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Abstract

The Swedish state has participated as an elected member of the United Nations Security Council three times and is entering their fourth. The UNSC is an old institution that is not equal to what powers the states within it has. The permanent states, the victors from the second world war, have a more prominent role in the council and do not have to be elected every two years as the other states that want to be a part of the council. The cost of for small states like Sweden to be a part of the council can be quite large, but in financial means and as a time-consuming task for the foreign department. Therefore, it is essential to know if the time spent in the council for a state like Sweden amounts to something in the sense of influence over the outcome. This bears the question if Sweden has used and is using its membership in the UNSC in an effective manner. By looking at the official documentation by the foreign department and interviewing former diplomats about Sweden’s role in the UNSC during these periods this thesis analyses the way that Sweden has acted before. Furthermore, the thesis also looks at the first five weeks in the current period of 2017. The results are analyzed through a theoretical framework of what should be methods to achieve influence in the UNSC. As the analysis shows, Sweden has moved from being a more passive participant to a more active and proactive part of the UNSC. This, however, can come at the cost of changing other states view of the Swedish state in international relations.

Keywords: Public diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, United Nations security council, Sweden, effectiveness.

Word count: 19999
1. Introduction
The United Nations, UN for short. A beacon of hope for some, slow and useless institutions for others. However, one’s view about the UN there is some evidence that it might not be all that bad considering it is one of the oldest international institutions that we have today. Since its founding in 1945, there have been ups and downs in its popularity but has over the years prevailed as the forum for states to communicate with each other and to deliver statements to the rest of the world. With its age and high membership of around 193 states in the world according to the United Nation (2017a), it can be said that it brings respect to its institution that no other international institution can exhibit. One might call the UN the pinnacle of high-table diplomacy.

As of its founding in 1945 the primary goal of the UN has been to ensure and keep the peace and security of all the people in the world. This means that the UN is against wars in theory and want to end war and suffering indefinitely. Although there is no demand for a state to remain passive if violence is exercised over them by another state. On the contrary, the UN deems it justified to defend against violence with violence. This is nevertheless not always that clear-cut. To handle questions regarding peace and security in the world the UN has the particular organ within the UN called the security council. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the primary executive organ that handles peace and security.

When a complaint about regarding a breach of the peace comes to the UNSCs attention, the first action is to broker peace by peaceful means. However, when peaceful solutions and threats of sanctions are fruitless, the UNSC can legitimize force as a means to achieve peace and stability in the conflict.

Since the UNSC has the power to decide on when it is internationally legitimate to use force and when something will be considered an aggression against another state it makes a seat at the table highly attractive. The power that the UNSC has a mandate over is considerably one of the most potent organizational mandates in the international community. It is also one of the oldest institutions in the world which comes with a certain amount of respect to it. In the current way that the UNSC is organized, there are five permanent and ten rotating members, which is voted in from the UN general assembly. This gives all states that want to serve two years on the UNSC the opportunity to do so. This makes a seat highly sought after, but competition is intense, and it is not all that easy to win the favor of enough states to win the election to the UNSC.
Sweden has succeeded in this task of getting a place in the UNSC four times. The most recent period Sweden was chosen to serve was from 2017 to 2018. However, do Sweden got what it takes to put on such a task?

The question that arises when considering the different states in the UNSC is the power and recourse dimensions between them. The permanent members are usually more resourceful and generally powerful than the smaller elected states. There is also an information gap between permanent and non-permanent members since states usually don’t get elected more than once every ten years or so. How should states handle such an “unfairness”?\n
Smaller states usually have a smaller budget. The foreign department of a small state might not have the capacity to fully engulf itself in the dealing of the UNSC and all other organs of the UN the will deemed its attention.

This also poses the question if the UNSC is the “best” organization to put in the most effort to? There are more international organizations then there has ever been before. The UN is still the biggest, oldest and most respective, but is it the most effective? The smaller state might find it easier to exercise diplomacy in other forums that are more informal, and does not require the attendance and permanent residency as the UNSC. Global G7 or G20 forums are looser in its organization and meetings like the world economic forum, and other convention style forums might be a more suitable arena to exercise diplomacy in for smaller states. To costs might be less demanding and the agenda is slightly fixed depending on a different kind of event. Therefore, smaller states can pick and choose what forums to spend resources to get influence and get their voice heard.

Since Sweden has a history, and desire to, of taking place in the UNSC several times there must be a positive outcome for the Swedish state to continue this pursuit of the non-permanent seat. If a state cannot achieve a change or implement their view and agenda to an organization, the resources spent to get there might be better off spent on other endeavors.
Purpose and Research questions
The purpose of this thesis is to look at the use of the elected membership in the UNSC for small states, with Sweden as an example, in the United Nations Security Council. Is there any possibility for the smaller state to have a say in the matter or are the agenda controlled by the P5? The whole point of having elected members in the UNSC is to give the UN more legitimacy internationally, but regarding the size and power of the permanent members in comparison to most of the elected members, the potential to impact the work in the UNSC might be limited.

The question that I am going to try to answer to be able to fulfill the purpose of this thesis is the following.

➢ Has Sweden used its repeated membership in the UNSC in an effective manner?

Why this question? It relates to what Sweden has done in the UNSC and why one would want to be a part of it multiple times. The research question also handles the dimension of time and opens for us to see the change in effectiveness over the different time periods. Within international relations, the reputation or previous actions could have an impact on how other states choose to see you. Knowing what Sweden has done before will, therefore, give a bordered picture on what states might expect but also how the actions we take now effect the reputation that Sweden has built up over the years and previous times spent in the UNSC.
Disposition
The next chapter is the methods chapter in the thesis and will go through the kind of methodical thinking used in creating the thesis and what methods were used in producing the empirical material. Here I will also talk about the scientific rigor of the thesis and alternative methods that could have given a different result. The next chapter will give a brief layout of the theoretical background for this thesis. It will begin by discussing the power in international relations regarding soft power and how it relates to diplomacy and public diplomacy. The second part will go through the UNSC, how it works and methods of influence that can be used in the UNSC. I will finish the chapter with an overview of the theoretical framework that will be used in the thesis and how the analysis will be structured. Chapter four is an analysis of the previous terms that Sweden has served in the UNSC. Every term is presented through the work conducted in the UNSC according to documentation. Chapter five analyses the current term that Sweden is now serving the UNSC. Here the campaign process for the winning the election in the UN to a seat in the UNSC will be presented alongside the goal and official statements that the Swedish government made in this process regarding the prospects of a Swedish seat in the UNSC. In the sixth chapter, the implication of the results and what it could mean will be discussed. The results will also be provided in a single summary of all the terms Sweden has been in the UNSC. The last chapter is the conclusion of the findings. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief discussion on further research that could be interesting to the context of this thesis.
2. **Method and material**
Here it will be described the methodological approach and the methodology used in gathering empirical data and information.

**Approach**
The methodological approach I will use in this thesis is what I would consider problem driven, more than method driven. This means as Smith (2004) explains, that the choice of method to answer the question is based on what would be the best alternative to deliver an answer to the problem. The problem that this thesis is looking at, effectiveness in the UNSC, will be hard to quantify and make readable in a chart or figure. This is something that Weeden (2004) then would suggest a thicker description is needed to be able to understand, purely descriptive would be in this case be sufficient.

This study could be said to be what Bryman (2016) would call a case study. There are in theory many cases to choose from regarding non-permanent members in the UNSC. I have chosen Sweden due to its perceived history as a pro-UN actor that includes, among other things, the history of having an appreciated general secretary, Dag Hammarskjold, in the UN. One deciding factor was also the possibilities of getting a hold of information. The Swedish state has a tradition of transparency when it comes to official documentation, and it is not hard to get hold of it as a private citizen, this may not be the case with other states that would be allegedly for this thesis. The case in question is there for the Swedish state.

The case will be looked at in two different ways. As Pierson (2004) describes it the notion of time in research is essential, and you should know what timeframe you want to study. The temporal aspect of Sweden’s actions in the UNSC is of the long-time horizon of cause and outcome. The history Sweden has in the UNSC and UN will have cumulative causes that will impact the possibilities of actions today. Only by understanding the previous action can we get a sense of why things are happening today and what actions are taken now can have for implications later.

**Material**
The main material used for this thesis will be based on what we know from our previous terms in the UNSC. After each term that Sweden has served in the UNSC, the department of foreign affairs in Sweden produces a book which accounts for the statements and action takes in the UNSC. According to Utrikesdepartementet (1970) Sweden released, before entering the UNSC for the first time, a yearly review of the operations within the UN general assembly that Sweden was conduction.
These reviews are not a scientific document and are not to be seen as an evaluation of our term as a non-permanent member in the UNSC but rather an overarching description of issues and matters that were of great concern for the time. By looking at the reviews, we can see what the Swedish delegation prioritized at the time and how the delegation thought and handled specific international issues. It is important to note that there might be a slight bias in these reviews since it is written by those who worked with the questions where the authors might want to shift focus away for instances where their colleagues might be questioned for their actions.

I will use these reviews to look how Sweden was conducting themselves more in a work-method and procedural way then what Sweden thought of specific issues. This is to understand how Sweden has worked within the UNSC and to set this in contrast to how one should work in the UNSC to be effective. Therefore, statements made and thoughts about how we acted in certain situations will be limited to the specific instance and not an analysis of the issue in which these statements were made. We want to generalize over Sweden’s actions as a whole in the UNSC and not Sweden’s actions on specific issues.

**Elite interviews**

To complement the written material that will be analyzed another source of material will be interviews. The interview subjects that I have chosen to the base of my empirical data are people that have had a close relation to Sweden’s work in the UN. These are people that are either still an essential part of the ongoing processes in the Swedish delegation that works with UN questions or people that have been. Not all have been an essential part of the work that Sweden does in the UNSC but considering that the opportunity to serve in the UNSC only have been given to Sweden once every twenty years or, so this is a non-issue. The goal of the empirical data collected from people that have work for, or close to, Sweden is to give an insider view of and perspective that will help analyze and understand the mechanisms that play a part in the UNSC work that Sweden does.

The simplest way to get an answer to a question may seem to ask it straight out, and in some circumstances, this may be the most effective way. When one is conducting an inquiry into the broader population, for Aberbach and Rockman (2002), close-ended questions asked straight out is probably be the best option. When, however, you seek more complex information, a prodding approach might help you fill in missing information to make sense of a puzzle; open-ended questions are to be recommended. The critical difference here is that open-ended questions force the researcher to interpret the answer and codify what is said.
The style of questions that were used in this thesis was, as Leech (2002) describes them, *Grand tour questions*. A question like this focuses a lot on the view of the subject of itself as an interactor with that is being asked about. An example of a question used in the interview that could be asked is “*What is your relation to the UN and UNSC?*” or “*How did you work during Sweden’s term in the UNSC?*”. These questions could, in turn, lead to other questions depending on what they answered, and since it would be hard to predict what they would answer, prepared follow-up questions had to be quite general. To avoid the risk of *contamination* in the answers, that Aberbach and Rockman (2002) encourages, the respondents were given a vague description of what the interview material was going to be used for. There was no foul play or lying involved, but when describing what the interview was about, they were given an ambiguous answer of “Sweden’s role in the UN and the UNSC.”

**Interview subjects**

Each interview subject was chosen in consideration to what period they were active in questions regarding the UN and the UNSC in particular. Due to both time constraints and the complexity to get a hold of persons that are willing to be interviewed by a student writing a masters thesis the choice of interview subjects did change somewhat during the writing of this thesis. There were, for example, hard to get a hold of people that worked within the foreign department. However, the subjects that constitute my empirical material will suffice to answer my research question. This is due to the closeness and involvement that their people have had in their career with the UNSC.

*Hans Blix*

During the term of 1957-58 Hans Blix did his doctoral studies at Cambridge Universitet and earned this PhD in philosophy 1958. The following years he began working as an advisor in international law for the Swedish foreign department. Blix would later become an integral part in the UN organization as a delegate in from the UN organ of disarmament IAEA.

*Lena Hjelm Wallen*

When the second time came for Sweden to take place in the UNCE in 1975-76 Lena Hjelm Wallen were the Swedish foreign minister. She was an essential part of the planning of the campaign and the work that Sweden focused on during this term.

*Hans Dahlgren*
When Sweden took the seat at the UNSC in 1997-98 Hans Dahlgren lead the Swedish delegation to the UNSC as the ambassador for Sweden’s UN mission. Dahlgren got to represent Sweden at the council and did act as president over the council the times that Sweden had the presidency.

*Carl Skau*

During the most current term 2017-18 Carl Skau were responsible for and lead the campaign to gain the seat in the UNSC which began in 2016. Skau is also an advisor to Olof Skoog which is the current ambassador for Sweden mission to the UN.

**Ethical considerations**

When interviewing subject, you must according to Kvale and Brinkmann (2014) consider the power relationship between you as a researcher and the one answering the questions. In this case, the diplomats that were interviewed could be said to be the stronger part of the power relation. As a researcher, it is important not to be too much straight forth and to handle specific question with delicacy. The subjects are doing this in their spare time and don’t get any compensation for partaking. This means that they can decide at any moment to abstain from taking part in the study, which is an outcome that should be avoided.

There is also as Halperin and Health (2017) mentions a risk of these kinds of subjects to be reluctant to give or want to hide information. Usually, it is not a secret that they are reluctant to talk about bit it might be seen from these people that the researcher does not need this information, or that they do not feel like anyone outside the department has anything to do with this. There is also the risk of giving away information that will lead to criticism, which the subject may want to avoid.

To make sure that both interviewer and respondent have the same picture of what has been said during the interview Woliver (2002) suggests that the transcript from the interview should be sent to the respondent to approve, or to make any necessary changes. Since the people that allowed themselves to be interviewed are in an occupation where it could be potentially damaging for them to say anything inappropriate all citations made from the interviews have been shown and accepted from the respondents. The interviews that were made were quite long so sending a full transcript that, Woliver suggests, would not be necessary since they would not be used in their entirety.
Translating in the thesis
Some of the empirical material and official statements from the government is in Swedish. Since this thesis is written in English, and for English speakers, there is a problem with writing citations in Swedish. It would only benefit the reader that can comprehend Swedish. Therefore, statements and citations are translated into English for the comfort of the reader.

To avoid any misrepresenting the original text citations taken from sources that is not available online are to be found in the appendix to ensure transparency.

Alternative sources and methods
All the empirical data collected as material for this thesis has one common denominator that might impact the results. Since all sources come from Sweden and see Sweden in a similar light, and in a favorable light, sources that do not steam from Sweden could yield a different result. It could give a different picture if the sources had a more diverse perspective.

For practical reasons finding key-people that have enough insight to give a reliable answer that is not from Sweden is not possible. How to get a hold of the right people is always a hard question to answer and when you have a notion on whom to interview how do you get in touch with them and convince them to partake in a study. The most realistic alternative would be to interview ambassadorial personnel and diplomats from other countries that presides in Sweden. Although, one could question their sincerity in the answers. That is because diplomats stationed in Sweden has no interest in criticizing or being anything but favorable to the state that they are continually trying to improve the diplomatic relations too.

A more descriptive and positivist choice of method would perhaps be to quantify different interactions within UNSC. Counting times proposed resolutions passed, the number of statements made in the UNSC or some other sort of measurable aspect that is available. I find it hard to see that the answer those methods would alone provide would have any effect on my research question. Although it might be interesting in other aspects which this thesis does not deal with.

Scientific rigor
The results of this material should be able to stand the test of time and correlate with the findings of another researcher that want to survey the same subject. For this, the finding and presentation should have high validity, reliability. The validity that ensures that the way in which we are looking at the right place for and using the right instruments for measuring according to Bryman (2016), would be considered high. The material used is first-hand
sources regarding the Swedish actions and history within the UNSC. Therefore, we know that this is what happened and that the people interviewed are familiar with in the situation on a first-hand basis. For the reliability that Denscombe (2014) would describe as if we would get the same results again with the same research design, it is high considering the documentation. However, there is always a problem when it comes to interviews that are highly dependent on what people the research includes. The answers that were given in the interviews might not be expressed in the same way a second time, which could affect the outcome and slightly change the results if replicated. However, the truth can only be told in so many ways, and if there is no foul play from the interviewees, it should not be a problem for the scientific rigor of the research.

The design and framework are transferable to other cases and is not specific to just the Swedish state. However, the material is dependent on the case of Sweden with its transparency of information.
3. Theoretical framework
Looking at previous actions that Sweden has taken during terms within the UNSC it is vital to know what possibilities you first have before engaging in this institution. Therefore, we need to get a bigger picture of how the workings of the UNSC functions and how states operate within and with each other as a part of the UNSC.

Soft power and public diplomacy
Considering that the five of the world’s most powerful states preside in the UNSC as permanent members, one can ask whether it matters for smaller states to join. Power in the international society is unequal, and it would be hard for a state such as Luxembourg to beat China in any power dynamic. Power behaves in different ways and comes from different means that provides this said power. For authors like Nye (2004) power can be divided into hard and soft power. Depending on what the resource is that the power precedes from it makes the wielder of that power use it in different ways. Looking at the table that Nye provides we can we that he places power within institutions as the main resource for agenda setting.

The sort of power that is in question here is then the sort of power that Nye (2004) puts on the soft power spectrum. Therefore, when we are talking about power within the UNSC, we are referring to soft power and the in part the power to set the agenda in international relations. Although the institution of the UN has the hard power capacity of enforcing sanctions on other states, the power that individual states use within the UN could be considered soft power. To explain what soft power is Nye (2008) attributes all power that is persuasive without the threat of military use or the risk of economic sanctions. That is to say, a power that is effective without considering the military or economic power of the state in question. Of course, there are exceptions and critics such as Ferguson (2003) and Ford (2012) thinks a distinction between soft and hard power is unnecessary since, in their view, you need hard
power resources, such as military and money, to create soft power. In a sense, for them, soft power is hard power but with another face.

Soft power as Nye (2011) describes it is hard to come by and is intimately connected to the credibility of a state. If a state, Nye says, is seen as more of a manipulator then an informer or the information they provide is seen as propaganda, the credibility that provides them with the soft power is destroyed.

However, within the rules and regulations of the UNSC, the table may not have shifted in Luxembourg’s favor, but the playing field has been somewhat leveled.

The reason that can be attributed to the hunt for a seat in the UNSC for many states can be the changing nature of diplomacy itself. When looking at diplomacy Melissen (2013) explains the development of diplomacy must move from practice for a selected few to more public diplomacy which involves more actors and is, as the name suggests, a practice that is done publicly. Old diplomacy, referring to diplomacy between professional diplomats and small group talks for a restricted few is still an important, and occurring practice. However, since this practice is just dedicated to the few, it can be hard for smaller or middle powers to gain access to these kinds of negotiations and talks. This is one reason that some states prefer to use public diplomacy as their main way of diplomatic communications and diplomatic tool. Therefore, the use of and search for strong public diplomacy is in most states interest to acquire, since it gives them an equal ability to participate. Gilboa (2009) suggests that middle and small power can use these sorts of institutions for public diplomacy which would give them far better reach in world affairs that would stretch beyond their natural capabilities.

**Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy**

Public diplomacy is conducted simultaneously by states from the forum of the UNSC but also as independent states without the framework of the UNSC or the UN. Therefore, one needs to distinguish between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Bilateral diplomacy is according to Rozental and Buenrostro (2013) the traditional way that one thinks of diplomacy as a practice that is exercised face to face by diplomats representing states. This put a greater emphasis on the diplomats at hand to have a good connection and a well-established network in the diplomatic arena. Bilateral diplomacy is conducted between two states, and the measure of if the diplomacy is successful or not is to look at things like agreements signed or the number of conflicts avoided or resolved. In practice, the bilateral diplomacy takes place in embassies and
by envoy diplomats. The bilateral diplomacy is then conducted by the stationed diplomats usually towards other diplomats from the host country or other foreign ministry personnel.

Multilateral in contrast to bilateral diplomacy is diplomacy conducted in a multi-state setting. In the simplest sense, multilateral diplomacy is all diplomacy that is conducted with three or more states at the same time. However, for a more defined explanation Mahbubani (2013) explains that one key principle in multilateral diplomacy is the construction of international organizations which interests are international order and to provide certain global goods that could not otherwise be gained. Mahbubani remarks that in theory these organizations would not be used by major powers to their own ends but in practice, this is not always so. Borrowing from Pouliot (2016) this thesis will define multilateral diplomacy as a *practice of global governance*.

Multilateral diplomacy is depended on the organization that the diplomacy is conducted within. If the actors within (states) are not interested in the work conducted in the organization, it will not be able to work effectively. Therefore, it is essential that all actors strive for inclusion and cooperation with all states in the organization. Mahbubani (2013) exemplifies this in a case where the UNGA had both denounced the actions of the US and USSR, which lead to the two superpowers losing interest in UNGA. This made the public lose interest in the UNGA which severely hampered the influence the institution had.

The UN is a forum for multilateral diplomacy, and if we take Mahbubani’s words into account, the UNSC can be seen as a way for powerful states to use their power to their own ends in the organization, especially regarding the permanent five states.

According to Tyler and Pahlow (2014) being at the table of the UNSC might not grant you more power in a sense that you can change the outcome of a decision, but what it might do is to grant you the recognition as a great power in some circumstances. This means that when states are analyzing how the international society will react to what they say and do, states that are elected to the UNSC will have to be considered to a higher degree then states that are not. Why is this? It can, as Tyler and Pahlow (2014) explain, be a part of the proximity that these states will have to the “real” great powers of the world. Proximity that might allow the weak state to persuade a more powerful state to act in a way that could be to another’s loss.

The UNSC is, with this in mind, not a useless institution for the less powerful and smaller state. However, instead could be an excellent tool for influence. Smaller states in the UNSC would not only get a chance to voice its own opinions in forums with other important states,
but they would also have an easier time getting its message across if other states outside the
council would change its relations to the state in question because of the seat on the UNSC.

**How the UNSC works**
Chapter five of the United Nations charter, article 24 states that

“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” – United Nations, 2017

The UNSC can be said to be the affirmative or executive committee to which all questions of international peace and security will be decided upon and handled by. This focus on international peace and security is according to Daws and Silvers (2014) prevalent throughout the UN Charter and is mentioned thirty-two times in direct relation to the Security Council. International peace and security are a rather large field to cover, and the more complex the international society becomes, the harder it gets to solve or work with specific issues for the UNSC. To alleviate the council of this time-consuming job the UNSC have the ability according to article 29 of the UN charter to establish subsidiary organs to handle specific issues. Depending on what kind of issue the subsidiary body will handle different sort of bodies will be arranged to fit the issue at hand. It might be a committee in charge of overseeing how a conflict is developing, or a working group tasked with coming up with a solution to a specific problem.

There are five permanent members in the UNSC, and those are United States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and China. Apart from the power dimension that these states have in the permanent seat, which means they do not have to campaign to get elected to the council, they also have a veto vote. Walker (2015) explains in the most simple’s terms that the permanent membership to the UNSC was given as a reward for the victorious states in the second world war. Furthermore, the P5 is also the only states which are allowed to have nuclear weapons, although it is not heavily enforced due to the secrecy of some states which have allegedly acquired these weapons anyway.

There are fifteen member states in the UNSC which all have one vote. Five of the members, the P5, have veto power. This means that if one of the P5 members do not agree on a vote and votes against a proposal in the UNSC, it automatically falls. However, according to the Department of Public Information (2015), the veto is not exclusive to all matters of the UNSC. As the charter states, the veto does not apply to vote regarding procedural
matters. Furthermore, to make a vote pass, it is necessary for nine of the members to vote yes for a proposal to pass. A state which is a part of a conflict that is the subject of a vote shall, according to the UN Charter, abstain from voting. The ten states that are not part of the P5 are elected states that are chosen for a two-year term by the UN general assembly. Within the UNSC, the presidency of the council is rotating between all member one month at the time. This means that all the states that serve on the council will have the opportunity to lead it as the president, at least one time.

**Getting the seat**

While there are a number of reasons that a state might put up as arguments for getting elected to the UNSC, it is not all about rhetoric during the campaign that will influence the outcome, but instead, a large part has to do with earlier actions. Since there are some different groupings within the UNSC, as explained previously, the determinants that will affect your chances of getting one of the non-permanent seats in your states group are depended on the group you are in. A study by Dreher, Gould, Rablen, & Vreeland (2014) quantifies the probability in/decreases of a state getting one of the seats depending on a plethora of factors. For the WEOG group, the group Sweden is a part of, the factors that have the highest influence in the election is the turn-taking norm and the history of voting against both the US and Russia in the UN General assembly. So, we can in part the expect that states that from the WEOG group will put its self against both the US and Russia since that is in some part attributed to their seat, to begin with. In contrast to this, the seats in the Asia-group have a higher likelihood of getting elected according to (Dreher, Gould, Rablen, & Vreeland, 2014) if they vote with US or Russia in the UN General assembly.

After a state has declared that they will admit their candidacy to the UNSC, it is followed by a campaign to establish trust and ensure that the will win the vote. According to Byrne (2011), the timing of the campaign has been more important. It used to be that states could declare their candidacy days before the election and win, but no state usually declares well ahead of time to ensure that there is enough time to build support. A late campaign could impact the results, and since states like Switzerland declares their candidacy around ten years in advance, it requires other states to follow suit if they are going to have the same opportunity to cement their support and win the election.

The campaign is not the same as an ordinary political campaign. Byrne (2011) explains that there are no “glossy folders” or other material that is handed out to anyone in that sense. Instead, the vital function of the campaign is to utilize diplomats and other more known
people as envoys to other states. This is to convince and to enhance the network between the states to that the relations will become better, and in turn earn the vote in the election.

Within high politics and international relations, there will perhaps always be those who see specific forums and gatherings as an opportunity to look good, and for some diplomats to further their career by appearing there. This question is something that is frequently used as a counterargument when states initiate the process of petitioning their campaign to enter the UNSC. Australia is one of those states that have been questioned if they aim to work and make a change or just a hunt for recognition and prestige by individual political leaders. In an article by Hunter (2013) it is mentioned that the effort that Australia has put into the UNSC is below expectations and that the actions that have been taken more reflect the opinions and foreign policy of the United Stated then of Australia’s own.

There are more examples of this when looking at states like India, Germany, and Brazil that have each submitted petitions to become a permanent member of the UNSC. This, however, has been met with a somewhat cold response from the permanent five members of the council.

**Methods for gaining influence in the UNSC**

Within high politics, and especially in the UNSC there is a power variance among the participants. It would then be natural to assume that the P5 has slightly more power than the other non-permeant states. This is not just because of the perceived power in realist terms, that is to say, the state has more military and economic power, but also because of the institutional power that comes with the permanent seat. This power takes form as being a guarantee to always be part in UNSC negotiations, which might give their statements and cooperation a more lasting nature, but also the direct veto-power to block legislation that seems unpreferable. For states that have gained a non-permanent seat, there are according to Tyler & Pahlow (2014) five different methods that can be used to gain influence in the UNSC. These different methods are *Active Participation, Coalition-building, Strong and Creative Leadership Skills, Building the Confidence of Other Members* and *Involving States and Organisations with Real Interests.*

**Active participation**

Working within the UNSC will require more effort from the elected members than the permanent. This is because of the longstanding “monopoly” that the permanent members have on the agenda-setting in the UNSC. Therefore, according to Byrne (2011), demands that the elected members need to engage and draft proposals of their own if they are going to get
influence. One of the powers that elected members can use is the Provisional Rules of Procedure in which contains rules that allow all members of the council to bring any matter they wish to the attention of the UNSC (United Nations. Security Council, 1983). There are some exceptions in the rules though as matters of great importance will be prioritized.

For a state that does not have the experience in participating the UNSC are at a disadvantage to the other states that have a permanent seat or have served as an elected member more times than the rest. Engelbrekt (2016) explains that the permanent members have a corps that is their own and only work for them and no other state. Therefore, when a state is elected into the UNSC, they must rely on auxiliary staff to work with. This puts the elected member in a situation where they need to work with a staff that is not their own and thus might not be as effective as staff which is native to the state. Because of this, elected states usually try to bring in diplomats and other civil servants that have been in the UNSC before. This means that a state that has served more terms in the UNSC will have a more reliable choice of staff and expertise to work with. Prantl (2005) also mentions the problem of staff for elected members and that it is often hard for smaller non-permanent states to afford the resources that are required. If one is to have a good insight into all the world affairs and situations that might become an issue in the UNSC good personnel is a must.

As we can see one might say that the odds are stacked against the non-permanent states and especially the smaller states that get elected. Therefore, it is of great importance that a non-permanent state is to have any influence in the UNSC they need to work hard and be an active participant in all areas of interest of the UNSC, which is no easy task.

**Coalition building**

No one can be the sole ruler and make decisions on his or her own in the UNSC. To pass resolutions and statements you need the majority of the other states to agree with you, or at least not disagree with you. Thorhallsson (2012) explains that to gain influence and pass proposals you need to work with and find support for your ideas among the rest of the member states. This is especially important when it comes to proposals that can be viewed as going against the national interest of one of the P5 states. Therefore, it would be wise to take the P5s interest into account when drafting proposals with the intent to make them pass.

Important to note when thinking about coalitions building in the UNSC is according to Hurd (2007) the interest of the regional group that a state is elected from. Since some states are
competing for the same seat, it is becoming more important now than ever to listen the what the members of one’s regional group want. This means that coalitions may not only be used within the UNSC but is to be expected outside with members of the same regional group if one is to get elected once again. Furthermore, Hurd (2007) explains that coalitions within the UNSC are built on a sort of solidarity among its partners. This means that states that do not have a strong interest regarding an issue will still stand by its coalition partners due to the trust and stronger unit that they make together.

Coalitions can also be a sort of insurance to ensure that a state will be a part of discussions and decision-making talks. As Menon (2009) suggests that if smaller states work together in letting other in on the discussions surrounding an issue they are interested in, others will do the same. This can then lead to more involvement from the non-permanent members and in effect force the P5 to involve states in negotiations surrounding issues they would rather as few as possible was a part of.

Depending on what the goal of a state is and what other states are a part of the UNSC at the moment it might be wiser to stick to certain actors within the UNSC. There is nothing to guarantee that a state will have more influence by building coalitions with every state. There needs to be a certain level of reliability and credibility to gain influence despite cooperation.

Building coalitions can also have an impact on how a decision is perceived domestically for member states. In a study that Tago and Ikeda (2015) did show that if a resolution to authorize force is passed with all member states, it is more likely to be accepted as a legitimate decision within the member states domestic political discussions. In contrast to this, a resolution to authorize violence that is passed with a small or minimal majority has far less acceptance. This means that building strong coalitions in the UNSC may also be important for stats domestic politics.

_Strong and creative leadership skills_

For Tyler and Pahlow (2014) strong and creative leadership skills are essential if a small or middle power is going to gain any influence in the UNSC. Strong leadership can for Tyler and Pahlow (2014) mean that a state is willing to take a stand with one of the P5 members. Independence is seen as a strong leadership quality and not being under the thumb of a P5 member can increase the notion that other states view one as an independent and strong voice in the UNSC.
The creative part of leadership might be harder to pinpoint, but according to authors such as Thoralldsson (2012), it can depend on how a state utilizes the time spent as the chairman in the UNSC. The Chairmanship gives a member the power, to a certain extent, to decide over the agenda of the UNSC. Therefore, issues can either be taken off or on the agenda of the UNSC depending on the interest of the member who has the chairmanship.

Under the UNSC there are other subsidiary organs such as committees and advisory bodies. To chair one of these bodies means that you will be able to set the agenda for how the specific work within the body will be conducted, just as in the UNSC. If you get the opportunity to lead one of these groups as the president, it can be a platform for strengthening your role in the UNSC as a whole. This, of course, depends on if a state does a good job or not. Since there aren’t many regulations how these more or less temporary bodies shall constitute themselves, it leaves the individual state in charge of the body with much room for creativity. Some bodies are more adaptable for creative ideas than other. The Establishing of an international court or tribune may have less room for a less traditional work process than an advisory or a working group on children and armed conflict.

Nevertheless, the results made in these bodies connected to the UNSC will influence certain decisions. If a state is showing to be able to present interesting results to the other member of UN thought its work in a subsidiary body the state may gain more trust and increase confidence for the state in the international community.

Building the confidence of other members
Generally speaking, other states need to have confidence in any given state to elect it to the UNSC, to begin with. That said, there are some states which have earned more confidence from other states from the way they have acted before. Tyler and Pahlow (2014) explain that the key to building confidence is to be a reliable state, that is, a state that others can depend on, and a state that is credibility in what it says and does are sincere.

Cotton and Ravenhill (2012) suggests that to become a reliable state in international relations, you do not only need to be present at the meetings and an active part of the international community. You must also be well informed and interested in the current issues and other states. Knowledge is thus a big part of being able to participate in the issues that are present in the UNSC. For a smaller state, the recourses on hand can be few when compared to the larger states which can employ a vast assembly of diplomats and personnel to handle their
information gathering. Smaller states, on the other hand, need to prioritize and be smart in how they utilize their recourses in this process.

Does a state need to have the best and most informed diplomats regarding every issue? The answer is both yes and no depending on what a state’s goals are. If a state wants to build confidence with other states, there is a risk of not having all the information or being poorly prepared for certain issues. As Menon (2009) explains in a speech to the Academic Council on the United Nations System, you need to be perceived as knowledgeable. When a state is not seen as knowledgeable, they will run a risk of being left out from informal talks and discussions about issues which they could have a vested interest in.

Another risk for small states which Menon (2009) mentions is that they might not have the resources to appear at every meeting or discussion taking place regarding an issue. This means that some states, mostly P5 states, may find it unnecessary to invite smaller E10 states and work together with them since they might not be able to deliver and be as involved as they are expected to be. Therefore, sporadic attendance at meetings should be avoided if one is to build confidence. As a smaller state it will be impossible to be involved everywhere, and if one is to be seen as a reliable actor, there can be no doubt for other states regarding the attendance ability to take part on equal terms.

Involving states and organizations with real interests

The last method of influence that can be used in the UNSC is the opportunity to invite other interested parties to the UNSCs talk. According to rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure any member of the UN or others that have an interested in the topic which is being discussed can attend the meeting if invited (United Nations Security Council 1983). These invited might also suggest proposals to the UNSC but may not themselves vote on the matter.

This leaves a lot up to the individual members of the UNSC to involve other states or special interest groups to take part in an issue. Prantl (2005) explains that this can be used in informal groupings within the UNSC to pursue influence over the agenda. By inviting the right people to a meeting or an informal group, that particular guest might say what you could not. The impression can also be made that you as a state might become persuaded by the guest, even if you already had a clear sympathy for the matter at hand.

Regarding who gets access to the UNSC Basu (2016) mentions that there is a misrepresentation of women in the UNSC, which for Basu is a problem because of the lack of
a female perspective. To solve, or tackle this problem, states such as Sweden, Basu explains, have used this power to involve women’s rights groups and other organizations connected with women’s issues to get the UNSC more involved in those matters.

**Analytical framework**
To conclude the theoretical framework and to make a concrete matrix of how this thesis will frame the analysis we will look at how these methods can be interpreted as being used in action for each term in the UNSC.

### Methods of influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active participation</th>
<th>Take part for day one. Draft own proposals.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition building</td>
<td>Talk with other members in the UNSC. Other states outside the UNSC might want your help; outside support can be of use inside UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong and creative leadership skills</td>
<td>Chair subsidiary organs, and provide results where others have not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building the confidence of other members</td>
<td>Be informed and a reliable partner in important issues. Knowledge is key.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Involving states and organizations with real interests</td>
<td>Involve other actors in the UNSC that you sympathize with. If others can say what you want, let them.</td>
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Using our definition and the criteria put forward for the possibility of good multilateral diplomacy to take place the actions taken by Sweden need to be attributed to variables that can increase or decrease the effect of the multilateral diplomacy. I have here chosen four variables that should give positive and negative consequences to the effectiveness. Does are if Sweden’s actions are Unifying or polarizing and if Sweden is representing their own state interests or global interests.

### Multilateral effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unifying</th>
<th>Statement and actions that promote consensus</th>
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<tr>
<td>Polarizing</td>
<td>Statement and actions that are made in opposition to another state/states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global interests</td>
<td>Promoting the collective responsibility as the UN or regional actors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>State interests</td>
<td>Proclaiming the viewpoint of one’s own state towards certain issues.</td>
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Both of these frameworks will be used as the criteria to assess the effectiveness of the work done in the UNSC. The analysis will look at the level of degree that each of these variables and the methods of influence can be interpreted during the terms that Sweden has served in the UNSC. The measures used will be *low, some* and *high*. 
4. Sweden’s previous terms in the UNSC

1957-58
According to the recollections of Utrikesdepartementet (1970), the election to the UNSC for the 1957-58 seat pitted Sweden against Spain, which withdrew their candidacy after overwhelming support for Sweden in the UNGA. During this term, Sweden would preside as chairman in the UNSC for three months, February 1957, January 1958 and December 1958.

There are no explicit goals or agenda specified that Sweden was going to push for it during their term. Instead, the focuses were issues that were raised during this time in the UNSC and how Sweden reacted to them.

Law and order seemed to have been one way through which the Swedish delegation tried to profile themselves with. The delegation, as represented by Gunnar Jarring, made an effort to give an impression of a natural judge not trying to weight the scales of justice in anyone’s favor. This is apparent in the way that Jarring formulated his statements regarding the Kashmir question.

…It follows that, since the question has now been submitted to the Council, the Swedish Government does not consider itself bound by any means to deal with the matter in any specific way. In accordance with our apparent duty, we have studied the various aspects of the problem in order to get an idea of what solution should be sought and what procedure should be followed. – Jarring (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970, p.67)

Here the Swedish delegation makes clear that the Swedish government does not have any vested interest in the Kashmir conflict. Instead, we here get a declaration that Sweden will look at this problem in a neutral way and mention “duty” as a factor, a duty presumably to the UN and world as a whole, to give the fairest and just solution to the problem.

This neutral approach to the problem is something that the Swedish delegation pushed hard for and that the charter should be the guiding principle not only how the UNSC acted but also how member states should act. This apparent when looking at a statement made by Jarring regarding the US’s decision to send forces to stabilize the internal situation in Lebanon.

A prerequisite for the application of Article 51 is that an armed attack took place against a Member State. The Swedish Government does not consider that this condition exists in this case. Nor does my government consider that there is an international conflict under Article 51. Through the US action, the conditions for observers’ activities in Lebanon have changed significantly, and the question is whether they have actual opportunities to fulfill their tasks as provided for in Council Decision June 11th. – Jarring (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970, p.93-94)
Since Jarring then could not see any breach in the peace from either internal or external forces, Sweden’s opted for the UN to say out of the conflict. This is not to say that the Swedish delegation did not understand that there were issues in the state the need to be solved. However, the use of force from the UN was not the desired solution in regards to solving the situation and stabilizing the state.

Hans Blix (personal communication, October 29, 2017), former Swedish diplomat who was active in the UN during this time, explains that the intent of the charter is to categorically deny state the use of violence against each other, with the only exceptions being self-defense and when the UNSC passes a resolution to allow an intervention of violence. However, Blix proclaims, there will always be lawyers and jurist that will do their best to justify the actions of their state for intervention without the UNSC consent.

By having a great knowledge of, and understanding the importance to stick to the original intent of the UN-charter, we can see how the Swedish delegation at this time, and in times to come, felt the need to not give in to powerful states when they felt it would be a breach of the charter. The mindset in relation to, as Blix describes it, was that people will always try to justify their action, it is important not to allow them.

There are several instances where the Swedish delegation has asked for the UN to orchestrate investigations or observations. This is to ensure that information that the members of the UNSC bases their decision on will be in the greatest respect neutral and transparent.

As regards the current question, the Council is primarily asked whether the unrest in Lebanon is caused by internal contradictions or provoked by foreign power. – Jarring (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970, p.91).

As we can see in this statement by Jarring, there is a slight uncertainty risen whether the information provided by Lebanon is undoubtedly true. By launching a UN-investigation, everyone could rely on that the information given was to the best of the investigators capacity true.

Issues handled by the UNSC also regarded members in the UNSC, at this time the cold war was a rather complicating factor. Therefore, the UN could be used as a mediating factor between the United States and the Soviet Union and under neutral pretenses secure that no one was getting the “upper hand” over the other. One such instance where Sweden took the initiative and proclaimed their support for an artic inspection zone. This was to prevent from surprise attacks from either side of the Arctic between the United States or the Soviet Union.
The relations between the US and the Soviet Union was problematic during this time. Despite this, it was not an issue that Sweden or the UN should meddle in on a detailed level. However, even if the relationship itself were not a direct concern of the UN or the UNSC, Sweden found that circumstances surrounding the relationship could be dangerous, and that misinformation could lead to disaster.

It is not Sweden's responsibility to comment on the need for such preparedness, but the Swedish delegation wishes to make a general reflection that readiness can be so high that it in itself poses greater risks to world peace than those in which it is intended to eliminate. – Jarring, (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970, p.89)

As we can see Sweden did not want to take sides in the conflicts between the US and Soviet Union, but it is still important for the Swedish delegation to ensure that there is an openness surrounding certain information. To have states arming and preparing for an attack in secret could as, Jarring suggested, lead to a tenser situation. If a state would find out that their adversary has been arming them self, it is hard to know if the arms will be used for attack or defense. Therefore, if everyone is open about this information to each other the risk of conflict would diminish. The UNSC would, in this case, be the neutral part to observe and gather the information needed for the rest of the world to base their opinions on.

During this time-period, the UN was still expanding and not all state that we today consider a natural part of the organization had a seat at the UN. Appointing new members to the UN was, and still is the task of the UNSC.

When the state of Korea and Vietnam applied for membership into the UN, there was a concluding vote of ten for and one against, the Soviet Union voted against. Since the Soviet Union had a veto vote, the proposal fell, and Vietnam and Korea could not join the UN. Regarding this outcome, the Swedish representative Jarring (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970) spoke up and strongly expressed its disappointment form the outcome. Jarring stressed that the Swedish government believed that for the UN to fulfill its purpose all state of the world needed to be a part of the organization.

“Ever since Sweden became members of the United Nations, it has maintained the universal principle of membership in the organization. In our opinion, the organization needs all states' efforts, large and small, to effectively fulfill their obligations.” - Jarring, (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970, p.99)

As we can see, universalism and the belief that the UN was not an organization for the “west” or powerful states in the Swedish opinion. Instead, it was early declared that the Swedish view of the future of the UN was to be a global institution that would be the apex of global politics.
For this organization to reach this goal, all willing states had to be given membership if they so desired. This a fact that is hard to interpret. On one side Sweden is promoting global interests, but at the same time, these are expressed as Swedish interests. However, one could view this as a Sweden’s dedication to global interests and not necessarily as Sweden’s state interests.

At the time this was not self-evident though that this was a global interest. The cold war divided the east, and the west and global institutions like the UN were not entirely free from skeptics about its use and possibilities. From the Soviet side, there could have been a fear that the UN would cull and ease states to sympathize with western ideals of democracy and free-market capitalism.

To summarise the period of 1957 – 58 Sweden can be said to be a very vocal pro-UN advocate. The belief that the UN should be the highest political institution in global politics and its rules to be followed as more or less law seems to be the Swedish interpretation of the organization. Sweden often expressed itself in regards to the UN charter and the intent of the organization. Rarely do we see any statements that directly adhere to Sweden’s national interest of national agenda, instead of when the Swedish representative relay the view of the Swedish state its almost always in relation to some article in the UN charter or in relation to the benefit of the organization and stability in the international community.

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**1975-76**

Sweden got elected to the UNSC together with Italy, Japan, Guiney, and Tanzania. Chosen for the position as ambassador for Sweden’s place in the UNSC was Olof Rydbeck. Planning and goal setting for the Swedish delegation at the UN in this time might not have been as professional as one might think. Looking at the remarks by Olof Rydbeck when he first arrived at the delegation there was not any form of introduction in the way that one might expect for an important position as the ambassador for Sweden’s permanent delegation at the UN headquarters.
I came to my first general assembly in the UN 1970 without any briefing. My predecessor Sverker Åström had given me a so-called blue book of the last general assembly to study during my vacation. – Rydbeck (1990, p.240)

Rydbeck was however not left to his own, and as he describes it his college, Kaj Sundberg was of great help to him as he had been in the delegation for a very long time and had the practical knowledge that Rydbeck needed to get the job done.

Olof remarks that when Sweden was elected to the UNSC in 1975, it happened to be so that the council would often be divided in such a way that would leave Sweden to have the deciding vote in a lot of cases (Rydbeck, 1990). This would give Sweden multiple time to act as a deciding leader in the UNSC.

This was the second time that Sweden had served in the UNSC and Sweden´s way of approaching the task could be said have a familiar tone from the previous term. The documentation is however thin, although better than the previous between 1957-58 but still lacking in any substantial actions taken outside the official meetings.

When conflict arrived, and it got to the point when the members of the UNSC had to discuss the issue, Sweden often turned to the interpret the UN-charter to justify their actions. Regarding the principle of nonaggression, Sweden’s delegation remarked on an attack by Israel on Lebanon with sadness and disappointment (Utrikesdepartementet, 1977). When a state uses violence on another as a way of settling a dispute solving the issue will be immensely harder. Because of this Sweden emphasized that acts of violence are first and foremost a breach of the UN-charter and such acts should always be denounced by the international community and the UN. Important here to not is the denunciation of the violence and to not the state itself. This can see seen as how Sweden want to engage in the international community as a unifying force with a “we should not do this” in contrary to “you should not do that.”

The UN charter could someone times be seen as an obstacle in the pursuit of making certain regions stable. In the case of international terrorism, the negative impact is not often isolated to a specific state, but instead spreads throughout a region. Swedish delegate Sundberg saw this problem with states that did not have the will and capacity to fight terrorism in their own state and other states taking harm from this and wanting to intervene. As Sundberg explained to the council, that even if a state can and want to fight terrorism in another state, the rules of the UN charter must still be upheld. Therefore, deploying military personnel in another state without their request was a breach of the charter. This was in response to threats made from
other states which had on occasion said to intervene in states which did not get their “terrorism problem” under control. Sundberg called for states not to make these sorts of announcements and for the respect of the sovereignty of states to be respected (Utrikesdepartemente, 1977).

This, however, did not mean that the view of the Swedish delegation was that the UN should stay out of internal affairs of states. On the contrary, as Rydbeck expresses the Swedish view in a statement regarding the situation in Cyprus

No suggestion should be left untried. Primarily, it is, of course, the Cypriot people themselves to find a final solution to their political problems through negotiations. However, given the danger that threatens the peace in the island and in the area if a move forward towards a peaceful settlement does not soon take place, the security council have the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has the obligation actively to assist the parties in finding a new approach (Rydbeck, 1977a, p.196).

We can see by this that the Swedish delegation was quite keen on the UN supporting and being a part of the solution to internal conflicts within states. The involvement from the UN should however not exceeded the limitations inherent in the UN charter, or other rules and conventions surrounding the international community. The sovereignty of the state, no matter what should be respected. This can also be seen in the Cyprus conflict when the conflict had dragged on for some time in which Sweden’s view was that as long as peace talks were going on between the different sides, no action should be taken by outside actors that could compromise the outcome of a peace agreement (Utrikesdepartemente, 1977).

The reality of UN operations often comes down to the funding of an operation. When the UNSC agrees on what action to take they rely on financial support from other states. Sweden saw this as an important factor for states to understand funding is correlated with the UN’s possibility to execute its operation in accordance with what the council has agreed upon. In the Cyprus situation, it was the case in which the UN organ, the UNFICYP, was assigned to keep the humanitarian situation under control despite frequent problems with funding. As Rydbeck (1977, p.212) mentioned in a statement “Sweden, as a troop-contributing country, feels itself compelled to bring up once again the precarious financial situation of UNFICYP.”.

There were instances where the Swedish delegation advocated for direct action and sanctions toward a state. In one case South Africa had moved into Namibia with armed forces in what could be called an occupation. For this, Sweden strongly voiced its opinion that this was a
breach of and threat to the international peace and stability and called for sanctions and weapon embargos against South Africa.

Even if Sweden seldom took a stand on either side of a conflict, they still voiced their opinion. Regarding an occupation made by Israel, Sweden did not denounce the occupation itself since it was in somewhat of a grey area. However, there were still laws and ethics that needed to be upheld during situations like this, and although it might justify, it could still be detrimental to the people affected.

Any military occupation, however humane and well-meaning the intentions of the occupant, implies by necessity that the inhabitants cannot exercise fully their political and democratic rights (Kaj Sundberg, Uttrikedepartementet 1977, p.168).

Sundberg later elaborated on the issue in that the regulations of the Geneva convention be respected in all situations. (Utrikesdepartemente, 1977).

The UNSC has the responsibility for international peace and security. Sweden, as shown before promoted respect toward the sovereignty of states to handle their own internal affairs. This, however, did not mean that Sweden was prepared to stay silent on the issue. In a statement to the council, the Swedish delegate denounced the polis brutality against schoolchildren in the state of South Africa (Utrikesdepartemente, 1977). This was threatening the humanitarian situation and the stability of the state, and as a warning to the South African government, Sweden stated that this might be the final warning towards South Africa that they should heed before others may take actions against them. By voicing a strong humanitarian opinion, Sweden could have contributed to some polarizing effects. This is because it could put the pressure on states to also make public announcements about or cut ties with the state in question. That might not be in the direct interest of a state.

Sweden had the view that a state should not be punished for complying with the sanctions on other states that the UNSC had put in place. In one instance Mozambique, who based a major part of their economic infrastructure on trade with South Rhodesia was worried about the plan to put trade sanctions on South Rhodesia (Utrikesdepartemente, 1977). The Swedish delegation’s response to this factor was a declaration of support for Mozambique with aid. As Rydbeck (1977c, p.241) proclaimed to the council “My government has decided to increase the bilateral assistance foreseen this year from 50 to 70 million kronor, that is from approximately $11.4 to $16 million”. This was necessary for Sweden to ensure that the humanitarian situation in Mozambique did not deteriorate under the weight of sanctions.
placed on South Rhodesia. An action that showed that Sweden could take responsibility for the consequences their actions made.

The period of 1975-76 Sweden was a strong proponent for upholding the intent of the UN charter and reminding the other members of the council that they should stay within the given framework in their action. Even if the situation was dire, it had to be justified by the criteria that the international rules have for intervention from other states. There were instances when Sweden was appalled by what was happening in other states but still did not desire an intervention if there were no ground for it in a legal sense. However, when there were ground for it, Sweden was not afraid to point it out. Sweden can also be seen trying to avoid that actions taken by the UN did not do any harm to others. Resolutions need to make sure that to minimize the negative impact on third parties and also that the international community did not forget its responsibility outside the UN. However, Sweden is an actor that works mostly for itself and reacts to what is happening. Their work is somewhat of a more passive nature even if the delegation is involved and knows what is going on.

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<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Some</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**1975-76**

The review book released by Utrikesdepartementet after the period of 1997-1998 is by far the most in-depth account of the Swedish view and actions taken in the UNSC. The book has been edited by Anders Lidén and Anita Melin which makes the text a more accessible and it feels less of an official document that had to be done and more of a summary meant to be read by those interested. This does provide a broader grasp of all the issues the delegation handled in the UNSC.

The Swedish delegation was well aware that the presidency position in the UNSC required a lot of resources and demanded more from the delegation’s employees (Lidén & Melin 1999). To increase the transparency of the UNSC the Swedish delegation took the opportunity during their presidency to inform non-member of the UNSC about what was being discussed. Sweden also took the opportunity to make information publicly accessible online.
Most of the meeting held in the UNCS were informal consultations. The Swedish delegation pursued a solution to issues in these kinds of settings and usually did not bring up an issue to the formal and public meeting if the parties beforehand had not come to an agreement (Lidén & Melin 1999).

When looking at the way that the Swedish delegation approached work in the UNSC one of the premises for each action taken was to achieve results and not to use the forum as a way to convey demonstrative politics (Lidén & Melin 1999). It was important that Sweden sent the signal of not taking a side between members and to remain a neutral party. The side that other members should associate the Swedish delegation with was the side of the UNSC to uphold the right of people and global security. This was an essential part of the strategy of acquiring results in the UNSC and Sweden seemed to have garnered the respect of the other member states.

In the negotiations of a joint statement of the monitoring of African peacekeeping Sweden pushed for the inclusion that the rule of the UNs charter regarding violence must be respected and upheld (Lidén & Melin 1999). For Sweden, it was also important that the statement wasn’t just words that would give an abstract idea of intent. Instead, the Swedish delegation was determined that statement like these should include concrete proposals for how to improve the relationship between the UNSC and regional actors.

Rarely can it be seen that Sweden chose to convey any statements including any indication on the will of the Swedish government as a national interest. There is the occasional mention of the word “Sweden” in some statements like this one made by Osvald (1997, p.18) “Sweden welcomes this debate. It should be a step towards concrete proposals and decisions by the Council in this field.”. This statement is more a reaffirming of an action taken, and it is aimed to focus on the results of the UNSC. This reluctance to show any hint of a state agenda can also be seen in way Sweden mentions itself. In a statement made on humanitarian assistance to conflicts Dahlgren (1998, p.9) says: “My delegation also welcomes the format of this briefing and I want to thank you, Sir, for arranging it.”. This is a common formulation for the Swedish delegation, rather than saying “the Swedish delegation” the allusion to Sweden as a state with interest is avoided with language that is chosen for a more neutral tone without mentioning’s of the own state.
In a resolution regarding how the UNSC should work with the African regions, Sweden was assigned to lead the workgroup on peacekeeping operations in Africa (Lidén & Melin 1999). Sweden, together with Japan, United Kingdom, and Portugal did try to get the resolution to include peace-enhancing operation after a situation was de-escalated and no longer a threat to the peace. The proposal failed. Later, another resolution was passed under the presidency of Sweden which included some addition, and the council could agree on a joint public statement about the importance of peacekeeping operation in Africa (Lidén & Melin 1999). Sweden here showed that they are willing to put in the extra effort to make their propositions into actual resolutions.

Sweden’s belief in a continuation of peacekeeping after a conflict has settled down is also apparent in the way Sweden viewed UN police presence. In the case of Angola, a resolution was passed to decrease the military presence in the area sins the conflict was no longer that dire. Sweden was positive towards a reduction of military personnel but upheld that decreasing military presence had to be combined with an increase of police to maintain the newly acquired stability (Lidén & Melin 1999). This proposal did not pass due to an unwillingness from Russia and the United States. According to Lidén and Melin (1999) when Sweden left the UNSC, the peace process in Angola had failed. Sweden saw this as a defeat for Sweden’s engagement in the conflict, and for the struggle for peace in Angola.

The informal meetings for Sweden as not only to discuss current issues that would be brought up to the official meetings. Instead, Sweden used these moments to raise questions that could become a situation where the council had to act in the future. One such example of this is the Situation in Burundi with the tensions regarding the fighting of different ethnic groups. The council had concluded that they would not intervene due to the lack of fulfilled requirements for the UN to intervene (Lidén & Melin 1999). Sweden however, saw the potential escalation of the conflict and during the informal meetings required that the situation in Burundi continued to be discussed even if it was a question for the regional actors and not primarily the UN. To persist using the mandate as president with the power over the agenda could be polarizing and exhausting for states that are not interested.

The UNSC is only one of many UN-organs, and there are many working with issues in all areas of the world. Sweden has worked for active participation from the UNSC into issues and conflict solution and not left it up to a public servant within other sub-organizations to solve alone. This, however, means more work for the UNSC and might not be appreciated by other states which believe that it might take the focus away from other, more important question.
This became apparent in the issue regarding Angola were the general secretary was sent to negotiate and broker peace. Sweden, on the other hand, wanted to UNSC to be involved in the process with a delegation of its own (Lidén & Melin, 1999). As Dahlgren expressed this in council:

“The conflict-prevention mechanism of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) deserves full support. At the same time, the Security Council cannot renounce its primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. The capacity to establish rapidly an international presence is crucial in order to prevent and contain conflicts.” (Dahlgren, 1998 p.8).

The proposal fell, but the intention was clear that Sweden sought more direct involvement from the UNSC in peace negotiations.

Another case with the reverse situation in Ethiopia, and Eritrea conflict wherein the two states did not want the UNSC to get involved in their affairs, despite the desire of the UNSC to do so. Sweden, in this case, was not content with the exclusion of the council and demanded that the council put the Ethiopia and Eritrea conflict on the Agenda and that the secretariat continually updated the council on the situation (Lidén & Melin 1999).

The will to increase the engagement of the UN more was for Sweden an active question. In the talks surrounding the situation, Sweden proposed a presidential statement to the council to increase UN activity in Somalia in the way that the general secretary had proposed (Lidén & Melin 1999). This, despite some reluctance from Russia, did pass and the presidential statement was agreed upon in the council.

Because of a military coup, Sierra Leon was the subject of sanctions from the UN. For Sweden, it was important due to the situation that they did not inflict a negative impact on the bad pre-existing humanitarian situation (Lidén & Melin 1999). To ensure this Sweden managed to get the Swedish ambassador Hans Dahlgren appointed as the president of the committee to oversee the implementation of the sanctions against Sierra Leon. Furthermore, Sweden requested that a special technical review-commission to the region evaluate the effect on the humanitarian situation from the military coup, as well as the sanctions placed on the state.

The humanitarian situation for the people of all states was important for the Swedish delegation. In a meeting on the situation in Afghanistan the Swedish representative Anders Lidén heavily emphasized that the conflict that ravaged Afghanistan also affected the region.
“The case of Afghanistan illustrates that, in today’s world, no country can separate itself from the international community. Events in Afghanistan have not only major humanitarian consequences but also serious international repercussions.” (Lidén, 1998, p.13)

The repercussions that Lidén is alluding to here is the spread of international terrorism and crime fuelled by the lawlessness that engulfs large parts of Afghanistan.

Compared to the previous terms this time Sweden had a greater focus on how to work as a member of the UNSC. Sweden knew beforehand about what was going to be required of them and a sense of what they wanted to accomplish. The Swedish delegation was there to make a change, and the results mattered. Most of the voiced opinions and statements were made in a neutral way that gave the impression that Sweden did not pursue any national agenda in the council. Instead, the impression that seems to have been intended was that Sweden was a state that works for the interest of the international community and the UN. The UN was more important than any single states interests in the mind of the Swedish delegation, and this seemed to have garnered respect among other members. The importance of rules and regulations of international law and the UN Charter has throughout Sweden appearances in the UNSC been a cornerstone in the way that Sweden has acted. During the 90s however, Sweden became more proactive in trying to prevent conflict than to act on it when it arose. The goal of Sweden here seemed to have been wanting a more active security council that constantly worked with these types of questions and not just an organization that entered a conflict when a breach of international peace had erupted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1997-98</th>
<th>Active participation</th>
<th>Coalition building</th>
<th>Strong and creative leadership skills</th>
<th>Building the confidence of other members</th>
<th>Involving states and organizations with real interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of degree</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1997-98</th>
<th>Unifying</th>
<th>Polarizing</th>
<th>Global interests</th>
<th>State interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of degree</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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</table>
5. Sweden in the UNSC today
Since the term, as the writing of this thesis, is not yet finished, there is no summarising book or text provided. Therefore, the material that will be used here going, through the events leading up to gain the seat in the UNSC for the period of 2017-2018, are documentation that the Swedish foreign department continually provides. The promises and process before the election took place will be discussed and presented. After that, the chapter will present how the Swedish delegation has acted and what they have strived for in the UNSC. Lastly the first month as the chairman of the UNSC and how the Swedish delegation handled that will be presented.

When it was decided that there would be a shift in government the newly formed government made clear that they had an aim for the seat in the UNSC during the term of 2017-2018 (Regeringen, 2014a).

To begin with, the “why” of the campaign for the UNSC seat before we look at the what Margot Wallström, Sweden’s foreign minister said that

> It is about taking responsibility for multitalented cooperation in an uncertain world with many conflict areas. The Security Council is a unique platform that offers the opportunity to implement Swedish peace policy, affect the events of world politics and get through our agenda. - Margot Wallström. (Regeringen, 2014a)

By this statement, Sweden’s sets the tone for the work that is to come. If Sweden gets elected, the international community can expect that Sweden will focus heavily on cooperation and peace in conflict areas. Furthermore, Wallström explains that conflict zones such as Libya, Syria or Iraq will be a part of these conflict zones in the world (Regeringen, 2014a).

Wallström develops Sweden’s view of how this work is going to develop and how Sweden will act as a state to tackle these issues

> Certainly, we work through the EU, we work bilaterally, and we act within the UN framework. But in the Security Council, you are in the process of setting the political framework. - Margot Wallström. (Regeringen, 2014a)

Wallström ensures that Sweden is working and will continue to work with the EU and other states bilaterally on international issues. The drive to be a part of the UNSC can be interpreted as a will to change how the UNSC is working today by the desire for Sweden to be a part of “setting” the political framework. Wallström later states that “Sweden will be a professional and principled member who takes responsibility for all issues in the Security Council's entire agenda - prepared for the unexpected.” (Regeringen 2016a). This gives a clear indication that
Sweden will take the mandate in the UNSC given to them with great seriousness. States can expect statements like this that no matter the issue, the Swedish delegation will be prepared to handle it and take part in talks regarding the subject on equal part as other members and with interest that other members might lack.

During the campaign, Sweden had chosen a couple of “celebrity diplomats” to promote Sweden’s desire to be a part of the UNSC. The people chosen for this mission can be seen in Table 4.1.

As we can see some of the diplomats, like Pierre Schori, were utilized extensively to travel and promote Sweden’s cause. On the other hand, there were those who, for reasons unknown, had been noted in the expense budget but who did not partake in any travel at the expense of the Swedish government. It is hard to say though if this was because they were uninterested in being a special envoy or if there were other complications.

To be able to act as an active part in UNSC resources is important. The Swedish government was aware from previous times in the UNSC that having the presidency would demand a lot of extra recourses, which they invested in the Swedish delegation. Being an active participant does require not only resources in monetary means but also as good and experienced personnel. Looking at how the Swedish government funded their campaign to achieve the UNSC seat there was no doubt about putting recourses into this area. The top diplomats that Sweden sent across the globe in promoting Sweden as the candidate for the UNSC could have given a strong impression that Sweden was aiming to be an active participant in the UNSC. This might have gotten Sweden elected and could have had an impact on the later work done in the council.

Furthermore, the use of experienced personnel in the campaign stages of getting elected possibly lead to a lot of information input to the foreign office and the UN delegation. Since

### Table 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Travel expenses for Special Envoy sent in the UNSC campaign.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lena Ek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marika Fahlen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrik Salander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Schori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lena Hjelm-Wallén</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Bildt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunnar Lund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Göran Persson</td>
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</table>

Table 4.1 Utrikesdepartementet (2016a)
there is an information gap due to the limited term in the UNSC of the elected members this information gathering before the term could have worked as a method of narrowing this gap.

**Working in the UNCS**

After winning the election to the UNCS Sweden put forward a program for the membership in the UNSC for the term 2017-2018. This program entails what themes the Swedish delegation are going to focus their attention towards. The themes in the program consist of human rights, conflict prevention, new security issues, effective peace operations, equality, transparency and regional cooperation (Utrikesdepartementet, 2016b). Since the period is not yet done this thesis will only look at the first term Sweden served as president. This is because the time spent as president is the time where you have the most opportunity to influence decisions and set the agenda.

The representative and UN ambassador for Sweden was Olof Skoog. Skoog was according to Dahlgren (personal communication 11 November 2017) a part of Dahlgren’s staff when he was working in the Swedish UN delegation during the 90s. The expertise of the people that have been involved in the process before is important, but it is also valuable to include people in the Swedish delegation that has experience from the last period that Sweden served in the UNSC. When Rydbeck took over as Swedish ambassador to the UN in 1975, he did not get an introduction to the work. Ambassador Olof Skoogs experience from serving under Hans Dahlgren in the UNSC earlier in his career might have given a better starting point for Sweden then if a “rookie” had taken place. By using experienced diplomats before getting elected and after getting elected sends the signal that Sweden has people that are well versed in what they are doing, which in turn give respect and seriousness to the delegation that they might otherwise not have gotten.

Sweden took to the presidency of the UNSC on the first week of January. Since there had been an appointment of a new general secretary for the UN Sweden decided to have a general discussion and debate to strengthen the UNSCs relationship with the new general secretary António Guterres (Regeringen, 2017a). The topic of the debate was about conflict prevention. The debate would be held at ministerial level, and Sweden’s foreign minister wanted to give extra attention to the subject of women, peace, and security. The meeting was a success, and 93 of the member states chooses to participate (Regeringen 2017c). Participation in the debate was out of the ordinary, and the chamber where the debate took place was well seated, both with participant and audience.
Sweden would come to lead a discussion in the security council regarding the situation in Syria and Iraq (Regeringen, 2017a). The council talked about chemical attacks on civilians in Syria and the humanitarian situation regarding the city of Mosul and the spread of Isis throughout the region. The UK and France proposed resolutions that were not adopted. The result of the meeting was presented by Olof Skoog in a press briefing. During the briefing Skoog mentioned Sweden’s humanitarian work in Iraq in regard to the Isis situation, “Can I add that my own country Sweden has done so, and it remains one of the biggest humanitarian contributors to also this situation in Iraq” (Olof Skoog, 2017a). Here Skoog is alluding to the humanitarian aid that Sweden is providing in the area and want others to do the same.

Being an active part of working groups has left Sweden with a lot of room for influencing the outcome. The more loosely and informal working groups like the one assigned to create a draft resolution for the situation in Syria are the grouping that provides the leading state with the most influence. This has therefore given the Swedish state a good degree of influence regarding these groups goals.

After a press briefing, Sweden released a presidential statement that welcomed the current changed to the electoral process within the Democratic Republic of Congo. The statement emphasizes on Swedish behalf the importance of women participating in the election and democratic process. Sweden later made a statement in their own right after the presidential statement which further welcomed the changes within the DRK (Regeringen, 2017a). The presidential statement was later followed up, on Sweden’s behest with a briefing of the situation regarding the DRK. For Sweden, it was important that other actors that were affected partook in the briefing as well as leading figures affected by the process (Regeringen, 2017c)

A large part of the work within the UNSC concerns the African continent, and this is an area that Sweden wants to focus the council’s attention to. Inviting members to the briefings and meeting of the UNSC is not something that was apparent for the two first times Sweden served on the council. Looking at this period in 2017 we can see that this become more of a prominent strategy for the Swedish delegation. Regarding the Chad lake region, Sweden’s work to give the civil society a voice in the UNSC included giving a representative from Borno Women Development Initiative a chance to partake in the discussions (Regeringen, 2017c). The representative suggested long-term solutions to tackle the regions many challenges. The council based their further discussions of the premises lifted by the Borno Women Development Initiative and agreed that they should visit the area in question somewhere in the future.
During a press briefing Olof Skoog, president in the UNSC, was asked about the issues regarding South Sudan, without any further detail the answer from Skoog was that the council would meet on the issue soon (UN web TV, 2017). Later that week, on Swedish initiative, the council invited the president for the African Union for a so-called high panel discussion on the conflict in the Darfur region. The council is split on the issue, and the president of the African Union is currently the mediator with Sudan concerning Darfur (Regeringen, 2017c).

The day after that meaning the council meet with the director of the UN West Africa office to discuss the situation in Gambia where the incumbent president lost the election and had proclaimed his intent to remain president despite the electoral defeat. The council expressed its desire for the new leader to take his place as president and proclaimed its support for the efforts made in the region. The council concluded that more cooperation would be necessary to secure the peace in the area and that the international community needs to keep its level of engagement and interest in the conflict. Following the situation in Gambia, the Swedish government described the work in Gambia as an example of successful conflict management (Regeringen 2017d). By reminding of the importance of regional actors, not only broadens the view of solutions to conflict but also puts pressure on states not directly involved to take responsibility for the stability of their regions. This also gives attention to other states that might not get in on other cases, which in turn leads states to look at Sweden for recognition and give Sweden its support. This might increase Sweden’s possibilities to influence the council further because of the support the state can gather from outside sources.

The new general secretary Antonio Guterres has made South Sudan one of his priorities for the UN. The UNSC supports his move to work with the South Sudan conflict, and the Swedish government expresses that it is positive that the council now is behind a peace process that includes, among other things, an inclusive political process (Regeringen 2017d). After this meeting, the council also discussed the situation on Cyprus and UNFICYP, which is observing and managing the situation. Since there had been progress in the negotiations, the UNSC prompted that the two parts do not lose momentum. The UNFICYP got an extended mandate to oversee the situation from the council since the council did not want to change its mandate and mission before there has been more clarity in the negotiations on the Cyprus issue (Regeringen 2017d). The council also extended another sanction regarding the Central African Republic wherein the Swedish delegation managed to get a response from the other members that the sanctions should also concern people that have committed sexually or gender-related violence (Regeringen, 2017d).
The council had two important meeting regarding the situation in Yemen and Syria. This resulted in two public statements that the council could agree on and it was read by Olof Skoog to the media (Regeringen 2017d). In the statement regarding Yemen Skoog got a question regarding if there would be any changes to the situation and if a solution was within reach. Skoog answered, “I tend to believe that is the security council expresses itself with such strong support for the envoy and his efforts I hope that the parties will really move forward now…” (Skoog, 2017b).

For the situation in Syria Sweden expressed that it was important that the council could show unity in its opinion of what is happening in Syria right now. During the preconference Skoog was question about if there had been any discussion in the council regarding safe zones in Syria, in which Skoog answered, “Well, I have been in the security council for three and a half weeks so what has happened in the past, I don’t know” (Skoog, 2017c). Skoog was then further questioned on his view of safe zones in which he told the reporter that his view was consistent with the security council’s view. Following this briefing, it was announced that Sweden would be the “penholder” together with Egypt and Japan in the handling of the humanitarian aspects of the Syrian crisis (Regeringen, 2017d). This is an informal task that gives these assigned member states the duty of preparing and drafting statements and decisions regarding the humanitarian situation in Syria. Sweden expresses in their own documentation that the majority of penholder assignments are given to permanent member states and mentions that this assignment is one way for Sweden to increase the importance of the non-permanent member states (Regeringen, 2017d).

The council had a meeting on the situation in Somalia in which the council could agree on a statement and show unity in the denouncement of the attacks made by the al Shabab on civilians. During this meeting, Asha Gelle, a spokesperson for a woman’s rights organization in Somalia, was invited to speak to the council on Sweden’s initiative. The council and Gelle could agree on the welcoming change for women’s representation in the parliament in Somalia (Regeringen, 2017d). The press briefing regarding the council’s actions in Somalia Skoog was questioned about the situation in Morocco in which he answered

“Well the national position, speaking now as an ambassador to the UN, our position is that there is a tense situation going on in Elgart, the mission is now fully functional currently and we believe that the most important thing is to very quickly get back to a UN-led political process.” (Skoog, 2017d)
Skoog did not take any further questions and did not express the council’s opinion on the matter.

In preparation for the transfer of the presidency from Sweden to Ukraine Sweden held an added meeting on the security situation in the eastern parts of Ukraine. The council could agree on a statement that called for a ceasefire and for the respect of Ukraine’s full rights to its sovereignty (Regeringen, 2017e). The meeting was continued in the form of a public meeting after the presidency had been given to Ukraine. Therefore, the statements made at this meeting can be seen as Sweden’s last prepared statements as the president in the UNSC.

Regarding the situation of the Sevastopol and Donbas regions, Sweden expressed its opinion as follows: “As a small country committed to a rule-based international order Sweden relies upon strict adherence to the principals enshrined in the UN charter and respect for international law.” (Swedish delegation, 2017). Furthermore, the delegate emphasized the importance of humanitarian law as well “We call for the rules and principals of international law, including that international humanitarian law to be fully respected.” (Swedish delegation, 2017).

This concludes the action taken in the UNSC while Sweden had the presidency. In table 5.1 and 5.2 there is a summary of the frequency of statements made during this period, as well as the different kind of meeting that occurred. Regarding the meeting, it is near to impossible to know how much went on behind closed doors and who met whom of the record but never the less it gives an indication of the activity that took place. According to Hans Blix (Personal communication, October 29, 2017), the backroom talks are the most important forum. Blix also mentioned that very often, before a subject is brought to the table to be discussed officially, the interested parties had already met and decided on the issue, the meeting as such is just to make the agreement official. Therefore, the activity within the UNSC when looking at the frequency of meeting might not give the whole picture, but at least it’s one indicator of many.
To summarise their term as president over the UNSC, the Swedish delegation in the UN stresses three important achievements that they succeeded with during this time (Regeringen, 2017f). The first point Sweden raises is the good start they provided for the new general secretary Antonio Guterres. This had taken its form both in the high-level debate that Sweden arranged as president when Guterres was appointed but also the many informal lunch meetings that Guterres has been invited to with other members of the UNSC. The Second point of success that Sweden has achieved is the inclusion of women and women organizations in work towards peace and security and conflict prevention. Lastly, Sweden stresses its work to improve the work methods within the UNSC. This takes it form in that organization and part of the civil society that is affected by conflict, or an issue that is up for debate should also be invited to participate. Sweden also takes that stand that the information from the UNSC should be more highly available and therefore during the time as president continually updated the UNSC social media channels and publicized weekly letter on what’s going on the UNSC to the UNSC website but also on the government of Sweden’s own website.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of meeting</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of resolution and statements</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing and consultation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open debate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed negotiations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total amount</strong></td>
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Table 5.2. Regeringen (2017b)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of statements</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press releases</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President statements</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unanimous statements from the council</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total official statements</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
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Table 5.1. Regeringen (2017b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017 Active participation</th>
<th>Coalition building</th>
<th>Strong and creative leadership skills</th>
<th>Building the confidence of other members</th>
<th>Involving states and organizations with real interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Some</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017- Unifying Polarizing Global interests State interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of degree</td>
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</table>
6. Discussion

If we are to look at the results of the analysis summarised, we can see that there have been changes in how Sweden has acted throughout the different time periods.

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>Active participation</td>
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<td>Some</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition building</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong and creative leadership skills</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building the confidence of other members</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Involving states and organizations with real interests</td>
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<td>State interests</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can see how there have been increases on almost ever front both regarding the methods and on the variables, that determine the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy.

There are instances where Sweden has made proposals to the UNSC with draft resolution constructed together with other states. Rarely has Sweden proposed a resolution draft alone, and often when a vote is done, Sweden can sometimes side with other members regarding what issue is at hand. Sweden’s is for this reason independent, but this does not mean Sweden is unreliable. Instead, Sweden has no side that the state always votes with. Instead, it is dependent on that issue the vote is about. Sweden as also gone from a reactive to a proactive member of the UNSC.

The way in which Sweden used its presidency both in the 90s but also in 2017 we can see that there is a genuine will to include all states in the considerations and workings of the UNSC. Sweden as president uses a transparent and inclusive way of providing information from the UNSC. States that aren't members are briefed on what’s going on and hold regular informal meetings to allow the possibility of coalitions growing forth. As we have seen, the members of the UNSC have often already decided on what action to take when they appear at the council. This means that if you want to persuade a state, you need to meet with them and discuss the issue beforehand.
For Sweden, it seems to have been increasingly important that resolutions and statements are passed unanimously. During the most recent presidency, nothing was passed in the UNSC unless the council could unanimously agree upon what the decision should entail. This is a good sign of successful coalition building. As explained, decisions that are passed without a complete fifteen to zero vote in the council can have a negative impact on how well the decision is received, even in states which voted yes. Therefore, for the acceptance and effectiveness of the resolutions and statements made during the Sweden presidency have the potential of receiving a good response.

Sweden has proved itself to be a strong player in the leadership of certain issues in later terms compared to earlier terms. Humanitarian issues seem to be the best example of where Sweden several times have been the obvious choice to lead a working group or commission. When Sweden has been given these tasks, they have sometimes been assigned co-state to cooperate in the group with, and sometimes the possibility of choosing someone to head a commission. Whether Sweden has cooperated or done a task like this on a mandate solely give to them, it has left Sweden with a lot of room for influencing the outcome. The more loosely and informal working groups like the one assigned to create a draft resolution for the situation in Syria are the grouping that provides the leading state with the most influence.

Why has Sweden then been appointed for these missions? Looking at the way that Sweden has traditionally acted as neutral as possible, and not allying itself with any side in the UNSC, has potentially given other states the view of Sweden as a strong and independent voice in the UNSC. This historical view of Sweden can then be used by states who want a draft to reflect this neutrality. Some states might find it easier to get resolutions passed depending on who is proposing them rather then what the proposal entails. An example of this can be the somewhat longstanding rivalry between the United States and Russia. The united states might in some instances be willing to assign Sweden as the leader of a working group, hoping that the results might be the same as if they came up with the proposal, to avoid having it vetoed by Russia.

From the 50s to present day the UN charter has been the guiding light in how Sweden has acted. This has sometimes given other states impression of Sweden as a state working for the UN and not a state using the UN as a forum for their own politics. However, this might not be as genuine as one can think. In conversations with Dahlgren (Personal communication, November 1, 2017) there was a clear indication that Sweden is in the UNSC to promote and exercise Swedish interests.
When issues have been raised, Sweden has not been shying away from mentioning their own aid work, or their relation to the issue at hand. But also in questions as to where Sweden has supported with military troops. This can be seen a way in which Sweden is conveying the message to other states that they are well informed, not only on the issue at hand but also the region or situation since long before this issue arose in the UNSC. This is something that has become more prominent in the recent term and is most strongly seen in the 2017-18 term. Presidential statements and briefings have on occasion been used to clarify the Swedish state’s opinion.

Since the reputation is slowly changing other states might come to change their view of Sweden in the coming years. Sweden’s proactive role and increasing will to exercise both polarizing statements and their own state interests could have a negative impact on the possibilities for Sweden to utilize effective methods in the UNSC.

Sweden started out in the UNSC as a state reluctant in pushing any type of national agenda. This when looking at the last term seems to have been shifting, and mentioning’s of Sweden’s interests and opinions are not that uncommon anymore. If this is, as the thesis would suggest, that there is a shift in methods and diplomatic strategy for Sweden within the UNSC what implication will this have for future endeavors within the UN system or for Sweden’s international relations as a whole?

For a small state with limited recourse, it is an uphill battle to compete in the international organizations that require people on the ground. In the UNSC a lot of meetings take place informally, and issues that are handled continues to be debated time and time again in the council. Questions such as how to stabilize the situation in the Israel Palestine conflict have been a reoccurring issue for a long time. The problem then arises for a small state that is more or less thrown into the security council’s discussions when they have not participated in the other meetings that have taken place. This gives the permanent members an upper hand in regard to the information that the members of the security council have. This is why it is important for smaller states to be an attractive partner for cooperations. A state like Sweden relies upon other states “liking” them to have an impact in the UNSC. If Sweden changes to a more polarizing and more radical diplomacy, it might not be so apparent the methods for influence would be so easy to exercise in the future.

The competition within the UNSC for Sweden is tough. A lot of states have more resources and are more eager to be a part of the council time and time again. Therefore, it is important
for the Swedish delegation to consider that action taken now will have an impact on the view other state have of Sweden. Because of this Sweden should be aware of what has given them the current reputation and avoid taking action that can change or damage it.
7. Conclusion

Studying the results, we can conclude that there is some interesting aspect that has come forth through this thesis. The reason as to why a small state would want to be on the UNSC is quite simple and complex. The main reason is that the UNSC is the apex of high-diplomacy and one of the most powerful international institutions. However, the possibilities are limited since there is both an information gap compared to the permanent members and a recourse difference for smaller states. Just being on the council is no guarantee of influence. Therefore, the possibilities of small states are largely due to its willingness to prepare for a term in the UNSC and the number of recourses they are willing to spend.

To answer the sub-question first that this thesis put forward, the criteria for what can be said for how to access effectiveness the analytical framework that was constructed can give the insight to answer this. A combination of how well a state uses the practical methods for influence and how they choose to act under the principals of a multilateral diplomatic setting will determine the outcome of the current situation. However, it will also affect the possible future effectiveness of the state and the diplomatic forum if the actions taken have a polarizing effect or if the forum is used for apparent single state interests.

For Sweden, it is hard to say if the Swedish UN delegation has done an effective job historically. Sweden has been appreciated as a part of the UNSC, and the neutral side Sweden has usually chosen has given Sweden a somewhat unique role in some cases. This has left Sweden with a lot of influence on some deciding matter, but regarding influence over setting the agenda, it is not quite so evident. The work method of Sweden has evolved over time, and Sweden seems to get more effective in its work within the UNSC for ever time the state serves on the council.

Looking at the most recent term one can see that Sweden today is working in a vastly more effective manner then the state has previously done. The work method and plan that is used by the Swedish delegation is in accordance with how to be effective and should, therefore, provide Sweden with influence in the UNSC. There is the risk however that when more work is being done, more actions can run the risk of being either polarizing or a show of Sweden’s state interests. This can result in the long run damages Sweden’s possibility to work as effectively as they are doing in this current time period.
Further Research
A lot of question arises from this term, although it is not yet over. To begin with, we need to assess how the diplomacy of Sweden is conducted now in a contemporary way. Perhaps the change is not so radical that it might look at first glance when we now entered the UNCS for the fourth time. This might be the way that Sweden has viewed international relations and work in various international institutions over the past decade that this thesis has not seen due to its focus on just the UNSC.

Where to go from this? In this thesis, I have lifted the history and the function of a Swedish seat in the UNSC. What has been apparent is the lack of documentation regarding these periods and the low interested from both scholars and bureaucrats of what has happened in the past when planning for a new period in the UNCS. This is not some mystery though and is what you can expect when there aren’t people constantly working with or monitoring the security council as a dedicated part of the UN work. Therefore, if the Swedish government want to continue pushing to a seat in the UNCS again there needs to be research done on the specific implication this will lead to and what is necessary to do before taking on such a task. From what we have seen it is no simple thing to be a part of the UNCS but looking at the achievement that Sweden as a lone member can be attributed to when it comes to change is hard. Research needs to be made on specific issues that Sweden works within the UN and compare the impact the Swedish state has before taking place in the UNCS, during the mandate and after leaving its seat. Then we can more fully understand what Sweden as a non-permanent member can achieve and if similar results can be reached without being a part of the UNCS and paying the price that it entails.

I have only scratched the surfaces of Sweden’s history within the UNCS. The material I have used are all tied to Sweden in some sense. For a more nuanced picture, a third party could monitor and conduct a long-standing survey over Sweden in the UNCS to get information that is not partial in what information is made public and how the story of Sweden in the UNCS is told.
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**Interviews**

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Dahlgern, Hans (2017-11-11)
Hjelm Wallen, Lena (2017-11-01)
Skau, Carl (2017-11-01)
Appendix 1
Original Statements in Swedish

Gunnar Jarring (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970, p.67)
Härav följer, att sedan frågan nu ånyo underställts rådet, svenska regeringen icke anser sig bunden av något särskilt sätt att behandla saken.
I enlighet med vår uppenbara plikt har vi studerat problemets olika aspekter I syfte att bilda oss en uppfattning om vilken lösning som bör sökas och vilket förfarande som bör följas.

Gunnar Jarring (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970, p.89)
Det tillkommer icke Sverige att fälla något omdöme om behovet av en sådan beredskap, men den svenska delegationen vill dock göra en allmän reflektion, att en beredskap kan bli så hög, att den i sig själv innebär större risker för världsfreden än de, som den är avsedd att eliminera.

Gunnar Jarring (Utrikesdepartementet, 1970, p.91)
Vad avser den nu aktuella frågan ställs rådet i första hand inför frågan, huruvida oroligheterna i Libanon är orsakade av inre motsättningar eller provocerade av utländsk makt.

Gunnar Jarring (utrikesdepartementet 1970, p.93-94)
En a förutsättningarna för tillämpning av artikel 51 är att ett väpnat angrepp ägt rum mot en medlemsstat. Sveriges regering anser icke, att denna förutsättning föreligger i förevarande fall. Icke heller anser min regering, att det föreligger en internationell konflikt enligt artikel 51. Genom den amerikanska aktionen har förutsättningarna för observatörernas verksamhet i Libanon väsentligt förändrats, och frågan är, om de har faktiska möjligheterna att fullgöra sina uppgifter på sätt som förutsattes i rådets beslut den 11 juni.

Gunnar Jarring (utrikesdepartementet 1970, p.99)
Alltsedan Sverige blev medlemmar av Förenta nationerna, har det städse vidhållit universalprincipen i fråga om medlemskap i organisationen. Enligt vår mening behöver organisationen alla staters insatser, stora och små för att effektivt kunna fullgöra sina förpliktelser.

Olof Rydbeck (1990. P240)
Jag kom till min första generalförsamling i FN 1970 utan varje briefing. Min företrädare Sverker Åström hade stuckit till mig en så kallad blåbok över den senaste generalförsamlingen att studera under min semester.