Free market or food stockpiles

A comparative case study of food supply in a crisis perspective in Sweden and Finland

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to identify similarities and differences in preparations by Sweden and Finland to ensure food supply in a crisis.

Previous research consisting of separate studies have showed a decreased ability to ensure food supply in crisis in Sweden, and an increased ability in Finland. In a time of raising awareness, changing security concerns and political will, the contribution of this study is to simultaneously investigate the two countries and provide an understanding of the historical- and present approaches.

By using comparative case study as method and applying International relations theory, a broader understanding of the different approaches by otherwise similar countries is achieved. The approaches of Sweden can be explained by using realist, neorealist, liberal and neoliberal theories while Finland’s approach best can be explained by realist and neorealist theories.

The study is relevant for the field of humanitarian action and conflict since it provides an understanding of the countries contingency plans regarding food. Threat assessments from both countries identifies man-made conflicts such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, use of military force and war to have the possibility to create disruptions in the normal cycles of the society and those of surrounding countries. If these threats were to occur, basic needs must be met, one being food supply.

Keywords: Food supply, stockpile, free market, crisis, Finland, Sweden, International relations theory
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## Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KBM</td>
<td>The Swedish Emergency Management Agency Krisberedskapsmyndigheten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKrVA</td>
<td>The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KÖMS</td>
<td>The Royal Society of Naval Sciences Kungliga Örlogsmannasällskapet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NESA</td>
<td>National Emergency Supply Agency Försörjningsberedskapscentralen Huoltovarmuukseskus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFS</td>
<td>Swedish Code of Statutes Svensk författningssamling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization Världshandelsorganisationen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÖCB</td>
<td>The National Swedish Board of Civilian Preparedness Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap</td>
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Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

“Starvation and chaos within a week” was the headline on Swedish newspapers in December last year following a report from the Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien (KKrVA), on what could happen to Sweden in the event of a major crisis or war. At the same time the neighbour to the east – Finland – with emergency food supplies equivalent to three meals a day for six months, as well as plans on how to become self-sufficient should there be a longer crisis, is prepared to meet any kind of crisis.

The report was not the first on this matter. In fact, during the last years there has been an increased interest in crisis preparedness in Sweden, and especially the question of food supply. Articles, political debates, polls and documentaries explain the absence of emergency stocks and the low level of self-sufficiency and try to predict how long Sweden’s food would last. As citizens cannot expect to get more than a few days of food, the authorities recommend all households to store supplies for at least 72 hours. A poll from the Myndigheten för samhällesskydd och beredskap (MSB), show a low level of crisis preparedness among the Swedish population, with 40% not being prepared at all (MSB, 2016a). A yearly national crisis preparedness week has been initiated to raise awareness.

Sweden and Finland are comparable for many reasons. Both have a similar climate with a similar vulnerability to natural disasters, a similar size (55th and 66th biggest in the world) and are under a similar risk of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, they have had similar approaches regarding crisis preparedness between the 1920s and late 1980s and became members of the European Union at the same time in 1995, they have not joined NATO but do cooperate.

Sharing almost identical definitions of basic needs and threat assessments, it is fascinating that Finland and Sweden currently have greatly different approaches to ensure food supply, should any of those threats occur. Similarities in history, language and culture allow us to assume that the different approaches can be explained by different political strategies.

Investigating food supply in a crisis perspective is relevant for the field of humanitarian action and conflict. Not only will it provide an understanding of the current situation, but also a general understanding on how the states regard the responsibility to avoid a humanitarian disaster involving lack of food, should a major crisis occur.
1.2 Research questions

The following questions will be posed to investigate the food supply in a crisis perspective in Sweden and Finland.

- What are the similarities and differences in crisis preparedness regarding food supplies in Sweden and Finland?
- Why did these changes occur?
- How can the approaches to food supply in a crisis perspective be understood by using International relations theory?

1.3 Delimitation and definitions

Sweden and Finland have been chosen because they share history, language, size, location, climate and have a similar historical approach to crisis preparedness as well as similar threat assessments including epidemics, natural disasters, terrorism, power failure, disruption of supply chain, use of military force, war and cyber-attacks (Andersson et al., 2017, p. 24; Försvarsberedningen, 2017; Inrikesministeriet/Sisäministeriö, 2017, p. 26; Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien, 2017, p. 6; NESA, 2018d; MSB, 2018b; Säkerhetskommittén / Turvallisuuskomitea, 2018).

1.3.1 Basic needs

The ability to effectively respond to a crisis depends on the type of crisis and on coordination between several actors and functions. The MSB has defined the basic needs to be survivability, decision ability, ability to act, dignity and community. Survivability allows the other four to exist. In the initial phase of a crisis, the most important are 1) survivability, 2) decision ability, 3) ability to act (MSB, 2010, p. 14). In a longer crisis, dignity and community is essential. To ensure survivability, access to basic services and goods is needed. Some of which the most important are water, food, heating, healthcare, information, order and security (MSB, 2010, p. 23; Inrikesministeriet/Sisäministeriö, 2017). This thesis will be focusing on food supply.

1.3.2 Crisis and crisis preparedness

Crisis has been defined by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, Försvarsdepartementet in the Government bill 2007/08:92 as “[…] an event that affects many people and large parts of
society and threatens fundamental values and functions” (Försvarsdepartementet, 2007, p. 7, translation by the author). Two fundamental functions are food supply- and water supply services. Absence or disruption of one or both could, in a short time, lead to a serious crisis. In a crisis already caused by other factors it is essential that these two are working to limit the damage as much as possible (Ibid, p. 33). A crisis cannot be handled by normal resources or by normal organization. It occurs unexpectedly, out of the ordinary and coordinated actions from several actors is required to get out of it (MSB, 2010, p. 17).

Crisis preparedness is defined by the Ministry of Justice of Sweden, Justitiedepartementet to be “[…] the ability to prevent, withstand and manage crisis situations through education, training and other measures as well as through the organization and structures created before, during and after a crisis” (SFS 2015:1052, § 4, translation by the author).

1.4 Method and design

A case study has been defined by George and Bennet (2005) to be “[…] a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 12). In this study the well-defined aspect is food supply in a crisis perspective in Finland and Sweden between 1917 and present day.

The design applied is Most Similar Systems (MSS), which can be used when comparing cases that are similar in the most possible ways, but different in the factor that is examined. MSS is often used when comparing countries (Esiasson et al., 2012, p. 103,109). As stated above, Finland and Sweden are similar in numerous regards but not regarding food supply in a crisis perspective during the last 30 years. A common critique to MSS is that it is almost impossible to find two cases that are identical but on one factor, especially countries (Ibid, p. 103). However, this study will compare two countries within Scandinavia that share a similar history, language etc and used to have similar approaches to food supply in a crisis perspective – which makes them relevant for an MSS.
The method for comparing the two countries, as well as the structure for the empirical part, is to look at the empirics regarding the following themes; present time, the beginning of food supply in a crisis perspective, the total defence, end of cold war and beginning of the 2000s. Stating that the countries have different approaches, and even that Finland has a more extensive crisis preparedness regarding food, before the actual investigation has started, could put the thesis at risk of simply summarizing something already known. This is avoided by not knowing what is similar and different, why these differences occurred and how we can understand the different approaches using IR theories (Ibid.).

1.5 Reflexivity

A case study is dependent on the researcher’s ability to find and process information, meaning there is a risk of being bias while selecting data which could affect the quality of the study (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 235–237). To avoid this, the data will be mirrored according to time period and consists of official documents, reports and books on food supply in a crisis perspective. Some newspaper articles are used when suitable. Since the aim of the thesis is to compare what has been done, official government documents lay ground for the data, while reports and other studies investigating their impact are used to understand the effects. The study is a comparison of approaches, rather than a comparison of a good and bad approach. Since most of the data originates from political decisions, a study of the different political views of ruling Governments in both countries could increase the understanding of the approaches. However, due to limitations of space, it has not been possible.

1.6 Theory

Within International Relations (IR), liberalism and realism can among other theories be used to understand interactions between states in the international system. Realists focuses on the conflict of interests and liberals focus on the common interests that people and nations share and “the cooperative activities that will satisfy these interests” (Shimko, 2013, p. 41). Neorealism and neoliberalism emerged from these in the 1970s.

1.6.1 Realism

Realism is a conservative perspective on international politics dating back to the Greek historian Thucydides. Two of the most prominent classical realists are E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau that were active in the 20s century. They shared a conservative view of the human as imperfect, with desire for power that ruins the best of intentions and that within all
humans, there are small parts of totalitarianism. The world is imperfect as a result of forces inherent in human nature (Shimko, 2013, p. 38).

Group identities and conflict are essential, meaning that in a world with limited resources, individuals will ultimately join in groups and confront one another for these resources. At the global level, the main group identity is the nation state and while realists recognize other actors, nation-states are the most important and relevant actor- or conflict group in international politics. Conflict as inevitable means an ever-present threat of war (Shimko, 2013, pp. 36–39).

Today, most realists have abandoned the view on the negative human nature, and focus on the international anarchy, meaning that there is no world government operating above the state. For realists, the anarchic nature of IR and the security dilemma are fundamental in understanding the actions taken by states. Anarchy in this sense does not mean chaos or mayhem, but the absence of a higher authority. The international system is a system of self-help meaning that states cannot rely on others is need of aid (Waltz, 1979, p. 12). Nation-states take measures to not be attacked or dominated by another. While taking protective measures, the security dilemma arises when increasing one’s own security might lead to threatening another. No state can feel secure among competing actors, meaning that the cycle of power accumulation continues (Shimko, 2013, p. 39). Realists do not have a teleological view of history that would mean continuous increasing cooperation among states, since states have no permanent friends or enemies, but merely permanent interests (Nye and Welch, 2011, p. 56). Because of this, improving one’s own security is of great importance since there is a notion that the international system and order quickly can dissipate, which would force the states to fall back on their own resources to guarantee their security (Booth and Erskine, 2016, p. 56).

1.6.2 Neorealism

Neorealism was developed by Kenneth Waltz in the 1970s as a critique against classical realism and its focus on human nature. While states remain to be assumed as the most important actor and acting in anarchy, the explanations of international politics are found at the level of international system, and not at individual or state-level (Waltz, 1979). Within neorealism, the national and international politics are strictly divided and the international system is assumed to consist of two elements; the structure of the system and the states within it (Spindler, 2013, p. 127). States are assumed to be seeking survival and preservation and
strive for domination within the international system. This leads the states to prioritize security above all else by increasing its military and economic capability (inside the state) as well as to seek alliances (outside the state). According to Waltz, only when survival is assured can states safely seek other goals. The balance of power can be a way to prevent conflict. State interaction is done in a self-help system, meaning that states that do not help themselves will suffer and fail to prosper by opening themselves to danger (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). States may choose internal balancing, such as internal resources when faced by threat, as opposed to external balancing such as expanding and strengthening one’s own alliances (Waltz, 1979, pp. 163–169). Waltz and some classical realists argue that states are normally most concerned with their security and do not only strive to maximize their power. This is a defensive view of neorealism that contradicts with the offensive realism, states becoming aggressive because of the anarchic system (Brown, McLean and McMillan, 2018).

1.6.3 Liberalism

Liberalism is a social, political and economic philosophy that is based on a positive view of human nature, the harmony of interests and the inevitability of social, scientific and moral progress. Liberals are drawn to common interests between people and nations and focus is on the numerous peaceful, or non-conflict interactions between states. In contrast to realism, liberalism does not see the balance of power as the reason to why nations avoid going to war, and states are not the only legitimate actor, but institutions, churches, NGO’s and other organisations also play important roles. Security can be achieved by cooperation and liberalism rests on an idea that war is too costly (Shimko, 2013, pp. 40–42). The trade among states and private investments abroad contribute to create interdependence and peace. One nations well-being is dependent on another’s well-being which in turn creates common interests. By each other’s success being mutually at stake, war becomes unthinkable since it would disrupt the trade and the interdependence on which it lies (Ibid, p. 43).

1.6.4 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism emphasises the importance of limited government, reduced regulation and increased reliance on the market (Shimko, 2013, p. 167). It further emphasises the role of institutions to allow people to believe that conflicts won’t happen. There is a high trust in institutions to reduce the effects of anarchy as assumed by realists and to stabilize anarchy by allowing people to develop peaceful expectations. This is done in four different ways. By providing a sense of continuity, an opportunity for reciprocity, flow of information as well as to provide a way to resolve conflicts. Areas in which institutions and expectations have
emerged and in which war becomes so unthinkable that stable expectations of peace develop
are known as islands of peace, or pluralistic security communities (Nye and Welch, 2011, pp.
59–61).

These theories will be used to try to understand the approaches on ensuring food supply
during crisis. In the analysis part, realism and liberalism as well as their branches, will be
applied on the empirical data to try to understand the actions taken by Finland and Sweden.

1.7 Previous research

The review article on crisis research in Scandinavia between 1975 and today by Danielsson et
al. (2015), consists of topics such as challenges to crisis management, how the adoption of
elements of New Public Management has affected crisis preparedness in Sweden and
collaboration between emergency organizations. The report Livsmedelsförsörjning i ett
krisperspektiv by the National Food Agency Livsmedelsverket (2011) examines the food
supply chain from a crisis perspective. A similar study has been made by Frick (1985) giving
a detailed and critical view of the situation in the mid-1980s and call for a readjustment to
organic farming. The MSB’s report Supply Chain Security in Other Countries (2016) include
Finland’s crisis preparedness and food supply.

The author has not found any academic study with the aim to compare and/or understand the
food supply in a crisis perspective in Sweden and Finland by using International relations
theory.
Chapter 2. Empirical investigation

2.1 Crisis preparedness today

In this chapter, the food supply in a crisis perspective will be examined followed by the crisis preparedness structure on all levels. Before proceeding, the current threat assessments will be discussed.

Russian interventions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria are according to *Försvarsberedningen*, clear signs that Russia is willing to use military force to reach political goals. Inference in elections and political matters as well as threatening behaviour in forms of military deployments along the EU border strengthen the concerns. Increased defence spending’s among European nations and the NATO can be linked to the annexation of Crimea and pressure from the US. Brexit has sparked further security and defence cooperation and NATO has established task forces with the aim to increase the security in the eastern European states, to deter from Russian attacks. For the Swedish and Finnish part, the Baltic Sea is defined as a main point of interest where it clashes with those of the EU and the U.S. The increased Russian military capacity and advantage in the region is estimated to continue for the next ten years, despite sanctions, increased European spending’s on defence and increased presence of US troops (*Försvarsberedningen*, 2017). In the event of confrontation involving the Baltic states, Finland is estimated to get involved since NATO might need to use its airspace (*KKrVA*, 2017, p. 7)

2.1.1 Sweden

2.1.1.1 Food supply in a crisis perspective today

*Livsmedelsverket* is responsible for national coordination of crisis and contingency planning for food security and to make risk and vulnerability analyses. However, the responsibility only includes stages after production. No governmental body is responsibility to prepare for and ensure food supply in the event of crisis and the MSB recommends all households to store supplies for 72 hours, which has been recommended to be raised to one week (*Försvarsberedningen*, 2017, p. 77).

Without emergency stocks and a level of self-sufficiency of 50%, the resources available within Sweden are not enough for the whole population, meaning that people who are healthy will have to manage by themselves in the event of a crisis (*Civilförsvarsförbundet*, 2017, p. 10). The then-Minister for Home Affairs, Anders Ygeman, said last year that the food
available within the country is what the grocery stores have, and it will last 5-10 days in a crisis involving a complete blockade, given that the transportation works and that private companies are willing to distribute. He added that this scenario is very unlikely (Sveriges Television, 2017). If transportation does not work, the food is estimated to last 24 hours (Civilförsvarsförbundet, 2015, p. 2). Trade has for a long time been the Government’s official position on how to solve the demand for food in crisis, primarily with the EU. This is still the case. However, the EU has no emergency supplies of food and no instruments, guidelines or action plans regarding food supply in a crisis perspective (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2015, pp. 34–35).

A report from the Kungliga Örlögsmannasällskapet (KÖMS) this year state that there are around 100 vessels above 500 gross tonnage sailing under Swedish flag, a decrease of 150 in 10 years (KÖMS, 2018, p. 8). This brings possible consequences in relation to crisis preparedness since with a decreasing number of vessels comes the decreasing possibility for the authorities to requisition ships with support in law Förfogandelag (SFS 1978:262 §5). Most goods arrive by sea and the Swedish Navy is only capable to protect cargo vessels on one third of the coast (KÖMS, 2018, p. 17). The report conclude that Sweden has no possibility to meet the needs of import and export in the event of a crisis, and through that live up to international promises and agreements (Ibid. p, 15).

2.1.1.2 Principles

Three principles lay the foundation for the crisis management system; the principles of responsibility, equality and proximity. The principle of responsibility means that the actor’s (businesses, state authorities etc.) responsibilities during normal circumstances are to be retained during a crisis. The principle of equality that activities carried out normally are to remain the same during a crisis as far as possible, with as few changes as possible. The principle of proximity that a crisis should be dealt with where it occurs by those closest. Crises are to be handled first on local-, then regional and ultimately national level. In the event of a crisis (not war) decisions are still to be taken collectively (Skr 2009/10:124 p. 5; Andersson et al., 2017, pp. 27, 67).

2.1.1.3 Local and regional level

In addition to the principles, responsibilities on all levels are regulated in law. The decree (2015:1052) explain what governmental authorities are to do in preparations and during a crisis. The Livsmedelsverket are with the County Councils and others responsible for
cooperation between agencies, municipalities, county administrative board, associations and business (SFS 2015:1052, ch. 1 § 10, annex 1). The responsibilities of government agencies to consider the requirements of the total defence are further regulated in the decree (2015:1053). Law (2006:544) regulate what County Councils and municipalities are to do before and during a crisis. They have a geographical responsibility and must ensure coordination between actors on local, regional and national level. They are also to assist in rationing and take necessary measures to ensure the supply of necessary goods (SFS 2006:544, ch. 3 § 3.1, 4). The decree (2006:637) relates to law (2006:544), and further state what the County Councils and Municipalities are to do in assisting other authorities to ensure production, provision and inventory of necessary goods (SFS 2006:637, § 8.1).

2.1.1.4 National level

The Government, supported by the Government Offices, is responsible for crisis management at a national level where it also has the geographical responsibility of strategic matters.

Crisis preparedness in the Government Offices is managed by the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs. The State Secretary for the same is to assemble secretaries of other ministries to provide strategic directions. The Secretary is supported by the Director-General for Crisis Management that will ensure immediate coordination between Ministries. The Director-General is in turn supported by the Crisis Management Coordination Secretariat which is responsible for training, monitoring and analysing impacts on the society and provide overall views. In addition, the Crisis Management Council, consisting of officials from the armed forces, police, private- and public sector can be summoned to exchange information. The ministries are through the principle of responsibility obliged to handle matters within their area of responsibility and have crisis plans, regular drills and 24h standby (Regeringskansliet, 2016).

The MSB is responsible for measures taken before, during and after a crisis if no other authority has the responsibility. This includes emergency management, public safety, civil protection and civil defence. In 2017, the MSB was tasked with preparing the population for war and crisis. In late May this year, brochures will be sent to 4.8 million households focusing on personal crisis preparedness (MSB, 2018b). The Governments food strategy was adopted in 2017 and will be in place until 2030. The strategy affirms the strong dependency on import. Free market, cooperation and integration are put forward as essential to promote positive development, and increased national production is highlighted to be of great importance to
meet possible crises (Näringsdepartementet, 2016). Försvarsberedningen welcomed the planned increase of national production and concluded that the supply chain can be disrupted and agreements on food delivery cannot be guaranteed during crisis. They recommend reinstating food supplies with private actors according to the Finnish model to meet a three months crisis (Försvarsberedningen, 2017, pp. 170–172).

2.1.2 Finland

2.1.2.1 Food supply in a crisis perspective today

Finland has food stocks to supply the whole population with 2500-2800 calories per day during six months (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 2015, p. 11; ATL, 2016). The level of self-sufficiency is estimated to be around 80% (Riksdagen, 2016) and there are plans on how to become self-sufficient in the event of a longer crisis (NESA, 2018d).

Finland also rely on free trade and a competitive economy to ensure the access to food, but to a lesser extent than Sweden. Försörjningberedskapscentralen (NESA) state that market forces not always has the capacity to sustain basic functions in the event of a crisis since “[c]onflicts may have an impact on world trade and cause serious disruptions in the availability of critical goods and raw materials” (NESA, 2018d). NESA argue that the liberalisation of world trade and using global logistics systems has the potential to create political stability in the form of interdependencies. But, there is also a risk that it creates political tensions. The NESA acknowledge that international treaties do support security of supply, but when preparing for major crisis, national measures must be taken (Ibid.)

2.1.2.2 Principles

The crisis preparedness rests on the principle of comprehensive security, which in turn is divided into eight principles involving democracy and the constitutional state, responsibilities among authorities, cooperation among all sectors, pools with local- regional and national actors, usage of resources, preparedness in relation to the EU, the development of preparedness and the principle of transparent sharing of information (Inrikesministeriet/Sisäministeriö, 2017, p. 5)

2.1.2.3 Ensuring security of supply

NESA is making sure that the security of supply remains an integrated part of the economic and political decision-making, and that vital functions work at all times. The Trade and Industrial Policy is an instrument used to ensure competitiveness of the economy and ensure functions, economic resources and competencies necessary for maintaining security of supply.
Emergency stockpiling is used to guarantee that the society functions during crises and are divided into reserve stocks (private-run), obligatory stock (law-binding) and state-owned stocks, which is regulated in law (1390/1992).

NESA provides tools to businesses that voluntarily want to improve their Business Continuity Management. In addition to the voluntary part, especially important companies need to draw up action plans in advance on how to meet serious crises (NESA, 2018e). NESA is also responsible for the KOVA-committee, that works to increase individual crisis preparedness by recommending home supplies, teaching how to perform small scale cultivation and take care of and use game and fish (MSB, 2016b).

2.1.2.4 National level

The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Jord- och skogsbruksministeriet/ Maa- ja metsätalousministeriö is through law responsible for food supply in crisis (Inrikesministeriet/Sisäministeriö, 2017, p. 63). In the Security Strategy for Society 2017, the ability for the economy and the infrastructure to work is defined as one of seven vital functions that must always work. Within this function lies the basic needs of food and that it is to be ensured by self-sufficiency and emergency stocks. The strategy further stresses preparedness and prevention of future crises. According to The Security Committee, this cooperation model is internationally unique and recognized. It has been developed by NGO’s, business, authorities, communities and citizens. Each ministry is responsible to implement the strategy within its competence (Inrikesministeriet/Sisäministeriö, 2017). The Security Committee is responsible for monitoring its implementation as well as to coordinate cooperation between with the responsible heads of preparedness within the ministries (Säkerhetskommittén/Turvallisuuskomitea, 2018). In addition, law (1552/2011), give Finnish authorities special authorisation to intervene, should a crisis or war occur.

The authorities are not only obliged and able to continue their work during a crisis but also to intensify it during ongoing emergencies and disruptions (NESA, 2018c). Costs for crisis preparedness are funded by a supply security fee on energy that goes into the National Emergency Supply Fund. The fund has an income of roughly 50 million euro a year. The balance position is 1,2 billion euros, with a majority of it tied up in reserve stocks (Ibid, 2018b).
2.2 The beginning of food supply in a crisis perspective

This section will deal with the historical development. Looking at decisions taken by the authorities we will see how the crisis preparedness regarding food supply developed from its start during WWI and throughout the years of war. During this time security concerns regarding survival of the state was highly present. Finland went through a civil war, fought the Soviet Union twice and later Germany, and was on the brink of losing its independency more than once. Sweden did not officially engage in the hostilities but could at any time become involved (Andersson et al., 2017, p. 6).

2.2.1 Sweden

At the outbreak of WWI, the authority Statens Livsmedelskommission was set up to handle the food supply. In 1916 the food situation grew increasingly complicated and the Folkhushållningskommissionen was founded with the tasks of regulating and rationing food (Andræ, 1998, p. 197). The level of self-sufficiency was high but crop failure, the British naval blockade and the lack of distribution systems other than price limits, led to shortages of food. In 1917 hunger demonstrations and riots broke out in several Swedish cities (Andræ, 1998, pp. 6, 30–35, 63–65; KÖMS, 2018, p. 6). In the 1930s, the government of Sweden improved the ability to provide food during crisis to not repeat what had happened. In 1939, the Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson said in a speech “[…] [c]itizens, our preparedness is good […]”, referring to the food supply, although it has been debated whether he meant the military preparedness, which was not sufficient (Sveriges Radio, 2017) The same year, the Statens Livsmedelskommission was reinstated. At the outbreak of WWII, a rationing system for some food was in place that would be active for ten years (Andersson, 1987, p. 6). The level of self-sufficiency within the agricultural sector was high. Great Britain again imposed a naval blockade but through negotiations with warring countries, Sweden could import important products needed to ensure food supply (KÖMS, 2018, pp. 6–7) and the society was by 1943 able to function normally during a blockade for at least six months (Linder, 2002, p. 155).

2.2.2 Finland

In 1917, when Finland still was an autonomous part of the Russian Empire the need for a nation-wide plan strategy of food supply became apparent. Despite efforts to forbid export

3 “… Medborgare, vår beredskap är god […]”
between provinces and imposing price limits, the food situation became worse after the Russian revolution, and the subsequent declaration of independence by Finland in 1917. The new authorities implemented laws, but no preparations had been made and there were no storage facilities. Meanwhile, the political tensions grew and the grain import from Russia stopped completely, leading to a devastating supply catastrophe which in turn became one of the reasons behind the civil war the following year (NESA, 2018a).

As part of the Government’s security policy to ensure food in the event of crisis, the Krigshushållningskommittén was established in 1924 with the responsibility to organize the national economy based on invested resources abroad and on relying on help from the League of Nations that Finland had joined four years earlier when it was founded. In 1928, a State Granary was established to supply the military as well as important civil service departments and agencies with grain. A war-time food-rationing system and a procurement policy was in place from 1932 and by 1939, the Folkförsörjningsministeriet took over the implementation (NESA, 2018a).

The preparations were quickly tested with the outbreak of the Winter War in 1939. While the organization was fully working, there was an almost complete lack of material. During the years of war in 1939-1944, the economy was divided into a military and a civil sector. The Folkförsörjningsförvaltningen managed the business relating to the basic supply in the civil sector, meaning acquisition and distribution, delivery and rationing. By 1941, the civil administration was through law granted more power and abled to take financial decisions, this led to the whole economy of the country being mobilized for war. During WWII, Finland experienced two supply crises, 1941-1942 and 1944-1945. Apart from this, the system that had been built up proved to be rather effective with food supplies being 90% of the levels of 1938 (Ibid.).

2.3 Totalförsvaret and the Cold War

The total defense or Totalförsvaret, was (and since 2015 in Sweden again is) a term to explain the maximum defense capability obtained by coordination and collaboration. It consists of coordinated actions between the military and civil defense and was first used in the late 1930s in Sweden (Andersson et al., 2017, p. 5) and between the 1950s and 1990s in Finland (NESA, 2018a).

Both Sweden and Finland were officially neutral during the Cold War, however in 1948 Finland and Soviet signed the so called YYA-treaty guaranteeing no attacks on Soviet
territory through Finland. Finland was not obliged to intervene should the Soviet be attacked from another direction. The treaty also contributed to Finland keeping its independence (Nationalencyklopedin, 2018). The threat of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was highly present, and the Swedish government feared a ground war or use of nuclear arms (Danielsson et al., 2015, p. 317). The consequences of war had to be considered and plans involving total war and total defence including countering massive military attacks were present in both countries, as well as to ensure the subsequent access to food (Andersson, 1987; Andersson et al., 2017; NESA, 2018a)

2.3.1 Sweden

After WWII and during the 50s and 60s, the level of self-sufficiency was high and Sweden had several storage facilities for food (Gäre and Lyckhage, 2015, p. 15). In 1972, it was decided that import and export on the sea in the event of a blockade should not be settled by military means (apart from Gotland). The Navy was from this point to focus on preventing aggressors from landing on the shores and not the protection of cargo vessels (KÖMS, p. 18).

In 1978, Sweden passed a rationing law (SFS 1978:268) that could be used in the event of crisis.

According to Frick (1985) Sweden was in 1985 almost fully dependent on import in all parts of the food chain, including most fertilizers and spare parts but produced during the 1980s a surplus of the main agricultural products. This was possible because of chemicals, mechanisation and centralisation of farms with increased use of fertilizers (Frick, 1985, p. 9, 14). In the event of a total blockade, emergency supplies of food were planned to last for one year given 25-30% import and were estimated to be completed in 1988 (Ibid, p. 7, 26). In addition, there were plans on how to provide the population with crisis food, krismat, by re-adjusting the agriculture sector within three years. The krismat would be similar to the food during WWII, meaning primarily dairy products, bread, potato, vegetables and fruit. Almost all production of other products was estimated to drop, including meat (Ibid.). The krismat would consist of 2900 kcal per individual and day (Regeringen, 1986, appendix 1, ch, 7). The agriculture sector was to be organized as usual, but use radically less fertilizers and chemicals, explaining the estimated drop in production (Frick, 1985, pp. 26–27). A nitrogen facility would be built to produce the needed amounts. To support transformation to krismat, there were emergency stocks of fertilizers, protein feeds and pesticides (Andersson, 1987, p. 7).
The guidelines of the *krismat* were abandoned in 1987 (Ibid., p. 8) and half of the stocks for the agriculture sector were sold along with other products such as staple food (Göransson, 1987, p. 19). Since 90% of the total costs of the crisis preparedness was funding emergency stockpiling, the sale allowed for substantially reduced costs for the civil defence within the total defence (Preuthun, 1987, p. 33). Instead, several agreements with companies and producers were signed in order to guarantee the “robustness, stamina and flexibility” in the important systems and structures of the country (ÖCB, 2002, pp. 124–125).

In 1986 the ÖCB was founded and took over the responsibility of the coordination and management of the civil defence within the total defence (Lindberg, 2017, p. 7). The focus was on crisis preparedness before or during war, and not peace time crises (ÖCB, 2002, p. 13; Andersson *et al.*, 2017, p. 10).

### 2.3.2 Finland

In 1958, state-run emergency stocks of supplies were set up and regulated in law. In addition, each branch of industry was organized into pools and could become part of the then-Ministry of Trade and Industry if the situation required it. From 1970 and onwards, appropriations for emergency stockpiling have annually been included in the State budget.

In 1978 concepts relating to emergency preparedness were developed. *Försörjningsnivå* (supply level) was to be the level of supply during crisis. *Basförsörjningsnivå* (basic supply level) the absolute minimum level and *försörjningsberedskap* (security of supply) meant stocks, production, imports and the level of rationing in relation to the expected duration of a crisis. With these new concepts in place, the security of supply level was calculated to be low, with cereal stocks being 50% of what was needed. The following year it was defined to include, among other basic needs, the access to 90% foodstuffs under all circumstances (NESA, 2018a).

A law passed in 1982 allowed the state to sign agreements with private actors and companies to store supplies in addition to their normal stocks. The state decided what was to be stored. The costs were subsidized and the agreements could be extended (970/1982, § 6, 7, 4). In 1986, the objective of security of supply was defined to be the safeguarding of the citizens’ basic livelihood under all circumstances. While 100% was the aim, 70% was put as an intermediate goal (NESA, 2018a). In 1988 the inclusion of specific workplaces in emergency planning and preparations was initiated. The pools created in the 1950s were now linked to important workplaces and enterprises (Ibid.).
2.4 End of the cold war and EU membership

The security situation improved after the Cold War. The Soviet Union had collapsed, and with it the Warsaw Pact. The YYA-treaty was on Finish initiative abandoned and the expanding EU brought prospects of lasting peace and improved security. The risk of war was low, with the reduced military capacity of Russia being one contributing factor (SRR 1/1995, p. 29,37; Försvarsberedningen, 2017). The EU membership was considered to strengthen the security of both countries. However, Finland kept its strong defence for security reasons (SRR 1/1995, p. 37).

2.4.1 Sweden

Despite the Cold War having ended, the lag om totalförvar och höjd beredskap came into force affirming the need for various parts of the society to work towards a total defence and the continuation of their regular activities in all circumstances (SFS 1992:1403). In 1995 the lag om totalförvarsplikt affirmed the Totalförvar as a collective matter and obliging all citizens between 16 and 70 to serve in the armed or civil forces during major crises or war (SFS 1994:1809).

Sweden joined the EU in 1995 and the risk of war was seen as increasingly low with the expanding European Union contributing to increased security (Försvarsdepartementet, 1995). Sweden became part of the European free-market and could no longer favour its own agricultural production, followed by a decrease of the self-sufficiency level. In Budgetproposition (1994/95:100) the stored supplies were proposed to be reduced to only meet war-time needs. From this time on, no more supplies of food were bought. With the Government bill (1996/97:4), the food supplies intended for war were seen as sufficient, given that the emergency stocks could be re-filled for one year. However, the peace-time storing of food and agriculture input was no longer seen as necessary since trade within the EU was possible even during crisis. “The security policy situation and the special conditions in the food sector mean that the Government is of the opinion that the emergency stocks can be completely wound up. The planning and security of food supply should be possible in other ways than through peace-time food stocks”\(^4\) (Försvarsdepartementet, 1996, sec. 20:3.13, translation by the author).

\(^4\) “[…] Det säkerhetspolitiska läget och de särskilda förhållandena inom livsmedelsområdet gör att regeringen anser att beredskapslagringen helt kan avvecklas. Planeringen och säkerställandet av livsmedelsförsörjningen bör kunna ske på andra sätt än genom fredstida lagring av livsmedel.”
The strong belief in the free market was reaffirmed in the Government bill *Förändrad omvärld – omdanat försvar* (1998/99:74) where the solidarity principle within the EU, WTO, the internationalization of international companies and peacetime trade patterns were put forward as signs that trade would continue to a large extent even during crisis. The increased interdependence reduced the risks. The bill also stated that the role of the state in this matter could be decreased and that emergency stocks, especially of food, could be replaced by other methods, without specifying these methods. It was also affirmed that Sweden should work internationally regarding crisis preparedness (Försvarsdepartementet, 1998).

2.4.2 Finland

Finland saw the tension from the struggle for independence in the Baltic states and adopted a different approach than Sweden. In 1991, the *beredskapslag* and the *lag om försvarstillstånd* were introduced. The *beredskapslag* stated the need for all duties within the state to be performed without disruptions in case of emergency, and all preparedness actions should be managed, supervised and coordinated by the Government and the responsible ministry (1080/1991, sec. 40:1-2), this law was active until 2011 when it was replaced. The *lag om försvarstillstånd* strengthened the ability of the state to intervene in most sectors in case of war or emergency, including assigning temporary mandatory work for all individuals between 18-68 years of age (1083/1991, § 30). While these two laws did not explicitly handle the access to food, they further allowed for crisis preparedness to become integrated into the security policy.

In 1993, NESA was founded and tasked to connect the material supplies with the economic preparedness (NESA, 2018a). During the 1990s, the focus shifted from war, trade blockades and emergency food stocks to more specific threats on critical systems and the maintenance of functions and services. The basic functions were to be ensured for one year in case of a blockade and the national production was to be able to provide the basic supply level. The risks of trade blockade were reduced by joining the EU and the goal of the emergency preparedness was defined to be the ability to ensure an independent preparedness based on national actions and resources, complemented with international cooperation such as the EU. The planning involved a 12 months crisis scenario where Finland would not be able to, or have great difficulties in acquiring necessary goods from abroad (Ibid.)
2.5 Dismantling or reinforcing food supplies

For both countries, the shift from total defense to coping with peace-time crises continued during the early 2000s (SRR 2001, p. 16; Andersson et al., 2017, p. 15). While affirming the improved security situation, Finland included the risks of regional and local conflict within the EU into the threat assessment in 2001. The risk of war was, in both countries, further seen as very low and the improved security situation in Europe was estimated to be deep and lasting with no foreseeable threat to the security of the nations (SFS 2001/02:10; SRR 2001, pp. 12–13). Finland only marginally reduced the funding of its military capacity, one major reason being that the only possibility to counter an aggressor was to exhaust the opponent, and another of Russia’s increased military capacity in the region (SRR 2001). The threat assessment of Finland and Sweden today do include disruptions in trade as a threat towards food security as well as armed attacks.

2.5.1 Sweden

2002 brought major changes to the crisis preparedness in Sweden and especially regarding food supply. The decree 2002:472 reversed the preparedness decree 1993:242, which resulted in the last emergency stocks intended for war-time being closed (SFS 2002:472), the ÖCB was replaced by KBM and hence no governmental body had the specific responsibility to ensure the food supply in crisis or war (Civilförsvarsförbundet, 2015, p. 2; Livsmedelsverket, 2017). The following year, the Fartygsuttagningskommissionen that had been in place since 1963 to select vessels that could be requisitioned by the state in the state of emergency, was closed (KÖMS, p. 8). Only three years into its work KBM concluded that in case of a crisis, food supply along with healthcare were estimated to be at a critical level after a week (KBM, 2005, p. 94).

In the Government bill 2007/08:92, a major part of the critical infrastructure was defined to be privatized, including the food supply. An effective cooperation between the public and the private sector was needed which should be based upon voluntary agreements and methods to ensure quality. Each actor having the financial responsibility to ensure basic security within its business (Försvarsdepartementet, 2007, sec. 4:8). KBM was closed in 2009, the MSB was established and took over KBM’s responsibilities as well as the responsibilities of the Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar and Statens räddningsverk (Lindberg, 2017, p. 7).

In 2010, Livsmedelsverket was given some of the responsibility for coordination of crisis and contingency planning and to assess risks. And were only responsible for the stages after
production. The following year, the level of self-sufficiency were estimated to be 50% (Civilförsvarsförbundet, 2015, p. 1). This was still the case in 2015 (Riksdagen, 2016) and the MSB proposed to ensure distribution of food consisting of 2100 kcal / day to everyone within three to four days in the event of a crisis (MSB, 2015). It was not adopted by the Government, however it was decided to rebuild the total defence and start with the civil defence within it (Andersson et al., 2017, p. 21). In 2017, the MSB recommended all households to store supplies for 72 hours and a nation-wide yearly crisis preparedness week was initiated (MSB, 2018a).

According to Ygeman, in the event of a blockade, Sweden would increase the level of self-sufficiency. However, no such plan was in place. A rise of the recommended 72 hours should wait until awareness has risen among the population (Riksdagen, 2017). No food stocks were to be reinstated, but fuel stocks are needed. A raised level of self-sufficiency might not be the most important thing since in the event of a crisis, Sweden would trade with its neighbours. The most important thing was according to Ygeman to improve IT-security (Dagens Nyheter, 2017).

The Minister for Rural Affairs, Sven-Erik Bucht, stated in 2017 that Sweden was self-sufficient in cereals, and nearly self-sufficient in chicken meat and eggs. Trade blockades are implausible, but cereals would be preferred before meat in the unlikely event (Riksdagen, 2017). Meaning that in a crisis there could be half as much food available as today, given that transportations and import to the agriculture sector work. Focusing on cereals as food during crisis, Bucht seemed to have a similar diet as the krismat during the 80s, in mind. Without specifying amounts, the Civilförsvarsförbundet consider strategic stocks of food, input material for the agriculture sector and oil to be essential if the dependency on import is as big as today (Civilförsvarsförbundet, 2015, p. 3). With a great part of the responsibility for food supply put on the households, a poll showed that while 56 % did not know about the recommendation, 66 % had already taken measures to secure food in the event of a crisis (MSB, 2016a, pp. 3, 9).

2.5.2 Finland

In 2002, a decision from the Ministry of Justice with support in law (350/2002) made at least twelve months of stored supplies of food mandatory to meet any possible crisis. The increased dependency of technology and networking to meet the goals of security of supply resulted in stockpile changes. Fuel was decreased from seven months to five, and cereals for animal use
was replaced by imported protein (NESA, 2018). In 2008, the at the time-head of the NESA, Ilkka Kananen, stated that Finland had an extensive crisis preparedness including stocks of cereals for human consumption for one year's need and seed for one harvest period to guarantee national food production (Yle Nyheter, 2008).

In 2013, the amount of stored cereals was decreased from 12 months of average consumption to six months. Protein crops, certified seeds and other necessary products are since then stored to ensure primary production. In 2014, a report from the NESA concluded that there were no acute threat to the emergency preparedness (MSB, 2016b, p. 10) and in 2015, Finland was self-sufficient or more in eggs and grain, and nearly self-sufficient in dairy products and pork meat (NESA, 2017, p. 52).

As we have seen, Sweden and Finland both have systems in place for how to cope with emergencies on all levels. There has been many similarities, but since late 1980s a significant difference regarding food supply.
Chapter 3. Analysis

The theory will be applied on the empirical data to see how the approaches to ensure food supply in a crisis can be understood and explained.

3.1 A unified approach

Both countries long had approaches best explained by realist theory. During the years of war, there were serious threats against the food supply and even independence, especially Finland’s. It is likely that the experiences affected the subsequent strong civil defences with high levels of self-sufficiency that became integrated in the security planning. The states were responsible for food supply, meaning they were the most important actors and not expected other countries or private actors to help. Indicating that a system of self-help was assumed in a world with states as the highest actors, and without permanent friends. All of which are central in realism (Waltz, 1979, p. 12; Shimko, 2013, p. 36).

Finland relied on help from the League of Nations in the 1920s, but it was very limited and could have been a way to make alliances to increase its own security. With a belief that the nations could be isolated and forced to fall back on their own resources for survival and rely on internal balancing, improving one’s own security became central, which is a fundamental part of classical realism (Waltz, 1979, pp. 163–169; Booth and Erskine, 2016, p. 56).

Sweden did not have expansion plans and Finland had in 1945 given up on reclaiming the territory lost in the wars. The concern for security by providing for the population can thus be understood as greater than to maximize power by increasing territory. This was emphasised in the 50s, when state-run emergency stocks further increased Finland’s ability to cope with crises. Indicating that the version of neo-realism defined by Waltz as defensive realism, can be used to understand the approach (Brown, McLean and McMillan, 2018).

With states as the most important actor operating in a system of self-help with no expectations of receiving help, Sweden and Finland can during this time be assumed to have had approaches best explained by classical realism and neorealism.

3.2 First steps apart

In the 1970s, Finland included annual appropriations for emergency stockpiling in the state budget and developed concepts that would ensure access to food in crises. The state was continuously responsible for the food supply. Sweden passed a rationing law and had emergency supplies for months but reduced the navy and affirmed that a naval blockade
should be settled by other means than military. Pointing towards a trust in institutions and diplomacy, rather than power.

The approaches adopted to ensure food supply during crisis in the 1970’s can be understood by using neorealist theory in Finland’s case and both neorealist and neoliberal theory in Sweden’s case.

3.3 A further divide

With private-run stocks in place in Finland by the 1980s and the state deciding what to store, the position as the most important actor was kept. Sweden had food stocks for about a year, given a limited import. The krismat plans show us that trade blockade was seen as plausible. This could, again, mean that the countries had to fall back to its own resources. While being neutral during the Cold War apart from the YYA-treaty, a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could get Finland and Sweden involved. The absence of a world government and continuously relying on national resources to ensure food supply during crisis indicates an approach best understood by realist and neorealist theories (Nye and Welch, 2011, p. 56). Seen in the light of the experiences from the wars, which included limited help from other countries, it can be argued that these decisions were rational.

However, the late 1980s brought significantly different approaches. Sweden abandoned the krismat and parts of the emergency stocks were closed, with private actors taking over. This indicates a de-centralized role of the state. Putting responsibilities on private actors can be explained by neoliberal theory (Shimko, 2013, p. 167).

To summarize, Finland continued to strengthen the Totalförsvar and aimed to be able to provide food and security for its population, which is central in neorealism. Sweden can be said to have taken the same approach until late 1980s when private actors gained increasingly important roles, which in turn is central in neoliberalist theory.

3.4 Different approaches

3.4.1 Finland

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought major changes in the security policy. The Cold war ended, the YYA-treaty was abandoned, and prospects of a peaceful future dominated. Despite this, Finland adopted laws in the early 90s that sought to improve the Totalförsvar. By the time Finland joined the EU, the threat model shifted from war and blockade to more strategic threats on critical systems. Despite a lower risk of trade blockade, the emergency supplies of
four to six months were maintained, indicating a non-teleological view on cooperation among states. Finland maintained the ability to provide their own security with their own means, if necessary. While the EU was important, it never replaced the role of the state regarding food supply but complemented it. This indicates that Finland sought to assure its own survival, which is central in neorealist theory (Booth and Erskine, 2016, p. 269).

In 2002, addition, Finland increased the supplies to twelve months and the focus further shifted from massive military attacks to withstand strategic attacks. Finland needed food to counter an aggressor during an extended period of time. In 2013, the food stocks were decreased to six months, but the work to improve society’s crisis preparedness continued. As we have seen, this is still the situation today and the organisation is well funded and an integrated part in the Finnish society.

Finland did not divert from the ability to ensure food supply at all times, with the state as the most important actor. While becoming integrated in the free market and benefiting from it, Finnish authorities still do not trust it to solve the need for food in a crisis. Finland approach to food supply in a crisis perspective can thus still today be understood by realist and neorealist theory.

3.4.2 Sweden

In the 1990’s, Sweden also passed laws to strengthen the Totalförsvar. But in the mid-90s, sold and closed emergency stocks for peace-time crises. The increased security, the EU and its market and the belief in lasting peace, can contribute to explain these decisions. The increased reliance on the market can be explained by neoliberal theory. The role of the state in providing food was decreased and reliance and expectations on the market increased. Institutions and private actors became important contributors, and the mutual security was to be achieved by cooperation among nations, which is important in neoliberal theory (Shimko, 2013, p. 167).

While peace-time emergency stocks were abandoned, war-time stocks along with a relatively high level of self-sufficiency was still present indicates that Sweden did not trust the free market to always provide what was needed. However, by 1998, institutions such as the EU and its solidarity principle, the WTO, free trade and interdependence were put forward as a guarantee that the risks were reduced and in the unlikely event of crisis, supplies would still be accessible. The supply capability was no longer to be based on self-sufficiency, but on trade. With a view that shared interests and cooperative activities will satisfy the needs and
contribute to peace, Sweden took a significant step towards trusting the market. Beliefs that are central in liberal theory.

In the 2000’s, the last food supplies were abandoned. There was a determined move toward an increased reliance in the market, a reduced role of the government and war was unthinkable. Without a responsible government agency for food supply in crises, emergency stocks and with a shrinking level of self-sufficiency, the entire accessibility of food was put on the free market. This indicates peaceful expectations and the ability to trade even in the event of war. It is possible that the flow of merchandise on the market provided a sense of continuity and opportunities for reciprocity and that trade was to reduce conflict. It is also possible that the surrounding countries and the EU were seen as an island of peace, because of its strong institutions and the unlikeliness of war (Nye and Welch, 2011, pp. 59–61). The closing of the Fartygssuttagningskommissionen in 2003, further increases the possibility that expectations of a peaceful development in the region persisted.

In less than 20 years, from 1987 to 2004, the entire organisation to ensure food supply in crisis had moved from being the responsibility of the state to be solved by the free market. In 2007, the food supply was defined as an essential service and among those that were now privatized, requiring collaboration between the private and public sector. Again, indicating an approach that can be explained by neoliberal theory. When the MSB replaced the KBM in 2009, without overtaking the responsibilities of food supply in a crisis perspective. We can see that the trust in the free-market to solve any demand of food in all circumstances had persisted. Statements from government officials today show us that this is, to a large extent, still the case. However, the food strategy in 2016 and the report from Försvarsberedningen in 2017 along with awareness raising campaign indicates that a change in the Swedish approach could lay ahead, including less reliance on the market and a shift from the prevailing neoliberal approach. These new approaches must be seen in the light of a worsened security situation involving increased Russian military activity and increased NATO presence in Europe, increased risks of terrorism, tensions within the European Union and an unpredictable president in the United States.
Chapter 4. Conclusion

To answer the research questions, we have seen many similarities regarding food supply in a crisis perspective. To summarize the most important; extensive emergency stocks, readjustment plans on self-sufficiency, crisis plans on all levels, access to the European market and recommending households to store supplies at home.

The main differences started in the late 1980s when Sweden abandoned the *krisman* and closed half of the agriculture supplies. The differences grew stronger when the countries joined the EU. War was unthinkable, and Sweden saw the free market as a way to obtain supplies at all times. Emergency stocks were unnecessary and were closed along with the agency responsible for food supply in crisis in 2002. Finland saw the EU as a complement to national preparedness and vital emergency stocks, but not as a replacement and in 2002, increased its stocks to twelve months. A strong Finnish defence was seen as positive for the EU and for Finland. The free market is seen as important for Finland, but not as a guarantee to food during crisis, which is another indication to why Finland never dismantled their emergency stocks.

Finland’s approach to crisis preparedness can to a large extend be explained by realist and neorealist theories. This because of the strong focus on survival and security and by incorporating food supply into the security policy. Plans were developed to ensure the country to function in the event of blockade and without help from outside. The focus has been, and still is to ensure the basic needs of food at all times, by their own means if necessary.

Sweden’s approach can, with some exceptions, best be explained by using realist and neorealist theory until the late 1980s. This was when the idea started shifting from having resources within the country to be based on trade and interdependence. This continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s with an increasingly reduced role of the state and an increased belief in the free market to create interdependence and peace among the European states. From then the approach can better be explained by liberal and neoliberal theories.

Reconnecting to the field of humanitarian action and conflict. We have investigated how Sweden and Finland prepare to meet the basic need of food in a crisis. While Finland can be said to be very prepared, Sweden could by the lack of a stable food supply program, within days become dependent on humanitarian relief as well as being unable to provide relief to surrounding countries, should a major disruption in trade occur within the EU. It could be argued that Sweden to a large extend assume peace and stability. While Finland
undoubtedly also expect peace, the food supply is given much attention to cope with a crisis. Sweden put trust in the EU to prevent conflict and solve the need of food, meaning Sweden assume that countries will collectively solve any crisis. Similarly, Finland can be said to not trust the EU to ensure food at all times, and if the EU fails to prevent conflict, national resources are needed to ensure food supply for the population.

It is possible that Sweden has seen the EU as a self-sufficient unit, and by being a member, the food supply is assured. Finland might not have seen the EU in the same way. Further studies could include investigations on how the EU has been perceived by the Swedish and Finnish leaders, and how this might have affected the decisions on food supply in a crisis perspective.
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