Sharing Responsibility or Protecting Borders?

A Qualitative Analysis of the Development of the Common European Asylum System

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Abstract

Building on three theories of European integration – liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism – I offer an explanation to the process and outcomes of the development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) between 2008 and 2018. The process to establish the CEAS has been characterized by clashing actor preferences, which forced actors into negotiations. This thesis aims to analyze the dynamics of these negotiations surrounding the CEAS. My results show that liberal intergovernmentalism explains locked positions in interstate bargaining and highly compromised outcomes, and even non-decisions, of the CEAS. I also argue that neofunctionalism loses explanatory power when sensitive issues concerning automatic quota systems and national sovereignty are discussed, although many arguments by the involved actors in the policy process draw upon neofunctional assumptions. Postfunctionalism is argued to gain explanatory power during recent years, since identity-related arguments and Eurosceptical and anti-immigrant ideas in European governments have increased.

Key words: Liberal intergovernmentalism; neofunctionalism; postfunctionalism; asylum; Common European Asylum System; CEAS; European integration; EU.

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1. Introduction

At a summit in Tampere 1999, the heads of the governments of the EU agreed to work for a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) that should be in place in 2010 (Crosbie, 2009c). In 2013, the first framework of the CEAS was adopted, consisting of five pillars: a mechanism for determining state responsibilities of applicants for international protection within the EU, a fingerprint database, a directive for reception conditions, rules on common asylum procedures across the EU and a qualification directive. Critics have argued that the CEAS is an inefficient tool to respond to large migration flows, since the policy has been watered-down from negotiations and compromises (Crosbie, 2009f). On the other hand, some regarded the establishment of a CEAS a success, since this was the issue where the EU waited the longest to introduce common rules on (Hedström, 2008). In 2016, a new proposal was presented by the European Commission to respond to the refugee crisis in 2015 and to further develop the current European asylum system, although these changes have been disputed and the member states have failed to legislate this proposal.

1.1 Purpose and Research Question

Although it has been disputed whether the CEAS was a success or a failure, it is evident that the process has been characterized by clashing actor preferences along the road to establishment. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to explain the process and outcomes of the development of the CEAS during the last ten years. With this aim in mind, my research questions are:

How has the Common European Asylum System developed during the last ten years? And, how have clashing actor preferences affected the process and the outcomes of the CEAS?

This question is relevant since it aims to address the policy development on a sensitive issue where actors have perceived different paths forward as beneficial to develop the European asylum system. In addition, migration is one of the biggest challenges facing the EU, where asylum has been a crucial topic in the discussion of how the EU shall deal with the large inflow of migrants. Thus, the issue of asylum is interesting to examine, especially since the European Commission (hereafter: the Commission) has proposed a way forward that is supported by most experts as the most suitable to respond to this crisis (Gilgan, 2017; Panebianco & Fontana, 2018; Parkes, 2017). However, the puzzle for this thesis is that the Commission has struggled to establish a CEAS, although all actors involved in the policy process recognize that something needs to be done. Hence, there has been clashing actor preferences of how a CEAS should be designed.

European integration has been discussed by political scientists since the start of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s. What is interesting with the CEAS is that the division between relevant actors' preferences have been wide, although there seems to be a desire for European solutions (Eder & Golod, 2018). Thus, this thesis will address how a setting of clashing actor preferences where actors aim to develop the EU in different directions shape EU decisions. Arguably, the main theory for explaining European integration outcomes has previously been neofunctionalism, that was first developed by Ernst B. Haas, where he argues that non-governmental actors shape the policy process to a higher extent than member states (1958). This assumption has been challenged by more member state-oriented theories, first by liberal intergovernmentalism, emphasizing the interstate bargaining process between member states (Moravcsik, 1998), and later by postfunctionalism, stressing the public opinion and national identities' importance to European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Thus, I will create a theoretical framework based on these theories with the aim to explain the process and the outcomes of the CEAS. Nevertheless, I do not aim to announce a winning theory. Instead, my aim is to examine the theoretical heuristics of the potential explanatory theories behind the policy process and outcomes.

Drawing on the policy process of the CEAS, this thesis aims to fit into the literature on European integration in a setting of clashing actor preferences. I will not only examine the member state preferences but also take preferences of supranational actors, transnational actors and public opinion into consideration. Thus, this thesis also contributes to the area of power relations between the actors involved in European integration, since the interaction between different actors in the policy process will be revealed. I will use both an actor centered and idea centered approach, meaning that I will examine both which actors that have contributed to the policy process and their ideas and preferences of how to develop the CEAS. I will provide answers to questions regarding how interstate bargaining have affected the CEAS, how supranational and transnational actors have attempted to steer the process in their favorable directions, and how national identities shape government preferences and, thus, European integration.

1.2 Research Gap

I intend to address two main research gaps in this thesis. First, one part of my analysis will focus on the proposal of the updated version of the CEAS that was suggested in the wake of the refugee crisis in 2015. Little research has engaged in explanatory studies on the EU responses to the refugee crisis, since these studies have been mainly descriptive or normative (Niemann & Speyer, 2018, p. 23; Trauner, 2016). Thus, I aim to provide an analysis with explanatory

ambitions to highlight why the EU management of the refugee crisis have developed in certain directions.

Second, postfunctionalism is an underexplored topic in the debate on European integration. This is a newly developed theory where little research has been done, although it has gained recognition as an explanatory theory on both European integration and disintegration during recent years (Schimmelfennig, 2018a). Thus, combining the new line of research of postfunctionalism with the more traditional theories on European integration, liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, will contribute to acknowledge the current direction of the path towards a more (or less) integrated European asylum system. It also enables me to analyze whether the dynamics of the policy process negotiations on asylum has changed over time.

1.3 Delimitations

The area of migration is wide and encompass several policy issues. In this thesis, I will only examine the policies connected to the CEAS, meaning that I will not take policy documents on, for instance, Schengen into consideration. The temporary relocation schemes and the Turkey deal that were introduced in 2015 respectively 2016 will not be encompassed by this thesis, since they are council decisions and not permanent policies included within the legislative framework of the CEAS (Niemann & Speyer, 2018, p. 24).

When examining supranational institutions, I have chosen to only focus on the Commission. The Commission plays a major role in the policy process on asylum, since it formulates the proposal and final legislations and, simultaneously, has its own agenda and preferences. To limit the scope of this thesis, I have left out other supranational institutions by arguing that the Commission is the most powerful supranational actor in this process.

1.4 Disposition

In the next section, my theoretical framework will be presented, consisting of liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism. In the third section, my methodological choices will be discussed. This section will be followed by my analytical framework, consisting of my operationalizations of each theory. In this section, I will also draw upon previous research and how it has been used to explain previous cases of European integration. Section five consists of a description of the current legislative framework of the CEAS. In the following section I will present my analysis and, in the last section, I will summarize my concluding remarks.

2. Theoretical Framework

In the following section, I will present the theoretical framework, which will be based on three theories on European integration: liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism, where the two former theories have been the most influential on European integration (Rosamond, 2000, p. 50). European integration is defined as "an increase [...] in the centralization level, policy scope, and membership of the EU" (Schimmelfennig, 2018a, p. 1156), meaning that actors engage in more cooperation and integrative policies on the European level. Liberal intergovernmentalism is based on the assumption that the individual member states are the main actors in European integration and that the drivers of the integration process are national governments through interstate bargaining processes (Moravcsik, 1993). Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, highlights the importance of supranational governance. It does not neglect the importance of national governments, however, neofunctionalists are convinced that supranational actors play a crucial role in shaping policies and that the integration process rather is determined by spillovers from the already existing European legislation (Pierson, 1998; Schimmelfennig, 2015a). Postfunctionalism has gained credibility as a theory of European integration during the last decade. It was first developed by Hooghe and Marks (2009) and presents an alternative perspective on European integration. According to this theory, European integration has become politicized and, consequently, national political party preferences and the public opinion are important drivers of the European integration process.

2.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes state preferences and preference formation within an international context of interdependence and institutions. The preference formation is shaped by a rational choice assumption, meaning that actors choose their preferences based on material, and mainly economic, interests. National governments are the most important actors in the process of European integration, since interstate bargaining is seen as the vital process for decision-making on the European level (Schimmelfennig, 2015b, p. 178). In sum, European integration is shaped by a tripartite explanation: economic interests, relative power and credible commitments (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 4). In the continuity of this subsection, I will elaborate on the three assumptions on which liberal intergovernmentalism is based on: (a) national preference formation is exogenous to the international political environment; (b) states develop strategies and bargain with each other to reach agreements where their national preferences are achieved more efficiently than within unilateral decisions; and (c) member states either choose

to pool or delegate sovereignty to international institutions to increase the credibility of agreements (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 20).

First, national preferences are exogenous to the international political environment, meaning that they are independent of other political decisions or actions by other governments, in difference to strategies (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 22–24). The liberal elements of supply and demand is, thus, important for this theory. The preference formation on the domestic level works as an indicator of how beneficial an integrative policy outcome on the EU level would be for a state. Thus, the preference formation process represents the demand for European integration on a specific policy issue. After recognizing its own interests and demand for European integration, governments must identify the supply of potential integrative steps. Through a process of interstate interactions, the possible political responses are identified (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 481). In sum, the demand (preferences) and supply (strategic opportunities) determine the behavior of the member state within the European cooperation.

Second, bargaining power and the intensity of preferences are argued to be important determinants of European integration. Moravcsik identifies three types of bargaining power: (a) unilateral policy alternatives, (b) alternative coalitions, and (c) the potential for compromise and linkage (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 499). When studying the policy development of the EU on the area of a CEAS, all these bargaining powers are relevant. States which do not find multilateral European agreements appealing are likely to seek unilateral alternatives or form smaller coalitions and, thus, threaten with non-agreement to the proposed EU policy (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 499). When credible threats of non-agreements are presented by status quo advocates, non-decisions are a possible outcome, unless the proposed changes are appealing to the status quo advocates. Also, national governments are often most keen to seek cooperation on issues where they have the least bargaining power but where the issue is still important to them (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 505). This shows that member states are ready to compromise on those issues where they have a high demand. The interstate bargaining dynamics will be the most important aspect of liberal intergovernmentalism for my thesis, since this process of interaction between the member states is argued to shape the final policy outcomes.

Third, institutional choices of pooling and delegation of sovereignty affect the European integration. Whether states are interested in delegating sovereignty to the European institutions depends on how important they perceive the issue (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 9). This assumption is related to the one above on how urgent an issue is for a member state. Member states that are

under heavy pressure of applications for international protection are likely to advocate solutions that require European cooperation, while states under less pressure are interested in retaining their sovereignty and the opportunity for flexible solutions.

In sum, the policy process is argued to be determined by interstate bargaining and the willingness of the member states to transfer their sovereignty to supranational institutions. Thus, this theory is relevant for my thesis, since it contributes to explain the dynamics of negotiations and can be applied to outline how the member states prefer to develop the CEAS. For instance, it contributes to outline whether the member states prefer supranational solutions or favor unilateral policies.

2.2 Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism differs on some crucial points from liberal intergovernmentalism. It does not deny the power of the member states' influence on the policymaking of the EU. However, the main difference between these theories is the belief in supranational governance. The liberal intergovernmentalist approach argues that supranational institutions are dependent on delegation and pooling of member states' sovereignty, which, neofunctionalists argue, is a crucial mistake (Schimmelfennig, 2015b, p. 178). Instead, European integration is a process taking place within a centralized governmental structure. This means that supranational actors are able to constrain and shape the behavior of the member states within the specific policy domains by exercising power over subordinated actors (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 8). Moreover, the supranational institutions do not only take member state preferences into account but are also engaged in cooperation with transnational actors. Transnational actors consist of interest groups, corporations and knowledge-based elites. It is argued that these actors create cross-national ties by interacting with each other and, together, attempt to influence the supranational institutions by framing their preferences as beneficial (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 11).

The central assumption of neofunctionalism is that European integration in one sector will spill over to other sectors of policies and cause actors to call for further integration of European decision-making. The increased power of the supranational institutions that arise from this development will generate more processes that favor further integration (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, p. 4). These processes are labeled spillovers and lead to a more interconnected decision-making procedure among the involved actors, not only the member states. There are three types of spillovers that I will base my theoretical framework of neofunctionalism on. In the continuity

of this subsection, these three types of spillovers – functional, political and cultivated – will be presented.

First, the functional spillover process is characterized by a situation where a goal cannot be achieved without further integration (Andersson, 2016, p. 42). This means that a problem within the current system is recognized and that the only perceived solution is further integration. The interdependence between different sectors is crucial for neofunctionalists, although, sometimes, a mismatch between these sectors lead to unintended consequences for certain actors (Andersson, 2016, p. 42). These consequences are labeled functional dissonances and cause actors to call for necessary integrative steps when crises or shocks are generated from these unbalances. The management of such crises tend to generate functional pressures and, consequently, integrative outcomes (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 198). For this thesis, it will be important to outline how previous policies have responded to events and whether these events have generated any crises or shocks to the asylum system and how the involved actors have responded to these crises.

Second, political spillover effects encompass a process where transnational actors encounter problems, which they perceive cannot be dealt with at the domestic level (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 199). Both governmental and non-governmental groups have been addressed for this process. On the one hand, governmental elites, through an increasing bureaucratic system, have gained power over the policy processes. This bureaucratic development has led to the undermining of national government preferences and, thus, aggravating the role of member state governments to influence the policy development (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, p. 5). On the other hand, Haas (1958, pp. xv–xvi) focuses mainly on non-governmental elite groups. He emphasizes the importance of leaders of political parties, trade associations and trade unions, both on the domestic and international level. On the international level, umbrella organizations are emphasized as important actors (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 205). This thesis will emphasize the latter actors, since the development of a CEAS has mainly involved non-governmental actors and umbrella organizations with humanitarian objectives, rather than economic interest groups. Furthermore, uncovering processes characterized by bureaucratic decision-making is difficult, due to the lack of transparency within these processes.

Third, cultivated spillover effects emphasize the role of central institutions and, mainly, the Commission. Since the Commission is responsible for proposing new legislation, it embodies the common interests of the relevant actors. Hence, the Commission is argued to be an important actor to "upgrade" the common interests, by moving the agreements beyond the

lowest common denominator (Haas, 1961, p. 389). Through this process, the Commission is able to extend its power by operating as a policy entrepreneur, since its position of authority enables the Commission to steer the dynamics of the negotiations in a certain, preferable direction (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 199). The consequence of the power extension of the Commission is framed in a principal-agent problem, meaning that the principals, the member states, give up their powers to the agent, the Commission. This allows the Commission to operate on its own preferences and not only as a coordinator of member state preferences (Pollack, 1998, p. 220). This contributes to the cultivated spillover assumption, since it is argued that the increased autonomy of agents makes it difficult to control supranational institutions for those principals that created them (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 199). Thus, what is important for this thesis related to cultivated spillovers is whether the Commission has managed to lift agreements above the lowest denominators in the negotiations and, thus, succeeded to act as a policy entrepreneur, or if the process is still characterized by a race to the bottom, since this will indicate to what extent the Commission has managed to operate autonomously as an agent on its own.

In sum, there are three different types of spillover processes representing the theoretical framework of neofunctionalism; the functional spillovers relate to the function of the current legal system, political spillovers to the process of lifting issues to a European level that cannot be dealt with on the domestic level, and cultivated spillovers concern the Commission's power to operate autonomously and steer dynamics of the negotiations towards the Commission's own preferences. These different types of spillovers have the common denominator that they reinforce supranational institutions and, in essence, the Commission.

2.3 Postfunctionalism

Postfunctionalism can be described as a reaction to the increased supranational governance that follows from the neofunctionalist assumption. It is argued that an increased Euroscepticism among the European citizens has politicized the European integration and caused a higher degree of multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). The politicization of European integration is dependent on elite mobilization in domestic parties and the support among the national citizens for these parties. This theory also breaks with the two previous theories, since it is based on a different fundamental assumption. Postfunctionalism has a constructivist approach, stressing territorial identities and how these affect the support for European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 13). In sum, this theory emphasizes two main elements

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that should be addressed: public opinion and domestic political party preferences on European integration.

Public opinion is emphasized as one of two crucial factors for postfunctionalists to explain European integration. Identity is argued to affect the public opinion, since whether a population is identified as inclusive or exclusive matters for the support of European integration. An exclusive identity is described as predisposed to Euroscepticism and is only identified as national, not European, while the inclusive identity works in the opposite way (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 13). The more exclusively individuals identify themselves with their national identity, the less support will be generated to policies advocating European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 12). Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 13) argue that a change of the political game has occurred, since economic effects of a decision often is hidden but consequences for a geographical area often are visible. Thus, these issues are picked up by mass organizations (e.g. political parties) and are used for mobilization of the citizens. Consequently, European integration issues have entered the stage of national politics and has led to a multi-level governance system (Laffan, 2016, p. 927). This shall be contrasted to the neofunctional system, where a centralized system of governance is emphasized, only containing member state governments, bureaucrats and transnational interest groups. In sum, public opinion is argued to matter for European integration, since domestic politics is not isolated from the European level anymore. The next step to influence the European integration policies is for domestic parties to mobilize the public opinion.

When discussing political parties in this context, two political conflicts shall be addressed: first, the left/right distributional conflict on economic means, and, second, the more identity-based dimension; the green, alternative and libertarian (gal) versus the traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (tan) conflict. Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 16) argue that the importance of the economic left/right conflict has decreased for the European integration debate and been replaced by a conflict along the gal/tan scale. The gal/tan dimension is deeply tied to identity, since tan parties are based on Euroscepticism and exclusive identities and gal parties are more open to European integration. This has caused the growth of challenging (often populist) parties along the gal/tan scale (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 17). The tan parties has "picked up" the Eurosceptical public opinion and brought it to the political agenda, where the issue of European integration has become politicized in the multi-level governance system (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016, p. 985). For this thesis, the development of tan parties is supposed to affect the willingness or reluctance within a state to engage in the CEAS. Tan parties are critical against both European

integration and immigration, since they argue that these issues undermine the national community and threaten the identity of the national population (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 17). Thus, I expect to find opposition against a CEAS and support for decisions on a national level on migration in states where tan ideas are represented in governments. It shall also be noted that tan ideas can be adopted by more traditional parties, why it is important to analyze the argumentation of traditional parties to outline whether Eurosceptical ideas related to identity have been adopted.

In sum, postfunctionalism offers an explanation to how the domestic political arena has gained importance for European integration through tan parties that adopt the Eurosceptical agenda held by exclusive territorial identities. The CEAS is a sensitive topic where states have been reluctant to transfer their sovereignty to supranational institutions, which offers an interesting setting for postfunctionalism, since migration has been argued to threaten cultures and national identities (Mewes & Mau, 2013).

2.4 Theoretical Expectations

The above presented theories provide a theoretical framework for European integration and are based on different assumptions on how actors take decisions to integrate or remain outside a common European policy with the already existing unilateral policies. A CEAS is thus a case of European integration, where states engage in cooperation and drop unilateral policies in order to increase the European cooperation. In the reminding part of this subsection, I will discuss what theoretical expectations each theory offers for the case of European integration on the field of asylum.

First, from the liberal intergovernmentalist theory, I expect bargaining between states to be important for pushing the European integration on common asylum procedures forward. For this theory, I am mostly interested in member state preferences and what compromises the advocates of change have been ready to make in order to create better alternatives for the reluctant states than the status quo options. In addition, I expect the process of establishing new asylum policies to be slow, since 28 member states have been involved in the negotiations and several government preferences need to be taken into consideration. Related to this slow process, the outcome of interstate bargaining is expected to be characterized by watered down compromises, races to the bottom and even non-decisions, since the positions on the progression of asylum policies have proved to be sensitive issues. A non-decision is defined as a "failure to make a decision" (MerriamWebster.com, n.d.), meaning that negotiations end up without a formal policy outcome.

Second, the neofunctional expectations for policy development on the CEAS vary, depending on what kind of spillover we examine. However, common for all the spillover processes are that I expect integrative outcomes, since neofunctionalism poorly explains non-decisions (Niemann & Speyer, 2018, p. 24). From the functional spillover logic, I expect unintended consequences of previous policies on asylum to generate situations where actors refer to an inadequate system and call for change. In the end, the pressure from these actors will generate new policies to establish and extend the asylum system. The political spillovers are expected to be recognized by non-governmental actors, which highlight issues that cannot be dealt with on the domestic level and, thus, call for European cooperation. The transnational actors that are involved in the process of establishing the CEAS are mainly humanitarian organizations. Thus, if political spillovers occur, I expect these actors to frame policy outcomes that safeguard the rights of the applicants. Also, since these organizations do not need to take preferences of national sovereignty and voter preferences into consideration, I expect them to propose ambitious, supranational solutions. From the cultivated spillover process, I expect the Commission to be the driver of an integration process. The Commission shall work as a policy entrepreneur by advocating policies for further integration by proposing more common principles and harmonization between the member states to implement a CEAS. To find evidence for cultivated spillovers, the agreements shall not be characterized by compromises and races to the bottom, in difference to the liberal intergovernmentalist theory. Instead, the Commission's proposals shall be adopted and include content that might be controversial or contradictory to some member state preferences.

Third, from the postfunctional perspective, I expect the domestic politics to shape member state preferences on European integration concerning asylum policies. I expect the public opinion on support for a CEAS to correlate with the member state preferences for integrative steps towards a CEAS. A reluctance against the CEAS of the public opinion within a state is expected to generate reluctance against a CEAS by the government of a member state, while a public opinion favoring a CEAS shall indicate support for EU decision-making. I also expect the presence of tan ideas in national governments to generate opposition against a CEAS. Thus, the process of integration will depend on the attitudes of the national populations towards immigrants and on the influence of tan ideas on the domestic politics.

In sum, these three theories offer a framework for the continuation of this thesis that can be used to evaluate and analyze the process of the policy development of the CEAS. It shall be noted that these theories are not mutual exclusive and an outcome of the CEAS can depend on

several factors, correlating with more than one theory. I will examine how the process to establish new policies has emerged, what policies have been adopted and what roles the involved actors have played for this process, although it might differ between policies and over time. In the next section I will provide a description of how this examination will be performed.

3. Methodology

In this section I will present my choices on methods and motivate these choices. In short, I will examine the development of EU asylum policies during the last 10 years by using media reports to outline actor preferences. This section contains motivations of how I have chosen my empirical material, actors and a methodological discussion.

This thesis is a qualitative case study of the policy development of the Common European Asylum System during the last ten years and is conducted by a textual analysis. To provide data for postfunctionalism, I have also included survey-based material. Although this is not a full-fledged process tracing study, I will draw on literature from this field of research, since I have the ambition to explain a policy process over time that leads to an outcome. The aim of my method is to conduct a systematic analysis of the policy process of the CEAS and to provide material that helps me to examine how useful my theoretical framework is to explain the process and outcomes of the CEAS. My intention is not to establish a specific causal link between the independent variables and the dependent variable, but to analyze the surrounding dimensions that theoretically could affect the outcome of the policies.

3.1 Data Collection

In this subsection, I will present the choices, motivations and implications that I have made and faced when collecting the empiricism for this study. I will first elaborate on the empirical material that I have chosen to analyze and, in the following subsection, present what actors I will address in the analysis. In the end of this subsection I have included a table to summarize what material and which actors I have used for examining each theory.

3.1.1 Empirical Material

The material I have used in this thesis is mainly based on media reports, legislative documents and Eurobarometer surveys. Thus, the material has been strategically selected with the purpose to answer my research question (Bryman, 2008, p. 392). In the continuity of this section, I will elaborate more on why I have chosen these sources. First, to outline member state and transnational actor preferences, media reports have been my main source. This material responds well to the purpose of outlining actor preferences, since quotes from government

representatives and international organizations are presented in this material. Thus, it offers indicators of what preferences the relevant actors have. When searching for media reports, I have used European newspapers, such as Politico, BBC, Dagens Nyheter and the Guardian by applying the search term "asylum" and filtered the search from January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2018.

Second, to outline the Commission's preferences, I have used the Commission's proposal for policy changes on the documents encompassing the CEAS. In these documents, it is clear what changes the Commission proposes and what their standpoint is on the policy development of the CEAS. Thus, this material offers a good base for my analysis of the Commission's preferences. Also, I use the final legislative documents for my analysis, since my dependent variable consists of these policy outcomes and non-decisions (see section 4.2). By comparing the policy outcomes to the previous policy proposals and the member state preferences outlined in the media reports, I am able to see what changes have been made and what actors that have pushed for these changes.

Third, to outline the public opinion of the national populations, I have used Eurobarometer data on questions concerning a CEAS. I have chosen to examine country specific data from the same states that have been involved in the policy debates and analyzed for the liberal intergovernmentalist framework. This material offers a view of the public opinion that could be contrasted to the member state preferences outlined in the media reports. Thus, this enables me to see whether there are any correlations between public opinion and member state preferences. Not only member state preferences play a crucial role for postfunctionalism, but also what premises the preferences are based on. Thus, I will examine quotes from media reports by government leaders to outline whether they are based on identity-related issues or not.

As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature on European integration where clashing preferences between actors exist. Clashing preferences between the relevant actors for the policy process cause negotiations and bargaining between these actors (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, p. 178). One problem that should be addressed in this thesis is that these negotiations are often performed through informal and hidden procedures, meaning that they are not documented. The lack of transparency of these negotiations makes them difficult to access. Consequently, I will not be able to determine one causal link between the independent and dependent variables, since the process of establishing policies on the CEAS is partly hidden and non-accessible. One alternative method could have been to conduct interviews with policymakers with insight in the process. However, this method would have been difficult to

perform, since the process of establishing a CEAS is multidimensional and there was a risk that the quality of the answers would not have been sufficient to provide a useful material for a thesis. Additionally, these policymakers are often difficult to access and, consequently, I estimated the risk of not getting a sufficient material for my analysis to be too large. Instead, I chose to use secondary sources to reveal the process of establishing policy outcomes on the area of a CEAS. These sources offer me a clear picture of the debate of important issues for the CEAS and it responds well to my aim of outlining the preferences of the involved actors.

3.1.2 Actors

Which actors I have chosen to examine are based on my theoretical framework, since each theory stresses the importance of different types of actors. First, for liberal intergovernmentalism, I have chosen to examine the preferences of the member states, since these are advocated to be the driver of the policy processes. What is problematic by examining liberal intergovernmentalism is that which member states that drive the policy process vary over time, depending on the dynamics of the negotiations. This left me with a dilemma: (a) to choose a few member states and analyze their preferences from 2008 to 2018 or (b) to choose the member states that have been the loudest debaters for and against the policy changes during different sequences. I chose the latter alternative, since the material I have chosen to analyze, to a large extent, reflects the debates on the proposed changes. Thus, the changing dynamics of the debate on the issue of asylum, meaning that different aspects have been important in the debate over time, is a crucial factor for the choice of my study objects.

Second, the neofunctional actors I will analyze are the Commission and transnational actors surrounding the issue of asylum. The Commission has been argued to be the most important supranational actor in the process of legislation of EU documents by neofunctionalists (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015) and thus I will examine the Commission as the supranational actor of this process. The European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union are supranational actors that have influence over the policy process and could have been examined. However, since it is argued that the Commission has the power to work as a policy entrepreneur and drive the legislation process by proposing changes to the existing documents, I will argue that the Commission is the most relevant actor to outline the neofunctional influence over the policy process. Additionally, lobby groups are analyzed as transnational actors, attempting to influence the policy process. In this thesis, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), the United Nation High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and Amnesty International are examined as the transnational actors with influence over the policy process.

The ECRE and the UNHCR have also had formal influence on the policy development of the CEAS, through policy consultations by the Commission.

Third, postfunctionalism differs slightly from liberal intergovernmentalism. Instead of examining interstate bargaining, I direct my attention to the public opinion of the states that are examined as the study objects of liberal intergovernmentalism. Thus, the national public opinion and government preferences are the two main study objects within the frame of postfunctionalism. However, we shall note that examining a correlation between public opinion and national government preferences does not offer a causal explanation, only a snapshot over the current correlation between these indicators. To deal with this issue, I argue that the correlation is what is important for my thesis, not the causal direction, since postfunctionalists argue that national governments strive for support for their decisions and that the preference formation of inclusive or exclusive identities is of less importance (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 17). In Table 1, I have summarized the actors and material I have used to examine each theory.

Table 1: Summary of Examined Actors and Material

Theory	Actors	Material
Liberal intergovernmentalism	Member states	Media reports
Neofunctionalism	Supranational actor: The Commission Transnational actors: Amnesty, UNHCR, ECRE	Commission proposals, policy outcomes Media reports
Postfunctionalism	Public opinion and national governments	Eurobarometer, media reports

3.2 Methodological Discussion

In this section, I will address the possibilities to generalize the results of my study, the reliability and potential selection biases and selection effects that might affect the results.

The possibilities to generalize this debate are limited. As mentioned previously, this is a case of clashing actor preferences within European decision-making. The scope conditions for this process are, however, rather unique, since it has been argued that the development of a CEAS has been one of the slowest and less integrated policy processes of European integration (Crosbie, 2009f). Thus, my main purpose is not to generalize the results to other policy areas, but to outline the dynamics of this specific policy process. Thus, the external validity is of limited importance when conducting a study of a process over time and, instead, the aim is to maximize the internal validity (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 271).

However, there are elements of this process that can be generalized. I will argue that the development of a CEAS is a hard test for European integration, which is characterized by a situation that is the least likely for a theory to be successful (Powner, 2015, p. 114). Since migration has been a sensitive area, member states often emphasize their sovereignty and national interests, issues where little integration has occurred, when discussing a CEAS (Niemann & Speyer, 2018, p. 24). Migration is a part of the policy area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which is connected to issues such as security and defense cooperation where there has been a reluctance to transfer national sovereignty to supranational institutions. Thus, if we can prove that European integration occur within the frame of asylum, we shall expect integration on other policy areas that are less connected to securitization. Additionally, other topics within the JHA area could possibly be generalized, since migration is one of the most securitized issues and concerns similar aspects of other issues within the JHA area (Niemann & Speyer, 2018, p. 24). The dynamics of the negotiations among the relevant actors are also likely to be similar, since the JHA differs from many other policy areas, due to the lack of economic agents and, instead, human rights organizations are the main transnational actors. Thus, this limits the possibilities to generalize the European integration on issues where transnational economic agents are more frequently involved, such as the policy areas of Competitiveness Issues; Economic Financial Affairs; and Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Regeringskansliet, 2015). In sum, the best environment for generalizations are on European integration within securitized issues and the JHA policy area.

Regarding the reliability of this study, there is a risk to be over-determinant when analyzing the data and trying to fit causal mechanisms into a coherent "story" when analyzing a process over time (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 15). To avoid this problem, I am aware that I might not be able to isolate and specify the causal mechanisms of the process of establishing a CEAS. Instead, I aim only to analyze the theoretical heuristics and what elements that theoretically could have a leverage on the outcome. Thus, as previously mentioned, I will not rule out the possibility that several factors might affect the outcome and acknowledge that the theories are not mutual exclusive.

When conducting this thesis, I have identified three problems of selection bias. First, one problem is that only the larger discussions on policy changes are presented in the media reports and not the whole negotiation process between all the involved actors. This could cause a selection effect, since the material I analyze might ignore some member state preferences and, thus, cause a neglection on the variance of key variables (Powner, 2015, p. 117). However, I

will argue that this material is still sufficient to conduct a corroborated analysis of actor preferences and whether member states are positive or negative to changes within the policy documents. It is not necessary to outline every member state preference for this research, since the most frequently used arguments and what actors who advocate these arguments are likely to be covered by my material. Thus, the material provides an adequate basis to answer my research question.

The second risk of selection bias concerns the operationalization of postfunctionalism. Here, I will analyze questions asked in the Eurobarometer. What questions I choose to analyze might affect the results of my thesis concerning the postfunctional assumption. To deal with this problem, I have chosen to analyze the questions that are most connected to the CEAS. However, in the 2008-2012 Eurobarometers, no questions are explicitly asking for the citizens' attitudes towards a CEAS. Instead, questions were asked whether the citizens preferred asylum decision-making on the national or European level. This was the closest related question to the attitudes towards a CEAS in the questionnaire. Interpreting this as a question for or against a CEAS was the best available option to examine the public opinion on a CEAS.

The final risk of selection bias concerns the outcome of the proposals for a CEAS in 2016. This process has not generated a formal legislation and, consequently, this outcome will be interpreted as a non-decision. Powner (2015, pp. 117–118) argues that analyzing non-decisions are difficult, since few traces are left from the policy process when no formal agreement has been reached. However, I will argue that the dynamics of the negotiations is still relevant to analyze, since these negotiations reveal the actor preferences and positions on the policy development. These dynamics are sufficient to outline how the actors interact and whether the negotiations are heading towards an agreement or if the positions will remain locked.

In sum, the main purpose of this thesis is to examine the internal validity of the process to establish and develop the CEAS, although the process offers a rather favorable setting to generalize the results to policies within the JHA policy area. Furthermore, I have argued that I have attempted to reduce the selection effects of my material as much as possible, although we shall keep in mind that the above-mentioned factors could influence the results.

4. Analytical Framework

In this section, I will present the operationalizations of my independent and dependent variables. My framework aims to outline patterns of what actor preferences that have shaped the process of the outcomes and to create indicators of which theories that have been present in

the policy development of the CEAS. I will ask questions to my material which work as operationalizations for liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism. These questions can be found in my appendix. I will finish this section with a discussion on possible implications for my analysis caused by this analytical framework.

As mentioned before, this thesis has an explanatory approach to the policy process and aim to explain why both policy outcomes and non-decisions have occurred. The operationalization that I have chosen is partly based on Schimmelfennig's framework for European integration (Schimmelfennig, 2015a, p. 106). I have used this framework as a basis for my analysis and I will take into consideration which the relevant actors are, what their preferences are and how the outcome responds to the actors' standpoints. In the following subsections I will motivate and present the independent variables and the indicators of each theory for the questions that I base my analysis on. What is important to keep in mind is that the theories are not mutual exclusive and that more than one theory can explain how the policy issue has developed.

4.1 Motivation of Operationalization

The analytical framework aims to create operationalizations of the variables for each theory. The operationalizations of the independent variables aim to outline the processes that are argued to determine the outcome of EU policies for the CEAS by each theory.

This thesis has both an actor-centered approach and a content-centered approach. First, the theories that are used in this thesis emphasize that different types of actors are important and drive the policy process forward. Thus, it is important to outline which actors that are involved in the policy process. Second, these theories also emphasize the preferences of each actor, which means that, to outline which actors that are important to the process, we must know what preferences the actors have and the content of the policy outcome. These two aspects offer an important base for my analytical framework, which covers the relevant actors and their preferences.

The structure of the operationalization subsections is the following: First, I will present the operationalization of my dependent variable and, in the second subsection, present the operationalization of my independent variables, based on my theoretical framework.

4.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this study is the outcome of the negotiations on the CEAS. This includes both policy outcomes and non-decisions. My theoretical framework aims to explain European integration and the dependent variable is used to examine to what extent European

integration has been achieved. Since the independent variables are examined through processes that lead to an outcome of the CEAS, the content of the outcome will be examined to outline which preferences have been included in the policy outcomes and, thus, which actors that have had the most influence of the negoitations (Jacobs, 2015, p. 60). However, as already mentioned, a somewhat controversial decision, is to also include non-decisions in my dependent variable. In the cases where a set of proposals has not been adopted, these outcomes are labeled non-decisions. Non-decisions are more difficult to analyze than policy outcomes, since there is no content of a legislation to analyze (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963, p. 641). To deal with this problem, I will analyze the dynamics of the process of negotiations between the relevant actors towards a final agreement, since it has been argued that the process leading to non-decisions (the impact of the mobilization around latent issues) are still relevant (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963, p. 641). I will analyze in what direction the interaction between the involved actors is heading and explain the theoretical heuristics behind the failure of establishing a policy outcome.

4.3 Independent Variables

In this subsection, I will present the independent variables of each theory. I aim to outline what actors each theory takes into consideration, what preferences these actors have had and, mainly, to explain how the process leading to policy outcomes or non-decisions through interaction between the relevant actors is determined for each theory. The independent variable for liberal intergovernmentalism is interstate bargaining dynamics, for neofunctionalism spillover effects and for postfunctionalism public opinion in combination with identity-based arguments of political leaders.

4.3.1 Liberal intergovernmentalism

The independent variable for liberal intergovernmentalism is interstate bargaining. Liberal intergovernmentalists argue that the member states are the decisive actors in the policy process. It is argued that interstate bargaining is the process which shape the policy outcomes and, thus, the member states are the driving actors of this process (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 60–62). Thus, the main element that needs to be operationalized within the frame of this theory is the interstate bargaining. The first indicator that we need to take into consideration concerning interstate bargaining, is that there must exist clashing preferences over the CEAS between member states, since competing preferences generate negotiations between the member states. Thus, the second element of liberal intergovernmentalism that needs to be operationalized is the negotiation process. The indicators are statements in media by government representatives of whether they are defending the status quo or advocating change, either in accordance with the Commission

or through alternative policies. More specifically, this concerns, for instance, whether states advocate further or less integration. The indicator for liberal intergovernmentalism also includes what member state preferences that are mirrored in the policy outcome, since it indicates which member states that achieved their objectives.

Previous research shows how liberal intergovernmentalists emphasize the bargaining position of member states by arguing that states advocating status quo have a higher degree of bargaining power and, thus, are likely to be successful in interstate bargaining (Zaun, 2018, p. 48). An analysis of the Euro crisis also shows how the crisis management was carried out in intergovernmental negotiations (Schimmelfennig, 2018b, p. 1583). For instance, the indebted countries slowed down the process by showing its incapacity to deal with market pressures and used its bargaining power to push the richer countries (led by Germany) to rescue them (Schimmelfennig, 2018b, p. 1583). This exposed the dangers and potential consequences of not rescuing the indebted countries to the richer states: disintegration from the Eurozone of several member states and, in the long run, the failure of the Euro. These consequences were perceived as frightening to Germany and its allies and led to the abandonment of the status quo option. Thus, this is an example of how interstate bargaining has contributed to European integration where clashing actor preferences occurred and a group of states managed to create incentives for other states to engage in cooperation to which they were first reluctant.

4.3.2 Neofunctionalism

The independent variable for neofunctionalism is the three different kinds of spillover effects. Neofunctionalists emphasize spillover effects as decisive for policy outcomes, since the centralized style of supranational governance is argued to shape integrative policies. This kind of supranational governance does not neglect national governments, but stresses that power, to some extent, is moved from national governments to supranational institutions and transnational actors (Haas, 1958, p. xxiv). However, member states will not be entirely excluded from the analysis of neofunctionalism, since they still are perceived as relevant actors. To analyze the process of changing power dynamics, I will operationalize three types of spillover effects in order to determine to what extent these mechanisms have correlated with the policy process: functional spillover, political spillover and cultivated spillover.

First, functional spillover emphasizes how well a current legislation works, meaning that limitations of a legislation will cause calls for integrative steps and improvement of the current system. Functional spillover is a process based on functional dissonances between the existing system and a current situation. When exogenous shocks or crises arise due to a current, non-

working legislation, these functional dissonances are exposed and put pressure on the actors involved in the decision-making process to take necessary integrative steps to deal with these shocks (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 198). Thus, functional spillover processes are examined through arguments by actors involved in the policy process – encompassing member states, transnational actors and the Commission – based on efficient revisions of a current non-working legislation, aiming to create more integration and supranational solutions.

Second, political spillovers encompass the recognition among transnational actors that a problem cannot be dealt with at the domestic level and, instead, direct their expectations, activities and loyalties towards the European level by promoting further integration. According to Niemann and Iouannou (2015, p. 199), by lifting the issues that need to be dealt with to the European level, it creates an understanding among the involved actors and, thus, fosters a consensus formation that eventually leads to integrative outcomes. Thus, for my analysis, I will address what solutions transnational actors have proposed to develop the CEAS and compare these proposals with the outcomes and dynamics of the debate. I will also highlight if the transnational actors have had any formal channels of influence on the policy process and whether their standpoints are mirrored in the final legislation.

Third, cultivated spillovers emphasize the role of supranational institutions. It is argued that these supranational actors engage in processes that turn them into agents of integration and that the supranational actors attempt to extend their powers. By acting as policy entrepreneurs, these actors lift agreements beyond the lowest denominators and use their authority to position themselves as promoters of specific solutions (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 199). As mentioned above, I will use the Commission as the supranational actor in this thesis. I will evaluate the Commission's role as a policy entrepreneur by examining whether it has proposed changes that are controversial to certain member states and, thus, acted upon its own interests, instead of only coordinating the interests of member states. An important indicator for the cultivated spillover effects is also that the Commission's preferences are mirrored in the policy outcome, since a requirement for a policy entrepreneur is to include its preferences in the policy outcome.

Previous research has also addressed neofunctionalism as an explanation for the EU response to the Euro crisis. I have chosen to examine previous research on the Euro crisis on both liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism to show that there might be several explanations to an outcome and how different theoretical heuristics can explain the same policy outcomes. In short, it was argued that functional dissonances within the architecture of the EMU resulted

in more integrative outcomes (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 212). The original goal, financial stability and safeguarding the EMU, was shared by the leaders of the EU, however, the functional dissonances between the establishment of a banking union, while, simultaneously, remaining a banking system essentially functioning under national policies, caused the EU leaders to call for more integration (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 202). This notion was strengthened when they considered the alternative solution: retaining status quo, a break-up of the euro area and a return to national currencies (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 203). This shows how the EU leaders commonly agreed to fix the European banking system by striving for more integrative outcomes and, hence, reduced the functional dissonances in a process of functional spillovers. Furthermore, several transnational actors and business leaders advocated supranational solutions and campaigned for supporting the indebted countries. For instance, BusinessEurope stated that they were satisfied that many of their suggestions were reflected in the legislation of the European Action Plan that was established to respond to the Euro Crisis (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 207). This example highlights how the different spillover effects work. We can conclude that there seems to have been a consensus among transnational actors and, to some extent, member states. However, we cannot expect such a consensus on the issue of common asylum procedures in the EU. Thus, it will be interesting to examine how clashing preferences between different types of actor responds to neofunctionalism.

4.3.3 Postfunctionalism

The independent variable of postfunctionalism is the public opinion of national populations and arguments by national government representatives. What is important for my thesis is to describe the public support for integrative measures on the policy issue of asylum and compare it with the national government preferences of the CEAS. It is argued that the public opinion affects the domestic political agenda, which, in the long run, affect the European integration, since the debate on the domestic level influences the preferences of the national governments (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 14). What questions I have chosen and how they are used as indicators for my analysis of the postfunctional theory is presented in the appendix. Thus, by outlining the domestic support for the CEAS in the Eurobarometer, the public opinion will be addressed and, by examining the arguments of the national governments, I will be able to determine whether the national governments follow the public opinion. These arguments will also be analyzed on identity-related issues, since postfunctionalism emphasizes the importance of inclusive or exclusive identities. Thus, where arguments follow the public opinion and relates to identity-matters, this will be interpreted as support for postfunctionalism.

Previous examinations of postfunctionalism has been provided by Schimmelfennig (2018a) when evaluating an explanation to Brexit. He shows how spillover effects on identity-related issues (mainly immigration) in EU policy-making led to a rise of a Eurosceptical party (UKIP) at the domestic level in the UK. Immigration issues dominated the Leave Campaign and UKIP's anti-immigrant agenda was largely supported by the British population (Schimmelfennig, 2018a, p. 1155), which shows how the public opinion affected the domestic political conflict. Furthermore, the decision to hold a referendum enabled the Brexit outcome, since a formal path for the public opinion to influence the European (dis)integration was opened by this referendum (Schimmelfennig, 2018a, p. 1169). This shows how the public opinion, through domestic Eurosceptical political parties can affect European (dis)integration. Tying this to the case of the development of the CEAS, this shows how we shall expect high levels of public opposition against a CEAS to correlate with the rise of Eurosceptical parties and ideas, making calls for steps towards non-integration.

In sum, the responses will be used to describe the correlation between support for a CEAS and the outcome of either a policy or a non-decision. For instance, decreased support within a state for a CEAS should decrease the support for a CEAS within a member state.

Table 2: Summary of Independent Variables

Theory	Independent Variable
Liberal intergovernmentalism	Interstate bargaining
Neofunctionalism	Spillover effects
Postfunctionalism	Public opinion and government motivations for its preferences

4.4 Discussion on Operationalization

The main problem with my operationalization is that some of the operationalizing questions are rather similar. What is important to keep in mind is that which actor who makes a statement matter, since, for instance, a statement of a transnational actor is argued to have less impact on the policy process than a statement by a member state according to liberal intergovernmentalists. In addition, a supranational solution proposed by a transnational actor and a solution proposed by the Commission will not be placed within the same spillover category, since transnational actors are assumed to drive political spillovers, while the Commission drives the process of cultivated spillovers. Additionally, the premises of the arguments by the actors are also relevant, since they can be based on, for instance, functional

logics or identity-matters even though the preferred solution is the same. In these cases, the explanations will be encompassed by different theories.

There are four factors of the postfunctional operationalization that should be discussed. First, the questions asked in the Eurobarometer concern migration and not specifically asylum. There are no questions asked about asylum and, thus, I have chosen to include these questions, since asylum is a smaller policy issue within the concept of migration. A second problem is that different questions have been asked over time. This is a validity problem, since the responses cannot be adequately interpreted as coherent. However, since this is secondary data, I have no power to impact the questionnaire. The questions concerning support for the CEAS and the questions concerning national or European decision-making both aim at grasping whether the migration policies should be dealt with on national or European level. Thus, I have chosen to include these questions, since they have the same objectives, although they are formulated in different ways.

Third, since the questions are asked in rather broad terms, it is difficult to specify support for details within the policy proposals. The postfunctionalist theory can only be used to look at general correlations, such as support or opposition against the CEAS, and not the content of the policy outcomes. To deal with this problem, I have chosen to interpret the Commission's proposal for a CEAS as the solution that the respondents share their opinions on, since these are the most debated solutions for the establishment of a CEAS. Finally, the advantage with the questionnaires of the Eurobarometer is that I can outline both country specific data and how the public opinion has changed over time. The postfunctional assumption is that country specific data indicates how willing a member state is to engage in cooperation on a CEAS, while the longitudinal data offers the opportunity to outline the support for migration policies and to see how the public opinion correlates in accordance with external events, such as the refugee crisis.

5. The Common European Asylum System
In this section, I will present the policies included in the CEAS. I will describe the purpose and main contents of the policies and policy proposals within the CEAS. The CEAS was first adopted in 2013 and was based on policy proposals presented in 2008 and 2009. Two central concepts for these policies are international protection and applications for international protection. International protection is defined as "protection from refoulement, [and access to] residence permits, travel documents, access to employment, access to education, social welfare, healthcare, access to accommodation, access to integration facilities, as well as specific

provisions for children and vulnerable persons" (European Commission, 2016i). An application for international protection is defined as "[a] request made by a third-country national or a stateless person for protection from a EU Member State, who can be understood to seek refugee status or subsidiary protection status" (Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, 2016). These definitions are frequently used in the policy documents and are thus important to keep in mind. In 2016, an updated version of the existing policies was proposed by the Commission, containing new regulations and directives. Important to note is that regulations and directives are different kinds of legal acts, where a regulation is a legislative act that must be adopted all across the EU, while a directive is a legislative act containing a goal that all member states must achieve, although the member states are free to decide how this goal shall be achieved (European Union, 2016). In sum, the CEAS consists of five legislative regulation and directives:

- The EURODAC Regulation
- The Dublin Regulation
- The Reception Condition Directive
- The Asylum Procedure Directive
- The Qualification Directive.

The EURODAC Regulation consists of the EU asylum fingerprint database and sets out rules on, for instance, transmissions on time limits on when member states shall register applicants fingerprints of the database and allow access for member states and EUROPOL to carry out crime investigations (European Commission, 2013c). For instance, to prevent applicants to apply for international protection in several member states. However, the changes within these policies have been related to minor technicalities and have barely been debated in media reports. Thus, this regulation will be paid little attention in my analysis.

The Dublin Regulation aims to provide criteria and mechanisms to determine which member state is responsible for examining applications for international protection. This regulation establishes that the member state in which an applicant first enter the EU shall be responsible for determining the status of protection of the applicant. The Dublin III Regulation was an updated version that was implemented in 2013, containing, for instance, applicants' right to have a personal interview, guarantees for minors, extended possibilities for family reunification and free legal assistance (European Commission, 2013d).

The Reception Condition Directive aims to ensure high and harmonized standards for the reception conditions across the member states. This directive focuses on safeguarding the applicants access to accommodation, food, clothes, health care and education for minors (European Commission, 2013b). In addition, it includes rules on member states' possibilities to detain applicants during the asylum process and under what conditions and for how long detention is allowed.

The Asylum Procedure Directive (European Commission, 2013a) and the Qualification Directive (European Commission, 2011a) are closely connected. The Asylum Procedure Directive aims to safeguard the right to apply for international protection effectively, ensuring access to legal assistance, a reasonable time limit for the procedure of examining an application and ensure adequate support for those with special needs. The Qualification Directive aims to ensure all these measures by laying out common ground rules for granting and withdrawing international protection, specifying conditions for exclusion and cessation of these rules and safeguarding the integrational measures, such as access to employment and education.

6. Analysis

The analysis of this thesis will follow a chronological order, where the process of establishing a Common European Asylum System will be analyzed, starting with the policy package that was proposed by the Commission in 2008 and then proceed forward until June 2018. The purpose is to examine how helpful my theoretical framework is to explain the process and outcomes of the CEAS. Thus, the policy process will be analyzed with reference to liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism. The analysis will be presented in two subsections. The first relates to the policy package proposed in 2008 that was finally adopted in 2013. The second part will analyze the policy proposals from 2016 and the dynamics of the debate of that proposal. There has been no formal outcome of this policy proposal and, thus, this process will be analyzed as a non-decision. In sum, in this section the theoretical framework will be applied to the empirical material.

The analysis will mainly elaborate on the most influential theories for the outcomes and vigorous results that are surprising. Thus, I will not elaborate on all different theories under each subsection. Additionally, as will be shown in the analysis, the postfunctional discussions have mainly occurred around the Dublin Regulations. Thus, the public opinion will be presented under the subsection of the proposed Dublin Regulations.

6.1 The CEAS Proposal in 2008

In 2013, a package of five proposals was accepted by the European Union, contributing to the formation of a CEAS. In the following subsections, I will interpret the process from the policy proposals presented by the Commission in 2008 to outline which actor preferences that were implemented in the final outcome of the CEAS in 2013. First, the Dublin III Regulation will be analyzed. Second, the Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedure Directive will be analyzed together, since the content of these policies have been similar and discussed in accordance with each other and, finally, I will discuss the Reception Condition Directive. The largest battles were fought over the Dublin III Regulation and the reception conditions, while the establishment of EURODAC was completely ignored by the media coverage. Thus, the latter regulation will be left out of my analysis. The most active debaters around this proposal has been Italy, Greece, Malta, Germany, the UK and Sweden. Consequently, these states will be analyzed for the scope of postfunctionalism.

6.1.1 The Dublin III Regulation

The largest conflict of the CEAS package in 2013 concerned the proposal for the Dublin III Regulation. The previous Dublin II Regulation contained mechanisms and criteria for determining which member state that is responsible for persons applying for international protection in the EU, where it was stated that the member state in which an applicant first hands in an application is responsible for the process of determining whether the applicant shall be granted protection (European Commission, 2003). However, the proposal of the Commission contained a change within this principle, stating that if a member state is under a heavy pressure of applications, a temporary suspension clause shall be activated, meaning that applicants that have absconded shall not be returned to the state where s/he first applied for international protection if this state is under a disproportionate pressure of applications (European Commission, 2008c, sec. VII). In the end, this principle was left out of the legislation.

I will start by outlining the liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions for the development of this policy. Looking at member state preferences, there were deep cleavages between some member states. On the one hand, the Mediterranean frontline states that were under heavy pressure of applicants for international protection (mainly Italy, Cyprus, Malta and Greece), called for a suspension clause. On the other hand, Sweden, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK opposed such a clause (Vogel, 2011b).

Turning to interstate bargaining, the opposing states argued that a suspension clause would decrease the incentives for the Mediterranean states to improve their poor asylum systems

(Vogel, 2011b) and, thus, showed reluctance to cooperation. The states advocating a suspension clause, argued that the pressure on their asylum system was too heavy and that they could not handle the amount of applications for international protection (Vogel, 2012). Greece's civil protection minister, Christos Papoutsis, stated that Greece and ten more member states advocated a suspension clause, but he also noted that there was "a long way to go before all 27 member states [would] agree" to this solution (Vogel, 2012). This shows that interstate bargaining has occurred, but that the positions have been locked and the process has been slow. In addition, the Italian Minister of Interior, Roberto Maroni, said: "If this [the reluctance among member states to implement a suspension clause] is the answer, it is better to be alone than in bad company. I wonder if it makes sense to stay in the European Union" (Vogel, 2011c). This quote shows how the Italian government used its bargaining power to pressure member states to agree to the Italian preferences by stating a threat to leave the negotiations and refuse to accept an agreement that is not acceptable for the Italian government. This shows clear indications of an interstate bargaining process that is related to the liberal intergovernmentalist theory, since states will only engage in multilateral policies if the outcome is more beneficial than status quo (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 612).

The outcome of the policy process shows that the suspension clause was neglected and left out of the legislation (European Commission, 2013d). Thus, consensus was not reached among the member states and the group of states opposing a temporary suspension clause won the negotiations. In sum, the liberal intergovernmentalist theory is supported to a large extent, since the outcome is closely connected to a group of member state preferences and follows the locked interstate bargaining positions. The final outcome is characterized by a watered-down compromise compared to the proposal, since the suspension clause was left out.

Neofunctionalism finds less support for its assumptions and none of the three types of spillover effects correlates entirely with the policy outcome. First, functional spillover pressures existed, since the heavy burden that was put on the Mediterranean states was an unintended consequence of the Dublin II Regulation, forcing member states where refugees normally enter the EU zone to be responsible for a large share of the applications made by refugees (Frontex, 2018). Thus, the heavy burden that the Mediterranean states faced led to calls for policy reforms that should ease the burden of these states. Therefore, several actors, including member states and several international organizations, pushed for new mechanisms to avoid the over-burdened situation that some member states faced during this period (Grant & Domokos, 2011). Not only through

a temporary suspension clause of the Dublin Regulation, but also through proposals for resettlement and relocation schemes within the EU for applicants (Sykliotis & Billström, 2009).

Related to cultivated spillovers, the Commission has pushed for an integrative policy where the suspension clause was included and, thus, has acted as a policy entrepreneur. However, the Commission failed to lift the agreement above the lowest denominator, since the changes proposed by both the Commission and the Mediterranean states were neglected in the outcome (European Commission, 2013d).

In sum, there are some parts of the neofunctional spillover effects that correlate with the process of establishing the Dublin III Regulation. However, none of the spillover effects fully supports the policy development, since there was reluctance against collective actions (functional spillover process) and the Commission failed to lift the agreement above the lowest denominator and, in the end, the Commission was on the losing side of the negotiations (cultivated spillover).

The postfunctional support for the process of the Dublin III Regulation is difficult to analyze and varies between the analyzed states. In Malta and Italy, the correlation between governments pushing for European solutions and support for EU decision-making is strong. The largest support for a European solution is found in Italy and Malta among the Mediterranean states, while the support for a CEAS is surprisingly low in Greece (see appendix: section 8.2.1). Turning to the opposing states of a progressive Dublin III Regulation, we find little support for the postfunctional assumptions. The German population is a strong supporter of EU decision-making, since the support for decision-making on the EU level is between 62 and 67 percent during the time period 2008-2011. This goes against the assumption that the public opinion is important for the European integration, since Germany has been reluctant against an extension of the Dublin II Regulation (Crosbie, 2009e). The UK shows a correlation between support for national decision-making and reluctance to European integration on the asylum area.

In sum, the correlation between national support for EU decision-making and government preferences seems to be limited. In Malta, Italy and the UK, the public opinion follows the national preferences. However, Greece and Sweden do not support the postfunctional assumption and Germany shows results that are opposing the postfunctional theory. Thus, we cannot draw any coherent conclusions, although some populations correlate with the government preferences. Furthermore, the empirical material provides no support for

government statements based on threats of the national identity, only functional premises have been used in the argumentation by government leaders.

6.1.2 The Qualification Directive and Asylum Procedure Directive

The qualification directives for international protection, containing rules on minimum standards for stateless persons or third country nationals applying for international protection (European Commission, 2011a), was regarded as uncontroversial and was accepted without any larger battles over the content (Vogel, 2011d). Among other states, Belgium and Sweden pushed for changes towards a more coherent qualification directive all over the EU (Samyn, 2010). The only controversy that arouse was Greece's fear of not being able to respond to a new minimum standard of harmonization (Persson, 2008). However, most states were positive to this idea and no states opposed the entire idea of a harmonization of the asylum system. This offers some support for liberal intergovernmentalism, since the outcome mirrors the preferences of member states, however, the lack of clashing preferences makes it difficult to outline whether interstate bargaining has been present in the policy development process and how it has shaped the outcome.

Regarding neofunctionalism, the Commission's proposed changes have been accepted by the member states without any major changes. We can find some support for the functional spillover effect within the frame of neofunctionalism. The member states seem to have had common goals, to implement a common asylum procedure among the member states, and the actors have presented a solution by engaging in collective actions without any alternative solutions. Furthermore, there have been arguments presented related to functional logics, since a Belgian government representative, Melchior Wathelet, and the Swedish Minister of Migration, Tobias Billström, argued that harmonization would prevent "asylum shopping" and be fairer to the applicants (Samyn, 2010). Asylum shopping means that an applicant does not seek asylum in the first member state s/he enters in the EU and apply for international protection in a state where the probability of a successful application is higher. The call for common procedures is a result of uneven asylum procedures between member states, which create incentives for applicants to seek asylum in those member states with the best opportunities to achieve a residence permit. This shall be seen as a functional spillover pressure that helped establish the final policy. The only reluctant actor has been the ECRE, arguing that there was a risk of decreased standards for the asylum procedures in member states with better reception conditions, since the standards would be adjusted for member states with lower-quality systems (Hedström, 2008). This assumption shows how the credibility of the CEAS will never be

perceived as better than within the state with the lowest quality of the asylum system. However, this argument has been neglected in the rest of the material and, thus, rejects the presence of political spillovers. In sum, we can find support both for liberal intergovernmentalist and functional spillover characteristics, although, it is difficult to draw any conclusions due to the lack of conflicts around this directive.

6.1.3 The Reception Condition Directive

The final conflict that will be analyzed within the frame of the CEAS concerns the Reception Condition (European Commission, 2013b). The main conflict within this directive was connected to member states' permission to detain applicants. The Commission proposed to implement rules on under what conditions applicants are allowed to be detained, for how long and how the process of detaining applicants should be carried out (European Commission, 2008d, Chapter II). The Commission suggested changes on this area as a consequence of Greece, Italy and Malta violating the previous principle of non-detention by detaining applicants automatically when they applied for asylum (Crosbie, 2009d). The proposals that were adopted contained that applicants should not be detained "for the sole reason that he/she is an applicant for international protection" and that applicants only could be detained when there is a significant risk of the applicant absconding (European Commission, 2013b, Chapter II).

The liberal intergovernmentalist theory finds little support for the development of the reception conditions. The conflict over the reception conditions is divided along the same lines as the conflict over the Dublin III Regulation. However, in this case, the Mediterranean states advocate preservation of the legislative framework, while the Commission and other member states prefer changes to restrict the possibilities to detain applicants. This debate has had less attention in the media reports and is thus more difficult to analyze. However, the governments of Italy, Greece and Malta have argued that the pressure is too heavy on their asylum systems and that their material resources are not sufficient to deal with the amount of applicants and, hence, they need to detain applicants (Brundsen, 2009; Persson, 2008; Vassallo, 2011). Sweden is the only country which has explicitly argued for a restriction of the detention clause (Crosbie, 2009b). This makes it difficult to analyze the interstate bargaining process. It does not mean that interstate bargaining has not occurred, but the lack of media reports makes it difficult to describe the process within the frame of this thesis.

Instead, the neofunctional frame of analysis is better applied to the policy development of the reception conditions. The Commission has acted as a policy entrepreneur, which is related to

the cultivated spillover process. It has proposed changes in the reception conditions, relating to when applicants can be detained, the judicial process of detained applicants and restrictions on vulnerable persons such as unaccompanied minors and victims of, for instance, torture (European Commission, 2008d, Chapter II). In this way, the Commission has put pressure on states that are not fulfilling its commitments to the common asylum procedure. Thus, the Commission has framed the integrative policy outcome as preferable. In addition, the Commission have lifted the agreement above the lowest denominator, since there was a widespread reluctance among the Mediterranean states to reach an agreement without a clause that allowed detention. However, in the policy outcome a detention clause was included, although some changes were made from the legislation proposal. The proposals that were adopted established applicants' rights not to be detained "for the sole reason that he/she is an applicant for international protection" and that applicants only could be detained when there is a significant risk of the applicant absconding (European Commission, 2013b, Chapter II). The Commission's power to operate as a policy entrepreneur is reinforced when investigating how different the current member state rules on detention were before the adoption of this policy, where the UK and six other countries had no time limits for how long an applicant could be detained, while France had a maximum of 32 days (BBC, 2008). This shows how wide cleavages between the actors were present and, still, the Commission mangaed to lift the agreement over the preferences of the most reluctant member states. Thus, the cultivated spillover process gains support by the policy development of the reception conditions.

Furthermore, transnational actors' preferences correlate to a high extent with the policy outcome. The UNHCR, the ECRE and Amnesty have stressed the poor reception conditions in Malta, Greece and Italy (Vogel, 2011a). These organizations expressed concerns that applicants were detained in the Mediterranean states and argued that the possibilities to detain refugees without any specific reasons must be prohibited (Crosbie, 2009a). These preferences were mirrored in the final policy outcome, which shows that there is a correlation between transnational actors' preferences and the policy development. These organizations were also consulted in the process of establishing the policy proposal for the Reception Condition Directive, which shows how they have had the possibility to exert formal influence over the policy process. This works as an indicator for political spillover, since a supranational solution, through an overarching legislation, is proposed by the transnational actors to limit the possibilities to detain applicants. Whether this has formed a mutual understanding among the relevant actors is difficult to analyze, since there are few media reports about this issue. What

we can conclude is that the transnational actors' preferences to a large extent is present in the policy outcome, which offers support for the political spillover process.

However, no support has been offered for the postfunctional assumption. The arguments lifted by government representatives mainly stress the functional aspects of the proposed legislation, where the practical implementation of accommodating applicants was the main issue. Thus, no identity-related arguments have been used in this debate.

6.1.4 Summarizing Discussion on the Policy Proposals from 2008

In this section, I will summarize the analysis of the CEAS proposals and policy outcomes during the time period 2008-2013. In sum, the conflict has generated support both for the liberal intergovernmentalist and neofunctional theories. First, liberal intergovernmental elements of the policy development were mainly present in the process of the Dublin III Regulation, where clashing member state preferences led to interstate bargaining and compromises with only small changes to the previous policy. The interstate bargaining resulted in removal of the suspension clause, which was advocated by a group of member states and opposed the Mediterranean states and the Commission. Thus, this process undermined the power of the Commission and supported the liberal intergovernmental assumption emphasizing the importance of interstate bargaining. Furthermore, material resources have been the basis for the argumentation of some member states, which is an important indicator for liberal intergovernmentalism.

Second, there is mainly support for the neofunctional theory in the policy process of reception conditions. Both the political and cultivated spillover process is correlated to the policy outcome within the framework for the reception conditions. In this case, the Commission seems to have played the role as a policy entrepreneur and contributed to lifting the agreement over the lowest denominator. This offers support for the cultivated spillover. Also, it was supported in the process by transnational actors such as Amnesty and UNHCR, which pushed for increased rights of applicants by restricting detention in the policy outcome. These preferences are mirrored in the final policy outcome and, thus, works as support for the political spillover process. On the other hand, the Dublin III Regulation shows how the Commission ended up on the losing side of the negotiations and how it failed to lift the negotiations over the lowest denominator.

Third, it is more difficult to outline postfunctional correlations with the policy outcome. Looking at the member state preferences of Malta, Italy and the UK, the public opinion within these states correlates with the member state preferences on which level asylum decision-

making should take place. On the other hand, the public opinion of Germany does not follow the government preferences of national decision-making and a reluctance against a progressive Dublin III Regulation, since the public opinion advocated EU decision-making. The Greek population is divided and the support for both EU and national decision-making is around 50 percent. In sum, the correlation between member state preferences and public opinion is supported in some cases, but not in all cases, which makes it difficult to draw any cohesive conclusions.

6.2 The CEAS Proposal in 2016

In this subsection, the legislative process for the updated version of the CEAS will be analyzed. This policy package was presented in the wake of the refugee crisis in 2015 and contained several measurements to deal with the increase of applications for international protection. The same policies will be discussed as in the previous subsections, since, once again, the debate over the EURODAC regulation has been paid little attention in the media reports. Thus, first the Dublin IV Regulation, where the main battles between the involved actors were fought, will be analyzed. Second, the Qualification Regulation and the Common Asylum Procedure Directive will be analyzed together and, finally, the Reception Condition Directive will be discussed. The most active states surrounding this proposal have been the Visegrad group, Germany, Sweden, Italy and Greece and, consequently, these states will be analyzed within the frame of postfunctionalism.

6.2.1 The Dublin IV Regulation

The proposed changes to the Dublin IV Regulation contained a permanent fair sharing mechanism between the member states that aimed to relocate applicants between the member states to even out the burden on all member states (European Commission, 2016b, Chapter VII). This mechanism has been the main topic of discussion among the member states and seems to be the blocking principle for an agreement.

Shortly, the outcome of this non-decision is supported by the liberal intergovernmentalist heuristics. The process has progressed slowly and has been characterized by deadlocks between different groups of member states and clashing member state preferences. The Commission's proposal has been advocated by countries that received high number of applicants during the refugee crisis, mainly Sweden and Germany, and the frontline states where the asylum systems were put under heavy pressure, mainly Greece and Italy (Traynor, 2015). The loudest opponents to a relocation system have been the Visegrad Group – consisting of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. These states have blocked all proposals containing permanent

relocation and resettlement schemes. After the increased influx of refugees entering Hungary in 2015, the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced that Hungary will not receive any more applicants (Scheppele, 2015) and he was later joined by the other Visegrad states (Barigazzi, 2017a; Cienski, 2016; Sander & Weissbecker, 2015). This shows how the Visegrad states sought an alternative coalition to strengthen their voice in the European cooperation. On the other hand, the Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven criticized several countries for not taking their fair share of responsibility (Barigazzi & Ariès, 2017). The locked positions have generated a stalemate in the process of expanding the CEAS, since both blocks have proved to be reluctant to change their positions on the policy development.

Although the bargaining positions have remained locked, the Estonian government attempted to establish a Dublin IV Regulation with less changes than the Commission proposal contained and without a relocation and resettlement scheme. This proposal was described as "the mother of all compromises" by the Estonian President (Barigazzi, 2017b).Yet, the member states failed to find an agreement and the efforts by the Estonian government resulted in a new failure to establish a CEAS. The Visegrad states have confirmed the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption that the parties advocating status quo have a higher degree of bargaining power and are more likely to succeed in negotiations. This also confirms the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption that the process of establishing new policies will be slow and characterized by compromises. The positions have been locked for over two years since the first proposal for a new Dublin Regulation was suggested and no progress have been made on permanent relocation and resettlement schemes. Thus, the prospects for a new Dublin IV Regulation seems to be low and the non-decision is likely to remain.

In addition, the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption is confirmed by the alternative solutions that member states have presented. This means that a group of member states have perceived the proposed solutions worse than the already existing Dublin III Regulation. However, the call for European solutions have been unanimous and even the Visegrad group has called for common solutions, although mandatory relocation and resettlement schemes have been absent from their proposal. Instead, Slovakia, supported by the other Visegrad states presented a solution under the label "flexible solidarity" (Gotev, 2016). This proposal implied that states could choose to either participate in relocation schemes or financially contribute to states with a large pressure of applicants. However, the frontline states were not impressed and rejected this proposal by stating that this would not change the situation in the states carrying a heavy burden (Barigazzi, 2016b). This raises questions concerning the willingness of the

Visegrad group to reform the current Dublin III Regulation, since this solution does not deal with the core of the problem, the overburdened asylum systems. Rather, this proposal was designed based on the Visegrad groups' preferences and contributed little to progress of the CEAS. This shows that the Visegrad states were rather satisfied with the status quo and engaged in negotiations mostly to avoid criticism from other member states. The bargaining position of Sweden, Germany and the frontline states is that the mandatory relocation scheme is decisive for an agreement and that they will not accept anything less. On the other hand, the Visegrad states consider these mandatory schemes as deal breakers, which clearly shows why the status quo has remained concerning the Dublin Regulation.

The neofunctional assumption is more difficult to interpret, since it expects integrative outcomes. However, the process of establishing the updated CEAS has not been finished and, thus, none of the spillover effects seem to fully support the development of this process. Nevertheless, there are patterns of functional spillover processes. There seems to be a unity within the EU that European solutions should be addressed, since both Eastern and Western EU states have proposed multilateral agreements to deal with the migration flows, although the actors are far from reaching an agreement. Additionally, the Commission and several IOs and NGOs, such as the UNHCR and the ECRE, have suggested common solutions to the European asylum system (Sutherland, 2015). These proposals were also addressed after the refugee crisis that caused an external shock to the European asylum system, which made several actors to call for new solutions, due to a lack of functioning legislations (Karnitschnig, 2015). The EU Migration Commissioner, Dimitris Avramapolous, argued that the Dublin III Regulation "was established when reality was different" (Barigazzi, 2016a). All the above arguments are based on functional spillover processes, since they refer to unintended consequences of the previous legislation which caused heavy pressure on frontline states. However, the proposal has not been accepted and, consequently, the support for functional spillovers stops at this point.

Additionally, transnational actors, for instance, the UNHCR and the ECRE were consulted by the Commission before deciding on the policy proposal. Supranational solutions have been perceived as the favorable outcome for the UNHCR. The United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for International Migration, Peter Sutherland (2015), argued that

> [w]hen asylum seekers reach European shores, the EU should take collective financial and administrative responsibility for processing and accommodating them, regardless of where they disembark. And it should take solidarity a step

further when it comes to Syrians, equitably distributing the responsibility to host them across all member states.

This statement has also been supported by the General-Secretary of the ECRE (Diedring, 2015) and indicates that more integration is required by advocating the Commission's proposed Dublin IV Regulation. However, the socialization process and mutual understanding among the relevant actors, have failed, since the positions of these actors are still locked, and no agreement is in sight. This confirms that the theoretical heuristics of the political spillover process has failed.

Third, the cultivated spillover effects cannot be confirmed either. The Commission has proposed the Dublin IV Regulation, a more integrative policy than the previous regulation, since it emphasizes European cooperation to a higher extent when proposing the burden sharing mechanism (European Commission, 2016b). The Commission works as a policy entrepreneur, since it does not only coordinate the common interests and preferences of the member states but propose controversial changes that oppose the preferences of several member states (mainly the Visegrad Group). This shows how the Commission favors a certain outcome which it tries to force upon the reluctant states. However, as already mentioned, this has only generated a non-decision. Evidently, the Commission has failed to lift an agreement over the lowest denominator of the involved actors and the chances of doing so are perceived to be low, since the positions of these actors are locked. This shows that the capacity of the Commission to promote a favorable solution beyond the lowest denominator has been too low to reach a final agreement and, instead, the process is characterized as a race to the bottom where the actors are reluctant to find compromises. In sum, there have been patterns of neofunctionalist argumentations, but there has been no agreement of how to design a new asylum system.

The postfunctional theory offers a high degree of support for the policy development of the Dublin IV Regulation. When looking at the public opinion of the Visegrad group, Italy, Greece, Sweden and Germany, which have been the main actors in the debate of the Dublin IV Regulation, the postfunctional assumption is to a large extent confirmed. The support for a CEAS among the Visegrad states is lower than among the advocates of the Dublin IV Regulation (see appendix: section 8.2.2). We shall also note that the public support for a CEAS dropped with between 12 and 15 percent among the Visegrad states in only half a year between spring 2015 and fall 2015, which marks the time for the refugee crisis. There is no similar correlation of a drop in the support for a CEAS among Sweden, Germany, Italy or Greece, since the support for a CEAS increased during the refugee crisis in all these states, except in Italy,

where it dropped 4 percent. Thus, the highest support for a CEAS is identified in Germany and Sweden, the two countries that have been the main advocates of a relocation scheme and that received a large number of applicants during the refugee crisis in 2015 (Eurostat, 2018). The public opinion of the Visegrad group shows an apparent lower support for the CEAS than the advocates. The correlation between public opinion and member state preferences is interesting, since it goes in line with the postfunctional assumption that state preferences follow public opinion.

Furthermore, the leaders of the Visegrad states all belong to anti-immigrant, Eurosceptical parties (Chytilek & Kaniok, 2006; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008, p. 224; van de Rakt, 2013). Thus, following the expectations of postfunctionalism, we can see a reluctance against European integration among these leaders and an argumentation that is based on identity. For instance, the leader of the Polish government party Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaczyński, argued that Poland "would have to completely change [its] culture and radically lower the level of safety in [the] country" if more refugees were let into Poland (Cienski, 2017). This statement clearly shows how identity plays a major role for the Visegrad countries in their argumentation and how their leaders have adapted tan ideologies to carry out their message in the public sphere. These are signs of where government representatives attempt to reach out to populations with exclusive national identities, where foreign cultures are perceived as threats to the national identity. This shows how the multi-level governance has affected the policy outcome. The success of Eurosceptical parties within the Visegrad group has led to a situation where they are capable of blocking negotiations within policy processes and seek differentiated integration, meaning that they seek opt-outs to preserve their national sovereignty on certain policy issues (Schimmelfennig, 2018a, p. 1155). More evidence for the differentiated integration is the referendum that Orbán chose to arrange in order to let the people of Hungary give their opinion on relocation schemes (MacDowall, 2016). The result was 98 percent for the against side, although the turnout was only 43 percent. This shows how the Prime Minister takes the public opinion into consideration and use the referendum to support its position on European issues, such as the development of the CEAS. In sum, postfunctionalism is largely supported, since the government preferences follow the public opinion of the CEAS and the reluctant governments' have used identity-related arguments to oppose the Dublin IV Regulation. However, we find no support for identity-related arguments among the advocates of the Dublin IV Regulation.

6.2.2 The Common Asylum Procedure Directive and the Qualification Regulation

The Commission presented an updated version of the Common Asylum Procedure Directive (European Commission, 2016d) and proposed to turn the previous Qualification Directive into a Qualification Regulation (European Commission, 2016e). These proposals were presented at the same time and are often discussed in accordance with each other. The main discussion topic has concerned the establishment of a safe third country list and a list of safe countries of origin (hereafter: safe lists). A safe third country means a country outside the EU where, among other criteria, the applicants face no risks to be persecuted and that follows the Geneva Convention (European Commission, 2016h), while a safe country of origin means that there is "no persecution, no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict" within the state that the applicant originally left (European Commission, 2016g). Hence, the EU has proposed to establish a list of third countries to which an applicant should be sent back to if s/he passed through one of these countries on its way to the member state (European Commission, 2016d, p. 8). Thus, this subsection will mainly discuss the safe lists that the Commission has proposed to establish.

Regarding liberal intergovernmentalism, the member states seem to agree that safe lists should be established. The Visegrad group, the German chancellor Angela Merkel and representatives of the Austrian government expressed support for the safe lists by referring to enhanced measures to distinguish economic migrants from refugees and by arguing that these lists would speed up the asylum procedures, since these lists could be seen as check lists of whether an applicant has the right to apply for asylum in the member state (Benner, 2016; Delcker, 2016; Schetyna, 2015). This shows that there is a consensus between the member states from East to West. Following the liberal intergovernmentalist reasoning, this indicates that an agreement should be reached. Thus, the lack of a policy outcome does not support the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation, since a consensus among the member states should indicate an agreement on safe lists to further harmonize the European asylum procedures.

There are some lines of reasoning that follow the neofunctional spillover assumptions in the policy developments on the safe lists, nevertheless, the non-decisions lack support from the neofunctional theory. There is a functional spillover argumentation presented by the above-mentioned European leaders. For instance, the Austrian argumentation that safe lists would speed up the asylum procedures is related to functional spillovers, since the argument is presented to make the asylum procedures more efficient. Furthermore, the refugee crisis

provided an external event that made, for instance, Germany to change its position on safe country lists and, thus, push for such a change (Benner, 2016). This should support the functional assumption, especially when there is consensus on the safe lists, however, no policy outcome has been reached and, thus, the functional spillover logic has failed.

The Commission proposed the safe lists to harmonize the current national safe lists to European ones. It argued that "[w]here applicants are manifestly not in need of international protection because they come from a safe country of origin, their applications must be quickly rejected and a swift return organized" (European Commission, 2016d, p. 4) This shows how the Commission tried to lift the harmonization of the European asylum procedures to a more integrated and efficient system by accepting common safe lists. However, since the member states agree on the establishment of safe lists, it could be argued that the Commission does not operate as a policy entrepreneur and, instead, only coordinates the preferences of the member states. How this situation shall be interpreted is difficult to analyze, since my empirical material does not provide any indications for whether the Commission is only coordinating member state preferences or driving its own agenda. Again, the lack of a policy outcome does not go in line with the expectations of the theories. Thus, it is difficult to determine any explanations to how the cultivated spillover processes have affected the outcome, since the non-decision of the process seems to falsify this theory. In sum, the neofunctional theory expects further integration and this has not occurred. It is surprising, since both the functional and cultivated spillover find some degree of support by looking at the arguments of the involved actors. Thus, we should expect an integrative outcome in the near future, although, the non-decision will be interpreted as a failure of neofunctionalism in this thesis.

6.2.3 The Reception Condition Directive

The proposal for the Reception Condition Directive sought mainly to safeguard equal treatments of applicants and nationals on the labor market, lay out rules of how states should deal with applicants that absconded to other EU countries than in which they applied for international protection and to set up contingency plans for situations where member states find themselves in situations of disproportionate pressures of applications. The contingency plans aim to force member states to draw up plans on how they shall ensure reception conditions when they are faced with disproportionate numbers of applicants (European Commission, 2016c, Chapter VI). Also, the proposal aims to provide the applicants with equal treatment as national citizens on employment, education, freedom of association and affiliation, and social security (European Commission, 2016c, Chapter II).

The member states seem to be far from agreeing to a policy outcome on this issue. In Austria and Hungary, applicants are placed in mandatory detention camps (McTague, 2017), which is directly opposing the EU proposal of equal treatment of applicants and national citizens. Furthermore, a contingency plan principle seems to be out of reach for the Commission, since the Austrian then Foreign Minister (now Chancellor), Sebastian Kurz, proposed an alternative policy, which would move all applicants to refugee centers outside Europe, where they later would be resettled in European countries (Eder, 2016). Thus, the Eastern bloc is keener to move the reception facilities of applicants from European soil, than safeguarding the internal measurements of the reception conditions. I have found little evidence of how the Western states have responded to the proposal by the Commission. Thus, in short, the debate seems to have been moved from the policy proposal of the internal reception conditions to the external aspects of keeping refugees out of the EU. This indicates that the member states are driving the process by steering the debate to other policy issues than the ones suggested by the Commission. This offers support for liberal intergovernmentalism, since the alternative solutions are perceived as better than the proposal by the Commission, which has slowed down the process.

The new direction of the debate on the reception conditions shows how the Commission lacks skills to create credible agreements between the member states. The Commission has failed to operate as a policy entrepreneur, since, as argued above, the member states have taken command over the debate. A new version of the proposal for the Reception Condition Directive was presented in June 2018, where several member states (i.e. Germany, Italy, France and Spain) pushed for limiting the access to accommodation and money for applicants that have absconded from the member state they first entered (Eder & Herszenhorn, 2018). This shows how the Commission revised its proposal in accordance with a bloc of member states to increase the possibilities to reach an agreement. Additionally, this supports the assumption that the Commission only coordinates the member state preferences and lacks the capacity to work as a policy entrepreneur.

Furthermore, several NGOs and transnational actors seem to attempt to influence the development of the reception conditions by criticizing the reception conditions, mainly in the Eastern European states. The UNHCR has opposed the mandatory detention centers and criticized Hungary for establishing these centers, while it has cooperated with the Greek government to improve the situation on the islands and stop the detention of applicants (see section 6.1.3) (Surk, 2016). The Senior Policy Officer at the ECRE, Aspasia Papadopoulou, criticized both Italy and Greece for applying "practices and standards that are inadequate and

disrespect fundamental rights" (Stavinoha & Philo, 2016). This shows how transnational actors have attempted to influence the policy process through political spillovers. However, their actions have had limited influence over the policy process, since their push for safeguarding the rights of the applicants and closing the mandatory detention centers have had no effect on the states concerned and have failed to bring this debate to the political agenda. Thus, the political spillover finds little support for the policy process on reception conditions.

The arguments by government representatives are mainly focused on how to respond to the large influx of refugees and to facilitate the national reception conditions. Thus, this debate has left out the postfunctional identity assumptions. However, the reluctance to facilitate the reception of applicants corresponds with some of the arguments presented for resisting the Dublin IV Regulation. For instance, detaining applicants shows how these states do not offer access to the same benefits as nationals, which could be interpreted as an issue related to identity, making applicants "lower level citizens." However, since there is no support for this argument in the examined material, I have chosen to neglect this interpretation and, consequently, postfunctionalism offers no support for this non-decision.

6.2.4 Summarizing Discussion on the Policy Proposals from 2016

In this subsection, I will summarize and make some concluding remarks on the analysis of the proposals of the CEAS from 2016. In short, the analysis has generated different levels of support for each theory.

First, liberal intergovernmentalism is supported to a large extent, since both the policy processes of the Dublin IV Regulation and the Reception Condition Directive have been characterized by clashing member state preferences that have led to a deadlock in the process of establishing a policy outcome of these topics. The advantage when studying liberal intergovernmentalism is that it does not expect a policy outcome, unless the member states are willing to cooperate, which enhance an analysis of a non-decision. This responds well to the stalemate in the negotiation process, as the ones we have seen in two of the three cases above. Furthermore, concerning the Reception Condition Directive, the member states managed to steer the debate in their preferred direction, which shows how the member states were the policy entrepreneurs of this process.

Second, the interstate deadlock cannot be explained by neofunctionalism, since the different spillover effects expect a policy outcome and further integration. The spillover effects seem to be falsified and do not generate the expected outcomes in form of integrative policy outcomes,

although there have been signs of first steps of both functional, political and cultivated spillovers. However, these first steps have not been lifted above disagreements between the relevant actors. Yet, since we are dealing with non-decisions, neofunctionalism is expected to have limited explanatory power of the outcome and, thus goes in line with my theoretical expectations. A possible neofunctional explanation to the non-decisions of the policy proposals from 2016 could be that the CEAS is a system that has been integrated to a less extent than other policy areas, since the member states have been careful to delegate its sovereignty to the EU. Thus, the member states have been aware to retain control over the system, which is uncommon, since policy areas often are integrated and more difficult to control by member states (Niemann & Ioannou, 2015, p. 199). This opposes the neofunctional principal-agent problem that was addressed in section 2.2, since the principals (the member states) do not seem to have lost power over the policy process to supranational agents.

Third, the theoretical heuristics of postfunctionalism finds a rather large share of support in the policy development of the Dublin IV Regulation. Both the public opinion and quotes from government representatives of the tan parties within the Visegrad group follows the postfunctional assumption of Eurosceptical attitudes that will lead to differentiated integration. The reluctance of engaging in the Dublin IV Regulation among the Visegrad countries are not surprising when looking at the opposition of a CEAS, simultaneously, the support for a CEAS is mirrored in the frontline states, Germany and Sweden's government preferences. Thus, the blockage of further integration is not surprising. A pattern that emerges is that more identity-related arguments are presented when it comes to reception volumes of applicants, which are perceived as sensitive issues among member states, but that these arguments are left out on more technical disputes, such as safe lists.

An interesting finding from this policy proposal package is, however, the consensus among both member states and the Commission to introduce the Common Asylum Procedure Directive and the Qualification Directive that did not not generate any policy outcomes. Liberal intergovernmentalism expects a policy outcome, since the member states agree to the terms proposed by the Commission and neofunctionalism expects a policy outcome since the Commission is not opposed by any major actors. The only possible explanation from a neofunctional view is that transnational actors are blocking this agreement. However, this seems unlikely, considering that the evidence for political spillover has had limited explanatory power for other policies. Thus, the conclusion for this agreement is that we should expect a policy outcome in a near future, since all the evidence is pointing in this direction.

7. Conclusions

In the beginning of this thesis, I posed the questions: *How has the Common European Asylum System developed during the last ten years? And, how have clashing actor preferences affected the policy outcome of the CEAS?* These questions aimed to explain the process and outcomes of the policy development of the CEAS within the context of clashing actor preferences. In sum, the policy development has been slow, although the EU managed to establish a CEAS in 2013. Additionally, the EU failed to establish an efficient, long-lasting solution to the pressing situation of the refugee crisis, since this process has resulted in a non-decision and a lack of measurements to consolidate the European asylum system.

Turning to how the clashing actor preferences have affected the outcome of the CEAS, I used a theoretical framework, consisting of liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and postfunctionalism, to answer this question. Before I get to the main conclusions, I will highlight that the dynamics of the negotiations changed between the first and the second policy packages that were presented. The first package contained discussions on both the Dublin III Regulation and the Reception Condition Directive where the national asylum systems were in focus and how these should be harmonized and safeguard the rights of the applicants. The disputes over the second proposals mainly concerned the Dublin IV Regulation and, specifically, the burden-sharing mechanisms and an interconnected approach between the member states on the European asylum system.

The conclusion that is drawn from the second part of my research question is that the negotiations between the involved actors, mainly the member states and the Commission, has taken place within a context of a securitized environment, where some states' devotion to the national level has been larger than to the European level. This dynamic of the negotiations is mainly confirmed in the most disputed legislative document of the 2016 Proposal Package, the Dublin IV Regulation, where the reluctant states have had a large influence of the policy process and slowed down the negotiations. Thus, the importance of member state preferences and the reluctance to engage in meaningful negotiations offers support for liberal intergovernmentalism. The references of some European leaders, and mainly the development within the Visegrad states, shows how the Dublin IV Regulation has become a securitized issue, where refugees are argued to threaten both the national security and national identity. Thus, the integrative development of the CEAS has not benefited from the politicization of the asylum issue. Instead, the leaders of national parties with anti-immigrant and Eurosceptical agendas have become key players to the development of the CEAS when the tension between Eastern

and Western member states has increased. Especially when evaluating the debate on the Dublin IV Regulation, the public opinion follows the government preferences. Thus, this politicization of asylum offers support for postfunctionalism.

In sum, postfunctionalism gained a high degree of support for the non-decision of the Dublin IV Regulation, both according to the public opinion that correlated with the governmental preferences and the statements by government representatives that were reluctant to integrative outcomes. Additionally, as mentioned above, the dynamics of the interstate bargaining has played an important role, which confirms the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption. However, the importance of the economic incentives for supporting or opposing a CEAS has been neglected in this debate and, instead, functional or identity-related issues are increasingly emphasized in the debate over the Commission's proposal from 2016. Thus, it could be interesting to combine the postfunctional and liberal intergovernmentalist theories, since the postfunctional assumption argues that public opinion shapes the government preferences, which they bring to the interstate bargaining on the European level. However, postfunctionalism mainly managed to explain outcomes on sensitive issues, such as quota systems, rather than technical details, such as safe lists and harmonization of asylum procedures.

An interesting finding is also the lack of explanatory power of neofunctionalism. For almost all policy proposals, the involved actors have emphasized functional aspects to improve both the Dublin Regulations, the reception conditions and the harmonization of common asylum procedures. Still, these improvements have rarely been implemented in the legislative documents. For instance, both the Dublin III Regulation and the Dublin IV Regulation were brought to the agenda by disproportionate pressures on some member states, where the Commission's proposal aimed to establish further integration to uneven these pressures. However, the highly compromised legislation that the Dublin III Regulation resulted in and the lack of the establishment of a Dublin IV Regulation show how the Commission has failed to operate as a policy entrepreneur and lacked the capacity and ability to create credible legislations from the negotiations. That functional and cultivated spillover effects have not occurred is contradicting to my theoretical expectations and a bit surprising, since many actors have used functional arguments to improve the CEAS. On the other hand, as previously argued, it is not very surprising that the development on this specific issue has been slow and that member states have been reluctant to further integration, since issues concerning national sovereignty within the JHA policy area has shown less progress than within many other policy areas. The lack of support for cultivated spillover on the Dublin Regulations also shows how

the Commission lacks power on more sensitive issues. These have been the most debated policy proposals where the clashing actor preferences have been most pronounced and where member states have refused to change their standpoints. This supports the assumption that neofunctionalism fails to explain outcomes on sensitive issues, where member states are reluctant to give up their sovereignty and where little integration have occurred.

Finally, this thesis has offered an explanatory contribution to the policy development of the CEAS over the last decade. The dynamics of the negotiations have not changed over time in any drastic ways, although the postfunctional theory gained more support in the debate over the Policy Package in 2016, and mainly surrounding the Dublin IV Regulation. This provides me with one of three paths for future research that I will elaborate on. First, the increased support for postfunctionalism on the development of the Dublin IV Regulation indicates that further research on this theory is required. Questions on whether this theory is relevant for other policy areas that are more related to, for instance, economic issues should be addressed, since migration often is argued to undermine national values and national security, which is a rather favorable setting for postfunctional argumentation. This thesis and Schimmelfennig's (2018a) work on Brexit shows that recent events in the EU have followed the postfunctional reasoning. Thus, future research should address whether this is a new trend in European integration or if these cases are only favorable settings for this theory. Additionally, as elaborated on above, a combination of liberal intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism offers an interesting path for future research.

Second, this thesis is limited to only include the Commission as a supranational actor of the EU. Future research should address other supranational institutions of the EU, such as the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament and the European Council to outline how these institutions use their power to affect the European integration on the CEAS. To really determine the causal mechanisms and the role of supranational actors, more comprehensive studies need to be conducted with these actors on this issue.

Third, one limitation with this study is, as already mentioned, that some processes of the policy development are hidden. For instance, both interstate bargaining and consultation meetings between policymakers and transnational actors are often carried out in informal settings where no protocols can be accessed. Thus, an alternative method to achieve more insight in the processes could be to conduct interviews with relevant actors with insight in negotiations related to the CEAS, which I thought would be too extensive for the scope of my study.

8. Appendix

8.1 Operationalizing Questions

8.1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

- What statements concerning the policy process have been made by government representatives? Are there any clashing preferences between the member states?

This question is used to outline what changes member states prefer and which member states that want to remain the status quo. Clashing member state preferences will indicate that interstate bargaining is required to reach agreements between the member states and to reach integrative outcomes.

- Have any alternative policies been proposed by member states?

If alternative policies are framed as better options for member states, this indicates that they are reluctant to engage in the policies that are proposed by the Commission. This includes both unilateral alternatives and proposals for alternative multilateral policies.

- What member state preferences are present in the policy outcome?

This indicator shows the bargaining power of the involved states. The member state preferences that are included in the policy outcome will indicate that these states have a larger degree of bargaining power.

8.1.2 Neofunctionalism

Functional spillover:

- Have the actors involved in the policy process had common goals?

An original common goal among the actors involved in the decision-making process is a presumption for functional spillovers to take place.

- Have external events led to crises or shocks to the current asylum system?

If external events expose limitations to the current system and lead to unintended consequences of previous policies, it indicates that a functional spillover logic is present.

- Have the external events caused actors to call for supranational solutions or have alternative solutions been suggested?

If the external events cause actors to call for more integrative outcomes and supranational solutions, these solutions will be perceived as functional spillovers. Thus, actors arguing for measures that aim to fix a current non-working asylum system will be labeled functional

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spillovers. Alternative solutions could be unilateral policy suggestions and falsify the functional spillover assumption.

Political spillover:

- Have supranational solutions been perceived as more beneficial for the transnational actors than domestic solutions?

This question is used as an indicator for whether transnational actors have perceived an asylum issue as impossible to deal with on only a domestic level and, thus, framed the issue as necessary to cope with on the European level.

- Have the concerns lifted by transnational actors formed a mutual understanding on the supranational level and, thus, led to integrative outcomes?

A socialization process as the one mentioned in the question will indicate that actors that first have been reluctant to engage in agreements, through discussions, change their standpoint and agree to adopt the changes to which they were first reluctant.

Cultivated spillover:

- Have the Commission operated as a policy entrepreneur and framed integrative policy outcomes as preferable?

A policy entrepreneur is defined as an actor who takes advantage of opportunities to influence policy outcomes to increase their self-interests (Kingdon, 2014, p. 20). Thus, if the Commission presents proposals that provide itself with a larger mandate, it will be analyzed as a cultivated spillover action, while only coordination of member state preferences will reject the cultivated spillover logic.

- Did the Commission manage to lift the agreements beyond the lowest denominators?

This question aims to outline whether the Commission manages to adopt policy outcomes that are not characterized by a race to the bottom, but agreements that goes against the original preferences of some involved actors.

8.1.3 Postfunctionalism
The first two questions are taken from the Eurobarometer and will operationalize the public opinion of national populations:

- What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me whether you are for or against it: A common European policy on migration.

The responses are divided into three categories: for, against and don't know. This question works as an indicator of the support for a CEAS within the member states. Thus, the postfunctional assumption is that support for this statement should increase the probability for the establishment of a CEAS. This question was asked from fall 2014 until spring 2018.

- For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly within the European Union? Migration.

This question indicates support for or reluctance against a CEAS. A CEAS is regulated at the European level and decrease the possibilities to take decisions on national levels. Thus, support for jointly decision-making at the EU level will work as an indicator for a CEAS, while support for national decision-making indicates reluctance against a CEAS. This question was asked from spring 2008 until fall 2011, however, it was left out for some years during this time period.

I will also pose an operationalizing question to the media reports:

- Do the government representatives refer to culture, identity or religion when arguing for or against a position on a policy proposal.

If this question is answered with a yes, it will indicate support for a postfunctionalism.

8.2 Public Opinion on the CEAS
8.2.1 Eurobarometer 2008-2011[1]
The question that was posed in the questionnaire was:

For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly within the European Union? Immigration (%):

Malta

	National	EU
2008 spring	20	79
2008 fall	22	76
2009 s	-	-
2009 f	12	87
2010 s	18	82
2010 f	16	81
2011 s	-	-
2011 f	19	79

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[1] These results are collected from the Eurobarometer surveys from 2008 to 2011 (European Commission, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011b, 2011b, 2011c, 2012).

Italy

	National	EU
2008 sprin	32	61
2008 f	25	68
2009 s	-	-
2009 f	22	72
2010 s	24	70
2010 f	23	72
2011 s	-	-
2011 f	21	72

Greece

	National	EU
2008 s	56	40
2008 f	51	49
2009 s	-	-
2009 f	34	65
2010 s	50	49
2010 f	48	51
2011 s	-	-
2011 f	49	51

Sweden

	National	EU
2008 s	53	45
2008 f	51	47
2009 s	-	-
2009 f	50	48
2010 s	50	49
2010 f	54	45
2011 s	-	-
2011 f	55	43

The UK

	National	EU
2008 s	61	35
2008 f	54	43
2009 s	-	-
2009 f	57	40
2010 s	61	37
2010 f	61	37
2011 s	-	-
2011 f	66	32

Germany

	National	EU
2008 s	35	64
2008 f	34	64
2009 s	-	-
2009 f	31	67
2010 s	36	62
2010 f	34	64
2011 s	-	-
2011 f	33	64

8.2.2 Eurobarometer 2014-2018[2]

The question that was posed in the questionnaire was:

What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common European policy on migration (%):

Czech Republic

	For	Against
2014 fall	59	33
2015 spring	52	41
2015 f	37	55
2016 s	41	54
2016 f	41	55
2017 s	39	58
2017 f	41	55
2018 s	41	54

Hungary

	For	Against
2014 f	66	28
2015 s	68	27
2015 f	55	39
2016 s	49	45
2016 f	54	41
2017 s	47	45
2017 f	50	45
2018 s	48	49

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[2] These results are collected from the Eurobarometer surveys from 2014 to 2018 (European Commission, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016f, 2017a, 2017b, 2018).

Poland

	For	Against
2014 f	70	13
2015 s	66	22
2015 f	54	31
2016 s	48	39
2016 f	56	35
2017 s	49	42
2017 f	47	43
2018 s	51	39

Slovakia

	For	Against
2014 f	71	21
2015 s	65	25
2015 f	54	37
2016 s	50	41
2016 f	54	39
2017 s	58	31
2017 f	53	35
2018 s	46	44

Sweden

	For	Against
2014 f	69	25
2015 s	77	18
2015 f	78	17
2016 s	75	21
2016 f	76	21
2017 s	76	22
2017 f	79	20
2018 s	74	23

Germany

	For	Against
2014 f	75	18
2015 s	84	13
2015 f	82	16
2016 s	79	18
2016 f	85	12
2017 s	83	14
2017 f	85	13
2018 s	85	14

Italy

	For	Against
2014 f	73	19
2015 s	73	21
2015 f	69	21
2016 s	67	25
2016 f	68	23
2017 s	67	25
2017 f	70	21
2018 s	68	25

Greece

	For	Against
2014 f	74	25
2015 s	72	27
2015 f	77	21
2016 s	74	25
2016 f	77	22
2017 s	74	24
2017 f	70	28
2018 s	73	25

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