WHEN PEACE FAILS
BUT TERRORISM SUCCEEDS

DO FAILING PEACE AGREEMENTS ENCOURAGE TERRORISM?

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ABSTRACT

The quality of peace at the end of civil war has emerged as an important concept for understanding persistent security threats. This study seeks to bridge two well established fields by asking: Does the failure to implement a peace agreement encourage terrorism? I argue that the psychological effect of a failing peace agreement shapes the individual’s propensity to terrorism by enhancing the appeal of a frame which favors “radical” action to advance the group’s struggle for recognition. Terrorism can be simultaneously an emotionally driven response at the individual level, and a rational choice at the group level. This paper employs mixed methods. A cross-case study measures the spatial/temporal variation in peace settlement implementation and the intensity of terrorism between/within 34 post-accord settings. A within-case study leverages temporal variation to illustrate how four violent non-state actors responded to perceptions of salient loss at various points in the Mindanao peace process. While each organization used terrorism strategically, the strategies were not always linked to peace settlement implementation. This study advances understanding of the event-driven relationship between implementation failure and terrorism, the process by which “radical” frames convert an individual’s emotional reaction into political violence, and the dynamic integration of quantitative and qualitative research.

KEYWORDS

peace agreement, implementation, terrorism, radicalization, quality peace, framing process, political violence
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### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBL</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Basic Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIAF</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (armed wing of MILF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIFF</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Transition Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISAC</td>
<td>Center for International Security and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTO</td>
<td>“Foreign Terrorist Organization” (designation by US State Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRP</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTD</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEP</td>
<td>Institute for Economics and Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Mindanao Final Agreement (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People’s Army (armed wing of CPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAPP</td>
<td>Office of the Presidential Adviser to the Peace Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>Peace Accords Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
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“Every period of history has known people who close their hearts to the needs of others, who close their eyes to what is happening around them, who turn aside to avoid encountering other people’s problems.”

Pope Francis, Bishop of Rome
49th World Day of Peace Message, 1 January 2016

“The real hard work begins after the signing of the agreement. For a peace agreement, or any other agreement for the matter, does not implement itself: it assumes concrete reality only on the accretion of activities completed.”

Ali Alatas, Foreign Minister of Indonesia
Signing of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, 2 September 1996

“Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter’s gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”

Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO
UN General Assembly Speech, 13 November 1974
I. WHEN PEACE FAILS

The life of a peace agreement is a constant battle. Its supporters need strength and courage to sustain the common vision of peace; its detractors use any means necessary to sabotage it (Kydd & Walter 2002). While peace agreements offer a “radical overhaul of political and legal institutions” (Bell & O’Rourke 2007), they may lead to post-accord settings “marked by varying degrees of social, political, and economic contradictions” (Joshi & Wallensteen 2018). Peace, when understood as a continuum rather than as a discrete state, may at lower gradations establish conditions for insecurity and instability. Political violence and terrorism originate from the “struggle for recognition” accompanied by “emotions of anger, shame and pride” (Fukuyama 1992). Research has identified four significant correlates of terrorism: “the presence of armed conflict, political violence by governments, political exclusion and group grievances” (IEP 2017). The highly contingent setting of failing peace agreements may engender all four correlates of terrorism. UN Secretary-General António Guterres observed that “terrorism is linked to the multiplication of conflict and the connections between conflicts” (Guterres 2018).

Despite the link that has been made in policy circles between these two phenomena, sustaining peace in post-accord settings and countering terrorism have conventionally been treated as separate domains of academic inquiry. The ambition of this study is to bridge two fields between which few scholars have so far traversed: the effects of implementation failure and the causes of terrorism. To the extent that such a bridge already exists, it directs the flow of traffic in generally one direction: from terrorism (as the independent variable) to failing peace agreements (as the dependent variable) (see Kydd & Walter 2002; Mac Ginty 2006; Stedman 1997). I want to construct a second deck of the bridge to encourage scholarly trips in the reverse direction. Furthermore, the methods used to research terrorism are rigidly divided into quantitative and qualitative approaches. The extensive study of terrorism usually covers a broad array of political settings, whereas the intensive study of terrorism usually covers a specific political context or actor investigated in no more than a handful of countries. No study has systematically applied the specific political context of a failing peace agreement as a scope condition for terrorism.

I start by asking the research question: Does the failure to implement a peace agreement encourage terrorism? I argue that the real or perceived failure of a peace agreement in a post-accord setting precipitates a “disproportional emotional reaction, particularly emotional distress” (Canetti 2017) or “a psychology of humiliation” (McCauley 2017) for those with a stake in the outcome of the peace agreement. In post-conflict settings, a “salient loss” can easily
betray an “ephemeral gain” from the peace accord (Midlarsky 2011). The salient loss triggers a radical “frame” among members of the affected group that enhances the appeal of terrorism as “ameliorative collective action” (Benford & Snow 2000). This framing process drives the recruitment of disaffected individuals into organizations using terrorism to achieve their strategic goals, which may include fulfilling the agreement, spoiling the agreement, gaining bargaining leverage for political negotiations, or criminal enterprise. While most literature on the causes of terrorism presumes either rationalist or emotionalist motivations, my argument allows for a more nuanced interpretation: Terrorism can be simultaneously an emotionally driven response at the individual level, and a rational choice governed by utility maximization at the group level.

A vignette from Israel-Palestine illustrates the deep intersection between failing peace agreements and terrorism. In a narrative account of the “strategic logic of suicide terrorism”, Palestinians used terrorism to coerce Israel into fulfilling specific terms of the Oslo Accord (Pape 2003). For example, Oslo I required that Israeli military forces be withdrawn from Jericho and the Gaza Strip by 13 April 1994. As it became clear that Israel would not meet the anticipated deadline, Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out dramatic suicide attacks in Israel between 6 April and 13 April, killing 15 civilians. On 13 April Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin implored the Israeli parliament to fulfill the military withdrawal from Jericho and the Gaza Strip: “We have seen by now at least six acts of this type by Hamas and Islamic Jihad… The only response to them and to the enemies of peace and on the part of Israel is to accelerate the negotiations” (Rabin 1994, cited in Pape 2003). The Knesset accepted Rabin’s reasoning and voted to withdraw the military from these areas in May 1994. Palestinian suicide attacks promptly abated.

As the vignette illustrates, the causal mechanism generates many observable implications. I search for evidence in post-accord settings of this hypothesized relationship: a broader failure to implement the provisions of a peace agreement is associated with a higher intensity of terrorism. In the first stage of analysis, I measure the independent causal effect of the “failure to implement the provisions of a peace agreement” on the “intensity of terrorism”. The cross-section, time-series data come from the Peace Accords Matrix and Global Terrorism Database, respectively. I apply the term “cross-case study” to the regression of the intensity of terrorism (Y) on the failure to implement the provisions of a peace agreement (X), between and within 34 post-accord cases.

My findings from the “cross-case study” indicate that the failure to implement a peace agreement is strongly associated with the intensity of terrorism within cases (longitudinally),
but not between cases (spatially). The “within” estimator reveals that the failure to implement provisions has a statistically significant and substantial parameter estimate: its predicted effect upon the terrorism index is nearly equal to the predicted effect from an ongoing armed conflict. These findings prompt the second stage of analysis: a “within-case study” of the Mindanao peace process, leveraging temporal variation to explain how four violent non-state actors in the Philippines responded to perceptions of gain and loss at key turning points in the Mindanao peace process. This may be described as a comparative dynamic analysis of actor-driven terrorism in relation to trigger events. I use geospatial analysis to disaggregate the intensity of terrorism by province and time interval; and event history analysis to infer the motivation behind certain terrorist attacks in relation to the peace process. My findings from the “within-case study” indicate that while each violent non-state actor used terrorism strategically, their strategies were not always linked to the status of implementation. As the historical situation unfolds, groups themselves may sometimes replace their master frame, or shift between moderate and radical frames.

The contribution of this study is twofold. From a theoretical standpoint, I introduce a new causal story that connects delayed peace implementation to terrorism through a process by which a “radical” frame converts an individual’s psychological frustration into collectively organized political violence. The causal mechanism described here may be of interest to policymakers because it corresponds to a process otherwise referred to as “radicalization”, explored in the specific context of post-accord settings. From an empirical standpoint, I find compelling evidence of a temporal (event-driven) relationship between the failure to implement the provisions of a peace agreement and the intensity of terrorism. The within-case study also applies multiple methods in the spirit of an “emerging research program” connecting the micro-dynamics of violence to macro-observations (Kalyvas 2008).

The balance of this thesis shall explore the causal relationship between failing peace agreements and terrorism. The next section proposes a theoretical explanation of how failing peace agreements cause terrorism, situating the theory in relation to previous literatures. The section thereafter introduces the research design, motivating empirically the cross-case and within-case approaches and the integration thereof. The two sections thereafter review findings from the cross-case and within-case studies, respectively. The penultimate section describes some limitations. The conclusion proposes a direction for future research and policy implications.
II. THEORY

A. Definitions

This section defines four concepts which are central to this study: peace agreement, implementation, terrorism and radicalization.

Peace Agreement

Peace agreement is conventionally defined as “a negotiated, formal and voluntarily signed agreement between primary parties to a conflict with the purpose of terminating organized, armed violence” (Ohlson 1998). A peace agreement implies “that the parties have agreed on a framework for changes in the post-war period” (Joshi & Wallensteen 2018). From a legal perspective, peace agreements “emerge in peace processes” and “take recognizable legal forms” with the expectation of “compliance” (Bell 2006). Peace agreements fall broadly into three categories which correspond to different stages of the peace process: pre-negotiation agreements, substantive/framework agreements, and implementation agreements (ibid.). I accept Bell’s contention that substantive/framework agreements “most clearly deserve the label ‘peace agreement’” because “they provide a framework for governance designed to address the root causes of the conflict and thus to halt the violence more permanently” (ibid.). In this study, I use the descriptor “comprehensive” rather than “substantive” or “framework” when referring to such peace accords. While my theory is not restricted to any class of peace agreements, this study covers mostly intrastate, comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs).

Implementation

An important concept used to formulate the research question is implementation, which I define as compliance with the agreed-upon terms of a peace agreement (see Walter 2002). Each party supposes that the other party’s implementation will “address their legitimate concerns” (Joshi & Wallensteen 2018). The signing of a peace agreement leads to an implementation phase “during which [the parties] choose whether to execute the agreed-upon terms” (Walter 2002). In practice, implementation varies across space and time. In this study, failure to implement a peace agreement refers to a situation where “many provisions of the accord are either not implemented or the delayed implementation fails to deliver the expectations articulated at the time of the signing of the accord” (Joshi & Darby 2013). A return to hostilities implies that implementation of the peace agreement has certainly failed.
**Terrorism**

The concept of terrorism is challenging to define because it is “seen differently by different observers” (Cronin 2002). Nonetheless, I accept the definition put forth by the Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START 2017). This definition addresses the fundamental attributes of terrorism: its intent “to achieve compliance” (Kalyvas 2004) or “to exert pressure on the state and society at large” (Stepanova 2008), its “extreme violence” or “non-banality” (ibid.), and its “asymmetrical nature” (ibid.) or “nonstate character” (Cronin 2002). Notably, this definition does not require the victims of terrorism to be civilians or even human beings; sabotage may qualify as terrorism. I accept Cronin’s distinction between victims and targets of terrorism, namely, “the targets of a terrorist episode are not the victims who are killed or maimed in the attack, but rather the governments, publics, or constituents among whom the terrorists hope to engender a reaction” (Cronin 2002). In this study, a terrorist refers to an individual who (often working through a group) has attempted or perpetrated an act that qualifies as terrorism. On the other hand, a terrorist does not refer to an individual who may have been radicalized but has not attempted terrorism.

**Radicalization**

Finally, the concept of radicalization is defined as “the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through unorthodox means” (Korteweg 2010). The radicalization process typically involves “a combination of socio-psychological factors, political grievance, religious motivation and discourse, identity politics and triggering mechanisms that collectively move the individual towards extremism” (ibid.). In this study, radicalization is consistent with the adoption of a “radical” frame which replaces a “moderate” frame that individuals would hold by default. The moderate-radical spectrum has many gradations, and the radicalization process may lead to varying levels of engagement with terrorism. For example, a societal pyramid may consist of a first tier of “terrorist operators”, a second tier of those “willing to assert themselves”, and a third tier of bystanders who offer “tacit support” (ibid.).

**B. Identifying a Research Gap in Two Fields**

The research question – *Does the failure to implement a peace agreement encourage terrorism?* – suggests a lacuna in at least two areas of research: the effects of implementation failure, and the causes of terrorism. By noting the boundaries of theories dealing with these phenomena, I obtain some assurance that my own theory will occupy a research gap.
Genealogy of Research on the Effects of Implementation Failure

In the study of conflict resolution, implementation of peace agreements has acquired significant traction as an explanation for lasting peace. The implementation process establishes “key precedents, incentives, and patterns of behavior” upon which “quality peace” is built (Lyons 2018). Amidst “endemic uncertainty” in post-conflict settings, implementation clarifies “how committed the government is to peace” (Kydd & Walter 2002). The logic of implementation in post-accord settings is closely related to the bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995, cited in Weinstein 2007). A disaffected party might return to war if it perceives the expected benefits from war to exceed the actual costs of the bargained outcome.1 Peace accords collapse when violence is deliberately carried out by “groups outside the peace process” and “factions inside the peace process” (Joshi & Wallensteen 2018). However, the conventional typology of spoilers who “perceive peace as threatening and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997) promotes “an oversimplified commentary that considers peace as ‘good’ and opposition to that peace as ‘bad’ regardless of the quality of peace on offer” (Mac Ginty 2006). On the contrary, a critical assessment of the peace process with respect to the parties’ intent and extent of implementation may suggest

that an iniquitous peace is on offer and the label spoiler is a wholly inappropriate description for those who continue to pursue a grievance agenda. As a blunt label it also risks conflating varied opposition positions and methods into a single category. (Mac Ginty 2006)

Peace demands to be understood as a complex, dynamic, and interconnected system. The concept of “quality peace” suggests a “framework for what constitutes the success or failure of peace efforts beyond the absence of war” using five dimensions: post-war security, good governance, economic reconstruction, reconciliation, and civil society (Joshi & Wallensteen 2018). While this new typology is a significant advance toward conceptualizing peace as a continuum rather than a discrete state, the relationship between these dimensions (e.g. how a change in one dimension affects other dimensions) has not been thoroughly researched (ibid.). The degree of implementation typically impacts multiple dimensions of quality peace. While the implementation of “accommodation measures” has been found to reduce “the destabilizing effects of post-accord elections”, other instantiations of implementation (both real and perceived) could easily have “the potential to... consolidate the peace process or trigger renewed violence” (Joshi et al 2017).

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1 In fact, more than one-third of civil war settlements between 1945 and 1996 relapsed into armed conflict (Walter 2004, cited in Joshi & Wallensteen 2018).
Post-accord settings with a failing peace agreement may be described as belonging to a condition identified as not-peace and not-war (Addison 2002). The state of knowledge on this condition derives primarily from historical-political accounts of the dynamics of violence in stalled peace processes such as Israel-Palestine (Said 2002) and Northern Ireland (Addison 2002, Mac Ginty 2006). However, there has not been a systematic attempt to theorize to a broader set of conflicts.

**Genealogy of Research on the Causes of Terrorism**

The September 11 terrorist attacks spurred the growth of terrorism studies, which was “once seen to lie in the margins between political science and military studies” (Shepherd 2007). The causes of terrorism can be broadly divided into rational, psychological, and cultural motivations. Rational motivations presume that terrorism is a tactic “instrumental to the attainment of some other goal” and “intended to shape the behavior of a targeted audience by altering the expected value of particular action” (Kalyvas 2004). Psychological motivations include “internal mental processes”, “external situations impacting mental processes”, “lifelong personality traits”, and “society-wide psychological processes and emotions” (MacNair 2003). Psychologists concur that “the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality” (Crenshaw 1981), suggesting that externally induced situations and processes deserve more weight than internal dispositions. Cultural motivations suggest that resonant narratives such as “foundational” myths (Kearney 1997) and “jihadist” ideology (Moghadam 2009) facilitate the recruitment of terrorists. In a more banal sense, cultural motivations may also entail interpersonal benefits such as “strong affective ties with fellow terrorists” (Abrahms 2008).

Terrorism exhibits several properties identifiable with other forms of conflict-related violence. First, the underlying logic of terrorism resembles the logic of indiscriminate violence in civil war. According to this view, such violence is “not gratuitous, wanton or solely bent on revenge”, but rather “primarily deterrent” because its objective is “to achieve compliance” rather than extermination of the civilian population (Kalyvas 2004). While indiscriminate violence is informationally cheaper to carry out than is selective violence, its “counterproductive effects” on the legitimacy of the perpetrators may induce an eventual “switch over” to selective violence (ibid.) Second, terrorism as collective violence may follow a dynamic process like the conflict spiral model, where each violent interaction is “selective retaliation” for prior escalations taken by the other side, causing “senseless spirals of action and reaction” (Tilly 2003). This view is consistent with empirical findings that terrorism is highly
correlated with grievance factors such as “political violence by governments” (IEP 2017). On the other hand, the recruitment of individuals by militant organizations may be driven by either “activist” or “opportunistic” motivations (Weinstein 2007). Third, terrorism fits the paradigm of so-called “new wars” which blur the distinction between localized vs. transnational and private vs. public actors (Kaldor 2001). In this paradigm, weak institutions and political instability (e.g. political systems in transition) provide an opportunity structure for terrorism to take hold (Chenoweth 2006). Many studies have found that “democracy actually encourages terrorism” (Jebb et al 2006). Besides the conventional explanation that civil liberties and press freedom create a more permissive environment, democracies also possess a “high degree of conventional mobilization” and a “competitive logic that drives groups to compete with other political groups using violence” (Chenoweth 2018). While these diverse perspectives are not easily reconcilable, one may arrive at the basic conclusion that the same sorts of political processes that generate other forms of coordinated destruction produce the special forms that authorities and horrified observers call terrorism. (Tilly 2003)

The study of terrorism demands a more complete integration of rational, psychological, and cultural explanations. Any explanation taken in isolation would impoverish our understanding of the complex motives underlying violence. Furthermore, a greater focus on “situational factors [involving] the concept of a precipitating event” (Crenshaw 1981) would support a movement away from “root causes” and toward less well studied “triggering causes” of terrorism. The “triggering causes” may in turn suggest that emotions deserve greater attention as they “can be easily translated into support for radicalization” (Canetti 2017).

C. Proposing a Theory of Failing Peace, Radicalization and Terrorism

The reflections put forth on the effects of implementation failure and the causes of terrorism may be useful, but nothing is more enlightening than a causal story connecting the two phenomena. To show causality demands a level of analysis that is typically lower than the outcome. As I seek to explain the intensity of terrorism at the country level, the causal story describes how the failure to implement a peace agreement shapes framing effects at the individual level and recruitment dynamics at the group level. By focusing on individual motivation and collective action, the causal mechanism incorporates both emotionalist and rationalist explanations of terrorism.

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2 Stepanova (2008) notes that “in some cases terrorist attacks may be partly motivated by economic gain, but this is not the groups’ sole or dominant raison d’être”.
The basic causal story goes like this: The psychological effect of the failure to implement the peace agreement enhances the appeal of a frame which favors “radical” action to advance the group’s struggle for recognition. Individuals who accept the “radical” frame are understood to have been “radicalized”, which means they support or participate in terrorist campaigns. A causal diagram of the theory traces the process from failing peace agreement to individuals’ acceptance of the “radical” frame to terrorism: from macro-situation to micro-processes to macro-outcome.3

| failure to implement peace agreement [X] | individuals accept the “radical” frame and its interpretation of the conflict situation [causal mechanism] | terrorism [Y] |

For analytical clarity, I break the causal pathway into two distinct journeys, each represented by an arrow in the schema above. This decision is inspired by McCauley’s (2015) analytical distinction between individual- and group-level desistance from terrorism. The first journey – from failing peace to radicalization – occurs at the individual level and is driven primarily by emotion. The second journey – from radicalization to terrorism – involves substantial individual-group interaction and is driven primarily by strategic pursuits.

**Journey from Failing Peace to Radicalization**

The peace process generates salient events that influence the parties’ perceptions of gain or loss. The complex legal nature of a peace agreement suggests that individuals in society interpret its implementation primarily through a situational lens. Extremely resonant events arouse strong emotional reactions when they are perceived “as having a particular importance for well-being” (McCauley 2017). Emotional reactions such as hope, or despair, shape the individual’s responsiveness to competing frames. Frames inform how people diagnose problems in the external world, propose solutions for addressing the problems, and summon motivation to take a certain course of action (Benford & Snow 2000). Individuals who identify with a group having a stake in the conflict have been socialized into a “master” frame which presumes the group’s struggle for recognition. This “master” frame is complemented by a frame of action, either “moderate” or “radical” in nature, which determines whether the individual waits for peace tomorrow or becomes a terrorist today.

The signing of a peace agreement is a watershed event because it crafts a shared vision of peace, which the signing parties interpret as a categorical gain. Arguably, the more

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3 In this study, the “macro” level refers to those events that are externally observable in the context of this study, whereas the “micro” level refers to processes that are internalized processes.
comprehensive or inclusive the agreement, the greater hope it inspires in the population that peace will obtain when the parties fulfill their obligations as recorded in the peace agreement. Implementation sustains this hope and brings into focus a “moderate” frame. This “moderate” frame is characterized by the belief that the peace agreement fulfills the group’s struggle for recognition; and a preference for nonviolent political reform.

On the other hand, the failure to implement a peace agreement is construed as a loss. Implementation is a process or phase containing multiple events that confirm or disconfirm the parties’ commitment to peace. In asymmetric conflict, the weaker party or minority group may view unexpected gains as highly salient because the odds are considered against them (Johnson & Tierney 2006). But exaggerated gains may heighten the perception of inconsolable loss if subsequent events betray the earlier gains as having been “ephemeral” (Midlarsky 2011). My claim here is broadly consistent with prospect theory which suggests that people react more strongly to a perceived loss than to a perceived gain. The milieu of a failing peace process has immense capacity to induce frustration and feelings of perceived loss: the loss of agency, the loss of control, the loss of pride, the loss of faith, the loss of hope. Emotional distress allows a “radical” frame to take hold more easily in the individual. The “radical” frame is characterized by the belief that the failing peace agreement impedes the group’s struggle for recognition; and a preference for terrorism and political violence.

Figure 1: ‘Gains and Losses’: Framing Effects Induced by Trigger Events at the Societal Level

![Figure 1: ‘Gains and Losses’: Framing Effects Induced by Trigger Events at the Societal Level](image-url)
Figure 1 adapts a theory proposed by Midlarsky (2011) which explains how the combination of ephemeral gains and salient losses makes individuals vulnerable to political extremism. In my adaptation, I concretize an “ephemeral gain” as the signing of the peace agreement and a “salient loss” as some failure to implement the peace agreement; the individual’s vulnerability to political extremism in Midlarsky’s theory corresponds to the individual’s acceptance of the “radical” frame in my theory. This adaptation further contextualizes the implementation phase as the latest stage in a historical-mythological narrative understood by the minority group as their downward trajectory from greatness to subordination.

Figure 2: ‘Radicalization’: Frustration and Framing Effects at the Individual Level (Minority Group)

It is important to discuss briefly the relationship between frames, particularly the conversion from a “moderate” to a “radical” frame of action. Figure 2 illustrates how an individual beyond a certain level of frustration no longer deems the “moderate” frame useful and instead replaces it with a “radical” frame. The “moderate” and “radical” frames are mutually exclusive, yet both remain consistent with the “master” frame which has been put forth. The frame dispute is not between the “moderate” and “master” frames, nor is it between the “radical” and “master” frames: the frame dispute is between the “moderate” and “radical” frames. This understanding of a frame dispute within the same individual deviates from the classic frame dispute which originally describes “situations where an individual’s frame
conflicts with the frame promulgated by his organization” (Benford & Snow 2000). While every individual has a different tipping point, a highly provocative event may uniformly cross the red line for many individuals. In other words, a salient loss may trigger the widespread adoption of the “radical” frame. The next section elaborates on where the “radical” frame comes from, and where it may lead.

**Journey from Radicalization to Terrorism**

The mere thought of becoming a terrorist does not make one a terrorist; in most cases groups turn individuals into terrorists. I assume the a priori existence of terrorist groups formed by earlier-radicalized individuals. These groups define the terrorism landscape by supplying variations of the “master” and “radical” frame: who to blame, what action to take, and why participate. Table 1 summarizes how terrorist groups accomplish Benford & Snow’s three “core framing tasks” (2000) – diagnosis, prognosis and motivation – with respect to a failing peace situation. Beyond these core framing tasks, groups also convert individuals’ beliefs into actions by providing the information, resources and opportunity structure for carrying out terrorist attacks.

**Table 1: Core Framing Tasks Accomplished by the ‘Radical’ and ‘Master’ Frames**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnostic</th>
<th>Prognostic</th>
<th>Motivational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification of the source of blame or culpability</td>
<td>Articulation of a proposed solution to the problem</td>
<td>Rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing peace agreement signals the majority's indifference to the group's struggle for recognition</td>
<td>Groups prescribe terrorism as effective tool to challenge indifference and improve status quo</td>
<td>Individual perceives that expected benefit of joining terrorist group outweighs expected cost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Benford & Snow (2000)

It is important to touch upon the link between mobilization and terrorism. The theory speaks to recruitment dynamics and how radicalized individuals assort themselves into terrorist groups. Recruitment dynamics can reflect a wide range of individual motivations. This premise underscores the necessity of micro-analysis and disaggregation (especially by actor) to understand the specific motivation behind a terrorist attack. As more groups promote the “radical” frame, individuals can more easily identify a group that offers the right incentive to become a terrorist (i.e. the expected benefit of joining outweighs the expected cost). Based on a competitive logic, “the more mobilization that occurs, the more likely terrorist groups are to form” (Chenoweth 2018). As terrorist groups proliferate, terrorism grows more intense.
Terrorism is strategic behavior insofar as it challenges the indifference of the majority group (or the government). In asymmetrical conflict, the majority may have low resolve to address the contested issue. The “ethos of conflict” may lead them to interpret events through the lens of their own biases, as the ethos represents a set of shared conflict-supporting narratives, with an ideological structure, that decrease support for the peaceful resolution of intractable conflicts. (Bar-Tal 2013, cited in Canetti 2017)

Terrorism shatters deeply held illusions about security/insecurity, justice/injustice, perpetrator/victim status. Effective terrorist attacks pose a symbolic threat “to relatively abstract aspects of the collective, such as threats to the in-group’s identity, value system, belief system, or worldview” (Canetti-Nisim et al 2009).

Figure 3: ‘Shock Therapy’: Effect of Terrorism on the Majority Group’s Valuation of Cheap Peace’ and Costly Peace’

Recalling substitution theory from economics, Figure 3 illustrates the effect of terrorism on the government’s valuation of quality peace. Suppose the majority group has two goods to choose from: “costly peace” vs. “cheap peace”. Costly peace requires the parties to

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4 Indifference curves allow different combinations of two goods to yield the same level of utility according to the consumer’s idiosyncratic preferences. A rational consumer adjusts his consumption of the two goods on offer so that the marginal rate of substitution equals the ratio of prices. If the relative price between two goods changes, then the quantity demanded of each good should also change.

5 I use the term “costly peace” because it is suggestive of “quality peace”.

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comply with their commitments in the peace agreement, whereas cheap peace does not. Costly peace comes at the expense of “mutual vulnerability” (Hoddie & Hartzell 2007), whereas cheap peace gives the majority a false sense of peace without requiring any sacrifice. In a scenario without terrorism, “cheap peace” has a lower price than “costly peace”, so the government prefers to consume more units of “cheap peace”: implementation does not occur. However, in a scenario with terrorism, “cheap peace” is revealed to have a higher price than “costly peace”, so the government prefers to consume more units of “costly peace”: implementation occurs.

D. Presenting the Hypothesis

From the causal story, I derive the hypothesized relationship:

H1: A broader failure to implement the provisions of a peace agreement is associated with a higher intensity of terrorism.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Motivating the Cross-Case Study

A cross-case, or large-n, study is motivated primarily by the “search for patterns” across many cases (Eisenhardt 1989). I search for patterns in 34 post-accord settings to infer the independent causal effect of the failure to implement provisions of a peace agreement on the intensity of terrorism. The critical use of quantitative methods, particularly regression analysis, compels me “to look beyond initial impressions” formed by my theory (ibid.). The evaluation of many cases serves as a bulwark against information bias regarding a single case.

Case Selection, Unit of Analysis

The case selection is informed by the independent variable, the level of peace agreement implementation. The University of Notre Dame’s Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) represents the population of comprehensive peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2012, listed in Table A-1. A comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) must satisfy two operational definitions to be included in PAM: “(1) the major parties in the conflict are involved in a negotiation process; and, (2) substantive issues underlying the dispute are included in the negotiation process” (Joshi & Darby 2013). CPAs, also referred to as “substantive” or “framework” agreements, “most clearly deserve the label ‘peace agreement’… their implementation requires parties to make fundamental compromises with respect to their preferred outcome” (Bell 2006). While my theory is intended to apply to a broad class of peace agreements and peace processes, the restriction to CPAs facilitates comparability for the cross-case study. A CPA is also more likely
than a pre-negotiation or re-negotiation agreement to generate a strong (observable) response: greater hope that peace will obtain, and greater despair once implementation fails.

Initially, each PAM observation is an accord country-year, and each GTD observation is an incident-date. Merging the two data sets requires aggregating GTD incidents into their respective accord country and GTD dates into their respective year. Thus, each “case” is a post-negotiation setting comprising up to ten yearly observations of peace agreement implementation and terrorism in that country. This understanding is consistent with the definition of a “case” as “an instance of a class of events” (George and Bennett 2005, cited in Levy 2008). I construe the time series for each case as a moving ten-year period: the first year is moving because the peace agreement could have implemented in any year from 1989 to 2015, and the period is at most ten years because PAM tracks implementation for only that amount of time. The moving ten-year period is the key to panel analysis because each time-series can be indexed using the ordinal year count (1 to 10). Hence, the basic unit of analysis is technically an “accord country-year count”.

From a historical perspective, the temporal and spatial characteristics of the 34 post-accord settings warrant discussion. In the Appendix, Table A-1 lists the 34 comprehensive peace agreements and the date signed. PAM records the earliest year of implementation as 1989 (in Lebanon) and the latest year of implementation as 2015 (in Cote d’Ivoire and Nepal). This range of years corresponds perfectly to the post-Cold War era marked by the frequency of civil wars, and partially includes the post-9/11 era marked by the rise of transnational terrorist groups. The trend of transnational terrorism potentially weakens my causal story that failing peace agreements encourage terrorism through the radicalization of politically frustrated individuals in that country. A post-accord setting might attract transnational terrorist groups due to larger regional dynamics, such as porous borders or ungoverned areas. Figure 4 maps the 34 cases to see which may have been exposed to regional dynamics. The post-accord settings can be visually grouped into several historically unstable regions: the Balkans, the Levant, West Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, Central America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. During this period, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Levant were typically regarded as hubs for transnational terrorist groups.

6 Hereinafter, I deliberately refer to an “accord country-year count” as a “country-year”. I prefer the simpler term because it is more widely used and improves readability, especially in the empirical discussion.
Figure 4: Comprehensive Peace Agreements in the Cross-Case Study

There are many ways to operationalize the “intensity of terrorism”. I use observations from Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). GTD records approximately 170,000 incidents of terrorism between 1970 and 2016. Among other attributes, an incident of terrorism must logically have a location, a target and a perpetrator, though the perpetrator is not always properly identified. The attack may result in deaths, injuries, hostages, or property damage. GTD records unsuccessful incidents if the perpetrator was thwarted during an attempt to carry out the attack. On the contrary, GTD does not record plots or conspiracies which were not attempted. The incidents in GTD are sourced from more than two dozen data collection efforts.\(^7\) There is a well-known problem with missing data from the year 1993 having been “lost prior to START’s compilation of the GTD from multiple data collection efforts” (START 2017). Instead, GTD offers country-level statistics on incidents, injuries, and deaths in the year 1993, but without source citations for each incident.

I subset GTD to increase the validity of the observations with respect to my theory. GTD includes a spectrum of political violence, and some incidents may not qualify as “terrorism proper”. I exclude the doubtful incidents using a flag that is available from 1997 onward. I also limit the observations to only incidents that simultaneously satisfy variables labeled as Criterion 1 (“aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal”) and Criterion 2 (“an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some message to a larger audience than the immediate victims”) (START 2017). I waive the variable labeled as Criterion 3 (“outside the context of

\(^7\) The largest data collection efforts were Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, and presently the START Primary Collection.
legitimate warfare activities, insofar as it targets non-combatants”) because the targeting of non-combatants is not a strict requirement of my theory.

I construct a terrorism index to measure the “intensity of terrorism” in the cross-section, time-series data. The index minimizes the burden of reporting and analyzing at least four different indicators relevant to the “intensity of terrorism”: the count of terrorist incidents, deaths, injuries, and level of property damages. A composite measure is appropriate because the indicators may not correlate well with one another, varying from case to case based on the preferences of local actors. Apart from my filtering of the data described above, I follow the methodology of the Global Terrorism Index, which has been calculated since 2000 by the Institute for Economics and Peace. I first compute a raw score for each country-year based on the level of terrorist incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damages in that year. Each indicator is assigned various weights ranging from 0.5 (one injury) to 3 (one death). I then compute a five-year weighted average incorporating the raw scores from the previous four years in that country “to reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time” (IEP 2017). Also, I logarithmically band each five-year weighted average to a scale of 1-10 to overcome dispersion in the data because terrorism is “not evenly distributed throughout the world” (ibid.); the maximum raw score in the entire GTD (Iraq in the year 2014) is banded to the maximum score of 10. Together, my decisions to use a historical weighted average and logarithmic banding reflect the intuition that there is diminishing marginal return to terrorism. Terror speaks to both the present and the future. A terrorist attack in a country that has experienced few incidents, would have more bearing over the terrorism index than a similar attack in a country that has experienced many incidents already.

**Independent Variable**

In comparison to the “intensity of terrorism”, there are fewer ways to operationalize the “failure to implement the provisions of a peace agreement” in the cross-case study. Yet my approach still demands explanation. In PAM, the implementation phase “begins immediately after the signing of the peace agreement and continues for ten years where applicable” (Joshi et al. 2015). The provisions of a peace agreement may be implemented to varying degrees over time. PAM scores “the degree of implementation achieved to date” for every relevant provision based on the likelihood that its implementation will be completed by the end of the following year: “minimal” (not likely), “intermediate” (likely), or “full” (already or nearly complete) (ibid.). PAM calculates an “aggregate implementation score” (0-100%) from the implementation of the relevant provisions. However, the “aggregate implementation score” found in PAM is not ideal
for my study because it is not sensitive to the failure of provisions. Consider that a post-accord setting could arrive at a hypothetical “aggregate implementation score” via two completely different paths: if all the provisions were implemented to an intermediate degree; or if half the provisions were implemented fully, while the other half were implemented minimally.

I propose a new indicator to operationalize the “failure to implement the provisions of a peace agreement”. By defining failure as “minimal” implementation, I count the provisions which score 0 or 1 (minimal implementation) and divide by the total provisions in that country accord-year, to arrive at the “proportion of failing provisions in the peace agreement”. There are several advantages of using an indicator which measures the failure of individual provisions rather than aggregate implementation success. First, I ensure that the direction of the independent causal effect will be consistent at first sight with the hypothesized relationship. Second, this indicator attempts to combine the objective and subjective dimensions of failure. While the individual provisions are objectively implemented to varying degrees over time, peace agreements are collectively perceived as either succeeding or failing at a certain point in time. This foreshadows the intuition of the within-case study, by making a deductive leap from individually “failing” provisions to collectively “failing” agreement.

Control Variables

Besides the “failure to implement the provisions of the peace agreement”, there may be other relevant variables that explain the “intensity of terrorism”. Failure to control for these covariates, especially if they correlate with my independent variable, would bias the parameter estimates. However, control variables should not be “in part a consequence of our key causal variable” (King et al 1994). Previous large-n studies have identified two causally coherent phenomena that are highly correlated with the intensity of terrorism: involvement in armed conflict, and high levels of political terror (IEP 2017). I select additional covariates that control for at least these causally coherent phenomena, as they suggest alternative causal pathways that could be confused with the causal mechanism proposed in my theory.

I include a dummy variable to indicate whether “armed conflict” exists in a given country-year. Ongoing armed conflict creates political instability and expands the opportunity structure for terrorism. The armed conflict may or may not relate to the expectations of or parties to the peace agreement. My indicator for armed conflict comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Furthermore, I include a variable to measure “state terror”, or political terrorism carried out by the government, in a given country-year. State-sponsored terrorism heightens the risk of terrorism “from below” (Laquer 1977, cited in McCauley & Segal 1987) as it exacerbates
group grievances. My indicator for state terror comes from the Political Terror Scale and takes on a value of 1-5. Moreover, I include a log-transformed variable measuring “male unemployment” in a given country-year. Terrorists are often portrayed as young men who seek kinship and purpose in militant groups because they have been removed from other social and economic structures. A higher unemployment rate may lower the opportunity costs of terrorism. My indicator for the male unemployment rate is derived from International Labor Organization estimates. Additionally, I include dummy variables to indicate whether people have freedom or democracy in a given country-year. The transition to democracy is associated with state weakness and political instability, which increases the risk of terrorism. By the inverse logic, the transition to autocracy may increase stability and reduce terrorism. The dummy variables are derived from two competing scales: Freedom House and Polity IV Project. The proper interpretation of the dummy variables (free vs. not free; democracy vs. autocracy) is the causal effect of transitioning from an in-between phase (partially free; anocracy) to a phase expressed by the dummy variable. I describe in the next section how the panel structure of the data can be leveraged to introduce country-specific, time-invariant fixed-effects. Table 2 summarizes the conversion of theoretical concepts into covariates and their predicted effect on terrorism.

**Table 2: Covariates and Their Expected Relationship with Terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory Source</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Expected Relationship with Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credible commitment, signaling theory</td>
<td>Peace Accords Matrix</td>
<td>Proportion of failing provisions in peace agreement</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric conflict, post-war violence</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
<td>Armed conflict</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance theory of civil war, perception of victimization</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale</td>
<td>State terrorism</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic bulge, social networking, opportunity costs</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
<td>Male unemployment rate in labor market</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State weakness, political instability, democratization</td>
<td>Freedom House; Polity IV</td>
<td>Type of political system</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Country-specific, time-invariant fixed-effects from panel analysis</td>
<td>Availability of illicit small arms, porosity of borders, etc.</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model**

I use a linear mixed model to leverage the panel structure of my data. As a class of the general linear model, the linear mixed model extends the multiple linear regression with fixed-effects. Multiple linear regression is appropriate because the explanatory variables are expected to have
a linear relationship with the dependent variable, which as a continuous index can assume any real value between 0 and 10. The motivation for introducing country-specific, time-invariant fixed-effects is to control for unobserved heterogeneity across cases. I believe there are possibly other relevant explanatory variables beyond the already specified control variables, e.g. the availability of illicit small arms or the porosity of a country’s borders. However, these variables proved computationally burdensome or highly impractical to operationalize for the relevant period in all 34 cases. Fixed-effects modeling conveniently treats these variables as unobserved and attributes their overall effect to a country-specific intercept.

The linear mixed model offers various estimation methods, any of which can reduce omitted variable bias. Among the estimation methods, I use the standard “within” estimator and the less commonly used “between” estimator to estimate the casual effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable within and between cases. The “within” estimator relies on within-group variation in the observed explanatory variables, whereas the “between” estimator averages out the time component for each group before regressing.\(^8\) The explanatory variables tend to exhibit substantial variation because post-accord settings are highly dynamic. While the general use of fixed-effects exposes the statistical model to higher sampling variability than would a pooled OLS regression, “the statistical question is whether the results change more profoundly than could be expected simply as a result of sampling variability” (Green et al 2001). In fact, the failure of pooled OLS regressions to control for country-specific effects produces biased estimates in many cases (ibid.). Finally, the relative explanatory power of the “within” and “between” estimators has structural implications for the design of my case study, which I discuss in the following section.

The model applied to the cross-case study is summarized as follows:

\[
\text{TERRORISM INDEX}_{it+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{FAILING PROVISIONS}_{it} + \gamma' \mathbf{X}_{it} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it}
\]

where TERRORISM INDEX \(_{it+1}\) is a country-year observation of the dependent variable, led by one year; FAILING PROVISIONS \(_{it}\) is a country-year observation of the independent variable; \(\mathbf{X}_{it}\) is a vector of control variables; \(\mu_i\) is a country-specific intercept; and \(\varepsilon_{it}\) is the error term. The dependent variable is led by one year to avoid the problem of simultaneity; in effect, all the independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable.

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\(^8\) The “between” estimator for a fixed-effects model is not to be confused with the “pooled OLS” estimator for a general linear model, which makes no distinction as to group identification.
B. Motivating the Within-Case Study

A within-case study “allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge” (Eisenhardt 1989). I review the unique patterns within a single case to ascertain the leverage of my theory when motivated by temporal variation in the perception of failure associated with implementation of the peace agreement. The design bears resemblance to a theory-guided case insofar as it “focuses attention on some theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others” (Levy 2008). Theory-guided case studies are considered idiographic because they aspire “to describe, explain, interpret, and/or understand a single case as an end in itself” (ibid.). I focus on details of the case that help bridge the independent and dependent variables by way of the causal mechanism.

Case Selection, Unit of Analysis

I select the Mindanao peace process because it supplies a large set of historical events and violent non-state actors. I use several historical events associated with a perceived gain or loss in the peace process to operationalize the independent variable and delimit the relevant periods of analysis. I examine the terrorist behavior of several violent non-state actors to infer their motivations in relation to my causal mechanism. While the Mindanao peace process could be divided into multiple cases according to peace agreements or splintered rebel groups, I treat the process as a single case that has generated many observations over time. This is consistent with my previous understanding of a “case” (in the cross-case study) as a post-accord setting. The observations in this case are terrorist incidents, which possess other inherent characteristics such as location, date, type of attack, perpetrator, target, deaths, and injuries.

Independent Variable

“Failure to implement a peace agreement” is operationalized as a historical event associated with a group’s perceived loss in the implementation phase. I am particularly interested in any “salient loss” that betrays an “ephemeral gain” (Midlarsky 2011). My theory suggests two turning points in the peace process. The “ephemeral gain” gives rise to hope by validating the peace process, while the “salient loss” gives way to despair. Hence, a temporal comparison involves two periods of analysis: an ephemeral gain initiates the first interval, while a salient loss initiates the second interval. Because the second interval must also end, I close that interval with the first post-accord election as a “game changer”. Scholars have treated the first post-accord election as a watershed event with “the potential to trigger renewed violence” (Joshi et al 2017). If terrorists seek to maximize their political impact, incidents would be “timed to coincide with major events in a peace process” (Kydd & Walter 2002) such as the first post-
accord election. In the Philippines, a presidential election is the ultimate “game changer” because policy can shift dramatically between administrations.

Among the considerable gains and losses in the Mindanao peace process, I evaluate two sets of turning points {ephemeral gain → salient loss → game changer}. The first set is {Mindanao Final Agreement → Republic Act No. 9054 → 2004 Presidential Election} and the second set is {Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro → Stalled Passage of Bangsamoro Basic Law → 2016 Presidential Election}. The Mindanao Final Agreement and Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro generated perceived gains in mechanically similar ways. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 9054 and the stalled passage of the BBL generated perceived losses in mechanically dissimilar ways: the former was the enactment of a suboptimal law, whereas the latter was the rejection of an optimal law. The theory may be robust to both specifications of a “salient loss”, or it may not. In any case, I predict that the dynamics of terrorism should vary before and after the salient loss, as the “moderate” frame prevails in the first interval and the “radical” frame prevails in the second interval.

**Dependent Variable**

The “intensity of terrorism” can be described by the level of incidents, deaths, injuries, and hostages. As in the cross-case study, I apply the same criteria to filter incidents which satisfy my definition of terrorism. The ability to enforce this causal category was one advantage of using the GTD over other specialized data sets such as Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (which exceeded GTD in its coverage of Mindanao). Unlike in the cross-case study, I break out the incidents, deaths, injuries, and hostages for each period of analysis, rather than convert them into an index. Furthermore, I report them as annualized rates because the “ephemeral gain” and “salient loss” intervals differ in length.

The entire period of analysis contains 4,613 incidents of terrorism in the Philippines, of which 19 occurred in Sabah, Malaysia, which was historically linked to the Islamic sultanate in Maguindanao and Sulu. I compute a weighted score for each incident that allows me to rank all 4,613 incidents in descending order of intensity. For the four intervals, I rank the top 10 incidents and include locations, dates, attack types, targets, perpetrators, and associated casualties. These are presented in Tables A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5.

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9 For the within-case study, I report hostages in lieu of property damages because kidnapping for ransom emerged a widely practiced tactic in the Philippines at this time.

10 Hereinafter, I refer to the location of an incident by the name of the province rather than the city in which it occurs. This allows locations to be more easily identified in my heat maps.
Probing the Causal Mechanism

The main challenge is to identify and isolate the “precise mechanisms, whereby macro-level processes may affect actors, institutions, and processes at the micro level” (Balcells & Justino 2014). I propose a comparative dynamic analysis consisting of actor-event analysis and dynamic geospatial analysis.

Actors provide a critical link between the two observed macro-phenomena: the failure to implement a peace accord and the intensity of terrorism. This requires identification of actors and evaluation of whether terrorist behavior by the group (or individual belonging to the group) was motivated by a frame promoting “radical” action. Using the four periods of analysis suggested by the historical turning points, I designate two organizations which were responsible for the most intense terrorist incidents within each period. The four actors are: Abu Sayyaf Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Communist Party of the Philippines, and Moro Islamic Liberation Front. These groups are “for the most part ideologically driven, predictable, and supported by a part of the local population” (Santos & Santos 2001). Another important attribute is their longevity, as “90 percent of terrorist groups have a life span of less than a year, and more than half of the remaining 10 percent disappear within a decade” (McCauley 2009). I investigate micro-process at the actor level using primary and secondary material such as speeches, interviews, newspaper accounts, and policy reports. My aim is to describe how the material or psychological circumstances of the historical event influenced the actor’s behavior in that period, with a focus on the local population’s propensity to terrorism. Table 3 summarizes the historical events, periods of analysis, and actors selected for review.

I make additional causal inference using geospatial analysis. While the within-case study is designed to exploit primarily temporal variation, it also offers substantial spatial variation resulting from the distribution of violent non-state actors and their choice of where to launch attacks. I generate heatmaps showing the distribution of annualized incident and death rates across provinces and over time. I count attacks perpetrated by unknown groups if they satisfy the definitional criteria for terrorism. The incident locations can be suggestive of the constraints or motivations facing the actors in relation to the proposed causal mechanism. Finally, I consider the effect that exposure to terrorism in the “salient loss” interval might have had on political outcomes, interpreting the results of the presidential elections as observable

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11 The incidents are score using similar methodology to the cross-case study, with the addition of a 0.5 weight for a hostage (equivalent to a non-fatal injury).
implications of the causal mechanism. The latter may include commentary on the geopolitical significance of the attack location.

**Table 3: Four Actors and Intervals Delimited by Four Turning Points**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Event</th>
<th>Ephemeral Gain I</th>
<th>Salient Loss I</th>
<th>Ephemeral Gain II</th>
<th>Salient Loss II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period of Analysis</td>
<td>Interval 1</td>
<td>Interval 2</td>
<td>Interval 1</td>
<td>Interval 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group;</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters;</td>
<td>New People’s Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C. Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Research**

Mixed methods research demands explanation of how the methods relate to one another (Bryman 2007; Levy 2008). The research design consists of *cross-case* and *within-case* studies; each study employs *quantitative* or *qualitative* methods. Precisely speaking, the cross-case study uses only quantitative methods, while the within-case study uses both quantitative and qualitative methods. Rather than treat quantitative and qualitative research as separate domains, I show that the methods either “substantially enhanced” or called into question one another, making the integrated analysis “more than the sum of its parts” (Bryman 2007). A notable weakness of the research design is that conceptual slippage between the two studies undermines mutual validation. Finally, I describe the relative strength of the within-case study and how multiple methods enhance micro-dynamics of violence research.

**Quantitative Methods Enhance Qualitative Findings**

Sequencing the cross-case study before the within-case study is central to the research design. The “between” and “within” estimators of the fixed-effects model ascertain whether there is stronger evidence supporting the spatial (between post-accord settings) or temporal (within post-accord settings) dimension of the hypothesis. The quantitative findings suggest the latter and thus motivate a within-case study rather than a between-case study. The regression analysis clarifies which control variables are important to address in the qualitative approach. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in the within-case study itself strengthens the overall findings. Quantitative methods are used to evaluate the intensity of terrorism incidents, rank the incidents in each period of analysis, and select four actors to review qualitatively. Also, geospatial and statistical analyses generate additional data points on the intensity of terrorism, which are brought into the narrative discussion.
Qualitative Methods Call into Question Quantitative Findings

Given the order of the two studies, the qualitative findings influence the quantitative findings ex post facto by broadening the space for critical reflection on the limitations of large-n research. The qualitative approach is obviously more suitable for probing the causal mechanism because it can accommodate irregular details pertaining to human motivation that are not easily specified in a statistical model. My findings from the within-case study reveal that the causal mechanism does not always work in the way I had put forth, which weakens the independent causal effect that might be claimed with the fixed-effects model. Moreover, the within-case study suggests that the temporal relationship is driven more strongly by salient events rather than the proportion of failing provisions (though they are of course related), and that one year may not be the most appropriate time scale to observe sensitive changes in the response variable. Given the opportunity to reiterate the cross-case study, I might operationalize the independent variable and unit of analysis differently based on knowledge acquired from the within-case study.

Conceptual Slippage Undermines Mutual Validation

Two subtle enemies of mixed methods research are “conceptual slippage” and “mechanism muddling” (Ahram 2013). Conceptual slippage refers to the use of “incompatible nominal, ordinal or radial scales” for “qualitatively and quantitatively construed concepts” (ibid.). This is a legitimate concern for my study because, as noted above, the independent variable and time scale are operationalized differently in the cross-case and within-case studies.12 The cross-case study uses the “proportion of failing provisions in the peace agreement”, while the within-case study uses “a historical event associated with a group’s perceived loss in the implementation phase”. The former is a more objective indicator of failure based on implementation status according to PAM, while the latter is a more subjective indicator of failure based on a historical rendering of the Mindanao case.

As Homer’s Odysseus was forced to choose between Scylla and Charybdis, I too must choose between the “conceptual thickness” demanded by intensive research and the “conceptual thinness” demanded by extensive research (Ahram 2013). In the end, I prioritize the within-case study because its operationalization better captures the effect of strong

12 The dependent variable is less problematic than the independent variable. The concept/variable “intensity of terrorism” is reasonably valid and reliable. Its validity owes to the fact that the empirical data and definitional criteria for terrorism are both derived from GTD. Its inter-study reliability is somewhat lower because the “intensity of terrorism” is reported as an index in the cross-case study and as annualized incident, death, injury, and hostage rates in the within-case study.
emotional reactions as posited in my theory. Therefore, I invest more analytical resources into the within-case study and discount the intrinsic value of the cross-case study (relative to the within-case study). The cross-case study remains instrumental in helping me determine whether the theory-guided case study should be motivated by between-case (spatial) or within-case (temporal) variation; and definitively suggests the latter. Given that the cross-case and within-case studies cannot mutually validate each other due to conceptual slippage, I prefer to put the cross-case study in service to the within-case study.

Finally, mechanism muddling refers to the embedment of “different causal properties into conceptual definitions… a problem of equifinality and multiple pathways leading to the same outcome” (ibid.). Mechanism muddling is not an obvious concern because I use the within-case study to investigate the causal mechanism, and I attempt to distinguish between individual dynamics and individual-group dynamics at work in the causal mechanism.

**Multiple Methods Enhance Micro-Dynamics of Violence Research**

The within-case study allows the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods in the same conceptual framework. The within-case study is ambitious because it strives to bridge two different levels of analysis: macro-outcomes (failure to implement a peace agreement, terrorism) and micro-processes (radicalization). This is consistent with an “emerging research program” on the “incidence” and “character” of civil war (Kalyvas 2008), which contrasts with the dominant approach of investigating structural determinants. A focus on “interrogating the event” (King 2010) requires disaggregation by actor, by temporal period, and by type of violence (Kalyvas 2008). While regression analysis presumes that terrorism is “a causally coherent category of collective violence” (Tilly 2003), micro-level research, which accommodates wide-ranging human behavior and motivation, may suggest that terrorism cannot be easily understood as “a causally coherent category of collective violence” (ibid.). Some scholars have proposed multiple methods to untangle this effect:

Multiple methods – from large-n data collection to participant interviews and careful archival work – can yield a far more complex picture not only of the interests and intentions of violent actors but also of the durable social meanings with which their acts are invested. (King 2010)
IV. CROSS-CASE STUDY: 34 COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENTS

A. Data Description

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Cross-Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism Index</td>
<td>Weighted index measuring intensity of terrorism (calculated using GTD)</td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>6.906</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td>4.981</td>
<td>8.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Failing Provisions</td>
<td>Proportion of provisions with minimal implementation (calculated using PAM)</td>
<td>(0, 1)</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict</td>
<td>Has ongoing armed conflict (Uppsala Conflict Data Program)</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Terror</td>
<td>Level of state-sponsored terrorism (Political Terror Scale)</td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>3.172</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Unemployment</td>
<td>Rate of male unemployment (International Labor Organization)</td>
<td>(0, 100)</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>8.511</td>
<td>7.427</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Is &quot;Free&quot; (Freedom House)</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>Is &quot;Not Free&quot; (Freedom House)</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Is &quot;Democracy&quot; (Polity IV)</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>Is &quot;Autocracy&quot; (Polity IV)</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.0638</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables referenced in the cross-case study. The terrorism index has a mean of 6.91 and standard deviation of 0.81, while the proportion of failing provisions has a mean of 0.33 and standard deviation of 0.27. Figure 5 and Figure 6 plot the kernel density for the terrorism index and proportion of failing provisions, respectively. The terrorism index appears normally distributed and unimodal around the mean; its derivation from a five-year weighted average and logarithmic scale create a relatively smooth distribution, so no outliers are dropped prior to the regression. The proportion of failing provisions follows a roughly normal distribution but is positively skewed, with the mean slightly surpassing the median. Most variables have 298 observations. The shortfall (from the ideal 340 country-year observations) derives from a few cases having severely truncated observations in GTD. The missing observations in GTD seem to be associated with countries (Liberia after 1999, Sierra Leone after 1997, Djibouti after 2000) where the post-conflict environment was too precarious for media outlets to independently corroborate the incidents. The missing values imply that the parameter estimates may underestimate the true intensity of terrorism in those countries.

Figure 5: Kernel Density of the Terrorism Index
Figure 6: Kernel Density of the Proportion of Failing Provisions

Figure A-1 plots the proportion of failing provisions and the intensity of terrorism for all 34 cases over a moving ten-year period. Given the cross-section, time-series structure of the data, this is the most efficient way to visualize the hypothesized relationship within and between cases. A cursory glance at the 34 panels suggests that the dependent and independent variables covary in the expected way. The proportion of failing provisions tends to decrease monotonically over time, and the intensity of terrorism tends to decrease in lockstep. Some cases such as Croatia, Papua New Guinea and South Africa experienced a precipitous drop in the proportion of failing provisions. On the other hand, some cases such as Republic of the Congo and Senegal experienced reversions. A typical reversion might owe to the violation of a ceasefire agreement, or a change in the rate of implementation (such that a provision that was expected to be completed by the end of the following year is no longer expected to be completed). Three countries exhibited no variation at all in the proportion of failing provisions: Guinea-Bissau (0%), India (nearly 100%) and Sierra Leone (nearly 100%).

Table 5: Correlation Coefficients Matrix
Table 5 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the continuous variables: the terrorism index, proportion of failing provisions, state-sponsored terrorism, and male unemployment. The correlation between the dependent variable and the continuous explanatory variables, except male unemployment, is significant. The dependent variable shows the strongest correlation with state-sponsored terrorism ($r = 0.37$) and proportion of failing provisions ($r = 0.30$). Moderate correlation among the explanatory variables suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue. Because democracy (freedom) and presence of armed conflict are dummy variables, I use a two-sample t-test to compare the true difference in means for the terrorism index with respect to each dummy group. The parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 0.01 level for armed conflict vs. no armed conflict ($\mu_1=7.57$, $\mu_2=6.57$); democracy vs. non-democracy ($\mu_1=7.09$, $\mu_2=6.72$); and free vs. not free ($\mu_1=7.00$, $\mu_2=6.78$). Finally, I address the issue of simultaneity by leading the terrorism index by one year with respect to all the explanatory variables.

B. Regression Analysis

Table 6 reports the regression output for the fixed-effects model using the “within” estimator. In the bivariate and multivariate specifications, the independent variable is statistically significant. The parameter estimate for the proportion of failing provisions ranges from 0.581 (low estimate) to 0.796 (high estimate). As expected, the control variables – the presence of armed conflict, state-sponsored terrorism, and transition to democracy – are statistically significant predictors with positive effects. I consider the fourth specification of the model, which is the most complete and conservative, for this discussion. To put the independent causal effect in perspective, if all the provisions of a peace agreement were to fail, the marginal effect on the terrorism index would be slightly greater than the effect of ongoing armed conflict. Another interpretation: if all the provisions of a peace agreement were to fail, the marginal effect on the terrorism index would be greater than the effect of a transition to democracy. Still another interpretation: if half the provisions of a peace agreement were to fail, the marginal effect on the terrorism index would be equal to a unit increase in the Political Terror Scale. The test of goodness-of-fit suggests that the model at its best can explain 52% of the variation in the terrorism index. The test of joint significance produces a convincing F-statistic of 42.288. Finally, the model is robust to different operationalizations of democracy using either Freedom House (third specification) or Polity IV (fourth specification).
Table 6: Regress Terrorism Index on Covariates (country-specific fixed-effects model, ‘within’ estimator)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Terror Index (led by one year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Failing Provisions</td>
<td>1.214***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict</td>
<td>0.510***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Terror</td>
<td>0.283***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Unemployment</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>0.349***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>40.154*** (df = 1; 251)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7 reports the regression output for the fixed-effects model using the “between” estimator. The proportion of failing provisions never appears as a significant predictor in the multivariate specifications. However, the presence of armed conflict, state-sponsored terrorism, and transition to democracy remain statistically significant with parameter estimates comparable to those calculated by the “within” estimator. I consider two explanations for these puzzling results. First, the peace accords may not easily lend themselves to between-case comparison. There is a scholarly consensus that the content of CPAs has generally improved over time, reflecting learning and innovation (Herbolzheimer 2015; Joshi & Quinn 2015). The failure to implement provisions of a low-quality peace agreement may not equal the failure to implement provisions of a high-quality peace agreement. Second, there may be a high degree of path dependency in each case. The intensity of terrorism may be associated with a confounding variable, the prevalence of existing terrorist organizations in the country, which influences the ability to translate popular discontent into terrorist attacks. The formation of terrorist organizations requires substantial leadership, internal and external resources (see Santos & Santos 2010) which may not materialize in certain countries within a ten-year period. The “within” estimator captures unobserved heterogeneous factors such as this more so than
the “between” estimator. The “between” estimator performs better than the “within” estimator on the goodness-of-fit test: the model at its best can explain 70% of the variation in the terrorism index. On the other hand, it has lower joint significance than the “within” estimator, with an F-statistic of 10.496.

Table 7: Regress Terrorism Index on Covariates (time-invariant fixed-effects model, ‘between’ estimator)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Terror Index (led by one year)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Failing Provisions</td>
<td>1.195***</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Conflict</td>
<td>0.734***</td>
<td>0.745***</td>
<td>0.847***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Terror</td>
<td>0.368***</td>
<td>0.432***</td>
<td>0.394***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Unemployment</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>0.529*</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>(0.252)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.528***</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.412***</td>
<td>5.196***</td>
<td>4.937***</td>
<td>4.929***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>5.899*** (df = 1; 32) 9.590*** (df = 4; 28) 8.478*** (df = 6; 26) 10.496*** (df = 6; 26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the “within” estimator shows support for an association between the intensity of terrorism and the proportion of failing provisions, while the “between” model shows no support for this association. Based on these results, I use the case study in the next section to probe the causal mechanism in the context of temporal, within-case variation.

V. WITHIN-CASE STUDY: THE MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS

A. History of the Case

The history of the conflict in the Mindanao region descends from the Spanish and American colonization of the Philippines. The spread of Islam to indigenous communities in Sulu and
Mindanao in the thirteenth century preceded the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521 (Santos 2001). The Muslim inhabitants, or Moros, fiercely resisted colonization and warred with Spain for three centuries (Iqbal 2012, cited in OPAPP 2015). When Spain ceded the Philippine islands to the U.S. in 1898, the Treaty of Paris “forcibly and unjustly” annexed Mindanao-Sulu to the northern and central parts of the archipelago designated as a U.S. protectorate (Ferrer 2006). The Americans appointed Christian Filipinos to governing posts in Mindanao (Ferrer 2006) and promoted the large-scale migration of Christian settlers to Mindanao (Liepold 2010). When the Filipinos attained independence from the U.S. in 1946, Manila was given sovereignty over Mindanao, again without the consent of the Moro people.

The contemporary Mindanao population can be rendered into three main ethnic groups: the Muslim Moros, Christian Filipinos, and Lumad indigenous people (Santos 2001). Once the majority in their own ancestral homeland – “Bangsamoro” – the Moros and Lumad now view themselves as greatly disadvantaged minorities. They are outnumbered by Christians in eighteen of the twenty-three provinces in Mindanao (Ferrer 2006). To complicate matters, the Moros “have demands quite unique to themselves and demands conflicting with those of the other groups” (Santos 2001). Some scholars of this conflict helpfully distinguish between two related conflicts in the southern Philippines: the Muslim (Moro) problem “concerns the socio-cultural and economic life of the people”, whereas the Mindanao problem “concerns the socio-economic and political struggles of Muslim leaders among themselves and against intruders into their homeland” (Diaz 1999, cited in Santos 2001).

More than four centuries of colonization have produced intense mistrust and anxiety between the Christian and Muslim populations. Yet the modern period of the Bangsamoro conflict began in March 1968 with the Jabidah massacre of Moro recruits who refused to participate in a military operation in Sabah, Malaysia. The massacre triggered communal conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Mindanao. Only two months later, the Muslim Independence Movement published a manifesto declaring that the Moro people desired to “secede from the Republic of the Philippines, in order to establish an Islamic State that shall embody their ideals and aspirations, conserve and develop their patrimony, their Islamic heritage” (cited in Ferrer 2006). When President Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law throughout the Philippines in 1972, the newly formed Moro National Liberation Front launched an armed rebellion.

The Mindanao peace process is nearly as old and polarizing as the conflict itself. Some scholars of this conflict helpfully “speak of processes and not just one process” (Santos 2001). Seven presidential administrations and three regional mediators have each brought their own
“distinct dynamics” (ibid.). Attempts at making peace have been unilateral or halting for several reasons. On the government side, there are doubts as to whether the constitution can fully accommodate Moro demands. On the rebel side, each peace agreement tends to produce new splinter groups who doubt that the political solution does enough to advance their struggle. Consequently, the peace agreements tend to lack substantial implementation and “fail to secure a lasting peace” (International Alert 2009). Nowhere is this pattern seen more clearly than with the promise of regional autonomy in Mindanao.


Ephemeral Gain: Mindanao Final Agreement

On 2 September 1996 the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and MNLF signed the Mindanao Final Agreement (MFA), after two previously failed attempts to reach peace. The accord “constituted the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement” by concretizing the details for certain provisions (such as military-rebel integration) which had been left vague in 1976 (Hernandez 2014). To address problems in autonomous governance, the agreement proposed a “two-phase, three-year process” of implementation (Santos 2001). The first phase would establish a Special Zone of Peace and Development to promote “intense development and aid projects” in more than a dozen provinces in Mindanao, including the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), while the second phase would expand the ARMM based on the idea that “provinces would vote for inclusion after seeing the benefits of autonomous rule” (Tuminez 2007).

The 1996 Mindanao Final Agreement seemed promising because implementation was expected to be bilateral rather than unilateral; swift rather than delayed. The MFA was supposed not to repeat the mistakes of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which had betrayed an incongruity between the Moro vision of autonomy in their ancestral lands and the ARMM. After the Tripoli Agreement was signed, the Aquino administration unilaterally downgraded the number of provinces under consideration for autonomy from 24 to 15. When these 15 provinces held a 1989 plebiscite on whether to join the proposed ARMM, discontent with the initiative was manifested in the low turnout and 85 percent of “No” votes (Ferrer 2006). Only four provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) joined the autonomous region; even the leading Islamic centers in Mindanao, Marawi City and Cotabato City, were strongly opposed to the measure. Many rejected it outright as a “unilateral creation of puppet autonomous regions” (Santos 2001) plagued by “charges of corruption and inefficiency” under MNLF chief-turned-ARMM governor Nur Misuari (Hernandez 2014).
Moro Islamic Liberation Front – Ephemeral Gain

The ideology of the MILF in this period was broadly consistent with a master frame based on the struggle for recognition. The MILF was founded in 1979 after an imam, Salamat Hashim, broke away from the secular-nationalist MNLF, with the stated objective “to regain the illegally and immorally usurped freedom and self-determination of the Bangsamoro people” (Hashim 2001, cited in Santos & Santos 2010). Throughout most of its history, the MILF was “in competition with its parent organization for resources, support, and political legitimacy” (CISAC 2015a). After the Mindanao Final Agreement integrated the MNLF into the political mainstream, the MILF was considered the authentic Islamic voice on the Mindanao question, and distinguished itself by its sharp opposition to the ARMM. Hashim’s vision of “a higher form of Moro self-determination” can be characterized as “radical Islamic revivalism”, but not as “jihadi Islamism” (Santos & Santos 2010). This is a critically important distinction because while the MILF’s end may have been considered radical, the means it used to reach that end could at times have been moderate.

By the 1990s the MILF controlled swaths of territory in Central and Western Mindanao and earned popular support by engaging Moro communities in self-governance (CISAC 2015a). Its main supporters came from “the Islamized Maguindanao, Maranao, and Iranun ethnic groups in the central Mindanao provinces” (Santos & Santos 2010). The MILF’s armed wing, Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), claimed 45,000 “fully armed combatants, supported by tens of thousands of armed guerrillas” (ibid.). There was little doubt as to the sincerity of the MILF’s supporters. The daily routine of the militants included “five compulsory Muslim prayer sessions” and their vittles were often “provided by nearby villagers whose support for the Moro cause is palpable” (ibid.). Interestingly, the AFP “periodically reported the existence of ‘Arab-looking’ individuals with turbans and heavy beards” in MILF territory, suggesting that political frustration with the Mindanao peace process drove recruitment far beyond the Philippines (Chalk 2005).

The MILF reached a ceasefire agreement with the GRP in 1998 and started political negotiations shortly thereafter. During this period, MILF rebels carried out a mass hostage-taking in Lanao del Norte. On 18 March 2000 about 400 MILF rebels “stormed Kauswagan, hoisted a rebel flag at the town square and took positions on a main road fronting the municipal hall” (Parreño 2000), taking 329 hostages. The crisis ended the following day when the military stormed the building and killed eight rebels. Despite the exceedingly high count of hostages, the GTD classifies this event as an “armed assault” rather than a “hostage-taking”. There are
conflicting accounts as to the motivation behind this attack. According to the MILF deputy chief for military affairs, the seizure of Kauswagan City Hall was part of a larger guerrilla campaign, following the AFP’s assault on MILF camps (ibid.). On the other hand, an MILF spokesman denied responsibility for the incident and instead blamed a rogue element in its Special Operations Group, Abdullah Macapaar, alias “Commander Bravo”.

I assess as credible the MILF’s claim that it did not have control over Commander Bravo in this case. The AFP reported that “nearly half of the 400 rebels were new recruits on a test mission, most of whom were in their late teens” (ibid.). Furthermore, the indiscriminate nature of the attack diverges from previous MILF terrorist incidents involving the use of explosives against explicitly Christian targets. Lanao del Norte has a distinct Islamic heritage, and it did not vote to join the ARMM in 1989, which contradicts the logic of attacking the local government. Given “the territorially dispersed nature of the group”, MILF base commanders could easily have engaged in actions “that do not necessarily reflect the thinking or wishes of the central command structure” (Chalk 2005). Therefore, I do not attribute this terrorist incident to a “radical” frame prompted by frustration with the 1996 MFA.13

Abu Sayyaf Group – Ephemeral Gain

The founding ideology of the ASG was consistent with a master frame based on the struggle for recognition. The ASG was founded in the southern islands of Basilan and Sulu in 1991 after Abdurajak Janjalani left the MNLF, criticizing Nur Misuari’s peace negotiations with the GRP and “his failure to appropriate Islamic concepts of jihad for the Moro struggle” (Santos & Santos 2010). The ASG’s stated objective “to achieve an independent Islamic state in the whole of Mindanao” certainly exceeded the MILF’s (Santos & Santos 2010). Janjalani himself was radicalized during his resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, where he allegedly met Osama bin Laden. Janjalani based his leadership on “the sheer force of his own personality” and accordingly infused the ASG with political and spiritual purpose in its early years (Taylor 2017). In fact, some believe that “al-Qaeda sponsored the formation of the ASG” (Santos & Santos 2010), which increased its level of professionalism and violent extremism, coinciding with the promotion of a truly radical frame.

However, Janjalani’s death in December 1998 caused total “fragmentation and deterioration of discipline” (CISAC 2015b). Without its charismatic leader, the ASG grew more concerned with its own survival than with any political or religious orientation. The post-

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13 Regardless of the underlying motivation, the government’s response to the Kauswagan City hostage crisis was swift and unforgiving: President Estrada broke the ceasefire just three days later and pursued “all-out war” against the MILF.
Janjalani era was marked by the emergence of “two main ASG groups, each with its own local leaders or commanders – one in Sulu and the other in Basilan” (Santos & Santos 2010). The ASG operation in Basilan practiced stricter adherence to Islam (even asking female hostages to cover their legs), while the ASG operation in Sulu resembled a confederation of bandits “competing for kidnapping victims” (Gerdes et al 2014). Whereas Basilan closely fits the “radical” frame described in my theory, Sulu emphatically does not. As a criminal enterprise, the ASG attracted recruits whose motivation could be described as driven more by individual rather than collective frustration. A young man explained his involvement with the ASG in this way: “They feed you. They give you a gun, so you can feel powerful. I was only 9, in third grade. My father had no work; there was nothing to do in my village” (cited in Liepold 2010). His story suggests that recruitment to the ASG was driven by a frustration not directly related to the vicissitudes of the peace process, but rather to the impact of protracted conflict on human development and psychosocial conditions.

The exact danger posed by the ASG has generated scholarly debate (Gerdes et al 2014). The ASG in this period was viewed as “a lean, loose, decentralized, highly motivated organization” whose strategy was “hitting, running, and hiding” (Santos & Santos 2010). Their base of support consisted of “the youth, rural poor, and kinship networks among the Tausug, Yakan, and Sama ethnic groups – which are among the Islamized Moro tribes – in Western Mindanao” (Santos & Santos 2010). The term “Abu Sayyaf Group” is used loosely to connote “networks in which each man is connected to every other by a complicated chain of personal ties” rather than “a clear command and control structure” (Taylor 2017). Because the ASG lacked internal coherence, its use of terrorism did not translate directly into political capital. But it still communicated the group’s frustration to the political collective. An ASG sympathizer saw terrorism as a way “to get attention, especially for people like us in the neglected parts of our country” (Labog-Javellana 2000, cited in Santos & Santos 2010). Despite having situated itself outside the peace process, the ASG opposed political compromises made by the MILF and MNLF.

If anything, the ephemeral gain from the Mindanao Final Agreement may have had a negative effect on the ASG’s recruitment, as people would have sensed more promise in a moderate solution to the conflict, isolating the ASG. The ASG’s most dramatic attack in this period occurred on 2 January 1999: ASG militants tossed grenades into a crowd as they watched a fire being put out in Sulu, killing 10 and injuring 74. The terrorist attack was clearly unpremeditated, despite speculation that it was to avenge the police killing of Janjalani just one month earlier. In general, terrorist bombings require a “long organizational chain” involving
“target selection, surveillance, recruitment, spiritual training, explosives preparation, and execution”; however, Mindanao was exceptional because the cultural knowledge and materials for bomb-making were widely available (Gerdes et al 2014). At the time, the ASG was struggling with a crisis of leadership, but had not yet split into two different operations. With such low barriers to entry and no central authority, attacks like this were seemingly impossible to deter or to predict. I find it hard to infer a clear motive for this attack (and many others using “hit-run-hide” tactics). Therefore, I cannot attribute this incident to a “radical” frame prompted by frustration with the 1996 MFA.

**Salient Loss: Republic Act No. 9054**

On 31 March 2001 Congress legislated *Republic Act No. 9054*, which “integrated powers previously devolved under the 1991 Local Government Code, broadened representation of the ARMM and/or Muslims in national bodies, and increased revenue shares for the region” (Ferrer 2006). Delayed by three years, the act did not satisfy the Mindanao Final Agreement’s provision that a law be “submitted to the people for approval in a plebiscite in the affected areas, *within two years* (i.e. end of 1998)”. On 24 November 2001 fifteen provinces held a second plebiscite to determine whether to join a new ARMM, but the results were hardly better than the first plebiscite: only Basilan province and Marawi City voted to join the original four provinces in the ARMM (Ferrer 2006). This very marginal expansion of the ARMM was offset by a much greater contraction of Moro hopes for self-governance in their ancestral lands. Another concern with the plebiscite was that Nur Misuari refused to step down as ARMM governor after his term had expired, reinforcing the image of poor governance. Overall, *Republic Act No. 9054* contributed to the persuasive narrative that, according to MILF spokesman Mohager Iqbal, “the MNLF… has failed miserably in their quest to empower our people” (Iqbal 2012, cited in OPAPP 2015). The disappointment was exacerbated by the high expectations that the government and the MNLF had projected onto the Mindanao Final Agreement, creating an opportunity for political violence.

**Moro Islamic Liberation Front – Salient Loss**

Since 1996 the MILF had swelled its ranks to become the largest insurgent movement in the Philippines and finally “eclipsed the MNLF in importance and viability as a negotiating partner for the government” (CISAC 2015a). The MILF’s quest for legitimacy was broadly consistent with the “moderate” frame. The MILF’s preferred strategy was to negotiate with the government on equal terms, especially through international support (Santos & Santos 2010). However, “radical elements” in the MILF occasionally employed violence to gain bargaining
leverage over the government (CISAC 2015a). This effect was typically accomplished through “tactical alliances with terrorist groups” such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Santos & Santos 2010). This amounted to the strategic use of a “radical” frame to pressure the government to return to the “moderate” solution proposed by the MILF.

For its part, the government suspected that “the MILF was hedging its bets by maintaining military capacity and international jihadist solidarity at the same time as they negotiate” (ICG 2004, cited in Santos & Santos 2010). But the government had its own way of bringing pressure to bear on the MILF. Two related external developments gave the government a significant military advantage during this period: the U.S. introduced a “Terrorist List” in 1997 and brought its global war on terror to the Philippines in 2003. In May 2002 the government lobbied the U.S. not to list the MILF as a terrorist organization, even as the CPP-NPA was blacklisted as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (Santos & Santos 2010). Hence, the government could credibly threaten to have the U.S. blacklist the MILF and frame their insurgency as terrorism (ibid.). Finally, the unilateral implementation and disappointing outcome of Republic Act No. 9054 would have lowered the MILF’s perception of the government’s trustworthiness as a negotiating partner.

These intrigues formed the backdrop for the most intense terrorist attack during this period: on 3 March 2003 the MILF is alleged to have bombed the Davao City International Airport, killing 22 and injuring 148. Given that it was a suicide attack, I infer that the individual experienced desperation in relation to the situation. The GTD observes that “suspected MILF members may have used the services of a known JI operative in preparing and detonating the bomb” (cited in GTD). The timing of the attack gives further clue as to the motivation, as it occurred “before a planned deployment of U.S. anti-terror troops to the region” (cited in GTD). The targeting of foreigners at an international airport commanded global attention, giving further credence to this interpretation. Thus, the government’s interest in a military solution to the Mindanao problem – rather than the salient loss associated with Republic Act No. 9054 – may have been the proximate cause of this incident, though both events altered the perception of viability of the peace process. Finally, the airport bombing closely resembled another terrorist incident in Davao City just one month earlier, in which members of the MILF’s Special Operations Group detonated a bomb at the wharf, killing 16 and injuring 55. The MILF denied any responsibility for the attacks, even as the government named MILF leaders in connection with both incidents.

The MILF’s charade was closely linked to the uncertain status of peace talks during this period. While the attacks were meant to convey discontent with the situation, the government
wielded even more leverage over the MILF. On 29 May 2003 President Arroyo gave the MILF an ultimatum: peace talks would resume on the condition that the MILF categorically reject terrorism (Stratfor 2003). One month later Salamat Hashim denounced terrorism as “anathema to the teachings of Islam” (Hashim 2003, cited in Stratfor 2003) and severed the MILF’s relationships with JI and ASG. In retrospect, the Davao City International Airport bombing seems to have been inspired by a “radical” frame precipitated by frustration with the overall direction of the peace process, but not necessarily the salient loss, Republic Act No. 9054. However, the MILF itself replaced the “radical” frame with a “moderate” frame as soon as it became clear that the “radical” frame would not succeed.

**Abu Sayyaf Group – Salient Loss**

The post-Janjalani and post-9/11 era brought new challenges for the ASG. The global war on terror generated extreme pressures upon the ASG: the U.S. provided military assistance to the AFP to defeat the ASG and interrupted its flow of money from al-Qaeda. These events forced the ASG to recover revenue “from a variety of sources, including taxation, extortion, and smuggling” (Croissant & Barlow 2007). While criminal activities could be viewed as essentially opportunistic, they could also be justified by Islamic concepts such as *fa’i* (“the robbing of non-believers as a way of raising funds for jihad”) (Croissant & Barlow 2007). Even kidnapping could be morally justified through its symbolism. An ASG manifesto noted that “for about 100 years already, the Bangsamoro people have been made hostages under the rule of democracy… The colonial government in Manila kidnapped the sovereignty of the Bangsamoro people” (Agence France-Presse 2000, cited in Santos & Santos 2010). Indeed, kidnapping for ransom emerged as both a lucrative and manipulative strategy.14

The ASG was uniquely positioned among terrorist groups because it could appeal to not one but two master frames with the different operations in Basilan and Sulu: opportunism (greed) and the struggle for recognition (grievance). Both master frames contained “radical” frames justifying wanton violence. The salient loss associated with Republic Act No. 9054 benefited the ASG’s recruitment because people who previously hoped for a “moderate” frame found themselves more attracted to a “radical” frame, no matter which master frame it belonged to. Under the leadership of Khadaffy Janjalani (no relation to Abdurajak Janjalani), the evolution of the ASG was marked by a return to the “classic terrorism of bombings” (Santos & Santos 2010). This marked a tactical shift away from kidnapping operations which ultimately

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14 While the Philippines and the U.S. have adopted a “no negotiation, no ransom policy in dealing with the hostage takers” (Stratfor 2001), other countries such as Norway have paid millions of dollars for the release of a single captive (Guardian 2016).
became “too drawn-out, labor-intensive, and risky, especially after the involvement of US counterterrorism forces and resources” (ibid).

These pressures came to a head in the deadliest terrorist attack ever in the Philippines: on 27 February 2004 a powerful blast on the Superferry 14 caused the vessel to sink in Manila Bay, killing 114. Despite initial uncertainty over whether the explosion was accidental, an ASG spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack: “We will bring the war that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people” (Solaiman 2004, cited in Santos & Santos 2010). The government arrested several suspects who were arrested in connection with the Superferry 14 attack, including a few who were affiliated with the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement of Filipino Christians who had converted to Islam, suggesting that politically motivated frustration extended to sympathizers beyond the population initially concerned with the peace process. Therefore, I attribute the Superferry 14 incident to a “radical” frame prompted by frustration with the salient loss, Republic Act No. 9054.

**Exposure to Terrorism and Political Consequences: 2004 Presidential Election**

At a higher level of aggregation, the exposure to terrorism varied both spatially and temporally. According to Table 8, from 2 September 1996 to 31 March 2001, the incident rate was 48.06 per year, the death rate was 86.94 per year, the injury rate was 245.74 per year, and the hostage-taking rate was 157.71 per year. The incident and death rates for this period are broken out by province in the left panel of Figure 7. The provinces most afflicted by terrorism were North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, and Sulu. These Mindanao provinces had significant Muslim populations of between 10 and 20 percent, and none except Sulu in 1989 and Basilan in 2001 had elected to join the ARMM. The prevalence of attacks in Basilan and Sulu is due to the ASG, which thrived “mainly due to clan loyalties in its area of operations and because the local Muslim population does not trust the Armed Forces of the Philippines” (Thayer 2005).

**Table 8: Annualized Incident, Death, Injury, and Hostage-taking Rates in the Philippines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interval</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Incident Rate</th>
<th>Death Rate</th>
<th>Injury Rate</th>
<th>Hostage Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1671</td>
<td>48.06</td>
<td>86.94</td>
<td>245.74</td>
<td>157.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>56.55</td>
<td>170.61</td>
<td>328.69</td>
<td>142.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>383.01</td>
<td>252.14</td>
<td>398.62</td>
<td>132.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>563.03</td>
<td>283.46</td>
<td>431.79</td>
<td>173.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Terrorism Database (calculated by author)

Notes: The annualized rate refers to the average daily rate for the indicator multiplied by 365
From 31 March 2001 to 10 May 2004, at the national level, the incident rate increased slightly to 56.55 per year, the death rate nearly doubled to 170.61 per year, and the injury rate increased markedly to 328.69 per year. Only the hostage-taking rate decreased slightly to 142.34 per year. The decline in hostage-taking can be explained by the effectiveness of U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. The death rate and incident rate for this period are broken out by province in the right panel of Figure 7. North Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Metropolitan Manila experienced notable increases in terrorism. This suggests that people responded to the salient loss either by executing attacks in the heavily Muslim provinces (perhaps directed to the Christian population) or by executing attacks in the national capital area (perhaps directed to politicians and national audience). It is interesting that the violence descended upon regional centers rather than distant islands such as Tawi-Tawi, reinforcing the notion that the intent of terrorism is to challenge the indifference of the majority. Overall, terrorism became slightly more frequent and much more lethal in the later period of analysis: this is consistent with my hypothesis that a failing peace agreement should be associated with a higher intensity of terrorism.

An observable implication of my theory is that the intensity of terrorism caused a shift in public opinion that was measured in the 2004 presidential election. Democratic elections tend to indicate the political mood and policy preferences of the electorate. The 2004 election provided an opening for disaffected minority to challenge the society’s indifference in a way that would translate into a new policy. While the MILF strategically used terrorism to influence the government, the ASG in its more strategic phase used terrorism to influence the public. Both groups made the Mindanao conflict a relevant political issue. The incumbent and presidential candidates were surely aware that their positions on the peace process would be closely scrutinized. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo invested substantial effort into the GRP-MILF peace process, which she styled as “all-out peace” with the MILF (in contrast to her predecessor’s “all-out war”). The effort paid off when the MILF disavowed terrorism and severed its connections to terrorist groups six months before the election. Arroyo’s credibility on security was enhanced by her support of the joint U.S.-Philippine counterterrorism initiative against the ASG and her pressure on Malaysia to terminate its support to Islamic dissidents (Rodell 2005). On 10 May 2004 the electorate awarded the presidency to Arroyo by a three percent margin.

Ephemeral Gain: Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro

On 27 March 2014 the GRP and MILF signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB), which put together all previously signed agreements between the two parties (Ferrer 2014, cited in OPAPP 2015). The MILF had urged the government to “stop thinking about solving the conflict in Mindanao by attempting to integrate the Moros into the national body politic,” equating integration “to shattered hope and dim future” (Iqbal 2011, cited in OPAPP
Therefore, an important aspect of the CAB was the devolution of powers to a truly self-governing region, Bangsamoro, which would replace the ARMM. A Bangsamoro Transition Commission was tasked with drafting new legislation “to serve as the organic act for the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao provided for in the 1987 Constitution” (Ferrer 2014, cited in OPAPP 2015). In September 2014 the commission submitted the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) to Congress for approval. The BBL offered a strong legal framework for autonomy, but also highlighted the need for constitutional reform, which remained “a contentious issue” in the Philippines (Herbolzheimer 2015). The BBL’s provisions on fiscal autonomy and natural resources sought to correct the problem of regional underdevelopment and economic exclusivity in Mindanao (BTC 2014). As the MILF expected the CAB to be implemented by 2016, much of the terrorism during this period originated from two groups that were squarely outside the peace process.

**New People’s Army – Ephemeral Gain**

As the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA) “has waged the world’s longest Communist insurgency” (CISAC 2015c). Founded in 1969 by Jose Maria Sison, the CPP-NPA had the stated objective of establishing a “national democratic” state and freeing the Philippines from foreign influence (Santos & Santos 2010). The CPP-NPA had a smaller fighting force than the MILF, but enjoyed broader support throughout the archipelago, recruiting from the disenfranchised poor (ibid.). Despite its large rural base of support, the communist rebels in more than forty years still had not realized their Maoist strategy of “encircling the cities” (ibid.). The NPA’s military organization was marked by “a notable degree of discipline” across “highly mobile armed propaganda units of between 8 and 15 guerrillas” (ibid.) From 1969 to 1976 the rebels received material support from China (CISAC 2015c), but the small arms found in more recent stockpiles have occasionally been traced to the AFP (Santos & Santos 2010), raising questions about the extent of public sympathy for their cause. The CPP-NPA’s stake in the Mindanao peace process was not based on Moro identity, but rather the extent to which the population in Mindanao accepted the group’s prescriptions to economic and social problems. The CPP-NPA’s master frame was broadly consistent with the Marxist class struggle, and its frame of action was mostly “radical”, but occasionally “moderate”.

The National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), an umbrella group for the communist rebels, attempted for years to reach a negotiated settlement with the government. While the NDFP and the government reached several interim ceasefires, the primary stumbling
block to peace talks was the U.S. State Department’s listing in 2002 of the CPP-NPA as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (FTO) (Morada 2004). The “FTO” label was rather unfair to the CPP-NPA, which manifestly discouraged the indiscriminate targeting of civilians (Santos & Santos 2010). Strenuously objecting to this label, the CPP-NPA suspended peace talks until it could be removed from the blacklist, but the Arroyo administration, which had personally lobbied for the MILF not to be blacklisted, never extended this favor to the CPP-NPA (Morada 2004).

During this period, the CPP-NPA carried out an extortion attempt which turned extremely violent and was listed in the GTD as terrorism, perhaps also unfairly. On 15 July 2014 deadly clashes between the NPA and the Manobo mountain tribe occurred in Agusan del Sur, killing 16. The CPP-NPA financed their rebellion by extorting “bananas, pineapple and rubber plantations, as well as poultry farms and mining outfits” (Sun Daily 2014). The Manobo tribe was targeted for its gold mining operation, and the village chief Calpito Egua was killed after he refused to pay the militants (ibid.). Other sources claim that Egua was a “leader of an anticommunist lumad [indigenous people] group” (Panganiban 2014). The contingent circumstances of his assassination (as the GTD labels it) do not resemble other assaults on political figures carried out by the CPP-NPA. This incident requires cautious assessment because of conflicting information about the underlying motive. If Egua was killed for refusing to pay up, then the attack was purely instrumental and cannot be attributed to the “radical” or even “master” frame (and clearly not motivated by the signing of the CAB). If Egua was killed due to his anticommunist stance, then the attack is consistent with the CPP-NPA’s proposed “radical” frame (but still not motivated by the signing of the CAB).

The only association that can be made between this incident and the signing of the CAB is that the CPP-NPA perceived other groups’ agreements with the government as “betrayal of a revolutionary cause” (CISAC 2015c). In fact, the MFA in 1996 and the CAB in 2014 undermined the CPP-NPA’s tacit cooperation with the MILF and MNLF by “avoiding clashes” and assuring “safe movement” through rebel-held territories (ibid.). Denied access to large swaths of territory in Mindanao – and the illicit economies therein – the communist rebels would have financed themselves through other ventures.

\[15\] A more typical political assault recorded in the GTD is the August 2011 kidnapping of a mayor in Surigao del Sur, who was released after he issued a public apology for his alleged human rights violations.
In contrast to the decades-old communist insurgency, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) constituted a much newer security threat. Their origins can be traced to Ameril Umbra Kato, who had commanded the “MILF’s biggest and most well-armed field division” (CISAC 2015d). As the GRP-MILF peace talks moved toward a solution of regional autonomy rather than full independence, he became increasingly disaffected with the MILF (ibid.). In 2008 Kato and two other MILF commanders went rogue and led unsanctioned raids on non-Muslim villages that resulted in large-scale displacement and violence against civilians, “moving the situation from the brink of peace to the brink of war in just a matter of days” (Santos & Santos 2010). Two years later he founded the BIFF in Maguindanao, with 300 members from his division, with the objective of establishing an Islamic state for the Moro people (CISAC 2015d). Kato’s rebellion within a rebellion greatly destabilized the GRP-MILF peace talks. The MILF panel chair Mohager Iqbal dismissed Kato as “one of our commanders who does not believe in negotiation, but we managed to let him toe the line for so long” (Iqbal 2011, cited in OPAPP 2015).

From 2011 to 2014, the BIFF wasted no opportunity to undermine the GRP-MILF negotiations. The group’s behavior was strikingly consistent – intransigent – despite multiple leadership changes after Kato was incapacitated from a stroke in 2011 (CISAC 2015d). The first GRP panel chair Marvic Leonen noted that their attacks were “suspiciously timed to coincide with the opening of [peace talks], when the passion is high that there may be an agreement this year” (Leonen 2012, cited in OPAPP 2015). As a round of peace talks ended in January 2014, like clockwork, the BIFF launched a bold attack against the AFP using roadside bombs in Maguindanao. The second GRP panel chair Miriam Coronel Ferrer beseeched “the members and the leaders of the BIFF to put down their arms and be part of the process. We ask them to listen to the plea of their own brothers and sisters to give peace a chance” (Ferrer 2014, cited in OPAPP 2015).

Rather than accept Ferrer’s invitation to enter the peace process, the BIFF chose to side with uncompromisingly radical groups, including the ASG and the newly established Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In September 2013 nearly two hundred BIFF and ASG members launched a joint attack against the AFP (CISAC 2015d). In August 2014 the BIFF declared its allegiance to ISIL in a grainy YouTube video and carried out “mass executions of those not willing to join them” (Pike n.d.). However, the BIFF’s allegiance to ISIL was publicly questioned because there was no evidence of cooperation between the two groups, and the BIFF
conceded that it had no plans to impose radical Islam in the independent state that it sought to establish in Mindanao (ibid.). A BIFF spokesman described the group’s allegiance to ISIL in the following terms: “If they need our help, why not?” (Mama 2014, cited in ibid.). An AFP colonel dismissed the BIFF as having “no legitimate revolutionary ideology but plain and simple banditry and terrorism” (Hermoso 2014, cited in ibid.).

In this context, the BIFF is thought to have carried out its deadliest attack on 9 December 2014. In Bukidnon, a bomb was detonated on a bus parked at Central Mindanao University, killing 11 and injuring 42. The bomb had been placed in a baggage stowed on the bus, which must have instilled fear in bus passengers throughout the Philippines. The attack bore the tactical signature of the BIFF, which used improvised explosive devices and high-caliber firearms (International Alert 2017). However, it differed from other attacks by the BIFF that might be categorized as “armed encounters with the AFP” and “armed confrontations with local clans” causing massive displacement in Maguindanao (International Alert 2014). Some military officials viewed the bombing as an attempt to undermine the peace process because the BIFF “don’t want the peace process to succeed” (Daang 2014). The BBL had been introduced in Congress two months earlier, and Central Mindanao University symbolized the integration of Christians and Muslims (ibid.). On the other hand, local authorities believed that an extortion syndicate was in fact responsible for the attack because the targeted vehicle belonged to the RTMI transportation company which had refused to comply with extortion demands in the past (ibid.).

Given the difficulty of attribution, I cannot assess with confidence whether this incident was motivated by developments in the Mindanao peace process. However, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the BIFF consistently behaved as a total spoiler with a narrowly defined struggle for recognition which could not be aligned with the more moderate MILF, nor with the more radical ISIL. The BIFF’s poorly articulated master frame did not facilitate its recruitment among the broader population. Despite its pitiable attempt at social media outreach, membership in the BIFF remained only three hundred militants “situated in Maguindanao’s inaccessible and inhospitable swamplands” (Sarmiento 2017). The BIFF membership in this period adhered strictly to a “radical” frame of action because the group never displayed interest in the pursuit of political negotiation or nonviolent reform (CISAC 2015d).

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16 It is remarkable that while the CPP-NPA strenuously objected to its listing as a terrorist organization, the BIFF went out of its way to be associated with the most notorious terrorist organization at that time.
**Salient Loss: Stalled Passage of Bangsamoro Basic Law**

On 25 January 2015 the AFP sustained a joint offensive by MILF and BIFF rebels, killing 67. This incident was severely at odds with the MILF’s assurances to the government that it had broken off all ties with terrorist groups, including the BIFF. As a result, Congress immediately suspended its deliberation on the BBL. The suspension probably masked significant opposition from Filipino constituents whose collective memory of martial law during the Marcos dictatorship made them skeptical of constitutional reform, or the step toward federalism, suggested by the BBL. The stalled passage of the BBL was contrary to the sense of urgency expressed by the government and MILF regarding the legislation. As early as 2013 the MILF had warned that “any further delay” would give the “enemies of peace” the chance “to jump on our failures to stop the dead peace process on track” (Iqbal 2013, cited in OPAPP 2015). Also, the delay prevented further demobilization of MILF forces, which had been conditioned on the enactment of the BBL during a transitional period (Herbolzheimer 2015). Having never supported the BBL, the CPP-NPA and BIFF may have been indifferent to its collapse in Congress, but the salient loss would have contributed to greater radicalization in Mindanao and broader recruitment to their causes.

**New People’s Army – Salient Loss**

The stalled passage of the BBL amounted to a missed opportunity for the government to peacefully resolve enduring resource-based conflicts in Mindanao. Had the BBL been legislated by Congress, Article XIII would have given the Bangsamoro Government authority “over the exploration, development, and utilization of resources in Mindanao”, and inhabitants of the Bangsamoro “preferential rights over the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources” (BTC 2014). In other words, the BBL would have addressed legitimate economic grievances upon which the CPP-NPA’s “radical” frame was based. Instead, the failure to implement this aspect of the CAB gave the CPP-NPA license to recruit effectively from the local population in this period.

The CPP-NPA’s most disruptive terrorist attack occurred on 16 February 2016. An explosion in Cagayan, leading to a clash between the assailants and police officers, killed 8 and injured 8. The CPP-NPA claimed responsibility and framed their attack as a “response to environment and health violations committed by the Brostan Company through their mining operations” (GTD 2016). Apart from the *Superferry 14* bombing in Manila Bay, this incident differs from other incidents reviewed because Cagayan lies in the northern island of Luzon, rather than the southern island of Mindanao. The CPP used its limelight from the Luzon attack
to issue a public statement on the same day ordering further attacks on coal mining firms in the Caraga region of Mindanao (Capistrano 2016). It is remarkable that the CPP-NPA could launch an attack in one location and credibly threaten another audience 2000 kilometers away. Not every “terrorist” group displayed such breadth or strategic planning. The CPP’s Northern Mindanao spokeswoman claimed that coal mining in Caraga had caused “further destruction of forests and mountains [which] will dislocate and destroy the livelihood of thousands of people and worsen the rapid climate change of the planet” (Malaya 2016, cited in Capistrano 2016). She added that the CPP-NPA would soon “carry out punitive actions to prevent coal mining companies from operating in the areas, by destroying their equipment, preventing their agents or administrators from entering the area and attacking their armed troops” (ibid.).

The public statement issued by the CPP-NPA on this occasion provides strong evidence that the group advanced a classic “radical” frame to justify its recourse to terrorism. The well formulated threat clarified that further attacks would cease if the group’s demands were met. Far more disruptive incidents, such as the Davao City International Airport bombing, sometimes failed to capitalize on the widespread attention; the perpetrators of those incidents did not link their attacks to specific demands, making it hard to infer the kind of compliance that the groups may have sought. While the strategic rationale behind this incident in Cagayan is transparent, it can be generally difficult to discern whether an individual is motivated to join the CPP-NPA because of economic grievances or other unstated reasons. For example, conflict analysis in the Philippines suggests that resource-based conflicts tended to interact with *rido*, or clan feuds, as a major cause of lethal violence from 2011 to 2016 (International Alert 2017).

**Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters – Salient Loss**

In this period the BIFF started to resemble the ASG because its brand of terrorism simply could not translate into political capital. After Kato’s death in 2015, the BIFF became deeply fractured. A radical wing came to be led by Esmael Abdulmalik, who adhered to ISIL ideology, while two other factions came to be led by imams who were “more equivocal in their stances” (Sarmiento 2017). With such a low base of support, the BIFF continued to operate in the backwaters of Maguindanao and North Cotabato, which had been ravaged already by years of the Mindanao conflict. Ironically, given the BIFF’s position firmly outside the peace process, its only fortune came from the collapse of the BBL. The stalled passage of the BBL stirred frustration among some MILF members whose radicalization led them to join the BIFF instead (CISAC 2015d).
At the same time, discipline within the ranks of the BIFF seemed to break down. Low-level recruits of the BIFF became materially motivated as the U.S. posted attractive bounties on the BIFF leadership (CISAC 2015d). On 3 May 2015 Abdul Basit Usman, a bomb-making expert and head of the Special Operations Group, who had eluded capture by the AFP, was killed by his own bodyguards. The GTD categorized this incident as terrorist-on-terrorist violence. This episode sharply reveals that not all members of the BIFF adhered to its proposed “radical” or even “master” frame. Some recruits may have operated under a different “master” frame altogether: greed.

The most intense terrorist attack credited to the BIFF in this period reflected a lack of clear purpose. On 10 March 2015 the perpetrators attacked a village in Maguindanao, and the clash with security forces killed 8 and injured 7 (GTD 2015). While no group claimed responsibility for the incident, it resembled previous attempts by the BIFF to terrorize the local population. It also occurred during a month-long AFP offensive against the BIFF, so it could have been a distraction to relieve military pressure. Considering the internal and external pressures upon the BIFF, no attempt was made to communicate a political message with this attack. But the country still paid close attention.

**Exposure to Terrorism and Political Consequences: 2016 Presidential Election**

At a higher level of aggregation, the exposure to terrorism varied both spatially and temporally. According to Table 8, from 27 March 2014 to 25 January 2015, the incident rate was 383.01 per year, the death rate was 252.14 per year, the injury rate was 398.62 per year, and the hostage-taking rate was 132.07 per year nationally. The incident rate and death rate from terrorism are broken out by province in the left panel of Figure 8. The provinces most afflicted by terrorism were Maguindanao and North Cotabato due to the BIFF. A striking observation is that the incident rate increased by a magnitude of eight, and the death rate increased by a magnitude of three, over the two intervals examined. This suggests that the frustration was cumulative, building up over the twenty-year period.

From 25 January 2015 to 9 May 2016, at the national level, the incident rate increased significantly to 563.03 per year, the death rate increased to 283.46 per year, the injury rate increased to 431.79 per year, and the hostage-taking rate increased to 173.96 per year. The death rate and incident rate for this period are broken out by province in the right panel of Figure 8. One interpretation is that counterterrorism efforts were effective at foiling large attacks, while smaller and less predictable attacks became more frequent. In this period, certain incidents involving the CPP-NPA and the BIFF highlight the need to distinguish between vertical conflict
pertaining to “armed struggles against the state” and horizontal conflict pertaining to “violent struggles between clans, ethnic groups, rival insurgent factions, political parties and private armed groups or shadow authorities” (International Alert 2014). Conflict analysis in Mindanao shows that horizontal conflicts surpassed vertical conflicts in this period (ibid.). Overall, terrorism became both more frequent and more lethal in the later period of analysis: this is again consistent with my hypothesis that a failing peace agreement should be associated with a higher intensity of terrorism.

An observable implication of my theory is that the intensity of terrorism caused a shift in public opinion that was measured in the 2016 presidential election. The unprecedented levels of terrorism in the period leading up to the election signaled to the majority that the failure to pass the BBL was unacceptable. The micro-level analysis of terrorism suggests that the groups were often working at cross-purposes. While the New People’s Army applied terrorism strategically to bring attention to substantial issues left unresolved by the failing peace agreement, the BIFF used terrorism without restraint to undermine practical efforts to bring about quality peace. Given the rapid proliferation of terrorist groups at this time, Filipinos may have failed to distinguish between the multiple actors with diverse motivations and instead conflated them all into one category: Mindanao terrorists. An unlikely presidential candidate to profit from this situation was Rodrigo Duterte, the coarse Davao City mayor with Moro ancestry. Duterte staked his presidential campaign on resolving the Mindanao conflict. While he was extremely compromised on other issues, such as his handling of the war on drugs in Davao City, Duterte had far more credibility than did Manila politicians on the Mindanao question. On 9 May 2016 the electorate awarded the presidency to Duterte by a 16 percent margin: the first ever president from Mindanao. One month later President Duterte in his inaugural address reminded Filipinos:

On the domestic front, my administration is committed to implement all signed peace agreements in step with constitutional and legal reforms (Duterte 2016, cited in Lorena 2017).
VI. LIMITATIONS

A. Potential Flaws of the Cross-Case Study

The cross-case study has several flaws inherent to quantitative studies of this nature. The problems can be summarized as empirical issues related to the underlying data, the operationalized variables and the model specification. I address each of these issues in turn.
**Systematic Measurement Error in the Global Terrorism Database**

A major source of bias in the GTD has to do with underreported incidents. Underreporting is systematically associated with certain targets ("unimportant populations"), locations ("rural incidents"), and the "capacity of the press" (Weinstein 2007). Thus, my estimates of causal effect almost certainly understate the true intensity of terrorism. On the other hand, it could be argued that terrorist incidents that fail to seize the attention of a broader audience do not qualify as terrorism proper.

**Nonsystematic Measurement Error in the Global Terrorism Database**

Intertemporal reliability is a lesser concern with the GTD. The project integrated multiple data collection efforts over different periods, of which the largest were Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, and Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (START 2017). The START Primary Collection began in 2011, at which point the GTD began to apply its own methodology consistently. While the GTD indicates the original data collection effort to which an incident corresponds, my analysis treats all data collection efforts as equal.

**Unit Homogeneity among Peace Accords**

The operationalized independent variable, "proportion of failing provisions", treats all provisions of a peace agreement as equally important. This is because PAM treats all 51 provision categories as equally important, despite research suggesting that certain provisions such as military and territorial power-sharing deserve more weight (Hoddie & Hartzell 2007). The "between" estimator of the fixed-effects model makes an even bolder assumption, which is that the marginal effect of failing to implement provisions is constant across different peace agreements. I consider this somewhat improbable and am not surprised that the "between" estimator returns a lack of significance for the independent variable.

**Serial Correlation in the Constructed Terrorism Index**

The operationalized dependent variable, a constructed terrorism index, has built-in serial correlation because it uses a five-year weighted average. Serial correlation challenges a fundamental assumption of the general linear model, namely, that the residuals are independently and identically distributed (IID). However, the terrorism index can be defended because the impact of terrorism in the current year contributes to approximately half the value of the index. A handy rule of thumb for whether IID holds is, whether the observations can be
imagined as exchangeable in the sequence. Figure A-1 displays the scatterplots broken out for all 34 cases, suggesting that observations seem to vary considerably from year-to-year.

**Model Specification**

The Achilles’ heel of the cross-case study is that the statistical model may not bear fidelity to reality. PAM’s tracking of implementation for ten years may not correspond to the actual time horizon that implementation processes require. Furthermore, the population may not base its assessment on the objective implementation of provisions, but rather on the subjective perception of an agreement is collectively succeeding or failing. Event analysis produces more “qualitative criteria, such as whether the agreement stands the test of dramatic political changes or not” (Joshi & Wallensteen 2018). The within-case study follows precisely this logic, but also has its own flaws.

**B. Potential Flaws of the Within-Case Study**

While the within-case study may be less exposed to criticism than the cross-case study, the pioneers of research on the micro-dynamics of violence have elaborated on its potential flaws. The first potential flaw is “the use of over-aggregated variables” combined with “insufficient theorization, superficial engagement with the case at hand, and reliance on off-the-shelf datasets” (Kalyvas 2008). The second potential flaw is “the frequent omission of what turns out to be a key factor shaping the dynamics of civil war, namely territorial control” (ibid.) I address each of these issues in turn.

**Insufficient Theorization**

While my empirical analysis disaggregates terrorism by actor, temporal period, and type of violence, the causal mechanism may have been insufficiently theorized with respect to how each of these variables matters. There is some ad hoc theorization provided in the case study itself, such as my inductive reasoning that “[a group] applied terrorism strategically to bring attention to substantial issues left unresolved by the failing peace agreement”, or “[a group’s] strategic use of a ‘radical’ frame to pressure the government to return to the ‘moderate’ solution”. In retrospect, the causal mechanism did not work precisely as I had expected in part because certain variables or scope conditions were not taken into consideration. A more sufficient causal theory might incorporate, for example, how a group may alter its own frame in response to a new situation, how groups use terrorism to compete with one another, how a group’s ideology and command structure affect the type of violence it produces, and how trigger events may have differential or opposite effects on different groups.
**Superficial Engagement with the Case**

As a desk study, the within-case study uses readily available, mostly circumstantial evidence to infer the motivation of the actors. But who are the actors exactly? The within-case study is primarily concerned with radicalized individual-group dynamics and group-level motivations and outcomes; however, the voice of individuals on the path to radicalization is largely missing. A more thorough investigation of the causal mechanism might involve the intensive study of human subjects who have been exposed to the setting of a failing peace agreement. It would likely involve longitudinal process-tracing at the individual level. In my haste to evaluate the group journey from radicalization to terrorism, I may have overlooked the individual journey from failing peace to radicalization. This suggests that my causal mechanism, the bridge connecting the two phenomena of interest, may yet collapse under the heavy burden of research traffic.

**Reliance on Off-the-shelf Datasets**

My reliance on the GTD for the within-case analysis has advantages and disadvantages. The advantages have to do with maintaining the same concept of terrorism used in the cross-case study, accessing a longer time series (my period of analysis spans twenty years), and evaluating incidents that occur beyond Mindanao (particularly in Manila) and in some cases outside the Philippines (e.g. Malaysia). I briefly considered using data from the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System due to its higher quality (having been coded by researchers in Mindanao instead of Maryland), but its coverage would have been restricted to incidents that occurred in Mindanao after the year 2011. The disadvantages of the GTD have been expounded in the previous section.

**Omission of Territorial Control**

My geospatial analysis displays where terrorism was most intense in various periods, and the data can be related to territorial control based on general knowledge of the case. Basilan and Sulu experienced a high intensity of terrorism due to ASG operations based there, while Maguindanao and North Cotabato experienced a high intensity of terrorism due to BIFF operations based there. Other incidents throughout the archipelago may be attributed to the CPP-NPA, which had a national presence. Even so, a quantitative operationalization of territorial control and its changes over time would have been ideal.\(^7\) A caveat is that at least 1594 incidents were recorded as having an “unknown” location in the Philippines. Recalling a

\(^7\) Heatmaps are always desirable, but computationally intensive.
previous discussion, these incidents probably occurred in rural areas where there was less reliable media coverage, such as contested or rebel-controlled territory. Because these incidents could not be mapped, the heatmaps systematically understate the true level of terrorism, particularly in contested or rebel-controlled territory. While a quarter to half of the incidents (depending on the period of analysis) were recorded as having “unknown” actors, the heatmaps still include them.

**Observational Equivalence**

The issue with observational equivalence is that different causal mechanisms may be observed in the same way. This problem is evident in the spatial variation observed in heatmaps of the Philippines because a location experiencing a high intensity of terrorism may not necessarily experience a prevalence of the “radical” frame. For example, Manila and Davao were highly exposed to terrorist attacks because they were important commercial centers, but the perpetrators in many cases may have traveled there from other regions to launch their attacks. Bearing in mind this pitfall, the heatmaps should be interpreted with more emphasis on the temporal rather than spatial variation in the intensity of terrorism. Overall, I derive more causal inference from the actor-event analysis than from the geospatial analysis.

**Arbitrary Decisions**

My selection of historical events – ephemeral gains, salient losses, game changers – which functioned as turning points in the Mindanao peace process were somewhat arbitrary. Different historical events could have delimited different periods of analysis, which may have yielded different results. There is a possibility that the periods of analysis I reviewed may have been too long (first ephemeral gain: 1671 days) or too short (second ephemeral gain: 304 days). Finally, the methodology used to rank the intensity of each incident was somewhat arbitrary; for example, why should a death be weighted six times as much as a hostage taken?
VII. CONCLUSION: CAN TERRORISM SUCCEED?

In post-accord settings, the quality of peace can explain persistent threats to human and international security. There is a recognized link between peace settlement implementation and the duration of peace (Joshi & Quinn 2015). But what academics have missed is how the failure to implement a peace agreement is causally related to political violence and terrorism. It is harder, but more instructive, to discuss failure rather than success. In this study, I sought to bridge two well established fields by asking: Does the failure to implement a peace agreement encourage terrorism? I proposed a theoretical framework to understand the journey from failing peace to radicalization (at the individual level), and from radicalization to terrorism (at the individual-group level). The linchpin for this causal story is radicalization: the appeal of a frame which favors “radical” over “moderate” action to advance the group’s struggle for recognition. When the implementation process fails, the radicalization process thrives. As the peace agreement becomes increasingly less relevant, terrorism can take its place.

This study integrated quantitative and qualitative approaches to test the theory and probe the causal mechanism. A cross-case study of 34 post-accord settings found that implementation failure was significantly associated with variation in the intensity of terrorism within, but not between, cases. The estimated causal effect of failing to implement all the provisions was slightly greater than the estimated causal effect of an ongoing armed conflict, which is to say, substantial. The significant findings from the “within” estimator of the fixed-effects model motivated a within-case study of the Mindanao peace process. The within-case study incorporated actor-event analysis and dynamic geospatial analysis to evaluate the causal mechanism. Specifically, I searched for micro- and macro-evidence that terrorist incidents were fundamentally motivated by a “radical” frame that gained resonance after a perceived failure to implement the peace agreement.

I found that the causal mechanism did not always work as posited in my theory. The design of the within-case study made it easier to observe behavior and infer motivation at the group level rather than individual level; but group motivations were far more diverse than I had expected. Groups that were more pragmatic (i.e. open to political compromise), such as the MILF, could switch between promoting a “radical” or “moderate” frame of action, depending on the circumstances. Even more surprising, “master” frames could shift in response to a severe disruption to internal cohesion, as seen with the ASG and BIFF. As groups splintered and grew increasingly divorced from the peace process, they accepted master frames other than the struggle for recognition. Implementation failure could have differential effects on groups,
depending on whether they were inside or outside the peace process. A salient loss might increase the frustration of groups with a stake in the peace process, while groups outside the process could remain indifferent (but stand to benefit from newly radicalized recruits). To the extent that I was able to infer motivation for individuals, sometimes it matched the group’s stated objective, but other times it did not. While there is some evidence to support my causal argument regarding failing peace, radicalization and terrorism, I would not exclude other causal pathways to terrorism.

The findings and methodologies of this study suggest future directions for academic research. First, I have presented a compelling causal story that bridges two well established fields, proposing a new direction of causality. Further theoretical work could seek to explain how external circumstances, ideologies, and the principal-agent problem can induce shifts in the “master”, “moderate” and “radical” frames, as my theory did not sufficiently account for these surprising patterns. Second, the cross-case and within-case studies that I have developed are only preliminary attempts to investigate the causal relationship. Further empirical work might include intensive or ethnographic research. Third, I have derived an insight that may reconcile the emotionalist vs. rationalist divide in terrorism studies: Terrorism can be simultaneously an emotionally driven response at the individual level, and a rational choice at the group level. This distinction between individual and individual-group dynamics could benefit further empirical work. Fourth, I have shown how two disparate methodologies (actor-event analysis and geospatial analysis) can be combined to investigate the micro-dynamics of terrorism. Further research could correct some of the weaknesses in my approach, such as inconsistent time scales and failure to operationalize territorial control.

Finally, this study suggests obvious policy implications. As states continue to expend considerable resources to counter violent extremism, full implementation of peace agreements in post-accord settings may prove a more cost-effective and human-centric approach. With the threat of transnational terrorism, obtaining quality peace in post-accord countries promises to have regional effects. The Mindanao case illustrates how the failure to do so created new terrorist groups with each perceived failure of the ongoing peace process. Sustainable peace “requires a long-term view that focuses as much on the people in the setting of conflict building durable and flexible processes as it does on specific solutions” (Lederach 2005). The failure to implement a peace agreement should not justify a resort to terrorism, but rather inspire those living in fragile settings to initiate new processes to build peace.


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APPENDIX

Figure A-1: Proportion of Failing Provisions and Terrorism Index in 34 Cases
Source: Peace Accord Matrix; Global Terrorism Database (graphed using R)
Table A-1: Comprehensive Peace Agreements Recorded in the Peace Accords Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Date Signed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>Lusaka Protocol</td>
<td>15 November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>Luena Memorandum of Understanding</td>
<td>4 April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Chitagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT)</td>
<td>2 December 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>21 November 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict</td>
<td>23 October 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo</td>
<td>29 December 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Erdut Agreement</td>
<td>12 November 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti I</td>
<td>Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord</td>
<td>12 May 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti II</td>
<td>Accord de paix et de la reconcilation nationale</td>
<td>26 December 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Chapultepec Peace Agreement</td>
<td>16 January 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace</td>
<td>20 December 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Abuja Peace Agreement</td>
<td>1 November 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Memorandum of Settlement (Bodo Accord)</td>
<td>20 February 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement</td>
<td>15 August 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Ouagadougou Political Agreement</td>
<td>4 March 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Taif Accord</td>
<td>22 October 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Accra Peace Agreement</td>
<td>18 August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Ohrid Agreement</td>
<td>13 August 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>National Pact</td>
<td>6 January 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement for Mozambique</td>
<td>4 October 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
<td>21 November 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Agreement between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA</td>
<td>15 April 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Bougainville Peace Agreement</td>
<td>30 August 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Mindanao Final Agreement</td>
<td>2 September 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Arusha Accord</td>
<td>4 August 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la republique du Senegal el le Mouvement des forces democratique de la Casamace (MFDC)</td>
<td>30 December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone I</td>
<td>Lome’ Peace Agreement</td>
<td>7 July 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone II</td>
<td>Abidjan Peace Agreement</td>
<td>30 November 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Interim Constitution</td>
<td>17 November 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
<td>9 January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan</td>
<td>27 June 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste (East Timor)</td>
<td>Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor</td>
<td>5 May 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement</td>
<td>10 April 1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Peace Accords Matrix
### Table A-2: Top 10 Terrorism Incidents in the Philippines: 2 September 1996 – 31 March 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Hostages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kauswagan</td>
<td>Lanao del Norte</td>
<td>18/03/2000</td>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
<td>Civilians in Kauswagan, Philippines</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kolambugan</td>
<td>Lanao del Norte</td>
<td>25/02/2000</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
<td>Our Lady of Mediatrix Ferry boat in the Philippines</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sumugot</td>
<td>Lanao del Sur</td>
<td>17/07/2000</td>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
<td>Christian villagers in Sumugod</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jolo</td>
<td>Sulu</td>
<td>02/01/1999</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)</td>
<td>Civilians in Jolo, Philippines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Liguan</td>
<td>Albay</td>
<td>15/04/1999</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Residents of Laguan Village</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pindulonan</td>
<td>Lanao del Sur</td>
<td>23/07/2000</td>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
<td>Christian Plantation Workers in Pindulonan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tibao</td>
<td>North Cotabato Metropolitan</td>
<td>14/11/1999</td>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
<td>Tibao residents and others in the vicinity of the village in Tibao</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>30/12/2000</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiya (JI)</td>
<td>Manila, Philippines</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cotabato City</td>
<td>Maguindanao</td>
<td>26/06/1997</td>
<td>Hostage Taking</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
<td>Buses</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Manila Metropolitan</td>
<td>03/09/1997</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Filipino Soldiers for the Country</td>
<td>Bus Terminal/Bus</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Terrorism Database (calculated by author)

Notes: Event ranks based on weights assigned to deaths, injuries, hostages, and property damage.
Table A-3: Top 10 Terrorism Incidents in the Philippines: 31 March 2001 – 10 May 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Attack Type</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Hostages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Metropolitan Manila</td>
<td>27/02/2004</td>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)</td>
<td>Superferry 14 Medical personnel and hospital patients in Lamitan</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lamitan</td>
<td>Basilan</td>
<td>02/06/2001</td>
<td>Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)</td>
<td>Civilians in Davao A Philippine military headquarters in Siocon, Philippines</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>A military camp housing the Philippine's 52 Infantry Battalion near the town of Oras in Samar Province</td>
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Source: Global Terrorism Database (calculated by author)

Notes: Event ranks based on weights assigned to deaths, injuries, hostages, and property damage
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<th>Rank</th>
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Source: Global Terrorism Database (calculated by author)

Notes: Event ranks based on weights assigned to deaths, injuries, hostages, and property damage.
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