THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE PEACE
GOVERNANCE PERCEPTIONS AND SUSTAINING PEACE

UPPSALA
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ABSTRACT

Quality of Government (QoG) peace is a concept gaining some traction alongside more known concepts such as the democratic peace, or liberal (capitalist) peace or the globalist/modernist peace. This study aims to uncover how perceptions of governance quality uncover variation in the number of violent and nonviolent collective and interpersonal events at the sub-national level in Nepal. National survey data is used to operationalise the mechanisms for quality of governance perceptions which are then aggregated at District level. In-country elite level interviews were also completed in order to trace the process in the causal mechanism and control for reverse causality. Results point to a strong negative effect between perceptions of governance quality and the number of events occurring. There was not, however, any causal relationship established between perceptions of governance quality and the ratio of violent to non-violent events. Instead, interviewees related the resort to violence as coming about more strongly from a committed leadership of protest movements (or lack thereof) and moves by the State to instigate violence through repressive tactics against protest events.

Keywords: Governance; Peace and Development: Nonviolence; Protest
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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Any errors in data coding and interpretation as well as interviewing are entirely my own.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Constituent Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDO</td>
<td>Chief District Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Horizontal Inequality</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
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<td>QoG</td>
<td>Quality of Governance</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

The Quality of Governance (QoG) Peace theory – that a key determinant of peace or conflict will be the quality of a State’s ability to govern – represents part of a growing literature from both academics and practitioners surrounding sustained peace. This study seeks to contribute to the QoG peace literature through introducing a focus on perceptions, rather than objective measures of QoG in order to better get at the grievance mechanism driving the relationship between governance quality and peace. Moreover, this study progresses existing peace and conflict research by applying QoG Peace concepts to a sub-state level – the Districts of Nepal – and evaluating peace not in terms of the absence of violent conflict but in terms of forms of demonstration/disruptive protest.

Nepal is not the only post-war, multi-ethnic country to struggle with establishing a full and fair polity agreeable to various identity groups (see Walter 2014). In Bosnia and Hercegovina, the efforts to create sustainable peace through nation-building have been typified as limited (Kostić 2008). In East Timor, national institutions established by the UN and progressively handed over to Timorese control from 2002 unravelled in the face of tensions across East- and West-origin ethnic groups, patronage politics obligations, and the lack of a narrative around national identity (Peake 2013). In Iraq, the constitution adopted in 2005 to establish a democratic, federal, representative, parliamentary republic has not been able to avert a recurrence of civil war, much less protest and political violence. Every country will experience its own unique path post-settlement. However, it is evidently quite a common occurrence that the desired stability of newly established governance institutions – even with international support – remains elusive as disruptive protests continue and can escalate to violence.

Testing how governance quality affects protest events in post-war states is crucial both for academics and practitioners. From an academic viewpoint, Walter finds that preventing recurrence of civil war is contingent on legal and political constraints on governments (2014). For practitioners, “sustaining peace” has emerged as a new terminology of the United Nations, as both an extension of the ‘peacebuilding’ phase of a sequential process following the end of conflict, and a holistic approach to good/participatory governance as a means to peace (Rosenthal, et al. 2015). Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 groups together and attempts
to measure peace, justice and strong institutions (a major aspect of good quality governance) in another acknowledgement of the concomitant roles of these variables.¹

There exists a developing body of academic literature identifying poor Quality of Governance as a source of grievance compelling internal conflict (Hegre and Nygård 2015, Teorell 2015, Yiew, et al. 2016). Other studies link grievance to internal conflict by way of relative deprivation using the concept of ‘horizontal inequalities’ which enable group formation over QoG grievances (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013, Selway 2011, Østby 2007). However, measuring grievance over the quality of governance can be done more directly than is generally possible in large-N studies. There is a growing literature addressing actual perceptions of grievance rather than objective measures of inequality (Must 2016, Miodownik and Nir 2016, De Juan and Wegner 2017). Likewise, it is possible to redefine conflict away from the common definition of dyadic campaigns in which 25 battle deaths per year have been recorded (as used in each of Hegre and Nygård 2015, Taydas, Peksen and James 2010, Teorell 2015). Indeed, the study of nonviolence and protest can offer useful new avenues to testing the QoG peace theory. A research gap thus exists in so much as QoG has been studied primarily through large-N tests focusing on objective realities. While elements of governance have been studied within-country, even using perceptions, as yet there has not been a systematic study of QoG applied at the within-country level and using perceptions of governance quality (Walter 2014, 1264).

This paper builds on nonviolence and political science literature seeking to understand the nature of political institutions and their relation to disruptive protest and nonviolent demonstrations (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, Cornell and Grimes 2015, Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 2011, Matabesi 2017). I extend the QoG peace literature to the sub-national level in order to further test both the grievance mechanism (through looking at perception rather than objective scores) and the ‘peace’ variable through looking at how violent and nonviolent events might be predicted by Governance Quality. This study looks at unrest that emerges as individuals and groups continue to perceive themselves as disempowered. It looks at this disempowerment as relative deprivation coming about from ‘state strengthening’ and economic development initiatives holding primacy over addressing horizontal inequalities and ensuring fairer distribution of resources and privileges (Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch

¹ https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16
2014, 429, Walter 2014). The research question is then: *How do perceptions of the quality of governance impact the number and nature of political protests?*

I argue that worse perceptions of governance quality will reflect a widening gap between expectations and actual experience of citizens vis-à-vis the State. As the gap grows larger, citizens turn away from formal structures and towards informal channels with their demands. In turn, the occurrences of protest behaviour, either violent or nonviolent, become more likely. I test these concepts through two hypotheses – one addressing the effect of governance perceptions on protest generally, the other addressing how better-quality governance perceptions can decrease violent protest (compared to nonviolent protest).

I test the theoretical framework through a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, I use a quantitative study that analyses District level instances of protest against governance perceptions collected from individual responses to a 2013 nationally representative governance survey, which I have aggregated at the District level. Second, I use a qualitative analysis through field research using elite-level semi-structured interviews both in the capital, Kathmandu, as well as in Parsa and Dhanusa districts in the South of Nepal.

By looking at a sub-national level, using perceived rather than objective standards of governance quality, and using instances of violent/nonviolent events rather than campaigns, this paper has uncovered two useful insights. First, better perceptions of governance quality do indeed result in fewer protests at the sub-national level. Secondly, quality of governance does not predict the ratio of violent over non-violent interpersonal and/or collective events. Instead, interviews pointed to government intervention and political leadership as being the main causal factors for the form that events take.

The next section reviews the existing literature on quality of governance peace, group formation and protest. In Theory, I discuss the logic linking perceptions of governance to protest events, explaining how fine-grained analysis of governance can uncover reasons behind variation. From there I present the Research Design including explanations of sub-national data and the interview process in Nepal. Findings and Analysis are considered together, including possible extensions and alternative explanations. I then summarise that while Nepal does indeed reflect the growing confidence in the QoG peace theory, there are limitations to specificities around generalisation due to complex contextual issues.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

This section outlines the literature on: governance as a concept; opportunity and grievances (including ethnicity) as mechanisms in the QoG peace theory; nonviolent action/protest from the peace and conflict research field, as well as from political science related literature. Finally, I outline my approach to bridging a gap in the research by using a systematic study of QoG perceptions applied to a sub-national study.

2.1. Quality of Governance as a determinant of civil conflict

The idea that Quality of Governance informs both grievances and incapability/unwillingness on the part of the state to enforce the social contract – including the rule of law – has been extensively studied in the conflict field.

QoG is characterised with emphasis on different points. Fundamentally, governance falls under categorisations of rule of law, bureaucracy and legitimacy (Fukuyama 2014). Teorell focuses in particular on rule of law, defining “QoG as impartiality in the exercise of government authority, implying that government officials should act in accordance with the beforehand-stipulated law or policy and take no other considerations into account” (2015, 651). Kaufman et al have a broader definition of six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence or terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008). These are the dimensions that form the World Bank’s governance index. Cammett and Malesky, look at the role of the State as a guarantor of the free-market; the ability of the bureaucracy to adequately deliver public services; and the notion of revenue collection (2012). Finally, for Walter in her study specifically on recurrence of civil war, the main focus is on political and legal constraints – namely rule of law, popular accountability through public participation in government, and a free press (2014). These definitions are each useful for the purposes of identifying objective measures. For the purposes of my study, I am interested in the manner in which governance is perceived by its citizens. Hence, prior to establishing the dimensions of governance against which I measure perceptions in the research design below, I will outline briefly the philosophical dimension from which my theory is built. That is, the concept of open versus limited access governance.

To better understand dimensions of Governance Quality, the following is a relatively straightforward comparison of what is typified as “open-access” and “limited access (natural
state)” orders developed from North, Wallis and Weingast (NWW). The open access order differs from the logic of limited access states in that individuals in society have access to economic organisations, political organisations and open access to legal enforcement of rights (2013, 27). Limited access on the other hand is related to a rent-creating logic wherein a smaller elite group attempts to maintain and grow its privileged position through denying access to: equal enforcement of rights, and economic and political organisations. From the supply-side, NWW develop a conceptual framework of open versus limited access as related to “state capacity to support complex and specialised organisations, create impersonality, sustain a perpetually lived state, and control the dispersion and use of violence in society” (North, Wallis and Weingast 2013, 270-271). It is impossible in development terms to simply graft on appropriate good governance institutions and be assured of achieving positive, sustainable peace results. However, NWW propose that strong development outcomes, democracy and peace are strongly correlated and create sustainability in one another. They claim that this relationship is due to “the pattern of social relationships in the open access order” (2013, 13). A brief summary of how these two different categorisations appear is outlined in the table below:

**Table 1 - Open-Access vs Limited Access States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Open access</th>
<th>Limited access</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and economic development</td>
<td>Slow-growing economies vulnerable to shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economies that experience much less negative growth</td>
<td>Polities without generalised consent of the governed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich and vibrant civil societies with lots of organisations</td>
<td>Relatively small number of organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bigger, more decentralised government</td>
<td>Smaller and more centralised government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widespread interpersonal relations including Rule-of-Law, property rights, fairness and equality</td>
<td>Predominance of social relations organised along personal lines including privileges and hierarchies</td>
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These measures – and in particular the point around privileges and hierarchies help to understand how conditions might provoke individuals and groups in a society to go outside of formal structures to address their claims.
2.2. Relative deprivation creating political opportunity and grievances

There is substantial empirical evidence to support the theory that good quality of governance will result in less conflict. The long-term positive effect of good quality governance on peace follows the reasoning that a State providing a legitimately representative set of formal political institutions, alongside a well-functioning bureaucracy and an impartially applied rule of law will reduce grievances among disaffected groups who would then find themselves far better served to address remaining problems through official government channels, rather than through violent conflict (Hegre and Nygård 2015). At the same time, a well-functioning State is more capable of policing contingent territories and practicing (where required) appropriate counterinsurgency tactics (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Walter uses strong institutionalisation of governance to find that both grievance and greed-based mechanisms are more likely to result in a return to civil war in the absence of good governance (Walter 2014).

Another aspect of the strong versus weak state argument proposes an elite based model, wherein identity is more likely to be formed along state lines where the state is strong and able to provide, but along ethnic lines where it is weak (Kroneberg and Wimmer 2012, 194-5). Both resource-based co-optation (Fjelde 2009) and/or repression-based stability (Gates, et al. 2006) are shown to inform short- or even medium-term stability in spite of poor elements of governance. However, there is an expectation that the risk of post-conflict countries characterised by good governance experiencing renewed conflict will drop more quickly than those characterised by poor governance (Hegre and Nygård 2015, 1009). Therefore, it is quality of governance over co-optation or repression that is more likely to sustain peace.

The structural reality of social polarisation can also exacerbate conflict through issues of free-riding and the tragedy of the commons. Structural reforms of the economy become problematic where competing views of public goods such as import/export are tied to identity groups; and/or rent extraction from commodity producers is tied to patronage-based systems (Easterly 2001, 689). These two points demonstrate how a limited-access state is unable to solve these basic social issues due to entrenched incentive systems at a group level (North, Wallis and Weingast 2013). This issue is referred to in development circles as a patronage-based system and goes hand in hand with perceptions of exclusion.

Democracies should only expect groups who do not face a reasonable chance of being co-opted into the government system to then openly revolt and engage in political violence as a final
solution (Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008). Returning to the SDG concept of Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, there are multiple authors who discuss modernisation theory in terms of the interaction between development and democracy including the concept that development may not bring but will sustain democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997); that cooperative norms and checks and balances coupled with modern science, labour and industrial revolutions, declining inequality and diversified economy all facilitate the transition to and consolidation of democracy in the international system (Boix 2011, Gat 2005); or indeed that modernisation must also be tempered by legitimacy and effectiveness of a given system in order to provide stability to democracy (Lipset 1959). An interesting example of the development, governance and conflict nexus is in the study completed by Thyne looking at government expenditure on education, which sends a signal of care and interest in the population. According to Thyne’s operationalisation, as adult literacy improves, a country can expect more protest and less violent rebellion (2006). These theories considered together are indicative of a public good that is quality governance interacting across the complex processes of institutionalising development and democratisation to sustain peace.

2.3. Addressing grievances without violence
The nonviolence discipline seeks to understand why nonviolent campaigns start, how they mobilise participants and what makes nonviolent campaigns remain nonviolent (or turn to violence). The discipline in large part seeks to understand campaigns, which by definition have ‘maximalist’ demands.

Nonviolent uprisings have proven to be exceedingly difficult to generalise or predict. Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s large-N study shows that political opportunity holds more explanatory power than each of grievance, resource mobilisation and modernisation models when it comes to predicting nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). Butcher and Svensson further analyse causal factors to find positive correlations between state-year measures of wealth, education, urbanisation and nonviolent conflict noting that most of these measures have negative associations with violent conflict (Butcher and Svensson, Manufacturing Dissent: Modernization and the Onset of Major Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns 2016). And Karakaya finds that increased globalisation of economic, social and political dimensions makes nonviolent campaigns more attractive while also making violent campaigns more costly (Karakaya 2016). Cunningham is particularly relevant to this study in that she tests multiple factors in determining strategic choice of either war or non-violence,
including exclusion from political power, economic development and democracy (Cunningham 2013). She finds exclusion from political power to be a strong predictor for both violent and nonviolent onset. 

Mobilisation of nonviolent campaigns as opposed to violent campaigns has therefore been shown in the literature to have different drivers.

Another consideration is the escalation from nonviolence to violence. One side argues that protestors are rational actors pursuing the most effective protest activity, changing from violent to nonviolent (and vice-versa) protest activity when confronted with repression (Moore 1998). Importantly, a lower level of mobilisation does not simply mean protest as a replacement for violent conflict. Indeed, mobilisation to a nonviolent campaign can be equally if not more effective than mobilisation to a violent campaign (Chenoweth and Lewis, Unpacking nonviolent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset 2013) (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings? 2017).

**2.4. Demonstrations versus disruptive protest**

Considering occurrences of disruptive protest and nonviolent demonstration rather than violent or nonviolent campaigns deviates slightly from the peace and conflict field. I therefore use political science literature to look at these lower levels of mobilisation and unpack the manner in which low-level protest has been affected by governance quality. This offers several vital insights into the paper: first, the violence/nonviolence nexus in community-level protest; second, the concept of individual grievances and how these are brought to the community level; and finally, the field has started to open up to the use of perceptions of grievances, which I address more thoroughly in the following chapter on my theoretical framework.

The basic premise of political science runs that institutions (defined broadly to capture issues of state structures, capacity of individuals within the government, trust and interconnectedness in society (Fukuyama 2014, North, Wallis and Weingast 2013)) that are strong and capable enable and allow disaffected individuals to address their concerns through formal, institutional channels thus preventing a recurrence of violence (this is the same basic principle discussed above with Walter’s theory on recurrence of civil war, 2014). Where institutions are weak, individuals will form groups to take their claims through more direct channels such as protest and demonstration. These direct channels are referred to by Machado et al as alternative political technologies and include blocking roads, burning tires, picketing, and threatening
violent actions (Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 2011, 344). This argument relates back to Fearon and Laitin’s arguments around government capacity (2003), but also to the capacity of a protest movement itself to pose as an alternative, legitimate source of authority. If the intent of protestors is to develop an ethos of legitimacy, then it clear that disruptive protests are less democratically legitimate than peaceful demonstrations (Cornell and Grimes 2015, Chenoweth, 2017, Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Similarly, organised entities – in particular political parties – can move between supporting/fomenting protest where they are not included in the State and using formal channels where they are co-opted (Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 2011).

2.5. Research gap: measuring grievances more closely
This paper is primarily concerned with the manner in which quality of governance impacts the numbers of violent and nonviolent events at a sub-national level. There is a growing literature that considers perceptions of governance, rather than objective measures of governance quality as used by Walter 2014, Hegre and Nygård 2015 and others. This creates the vexing question of extrapolating individual perceptions to the group level.

Using perceptions as an operationalisation of governance quality requires the use of the grievance mechanism linking injustices to violence. In previous research, the mechanisms tied to grievance-based conflict follow the concept of the group identification of horizontal inequalities – i.e. inequalities along categorical distinctions rather than pertaining to individual attributes (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013, 36) – before passing through necessary steps of creating actionable claims, mobilising and facing government repression which could possibly escalate to violent conflict. Horizontal inequality (HI) arguments also apply to the relative deprivation experienced by the non-elite majority of the population at the hands of the elite government (Hegre and Nygård 2015). Whereas HIs have come to be associated strongly with ethno-linguistic identity groups, the nature of governance quality as delivering benefit to society at large led Hegre and Nygård, drawing on John Davies and Ted Gurr, to use relative deprivation with actors defined broadly wherein the government are the elites and others are the nonelite majority. They postulate that if government is seen as the source of the gap between

2 Gurr notably defined relative deprivation as “actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep) (Gurr 1968, 1104)
actual and expected ‘need satisfaction’, then perceptions of good governance will be low (2015, 986). Other authors, however, attempt to consider HIs as well as the broadly defined relative deprivation used by Hegre and Nygård. As emphasised by Must, “both relative deprivation theory and social identity theory – the two main building blocks for horizontal inequality theory – emphasize perceptions over objective facts” (2016, 60).

Beyond ethno-linguistic HIs, socio-economic status, religion and region also are plausible identity markers. The field remains understudied as outlined by Must, who shows in her literature review the concentration on the political and economic dimensions of HIs, and in particular the manner in which HIs relate to ethnic civil war (Must 2016, 19-22). That said, there is an increasing literature using regional HIs. Noting the difficulty in discerning the salience of ethnic markers (more often than not there are blurred lines at the boundary); the greater correlation of regional HIs with asset and education inequality over ethnic or religious HIs; and the greater ease for accessing survey data aggregated at the regional level (especially given the sensitivity of ethnic groups), Østby uses a regional HI measurement (2007). Similarly, De Juan and Wegner use a spatial analysis for their consideration of service delivery and protest in South African communities (2017). Other authors who identify in-country variance and cross-cuttingness of (variously) ethnic, socio-economic and religious identities at the community level include Must 2016, Hegre, Østby and Raleigh, 2009 and Miodownik and Nir 2016. Furthermore, Miodownik and Nir devote substantial effort to discerning the way in which individual grievances on behalf of a group are far more important predictors of dissatisfaction, and validate their perceptions results by measuring objective economic grievances at the respondent’s district (Miodownik and Nir 2016, 28).

The usage of perceptions by Miodownik and Nir brings a further interesting element to the study of the Quality of Governance Peace. The authors found that heightened perceptions of economic and political ethnic inequality relate to higher acceptance of political violence, as well as to participation in protest marches. They conclude that “specifically, our findings support the argument that perceived grievances about one’s group conditions crystallize the effects of horizontal inequalities on violence” (Miodownik and Nir 2016, 38). There is thus an emerging trend in the literature to look at grievances and their effect on mobilisation to violence or nonviolence. It is this growing trend that I seek to expand upon through my systematic study of governance quality as a construct measured in perceptions affecting the onset of interpersonal and collective violent and nonviolent events at the sub-national level.
3. THEORY: extending quality of governance peace analysis to a sub-national level

If good quality governance contributes to sustaining peace by averting civil war, does it also contribute to sustaining peace through positive means? Is it possible to look at variations at the sub-national level amongst non-campaign violence and nonviolence as part of a causal mechanism driven by perceptions of governance quality? In this chapter I argue that perceptions of QoG measured along seven components of bureaucratic quality, rule of law, corruption, economic policy, military in politics, political exclusion and repression, and formal institutions will inform the nature of individual and group level relative deprivation. I argue that this relative deprivation will then result in increases in violent and nonviolent events. I further argue that worsening perceptions of QoG will likely result in increased violent over nonviolent events.

3.1. Getting at grievances – perceptions over objective measures

As outlined above, perceptions are critical to the way in which quality of governance impacts protest. While Hegre and Nygård (and implicitly various other authors) assert that governance quality measures are adequate in understanding relative deprivation, this paper choses to use perceptions gleaned from survey data. This, however, is not without limitations.

An objective study of quality of governance3 or an expert survey (see for example Dahlström, et al. 2015) are both valid in measuring actual variation, but the concept of grievance requires us to understand perception. The philosophical reasoning behind the use of perception over objective reality extends naturally from the concepts of relative deprivation (Davies 1962). In particular it is important to note a sense of fatalism that develops among individuals leading them to avoid questioning their poor conditions without first having hopes raised – this is particularly important in the context of Nepal where fatalism plays a substantial role in society (Bista 1991). De Juan and Wegner further support the idea that objective realities are less likely to explain protest than are perceptions. In particular they find that economic status of individuals is less of a predictor than perceptions of unequal service delivery. They postulate that an individual will blame his/herself, a variety of structural conditions or just bad luck for their personal poverty, and thus economic deprivation is not as relevant to protest because people are less likely to be able to directly blame the state for their economic status. The authors

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3 Objective studies used by Hegre and Nygård include the data from the International Country Risk Guide; World Governance Indicators; the Economic Freedom Network; Freedom House; the World Bank and Transparency International (Hegre and Nygård 2015, 992).
conclude that “any protest frames blaming the state for lack of responsiveness and accountability will therefore resonate more effectively in the light of people’s more general assessment of state institutions, thereby increasing the overall probability of resulting in protest against the state” (De Juan and Wegner 2017, 7).

Finally, based on global studies it is anticipated that quality of governance will co-vary with decreasing levels of violence. However, considering Krampe’s Nepal study completed in Rishmi and Kharbang villages, which discovered the disconnect between government activity and civilian understanding of government activity⁴, some aberrations between government activity and civilian perceptions can be expected. Indeed, as concluded by Krampe, “rather than the actual provider of the service, it is the perceived provider that gains legitimacy in the process. While the legitimacy of local actors and governance structures has increased, the findings indicate that the projects have not been able to reduce the existing divide between society and the state” (Krampe 2016, 69).

3.2. Testing a causal mechanism using relative deprivation

In a limited access state, there are empowered elites with access to political and economic resources; and non-elites who do not enjoy that same access. Whereas those with access to power via formal, institutional means will address their claims along those lines; those without such access will be justifiably aggrieved. If these grievances are perceived as being the fault of the government, and there exists an expectation that the government should reasonably provide better outcomes, then a sense of relative deprivation can build up leading to incentives for protest to develop. The process that I anticipate and thus use to guide my interview questions runs as follows. Good governance should lead to a reduction in relative deprivation that citizens feel against their governing bodies. Where relative deprivation exists, it can be mobilised to collective grievances through ingroup forming and intergroup comparison. These grievances can then develop into collective violent and nonviolent events. The key steps in the process are demonstrated below in Figure 1.

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⁴ In many instances, citizens did not realise that projects were in fact funded/operated by the Government of Nepal and instead attributed them to others, meaning the government legitimacy did not increase as would be expected from the installation of infrastructure (hydroelectricity) (Krampe, 2016).
Figure 1 - the Causal Mechanism

My causal mechanism looks at a lower level of conflict that lacks the maximalist campaign goals seen in much of the conflict and nonviolent action literature. There are two reasons for this choice. First, the sub-national approach seeking variation across states in a post-conflict setting requires a far lower level of conflict incidence than would a global, large-N study. Second, this enhances the ability to get at questions of sustainable peace, picking up on campaigns before they become large enough to create their own environment – that is, identifying demonstrations and disruptive protest before they become full-blown violent or nonviolent campaigns seeking not just to reform but to renounce the government. This leads to my first hypothesis:

H1: Poor perceptions of governance quality are likely to increase the number of protest events.

3.3. Violence vs nonviolence – delving into indicators of peace and conflict

Taking this line of reasoning a step further, an argument can be made that as the perceptions of governance quality get worse, the form of protest will also worsen. Arguments outlined above have sought to explain the form of violent and nonviolent actions in terms of strategy and structure. There is little indication in the literature of how the issue being protested might impact on the form of the protest.

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5 NAVCO 2.0 further specifies the following criteria for inclusion: more than 1000 participants in two connected protests within a calendar year; having a clear maximalist objective of either regime change, anti-occupation and/or self-determination; and be primarily nonviolent (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

6 De Juan and Wegner (2017) testing service delivery inequality find that there is no substantial variation between peaceful and violent protests: a 10 percentage point increase in service inequality (measured objectively) leads to a 7% increase in peaceful and 6% increase in violent protests.
I build a hypothesis around the concepts of poor perceptions of governance quality weakening the social contract, resulting in both a weakening of state capabilities to respond to disruptive protest (Fearon and Laitin 2003) as well as a normative shift away from legitimate social order and thus away from the positive outcomes associated with nonviolent demonstrations.

Call considers four philosophical perspectives on peace: no war recurrence (security perspective); root causes (social perspective); legitimate regimes, effective states (political perspective); and economic recovery (economic perspective). My typification of QoG preferences the concepts of legitimacy and effective states. This builds on Call’s final contestation for a standard that “includes the extent to which institutions are actually capable of resolving social conflicts, as well as the extent to which governance is structured so as not to fuel renewed conflict. In other words, war recurrence plus some indicators of minimal state institutionalisation and minimal participation by salient social groups” (Call 2008, 190). Call finally mentions that the differences in societies will determine which aspects of institutions are best suited to ensuring sustainable peace, with variation in emphasis on judicial structures, legitimacy, government effectiveness and social norms. It is not entirely possible to develop a theory around good quality governance leading to positive peace in Call’s ‘political perspective’ due to the definitions of positive (also sustaining) peace relying on the concept of good governance itself (Wallensteen 2015, Call 2008). This tautology leads me to study how good governance can affect negative peace defined in terms of the absence of violent and nonviolent events.

Measures already exist linking governance to a lack of conflict. As put by Walter, “civil wars are much more likely to repeat themselves in countries where government elites are unaccountable to the public, where the public does not participate in political life, and where information is not transparent” (Walter 2014, 1243). Measuring violence at levels lower than outright conflict can enable a nuanced test of how good governance is faring in a post-conflict setting, whether it is indeed inhibiting a return to violence and hence supporting peace (both in the positive sense by definition, and the negative sense by test).

This requires a separation in the dependent variable between violent or disruptive protest which is harmful to peace; and nonviolent protest which if not repressed, is a healthy sign of a functioning polity (Cornell and Grimes 2015). Elsewhere in the existing literature, Miodownik
and Nir take protest as a proxy for actual mobilisation towards violent anti-State behaviour (Miodownik and Nir 2016). They attempt to differentiate between protest and violence by using data on attitudes towards violence. While I don’t have the data to strictly link individual perceptions with participation in protest, I can link regional aggregate perceptions with actual instances of collective and interpersonal events to achieve the same outcome.

As perceptions worsen further, one could anticipate worsening protest outcomes (i.e. violence). There are two reasons: First, people’s grievances cause more and more anti-government sentiment thereby higher willingness to cause disruption rather than simply demonstration; Second, worse perceptions likely correlate to some degree with worse objective outcomes which means that the leadership (either local or state level) doesn’t exist to establish a social contract that stops violence.

This results in my second hypothesis:

H2: Poorer perceptions of governance quality are likely to result in an increase in violent, disruptive protest over nonviolent protest.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN

This section describes the research design used to test my following hypotheses:

-  **H1:** Poor perceptions of governance quality are likely to increase the number of protest events.

-  **H2:** Poorer perceptions of governance quality are likely to result in an increase in violent, disruptive protest over nonviolent protest.

First, I outline the reasoning for using Nepal as a case study. Next, I describe the research design: a mixed-methods study combining a quantitative analysis of survey data against the number and form of protest across 40 out of Nepal’s 75 Districts\(^7\) to uncover covariation, as well as qualitative semi-structured elite level interviews to uncover causality. This section concludes with a detailed explanation of the regression and structure of the qualitative individual interviews.

**4.1. Nepal as a case study**

A case study for QoG at the sub-national level requires an emerging polity with: governance reform being central to public discourse; administrative divisions that have readily available data; and the ability to control for confounding variables such as, for example, multiple salient ethnic and other identities. In choosing Nepal I have used a typical case selection (Gerring 2007, 89) forms a particularly useful case that conforms with all three requirements.

The end of Nepal’s civil war in 2006 has brought about a period of drastically reduced conflict and violence. Another step has been taken towards a representative government for the dozens of identity groups living together in the country, and a round of democratic elections in each of the three federal tiers has now been completed. Despite these positive governance reforms, discontent continues to simmer and various protests have occurred against perceived failures of the State to meaningfully address the commitments to federalism, inclusion and accountability set out in Nepal’s 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (International Crisis Group 2016). These protests in Nepal – including violent clashes with State forces – are exacerbated by ethnpolitical incompatibilities that could plausibly lead back to war if not sufficiently addressed (Gellner 2007, Thapa and Ramsbotham 2017).

\(^7\) Nepal’s 75 Districts were increased to 77 in 2015. For the purpose of this paper I am looking at the original 75.
Studies of protest in Nepal have previously focused on identity-based cleavages. Nepal has issues across multiple cleavages: caste (Dalit HI); ethnic (Janajati HI); regional (Madhesi HI) and religious (Muslim HI) (Lawoti 2013). Lawoti finds the Madhesi protests and blockades to be the most serious in that they have large grievances and large protest/violent protest. Whereas Dalit have far more objective grievances, they are so dispersed that they are not able to engage in protest (Lawoti 2013). A further critical reason to use spatial over ethnic identity lies in the nature of disempowerment in Nepal itself. For an historic overview of how the “the dominant order has remained largely confined to male Brahmans (Bahuns) and Kshatriyas (Thakurus and Chhetris) from the traditionally influential Parbatia or Hill Hindu group, and the urban-based and generally well-educated Newars” see Bennett (2005, 5). This sort of dominance is widely claimed to continue with various observations existing in Nepal around Bahun dominance of media, leadership of the major political parties, judiciary and the public service (Tamang 2014, 28, Jamil and Dangal 2009). Even so, there exist impoverished Bahun in the far Western regions who have in the past ten years begun to assert their own rights as ‘indigenous’ populations requiring reservations in the political system (Adhikari and Gellner 2016).

Research on HIs in terms of spatial (in this study, District level) units of analysis draws also on the concept of efficacy theory around expectations that an individual may identify an ability to change their circumstances through expedient demonstrations with an appropriate group and favourable political circumstances (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). In Nepal, the use of spatial inequalities – including with Districts as the unit of analysis – has a strong history of usage (Murshed and Gates 2005, Deraniyagala 2005, Askvik, Jamil and Dhakal 2011).

It is therefore Nepal’s administrative district system of governance which presents here an opportunity to consider the QoG theory using spatial inequalities and simultaneously pertaining to relative deprivation aggregated for convenience at the district level. This analysis can therefore be extended to other nations with emerging governance systems in multi-identity contexts. Generalising findings from Nepal is a crucial element to uncovering ideas around governance quality and sustaining peace.

4.1.1. Nepal as a study of identity and governance quality
A good explanation of Nepal’s administrative districts is given in Askvik, Jamil and Dhakal. “Nepal has three ecological divisions which run from east to west, creating the Tarai region
(the southern plains bordering India), the Hill region (where the capital Kathmandu is located) and the Mountain”. Running north to south it was divided into five ‘development regions’ - Eastern, Central, Western, Midwestern and Far Western. For administrative purposes, the resultant 15 ecological/development divisions were further divided into the 75 Districts that until December 2017 were the primary government units in Nepal’s central governance structure (Askvik, Jamil and Dhakal 2011, 421).

As outlined in a 2010 ICG report, “CDOs\(^8\) and district police chiefs wield significant power and can shape local perceptions of the state for better as well as for worse.” (International Crisis Group 2010, 40). These ideas are further supported by a study on the Maoist conflict itself: Murshed and Gates use a District-level study of violence and find with respect to the Human Development Index (HDI), “the greater the degree of inequality in a district relative to Kathmandu, the greater the intensity of conflict” (Murshed and Gates 2005, 132). Deraniyagala found that Nepal’s historic status as the poorest country in South Asia led to substantial relative deprivation as liberal economic policies were implemented in the early 1990s, leading to the horizontal inequalities experienced particularly between rural and urban areas which provided impetus for the onset of conflict in Nepal (Deraniyagala 2005). Holtermann likewise found Districts a useful unit of analysis in studying the mobilisation of rebels during the Civil War (Holtermann 2014). This would suggest that now, in post-conflict Nepal, there could be a reasonable expectation to find variation in protest behaviour (even at lower levels) across districts.

The use of salient identity groups has been established in various studies in Nepal. And in global studies there exists research on Minorities at Risk or the Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform (Girardin, et al. 2016) in order to get at the identity group level. However, not all manifestations of protest in Nepal has followed strictly defined identity groups. Instead, the cleavages in Nepal are very cross-cutting (Gellner 2007) resulting in a diversity of overlapping ethnopolitical, social, economic-group and geographic actors. Crosscuttingness, as per Selway, outlines that measures should take into account where cleavages reinforce or limit one another (Selway 2011). Following on from Brown, I use a more regional approach for this paper and look at the 40 Districts in Nepal limited by those for which there is survey data available rather than attempt to untangle crosscuttingness of ethnic

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\(^8\) Chief District Officers
groups (2009). Finally, while it is not possible to study ethnic protest participation, the inclusion of ethnic identity at district level as a confounding factor in my quantitative analysis in combination with anecdotal evidence of participants enables this study to address the potential for ethnicity as a major factor.

It is clear to that both emphasis on group-based grievances or emphasis on relative deprivation experienced individually can be used as a mechanism connecting governance quality and violent/nonviolent protest. While both are important, it is relative deprivation that I use in my causal mechanism. This not only responds to the practicalities of complex social identity salience in Nepal but enables testing of the QoG theory in line with the global studies referenced in previous literature.

4.1.2. **Scope and conditions**

While the findings from Nepal should indeed be generalisable beyond its borders, there are some specific scope conditions that require elaboration before I outline my operationalisation. In particular, it is important to describe temporal factors in Nepal as relates to my data. Moreover, the implementation of Federalism in Nepal is very much in flux, as is later discussed in the analysis of interviews. With that being said, governance and citizens’ perceptions thereof are not a static concept, so arguably there is never a perfect time to gauge perceptions, rather a requirement to set benchmarks and return regularly. The clarity offered by this paper is thus restricted by being a single rather than longitudinal test of governance quality perceptions and violent/nonviolent events.

The time period that is being studied is in part a response to the data availability, and in part an effort to get at a time period sufficiently separated from the end of the Civil War in Nepal, which ended in 2006. At this time the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was put in place. The Interim Constitution was introduced in January and amended in December 2007 due to contestation in the Tarai over the lack of reference to Federalism, and with the Maoists over

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9 Brown, in his cross-national study of how decentralised institutions impact the dynamics of ethnic mobilisation uses Primary Administrative Divisions (PADs) (Brown 2009). Brown finds support at the PAD level for “the theoretical claims of the horizontal inequalities literature that inequality is mediated by political institution” (ibid, 64).
the lack of explicit mention of secularism\textsuperscript{10} (Thapa and Ramsbotham 2017, 139-140). The deadline for drafting and adopting the Constitution proper was missed during the First Constituent Assembly (CA) (2008-2012) and again with a new deadline of January 2015 during the Second CA. Finally, in order to enable a more effective response to the April 2015 earthquake, the Constitution was fast-tracked and passed in September 2015. “However, key constituencies felt their interests were not adequately represented in that final vote” and massive protests and a blockade in the Madhes/Tarai (the southern belt of Nepal) region took place (International Crisis Group 2016, 1).

As outlined below, I have data in the form of a survey from April-May 2013, which included questions that relate to perceptions of the Quality of Governance; and a dataset of all violent and nonviolent demonstrations/protests from January 2016 through to December 2017. The separation of these datasets is not ideal particularly as the formation of a new Constitution happened in the gap for which I do not have data, however the dataset I have used is the best available at the time of writing. Moreover, interviews being performed in April 2018 seeking to further understand the cause of protest adds further potential limitations around the nature of reverse causality in so much as it is difficult to conclusively establish that perceptions of governance quality were what led to violent and nonviolent events, rather than these events adversely affecting perceptions of governance quality.

I have made the assumption that the perceptions of QoG should hold over until present. Foremost, this is because much of the QoG concept depends on long term reform, the major advancement in governance of the final promulgation of the Constitution notwithstanding. Second, I conduct qualitative interviews to discern the potential changes in perceptions of governance over this time period.

During the qualitative interviews I specified the time period under consideration as being between the beginning of 2013 and the beginning of 2018 (interviews were conducted between 16 March and 05 April 2018). This follows the quantitative data that I have. It also enables a focus on a time period commencing after the initial five-year post-conflict period. As outlined by Boyle, a convention has emerged in peace and conflict literature for the classification of

\textsuperscript{10} Note that prior to the Civil War, Nepal had been the world’s only “Hindu” state, which is relevant in the South Asian context were Pakistan is formally known as the Islamic Republic.
states as ‘post-conflict’ for up to five years after the conflict has ended (Boyle 2014, 51). The period from 2008-2013 can therefore be considered post-conflict. By looking at protest from 2013 to 2018, there is thus the opportunity to look at a time frame that is not strictly post-conflict, but still a period in which sustaining the initial peace is vitally important (Rosenthal, et al. 2015).

The role of federalism being introduced into Nepal during the time-period being assessed is an important factor to consider. Given that there is a degree of responsiveness from the government, this should catalyse differences in perceptions. The advent of governance reform is particularly important to relative deprivation, though based on interviews it becomes clear that the timeframe is too soon or too late to capture all protest based on relative deprivation: people are currently in a ‘wait and see’ mood. This is explored further in the analysis section.

The data available is comprehensive in terms of tracking various manifestations of violent and nonviolent outbursts. The degree to which these can be cut and shaped for the quantitative study are discussed in the further analysis section. Likewise, the interviews conducted were limited to Kathmandu and two towns in the Tarai. Further interviews could have been conducted in areas said to be dominated by those belonging to the dominant caste/religious/ethnic group to strengthen the data. Similarly, interviews could have been conducted with members of protest groups who have not had the same organisation levels as the protestors from the Tarai. That is, disaffected groups who despite identifying injustice have not been able to mobilise protest. These sorts of issues are all excellent themes for further pursuing this line of research and better uncovering the linkages between governance quality and peace.

4.2. Mixed methods approach
Mixed methods is a crucial approach to testing this hypothesis and providing support to my argument that QoG perceptions explain the number and form of violent and nonviolent events occurring in collective and interpersonal ways at the sub-national level. This gives both added robustness and a detailed analysis of the causal mechanism. Process tracing in multi-method studies involves ascertaining if ‘hoop’ and ‘smoking gun’ tests are satisfied. Process tracing generates causal-process observations (CPOs) to offer insights on context, process or mechanism (Dunning 2015). Specifically, process tracing helps to validate the assumptions in my causal mechanism. By using in-depth interviewing and quantitative analysis I am able to
gather different perspectives on how the research question might be answered, as well as the ability to understand what the theoretical concept – quality of governance peace – actually means to those experiencing it (Brounëus 2011).

4.2.1. The Quantitative approach
To statistically test the validity of the hypotheses I use two datasets. Firstly, the Independent Variable is measured using a survey taken from 2013 completed on behalf of International IDEA and linked with the Global Democracy Barometer. The Dependent Variable is measured using the Nepal Monitor dataset from Aug 2016-Dec 2017 measuring all instances of violent and nonviolent events in Nepal, aggregated to the District level. The regression is completed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Whereas OLS might not be the perfect regression due to working with a Count rather than Continuous Dependent Variable, using a linear regression makes the results easier to work with and more intuitive. Using OLS will enable me to estimate how much change in protest events can be anticipated from an improvement in the QoG score. In order to test robustness, I use a Negative Binomial regression.

Variables that may affect both the incidence of protest and the perceptions of governance include the Human Development Index rating disaggregated to the district level from the 2014 UNDP report and the density of population, which I log. The density of population provides an interesting control following on from the assertion that countries with a higher urban population have a higher likelihood of non-violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 315). Schaftenaar uses urban population as a control variable (Schaftenaar 2017) and therefore this can be reasonably extended to the within country tests that I run at the protest (rather than campaign) level, using population density as a measure approximating urbanisation, but also approximating the ease of access to crowded areas for protest. I also consider that the symbolic nature of Kathmandu as capital of Nepal means that Kathmandu District can be dummied out in order to consider the effects without it (Butcher 2017). Indeed, Kathmandu is an outlier in so much as the number of protests is far higher than any other District. Another common control variables used in the literature is Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) (Must 2016). I therefore use a measure of Ethnic Diversity developed by Trilochan Pokharel for Nepal.

4.2.1.1. Operationalising Quality of Governance
Perceptions of governance are measured based on the concepts developed by Hegre and Nygård in their large-N study (Hegre and Nygård 2015). This paper uses their 7 different
dimensions of governance as follows: (1) bureaucratic quality, (2) the rule of law, (3) corruption, (4) economic policies, (5) military involvement in politics, (6) political exclusion and repression, and (7) formal political institutions. I go through each of these in accordance with Hegre and Nygård’s formulation, (Hegre and Nygård 2015, 988-992) and state how these are understood in the context of perceptions from the 2013 Survey. The survey was completed in 40 out of Nepal’s 75 districts using 3850 respondents selected from a voter list prepared by the Election Commission of Nepal. The interviews were conducted face to face, with sample respondents making up a representative fraction of Nepal’s gender, rural/urban, education, age and caste/ethnicity divides (International IDEA 2013, 6). I have reordered the data to aggregate individual responses at the District level giving each District a mean score.

Below is a summary of the seven key points. The exact wording of the questions and possible responses from the 2013 survey are copied in Annex A.

Table 2 - governance components combined to form the Quality of Governance index variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of governance</th>
<th>Brief definition according to Hegre and Nygård</th>
<th>Indicators available from Survey data 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Quality</td>
<td>No consensus definition. H&amp;N use instead a proxy from Fjelede and de Soysa (2009) using tax income to define State capacities to coerce, co-opt and cooperate</td>
<td>Trust in civil service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ease of getting services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rule of Law</td>
<td>Contracts and property rights are enforced and judiciaries are isolated from interference from decision makers</td>
<td>Trust in court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Diversion of public funds leads to grievances, rents as an attractive prize, undermined ability to implement public policies</td>
<td>Self, friend or family witnessed act of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Policies</td>
<td>Strong economic growth reduces poverty even without redistribution, and even if inequality increases</td>
<td>Economic conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Involvement in Politics</td>
<td>Militaries not accountable, more likely to divert funding to military.</td>
<td>Trust in military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The country should be governed by army.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Exclusion and Repression</td>
<td>Systematic exclusion of ethnic/religious groups can result in conflict if those groups have networks that facilitate organisation.</td>
<td>Has condition of excluded groups improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Political Institutions</td>
<td>de jure institutions that ensure that the executive branch of government is elected by a majority or plurality of the population and that guarantee that the executive is constrained by an elected legislature</td>
<td>If democracy is preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfaction with how democracy works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vote effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in political parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To create a score for each of these seven components I have created dichotomous scores (0 and 1) for each of the relevant questions mentioned in column three. From there I was able to aggregate scores at the District level to create a percentage of the ‘1’ scores. This enables me to see the percentage of the tested population who respond positively to questions of trust, satisfaction, preference and opinion.\(^{11}\) From there I created an index variable by averaging the percentage score of each district from each question together to create a component score\(^{12}\). Finally, the Quality of Governance index variable is created by combining all component scores using equal weighting for each of the seven components.

Using equal weighting for the index variable is a common standard. Hegre and Nygård, from whom I take the definition of governance, create a “composite index of governance as an unweighted average of the seven subindices” (2015, 992). Nepal’s 2018 multi-dimensional poverty index (MPI) considers three dimensions of poverty (health, education and living standards). Each of these dimensions have two or more indicators. The MPI in order to conform with global MPI standards weights each of the dimensions equally (1/3 each). Furthermore, each variable within the dimension is weighted equally. Therefore, it does not matter if a

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\(^{11}\) Note where questions allow for an intermediate answer (the same/so so/doesn’t matter) scored 0.5.

\(^{12}\) Each question was weighted the same.
dimension has more indicators, it is still weighted the same as others (National Planning Commission 2018, 8-9). The Global Peace Index, however, used an expert panel to decide on weighting ‘internal peace’ at 60% of the index, and ‘external peace’ at 40%. The indicators within each of these components were then weighted by the expert panel on a scale of 1 to 5 in relative importance. So, for example, weapons imports is weighted at 2, whereas deaths from internal conflict is weighted 5. The GPI performs a robustness check using pairwise country comparisons (i.e. testing that country A is consistently higher than country B, regardless of actual rank) and a systematic test of over 5100 recalculated GPls to find that “around 70 percent of all pairwise country comparisons in the GPI are independent of the weighting schemes” (Institute for Economics and Peace 2017). The use of an independent expert panel and a systemic robustness check of weighting is beyond the scope of this paper, therefore I use equal weighting, as done by Hegre and Nygård and Nepal’s 2018 MPI.

4.2.1.2. Definitions of nonviolent versus violent events

Whereas listing campaigns as the dependent variable forces the researcher to characterise a campaign that includes both violent and nonviolent tactics as one or the other (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), looking at individual events separation across violence/nonviolence. These forms are broadly consistent with Chenoweth and Stephan’s typification: “Civil resistance employs social, psychological, economic, and political methods, including boycotts social, economic, and political, strikes, protests, sit-ins, stay-aways, and other acts of civil disobedience and noncooperation to mobilise publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimise adversaries and to remove or restrict adversaries’ power… Violent tactics include bombings, shootings, kidnappings, physical sabotage such as the destruction of infrastructure, and other types of physical harm of people and property” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 12-13). For a comparison to the types of event typified as either violent or nonviolent by Nepal Monitor, see Annex B with a table of coded events.

The coding of events is fraught. Nam points out four key problems with coding: 1) coding inconsistencies can make for confusing categories; 2) an event may fall into multiple categories or none at all; 3) potentially valuable details are discarded where they don’t fit in; 4) end-user ability to sort and recode events can be constrained (Nam 2006). Moreover, the accuracy of data can also be questioned if there are not sufficient sources used, and sufficient controlling of those sources. Nepal Monitor differentiates between nonviolent and violent, with smaller sub-categories included for a more precise understanding of event forms. The website,
“NepalMonitor.org maps reports from media, collected by large reputable organizations, or sent directly by individuals” (Nepal Monitor 2018). Moreover, Nepal Monitor (as opposed to ACLED) uses data from Nepal-language publications, enabling further triangulation as well as cross-checking of data (interview with Friso Hecker 2018). Further categorisation includes date, location (across several types), actor (perpetrator and target) type and entity name (if known), and cause (Nepal Monitor 2017). There are other more specific categorisations for weapons, collective vs interpersonal violence, youth (yes/no/unknown), and different types of inflicted damage.

In the first hypothesis I look at the number of events (violent and nonviolent) per district as opposed to other measures such as, for example, size, frequency, goal (as done in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset in Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) or protest target (see for example De Juan and Wegner 2017). For the second hypothesis, I look at the violent and nonviolent events separately. I take violent events as a proportion of total events per District and re-run the same regression as total events.

4.2.1.3. Collective versus interpersonal events

In order to better test robustness of the operationalisation, I have completed analysis of both all events interpersonal and collective, as well as collective only which is tested in section 5.4 below. Interviews focused specifically on instances of collective protest.

The concept of governance has been shown in this paper to be difficult to pin down. The concept of ‘sustained peace’ has also been shown to be difficult. I use the coding for Forms to allow me to discriminate between violent and nonviolent (see Annex B). A further issue with Cause is how to deal with ‘Interpersonal’ (Nepal Monitor 2017, 9-10). Nepal Monitor codes ‘collective’ noting “it refers to situations where perpetrators of an action – an individual or a group – act on behalf of a formal or informal organization, an identity group or a community, for an identifiable collective purpose or agenda” and ‘interpersonal’ “situations where an individual or group of individuals engage in violence based on private motives, without a broader collective purpose or agenda” (Nepal Monitor 2017).

Deleting all interpersonal events, however, would miss out on some fascinating insights including how these very individual level sorts of events could proxy the weak reach of the State in so much as either citizens or the state forces themselves (Institutional violence; Law
& order violence) are not under the control of State monopoly on legitimate violence (for a discussion of state control of violence and the emergence of an open-access State, see North, Wallis and Weingast 2013). That is, I would miss out on the side of the argument discussing a failure in State capacity. I therefore keep all violent and nonviolent interpersonal and collective events coded by Nepal Monitor in the main analysis and return to a consideration of collective events only in the extended analysis.

During interviews I did not seek to understand from respondents how interpersonal violence might have been brought about by perceptions of governance quality. This is due to my use of elite-level interviews to interrogate public processes. While my quantitative study considers both collective and interpersonal together, before testing interpersonal on its own, I see questions around interpersonal violent events linked to governance quality perceptions as needlessly complicating and potentially confusing respondents.

4.2.2. The Qualitative approach

I use qualitative methods in order to better evaluate the processes at work. In order to do this, I use semi-structured elite level interviews and process-tracing based on 21 interviews conducted in Nepal in April 2018. Given the nature of the work, it is important to ensure ethical considerations were made prior to going into the field.

The intent of this field work is to test conclusions developed from initial quantitative studies around the Quality of Governance Peace Hypothesis. I therefore provide a set of issues which are fairly consistent for each respondent, while also remaining flexible in order to probe and uncover specific areas of interest (Arthur and Nazroo 2003). This is broadly in line with Arthur and Nazroo’s estimation that an interview tends to be more “structured in an evaluative or investigative study looking for example at the operation of a service or policy” (Arthur and Nazroo 2003, 111).

As established by Brounéus, semi-structured, in-depth interviews can be used to gain a deeper understanding of processes behind war and peacebuilding (Brounéus 2011). The use of in-depth interview enables me to pick up on contextual clues and start to better understand what respondents are explaining. Given that I have a good understanding of the present and historical context of federalism and ethnic politics in Nepal, I am able to use a reasonably flexible semi-structured interview approach (Arthur and Nazroo 2003). I can therefore allow the respondent
to outline his/her thoughts on a series of topical issues that I have set (see Annex C) and be flexible in terms of the order of questions, probing for further details, and integrating findings from interviews into following interviews. That being said, it is important to realise the limitations around simplification and generalisability. Indeed, “simplifications may help sort the important from the unimportant, but sometimes salient distinctions and details are lost in reporting in order to make the news more unambiguous and easier to understand for the intended audience… simplifications typically become more severe the more complex the conflict and the lower the relevance of the conflict for the intended audience” (Öberg and Sollenberg 2011, 64). This issue is particularly relevant here in that I am using a case study and attempting to generalise more broadly to sustaining peace. There are thus limitations in that I cannot possibly represent the complexity of Nepal’s peacefulness and governance reform in this paper.

Using qualitative methods allows interrogation of the causal mechanism beyond simple correlation. The theoretical basis for this approach is grounded in process tracing theory. Process tracing is “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case” (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 7). Process tracing helps to identify and explain some of the complementary variables in the obviously very complex question of governance-peace interaction. Following Lyall, I take the relationship between governance perceptions and protest as given and seek to test the pattern in order to discover how it works (in specific cases) and ensure that I have the direction of causality correct (in order to maintain generalisability) (Lyall 2015). I have chosen process tracing broadly for the flexibility it provides in using elite-level interviews (Tansey 2007) as well as for the manner in which it can be integrated with mixed methods to further interrogate a causal mechanism. Following on from Hall, I use process tracing wherein “successive observations should be seen as a stream of data that gradually enhances or erodes the credibility of a theory” (Hall 2013, 27). Rather than attempt to develop a comparison of two or more separate communities, I take insights from influential community members in Nepal as indicative of broadly held beliefs. Where differences of opinion exist concerning politics, I avoid taking sides, but instead identify convergence and divergence of explanations. This affords me a strong approach to getting at some of the most credible and broadly held perspectives on what connects perceptions of governance quality to violent and nonviolent events.
Elite-level process tracing is used as the overarching methodology for the field work part of my paper. I use both purposive and snowballing sampling methodologies (Tansey 2007). As outlined by Bieranacki and Waldorf, snowball (or chain referral) sampling “yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest” (1981, 141). Using snowball sampling allows the researcher to guide informants as to which further respondents they are seeking – in my case ensuring gender, geographic and caste diversity. The nature of my study did not require specific characteristics of having been involved in protest or countering protest movements from the government. Instead, given the focus on perceptions of governance quality and tracing the causal mechanism through grievance and mobilisation, it was more important to gain a diverse respondent group with assumed generalisability. There is a drawback of snowball sampling in that referrals will result in ‘branches’ of respondents known to each other and sharing perspectives thus biasing the sample. I therefore use my contextual knowledge of Nepal to start three separate branches. There is no way to completely control for diversity, however my approach is designed to ensure I have developed a good knowledge of the research area and key players ex ante in order to then be able to judge if further suggested respondents will not systematically exclude one group of actors.

The list of interviewees is contained in Annex D. Some have been anonymised. The interviewees were selected and interviewed based on considerations of: dependence – the relationship between interviewee and issue they’re discussing including whether theirs is a first-hand account or something they heard of; temporal proximity keeping in mind their recollection could be off; and any expectation of bias (Arthur and Nazroo 2003). The interviewees themselves consist of five female and 16 male respondents. This is clearly biased in favour of male respondents but also representative of elite-level interviewing in Nepal, a country characterised by high perceptions of gender inequality and the exclusion of women (Ariño 2008). There were 14 interviews completed in Kathmandu, 3 in Birgunj and 4 in Janakpur. Ten of those interviewed were of Madhesi origin, which was an intentional effort to have equal representation between Hill and Madhes origin respondents. I also completed interviews with Janajati and Dalit/OBC. Respondents represent development professionals/academics, government employees (former and current), NGO staff, business people, journalists and individuals who have joined protests. The interviews are therefore broadly representative of the elite levels of Nepali society – though in in numeric terms are not
representative of Nepali demographics as a whole. I have interviewed largely in English due to the high level of English spoken by respondents and engaged a translator for one interview.

The ethical considerations here are less around retraumatisation or endangering interview subjects than on a general Do No Harm principle (Brounéus 2011), and on avoiding wasting peoples’ time (Eck 2011). This second point while relatively minor is nonetheless a concern given attempts made at pursuing different interviewees for my ‘elite-level’ approach. I avoid wasting time through concise questions, as well as the topic itself which is broadly of interest in Nepal and not overly studied. The concept of Do No Harm is of greater importance. As outlined by Brounéus, “when conducting research on sensitive topics in highly politicized or unstable settings, a main responsibility is to assess and ensure the security of the population under study” (2011, 143). On a broad level, there are well-established risks around publishing research based on interview. Three key issues that present difficulties are: first, the concern that results produced are not what participants expected; second, concern that informants may be put at risk (including embarrassment, business/employment ramifications, or otherwise intruding on respondents’ right to private opinions) due to publishing findings; and third access to the research environment could be constrained in the future (Högglund 2011, 126). The informed consent form which was verbally outlined to each interviewee is attached in Annex E. The process followed included making participants aware of my intention to quote them, as well as the offer to keep their perspectives anonymous, voice recording to ensure accurate quotation, suppressing identities where specifically requested and – though for the purposes of this study likely overkill – storing data in an anonymised manner (Lewis 2003, 68).

4.2.3. Validity, reliability and bias
As this is a subjective exercise undertaken by humans, there is the possibility for inconsistency from one coder to another, thus decreasing reliability. Nepal Monitor responds to this issue in one way by allowing for primary and secondary causes to be coded (suggesting if there are multiple causes in sources the coder uses the primary cause “on which most sources appear to agree”). Furthermore, there are detailed definitions for category and sub-category of each event (Nepal Monitor 2017). Finally, Nepal Monitor uses checks by managing staff to ensure reliability (interview with Friso Hecker, 2018).

Second, there is the issue of reliability in reporting of incidents. For example, it is reasonable to assume that in a complex society with different standards of gender equality according to
religious, rural-urban and caste-based differences, there could be variation in the amount of gender-based and domestic violence reported in the news media. This represents the possibility of systematic errors. Such systematic errors would be less likely in those causes grouped together under political, economic, governance and identity issues due to these sorts of events being more visible (see the Nepal Monitor coding book which groups these two separately). Reliability is tested by running a separate test with only ‘collective’ events considered. This would increase the likelihood of events making the news regardless of location given there is a more visible aspect to collective action. More broadly, there are no clear incentives for Nepal Monitor to misreport, given it is an independent organisation. Aside from the issues outlined above, validity can be assumed to be high given that reports are made from multiple different news sources and confirmed by staff members, thus decreasing the possibility of systematic under or over-reporting.

A final point to make on the validity and reliability of the data comes from the perception survey. As outlined in previous sections, the survey itself is considered robust and valid. Reliability is more of an issue as Data on perceptions is from a survey, not census. The survey was designed specifically to be representative nationally with provisions made for gender, caste, religious and geographic representation. However, these same provisions don’t necessarily apply at the District level. This is one weakness in the data and is addressed by controlling for district-wise Ethnic Diversity Index.
5. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter presents findings and analysis from both the quantitative and qualitative data of the hypotheses that: Poor perceptions of governance quality are likely to increase the number of protest events and that Poorer perceptions of governance quality are likely to result in an increase in violent, disruptive protest over nonviolent protest. I start by addressing the two hypotheses through a quantitative analysis; then seek to expand on the findings through tracing the process using analysis of the interview results. Finally, I conduct a series of robustness tests on the data and consider some of the alternative explanations that have become apparent from the interviews and how these might be considered quantitatively with the data available. This includes a discussion on the ability to generalise beyond Nepal to other nations restructuring their governance.

The findings indicate that overall, the number violent and nonviolent events can be explained by variation in the quality of governance. However, multiple other factors are identified as being important for protest incidence, including especially identity and protest fatigue. Factors leading to the occurrence of violence in protest are found to be a repressive/violent reaction from the state to nonviolent demonstration and the leadership of protest movements.

5.1. Quantitative Analysis

The goal of this section is to provide findings from the quantitative tests for both hypotheses, including taking under consideration the various confounding factors discussed in the research design. Broadly, Hypothesis 1 finds support whereas Hypothesis 2 does not.

The table below outlines my descriptive statistics. I show each of Nonviolent and Violent event frequency across the 75 districts of Nepal\(^\text{13}\), as well as total event frequency. Each of the seven components of Quality of Governance are shown, after the total QoG variable. The QoG variables are shown for the 40 districts for which I have data. Finally, Ethnic Diversity and Human Development Indices are controlled as confounding variables.

\(^\text{13}\) NVfreq shows 76 observations – 75 districts plus one where no district was coded.
As per the scatterplot in Figure 2 below, there is seen to be a strong negative correlation between the IV – Quality of Governance Index, and the DV – the number of violent/nonviolent events. This means that as perceptions of Quality of Governance improve, the number of events tend to decrease. As expected, Kathmandu represents a notable outlier. I therefore dummy it out in model 4 of my OLS regression below.
Figure 2 - Total violent/nonviolent events over QOG index score

Table 4 below shows the results from the empirical analysis of how the Governance index variable (QoG) affects the risk of violent and nonviolent events taken together (Totalfreq). Models 1 to 5 show the introduction of different control variables to the analysis. The results show that the QoG variable gains significance with the introduction of new variables and is significant to a 99% confidence interval in model 5 controlling for each of a Nepal-specific district-wise Ethnic Diversity Index, Logged Population Density, the Capital City (as a dummy) and the Human Development Index. District-wise Ethnic Diversity Index (EDI) is from 2008\textsuperscript{14}. District wise population density (LogPopDens) is for 2011 from Environment Statistics of Nepal, 2013 (OCHA 2014). Kathmandu as the District containing the capital city (Capital) is dummied out. The District-wise Human Development Index for 2011 (HDI) is extracted from Nepal Human Development Report (2014) by UNDP (OCHA 2014).

\textsuperscript{14}The EDI is developed from an index as follows: “a composite index using two dimensions of ethnic composition is developed to measure ethnic diversity. First, the number of ethnic groups having 1 per cent and above population is considered to calculate fractionalization index. Second, the difference between first two ethnic groups is considered to calculate distribution index. The ethnic diversity index is derived from unweighted average of both of these two” (Pokharel 2008, 7).
Table 4 – All events collective and interpersonal – OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totalfreq</td>
<td>Totalfreq</td>
<td>Totalfreq</td>
<td>Totalfreq</td>
<td>Totalfreq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QoG</td>
<td>-547.4**</td>
<td>-415.3**</td>
<td>-369.1**</td>
<td>-399.3***</td>
<td>-419.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[233.0]</td>
<td>[202.6]</td>
<td>[166.3]</td>
<td>[128.1]</td>
<td>[134.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>142.7***</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>113.9***</td>
<td>118.9***</td>
<td>118.9***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[37.17]</td>
<td>[38.89]</td>
<td>[33.56]</td>
<td>[35.00]</td>
<td>[35.00]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LogPopDens</td>
<td>39.13***</td>
<td>10.45</td>
<td>8.839</td>
<td>8.937</td>
<td>8.900</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>[8.937]</td>
<td>[8.900]</td>
<td>[9.415]</td>
<td>[9.145]</td>
<td>[9.415]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>208.6***</td>
<td>203.4***</td>
<td>203.4***</td>
<td>203.4***</td>
<td>203.4***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[41.09]</td>
<td>[42.48]</td>
<td>[42.48]</td>
<td>[42.48]</td>
<td>[42.48]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>61.63</td>
<td>61.63</td>
<td>61.63</td>
<td>61.63</td>
<td>61.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[107.7]</td>
<td>[107.7]</td>
<td>[107.7]</td>
<td>[107.7]</td>
<td>[107.7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>456.9***</td>
<td>281.2*</td>
<td>94.61</td>
<td>223.9**</td>
<td>214.9**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[163.5]</td>
<td>[147.4]</td>
<td>[128.0]</td>
<td>[101.7]</td>
<td>[103.9]</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>0.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.733</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 1 in Table 4 above shows that there is a negative relationship between improvements in the QoG index and the number of collective and interpersonal, violent and nonviolent events. An improvement of 0.1 (10%) in the QoG index would predict 54.7 fewer violent and nonviolent events with a standard error of 233 and statistical significance whereby p < 0.05. The R-squared statistic is 0.127 indicating a goodness of fit where 12.7% of the variation in violent and nonviolent events is accounted for by the QoG index variable. That is, given the linear nature of the relationship (see Figure 1 above), it can be assumed that an increase from, say, 0.7 to 0.8 in the QoG index would result in an average 54.7 fewer events.

When controlling for each of the above-mentioned variables, I find in Model 5 a 10% improvement in the QoG index would predict 41.9 fewer violent and nonviolent events with a standard error of 130.9 and statistical significance at p < 0.01. The Adjusted R-squared statistic is 0.733 indicating a goodness of fit where 73.3% of the variation in violent and nonviolent events is accounted for by the QoG index variable when controlling for EDI, Logged Population Density and HDI, while also dummying out the Capital City. Looking at logged population density, it is interesting to note that it loses statistical significance with the introduction of the Dummy variable for the Capital city. Kathmandu is a clear outlier (Figure
Scatterplot), and the that the significance of a capital city as a protest location should predict a higher number of protests. It is interesting to note, however, that the population density of a district does not seem to affect the number of predicted events after the introduction of the Capital control. A further factor for discussion is the failure of HDI to return significant findings. This control variable was introduced in several different orders and each time HDI did not account for a significant finding. The concept of relative deprivation being more important than objective scores – in the case of HDI life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators – as an explanatory factor for violent and nonviolent events is given some support.

There is thus substantial and statistical significance behind the data confirming the hypothesis that an improvement in Quality of Governance perceptions should lead to fewer violent and nonviolent events.

Moving to Hypothesis 2, Poorer perceptions of governance quality are likely to result in an increase in violent, disruptive protest over nonviolent protest, the broad finding is that the hypothesis does not find support. Hypothesis 2 is operationalised through taking a ratio of violent over nonviolent events.

**Table 5 - Ratio of violent over nonviolent events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Ratio Violent</th>
<th>(2) Ratio Violent</th>
<th>(3) Ratio Violent</th>
<th>(4) Ratio Violent</th>
<th>(5) Ratio Violent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QOG</td>
<td>5.010</td>
<td>4.134</td>
<td>3.518</td>
<td>3.479</td>
<td>1.772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[5.642]</td>
<td>[5.740]</td>
<td>[5.602]</td>
<td>[5.686]</td>
<td>[5.877]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>-0.946</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>-0.695</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.053]</td>
<td>[1.310]</td>
<td>[1.490]</td>
<td>[1.534]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LogPopDens</td>
<td>-0.521*</td>
<td>-0.559</td>
<td>-0.695</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.301]</td>
<td>[0.395]</td>
<td>[0.413]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.824]</td>
<td>[1.862]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>5.191</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[4.719]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.369</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
<td>2.283</td>
<td>2.454</td>
<td>1.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[3.959]</td>
<td>[4.175]</td>
<td>[4.313]</td>
<td>[4.516]</td>
<td>[4.555]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Here it is evident that the QoG variable does not maintain statistical significance as an explanatory factor for the ratio of violent to nonviolent events\textsuperscript{15}. There is no support for Hypothesis 2 from the OLS analysis. I have not run a robustness test for Hypothesis 2 as the results from the OLS test do not show statistical significance. Neither a logged nor binomial test as performed below for H1 robustness tests would be appropriate to a ratio variable used in H2. One test that could be relevant would be a multinomial regression similar to the tests done by Schaftenaar to measure her hypothesis that Countries that are more gender equal are more likely to experience a nonviolent campaign onset (compared to armed conflict) (Schaftenaar 2017). However, the 40 observations in my current dataset would each have at least one violent and one nonviolent onset making the required dichotomous approach unworkable. A robust multinomial study would require further transformations of the available datasets so as to create a longitudinal study of District-months in order to better uncover variation. For the purposes of the time and space constraints of this paper, I have not extended to this level of analysis. While this sort of analysis could be a fruitful endeavour for future study I instead focus analysis of H2 more fully in the Qualitative section below.

5.1.1. Robustness tests for the Quantitative Analysis

The data has been analysed using a linear regression. There are however problems with using OLS regression in so much as the data does not perfectly follow normal distribution and is count data, rather than continuous. My first robustness test involves logging the Dependent Variable, which returns the same statistical significance as the OLS test. Another potential model might have been Poisson regression. Even this, however, poses problems of its own in so much as interdependence between data points exists with the chosen Dependent Variable – otherwise known as contagion (Coxe, West and Aiken 2009, 131). Finally, given the mixed methods approach taken which allows for further interrogation of results, I am able to confidently proceed without over-emphasis on the quantitative analysis at the expense of the qualitative.

\textsuperscript{15} I also completed a separate regression using only ‘collective’ events, this model likewise did not show any significance.
5.1.1.1. **Logging the Dependent Variable**

In order to reduce the variation in the dependent variable, I have logged the number of total events (violent and nonviolent) and re-run the OLS regression. Because of the nature of collective protest events, the difference between 7 and 8 is not the same as, say, 200 and 201. Therefore, looking at a logged dependent variable enables me to control for this discrepancy and approximate the differences more closely. As below, the regression maintains significance across all models with various controls. The R-squared in Model 1 and Adjusted R-squared values in all other models are slightly lower than those seen without logging the data, however the goodness-of-fit is still very high thus giving this regression good explanatory power. The direction of causality is still negative, therefore H1 still holds in light of this robustness test.

**Table 6 - Logged Dependent Variable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) logfreq</th>
<th>(2) logfreq</th>
<th>(3) logfreq</th>
<th>(4) logfreq</th>
<th>(5) logfreq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[3.072]</td>
<td>[2.515]</td>
<td>[2.181]</td>
<td>[2.166]</td>
<td>[2.270]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>2.132***</td>
<td>0.971*</td>
<td>1.294**</td>
<td>1.370**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.461]</td>
<td>[0.510]</td>
<td>[0.567]</td>
<td>[0.592]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LogPopDens</td>
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<td>0.309**</td>
<td>0.284*</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.117]</td>
<td>[0.150]</td>
<td>[0.159]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>10.46***</td>
<td>7.835***</td>
<td>5.789***</td>
<td>6.331***</td>
<td>6.194***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2.155]</td>
<td>[1.829]</td>
<td>[1.679]</td>
<td>[1.720]</td>
<td>[1.759]</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>0.594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.1.1.2. **Running a negative binomial regression**

Given these data are not continuous, but rather an overdispersed count data, it is useful to run a robustness test which accounts for iterative weighting. Whereas a Poisson model assumes that the probability of one more event is unrelated to the existence of the previous event, the reality of protest events suggests that where there have been one or more protests, further protests may (may not) follow based on the success (failure) of the preceding event. Therefore, the Poisson model itself is problematic for interpretation of this data. Negative Binomial
Regression is a generalisation of the Poisson model and has become a central feature of analysing count data which is overdispersed (Hible 2017). For the purposes of a robustness test it is therefore deemed appropriate. As can be seen in the table below, the QoG variable maintains significance across all three models progressively controlling for EDI and HDI. The direction of effect is still negative and the coefficients do not change substantially across the models. Each model also offsets the log of population. Population is a good predictor for total events (collective and interpersonal) with an R2 of 0.8 (test run separately). Following on from Lee and Thomas, I specify the logged population size as an offset variable in the regression equation to capture the rate of events against logged population. The model thus shows a per capita logged rate of events instead of the less intuitive event count (Lee and Thomas 2010).

In summary, based on model 5 below, the rates of events are indeed dependent on QoG and the EDI and HDI indices are not confounding as they do not hold statistical significance and the coefficient of QoG does not change across all three models (1, 3 and 5). Because the QoG variable is equally significant in the negative binomial as previously seen in the OLS regression, it is safe to maintain the conclusions discussed in the original OLS analysis above.

### Table 7 - Negative Binomial Regression, logged population offset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(2) lnalpha</th>
<th>(3) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(4) lnalpha</th>
<th>(5) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(6) lnalpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QoG</td>
<td>-4.959***</td>
<td>-4.852***</td>
<td>-4.920***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.381]</td>
<td>[1.402]</td>
<td>[1.440]</td>
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Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.2. Qualitative Analysis

Following on from the quantitative analysis above, the interviews conducted in Nepal can shed some light on the causal mechanism at hand. Hypothesis 1, which receives support from the quantitative analysis, is discussed in terms of tracing the process of how violent and nonviolent
events occur. This section first outlines responses given in terms of the relative deprivation felt against the seven components of governance tested in this paper – including the observation that these components are joined together in many ways and Federalism is the most important issue currently. Following that, I consider the failure of H2 to receive support and why that might be based on interviews and alternative theory. I address the form that protest takes, what drives it to either violence or nonviolence, and why in some cases it doesn’t occur at all. Broadly the response from interviewees was that the escalation to violence derives from either or both of State instigation and protest-group leadership. It is notable that there was also considerable emphasis on identity politics.

5.2.1. A note on political perspectives
Prior to beginning the process tracing of my causal mechanism, I wish to point out the broad political economy camps that, based on my interviews, can be identified in contemporary Nepali discourse. While of course it is not possible to completely categorise respondents as one or the other, or to say that the concepts identified in these camps are mutually exclusive, it is important to outline fundamental differences in belief. The first perspective runs along the lines that economic policy will enable the expansion of development gradually throughout the country. The main cleavage is said to run along elite/non-elite lines; and that caste/religious/ethnic identity does not inform elite/non-elite status. In this broad camp, any ongoing issues with inclusion/exclusion are seen as purely societal and the Constitution and developing legislation are in place to take care of these issues. Finally, there are some elements in Nepal who see foreign donors as interfering in Nepali domestic issues and creating ethnic divides where they don’t actually exist.

The other broad perspective is more critical of the State, suggesting that the Permanent Establishment of Nepal has been entrenched since the 1960s where the same group of families continue to maintain power. Grievances are said to be against this entrenched elite, not necessarily the State. Elements of this broad perspective include the idea that there will be no economic development without inclusion of marginalised groups, which is not happening because critical political leaders are co-opted by the State. This argument continues that the inclusion agenda from the Peace Agreement and Interim Constitution was taken out of the final Constitution and that any policies promoting women, Dalits, and janajatis are not implemented in practice.
These two perspectives, while not entirely representative of any one respondent, nor yet given in their entirety by one respondent, are useful for understanding the political discourse such as it exists in Nepal. In this context, the following paragraphs summarise the manner in which components of governance are seen.

5.2.2. Interlinked components of governance

The first node in the Causal Mechanism deals with how governance quality is perceived. I therefore started my interview questions by seeking to understand the way good governance relates to a reduction in relative deprivation. I gave respondents a list of the governance components and allowed them to talk through (in order or as they saw fit) the different ways in which each component, separately or together, had improved or worsened since 2013.

Most respondents identified early on in interviews that the seven components of governance are interlinked, often giving examples that related to more than one component. For example, issues with bureaucratic quality were typified as being due in part to other components such as corruption, exclusive control by the dominant group in Nepal, and even a failure of rule of law whereby separation between bureaucrats and the legislative/judicial functions of the State has been insufficient. Respondents in most instances focused heavily on issues of political exclusion – many noting that while there have been policies designed to promote inclusion, the social capacity for Nepal to be inclusive is still lacking, some outlining that vested interests ensure any changes are cosmetic only.

The key observations on components of governance are as follows:

Perceptions on how bureaucratic quality has changed differed widely. Some mentioned it had improved, others that it had worsened or is perceived to have worsened and others that it hasn’t changed much at all. As might be expected, those government employees interviewed were generally more positive in their assessment. As outlined by Prakash Bhattarai who runs a think tank in Kathmandu, there is an historical aspect to this argument, in that the current cohort of bureaucrats are a combination of panchayat\textsuperscript{16} era, 1990s era and post-2006 era civil servants, which makes it hard to maintain a common standard across the civil service. Bureaucratic

\textsuperscript{16} A party-less guided democracy system with power vested in the monarchy and local administration directly subordinate to the king that ran from 1960-1990.
Quality was regularly emphasised as service delivery, which is a common measure in Nepal (see quantitative analysis questions at Annex A). The idea that service delivery continues to be poor in rural areas was emphasised. As were linkages made with the component of corruption, where bureaucratic quality is seen by many to be constrained by corruption. While there was evidence of poor perceptions of bureaucracy manifesting relative deprivation in so much as there is a continued under-representation of certain groups and ongoing failures of service delivery, it was made clear that this has not been an issue of particular importance to Nepali people due to a focus on resilience (see section 5.2.4 below).

**Rule of Law** is said to contain both functional and structural injustice. Many functional problems with rule of law were mentioned including circular processes around complaints to Customs Offices; nominal independence of institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and Corruption Investigation Authority; and issues with the newly formed Judicial Committees. Journalist, Manika Jha, pointed out that

“In all local bodies they have to form the Judicial Committees... the Deputy Mayors are the main people who have to form the Judicial Committee, but they don’t have any knowledge. In our District we have 18 local bodies. They’ve all formed the judicial committee but most of them they don’t know anything about these committees’ provisions, what are their rights, what they have to do.”

The Judicial Committees also have the potential for longer term grievances to arise. Not only are these Judicial Committees struggling with separation of powers, Shalini Tripathi, noted that Panchayats were made of political representatives who were taking decisions on peoples’ lives. The Judicial Committees have three members who belong to political parties and again they are going to take decisions on peoples’ personal matters. These are not independent, fair judicial representatives. These are dependent, unfair politically inclined and affiliated people who are going to take a decision... you are telling me that I should not go to the Courts I should first go to the Judicial Committees with my problems, where I know that these people are politically inclined and have their own political obligations? It is regressive. Parallels should be drawn with the Panchayat system.

A final point on Rule of Law that continued to be raised concerned the concept of Rule by Law (see North, Wallis and Weingast 2013 for an explanation of how in closed-access societies
leaders use the judicial and security sectors to maintain stability, but are not themselves subject to laws). This was summarised nicely by Surendra Labh, a retired Economics professor from Janakpur, who noted that “high political powers are gaining. There is no rule of law, but rule of leaders. There is no policy of party, but policy of leaders”. Further examples of the limitations of rule of law include the well-documented failures of the Transitional Justice process in Nepal to convict many of the military or former rebel leaders accused of crimes\textsuperscript{17}; as well as multiple examples given of poor police and judicial treatment of Madhesis, Dalits, Janajatis and women. These concerns demonstrate that relative deprivation does exist, though tends to go beyond the conceptualisations made in the quantitative study of trust in police and courts and is instead more pertinent with respect to the perceived failure of Nepal’s Transitional Justice process and separation of powers.

**Corruption** was a major issue addressed by respondents. Many interlocutors related generally held views that bureaucrats live well beyond their means, indicating to them evidence of corruption. For an average citizen, middle men or fixers are widely noted in Nepal to be necessary to access government services\textsuperscript{18}. Birgunj businessman, GP Lath, gave the following summary of the patronage system in Nepal:

such kind of resources which are very profitable, first of all powerful people, who are very well connected, they are grasping for themselves only. When they are very much full, their relatives and their own peoples will get benefits. If there is more resource availability, then only will common people have a chance to get it. This ‘chain of leakages’ is continuous in Nepal. Previous days such kind of access was even narrower – the Royal family and their relatives.

So while relative deprivation may be decreasing as improvements are made, it is clear that grievances do remain and are particularly related to concepts of inclusion/exclusion.

Another issue is the widely held belief of corruption in the elections with candidates spending over the mandated amount allowed for campaigning. NGO representative Ashim Pandey summed this up:

\textsuperscript{17} There have been several extensions and few of the original outputs delivered (Thapa and Ramsbotham 2017, 32-6).

\textsuperscript{18} This is an issue that is also raised in the 2013 survey report which reported 75% of respondents use ‘intervention from influential persons’ and a further 49% reported ‘using an agent’ in order to obtain public service (International IDEA 2013, 83).
In the last local elections, maybe you’ve heard from other people also, those people who stood for elections spent a huge sum of money to win the election... those constituents, they also have expectations from the candidate. This is like some sort of accepting that the people whom we elect, they will go and assume the position and they’ll engage in some sort of corruption... Indirectly, those people who are casting the vote, they’ll want some share of this corruption money. This is a huge problem. If this remains, it is a problem with everything. With rule of law, bureaucratic services, and in the long-term it also hampers democracy, progress and the momentum we have at the moment.

Relative deprivation is here evident and pervasive due to the effect both on day-to-day lives, as well as the manner in which patronage reinforces continued limited-access, thus hampering multiple components of governance.

While corruption is highly visible to the common person, it is less known whether this is the case with economic policy. On the one hand, as noted by Government bureaucrats, Trilochan Pokharel, the average person does not know about economic policy – only his/her own well-being according to poverty and market prices. On the other, many people linked economic policy back to patronage. Anubhav Ajeet gave this explanation:

if you are a member of certain families, one brother will be Secretary in one department, another will be in the judiciary, another will be at the top level of the military... that network is so corrupt. They don’t want any outsider to come into that... And who is making economic policies? The same group. The same group is getting benefitted from those policies.

Further issues raised gave an indication of the fairly esoteric nature of economic policy grievances including: a failure to spend the entire foreign development budget; poor handling of Foreign Direct Investment schemes; a protective labour policy at odds with liberal economic policies promoted by the government; and failure of the government to contain price spikes on land from speculation. While some praised the work done to establish economic policy in Nepal, others including Professor Surendra Labh countered that:

The economic policies are only on paper. Not in practice... There are so many policies, but policies are not clear. Our new Constitution has a provision for a socialist economy,
but our political leaders are not ready for a socialist economy. It is mentioned in the Constitution, but in practice there is no socialist economics, only the private sector is emerging day by day.

It is therefore evident that there is unlikely to be much relative deprivation felt in every day interactions in Nepal as concerns economic policy. Rather, it is the more politically active individuals who hold concerns that people are expecting more from economic policy than the government can deliver. And for the average citizen economic policy could provoke relative deprivation indirectly via unemployment, as explained by bureaucrat Dipendra Singh:

The economic policy is most vulnerable in Nepal. We don't have any production or industrial development, we have not any exports, so this is why economic policy is more vulnerable in terms of economic development as it affects employment also. Economic development is the most important issue for political stability, rule of law and all things. This is the more problematic issue in Nepal.

Perceptions of military involvement in politics appear to be a very minor area of relative deprivation in Nepal in so much as there were not too many respondents identifying that their expectations around military involvement in politics were unmet. While certainly there is no overt involvement of the Generals in Nepal’s governing body, there are perceptions among multiple respondents that the Military is outside of the control of the government. Another criticism made by one respondent is that the institution itself is not particularly inclusive, but is instead a way to co-opt Hill/Mountain Janajati through the prestigious “Gurkha” regiments serving in the Nepali and foreign militaries. Nonetheless, the Military maintains a high degree of trust and popularity19. The well-known contracting of the Nepal Military to complete road works, as well as the fact that the public aren’t permitted to know the budget of the Army was related to me as something most people don’t care about20. On the other hand, a far more ominous point was made by an anonymous respondent to the effect that the “Military officially is not in politics, but day by day it is. Slowly Nepal is moving towards the Pakistani model. The Fast Track from Kathmandu to Nijghadh is contracted to the military. This is not good for the social life of Nepal.” The respondent went on to say that this is a “very serious matter and is

19 Data from the 2013 Survey showed that 66.5% of people had either ‘a great deal’ or ‘some’ trust in the Army. See also Army outperforming other State institutions in the Global Corruption Barometer https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=nepal.

20 The contracting of roadworks to the military may be seen by some as a minor issue, but as will be seen in the sections below, the manner in which road works are being completed has contributed directly to protest events.
not good for democracy. There is a possibility that the generals could take power, but this is very dangerous to say.”

Political exclusion and repression is perhaps the most interesting area as related by respondents. I will delve into this point further in the section below on extending analysis, but here it is interesting to relate at length the historical narrative of identity, ethnicity and the State as told by Krishna Hachhethu. According to Hachhethu, the modern context can be traced back to the 1960s. In 1962, overlapping treaties created the process of nation building/ethnicity destroying. The “District” structure itself was the entry point to dispose of ethnicity across different administrative units, leading to the current situation where now the Janajati are a minority in their own lands. For example, there are 68,000 Sherpa settled across 6 Districts, meaning they are a minority in each and thus lack the ability to join their ethnic authority with administrative authority. After centuries of migration – starting with the 18th century Gorkhali conquest of Nepal and most recently the 1960s Hill migration to the Tarai – the dominant group has spread across the country. Identity-based federalism was introduced as a concept during the Civil War and peace negotiations to correct this history. According to Hachhethu, Provinces should have been relatively comfortable for historically marginalised groups: a putative Limbuwan Province could have been 28% Limbu, which would have been 1.5% higher than Khas Arya, thus giving the Limbu a demographic majority and ability to effectively promote their interests. Instead, the Territorial Federalism that was implemented in the 2015 Constitution helps to retain the status quo and expand the political influence of the same dominant Khas Arya group. As underlined at the beginning of my qualitative analysis, this opinion is certainly not shared by all respondents. It does, however, provide a clear example of the manner in which grievances exist in the perceptions of many Nepalis – including civilians beyond the elite-level interviews performed in this study and in a way that promotes horizontal inequalities to be identified by ingroups.

As discussed in the research design, formal institutions pertain to the elections of representative government, as well as the mutual constraints created through the separation of executive, judicial and legislative powers. The concept was relayed in interviews through reference to legitimate democracy. Hiramani Ghimire pointed out the difference between the formal versus functional parts of institutions in Nepal. He notes that “excellent structures and systems are in place, however the budget is never passed on time. The people of Nepal are aware of this, but can’t see why – only the dominant decision makers know why”. This concept
relates strongly to the exclusion and repression debate with the narrative developed above juxtaposed against emphasis on how the Constitution and related legislation formally makes room for proportional reservations for women, Dalits, janajatis, Madhesis (as well as, controversially, Khas Arya who are already over-represented in parliament). As could be expected, there are some that see the federal process in Nepal as on track to achieve a functioning set of self-regulating formal institutions, whereas there are others who see change as only cosmetic while real power is concentrated now and into the future with the established dominant group. From the perspective of one Madhesi, Anubhav Ajeet (who is an NGO representative based in Kathmandu) “it’s not a transfer of power. Essentially it was thought that the power would transfer from Kathmandu to Janakpur... but it’s not going to happen. They withhold everything. Federalism is an achievement, but... the gap between expected and what people are getting in reality: I expected that my government in Jankapur would be independent of Kathmandu and they would have more powers, more authority to decide on their own. But the Chief Minister has to call the Prime Minister, Mr. Prime Minister, please give us some works. It’s a tragedy. I have not imagined this kind of Federalism.” The grievances around how formal institutions are perceived and the importance given to these in conversations is evidence on the strong influence that governance has on relative deprivation.

These seven components were given varying degrees of emphasis, but in all the linkage between perceptions of governance quality and a sense of relative deprivation held firm. The relative deprivations noted in each, while being in many cases speculative and based on the many unknowns yet to be uncovered as the federalisation process continues, show not only people’s dissatisfaction with their lot, but also a strong element of grievance based on HIs across multiple forms of social identity.

5.2.3. Relative deprivation and grievances

The relative deprivations giving rise to group grievances is explained in terms of Nepal’s all-important identity politics. Evidence presented during interviews suggests that the perceptions of governance tend towards those of North, Wallis and Weingast’s ‘limited-access’ society, albeit with notable moves towards increasing access to previously marginalised groups.

From a historical perspective, Hachhethu outlined that before modernisation in Nepal, systematic problems existed between the aristocracy and peasants. After modernisation, rules and laws increased but only for one particular group. It is this, according to Hachhethu that
accounts for group-based deprivation. Hachhethu’s conclusion is backed up by multiple other respondents including Ajay Das who pointed out that the main grievance is ‘who is ruling us’? The key question being around representation and thus access to power and resources. From Shalini Tripathi: “Where fairness could impact people in authority, unfairness has not decreased”.

According to Hiramani Ghimire, if you were to take a measurement now, you’d likely find that there is a larger gap – not because QoG has decreased, but because there is more openness, the ability to compare and discuss. That is to say, part of any relative deprivation gap experienced by Nepalis is due to the improvements in openness in society. This comment further confirms the discussion in the research design on how perceptions rather than objective evaluations of governance quality are crucial in testing a deprivation based causal mechanism.

But this openness is also bringing benefits. A point made by Dalit and marginalised people’s rights advocate, J.B. Biswokarma, outlines the growing potential for some identity-based issues to be resolved through formal channels:

I’ve seen that diversity in political representation has increased in the local level. Even in the big political scenario, political parties have not accepted the identity issues, but they were compelled to nominate the candidate from particular ethnic groups, for example most of the Nepali Congress and UML and Maoist Centre, they nominated Madhesi candidates in the Tarai-Madhes region. They nominated indigenous people in most of the places where that indigenous group has a majority. They haven’t accepted well, but they thought: if I nominate somebody else from non-indigenous people in a mainly indigenous settlement then they are going to lose the election. This is how the identity-based movement is getting space… Most of the people said the identity movement has lost, it has gone, but I think the opposite. The identity-based issue is coming from different ways. It has not vanished.

This demonstrates both that issues around identity continue to be major potential areas of grievance, but also have the possibility of being brought into formal governance structures and dealt with.

As outlined in the previous section there is disagreement over the degree to which relative deprivation exists, however there is indeed a broad recognition that complex group formation
and politicisation in Nepal is an important part of the protest process. Indeed, a fascinating insight into the failure of the Madhes protests to achieve all of their goals was described by Madhes Analyst, Tula Narayan Shah. Shah pointed out that the Hill versus Madhes agenda after the Madhesi Andolan of 2015/16 was politicised to the extent that Hill Janajati and Dalit eventually sided with the State rather than the protesting Madhes, as they saw Madhes and India as being a greater threat. The question of how these grievances turn to protest or are dealt with through formal channels is therefore one that is linked tightly to politics.

5.2.4. Grievances to protest
There are several perspectives on how grievances around governance inform protest. The major apparent driver for protest in Nepal would seem to be grievances related to Federal restructuring.

Tula Narayan Shah pointed out that Federalism is like a wine glass with the majority of power at the top (Federal government) a very narrow area of power along the stem (the Provinces) and a wide but not particularly powerful set of representation along the base (the local level government). He concluded that Nepal’s is therefore a centralised/administrative federalism: “Federalism is tolerated, not accepted. Reluctant federalists designed federalism in Nepal”. It is this incompatibility that has driven the major protests in Nepal – the Madhesi Andolan. Rita Sah explained the five agenda of the Madhes Andolan of 2015/16, and political demands now, as follows: 1. Federalism with 20 districts in 2 or 3 Provinces, separated from the Hills; 2. Political representation based on population, not geography; 3. Inclusion with the system of reservation/quota; 4. Language inclusion in the Constitution; 5. Equal citizenship regardless if born or naturalised as a Nepali. These five issues, while obviously specific to Nepal, can be considered in terms of exclusion and repression, as well as formal institutions. There is thus a clear process that can be traced from perceptions of exclusion and unrepresentative institutions creating a sense of relative deprivation which results in group-based grievances giving rise to protest along identity lines.

5.2.5. Grievances that don’t result in protest
There are several reasons given as to why the perceptions of governance quality don’t result in more protests in Nepal. From one perspective, it is because relative deprivation in governance perceptions is decreasing. Others don’t see that grievances with governance result in mobilisation at all, rather that it is the whims of the elites driving mobilisation. And finally,
there is the ideas that people either address their problems within society, carry on under the idea of resilience, or are simply tired of protest and prefer to wait and see.

Kathmandu-based senior bureaucrat, Trilochan Pokharel, on a particularly positive note identified low relative deprivation because the gap between demand and supply is decreasing. He went on to say that where there is continuing pressure from the public, the gap between demand and supply will continue to decrease.

This idea is expanded upon through considering the perspective of Prakash Bhattarai, a Kathmandu-based researcher, “it is important to distinguish which are locally initiated movements and which are just politically motivated movements. Politically motivated movements have political ambitions, and once they’ve fulfilled that, the protest vanishes. Whereas the organic kind of protest movements, that remains for a long period of time and that can create impact in the long term”. Here we can see that while protest can indeed be politicised and co-opted by elite interests, these will not be as lasting nor ‘maximalist’ as those founded in genuine grievances.

Bhattarai’s perspective is shared by many who see the differences between social and political sorts of movements. Chandra Kishore, a journalist from Birgunj, also recognised these two issues, but focused on some of the ideas around elite manipulation.

*In the Madhes there are two types of movement. The relation between Centre and Province this is a political movement; second, how we maintain social behaviour between Madhesis, the social movement... The government thinks that if they promote the social movement then the political movement is neutralised... because there is untouchability, domestic violence, social hierarchy, the government says: there is no need to change the state, but need to change the society. In Kailali, Ratha Chaudhary was beaten for witchcraft. The Prime Minister pointed to this as a problem in between the Tharu community. The marginalised community now days says all problems are with the State... the State says all problems are within society. So, the government needs social movements. For political movements, government strategy is divide and rule. They try to buy the leaders and provide them with opportunity in the State.”*

This argument that societal discrimination is the main issue confronting Nepal (regardless of whether or not it is seen as adequately addressed by policy) was brought up several times.
Dipendra Singh from the National Human Rights Commission office in Jankapur explained the point as follows: “Social discrimination is happening people to people in society. No one with problems wants to come to the police office, no one wants to come into our office because they want to negotiate their own ways, between their own society... their level of awareness and education means they can’t legally challenge their problem at court, with police”. He went on to explain that “society is interconnected they don’t want to go to police or court because they don’t want to break their relations”. This argument further supports the concept that the lack of strong and representative institutions in society will lead people to address their small grievances through informal channels. This idea supports the quantitative finding that those with lower perceptions of governance quality on average see more violent and nonviolent ‘interpersonal’ events occurring.

Ashim Pandey, a Kathmandu-based peacebuilding and governance practitioner, made an observation that reflects why some genuine grievances do not shift to protest. Pandey noted that policy changes have been rapid, which has led to a mismatch as attitude and behaviour change has not kept up. He gave the example wherein caste-based discrimination has been legislated against, but the mindset has not changed. This point links with the concept of relative deprivation in that if grievances are against a pervasive societal issue, there is not much of a sense of relative deprivation due to expectations remaining low and a lack of grievance against the government itself. Indeed, as further elaborated by Pandey:

> when there was the earthquake, there was a lot of talk about resilience. People said that Nepali society was very resilient. And then the response was not very quick, the government was not doing enough to respond, still there are many people living in a tent. And they said this is resilience, huge resilience Nepali society has. But I think this is not a positive resilience, it is a negative resilience. There is mismanagement from the government side, but as a citizen, we are not questioning the government. We always try to find the ways how our job is to get done, how we get service from the government, from public services. This is the sort of resilience we have. We need to change this. We should start asking questions to our representatives, to the bureaucrats to the government policies.

Pandey’s point of view underscores the manner in which relative deprivation is far more important to explaining protest, but also to catalysing further governance reform.
Finally, there is the idea of fatigue. Over the time period studied from 2013 to the end of 2017, the major protest campaign that occurred was the Madhes Andolan. Those other protests which have occurred do not form part of a coherent campaign. According to multiple respondents, this is because people are going back to their own lives giving government time to work. Many believe that this is because morale has gone down among protestors. As pointed out by Shalini Tripathi, even though issues of inclusion – especially among the Tharu, Limbu, Rai – were mismanaged by the government, no voices were strong enough to reverse decisions. With varying degrees of emphasis, almost all respondents pointed to years of violence, and the Earthquake as having resulted in too much loss for people to maintain a spirit of protest, even if issues are still present. According to Prakash Bhattarai, civil society is dropping off and CSOs are weaker. While people show solidarity, they have no real power. The concept of people having no real power is underscored by the situation with Dalit people who according to Kathmandu-based development practitioner, Ajay Das, are not able to mobilise to protest untouchability (which still exists despite law changes). Das pointed out that there is no Dalit party, only CSOs who don’t have the ability to form a large protest.

The arguments presented in response to the causal chain relate to the question of violence/nonviolence against passivity. On the one hand, absences of protest is explained in so much as civilians are said to respond to unmet demands of service delivery (linked most to bureaucratic quality, but also corruption and economic policy) through simple passivity, acceptance and personal resilience in adversity. On the other hand, some argue that a lack of protest in Nepal over these sorts of issue proves that protest is therefore not an issue of grievance so much as manipulation by elites seeking to disrupt the government.

5.2.6. Escalation to violence

Testing the linkage in the causal chain of how quality of governance can explain the form of protest starts to lose explanatory power. The hypothesis that poorer perceptions of governance quality are likely to result in an increase in violent over nonviolent events failed to find significance in the quantitative test. Likewise, the interviews turned up comprehensive disagreement with the concept that violence may occur due to perceptions that governance quality is poor, which obviates the need for further quantitative analysis. Instead, there was some suggestion that issues of lower relative importance (bureaucratic quality, military in politics, economic policy) would be less likely to drive violence than exclusion and failures of
formal institutions. These observations were linked primarily to the concept of political leadership being a more important explanatory factor in the escalation of protest to violence. Another explanation offered was that violence in protest is the result of a reaction to State instigation. This is expanded upon in the Discussion section below.

5.2.7. Reverse causality

As discussed in the research design, a major limitation of this study is the temporal dimension and the inability to categorically rule out any reverse causality. The quantitative analysis was not able to rule out reverse causality due to the fact that I do not have comparative data for governance perceptions, only a survey at a single moment in time. I have therefore attempted to rule it out by introducing it as a concept in the qualitative interviews. However, due to the manner in which it was asked and the attempt to ensure the interviews were largely respondent-driven, the issue itself was not necessarily picked up on. However, there are some inferences that can be made.

Several respondents pointed out that demonstrations and protest behaviour are viewed by many to simply be instances of opposition groups wishing to demonstrate their capability to disrupt the normal business of the government, to demonstrate that in fact the government is performing poorly. This suggests that it is quite possible perceptions of governance are indeed swayed by protest – or at least that this is the intention of the protesting groups. That being said, other interlocutors asserted that in fact the raw emotion and feelings of exclusion in the Madhes were such that very little incentive was required for hundreds of thousands of civilians across the entire Madhes belt to join in on the four-month blockade of 2015/16.\textsuperscript{21} This shows that real grievances existed and were the catalyst for joining (that is to say, the protests were universal and voluntary, not simply put on to delegitimise the State).

It is likely, given the emphasis on political parties seeking to co-opt protest for political ends that QoG perceptions, at least in part, are influenced by protest events. I would argue that based on these interviews there is a degree of influence running in both directions, with a stronger emphasis on QoG perceptions causing protest due to the very real nature of the grievances

\textsuperscript{21} See in particular International Crisis Group (2016, 19-25) for a balanced view of the blockade recognising both that it was an indigenous movement, and that it was facilitated by India and Madhesi political parties.
outlined, and the manner in which they follow the causal mechanism. To further ensure the clarity of the causal mechanism, I extend the analysis below to several further tests.

5.3. Extending the analysis

The quantitative analysis in this paper so far has tested a combined set of all collective and interpersonal events as coded by Nepal Monitor. As outlined in section 4.2.1.3 in the Research Design, the main extension of my analysis concerns removing the interpersonal data and instead focusing only on collective events.

Running a second regression leaving out the interpersonal data has two key effects. Firstly, the issues mentioned with robustness around potential systematic underreporting of domestic and gender-based violence can be mitigated based on the assumption that collective events are far less likely to go unreported, regardless of the District in which they occur. Secondly, the use of collective events alone shines light specifically on anti-government activity. That is, I look not just at the concept of a lack of effective governance proxied by increased occurrences of violence outside of the State, but rather specific occurrences of events, violent and nonviolent. This helps to underscore the concept of acting against the state versus passivity.

The regression returns the findings displayed in Table 8 below. As can be seen, Model 1 shows that there is a negative relationship between improvements in the QoG index and the number of violent and nonviolent collective events. An improvement of 0.1 (10%) in the QoG index would predict 37.1 fewer violent and nonviolent collective events with a standard error of 149.9 and statistical significance whereby $p < 0.05$. The R-squared statistic is 0.139 indicating a goodness of fit where 13.9% of the variation in collective events is accounted for by the QoG index variable.

The significance of QoG across each of these models is the same as from the OLS regression in Table 4. When controlling for each of the variables as shown in Table 8, we find in Model 5 an improvement of 0.1 in the QoG index would predict 28.6 fewer collective events with a standard error of 93.26 with statistical significance at $p < 0.01$. The Adjusted R-squared statistic is 0.693 indicating a goodness of fit where 69.3% of the variation in violent and nonviolent events is accounted for by the QoG index variable when controlling for EDI, Logged Population Density, the Capital City and HDI. Interestingly here again we see that HDI is not significant and LogPopDens loses significance with the introduction of the Capital dummy.
The R-squared value in model 1 is slightly better than in the Table 4, however Adjusted R-squared in model 5 is slightly lower. The substantial difference made reflects a lower mean of the count data given many events are deleted. By and large the data when measuring collective events only strongly supports H1 and is not statistically much different from an operationalisation using both collective and interpersonal events. The qualitative and quantitative findings therefore complement one another across multiple operationalisations.
Table 8 - Collective events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(2) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(3) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(4) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(5) Totalfreq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-371.2**</td>
<td>-294.7**</td>
<td>-265.1**</td>
<td>-285.2***</td>
<td>-286.3***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>[149.9]</td>
<td>[135.2]</td>
<td>[113.3]</td>
<td>[88.66]</td>
<td>[93.26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>82.59***</td>
<td>14.68</td>
<td>66.06***</td>
<td>66.33**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[24.81]</td>
<td>[26.49]</td>
<td>[23.23]</td>
<td>[24.34]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LogPopDens</td>
<td>25.08***</td>
<td>5.978</td>
<td>5.890</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[6.087]</td>
<td>[6.160]</td>
<td>[6.547]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td></td>
<td>138.9***</td>
<td>138.6***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[28.44]</td>
<td>[29.54]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.370</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[74.89]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>170.5**</td>
<td>170.0**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[105.2]</td>
<td>[98.37]</td>
<td>[87.18]</td>
<td>[70.42]</td>
<td>[72.28]</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.732</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.693</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.3.1. **Components of governance separated out**

A further clarification is made through running a regression using each of the seven components individually against the collective events recorded over the time period. Table 9 below shows models 1 through 7 with each component of governance listed separately. In each instance I have kept all four controls found from model 5 in table six above, given their significance and goodness of fit. As can be seen, bureaucratic quality (**BQ**), corruption (**CORRUPT**), economic policy (**ECONPOL**), exclusion and repression (**EXCLREP**), and formal institutions (**FORMINT**) have a negative relationship with the number of nonviolent and violent, interpersonal and collective events. These variables also are statistically significant with a p-value at least \( p > 0.1 \). Rule of law (**ROL**) and military in politics (**MILPOL**), however, do not hold statistical significance. Formal institutions holds both the highest significance and the most substantial effect on the predicted number of events. This is strongly reflected in the interviews where the concept of fully delivering on the Interim Constitution and Federalism was particularly emphasised as having been an issue over the past 10 years. The issue of Rule of Law and Military in Politics were also outlined to have some degree of relative deprivation in the interviews, although not necessarily as conceptualised in the quantitative study. Indeed, Military in Politics was by and large dismissed as an issue for everyday people in Nepal, even though some had private reservations. Rule of Law, on the other hand, is seen more as an issue of ensuring equal justice, including for powerful individuals. This concept was not captured in the quantitative analysis and could potentially be better operationalised for future survey work.
### Table 9 - Components of Governance OLS regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(2) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(3) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(4) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(5) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(6) Totalfreq</th>
<th>(7) Totalfreq</th>
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<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
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<td>65.52**</td>
<td>93.15***</td>
<td>63.66**</td>
<td>66.43**</td>
<td>52.42*</td>
<td>57.71**</td>
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<td>[26.37]</td>
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<td>[26.84]</td>
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<td>[7.391]</td>
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<td>[7.008]</td>
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<td>[6.184]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>138.6***</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
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<td>-51.79</td>
<td>-18.06</td>
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<td>-58.96</td>
<td>-44.59</td>
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<td>[53.56]</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ROL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORRUPT</td>
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<td>-69.44**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>[30.92]</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>ECONPOL</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXCLREP</td>
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<td>-81.30*</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-</td>
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<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>squared</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.4. Discussion

Both qualitative and quantitative findings above outline strong support for the original hypothesis, that the quality of governance does indeed have strong explanatory power for the number of protests. The causal process whereby poor perceptions of governance quality represent relative deprivation, which if brought together around collective grievances results in group mobilisation to protest. The incredibly consistent quantitative results using different regressions as well as operationalising collective and interpersonal events together as well as collective-only make a good case for generalisation. By using over half of Nepal’s Districts there is a good case to be made for generalisation throughout Nepal. By tracing a causal mechanism that is drawn from similar global studies and finding support for the first hypothesis, it is fair to say that these results can add to a more global generalisation that Quality of Governance does indeed affect peace. For H2, however, the argument that escalation to violence will depend on increasingly worse perceptions of governance fails to find support.

Why then do findings show that perceptions of governance quality predict numbers of events (both total and collective only), but fail to predict events becoming more violent than nonviolent? There are two main responses that can be seen in both the academic literature and in many of the interview responses.

5.4.1. Alternative explanation one: protest form is determined by group leadership

The interviews uncovered two key points: first, that leadership embedded in communities could influence more radical actors to maintain discipline; and second that political groups, once co-opted to the formal government, were no longer present to provide leadership for anti-government movements.

The idea of leadership keeping control of violence was emphasised by Vijay Karna who outlined the way in which community leaders and political representatives of the RJPN/Forum could talk down those sub-groups looking to initiate violence. The leadership embedded in communities on many occasions stopped youths from acting on their stated plans to engage in violent acts as part of the Madhesi protests. This was witnessed personally by Karna. Chandra Kishore, a Birgunj-based journalist, gave further detail on the matter stating that “overall, the
Madhesi movement was nonviolent. But sometimes when the State more and more pressurise, people throw the stone. People burn the government offices, vehicles. If you throw the stone, you burn the vehicle, actually this is not peaceful means. Why? Because we have not any committed leader who believe in nonviolence method”. This point demonstrates that while violence is instigated by the State forces and leadership has been important in halting major protest-side violence, the leaders do not always have sufficient control over the movement to maintain complete discipline.

In terms of co-optation, there are two key examples given. The first from the decade long People’s War. Mobilisation around discrimination has been normalised, however the demands for autonomy/self-determination have been diluted as the leaders of the People’s War were co-opted into government and compromised them away (Anonymous 1, JB Biswokarma). The second is a more recent example where the political parties from the Madhes hold a dominant position in the Province 2 State Assembly. Respondents particularly in the Madhes noted that the two Madhesi parties while they were outside of government, couldn’t achieve their goals (despite the large rallies and blockades). On the one hand this is seen by some to be a sign of elites more interested in self-promotion. According to some, the people who were against the central government are now in partnership. As expressed by GP Lath, for “Upendra Yadav22 – the Constitution, gender, ethnicity are no longer an issue for him. The next movement will be the same. Find a slogan that appeals – they know where is the pain, how to bring people together – then move on”. According to journalist Pankaj Das, however, now the Madhesi parties have joined government they can apply pressure, and in 2-3 more years they can return to the streets if required.

5.4.2. Alternative explanation two: escalation to violence is instigated by the State

Meanwhile, others pointed out that whether protest would turn violent depends entirely on whether the government would use force and initiate violence. Rita Sah, a Madhes-NGO representative based in Kathmandu went to the Tarai twice in 2015/16 once at the peak of the movement then again during the blockade of resources imported from India. She noted that the State was very cruel in dealing with the movement claiming that the security forces aimed for head and chest and the use of force was disproportionate, where even women were treated like enemies in war. Another response from Ajay Das noted that violent protest deviates public

22 Leader of one of the two major Madhes parties, the Federal Socialist Forum, Nepal.
attention from main core issues to violence giving as an example August 2015 when 11 were killed in Thikapur. Anubhav Ajeet, a Madhesi based in Kathmandu, explained to me: “I think, the nature of the State determines the nature of protest. If the State controls itself and does not use force, the democratic movements or any other movements in Nepal have been largely nonviolent. Except the Maoist movement... other movements were largely non-violent, but when the State started using excessive force then it became violent... in the Madhes movement, the police started using excessive forces from the first day. I think State is more violent against identity movements. Whereas State has not been that much violent against the larger democratic movement (2006/7). This is a fascinating concept in so much as not only is violence attributed to State instigation, but whether the State chooses to instigate violence is seen to depend on the type of movement it is facing. This can be extended to the perspective that identity of the protesters will determine violence. The following story related by Vijaj Karna, a Development Practitioner based in Kathmandu outlines this point. “I remember in 2015, in the very beginning of June. 12 or 13 MPs of the Dalit community were mercilessly beaten by police. But there were Chhetri with sword in their hands – Chhetri is ruling class of this country, the kings, ranas, military people all this – so they have protested the Constitution asking for a Hindu Kingdom, asked for the Hindu religion as well as King. So they protested at the very gate of Constituent Assembly, and they were protesting with the sword. In Nepalese law it is written: you cannot gather with arms and ammunition, any sorts of threatening items, but they were allowed to protest with the sword. So you know why it happened? Because all police officials, all the military are Chhetris. ‘They’re our brother. Our clan. Our family member’. And that’s why no. But Dalits. I was there. It was so bad. When they go to Tarai, ‘oh they are foreigners, they are Indians, they are strangers, they should be beaten’. And that is why where there was no need to fire they have fired and killed the people.”

These few statements demonstrate that a) the State is perceived as being the main instigator for turning nonviolent protest to violent, and b) the State is seen to instigate different identity-protests depending on whether they belong to the dominant or marginalised communities.

Both of these alternate explanations have support in the existing nonviolence literature. The other side focuses on internal structures. It has been established elsewhere that cohesion is a necessary but not sufficient condition for nonviolence, but fragmentation generates domestic competition, weakens constraints on escalation, and invites external interference (Pearlman 2012, Dudouet 2013). Therefore, there is significant opportunity for further study of nonviolence in Nepal.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study aimed to address the research question: How do perceptions of the quality of governance impact the number and nature of political protests? Using quantitative analysis of collective and interpersonal events and qualitative elite-level interviews, I assessed how well the quality of governance theory could be applied at the sub-national level. Further analysis tested which of the seven different components of governance quality held explanatory power. By addressing questions on governance and protest participation and behaviour to various influential members of Nepal’s development, NGO, media, government and business communities in both Kathmandu and in two districts of the Tarai, I was able to follow through on the observations garnered from the quantitative analysis to better understand what might be driving different outcomes.

Worsening quality of governance was hypothesised to result in more collective violent and nonviolent events. This was borne out in the quantitative analysis. Interview results by and large suggested that issues of under-representation for different social groups are critical determinants of grievance leading to protest. Collective protest events continue to occur and people continue to pursue interpersonal issues outside of formal governance structures. But, levels of protest do not necessarily represent object measures of governance quality. Rather, as hypothesised, protest reflects issues where expectations outpace reality. This is especially prevalent along HI grievances arising from relative deprivation identified by multiple members of social identity groups. A lack of protest reflects issues with governance which are either interpreted as social issues; a willingness to wait and see if recent governance reforms will ameliorate deprivations across multiple forms of QoG but especially formal institutions and their legitimacy; and finally, a weariness with taking to the streets without achieving substantial changes in desired areas. Hypothesis 1 was therefore supported by both quantitative and qualitative tests. The quantitative failure to show a causal relationship between QoG perceptions and increasing violence over nonviolence in Hypothesis 2 with violence in collective protest instead explained during interviews through a combination of protest group leadership and state repression of nonviolent protest events.

While I do make the claim that these result support the broad QoG peace theory, caution is required in generalising specifics of these results beyond Nepal. Nepal has for the past 10 years been undergoing a massive governance transition from central to federal administration and
political representation. The specifics of the transition have driven much protest with different groups railing against certain points in legislation. At the same time a ‘wait and see’ approach adopted among many of the respondents likely represents lower relative deprivation as relates to governance perceptions, thus explaining fewer instances of protest than could be expected if there had been more time passed between the finalisation of the federalism protest with voting completed in December 2017, and the interviews taking place in March/April 2018. The heightening of expectations due to the federal transition could very well in the future turn into relative deprivation if expected need satisfaction is identified as a failure of the government worthy of protest.

These findings provide substantial support for the theory that quality of governance matters. First, there is the political opportunity created when civilians turn away from formal government structures and towards other identity groups. Second, there is a strong incentive for elites from potential alternative groups to utilise protest as a means to undermine the present government.

The research findings also provide some possible policy implications. The regularly repeated recommendation that state legitimacy is more important than state-strengthening or economic development (Krampe 2016, Hegre and Nygård 2015, Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch 2014) is evident from this study. Future governance reforms in Nepal should continue to ensure gains for inclusion and representation agendas so as to further support the formal institutions of the State over alternate, informal pathways associated with Nepal’s various identity groups. This study is by no means designed to support a particular political viewpoint, nor is it conclusive in any sort of policy recommendation for Nepal specifically. Generally, it is recommended that further replications of this study in Nepal including with time-series data for governance perceptions would provide useful observations. Similar sub-national studies in other countries could be completed to further examine each of the seven components of governance.


ANNEX A: 2013 SURVEY RESPONSES USED

Bureaucratic quality

Combined A and B (V.23)

V. 23  I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much trust you have in them. (in case of trust, probe further whether a great deal of trust or some trust and for not trust also probe further not very much trust, or none at all)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>No trust</th>
<th>DK/ CNS</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great deal</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>None at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A President</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Courts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Civil service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Political Parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>G Mass Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Election Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Combined A and B (V40)

V.40  Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? Or have you never tried to get these services from government? (probe further easy or very easy and difficult or very difficult)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Easy</th>
<th>Difficult</th>
<th>Never tried</th>
<th>DK/ CNS</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very easy</td>
<td>Easy</td>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>Very difficult</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a An identity document (such as citizenship card, passport)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b Admission in a Govt. school for children</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c Medical treatment at a nearby government clinic/Hospital</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d Help from police when you need it</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rule of law

Combined A and B (V.23)

V. 23  I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much trust you have in them. (in case of trust, probe further whether a great deal of trust or some trust and for not trust also probe further not very much trust, or none at all)
Corruption

Combined A and B (V. 38)

V. 38 Have you or anyone you know personally witnessed an act of corruption and/or bribe-taking by a politician or government official in the past year?

Economic policies

Combined A and B (V. 15,16,17)

V.15 How do you rate economic condition of our country today? *(in case of good or bad, probe further whether very good or very bad)*
8. D.K./CNS  9. NR

V.16 How would you describe changes in the economic conditions of our country over the last few years? *(probe further whether very good or very bad)*
8. D.K./CNS  9. NR

V.17 What do you think the state of country's economic condition a few years from now?
8. D.K./CNS  9. NR

Military in politics

Combined A and B (V.23)

V. 23 I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much trust you have in them. *(in case of trust, probe further whether a great deal of trust or some trust and for not trust also probe further not very much trust, or none at all)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>No trust</th>
<th>DK/CNS</th>
<th>NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great deal</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>None at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Mass Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Election Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Combined A and B (V.37)

V.37 There are many ways to govern a country. Would you approve or disapprove of the following alternatives? (probe further strongly or somewhat approve or disapprove)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly approve</td>
<td>Somewhat approve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>The army should come in, to govern the country.</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>All major decisions about the country should be taken by religious leaders rather than politicians.</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>The country should be governed by those chosen by the people in a fair election.</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political exclusion and repression

Combined A and B (V.52)

V.52 In your opinion has the condition of Excluded group improved, deteriorated or remained the same during the last few years?

1. Improved 2. Deteriorated 3. Remained same
8. DK/CNS 9. NR

Formal institutions

Combined A and B (V.5)
Combined A and B (V.19)

V.19 On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Nepal. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied? (Probe further very satisfied/ fairly satisfied or not very satisfied/ not at all satisfied)


Combined A and B (V.36)

V.36 Do you think your vote has effect on how things are run in our country or do you think your vote makes no difference?

1. Has effect 2. Makes no difference 8. CNU 8.NR

Combined A and B (V.23)

V. 23 I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much trust you have in them. (in case of trust, probe further whether a great deal of trust or some trust and for not trust also probe further not very much trust, or none at all)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>No trust</th>
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<th>NR</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Great deal</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>None at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 8 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 8 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Civil service</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 8 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 8 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 8 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Mass Media</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 8 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Election Commission</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX B: NEPAL MONITOR EVENT FORMS AND FREQUENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event form - primary</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Arrest (politically significant)</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Banishment/shunning</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Curfew/prohibitory order issues by the state</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Demonstration</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Extortion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Gherau/Dharna (sit-in)/padlocking</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Other forms of nonviolent political protest</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Program Interference/Obstruction</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Public humiliation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Raid/sweeping</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Road block</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Strike/Bandh</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent - Threat/intimidation</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Abduction</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Arson</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Assault (large group)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Assault (small group)</td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Fight</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Group Clash</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Infanticide</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Murder/attempted Murder</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Other violent form</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Remote violence</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Robbery</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Sexual Assault</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Symbolic violence</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Torture</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Unclear</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Vandalism</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Violence against civilians</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Violence during arrest/detention</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent - Violent demonstration</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C: TOPIC GUIDE

OBJECTIVES

- To explore quality of governance perceptions in Nepal, and how these contribute to protest/protest behaviour.
- To determine utility of governance reforms in mitigating conflict.
- To identify the process through which governance reforms are linked to changes in protest/protest behaviour.
- To identify variables that limit/enhance governance reform effectiveness.

INTRODUCTION

- Introduce study; informed consent; timing
- Summary of topics
  - seven components of quality of governance and how these factor in Nepal
  - How these factors (individually or combined) result in perceptions of unfair treatment
  - To what extent perceptions of QoG have caused protest in Nepal – any alternative explanations, possibility that the perceptions of QoG have been caused by protest

1. CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION

- Ethnicity/caste/identity
- Occupation (current and former if different in the past five years)
- Relationship with the GoN

Definitions: Several terms I use in this interview are fairly subjective. I would like to understand what you feel is the Government’s responsibility in terms of the following aspects of governance:

- Bureaucratic quality
- Rule of Law
- Corruption
- Economic policies
- Military in politics
- Political exclusion and repression
- Legitimate democracy
2. GOOD GOVERNANCE → REDUCED RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
   - Main aspects of governance defined at beginning – how have these improved/worsened, particularly since 2013 (including the second Constituent Assembly)?
     • Bureaucratic quality
     • Rule of Law
     • Corruption
     • Economic policies
     • Military in politics
     • Political exclusion and repression
     • Legitimate democracy
   - How has this/not decreased unfairness?
   - Has government been able to address concerns of unfairness in any way?

3. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION → COLLECTIVE GRIEVANCES
   - History of collective identity formation in Nepal
   - Nature of intergroup comparison in Nepal
   - How have identity groups portrayed injustice they have suffered?
   - How have these injustices been framed against the government?

4. GRIEVANCES → PROTEST
   - What have been the rallying points for protest?
   - What have been the key claims and demands made in protests?

5. TESTING PROTEST TYPE
   This section deals with the bargaining phases of protest movements
   - Think about how protests evolve and escalate/deescalate in Nepal.
   - What moves protest from small to large, nonviolent to violent?
   - What moves protest in the other direction?

6. ANTICIPATED DIRECTION OF PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN NEPAL
Use this section to gauge causal mechanisms, look to the future, summarise.
   - How do you see the protest movements evolving in the next few years?
   - Summary question on main points brought out. Anything else I should know.

ENDING
This section to thank again, remind of contact details for follow up, confirm details for re-contacting if required to confirm quotations, finalisation of project and any other.

EXAMPLE FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS
Group protests can be shaped by individuals – who, what, when, where, why.
Government can be supported by non-employees – probe dynamics outside of the capital within village/region.
## ANNEX D: INTERVIEW LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SN</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ajay Das</td>
<td>Development professional</td>
<td>OBC Madhesi/male</td>
<td>20-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Friso Hecker</td>
<td>Development professional</td>
<td>Expat resident male</td>
<td>20-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>J.B. Biswokarma</td>
<td>Researcher and writer</td>
<td>Dalit male</td>
<td>21-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anonymous 1</td>
<td>Development professional</td>
<td>Indigenous heritage/female</td>
<td>21-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Hiramani Ghimire</td>
<td>Development professional</td>
<td>Brahmin male</td>
<td>22-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<td>Tula Narayan Shah</td>
<td>Development professional</td>
<td>Madhesi male</td>
<td>22-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Vijay Karna</td>
<td>Development professional</td>
<td>Madhesi male</td>
<td>22-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Prakash Bhattarai</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Kathmandu based male</td>
<td>23-Mar-18</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ashim Pandey</td>
<td>Peace building</td>
<td>Bahun Chhetri Male</td>
<td>24-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Anubhav Ajeet</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
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<td>24-Mar-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>GP Lath</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>Marawi male</td>
<td>26-Mar-18</td>
<td>Birgunj</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Chandra Kishore</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td>27-Mar-18</td>
<td>Birgunj</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pankaj Das</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Madhesi male</td>
<td>27-Mar-18</td>
<td>Birgunj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Punam Chaudhary</td>
<td>Activist (former local candidate)</td>
<td>Madhesi female</td>
<td>28-Mar-18</td>
<td>Janakpur</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Dipendra Singh</td>
<td>Government employee</td>
<td>Male posted to Janakpur</td>
<td>28-Mar-18</td>
<td>Janakpur</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Surendra Labh</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>Madhesi male</td>
<td>28-Mar-18</td>
<td>Janakpur</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Manika Jha</td>
<td>Reporter</td>
<td>Madhesi female</td>
<td>28-Mar-18</td>
<td>Janakpur</td>
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<td>Rita Sah</td>
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<td>Madhesi female</td>
<td>30-Mar-18</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Newari male</td>
<td>2-Apr-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Shalini Tripathi</td>
<td>Development professional</td>
<td>Female Indian-born Nepali</td>
<td>3-Apr-18</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Trilochan Pokharel</td>
<td>Government employee</td>
<td>Bahun Chhetri Male</td>
<td>4-Apr-18</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX E: CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPATION

Study Title: Quality of Governance Peace

Principal Investigator: Richard Bell

I am a student at Uppsala University, in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research. I am planning to conduct a research study for my Master’s Thesis, which I invite you to take part in.

You are being asked to participate in a research study about governance and protest in Nepal. The purpose of the study is to gain a better understanding of why some ethnic groups have engaged in violent confrontations with the state, whereas others have not.

You will be asked to speak from your perspective on the subject of identity-based grievances, the reasons behind protest against the State and/or State response, as well as any insights you might have on how governance reforms by the Government of Nepal have affected protest.

I would like to audio-record this interview to make sure that I remember accurately all the information you provide. I will keep these recordings on my computer under randomly assigned names and they will only be used by me. If you prefer not to be audio-recorded, I will take notes instead.

If I want to quote you, I will get in touch with you specifically to ensure the quote I wish to use is accurate and to get your consent to use this quote.

What are the possible risks or discomforts?  
There are no foreseen risks to participation in this interview, however you will be asked to share your personal views on protests in Nepal. Please tell me at any time if you wish to take a break or stop the interview. If you are uncomfortable with some of the questions and topics I will ask about you are free to not answer or to skip to the next question.

I have taken all reasonable precautions to minimise the chance that confidentiality of the information we collect from you could be breached.

What are the possible benefits?  
Taking part in this research study may not benefit you personally, but we may learn new things that will help others through contributions to academic research in the field of peace and conflict studies.

Participation in this study will involve no cost to you. You will not be paid for participating in this study.

How will you protect the information you collect about me, and how will that information be shared?  
Results of this study may be used in publications and presentations. Your study data will be handled as confidentially as possible and anything you say will be attributed to an anonymous source.

Storage of these recordings is anonymised and restricted to my personal computer and back-up storage, which are password protected and kept securely with me at all times. I may share the data I collect with my thesis advisor for the purposes of verifying my field work. Your personal details will remain anonymised.
What are my rights as a research participant?
Participation in this study is voluntary. You do not have to answer any question you do not want to answer. If at any time and for any reason, you would prefer not to participate in this study, please feel free not to. If at any time you would like to stop participating, please tell me. We can take a break or stop altogether. You may withdraw from this study at any time.
If you decide to withdraw from this study, I will ask you if the information already collected from you can be used.

Who can I contact if I have questions or concerns about this research study?
If you have questions, you are free to ask them now. If you have questions later, you may contact me at richardkbell3@gmail.com; or on +46 76 578 76 98

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, you can contact my Thesis Adviser, Professor Isak Svensson at the following office at Uppsala University:

Department of Peace and Conflict Research
Uppsala University
Gamla Torget 3, 1tr
753 20 Uppsala
Phone: +46 18-471 57 40
Email: isak.svensson@pcr.uu.se