From Combatants to Civilians.
The dos and don’ts when reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life

A Comparative Case Study on Reintegration Efforts in Post-Conflict Societies.

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1.1 Introduction

When a state that has been entrenched in intra-state conflict transitions to peace, the way towards peace is marred with a number of pitfalls and uncertainties. Around 56% of the states that have been struck by intra-state conflict, find themselves in a new intra-state conflict (Walter, 2010). How come? And how does one go about to avoid these traps? This has been a theoretical puzzle asked in the field of post-conflict development. The answers to this puzzle has generated varied answers, and in these answers the role that the ‘international community’ should take also varies. A key question in the task of building peace is to know how to deal with the combatants who took part of the conflict, and whose actions during the transition either can undermine or strengthen the process (Kilroy, 2014).

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs are one of the many answers to the theoretical puzzle presented above. The role of DDR is to quell conflicts and strengthen the chances of for peace. DDR has been a part of post-conflict reconstruction, being conducted all over the world from Afghanistan and Haiti. The bulk of them has occurred in Africa, there has been around 24 of them since 1992 (Hanson, 2008). Hansson argues that reintegration is the most difficult phase of any DDR process. This is due to the fact that plenty of the donors have the idea that as soon as the ex-combatants are disarmed the peacebuilding is complete (ibid).

Thusly DDR is an integral part of the international community’s response to intervene. Yet the effectiveness of this is very varied, in particular the reintegration aspect of the process. Partly as a consequence of being the last part of the process, reintegration and how it is implemented relies more on assumptions rather than evidence. Assumptions regarding how states and its inhabitant’s acts after an intra-state conflict factor strongly in how reintegration is conceptualized which at times tends to be so broad that it ends up ineffective (Jennings, 2008: 328).

There is a dilemma regarding reintegration which is both present in theory and practice. It concerns whether reintegration efforts are meant to address the structural issue and the root of the conflicts of or if reintegration efforts should focus on addressing the idleness of the soldiers after conflicts (ibid: 331).
1.2 Aim and Research Question

Reintegration is the last phase of the program, it is seen as the bridge for combatants who are enrolled to be a part of society as a whole again. As mentioned before, as more focus is put on the two first steps on the program the third step is usually neglected or wrongly enacted in post-conflict settings. This thesis aims at examining reintegration efforts, more specifically the temporal dilemma in reintegration. I.e. the questions regarding whether actors should focus on short-term efforts or long-term efforts of reintegration. By doing this it is the authors hope to deepen the understanding of reintegration efforts in post-conflict development.

Thus in order to find out where most efforts should be put in these post-conflict development processes, the aim of this thesis is find out the relationship between reintegration efforts of ex-combatants and peace. This will be conducted in a between case comparison and evaluating how reintegration efforts fare regarding on whether efforts are made in long term or short term efforts.

Thusly the question for this thesis is: *How does short- and long-term reintegration efforts affects the outcome of the peace or lack thereof?*
2.1 Theoretical Background

The focus of this section is to review the current literature and theories in the field of interest.

Post-conflict Development

The World Bank is a vital actor in aid and development who states that nations which have been ravished by intrastate conflict finds themselves between a rock and a hard place, between pervasive poverty and renewed round of conflict. The former makes societies more vulnerable to violent conflict, the latter makes them more vulnerable to stuck in the poverty trap. Albeit the concept of the poverty traps is a contested one, the concept helps convey the situation that some states find themselves in following an intra-state conflict. Post-conflict development is a school of thought that seeks to overcome this hurdle. The concept post-conflict development may have at first been motivated by the desire to return to former status quo for development strategies, such as market orientation, liberalization, privatization etc. far too quickly following violent conflicts by international actors such as the World Bank. However this changed, the World Bank and others followed the line set by scholars and beneficiaries of development aid. By broadening their approach from focusing on returning to the status quo at the time towards focusing on understanding the root causes of conflict, addressing the needs of people in post-conflict situations and promote assistance to minimize the risk of renewed conflict (Junne and Verkoren, 2005: 2). Post-conflict development is simply put a field of three clashes of ideas. Peacebuilding, conflict recurrence prevention and development.

Peacebuilding and Peace in Post-conflict Development

According to author Michelle Maiese, there are two ways of understanding peace building. One that follows the UNs definition, namely that peace building is a long-term process that occurs after violent conflict has slowed down or has stopped. The ‘building’ consists of a wide range of activities that is related capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation. The other way of understanding peacebuilding sees it as an umbrella concept that encompasses peace making and peace keeping (Maiese, 2003).

Peace is an overwhelming concept that can be used unclear in the literature. Galtung divided the concept into two, dubbed as negative or positive peace. The definition of negative peace can generally be stated as the absence of collective violence. In other words, violence between more or less big groups of people. This definition does not cover the occasional homicide or
similar unpatented individual violence. Galtung states that this is problematic due to the fact that centralization around dominant powers are common in post conflict societies. The dominant power can make sure that some are disadvantaged in the peace and as the small powers are unable to mount any viable political opposition it can make them marginalized (Galtung 1967:13).

Positive peace is harder to define. Factors such as freedom from fear, freedom from want, economic growth, absence of exploitation, pluralism, justice and equality equates to positive peace. Being an almost utopian definition of peace, no actual state can fully reach positive peace and it is hard to measure in reality in contrast to negative peace. However the strength of the concept lies in its ability to ‘rate’ the state of peace. It is not black and white but rather one can use it as a scale. This peace works as a synonym for particularly cooperation and integration between human groups. Less emphasis is put on the absence of violence (ibid: 14-15). Negative peace has many pitfalls, however it still can and should be used to a degree in peacebuilding According to Shields (2017) conflicts are often complex and in such situations the absence of war can be the best solution for the moment to alleviate tension from the civilian people. Negative peace is also in some regards more tangible than positive peace. When contrasting the absence of collective violence in to freedom from want, one can see why negative peace had has much of the attention in peace building. (Sheilds, 2017: 5). The overarching aim for both efforts are according to Royce Anderson, namely to creating conditions for creating institutions that in turn can sustain durable peace (Anderson, 2004).

**Conflict Recurrence Prevention**
In their discussion of what peace is and what peacebuilding is, the authors often misses out on what peace in a post-conflict development may entail. The fact that states can find themselves in either cycles of violence or poverty is something that is neglected.

This aspect is highlighted in the sub-school of conflict recurrence prevention. In their article Collier et al study the reduction of the risk of a recurring conflict (Collier et al, 2008: 461). Post conflict peace is what most of us imagen it to be, a fragile state of flux where uncertainty looms. This is maybe why around half of all civil wars are due to post conflict relapses (ibid: 462).

The authors’ link economic recovery and risk reduction as complementary to each other meaning that economic recovery may reduce risks and that risk reduction may speed economic recovery. They state that there are stages in international post conflict practice. The
first stage in the sequence starts while the conflict is still continuing. This is to achieve a negotiated settlement rather than allow the conflict to continue until one side has reached victory. The second stage is the relatively light presence of peacekeeping troops. The third stage is to encourage a constitution which provide for a degree of democracy. The authors state that intervention is seen essentially as pump priming democracy. The fourth stage is that during its period of presence in the country, the international interventions should be conducted in a way as to leave a light foot print. The fifth stage is to gain acceptance for the settlement through post-conflict elections. The sixth stage is the withdrawal of international peacekeeping troops. The authors state that the election can serve as a milestone for this withdrawal (ibid: 463).

The lacuna in the ideas put forth by Collier et al (2008) is the over emphasis on external assistance, institution building and neglecting the role of local actors. In addition to this the idea that elections can serve as milestone for when to withdrawal is a narrow focus of conflict prevention, withdrawal should not be done to early as learned from Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In addition to this Collier and his ilk often misses the importance that development can have in post conflict society.

**Economic and Social Development**

Economic and social development gives incentive to look beyond the past at the same time, the past is not forgotten. It can give people other perspectives in life rather than continuous fighting. Simply put development can make the people more resistant to renewing conflict (Junne and Verkoren, 2005: 1). If the economy remains stagnant following a conflict during a decade the risks of intra-state conflict recurrence is 42, 1% where as if the economy grows 10% per year the decade risk falls to 26, 9%. Other things being equal, international post conflict efforts should be concentrated disproportionately in the poorest countries and should focus heavily upon economic recovery according to the authors (Collier et al, 2008: 469). At the very basic of post conflict development is the need for security, if there is none then it becomes hard to attract investors in development initiatives.

**Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration**

The UN defines Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration as a process of removing weapons form the hands of former combatants, removing them from their groups and to
reintegrate them into society (UN, 2018). DDR can act as a bridging mechanism between these sub schools discusses under previous sections.

This process aims to deal with post conflict security problems that emerges when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period stretching from conflict to peace. Disarmament is the collection, documentation control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often of the civilian people. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs that are designed to manage the flow of arms after the disarmament process. Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants, to the massing of troops in camps. The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package proceeded to the demobilized which is either called reinsertion or reintegration depending on context. Reintegration is the process by which former fighters’ acquire civilian status and gains sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long- and short-term external assistance (UN, 2014: 25).

As mentioned before, when planning and conducting post-conflict development initiatives security is a priority. Threats to security in a region emerging from conflict can come in many shapes such as military, economic or political. A state or region without peace and security is doomed for a marginal existent locked in perpetual insecurity. The response to this threats has to be flexible and broad, using the tools available to deal with it. Institutions or institution building is often emphasised as the method of dealing with such threats, however since institutions are not created overnight, alleviating and eliminating the threat of collective violence is a first step. A way of conducting this is the successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants following violent conflict. When combatants are asked to give up their arms, they face a vital step either a step towards peace and development or a step toward more conflict. If the former is chosen, it represents that the ex-combatants have faith in a chance for peace (Salomens, 2005: 19).

The beginning of a DDR process needs to start with a realistic political scenario where the means of continued warfare has dried up in other words the conflict must be ripe for de-escalation. A dilemma that DDR faces is the task of prioritizing who should be the beneficiaries. On one hand we have former combatants who can be a threat to security on the other we have the civilians who have faced the full blunt of the conflict in most cases. To
overcome this dilemma, those in charge need to make sure that the worst offenders do not get rewards for their actions, in conducting the process with the local population one can make sure of this (ibid: 22-23).

Some of the pitfalls of DDR has been addressed in the following evolution of the programme. The second generation of DDR included an additional R for resettlement or reinsertion. The third generation of the programme has been dubbed DD triple R or DDRRR. The two additional R’s stands for reparation and resettlement. These newer approaches aims at mitigating the tension between civilian and combatants as well as working from a bottom-up approach to fill the gaps between the classic DDR steps (Clark, 2011, 381).

The focal point of this thesis will focus on the original DDR programme. This is due to the fact that in both of the cases respective peace agreement called for a DDR initiative as a conflict resolution mechanism, thus none utilized the newer generations of DDR (Security Council, 1992; Security Council, 2003).

DDR must be seen and conducted as a holistic process, meaning that every step needs to be integrated closely into the whole. It is essential that these process are planed interconnected to each other, if one strain is neglected the others will suffer as a consequence (Salomons, 2005: 25). Thus the role of DDR and even more importantly the role of reintegration is a bridging effort in the post conflict development from conflict to peace.
2.2 Theoretical framework

As mentioned briefly, there is a clash of ideas between the different sub schools within post conflict development. One that is apparent in the theories is between peacebuilding and democratization. A dilemma here is the trade-off situations democracy without peace or peace without democracy (Jarstad, 2008: 17). These dilemmas are referred to as the horizontal dilemma, the systemic dilemma and the temporal dilemma. The aim of Jarstad is to identify and enhance these at some time incompatible tasks of peacebuilding and democratization. A broad conclusion by Jarstad is that when deciding what to prioritize, peace outweighs democratization (ibid: 18).

The horizontal dilemma represents the issue of which groups should be represented in the process of peace and democracy and those who should not be. Jarstad discuss this dilemma mainly from a power sharing and Security Secretor Reform perspective, however this is also applicable to dilemma of who should be a part of DDR. While groups may have a legitimate reason to demand inclusion in the process after a period of oppression and discrimination and that warring parties are more inclined to sign peace agreements if they are guaranteed a new type of life. A consequence of having violent parties are included in the process is that it may deteriorate the democratization. Such inclusion may be perceived as a reward for violence (ibid: 22).

The systemic dilemma refers to the idea or question regarding who the owner of the process(es) are. On the one hand, international or similar actors may be a necessary to end violence and to mitigate a smooth shift from violence to peace during transition. In addition to this these actors may promote stability and institutions for conflict management. However on the other hand, sustainable peacebuilding and democratization depend on local knowledge and context specific facts that may be hard to gain as an outsider (ibid: 24).

The third and last dilemma, the temporal dilemma concerns the trade-offs between short- and long-term efforts and effects off these process. Thus there is a clash between weather to address the immediate post conflict issues or the underlying problems that the conflict has created. This dilemma differs from the systemic dilemma which is more oriented to the content and actors of the peacebuilding initiative. The temporal dilemma is fundamentally about the trade-offs between time specific tasks such as longterm efforts such as democratization which in the short run could increase the risk of violence and short-term efforts such as an armistice to stop violence which in the longer run could have adverse consequences on the democratization (ibid: 25). Although these dilemmas are formulated by
an author who focuses on the clash between democratization and peacebuilding. This thesis will use the last theory/dilemma regarding the temporal concerns and apply it to the goals of the reintegration phase. Jennings (2008) mentioned the temporal dilemma in brief. Jennings highlights a dilemma regarding reintegration which is both present in theory and practice, whether it is meant to resolve the root of the problem or should it focus on addressing the immediate idleness of the soldiers after conflicts (Jennings, 2008: 331).

The theory or causal story of the thesis. Whereas long-term efforts for the reintegration phase may lead to a turbulent start, in the long run it will sustain a more positive peace. Short-term efforts for the reintegration phase, will mitigate violence form the outset and in the long run it will sustain a more negative peace. A concept definition of long/short term efforts as well as positive and negative peace will be further explained in the operationalisations.

The causal mechanism for this is the following: Reintegration that focus on addressing the idleness of the former soldiers by vocational training or cash grants would lead to a situation where the soldiers might attain another source of living than living by the gun. However, the underlying causes of conflict may linger on and thus lead on to a negative peace or lack of peace in worst case. Whereas reintegration efforts that focuses on reintegrating former combatants into society by addressing their needs and the structural issues of post-conflict societies. The complexity in addressing the root of the structural issues is not an easy task which may lead to a longer process that can cause issues such as no peace at all but if done correctly it can lead to a positive peace. The theoretical framework for this thesis can be seen summed up bellow.

Figure 1

- Short-term reintegration efforts
- Long-term reintegration efforts
- Negative Peace
- Positive Peace
- DDR
3.1 Case Selection and Research Design

The scope conditions for the case selection are the following, African states where there has been a presence of a UN mandate. This is due to the fact that a number of the world's recurring conflicts take place in Africa and as stated previously the bulk of DDR programs have and are taking place in Africa. I included presence of UN personnel due to the fact that excluding them could alter the outcome of the conflicts severely in addition to that DDR is in most aspects a UN initiative. This thesis compares the reintegration efforts of Mozambique and Liberia. They were chosen due to the fact that they have been perceived as success stories of DDR (Alusala and Dye, 2010: 4).

The number of cases that were chosen is largely as consequence of the limited time and space for the thesis. With this in mind the generalizability of the study is limited however eventual findings may serve as spring board to areas further study. The cases were chosen strategically on the variation of the independent variable.

In order to rule out alternative variables that could be confounding variables and to utilize mills method of difference, the cases needs to be comparable. Simply put they have to be similar in order to rule out alternative explanations, for a reliable analysis.

The following control variables for this thesis: cross country ties, conflict duration, conflict incompatibility and conflict termination which importance or unimportance will be discussed in the later. These are not the only factors that can influence a state towards one case of action over the other, however I deem these factors to be the most important for the research question.
3.2 Method of Analysis

This thesis is a qualitative study between two cases where civil war has been a part of the daily basis for a period of time. In order to test my hypothesis based on the theoretical discussion above, I have chosen two cases with variation on the independent variable. This is necessarily due to the fact that you cannot explain a constant with a variable. The comparative strategy utilized in this paper is structured focus comparison (SFC).

The method of SFC is a between-case design that focuses on specific aspects of the cases to help evaluate the theoretical framework that can be summed up in figure 1. The structured part of the comparison refers to a set of questions that will be asked to the material. The material in turn which compose of different aspects regarding the variables, this is in order to ensure the material in turn comparable. The questions in turn will be formulated on the same basis, meaning that they are formulated to pick up different aspects of the variables. The questions one by one do not generate much however holistically they aim at giving a thorough picture of the independent variable, the cases and the dependent variable. In this way the research obtains crucial, systemic and consistent data on the crucial variables of the thesis (Powner, 2015).

Control variables

As mentioned above, the control variables are chosen in order to evaluate whether there may be an alternative factor that explains the outcome. Cross country ties are chosen due to the fact that conflicts can spill over into neighbouring states and change the dynamics of the conflict. Which can in turn make it harder to reach a sustainable peace. A large portion of current intra-state conflicts are characterized by cross country ties. These ties as briefly mentioned can change the dynamics of the conflict, these could be economical, ethnical or pragmatically political. These ties are common in the conflicts in Africa, which in part can be attributed to the problematic boarder dimensions that were drawn by colonial powers (Fjelde, 2012: 62). The second control variable is added due to the fact that as conflicts are prolonged the underlying causes of armed conflict may change and thus change the stakes of the conflict for the actors. Conflict duration can also have an impact on how the chances of peace may turn out, where collier states that as longer conflicts drag on the harder it may be to resolve the conflict peacefully (Collier et al 2003: 100). The incompatibility of the conflict can have detrimental impact in how it is later resolved. Incompatibilities of conflicts are central when understanding the conflict, the motives of the actors and the possibilities of conflict.
resolutions. Thus understanding the incompatibilities of the cases are vital when analysing them (Wallensteen, 2012: 4). The last control variable is added due to the fact that whether the conflict is terminated through a decisive victory or reached agreement can have effect on the outcome of the peace (ibid: 141).

Other factors such as ethnic fragmentation of the states, level of grievances within the state, and natural resources were not chosen as controlling variables for this thesis. The reason why the ethnic fragmentation of the states was not chosen is due to the fact that it in times fail to explain why the level of ethnic fragmentation at times does nothing to affect the behaviour of the population. As discussed in Wangel and Blomkvist (2013) who researched how population heterogeneity affects the population’s attitudes towards collective action. When it comes to the second possible controlling variable. It was left out on the basis that it is problematic to operationalize level of grievances within a state. When it comes to natural resources. Ross (2004) discusses, natural resources can influence an intra-state conflict and also finds a high correlation between states in Africa who have natural resources face a higher risk of facing some form of conflict. Albeit this is an interesting factor that could in itself be a topic to research however in the cases of Mozambique and Liberia, natural resource did not become the most contested topic and thus it will not be used in this thesis.

**Independent variable**

The reintegration of ex-combatants into society is the independent variable. As was with the dependent variable, this concept also needs a definition. Reintegration is the process by which former fighters’ acquire civilian status and gains sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long- and short-term external assistance (UN, 2014:25). As mentioned briefly there is a temporal dilemma regarding reintegration. Long-term reintegration efforts and short-term reintegration efforts. In order to measure these two concepts correctly, a survey of question will be introduced.

**Short-term reintegration efforts operationalisations**

*Does the peace agreement entail provisions for reintegration efforts and are they implemented?*

This is included to create a baseline for reintegration and to see if they are implemented in any shape or form.
Are cash grants used in the reintegration efforts?
Since the ex-combatants lose their source of income following discharge of demobilization. They may be in a critical financial situation and thus the former combatants are in need of a transitional safety net, cash assistance could be provided as a monthly or weekly allowance. The reinsertion cash grants are often in practice used as reintegration cash grants (Knight and Özerdem, 2007).

Is pay and scatter a part of the reintegration effort?
Paying and scattering ex-combatants is an effort that scatters ex-combatants in order for dispersing the rebel network following a demobilization phase where cash is given for compliance. It is seen as a vital way of overcoming the idleness of ex-combatants. Since the speed of implementation is at times an important criterion for any reintegration measure because ex-combatants are most vulnerable in the first two years after demobilization (Colletta et al, 1996: 18).

Does the reintegration efforts include vocational training?
Reintegration is the last step of the DDR process. Finding an alternative to living by the gun is an important aspect of being reintegrated into society. This vocational training is often in some cases confined to vocational training in one or two fields of work (Hansson, 2007).

Long-term reintegration efforts operationalisations

Is every ex-combatant eligible to inclusion in reintegration?
If reintegration efforts are targeted towards men as well as women, there is a higher probability of long-term success (Knight and Özerdem, 2007: 502).

Are there any job creating initiatives?
Creating public sector employment may be effective for preventing unemployment. That is included in some reintegration efforts. They may aim in creating special labour-intensive public works may provide immediate employment opportunities for many unskilled ex-combatants (Colletta et al, 1996: 19).
Does the reintegration efforts include educational training?
Educational training initiatives can serve to alleviate the immediate idleness of soldiers as well as quelling some grievances that ex-combatants may have about their lives.

Has the community where the ex-combatants going to resettle been informed or sensitized?
It is often overlooked how well community that has been ridden by conflict for year can support and integrate ex-combatants into their societies. Thus this question is included to see if there has been any type of information towards the communities.

Dependent variable
In order to measure the dependent variable peace, one must have a clear definition. As mentioned in the theoretical background there are two types of peace in post conflict development. For the definition of negative peace for this theses will be the absence of large scale violence after the peace agreement has been signed. To test this test this hypothesis in the two cases, a survey of questions has been developed to encapsulate the variable.

Negative peace operationalization
Has battle related deaths reached over 25 in a calendar year?
In order to discern whether the actors can fully implement a peace agreement, the question “Has battle related deaths reached over 25 in a calendar year?” was included in the questioner. Uppsala Conflict Data Program uses the number 25 to measure if a state has reached the threshold for armed violence, thus the number was picked.

Has a new round of violence occurred following the peace agreement?
If the both parties are unsatisfied or angered with the outcome of the peace agreement, their actions could result in a new round of violence, thus the question.

One sided violence absent?
A part of the intrastate conflicts, one sided violence is a used tactic by leaders in order to show their force and to illustrate how the other side is not capable of protecting its own, in addition it can be used to show dissatisfaction from the lower ranks with in a group and thus
making the groups position harder to negotiate with. Using the question “Is one sided violence absent?” I argue will illustrate whether the implemented peace agreement is followed.

**Return to normal?**

During times of intrastate conflict, normal institutions are largely absent. “Return to normal?” is a question to explore whether a state’s institutions are functioning at a normal rate such as holding elections etc.

As mentioned previously there is another kind of peace definition that is required additionally when one is researching post-conflict development. The definition for positive peace that this theses will work with is from Johan Galtung that addresses normal violence as well as structural violence.

**Positive peace operationalization**

**Absence of organized violence?**

Although absence of organized violence is the definition for negative peace. One needs absence of violence as a baseline in cultivating for a positive peace (Turan, 2016: 133). What is defined as organized violence is borrowed from Uppsala Conflict Data Programs conflict definition where it is defined as at least 25 battle related deaths (UCDP Database, 2018).

**Is the political landscape pluralistic?**

One of Galtung’s points regarding positive peace conditions that states should contain a variety of actors within the societal and cultural landscape in a peaceful coexistence. In this thesis it will be applied to the political landscape in order to evaluate in some aspects whether the state apparatus makes place for multiple actors (Galtung, 1967: 15).

**Is horizontal inequality present in post-conflict society?**

One of his definitions on positive peace is absence of exploitation. By this Galtung means that all interactions between individuals, groups or different actors within society should be met on equal terms, and thus feel equally protected by the state who has monopoly over violence. This is meant to capture any aspect of horizontal inequality (ibid).
Absence of civil and political abuse?
Among the traits of Galtung positive peace is freedom of action. What this entails is all individuals are free from oppression and are able to pursue their civil and political rights. This is meant to capture any aspect of vertical inequality (ibid).

Has there been growth in economic or development following the conflict termination?
This is to measure whether there has been a change in the state rather than a return to normalcy. Included to evaluate whether any of the economic and human development grievances are met in the post-conflict recovery.

Source of Material
The empirical and theoretical material used for this thesis was collected from open sources mostly through the university’s library collection. Where the articles and studies picked have been peer review which should alleviate some concern regarding the reliability of the cases. The information regarding peace agreements have been accessed from UN documents and peace agreements. For the news articles I have gone about selecting the ones with a good journalistic principle and with the content being as factual as possible. For the data regarding the number of battle related deaths and the defining for them the study collected said data from the UCDP.
4.1 Case Study Liberia

Background

Unlike most African states, Liberia was established as a safe haven for freed slaves from the Americas 1822. Shortly their after in 1847 it gained its independence. During the 20th century the state declared war on Germany, thus giving the allies a base in West Africa during the First World War. During the 80’s the state found itself in a rough patch. The sergeant of the military, Samuel Doe carried out a successful military coup and suspended the constitution and assumed full power. During this coup president William Tolbert was executed with 13 of his aides. In 1985 after Doe’s regime allows a return of political parties following pressure from the US, Doe wins the presidential election. During the end of the decade in 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by a Charles Taylor mounts an uprising against Doe’s government (BBC, 2018).

The conflict in Liberia can be divided into two main phases. One phase is the conflict that ranged from 1989-1995 between the government of Liberia and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF) and the splinter faction Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The onset of the conflict was marked when Charles Taylor who had previously been a part of Doe’s government but fled the country after being accused of embezzling. Taylor reentered Liberia with support from the government of Burkina Faso and the Ivorian president Félix Houphouet-Boigny (UCDP Database 1, 2018).

The offensive by NPLF was met by unrestricted levels of violence by Doe’s men. The consequences of this was that members of the affected groups either joined or supported NPLF forces. The violence was answered with more violence by the NPLF who were also forcibly recruiting child soldiers. The balance of power shifted toward the NPLF during the first half of the 1990’s and their advance in the country was fast (ibid).

Doe’s forces the Armed forces of Liberia (AFL) derogate from a national armed forces into an organization of armed bandits and members began forming their own factions often on the bases of ethnic affiliation. Taylors NPFL fractured into the formulation of the Independent INPFL led by a Prince Johnson. In June 1990 Monrovia the capitol of Liberia was under siege, when Doe was apprehended and subsequently killed by INPFL forces. Two months after this in an attempt to quell the chaos, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) launched a peacekeeping mission. Which was composed of troops from neighboring states and led by Nigeria. The operation was named Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was successful in preventing NPFL
forces from taking control of the capitol. Which however led to the creation of Taylors ‘Greater Liberia’ who at one point consisted of 90% of the total territory of the state (ibid).

Taylor was also involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone where he assisted Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front in its attacks against the Government of Sierra Leone. The Liberian army and the Doe government soon began to spawn new faction, one of them was The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) who joined forces with ECOMOG in an alliance to oppose Charles Taylor’s NPLF. At the same time negotiations had been taking place between the NPFL, the INPFL, ECOWAS and the Liberian interim government, this lead to the disbanding of the INPFL as a show of good faith. Taylor objected to the terms due to the fact that the leaders of the warring factors would not be allowed to lead the interim government, in addition to the fact that implementing the agreement would entail a loss of power and to disband Taylor’s ‘Grater Liberia’. The peace process ultimately collapsed when Taylor tried to seize the capitol once again in 1992 which failed but only after widespread destruction of the capital. Which compelled ECOMOG to call for reinforcements that in time pressured Taylor enough to opt for negotiations which resumed in 1993. This phase of negotiation was also marred with conflict. This negotiation phase led to the Cotonou agreement in which the ULIMO and the NPLF agreed on a joint power-share over governance to rule the state until fair elections could be held, which ultimately failed due to the NPFL’s refusal to disarm (ibid).

This back and forth continued until the international community pressured the warlords which finally marked an end to the first phase of the civil war when the parties met and signed an agreement in Abuja in 1996 which at the time seemed to hold. The agreement stipulated that an election was to be held the following year. Elections were indeed held in 1997 which was won by Charles Taylor, however Taylor’s presidency was not a peaceful one (ibid). Taylor won a free and fair presidential election according to international observers. This was however not the end of conflict in Liberia. The new century also brought more conflict. Liberia is accused of supporting rebels in Sierra Leone which leads donors to threaten to suspend aid (BBC, 2018).

His involvement in Guinea Bissau was answered with the formation of an opposition against Taylor called the Liberians United for Reconciliation (LURD), that in essence was the reformation of faction of ULIMO. They began an attacking Taylors forces which escalated into an armed conflict in 2000 (UCPD Database, 2018).

The second phase from 2000-2003 where Charles Taylor engaged in conflict against LURD and its faction Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). One can say that the second
phase was in most regards a continuation of the one that it followed, however under new group dynamics. As negotiations and military pressure mounted against Taylor, he stepped down as president in August 2003. Under his vice president, Moses Blah a peace agreement was signed (ibid).

The Liberians United for Reconciliation (LURD) have begun mounting attacks towards the government. The road leading up to the eventual peace agreement of 2003 was a violent one where several hundred people are killed during a battle of Monrovia. The agreement is signed when Taylor exiles himself when Nigerian peacekeepers arrive in August of 03 and hands over power to his deputy Moses Blah who signs the Accra peace agreement (BBC, 2018).

The analysis of the case will be focused on the time period following the Accra Peace agreement of 2003.

Independent variable results - Short-term efforts.

*Does the peace agreement entail provisions for reintegration efforts and are they implemented?*
Yes. The Accra peace agreement as many other peace agreements called for a Disarmament Demobilization and reintegration program (Nilsson, 2009: 21). The reintegration efforts were added in the peace agreement and implemented in October 2004 (Paes, 2005: 255).

*Are cash grants used in the reintegration efforts?*
Yes. Cash grants are used as both reinsertion and reintegration efforts (ibid: 245).

*Is pay and scatter a part of the reintegration effort?*
No, other avenues regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants were utilized in the efforts (ibid).

*Does the reintegration efforts include vocational training?*
Yes. Ex-combatants who wanted and were eligible to partake in the DDR received in most cases some kind of formal or vocational training (Bøås and Hatløy, 2008: 48)

Independent variable results – Long-term efforts

*Is every ex-combatant eligible to inclusion in reintegration?*
Yes. Women and Children, groups who often are overlooked or ignored in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs were included in Liberia’s reintegration efforts (Nilsson, 2009: 29).

*Are there any job creating initiatives?*
Yes. United Nation Mission in Liberia (UNIMIL) implemented a series of job creating initiatives which targeted a number of the conflict afflicted communities (Tamagnini and Krafft, 2010).

*Does the reintegration efforts include educational training?*
Yes. The reintegration consisted of formal education, vocational training, public works training, agricultural, and livestock or fishing programs. In addition to this those enrolled in the reintegration programs were to receive a monthly stipend while participating and have their school fees paid for up to three years (Jennings, 2008: 329).

*Has the community where the ex-combatants going to resettle been informed or sensitized?*
Yes. There was a National Information and Sensitization Campaign in Liberia which took place in 2005. This campaign sought out to inform both the ex-combatants as well as community stakeholders about the DDR process. This took place about a year after DDR had begun (UNDP, 2006: 29).

**Dependent variable results – Negative Peace**

*Has battle related deaths reached over 25 in a calendar year?*
No (UCDP Database 1, 2018).

*Has a new round of violence occurred following the peace agreement?*
No. As of the Accra peace agreement, no new round of violence has emerged in Liberia (ibid).

*One sided violence absent?*
No (ibid).
Return to normal?
Yes. The presidential election of 2005 was a successful and peaceful one where Ellen Johnson Sirleaf won the presidential race (Harris, 2012:161).

Dependent variable results - Positive Peace

Absence of organized violence?
Yes (UCDP Database 1, 2018).

Is the political landscape pluralistic?
Yes. The presidential election in 2005 had several different candidates and the ruling government was replaced following a calm election in most regards (Harris, 2012: 168).

Are horizontal inequalities present in post-conflict society?
Yes. As was the case during prior to the conflict outbreak, the economic and societal arena is in most aspects dominated by the Americo-Liberian elite (Waldorf, 2018: 10).

Absence of civil and political abuse?
Yes. Despite claims that Johnson-Sirleaf had a familiar relationship with Prince Johnson backed her for personal gains in the election (BBC, 2011). The political landscape following the civil war was unusual with the major rebel parties and actors disbanding and not in the fore front of the election, this left the political arena one consisted of civilians in a level playing field. (Harris 2012: 183).

Has there been growth in economic or development following the conflict termination?
Yes. The Human development index, which is an index that not only captures the economic development but human development as well that entails dimensions such as life expectancy and levels of education within a state. Liberia has gone from 0,335 in 2003 to a 0,427 in 2015 whereas the world as a whole scores a 0,710 (HDI, 2018).
4.2 Case Study Mozambique

Background

Present day Mozambique came about following a violent independence war where Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) and its armed branch popular forces for the Liberation of Mozambique FPLM. The conflict between the Frelimo and the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) was one fought over government power (UCDP Database 2, 2018).

Mozambique was as many African states a colony. Up until the second half of the 20th century, it was a Portuguese colony. In 1962 exiled activists from Mozambique met in Tanzania to form Frelimo who opposed the colonial rule. In 1964 Frelimo begin their war of independence which wages on in 11 years when following a military coup in Portugal a new government emerges and supports the independence for the Portuguese colonies. Portugal and Frelimo sing the Lusaka Accords in 1974 which marks Portugal’s exodus from Mozambique who gain independence in 1975 (BBC 1, 2018). Before the colonial power left Mozambique they requested for elections to be held. This request was rejected by Frelimo who saw itself as the only legal political party and established control over the state as the government (UCDP Database 2, 2018). Frelimo ruled under a single-party socialist system. In the following year Renamo an opposition to Frelimo is set up with support from white Rhodesian officers (BBC 1, 2018).

The new independence was perceived as a threat to the white regimes in both Rhodesia and South Africa. This perceived threat was increased when the newly formed government openly supported Rhodesian Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and South Africa’s African national Congress (ANC). Frelimo was from the very beginning a socialist movement and during the early years of independence the party was popular among the citizens. However this changed as growing dissatisfaction as a number of un-favourable programs and policies were to be implemented. The introduction of one specific policy called the ‘socialisation of the countryside’ that promoted collective agriculture, banned traditional beliefs and ceremonies, taking away power from tribunal kings and the shutdown of church-run social projects alienated the party from the people who lived on the countryside.

This was perceived as a ‘ripe’ opportunity for the white regimes in the area to set up the creation of counter-revolutionary forces in the region since the dissatisfaction with Frelimo was high in the countryside. Those who were willing to fight the government were also from FPLM deserters in northern Mozambique. In addition to this there were some Portuguese
army members still in the country who were a part of this opposition. In 1976 a radio transmission from Rhodesia stated that the conditions to wage a war against the government was underway in the form of the rebel group Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). This marked the beginning of a 16 years long civil war between Frelimo and Renamo.

As Ronald Regan became president of the United States of America, he intensified the Cold war. Southern Africa and Mozambique became an arena for the Cold War. During this period, the US staunchly opposed the socialist Frelimo and backed the South African government’s efforts to support Renamo. The South-African backed Renamo movement used terror against civilian population. This worked in affecting Frelimo’s school and health posts when teachers and nurses were too afraid to work in some regions. At the same time, Renamo worked on building up public support by exacerbating the dissatisfaction of Frelimo’s economic and political policies in the rural areas (Hanlon, 2005, 274).

The government maintained its socialist stance during the early years of the ear until a deep structural crisis in the early 1980’s. This crisis marked as shift in the attitude of Frelimo wanting to improve its relation with the west and applied to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which led to a conditional recovery program. It aimed moving towards creating a free market economy. In 1989 the party renounced its hard socialist ideology.

Renamo on the other hand lacked a coherent ideology to rally around. The group was constituted by Frelimo deserts, unpleased civilians and former Portuguese army members, the only common ground was the dissatisfaction with Frelimo. Much of their strength came in external support from Rhodesia which made it a powerful antagonist of Frelimo in the 1970’s and when Rhodesia became independent, the main support became South Africa. It grew from around 500 fighters towards 8000 during this period. The growth was spurred on by popular dissatisfaction with Frelimo government in addition to forced recruitment.

The government also received external support. The newly formed Zimbabwean government entered a defence agreement in 1981 which led to 12 000 Zimbabwean troops active in Mozambique. The aims of Renamo’s guerrilla style attacks was to attack symbols of Frelimo’s success in often brutal ways. The path towards peace was a long one with many filed attempts to resolve the conflict. As mentioned above, the conflict had strong regional ties. When Mozambique and South Africa signed a non-aggression pact, the Nkomati accord in 1984. The parties agreed to stop supporting its antagonists, meaning that Mozambique would stop supporting the ANC and South Africa would stop supporting Renamo, which South Africa did not. Later the same year peace talks were held under South African guidance, the talks lead to a peace process by which the parties would ceasefire as first step
this turned out to be a tough task which was proven when the process collapsed and war continued. During the end of the 1980’s and beginning 1990’s it seemed as there was a ripe moment for reaching peace. External parties decreased the flow of support for the war and pressure began to mount on the parties in reaching a negotiated settlement. This eventually led to a dialogue between the parties that was mediated by a catholic NGO based in Rome. The negotiation took place during two years. During the third and fourth round of twelve rounds of negotiation a partial ceasefire was reached. The culmination of the process was reached in October of 1992 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (UCDP Database 1, 2018).

The analysis of the case will be focused on the time period following the Rome General Peace agreement.

**Independent variable results - Short-term efforts.**

*Does the peace agreement entail provisions for reintegration efforts and are they implemented?*

Yes. The Rome Comprehensive peace agreement included provisions for reintegration efforts that was part of a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration effort following the civil war (Alusala and Dye, 2010: 4).

*Are cash grants used in the reintegration efforts?*

Yes. Ex-combatants received subsidies when enrolled in the reintegration efforts (ibid).

*Is pay and scatter a part of the reintegration effort?*

Yes. Pay and Scatter was the effort that UNUZOM focused most on (McMullin, 2004: 629).

*Does the reintegration efforts include vocational training?*

Yes. The reintegration efforts consisted of basic vocational training in addition to information regarding reintegration and agricultural tool kits (Alusala and Dye, 2010, 5).
Independent variable results – Long-term efforts

Is every ex-combatant eligible to inclusion in reintegration?
Partly. Female ex-combatants were virtually non-existent in the Rome peace agreement. In official terms female ex-combatants made up about 1.48% of the total DDR participants. Women and children were not prioritized since they were not perceived as security threats (Baden, 1997: 72).

Are there any job creating incentives?
No, the unique reintegration effort in Mozambique did not focus its efforts in creating jobs for the ex-combatants (McMullin, 2004: 630).

Does the reintegration efforts include educational training?
No. Focus was put on vocational training since it would foster quick alleviation of ex-combatant idleness (Vines, 2013).

Has the community where the ex-combatants going to resettle been informed or sensitized?
No. The thought behind the pay and scatter effort was that in making sure that the ex-combatants were paid longer than usual, no additional information regarding how the communities that they were placed in due to the fact that the cash would in some aspects make the community less hostile towards ex-combatants (Dzinesa, 2007: 78)

Dependent variable results – Negative Peace

Has battle related deaths reached over 25 in a calendar year?
Partly yes. The number of battle related deaths reached 32 in 2013 (UCDP 2, 2018).

Has a new round of violence occurred following the peace agreement?
Yes, since Renamo pulled out of the General Peace agreement of 1992 in 2013 the parties have clashed after the government seizes control over a former Renamo base that belonged opposition leader Afonso Dhlakama (BBC 1, 2018).

One sided violence absent?
No. Since the Renamo had backed out of the peace agreement both sides have been accused of targeting civilians in their efforts to contest the control over the state. This has in fact been
going on since the first election following the conflict in 1994 with almost every election being marred with threats and violence towards the civilian population (UCDP 3, 2018; BBC, 2018; J Nilsson, 2017: 213)

*Return to normal?*

Partly, during the 21 years there was an absence of violence and elections were held (Brown and Weimer, 2010: 22). However as mentioned above, the peace agreement is now void and the state is entrenched in conflict once again.

**Dependent variable results - Positive Peace**

*Absence of organized violence?*

No. As mentioned above, the conflict has remerged (BBC 1, 2018).

*Is the political landscape pluralistic?*

Partly. There is a degree of pluralism in the political landscape of Mozambique with the emergence of Democratic Movement of Mozambique MDM, however the main political competition is mainly between Frelimo and Renamo. This political bickering is one where there is no real political opposition (Brown and Weimer, 2010: 16)

*Is horizontal inequality present in post-conflict society?*

Yes. The horizontal inequalities are present in post-conflict Mozambique. This can be seen in how the Southern part of the nation where Frelimo government has its stronghold, have more power in society when it comes to standard of living and human capital than the centre part of the nation where the opposition has its stronghold (Stewart, 2005, 23).

*Absence of civil and political abuse?*

No. The final phase of the election in 1994 was not calm. Threats and intimidation were reported, Dhlakama announced a boycott of the election three days before the election due to as he saw unfair conflict termination details which will be discussed later. Dhlakama eventually lifted one day prior to the election (BBC 1, 2018; Maschietto, 2016: 123).

*Has there been growth in economic or development following the 10 year benchmark?*

Yes. The HDI score of 1992 was 0.208 which rose to 0.418 in 2015 (HDI, 2018).
### 5.1 Results

#### Table 1.1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators for IV (Short-term)</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Does the peace agreement entail provisions for reintegration efforts and are they implemented?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Are cash grants used in the reintegration efforts?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Is pay and scatter a part of the reintegration effort?</em></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Does the reintegration efforts include vocational training?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 1.2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators for IV (Long-term)</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Is every ex-combatant eligible to inclusion in reintegration?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Are there any job creating incentives?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Does the reintegration efforts include educational training?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Has the community where the ex-combatants going to resettle been informed or sensitized?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators for DV (Negative Peace)</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Has battle related deaths reached over 25 in a calendar year?</em></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Has a new round of violence occurred following the peace agreement?</em></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>One sided violence absent?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Return to normal?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 2.1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators for DV (Positive Peace)</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Absence of organized violence?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Is the political landscape pluralistic?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Is horizontal inequality present in post-conflict society?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Absence of civil and political abuse?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Has there been growth in economic or development following the 10 year benchmark?</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross country ties</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Incompatibility</td>
<td>Over Governance</td>
<td>Over Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Termination</td>
<td>Reached through Negotiations</td>
<td>Reached through Negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2 Analysis

Independent variables

The empirical pattern regarding the independent variable from the two cases conveys a picture of two different reintegration efforts, but not clearly as once expected at first.

An interesting starting point is to examine the first indicator in table 1.2. Since reintegration efforts targeted towards including the needs of women tend to be better on delivering on the needs of every ex-combats and not deliver those needs under the assumption of preconceived knowledge of how ex-combatants should be and thus who should not get any reintegration assistance (UNIFEM, 2004: 4). As mentioned previously the almost every ex-combatant were eligible to reintegration in Liberia, however reintegration efforts were not unproblematic. Women were in some cases not considered to be real soldiers, thus upholding the traditional gender roles of women being perceived as peaceful. Which in terms limits the possible outcomes for the ex-combatants lives (Nilsson J & Thapar Björkert, 2013: 116).

However in some aspects Liberia was more successful at including female combatants than Mozambique. Liberia, at the end of the reintegration process around 22 % of the ex-combatants were female (Ollek, 2007: 60). The case regarding reintegration in Mozambique was one where men in most aspects where the ones who were considered eligible to the reintegration efforts. Female ex-combatants and former child soldiers were mostly considered to be non-threatening and thus left out of the reintegration. For the 1.48 percent of female ex-combatants who did take a part of the DDR process the reintegration efforts were mainly tailored after the gender roles of women rather than the actual needs of these ex-combatants (ibid: 42). The low number of female ex-combatants in regards to reintegration is not simply a reflection of a low number of female combatants during the conflict. The number of female combatants during the conflict was officially around 2 %, however the number of female combatants within the rebel side is disputed and is argued to be around 10 % (Mazurana et al, 2002; 110). The discrepancy could be argued to be a consequence of societal norms or these women simply chose not to take place in the reintegration phase, however it can also be argued to be a consequence of a rushed reintegration, were assumptions governed the outcome rather than facts. In regards to this indicator it raises the likelihood that the reintegration in Mozambique was one that was based and conducted around assumptions rather than actual facts from the ground.
In table 1.1 we see that the only indicator that varied in the two cases was ‘is pay and scatter part of the reintegration efforts?’ with every other indicator in the table being in most regards equal, what does this tell us? This shows that the temporal dilemma is very much a dilemma in practice as it is in theory. While the Liberian reintegration effort was in most aspect a mixed bag of both short- and long-term efforts which will be discussed later on (Jennings, 2008: 334). The Mozambique reintegration effort was one where pay and scatter was prioritized in order to get ex-combatants quickly away from each other and paying them to alleviate the immediate idleness that followed. Which in turn would create a positive spill-over effect in to gaining employment. The reintegration efforts conducted in Mozambique was unique in wanting to draw payments out for a relatively long period. The motives behind this was that the money worked as a guarantee of income, in addition to this it also helped ex-combatants win acceptance in the new communities in which they resettled. There were some procedural problems but the effort was in most aspects a success, in paying and scattering the ex-combatants. However when it comes to helping ex-combatants to gain employment, there was no positive-spill over effect. Which may have made things worse by raising the expectation of ex-combatants and not deliver on the promises (McMullin, 2004: 229).

As mentioned above and as conveyed in table 1 Liberia’s reintegration efforts also included short-term efforts. This highlights the temporal dilemma in practice where things are not as clear cut as either having only short-term or only long-term efforts. Instead there are trade-offs between alleviating both issues. One can see reintegration efforts as a spectrum where the starting point of short-term reintegration efforts on one side and long-term on the other. This was the case of Liberia where a lot of short-term reintegration efforts were used in tandem with long-term efforts. This becomes more apparent when looking at table 1.1. While all the indicators of long-term efforts in Mozambique were non-existent since as I mentioned opted for the unique at its time pay and scatter effort.

When it comes to long-term reintegration efforts in Mozambique it was in stark contrast to the ideas of the UNUMOZ leadership. From UNOMOZ it was felt that for the peace to take hold, it needed a boost with direct effect. In the end, the majority of the DDR funding was spent on the short-term pay and scatter program that have been discussed previously. This prioritizing of scattering the ex-combatants is argued to have its roots in the DDR operation in Angola where payments were made but the military network of the rebel group was intact (Levine, 2006). Liberia’s reintegration efforts had both short- and long-term efforts. This is not to say that the reintegration efforts of Liberia were perfect and led to a society free from issues. Poverty and unemployment is still a serious problem in a still polarized state that is
still reeling from the civil war (Jennings, 2007, 205). However in tackling some of these issues in the reintegration efforts in Liberia, strengthen the likelihood of peace having a chance. Collier (2008) discussed the possible threats that ex-combatants can pose. The chances diminishes if demobilized combatants are not place into employment or provided with skills training opportunities, the lack of income source increases their propensity to commit crimes. In conjunction with the macro-insecurity framework are not addressed through a reintegration strategy, former combatants can be remobilized easily and pose security risks at a regional level. By having vocational, educational training for ex-combatants in addition to creating labour intense jobs in the Liberian reintegration effort, it minimized the threats that collier discusses (Tamagnini and Krafft, 2010: 19).

**Dependent Variables**

When assessing the outcome variables, the relationship between the explanatory variable and the outcome variable becomes clearer. While looking at table 2.1 horizontal inequality indicator that states that it is present in both cases, it does not necessarily imply that there is no positive peace in any of the cases. This is in most aspects the excepted reality in states that have been entrenched in a prolonged intra-state conflict with pervasive socio-economic challenges. Positive peace as a concept can be seen as an ideal type of peace in some aspects. Thus it is not as one dimensional as negative peace definition absence of violence, but rather gradual. In the cases what differs is the fact that the prerequisite for positive peace to exists in Mozambique is not present namely the absence of organized violence.

Another factor that did not exist in Mozambique but did at least to a higher factor in Liberia is political pluralism. Political pluralism can have positive effect on a states by providing different political options for the population fostering a positive competition among the parties of the states in trying to meet the needs of the citizens from different perspectives (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003: 318). In table 2.1, Mozambique was coded as partly pluralistic whereas Liberia was coded as Yes. For the former it is due to the fact that the political power has from the end of the civil war been dominated by Frelimo who has had a strong grip on it. This is no surprise but rather it was a prerequisite, in order for the peace agreement to be signed Frelimo wanted a political system which was formed on a ‘winner takes all’ model where the executive branch of government, the president has dominant power in the main national decision making process. Due to the fact that Frelimo could retain power in such a
system (Maschietto, 2016: 139). The democratic institutions in Mozambique is in most aspects weak. With a population who are broadly unaware of its entitlements and rights. In addition to the fact that there is no real opposition or alternative to the parties. A splinter group from Renamo emerged in 2009 MDM but it exists on the political fringes of Mozambique. Rather the contestation over political control is between a strong Frelimo party and an exhausted Renamo who continues to challenge Frelimo’s rule politically (Brown and Weimer, 2010: 16). For the latter it is due to the fact that the political landscape since the 2005 elections have had strong contenders for political power. With the former rebel actors moved to the side line the election of 2005 saw the emergence of political actors such as football stars George Weah and political elites such as Ellen Johnson Sirleaf that turned to be the freest and fairest election in Liberian history so far (Harris, 2012: 161-166).

When looking at table 2 and table 2.1 the relationship becomes between the independent variable and the dependent clearer. More notable whether a new round of violence has occurred and if there is any organized violence in any of the cases. To understand the variation in the indicators we ask whether there in fact is a causal relationship between reintegration and conflict or lack of conflict. This thesis argues that while short-term reintegration efforts were a success, the overreliance of short term efforts eventually increased the risk of renewed conflict in Mozambique by not dealing with some of the underlying issues that were overlooked by the prioritizing of pay and scatter. Firstly the nature of the peace was one problem ridden one. As tensions rose eventually it erupted in violence as armed Renamo men killed ten people in an attack which led to a retribution of sorts by the police who arrested 100 Renamo who later died as a result to overcrowded cells. (Hanlon, 2001; 7). One of the causes for the renewed round of violence was the issues that had been neglected during the reintegration efforts. One of the inequalities between the former fighters were that while Frelimo ex-combatants were able to receive pensions Renamo soldiers did not. There was a perception among Renamo ex-combatants that more was promised then what eventually given however from the Frelimo government reintegration is something from the past that had been concluded (McMullin, 2007: 632-634).

**Control Variables**

With table 3 we can see that the control variables were present in both cases. In regards to the first control variable on how cross country ties may influence the outcome of a war. Complex regional conflict can affect the outcome or both peace and conflict by changing the dynamics.
and stakes in the conflict or peacebuilding (Fjelde, 2012, 62). As seen in table 3, both cases had transnational dimensions to their conflicts was in addition to the fact that the states also became involved in many of the regional conflict in the area, the consequence among other things to this was the presence of foreign troops on their sovereign soil. In addition to this the respective conflict was brutal in their own manner.

This ties into the next control variable, conflict duration. Duration of conflict can have profound impacts in peace and conflict such as changing actors or nature or the conflict (Collier et al 2003: 100). For the cases at hand they spanned over 14 years for Liberia and 15 in Mozambique thus both cases were prolonged violent conflicts that stretched over a long period of time. Thus with all control variables present in both cases we can see none of these variables are confounding in any ways in regards to the outcome of the respective conflicts.

**Main findings**

The intention of this thesis was to explore whether the theoretical framework and causal story was valid in explaining how short- and long-term reintegration efforts affects the outcome of the peace or lack thereof? With the control variables being accounted for and ruled out it is this authors stance that long-term reintegration efforts foster a more stable and positive peace. However this is not as clear cut as the theory proposed.

With reintegration being the final step of DDR it needs to address both structural and immediate issues of the post conflict society. A key way of achieving stability and development following an intra-state conflict is to tackle these issues in tandem which was the case in Liberia. By addressing both short-term needs as well as long-term needs of a post conflict society, Liberia managed to avoid conflict recurrence. For instance although the creation of the labour intensive jobs were not the most stimulating ones, it helped some ex-combatants who had not known any alternative to fighting in wars and a majority who were un-educated to find a new avenue into society and life free from fighting (Tamagnini and Krafft, 2010: 19).

While the case of Mozambique overemphasized the issue of addressing the idleness of ex-combatants in post-conflict settings due to the overwhelming security risks of having them do nothing, it neglected the need to also address the more structural issues. This left the reintegration efforts in Mozambique with a blind spot. Another important and tragic factor with the reintegration in the case was the vocational training. In most cases it did not lead
towards retaining gainful employment. For instance, in one instance conveys the faulty reintegration efforts in Mozambique where some ex-combatants were trained to be electricians in an area of the country with no electricity (McMullin, 2004:629). By only addressing the immediate post-conflict issues when reintegrating, the long term issues such as employment, education and social left unabated which eventually became causes for a new round of violence in the case of Mozambique.
6.1 Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to evaluate the relationship between reintegration efforts and peacebuilding.

Seeing that the control variables were held constant across the two cases does not however equate to the same as ruling out every thinkable explanation to the two cases. It only rules out the ones that was deemed important.

In the case of Mozambique, there was what would constitute to negative peace for roughly twenty years and to some extent a flourishing economy before violence broke out again. This was not the case in Liberia, there has only been fifteen years since the signing of the Accra peace agreement.

The thesis does not simply state that there is a clear causal connection between the short-term reintegration efforts and the resulted outcome. It states that as short-term reintegration efforts fail to address aspects of post-conflict society, the risk of conflict recurrence rises. The thesis states that as the short-term reintegration efforts failed to address the employment or lack thereof for the ex-combatants, as well utilizing the pay and scatter initiative among other aspects that have been discussed created a post-conflict society where ex-combatants were unsatisfied with the peace brokered between the government and rebel forces. It is in these types of environment where ex-combatants are unsatisfied, to most extent unemployed and in a society where the flourishing economy has not reached the whole segment of society where conflict can break out.

The data reveals two important aspects. Firstly, short-term reintegration itself does not entail a higher success rate for the durability of peace. Rather in this thesis has shown that not addressing the structural issues can have a negative consequence. Secondly and more importantly reintegration efforts should try to cater both short and longterm efforts, rather than focusing on one or the other. This is due to the fact that solely focusing on long-term efforts the reintegration can be slow in addressing the immediate needs of the post conflict society. Thusly trying to meet the immediate needs as well as the structural ones is important.

Strength and Weakness of research design

By answering the research question and standing on the shoulders of well-versed authors in the field of post conflict development, I argue that the thesis contributes to the understanding of the temporal dilemma of reintegration. Namely that short-term in tandem with long-term
efforts can increase the likelihood of a state to avoid conflict recurrence. Thus rather than seeing the efforts at odds with each other, they can complement each other.

Secondly by utilizing structured focused comparison in the thesis has allowed me to explore my question in a structured and clear way in order to evaluate whether the relationship was causal or not. Another strength of the method was utilizing a between case design that enabled for a comparison in a small-n study. This allowed the thesis to explore in depth how the independent variable affected the dependent variable.

The case selection is another part of the method that I argue is a strength to the overall thesis. In order to utilize mills method of difference they are both very similar in most ways. However one weakness regarding the case selection may be the mandate the mediators had in the respective conflicts. Both Mozambique and Liberia’s DDR efforts has at times been named successful but in different aspects in DDR literature, this thesis underscores that reintegration is often overlooked even when authors have evaluated the process. Another weakness or problematic area of the study is the five year discrepancy discussed above. The long time frame in Mozambique makes it hard to draw out definite answers regarding causality.

The control variables is one aspect that is hard to gauge whether it can be seen as a strength or weakness of the thesis. It is in this author’s opinion that although there are infinite of variables that can affect the dependent variable, those who the literature deem important in the field of post-conflict development were included and did become confounding in any manner. The operationalization of peace is a limitation of the thesis. Mainly regarding my dependent variables indicators. Since the dependent variables are positive and negative peace, this may seem to subjectively defined concept even with the concept analysis at hand. It taints the overall indicators to encapsulate it. In addition to this some of the indicators feel at first hand retroactively speaking redundant but I feel that they only underline the indicators ability to encapsulate the variable.

Areas for further study

Although the question was answered, the thesis presents a further set of question drawn from the data compiled in the thesis. In regards to how participatory reintegration efforts are. A current discourse of peacebuilding has emerged in recent years concerning how the ‘local’ is involved in peace building and if participation in reintegration efforts affects the peacebuilding’s outcome.
However what I find more interesting regarding the research conducted here would be to see how this could be replicated across different cases with a combination of different scope conditions and control variables. Preferably in a large n-study could also explore the importance of long- or short-term reintegration efforts.
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