Populism in Power

A case study on the role of media strategies for preserving populist power and its implications for liberal democracy in Hungary

Adam Balázs Stuber
Table of Contents

Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 3
Previous Research......................................................................................................................................... 5
Research Design .......................................................................................................................................... 7
  Case Selection ........................................................................................................................................... 8
  Method ..................................................................................................................................................... 9
  Operationalisation ................................................................................................................................... 10
  Reliability and Generalisability ............................................................................................................... 11
  Source criticism and data collection ....................................................................................................... 12
Results and Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 13
  Background ............................................................................................................................................. 13
  First term: 2010-2014 ........................................................................................................................... 14
  Discussion ............................................................................................................................................... 24
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 28
References.................................................................................................................................................... 30

List of Figures

Figure 1: .................................................................................................................................................... 18
Figure 2: .................................................................................................................................................... 24
Introduction

The concept of populism has attracted the interest of scholars for decades (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969). Populism fascinates due to its ability to rapidly attract popular support and political influence while its radical features raise fears of societal polarisation and a decline in democratic pluralism.

In Europe, populism has often relied on nationalist, anti-establishment or xenophobic sentiments, commonly challenging the existing power and exerting anti-liberal attitudes (Mazzoleni, Stewart & Horsfield, 2003: 1-2). In this regard, little seems to have changed as contemporary populists often utilise similar tactics to gain support by challenging the power and the elites and by framing their agenda to represent “the people”.

One and a half decade ago Mazzoleni, Stewart & Horsfield (2003:1) claimed that populism had merely affected policies and the rhetoric of the global North but had never seriously shaken a democratic system elsewhere than in Latin America. One could argue that this claim was already inaccurate, as Europe had seen populists in ruling positions prior to it in both Italy (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015) and Greece (Pappas, 2013). Certainly, events occurring since have discarded this reasoning.

Contemporary scholars seem to agree that populism has been on an upsurge and continues to rise around the globe (Mudde, 2004; Moffitt, 2016; Kaltwasser, Taggart, Ochoa, & Ostiguy, 2017). The recent upsurge of populism has presented itself in eye-catching populist triumphs such as Trumps electoral win and the unexpected achievements of Nigel Farage and the Independence Party in the Brexit referendum (Galston, 2018). But even more alarming are cases like Hungary and Poland, where populist governments have started dismantling such pillars of democracy as the free media and the independent judiciary (Eiermann, Mounk & Gultchin, 2017). Cases as these from the past decade mean that the notion of populism as nothing more than a disruptive force, too uninfluential to seriously bother democracies in the global North, is firmly rejected. Perhaps most notable in this regard is the case of Hungary, which will be the focus of this study. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has taken measures against liberal institutions such as the media and the independent judiciary. These steps go against Western liberal norms and the values of the European Union (Pappas, 2013: 19). This study sets out to
examine those actions towards the media by the Hungarian government under Orbán.

There are considerable gaps within the scholarly literature on the actions of populists in power in Europe and within the literature on populists and the media. This is in part due to that traditionally, populism has been considered a more common feature of politics in Latin America than elsewhere (Taggart, 2000: 59). Consequently, much focus regarding populists in power have been aimed at leaders such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or Evo Morales in Bolivia (Waisbord, 2012: 507). In a study focusing on populists in Western Europe, Albertazzi & McDonnell (2015: 178-179) have specifically stressed the need for more in-depth case studies on the behaviour and impacts of the growing number of populists in European governments.

When it comes to the literature on populism and the media, it has been under expansion the past years (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Stromback, & de Vreese, 2017; Mancini, 2012; Manucci and Weber, 2017). However, it has mainly been focused on populist discourse and the different ways the media has enabled populist parties during their phase of growth. The literature specifically looking at the relationship of populists in power and their media strategies is scarcer. Existing studies have mostly focused on Latin America due to the multitude of populists in ruling positions, but in the case of the global North, the subject remains underexplored (Waisbord, 2018: 2).

This study attempts to fill both gaps by looking at populists in power and their actions towards the media when in government. There is an intrinsic value in deepening our knowledge of how populists act in power and how it may affect liberal democracy in a time where media are facing innumerable challenges. Furthermore, there is an empirical value in a case analysis of populist rule as it tells us something about an increasingly debated phenomenon which baffles its supporters and critics likewise.

Thus, the motivation for the research question and the purpose of this study comes from a combination of the contemporary global upsurge in populism and the relative lack of research on European populists in power and their media strategies. The aim of the study is to examine how populists in rule use the media to preserve their position, and how this may affect the democratic quality of the nation. This has produced the following research question: how do populists in government use the media to solidify their power, and what implications does it have for the level of democracy?
The structure of the paper is as follows, the next section contains a review of the relevant literature and key definitions, the subsequent section presents all components of the research design and is followed by a presentation of the results and the analysis.

Previous Research

The existing literature on populism is extensive and constantly expanding. Initially, scholars focused on theorising and defining the concept. But populism proved to be hard to define and for long there was no consensus for a general theory (Canovan, 1999: 3). The difficulty of conceptualising populism has perhaps been best expressed by Paul Taggart (2000: 2): “Populism is a difficult, slippery concept. It lacks features that would make it more tangible. Rooted in it are characteristics that render it quintessentially mercurial. For these reasons, it is profoundly difficult to construct a generalized description, let alone a universal and comprehensive definition, of populism as an idea or as a political movement.”

Attempts at conceptualising populism have been plentiful. Some notable examples are the definition of populism as a political strategy (see for example: Weyland, 2001), a thin ideology (see: Mudde, 2004) and a specific discursive definition (see: Hawkins, 2009). However, with the global upsurge of populism in recent years, the field has gotten increased attention from scholars (Bale, Kessel & Taggart 2011; Berezin, 2013; Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2017), and some views seem to be reoccurring. When it comes to defining populism, the thin ideology or “ideational definition” has been used by a growing number of scholars in past decades (Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2013: 1, 6). This definition sees populism as an ideological Manichean discourse, claiming to embody and promote “the people’s will” against “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Critics of the ideational definition have lifted the issue of delimitation, meaning that its simplicity may cause it to be applicable to an overly wide range of cases. In addition, it is argued that the rhetoric of representing the “will of the people” merely catches the façade of populism and not its true intentions to empower the leader in a top-down fashion (Weyland, 2017: 7-8). That said, the strength of the ideational definition lies precisely within its minimalistic character as it identifies the key features of populism but recognises that it may take varying forms in different contexts (Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2013: 2). As empirical examples throughout history
suggest, populism has taken many forms in different continents of the world. In Latin America, populism has mainly presented itself through leftist leaders such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, among others (Waisbord, 2012: 507). It has been argued that the general leftist direction of populism took a political shift to the right after the second World War (Mazzoleni, Stewart and Horsfield, 2003: 4). In Western Europe, populism has primarily been associated with right-wing politics (Taggart, 2017: 1-2), while in Central and Eastern Europe a combination of right-wing and centrist-populists have been more active (Stanley, 2017: 1-6). Hence, although there is still lacking consensus on what type of phenomena populism should be defined as, the ideational definition has gained ground and allows for a “thin-centred ideology” view. Seeing populism as a thin ideology means that it relies on other concepts and ideologies with the common utilisation of a Manichean discourse and an emphasis on popular sovereignty, or the peoples will (Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2013: 6-7). After reviewing the available literature on definitions of populism, this study uses the ideational definition, viewing populism as a thin-centred ideology. The definitions ability to see past variations of populism was the principal motivation for this choice as it allows for a broad view where the concept can be identified regardless of where it is positioned on the political spectrum.

A smaller part of the literature on populism has focused specifically on the relationship between media and populism. One of the key findings on the subject is that the main goal of the media – constantly in search of the most newsworthy story – is favourable for the profile and rhetoric of populists (Manucci, 2017: 1-2; Mazzoleni, Stewart & Horsfield, 2003: 6-8). While this argument is rather solid, it is limited to explaining why populists tend to attract media coverage. In fact, scholars have also argued that this trend eventually shifts as the radical populist discourse empties its potential and loses press value over time (Mazzoleni, Stewart & Horsfield, 2003: 224-225). Additionally, the populist rhetoric is expected to either be toned down by the movements themselves when successful or institutionalized and merged into the mainstream when reaching governing positions (Taggart, 2004: 284; Mény & Surel, 2002: 18).

The relationship between press freedom and democratic quality is generally accepted. A major reason for this is that press freedom is considered necessary to preserve pluralism in society. Liberal democracy, in contrast with a Manichean discourse, considers society to be built up by varying social groups and interests. Accordingly, scholars mean that an uncensored, unbiased and free press is at the core of liberal democracy (Bogart, 1998; Mughan & Gunther,
Thus, this paper considers press freedom as a vital component of liberal democracy. Consequently, if press freedom is severely restricted, it has a negative effect on the democratic quality of the country.

The literature on populism in power is thin, especially in Europe where only a limited number of populist leaders have been in rule. Takis S. Pappas (2013) has contributed to this specific field by a comparative study of Greece and Hungary in which he makes the case for “populist democracy” as a democratic subtype characterised by both the major political party and the main opposition force being identified as populists. Another significant contribution is *Populists in Power* (2015) by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, focusing on the cases of Switzerland and Italy. Their study contradicts the mentioned expectation of short-lived success for populist parties as such a statement no longer holds true based on the findings in their book (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015: 165-166). Their conclusion is further supported by contemporary developments in other European countries with persistent populist parties in government. With that said, we now know that populists are indeed capable of sustaining popular support under longer periods, even when attaining governing positions and even in Western democracies. However, we still know little about how populists act when in power and what effects their actions have on their societies.

**Research Design**

This thesis uses a within-case analysis as its research design. In other words, the study is qualitative and relies on an in-depth case analysis within a given timeframe. This is suitable as the aim of the paper is to describe how populists use the media once in power, which requires a conclusive analysis of the empirical case. George and Bennett (2005: 19) list conceptual validity as one of the major strengths of case studies, arguing that it enables a more accurate analysis of concepts which are notably difficult to measure such as political culture, power or democracy.

A risk of doing a single-case analysis is indeterminacy, as the analysis may struggle to rule out alternative explanations. However, George and Bennett (2005: 32-33) also argue that the indeterminacy issue can be effectively reduced if the study thoroughly analyses several observations within the chosen case. As will be explained further on in the method section, this
study uses a process tracing method to overcome that issue.

Although there are some limitations of this study as it only answers how populists have used the media to solidify their power in Hungary, the case is particularly relevant as Orbán is arguably the most powerful populist in contemporary Europe, with the eyes of populists around the globe on him. That said, there is a value in increasing our knowledge of such a central case as populist rhetoric is growing in the region and countries may follow Hungary’s example as we have already seen Poland do.

Another implication of the research question and design is that the study will have a descriptive character. A descriptive study aims to increase our knowledge about an unresearched or barely covered subject. Also known as “atheoretical” or “configurative” case studies, they contribute with good descriptions which can provide a base for future theory-building studies (George and Bennett, 2005: 75). In that sense, the descriptive character is suitable to answer the research question and to achieve the aim of contributing with empirical research on the specific case of Hungary. This also means that the study does not conduct theory or hypothesis-testing in the traditional sense.

As the strength of this research design is the in-depth case-analysis, the case selection is of high relevance for the study. As will be explained in the next section, Hungary is an extreme case in the sense that it is the sole example in contemporary Europe where populists have attained a two third majority in Parliament, in three consecutive elections.

Case Selection

When conducting a single-case study, there is a potential risk of selection bias in the case selection. To only investigate a case which confirms the expected phenomenon is fundamentally problematic and may lead to systematic errors. In other words, to test a theory, it is insufficient to only study one case which is likely to confirm the theory. However, as noted in the previous section, this study is atheoretical and descriptive. Therefore, the study runs no risk of measurement errors in the traditional sense as it does not conduct theory-testing. For this purpose, it is necessary to choose a case in which the phenomenon of interest can be investigated and described. Therefore, it is a deliberate decision to try to single out the most suitable and
relevant case for the contribution of this study. According to George and Bennett (2005: 240-241), any selection strategy should aim to find a case which is relevant for the research objective of the study. They also stress the importance of clearly defining a population from which the case is to be selected. Additionally, to raise generalisability, the aim should be to pick a case which is as representative of the population as possible. The scope of this study is limited to the population of contemporary populists in power. Furthermore, the chosen case must be one where populists have practiced governance, preferably for at least one term in office, as the research purpose is to answer how they use media to solidify their power.

As previously discussed, the existing literature on populists in power has mainly been focused on Latin-American cases (Waisbord, 2018: 2). Therefore, this study chose to expand the relatively scarce literature on European cases. Except from Italy, Switzerland, Poland and Greece, populists in ruling positions has been a rather rare phenomenon in Europe. However, it has also been noted that Europe is experiencing an upsurge in populist parties and an increasing amount of them are taking place in European governments (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015: 178-179). In contemporary Europe, Hungary is the most successful case of populism. The threefold electoral success of the Alliance of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ) also makes them the longest ruling populist party currently in office in Europe. Thus, Hungary is a suitable case for the research purpose as populists have been in rule for a period of two terms and won the election for a third term. Furthermore, Hungary is a case of interest as it is arguably the most successful case of populism in contemporary Europe. Although there are strong signs that Poland is following suit, when talking about populists in Central and Eastern Europe, Stanley (2015: 19) has noted that: “Only in Hungary did populist parties succeed in amassing sufficient power to make changes to the political system that could not easily be overturned by competing parties.” Finally, the Hungarian case has received widespread international attention by critics and supporters likewise and is arguably one of the most central cases of populism in present time.

Method

The method used in this study is process tracing. As a fundamental method for qualitative
analysis, process tracing is used foremost in within-case studies (Collier, 2011: 823). More specifically, as this study does not conduct theory-testing, it will not be using a traditional causal process tracing where the aim is to identify a causal mechanism. Instead, another form of process tracing has been picked for its suitability to the research purpose. Simply defined as “detailed narrative” by George and Bennett (2005: 210), this form of process tracing is atheoretical but may contribute with the necessary background for theory development. The process tracing method was chosen for its ability to identify key events and give a defined description of a case over time. The main strengths of this method, according to David Collier (2011: 824) is: “identifying novel political and social phenomena and systematically describing them…” In other words, its ability to distinguish and describe vital events which make up the process of interest.

As this study analyses media strategies of the Hungarian government, there is a need to set a timeframe for the empirical analysis. In this case the natural circumstances present a suitable period for observation; the years of Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Party rule from 2010 to 2018. The chosen period is divided into two parts for the structure of the analysis: the first term of Fidesz from 2010 and 2014, and the second term between 2014 and 2018. As Fidesz won a two-third majority for a third term in 2018 during the process of this study, relevant events occurring since will be considered in the discussion section.

The next section clarifies what type of media strategies this study has looked for during the process tracing to distinguish key events.

Operationalisation

In his research on Latin-American populists, Silvio Waisbord (2012: 508) found that populists use three key strategies when in ruling positions, namely; “strengthening the media power of the President, bolstering community media, and exercising tighter control of the press through legislation and judicial decisions.” The author found that the first strategy, to strengthen the media power of the President, was realised through several methods. Populist governments have for example: expropriated private media outlets opposing them, expanded state-owned outlets as well as designing and manipulating tax, advertising and funding to favour their supporters and punish opponents (Waisbord, 2012: 508). Secondly, regarding community media, it is suggested
that while populists tend to fund and promote community media, their policies also tend to leave community outlets in legal uncertainty, making them subject to fines and closure (Waisbord, 2012: 508-509). Finally, tighter control of the press through legislation has essentially been achieved by: using laws and fines to discourage criticism of the government, creating laws which allow for control of contents, and by formulating broad and vaguely defined laws for media restrictions (Waisbord, 2012: 509). These three strategies have been considered as guidelines to distinguish populist media strategies.

In addition to the focused areas of media strategy, the analysis is complemented by measures of the press freedom, using the Press Freedom index of the Freedom House. The index uses a scoring system ranging from 0 to 100 with three possible categories. The scores between 0-30 give the status of “Free”, 31-60 results in “Partly Free” and 61-100 indicates “Not Free”. The index is based on research and analysis carried out by more than 90 regional experts and scholars and it considers 23 methodology questions within three categories: the legal, political and economic environment of the press (“Freedom of the Press Methodology,” 2017). The index is incorporated in the study to give a statistical indication of the level of liberty that the Hungarian press enjoys. This is advantageous as it helps to answer the research question by adding a specific measure of press freedom.

Reliability and Generalisability

As with any given method, it is vital to consider the constraints of its functions. Although process tracing is a well-established method within academic research, critics oppose the idea that one can portray an entire historical process by describing a sequence of events. Although, there is some agreement on that accounting for all the details in a micro-causal process is rarely feasible (George and Bennett, 2005: 210), it is important to keep in mind that the method gives a selective description of reality. The nature of process tracing means that a thorough investigation of the chosen period is needed. Therefore, a wide range of events will have to be considered and narrowed down into key events. This has a certain effect on the reliability of the study. One might ask how different the results would be if someone was to repeat the same study. Essentially, some variation in the results is inevitable as the selection of events is dependent on
the retrieved material, and subject to the researchers own considerations. However, as the aim of this study has been clearly specified as the use of media strategies to preserve populist power, it is reasonable to expect that a repeated study would identify the same key events and only differ in smaller aspects. Furthermore, to increase reliability, the three strategies presented in the previous section have been used to specify what type of events the study has been focusing on.

Another critique of process tracing conducted on within-case studies has to do with its generalisability. Put simply, the argument is that any cause and effect relationship or process chain is limited to the specific case and cannot be generalised to other cases (Kay and Baker, 2015: 5). In other words, the generalisability of such a study may be restricted due to the context dependency of a given case. However, previous studies using process tracing in single-case studies have made claims applicable to similar cases, and such studies may also generate findings to be tested in a larger population or give a foundation for future studies to develop generalisable mechanisms for a relevant population (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 156-157).

Furthermore, as suggested in the research gap, there is not yet an entrenched theory regarding the relationship between populist media strategies to solidify power and its effects on democracy. As happens to be the case, another ability of process tracing is to give explanations for “deviant cases”, cases in which the outcome is unpredicted or lacks an explanation by existing theories. Analysing deviant cases in this way can at the very least produce a “contingent generalisation” in which the conditions under which the studied outcome occurs, are identified (George and Bennett, 2005: 215-216). To that background, an atheoretical detailed narrative remains the most suitable method for the research purpose of this study.

Source criticism and data collection

When conducting process tracing, a wide variety of material must be collected to distinguish the most relevant events during the chosen period of empirical analysis. This study has critically reviewed and used a mix of scholarly literature, news articles, reports and statements by experts, as sources of empirical material. The books and articles used are written both by scholars from Hungary and elsewhere to lower the risk of bias in the material. Some of the material, primarily news articles, have been collected in Hungarian. After identifying the specific events of interest
utilising the relevant scholarly literature, I drew upon supplementary news articles to gain a fuller picture of the events. These have mostly been retrieved from Index.hu, arguably the largest online news outlet still considered to report objectively in Hungary (Dunai, 2018). The reports used have been retrieved directly from the primary source of the organisations and institutions which published them (such as: OSCE and Freedom House). One of the issues during the data collection process has been to obtain unbiased media coverage of specific events in Hungary. This issue was dealt with by critically reviewing all sources, cross-checking facts by consulting several sources, and complementing news articles from Hungary with articles from some of the largest international news agencies, including; Reuters, BBC and The New York Times.

**Results and Analysis**

This section includes a brief background of relevant developments preceding the 2010 elections in Hungary, which came to be the benchmark of populist majority rule in Hungary. The following subsections will present the findings of the study before proceeding to the discussion and analysis in the final subsection.

**Background**

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Hungary started its path of democratisation with the first free elections in 1990 (Bozóki & Simon, 2010: 208-209). Since then, the political landscape has been varying. However, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was the most dominant party in the following two decades (Bozóki & Simon, 2010: 214-215). In the year of 2006, intense rallies unfolded on the streets of Budapest, spurred by leaked recordings of Ferenc Gyurcsány, leader of MSZP and prime minister at the time, confessing to have lied about the economic situation to the public for years. The following elections in 2010 showed the extent of the people’s disapproval towards MSZP as they suffered a crushing defeat to the conservative alliance of Fidesz and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) (Freedom House, 2011). Fidesz was initially formed in 1988 by university students as a liberal force with a strong anti-communist profile in
the centre of Hungarian politics. However, as Viktor Orbán took over the presidency of the party, a shift was made towards the right, eventually evolving into populism (Pappas: 2013: 10-11).

First term: 2010-2014

The key media strategies identified in this term are: changes in media laws, increased media monitoring, centralisation of media monitoring and funding, various forms of bias in the media, bias within the leadership of new media institutions, as well as systematic attacks on government-critical outlets. The findings will be explained in depth below, followed by a short presentation of Hungary’s press freedom scores during this term by the Freedom House.

In Hungary’s parliamentary election in 2010, Fidesz won 53 percent of the votes. Their decisive victory was in part due to the lack of any serious opposition as MSZP had been severely discredited from previous scandals and only attained 19 percent of the votes. However, the most notable consequence of the election results was that the constitution at the time translated the results into 68 percent of the available seats in parliament (Bánkuti, Halmai & Scheppele, 2012: 1-2). This allowed for the two-third majority needed to make constitutional changes in Hungary.

Right after the victory, Orbán held a speech in which he compared the historical importance of the majority result to the Hungarian revolution against the communist government and Soviet in 1956, and the first free elections which ended the one-party system in 1990. In his speech he went on explaining how the people had chosen change: “In 2010, they [the people] gave their verdict for a failed era, and chose unity, order and safety.”1 (“Orbán Viktor beszéde,” 2010).

An early step in the transformation that Orbán had promised in his victory speech was realised through changes in the media laws. The judicial implications of these regulations are plentiful and would acquire a study of its own to be fully covered. However, to highlight a few, “Hungary’s New Media Regulation” (2011) stipulates in Act CIV of 2010, article 4.3 that: “The exercise of the freedom of the press may not constitute or encourage any acts of crime, violate public morals or the moral rights of others.” Or as defined in article 9.7 of Act CLXXXV. of 2010: “Category VI shall include programmes which may seriously impair the physical, mental

---

1 All translations by author
or moral development of minors, particularly because they involve pornography or scenes of extreme and/or unjustified violence.” These vaguely formulated laws are believed to be part of the reason for government-critical journalists reporting that they operate under fear for their legal and financial situation (Scheppele, 2012; Dunai, 2014). Another relevant component is the 716 000 euro (2011 exchange rate) fine, which could be charged as most for any breach of the media law. Any such charge would be made by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság) which was created through the new regulations (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013: 82). Henceforth, the new Authority will be referred to by its acronym; NMHH.

In addition to implications of specific articles in the law, the new media regulations brought several institutional changes. Firstly, all forms of media (print press, television, radio and internet) became subject of monitoring and regulation by the NMHH, managed by the Media Council (Médiatanács) (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013: 81). The structure of the NMHH and the Media Council were defined by new legislation in the Press and Media Act and the Hungarian Media Law, both adopted in the end of 2010. The legislation assures among other things, that the head of the Council may nominate the executive directors of all Hungarian public media outlets (Freedom House, 2015). The members of the Media Council were appointed by a temporary commission of the government for a term of nine years, by far surpassing Hungary’s four-year term in office. This meant that all members were appointed by Fidesz, including the first Chair of the Media Council Annamária Szalai, who was nominated by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán himself (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013: 81-82).

Another institutional transformation put two of the largest TV-stations (MTV and Duna TV), a leading radio-station (MR) and the Hungarian News Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda), under the Public Service Foundation. Three members of the foundation’s board were picked by opposition parties and as many were appointed by the government, an additional member and the Chair of the board were chosen by the Media Council (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013: 82). In other words, a majority of the Public Service Foundation board, controlling three of the largest media outlets in Hungary as well as the news agency, were elected by the government and the pro-government Media Council.

By handing over news for free to outlets, the Hungarian News Agency eventually forced its only private competitor to shut down (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013: 82). For the funding of the public
service outlets, yet another institution was created. The Media Service and Asset Management Fund had its director appointed directly by the Media Council’s Chair and was granted a 2011 budget of over 22 million euros (2011 exchange rate) for distribution (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013: 82).

An issue stemming from the high proportion of Fidesz-appointed personnel in the new institutions, is bias in the media coverage. For instance, Hungarian online-media reported that the MTV station’s news programmes were dominated to 83% by coverage of Fidesz and its coalition party KDNP, that is ten times as much as the coverage of oppositional MSZP (“Jobbra tolódott az MTV,” 2011). Another issue related to bias is linked to the management of radio frequencies by the NMHH and the Media Council. The primary example, which some view as symbolic for the media’s struggle against government regulations, is Klubrádió’s fight for their long-term frequency. The conflict started when the frequency was given to another broadcaster not long after the NMHH and Media Council started operating. Perhaps most alarming is the fact that the radio wasn’t given access to its frequency even after three court verdicts had ruled in their favour (Bilefsky, 2013). Eventually, Klubrádió was able to buy back the rights to their frequency from NMHH while continuing the struggle for the additional free frequency which should have been handed to them in 2010. However, the guidelines for their original frequency was altered and required Klubrádió to increase their musical content from 15-20 percent to 42 percent, thereby shortening or completely cancelling some of their original programmes (Thüringer, 2013). This was a bitter victory for the radio as they had already lost most of their funds from advertising during the years of uncertainty and short-time contracts after losing their frequency. In fact, it was only after the fourth court ruling in their favour and thanks to the contributions of thousands of listeners, that they were able to get their long-term frequency back in March 2013 (Bilefsky, 2013). The free frequency, on which Klubrádió could continue their original programmes, was only granted to the radio with a four-year delay, in 2014 (Bednárik, 2014).

The changes in the first term of Fidesz supermajority sparked protests from the opposition, civil rights organisations and public demonstrators in Hungary. Criticism has also been sharp from the European Parliament, European Council, European Commission and the U.S. State Department. Scholars, EU policymakers and law experts have stressed that the reforms are breaching the principles of liberal democracy and fundamental civil rights (Verseck, 2013). It is safe to say that criticism of Orbán’s government has been plentiful. In fact, the European Union made several recommendations, for instance on how to protect the independence of the court and
the media pluralism in Hungary. The recommendations came in a previously unseen move towards a member state as the European Parliament declared that Hungary’s legal and constitutional changes were “[…] incompatible with the values of the EU set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.” (“Hungary: EP says,” 2013). In the same statement, the recommendations for the Hungarian government and the relevant institutions of the EU on how to amend the legislation according to European values, was approved by the European Parliament. Although this certainly put some pressure on Fidesz and resulted in some slight amendments to the regulation, it had little effect in reality as the relevant institutions and authorities were already controlled by Fidesz appointees (Freedom House, 2015). Fidesz has quite successfully been able to combat outside pressure and even turn it in their favour at home. They have done so by adding the EU and other international actors to the traditional populist rhetoric against elites and liberals, systematically attacking and labelling them as enemies of Hungary. Bajomi-Lázár and Horváth (2013: 230-232) identified three cases specifically aimed at gaining popular support against these “enemies” by promoting national independence and rejecting outsiders attempts to interfere in Hungary. Firstly, a press campaign filled with various allegations was launched in 2011 to discredit several liberal scholars. Secondly, three “Peace Marches” were held at historically symbolic dates in 2012 with large numbers of participants in support of the government and against the “colonisation attempts” by the European Union. Lastly, while negotiating a loan with the IMF, the government advertised in print and online outlets as well as on billboards that they won’t give in to alleged IMF requests of cuts in family benefits and raised property taxes. These claims were denied by the IMF which forced the government to stop the campaign. Essentially, Orbán successfully withstood international pressure during his first term, slowly distancing Hungary from the EU and defending the new regulations by portraying national independence as the desire or “will of the people”.

The electoral process ahead of the elections in April 2014 received widespread criticism for several reasons. Critique was directed at an electoral law which redrew voting districts and altered the seat-allocation in Parliament. Additionally, governmental influence in state TV and radio was deemed overly strong and Fidesz and their coalition party KDNP were accused of spending more than twice the legal amount on their campaigns (Freedom House, 2015). The final report of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE) stated that the campaign did not entirely fulfil the requirement of separation between party and state as Fidesz
had used almost identical advertisement in their campaign as the government (under Fidesz) had used prior to it (OSCE, 2014: 2). It also stated that media pluralism was undermined by increased numbers of media outlets being owned by Fidesz-associated individuals and by government advertising being allocated to certain media. Furthermore, OSCE media monitoring showed a clear bias in media coverage as news covering the Fidesz campaign were almost exclusively in a positive tone, while more than half of the opposition coverage was in a negative tone in three of five monitored channels (OSCE, 2014: 2-3)

In conclusion, the media strategies of the Hungarian government had a considerable effect on the freedom of the Hungarian press during Fidesz’s first term. Data collected from Freedom House’s reports on press freedom for each year of the four-year term, shows a decline in press freedom following the inauguration of Orbán (see Figure 1 below). Furthermore, if considering reports from previous years, the change becomes even more evident. For example, the press freedom in 2009 was labelled “Free” with a score of 23 (with 0-30 being free). Essentially, Hungary’s press freedom went from “Free” with a score of 30 in 2010 to the category “Partly Free” with a score of 36 in 2011 where it remained throughout the first term.

**Figure 1:**

![Bar chart showing press freedom scores for Hungary from 2010 to 2013]

*Chart by author, based on data from freedomhouse.org.*
Freedom House’s motivation for the decline has been based on several factors identified within the legal, political and economic environment of Hungary. In terms of the legal environment, the report lists motivations such as the issue of laws restricting freedom of speech and these being routinely used against journalists, and the issue of the extensive power and pro-government stance of the NMHH and the Media Council. Examples within the political environment are editorial bias in media outlets and the centralisation of media funding and production under the Public Service Fund. Finally, within the economic environment, factors such as the lack of competition of news production due to the free news provided by the state-funded news agency, and the lack of objectivity of many of the news from the same agency, have been considered (Freedom House, 2015).

Second term: 2014-2018

Findings for this period show that while several media strategies identified in the previous term were reoccurring, the second term would primarily be characterised by the closure and capture of various media outlets. Some of the key events presented in this section are: An amendment to the law on internet content which may restrict free speech, pro-government bias in an increased amount of media outlets, and heavy losses to media pluralism from the termination of outlets such as Hungary’s largest newspaper and the only private nationwide radio.

The parliamentary elections on April 6th ended with a clear victory for Orbán and Fidesz in 2014. This time the radical far-right party Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) became the second biggest party with 20 percent of the votes (Mudde, 2014). Compared to the results in 2010, the support for Fidesz had declined from 53 percent to 44 percent. But although the single majority was lost, Fidesz still received a two third majority in Parliament (Haász & Miklósi, 2014). This was primarily due to two carefully constructed legislative changes prior to the elections. The first change was to alter the Parliamentary seats from 386 to 199 seats. The second change designed by Fidesz, was the introduction of a new electoral system which, among other things, resulted in new borders for voting districts (Mudde, 2014). While some of these changes were encouraged by observers outside of Hungary, critics had also warned that they would favour Fidesz and raise
their chances of gaining a majority (Mudde, 2014).

In May, the Constitutional Court ruled that providers of internet content could be held accountable for user comments which break the law, even if such comments were removed rapidly. The decision was strongly criticised with the reasoning that it may motivate websites to completely remove commentary fields and thus limit forums of discussion (Freedom House, 2015). This ruling should be seen in the light of the previously discussed vagueness of legislations which mean that a wide range of statements could be deemed unlawful, according to the new media law. Thus, comments on any website may result in fines for the provider, depending on the arbitrary judgement of the court.

Ever since the new regulations on the media, defamation is a criminal offense. In 2015, seventeen people were brought to court for posting about a suspicious property deal by the mayor of Siófok on Facebook. Another case in December the same year ended with a blogger being detained and charged on grounds of defamation for criticising a Budapest mayor (Freedom House, 2016).

Two months after the elections, Klubrádió’s partner in Debrecen, Hungary’s second largest city, Lokomotív Rádió was shut down by the NMHH and the Media Council. The radio had operated without a license since 2012 as no legal solution was met with the NMHH for a renewal. The radio claimed that available solutions were ignored, and it blamed the authorities for violating press freedom by terminating their operation without a valid cause. Henceforth, the government critical Klubrádió could only be heard within Budapest and on the internet (“Lekapcsolták a Klubrádió,” 2014).

In 2015, the media empire of Lajos Simicska, previous Fidesz party treasurer, shifted from being largely supportive of Orbán to more critical coverage of the government, following a personal dispute between him and Orbán. In the same year, András “Andy” Vajna, head of Hungary’s film commission and supporter of Orbán, bought TV2, one of the biggest television stations in the country, although a Simicska associate claimed to have bought it as well (Freedom House, 2016). The purchase of the channel by Vajna was enabled through loans from the state bank MBK which consequently would become the owner if TV2 would fail to pay its loans (Csurgó, 2017). Previously, the main rival of TV2 and increasingly government-critical RTL Klub had filed a complaint to the European Commission as a new progressive tax (up to 50%) designed by the government, disproportionally affected their businesses (Byrne & Vasagar,
2014). Eventually, in May 2015 the government withdrew and replaced the progressive tax with a significantly lower flat tax of 5.3 percent (Freedom House, 2016).

In terms of media bias, the independent and frequently government-critical news website Origo.hu, was purchased by the relative of an MKB director, the same state bank which granted the necessary loans for Vajna to buy TV2. The news site has since shifted towards more pro-government news (Csurgó, 2017). In a similar case, the financial daily Napi Gazdaság shifted its name to Magyar Idők and became more government-friendly. According to Freedom House, the financial daily was purchased by businessmen with ties to Fidesz (Freedom House, 2016). A free paper called Metropol, owned by a business affiliate of Simicska, was closed due to a combination of financial difficulties and their license to distribute papers in public transport areas not being renewed. In its place, another free paper called Lokál emerged and was promptly given the rights for distribution. The new paper enjoyed serious financial support from state funded advertisement in its pages (Kovács, 2016).

Potentially the most significant blow to media pluralism in Hungary was the closure of Népszabadság in October 2016. The left-leaning outlet had been the largest newspaper in Hungary until it stopped both print and online publications. Journalists and the opposition claimed that the paper was shut down through a coup just days after the paper had released stories of alleged corruption scandals involving government officials. The governing party and the new owners who bought the paper in 2014 however, claimed it was shut down for financial reasons (“Hungary’s Largest Paper,” 2016). International media has voiced strong concern over the closure of Népszabadság and questioned why no cutbacks or alternative measures were taken to save the paper if it was closed solely for economic reasons (Bienvenu, 2016). According to the Freedom House, the parent company which closed Népszabadság was sold shortly after to Optimus Press, a company linked to Orbán’s childhood friend and oligarch Lőrinc Mészáros (Freedom House, 2017).

Yet another significant case in 2016 was the closure of Class FM, the only private nationwide radio station in Hungary. Previously owned by a company associated to the oligarch Simicska, the radio was sold not long before the license for its nationwide frequency expired. As the Media Council and NMHH decided not to renew the license, the station which had attracted over 2.5 million daily listeners went silent on November 19th (Rényi, 2016; “Ma Éjfélkor Elhallgat,” 2016). In contrast, Radio 1 which had only broadcasted in Budapest since its start-up in June the
same year, was granted licenses for nine additional cities in Hungary. The station which was started by Orbán ally Vajna was thereby able to broadcast over half of Hungary starting from the 15th of November, just four days before the closure of its largest rival Class FM (Szabó, 2016).

According to a report released by the Freedom House, the last regional newspapers in Hungary were acquired by businessmen linked to Orbán, primarily by Vajna and Mészáros. Several deals were supported by loans from the MKB state bank. The author of the report argues that this gave Fidesz total control over regional newspapers in 2017, just ahead of elections the following year (Hegedüs, 2018: 9).

These measures were all achieved without any serious obstacles for Fidesz, although international pressure remained a fact for Orbán and his government. In addition to the previously discussed criticism from various EU institutions, the U.S. State Department, NGO’s and the opposition, a U.N. report listed a total of 221 recommendations by its member states to Hungary in 2016. A large amount of the recommendations voiced concerns over lacking press freedom and particularly the lack of pluralism and independence of the Hungarian press (Marthoz, 2016). The most straightforward explanation to how Fidesz has been able to withstand criticism and continue “business as usual” lies within the very fact that they control most of the Hungarian media. Marthoz (2016), an EU correspondent at the Committee to Protect Journalists, noted that the U.N. report received limited coverage in Hungary and like previous criticism it was largely ignored, labelled as biased, or overshadowed by other news in the progovernment media. Hungary expert Kim Lane Scheppele (2016) has also argued that the European Union acted too mildly and too late in the case of Hungary due to lack of consensus between varying EU institutions regarding what action to take. Scheppele means that the EU’s inability to halt the developments early on in Hungary has had dire consequences as the Law and Justice party (PiS) has applied several Fidesz strategies since winning a majority in Poland’s 2015 elections. As a result, Scheppele argues that the Article 7 action to suspend an EU member’s voting ability is no longer viable as both countries have the possibility to veto it. In fact, Orbán announced early on in 2016 that he would use his veto if EU would take such action against PiS (Scheppelle, 2016).

Thus, during the second term of Fidesz, an ally in the resistance against “EU colonialization” emerged in Poland, providing yet another argument to legitimise the widely criticised policies of the Hungarian government.

In summary, the events during this term had significantly strengthened pro-government media
and terminated or weakened the reach of critical outlets. With Fidesz-affiliates capturing the last regional newspapers in 2017, the media landscape was considerably balanced in their favour ahead of upcoming elections. The 2018 elections were under the observation of an OSCE mission to determine its compliance with international electoral obligations, democratic standards and national legislation. It found, in line with observations in 2014, that the line between the state and Fidesz was blurred in their favour by the frequent and striking similarities of government information and the campaign of Fidesz (OSCE, 2018: 1). The overall conclusion of the observation mission was that the elections were free but not entirely fair. In terms of the media, the report lists several specific issues which are believed to have affected the fairness of the elections. Among others, the lack of media pluralism due to extensive media ownership by Fidesz-affiliated businessmen, the progovernment bias of leading TV stations like M1 and TV2, and an overrepresentation of Fidesz and their coalition party KDNP in newspapers coverage was considered to unequally favour the ruling coalition (OSCE, 2018: 10-12).

During Fidesz’s second term, press freedom ratings continued to deteriorate in Hungary. According to the latest available report on press freedom by the Freedom House, Hungary hit its lowest score yet in 2016. With a score of 44, Hungary’s press freedom got further entrenched as “Partly Free”, a label which is given for scores between 31 and 60 (Freedom House, 2017). The chart below shows the available data on the decline in press freedom during Fidesz’s two terms with supermajority in the Hungarian Parliament.
The chart shows that since Fidesz second term started in 2014, press freedom has decreased for each year according to the Freedom House. The scores were motivated by several factors, considering specific events within the legal, political and economic environment of the media for each year. However, the overall image is that the deterioration of press freedom in Hungary was enabled by the new media regulations in 2010 and the institutional changes that followed with it, scores have been further worsened by decreasing media pluralism due to the closure of critical outlets.

**Discussion**

The results of this study show that Fidesz has managed to use a wide range of media strategies in their favour. These strategies have further concentrated the power of Fidesz beyond the two third

---

2 Data for 2017 not available at the time of writing
majority in parliament which they have enjoyed since 2010. The media regulations imposed in 2010 allowed Fidesz to take control over media monitoring, regulation and funding by appointing allies of the party to all significant positions in the new institutions. This paved the way for years of systematic interference in government-critical media outlets by the NMHH and the new Media Council and has led to the closure or severe restriction of several outlets. The purchase and start-up of media outlets by Fidesz-affiliated businessmen has been widespread and has significantly diminished media pluralism. Ultimately, by the end of Fidesz’s second term the state and Fidesz-affiliates virtually controlled the media landscape in Hungary, except for a few outlets with narrower reach than the pro-government ones. Similar media strategies were identified in both terms and events unfolding since the elections in April 2018 further confirmed this notion. Just two days after the third electoral win by Fidesz, Lánchíd Rádió declared it would go silent at midnight while the newspaper Magyar Nemzet announced it would release its last paper the following day, after 80 years in print. Both outlets were associated to previous Fidesz treasurer Simicska who had shifted his allegiances after a dispute with Orbán (Dull, 2018). With that said, the closure of Népszabadság in 2016 and Magyar Nemzet in 2018 means that two of the biggest newspapers in Hungary have seized to exist. According to data from MATESZ, the Hungarian Distribution Monitoring Association, Népszabadság was the most widely read paper until its closure while Magyar Nemzet was the second most popular (Bajomi-Lázár & Filep, 2018). After these losses of media pluralism, RTL Klub TV and Index.hu are arguably the only remaining independent outlets with a widespread reach in the country (Dunai, 2018).

The findings suggest that the media strategies of Fidesz have great similarities to the three strategies identified in Latin American cases by Waisbord (2012). The first strategy, *strengthening the media power of the President*, was observed in a wide range of actions in each term by Orbán’s government. For example, the expansion of state-owned outlets was achieved in the first term by uniting public broadcasting under the Public Service Foundation, controlled by Fidesz appointees. These outlets were granted substantial state funding. Consequently, the Hungarian News Agency ousted its only private competitor by handing out news free of charge. In addition, several media outlets owned by affiliates of Orbán have expanded their businesses thanks to granted licenses by the NMHH and the Media Council as well as state funding, such as Vajna’s Radio 1. Although the state has not directly expropriated private media outlets, businessmen affiliated to Fidesz, some even personal friends of Orbán, have acquired several
outlets which had been critical of the government. These cases occurred primarily during the second term and several of the deals were funded by loans from the state bank MKB. Two notable examples in the findings are the purchase of Origo.hu which largely shifted to pro-government news thereafter, and Napi Gazdaság which changed names and increased positive reporting of the government. In addition, several cases like the recently mentioned closure of Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet are believed to have been politically motivated. The study also found cases of tax design, advertising and funding which favoured Fidesz-supporters and punished their critics. The RTL Klub was forced to file a complaint to the European Commission to revoke a government designed tax which effected their businesses disproportionally. In another case, the Simicska associated paper Metropol was forced to close in part due to financial issues and losing their license to distribute in public transportation. In contrast, the newly started Lokál was granted the license and instantly gained large revenues from state advertisement.

The second media strategy, bolstering community media, has only partially been identified in the case of Hungary. As part of the strategy, Waisbord (2012: 509-510) found that certain Latin American populists promoted community media to diversify media ownership and minimise the power of larger media outlets. The study found no evidence for this part of the strategy in Hungary. This could be because many of the larger media outlets have either been closed or acquired by Fidesz affiliates, making the strategy to diversify media ownership less attractive in the context. Seemingly, while some Latin American populists aimed at breaking up private media monopolies by pluralising media ownership in the public sphere, Fidesz has been working in reverse by closing a rather diverse media landscape. However, the second part of the strategy which suggests that populist policies leave community outlets in legal uncertainty, risking fines and closure, is supported by the findings. The prime example of this is the case of government critical Klubrádió which was deprived of its frequency and had to operate in uncertainty with short-term contracts for years before it regained its license by the NMHH in 2013. Lokomotív Rádió, the Klubrádió associated station in Debrecen, was less fortunate and got shut down by the NMHH and the Media Council as no legal solution was met with the institutions for its continued operation.

Lastly, the third strategy, exercising tighter control of the press through legislation and judicial decisions, is largely supported by findings of this study. To begin with, the creation of laws to control media contents was one of the first things the Fidesz implemented with their
supermajority. The New Media Regulation of 2010 centralised the monitoring and regulation of all media content to the NMHH and the Media Council, managed by Fidesz appointees. The institutions have since been reluctant to renew licenses for critical outlets in several cases. Additionally, they have used their authority to change guidelines for media content as in the case of Klubrádió’s frequency which was altered to double the musical content of the radio. New media laws have also been broadly and vaguely defined in Hungary, another part of the second strategy which was realised early on by Fidesz. For example, the new laws created in 2010 include vague formulations which make violations of “public morals or the moral rights of others” punishable. In the second term it was added that websites may be fined for comments by its users which violate the law. Finally, the usage of laws and fines to discourage criticism has been reoccurring under Fidesz’s rule. For instance, the introduction of large fines for any breach of the media law has been pointed out in this study as a cause for journalists’ self-censorship. In addition, defamation was made a criminal offense and was used in some instances against people criticising politicians on forums like Facebook.

In addition, findings show that the media management strategies by Orbán’s government severely diminished the level of press freedom in Hungary. As data from the Freedom House has shown, press freedom went from “Free” to “Partly Free” during the first term, and continued to deteriorate during the second term. The latest data shows that in 2016, Hungary had a score of 44 compared to a score of 23 in 2009, the year before Fidesz came to power. This shows an alarming pace of decline as the country moves towards the “Not Free” category given to countries with a score between 61 and 100. The decline in press freedom has had a negative effect on the democratic quality in Hungary. Democracy indexes such as The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index and the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports, both note a negative trend in the level of democracy for Hungary between the years of 2010 and 2017 (The Economist, 2018; Freedom House, 2018).

Although it is hard to assess to what extent the media strategies of Fidesz allowed them to keep their two third majority in three consecutive elections, it is safe to assume that it has had a considerable effect. As findings have shown, election monitoring reports pointed out that media bias and the lack of media pluralism favoured Fidesz and had a notable impact on the fairness of elections in 2014 as well as 2018.

The findings of this study suggest that in the right circumstances, European populists may
employ hostile media management strategies in line with those identified in Latin American cases by Waisbord (2012). This gives some interesting insights into what we may expect from rising populist leaders in the region.

By showing how the media strategies of the Hungarian government significantly and continuously diminished press freedom, the findings confirm the notion that this relationship is a negative one. In addition, the results support the findings of Albertazzi and McDonnell (2015), further discarding the expectation that populist parties enjoy only short-lived success in Europe.

As a concluding remark, it should be considered that in the case of Hungary, the majority result in 2010 was seemingly crucial for the developments that unfolded. Without it, Fidesz could not have made amendments to the constitution which were necessary for the media control they established during the first two terms in power. Although this could be used as an argument that similar media management strategies are unlikely to occur elsewhere in the region, as previously mentioned, Poland has gone down a similar path since the 2015 elections. That said, the risk of these strategies being implemented by other populists gaining power in Europe and elsewhere, can simply not be disregarded.

**Conclusion**

The main purpose of this study has been to examine how populists in power use media management strategies to remain in power and what effect these actions have on press freedom and democratic quality. The study examined the case of Hungary, using descriptive process tracing to collect empirical material on the actions of Fidesz during their two terms in power between 2010 and 2018. The findings of the empirical analysis showcase a negative relationship between populist’s media management and press freedom. The results indicate that these strategies are used to gain control over the media landscape and thereby secure their position in government through curbing critics and minimising the oppositions chances to challenge them. It also suggests that these strategies are utilised across continents and political alignments as the analysis has shown that the strategies of the conservative right party Fidesz, closely resemble those of populists primarily on the political left in Latin America, as identified by Waisbord (2012). Although further research would be needed, the findings of this study may have valuable
implications for policymakers as it points to the need of solid legislature to protect the freedom of the press. As this case has shown, the EU has failed to prevent developments occurring in a member state which suggests that there is a need to establish new mechanisms which can identify similar cases and take effective measures at an early stage. This is of specific importance as scholars have noted an upsurge in populism in Europe (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015: 178-179) and as events occurring in Poland raise fears of similar strategies spreading across the region.

This study contributes to the identified research gaps, specifically adding to the thin literature on the actions of populists in power in the global North. It also contributes with empirical findings to the literature on the relation between populists and the independent media, as well as the level of press freedom.

Future research may contribute to this field by further examining the workings of populists in power and by cross-regional comparison of populist media strategies. The specific cases of Hungary and Poland make up interesting cases for further studies and may be valuable sources for theory development in the field. Theory developing studies could utilise and build on the media strategies identified by Waisbord (2012) and the findings of this study. Researching the governing strategies of populists in power may have far reaching implications for policy making and for any future attempts to prevent the negative effects of such strategies on liberal democracy.
References


Thürringer, B. (2018, May 2). Aláírta a szerződést a Klubrádió a 95,3-ra. Index.hu. Retrieved from https://index.hu/kultur/media/2013/05/02/alairta_a_szerzodest_a_klubradio_a_95_3-ra/


