions express views in conflict with that of the government.<sup>141</sup>

Under the Protect-category, the overall aim to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas. The aim of the measures is not to reduce the threat of terrorism (as in *Pursue* and *Prevent*) but reduce vulnerabilities to attacks. According to the strategy this will be done by strengthening UK border security, reduce vulnerabilities to the transport network, increase resilience of the UK’s infrastructure and improve protective security for crowded places.<sup>142</sup> The government will continue to improve in advance data collection of travelers both within and outside the EU to screen identities and check these against counter-terrorism watch lists. Furthermore, in the aviation sector, measures are in place to deny airlines authority to carry foreign national passengers to the UK who are included on the watch-lists.<sup>143</sup> The government will explore options to prevent watch-listed British nationals from flying to the UK until it is established they pose no threat to the aircraft.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid. pp. 47–48

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. pp. 59–60

<sup>140</sup> Ibid. pp. 68

<sup>141</sup> Ibid. pp. 68

<sup>142</sup> Ibid. pp. 79

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. pp. 83–84

<sup>144</sup> Ibid. pp. 84

The goals of measures under the Prepare-category is to ensure emergency services can respond effectively to any terrorist and other civil emergency, improve ability of emergency services to work together during an attack and enhance communications and information sharing during attacks.<sup>145</sup> The government has taken note of the 2008 attacks in Mumbai which showed how complex, and at times, protracted terrorist attacks can become.

The government will create a ‘National Resilience Capabilities Programme’ to improve all aspects of preparedness for civil emergencies, including mass causality and fatality planning and crisis management arrangements based on knowledge from civilian, police and defense specialists.<sup>146</sup> The government also focuses on measures to reduce and mitigate potential consequences of mass impact attacks using biological agents and radiological or nuclear devices. Measures include build the Department of Health’s stocks of antibiotics and vaccines, together with emergency distribution arrangements and improved capabilities of emergency responders to detect, monitor and track bio-terrorist and radiological hazards.<sup>147</sup> Measures to improve ‘interoperability’ between emergency services, where different agencies jointly work within and between services will be enhanced by joint exercises such as the national Counter Terrorist exercise programme and the inception of a standardized terminology for all relevant actors.<sup>148</sup> The strategy also calls for the roll-out of strategic emergency communications enabling multi-agency crisis centers to use military communication satellites in an emergency.<sup>149</sup>

## 5.5 CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism: Annual Report for 2015

### Claim and propositional content:

The government of the United Kingdom’s main claim is that;

“We [the UK] face a significant and changing threat from Daesh. In 2015, there were almost 60 attacks - from Paris to Sydney – as well as over 200 attacks carried out by Daesh branches including those in Libya and Egypt. Al

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid. pp. 98

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. pp. 98

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. pp. 99

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. pp. 100–101

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. pp. 101

Qa'ida's senior leadership may have been weekend, but that threat has not gone away. Its affiliates in Yemen and in North Africa remain a serious concern. We [the UK] continue to face an ongoing threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism.”<sup>150</sup>

The claim is supported by propositional content stating that Islamist terrorism has remained the principal threat to the UK, due to the nature and scale of recent attacks and plots by “terrorists inspired or directed by Daesh.<sup>151</sup> More propositional content supporting the claim is the reference to the UK threat level, which has throughout 2015 remained at ‘SEVERE’, meaning an attack is ‘highly likely’. Further propositional content supporting the claim is the reference to Daesh attacks in Tunisia and Paris, resulting in a total of 160 deaths, among them 31 British nationals. Daesh still operates in substantial areas of Iraq and Syria and is using propaganda to encourage individuals from around the world to travel to the areas. Approximately 850 individuals of national security concern have travelled from the UK, and just under half have returned so far.<sup>152</sup>

Daesh is the current predominant terrorist threat to the UK and its interests, but other groups such as Al Qa'ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and affiliated groups in the Arabian Peninsula continues aspiring to attack western interests, including civil aviation.<sup>153</sup> Dissident republican groups also continue to pose a threat in Great Britain, but most of their focus remains on conducting attacks in Northern Ireland – likewise the right-wing environment pose a threat, “but it remains lower by comparison”.<sup>154</sup>

#### Warning and propositional content:

With the predominant threat to the UK coming from Daesh, the main warning from the government is that the threat from terrorism continues to adapt and change. Threats to the UK and its interests are driven largely by the situation in Syria and Iraq and “It is vital, therefore, that we continue to ensure our counter-terrorism effort in the UK is complemented by work overseas with our international partners”.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism, *Contest*(2015) London: Home Department [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/539684/55469\\_Cm\\_9310\\_PRINT\\_v0.11.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539684/55469_Cm_9310_PRINT_v0.11.pdf) pp. 5

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. pp. 7

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. pp. 7

<sup>153</sup> Ibid. pp. 8

<sup>154</sup> Ibid. pp. 8

<sup>155</sup> Ibid. pp. 5

## Demand:

Demands under the pursue category are put forward with regards to the “ongoing risk connected to people who have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups, both from those who have returned, and those who remain in the region, where they can inspire and direct attacks.”<sup>156</sup> The purpose of Pursue measures is to stop terrorist attacks by detecting and investigating terrorist threats, and where possible prosecute those engaged. In 2015, Law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies disrupted six plots to Great Britain and 280 terrorism related arrests were made on British soil. Of those arrested were a growing number of women and under-18s, compared to the previous year. The government views convictions as the most effective way of stopping terrorist, but where prosecutions are not possible a ‘Royal Prerogative’ can be exercised against British passport holders. The passport can be canceled or be refused to issue on ‘public interest grounds’. The prerogative can be used to disrupt individuals who seek to travel to engage in terrorism, and between January and December 2015, the Royal Prerogative power was used 23 times.<sup>157</sup>

The government uses measures such as the Deportation with Assurances (DWA) to deport foreign nationals posing a threat to national security, and will continue to seek other ways of deportation. This includes using immigration powers to deprive dual nationality holders of British citizenship, on grounds connected to “not conducive to the public goods”, and exclusion powers on grounds of unacceptable behavior such as hate speech. 16 exclusions have been made so far.<sup>158</sup> The government has also published a draft of the Investigatory Powers Bill, aiming to regulate the acquisition and interception of electronic communications data. “The bill aims to make it clear who can exercise these powers, and under what circumstances; it also sets out the oversight arrangements that apply to them” and “introduces a double lock for the most sensitive powers in the bill”.<sup>159</sup>

Measures to use powers to proscribe organizations believed to be supporting terrorism organizations will continue in a proportionate manner. 70 international terrorist organizations have so far been proscribed, with four new groups added in 2015. The government also vows to continue taking part in international efforts against Daesh and vows to “act decisively where terrorists pose an imminent threat to the UK and our interests overseas

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid pp. 10

<sup>157</sup> Ibid. pp.10

<sup>158</sup> Ibid. pp. 11

<sup>159</sup> ibid. pp. 12

or to our allies”<sup>160</sup> Such measures are taken within the military campaign spearheaded by the ‘Global Coalition against Daesh’. The UK has so far conducted 942 airstrikes on Daesh targets.<sup>161</sup>

Under the Prevent-category, the government’s measures aim to challenge extremist and terrorist ideology, prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and focus on sectors where risks of radicalization is evident.<sup>162</sup> The government has taken measures to restrict access and availability to terrorist material on the internet, in response to terrorist groups such as Daesh using internet to spread fear, propaganda and persuade individuals of joining or supporting them. So far in 2015, an ‘Internet Referral Unit’ has contributed to Social Media providers removing 55,000 illegal materials. The government is working with the industry for the creation of a body to monitor and highlight occurrences of terrorism and extremism in their networks.

One of the main focus areas of the government is to reduce the risk of people travelling to, and returning from conflict areas such as Iraq and Syria. Family courts have been instrumental in this area, which have protected approximately 50 children from being taken to conflict areas. The voluntary programme Channel, for people at risk of being drawn into terrorism, has been put on statutory footing by the government, and has helped several hundred individuals with support from experts.<sup>163</sup> Likewise, measures are in place to subject prisoners who have been identified as extremist or vulnerable to extremism, to specialist interventions spearheaded by the National Offender Management Services (NOMS). The Department of Education has been provided with an ‘Educate against Hate online portal’ to provide advice and curriculum materials to parents, school teachers and governors. This in combination with community based projects aimed to reduce vulnerabilities of radicalization and in schools to increase young people’s resilience to extremist and terrorist ideologies.<sup>164</sup>

Under the Protect-category of measures, the government focuses on strengthening border security, reducing vulnerabilities to transport networks, increasing resilience of critical infrastructure and improving security for people and crowded places from terrorist attacks.<sup>165</sup> The introduction of the ‘Authority to Carry Scheme’ by the government allows the refusal of carrying British and foreign nationals to travel to or from the UK if the individuals are posing

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid. pp. 13

<sup>161</sup> Ibid. pp. 13

<sup>162</sup> Ibid. pp. 15-16

<sup>163</sup> Ibid. pp. 16

<sup>164</sup> Ibid. pp. 16-17

<sup>165</sup> Ibid. pp. 19

as “security, crime or immigration threats”. The government has increased collection of so called Passenger Name Records (PNR) and collaborates with EU member states due to a new EU directive on the use of PNR for prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and other serious crimes. This allows UK and member states security authorities to identify individuals who have taken part, or intend to take part in terrorism related activity, trying to avoid detection by taking circuitous routes through Europe to or from Syria.<sup>166</sup>

The government is also increasing security measures to different modes of transport for instance aviation, by installing and increasing the use of security scanners and investments of screening technologies. The government has tasked the British military to support aviation security by providing air defense systems at constant readiness and aircrafts to intercept unidentified or unauthorized aircraft compromising UK airspace. Measures has been taken to increase security on the general rail network and includes new transport policing tactics to deter and detect criminal and terrorist activity, while also reassuring the general public as well as armed patrols on the London Underground.<sup>167</sup> As a result from the recent attacks in Europe, the police will increase overt and covert presence on the streets and at major events in big cities, while also providing advice and reassurances to communities and businesses.<sup>168</sup>

The government’s measures under the Prepare-category are focused on improving emergency response and recovery capabilities, preparing for high impact risks, interoperability between emergency services and communications and information sharing.<sup>169</sup> The November Paris attacks demonstrated the destruction terrorists can cause with firearms and the government has therefore provided extra funding to elevate armed policing capability and capacity to respond more quickly and effectively to firearm attacks. The government has in collaboration with the UK armed forces established plans to provide support in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack, with up to 10,000 military personnel, including military experts such as bomb disposal teams. Furthermore, regular training exercises are held between the police, security and intelligence services, armed forces and government departments to increase counter-terrorism response capabilities. The strategy also highlights the government’s focus on emergency services multi-agency responses, which has been strengthened and improved by the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, originally launched in 2012. The November attack in Paris also caused the government to implement measures to strengthen

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid. pp. 19–20

<sup>167</sup> Ibid. pp. 20

<sup>168</sup> Ibid. pp. 21

<sup>169</sup> Ibid. pp. 22-23

healthcare providers capabilities to respond to large number of casualties with complex injuries in order to save as many lives as possible. A newly launched website called ‘ResilienceDirect’ allows for multi-agency planning, response and recovery from emergencies. The platform has been upgraded so that responders can share real-time information from any emergency situation.

## 5.6 Discussion of the United Kingdom’s CONTEST strategies

My interpretation of the CONTEST strategy from 2011 is that Al Qa’ida and its affiliates are discursively portrayed as the existential threat, as the group is “one of the highest priority risks to the UK’s national security”. With the military-political sector in mind, the referent object being existentially threatened is the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, including its interests overseas and national security. The strategy does not adequately define what it means with ‘overseas interests’, but there are references to British nationals abroad and my interpretation is that the interests includes British embassies, businesses and military objects. My understanding of national security is that as a concept, it is closely intertwined with state security over its sovereign territory, people residing on the territory and its interests overseas. It is clear from the language and discourse used that the government is deeply concerned over the capabilities of Al Qa’ida and the danger the group poses to the referent object. As a reaction, the government aim to take appropriate measures in order to disrupt and deter future attacks. It is important to highlight that the strategy discursively describe Al Qa’ida to be weaker in its current form compared to before 9/11, but fragile and failed states, technological capabilities and radicalization sustains the group and its ability to attack. Furthermore, the government also view the increasing number of British nationals traveling to conflict areas mainly Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia, where they receive combat experience and training from Al Qa’ida and affiliated groups, and then return to the UK to plan and carry out attacks as a growing security concern.

Contextually, it is also important to remember that the UK, at the time of the publication of the strategy, had recently experienced terrorist attacks, both domestically and on its interests abroad. In combination with the government’s own judgement of an attack being ‘highly likely’, further prompts the government to take appropriate counter-terrorism action. Aside from the main threat of Al Qa’ida, the government also state that Northern Ireland related terrorism endanger UK national security and the Good Friday-agreement, put in place to stabilize the situation in Northern Ireland during the late 90s. Right-wing terrorism is on the

contrary discursively portrayed as a low threat as these groups are far less organized with lacking capabilities and intent. My interpretation of the strategy is that there is no explicit declaration of what potential inaction from the government could result in. But the discourse in the strategy portrays the stakes as high and the government is committed to take action in order to provide protection for the state, its interests and national security.

The government of the United Kingdom want its counter-terrorism strategy to be as transparent and proportionate as possible within the confines of rule of law based democracy. All measures put forward are aimed to improve the UK's counter-terrorism in order to be able to stay one step ahead of the terrorist threat. The government explicitly states it continues to identify far more people engaged in terrorist related activity than it is able to prosecute, which further contributes to Al Qa'ida being represented as an existential threat to the UK. By introducing new legislation allowing intercepted communication as evidence in court, the government hope to improve prosecution rates. The government want to legally be able to collect data concerning communications, travels and money transfer from the private sector. Yet, the strategy humbly expresses that the collection of data concerns people and these measures should therefore be a subject to proper oversight to ensure individuals privacy is protected.

The data collection measures can accordingly not be used extensively, but must be necessary and proportionally used in the event of an investigation in accordance with rule of law and human rights.

The government is of the opinion that individuals involved in terrorist related activity, who cannot be convicted or have served a sentence, should be deported from the UK. The government will therefore seek ways of deporting people in way consistent with its obligations under article 3 of the European Convention on Human rights. In the aviation sector, foreign nationals, placed on the UK government's watch-lists can be denied air travels to the UK. The government will explore options to prevent watch-listed British nationals from flying to the UK until it is established they pose no threat to the aircraft.

My analysis of the first CONTEST strategy is that it cannot in its entirety be viewed as a speech act. Although the government argues that Al Qa'ida is an existential threat to the UK's sovereignty, its interests and people residing on the territory, there are no real extraordinary measures proposed by the government. Furthermore, there are no clear indications in the discourse of what inaction could result in, although I interpret inaction to potentially result in more attacks. The government's main course of action is to increase its counter-terrorism capabilities within the confined space of rule of law which is the normal

course of action when an issue is politicized and not securitized. However, one could make the argument of the discourse in the strategy is very security oriented, which in itself could hypothetically be the start of a security move in the future.

The analysis also shows very few references to human rights. The clearest reference is concerning deportations in accordance with article 3 of the European Convention on Human rights. But given the government states that the proposed measures always have to be situated within, and not outside of rule of law, it is reasonable to conclude this also means the human rights obligations the UK are bound to follow. In the most recent CONTEST-strategy from 2015, the existential threat is predominantly Daesh which is discursively described as a significant and changing threat, having carried out 60 attacks globally during 2015, in which 31 British nationals so far have been killed. Adding to the threat is that the government's security agencies, in 2015 alone, have disrupted six plots and made 280 terrorist related arrests. This implies the following, Daesh has now in terms of existential threat transcended Al Qa'ida and continues to adapt and exploit weaknesses in order to attack and consequently, becomes the main priority for future British counter-terrorism efforts. It also implies that the threat is ongoing and adapts and changes over time – thus making it even more dangerous. Intertextually, the UK government still portrays Al Qa'ida and its affiliates in Yemen and North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan as serious security concerns, and adds that the groups continue aspiring to attack western targets and civil aviation. But these groups are simultaneously, still intertextually described as weak due to losses in its senior leadership. Northern Ireland Related terrorism is still intertextually posing a threat, but most attacks are focused on Northern Ireland and not on the UK. Likewise, the right-wing terrorism is as in the previous strategy described as a low threat in comparison to the other terrorist groups.

Similar to the previous strategy, the threat level remains 'Severe' meaning an attack on the UK is 'highly likely'. This reinforces the existential threat posed from terrorism targeting the UK and its interests, especially from Daesh and Al-Qa'ida groups. The previous strategy viewed fragile and failed states, increased technology capabilities and radicalization as sustaining and resilience factors for Al-Qa'ida and affiliated groups. Likewise, the strategy viewed the development of British nationals traveling to conflict areas to receive combat experience and occasionally returned to plot and execute attacks, as threatening. The recent strategy intertextually builds upon this, but adds that approximately 850 British nationals have traveled to mainly the conflict areas of Iraq and Syria to join and receive training with from Daesh - just under half have returned to the UK. Those nationals remaining in Iraq and Syria

can pose an equal threat since they can direct and inspire future attacks, both to the UK and elsewhere, hidden in the conflict areas.

This is an important departure from the previous strategy and proves global developments may have profound effects on countries national interests, especially with regards to national security. This is reinforced in the strategy when it details that the threat to the UK is driven largely to the situation in Syria and Iraq, therefore counter-terrorism efforts in the UK should be complemented by work and collaboration overseas with partners. The government yet again portray the United Kingdom's sovereignty as the referent object. One can also interpret the situation in Syria and Iraq as national security interest for the government, since developments there have implication for its state security. The main warning is that the threat from primarily Daesh and its affiliates, is in a constant state of change and adaptability, which implies that the counter-terrorism strategy also has to adapt in order to prevent and disrupt future attacks.

My analysis of the counter-terrorism measures in the 2015 CONTEST strategy is that the measures are increasingly militarized, and consequently more extraordinary. It is apparent that the measures are made in a response to the developments on the ground in Iraq and Syria and the dangers of Daesh's ability to adapt and change tactics over time. The United Kingdom is engaged militarily against first and foremost Daesh and its affiliates in Syria and Iraq in comparison with the previous strategy. The United Kingdom is participating in the ongoing Global Coalition Against Daesh and have so far conducted 942 airstrikes on Daesh targets. The government states that it will "act decisively where terrorists pose an imminent threat to the UK and our interests overseas or to our allies". My analysis is that the UK will continue to use military means, where necessary, to target terrorist groups associated with Al Qa'ida and Daesh to protect the UK, its interests and allies. There are very few references to direct military action in the previous strategy, which make this measure a significant finding to an increased securitization of the terrorism in the UK context. Other military measures put in place by the government, are the air defense systems and military aircrafts standing ready to intercept unidentified or unauthorized aircraft compromising UK airspace. My interpretation is that these measures are taken as a precaution in response to terrorist groups still are striving to find ways of using civil aviation as means in terrorist attacks.

The military is also standing ready to support British agencies in the event of a large-scale attack with up to 10,000 military personnel with expert capabilities. The government is still convinced, in comparison with the former strategy, of convictions being the most effective way of stopping terrorism – a clear nod to democratic rule of law traditions. But other

non-military measures which significantly indicates an increasing securitization of terrorism includes Deportations with Assurances (DWA). The government have developed the ability to deport citizens with dual nationalities, if they pose a threat to national security. Further the UK now use immigration powers to deprive dual nationals of British citizenship if the individual is not “conducive to the public goods”. Compared to the previous strategy this marks a clear shift on policies connected to immigration. But the strategy of 2015 also introduces the measure of exercising the ‘Royal Prerogative’, a power to cancel or refuse a British passport holder on the grounds of public interest. This power has been used 23 times during 2015 and allows the government to prevent people from traveling to conflict areas, thereby reducing the threat of British nationals joining Daesh and Al Qa’ida groups on the ground in Syria and Iraq. In terms of human rights, the recent strategy makes only one reference. This is as an indication of the discourse inherent in the recent strategy has become even more securitized and to a greater extent less focused on human rights.

Finally, the second strategy could be argued to represent a speech act from the government of the United Kingdom. The comparison shows a clear shift in both security discourse and measures called for. There are references to an ongoing existential threat which have to be combated with increasingly militarized measures – resulting in significantly decreasing use of human rights discourse.

## 5.7 Discussion on differences between UK and Sweden Speech Acts

The first Swedish strategy did not contain any reference to an existential threat, as terrorism overall was judged to be low. Compared to the first UK strategy, which starts with Al Qa’ida actively threatening the UK from the onset, along with other terrorist groups, and the possibility of an attack was there judged to be ‘highly likely’. The language use was evidently more security oriented compared to Sweden’s first strategy. However, the measures proposed and taken, was not of an extraordinary nature but would mostly likely be situated within politicized sphere. There are generally fewer references to human rights, compared to the first Swedish strategy, but similarly all counter-terrorism measures have to be enforced with respect to rule of law and with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms. If viewed as a speech act, there are clear evidence of an existential threat and a referent object, but it stumbles and falls on calling for extraordinary measures.

The first Swedish strategy, on the other hand, considered its counter-terrorism capabilities as adequately at the time, and the proposed measures were of no extraordinary nature such as calls for military involvement. Instead potential threats from future terrorism and extremism would be treated as a politicized issue, combated and handled with increased policing, democracy building and general efforts to make society more protected. All measures called for would be enforced within the rule of law and with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms. Consequently, the strategy could not be viewed as a speech act since it lacks an existential threat, referent object and extraordinary measures.

A perhaps not surprising finding, but all the same important is that terrorism threatened each country differently from the onset, and this was reflected on the security discourse in each country's first strategy on counter-terrorism. This in turn affected how the discourse portrayed existential threat to referent objects. The security discourse was increased in Sweden's second strategy, where Al Qa'ida was represented as an existential threat to the referent object, discursively constructed as the state, its values and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. The measures called for could be argued to be somewhat closer to the fringes of the politicization boundaries, but they cannot be considered to be extraordinary. It is evident that the government now view terrorism as a real threat and that precautions have to be taken, such as increased surveillance of public spaces. But most effort are focused on preventive measures to combat root causes leading to radicalization, violent extremism and antidemocratic ideas.

The second strategy of the United Kingdom is the only strategy that could be argued to be a carrier of a speech act. It makes only one reference to human rights. The discourse is marked by security and portrays Daesh as an existential threat which continues to adapt and change, thus making it even more threatening. The threat level is the same as in the former strategy, but Daesh is at the same time portrayed as a different and more lethal threat. This in combination with large numbers terror attacks globally, along with large numbers of British nationals traveling to conflict areas in Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups, leads the United Kingdom to enforce more militarized measures such as airstrikes in conflict areas and increased military involvement in counter-terrorism efforts. These measures can absolutely be argued to be more of an extraordinary nature especially when compared to the other strategies.

## 6 Conclusion

The analysis and discussion of each governmental strategy on counter-terrorism shows that three out of four strategies could not be interpreted to constitute speech acts. The discussion shows that the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy from 2016 was the only strategy that could be interpreted to constitute a speech act. The main finding of this thesis is thus that strategies can be carriers of speech acts, which answers the research question of the thesis. Stritzel's model on generic sequencing of speech acts, which combines the elements of securitization theory's speech act with elements of critical discourse analysis proved to be fruitful for the thesis as it helped meet the research question and aims.

The second finding is that in the case where the speech act occurred, the human rights discourse was significantly lower, compared to the cases where no speech act occurred. This finding supports the idea of Securitization being an extreme form of politics where the regular rules of the game does not apply, human rights included. Human rights are put to the side in favor of the extreme measures adopted to combat the existential threat. It is important to highlight that the findings cannot be generalized to a great extent since only two country separated governmental strategies was used in the thesis. A more valid argument for generalizations can be made by conducting larger studies involving a greater population of countries in a more quantitative manner.

Now it is common knowledge that terrorism is on essentially every governments agenda currently. If speech acts are not found in governmental strategies on counter-terrorism, where can they then be found? This opens up new areas for research on securitizing speech acts. On a side note to the study, I am convinced that the next Swedish counter-terrorism strategy will be much closer to a securitization. Sweden was hit by a deadly terrorist attack, resulting in multiple deaths. The second Swedish strategy analyzed was the most recent available and was published in 2014. Surely, the terrorist attack in 2017 will have implications for the coming strategies on counter-terrorism. Future research could focus more on how individual agencies such as the armed forces, intelligence agencies or other actors involved in matters on the deliberation of national security and counter-terrorism engage in speech acts on issues.

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