Abstract

In this study I explore how security sector reform affects the likelihood of democratization after a nonviolent resistance campaign in order to better understand the role of core security services during regime changes and the mechanisms of SSR. By using literature on nonviolence resistance, security sector reform, and by borrowing the concept of *spoilers* from policy and peace-making literature, I hypothesise that SSR will likely increase the ability of core security actors to manage security problems in the transition after a nonviolent resistance campaign, as well as reduce spoiler capabilities among core security actors, thereby increasing the probability of democratization. I used the method of structured, focused comparison on the regime changes in Tunisia 2011-2014 and Egypt 2011-2013, and found some evidence contrary to the first, while limited support for the second.

Key Words: Democratization, Security Sector Reform, Nonviolent Resistance, Regime Change
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Introduction

Nonviolent resistance campaigns have been a crucial force in many of the past decades’ major political transitions. Examples can be found among the anti-military struggles in Latin America and the Asian democracy campaigns in the 1980s, the Soviet Bloc independence campaigns in 1989-1991, the colour revolutions in the early 2000s, and most recently, the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-2011. However, the past few years have seen democratic backsliding in many countries with reports of declining democracy indexes, and a rise of new authoritarian norms (Pinckney, 2018:9).

The civil uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 that was initially seen as a series of successful demands for regime change and increased democracy have now, roughly eight years later, obtained very limited success in terms of democratization. Democracy may be a slow process, but the limited progress in the campaigns’ long-term goals begs the question of when countries that have experienced successful nonviolent resistance campaigns also manage a successful political transition from autocracy to democracy, as well as why democratic transitions fail.

There are some suggested explanations for why some democratic transitions succeed and some fail. Jonathan Pinckney, for example, argues in his article When civil resistance succeeds – building democracy after popular nonviolent uprisings (2018:73) that the ability for those involved in civil uprisings to maintain civic mobilization and avoid street radicalism can explain much of the variation. Most of the literature within the field of nonviolence and civil resistance likewise focus on the civil population as the main actors, this is in itself not surprising and also justified given that the civilian population is the driving force behind civil uprisings. However, an additional group of actors that is likely to influence the course of transition is the military and the security sector. Several of the regions that have seen waves of nonviolent resistance against authoritarian regimes were highly militarized, were the military often held a strong position within the previous regime or at times constituted that regime. Furthermore, within the nonviolence literature, actions by the military and/or other actors within the core security sector are often considered paramount to the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns (in terms of loyalty shifts and defections).

While being a main aspect of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and democratization literature on transitions following armed conflict, surprisingly little attention has been given the role of military and security services in transitions following nonviolent resistance campaigns. Reforming and restructuring the military and security services, also known as the process of security sector reform (SSR), are considered useful, and necessary, tools for democratization, reducing the risk of conflict recurrence and building sustainable peace following armed conflicts. SSR may, however, look different in a nonviolence setting than it would following an armed conflict, and although SSR has
been on the agenda after nonviolent conflicts there is no discussion addressing the issue of SSR in nonviolent transition settings specifically. The purpose of this study is to address that research gap. By asking the question “how does security sector reform (SSR) affect the likelihood of democratization after a nonviolent resistance campaign?”, I hope to gain a better understanding of the role of the military and security services in nonviolent resistance transitions.
Previous Research

Nonviolent Resistance & Democratization

The field of nonviolence has a rich theoretical background often connected to the work of philosophers, writers and activists such as Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. The study of nonviolent conflict, however, made a somewhat late entrance in academic research, but it has been a growing field ever since. A central aspect of the study of nonviolent conflict is the ability to bring about change through nonviolent means of conflict, and its relation to democratization. As for the theoretical aspects of the study of nonviolent conflict and campaigns, most contemporary academic studies define nonviolence in relation to (whether in favour or against) Gene Sharp’s definition of nonviolent resistance:

“the beliefs that the exercise of power depends on the consent of the ruled who, by withdrawing that consent, can control and even destroy the power of their opponent. In other words, nonviolent action is a technique used to control, combat and destroy the opponent’s power by nonviolent means of wielding power” (Sharp, 1973:4).

Sharp’s definition emphasises agency in explaining the onset and outcome of nonviolent campaigns. Another important aspect of Sharp’s definition of nonviolent action is the notion of power. Sharp argues that nonviolent theory sees the government as dependent on the support and consent of the people (Sharp, 1973:8, 28). Sharp’s main mechanism for the success of nonviolent civil resistance is to dislocate the government from its so-called pillars of support, i.e. the security, economic and civilian elites, structures and institutions that the state depends on for its sources of power (Ibid:11-12; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017:299). This mechanism is expressed in a different manner in Kurt Schock’s article The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance (2013), where the capacity of a campaign to dislocate a state authority form its sources of power is referred to as its leverage (Schock, 2013:283). According to Schock, leverage is one of three essential aspects of a nonviolent campaign, together with better prospects for mass-mobilisation and increased resilience when faced with state repression, compared to violent insurgencies.

In empirical research on nonviolent conflict and campaigns, one of the most comprehensive, comparative studies of nonviolent campaigns is Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan’s study from 2011 which process data of 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006. They found that nonviolent resistance campaigns were more successful than violent campaigns both in terms of short-term success (fulfilling campaign goals such as regime change) and more importantly in terms of long-term success (countries that experienced a successful nonviolent resistance campaign had higher levels of democracy five years after the conflict and less
risk of civil war within ten years after the conflict) (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013:202). Furthermore, Markus Bayer et al. (2016:760) find that democratic regimes that were induced by nonviolent campaigns survive substantially longer than those that experienced other forms of transitions (violent resistance or no resistance) (Ibid: 759, 764). Among researchers, there seems to be a level of agreement on the notion that nonviolent resistance is more effective both in obtaining short-term success to bring about a transition and in ensuring that that the transition is towards democracy rather than a new autocratic regime, especially when compared to violent resistance campaigns and insurgencies (Ackerman & Karatnycky, 2005; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Bayer et al., 2016). It has been empirically tested several times, using different variables, confounders and data sets while still showing similar results.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The study of security sector reform has, similar to the study of nonviolent campaigns, existed only a few decades in the scope of academic debate. The concept of SSR was originally introduced by development donors and practitioners in international organisations who propagated a more comprehensive approach to the security sector in post-conflict situations. The theory constituting SSR, however, evolved from two academic fields, one concerned about development and the other mainly concerned with defence and civil-military relations. The civil-military relations domain has primarily included political, historical and sociological approaches to understand relations between the armed forces, the state and the rest of society (Caparini & Fluri, 2000:8). Traditionally the domain was defined by works of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, dating back to the 1950s, which focused on civil-military relations in established democracies such as the United States. The main issues were civilian control over the military – and that a strong military might pose a threat to democracy – as well as the somewhat related issue of a trade-off between liberty and security (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:911).

According to authors Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (2008) the focus of the civil-military relations changed with the beginning of the third wave of democracy in the 1970s where political transitions in Latin America, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa – and later in Central and Eastern Europe – showed the military playing a key part. It thus became essential for new governments and other interested parties to understand how to deal with the armed forces in democratic transitions (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:912). Eventually, SSR developed as a reaction to limitations in the field of civil-military relations, such as the limited number of security actors considered and the focus on established democracies (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:913). Caparini and Fluri (2000:8) state that “the emergence of the [SSR] concept suggested the growing acceptance of
a broader definition of security than the traditional definition focused on military security of the state.” SSR is usually understood to include a wider and “more comprehensive” set of both military and civilian security institutions than the traditional security providers such as the military and the police (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:913). However, what should or should not be included in the concept of SSR remain an issue of debate within the field.

Bruneau & Matei (2008:913), explicitly links SSR to “broader efforts toward democratization, human-rights promotion, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction” by connecting the security sector to the political, economic, social and cultural changes that accompany democratization. SSR is also used by governments and many international organisations as a means to delivering security assistance and further democratization in transition societies (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:913; Chappuis & Siegle, 2015:2). Despite this, there is a scarcity, not to say lack, of large cross-case studies that assert the statistical effects of SSR on democratization. The relationship in mainly a theoretical one, exemplified through small case studies which show the difficulty for previous research to operationalize SSR but also to account for the causal mechanisms linking it to democratization.

The Concept of Spoilers

Partly due to the thin conceptualization of SSR, I will borrow the concept of spoilers from literature on peace-making, policy and civil war termination. In 1997 Stephen John Stedman defined spoilers in peace processes as the “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman, 1997:5). Desirée Nilsson and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs (2011:606-607) argue that the concept of spoilers has been widely used in the literature on peace-making, civil war termination and critical policy and in the process has been stretched too far beyond the scope of its original meaning and thereby lost some of its usefulness as a concept. While I argue that the concept of spoilers captures useful theoretical aspects of the behaviour and dangers of key actors in political transitions following nonviolent conflict (that is, beyond the specific scope of peace processes and peace-making prescribed for the use of the spoiler concept), I will apply the concept of spoilers in this study based on their ‘clearer’ and less ‘ambiguous’ definition, namely that spoilers are:

“[...] key individuals and parties to the armed conflict who use violence or other means to shape or destroy the peace process and in doing so jeopardize the peace efforts. Such groups can be found on the inside or the outside of the peace process and be either nonstate actors or state-related actors. In line with Stedman, we believe that it is critical to view spoilers and spoiling behaviour in relation to a specific peace agreement or a publicly committed pact. (Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, 2011:623)
Defining Key Concepts

**Regime change** is defined in the Autocratic Regimes dataset (Barbara Geddes et al., 2014) as the replacement of one set of “basic informal and formal rules” that determine what interests are represented in the leadership group which in turn influences policy choices, with another (Ibid: 314). The process of regime change is referred to by Geddes et al. as *transitions or regime transitions* (Ibid). I will look at regime changes that begin with an autocratic regime. Using the framework of Geddes et al. (Ibid:317) an autocratic regime begins when an executive achieve power through undemocratic means (any means besides direct or indirect fair and competitive elections or constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive); or when a government changes the formal or informal rules of the regime thereby limiting the competition in subsequent elections after achieving power through democratic means; or when the military prevents one or several popular parties from competing and partaking in elections or start dictating policy choices in important areas (Ibid). An autocratic regime ends when a competitive election is held for the executive or for the body that chooses the executive and is won by someone other than the former leader or allies of the former leader and that somebody is allowed to take office (regime end date is coded as the day of the election); or when the government is ousted by coercive means such as a coup, popular uprising, rebellion, civil war, invasion and is replaced by a different regime; or when the executive changes the rules for choosing leaders and policies so that ‘the identity of the group from which leaders can be chosen or the group that can select major policies change” (Ibid:318).

**Democratization** refers to a process in which a country increasingly move towards a political system were citizens are represented by elected officials that rule the regime, elections are fair and competitive, civil liberties and freedoms are respected and citizens are able to participate in government (Bayer et al., 2016:761). These characterisations of a democracy – representation, contestation, freedom and inclusion (which Bayer et al. in turn is borrowed from Jay Ulfelder in turn elaborates on Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy from 1971) – are similar to the definition of the electoral principle of democracy which “seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens” in Coppedge et al. (2019) V-Dem Index. I will discuss this further in the methodology section.

**Spoilers** are (for the purposes of this study) key, state-related, individuals and parties in the political transition following a nonviolent campaign that use, in particular, violent means or the (implicit or explicit) threat of violent means to shape or destroy the democratic transition (political transition
towards increased democratization) and by doing so risk the breakdown of the democratic transition and autocratic backslide. The goals of the nonviolent campaign (in this study limited to regime change) combined with increased democratization will be considered the ‘publicly committed pact’ in Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs’ definition above. However, in addition to Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs’ definition I will also consider the notion of spoiler capacities – that is the means to potentially become spoilers – similar to David E. Cunningham’s (2013:40) concept veto players, when discussing SSR efforts and the security sector in nonviolent settings.

**Spoiler Management** - Just as there are many definitions of what constitutes a spoiler, there are different ideas of how to manage spoilers – or prevent potential spoilers from becoming spoilers in the first place. Stedman identifies three strategies for spoiler management: inducement, socialisation and coercion, that is meeting the spoiler’s demands, changing the behaviour of the spoiler (by encouraging it to follow the agenda of the peace process or in this case, the political transition), and discourage spoiling by either punishing spoiler behaviour or reducing spoiler capacity (Stedman, 1997:12; Nilsson & Söderberg Kovacs, 2011:619-620). SSR and the establishment of civilian control over the military would work primarily through the last strategy of coercion, especially in terms of reducing spoiler capacities. The idea of SSR as a spoiler management technique (as it is defined here) would also fit Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major’s (2007) notion of spoiler management as being primarily about the distribution of relative power and leverage, namely that “every real or potential spoiler will be as greedy as he thinks he can afford to be” (Ibid:37).

**Security sector reform** is (here) the restructure and reform of core security sectors with the purpose of establishing civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency. This definition comes from the framework of Bruneau and Matei (2008:915), who base their conceptualization on Timothy Edmunds’ definition of SSR (2004) and his analysis of the interdependency between control, effectiveness and efficiency. Similarly, Brzoska divide SSR efforts in the ‘reconstruction’ and the ‘reform’ of the security sector where the first pertains to rebuilding security institutions and re-establish a legitimate monopoly of force, whereas the second pertains to changing governing principles and procedures of the security sector to include or strengthen for example civilian oversight and respect for human rights (Brzoska, 2006:1).
Core security actors are the actors authorized “to use violence in order to protect the state, its citizens or its external environment” (Brzoska, 2006:3). This includes military, police and intelligence services.

Civilian control - Bruneau and Matei conceptualize civilian control as the presence of institutional control mechanisms, oversight and professional norms (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:917). Mechanisms for civilian control will be presented in the methodology section.

Effectiveness and efficiency - Since the effectiveness of the security sector to fulfil their specific roles and missions such as fighting crime, external and internal conflict, terrorism etc. is indicated by the absence of these matters, Bruneau and Matei (2008:917) state that the general effectiveness of the security sector can be measured in terms of whether they are prepared to fulfil any or all of these roles and missions. Mechanisms for effectiveness and efficiency will be presented in the methodology section.
Theory

In the previous chapter I summarized some of the main trends and challenges from the literature on nonviolence, democratization and SSR. The main objective of this chapter is to merge these fields in a theoretic framework that could help me answer the research question of this thesis: “how does security sector reform (SSR) affect the likelihood of democratization after a nonviolent resistance campaign?”

How SSR Affect Democratization

In their framework on SSR, Bruneau and Matei conceptualize civilian control as the presence of institutional control mechanisms, oversight and professional norms. Civilian control over the security sector is a fundamental part of a democracy. It is especially important during the transition from authoritarian rule where the military and intelligence services often held a central role in the former government and served and protected it against the state’s own citizens (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:915-916). While establishing civilian control over the security sector obviously is important for any democratization process, so is the restructuring of the military and the security forces into a what Schnabel and Born (2011:11) call an effective, affordable and efficient security sector, capable and prepared to fulfil their roles and missions. Bruneau and Matei (2008:921) argue that the effectiveness and efficiency with which the government handle security issues can affect its legitimacy and popular support.

Bruneau and Matei argue that civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency work together in reforming the security sector in a way that is essential for democratization efforts and that they, to that end, are insufficient by themselves (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:922). However, although they at times re-enforce one another that is not always the case. For example, Bruneau and Matei state that “the reality is that direction and oversight are costly” (Ibid), i.e. oversight mechanisms demand that the security sector keep records, provide data to oversight organisations, make evaluations and follow up with reforms, improvements and training, etc. which will cost money and resources which in theory could have been used “more efficiently” on for example equipment or more personnel (Ibid:922-923).

Argument and Causal Mechanisms

Based on the arguments raised in previous sections, I argue that SSR contributes to democratization via two main mechanisms: (1), by mitigating security problems in the unstable conditions that signify political transitions; and (2), by reducing the risk that the security sector,
especially the military, become spoilers in the democratic transition. In this section I will account for the causal argument and mechanisms linking SSR and democratization following a nonviolent conflict and present my hypotheses and expected findings.

**SSR and Democratization I: Managing the Security Problem**

The traditional explanation used to explain the causal effect of SSR on democratization in violent post-conflict settings is that SSR is crucial, if not absolutely necessary, for the state to be able to deal with security problems and threats that otherwise could disrupt the democratization process or even plunge the state back into civil war (Caparini & Fluri, 2000:8; Brzoska, 2006:4-5). In post-conflict situations, insurgents and other potential threats to the new government are often armed. Stabilization, containing the spread of violence and eliminating remnants of it, as well as establishing basic security agencies are thus usually the priority for early stage SSR, according to Brzoska (2006:5, 9). However, thinking more broadly around what constitutes a security problem in a newly established political regime, it becomes clear that this is an issue that also concern transitions that follow after nonviolent campaigns. Caparini and Fluri (2008) use spiralling crime rates as an example of damning security problems:

“The inability or inefficiency of a state in providing for the basic security needs of its citizens thus poses a significant obstacle to stabilisation and democratic consolidation. In numerous post-authoritarian states of Latin America, for example, it is widely recognised that the inability of the state to provide for the public security of citizens against spiralling crime rates is potentially the most destabilising factor in the consolidation of democracy throughout the region.” (Caparini & Fluri, 2000:8)

Furthermore, political transitions after a nonviolent campaign present the same power vacuum which could provide violent elements with a window of opportunity to try and seize power.

The establishment of institutions that increase effectiveness and efficiency – and civilian control – would increase the preparedness for core security actors to fulfil their missions and roles, such as fighting crime, external and internal conflict, and terrorism that otherwise could pose potential threats to the transition towards democracy. My first hypothesis is thus:

**Hypothesis 1:** Security sector reforms will likely increase the ability of core security actors to manage security problems in the transition after a nonviolent resistance campaign, thereby increasing the probability of democratization.

If the hypothesis is true, the level of democracy after the end of regime change should correspond with the extent that institutions and mechanisms associated especially with effectiveness and efficiency were implemented during the transition period through reforms of the security sector. If such institutions and mechanisms were implemented to a large extent during the transition
period, the reforms should be followed by lower levels of ‘security problems’ (e.g. crime, internal and external conflict, and terrorism), and a higher level of democratization after the transition, compared to if such institutions and mechanism were implemented to a small extent or not implemented at all. In terms of the hypothesis being false, the most damning evidence would be if institutions and mechanisms of civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency were implemented to a high extent and democratization still were low or if the state transitioned back to autocracy even though reforms had been made.

SSR and Post-Transition Democratization II: Managing Spoilers in the Transition Process

Following violent conflict, there are, according to Bayer et al. (2016:763), several ‘dysfunctionalities’ to democratic transition left by armed movements, for example are armed groups generally in an ‘de facto veto position’ relative to civilians and prone to consider themselves ‘a revolutionary vanguard’ deserving of privileges in the new system they have created. They argue that nonviolent resistance campaigns do not leave this legacy for the following transition. However, Timothy Edmunds (2004:47) state that the security sector itself can be an important obstacle to democratization: in post-authoritarian states it is often politicised and “used to playing (or being used to play) a key (partisan) role in domestic politics” (2004:49). Furthermore, states Edmunds, “the security sector – or at least elements of it – is likely to have been a key instrument of authoritarian control and, as a result, tends to be tied to the old regime in relation to both ideology and its own interests” (Edmunds, 2004:49-50). Being used to privileges and to wield cohesive power, taken together with the, often, influential role they play during the campaign, the ‘dysfunctionalities’ that Bayer et al. accredit to armed movements in violent campaigns seem to also, at least partly, adhere to core security actors after a nonviolent campaign.

Leaving the security sector ‘untouched’ and old power structures intact after a post-authoritarian regime change might endanger the democratic process, since loss of old privileges, feelings of entitlement and extensive military capabilities (real or imagined) could push the security sector or parts of it to spoil the democratic transition and attempt to retake power if they are not satisfied with the new political regime. As Brzoska states:

“[...] after an initial shock, entrenched elements and traditional structures re-emerge, rendering the fiction of a 'clean slate' potentially dangerous because it allows old structures to take hold in the new situation.” (Brzoska, 2006:7)

Stedman (1997:12) identifies three strategies for spoiler management: inducement, socialisation and coercion: i.e. you give the spoiler what it wants, change the behaviour of the spoiler or punish spoiler behaviour or reduce spoiler capacity. SSR works mainly though the last strategy,
to reduce spoiler capacity, by shifting and reshuffling power relationships. Schnabel and Born state that “if pursued as intended – shifting power over a society’s security provision from the few to the many – SSR puts security institutions in the service of an empowered society” (Schnabel & Born, 2011:62). The civilian control aspect of SSR is obviously a very important mechanism for reducing spoiler capacities, as military capacities through policies and budgeting would be placed under civilian control. However, Bruneau and Matei (2008:921) argue that the effectiveness and efficiency with which the government handle security issues can affect its legitimacy and popular support. A legitimate government in the eyes of the public is also important in terms of keeping the pressure on the security sector to reform as the reforms themselves might be considered threatening to old privileges (Brzoska, 2006:8). In light of this argument, my second hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2: Security sector reforms will likely reduce spoiler capabilities among core security actors making it harder for them to become spoilers in transition period thereby increasing the probability of democratization.

If this hypothesis is true, the level of democratization after the end of the transition should correspond with the extent that institutions and mechanisms associated especially with civilian control were implemented during the transition period through reforms of the security sector. If such institutions and mechanism were implemented to a large extent during the transition period there should be signs of re-structured power relationships in the military such as the disentanglement of the executive and the military (the de-politicization of the military) and the establishment of formal procedure for internal issues such as recruitments and promotions. There should also be an absence of attempts to spoil the transition process such as interference in early elections and policy, and most obvious, an absence of military coups. Finally, there should be a higher level of democratization after the transition, compared to if such institutions and mechanism were implemented to a small extent or not implemented at all. In terms of the hypothesis being false, the most damning evidence would be if institutions and mechanisms of civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency were implemented to a high extent and democratization would still be low or if the state transitioned back to autocracy even though reforms had been made.
Figure 1: Causal Argument

Security Sector Reform

(+) Civilian Control
1. Institutional control mechanisms
2. Civilian oversight mechanisms (est. by SSR)

(+) Effectiveness & Efficiency
1. Preparedness to fulfil roles and missions*
2. Efficiency in fulfilling roles and missions*
(*Fighting internal and external conflict, crime, terrorism etc.)

(+ Post-Transition Democratization

(-) Spoiler capacities among core security actors

(+ Ability for core security actors to manage security problems*
(*Internal and external conflict, crime, terrorism etc.)
Research Design

In order to test the theoretical framework outlined above, I will do a qualitative study or more specifically a structured, focused comparison. A structured focused comparison method is motivated both due to the nature of the case population and the need to be able to follow the causal pathways between SSR and democratization more in depth than would have been possible in a quantitative study. I will outline these reasons more specifically in the sections below. Besides presenting the criteria for my case selection and method, I will account for my chosen time frame, data, as well as how the theory will be operationalized in the study.

Structured, Focused Comparison

The method of doing a case study by structured, focused comparison is carried out by formulating a series of standardized questions developed from the theoretical framework and set to reflect the research objective of the study, which are then ‘asked’ to each case (George & Bennett, 2004:67, 71). George and Bennett write that the method is ‘structured’ in the sense that these questions are asked of all cases in the study which makes comparison between cases possible and systematic. The part where the method is ‘focused’ refer to it being used to limit the study to deal only with certain aspects of a case – the aspects that the study sets out to examine in the first place – and not wander off to include other issues in the case, however interesting (George & Bennett, 2004:67, 70).

The use of a qualitative, small case study for this thesis is advantageous for several reasons, first small intensive case studies are better equipped to deal with large and complex concepts such as ‘democracy’, address causal complexity (since they can address issues and mechanisms more closely and in-depth than large statistical analyses are able to), and can examine the hypothesized causal relationship in-depth while also considering contextual factors and how they affect that relationship (George & Bennett, 2004:19). This is crucial for my study where I need to trace the causal mechanisms carefully as there is inconsistency in the theory of SSR and how it affects democracy. Structured, focused comparison will increase the comparability both between cases but also increase possibilities of comparing across studies as the transparency of the study increases. There are trade-offs, of course, with conducting a small and intensive case study as opposed to a larger statistical one. For example, while tracing the mechanisms will make it easier for me to obtain a high internal validity, i.e. high confidence about causality between the independent and the dependent variable, the external validity of the study will be lower, i.e. the ability to draw inference from the cases to the entire population (George & Bennett, 2004:22; Kellstedt & Whitten, 2016:89).
Operationalisation & Questions to the Cases

In this section I will operationalize my dependent and independent variables by, first, presenting ways to measure them and, second, integrate them in a set of structural, focused questions which I will apply to the material and data from the cases.

Operationalizing the DV: Level of Democratization

In the previous chapter I defined democratization in terms of representation (when elected officials rule the regime), contestation (elections are fair and competitive), freedom (civil liberties are respected), and inclusion (citizens are able to participate in government). I will use the V-Dem Electoral democracy index to measure the level of democratization. The index description states that:

“The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance.” (Coppedge et al. 2019)

The electoral democracy index incorporates all four dimensions of democracy as stated above: democratic representation in elected officials and chief executive, contestation through competitive and clean elections without systematic irregularities, freedom of expression and association, and inclusion through extensive suffrage and that elections “affect the composition of the chief executive of the country”. The index measures on an interval from 0 to 1, where 0 represent a low score on the interval (the country is no democracy at all), and 1 represent a high score on the interval (the country is fully democratic). The score is measured annually, and the data includes all states in the world (V-Dem; Pinckney, 2018:28). In order to measure the change in this variable, I will compare the V-Dem electoral democracy index score from the year of the regime change and start of the transition (2011 for both cases) with the score for each country on the year the transition ends (2014 for Tunisia and 2013 for Egypt) and, for reference, three years after the transition (2017 for Tunisia and 2016 for Egypt).

Operationalizing the IV: Security Sector Reform

In conceptualizing SSR in the previous chapter, I defined it as reforms of the core security sector to increase civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency. I defined it as both explicit SSR efforts and implicitly as reforms of the security sector that aim for the same goals. Finally, I defined SSR
efforts as reforms that deal directly with core security actors (military, police and intelligence services) in an attempt to narrow the definition and make it feasible in this type of empirical study. I will now turn to the operationalization of the SSR mechanisms: civilian control and effectiveness and efficiency.

1. Civilian control
Bruneau and Matei (2008) conceptualize civilian control as the presence of institutional control mechanisms, oversight and professional norms. Institutional control mechanisms refer to the formal civilian institutions in place to control the military, police and intelligence services, such as ministries of defence, committees in parliaments with authority over policy and budgets and national security councils (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:916-917). Establishing institutional control mechanisms also holds significant value in terms of separating the military from the executive power in government. This is especially important in cases where the military was the government and still enjoys prerogatives (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:915). The oversight mechanism refers to the ability of civilians to monitor the actions of the security forces both through the presence of formal oversight mechanisms in the executive, legislative and judicial branches (to monitor core security actors and investigate and reprimand them if they deviate from the rules and guidelines agreed upon by the civilian institutions), and through ‘informal’ oversight mechanisms such as NGOs and media monitoring of the security sector (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:916-917). In order for the latter to function, it is necessary that core security institutions are transparent and gather data on their activities and that this data and information is accessible to the public. Professional norms refer to whether or not the former two control mechanisms are internalized in the security sector. This include for example policies on recruitment, education, training and promotions within the core security institutions (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:917).

2. Effectiveness and efficiency
Since effectiveness of the security sector to fulfil their specific roles and missions such as fighting crime, external and internal conflict, terrorism etc. is indicated by the absence of these matters, Bruneau and Matei (2008:917) state that the general effectiveness of the security sector can be measured in terms of whether they are prepared to fulfil any or all of these roles and missions. The mechanisms they suggest for measuring effectiveness are: first, the presence of a plan or strategy (for example: national security or military strategies, doctrines on intelligence or counter-terrorism doctrines); second, the presence of structures to both create and implement these strategies (for example: ministries of defence or national security councils); third, material and human resources
sufficient to implement their assigned roles and missions (for example money and personnel); forth, a state needs to implement their roles and missions in an efficient manner, i.e. governmental agencies should determine the most efficient or cost-effective use of resources (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:918-919). In regard to last mechanism, the ‘efficiency-mechanism’, Bruneau and Matei argue that conceptualizing and measuring efficiency in the security sector comes with major problems. Since security is a mostly a public activity, there is no market mechanism to define whether a mission or a security activity is being done efficiently or not (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:919). Drawing on the research of Sharon Caudle, Bruneau and Matei suggest that efficiency in the security sector is best measured by the presence of the institutions necessary to make sure that governments consider cost-efficiency in their security policies and procedures, i.e. the presence of institutions that deal with allocation and oversight of public resources in other government agencies (Bruneau & Matei, 2008:920). Table 1 summarizes the indicators for each SSR mechanism and details the type of measurement to determine its presence/absence in the cases.

Table 1: Operationalizing the IV: Security Sector Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECHANISM</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
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| Civilian Control & Oversight     | **Institutional control mechanisms (+)**
|                                  | ▪ Civilian institutions with control over core security actors (e.g. ministry of defence, parliamentary committees with authority over policy and budgets, and national security councils)   |
|                                  | ▪ Depoliticization of the military                                                                                           |
|                                  | **Oversight (+)**
|                                  | ▪ Formal oversight mechanisms in the executive, legislative and judicial sectors of government (monitoring core security actors, investigating and reprimanding any deviance from the rules and guidelines set up by civilian institutions) |
|                                  | ▪ Transparency and access to information (is it possible for informal civilian actors such as NGOs and media to access information about the activities of core security actors?) |
|                                  | **Professional norms (+)**
|                                  | ▪ Formal policies and procedures on internal issues such as recruitment, education, training and promotions in the core security institutions                                                                 |
|                                  | **Spoiler occurrence (-)**
|                                  | ▪ Attempts by core security actors to spoil the transition process (e.g. interference in early elections and policy, military coups)                                                                 |
| Preparedness & Efficiency        | **Preparedness to fulfil roles and missions (+)**
|                                  | ▪ Plan or strategy (e.g. national security or military strategy or doctrine)                                                      |
|                                  | ▪ Structures to create and implement these strategies (e.g. of defence or national security councils, see civilian institutions)                                                                 |
|                                  | ▪ Allocation of material and human resources to implement these plans or strategies (local estimation)                                                                                                    |
Questions for Structured Focused Comparison

In accordance with the conceptualization and measurement of post-transition democratization, and the indicators for each SSR mechanism, I will ask the following questions in the questionnaire below to each case.

Questions for Structured Focused Comparison

1. What is the level of democracy in the year the transition ends? How does it develop in the three years after the end of the transition? Has there been an increase or decrease in the level of democracy since the start of the transition period?

2. To what extent did reforms place the core security sector (military and police) under civilian control?
   - What civilian institutions were put in place to govern the military and police?
   - How effective were these civilian institutions in controlling the military and police?
   - Did reforms set up formal oversight mechanisms that can monitor, investigate the military and police, and deliver sanctions if necessary?
   - Is information and data on the security sector and its activities made available to the public?
   - Did reforms include policies and procedures on internal issues such as recruitment, education, training and promotions in the core security institutions?
   - During the transition period, were there any instances where core security actors interfered in early elections and policy or otherwise attempted to take power?

3. To what extent did reforms address effectiveness and efficiency in the military and police in terms of fulfilling their main roles and missions (fighting internal and external conflict, crime and terrorism)?
   - Did reforms increase preparedness in the military and the police to fulfil their main roles and missions by establishing (1) a plan or strategy (such as a national security strategy or doctrine), (2) structures to create and implement these strategies (such as a ministry of defence or national security councils), and (3) account for the allocation of material and human resources appropriate to implement these strategies?
   - Did reforms set up institutions that deal with allocation and oversight of public recourses in other government agencies (specifically, the military and the police)?
   - During the transition period, were there high crime levels, internal or external conflict or terrorism attacks?
Case Selection

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between SSR and democratization in nonviolence settings, to do this I will look at political transitions that follow after a nonviolent resistance campaign (that is, transitions after successful campaigns with the purpose of regime change), including both transitions towards democracy (i.e. democratic transitions) and transitions that experienced democratic breakdown and autocratic backslide. To identify cases of political transitions following nonviolent resistance campaign I have used the list of 78 ‘civil resistance-led transitions’ between 1945 and 2015 compiled by Jonathan Pinckney (2018:26-27, for the full list, see Pinckney, 2018:85-87). To create this list Pinckney combined data from Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz’s (2014) Authoritarian Regimes dataset, the NAVCO 2.1 dataset (Erica Chenoweth and Christopher Shay, 2017), and a few additional cases identified in earlier research done by the author (Pinckney, 2018:26-27). Additional scope conditions from the SSR literature limited the case population further: as SSR as a concept was first introduced in the late 1990s, I will only look at cases from the year 2000 and onwards.

The process of case selection, i.e. the method used to choose cases for intensive study, is essential to avoid selection biases that could manipulate the causal relationship which in turn would render the study useless in terms of being able to render observational evidence that are generalizable across the case population (Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016:394). This is especially important in qualitative studies, i.e. intense study of only a few cases, and when the population holds a limited amount of cases which is not enough for a random case selection. The criteria for case selection within this population is based on Mill’s method of difference or the most-similar method. In this research design, cases are chosen based on similar background conditions and divergent outcomes with the purpose of identifying the impact of ‘X’ which is “regarded as a possible or probable cause of Y [the outcome]” (Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016:398, 399). Thus, in order to avoid selection bias and in line with the most-similar design, I will select cases based on information about the outcome (Y) and background conditions (Z). These cases should be different in terms of the outcome, i.e. change in the level of democratization and as similar as possible on the relevant background conditions.

Background conditions are variables that potentially also could influence the level of post-conflict democracy, based on previous research, and thus could ‘interfere’ with our ability to say whether X causes Y unless controlled for (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013:84, 87-88). Background conditions typically used in studies on nonviolence and democracy are: time period, regional context (such as the numbers of democracies among neighbouring states), old regime type, economic development, military legacy, and of course the nature of the resistance campaign (Bayer
et al., 2016:764; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2013:203, 212-213; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013:391, 393, 397; 2018:31). Based on fulfilling as many of these criteria as possible, I have chosen to examine
the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt that began in 2011 when the leaders of their previous
authoritarian regimes, Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak were ousted. The cases are similar on many
background conditions: they took place in the roughly the same time period, are located in the
same region, and were both autocratic ‘dominant-party’ regimes before the nonviolent resistance
campaign (Geddes et al., 2014:326). The campaigns themselves followed a similar pattern and
where similar means were used (the campaign in Egypt was directly influenced by the one in
Tunisia). The countries have a similar EDI-score in 2011 (Tunisia has 0.22 and Egypt has 0.16). In
2013 this had changed; Tunisia had an EDI-score of 0.7 (2014) and Egypt had a score of 0.21.
Tunisia thus experienced a high level of change in democracy during regime change and Egypt
experienced a low level of change. Figure 2 below shows the level of democracy for Egypt and
Tunisia in the years before and after the resistance campaign in 2011.

**Figure 2: Level of Democracy in Egypt and Tunisia 2008-2018**

![Electoral Democracy Index](chart.png)

**Time Period and Data Sources**

In establishing the time period for this study, there are two main issues that need to be taken into
consideration. I aim to measure democratization after the regime change. To do so, I use Geddes
et al.’s (2014) conceptualization to establish and measure the time frame for the regime change.
With their criteria, the regime change in Tunisia ended in 2014 while the one in Egypt ended in 2013.

The second aspect of identifying the appropriate time period for the study is estimating how long it takes for SSR policies to “give results”. This is tricky as it depends on what and when reforms were implemented, assuming there are capabilities and political will to implement them. In general, SSR, in full, is thought to take a long time both because they are demanding reforms that take time to implement and because conditions in post-conflict situations are far from what Schnabel and Born call ‘ideal’, which will make implementing a full-scale SSR immediately very difficult (Schnabel & Born, 2011:8-9). SSR, they argue, will be “a much longer-lasting and more demanding project in situations that are far removed from ideal-case SSR environments than in those that are more welcoming.” (Schnabel & Born, 2011:8-9). Acknowledging that it might take a few years for the new structures to become fully internalized I will look at the level of democracy a few years after the transition has ended to make sure I include any development in democratization pertaining to SSR reforms during the transition. However, to add too many years would be a mistake, as it would be harder to trace the level of democratization to SSR efforts during the transition.

To address the issue of temporal order and endogeneity, that is the problem of reversed causation, which plagues SSR in theory, I will look at reforms of the security sector within the years of transition. At the end of the transition and three years after the transition I will measure the level of democratization. However, I will take care to trace the causal mechanisms, year by year, listed above to enable a discussion on what type of covariation links SSR efforts and levels of democratization.

This study relies on a mixture of primary and secondary sources. In terms of primary sources, I have legal reform documents concerning the security sector in Tunisia (for the years of the transition 2011-2014), such orders and bylaws, compiled and made accessible by DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. I will use similar (but unfortunately not as extensive) material for Egypt as well as secondary accounts of reforms of the security sector. I will also use secondary material on the reforms made in Tunisia. Other than reports of security sector reforms in Tunisia and Egypt, I will use secondary source material form the Marsad project launched in several states in North Africa and the Middle East after the Arab Spring revolutions as a means of civilians to monitor the security sector and security sector reforms in their respective countries. Marsad is financed by the Trust fund for North Africa, TFNA, which was created by some of the DCAF members to “is to assist legal and institutional development in the justice- and security sectors in countries of North Africa” after the revolutions in 2011. The current members in TFNA
are Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovak Republic, Sweden and Switzerland (DCAF). I will use data from the Tunisia section of Marsad – Marsad Tunisie – as Marsad Egypt mainly re-distributes research articles. For information on my dependent variable, I will use the *Varieties of Democracy project, V-Dem* (Coppedge, 2019). I will discuss data limitation at the end of this paper.

**Structure of Analysis**

In the following two chapters I will present my findings in accordance with the structured, focused comparison questions listed above. I will do this case by case and in the order of the questions: beginning with the overall outcome after the transition, followed by an account of reforms during the transition and the extent that they fulfil the criteria for civilian control, effectiveness and efficiency. I will, however, begin each chapter with a short introduction of the case: the nonviolent campaign and the regime change. I will also account for the role of core security actors in the previous regime and during the campaign, as this is likely to have affected conditions for reforms. In the analysis I will compare the cases in order to answer the research question: “how does security sector reform (SSR) affect the likelihood of democratization after a nonviolent resistance campaign?”.
Tunisia

Introduction

Following weeks of widespread protest, on 14 January 2011, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali resigned from the post he held for twenty-three years and escaped to Saudi Arabia. Ben Ali came into power in 1987, after having seized the presidency from Habib Bourguiba in a coup. Initially, Ben Ali based his power and authority on the ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, (RCD), security services and a ministry of communications that silenced and censored the media. However, with time, Ben Ali and his wife Leila Trabelsi increasingly centralised the power to both their families and, in the process, deprived the RCD of their political prerogatives and marginalized parts of the security sector, thus increasingly eroding the support base of the regime (ICG, 2011b:1, 9). Ben Ali was initially replaced by his prime minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, with Fouad Mebazza being assigned the post as interim president for two months. This interim government struggled for a month to balance the continuity of existing institutions and fulfilling the demands of the revolution (Crisis group, 2011b:12). Ghannouchi was later replaced by Beji Caid Essebsi who had been a minister under Bourguiba but never a part of Ben Ali’s government. On February 27 all members of Ben Ali’s former cabinet resigned, effectively ending the regime (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014; Crisis group, 2011b:17-18).

Elections for the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) were held in October 2011 and was considered fair, transparent and pluralistic, the first of its kind in Tunisia (Crisis Group, 2012b:i). The election was won by the moderate Islamist part An-Nahda (also known as Ettahdha) which ruled Tunisia in a coalition called the ‘Troika’ with two secular parties, Ettakatol and Congress for the Republic, CPR, while the new constitution was being written. The new constitution was delayed several times due to political crises, two national dialogues and two political assassinations, but was finally ratified in January 2014 (Fraihat, 2016:59). In October 2014 the first elections were held for parliament and president, where An-Nahda proved willing to admit defeat to the secular party Nidaa Tounes and the opposition, thus indicating the end of the transition period and the beginning of a new and democratic regime in Tunisia.

Core Security Actors and the Security Sector under Ben Ali

The core security actors in Tunisia during the transition 2011-2014 can be divided primarily into the armed forces (the Forces Armees Tunisien) and the internal security forces (often abbreviated as the ISF), where the latter is under the control of the Ministry of National Defence and the latter
under the control of the Ministry of Interior (Hanlon, 2012:7-8; ICG, 2015:1). The Tunisian armed forces include the army, navy and air force. The ISF include agents of the police, the National Guard, the Judicial Police (operates in the Ministry of Justice and at the courts but is controlled by the Ministry of Interior), the Intervention Forces (special weapons and tactics forces), and the Presidential Guard Forces (Hanlon, 2012:12, 13).

In the former regime the military were marginalised and kept out of power. According to a report by the International Crisis Group (2011b:11) the military was estimated to consist only of 35,800 men at the time of the uprising in 2011 compared to the ISF, who were estimated at 150,000 men at the time. The military did not receive any special compensation or material advantages and were absent from political struggles (Ibid:11).

Ben Ali was relying, especially in terms of intelligence, on the security apparatus mobilized by the Ministry of Interior such as the National Guard and the police. The ISF were highly centralized under Ben Ali who build an extensive and omnipresent surveillance system with police stations and neighbourhood committees in most villages and neighbourhoods (Kartas, 2014:376-377). However, even though they were better supplied than the army and the military, the police and other security services within the ISF were poorly paid and working conditions were demanding under the Ben Ali rule (ICG, 2011b:11; 2015:4). The group that did get privileges and benefits, especially in terms of salaries, compared to other security services, was the Presidential Guard. This was an elite group of ca 5000 men and the only section within the ISF that Ben Ali trusted (ICG, 2011b:11). The privileged position of the Presidential Guard did however not sit well with the other sections within the ISF, nor with the military. The report by ICG from 2011 state that “the confidence that the president placed in the Presidential Guard at the palace was a source of humiliation for the other security services” (ICG, 2011b:11).

During the nonviolent uprising, it was primarily the ISF (mostly police) that partook in repression against protestors. Police violence against civilian protestors increased with the rise in strength and polarisation of the movement. ICG concludes that police violence, which was the primary way the government exercised power during the uprising, was an important factor as to why the initial socio-economic demands of the protestors morphed into demands of regime change (Ibid:5). The military, on the other hand, took very little or no part in the repression. During the first protests in Tunis, they interposed themselves between police and demonstrators (Ibid:11).

**Question 1: Democracy Consolidation in Tunisia**

To establish the nature of the dependent variable, the extent of democratization in Tunisia after the transition, I will answer the following questions:
What is the level of democracy in the year the transition ends? How does it develop in the three years after the end of the transition? Has there been an increase or decrease in the level of democracy since the start of the transition period?

The transition in Tunisia, following the classification of Geddes et al. (2014) ends in 2014 with the beginning of a new, democratic regime. The electoral democracy index score, EDI score (Coppedge et al., 2019), for Tunisia that year is 0.7 (on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is ‘fully democratic’). This is a sharp increase from 0.22 which was Tunisia’s EDI score in 2011 when the old regime fell, and the transition began. In the following three years after the start of the new regime in 2014, Tunisia have the EDI scores of 0.68 (2015), 0.73 (2016) and 0.76 (2017). That is, after a slight decrease in 2015 the level of democracy, as measured by the index, increases again in 2016 and again in 2017, although the level is fairly stable during this time period. Based on this index, Tunisia experienced to a fairly high extent that there was electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage was extensive and political and civil society organisations could operate freely, elections were clean and not marred by systematic irregularities and that they affected the composition of the chief executive of the country, and that there between elections existed freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance (Coppedge et al., 2019). Figure 3 below depicts the change in the level of democracy in Tunisia during the transition and after, according to the EDI score:

Figure 3: The Level of Democracy in Tunisia 2011-2017 (EDI score)

Source: Coppedge et al. (2019)
Question 2: Civilian Control & Oversight in Tunisia 2011-2014

To establish the extent of which civilian control and oversight were introduced by reforms, I will look at the following structured, focused comparison questions:

- What civilian institutions were put in place to govern the military and police?

After Ghannouchi and his cabinet had resigned in 2011 the army and the ISF were first placed under the control of the new interim government led by Essebsi with Decree-law no. 2011-14 which passed 23 Mars. The Decree-law no. 2011-14 stipulates the terms for the temporary organisation of political powers. According to articles four and five of Decree-law no. 2011-14, new legislation during this period will take the form of decree-laws, enacted by the interim president after deliberation with the council of ministers. This explicitly includes, but is not limited to, new legislation in areas such as criminal justice and legal systems, law enforcement, the military, and the fight against terrorism, money laundering and corruption. In Essebsi’s interim government neither the president, nor the council of ministers, were elected democratically (their mission was to prepare for nationwide democratic elections and to run the country until a new government was in place).

The Decree law no. 2011-14 was replaced after the election for National Constituent Assembly, NCA, in October 2011. The new constitutive act, Constitutive Act no. 2011-6, came into force on December 16, 2011 and controlled the temporary organisation of political power in Tunisia until the day a new constitution was in place. Constitutive Act no. 2011-6 centred the political power around the newly established NCA whose members were elected in an election that was considered democratic and transparent. According to Constitutive Act no. 2011-6, the executive power is ultimately held by the president, together with the head of government and government, through a mandate by the NCA: signing laws into force and representing Tunisia. Furthermore, according to Article 11 of Constitutive Act no. 2011-6, the president has high command of Tunisia’s military forces and can, together with the head of government, assign and dismiss high ranking military personnel. Finally, Constitutive Act no. 2011-6, gives the government executive power in all matters where the president does not have it (including the Ministry of Interior and the ISF): the head of government chairs the Council of Ministers, creates, reorganizes or removes ministries, state secretariats, public offices, institutions and administrative services (after deliberation with the Council of Ministers and having informed the president), and appoints high civil functions (in consultation with the relevant ministers and the Council of Ministers).

In January 2014, the Constitution for the Second Republic of Tunisia, henceforth called the constitution, replaced Constitutive Act no. 2011-6. Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the constitution address the nature and purposes of the military and the ISF. As stipulated by Articles 17, 18 and 19, military
and internal security forces can only be established by the state, and will be organized, follow and operate in order with current law and public interest. *Article 18* explicitly states that the military are under civilian control.

In the constitution, the Assembly of People’s Representatives (ARP) replaces NCA as the main holder of legislative power. Legislative power in regard to governing the security sector is regulated in *Article 65* in the constitution. *Article 71* of the constitution stipulates that executive power should remain in the hands of the president as well as in the hands of the head of government and his government which includes executive power over changes made to the security sector. *Article 77* of the constitution outlines, more specifically, the role of the president in relation to the security forces: it is the president that, after consultation with the head of government, decides the general policies on matters of national defence, foreign relations as well as national security and the protection of the state from internal and external threats. Furthermore, *Article 77* states that the president chairs (présider) the National Security Council and is the high commander of the military forces and can, together with the People’s Assembly decide to declare war or peace, and whether to send troops abroad. The president can also, according to *Article 78* of the constitution, decide to nominate candidates for high-ranking positions in the military, internal security forces and the diplomatic staff as well as terminate their missions after consultation with the head of government.

The 2014 constitution also places executive political power over the military and security sector in the hands of the government, which is regulated by *Article 89* in the constitution as the head of government, ministers and secretaries of state (those in the two latter categories are chosen by the head of government, ministers for defence and foreign affairs are chosen by the head of government together with the president, according to *Article 89*). The head of government usually presides over the Council of Ministers, as is regulated in *Article 93* of the constitution, except for matters of defence, foreign affairs, national security against both external and internal threats.

- *How effective were these civilian institutions in controlling the military and police?*

The next question is whether or not this formal civilian control through democratically elected political institutions trickled down to the actual management and control of the military. Namely, was there any change to the actual power structures in the military and internal security forces?

Hanlon states in her article (2012:21) that the ministries of defence and interior are the main executive functions of Tunisia’s different governments during the transition period (and were permanently established as such after the constitution passed in 2014). According to Hanlon’s research in 2012 (Hanlon, 2012:24), the Ministry of Defence is assigned oversight and governance
over the Tunisian armed forces (the Tunisian military), to a point where the latter are “completely subordinate to the government and controlled by it” (Hanlon, 2012:8). Hanlon states that the Ministry of Defence is “an almost entirely civilian organization”, led by a civilian minister of defence, with the primary responsibility for implementing policy that concerns uniformed services, namely the army, navy and air force (Hanlon, 2012:24). The Ministry of Defence, according to Hanlon (2012:25) is relatively transparent and welcoming of reforms such as increased oversight. The same is not said by the Ministry of Interior which is often portrayed as one of the major obstacles to any real reform of the security sector in Tunisia, being opaque in regards to structure and organisation, and being under recurrent, if not constant, criticism for not breaking with the ways of the old authoritarian regime (Hanlon, 2012:26). According to Hanlon (2012:26) the Ministry of Interior is “the proverbial black box of Tunisia’s security sector” and that “successful SSR in Tunisia will ultimately hinge on the establishment of real, democratically elected, civilian oversight of the MOI [Ministry of Interior]” (2012:26).

Several purges and shifts in leadership within the Ministry of Interior were made following this criticism in early 2011, mostly under Interior Minister Farhat Rahji. Two reports from the ICG, from 2011 and 2015 respectively, state that the minister “under pressure from human rights associations, long-term opponents of the dictatorship, and hurriedly reappointed former general directors” (2015:4) forced 42 high-ranking ISF officials into early retirement on January 27 (ICG, 2011b:17; 2015:4). Among the 42 officials were all 26 members of the General Directorate for National Security (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019:227). Ruth Hanau Santini and Giulia Cimini state in their article from 2019, that Interior Minister Rajhi between January and March 2011 also dismissed the security commanders that were more closely associated with the old regime and disbanded the Directorate for State Security (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019:227).

The Directorate for State Security was an important part of the Tunisian intelligence service, responsible, according to Bouguerra (2014:2), for coordinating to two main bodies in Tunisian intelligence that supported surveillance and targeting for the purpose of political control. According to Hanau Santini and Cimini (2019:227) it was also the subject for a majority of the torture allegations. The dissolvement of the Directorate for State Security became known as the dissolvement of the political police in the media and was advertised as such by Rahji, although the ICG later stated that calling it a dissolvement of the political police was an overstatement (ICG, 2015:4-5). Rahji’s decision to dissolve the Directorate for State Security was well received by the Tunisian public at the time according to Bouguerra (2014:2), although some security experts later stated that it caused disarray within the intelligence services.
Further complicating this picture is the fact that the Interior Minister not always seems in control of his ministry. Hanlon, for example, states that Tunisian human rights activists describe the relationship between Ali Laarayedh, Minister of Interior 2011-2013 who was detained and tortured under the Ben Ali regime, and his ministry as “a war” (Hanlon, 2012:26). An illustrating example is what Hanlon (2012:26-27) calls ‘the standoff’ between Laarayedh and Monsef Al Ajimi, the Director of the Intervention Forces. Laarayedh attempted to remove Al Ajimi from his post after the latter had been formally accused of firing on crowds during the revolution. Al Ajimi, however, had the support of parts of the police who organised blockades and strikes in protest of Al Ajimi being removed from his post. In the end, Al Ajimi was moved to another position within the ministry. Hanlon argues that this episode suggests that Laarayedh’s authority, and so also the authority of the civilian transition government in office at the time, over the Ministry of Interior was limited and that ministry officials can, and have the resources to, resist efforts to reform the Ministry of Interior (Hanlon, 2012:26-27).

One of the reforms that had impact on reshaping the relationship between the Ministry of Interior and the political leadership was the stripping of any electoral role from the Ministry of Interior. According to Ben Mahfoudh, it was “Tunisia’s most important legal and political procedure on the path to democratic transition” (Ben Mahfoudh, 2014:5). It took place in the build-up to the legislative elections for NCA in October 2011 when an independent High Electoral Commission took charge of supervising the electoral process (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019:227), thus decoupling the political process of electing a government (and for the first time, a parliament) form the ministry also in charge of mass surveillance and the ISF.

Did reforms set up formal oversight mechanisms that can monitor, investigate the military and police, and deliver sanctions if necessary?

This question addresses the creation or modification of formal oversight mechanisms in the legislative, executive and judicial sectors in Tunisia, making it possible to monitor, investigate and reprimanding any deviance from the rules and guidelines set by civilian institutions by the military and internal security sector. Reforms of the political system in Tunisia, as outlined above, did shift legislative power over the security sector from the autocratic government led by Ben Ali to, first, in 2011, the NCA, and later in 2014, the Assembly of People’s Representatives, ARP, which both were elected democratically. However, Ben Mahfoudh reports that NCA made little use of this prerogative to make structural changes to the legislation regulating the security sector; changes, he argues, have been largely technical and focused “more on stability and cohesion of the security institutions than on the necessary structural changes for these institutions” (Ben Mahfoudh,
He argues that, although an important step, the constitution prepared by NCA did not “make security institutions subject to parliamentary oversight or accountable to state institutions and the public” (Ben Mahfoudh, 2014:1). Bouguerra (2014:3) states that NCA did create a parliamentary oversight commission for the security sector in response to a violent attack on demonstrators by the police on April 9, 2012. The commission was led by a member of the ruling party Ennahda and tasked with investigating police misconduct and put together a report but, states Bouguerra, the commission never published a report and many of the members of the commission resigned due to, what they called, a lack of responsiveness from the Ministry of Interior (Bouguerra, 2014:3).

In the executive sector, power was similarly transferred from the previous authoritarian government, namely its president Ben Ali, to the ministers of defence and interior, the Council of Ministers (chaired by the head of government) and the National Security Council (chaired the President of the Republic) (Hanlon, 2012:21). As outlined above, the ministers of defence and interior are both appointed through a democratically elected government, the former after deliberation with the President who is appointed by a democratically elected parliament, and this process is enshrined in law through, first the Constitutive Act no. 2011-6, and later the constitution. The ministers of defence and interior are the links between the government and parliament on the one hand, and the armed forces and ISF on the other, both in term of governance and oversight. Formally, they can monitor their respective ministries and security forces and dismiss and reappoint personnel if necessary (Hanlon, 2012). In turn, they can be dismissed by the head of government, often in consultation with the president and/or the Council of Ministers as per the legal framework established by, first, the Constitutive Act no. 2011-6, and later the constitution.

However, this is a superficial form of democratic oversight. In her report from 2012, Hanlon, stated that the adjustment of the Ministry of Defence to a democratic system of governance require “regular review and oversight by parliamentary committees of the MOD [Ministry of Defence] and its budget” (Hanlon, 2012:25). She also argued that mechanisms for this type of external oversight had already been recognized and welcomed by the Ministry of Defence and expected little resistance from them in an eventual, future implementation (Hanlon, 2012:25). For the Ministry of Interior, according to Hanlon (2012:41), the need for reform in order to establish democratic oversight was more extensive in 2012. Such reforms, she argues, would include “executive oversight by the minister and parliamentary oversight over the ministry’s practices, budgets, and reform plans” (Hanlon, 2012:41).

For investigating crimes and misdemeanours in the armed forces, there are military courts. These existed under the previous authoritarian regime but underwent a series of reforms with the
aim of bringing military courts in Tunisia up to international standards in the summer of 2011, such as the creation of a military court of appeals through *decree-law no. 2011-69* on July 29, 2011 (Marsad Tunisie, Timeline 2011-2019). The military courts are regulated in the constitution mainly under *Article 110*. It states that “Military courts are competent to deal with offenses of a military nature. The law determines their competence, composition, organization, the procedures and the general status of their magistrates” (translation from French). The legal framework on military courts have however received criticism for not explicitly excluding the possibility that civilians may be tried under military law, something that was also not amended by the time the DCAF-TFNA published their report in 2017 (DCAF-TFNA, 2017:77).

- *Is information and data on the security sector and its activities made available to the public?*

This question pertains to another aspect of the issue of oversight, the external informal oversight that comes from the civilian population. However, this kind of oversight requires that information and data concerning the security sector and its activities are made available to the public, as well as NGOs, lobbyists and pressure groups specialising in security issues.

The issue of sharing information and making official documents available to the public rose on the political agenda soon after the revolution. A National Body for the Reform of Information and Communication was created, although ICG Crisis Watch reported that it disbanded on July 4, 2012 due to government censorship (ICG Crisis Watch, July 2012). Nonetheless, Marsad reports that *decree-law no. 2011-41*, that entered into force already on 26 May 2011, addressed the right of the public to request and partake in official administrative documents of the state bodies. (*Marsad Tunisie, Timeline*). This right was later included in the constitution under *Article 32*.

In regard to the security sector specifically, information especially on the existing legal framework was made available as an electronical database, accessible in both Arabic and French, and released in January 2012. This was the result of a cooperation between DCAF and the Ministry of Interior to collect and catalogue all laws and amendments that concerned the security sector (defined broadly as core security providers such as military, police and intelligence, along with the judiciary, and the institutions in charge of managing and overseeing the core security actors such as the government, ministries, parliament and the courts, etc.) (Hanlon, 2012:33-34). This database is still, at the time of writing, updated regularly with new legislation pertinent to the security sector. Tunisia has several NGOs and civil society organisations accessing and republicizing information, legislation and updates on the security sector, such as Marsad Tunisie (also funded through DCAF-TFNA). Bouguerra reports that the security sector also is visible in the media as they are “reporting
news on police work and airing debates between MoI representatives and human rights activists” (2014:5)

- Did reforms include policies and procedures on internal issues such as recruitment, education, training and promotions in the core security institutions?

According to Hanlon (2012:8-9, 16), in the previous authoritarian regime, officers within both the military and the police were often highly educated, not seldom abroad in the U.S. and Europe. She states that:

“Tunisia has a great deal of police capacity. […] Police currently are educated alongside military officers at the military academy, although there is a proposal to create a separate police academy. […] Training is standardized, and even Rules of Engagement have been established. The problem is that all of these remain largely unchanged from the Ben Ali regime.” (Hanlon, 2012:16)

Another issue of training police has presented itself along with the difficulty for the Tunisian security sector to provide security after the revolution. According to Bouguerra, the Tunisian governments during 2011 recruited “close to ten thousand new police officers in one year” in response to reports of the public feeling insecure (Bouguerra, 2014:2). The result, states Bouguerra, was that “training was reduced from nine to three months for about one thousand of them” (Bouguerra, 2014:2). An ICG report from 2015, states that between 2012 and 2014, “between 9,000 and 12,000 high school graduates joined the police force as constables or sergeants in the National Guard – the lowest rank in each – after just one month of shared basic training and fifteen days of experience in the field” (ICG, 2015:6), and that this type of recruitment of poorly trained agents (even though it decreased in 2013 and 2014 and ended in 2015) caused damage such as diminished integrity and professional skills in the police force as well as supervision which in turn has allowed and increase in petty corruption (ICG, 2015:6).

Although few or no structural reforms were implemented on policies and procedures of training, recruitment or promotions during the transition period 2011-2014, Tunisia have received plenty of international support for its security sector, especially for equipment and training of personnel. Bouguerra (2014:5-6) lists some projects: a partnership with Spain to train prison guards, 24 million dollars from the U.S. for criminal justice reform assistance, a UNDP project financed by Japan, Belgium and Norway to create six ‘model’ police stations and establish community policing, etc. This type of international security assistance increased as the security problems in Tunisia, especially with Salafist terrorist attacks grew worse (IFIT). Bouguerra states that this type of international support, although useful for strengthening the security forces, “undermines a more
comprehensive engagement with the security sector and SSR, which would include steps aimed at improving democratic governance and transparency in the security sector” (Bouguerra, 2014:5-6).

One of “structural” reforms to internal issues of personnel in the security sector, was the decision to give the ISF the right to unionize (which they did not have under Ben Ali). This right was recognized in May 2011 and was encouraged by the then interim government (Marsad Tunisie, Timeline 2011-2019).

- During the transition period, were there any instances where core security actors interfered in early elections and policy or otherwise attempted to take power?

There is no evidence that the core security actors, that is the Tunisian armed forces and the ISF, attempted to take power and/or overhaul the transition towards democracy, nor that they interfered in the early elections (the Ministry of Interior were stripped of its electoral role before the elections for NCA in October 2011, as discussed above). The armed forces have, on the contrary, been praised for taking a humble position in the transition from the beginning and staying neutral amidst the political struggles between the Islamist and secular parties that began in earnest after the moderate Islamist party Ennahda won the elections for NCA in 2011. This remained the case as DCAF-TFNA in their report from 2017 noted that “the armed defence and security forces [specified as the armed forces, not including ISF] respect their civilian superiors, and do not engage in extra-legal activities, or act without the consent of government officials” and that “armed defence and security forces remain neutral politically, and neither attempt to influence elections, nor support certain political parties or points of view” (DCAF-TFNA, 2017:90).

The role of the ISF during the transition period 2011-2014 was slightly different than the role of the military. An ICG report from 2015 state that, contrary to the army, the ISF “were considered counterrevolutionary, henchmen of the former regime” (2015:8) and that for some time after the revolution, police and other ISF officers were being targeted and police station were being burnt down by demonstrators (ICG, 2015:8). Furthermore, the report states that “the repercussions of the uprising and the persistence of arbitrary and anachronistic management procedures have, in the new context created by the fall of Ben Ali, weakened the ISF” (ICG, 2015:8). According to ICG, the combination of losing power in a new political context and fearing repercussions for their role in the previous regime and during the revolution drove the ISF and per extension the Ministry of Interior, on a course to protect themselves (ICG, 2015:8). This, argues ICG, caused ISF and some sections within the Ministry of Interior, to insist on their independence from political authorities, demand reforms that would offer protection form external threats and resist reforms that would increase democratic oversight and control (ICG, 2015:8). Thus, it can be
said that ISF and the Ministry of Interior did attempt, and succeeded, to interfere in transition policy. ICG states that:

“It is not by chance that the most successful security sector reform projects date from the first months of the transition, when ‘the people were mobilised against the police and the police was too weak to resist’. It’s also not by chance that, with the exception of the promising practice of parliamentary oversight, most reform projects were not implemented once the police regained its confidence.” (ICG, 2015:13)

Questions 3: Effectiveness & Efficiency in Tunisia 2011-2014
To establish the extent of which reforms addressed effectiveness and efficiency in the military and police in terms of fulfilling their main roles and missions (fighting internal and external conflict crime and terrorism), I will look at the following structured focused comparison questions:

- *Did reforms increase preparedness in the military and the police to fulfil their main roles and missions by establishing (1) a plan or strategy (such as a national security strategy or doctrine), (2) structures to create and implement these strategies (such as a ministry of defence or national security councils), and (3) account for the allocation of material and human resources appropriate to implement these strategies?*

Drafting a national security strategy for how core security actors should operate in post-2011 Tunisia (and what reforms are necessary to make that happen) has proved a challenge for the ministries involved. The work on drafting national strategies of security and defence began only after 2015 according to Hanau Santini & Cimini (2019:232) and agreeing to a national strategy for reforms of the security sector has proved equally difficult for the Tunisian governments. According to the DCAF-TFNA’s report from 2017, no national security policy or national defence policy had at the time been approved by the executive and implemented (DCAF-TFNA, 2017:81).

Interestingly, some of the structures that are often emphasised in order to create and implement this type of national strategies on security and security sector reform, such as a ministry of defence and a national security council, were in place in 2011 and were formally regulated under the new, although transitional, democratic system with the *Constitutive Act no. 2011-6*. Tunisia had both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, as well as a National Security Council which included the ministers of defence, interior, justice and finance and was chaired by the president.

In terms of resources, there are no account for the allocation of material and human resources appropriate to implement the national security strategy, as a national security strategy itself was never agreed upon within the transition period 2011-2014. However, the parliament or ARP have budgetary control over all state institutions, including the Ministry of Defence and the
Ministry of Interior, which was regulated in Article 66 of the constitution. Article 66 stipulates that ARP adopts budgets and budget regulations – in accordance with current budget law (which falls within the organic law). However, transparency in budgetary issues remained an issue.

- Did reforms set up institutions that deal with allocation and oversight of public resources in other government agencies (specifically, the military and the police)?

As stated above, the Tunisian parliament as of 2014, ARP, have budgetary control over all state institutions in the sense that they vote on the final draft budget submitted to them, this is regulated in Article 66 of the constitution. The Court of Audit (fr. La Cour des comptes), regulated through Article 117 of the constitution, also functions as an institutional oversight and justice mechanism in state finances. Article 117 stipulates that the Court of Audit will “monitor the proper management of public funds in accordance with the principles of law, efficiency and transparency” (translation from French).

- During the transition period, were there high crime levels, internal or external conflict or terrorism attacks?

During the transition period 2011-2014, reports state that Tunisia experienced increased levels of crime and tension, especially on its borders with Libya and Algeria, due in part to a security vacuum with the weakening of the ISF and security repercussions from the civil war in Libya (ICG, 2013c:i). This, the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising and the war in Libya, has according to an ICG report from 2013 (2013c:i), triggered a reorganisation of contraband cartels at the Libyan and Algerian borders and led to a “worrying increase” in cross-border trafficking of hard drugs, firearms and explosives to Tunisia from Libya and growing trafficking of cannabis and small arms across the northern part of the Tunisian-Algerian border. After the revolution, in 2011, the number of control operation in the border areas conducted by the National Guard decreased, as did the seizures of goods by customs service and the prosecutions of smugglers (ICG, 2013c:14). According to ICG (2013c:14), the Ministry of Interior reported only 91 smuggling operations thwarted by the National Guard in 2011 (which increased to 441 in 2012), compared to 3650 in 2010. The report states that the decreased presence and action by security personnel both led to smuggler venturing beyond their previous turfs, such as tourist regions on the eastern coast and along the roads connecting major cities, and to the increasing use of handguns and hunting rifles among smugglers (ICG, 2013c:14).

In 2012 and 2013 there was an increase in attacks conducted by armed groups in the border areas against members of the National Guard, armed forces and police (ICG, 2013c:i). ICG Crisis
Watch reported clashed between the Army and Libyan armed groups on the Libyan border already in the end of November 2011, which caused two main border posts to close (ICG Crisis Watch, December 2011). However, the majority of the attacks against security personnel and civilians were carried out by Salafist jihadist groups, one of the being Ansar al-Sharia that the Tunisian transition government classified as a terrorist group in 2013 (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019:228). According to Hanau Santini and Cimini (2019:225) these attacks took the shape of waves that successively hit the country mostly between mid 2013 and 2015, and successively morphed from targeted political violence to wide-scale terrorist attacks in 2015 (the Bardo national museum in Tunis, the hotel resort beach in Sousse and against a bus belonging to the Presidential Guard in Tunis).

Two attacks that, according to Bouguerra, “startled” the government to action, were the attack on the U.S. embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012 and the clashes at Mount Chaambi, close to the Algerian border, in December 2012 were over twenty military and police officers were killed (Bouguerra, 2014:3-4). Hanau Santini and Cimini state that the attack against the U.S. embassy “exposed the existing security vacuum and it revealed the disarray of the Tunisian security forces. The failure to respond effectively demonstrated gaps in institutional capacity, from situational awareness, command and control to coordination between security forces and senior government officials” (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019:228). Jihadi Islamists were also behind the two assassinations of politicians in Tunisia in 2013, popular opposition politician Chokri Belaïd in February 2013 and opposition MP Mohammed Brahmi on 25 July 2013. The murders caused public outcry and protest, and, in the case of Belaïd, a political and constitutional crisis (ICG Crisis Watch: February 2013; July 2013; Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019:225).
Table 2: Summary of Results for Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECHANISM</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Control</td>
<td>- Civilian institutions with control over core security actors (e.g. ministry of defence, parliamentary committees with authority over policy and budgets, and national security councils)</td>
<td>- Formal civilian governance. Military is reported to be mostly under civilian control. Difficulties in establishing civilian governance over the Ministry of Interior. Depoliticization attempted through purges, mostly in the Ministry of Interior. Reforms implemented to strip Ministry of Interior of electoral role which reduced its political influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Depoliticization of the military and police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight (+)</td>
<td>- Formal oversight mechanisms in the executive, legislative and judicial sectors of government (monitoring core security actors, investigating and reprimanding any deviance from the rules and guidelines set up by civilian institutions)</td>
<td>- Partly but with limited success, especially oversight of and within the Ministry of Interior. Civilians have access to information such as laws and amendments concerning the organisation and operation of core security actors through reforms on sharing public documents and cooperation with NGO’s to publish such information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional norms (+)</td>
<td>- Transparency and access to information (is it possible for informal civilian actors such as NGOs and media to access information about the activities of core security actors?)</td>
<td>- Very few structural reforms concerning training, recruitment and promotions. Police Unions were allowed and encouraged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiler occurrence (-)</td>
<td>- Attempts by core security actors to spoil the transition process (e.g. interference in early elections and policy, military coups)</td>
<td>- No election tampering. Some evidence suggest that the Ministry of Interior tried to influence policies pertaining to its own organisation, mostly resisting reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness to fulfil roles and missions (+)</td>
<td>- Plan or strategy (e.g. national security or military strategy or doctrine)</td>
<td>- No overarching strategy or plan and very limited cooperation between security actors. Structures were partly in place. Formally, ARP had budgetary control. Limited transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in fulfilling roles and missions (+)</td>
<td>- Structures to create and implement these strategies (e.g. of defence or national security councils, see civilian institutions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of ‘security problems’ (-)</td>
<td>- Allocation of material and human resources to implement these plans or strategies (local estimation)</td>
<td>- In general, yes (both ARP and the Court of Audit), but not specifically to the security services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Institutions dealing with allocation and oversight of public recourses in other government agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- High levels of crime, prevalence of internal and external conflict and terrorism</td>
<td>- Increasing levels of terrorism and violence on the Algerian and Libyan borders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Egypt

Introduction

In what has become known as the January 25 revolution the Egyptian people forced former President Hosni Mubarak to resign his presidency on 11 February 2011, after three weeks of protest through mostly nonviolent means such as demonstrations and occupation of the downtown Tahrir Square. The military was pivotal in the success of the campaign, eventually forcing Mubarak to step down after having failed to make timely concessions to calm down the situation (ICG, 2011a:14). The turning point of the protests based on long-time building economic and social grievances was when online activists called for a mass protest on the national Police Day holiday, 25 January. The turnout was massive with tens of thousands reported participants in Cairo and thousands more across the country (ICG, 2011a:2-3). Two weeks later, on 11 February, vice president Suleiman issued a statement saying that Mubarak had resigned and would transfer his powers to the military (ICG, 2011a:14). Suleiman acted as de facto President until two days later when power was transferred to Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). SCAF, which consisted of Egypt’s most senior military leaders, formed a transitional government until 30 June 2012 when they formally handed over power to the democratically elected president Muhammad Morsi (Eriksson, 2012:26; Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:3).

SCAF quickly suspended the 1971 constitution and dissolved parliament pending new elections and constitutional reform. Meanwhile they acquired full executive and legislative power to issue decrees with the force of law and map out the road for political transition, which was done, according to ICG, without much consultation with the political groupings at the time (ICG, 2011a:14; 2012a:2). Elections for the two chambers of parliament were eventually held and finished in February 2012. They were considered free and fair by most Egyptians and by the international community (ICG, 2012a:6; 2013b:17). The Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) received the highest percentage of votes, nearly 36 percent. (ICG, 2013b:2; Eriksson, 2012:49).

Presidential elections were held in two rounds, the first in late spring 2012 and the second in mid-June, where the FJP’s candidate Mohammad Morsi faced off against former prime minister under Mubarak, Ahmed Shafik, in the final rounds of the elections. Morsi won with 51.7 percent of the votes against Shafik’s 48.3 percent (Eriksson, 2012:30-31). In December 2012, Morsi and his administration managed to pass a new constitution (the 2012 constitution). In order to push the proposal through parliament and stop the eventual dissolution of both the upper house in parliament and the second constitutional assembly by SSC, Morsi issued a constitutional decree on
22 November both stated that all laws he had passed by decree since he took office would be binding until the time a constitution was adopted, giving him much extended legislative and executive powers at the same time (ICG, 2013b:2; Eriksson, 2012:32-33; Albrecht, 2013:1). Although the constitution draft passed in parliament on 30 November and in a (low-turnout) national referendum on 15 December, the event led to increased polarisation between the Islamists and the heterogenous camp of liberal and secular opposition groups and the security forces, with large demonstrations by opposition groups in Cairo following Morsi’s decree (Eriksson, 2012:23-33; Albrecht, 2013:1).

Discontent with the political leadership and the deteriorating economic and security conditions in the country grew and by June 2013, one activist group in particular, Tamarrod (Arabic for ‘mutiny’ or ‘rebellion’), gained momentum (ICG, 2013b:2, 4). On 3 July, the military, led by the Minister of Defence, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, stepped in and relived the president of his functions, suspended the constitution and established an interim government under the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), Adly Mansour, in what is widely regarded as a coup d’état (ICG, 2013b:5-6). For the presidential elections in 2014 SCAF endorsed the candidature of al-Sisi himself, who, according to official results, won 96.91 percent of the votes where a voter turnout of 47.4 percent (DCAF, 2014:10).

Core Security Actors and the Security Sector under Hosni Mubarak

The main actor in the modern Egyptian security sector is the military. At the time of the revolution it was headed by the president of Egypt which constituted the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, followed by a Commander in Chief (which was also the role of minister of defence), and the Chief of Staff, and mainly included the army, naval forces, air force and air defence force (Kadry Said & Bakr, 2011:3, 4-5). Mikael Eriksson states in his report for the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) from 2012, that Egyptian armed forces in 2012 had ca. 438,000 active personnel as well as a reserve base of 479,000 soldiers in 2011 (Eriksson, 2012:40). This, together with an estimated 3.4 percent of Egypt’s gross domestic product spent on the military (in 2012) makes Egypt one of the largest military powers in the region, according to Eriksson (2012:38, 40). The Egyptian defence sector were at the time (and remains) heavily subsidised by U.S. financial aid (Eriksson, 2012:38; Kadry Said & Bakr, 2011:8). Under Mubarak, the military was allowed to develop into an important economic actor which incorporated an increasingly amount of economic activities such as owning and selling land; running hotels, hospitals and nurseries; building and running power- and water treatment plans; owning businesses in sectors such as electrical appliances, tourism, aviation, foodstuffs (bottled water, olive oil, bread), refined gas and fuel, etc.
The extent of the military’s economic activities is unknown, as is the manner of taxation and the number of civilians employed by the military (DCAF, 2014:10; Kadry Said & Bakr, 2011:8; ICG, 2011a:16-17; 2012a:22).

The internal security forces (mainly police) and intelligence services are the other main security actors in the Egyptian security sector. The internal security forces are governed by a ministry of Interior led by a minister that, according to Kadry Said and Bakr, must have attended Police College (Kadry Said & Bakr, 2011:6-7). Brumberg and Sallam (2012:6) state that in the Ministry of Interior employed 1.7 million individuals (mostly police and administrative staff), a number that had steadily increased under the rule of Mubarak. There were two major police sectors: State Security Investigations Service (SSI) and the Central Security Forces (CSF). Both SSI and CSF have been repeatedly accused of systematic torture, kidnapping, illegal detentions, extrajudicial killings and ordered assassinations, as well as election tampering by means of stuffing ballot boxes and terrorising voters during the elections under Mubarak (Ashour, 2012:7).

No formal agreement on SSR reform was signed in Egypt during the transition period 2011-2013, however, several initiatives have proposed by stakeholders such as civil society groups, disenchanted police officers, the Ministry of Interior and by parliament (Ashour, 2012:8).

Question 1: Democracy Consolidation in Egypt

To establish the nature of the dependent variable, the extent of democratization in Egypt after the transition I will answer the following questions:

- What is the level of democracy in the year the transition ends? How does it develop in the three years after the end of the transition? Has there been an increase or decrease in the level of democracy since the start of the transition period?

The transition in Egypt ends in 2013 with a military coup (following the classification of Geddes et al., 2014). The electoral democracy index score, EDI score (see Coppedge et al., 2019), for Egypt in 2013 is 0.21 (on a scale between 0 and 1, where 1 is ‘fully democratic’). This is a small increase from Egypt’s EDI score in 2011 which was 0.16. In the following three years after the end of transition (and beginning of a new transition), Egypt has the EDI scores of 0.17 (2014), 0.21 (2015), and 0.2 (2016). That is, the level of democracy worsened slightly in 2014 and then stabilised in 2015 and 2016 at the same level as it was in 2013. Based on this index, Egypt experienced to a low extent that there was electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage was extensive and political and civil society organisations could operate freely, elections were clean and not marred by systematic irregularities and that they affected the composition of
the chief executive of the country, and that there between elections existed freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance (Coppedge et al., 2019). Figure 4 below depicts the change in the level of democracy in Egypt during the period of transition and after, according to the EDI score:

**Figure 4: The Level of Democracy in Egypt 2011-2016 (EDI score)**

Source: Coppedge et al. (2019)

**Question 2: Civilian Control & Oversight in Egypt 2011-2013**

To establish the extent of which civilian control and oversight were introduced by reforms, I will look at the following structured, focused comparison questions:

- *What civilian institutions were put in place to govern the military and police?*

Two days after former president Mubarak resigned as per popular demand, on 13 February 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued their first constitutional declaration. The declaration stated that the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 was suspended and that the existing houses of parliament (the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council) were dissolved. Furthermore it stated that SCAF would undertake the temporary running of state affairs for a period of six months or until new elections for parliament and president, and, finally, that a committee would be created to amend some of the 1971 constitution’s provisions (Abdel Wahab, 2012). The main set of principles that outlined a transitional roadmap was the constitutional declaration issued by
SCAF on 30 March. According to an ICG report form 2012, SCAF had appointed a committee on 15 February to recommend constitutional changes in regulation for the upcoming elections as well as a procedure for drafting a new constitution. These amendments were approved by a popular referendum (with 77.3 percent of the votes in favour) on 19 March and integrated in the constitutional declaration (ICG, 2012a:12).

According to Mohamed S. E. Abdel Wahab (2012), the 30 March constitutional declaration functioned as a temporary constitution. The declaration made amendments to the previous political system, as regulated in the 1971 constitution, rather than establishing a new one. Article 25 of declaration states that the president is the head of state and that he/she will assume the responsibilities that SCAF holds during the transition. Based on SCAF’s constitutional declarations, legislative and executive powers remained under SCAF for the first part of the transition period 2011-2013. SCAF transferred legislative power to the parliament (the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council) after the parliamentary elections finished in February 2012. On 17 June 2012, however, two days after the SCC had dissolved the People’s Assembly, the SCAF issued the 17 June constitutional declaration annex under which it came to exercise substantial authority (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:3; Eriksson, 2012:49). The main aspects of the declaration annex had already been discussed the year before (informally known as the “supra-constitutional principles”), put forward in a draft in November 2011 by Vice Prime Minister Ali El-Selmi (ICG, 2012a:5; Al-Ali et al., 2012:1-2). The November draft was never finished due to fierce protest by both Islamists and non-Islamists as it both undermined the parliament’s role in drafting the constitution and threatened to expand the power and influence of SCAF and the military (ICC, 2012a:5).

Basically, as stated by Al-Ali et al., “the June 2012 Declaration establishes that the military is a self-governing authority that is free to operate without any form of external oversight” (Al-Ali et al., 2012:3). It does this in amendments to Articles 53, 56, and 60 in the 30 March constitutional declaration, stipulating that SCAF is “responsible for deciding on all issues related to the armed forces, for appointing its leaders, for extending their terms of office” (Constitutional Declaration Dated 17 June 2012). It also stipulates that the President would need SCAF’s approval to declare war and that SCAF, in the event that the Constituent Assembly fails to produce a constitution draft, will be able to form a new constituent assembly to draft the constitution. However, newly inaugurated President Morsi annulled the annex on 12 August 2012 (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:3). It was instead his Freedom and Justice Party (endorsed by the Muslim Brotherhood) that led the process of drafting and passing the new constitution through a national referendum in the autumn and winter of 2012. The constitution came into force in December 2012 and remained until it was suspended in July 2013.
Egypt’s 2012 constitution places, in Article 82, legislative power in the hands of the Council of Representatives (the People’s Assembly) and the Council of Shura, the two houses of parliament. Article 115 of the constitution states that the People’s Assembly also “is responsible for approving the state’s general policy, the public plan for economic and social development and the annual state budget law” (Egypt’s Constitution of 2012). Notably, the constitution’s Article 131 states that, in the event of the dissolution of the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council will carry out its joint legislative responsibilities. The People’s Assembly was in fact dissolved at the time the constitution was written and passed. The constitution places executive power in the hands of the President and the government. According to Article 139, the president nominates a prime minister that is charged with the task of forming a government which he/she then will present to the People’s Assembly. Similar to previous legislation, the government is comprised of the prime minister and his/her deputies and ministers (Article 155). The mandate of the government, specified in Article 159 of the constitution, is the same as in SCAF’s constitutional declaration from March 2011. Article 195 states that the minister of defence has the role of Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and is to be appointed from among its officers, i.e. not a civilian. In a conference report from 2014, DCAF criticises the 2012 constitution for not addressing civil-military relations in any substantial form as the constitution ensured that the National Defence Council (the only institution where the military budget is discussed itemised) had a majority of military representatives, were vague on the trying of civilians in military courts, and allowed SCAF to appoint a minister of defence for two consecutive presidential terms (DCAF, 2014:11).

- How effective were these civilian institutions in controlling the military and police?

The next question is whether or not formal civilian governance translated to actual civilian control over the security sector management, namely, was there any change to the actual power structures in the military and internal security forces? As civilian control over the Egyptian armed forces was very limited, I will focus more on the Ministry of Interior and the internal security forces in this section. El-Essawy was the first minister of interior to be appointed after the revolution in the “revolution-friendly” government headed by Prime Minister Essam Sharaf that was appointed by SCAF in March 2011 (Ashour, 2012:10). El-Essawy had a background within the Ministry of Interior and as a police general, but had been retired from the security establishment for over a decade, according to Brumberg and Sallam (2012:8). They state that El-Essawy, upon his appointment, pledged to reform the Ministry of Interior and to restore public confidence in the police (2012:8).
Shortly after his appointment, and in response to popular demand after protestors stormed several SSI offices on 5 March and uncovered evidence of abusive practices, el-Essawy dissolved State Security Investigations Service, SSI, and established in its place the National Security Agency, NSA (also called the Homeland Security Sector, HSS). Although the decision initially was celebrated by many protestors, it has been criticised for not ensuring transparency in the process, not putting a vetting system in place to make sure that SSI officers suspected of human rights violations did not remain as part of the new NSA, and finally because the change from SSI to NSA seems to have been little more than a name change, as Ashour, Brumberg and Sallam state in their articles that most of the organisational structure of the SSI remained fully intact in NSA (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:8-9; Ashour, 2012:10-11). Under el-Essawy, also in response to popular protest but with the help of SCAF, the Ministry of Interior was subject to purges of, according to Ashour, 505 major-generals, 82 brigadier-generals, and 82 colonels that were either dismissed or forced to retire (Ashour, 2012:10; Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:8).

When Mohamed Morsi was sworn in as president on 24 June 2012, executive power was formally in the hands of a civilian. Ashour (2012:12) suggests that Morsi had some success in tilting the balance of power between the elected civilian administration and the military establishment. During his first months in office he annulled SCAF’s 17 June Constitutional Declaration and restored the powers to the presidency, and on July 8 he ordered the (since June dissolved) People’s Assembly to reconvene after which SCAF unsuccessfully tried to bring Morsi to court for violating SCC’s ruling to dissolve it (Ashour, 2012:12; Eriksson, 2012:31). Furthermore, Morsi announced the retirement of SCAF leader and Minister of Defence Tantawi along with the commanders of the army, navy and air defence forces and the successive dismissal of the heads of General Intelligence Directorate, Presidential Guard, Military Police, Cairo Security Directorate, and CSF (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:2; Ashour, 2012:12-13). Morsi appointed General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, to take Tantawi’s place. Ashour state that it was “first time in Egypt’s history that a serious attempt had been made by an elected civilian to control the armed forces and security establishment.” (Ashour, 2012:12). However, the difficulty to establish civilian governance and control over the security sector in Egypt remained under Morsi’s term in office. This was never clearer than when, in June and July 2013, neither the military nor the police and Ministry of Interior was willing to protect Morsi supporters and members of the Muslim Brotherhood from violent attacks. ICG reports that many police officers instead joined the protests and that the army openly had suggested approval of the demonstrations (ICG, 2013b:4).

- Did reforms set up formal oversight mechanisms that can monitor, investigate the military and police, and deliver sanctions if necessary?
This question addresses the creation or modification of formal oversight mechanisms in the legislative, executive and judicial sectors in Egypt, making it possible to monitor, investigate and reprimanding any deviance from the rules and guidelines by the military and internal security sector. In the first period of the transition until elections for parliament in February 2012, there was no legislative or executive oversight over the security sector in Egypt as SCAF had dissolved the old parliament, assumed presidential powers and the head of SCAF, Field Marshal Tantawi, was also the minister of defence. SCAF, as outlined above, transferred legislative powers to the civilian and democratically elected chambers of parliament after the elections finished in February 2012. Of the two chambers, it was the People’s Assembly that primarily held legislative and monitoring powers whereas the Shura Council mostly had a consultative role. According to Mohamed S. E. Abdel Wahab, there were “19 specialized committees of the People’s Assembly helping exercise its legislative and monitoring duties” until its dissolution in June 2012. This included a parliamentary Defence, National Security and Mobilization Committee (Abdel Wahab, 2012). After the dissolution of the People’s Assembly in 2012, no new parliament was elected until after the military coup in 2013, as the planned parliamentary elections after passing the constitution in late 2012 repeatedly were postponed. Thus, although the 2012 constitution includes several mechanisms for, at least formal, parliamentary oversight, no fully functioning parliament existed before the constitution was suspended in July 2013.

As stated above, SCAF retained executive powers (through assuming presidential powers and appointing the cabinet) until Morsi was elected president and appointed a new government in summer 2012. Until the 2012 Constitution was adopted in late 2012, SCAF’s 30 March Constitutional Declaration outlined the manner of governance. According Article 57 of 30 March Constitutional Declaration, the cabinet (including the ministers of defence and interior) is tasked with the responsibility to “direct, coordinate and follow the work of the ministries and their related fronts, in addition to public institutions and bodies”. The declaration also stipulates (in Article 54) the establishment of a National Defence Council to be headed by the president. However, executive oversight is made more difficult by the fact that the defence minister has to be appointed among the officers of the armed forces (which also is regulated in the 2012 Constitution, under Article 195). According to an ICG report from 2012 based interviews with SCAF members, SCAF resisted the appointment of a civilian minister of defence (ICG, 2012a:23).

In terms of oversight mechanisms within the Ministry of Interior, there doesn’t seem to have been many during the transitional period 2011-2013. According to Ashour (2012:14) there was at the time an Internal Monitoring Sector (al-Taftish), with the ability to investigate officers in reaction to complaints. He also states that external oversight mechanisms should be regulated in a new law
to replace the Police Institution Law No. 109 of 1971, which should also empower internal monitoring and criminalizing torture and degrading treatment, as this had not been enforced at the time (Ashour, 2012:14-15). Brumberg and Sallam state that although the police is defined as civilian in both the 1971 constitution and SCAF’s 2011 Constitutional declaration (and in the 2012 Constitution, under *Article 199*), the “secrecy surrounding its activities evokes the traits of a closed military establishment that is removed from society and governed with little transparency and accountability” (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:8-9).

- **Is information and data on the security sector and its activities made available to the public?**

A conference report by DCAF (2014) state that the publication of any information regarding the armed forces such as their structure, movements and personnel without consent from the Military Intelligence Department is forbidden. The same applies for information on activities, personnel matters, operations and functions of state intelligence and secret services (DCAF, 2014:14). Publishing information regarding the armed forces are regulated thus in Law No. (313) of 1956 and amendments to that in Law No. (14) of 1967 on Prohibiting the Publishing of any News about the Armed Forces. Publishing information on matters of state intelligence and secret services is likewise regulated in Law No. (100) of 1971. Breaking these laws can, according to DCAF (2014:14), result in imprisonment for anything between six months and five years and/or a fine. The report by DCAF also states that media and news outlets (both private and public) are under pressure from the military and intelligence services to conform to the strict regulations (2014:14).

- **Did reforms include policies and procedures on internal issues such as recruitment, education, training and promotions in the core security institutions?**

Reforms on policies and procedures on internal issues seem to have been limited during the transitional period 2011-2013. Recruitment to the Egyptian armed forces relies heavily on mandatory conscription which was included in both the 30 March Constitutional Declaration (under *Article 53*) and in the 2012 constitution (under *Article 7 and 196*). Brumberg and Sallam state that Egyptian law allows some people to spend their military service working within the internal security forces and the Ministry of Interior (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:9). They also state that the police academy, through which most internal security agents are recruited, is widely believed to discriminate against people with critical political views and who are from low-income families and lack connections (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:9).

Finally, various initiatives and organisations for officers seeking reform of the old structures were active under the transitional period of 2011-2013. These organisations (the General Coalition
of Police Officers, Officers But Honourable, Warrant Officers But Honourable, and Officers Against Corruption, to mention a few) lobbied for issues such as the establishment of police unions, initiatives to purge corrupt generals, improved work conditions, training, increasing salaries and pensions, etc., in 2012, however, their mission was cut short by the dissolution of People’s Assembly, see above (Ashour, 2012:9).

- During the transition period, were there any instances where core security actors interfered in early elections and policy or otherwise attempted to take power?

Despite a history of election tampering, there is little evidence that suggest that the Ministry of Interior and its security forces resorted to such practices during the transition period. There are, however, reports of police and internal security agents partaking in the 2013 coup (see above). Additionally, there are reports that some aspects of the internal security forces, such as the SSI, later the NSA, did not abandon old abusive practices after the revolution in 2011, and during the transition period 2011-2013, they clashed frequently with civilian protestors killing hundreds of people and injuring thousands according to Crisis Watch estimations (Crisis Watch Timeline).

SCAF and the armed forces interfered both in early election procedures and the drafting of the constitution (the most blatant was the constitutional declaration annex issued by SCAF on 17 June 2012), as well as staged a coup d’état in July 2013 which ended the transition period following the January 25 Revolution in 2011. SCAF issued a Constitutional Declaration annex on 17 June 2012 that limited the president’s power over the military and national security, gave the army immunity from civilian oversight, secured influence and control over the constitution drafting process to SCAF, and in effect, transferred back the legislative power from the dissolved parliament to SCAF (Eriksson, 2012:30-31; Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:1-2). The annex was, however, later annulled (see above). Finally, on 3 July 2013 following popular protest against Morsi’s rule as president, the military made good on previously issued statement that more or less obliquely threatened a military coup (see ICG, 2012a:7; 2013b:5). The Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, relived the president of his functions, suspended the constitution and established an interim government, in what is widely regarded as a coup d’état (ICG, 2013b:5-6).

Questions 3: Effectiveness & Efficiency in Egypt 2011-2013

To establish the extent of which reforms addressed effectiveness and efficiency in the military and police in terms of fulfilling their main roles and missions (fighting internal and external conflict crime and terrorism), I will look at the following structured, focused comparison questions:
Did reforms increase preparedness in the military and the police to fulfil their main roles and missions by establishing (1) a plan or strategy (such as a national security strategy or doctrine), (2) structures to create and implement these strategies (such as a ministry of defence or national security councils), and (3) account for the allocation of material and human resources appropriate to implement these strategies?

An ICG report from 2012 state that “Egypt’s military is famously hierarchical in its structure and opaque in its dealings – meaning the top echelon engage in key deliberations and those deliberations are hidden from public view.” (ICG, 2012a:1) This is a problem in that Egypt may have a national security strategy, well defined structures for creating and implementing them as well as account for the allocation of material and human resources appropriate to implement its strategies – the problem is that it’s difficult to know.

In the first part of the transitional period, the Constitutional Declaration of March 2011 does not state if there is a national security strategy nor how such a plan would be created or implemented. It does however, in Article 54, describe the mandate of the National Defence Council as “tasked with evaluating affairs concerned with means of securing the country and its safety”. Furthermore, Articles 56 and 57 of the Constitutional Declaration issued by SCAF on 30 March 2011, stipulate that SCAF “will deal with the administration of the affairs of the country” and to do so will have the authority to issue public policy for the state and the public budget as well as ensuring its implementation. The cabinet will assist SCAF in this mission and will prepare a draft public plan and a draft public budget for the state, as is specified in Article 57.

In terms of accounting for the resources necessary for its missions and operations, the only information the military provides on its income and spending is the military’s (from the rest of the state independent) overall, non-itemised budget, the itemised version is not submitted to civilian institutions or subject to any independent or external oversight (ICG, 2012a:22; Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:4). This also includes the military’s economic activities in the civilian sector – only estimates exist of the extent of these activities as well as how much revenue it produces (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012:4). According to the ICG report from 2012, SCAF assert that most of the profits made goes towards meeting the requirement for the defence budget (ICG, 2012a:21-22). Additionally, Egypt receive consistent and high levels of mostly U.S. foreign military aid which essentially, according to Kadry Said & Bakr (2011:11), is used to acquire military equipment produced in the U.S. The report by SCAF states that “the total value of U.S. military aid is estimated to constitute 25-30% of the budget of the Egyptian Armed Forces and amounts to 80% of their procurement spending” (DCAF, 2014:17).
• Did reforms set up institutions that deal with allocation and oversight of public resources in other government agencies (specifically, the military and the police)?

As stated in the previous section, there are minimal transparency on the military budget and on its economic activities in the civilian sector. Brumberg and Sallam (2012:4) state that the military maintains its own commercial bank accounts, regulated under the Law no. 32 of 1979. The 2012 Constitution establishes independent regulatory institutions such as Central Auditing Organisation with a regulated (in Article 205) mandate to have control over “state funds and any other body specified by law”, this includes the state budget (as regulated in Article 121 of the 2012 Constitution). However, the defence budget is independent from that, which does not appear to have changed over the course of the transition period. In 2011, Kadry Said and Bakr (2011:9) state that “although these activities [i.e. the military’s economic activities] are legal, it is not clear how much they are subjected to outside audit, and reveal of its turnover and profits, including pays taxes”.

• During the transition period, were there high crime levels, internal or external conflict or terrorism attacks?

During the course of the transition period 2011-2013, Crisis Watch report frequent attacks against security personnel, vehicles, checkpoints and gas lines in northern Sinai, along the border with Israel (see for example: August 2011, September 2011, March 2012, April 2012, January 2013, April 2013, etc.). In August 2011, the report state that the Egyptian armed forces in coordination with Israel begin an operation in northern Sinai after “a spike in attacks on security forces in the region” (Crisis Watch, August 2011). Eriksson state in his report that “already overlooked parts of the border with Israel became inflamed, on occasion leading to skirmishes between tribal communities, Islamic radicals, Egyptian security forces and Israeli forces” (Eriksson, 2012:28). In response to the killings of Egyptian soldiers, a demonstration in Cairo’s Tahrir Square to speed up reforms turned violent and thousands of protestors attacked the Israeli embassy, leading Israel to withdraw its ambassador (Crisis Watch, September 2011; Eriksson, 2012:28). In February 2012, 74 football fans were killed, reportedly by rival team thugs, the authorities, especially the internal security forces, were blamed for failure to act and stop the riot, Crisis Watch reports following clashes between police and protestors (protesting against the police and Ministry of Interior) (Crisis Watch, February, 2012).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECHANISM</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Control</td>
<td>- Institutional control mechanisms (+)</td>
<td>- Not in any significant way – SCAF had both legislative and executive power for most of the transition. The 2012 constitution included attempts at civilian control but did not include control over the military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Civilian institutions with control over core security actors (e.g. ministry of defence, parliamentary committees with authority over policy and budgets, and national security councils)</td>
<td>▪ Some restructure of the Interior Ministry and internal security forces – mostly through purges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Depoliticization of the military</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oversight (+)</td>
<td>- Formal oversight mechanisms in the executive, legislative and judicial sectors of government (monitoring core security actors, investigating and reprimanding any deviance from the rules and guidelines set up by civilian institutions)</td>
<td>- Very limited. Some formal attempts at oversight in the 2012 constitution but no evidence of implementation. The military was mostly excluded from any attempt at civilian oversight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Transparency and access to information (is it possible for informal civilian actors such as NGOs and media to access information about the activities of core security actors?)</td>
<td>▪ No. Legislation from the previous regime was kept intact, making publication of any information pertaining to the military illegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional norms (+)</td>
<td>- Formal policies and procedures on internal issues such as recruitment, education, training and promotions in the core security institutions</td>
<td>- Very limited if any. Initiatives from CSOs and officer organisations do not seem to have been implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiler occurrence (–)</td>
<td>- Attempts by core security actors to spoil the transition process (e.g. interference in early elections and policy, military coups)</td>
<td>- Yes. Interference by SCAF in early election procedures and in the drafting of a new constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness to fulfil roles and missions (+)</td>
<td>- Plan or strategy (e.g. national security or military strategy or doctrine)</td>
<td>- Unknown - the military does not share that information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Structures to create and implement these strategies (e.g. of defence or national security councils, see civilian institutions)</td>
<td>▪ Yes, some structures existed but limited if any civilian oversight over them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Allocation of material and human resources to implement these plans or strategies (local estimation)</td>
<td>▪ Unknown - no civilian oversight or transparency in military budget or military activities in the civilian economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in fulfilling roles and missions (+)</td>
<td>- Institutions dealing with allocation and oversight of public recourses in other government agencies</td>
<td>- Yes, but not over military resources. The military budget was separated from the state budget and any external oversight of public resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of ‘security problems’ (–)</td>
<td>- High levels of crime, prevalence of internal and external conflict and terrorism</td>
<td>- Frequently reported violent incidents against security personnel in Northern Sinai, along the border with Israel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis

SSR & Managing Security Problems in Tunisia & Egypt

Based on the review of the security sectors in Tunisia and Egypt, several observations can be made about Tunisia and Egypt’s capability to manage security problems. First, Tunisia seems to have experienced an increase in more severe security problems than Egypt, especially regarding Salafist terrorism, violence on several of its borders and a high number of individuals going to (and coming back from) Syria to fight with Daesh. An ICG report from 2015, after the regime change, states that “members of the security forces [ISF] are unanimous: the lack of strategy is the fundamental problem, the root cause to all others [in reference to failing security]”. Even though that may not be the whole story, it is supported by the results of the review. Tunisia did not, by all accounts, have a National Security Strategy that encompassed both the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior. Hanau Santini & Cimini (2019:232) state that part of the difficulty comes from competition and a lack of coordination among institutional security bodies and an under-conceptualization of new security orientations. They state that:

“On a strategic level, what hampered increased efficiency was the lack of coordination among different institutional bodies, each of them drafting White Papers or National Security Strategies without previously consulting the other security bodies. Unsurprisingly, only very few strategic documents have come to fruition. At the operational level, the lack of coordination and cooperation among the ministries of Defense, Interior and Justice continued unabated until 2015.64” (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019: 232)

The results from the review, summarized in Table 2, show that Tunisia in general implemented very few structural changes in regard to overarching national policy (none), structures (to some extent) and budgets (some) that should improve effectiveness and efficiency for the Tunisian security sector. They also seemed, in practice, to separate the mandates of the armed forces and the police, even though the legal framework for that existed. The armed forces had been called in repeatedly to riots and demonstrations when ISF did not manage to control the situation. The ICG report from 2015 make it clear that this did not necessarily approve after the regime change was completed in 2014, it states that riots in the interior of the country had come to follow script:

“local authorities and associations, the UGTT and the representatives of political parties – particularly An-Nahda and the CPR – try to channel demands (right to work, regional development) to avoid violence. Meanwhile, young men throw stones at the police and National Guard. The ISF uses tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. Tensions rise. The protesters attack police stations with Molotov cocktails. Riot police and National Guard
forces chase the demonstrators into their homes and treat them brutally. Less often, rapid response units make use of live fire. The ISF ends up retreating from the city while the army deploys to protect public buildings.” (ICG, 2015:18-19)

Despite experiencing frequent and severe security problems and with especially the Ministry of Interior and the ISF being woefully unprepared, Tunisia had a high level of democracy at the end of the regime change in 2013 and consistently high during the three following years according to its EDI-scores (see figure 2). Judging by the index, there was to a high degree of electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage was extensive and political and civil society organisations could operate freely, elections were clean and not marred by systematic irregularities and that they affected the composition of the chief executive of the country, and that there between elections existed freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. This result seems to contradict Hypothesis 1 which state that SSR will likely increase the ability of core security sector actors to manage security problems in the transition after a nonviolent resistance campaign, thereby increasing the probability of democratic transition.

Interestingly, in the case of Tunisia, the deteriorated state of security acted a strong incentive for reforms of the security sector both domestically and incited international support to reform the Tunisian security sector. After the attack against the U.S. Embassy, the government began to take action, although modest, though this increased especially as the frequency of Salafist terror attacks increased in 2013 with two murders of politicians. Hanau Santini and Cimini (2019) state that “from mid-2013, the terrorist threat increasingly replaced political violence in security discourse: counter-terrorism became the new mantra around which security forces coalesced in unanimously pushing for improved security management at the expense of reform and accountability” (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019: 232-233). Hanau Santini and Cimini (2019: 237) state however that the real change again came after the regime change has ended, in 2015 (after the attacks on a tourist resort beach in Sousse). They state that “Within a short span of time, European countries and the Tunisian government agreed on a new mechanism of multilateral security cooperation”, which included bilateral agreement on Security Assistance, SA (Hanau Santini & Cimini, 2019: 237). At around the same time, existing international support towards SSR in Tunisia was replaced by a new SA approach – which did not include the same goals to establish civilian control over the security sector, but was more focused on improving effectiveness and efficiency of the Tunisian security sector (Ibid: 232-233, 237).

Egypt also experienced security problems during its transition period 2011-2013, but as mentioned, they did not, at least initially, match those experienced in Tunisia. As in Tunisia, Egypt
experienced numerous and quite frequent attacks against security personnel in particular along its borders (the border with Israel, in northern Sinai). A report by Eriksson suggested that part of the border was overlooked as the Egyptian Armed Forces were strained due to extra responsibilities after the revolution. This was helped by the fact that Egypt’s internal security forces suffered a major loss with the uprising, both in terms of material damage (Ashour (2012:9) stated that more than 95 police stations and over 4,000 police vehicles were torched during the uprising, and that attacks and anti-police sentiment flared up sporadically).

Information about existing strategies, structures and military budget is difficult to obtain, as little to no transparency exist, especially in SCAF’s economic activities in the civilian market. The Constitution of 2012 provide a legal framework for a national security council and a national defence council that, formally, operates under civilian governance. However, as the Constitution was suspended only months after it had been approved it is unlikely that it had much influence on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Egypt’s armed forces and internal security forces. The lack of information makes it difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions about the first hypothesis. The level of violence, as defined here (not counting the violence security forces, both army and internal security forces, inflicted on the public themselves), appears relatively low in comparison to Tunisia. It does suggest, along with evidence about SCAF and its procedures, that the military was mostly successful in dealing with the security situation. However, the complete lack of oversight in its economic activities in the civilian marked and the reports of corruption suggest that it is not in fact an efficient institution.

SSR & Limiting Spoiler Capacities in Tunisia & Egypt

By reviewing the answers to the structured, focused questions several observations can be made: Tunisia adopted and implemented a higher degree of reforms (mainly to its political system) that pertained to civilian governance, control and oversight; they also experienced far less interventions in policies and elections than Egypt; the adoption and implementation of reforms regarding civilian control were much more limited (to the 2012 Constitution); Egypt experienced a military coup in July 2013; and finally that the interests and power of the major actors during a regime change (both those in favour of and opposed of reforms) matters greatly in terms of what reforms and what transition a country gets in the end.

During Ben Ali’s time as president, he centralized these institutions, especially the ISF under the Ministry of the Interior, to the point where he, himself, controlled the security apparatus. Besides the control of presidency, these security services were isolated from the rest of the administration, each headed by directors who profited by what Moncef Kartas (2014:376) calls the
‘clan-like allegiance of their subordinates’. Under the two laws and the constitution in 2014, NCA had legislative power over the organisation of the armed forces and the ISF and enjoys administrative and financial autonomy within the framework of the state budget. Although the NCA formally had legislative power over the organisation of the military and ISF, these were still controlled through their respective ministries (that under Ben Ali had developed into separate bodies from the rest of the administration with a relatively high degree of autonomy) and with more or less the same legal framework as in the previous regime.

Tunisia’s core security sector was under formal democratic civilian governance already in 2011 through the Constitutional law 2011-6 that passed in December (and later also in the constitution 2014), although this was limited in practice, especially for the Ministry of Interior. Several successive ministers of interior attempted purges of the Ministry and the ISF to rid the institutions both of often high-ranking loyalists to the old regime and also of officers that committed human rights violations during the previous regime and the uprising, these did not seem to have much effect. Notably, Tunisia secured legal frameworks that granted civilians access to information on the security sector institutions, without the clauses of national security that, in practice, made impossible for Egyptians to demand the same. By all account, Tunisia had more limited success on adopting internal policies on external oversight mechanisms for the army and, even more, over the Ministry of Interior, as well as on internal policies. Most tellingly, perhaps, is that there during the transitional period was no reported election tampering or major tampering with policies from either the armed forces or the ISF. As stated in the section above, Tunisia had a high level of democracy by the end of the regime in 2013 and for the following three years, in itself this may not say much as the high score largely would have been obtained as Tunisia adopted a legal framework for democratic governance and free media, held free elections etc. However, the security forces (neither the armed forces nor ISF) interfered when the transitional government and parliament establishment of these frameworks that would formally place them under, not only civilian control but democratic civilian control - formally.

In Egypt reforms to place the security sector under civilian governance were practically non-existent during the transition period 2011-2013. Some attempts were made in the 2012 constitution, according to which the internal security forces should be governed by civilians, however, the constitution (drafted and forced into act under a civilian president) states that only military officers can become ministers of defence. Additionally, the constitution was only in effect a few months. Superficial restructuring and purges (and the dissolution of SSI that allegedly just switched name) were made at the Ministry of Interior, reforms that did not manage to demilitarize the ministry. This was no surprise, as SCAF for the larger extent of the transitional period held both legislative
and presidential powers (and could appoint and dismiss the Cabinet as they pleased). SCAF also opposed civilian oversight over it, which several author argues might be out of fear to lose its extensive economic privileges but also out of fear for persecution and to be held accountable for severe violence against protestor and other actions since it took office after Mubarak left (Brumberg, 2012:2; ICG, 2012a:22-23).

SCAF intervened repeatedly in the election process, the drafting of a new constitution and policies to issue policies (and powers) they wanted and revoke those they did not approve of. Eriksson state in his report that Supreme Constitutional Council, SCC, (that dissolved the lower chamber of parliament in 2012) were widely assumed to be loyal to SCAF. Perhaps the ultimate proof of lack of civilian control was the military coup in 2013, after which SCAF again assumed responsibility of appointing a new transitional government. Unsurprisingly, Egypt has a low EDI-score in 2013 and a slightly higher (but still very low) score from 2014, 2015, and 2016 respectively.

The events that took place in both cases seemingly support the second hypothesis, that security sector reforms will likely reduce spoiler capabilities among core security sector actors making it harder for them to become spoilers in transition period thereby increasing the probability of democratization. However, this is not the entire case, the results of the review make it obvious that questions pertaining to the role, power and benefits, of the security actors in the previous regime, and to some extent also during the uprising, are important to ask, as are questions regarding the which actors were propelling attempts at reform, and what power and role they have. Mainly, was there reason to believe that any of the core security actors wanted to interfere, or spoil, any issues, and could they’ve had, or would they have been stopped?

The role of the Egyptian and Tunisian armed forces (although sharing some similarities) in the previous regime and under the 2011 uprisings were very different on several of the points mentioned above. First, the Tunisian armed forces were much smaller, less funded and had never played a political role in the former regime, according to Hanlon (2012:8). The Egyptian Armed forces were much larger (both in terms of serving a much larger country, but also in terms of military expenses per capita, according to Hanlon), they controlled, unchecked, economic activities that popular estimates have around ten to thirteen percent of the Egyptian economy (Eriksson, 2012:36), and have on numerous occasions intervened in domestic issues before the 2011 Revolution to restore order and stability on the streets (Kadry Said & Bakr, 2011:4).
Does SSR Increase the Likelihood of Democratization?

The review of security sector reforms in Tunisia (2011-2014) and Egypt (2011-2013) has yielded somewhat ambiguous results in term of support for the hypotheses. The evidence from hypothesis 1 seem to contradict the theoretical assumption of hypothesis 1 that the failure to manage security problem could impede the process of democratization in a newly established democratic regime. However, the review shows strain on Tunisia’s political scene, especially in relation to the Salafist terrorist attack and the murders of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi, the first which caused Prime Minister Jebali to dissolve the government and request a National Dialogue. Too much data on the existence of strategies and the lack of transparency on budgetary issues was unavailable for Egypt, to draw too much conclusions from it. Evidence from both cases seem to provide support for hypothesis 2, which states that security sector reforms will likely reduce spoiler capabilities among core security sector actors making it harder for them to become spoilers in transition period thereby increasing the probability of democratization. This result should be treated carefully though as the review also made clear that the role and power of core security actors – and their counterparts - played a significant part in what reforms could be made (in issue on which both cases were different).

Some final notes on causality between SSR and democratization are, first, that it should be clear by now that SSR or similar security reforms are not the only factor affecting democratization in a regime change – far from it. In fact, it might only explain a little of the variation in democratization during regime changes, but it should be explored further. Second, the causal relationship between security sector reform and democratization is complex, as becomes apparent if one studies previous research and theories on SSR. While SSR is conceptualized to be an essential part of efforts to bring about democratization, characteristics of a functioning democracy such as functioning political- and judicial institutions, low levels of corruption and an active civil society, will in turn, help bring about a successful and sustainable SSR process (Brzoska, 2006:4-5; Schnabel & Born, 2011:19). However, the opposite relationship, i.e. that higher levels of democratization improves the implementation of SSR, is also not obvious. Brzoska states that although this, theoretically, should be the case, in practice there have been cases (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Central Asia) where “security sector reform has been pushed forward despite visible deficiencies in the democratization process” (Brzoska, 2006:5-6). The fact that these issues are debated, suggest that additional research, and empirical studies, are needed to fill in the blanks.
Alternative Explanations

As mentioned earlier in the text, the presence of other actors powerful enough to balance the security sector seems, based on the review, to have played an important role for the direction of regime change and the reforms that was passed. The Tunisian General Labour Union, UGGT, played a pivotal role in the Tunisian uprising and during the subsequent regime change (Bayat, 2017:176). In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only opposition strong and organised enough to challenge SCAF but partly due to religious divides, they were distrusted by many Egyptians.

Limitations

This study has been an exploration in the workings of SSR following a nonviolent resistance campaign, and as such it is faced with several limitations. One of the limitations in methodology of this essay is the time-scope, that in terms of Tunisia did not cover much of the reforms that were eventually made. This was deliberated in outlining the methodology for this study. An increased time frame might have included more material, but it would have made it more difficult to trace those reforms back to the 2011 revolutions.
Conclusion

In this study I sat out to explore how security sector reform affects the likelihood of democratization after a nonviolent resistance campaign. By using literature on nonviolence resistance, security sector reform, and by borrow the concept of *spoilers* from policy and peace-making literature, I hypothesised that SSR will likely increase the ability of core security sector actors to manage security problems in the transition after a nonviolent resistance campaign, thereby increasing the probability of democratization, as well as reduce spoiler capabilities among core security sector actors thereby also increasing the probability of democratization. I used structured, focused questions on the regime changes in Tunisia 2011-2014 and Egypt 2011-2013, and found some evidence contrary to the first, while limited support for the second. This is only one step towards gaining a better understanding the role of the core security services during regime change and the mechanisms of SSR. Hopefully there will be more.
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