Coercion and its Effects
Evidence from the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Sophia Hatz
Counterinsurgency, state repression and other forms of coercion have multiple adverse effects. Although a state’s use of threats and force should deter an opposition group, these measures often stimulate resistance. And although state-led coercion aims to influence an opposition group, coercive practices have social, economic and political consequences for civilians. This dissertation studies the efficacy and effects of coercive policies in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The four composite essays investigate the impact of Israel’s practice of house demolition and construction of a separation barrier on Palestinians’ conflict preferences and use of violence, as well as the broader consequences of these policies for Palestinian communities. Essay I questions the conventional wisdom that the selective targeting of militants can be an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Through a survey of Palestinians, it demonstrates that house demolition can generate opposition to peace when it is perceived as indiscriminate in its targeting, even if it is selective by design. Essay II distinguishes between the mechanisms of collective threat and personal fear in state repression. In a longitudinal study of administrative demolition orders, it finds that orders issued against communal structures increase preferences for violence and militant political parties, suggesting that collective threats backfire. Essay III quantifies the economic consequences of counterinsurgency by measuring the separation barrier’s impact on Palestinian employment and wages. It further shows that this economic impact increases the rate of Israeli conflict fatalities, demonstrating that economic consequences of coercion can stimulate violent resistance. Essay IV conceptualises a state’s separation and exclusion of particular population groups as a general phenomenon and form of state repression. It draws on historical cases worldwide and presents the enclosure of Palestinian communities in special zones of the separation barrier as a contemporary example. The essays are empirical studies which use survey methods, quantitative analysis, principles of experimental design, qualitative sources and field work as a basis for description and explanation. As a whole, the dissertation contributes to the study of coercion by calling attention to understudied forms of coercion and identifying particular mechanisms by which threats and force can result in adverse effects.

Keywords: Civil conflict, state repression, counterinsurgency, coercion, Israel-Palestine conflict

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ISSN 0566-8808
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-373742 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-373742)
To my family.
List of essays

This thesis is based on the following essays, which are referred to in the text by their Roman numerals.


II “Israeli Demolition Orders and Palestinian Preferences for Dissent”. Accepted by The Journal of Politics on September 28, 2018.


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Contents: Introduction to the dissertation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical concepts</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical context</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting the essays</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research methods, inference and generalisation</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

Childhood memories, disruption of routines, social science as a collaborative enterprise, technology as door opening, research centers as institutionalized sources of ecological serendipity—those are the themes of the first part of my story on the logic of discovery.
–Sniderman (2011, 104)

While it would be impossible to acknowledge all the different modes of experience, discussion, review, criticism and collaboration which have shaped this dissertation, I would like to acknowledge some of the individuals and groups who have contributed greatly to my learning and research as a PhD student.

I would first like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors Dr. Håvard Hegre, Dr. Allan Dafoe and Dr. Kristine Eck, who have been a core source of support from start to end. I would like to thank my primary supervisor Håvard for his continuous engagement in my PhD research and studies, and for his patience and immense knowledge. Allan, thank you for introducing me to the world of research and for your encouragement and mentorship across all aspects of inquiry and knowledge-building. Thank you to Kristine for your insightful comments on many drafts, guidance in literature, strategic thinking and for expanding my perspective and interests.

Besides my supervisors, I would like to thank several other individuals and groups at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research. For many years of stimulating discussion and feedback, I would like to thank the leaders and participants of the Monday supervision group, including Dr. Magnus Öberg, Dr. Hanne Fjelde, Dr. Nina von Uexkull, Dr. Colin Walsh, Dr. Nynke Salverda, Dr. Niklas Karlén, Karin Johansson, Eric Skoog, Ida Rudolfsen, Stefan Döring, Annkatrin Tritschoks, David Randahl, Kristina Petrova and Mihai Croicu. Outside this group, many other members of the department have provided valuable guidance and support at critical junctures—notably, Dr. Johan Broché, Dr. Kristine Höglund, Dr. Desirée Nilsson, Dr. Jonathan Hall and Mohamed Al-Majdalawi. No less important has been the active support of the department’s administrative staff including Anna Norrman-Hedenmark, Naima Mouleb, Helena Millroth and Christofer Hägg.

Beyond Uppsala University, I have been fortunate to participate in activities at other universities and research communities. I am very grateful to professor Tim McDaniel, who brought me on as a teaching assistant on his course at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) summer
program. The four summers I spent in Ann Arbor, Michigan, are an invaluable and unforgettable aspect of my PhD studies. Charles Crabtree and Dr. Chris Fariss, you played important roles both in Ann Arbor and beyond. I would also like to thank professor Esteban Klor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and professor Daphna Canetti at Haifa University, for facilitating my field work visits to Israel and for many inspiring conversations. Thank you to professor Sami Miaari at Tel Aviv University for his encouragement and contribution to my PhD research. My international travel would not have been possible without financial support from Svensk Nationell Datatjänst, Bryzantiska Re-sestipendium, and Forskraftstiftelsen Theodor Adelswärds minne, whose gen-
erosity I gratefully acknowledge.

In addition to many sources of educational, technical, administrative and financial support, friends and family have been important contributors to my education and work. My close friends and colleagues Dr. Annekatrin Deglow and Dr. Holly Guthrey in particular have been sources of indispensable advice, both inside and outside the office. My Spanish friends deserve a collective mention as a community which provided vital fun and joy. Last but not least, I am indebted to my family, step-family and family-in-law: my mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters, for keeping me grounded and providing a basis for growth. A special thanks goes to my father Mikael Levin and my uncle Gabriel Levin, who guided my study of the Israel-Palestine conflict in many ways. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my husband Dr. Gianni Garcia Faroldi, who listened, understood, and helped me along the way.

Sophia Hatz
Uppsala, January 2019
Introduction to the dissertation

Scholars have long questioned the efficacy of counterinsurgency and state-led repression. Does state repression lead to deterrence or the escalation of dissent (Lichbach 1987)? Does state violence during counterinsurgency incite insurgent attacks (Downes 2007; Lyall 2009)? What determines why military force sometimes stimulates adversaries to react with military force (Myerson 2007)? This prominent line of questioning is often motivated by the observation that, under some conditions, intimidation and arm-twisting fail to convince an opponent to yield. Sometimes, strategies aiming to deter and induce compliance only provoke greater resistance and opposition.

A second prominent line of questioning relates to the broader effects of counterinsurgency and state repression. Although the primary target is an opposition group, counterinsurgency and state repression have enduring economic, social and political consequences for civilians (Collier 1999; Collier et al. 2003; Gates et al. 2012). Furthermore, these economic, social and political effects tend to increase the risk of further violent conflict (Collier et al. 2003; Ghobarak, Huth, and Russett 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Considering earlier research, it’s clear that counterinsurgency and state repression can be both “development in reverse” (Collier et al. 2003) and a “double-edge sword” (Abrahms 2013).

This dissertation studies the efficacy and broader effects of counterinsurgency and state repression in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. It examines two policies employed by the government of Israel against Palestinians: house demolition and the separation barrier. The composite essays investigate the impact of house demolition and the separation barrier on Palestinian conflict preferences and use of violence, as well as the socio-economic and political impacts of these policies. The essays are empirical studies which draw on surveys of Palestinians, indicators of social and economic conditions in Palestinian territories, fatalities data, secondary sources and detailed geographic data on house demolition and the separation barrier.

As a whole, the dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of coercion: the use of limited force and threats of force as a means of persuading a behavioural change (Schelling 1966, 2-3). As a theoretical concept, coercion is central to our understanding of war as a bargaining process and contest of will (Fearon 1995; Schelling 1960, 1966; Slantchev 2011). In practice, states often rely on strategies which involve force and threats as means of influencing the attitudes and actions of opposition groups.

A better understanding of the types, mechanisms and outcomes of coercion can improve efforts to reign in its adverse effects. Each essay serves this goal.
INTRODUCTION

in a different way. Essay I improves our understanding of how coercion works (and doesn’t work) by measuring individual-level perceptions of targeting in a coercive policy. Essay II unpacks the mechanism of coercive threats by identifying two divergent ways in which a state’s use of threats influences a population’s conflict preferences. Essay III traces the extended outcomes of coercion by estimating the causal links between counterinsurgency, its economic effects, and subsequent political violence against a state. Essay IV conceptualises an under-theorised form of coercion and outlines avenues for further research.

This introduction serves as a framework for the four independent essays which compose the dissertation. In the next section, I present the theoretical concepts relevant to each of the essays. After establishing this conceptual base, I present a short description of the empirical context of the dissertation: house demolition and the separation barrier in the Israel-Palestine conflict. I then present the four essays, describing the particular focus and findings of each, as well as how they relate to the dissertation as a whole. After this, I describe the research methods used and delimit the possibility of causal inference and generalisation. Finally, I discuss the implications of the dissertation for research and policy.

Theoretical concepts

Coercion, threat and brute force

Coercion is defined here as the actual or threatened use of force by one actor against another for the purpose of influencing the other actor’s preferences and behaviour (Schelling 1966, 2-3; Byman and Waxman 2002, 1). The logic of coercion involves causing limited harm or threatening harm in order to lead targeted groups and individuals to prefer a course of action which is in line with the coercer’s political goals. It is about manipulating a target’s incentive structure in order to persuade the target to choose to change their behaviour (Schelling 1966, 69-91; Pape 1990, 106; Byman and Waxman 2002, 10-11).

Coercion includes both acts of force and threats of force, but the mechanism of threat is central to coercion. The use of actual harm is limited to the extent it is necessary to credibly signal future harm; the extent to which it lends credibility to threats (Byman and Waxman 2002, 3). It is the threat of harm which is persuasive; it is harm that can still be inflicted or withheld which makes a target choose to comply (Schelling 1966, 3; Byman and Waxman 2002, 3).

Coercion is often defined in contrast to brute force: the application of harm in attempt to incapacitate a target and force a desired behavioural change (Schelling 1966, 69–91; Byman and Waxman 2002, 3). While coercion can include force (actual harm), brute force generally does not include the objective of manipulating a target’s incentives and preferences; the objective of brute force
is to leave the target with no choice. This distinction can be illustrated in many ways. It is the “difference between taking what you want and making someone give it you” (Schelling 1966, 2). It is the difference between genocide—the systematic elimination of a target group (Harff 2003)—and intentional mass killing as an attempt to convince survivors to surrender (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). In short, coercion uses limited actual harm or the threat of harm to structure a target’s preferences; brute force uses extensive harm to overcome a target’s capability to choose. Defined in way, coercion includes a wide variety of conflict strategies, ranging from policies that restrict freedoms to military operations which degrade, but do not overcome, a target group’s capabilities.

Counterinsurgency, state repression, resistance and political violence

Coercion can be used by a state in attempt to influence the behaviour of another state, an organised opposition group, or civilians. It can also be used by an opposition group to influence a state, another organised opposition group or civilians. This dissertation focuses on coercive interactions between a state on the one hand, and organised opposition groups and civilians on the other.¹ I use different terms for coercion depending on the perpetrating actor and the range of coercive instruments used.

When a state uses coercion against an organised opposition group and/or civilians, I refer to this either as counterinsurgency or state repression. Counterinsurgency is a more specific term which includes policies and practices primarily aimed at armed opposition groups and their civilian base of support. It is often defined relative to the threat it aims to address—counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are measures taken against what the state classifies as insurgency or terrorism (Moore 2007; Rineheart 2010). State repression includes a broader range of actions not limited to the aim of addressing threats by organised opposition groups. State repression includes physical harm as well as harm in the form of policies and practices which restrict civil liberties or violate personal integrity rights (Davenport 2007; Gurr 1986). Its broader

¹The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines these actors as follows. A state is “either an internationally recognised sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or an internationally unrecognised government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognised sovereign government previously controlling the same territory.” An organised opposition group is “any non-governmental formally organised group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility.” Civilians are “unarmed people who are not active members of the security forces of the state, or members of an organised armed militia or opposition group” (Definitions, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions (accessed Oct. 2, 2018)).
INTRODUCTION

goal is the deterrence of activities and/or attitudes perceived to be challenging to the state.

When an organised opposition group uses coercion against a state, I refer to this alternatively as resistance or dissent. Generally, the term resistance is used in the literature on social movements and collective action (Schock 2005; Sharp 1973; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008), while the term dissent is more commonly used in the literature on state repression (Davenport 2007; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998). Both resistance and dissent include a wide range of actions ranging from armed insurrection to non-violent campaigns to symbolic acts of defiance. Resistance is generally thought of as violent and/or non-violent actions carried out by one or more organised opposition groups in pursuit of a specific political objective (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 16). The role of named groups with discernible leadership is central to conceptualisations of resistance, which is clear from the concept’s situation in literature on social movements and collective action. However, actions can also be carried out by individuals without coordination or affiliation with organised groups. When a non-state actor uses violence to achieve a political objective, but the affiliation of this actor with an organised opposition group is not clear, I refer to this as political violence.

Common definitions of counterinsurgency, state repression and resistance all reflect the general logic of coercion. Counterinsurgency campaigns are coercive although they are designed to disrupt resistance activity and degrade opposition group capacity because states will generally accept the voluntary capitulation of an insurgent group before its total destruction (Byman and Waxman 2002, 5). Repression is coercive because it relies on threats, intimidation and sanctions for the purpose of influencing activities or attitudes (Davenport 2007, 2). The coercive nature of resistance, dissent and political violence is especially clear in ‘strategic logic’ theories of non-violence (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) and ‘terrorism’ (Abrahms 2006; Pape 2003) which emphasise how groups and individuals with inferior military capabilities attempt to achieve government concessions through the application of pressure and fear.²

Efficacy and effects of coercion

The dissertation is concerned with two kinds of outcomes of state-led coercion. One narrow set of outcomes relates to the ‘efficacy’ of coercion. This is usually measured relative to what we assume are the actor’s goals in using coercion. Coercion is considered effective or successful when its application persuades the target to change their behaviour in line with the coercer’s objectives. Co-

²The terms described in this section are used somewhat inconsistently across different disciplines and may carry normative connotations. I’ve explained here my rationale for using the terms as I do, recognising that few terms can be considered objective and that my choices may differ from others’.
The coercer is considered ineffective when it has no discernible impact on a target’s preferences and behaviour. It is considered counterproductive or “backfires” on the coercer when it results in a behavioural change that is the opposite of what the coercer intended (Byman and Waxman 2002, 35; Kalyvas 2006, 151; Chenoweth 2011, 23; Toft and Zhukov 2012, 797).³

A problem with this measure of efficacy is that a coercer’s objectives can be unobservable, counterintuitive, misrepresented or multiple. Most commonly, the aim of coercion is to reduce threats and violence against the coercer, but coercion may also be used to provoke retaliatory violence for strategic reasons (Abrahms 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Carter 2016). Increased violence in this case is not counterproductive, but rather is the response the coercer intended to produce. A coercer could also have unstated and unobservable objectives, which would necessarily not be recognised as a basis for evaluation.

When I refer to efficacy in this dissertation, I rely on a coercer’s statements of intent in order to infer the objectives of coercion. In counterinsurgency and state repression, a state’s goals are usually the deterrence or cessation of opposition groups’ use of violent and non-violent resistance, and compliance or compromise in line with the state’s demands in negotiations. I do not mean that states do not have other motives, only that I evaluate efficacy relative to these observable objectives. Assuming a state’s goals are to reduce resistance and induce compliance, the most appropriate measure of efficacy is a change in the target’s behaviour or the change in a target’s preferences for different policies and courses of action (Byman and Waxman 2002, 37).

The policy implications of studies of efficacy are pragmatic. By revealing that, under some conditions, coercion can be counterproductive relative to its goals, studies of efficacy call attention to unanticipated and adverse effects. At the same time, however, studies can also reveal conditions under which coercive instruments are effective. This latter policy implication naturally raises ethical concerns about how the research findings may be put to use. Although the word ‘effective’ may have normative connotations, it is important to emphasise here that when I evaluate efficacy in this dissertation, I am only assessing the outcome of coercion relative to what I infer are the state’s objectives.

The broader effects of coercion represent a different set of outcome measures. These have to do with the impact of coercive measures on civil society, in the realm of non-contentious interaction between states and populations.

³The Merriam-Webster definition of backfire (verb) is: “to have the opposite result of what was desired or expected” (Merriam-Webster, “backfire”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/backfire (accessed on Nov. 20, 2018)). Other expressions in prior research illustrate this implied meaning: violence can cause “blowback” (Chalmers 2000), a “boomerang effect” (Jaeger et al. 2012), and “backlash” (Francisco 1995); violence can be “a double-edged sword” (Abrahms 2013) or result in “accidental guerrilla phenomenon” (Kilcullen 2009).
INTRODUCTION

The kinds of outcomes measured in prior research include economic indicators such as poverty, economic growth and employment (Collier et al. 2003), social indicators including mortality and disability (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003) and political indicators related to state formation (Stein and Russett 1980, 408-409; Tilly and Ardant 1975) and democratic participation (Blattman 2009). Identifying measures of the broader effects of coercion does not rely on assumptions about a state’s goals. On the contrary, broader consequences are often considered unintended, collateral or indirect effects of coercive policies. As such, these outcomes of coercion are not measures of coercion’s success relative to its goals and they also lead to different policy implications. For policy makers and in future research, the extent of negative effects incurred could serve as an indicator of the proportionality of a state’s use threats and harm relative to the state’s goals. As the broader effects of coercion take place in civil society, they also speak to the degree of distinction between civilians and combatants as targets of coercive practices. Proportionality and distinction are two principles which are important in considerations of ethics in war.

In sum, the efficacy of coercion and the broader effects of coercion can be thought of as two different sets of outcome measures which differ in their assumptions and in their policy implications. At bottom, both approaches to studying the outcomes of coercion are concerned with the propensity of coercion to beget coercion. The question of efficacy has been central to studies of counterinsurgency and state repression precisely because coercion so often fails or backfires. Backfire is puzzling because the logic of coercion stipulates that expectations of costs and harm will reduce a target’s determination to resist (Byman and Waxman 2002, 10; Abrahms 2013, 2; George 1991, 12; Dafoe, Hatz, and Zhang 2017, 6-7). The backfire effect of coercion is also a critical component of the endogeneity problem in the “repression-dissent nexus”: states repress dissidents and repression fuels dissent (Lichbach 1987; Ritter and Conrad 2016; Tilly 1978, 2005). And it is the main thesis of “the conflict trap”: war degrades development and poor development increases the risk of war (Collier et al. 2003).

Empirical context

The Israel-Palestine conflict is an armed struggle between the state of Israel and various organised Palestinian opposition groups. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) classifies it as a conflict over territory. It can be classified in other ways from different perspectives. From the Israeli point of view, the

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4If we interpret backfire as an unintended outcome, then this can also be considered a broader effect of coercion. In the title of this dissertation, I conflate efficacy and effects, but I distinguish between the two kinds of outcomes here in order to highlight their differences.

conflict is a defence against threats to Israel’s existence from Arab populations and a campaign against Palestinian insurgents. From the Palestinian point of view, it is a struggle against foreign occupation and for statehood.

**Figure 1:** Israel and the Palestinian territories

Data sources: Israel boundaries and 1949 Armistice line: Tufts University; West Bank and Gaza boundaries: OCHA; base map: Leaflet | ©OpenStreetMap©CartoDB.

This dissertation approaches the conflict as an asymmetrical civil conflict: a conflict between a state and non-state actors, in which the state actor has a significant military advantage. The essays describe a subset of the conflict’s history: from 2000 to 2018. This time period is characteristically different from earlier phases. It includes the greatest escalation in Palestinian armed resistance (the Second Intifada, 2000-2005), an upsurge in Palestinian protests and uncoordinated violence (the Silent Intifada, 2014-2015), and several major Israeli air strikes and ground invasions (Operation Defensive Shield, 2002, Operation Cast Lead, 2008-9, Operation Pillar of Defence, 2012 and Operation Protective Edge, 2014). Slower-moving shifts in tactics also characterise this time period. Israel imposed a siege on Gaza and tightened its control over the West Bank with a mixture of tools outside air strikes and ground

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6 This is also referred to as the Knives Intifada, the al-Quds Intifada or the Children’s Intifada (Rokem, Weiss, and Miodownik 2018, 89).
invasions, including a security barrier and system of checkpoints, house demolitions, arrests, detentions, curfews and deportation. Palestinian resistance groups increasingly relied on rocket and mortar assaults, guerrilla tactics, roadside bombings, knife attacks and suicide attacks (Byman and Waxman 2002, 156-168; Shafir 2017, 35; Pappe 2006, 275-285; Thrall 2017, 155).

During this time period, the coercive interaction between Israel and Palestinians can be described as counterinsurgency and repression contra resistance and political violence. It’s important to remember however, that this does not describe the nature of the conflict and actors as a whole. Earlier Palestinian uprisings were more non-violent in character and Israel has used many of the same military and non-military measures outside the context of Palestinian uprisings. It’s also important to recall that conflict actors’ motivations necessarily must be inferred. It is likely that Israeli and Palestinian motivations are more complex and heterogenous, but studying social phenomena unfortunately involves assumptions and the simplification of complex realities.

While the Israel-Palestine conflict is heavily researched, several of Israel’s conflict strategies have gone understudied. The essays in this dissertation focus on two less-studied Israeli conflict strategies: house demolition and the separation barrier. These two policies are appropriate for the study of state-led coercion because they involve the application of limited force and threats by the Israeli government, and they aim to influence the preferences and behaviour of Palestinians in line with Israel’s conflict-related goals. Detailed, disaggregated sources of data exist on house demolition and the separation barrier, yet have not been leveraged for systematic analysis. A final motivation for the selection of this case is that questions related the efficacy and broader effects of house demolition and the separation barrier have high policy relevance: these types of discussions are frequently featured in media and in statements by government officials. A short background on house demolition and the separation barrier is given in the next sections.

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House demolition

House demolition is the destruction of Palestinian houses, apartments and other structures for various security-related and political purposes. This can include preventing attacks from specific locations, clearing areas for military operations, destroying militants’ infrastructure, punishing acts of political violence or enforcing restrictions on Palestinian building in areas under Israeli control. By some estimates, over 40,000 Palestinian structures have been demolished in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967.

Prior research and reports on house demolitions generally distinguish between three types of house demolition: military, punitive and administrative. Military demolition is the destruction of houses, structures and properties during military operations and for military purposes. Military demolitions are typically large in scale. For example, thousands of structures were demolished in Gaza and the West Bank during land-sweeping operations and military escalations in order to broaden access routes, create buffer zones and eliminate sites of potential cover for Palestinian snipers. In many cases, residents and those in the area were given no prior warning of the demolition and in most cases did not have a chance to clear their belongings. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) considers military demolition a tactical necessity in situations where Palestinian militants conceal themselves in civilian areas. The policy has drawn criticism, however, from legal scholars and humanitarian organisations who argue the destruction disproportionately harms civilians (Carroll 1990).

Punitive demolition is the destruction of residences as punishment for the actions, attempted actions or suspected actions committed by the owners or inhabitants. Punitive demolitions tend to occur as a swift response to an attack or suspected attack on Israeli soldiers or civilians. Palestinians facing punitive demolition are given notice, but there is generally no trial or chance to appeal. In some cases, houses belonging to relatives or suspected collaborators are also destroyed to send a message about the costs of resistance and political violence. In the case that a punitive demolition affects persons who were not directly involved in an offence, it is not necessary to establish guilt in order for the demolition to be used as a punitive measure. In recent years, punitive demolition has occurred mainly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; punitive demolitions in Gaza ceased with Israel’s disengagement in 2005. The policy is hotly debated within Israel and elsewhere, with proponents arguing it is an

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8The summary of house demolition in this section is primarily based on reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA), the Israeli Action Committee Against House Demolition (IACHD) and B’Tselem—The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, as well as relevant sections of Pappe (2006), Shafir (2017), Byman (2011) and Shlaim (2014).

9Author’s calculation based on reports by humanitarian organisations and data collected by B’Tselem.
INTRODUCTION

effective deterrent against suicide attacks in particular, and opponents arguing it constitutes collective punishment.

Administrative demolition is the destruction of Palestinian structures which were built without a permit or in violation of building or zoning regulations. For Israel, the policy is a means of preventing and deterring Palestinians from building and settling illegally. Administrative demolitions predominantly take place in areas where Israel maintains control; in East Jerusalem and Area C of the West Bank. Administrative demolitions can target a range of different structures: residences, but also agricultural structures, wells, schools and mosques. International humanitarian organisations provide relief and assistance to residents and communities in the aftermath, but even donor-funded structures may be considered illegal and threatened by demolition. An administrative demolition may target a single family or an entire Palestinian community. These demolitions are usually preceded by a written demolition order and under some circumstances residents can appeal the order in court. Several focal cases, particularly rural villages which have been repeatedly demolished and rebuilt, have received attention in international media and support from local and international activist groups.

Israel’s practice of different kinds of house demolition has varied widely over the time period studied and the longer history of the conflict. Surges in military demolitions have generally coincided with military operations and escalations. The policy of punitive demolition has alternatively been discontinued or reinstated in response to focal Palestinian attacks. Administrative demolitions have generally increased with time. There is also spatial variation in each type of house demolition. Figure 2 shows the distribution of different types of house demolition across Palestinian districts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the Second Intifada.

The case of house demolition in the Israel-Palestine conflict illustrates a challenge in the study of coercion. Identifying state policies that are cases of state-led coercion (as opposed to brute force) requires assumptions about the logic and goals of the policies, but these are often unobservable. Yet, the use of threat and harm as a means of persuasion is evident in each type of house demolition. Punitive demolition is the clearest case—according to official statements, the aim of demolishing houses in the aftermath of an attack is to deter potential attackers and their supporters by signalling that political violence will be punished.10 Military demolition, in contrast, may appear to be closer to brute force, since Israel’s stated goal is to compromise Palestinian militants’ capability to carry out attacks. According to reports by humanitarian organisations, however, military demolition has also been used a means of punishment—that is, to cause harm and signal more to come. For example, investigations into the razing of the Rafah refugee camp in Gaza suggest that much of the destruction did not serve a military function, but was carried out.

10IDF spokesperson in Shnayderman (2004, 64).
Figure 2: House demolitions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2000-2005

Note: this figure shows the total number of house demolitions in each district of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during 2000-2005. The 1949 Armistice line is shown in green. A Jenks Natural Breaks colour scale is used in order to highlight the spatial variation in number and type of demolition. Data sources: Israel district boundaries and 1949 Armistice line: Tufts University; West Bank and Gaza district boundaries: OCHA; military and punitive demolitions: Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2015 replication data; administrative demolitions: OCHA.

as a show of strength in response to a fatal attack on Israeli soldiers (HRW 2004, 3). Administrative demolition may also resemble brute force, or a way of establishing facts on the ground. Taking a broader perspective on the policy, however, the threat of displacement and the demolition of structures designated as ‘illegal’ are symbolic actions which are designed to influence Palestinian attitudes towards key conflict issues such as the viability of a two-state solution and Palestinians’ rights to a homeland (Braverman 2007, 344). In general, what the case of house demolition illustrates is that the coerciveness of a policy depends on observable and unobservable intentions, how the policy is practiced, and how it is perceived by others.

The separation barrier

Israel’s construction of a separation barrier began in 2002, during the most violent year of the Second Intifada, and continues today.11 At present, it is an over-700km long system of chain-link fences and concrete walls, surrounded

INTRODUCTION

by an intrusion-detection system and peppered with sensors and cameras. Generally, the barrier traces the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line), which delineates the border between Israel and the occupied West Bank. The barrier was constructed in stages, beginning in the northern districts of the West Bank, from which the greatest number of Palestinian attacks originated. The Jerusalem area was secured next, and as of 2018 most of the West Bank had been sealed off by the barrier. Figure 3 shows the barrier in the West Bank in 2018.

Figure 3: The separation barrier in the West Bank, 2018

![Map of the West Bank with the separation barrier and districts highlighted.](image)

Data sources: 1949 Armistice line: Tufts University; West Bank district boundaries, separation barrier and Seam Zone: OCHA; Israeli settlements: Palestinian Authority Geomolg.

The immediate and overt objective of the barrier was security: the barrier aimed to reduce the incidence of Palestinian attacks on Israelis by making it difficult for Palestinians living in the West Bank to enter Israel (Byman 2011; Cohen 2006; Palti 2004). As in house demolition, the security objective of the separation barrier may make the policy appear to be a brute force strategy—a strategy aimed at overcoming militants’ ability to carry out attacks. A closer look at the logic of the separation barrier, however, reveals that it aimed to
manipulate potential attackers’ assessments of the costs and risks of political violence, as well as to create physical limits on militants’ capabilities. The barrier worked in concert with a system of checkpoints which had been put in place at the start of the Second Intifada to increase the distance potential attackers must travel, as well as the necessity of coordination among militant groups and individuals, each of which in turn increased their risk of exposure to Israeli counterinsurgency (Palti 2004, 1; Byman and Waxman 2002, 328). In this way, the creation of physical obstacles (use of force) also served to influence Palestinians’ preferences for political violence by increasing the expected risks involved in orchestrating an attack. The coerciveness of the policy is also evident in Israel’s assertion that the wall is a temporary and conditional measure, suggesting that the barrier will be removed if Palestinians elect to cease their use of violence.

With the sharp decline in suicide attacks and other Palestinian violence since 2005, many Israelis view the barrier as an exemplary means of counterinsurgency. But the separation barrier has also raised a number of issues. Constructing the barrier entirely along the Green Line would have increased the vulnerability of Israeli settlements within the West Bank. As a result, much of the barrier was built outside of Israel’s internationally recognised boundary, so that it surrounded Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This ended up creating a Seam Zone: areas in between the Green Line and the separation wall. The Seam Zone (shown in figure 3) effectively brought Israeli settlements, as well as Palestinian-populated areas, into Israel. In some parts of the West Bank the fjord-like contours of the barrier created enclaves: Palestinian communities surrounded by the barrier on three or all sides. In Jerusalem, the barrier deviates from the 1967 Jerusalem municipal line, effectively excluding some Palestinian neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem from the city and unofficially incorporating some West Bank communities into the city.12 The divergence of the separation barrier from the Green Line and 1967 Jerusalem municipal boundary has led to criticism of the legality of the barrier under international law, and both the International Court of Justice and the Supreme Court of Israel have ruled that the barrier’s route was motivated by a desire to annex territory.

A second major issue is the humanitarian impact of the barrier for Palestinians. Restrictions on movement within the West Bank and reduced access to Israel separated Palestinians from their neighbouring communities, places of work, schools, agricultural land and cultural centres. This has led to a deterioration of West Bank economic and social conditions, measured in reduced employment and wages and reduced access to education and health services. The formation of special zones and enclaves in the curves of the separation barrier has also implied increased restrictions on Palestinians’ rights. Outside of restrictions on free movement, Palestinians living within the Seam Zone are subject to a military permit regime which imposes restrictions on many aspects

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12See figure 2 in Essay IV for a map of the barrier in Jerusalem.
INTRODUCTION

of life such as settlement, work and health care. The effective exclusion of some Palestinian neighbourhoods from Jerusalem has resulted in a de facto denial of residents’ rights to basic state services such as public infrastructure, transportation and security provision. Arguably, the associated rights violations make the barrier a case of state repression as well as a counterinsurgency effort. The different names for the barrier summarise the multiple facets of the policy well. The barrier is alternatively referred to as a “security”, “separation” or “expansion and annexation” “barrier”, “fence” or “wall” (Orkand 2006-2007).

Presenting the essays

The four composite essays of this dissertation examine two coercive policies used by the state of Israel against Palestinians. Essays I and II concern house demolition while Essays III and IV concern the separation barrier. Each pair of essays starts with a broader geographic focus and becomes more narrow. Essay I speaks to house demolition in the occupied Palestinian territories (the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip) while Essay II focuses on house demolition in the West Bank. Essay III studies the separation barrier in the West Bank, while Essay IV focuses on special zones created by the separation barrier in parts of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. There is also a transition from efficacy to effects across the two pairs of essays. Essays I and II examine the impact of house demolition on Palestinian preferences for resistance, while Essays III and IV consider the social, economic and political impacts of the separation barrier. The essays are summarised in table 1, following the section describing the essays’ research methods.

Essay I

The essay “Selective or Collective? Palestinian Perceptions of Targeting in House Demolition” has been pre-published online by Conflict Management and Peace Science. It addresses the central puzzle of why coercion sometimes fails to achieve its goals. One explanation which arises from prior research is that the efficacy of coercion depends on the type of target selection used. A number of studies find that selective targeting—threats or harm aimed specifically at guilty individuals—can be effective, while indiscriminate targeting—threats or harm which affects both the guilty and the innocent—often fails or backfires (e.g., Kalyvas 2006; Kocher and Kalyvas 2011; Toft and Zhukov 2015). Yet, a number of studies also show that selective targeting can fail or backfire (e.g., Condra and Shapiro 2012; Hudson, Owens, and Flannes 2011; Zussman and Zussman 2006). So although there is by now a near-consensus on the counterproductive consequences of coercive strategies which intentionally
or inadvertently cause harm to civilians,\(^\text{13}\) the essential puzzle of coercive inefficacy still remains when we consider selective forms of coercion.

Essay I tests one possible explanation for the inefficacy of selective targeting: that selective tactics may be *perceived* as indiscriminate. For example, threats or harm against militants may come across as the punishment of civilians if collateral damage occurs or if the militant targets have symbolic or political roles. Theoretical models underscore the importance of perceptions: as long as a policy is viewed as indiscriminate, it will have the effect of an indiscriminate policy (Kalyvas 2006, 145). While the role of perceptions is an important caveat, this caveat has not been empirically tested.

To this end, the study leverages a survey of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank as well as an embedded experiment to measure Palestinian perceptions of house demolition. It finds that individuals who characterised house demolition as indiscriminate were more opposed to political compromise compared to those who characterised demolitions according to common Israeli descriptions of intent. The results are consistent when target selection is manipulated in an embedded survey experiment. In a close comparison of two hypothetical demolition vignettes which each describe a punitive demolition, survey respondents expressed greater resistance in response to a demolition which was a more clear case of collective punishment, compared to a punitive demolition which was relatively more selective.

The findings of the study support the proposition that when targeting is viewed as indiscriminate, repression and counterinsurgency can be counterproductive. By measuring individual-level perceptions of targeting in a coercive policy, the essay improves our understanding of how coercion works—and doesn’t work. In particular, it helps to explain the puzzling inefficacy of selective targeting. While this contribution is very specific, it has broad implications. The role of target selection in coercive efficacy is still central. The scope of harm implied in a threat or caused in a limited use of force matters for individuals’ preferences regarding resistance and compromise: the wider the scope of harm, the greater the opposition to yield. But more importantly, it is important to account for how harm is perceived. As the case of house demolition shows, even policies designed to punish selectively can be viewed as collective punishments.

\(^\text{13}\)For references to this conventional wisdom, see: Toft and Zhukov (2015, 22), Kocher and Kalyvas (2011, 201), Kalyvas (2006, 144), Lyall (2009, 335), Souleimanov and Siroky (2016, 667).
INTRODUCTION

Essay II

The essay “Israeli Demolition Orders and Palestinian Preferences for Dissent” has been accepted by the *Journal of Politics*. This essay takes a closer look at the policy of administrative demolition in the West Bank: Israel’s practice of destroying Palestinian structures which were built without a permit or in violation of building and zoning laws. While administrative demolitions may account for as much as 60% of all demolitions since 1967, there is little prior research on this particular type of demolition. This is partly because the policy is less clearly related to Israel’s security measures and counterinsurgency campaigns. Administrative demolition can be considered a means of enforcing building regulations and lacks the overt political motivation which brackets what political scientists consider relevant to the study of political conflict.

Essay II takes advantage of the apparent disassociation of administrative demolition from security concerns as a research opportunity. It argues that the administrative nature of the policy makes it relatively exogenous to Palestinian militancy. As administrative demolition is a penalty for illegal building and is not provoked by Palestinian violence and radicalisation, the policy’s impact can be estimated while avoiding the challenge of reverse causality. The essay’s focus on written administrative demolition orders further aids in the identification of the policy’s impact. While punitive, military and administrative demolitions may be executed in concert with military escalations or other crackdowns, the essay demonstrates empirically that the issuance of administrative demolition orders is not related to Palestinian political radicalisation, Palestinian violence, or Israeli military escalations. In the case of administrative demolition, the very characteristic which makes it seem less relevant to the study of strategic interactions between states and non-state groups also creates an opportunity for causal inference.

Having established that the risk of reverse causation is low, the essay draws on a data set of demolition orders maintained by the Israeli Civil Administration and public opinion data collected by the Palestinian Center for Survey and Policy Research to analyse how administrative demolition orders issued against Palestinian structures in the West Bank have influenced Palestinians’ preferences for political and violent dissent during 2000-2012. Like Essay I, this essay studies preferences as the outcome variable as this is a relevant measure of what coercive policies aim to affect. The choice of demolition orders as an explanatory variable captures the essence of coercion in the sense that orders convey a threat, and it is the threat of harm which distinguishes coercion from brute force.

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14 The essay was accepted by the *Journal of Politics* as a short paper: a 10-page research note. This dissertation includes the 10-page short paper as well as longer appendices which include a full discussion of the theory and case, and additional analyses.

15 Author’s calculation.
While administrative demolition is unprovoked by Palestinian radicalisation and violence against Israelis, there is good reason to believe that the threat conveyed by a demolition order influences Palestinian preferences for violence and political dissent. Social-psychological theories on threat perceptions distinguish between collective threat (the perception of threat or danger to the group) and personal fear (the perception of a threat or danger to oneself or one’s family). Prior research has found that while personal fear reduces support for retaliation and increases support for policies that mitigate the probability of future harm, perceptions of collective threat reduce support for moderate policies and political compromise and increase support for retaliation and aggressive policies (e.g., Bar-Tal 2007; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Gordon and Arian 2001; Huddy et al. 2005; Maoz and McCauley 2009). Consistent with earlier research, the essay finds that, in the long term, the collective threat of demolition orders targeting diverse and communal structures in the same area (e.g., a school, an animal pen and a water tank) is likely to increase Palestinian opposition to peace and support for violence. This result holds after accounting for the aversive effect of personal fear from demolition orders targeting only residences.

By examining the case of demolition orders, the study focuses on the mechanism of threatened harm, while much prior research concerns state’s uses of force. It further unpacks this mechanism to show how and why a state’s use of threats can influence a population’s conflict preferences in divergent ways. Consistent with the findings of Essay I, the counterproductive outcome of administrative demolition can be attributed to the collective nature of harm caused by the policy. By also identifying the deterrent effect of personal fear, the essay helps to account for some of the contradictory findings in prior research.

Essay III

“Security in Separation? Externalities of the West Bank Barrier” is a working paper. The essay picks an overt and highly visible counterinsurgency measure: the separation barrier in the West Bank, a system of walls and fences which stretches along the border between Israel and the occupied West Bank (the 1949 Armistice Line). By Israeli accounts, the separation barrier is a security measure, and was never meant to serve as a political boundary. Its stated aims are to reduce the possibility of Palestinian attacks on Israelis by making it difficult for Palestinians to enter Israel. This means that the separation barrier affects Palestinians indiscriminately: with the construction of the barrier, it not only became more difficult for potential attackers to enter Israel, it became more difficult for all Palestinians to enter Israel.

Essay III starts with a firm classification of the separation wall as an indiscriminate counterinsurgency measure. There is no variation or ambiguity in
INTRODUCTION

the extent to which the barrier is considered related to security or the extent to which it can be considered selective. The empirical variation exploited in this essay is in the timing of barrier construction across different parts of the West Bank during the Second Intifada (2000-2005). Considering the barrier as an indiscriminate counterinsurgency measure which affects the Palestinian population of the West Bank as a whole, the focus of the analysis is on the strategy’s broader effects.

The main argument of Essay III is that the separation wall caused collateral damage to West Bank economies and that these economic externalities had an impact on Palestinian political violence. To test this argument, the essay incorporates data on socio-economic conditions from the Palestinian Bureau of Central Statistics (PBCS) and estimates the impact of barrier-induced economic conditions on the rate of Palestinian-perpetrated Israeli fatalities. It finds that the barrier had a statistically significant impact on wages and employment: Palestinian localities blocked by the barrier had lower levels of employment in Israel, higher levels of employment in the West Bank and lower average daily wages, compared to localities not blocked by the barrier. These barrier-induced changes in wages and employment, in turn, affected levels of subsequent Palestinian violence.

While the outcome variable in Essay III is acts of violence, rather than preferences for violence, preferences are a key variable and are implicitly measured in the mechanism of economic externalities. Individual-level explanations for violence suggest a number of mechanisms by which economic externalities can affect individuals’ choices between participation and non-participation in political violence, such as reduced opportunity costs (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Freytag et al. 2011), distorted incentive structures (Kalyvas 2006) and emotional reactions such as grievances (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Koubi and Böhmelt 2014), frustration (Gurr 1970) or moral outrage (Martin, Brickman, and Murray 1984). By examining how the barrier manipulated economic incentives and motivations for violence, the essay studies how coercion works as a means of influencing a target’s cost-benefit calculus. Although the barrier may have raised the costs of participation in violence, the barrier also caused economic externalities which lowered the potential benefits of non-participation and increased preferences for violence. In line with the two previous essays, it finds that broader costs–indiscriminate, collective or collateral harm–work against the goals of coercion.

The analytical focus of Essay III is on tracing the extended outcomes of coercion. By leveraging a two-stage estimation strategy, the essay estimates the causal links between counterinsurgency, its economic effects, and subsequent political violence against a state. This exercise takes prior research on counterinsurgency and economic conditions one step further. While earlier studies of Israeli counterinsurgency have focused only on its economic consequences (e.g., Oberholzer 2015) or on the effect of economic conditions during a counterinsurgency campaign (e.g., Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor
Presenting the essays

2012; Miaari, Zussman, and Zussman 2014), this study specifically examines the impact of economic damage caused by counterinsurgency. In this way, the study brings persuasive empirical evidence of coercion’s broader effects.

Essay IV

The essay “Zones of Exception: Place and Practices of Separation” is a working paper. In this essay, I theorise more broadly about state practices of separation. The essay begins with the observation that as long as there have been modern states, there have also been exceptions to states: separated territories where a particular population group is held and subject to a different set of rules and rights. This segregation is not voluntary, rather, it is the product of state practices such as forced relocation, restrictions on movement, threats of harm and violence. While there are well-developed theories around how early states formed out of nomadic and decentralised societies (e.g., Abramson 2017; Scott 2010; Spruyt 1994; Tilly 1990; Tilly and Ardant 1975), there is relatively less theoretical work on the practices by which consolidated states separate and exclude certain population groups. The essay addresses this gap by developing the concept of ‘zones of exception’.

The essay begins by reviewing a number of historical examples, including the post-partition enclaves along the India-Bangladesh border, the Jewish ghetto of Medieval Venice, the Bantustans of apartheid South Africa and the Japanese-American internment camps in the United States during World War II. It identifies three common elements across these examples: the spatial separation of territory, the differential treatment of particular population groups and a coercive process of enclosure. It then conceptualises zones of exception as a general phenomenon, drawing on Agamben’s theory of state of exception (1998; 2005) and bellicist theories of state formation (Scott 2010; Tilly 1985, 1990; Tilly and Ardant 1975).

In addition to discussing zones of exception across history and as an abstract concept, the essay presents an in-depth description of contemporary zones of exception in the Palestinian territories. It focuses in particular on special areas formed in association with the construction of the separation wall: the Seam Zone, Palestinian enclaves, and the Jerusalem envelope. It draws on detailed geographic data on the route of the separation barrier and the location of Palestinian communities in order present original maps which illustrate how the divergence of the separation barrier from the Green Line and 1967 Jerusalem municipal line has resulted in different forms of spatial separation. It also draws on secondary sources in order to describe the variation in degrees and types of social differentiation and coercive enclosure across these areas.

By describing the variation in aspects of daily life across Palestinian communities in zones of the separation barrier, the essay relates to the broader effects of coercion. Palestinian communities are separated from Israel, from
neighbouring Palestinian communities or are caught in ambiguous areas neither under Israeli nor Palestinian jurisdiction. In some cases, the differential treatment of Palestinians in these zones implies severe restrictions on rights, while in other cases it creates no man’s lands. The essay also expands our understanding of the range of coercive measures employed by states by considering a state’s separation and exclusion of particular population groups as a means of state repression. While foundational definitions of state repression generally focus on state actions which restrict civil liberties and violate personal integrity rights (Davenport 2007; Gurr 1986; Poe and Tate 1994), the separation and exclusion of a population group also includes actions which involve structural violence (Galtung 1969) and the violation of second-generation rights.

At the same time as Essay IV zooms in on a very geographically-specific situation, its primary aim is to put the situation in a wider context. By developing a concept which describes a general population of cases, it helps us to make sense of the apparent plethora of territorial oddities and exclusionary practices which exist alongside what we know about states and state formation. The essay enhances the dissertation by relating aspects of the Israel-Palestine conflict to other conflicts across time and space. It also complements the other essays methodologically. Unlike the other essays, the study is not designed to grant inferential leverage on a causal question, but rather to develop a concept. The empirics are used to typify the concept (by identifying key elements) and expand the concept (by illustrating how the elements vary across cases). As a descriptive paper, the essay opens up avenues for future research and theory-building in the literature on state repression.

Research methods, inference and generalisation

The dissertation takes an empirical approach to the study of coercion. The essays collect and summarise information through a combination of survey methods, quantitative analysis, experimental design, qualitative analysis and field work.

As Essays I and II aim to explain how individual-level attitudes are shaped by house demolition, surveys are a natural choice of research method. Essay I relies on an original survey fielded in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2016. The advantage of this method is that I was able to rely on measurements of my choice, rather than proxies, and collect data on an array of variables related to the respondents’ experiences, characteristics and political views. Essay II draws on public opinion surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Survey and Policy research. The particular advantage of this source was not only the individual-level, but also its longitudinal nature. The survey questions which were repeated during 2000-2012 allowed me to analyse how house demolition has shaped Palestinian views over time.
Essays I, II and III ask questions about the causal effect of demolitions and the separation barrier. The essays are cognisant of a fundamental methodological challenge to causal inference: ruling out alternative explanations. Recognising also that the use of experimental methods in conflict research is extremely difficult from both a practical and an ethical point of view, the essays instead incorporate principles of experimental design into their observational frameworks. Essay I includes a survey experiment in order to rule out common causes of exposure to different types of house demolition and variation in political attitudes. Like experiments in the natural sciences and medicine, survey experiments assign study participants to treatment and control groups at random, isolating the hypothesised causal variable from pre-existing or underlying factors.\footnote{In contrast to traditional laboratory or field experiments, however, survey experiment “treatments” consist of information rather than actual exposure to the hypothesised causal factors. This alleviates some ethical concerns by minimising the physical risk posed to study participants. Ethical protocol of Essay I are in included in appendix A of Essay I.} Essay II deliberately chooses a case that minimises the risk of reverse causation and quantitatively assesses the exogeneity of administrative demolition orders using random forests models. Essay III estimates the causal impact of the separation barrier by employing a generalised differences-in-differences design which is aided by elements of exogenous variation demonstrated in previous research. Although none of these empirical techniques are of the caliber of a true experiment, each essay is transparent about alternative explanations and the extent to which its research design is able to rule them out.

The quantitative and geographical datasets used for description and analysis in Essays II, III and IV required additional data collection and management methods. Although detailed and disaggregated data on house demolition, the separation barrier and contextual factors exist, these had to be compiled from various Israeli and Palestinian sources, cleaned and merged. As a result of these efforts, all four essays present systematic descriptions and/or analyses using novel empirical material.

All four essays also incorporate qualitative data from case studies, histories, testimonies, humanitarian reports and maps related to Israel and the Palestinian territories. In Essays I, II and III this information is used to support qualitative arguments about how house demolitions are perceived by Palestinians, the extent to which administrative demolition can be considered exogenous to conflict dynamics, and the motivations behind the route of the separation barrier. In Essay IV, this information is used, together with deductive reasoning from theory, as evidence of the particular characteristics which make the Seam Zone, Palestinian enclaves and Jerusalem envelope examples of ‘zones of exception’. In this essay, qualitative data is not used to validate an argument, but rather to inductively identify variations in the parameters of a concept. Field work (during 2016 and 2018) also contributed to the empirical studies in this dissertation. While I do not reference field work experiences and observations directly, the
most tangible result of the field work has been data collection and identification of data sources.

As the dissertation studies coercion within the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, I do not have quantitative evidence that the patterns observed in this context are likely to occur in civil conflicts more generally. The generalisability of the findings can only be supported by theory and qualitative arguments. Essay IV makes extensive use of qualitative evidence and historical comparisons to argue that the formation of special zones in the vicinity of the separation barrier is an example of a process that has occurred throughout history. In the same vein, house demolition appears in other contexts, such as during the British campaign against the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt (Segev 2001, 423) and in Operation Murambatsvina, Zimbabwe’s campaign to clean up and restore order to urban areas (Bratton and Masunungure 2006). The separation barrier can be compared to numerous historical and contemporary border walls and barricades including the Great Wall of China, the Berlin Wall, the wall between Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland, the Indian Line of Control fencing along the border with Pakistan and the United States-Mexico border fence (Cohen 2006). While the essays in this dissertation do not employ cross-national analyses of demolition practices and border walls, this is an interesting and timely avenue for future research.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essay</th>
<th>Effect of</th>
<th>On</th>
<th>Research design</th>
<th>Main conclusion</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Collective or Selective? Palestinian Perceptions of Targeting in House Demolition</td>
<td>Military, punitive, and administrative demolition</td>
<td>Support for resistance and opposition to compromise</td>
<td>Quantitative analysis of original survey and survey experiment with Palestinians, fielded in East Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza, 2016.</td>
<td>When house demolition is perceived as indiscriminate (even if selective by design) exposure to house demolition increases opposition to compromise.</td>
<td>Improves our understanding of how coercion works (and doesn’t work) by measuring individual-level perceptions of targeting in a coercive policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Israeli Demolition Orders and Palestinian Preferences for Dissent</td>
<td>Administrative demolition orders</td>
<td>Support for violence and preferred political party</td>
<td>Quantitative analysis of original dataset of demolition orders, Palestinian public opinion surveys, socio-economic indicators and Israeli measure of repression and counter-insurgency in the West Bank, 2001-2012.</td>
<td>Demolition orders which convey a collective threat increase support for violence and support for militant parties, even after accounting for personal fear.</td>
<td>Unpacks the mechanism of coercive threats by identifying two divergent ways in which a state’s use of threats influence a population’s conflict preferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Security in Separation? Efficacy and Externalities of the West Bank Barrier</td>
<td>Separation barrier and rate, average economic daily wage conditions and Israeli fatalities</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Quantitative analysis of original dataset of separation barrier route, socio-economic indicators, Israeli fatalities and Israeli measures of repression and counterinsurgency in the West Bank, 2000-2005.</td>
<td>Barrier-induced economic conditions increase the rate of subsequent Palestinian-perpetrated Israeli fatalities.</td>
<td>Traces the extended outcomes of coercion by estimating the causal links between counterinsurgency, its economic effects, and subsequent political violence against a state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Zones of Exception: Places and Practices of Separation</td>
<td>Description of: commonalities and variations in separated territories with a different set of rules and rights for a particular population group.</td>
<td>Qualitative analysis of secondary sources on historical cases and contemporary cases in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.</td>
<td>The separation and exclusion of particular population groups is a coercive practice that has been employed by states throughout history and continues today.</td>
<td>Conceptualises an under-theorised form of coercion and outlines avenues for further research.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Conclusion

This dissertation is not about the kinds of conflict strategies that are won by rendering an adversary powerless. It is not about tactics with the end goal to eliminate an enemy. Instead, it examines tactics that leverage harm as a means of influence and persuasion. The distinction is not so much the focus on measures such as the destruction of property and restrictions on movement instead of ground attacks and assassinations. Rather, the particular focus of this dissertation is on how harm is used by states not as an end in itself, but to deter, or to persuade the target of harm to comply (Slantchev 2011, 11). The focus of the dissertation is on war—not as a contest of strength, but as a battle of will (Schelling 1966, 7).

This central focus on coercive conflict strategies has led the essays to investigate instruments of conflict that tend to be understudied. Although violence can be coercive, the essays focus on tactics that do not involve violence in order to more clearly distinguish between brute force and coercion. This ends up calling attention to non-violent actions, while the bulk of prior research on conflict concerns violence. Even studies of state repression, which includes a wide range of harmful strategies characterised as rights’ violations, tend to focus on violations of physical integrity rights such as mass killings and security force violence against protesters. In the Israel-Palestine conflict, where decades of repression and counterinsurgency has included tactics ranging from missile strikes to forced eviction, the majority of what we know about this conflict has to do with major Israeli military operations and violent Palestinian uprisings. A product of this dissertation’s focus on coercion has been the addition of four essays to the burgeoning study of demolitions, check-points, settlement-building, land appropriation and other Israeli measures of coercion (e.g., Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2015; Cali and Miaari 2015; Khawaja 1993; Longo, Canetti, and Hite-Rubin 2014). By studying measures like these, this dissertation broadens our conceptual catalog of coerced instruments.

The essays on the use of non-violent coercion in the Israel-Palestine conflict make an empirical contribution as well as a theoretical contribution. Essay I presents a unique description of how Palestinians interpret and understand Israel’s policy of house demolition. Essay II draws on a data set maintained by the Israeli Civil Administration which contains information on all administrative demolitions ordered and executed in the West Bank since 1988. Essay II and the further description of the data in its appendices, is to my knowledge, the first instance in which information about administrative demolition has been published in an academic journal. Essays III and IV may be the first articles to map the separation barrier over time, and the location of Palestinian communities in relation to the wall. While reports on demolitions and the separation wall appear regularly in the media and humanitarian organisations publish reports on events and issues, this dissertation is the first study to analyse systematically collected data on administrative demolition and the separation barrier.
Measuring a relevant outcome of coercive efficacy—the change in a target group’s conflict preferences—is both a strength and a limitation. In parallel with the focus in previous research on violence, the outcomes measured in prior research tend to be actions. This is reasonable, as an actor’s actions are observable and often of great practical relevance. The limitation of Essays I and II is that they can only speak to whether Palestinian preferences for violence or compromise will change. There are many intervening variables between an individual’s willingness to take action and an individual’s actions, and actions carried out by organised groups may not reflect the aggregated preferences of individuals. While preferences as outcomes limits the extent to which Essays I and II can speak to what policy makers often want to know, the essays provide a theoretical base for further research on how coercion-induced preferences shape actions. Essay III takes a step in this direction when it proxies the link between coercion-induced preferences and actions by examining how barrier-induced changes in economic conditions affect rates of Palestinian violence.

While the dissertation generally speaks to house demolition and the separation barrier as means of influence, this has important implications for policy makers. Several central findings emerge across the four essays, and these have relevance for the policy design of house demolition and the separation barrier, expectations of how the policies may influence future negotiations and the debate on the legality of the policies under international humanitarian law.

The most consistent finding is that the broader the perceived scope of harm incurred in a coercive policy, the more likely it is to harden a target’s preferences. Military, punitive and administrative house demolitions that are interpreted as the targeting of civilians uninvolved in insurgency increase opposition to peace (Essay I). Administrative demolition orders that convey a collective threat against Palestinians as a group increase both support for violence and opposition to peace (Essay II). The wide-spread economic damage incurred by the separation wall has an independent impact on Palestinian political violence (Essay III). The bottom line is that the more harm appears to affect civilians, the more counterproductive the tactic. Conversely, the essays also show that coercive policies can meet their goals through mechanisms such as personal fear (Essay II) and physical constraints (Essay III), when these are not outweighed by the mechanisms spurred by indiscriminate harm to civilians. The implications for the policies of house demolition and the separation barrier is that the design of these measures must ensure that the scope of harm is as narrow as possible. Beyond considerations of design for efficacy, indiscriminate targeting, collateral damage and collective threat could also inform debates around the degree of distinction and proportionality in coercive policies, and their legality under international humanitarian law.

A second finding is that harm incurred can differ from harm intended (where intended harm is inferred from statements of intent). Harm that can be classified as narrow in scope (selective) can be perceived as broad (indiscriminate).
INTRODUCTION

What may be intended as the enforcement of individual penalties for individual transgressions can be interpreted as collective punishment. For policy makers, this implies that while designing policies to be as targeted as possible and avoiding collateral damage is very important, it is important to also ensure policies are perceived as selective. Local perceptions can be measured and could be allowed to inform a state’s design and selection of tactics.

In sum, this dissertation calls attention to two understudied measures of counterinsurgency and repression in the well-known Israel-Palestine conflict and traces their outcomes, both in terms of efficacy and broader effects. It builds on theoretical work on the logic and goals of coercion and advances our understanding by further exploring types, mechanisms and outcomes of coercion.
References


INTRODUCTION


INTRODUCTION


INTRODUCTION


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