

Why do Host Populations Turn against Refugees?

The Role of Knowledge Deficit and Relative Deprivation in Anti-Refugee Mobilisation



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ABSTRACT

The numbers of people on the move, fleeing from conflict, persecution and violence is increasing and so is the level of violence against those most vulnerable persons. The question why host populations turn against refugees in liberal European democracies as isolated phenomenon has, to my knowledge, not experienced great academic attention. This study investigates what societal conditions need to be fulfilled in order for violence to occur. Deriving from previous research on anti-refugee violence in developing countries and right-wing violence, I suggest the following argument: A high level of knowledge deficit regarding refugees and a high level of relative deprivation causes a high level of insecurity among society, which makes persons more susceptible to anti-refugee mobilisation, making it effective and thus leading to violence. In order to test this hypothesis, I conduct a structured focused comparison, investigating Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, two federal states within Germany. The first showing a high level of anti-refugee violence compared to the latter showing a low level of violence. The evidence found in the study shows some support for the proposed theory. A higher level of insecurity is prevailing in Saxony compared to North Rhine-Westphalia, yet the results are not as distinct as expected. Thus, more research is necessary in order to shed more light onto the phenomenon and develop countermeasures.

Key Words: Anti-Refugee Violence, Anti-Refugee Mobilisation, Knowledge Deficit, Relative Deprivation, Contact Hypothesis, Germany, Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia

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List of Abbreviations

ARV	Anti-refugee violence
ARVIG	Anti-refugee violence dataset
DRC	Democratic Republic Congo
ERD	Egoistic Relative Deprivation
FRD	Fraternalistic Relative Deprivation
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
KD	Knowledge deficit
NRW	North Rhine-Westphalia
RD	Relative deprivation
SFC	Structured Focused Comparison

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How your heart breaks everyday
because home, *home* no longer remembers
how to say your name.

Home was your refuge, and I wish they would see.
Because after cruelty taking it from you,
They call you refugee.
(Nikita Gill)

1. Introduction

Humans being forced to leave their homes, their refuge, due to violence, conflict and persecution, is a topic that already has and will gain more and more attention in the societal and political discourse. Living in a globalised world also means that the consequences of violence, conflict and persecution become a globalised matter. Violence against refugees is not an uncommon phenomenon which can easily be neglected (Savun and Gineste, 2019). In liberal Western democracies it has not had the extent it has had for example in some African states such as Uganda in 1982, the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) where refugees were attacked by state agents and the local population (Onoma, 2013) or Rwanda in 2018 (Human Rights Watch, 2019). However, the phenomenon is increasing and (forced) migration will become more and more relevant, due to increase and intensification of conflicts and issues such as climate change adding to causes of flight.

Physical violence is already a troublesome phenomenon in itself and impetus for scientific research. How can we explain that individuals turn to physical violence, what are their motives? The question becomes even more puzzling when it is violence against persons seeking safety and refuge, because as Onoma points out, refugees are per definition politically and economically disempowered and only stay temporarily in a country (2013). The puzzle becomes even greater when turning to liberal Western democracies and asking why local host populations turn against refugees. Why do individuals living in societies coined and based on values established in the Human Rights Declaration as well as the Geneva Convention on Refugees turn to violence? Europe and in particular Germany (FRG), due to its history, put strong emphasis on the adherence to said values and norms in their everyday discourse. The existing literature trying to explain anti-refugee violence (ARV) either focuses on developing countries¹ or is part of research on right-wing violence, in which refugees are one of the target groups. Research solely focusing on violence

¹ It should be emphasised that the categorisation of states into developing and developed countries is outdated. Yet, due to a lack in well-known alternatives and the focus of this paper a discussion on this matter would not be feasible and I will stick with this categorisation. Nevertheless, stressing that gradations and more differentiation is needed (Khokhar and Serajuddin, 2015; PLOS, 2018).

against refugees committed by the host population in liberal Western democracies, to my knowledge, is scarce².

Therefore, in this thesis I am aiming to shed some light onto the question why persons turn to violence against refugees in a liberal Western democracy. I will do so by looking at Germany, which witnessed an abrupt increase in anti-refugee violence from 2014 onward, with a temporary peak in 2016 (Benček and Strasheim, 2016; Bundeskriminalamt, 2018).

I take explanations from research on right-wing violence and anti-refugee violence in developing countries and test whether they can explain different levels of violence against refugees. Research seems to agree that effective mobilisation must have taken place if we see high levels of violence (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Smith *et al.*, 2012; Aasland Ravndal, 2018; Misago, 2019). This leads me to the question, *under which conditions does anti-refugee mobilisation lead to anti-refugee violence?* I am proposing two conditions that cause insecurity among society and therefore make individuals more susceptible to anti-refugee rhetoric and hence anti-refugee mobilisation. The first condition is knowledge deficit about the refugee population and the second condition is relative deprivation. I am hypothesising that a high level of societal insecurity, meaning high levels of knowledge deficit and relative deprivation, leads to effective anti-refugee mobilisation and consequently anti-refugee violence.

A new dataset systematically documenting ARV in Germany from 2014 onwards offers new insights and a chance for a more systematic approach towards explaining ARV. It shows a rather clear division of intensity of violence between eastern and western federal states. This variation within Germany will be used in order to gain more insights into the motives behind anti-refugee violence. Using the method of structured focused comparison, I will compare Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), as representative cases for higher and lower levels of violence against refugees. Since the proposed conditions are based on sociopsychological mechanisms, I will be using individual survey-based data representative of the federal states, looking at different variables, aiming to capture the proposed conditions.

The findings suggest that knowledge deficit as well as relative deprivation influence anti-refugee mobilisation and hence anti-refugee violence. Yet, the results are not as strong as expected, nonetheless the proposed theory holds.

By using theories on right-wing violence and anti-refugee violence in developing countries and applying them to anti-refugee violence in a liberal Western democracy I am contributing to academia in two ways: adding explanatory value to both, just mentioned, strings of research on violence and furthermore, shedding light on the motives behind a phenomenon that becomes

² I am only aware of one other study by Jäckle and König (2018) also using the ARVIG dataset, looking at the influence of terrorist attacks on ARV.

increasingly relevant in liberal Western democracies and therefore contributing not only to academia but also presenting some value for policy makers.

The thesis will start off with a short review of the already existing literature on anti-refugee violence. In the second part I will explain the concepts used in the later analysis, before presenting my theoretical argument. The analysis is split into two case studies and a subsequent comparison of those. Followed by a section on limitations before moving on to some concluding and summarising remarks.

2. Previous Literature on Anti-Refugee Violence

Looking at violence against refugees first of all raises the question of who is a refugee? In public and even political discourse terms and definitions are often used interchangeably, mixed up or being misused. The United Nations offers a definition based on the Geneva Convention on Refugees:

“A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries.” (UNHCR, 2019)

Individual regulations in the hosting countries are defined by the countries themselves, the Geneva Convention on Refugees only offers the basic framework of rights and obligations (UNHCR, 1966). The literature that will be reviewed in the following section is generally missing a definition of refugees. Yet, most are relating to the Geneva Convention on Refugees or the UNHCR at some point. This question is, however, important if one wants to research violence against refugees. Violence against whom is being investigated? In the thesis at hand I will investigate violence against persons holding a refugee status, meaning that government agencies have recognised that a person falls under the definition established by the Geneva Convention on Refugees (Flüchtlingsrat Niedersachsen, n.d.).

Literature about violence against refugees is scarce, and even more so if it is violence committed by the hosting civilian population. Scholars point out that research mostly focuses on the security consequences associated with refugee flows; perceiving refugees as threat to hosting countries rather than focusing on security issues faced by refugee populations (Metcalf, 1970; Onoma, 2013; Böhmelt, Bove and Gleditsch, 2019; Savun and Gineste, 2019). Research on anti-refugee violence³, meaning violence committed by the hosting population against refugees, in liberal Western democracies is even more limited than on such violence in developing countries. In liberal Western democracies this string of research is most always one subcategory of research on right-wing violence⁴, where refugees are part of the target group, but it has seldom been looked at independently. This is why reviewing literature on ARV in liberal Western democracies means

³ Anti-refugee violence in this thesis always means violence committed by the civilian host population if not stated otherwise.

⁴ Right-wing violence includes violence against any minority group, such as migrants, members of the LGBTQI* community, homeless persons or political opponents (Willems, 1993; Benček and Strasheim, 2016).

reviewing literature on right-wing violence. The following section will be structured according to the different existing explanations for anti-refugee violence. Although the population of the analysis at hand is liberal European democracies, literature on ARV in developing countries will also be included because it can generate further insights due to solely focusing on refugees. The explanations presented in the following are often times overlapping and not easily separable, because ARV cannot be explained by one single factor but the accumulation of circumstances.

2.1 Defining Anti-Refugee Violence Literature

Perceiving refugees as threat has been suggested as one explanation for the occurrence of violence. One argument is that if a high number of outgroup members, in this case refugees, arrive in a community the local population will feel politically and/or economically threatened. The underlying proposed mechanism is based on power and empowerment due to numerical size (Onoma, 2013). Onoma looked at this number argument- relative as well as total numbers- but he could not find support for the argument in Uganda, Guinea or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The authors explanation for the lack of support for the theory is that persons with a refugee status are by definition disempowered, leaving them little to no political or economic power and making them dependent on a state's and community's mercy (2013). What this argumentation is missing, however, is that perceiving refugees as threat does not need to be a rational act based on an actual threat.

Kuechler for instance finds evidence in his study on anti-immigrant violence and hostility in Germany and Western Europe that hostility is fuelled by abstract fears that foreigners will negatively affect the livelihood of the native population (1994). This is also supported by more recent findings showing a strong correlation between extreme anti-immigrant hostility and perceived threats. This fear need not to be for one's own personal well-being but it can also be a perceived threat to the cultural foundations of one's society leading to extreme hostility (McLaren, 2003).

The logic behind the threat perception explanation is based on insecurity. The local population feels insecure about the newcomers. Appadurai also argues in his paper on ethnic violence, in which he also touches upon migration and refugees, that the imagined threat posed by ethnic or culturally different persons in larger numbers arriving in a state or community triggers uncertainty regarding for example social benefits (1998). Because threat perception appears to be such a strong determiner of ARV and connected with other factors, as can be read below, I will briefly go into the underlying sociopsychological mechanism: "Group living represents the fundamental survival strategy that characterizes the human species" (Brewer, 1999: 433). Humans rely on cooperation, sharing of information, aid and resources in order to survive. Clear group

boundaries help individuals to know friend from enemy and solve the dilemma of whom to trust and whom to distrust. Part of this is also depersonalised trust among ingroup members. The expectation of cooperation and security motivate the adherence to ingroup norms and behaviour. Symbols and behaviours that differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup ensure that benefits are not extended to outgroup members. The differentiation between ingroup and outgroup does not automatically lead to hostility and conflict, but if certain conditions are met it can do so. One of these is threat perception: Competition over physical resources or political power, either actual or imagined. The perception that an outgroup is a threat to ingroup interests or even survival creates an ingroup identification that is directly associated with fear and hostility toward the threatening outgroup (Brewer, 1999).

In my opinion directly connected to threat perception is social and economic deprivation, because it works with the factor of competition. Research on the connection of deprivation and ARV shows ambiguous results. Studies in Europe and Germany showed that the economic situation per se does not seem to have the explanatory power as suggested by some authors (Kuechler, 1994; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Socioeconomic deprivation as cause of right-wing violence has long been established (Heitmeyer, Buhse and Vossen, 1992; Krell, Nicklas and Ostermann, 1996). However, studies on socioeconomic deprivation are often lacking direct links or show ambiguous results (Kuechler, 1994; Krell, Nicklas and Ostermann, 1996; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Looking at right-wing violence Willems showed that that perpetrators tend to be fairly average young men from average family backgrounds and not significantly more prone to unemployment than others (1993). The factor socioeconomic deprivation nevertheless seems to be an important one, but as Kuechler among others finds, not actual deprivation but rather a feeling of being deprived of what one feels entitled to, the situation relative to others and the feeling of not getting one's fair share that causes hostility and violence (1994) (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Appadurai's evaluation of insecurity in a globalised world goes into a similar direction. Although his overall look is on ethnic conflict, he implicitly also talks about migration and refugees. Persons feel uncertain and thus insecure if a great number of outgroup members enter the country, which raises the question of how to share the ingroups resources such as welfare benefits with outgroup members (1998), causing feelings of deprivation relative to the newcomers. Socioeconomic deprivation if interpreted as relative to others, always seems to be connected to threat perception, since others are perceived as threat to one's own fair share. Therefore, a comparison always bears the potential for threat perception and insecurity.

Another factor that found strong support in explaining ARV in developing states as well as explaining right-wing violence is contact. The effect of contact between refugees and locals even shows to be so strong that it can mediate threat perception, knowledge deficit and denunciations

of refugees by elites (McLaren, 2003; Onoma, 2013). If the refugee population does not become a black box to the community uncertainty will not arise (Onoma, 2013), which is a great factor for the occurrence of violence (Appadurai, 1998). Knowledge gain through contact is also verified by a recent case study on the attitude of Lebanese host communities, conducted by Ghosn, Braithwaite and Chu (2019). This goes back to the contact hypothesis, formulated most prominently by Allport (1958) and Williams (1947). The hypothesis showed strong results in liberal European democracies and developing countries, but ambiguous results in the US (McLaren, 2003). The mechanism is that when contact generates knowledge about the refugee population, uncertainty and prejudices against the refugees can be decreased, taking away the threatening abstract component and positive views can be developed (Homola and Tavits, 2018). As should have come across indirectly already, contact and threat perception are related explanations, working with similar mechanisms. Further, can contact mitigate threat perceptions, which also shows that the two factors are related.

The role of the state and its officials has also been investigated in regard to ARV in developing countries and right-wing violence. State official's behaviour has been found a decisive yet not sufficient condition for the occurrence of ARV in developing states. Refugees do not suffer violence when the host state offers them protection, but violence also does not automatically occur when protection is withdrawn. A withdrawal can have different expressions: It can be direct calls for violence but can also happen indirectly and implicitly, for example by scapegoating the refugee population (Onoma, 2013). This also functions on the basis of threat perception, by scapegoating refugees state actors incite anxiety regarding those.

More influence than the state itself, have local (state) elites. In South-western Uganda for instance the local population did not turn against refugees, although the state encouraged it. Onoma suggests that this is due to the fact that local elites did not join the anti-refugee campaign (2013). This argument is supported by findings on violence against Rohingya refugees in the North-western part of India, where local elites mobilised intensively against refugees, which subsequently lead to violence committed by the local population (Böhmelt, Bove and Gleditsch, 2019).

Koopmans and Olzak also find state and elite behaviour as an important factor, but they looked at it from a different angle: the interplay between media and elites and how this can lead to right-wing violence. The discursive opportunities, which are greatly shaped by the political discourse, play a crucial role in explaining violence against asylum seekers. Discourse offers diffusion processes that influence ethnic violence, race riots and protest cycles. Resonance to radical right-wing positions has diffusion effects and therefore "supports" radical right mobilisation. Public disapproval has, however, shown to dampen subsequent violence (2004). A recent study by Jäckle and König also stresses the interplay of politicians and media in regard of

depicting immigrants as a threat, particularly after threatening events such as terrorist attacks and how it fuels ARV (2018). Aasland Ravndal's QCA study goes into a similar direction, stating that the behaviour of elites towards anti-immigrant positions can be decisive because it can be exploited by extreme right mobilisation. Further, a highly polarised conflict between left and right is seen as necessary condition for right-wing violence (2018). Public repression and stigmatisation can on the one hand, as Koopmans and Olzak find, discourage individuals from joining extreme right groups (2004) but it can on the other hand also push people over the edge "onto more clandestine and revolutionary paths, ultimately leading to violence and terrorism" (Aasland Ravndal, 2018: 859).

State capacity has been identified as a factor that can increase hostility against refugees and trigger violence. States suffering from low economic and bureaucratic capacity are unable to provide welfare services and are thus more likely to experience conflict. As example the researchers Böhmelt, Bove and Gleditsch bring forward Lebanon in 2015, where civil conflict erupted again when great numbers of Syrian refugees came into the country and the state was not able to provide basic services. This led to a shift in public opinion regarding refugees (2019). Here the connection to social and economic deprivation can be drawn, although this time it concerns actual instead of relative deprivation. This, however, "applies to developing countries that face a disproportionate impact of [...] refugee[s] and also have the least capacity to cope with large refugee populations" (Böhmelt, Bove and Gleditsch, 2019: 75). Liberal European democracies have strong capacities and a strong welfare system, making it curious then that ARV takes place. This hints again at the factor of perception and relativity as well as the sociopsychological reasons behind it, which need not be rational.

Concluding, it can be said that anti-refugee violence greatly depends on perceptions, uncertainty and insecurity which when reinforced by personal experiences and/or exploited by (state) actors can lead to violence, in liberal democracies as well as in developing countries.

2.2 Identifying the Research Gap

As the previous section has shown, the knowledge we have so far on violence against refugees committed by the civilian hosting population mostly derives from studies either on ARV in developing countries or on right-wing violence in liberal Western democracies. Furthermore, the focus of most of the research regarding the link of refugees and violence so far has been on how refugee influxes bear a security threat to the hosting states, and little research has been conducted on the threats posed to the persons forced to flee their homes, and the research that has been conducted mostly focuses on developing and/or non-democratic states. In the Western sphere, research on ARV is subcategorised under the umbrella of right-wing violence, where refugees are

treated as one target group among others. Since the phenomenon is increasing among Western states, I suggest that ARV should also be investigated isolated from other target groups.

Focusing on Europe and Germany in particular, it has been shown that xenophobic and right-wing attitudes are fairly stable across liberal European democracies. No particular regions or states stand out with significantly more or less xenophobic attitudes, which is contradictory to earlier findings, suggesting that xenophobia in the former GDR can be explained by the authoritarian historical background (Kuechler, 1994), which would make the former GDR region stand out in a study as such. A just published study supports those findings, that openly extreme right orientations are on the same level in eastern and western parts of Germany (Zick, Küpper and Wilhelm, 2019). When looking at a new dataset published in 2016 containing incidences of ARV in Germany since 2014, however, one can see that in Germany the intensity of violence against refugees is clearly divided into eastern and western parts of the country, meaning that if it is not xenophobic or right-wing ideology that can explain the difference, as indirectly suggested by Kuechler (1994) the question is how can this division then be explained?

Summarising can be stated that the gap in research is manifold: The field is facing a general shortcoming of research on anti-refugee violence and even more so in liberal Western democracies. Additionally, explanations for the variations in intensity of ARV in Germany is missing.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Conceptualising Societal Insecurity (IV)

In the Oxford Dictionary the term insecurity has two definitions 1) “Uncertainty or anxiety about oneself; lack of confidence“ and 2) „The state of being open to danger or threat; lack of protection“ (Oxford Dictionary, 2019). Both definitions are important for the thesis at hand, because both types of insecurity can be a factor leading to ARV. Insecurity about oneself in the sense of one’s social or economic future and insecurity as being vulnerable to danger or threat because the arrival of outgroup members can trigger threat perception and insecurity as explained in 2.1.

Appadurai uses the term social uncertainty in connection to violence. He argues that globalisation and the resulting loosening of national boundaries regarding capital, labour, distributions and so forth has “created a new order of uncertainty in social life” (908). There are different forms of uncertainty triggered by this new order, according to Appadurai. One form is activated by increasing migration and refugee movements. The uncertainty results in intolerable anxiety about the relationship of many individuals to state-provided goods. Because the entitlement to those goods is tied to identities (1998)⁵, for example a German citizen is entitled to social benefits in Germany, meaning a German identity guarantees support. What about persons with another nationality, how and when are those entitled to German state support? This questions generates uncertainty and becomes important when a greater number of persons migrate or seek refuge in a country. Those uncertainties gain increasing force “when existing networks of social knowledge are eroded by rumor, terror, or social movement” (Appadurai, 1998: 909). Violence can become a form of creating certainty in the perpetrators mind, which of course it neither real nor sustainable (ibid.).

The author bases his argumentation mainly on ethnic competition. This, however, is not the basis for societal insecurity in this thesis. Nevertheless, the underlying argument of ingroup versus outgroup behaviour is adaptable to my suggested argument. For clarity and delineation, I will not use the term social (in)security but call it societal insecurity. This should, however, not be confused with the term societal security established by scholars of the Copenhagen School such as Buzan, Jones and Little (1993), and Wæver, Buzan and de Wilde (1998).

Various conditions can influence uncertainty and insecurity among individuals, which cannot all be looked at in this thesis due to a lack of space and also for the sake of in-depth analysis. Societal insecurity is defined by the proposed conditions that I argue are necessary in order for societal insecurity to prevail. Those conditions are knowledge deficit (KD) and relative deprivation (RD). The decision for those two conditions is based on findings that on the one hand show a

⁵ Also see Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002).

correlation between KD and RD with ARV in developing countries and on the other hand findings showing influence of KD and RD on right-wing violence (Forbes, 1997; McLaren, 2003; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Onoma, 2013). Both conditions independently are, however, not able to explain the occurrence of violence, which is why I argue for a combination. Further, both conditions lead to the same outcome, but are based on different mechanisms.

Conceptualising Knowledge Deficit

Knowledge deficit is a condition for societal insecurity because individuals that have not had the opportunity to work against prejudices against an outgroup and open the “black box” still base their opinion on faulty, unwarranted generalisations about outgroups. This leads to a prevailing of uncertainty which subsequently leads to insecurity and thus hostility and hatred (see Brewer, 1999). If close affective ties can be developed through contact fears will be reduced and positive views about the outgroup will be developed (Homola and Tavits, 2018).

However, it is not contact per se that works against knowledge deficit, only the type of contact that generates knowledge about the outgroup, creating affective ties with the outgroup. Close, intimate (not sexual) contact that offers the chance to open the “black box” and work against existing prejudices is necessary. (Brewer and Miller, 1984; Forbes, 1997; Brewer, 1999; Homola and Tavits, 2018). Further, it needs to be contact on equal terms for example at the workplace. If the outgroup member is always the inferior prejudices will not be broken down (Forbes, 1997). If this is not the case, contact can have the opposite effect, and consequently increase hostility against outgroup members. Pettigrew (1998) argues that for contact to have positive effects on hostility and violence against outgroup members it needs to be contact that has the potential to develop friendship. Only living or working side by side with persons from a minority or outgroup is not sufficient (Wagner, Hewstone and Machleit, 1989; Forbes, 1997).

A problem pointed out by various researchers is the question of direction of causality. Are persons with little to no prejudices more likely to have contact with outgroup members or are persons that have contact with outgroup members as a result less prejudices (Wagner, Hewstone and Machleit, 1989; Pettigrew, 1998)? McLaren in her study controls for this question of direction and still finds strong evidence supporting the contact hypothesis in European states (2003). Concluding from the afore mentioned findings and definitions I conceptualise KD as lack of close, affective contact with the refugee population. Prejudices are consequentially a result of a lack of contact. Persons that have had the chance to work against their prejudices by inter alia having contact with said outgroup will not show this trait.

Conceptualising Relative Deprivation

The concept of RD was introduced in the mid 20th century by Samuel Stouffer. It is part of social evolution theory and it is a key construct linking different levels of analysis. It postulates a subjective state that shapes emotions and cognitions and influences behaviour (Pettigrew, 2001). Two forms of relative deprivation can be distinguished: egoistic and fraternalistic. Egoistic RD (ERD) means that persons feel relatively deprived because of the personal position as member of a group (Moghaddam, 2008), the basis for comparison are ingroup members. Fraternalistic RD (FRD) means that persons feel relatively deprived because of the groups position in society (ibid.), here the basis for comparison is an intergroup comparison. Both forms are associated with anxiety and insecurity and also outgroup prejudice, the latter however to a greater extent. A combination of the two shows the greatest influence on insecurity and prejudices (Foster and Matheson, 1995; Pettigrew, 1998; Moghaddam, 2008). RD can concern tangible things, such as perceived monetary disadvantages compared to others but also a perceived threat to one's social identity. The first is usually concomitant with ERD and the latter with FRD (Smith *et al.*, 2012).

Smith *et al.* define relative deprivation as consisting of three steps: 1) comparison made by individuals, 2) cognitive appraisal that leads individuals to perceive that they personally or their ingroup is at a disadvantage and 3) the perceived disadvantage must be viewed as unfair (2012). The importance of how the persons feel about the comparison is also stressed by Grant and Brown. Feelings of relative deprivation only have effects on behaviour if the comparison causes emotions of dissatisfaction and unfairness (1995). The presence of those three steps or factors can lead to different kinds of outcomes. It influences participation in collective protests, can increase susceptibility to terrorist recruitment and promotes outgroup prejudices (Smith *et al.*, 2012). In order for comparison to take place, however, a comparison referent is necessary, something that one compares the other with. At this point social identity comes into play. Social identity is an integral aspect of a RD process, because a strong ingroup identification is necessary in order to create comparison referents. Concomitant is self-categorisation, which is necessary for demarcation of in- and outgroup (Ellemers, 2001; Pettigrew, 2001).

Based on this, RD is conceptualised as presence of ingroup identification, feelings of being treated unfairly and also the prevalence of outgroup prejudices as consequence.

3.2 Conceptualising Effective Anti-Refugee Mobilisation (DV)

Mobilisation is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as “The action of organizing and encouraging a group of people to take collective action in pursuit of a particular objective“ (Oxford Dictionary 2, 2019). This definition is in line with Misago who, in a study on xenophobic violence in South Africa, defined mobilisation as „activities, interactions and processes aimed at recruiting and

persuading individuals and groups to participate in collective action“ (2019:2). In the context of the thesis at hand, effective mobilisation according to this definition means that a group of people has been encouraged to take collective action against refugees in pursuit of a particular objective. The question of objectives behind the mobilisation attempts are not part of the thesis and will therefore not be further discussed. If mobilising is to encourage persons to take collective action, then mobilisation was effective when collective action has happened. This interpretation is supported by researchers stating that effective mobilisation must have taken place if violence can be witnessed (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Aasland Ravndal, 2018)⁶. Therefore, effective anti-refugee mobilisation in this thesis is conceptualised as a high level of ARV.

In defining anti-refugee violence, I will predominantly follow the definition of the ARVIG dataset, since I base my analysis on it. The researchers define ARV as assault, arson attacks, and miscellaneous attacks against refugee housing⁷ (Benček and Strasheim, 2016). I follow the researcher’s perspective that anti-refugee demonstrations are also a form of violence. However, I perceive protests as one form of visible mobilisation and will therefore look at it individually (see 4.2). Another sign of effective mobilisation is the support for anti-refugee parties that actively work against refugees and make them their main agenda.

3.3 Argument and Causal Story

The overarching question guiding this field of research and implicitly also this thesis is *what causes anti-refugee violence?* Due to its complexity, however, this question cannot be answered within one research paper no matter the extent and size of the study. Different aspects have undergone more or less research, quantitative as well as qualitative but due to the complexity of the issue no straight forward answer has been found. In order to close in on the answer and give a small contribution to the overall picture, it is necessary to simplify as much as possible and single out aspects for analysis.

Effective mobilisation has been connected to ARV and right-wing violence (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Onoma, 2013; Aasland Ravndal, 2018; Misago, 2019), however, not as root or stand-alone cause, but rather as intermediary exploiting structural and societal realities and perceptions (Moghaddam, 2005; Stern, 2016; Misago, 2019). Societal circumstances that create tensions and discontent are not enough to explain violence. It is the exploitation of those discontents by mobilising actors that triggers violence (Misago, 2019). As Koopmans and Olzak

⁶ The role of mass movements in radicalisation and toward the use of violence is also emphasised by Koehler (2016).

⁷ I am aware, that violence depending on the used definitions has different manifestations and is not limited to physical violence against persons or objects. However, for the purpose of narrowing down the analysis will other forms not be included. Nonetheless, I would like to stress the importance of investigating other forms of violence and also its influences on physical violence.

emphasise, mobilisation attempts that do not gain resonance or visibility will not be able to polarise and therefore will not be effective (2004), which is, however, necessary in order for mobilisation to have an effect on violence. Aasland Ravndal also emphasises the strong relationship between extremist mobilisation and violence (2018). Deriving from those findings, I draw the conclusion that if we see high levels of ARV, effective anti-refugee mobilisation⁸ must have happened beforehand. This leads me to the question:

Under which conditions does anti-refugee mobilisation lead to anti-refugee violence?

The question, put differently, is what makes anti-refugee mobilisation effective? I argue that in order for anti-refugee mobilisation attempts to find breeding ground and be effective, individuals need to be susceptible to the used rhetoric and hatred spread by anti-refugee actors. The aspect that I singled out for investigation and suggest as explanation for effective anti-refugee mobilisation and thus anti-refugee violence is societal insecurity.

The causal argument I am proposing in this paper is based on social psychology. In short, I am arguing that *societal insecurity* as independent variable leads to an *effective anti-refugee mobilisation* (DV), which is conceptualised as high level of anti-refugee violence. Societal insecurity, in this thesis defined by its conditions, leads on the micro level to an increase in ingroup vs. outgroup behaviour and negative attitudes towards groups that are perceived as inferior, weak or undeserving (scapegoating) and out group prejudices (see inter alia Kuechler, 1994; Brewer, 1999; Pettigrew *et al.*, 2008.) Increased ingroup versus outgroup behaviour and existing negative attitudes towards outgroup members makes individuals more susceptible to anti-refugee mobilisation attempts, which consequently leads to effective mobilisation. I argue further, that in order for societal insecurity to prevail two conditions need to be met: knowledge deficit (c1) and relative deprivation (c2), which are defined and argued for in section 3.1.

The argument for combining c1 and c2 and summarising them under the umbrella of societal insecurity is based on previous findings on ARV and right-wing violence, which show on the one hand that there is not only one cause for violence and further, because both conditions have been proven to have influence on ARV. Additionally, the underlying causal mechanisms are based on prejudices and insecurity. Both conditions cause the prevalence of prejudices and insecurity, the underlying mechanisms, however, differ. KD means that existing prejudices are not being reduced, whereas RD is a cause for prejudices to exist. The proposed causal argument is also illustrated by the following diagram:

⁸From this point onward anti-refugee mobilisation and mobilisation will be used synonymously.




Figure 1: Causal Argument

The argument behind c1 and c2 is that certain conditions need to prevail in order for insecurity to be exploited by anti-refugee actors. I am bringing the two conditions together with mobilisation, because, as Misago points out, societal preconditions alone cannot explain violence. Mobilisation can be the missing element between societal conditions and violence (2019).

KD about the newcomers (the refugees) in the community triggers psychological effects, which at first instance are utterly human (Forbes, 1997). Those outgroup members at first are a “black box” to the local, ingroup population, creating an abstract fear of the unknown (Brewer, 1999). It is, however, not inevitably human to stick with the first instinct of hostility towards outgroup members. Knowledge gain about the outgroup members can mediate the perception of newcomers as threat because it works against prejudices and stereotypes (McLaren, 2003). It is, however, problematic if outgroup members stay a “black box” for the local population and thus an abstract fear, something generating uncertainty and anxiety. This is the case if persons do not have any knowledge about the outgroup members (Brewer and Miller, 1984; Forbes, 1997; Brewer, 1999). If persons form their opinion about outgroup members based on prejudices rather than knowledge, they are more likely to fall victim to populist/mobilising rhetoric (Onoma, 2013). This means that if a deficit in knowledge is prevailing, anti-refugee actors can exploit the resulting insecurity and anxiety and effectively mobilise against refugees.

RD is a baseline factor which can be exploited for recruitment purposes (Moghaddam, 2005) and thus also mobilisation. It triggers insecurity and prevalence of prejudices against outgroup members, since they are posing a perceived threat to ingroup privileges. By entering the country and asking for asylum, refugees are raising questions of deservingness and claims to economic, social and cultural resources. If a feeling of undeservingness or preferential treatment

arises, persons, therefore, feel frustration and vulnerability (Appadurai, 1998; Pettigrew, 2001; Smith *et al.*, 2012), making them susceptible to anti-refugee mobilisation attempts. Negative feelings and insecurities regarding refugees make persons susceptible to anti-refugee rhetoric, because those attempts are cutting into already existing stereotypical ways of thinking. According to Appadurai, in a globalised world as ours, a certain degree of insecurity regarding state-based goods is prevailing, which is being reinforced and intensified by a great number of outgroup members entering the country, raising questions of rightful claims and deservingness (1998)⁹.

I argue for a combination of the two conditions, because the result is the same: threat perception and prejudices. Since KD has been found to mediate threat perceptions, the effects of RD can show its full scope if KD is also prevailing. If both conditions are met the mechanism of insecurity can be fully exploited by anti-refugee actors. From this causal argument I am deriving the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: A high level of societal insecurity leads to effective anti-refugee mobilisation and hence a high level of anti-refugee violence.

The **Null hypothesis** consequently reads as follows: A low level of societal insecurity will lead to non-effective anti-refugee mobilisation and consequently a low level of anti-refugee violence.

⁹ See also Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002).

4. Methodology

In order to ensure a well-structured and comparable case study I will use the methodology of structured focused comparison (SFC). This method is structured in the sense that the researcher asks general questions that reflect the research objective. Those questions are then asked for each case to guide and standardise the collection of data. This approach, if carried out correctly, guarantees for systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings. The methodology borrows from statistical and survey research. The developed questions ensure that a case study can contribute in an orderly, cumulative developed manner knowledge and theory about the phenomenon in question (George and Bennett, 2005). The focus of the study is guaranteed by the organisation of the final text, because it limits the discussion to only those facets of the case that are immediately relevant to the hypothesis (Powner, 2014).

I am taking a theory testing approach. In this thesis I will on the one hand analyse whether explanations for right-wing violence in liberal Western democracies are applicable to ARV, and on the other hand whether explanations for ARV found in developing countries are applicable in a liberal Western democracy.

4.1 Case selection

The decision to investigate ARV in a liberal European democracy in a qualitative comparative most similar within case study is based on two deliberations: First, a rather pragmatic reason, is that there is a lack of comparable and combinable data, making a quantitative study not feasible. Second, I am interested in investigating a variation in the intensity of anti-refugee violence, which makes the comparison aspect a necessity. Randomised case selection in a qualitative case design is not feasible, making this design delicate to selection bias. In order to limit down this risk the selection will be based on the ARVIG dataset. The case design I am suggesting is a most similar case design, with a variation in the DV, constant background conditions and an investigation of the proposed iv. I am aware that holding all background conditions and possible confounding variables constant in a qualitative comparative case study is an illusion. However, since I am proposing a within case comparison at least the background conditions should be fairly stable across the cases. Summing up the design in a table looks as follows:

	X/IV	Z	Y/DV
CASE 1	?	o	1
CASE 2	?	o	o

Table 1: Case Design

Choosing a liberal Western democracy as case is first of all rooted in the lack of existing research on ARV in those states and secondly, in the fact that the matter of violence committed against refugees becomes an increasingly pressing issue. The argument for choosing Germany as case is threefold: The first is fairly pragmatic, as already mentioned structured and comparable data is missing, therefore comparing two states is only possible if one does their own data collection, which would have exceeded this thesis' scope. Second, a new dataset has been published, which systematically collected data on ARV in Germany, allowing for a comparison of federal states. This dataset allows for a more systematic look at ARV in a liberal democratic state, which was not possible up until this point. The third reason for choosing Germany is that it has, due to its Nazi history, a very unique relationship to the right of asylum and persons fleeing their homes. Therefore, violence against persons that come to Germany in order to find protection and safety is even more baffling. The two cases that will be analysed within Germany are chosen on the basis of this new dataset. The *Bundesland* (federal state) with the lowest level of ARV and the federal state with the highest level of ARV relative to the population share will be analysed and compared.

Regarding the generalisability of the study, it can be argued that the population in a narrow sense is German federal states, since all possible confounding and background conditions are stable. I, however, argue for wider generalisability, including liberal Western European states. This argument is based on the fact that studies regarding right-wing violence and xenophobia showed similar results in those states. North American democracies should be treated with caution, since particular in regard to the contact hypothesis studies showed ambiguous results that differed from results in Western European states. Generalisations based on a case comparison, however, should always be viewed with caution.

Seeing the rapid increase of ARV from 2014 to 2016 (Benček and Strasheim, 2016) I will base the selection of cases on the numbers from 2016, since this year seems to have been a peak in violence. Looking at the numbers of ARV relative to the population share shows that Saxony is the *Bundesland* with the highest rate of ARV in 2016 and North Rhine-Westphalia with the lowest relative numbers (see table 1). Therefore, those two cases will be analysed as representatives for high and low levels of ARV. Interesting to see in the table is that all former GDR *Bundesländer* show relatively higher numbers of violence. The only exception is *Schleswig-Holstein* in the Northern part of Germany.

ARV total no. 2016	3766				
Bundesland (state)	ARV (total no.)	Share ARV %	Population	Share Population %	Difference relative no. %
Baden- Württemberg	316	8,39%	11.020.000	13,34%	-4,95%
Bayern	559	14,84%	13.000.000	15,74%	-0,89%
Berlin	250	6,64%	3.575.000	4,33%	2,31%
Brandenburg	345	9,16%	2.504.000	3,03%	6,13%
Bremen	13	0,35%	557.464	0,67%	-0,33%
Hamburg	43	1,14%	1.810.000	2,19%	-1,05%
Hessen	106	2,81%	6.243.000	7,56%	-4,74%
Mecklenburg- Vorpommern	142	3,77%	1.611.000	1,95%	1,82%
Niedersachsen	294	7,81%	7963.000	9,64%	-1,83%
Nordrhein- Westfalen	489	12,98%	1.7910.000	21,68%	-8,70%
Rheinland-Pfalz	96	2,55%	4.074.000	4,93%	-2,38%
Saarland	25	0,66%	994.187	1,20%	-0,54%
Sachsen	465	12,35%	4.081.000	4,94%	7,41%
Sachsen-Anhalt	214	5,68%	2.223.000	2,69%	2,99%
Schleswig-Holstein	216	5,74%	2.890.000	3,50%	2,24%
Thüringen	193	5,12%	2.151.000	2,60%	2,52%
Germany			82.606.651		

Table 2: Level of ARV in German Bundesländer¹⁰

The selection of cases is accompanied by reflections on assumptions and possible Z variables that could influence the findings at hand, some of which I will elaborate on in the following, some of which will appear later on in the analysis section. Factors that could make a relationship spurious or discredit the research design at hand will be discussed here. Factors that should be kept in mind, but do not challenge the analysis in general will be discussed at a later point.

The most basic, yet easily forgotten, assumption is that refugees are living in the case(s) at hand. As trivial as it might sound, where there are no possible targets, there will be no violence. The relative distribution of refugees is stable across Germany, due to the so-called *Königsteiner Schlüssel*, which “ensures [a] suitable [and] fair distribution of [asylum seekers] among the Federal Länder¹¹” (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2018). The quotas are based on the population size of the *Bundesländer* (ibid.). Deriving from this, I posit the assumption that the relative number of refugees is equal and stable across the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

The second assumption is that anti-refugee mobilisation attempts have been stable across Germany. This is derived from the fact that organisations and parties such as *Pegida* and *Alternative*

¹⁰ Own compilation based on Statista (2018) and ARVIG dataset

¹¹ Synonym for *Bundesländer*, which are the federal states in Germany.

für Deutschland (AfD) have regional subgroups or have at least tried to establish branches across the country (Gürgen, 2015; Krass, Wimmer and Glas, 2015; Neue Presse, 2015; Polizeidirektion Braunschweig, 2015; Spiegel Online, 2015; Schmitt, 2016; Burger, 2018; AfD, 2019). Therefore, I argue that the different levels of and support for such groups and parties are not due to a lack of trying but rather a lack of effectiveness.

4.2 Operationalisation

In order to capture the concepts established in the previous sections, indicators are necessary. Those indicators are rooted in the theoretical framework and conceptualisation of the variables. The following section will contain the operationalisation of variables and conditions as well as the introduction of general indicator questions, which aim at ensuring focus and structure of the then following analysis.

Societal Insecurity

Operationalising societal insecurity means operationalising its conditions. This is done by establishing two sets of indicators aiming at capturing knowledge deficit and relative deprivation. KD is captured by looking at 1) the level and intensity of contact that locals have with foreigners and 2) the level and intensity of contact locals have with refugees. Contact is a major factor for decreasing a prevailing deficit in knowledge about outgroup members (Forbes, 1997). A lack of contact means the chance to work against one's prejudices by increasing one's knowledge is lowered significantly (Forbes, 1997; McLaren, 2003; Ghosn, Braithwaite and Chu, 2019). Intensity and type of contact is important because it decides whether prejudices and stereotypes are being reduced or worst-case scenario even increased. Therefore, it does not only matter whether contact has happened but also what type of contact has happened and whether it can have the effect to generate acquaintance knowledge (Forbes, 1997).

Level and intensity of contact will be evaluated by looking at foreigners and refugees. Foreigners are treated as proxy for refugees based on two arguments: First, refugees are also foreigners living in Germany, therefore questions about foreigners also include refugees. Second, I follow McLaren's (2003) and Ghosn, Braithwaite and Chu's (2019) line of argumentation: First, contact need not be with persons having a refugee status, but contact with persons of the same cultural background can suffice to decrease prejudices and insecurity. Second, a Eurobarometer survey has shown that in Germany when asked to think about minority groups in terms of religion or culture they generally imagine Muslims from Turkey (EG Kommission, 1988; McLaren, 2002)¹².

¹² See also Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002) who point out that the distinction between migrants and asylum seekers in public perception is decreasing.

From those two findings I derive that perceptions of and contact with refugees can also be captured by looking at perceptions of and contact with immigrants/foreigners because the majority of refugees arriving in Germany since 2011 are from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (BAMF, 2019a), which in societal perception are associated with Islam. Both indicators are vulnerable to a desirability bias, because it uses questions regarding foreigners and refugees. Persons might not answer truthfully if their positions vary greatly from the position in mainstream social discourse. Validity can be estimated as high, since it captures the concept contact accurately.¹³

RD will be captured by looking at 1) Identification with the ingroup (German national identity and identity as citizen of the federal state¹⁴); 2) Egoistical relative deprivation; 3) Federalistic relative deprivation and 4) Concerns for the future. The first indicator is supposed to measure how strong a necessary comparison referent is, which is necessary for a RD process to happen. I estimate the reliability of the indicator as medium to high, because I am looking for identification at that point in time. However, particularly in Germany, questions regarding patriotism are sensitive, which is why a potential for desirability bias should be kept in mind. I estimate the validity of the indicator as medium, since it does not capture feelings of relative deprivation but rather a prerequisite for it.

The second indicator can be perceived as one of the two stronger indicators in regard to validity, as it looks per definition at relative deprivation. ERD is included in the measure because it can have influence on outgroup prejudice. Reliability of the indicator is high, since it aims at capturing feelings at a certain point in time. Its validity, as already stated, is estimated as high.

The third indicator is the strongest, because FRD shows strong correlation with outgroup prejudice, anxiety and insecurity. Reliability and validity are estimated as high just as for ERD. Adding concerns about the future as fourth indicator is based on the assumption that persons feeling relatively deprived are insecure about their future (Appadurai, 1998) and therefore have a pessimistic outlook regarding their personal future. Reliability is estimated as high, because it aims to capture personal perceptions at a point in time. Validity is estimated as medium with negative tendencies since it does not have a comparative aspect, nor does it look at feelings such as being unfairly treated or at a disadvantage compared to others.

As previously elaborated, the prevalence of prejudices against outgroup members can inter alia be a consequence of KD and RD, therefore measuring the level of persons that have prejudices is an indicator for both conditions. Foreigners will again be treated as proxy based on the same line

¹³ Further and more detailed elaboration on reliability and validity for all indicators will be part of section 5.3 Limitations.

¹⁴ I am, nevertheless, aware that persons can have multiple group identities and consequently have a complex social identity (see Brewer and Roccas, 2002).

of argumentation as before. The indicator is vulnerable to desirability bias, since it uses questions regarding refugees and foreigners, and persons might not answer truthfully if they believe their opinion is not conform with the majority in the population. Reliability and validity are estimated as medium. I am arguing for a combination of the two conditions and am not interested in looking at whose influence is stronger, therefore using one indicator that captures both should not be problematic. Also, because the strongest manifestation of societal insecurity in this thesis is the prevalence of prejudices.

	KNOWLEDGE DEFICIT	RELATIVE DEPRIVATION	RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND KNOWLEDGE DEFICIT
INDICATOR	1) Level and intensity of contact with foreigners 2) Level and intensity of contact with refugees	1) Ingroup identification 2) ERD 3) FRD 4) Concerns about the future	1) Prevalence of prejudices against foreigners 2) Prevalence of prejudices against refugees

Table 3: Operationalisation Societal Insecurity

The independent variable and its conditions are not binary, it is not a matter of presence or absence but rather of gradual differences in its manifestations. Therefore, I will categorise each indicator and consequently each condition as being present to a high, low or medium level. The categories are distinguished based on percentages, because I rely on percentage-based survey data. Low level is from zero to 30%, medium from 30 to 60% and high from 60% onward. Categorisation will be based on the evaluation of the indicator questions introduced in the following table:

VARIABLE	INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTIONS
C1: KNOWLEDGE DEFICIT	1) Level and intensity of contact with foreigners	1) How high is the level of persons having foreigners in their close circle of friends or family? 2) How high is the level of persons having contact with foreigners at their workplace? 3) How high is the level of persons having contact with foreigners in their neighbourhood?

	2) Level and intensity of contact with refugees	1) How high is the level of persons having direct personal contact with refugees?
C2: RELATIVE DEPRIVATION	1) Ingroup identification	1) How strongly does the population identify with Germany?
		2) How strongly does the population identify with the federal state?
	2) Egoistic RD	1) How high is the level of persons feeling economically deprived? 2) How high is the level of persons feeling politically deprived? 3) How high is the level of persons feeling generally deprived?
	3) Fraternalistic RD	4) How high is the level of persons feeling relatively deprived on behalf of their ingroup?
	4) Concerns about the future	1) How high is the level of persons worrying about their personal future? 2) How high is the level of persons worrying about the future in general?
KNOWLEDGE DEFICIT AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION	1) Prevalence of prejudices against foreigners	1) How high is the level of persons thinking in stereotypes and/or having prejudices regarding foreigners
	2) Prevalence of prejudices against refugees	1) How high is the level of persons thinking in stereotypes and/or having prejudices regarding refugees?

Table 4: Indicator Questions Societal Insecurity

Effective anti-refugee mobilisation

Since effective anti-refugee mobilisation in the thesis at hand is conceptualised as a high level of anti-refugee violence, the operationalisation is based on numbers of attacks and assaults against

refugees and refugee housing in 2016¹⁵. High level of anti-refugee violence in turn is defined as a high percental level of ARV in relation to the population share in Germany, meaning, if in a federal state the share of ARV in percent is higher than the share of the population, it will be considered as having a high level of ARV.

The Number of anti-refugee protests between 2014 and 2016 will be looked at separately as additional indicator. Although the right to assemble and protest is a basic right in a democratic state such as Germany (Grundgesetz Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2019), it bears potential for persons to radicalise themselves (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Therefore, this indicator will be added but it should be looked at with caution and not be overinterpreted.

Another figure generating insights about the effectiveness of mobilisation is voting behaviour and support for anti-refugee parties in 2016. In order to ensure comparability across cases I chose to look at support for the AfD, because it is the most prominent party whose predominant topic is refugees. The first indicator is vulnerable to a reporting bias because only incidences that made it into the news were documented in the dataset used to evaluate level of ARV. Its validity however is high, since it captures the exact concept used in the thesis. The second indicator is facing the same problem regarding reliability. Its validity is estimated as medium. Support for AfD is vulnerable to social desirability bias and is capturing the concept on a medium level.

	EFFECTIVE ANTI-REFUGEE MOBILISATION
INDICATOR	1) Level of ARV 2) Level of anti-refugee protests 3) Support for AfD

Table 5: Indicator Effective Anti-Refugee Mobilisation

In order to ensure focus and comparability, the following questions will be answered for both cases, aiming to capture effective anti-refugee mobilisation:

¹⁵ Because 2016 showed a peak in violence.

VARIABLE	INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTIONS
DV: EFFECTIVE ANTI-REFUGEE MOBILISATION	1) Level of ARV	1) Is the level of ARV above the population share?
	2) Level of anti-refugee protests	1) Is the level of anti-refugee protests above the population share?
	3) Support for AfD	1) How high is the level of support for AfD?

Table 6: Indicator Questions Effective Anti-Refugee Mobilisation

4.3 Time Frame and Data Collection

Germany witnessed an increase in violence against refugees after the numbers of persons seeking asylum increased due to the Syrian civil war (bpb, 2019), which began in 2011. The ARVIG dataset, which is the basis for the study at hand, documented violent attacks, arson and demonstrations from 2014 onward until November 2017. Creating the dataset was a joint project by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation and the magazine Stern. The information for the dataset is collected by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation and the human rights organisation PRO ASYL (Benček and Strasheim, 2016). When looking at the data, one can see a steep increase in ARV up until 2016. Therefore, my analysis is based on those numbers from 2016 and data will be used that was collected in close proximity to 2016 and not before 2011. I argue that even data from 2017 can be used, because the chosen conditions are not something that evolves or changes from one day to the other and no major changes happened between 2016 and 2017 in Germany that would have an effect on both conditions to change as drastically as that it could affect the results.

The main source of information to analyse c1 and c2 will be the ALLBUS 2016¹⁶ dataset, which is collected by the Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. It is a survey conducted every two years asking questions of interest regarding demographic situation, economic situation and attitudes towards the political system, certain groups of people, political affiliation and so on. This general survey is useful for the thesis at hand because it uses individual data and makes it representative of all 16 regions in Germany. Since the proposed causal argument is based on individual perceptions, feelings and contact, individual data is necessary, but since the aim of the analysis is not to investigate the psychological causal mechanism, it is necessary that the used data is representative of the regions (Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia). Yet, the dataset does not suffice in order to answer all the questions. Therefore, other survey-based reports, representative for the two cases, will be used: the *Sachsen-Monitor 2016*, the *SVR-Integrationsbarometer 2018* and the report *Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2017*. Collection of background information will rely

¹⁶ A detailed summary of the variables can be found in appendix 1.

mostly on secondary sources such as public figures by (federal) state departments, news articles and NGO reports.

32 variables of the ALLBUS dataset will be used in order to capture and evaluate c1 and c2 and answer the proposed indicator questions (see table 4). Seven variables are aiming at capturing KD, 13 variables at RD and 12 variables are used in order to evaluate the prevalence of prejudices. The variables are coded in different ways, using different scales. It ranges from “yes or no” questions to gradations of 1 “I fully agree” to 7 “I do not agree at all”. For simplification reasons the gradations will be aggregated into “agree”, “neutral” and “disagree”. For example, one variable proposes the statement “Foreigners living in Germany should be prohibited from any political activity in Germany”, the interviewees are offered a scale from 1 “I do not agree at all” to 7 “I completely agree”. In this thesis the numbers 1 to 3 would be aggregated as “disagree”, 4 being “neutral” and 5 to 7 as “agree”.

The question of biases will be part of the section on limitations in the analysis. Generally, however, it can already be mentioned that survey questions regarding foreigners, immigrants and asylum seekers bear the potential for desirability biases, since strong opposing opinions particularly on the question of asylum are not socially accepted and persons therefore might not answer truthfully.

5. Analysis

The now following comparative case study is based on certain assumptions that need to be set out before diving into the cases. Some have already been touched upon directly or indirectly. First of all, simply put where there is not target there will be not violence, meaning that it does not make sense investigating regions in which no refugees live. The refugee numbers increased when the Syrian conflict erupted in 2011 and based on the *Königsteiner Schlüssel* the relative number of refugees living in the cases can be assumed to be equal.

Further, since the majority of refugees arriving since 2011 are from countries associated with Islam (BAMF, 2019a) I am assuming that in societal discourse and perception refugees are associated with Islam. Additionally, the terms asylum-seeker and refugee are used interchangeably in the public discourse, therefore I will do so as well in the following analysis. Nevertheless, I am aware of the terminological difference.

5.1 Case Study

Germany has witnessed a peak of anti-foreigner and anti-refugee violence before. In the early 1990's when the numbers of refugees in Germany increased due to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the violence increased as well (Kuechler, 1994; Pro Asyl, 2015). By mid 1990's asylum seekers and immigrants were the majority of the victims of right-wing violence in Germany (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Now that an increase in refugees arriving in Germany can be witnessed again in the last decade, we are also witnessing a new rise in violence against refugees. By the end of 2017 Germany had taken in 970.400 refugees (UNO-Flüchtlingshilfe, 2018). Close to 45% of the persons applying for asylum were from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq. In 2017 almost one quarter of the German population had a migrant background¹⁷ (BAMF, 2019a). Looking at the ARVIG dataset, one can see a step increase in ARV up until 2016:

¹⁷ Migrant background means that either at least one parent or the persons itself was not born with a German citizenship (BAMF, 2019b).




Figure 2: ARV in Germany 2014-2017¹⁸

The following comparative case study aims to shed some light onto the causes of ARV. Therefore, the cases with the highest and lowest relative numbers of ARV have been selected for comparison, which as can be seen in table 1 are Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia. The case study will start off with a short introduction of the two cases, before looking at the empirical data for the DV and the two suggested conditions. After presenting the empirics for each case, the differences will be discussed with the goal of making inferences about the role of KD and RD in explaining effective anti-refugee mobilisation and hence violence.

5.1.1 Empirics Case I: North Rhine-Westphalia

North Rhine-Westphalia is the state farthest in the West of Germany. It has borders with the Netherlands and Belgium. In 2017 it had a population of roughly 18 Million, which is a share of 21,68% of the total population (Statista, 2018). The state has experienced an increase in anti-refugee violence (Ministerium für Inneres und Kommunales, 2016), just like all states in Germany since the refugee numbers increased. In 2016 every fourth inhabitant had a migrant background (Ministerium für Arbeit, Integration und Soziales, 2017). A total number of 2.214.000 foreigners (12,4%) lived NRW in 2016 (bpb, 2018).

Taking a look at general perceptions of and attitudes regarding refugees and foreigners in NRW shows that just over one quarter of the population feels foreign in their own country due to an increase of foreigners in Germany compared to 52% not agreeing with this statement. One third is of the opinion that the influx of asylum seekers should be limited. Adding the factor of conflict

¹⁸ Own compilation based on ARVIG dataset.

or political persecution decreases the level of persons wanting to restrict the influx of refugees to roughly 25% (gesis, 2017). Almost one quarter of the population states that they do not want to live next refugees, at the same time 77% state that there were never any problems with refugees in their neighbourhood (Arant, Dragolov and Boehnke, 2017). Regarding the personal and overall economic situation, the population seems quite optimistic, almost 90% stating that their situation is either positive or neither positive nor negative (gesis, 2017).

Effective Anti-Refugee Mobilisation (DV) NRW

In total numbers NRW is among the states with the highest number of reported ARV. However, as NRW is the state with the highest population, it has to be set into relation. Doing so, shows that NRW actually has the lowest relative rate at 12,98% compared to 21,68% share of the population. The numbers of protests show a similar result. 61 demonstrations took place in NRW between 2014 and 2016, which is 11,19% again compared to a population share of 21,68% (Benček and Strasheim, 2016). A similar picture becomes apparent when looking at the “Sonntagsfrage”, a poll asking the question “If elections would be held on Sunday, who would you vote for?”, in 2016. The AfD, right-wing populist party, strongly opposing and rhetorically mobilising against refugees has an approval rate of 10% throughout the year, which is below the approval rate in overall Germany (13%) (Infratest dimap, 2019a).

Based on the level of ARV in relation to the population number I conclude that the level of anti-refugee violence in North Rhine-Westphalia can be evaluated as low and hence mobilisation was only effective on a low level. The other two indicators are supporting those findings. Further, deriving that based on the proposed theory, I now expect to see low levels of KD and RD and consequently low levels of societal insecurity.

INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTIONS	ANSWER
LEVEL OF ARV	Is the level of ARV above the population share?	No, it is: 12,89% compared to 21,68 % population share
LEVEL OF ANTI-REFUGEE PROTESTS	Is the level of anti-refugee protests above the population share?	No, it is: 11,19% compared to 21,68% population share
SUPPORT FOR ANTI-REFUGEE PARTIES	How high is the level of support for AfD?	10 % approval rate for AfD in 2016

Table 7: Empirics Effective Anti-Refugee Mobilisation NRW

Knowledge Deficit (c1) NRW

The following section is structured according to the proposed indicator questions. Contact with foreigners and/or refugees can be a great factor for gaining knowledge about outgroup members and decreasing prejudices and stereotypes and consequently insecurity. Therefore, six ALLBUS variables are aiming to capture the level and intensity of contact the population of NRW has had with foreigners and refugees. Further, adding other sources to backup or contradict those findings. I will first start off with evaluating the type and level of contact with foreigners before moving on to type and level of contact with refugees.

In 2016 just below 30% of the population in NRW have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany¹⁹ within their family and almost 60% have foreigners in their circle of friends (gesis, 2017). The latter figure is also supported by another survey from 2017 (Wittlif and Schiefer, 2018). A combination of both variables shows 69% either have contact with foreigners in their family or circle of friend (gesis, 2017). Both variables can offer strong insights, because contact within family and circle of friends can be assumed to be intensive and therefore generate knowledge about the other to a great extent and hence decrease prejudice, threat perception and insecurity.

Over half of the population has contact with foreigners at their workplace or in their neighbourhood and over 80% of those persons state to have made positive experiences with foreigners (gesis, 2017). When looking at numbers from 2017 even 74% state to have contact with foreigners at their workplace and 91% describe this contact as being positive. In the same study 41% stated to have contact with foreigners in their neighbourhood, of which 86% again describe this contact as being positive (Wittlif and Schiefer, 2018). The fact that roughly 90% evaluate the interaction with foreigners in the neighbourhood or workplace as positive suggests that it managed to influence perceptions and generate knowledge. Nevertheless, more detailed information about the intensity of the contact is missing, particularly regarding the hierarchy structures at the workplace. The contact could also be a purely professional service provider – customer relationship, which could influence the general perception but has no ability of generating acquaintance knowledge. It can be derived that the majority in theory has the opportunity to make acquaintance contact with foreigners at their workplace or neighbourhood, but it cannot satisfactory be derived whether this opportunity has actually been used in reality.

Measuring the second indicator and answering its question is somewhat difficult with the data at hand. Almost 64% are living in close proximity with refugees. The other third either does not know that refugees are living close by or do not live in close proximity. Either way, the effect is the same: Contact with refugees in the neighbourhood cannot have happened. Almost 43% had direct personal contact with refugees (gesis, 2017). However, both variables do not offer insights

¹⁹ From this point onward, foreigners always means foreigners living in Germany.

about the intensity of the contact. The opportunity for gaining acquaintance knowledge was given to a relatively high degree. If it was used, however, cannot be derived.

The strongest indicator at hand, namely contact with foreigners within one's family and friends, shows a high level. Further, the opportunity for acquaintance knowledge at the workplace and neighbourhood is categorised as high and cautious conclusions can be made that this contact at least has not been negative. Insights regarding the hierarchical structures of contact at the workplace are however missing. Overall, I conclude that the level of KD is rather low in NRW.

INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTION	ANSWER
LEVEL AND INTENSITY OF CONTACT WITH FOREIGNERS	1) How high is the level of persons having foreigners in their close circle of friends or family?	High +++
	2) How high is the level of persons having contact with foreigners at their workplace?	High (under reservations) +++
LEVEL AND INTENSITY OF CONTACT WITH REFUGEES	1) How high is the level of persons having direct personal contact with refugees?	Medium (under reservations) ++
THREAT PERCEPTION OF FOREIGNERS/REFUGEES	1) How high is the level of persons stating to be afraid of refugees and/or foreigners	Low to Medium +(+)

Table 8: Empirics Knowledge Deficit NRW

Relative Deprivation (c2) NRW

In order for RD to be prevailing, persons need to identify with a comparison referent. I previously argued for two types of social identity as ingroup identification referents: 1) national identity as German citizen and 2) a regional identity as citizen of the federal state. In this section I will present the available data in order to evaluate the identification with both ingroups (with are not mutually exclusive). Starting off with national identity: Regarding German institutions, the question about the parliament *Bundestag* is an odd one out, with only 5% stating to be proud. Over 75% of the interviewees indicated to feel strongly attached to the FRG. Just over 60% are proud of the German constitution and 50% are proud of the welfare state. When it comes to more abstract things the figures are decreasing. One fifth states to be proud of German athletes, one third is proud of German art and literature and 40% feel pride when thinking about German scientific achievements. The highest approval rate has German economic success, which almost 50% are proud of. 64% of the interviewees feel strongly attached to the federal state (gesis, 2017).

Concluding I categorise the level of identification with the nation state as medium and with the federal state as high, on the edge of medium. Evaluation of the latter, however, only derives from one variable. Those figures are important, because feelings on deprivation either through a within group comparison or on behalf of one's ingroup greatly depends on how strong one's identification is with one's ingroup.

Looking at the second indicator, egoistic relative deprivation, I am interested in whether persons in NRW feel deprived within one of the established ingroups. A survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation, found that 63% of persons living in NRW perceive that economic gains are not fairly distributed within society (Arant, Dragolov and Boehnke, 2017). One third of NRW's population in 2016 had a feeling of getting less than deserved, compared to others living in Germany. 60% believed getting exactly what they deserve and 9% believed getting more (gesis, 2017). Bringing both figures together, the overall evaluation leads me to categorise ERD as medium. Yet, sources for political ERD are missing and the available data for the other two components is also not very extensive. This drawback is compensated by the strength of the second variable, holistically capturing the concept of ERD by asking if people feel that they get their fair share. Yet, the third indicator is stronger, because FRD can mediate feelings of egoistic relative deprivation. The role of ERD for mobilisation capacity becomes decisive in the interplay with FRD.

The third and strongest indicator regarding RD and its role for mobilisation effectiveness is fraternalistic RD. When asked about the state of social cohesion in Germany 35% have the feeling that it is at risk, 35% are indecisive regarding this question and 30% do not share this feeling (Arant, Dragolov and Boehnke, 2017). Similarly, 44% believe that refugees bear a risk to social cohesion in Germany (gesis, 2017). When asked about social cohesion in one's neighbourhood, interestingly 66% stated that it is good or very good. One question very precisely capturing FRD in the context of refugees shows that 30% believe that the German state cares more about refugees than about Germans in need of help (Arant, Dragolov and Boehnke, 2017). Concluding I answer the indicator question for FRD as medium with a tendency towards low, meaning that a feeling of deprivation on behalf of the group or feelings that the ingroup's social identity is at risk are prevailing on a medium scale level. So far, the indicators are pretty in sync with each other.

Concerns about the future as fourth indicator is lacking the comparative aspect, however, concerns regarding one's future can be a consequence of feeling relatively deprived (see 3.1). When asked about their personal economic situation, only 7% stated to have a negative outlook into the future. One third is of the opinion that the economic situation in one year will be worse. Interestingly, the figure is close to the percentage of persons perceiving refugees as a threat to German economy. Combining those variables shows that persons that feel pessimistic about the

future of German economy also perceive refugees as a threat to the aforesaid. 25% agree with the statement that it is irresponsible to bring children into the world (gesis, 2017). Concerns for one's personal future are prevailing on a low level, those for the future in general on a low to medium level. Those findings are also in line with the other two indicators.

In summary it can be stated that relative deprivation is prevalent among NRW's society to a medium extent. This conclusion is particularly deriving from the findings on FRD. Generally, the findings are conclusive and in sync. Those feelings of RD increase prejudices against outgroup members and prevalence of insecurity, which can be thus be exploited by mobilising actors.

INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTION	ANSWER
INGROUP IDENTIFICATION	1) How strong is the identification with the social identity as German citizen?	Medium ++
	2) How strong is the identification with the social identity as citizens of NRW?	High +++
EGOISTIC RD	1) How high is the level of persons feeling economic RD?	High to medium ++(+)
	2) How high is the level of persons feeling political RD	No data
	3) How high is the level of persons feeling general RD?	Medium to low +(+)
FRATERNALISTIC RD	1) How high is the level of persons that feel relatively deprived on behalf of their ingroup?	Medium to low +(+)
CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE	2) How high is the level of persons that worry about their economic situation in the future?	Low +
	3) How high is the level of persons that have general concerns about the future?	Low to medium +(+)

Table 9: Empirics Relative Deprivation NRW

Knowledge Deficit and Relative Deprivation NRW

Since the prevalence of prejudices against foreigners and/or refugees can be a consequence of knowledge deficit as well as relative deprivation, I am looking at this indicator separately. Twelve of the chosen ALLBUS variables are aiming to capture prejudices against or stereotypical thinking about either foreigners or refugees. I will first look at prejudices against foreigners, before moving on to refugees.

In the ALLBUS survey stereotypical statements about foreigners were being proposed and persons had to either agree, disagree or be indifferent. Almost 40% agreed with the statement that foreigners are doing the work that Germans do not want to do. 27% of the population were of the opinion that foreigners are burdening the German welfare net. A statement often heard at anti-immigration rallies, that foreigners take away German jobs, is being supported by almost 12%. Close to one fifth of the population believes that foreigners are a threat to social cohesion in Germany, whereas a majority is of the opinion that the presence of foreigners makes Germany more tolerant and cosmopolitan. 33% believe that foreigners are committing more crimes. A majority disagrees with the statement that foreigner's children lower the educational level for German school children, however, at the same time almost 40% either agree or are indifferent. 35% believe that foreigners do not contribute to securing the German pension system (gesis, 2017).

Overall, I would evaluate the prevalence of prejudices against foreigners at a low to medium level, some stereotypical viewpoints are more pronounced than others. A low to medium level of prevailing prejudices means, that those can also only be exploited by anti-refugee actors on a low to medium scale level.

In order to evaluate the prevalence of prejudices against refugees I looked at variables that asked interviewees to evaluate statements that have often been heard in the context of debates about refugees. 68% perceive the presence of refugees as a threat for public security in Germany and almost 45% think they are a threat to social cohesion and another 62% believe refugees to be a risk for the German welfare state. Almost 40% are of the opinion that the presence of refugees bears a risk for the economy, opposed to 25% perceiving in them a chance for the economy and 32% being indifferent (gesis, 2017). The numbers indicate that the prevalence of stereotypical opinions regarding refugees is present on a medium level within NRW's population. It seems that the level of prejudices against refugees is higher than against foreigners. Put together, it can be concluded that in general prejudices seem to be prevailing on a medium level in NRW's society.

INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTION	ANSWER
PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICES AGAINST FOREIGNERS	1) How high is the level of persons thinking in stereotypes and/or having prejudices regarding foreigners?	Low to medium +(+)
PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICES AGAINST REFUGEES	1) How high is the level of persons thinking in stereotypes and/or having prejudices regarding refugees?	Medium ++

Table 10: Empirics Prevalence of Prejudices NRW

Conclusion NRW

The empirical findings for this case are somewhat ambivalent and do not allow for strong inferences regarding the hypothesis on its own. The findings for KD and RD are in line with the theory, however, in relation to the DV I expected different results.

Based on the data at hand intensive contact between locals and foreigners living in Germany seemed to be present on a high level, when looking at the figures of persons that have contact within their family or friends circle. The fact that a great majority describes contact with foreigners at their workplace or neighbourhood as positive also suggests that it at least does not have a negative effect and reinforces prejudices, stereotypes and threat perception. Strong inferences regarding the contact with refugees can unfortunately not be made. Summarising I argue for a low to medium level of KD, always under the presented reservations.

Moving to condition two: relative deprivation. The here defined comparison referent seems present, meaning that persons in NRW identify strongly with a social identity as German citizens and as citizens of the federal state. This alone does not say much without looking at feelings of deprivation either within the ingroup or on behalf of the ingroup. The level of persons feeling economically deprived compared to others within their group is medium to high, just like the persons feeling generally deprived compared to others in their ingroup. Unfortunately, no survey data is publicly available in order to evaluate the level of political ERD in NRW. Since FRD is a stronger factor regarding violence, I am arguing that the possibility to make inferences is still given. FRD is prevailing in NRW on a medium to low level. And persons do not seem to be overly worried about their future.

All in all, I conclude that RD is prevailing in North Rhine-Westphalia on a medium level. The findings regarding prejudices against foreigners and refugees are also in line with the other findings. Since both conditions are evaluated to be present on a medium scale level, the proposed IV societal insecurity is also present on a medium level. Those findings are to a certain degree in line with the proposed theory. *NWR* is the case with a low level of ARV, which if my argument

holds can be explained with a low level of KD and a low level of RD. This case alone does not lead me to either verify or reject my hypothesis, since the level for both is neither high nor low. In order to make strong inferences and reject or accept the hypothesis, a comparison with another case, having a different variation in the DV is necessary. Therefore, in the following section I will present the empirics for case II, followed by a comparison of the two cases.

5.1.2 Empirics Case II: Saxony

Saxony is located in the eastern part of Germany, formerly known as German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 2017 it had a population of roughly four million persons, which is a share of 4,94% of the total population in Germany (Statista, 2018). The majority of foreigners living in Saxony in 2016 were Syrians (11,4%), followed by persons from Poland, Russia and Afghanistan. The number of asylum applications increased drastically from 2014 to 2015, 6.930 to 28.317 and the majority of persons seeking asylum in 2016 were from the geographical Asian continent (Der Sächsische Ausländerbeauftragte, 2016). By the end of 2016 4,2% of the population were foreigners, which is below the nationwide average of 11,2% (Der Sächsische Ausländerbeauftragte, 2017).

Saxony made the news on various occasions in the past years, regarding attacks on refugees or refugee housings (apr, 2015; Jansen, 2016; Pro Asyl, 2017; N.A., 2018). Some incidences all too similar to the attacks on refugees in the early to mid 1990's in Hoyerswerda and Rostock (Geißler, 2011). Asking general questions about perceptions in Saxony shows that 31% feel foreign in their own country due to an increase of foreigners in Germany. The attitude towards asylum seekers is ambivalent, one third agrees that persons seeking asylum, fleeing from conflict or political persecution should be granted access, but that the number of persons should be limited²⁰ (gesis, 2017). 45% state that they do not want to live next to refugees, at the same time 68% report that they never had any problems with refugees in their neighbourhood (Arant, Dragolov and Boehnke, 2017). Regarding their economic situation, well over 60% regard the general and the personal situation as positive and only under ten percent perceive Germany or themselves to be in a bad economic situation (gesis, 2017).

Effective Anti-Refugee Mobilisation (DV) Saxony

This impression that Saxony seems to be a particularly dangerous place for refugees is also supported by the ARVIG dataset. In 2016, 465 out of the 3766 documented incidences took place in Saxony, which is 12,35 % of the attacks compared to a population share of 4,94 % (see also table

²⁰ Number should be treated with caution, since only approximately half of the interviewees answered those questions.

2). Looking at mobilisation in terms of anti-refugee protests, out of the 545 protests that took place between 2014 and 2016, 142 happened in Saxony. That is 26,06 % of the protests, again compared to a population share of only 4,94 %, which is also the highest figure compared to the other *Bundesländer* (Benček and Strasheim, 2016). Looking at the support for AfD, in Saxony is interesting. A poll in 2016 shows an all-time high in support for the AfD of 25%. The party first showed up in the polls called “Sonntagsfrage²¹” in April 2014, due to the five percent hurdle²² included in the German electoral system. AfD’s approval rate showed a steady increase from six percent in April 2014 to 25 % in November 2016. As comparison the German wide support was 13 % (Infratest dimap, 2019b).

From those answers can be concluded that effective anti-refugee mobilisation has taken place in Saxony and that the DV under investigation in this paper is present on a high level. Based on the causal argument I am expecting low levels of knowledge regarding foreigners/refugees and high levels of RD and consequently a high level of societal insecurity.

INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTIONS	ANSWER
LEVEL OF ARV	Is the level of ARV above the population share?	Yes, it is: 12,89 % compared to 4,94 % population share
LEVEL OF ANTI-REFUGEE PROTESTS	Is the level of anti-refugee protests above the population share?	Yes, it is: 26,06 % compared to 4,94 % population share
SUPPORT FOR ANTI-REFUGEE PARTIES	How high is the support for anti-refugee parties?	25 % approval rate for AfD in 2016

Table 11: Empirics Effective Anti-Refugee Mobilisation Saxony

Knowledge Deficit (c1) Saxony

In order to evaluate the first indicator and answer the provided questions, I am looking at four variables in the dataset. In 2016 only 13% of the population had contact with foreigners in their family or among their close relatives. The number of persons having foreigners in their circle of friends was higher, namely between 26 and 29%, depending on the source (gesis, 2017; Infratest dimap, 2017). Combining the two variables of family and friends shows that over 60% neither have contact with foreigners in their family nor in their circle of friends. This indicator is a very strong determiner for close intimate contact, since it looks at family and friends (gesis, 2017). This form of interaction has strong influences on the reduction of knowledge deficit and thus in the reduction

²¹ It asks “Who would you vote for if elections would be held next Sunday?”.

²² This hurdle is included in the German electoral system in order to prevent a fragmentation of the parliament. Parties need to reach at least five percent of the second vote (bpb, 2009).

of prejudices, threat perception and insecurity. It can be derived that the level of persons having close contact with foreigners in their family and/or circle of friends is low to medium.

The level of persons having contact with foreigners at their workplace can be argued as medium, between 30 and 37% (gesis, 2017; Infratest dimap, 2017). This, however, does not say much about the intensity of the contact nor the hierarchy structures, meaning that the variable does not offer insights whether the contact suffices to generate acquaintance knowledge and thus decreases prejudices. Of the persons that stated to have contact with foreigners at the workplace, 72% also stated to have had positive experiences with foreigners (gesis, 2017), suggesting that the type of contact has not been negative, and that prejudices and stereotypes were at least not reinforced. Whether a knowledge increase has happened cannot be derived from the data at hand. Therefore, this variable is interesting to look at but should be treated with caution in the overall evaluation.

Just over one fifth (22%) of the population has contact with foreigners in their neighbourhood. 71% of these 22% stated to have made positive experiences with foreigners, however not specifically stating where this contact has happened (gesis, 2017). The Sachsen-Monitor proposes 12% having frequent and 18% having semi-regular interactions with foreigners in their neighbourhood (Infratest dimap, 2017). Just like the previous question regarding contact with foreigners at one's workplace, it should also be treated with caution, since it does not allow any inferences regarding the intensity of the contact.

Overall, based on the data at hand it can be argued that the level of persons having close, intimate contact with foreigners is low to max. medium. Strong statements about the type of interactions with neighbours and at the work place cannot be made. Yet, data about the level of interaction within one's family and circle of friends leads to the conclusion of low to max. medium level of contact with the ability to generate knowledge.

As argued in the theory section, contact with foreigners can be an important factor for reducing knowledge deficit and hence insecurity and prejudices regarding refugees. Nevertheless, close intimate contact with the refugee population does so even more. Therefore, the second indicator aims at capturing the level of contact with asylum-seekers. The question whether persons know if refugees are living in close proximity can be interpreted in two ways. If the answer is no, the persons either do not know about it, which means contact cannot have happened, or there are no refugees living close by, which also means that contact was not possible. If persons live that closely with refugees, the chances are higher that interaction generating knowledge can happen. However, it can also have the opposite effect and prejudices can be reinforced. This is why it is positive to see that the majority lives in close proximity with refugees (52%), however, this need not mean that existing knowledge deficit is being reduced. The second variable sheds somewhat

more light onto the second indicator question. 34% have had direct personal contact with refugees (gesis, 2017). Yet again this does not say anything about the type of contact and its ability to reduce knowledge deficit. Evaluating the indicator in a satisfying manner is hardly possible because insights on the type and intensity of contact are missing. Therefore, although under reservations, I conclude that direct contact has happened on a medium scale level, however, without being able to make conclusions regarding type and intensity.

The strongest indicator at hand, namely contact with foreigners in family and circle of friends, suggests a low level of knowledge regarding the proposed outgroup. The questions regarding contact at the work place and in the neighbourhood are enlightening in the regard that it shows the opportunity for knowledge gain, which can be estimated as low to medium. The same is true for the level and intensity of contact with refugees, which also does not generate insights about the type of contact but only about the opportunity for knowledge generating interaction.

INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTION	ANSWER
LEVEL AND INTENSITY OF CONTACT WITH FOREIGNERS	1) How high is the level of persons having foreigners in their close circle of friends or family?	Low to medium +(+)
	2) How high is the level of persons having contact with foreigners at their workplace?	Medium (under reservations) ++
	3) How high is the level of persons having contact with foreigners in their neighbourhood?	Low to medium (under reservations) +(+)
LEVEL AND INTENSITY OF CONTACT WITH REFUGEES	1) How high is the level of persons having direct personal contact with refugees?	Medium (under reservations) ++

Table 12: Empirics Knowledge Deficit Saxony

Relative Deprivation (c2) Saxony

For relative deprivation processes to occur the presence of a comparison referent is necessary (see 3.1). Therefore, as a first step I will take a look at the population's identification with the defined ingroups. Attachment to FRG is captured by looking at levels of patriotic attitudes. 80% feel strongly connected to the FRG. The variables looking at how proud persons are of German institutions and successes, show that the persons in Saxony are not particularly proud of the German parliament (only 2,5%), rather proud of the German constitution, the welfare state and German athletes (over 35%) and especially proud when it comes to German economic or cultural

achievements. Well over 50% are proud of German economic success, art and literature as well as scientific achievements. 80% of the population feels closely attached to Saxony (gesis, 2017) and 87% are proud of Saxony's achievements since 1990 (Infratest dimap, 2017). Combining the variables measuring the ties with the FRG and the federal state the level is still high (70 %). The figures suggest strong identification with Germany as well as the federal state, yet, somewhat higher identification with the federal than the nation state. Comparison referents are present to a high degree on behalf of which and within which feelings of RD can arise.

Here, I present the findings on how persons feel treated compared to others living in Germany, split in economic, political and general feelings of ERD. Only 4% of the population in Saxony are of the opinion that economic gains are being distributed in a fair way among society, compared to 76% perceiving the distribution to be unfair (Arant, Dragolov and Boehnke, 2017). 72% believe that politicians are not interested in what the voters want but only in gaining a mandate. 68% agree with the statement "Persons like me do not have any influence on what the government does anyway", 68% think that politicians are not taking care of the common good and another 75% believe that politicians do not care about what the "simple man" thinks (Infratest dimap, 2017). Just over 50% of the population feel that they get less than they deserve, 45% feeling to get exactly the fair share, and 5% believing to get more than they deserve compared to others living in Germany (gesis, 2017). Those numbers are also supported by the Sachsen-Monitor. Persons that stated to feel unfairly treated also showed a pessimistic outlook into the future (69%), believe that the situation as a whole is unfair in Germany (70%) and showed a high level of xenophobia (73%). 80% of the persons that categorize themselves as being part of the lower class and 63% of the lower middleclass believe that social mobility is not or hardly possible in Germany (Infratest dimap, 2017). Feelings of RD in all three categories is prevailing on a rather high level. Those feeling can be exploited by anti-refugee actors.

Moving on to feeling relatively deprived on behalf of one's ingroup or perceiving its identity at risk. A majority in society is of the opinion that social cohesion in Germany threatened, with only 16% not sharing this feeling (Arant, Dragolov and Boehnke, 2017). This figure corresponds with a variable offered by ALLBUS dataset, showing that 51% perceive refugees to be a risk for social cohesion (gesis, 2017). 58% are of the opinion that more money should be invested into German reunification rather than into the integration of foreigners. 56% perceive Germany to be alienated to a threatening degree. 58% of the population believes that persons from Saxony are worse off than persons living in western federal states and 44% perceive that persons from the eastern parts of Germany (which includes Saxony) are second-class citizens (Infratest dimap, 2017). FRD on behalf of the ingroup as German citizen as well as on behalf of the ingroup as citizens of the federal state are prevailing to a medium and almost high degree. Most of the

figures are on the edge of being classified as high. Those feelings cause insecurity and prejudices among society.

Evaluating concerns for the future might be the weakest indicator, since it does not add the aspect of competition. However, a negative and pessimistic outlook into the future can be a consequence of feeling relatively deprived (Appadurai, 1998). Asked about the future, interestingly only 11% estimate their own personal economic situation to be worse in one year (gesis, 2017). 37% are afraid that they will be worse off in the future but at the same time 75% are optimistic regarding their own personal future (Infratest dimap, 2017). Those numbers show a rather great spectrum, therefore in the evaluation I will take the middle way and categorise the indicator as medium to low.

Over one third is of the opinion that the economic situation in Germany in one year will be worse than at the time of the survey. Over 30% believe that it is irresponsible to have children in the current political and economic climate. The number of persons having a negative outlook onto the economic situation in Germany, fits together with the number of persons perceiving refugees as a risk for the German economy, however, when combining both variables, the percentage decreases to just over 17% (gesis, 2017). Based on those figures can be concluded, that the level of persons generally worrying about the future is medium. Those findings are somewhat contradicting the findings on how refugees bear a risk to the economy, social cohesion and public security, which showed very strong concerns.

The indicators that offer the highest validity and capture the concept of RD most accurately suggest, that in Saxony a high level of deprivation compared to others within the ingroup, as well as on behalf of the group is prevailing.

INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTION	ANSWER
INGROUP IDENTIFICATION	1) How strong is the identification with the social identity as German citizen?	Medium ++
	2) How strong is the identification with the social identity as citizen of Saxony?	High +++
EGOISTIC RD	1) How high is the level of persons feeling economic RD?	High +++
	2) How high is the level of persons feeling political RD	High +++
	3) How high is the level of persons feeling general RD?	High +++

FRATERNALISTIC RD	1) How high is the level of persons that feel relatively deprived on behalf of their ingroup?	Medium to high +++
CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE	1) How high is the level of persons that worry about their economic situation in the future?	Medium to low +(+)
	2) How high is the level of persons that have general concerns about the future?	Medium ++

Table 13: Empirics Relative Deprivation Saxony

Knowledge Deficit and Relative Deprivation Saxony

The prevalence of prejudices regarding foreigners and refugees, as argued in the theory section, is a strong indicator for both conditions. Yet, based on different causal arguments, both conditions can cause or manifest prejudices and stereotypical thinking. This is why I am looking at this indicator detached from c1 and c2. I again distinguish between foreigners and refugees, starting off with the first.

Almost half of the population believes that foreigners burden the German welfare net. This perception of foreigners costing the German population or not contributing to the system is also confirmed when looking at another question regarding the German pension system. Only one fifth of the population thinks that foreigners contribute towards securing the pension system in Germany compared to almost 60% disagreeing with the statement. A little more than 40% are of the opinion that foreigners are doing the work that Germans do not want to do. Accompanied by 15% believing that foreigners are stealing German jobs. Furthermore, 60% either agree (33%) or do not actively disagree (25%) with the statement that foreigners commit more crimes than Germans (gesis, 2017).

Looking at prejudices that persons have regarding the influence the presence of foreigners has on German society, shows that almost half of the population does not agree with the statement that foreigners cause a loss of social cohesion. This in turn also means that almost half does not disagree or actively agrees with the statement. The question whether foreigners living in Germany make the society more tolerant shows that the population is indecisive in this regard. Over one third believing that the presence of foreigners in Germany leads to more intolerance, however, can be valued as relatively high. The same is true for the fact that one third believes that the presence of foreigner's children in schools lowers the educational level for German school children. The level of persons thinking in stereotypes regarding foreigners in Saxony seems to be rather high, particularly regarding the social and economic safety net and how foreigners either do not contribute or exploit it. A stereotypical statement that can often be heard at anti-migrant rallies,

that foreigners take away German jobs, based on the data at hand finds low levels of support (gesis, 2017). Overall, the level of prejudices against foreigners can be estimated as medium, which looking at the other results is somewhat surprising, since contact has been rather low and relative deprivation rather high.

Moving on to the second indicator shows an even higher level of prejudices against refugees. 64% believe that the presence of refugees in Germany bears a risk for the welfare state, only 10% do not share this opinion and the other 30% are indecisive (gesis, 2017). Another interesting number is offered by the Sachsen-Monitor, showing that 69% are of the opinion that Muslims do not accept German values (Infratest dimap, 2017). Although not asking about refugees, the figure is still interesting because the majority of refugees arriving in Germany since 2011 is Muslim. The number regarding public security is even higher, almost 75% believe that refugees pose a security threat and 35% view refugees as problem for the economy (gesis, 2017). The here presented numbers suggest that prejudices against refugees are even higher than those against foreigners.

INDICATOR	INDICATOR QUESTION	ANSWER
PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICES AGAINST FOREIGNERS	1) How high is the level of persons thinking in stereotypes and/or having prejudices regarding foreigners?	Medium ++
PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICES AGAINST REFUGEES	1) How high is the level of persons thinking in stereotypes and/or having prejudices regarding refugees?	High +++

Table 14: Empirics Prevalence of Prejudices Saxony

Conclusion Saxony

The empirical findings for this case are somewhat more straight forward than the ones for the previous case. Based on the data at hand it can be argued for a low level of knowledge regarding the here defined outgroup. Although, I am again not able to investigate the intensity of contact between locals and in Germany living foreigners at the work place or in the neighbourhood as well as the intensity of contact with refugees, it was possible to state that the opportunity for knowledge generating contact was only on a low to medium level.

Looking at the indicators that capture the concept of RD the strongest suggests a high prevalence of RD among Saxony 's society. The comparison referents are present and attachment to the federal state is valued higher than to the nation state. All indicator questions regarding ERD

and FRD are evaluated as high. The persons worrying about their personal future is lower than those worrying about the future in general, which is interesting.

The high presence of KD and RD indicates that a high level of insecurity is prevailing in Saxony's society. This is furthermore supported by the high level of prejudices against and stereotypical thinking about foreigners, as well as refugees, which is a consequence of KD and RD and thus a sign for societal insecurity, which is making persons more susceptible to anti-refugee mobilisation and hence leading to ARV. This case at hand confirms the proposed theory and hypothesis that a high level of societal insecurity leads to effective anti-refugee mobilisation and consequently violence. If I were only to look at this case, I would reject the Nullhypothesis and accept the proposed hypothesis. Yet, scientific inferences based only on a single case study do not offer great external validity. Therefore, I will compare case I and II in the following section in order to estimate the explanatory power of the suggested theory.

5.2 Discussion

The two just presented cases show different levels of ARV, meaning different levels of effectiveness of anti-refugee mobilisation. Saxony shows the highest relative level of violence, compared to NRW with the lowest. The other two indicators are also in line with the data on ARV. The level of organised protests was distinctly higher in Saxony than in NRW, just like the support for AfD, which in NRW is even below the German wide support levels. According to the theoretical argument proposed in 3.3 it would be expected to see a low level of knowledge and a high level of relative deprivation in Saxony and a high level of knowledge and a low level of relative deprivation in NRW. The just presented empirical data for both cases shows those kinds of expected differences between the cases, particularly regarding the strong indicators with high validity, however, the differences are not as distinct as expected. The division into three categories high, medium and low level is helpful to get a first impression and it becomes visible that both cases are somewhat in accordance with the proposed theory. Nevertheless, taking a closer look beyond the categories of high, medium and low level, plus adding the factor of direct comparison will help making stronger inferences and estimate the strength of the proposed theoretical argument and its ability to explain effective mobilisation and hence violence. In this section I will bring together empirics and theory. The structure is again based on the proposed indicator questions for each condition.

Taking a look at the variables used to gain general background information about the two cases shows no great differences in perception of the general economic situation and also regarding foreigners. Differences become, however, visible when looking at questions regarding refugees. It can cautiously be said that the support for taking in refugees is slightly higher in North Rhine-

Westphalia than in Saxony. Yet, it should be mentioned that the response level was not high for all three variables. Just over 50% of the interviewees gave an answer, making it difficult to draw conclusions. Another factor important to mention is the relative quantity of foreigners living in each case, particularly, since contact with foreigners is one of the relevant indicators. In this regard the two cases are basically on two ends of the spectrum, with NRW having a share of 12,4% foreigners, compared to Saxony with only 4,2%. This fact obviously has influence on the possibility of getting in touch with foreigners. The level of refugees in both cases according to *Königssteiner Schlüssel* is equal relative to the population size. Regarding the component of contact with foreigners, Saxony already has worse prerequisites than North Rhine-Westphalia.

Knowledge Deficit (c1)

Looking at the first indicator and its questions differences can be witnessed. The level of persons having contact with foreigners in their circle of friends or family in NRW is dramatically higher than in Saxony. Diving into the variables used to evaluate the question the discrepancy becomes even more prominent. Combining the question of contact within family and circle of friends shows that in Saxony over 60% do not have any contact with foreigners in either group, compared to close to 30% not having that kind of contact in NRW. This type of interaction is however, one of the strongest indicators for knowledge gain through contact because it generates acquaintance knowledge and therefore, manages to work against existing prejudices, taking away the abstractness of a foreign person and consequently a perceived threat. Therefore, feelings of insecurity regarding outgroup members will not emerge and persons will not be as susceptible to mobilisation rhetoric. This, first of all has influence on foreigners in general and not necessarily refugees per se. Yet, as previously argued can the perception of foreigners also greatly shape the perception of refugees.

The results for the other two indicator questions also show a difference: The level of contact with foreigners at one's work place and in one's neighbourhood is evaluated as high in NRW and as medium to low and in Saxony. In NRW 91% of the persons that stated to have contact with foreigners at their workplace and 86% of the persons having contact in their neighbourhood described the contact as positive. In *Sachse* such conclusions can only be drawn more cautiously by combining two variables of the ALLBUS dataset. 72% of the persons having contact with foreigners at their workplace, and 71% in their neighbourhood are also stating to have made positive experiences with foreigners. However, no direct link between workplace/neighbourhood and the evaluation of the contact can be drawn. Both indicator questions could have generated stronger insights for the proposed theory, however, the variables do not allow for inferences about the intensity and type of contact at the workplace or in the neighbourhood. Evaluating the contact as positive, as happened in NRW suggests that it can have

increased knowledge and generated some insights into the “black box”. Drawing this conclusion for Saxony is somewhat more difficult. The important information that is missing for both cases is the level of hierarchical structure at the work place, whether foreigners are always subordinates or whether contact is happening on equal levels, because only then is it able to work against stereotypical thinking and prejudices. Therefore, both questions should be treated with caution and do not generate the insights as the first indicator question does. It can be derived that the possibility for knowledge gain through contact at the work place and in the neighbourhood was dramatically higher in NRW than in Saxony, with a percentage-based discrepancy between 20 and 30%.

Concluding for the first indicator, it can be stated that rather strong inferences can be made regarding the type and level of contact for NRW and somewhat more cautious inferences about Saxony. Nevertheless, even if the contact at the workplace and in the neighbourhood has had the intensity to generate knowledge, the level would still be dramatically lower than in NRW. Meaning that the level of insecurity regarding foreigners due to a lack in knowledge is higher in Saxony. This finding is in line with the proposed theory.

Unfortunately, in evaluating the second indicator “Level and intensity of contact with refugees”, I am facing a similar data problem. In NRW 64% state to living in close proximity with refugees compared to 52% in Saxony being aware of the proximity. The way the variable is formulated offers persons to either state, that they do live in close proximity, they do not know it, or they do not live in close proximity. Not knowing whether refugees live close by is also a sign of not having had contact. Taking from the numbers, the opportunity for contact can be estimated as medium in Saxony and medium to high in NRW. When asked whether the interviewees have had direct personal contact with refugees, the percentages decrease. 43% in NRW and 34% in Saxony indicate to have had contact. Yet, it is again not possible to make any inferences regarding the type and intensity of contact and therefore no conclusions about how those numbers affect mobilisation and thus violence. The numbers are relatively close together, nevertheless, does it go in line with the findings thus far, that contact or the chance for contact is higher in NRW. Yet, drawing conclusions regarding the theory based on the data at hand is hardly possible.

Summarising the results for c1, it can be concluded that in all aspects that were measured, Saxony shows a higher level of KD. In some areas the differences are more distinct than in others. Particularly, the strongest available indicator, contact with foreigners in family and circle of friends, suggests that a higher level of societal insecurity caused by lack of knowledge is prevailing in Saxony, making the population more susceptible to rhetoric and mobilisation attempts of anti-refugee actors. This is conclusive with the higher numbers of ARV and therefore a preceding effective mobilisation process.

Yet, as I pointed out, I believe that the prevalence of societal insecurity is also influenced by a high level of RD, it is necessary to include an assessment of the second condition before drawing any overall conclusions regarding the proposed theory and hypothesis.

Relative Deprivation (c2)

As previously explained a comparison referent is necessary for relative deprivation processes to take place. This referent in the thesis at hand, has been defined as twofold: On the one hand social identity as German citizen and on the other hand as citizen of the federal state. Overall the results indicate that the identification with the national identity is somewhat higher in Saxony than in NRW, but both show a strong attachment to the FRG. Persons from Saxony feel stronger ties to the federal state than persons from NRW. It cannot be stated that the level of identification or pride is always higher in Saxony than in NRW, as was possible when looking at the other indicators. It is interesting to see that in NRW persons tend to be prouder of state institutions, such as the constitution or the welfare state, than in Saxony. When it comes to successes or achievements, such as art and literature or economic success, persons living in Saxony show a stronger identification. It seems that in Saxony persons identify more with things that are more tangible and which Germany is also well-known for in the international community. Summarising, it can be said that the comparison referent national identity is given in both cases but with different manifestations.

Taking a closer look at ERD, feelings of deprivation in comparison with other ingroup members, shows that in Saxony the levels of ERD, economic, political and general are high in all three categories. Looking at economic RD, both cases show a relatively high level, and the difference is only 13%. Taking a look at political RD in Saxony displays a very high dissatisfaction with the politicians and also feelings of not being able to participate or that politicians actually do not care about what the populations thinks. A “us versus them” feeling seems to be prevailing in the sense that political elites act detached from the population and its control. I categorised this as egoistic RD since the established ingroup here is German citizen. It could, however, also be argued that other social identities come to play making it an intergroup comparison. This factor will be discussed in the following section on limitations (see 5.3). Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, the indicator political RD cannot be evaluated for NRW, making it difficult to compare between the cases and draw conclusion based on the comparison.

In NRW 30% and in Saxony 50% have a feeling of getting less than deserved compared to others living in Germany. Again, for Saxony more data is available, showing that the majority of the lower and lower middle class does not believe in social mobility for themselves. Some of the used variables or questions do not directly use the comparative aspect. However, social mobility

and political participation have been connected to RD. Looking at Saxony the findings are supporting the theory and hypothesis. For NRW the inferences need to be more cautiously since it is based on a limited amount of data. However, compared to Saxony the level of ERD is lower, which is also in line with the causal argument and the findings on ARV. The findings suggest that based on a higher level of ERD the population in Saxony also shows higher levels of insecurity and consequently susceptibility.

Fraternalistic RD is prevailing in both cases, however, in Saxony it is more distinct. Saxony's population does not only feel deprived on behalf of their ingroup as Germans but also as citizens of the federal state. An observation that could not be made for NRW. Interestingly, in both cases persons feel that social cohesion in Germany is at risk, yet, in both cases over 60% of the population states that the level of social cohesion in their neighbourhood is good or very good.

The overall evaluation of ERD and FRD indicates that a higher level of relative deprivation is prevailing in Saxony, which causes a higher level of insecurity among society, reinforcing ingroup versus outgroup behaviour and prejudices. This makes the population in Saxony more susceptible to anti-refugee mobilisation than the population in NRW. Looking at the DV shows that the proposed hypothesis here also holds. FRD has the ability to mediate ERD, however, since the findings for both forms of relative deprivation are in sync this seems not to be the case.

Evaluating the results for the fourth indicator, again brings some ambiguity to the matter. For NRW the results are fitting with the findings so far. NRW shows an overall medium level of ERD and FRD which leads to the expectation of a low level or medium level of concerns for the future. This expectation is being confirmed. However, looking at Saxony, one can see a high level of ERD and FRD and would hence expect a high level of concerns for the future, this expectation is not met, raising the question how this discrepancy can be explained. A more detailed elaboration on this question will follow in the next section on limitations (see 5.3). Looking at the percentage-based figures, Saxony shows higher numbers than NRW, which to a degree matches the theory. Nevertheless, the findings regarding Saxony require further discussion.

Knowledge Deficit and Relative Deprivation

The prevalence of prejudices and stereotypical thinking, as indicator for both conditions, shows intriguing results. Overall, the findings are in support of the theory, because NRW is showing lower levels of prejudices against foreigners as well as refugees compared to Saxony, which based on the findings for KD and RD would have been expected. However, particularly looking at KD, I would have expected the level of prejudices to be even lower in NRW because acquaintance knowledge about foreigners manages to work against prejudices and it was established in the empirics that in NRW this form of knowledge gain was present on a high level. Overall, the variables that I looked

at showed stronger attributes of prejudices in Saxony. The greatest discrepancy is in regard to the welfare net and the opinion that foreigners are burdening it: over 50% compared to 27% approval rate. A similar question shows an equally high difference: The question whether foreigners are contributing to securing the German pension system. 35% in NRW are of the opinion that foreigners are not contributing compared to 57% in Saxony thinking that they are not contributing. Regarding the perception of refugees, the level of persons perceiving them as a risk to public security is high in both cases, but even more so in Saxony. It seems that particularly regarding monetary or state provided goods prejudices against foreigners and refugees are prevailing in Saxony's society.

The ambiguity regarding NRW could be explained by different aspects. On the one hand the assumption, that contact with foreigners can also decrease prejudices against refugees could be wrong. This would, however, contradict earlier findings by McLaren (2003) and Ghosn, Braithwaite and Chu (2019). On the other hand, stronger factors than threat perception could influence prejudices, which cannot be mediated by contact. Additionally, not enough information is available regarding the intensity and type of contact at the workplace or in the neighbourhood. And since contact can also have the opposite effect and increase prejudices, inferences can only be made under reservations. Further, since evaluating the relationship between the conditions was not part of the analysis, no inferences can be made about the strength of RD in producing prejudices against outgroup members. Again, this discussion will be embedded in a more detailed elaboration on limitations and alternative explanations in the next section (see 5.3).

Having looked at and evaluated both conditions for societal insecurity, I draw the tentative conclusion that societal insecurity is prevailing to a higher degree in Saxony than in NRW. In all variables and indicators that were used for this study, Saxony shows higher levels of KD as well as RD. Further, concluding that due to the fact that the level of insecurity is higher, persons are also more susceptible to anti-refugee mobilisation and consequently mobilisation is more effective. Bringing independent and depended variable together shows that the overall findings are in line with the theory, even though not as distinctly as I would have expected. Nevertheless, based on the here presented and evaluated data and the resulting conclusion, I am inferring that the proposed hypothesis holds: a high level of societal insecurity leads to effective anti-refugee mobilisation and hence a high level of anti-refugee violence. However, also based on the just presented findings, I am not able to reject the Nullhypothesis, because the case with low level of ARV does not show a low level of societal insecurity but rather a medium level. A discussion on the implications of this finding will be part of section 5.3.

CASE	EFFECTIVE MOBILISATION	IV (SOCIAL INSECURITY)	SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESIS
NRW	low level	medium level	yes (under reservations)
SAXONY	high level	high level	yes

Table 15: Results Between-Case Comparison

5.3 Limitations

In order to fully understand the explanatory power of the study at hand it is necessary to take a look at certain limitations deriving from the structure of the research design, the proposed theory and the available data. It is further necessary to discuss other possible factors that could influence the relationship found in this analysis.

Theoretical Limitations

Various factors can influence the found relationship between IV and DV and render its correlation spurious. Particularly in a qualitative comparative case study it is not doable to control for all possible confounding variables. Although the study at hand is a thankful case in regard to holding background conditions and confounders as stable as possible, since it looks at two cases within one state. Nevertheless, different factors can influence the variables. Including all those variables would not have been feasible because of 1) a time and space issue; 2) insufficient data and 3) it would have decreased the depth of the analysis. This means, however, that the proposed theory and resulting analysis only captures a partial aspect of a greater field of research.

The strongest additional factor influencing perceptions of refugees and consequently insecurity among society as well as mobilisation capacity are (local) state actors. As mentioned above in the section on previous research, mechanisms such as scapegoating and resonance to mobilisation attempts and anti-refugee actors by (local) state elites play an important role. The influence of state actors is also related to the role of the media in this process. As Koopmans and Olzak argued, mobilisation can only be effective if it manages to diffuse and spread. Media as well as political elites are an important factor in this diffusion process because they also shape the image of refugees in society (2004). It could be argued that the setup of the study as a within case comparison holds the factor state constant. Yet, since Germany is a federal republic the local federal governments and actors possess the capacity to influence the public discourse.

In regard to the contact hypothesis, reverse causation cannot be ruled out. It is possible that persons are seeking contact with foreigners and refugees because they do not have any prejudices and not vice versa. Hence in places with low levels of prejudices, we would see high levels of contact between in- and outgroup members. Based on the findings and the setup of the analysis endogeneity cannot be ruled out. There seems to be a correlation between the two, however, it cannot be said in which direction it goes.

Research Design

This analysis would undoubtedly have profited from additional cases, in order to investigate the different levels of effectiveness and hence violence against refugees. In particular since the IV is conceptualised in gradual levels, adding more cases representing different variations in IV and DV would have generated greater insights and increased the study's explanatory power. Furthermore, the representativeness would have profited from a look beyond German borders into other European democracies. This was, however, as already touched upon in section 4.1 not feasible due to a lack in comparable and combinable data as well as a lack in time and financial resources in order to conduct field research and collect data. Yet, critics might rightfully point out the resulting limitation in regard to generalisability. The established population of liberal European democracies could be argued as too far-fetched due to the limited number of cases, which are both within the same country. Additional objections could be that Germany as case a is not representative because of its unique history in regard to refugees and anti-refugee violence. Theories even exist suggesting that Germany has a specific inclination towards fascism or right-wing tendencies, ranging from a "special path thesis", over German characteristics to a psychoanalytical, psychohistorical explanation (Krell, Nicklas and Ostermann, 1996), this could also mean that Germany has a specific tendency for anti-refugee violence, hence limiting the generalisability of the here presented case study. Since there are, to my knowledge, no studies that look at ARV as an isolated phenomenon and not within the wider context of right-wing violence in liberal European democracies, even if there might be an underlying proneness ARV in Germany, the findings still offer insights and can and should give reason to further research.

Moreover, it can be argued that a greater differentiation within the conditions would have contributed to gain more detailed insights into the origins of ARV and the role of KD and RD on susceptibility to mobilisation. It would have been enlightening to differentiate more between ERD and FRD in order to see different effects of the two types of relative deprivation. Capturing the relationship between the two is not included, yet, there is interdependency between the two types of relative deprivation. However, academia is not in agreement about the intensity of the relationship (Pettigrew *et al.*, 2008). Therefore, I have decided against including it in the study. Additionally, it would have extended the scope of the analysis. And the findings at hand are still valid, although not knowing how influential ERD and FRD are on their own.

A similar case could be made for the different forms of contact, either with foreigners living in Germany or with refugees. Greater differentiation in the analysis in order to detect isolated influences of contact with foreigners and contact with refugees would have been enlightening. Yet,

due to the scope of the thesis and also the available data (which I will get into in more detail further down the road) was this differentiation not included.

In addition, investigating the relationship between the two conditions and how they are influencing each other and hence mobilisation capacity would have generated greater insights. Even more so when thinking about the influence of prejudices on the susceptibility of persons and how both conditions play a role in the prevalence of prejudices.

Furthermore, partially explaining the smaller than expected variation between the cases is that the variation in the DV might not have been strong enough and therefore the variation in the proposed IV is also not as distinct as expected. Nevertheless, the cases show variations in IV and DV that are in line with the theory, which can therefore not be falsified.

Another limitation already touched upon in the analysis is the exclusion of other social identities. Adding more social identities and seeing differences in the levels of relative deprivation between different groups in society would have been enlightening, particularly in terms of deducing policy advice. This would, however, also have required further survey-based data, which was not available, leading to the next important limitation regarding this paper: availability of data and biases thereof.

Empirical Limitations

As already touched upon throughout the course of the analysis, the available data was not satisfactory in regard of allowing for strong inferences regarding ERD in NRW and level of contact with refugees in both cases. Apart from the fact that not all indicator questions could be answered in a satisfactory manner, I also see some problems with the way the survey questions particularly those of the ALLBUS dataset are constructed. First of all, the concepts of foreigners living in Germany, asylum-seeker and refugee are not being specified and are therefore open for interpretation to the interviewee to a certain degree. In particular since the terms in the societal discourse are often times used interchangeably, making it difficult to look at refugees alone and interpret the available data. This problem also applies to the other surveys as far as I can tell. To counteract this problem a pilot study in order to establish who people think about today when hearing refugee, asylum-seeker, foreigner living in Germany or migrant as a basis for further survey would be desirable.

Additionally, all questions regarding perception and feelings about foreigners living in Germany or refugees are vulnerable to a social desirability bias. "Social desirability is the tendency of some respondents to report an answer in a way they deem to be more socially acceptable than would be their "true" answer" (Lavrakas, 2008). Persons do this in order to avoid negative evaluation. It leads to an overreporting of socially desirable and underreporting of undesirable

attitudes (ibid.). For the research at hand, this would mean, that particularly for the questions aiming at capturing persons prejudices against foreigners and refugees would report more positive opinions about refugees and foreigners than they actually have.

Further, since the survey is conducted in Germany and thus in German language I am faced with the problem of the generic masculinum. This means that in German, the plural form of a group is always masculine, even if women are (part of) the group as well. Usage of the generic masculinum is problematic because one cannot distinguish whether a group is actually consisting only of males or whether women are part of it. Leading to the fact that psychologically when hearing *Ausländer* (foreigners) or *Flüchtlinge* (refugees) persons tend to associate those terms with male persons (Stahlberg and Sczesny, 2001). This is particularly problematic in the context of threat perceptions and resulting increase in outgroup prejudices. Studies show that ingroup members are more fearful and suspicious of male outgroup members and hence have a higher desire to dominate, punish or socially exclude them (Navarrete *et al.*, 2010). Further, intergroup bias is primarily directed at men and not women. Even more so if it has a competitive aspect to it (McDonald, Navarrete and Van Vugt, 2012). As threat perception and resulting prejudices are at the core of this study, and RD is based on competition, the usage of the generic masculinum can be problematic regarding the reliability of questions that aim at capturing perceptions of foreigners and refugees.

Regarding the ARVIG dataset, on which the variation in the DV is based, it only collected incidences that hit the news. Meaning, that there is a great chance that the numbers are in reality higher. Only if violence is being reported can it end up in media outlets. Victims might not report attacks because they are scared or do not trust state institutions. This feeling of mistrust might even increase through news about extreme right organisation structures within the German police apparatus (Gensing, 2018; Holzki, 2018) or virulent police operations in asylum accommodations (Heinz and Unverdorben, 2019).

It can be concluded, that the study is facing limitations, regarding theory, empirics and also the research design. Nevertheless, it does shed some light onto the phenomenon of ARV in a liberal European democracy. Moreover, it is adding theoretical knowledge to the theories of KD and RD by connecting those to mobilisation. The study should give reason for further research within and beyond Germany.

6. Conclusion

The topic of violence against refugees by the hosting population in liberal European democracies is under-researched, partly because ARV has been classified under right-wing violence. Therefore, the aim of the thesis at hand was to shed more light onto the applicability of on the one hand theories on ARV in developing countries and on the other hand theories of right-wing violence and investigate whether those also have explanatory power for ARV in liberal European democracies. Based on previous research I argued that ARV only takes place if effective anti-refugee mobilisation has happened. Further deriving from this the question what conditions are necessary for mobilisation to be effective and lead to ARV. Hypothesising that the prevalence of KD regarding refugees and feelings of RD cause insecurity among society and thus renders persons susceptible to anti-refugee mobilisation and in consequence making it effective.

In the structured focused comparison at hand, I compared two cases within Germany with a variation in the DV in order to test the proposed theoretical argument. As an overall concluding statement, it can be said that the posed hypothesis found support throughout the study. Yet, not as strongly as expected, which can to a certain degree be explained with the just explained limitations the study is facing. Overall relative deprivation and a lack in knowledge regarding refugees has effects on the effectiveness of anti-refugee mobilisation and hence ARV. Those findings are in line with earlier findings on ARV in developing countries as well as on right-wing violence in liberal democracies. Yet, the analysis only looked at one small piece of the bigger picture. The findings should be used in order to conduct further research, focusing on violence against refugees as isolated target group in order to gain more insights, particularly in investigating the underlying causal mechanisms.

The field of research still offers many aspects that have not yet undergone investigation. This thesis only looked at physical violence, however other forms of violence against refugees are also increasing, such as state repressions, structural violence and also attacks by security personnel in asylum accommodations. Furthermore, the influence of other forms of violence, such as state repressions and restrictions of civil rights for refugees, on physical violence would be interesting to investigate. In addition, the effect of securitising topics such as migration and asylum on threat perception and ARV should be investigated further. Another major takeaway should be that more survey-based data in the context of refugee perceptions is necessary in order to conduct focused and enlightening research.

The fact that *Schleswig-Holstein* as only state in the Western part of Germany shows a high level of ARV is intriguing and should be investigated further. Additionally, it is interesting to see that the level of violence abruptly decreased again in 2017 although no major changes within German society occurred. Yet, closure of the so-called Balkan route and the treaty between the EU

and Turkey in 2016, both aiming to keep refugees out of the European Union did show its effects and decreased the numbers of persons entering the EU and thus also Germany²³ (Peerenboom, 2016; ProAsyl, 2016; Dernbach, 2017; Pro Asyl, 2018; Schmeitzer, 2018). The numbers of persons applying for asylum decreased drastically by the end of 2016 (bpb, 2019). Investigating a possible correlation and finding explanations for the sudden decrease in ARV would be valuable, particularly the interplay of state actions and populations perceptions.

The decision for KD and RD as conditions was based on the fact that both result in the same effect: societal insecurity. Yet, each condition has a different causal mechanism, one causes prejudices whereas the other one can work against those. Future research should take a look at the different mechanisms and evaluate how they are interrelated and influence each other in the context of perceptions of refugees. In the regard of future research, it can be concluded that more research in liberal European democracies is necessary, particularly since refugee numbers are expected to increase rather than decrease.

Another important take-away is that the proposed causal mechanism should be investigated further. As also Misago (2019) stresses, the intermediary role of mobilisation in exploiting societal circumstance in order to promote violence, needs further research. The presented study should give incentives to investigate the underlying mechanisms in order to further understand the role of mobilisation in the emergence of violence.

It became clear that particularly in Saxony persons have a feeling of being left behind, not receiving a fair share and not being able to influence politics. Those findings should alarm policymakers, since it makes persons more susceptible to violence. Feelings as such should be taken seriously and trust in politics and the ability for social and political participation should be strengthened. Further, the fact that contact can decrease susceptibility to mobilisation should be an incentive for policy makers to support initiatives bringing together locals and refugees. Furthermore, asylum-accommodations should not be located decentralised in order to ensure that refugees are not isolated from public social life and hence stay a “black box” to local population. In addition, the observation that persons in Saxony feel deprived relative to the western population in Germany should be taken as sign that the efforts to reunify German society have not been successful yet, and that more effort should be put into equalizing the eastern and western parts of Germany and ensuring that it is not only equal on paper but also in the people’s perception.

²³ It is important to stress here, that it lead to a decrease in the number of persons entering the EU, it did, however, not decrease the numbers of persons on flight and furthermore, increased the refugees’ suffering at the EU’s external borders and is driving persons into the hands of scrupulous criminals. Additionally, are the living conditions in the so-called „hot-spots“ in Greece and Italy disastrous, which is being intensified particularly by the EU Turkey treaty (ProAsyl, 2016; Pro Asyl, 2018; Amnesty International, 2019).

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Appendix

Appendix 1: Results evaluation ALLBUS variables

	Condition	Indicator	Variable Name (ALLBUS)	Result NRW	Result Saxony
		Background Information	ep01	60,17% perceive the economic situation as positive in Germany	63,06% perceive the economic situation as positive in Germany
				31,11% perceive the economic situation in Germany neither good nor bad	31,53% perceive the economic situation in Germany neither good nor bad
				8,55% perceive the economic situation in Germany as bad	5,41% perceive the economic situation in Germany as bad
		Background Information	ep03	68,55% perceive their personal economic situation as positive	66,56% perceive their personal economic situation as positive
				22,74% perceive their personal economic situation as neither good nor bad	23,88% perceive their personal economic situation as neither good nor bad
				8,72% perceive their personal economic situation as negative	9,55% perceive their personal economic situation as negative
		Background Information	ma09	52,65% do not feel more foreign in one's own country due to more foreigners	53,18% do not feel more foreign in one's own country due to more foreigners
				11,28% are neutral	14,33% are neutral
				25,64% feel more foreign in one's own country due to the increase of foreigners in the country	30,57% feel more foreign in one's own country due to the increase of foreigners in the country
		Background Information	mi02	11,8% Influx of asylums seekers should be possible without restrictions	7% Influx of asylums seekers should be possible without restrictions

		Careful only 286 persons answered		34,20% Influx of asylum seekers should be limited	37,67% Influx of asylum seekers should be limited
				2,9% Influx of asylum seekers should be prohibited	2,5% Influx of asylum seekers should be prohibited
		Background Information	mi05	23,42% Influx of refugees fleeing from conflict should be unlimited	16,56% Influx of refugees fleeing from conflict should be unlimited
		Careful only 294 persons answered		25,47% Influx of refugees fleeing from conflict should be limited	32,48% Influx of refugees fleeing from conflict should be limited
				1,37% Influx of refugees fleeing from conflict should be prohibited	3,50% Influx of refugees fleeing from conflict should be prohibited
		Background Information	mi06	22,39% Influx of refugees fleeing from political persecution should be unlimited	13,69% Influx of refugees fleeing from political persecution should be unlimited
		Careful only 291 persons answered		24,10% Influx of refugees fleeing from political persecution should be limited	31,21% Influx of refugees fleeing from political persecution should be limited
				3,25% Influx of refugees fleeing from political persecution should be limited completely	7,32% Influx of refugees fleeing from political persecution should be limited completely
1	Relative Deprivation	ERD	id01	31,97% believe that they get less than they deserve compared to others living in Germany	50,16% believe that they get less than they deserve compared to others living in Germany
				57,09% believe that they get what they deserve compared to others living in Germany	45,02% believe that they get what they deserve compared to others living in Germany
				8,72% believe that they get more than they deserve compared to others living in Germany	4,82% believe that they get more than they deserve compared to others living in Germany
3	Relative Deprivation	Concerns about the future	ep04	8,55% think that the economic situation in Germany in one year will be better than today	8,68% think that the economic situation in Germany in one year will be better than today
				59,51% think that the economic situation in Germany in one year will be unchanged	60,12% think that the economic situation in Germany in one year will be unchanged

				31,28% think that the economic situation in Germany in one year will be worse than today	31,19% think that the economic situation in Germany in one year will be worse than today
4	Relative Deprivation	Concerns about the future	ep06	24,62% think that in one year their personal economic situation will be better than today	17,68% think that in one year their personal economic situation will be better than today
				67,69% think that in one year their personal economic situation will be unchanged in one year	71,38% think that in one year their personal economic situation will be unchanged in one year
				7,18% think that in one year their personal economic situation will be worse than today	10,93% think that in one year their personal economic situation will be worse than today
5	Relative Deprivation	Concerns about the future	lp04	23,42% agree with the statement that it is irresponsible to have children	31,53% agree with the statement that it is irresponsible to have children
				75,04% disagree with the statement that it is irresponsible to have children	68,47% disagree with the statement that it is irresponsible to have children
6	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent	pn13	64,10% feel strong ties with the federal state	81,21% feel strong ties with the federal state
				34,70% do not feel very attached to the federal state	18,47% do not feel very attached to the federal state
7	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent	pn16	75,56% feel strong ties to the FRG	79,94% feel strong ties to the FRG
				23,42% do not feel very attached to the FRG	19,75% do not feel very attached to the FRG
8	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent	pn01	28,84% are not particularly proud of the German constitution	60,51% are not particularly proud of the German constitution
				62,22% are proud of the German constitution	36,62% are proud of the German constitution
9	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent	pn02	84,10% are not proud of the German parliament	94,59% are not proud of the German parliament
				4,96% are proud of the German parliament	2,55% are proud of the German parliament
10			pn03	68,89 are not proud of German athletes	57,645 are not proud of German athletes

	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent		20,17% are proud of German athletes	39,49% are proud of German athletes
11	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent	pn04	41,37% are not proud of German economic success	45,86% are not proud of German economic success
				47,69% are proud of German economic success	51,27% are proud of German economic success
12	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent	pn05	57,09% are not proud of German art and literature	43,63% are not proud of German art and literature
				31,97% are proud of German art and literature	53,50% are proud of German art and literature
13	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent	pn06	49,06% are not proud of German scientific achievements	37,58% are not proud of German scientific achievements
				40,00% are proud of German scientific achievements	59,55% are proud of German scientific achievements
14	Relative Deprivation	Comparison Referent	pn07	38,29% are not proud of the German welfare state	59,87% are not proud of the German welfare state
				50,77% are proud of the German welfare state	37,26% are proud of the German welfare state
15	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp16	61,88% think the presence of refugees is a risk to the German welfare state	63,37% think the presence of refugees is a risk to the German welfare state
				23,59% think the presence of refugees is neither a risk nor a chance for the German welfare state	24,20% think the presence of refugees is neither a risk nor a chance for the German welfare state
				11,11% think the presence of refugees is a chance for the German welfare state	11,46% think the presence of refugees is a chance for the German welfare state
16	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp01	39,66% disagree with the statement that foreigners do the work that the Germans do not want to do	41,08% disagree with the statement that foreigners do the work that the Germans do not want to do
				21,54% neither agree nor disagree with the statement	20,70% neither agree nor disagree with the statement

				37,61% agree with the statement that foreigners to the work that the Germans do not want to do	36,62% agree with the statement that foreigners to the work that the Germans do not want to do
17	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp02	51,97% disagree with the statement that foreigners burden the German welfare net	27,70% disagree with the statement that foreigners burden the German welfare net
				19,32% neither agree nor disagree with the statement	23,25% neither agree nor disagree with the statement
				27,01% agree with the statement that foreigners burden the German welfare net	50,32% agree with the statement that foreigners burden the German welfare net
18	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp06	75,04% disagree with the statement that foreigners are taking away German jobs	66,24% disagree with the statement that foreigners are taking away German jobs
				12,48% neither agree nor disagree	18,15% neither agree nor disagree
				11,79% agree with the statement that foreigners are taking away German jobs	14,96% agree with the statement that foreigners are taking away German jobs
19	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp09	64,96% disagree with the statement that the presence of foreigners causes a loss of societal cohesion in Germany	51,91% disagree with the statement that the presence of foreigners causes a loss of societal cohesion in Germany
				15,73% neither agree nor disagree	21,34% neither agree nor disagree
				17,95% agree with the statement that the presence of foreigners causes a loss of societal cohesion in Germany	26,43% agree with the statement that the presence of foreigners causes a loss of societal cohesion in Germany
20	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp10	28,38% disagree with the statement that the presence of foreigners in Germany makes Germany more tolerant and cosmopolitan	37,90% disagree with the statement that the presence of foreigners in Germany makes Germany more tolerant and cosmopolitan
				18,63% neither agree nor disagree	26,75% neither agree nor disagree

				51,79% agree with the statement that the presence of foreigners makes Germany more tolerant and cosmopolitan	35,03% agree with the statement that the presence of foreigners makes Germany more tolerant and cosmopolitan
21	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp11	57,26% disagree with the statement that foreign children in schools lower the educational level for German children	51,91% disagree with the statement that foreign children in schools lower the educational level for German children
				15,04% neither agree nor disagree	18,15% neither agree nor disagree
				25,30% agree with the statement that foreign children in schools lower the educational level for German children	29,30% agree with the statement that foreign children in schools lower the educational level for German children
22	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp17	67,69% think that refugees are a risk for public security in Germany	74,84% think that refugees are a risk for public security in Germany
				27,86% think refugees are neither risk nor chance	21,66% think refugees are neither risk nor chance
				2,22% think refugees are a chance for public security in Germany	3,5% think refugees are a chance for public security in Germany
23	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp18	43,59% think that refugees are a risk for societal cohesion in Germany	50,95% think that refugees are a risk for societal cohesion in Germany
				31,97% think refugees are neither risk nor chance	28,89% think refugees are neither risk nor chance
				22,39% think that refugees are a chance for social cohesion in Germany	19,11% think that refugees are a chance for social cohesion in Germany
24	Knowledge Deficit &	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp19	38,80% think that refugees are a risk for the economic situation in Germany	34,39% think that refugees are a risk for the economic situation in Germany

	Relative Deprivation			32,14% think refugees are neither a risk nor a chance	39,17% think refugees are neither a risk nor a chance
				25,47% think refugees are a chance for the economic situation in Germany	26,11% think refugees are a chance for the economic situation in Germany
25	Knowledge Deficit & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp05	34,53% disagree with the statement that foreigners contribute to securing the German pension system	56,69% disagree with the statement that foreigners contribute to securing the German pension system
				17,95% neither agree nor disagree	19,43% neither agree nor disagree
				43,59% agree with the statement that foreigners contribute to securing the German pension system	21,66% agree with the statement that foreigners contribute to securing the German pension system
26	Deficit Knowledge & Relative Deprivation	Prevalence of Prejudices	mp07	48,89% do not believe that foreigners commit more crimes than Germans	40,45% do not believe that foreigners commit more crimes than Germans
				20,17% neither	24,84% neither
				28,03% believe that foreigners commit more crimes than Germans	32,48% believe that foreigners commit more crimes than Germans
27	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact have with foreigners	mc01	28,55% have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany in their family	13,06% have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany in their family
				61,54% do not have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany in their family	86,67% do not have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany in their family
28	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact have with foreigners	mc02	52,99% have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany at their workplace	29,94% have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany at their workplace
				29,40% do not have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany at their workplace	64,33% do not have personal contact with foreigners living in Germany at their workplace

29	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact with foreigners	mc02 & mc09	82,90% of the persons having contact with foreigners at their workplace, also state to have had positive experiences with foreigners	72,34% of the persons having contact with foreigners at their workplace, also state to have had positive experiences with foreigners
30	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact have with foreigners	mc03	51,45% have contact to foreigners living in Germany in their neighbourhood	21,66% have contact to foreigners living in Germany in their neighbourhood
				37,78% do not have contact with foreigners living in Germany in their neighbourhood	77,07% do not have contact with foreigners living in Germany in their neighbourhood
31	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact have with foreigners	mc03 & mc09	80,10% of persons having contact with foreigners in their neighbourhood also state to have had positive experiences with foreigners	70,59% of persons having contact with foreigners in their neighbourhood also state to have had positive experiences with foreigners
32	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact have with foreigners	mc04	57,26% have personal contact with foreigners in their circle of friends	30,57% have personal contact with foreigners in their circle of friends
				32,48% do not have personal contact with foreigners in their circle of friends	68,15% do not have personal contact with foreigners in their circle of friends
33	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact with refugees	mc12	63,93% live in close proximity (within 1 km) to refugees	51,91% live in close proximity (within 1 km) to refugees
				30,94% do not live in close proximity (within 1 km) of refugees (or do not know about it)	42,36% do not live in close proximity (within 1 km) of refugees (or do not know about it)
34	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact with refugees	mc11	43,25% have had direct, personal contact with refugees	34,08% have had direct, personal contact with refugees
				56,24% have not had direct personal contact with refugees	65,93% have not had direct personal contact with refugees

35	Knowledge Deficit	Level and intensity of contact have with foreigners	mc01 & mc04 combined	24,44% contact with foreigners in family and circle of friends	8,28% contact with foreigners in family and circle of friends
				3,93% contact in family, not in circle of friends	4,78% contact in family, not in circle of friends
				32,82% no contact in family, but in circle of friends	22,29% no contact in family, but in circle of friends
				28,55% no contact in family nor circle of friends	63,37% no contact in family nor circle of friends