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EU-Morocco Cultural Relations
A Study on Cultural Policies Between the EU and Morocco

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I, Rebecca EMRICK hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “EU-Morocco Cultural Relations: A Study on Cultural Policies Between the EU and Morocco”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.

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Abstract

Although cultural policy and cultural diplomacy are just some of various forms soft power, there is a lack of research between the EU and Morocco despite an increased interest from the EU in various Southern Mediterranean countries. There is a general research gap in the academic world regarding the evaluation the EU’s external cultural policy in Morocco, which this research paper seeks to contribute to fill in the soft power and global context. This paper seeks to examine the role that cultural diplomacy has in the soft power process, specifically with the case of the EU and Morocco.

From this research paper it was found that although culture has generally played an increasing role in EU and Morocco relations, when examining EU-Morocco cultural relations pertaining to their soft power potential, it was unveiled that the EU and Morocco are not fully utilizing their soft power abilities in relation to their cultural policy practices. For instance, in relation to EU-Morocco cultural policy there is a distinctive lack in clarity in government objectives which negatively impacts soft power potential. In EU cultural documents, there is also a clear and different role in internal and external relations also affecting cultural relations with Morocco. However, despite these shortcomings, the EU and Morocco continue to build on their relations with future plans to deepen their agreements. It is in the interest of the EU and Morocco to invest and refine their cultural policy in order to fully utilize the cultural opportunities and benefits for both states in these future agreements. The specific benefits and motivations for the EU and Morocco are also discussed.

The theoretical outline for this paper involved power, especially Nye’s conception of soft power, along with public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, as well as cultural relations. The focus of analysis of this thesis included EU documents such as, treaties, joint agreements, declarations, conclusions, and so on will be the main source of document analysis for this paper in order to trace the evolution of EU-Morocco cultural policy and relations. Additionally Chodubski’s framework derived from the political science field was used alongside critical political discourse analysis.

Keywords: Soft power, cultural diplomacy, culture, European Union (EU), Morocco
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1. Introduction

“...culture relations offer a unique opportunity for improving relations with EU partner countries. Culture is a valuable resource to tackle many of the challenges Europe and the world are currently facing.” - European Commission (“A New Strategy to Put Culture at the Heart of EU International Relations” 2017, 1).

How the EU, originally an organization for economic cooperation, handles external cultural relations with Morocco is the overall question that this thesis seeks to answer. Although the European Community was originally created as an economic entity to facilitate peace between France and Germany in a post WWII global stage by uniting the coal and steel communities, the EU has now grown to include economic, political, security, environmental, and cultural goals.

Cultural Diplomacy or Cultural Relations: Which one is used in EU documents?

For the purposes of this paper, both cultural diplomacy and cultural relations will have to be examined not only because of their different definitions, but also due to the nature of examining a nation-state and an international organization such as Morocco and the EU. Generally speaking, cultural diplomacy “is related to purposeful cultural cooperation between nations or groups of nations”, meaning that cultural diplomacy is essentially when two states collaborate in promoting their states culture in the form of high culture and popular culture in another state (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 366). What is important to note with cultural diplomacy is the necessary role of the government in order to make it “diplomacy.” Inversely cultural relations, as outlined by Arndt, “grow naturally and organically, without government intervention...If that is correct, cultural diplomacy can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests (Arndt 2005, 88:xviii). Therefore the determining factor as to whether something is cultural diplomacy or cultural relations is the role, or lack thereof, of the government.

More specifically in relation to EU external cultural relations, there are two academic approaches as outlined by Trobbiani. Firstly there is the school of EU thought that external cultural relations that “is seen as a broad conceptual instrument supporting culture as a factor of development, capacity building, exchange and dialogue between people” (Trobbiani 2017b, 2). However, within the second school of thought, there is “a more traditional and ‘realist’ approach to Cultural Diplomacy... [that Cultural Diplomacy] has the explicit aim to advance
and protect EU interests abroad” (Trobbiani 2017b, 2). There is an apparent lack of clarity when it comes to understanding how external cultural relations in the EU should function, as seen in the conflicting and various definitions and understandings of the term. This in turn becomes problematic when the EU develops their external cultural policy, since there is no clear policy goal or understanding of what role external cultural relations should have for the EU. In addition to these conflicting understandings of external cultural relations in the EU, there seems to also be a lack of research examining specifically the relation between the EU’s external cultural policy and how it effects the EU’s soft power abilities between the EU and other nation states, specifically in the MENA region.

This shortage of research is in part from a general “[lacking] approach to describing and assessing [soft powers] value” in general, but also due to the lack of clarity and understanding of the various terms related to external cultural relations in the EU (Singh 2004, 30). This paper seeks to redress both of these research gaps through a case study of EU-Moroccan cultural diplomacy.

Although the idea of cultural diplomacy has been a part of diplomacy in the European region since the Roman Empire, it remains “a field of study dominated by conceptual confusion” (Jora 2013, 44). This is in part because of the “distinct lack of clarity in the way that the notion [cultural diplomacy] is used, on exactly what its practice involves, on why it is important, or on how it works” (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 365). Part of this conceptual confusion is due to the multi-layered nature of cultural diplomacy in the EU, including non-state actors (Jora 2013, 43). But EU cultural diplomacy is also at its core contradictory, as it is an interest driven governmental practice, as well as a field that is “driven by ideals rather than interests” (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 365).

The confusion between interests and ideals are reinforced by the terminology used in EU documents; the term EU Cultural Diplomacy and EU External Cultural Relations are used interchangeably between Commission and Council documents with cultural diplomacy being favored in Commission documents, and external cultural relations in Council documents (Isar 2014; “About Us - Cultural Diplomacy Platform” n.d.; “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018; “Council Conclusions on Culture
in the EU’s External Relations with a Focus on Culture in Development Cooperation” 2015; “Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting within the Council, on the Promotion of Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue in the External Relations of the Union and Its Member States” 2008; “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations” 2016). Additionally, there is also the phrase *EU approach to international cultural relations* used within the Parliament, leading to various terms being used throughout the various EU institutions (Costa and Brok 2016).

The use of these numerous terms with various meanings creates an equation for confusion within the political, as well as academic, world when trying to evaluate EU cultural policy. This lack of clarification has been noted, for example “the EU has… made a rather unclear use of the term [Cultural Diplomacy]” because they use the term ‘culture in external relations’, but also because it is used as a term for internal EU “cultural cooperation and promotion” between member states, as well as on EU levels with states outside of the EU (Trobbiani 2017a, 5).

What Trobbiani highlights, that will not necessarily be discussed in depth but should be mentioned, is also the struggle that happens at the EU level due to Member States still having the main competences in cultural policy and the EU having a supporting role (Trobbiani 2017a, 5). This power dynamic influences both how the EU can approach it’s cultural policy internally and externally, however it is also important to hold the EU accountable for their cultural policy objectives which is one aspect that this paper seeks to examine. Additionally, cultural policy in the EU has gone through various momentous changes in its policy and how it approaches external cultural relations as highlighted by the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World (2007) as well as the Joint Communication proposing EU strategy for International Cultural Relations (2016). This ambiguity within the realm of EU cultural diplomacy and EU external cultural relations must therefore be clarified and researched by examining how EU cultural policy has developed over time.

**Examining EU External Relations: A Case Study with Morocco**

For the purposes of this paper, I have chosen to examine the external cultural relations of the EU and Morocco as the case study for this paper because in the Preparatory Action 2014 memo, it was claimed that “for geopolitical reasons and the wish to promote peace stability, freedom
and economic prosperity, EU Member States have turned their focus in recent years to… Southern Mediterranean countries” (Isar 2014, 43).

Morocco is an appropriate choice for a case study because “whereas several other Arab countries have experienced uprisings in recent years, Morocco has entered a phase of apparent political [modernization]” (Isar 2014, 70). This phase of political modernization and lack of uprisings signals that Morocco has the capability to be concerned with their cultural diplomacy practices, since they are stable enough to do so since they are not engaged with uprisings and mass internal protests.

Additionally, Morocco is specifically set apart from its southern neighbors for a multitude of reasons, making it an ideal state to examine EU external cultural policy with. For example, in 2008 Morocco was the first state in the MENA region to officially receive Advanced Status (AS) with the EU which is significant because “all [EU Member State] stakeholders [agreed] that the cultural sector in Morocco, because it has a key role in the development of the country, needs to be strengthened…and that this could be achieved through a deeper and more equal partnership with Europeans and the EU” (Isar 2014, 70; The North Africa Post 2012).

AS is a status that the EU shares with countries not a part of the EU in order to strengthen its external boarders by promoting political and economic stability, growth, as well as overall governmental strength with its neighboring countries. As the first country to receive AS, Morocco was recognized by the EU for being a strategic and necessary partner for the EU in the southern Mediterranean, making it ideal to examine for the purposes of this paper. AS specifically allows for the EU to “reinforce political dialogue and joint decision-making mechanisms… In brief, the [Advanced Status represents] a road map for the progressive construction and strengthening of bilateral relations between the EU and Morocco” (Jaidi 2009, 149).

For Morocco, “…the main benefit of this [Advanced Status] is twofold: being singled out as the EU’s closest partner in the Mediterranean, and boosting the Moroccan economy” (Kausch 2010, 2). Not only was the Morocco singled out from EU stakeholders as being a country whose cultural sector should be invested in, it also signaled to the global community and Morocco’s neighbors that Morocco is the EU’s strongest partner in the Mediterranean.
Not only did receiving AS highlight Morocco’s favored status with the EU it also made Morocco “… a key EU foreign policy laboratory in which the Union hopes to develop a new, more attractive formula for its relations with [neighboring] countries in the South where EU membership is not an option” (Kausch 2010, 3). The AS relationship with Morocco is also seen as a potential “arm” for policy and influence for the EU in third state countries where EU membership is not an option, therefore Morocco proves to be not only a relevant state to examine cultural relations with the EU, but an interesting one as well since it is seen as a “foreign policy laboratory.”

In relation to culture specifically, Morocco is a relevant case study because “many would like to see a more open European cultural market for Moroccan goods and a bigger effort made to increase awareness of Moroccan cultural diversity” (Isar 2014, 71). There is a call from Moroccan citizens to have the ability to be able to share their cultural goods with the EU, highlighting an inequality in soft power between the EU and Morocco, but also underlying the ambitions from Moroccan citizens to share their cultural goods and diversity.

**Research Questions, Hypothesis, and Methods**

Therefore, the evidence on the EUs complex and disarrayed external cultural policy, coupled with the evidence on Morocco and the EU’s cultural relationship, specifically leads one to ask the following research questions:

1. What are the EU’s and Morocco’s cultural policies, and how have they developed over time?

2. If culture is a resource for soft power, how is a country’s culture promoted by soft power?

3. What role do EU documents have in promoting Moroccan culture internally in Morocco, and externally?

4. To what extent do EU external cultural agreements and documents promote EU culture in Morocco and inversely promote Moroccan culture in the EU?

5. What are the cultural objectives and expected outcomes, if any, within EU-Morocco documents? How do these objectives, or lack thereof, effect relations between the EU and Morocco?
For the first research question, this will be explored through a historic overview of how cultural policies have developed in Morocco and the EU, as well as outlining the role culture has played in EU-Morocco relations. I will accomplish this by examining official EU-Morocco documents referencing to culture. For my second research question, I will be able to outline how soft power is being utilized by referencing cultural policies in EU documents. This is possible also due to the inherent connections with soft power, public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy as discussed in the previous chapter. The third research question focuses on how EU-Moroccan agreements in relation to culture promote Moroccan culture internally and externally. Therefore, an empirical analysis of EU documents and reports will be made, in particular those with Morocco, in order to evaluate how effective EU external cultural policy is. Fourthly once the question of how effective EU cultural policy is in Morocco, I will evaluate to what extent EU culture is promoted in Morocco and Moroccan culture promoted in the EU. Finally, there will be an examination what cultural objectives and/or expected outcomes are outlined in EU documents pertaining to external cultural relations, and use my findings to evaluate how this possible effects cultural relations with Morocco. As a result, a historical as well as a critical political discourse analysis approach will be used in order to answer my proposed research questions.

In order to answer these questions, I will firstly evaluate EU cultural policy since it was legally mentioned in EU documents in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and for Morocco we will evaluate their cultural policy since the major constitutional reformations in 2011 were established. When comparing specifically EU-Moroccan treaties and documents we will start from the beginning in 1967, but start our evaluation of policies when culture was first mentioned in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also referred to as the Barcelona Process).

I hypothesize that the EU promotes their culture by soft power in the form of various documents, joint agreements, that allows for the EU to run various cultural programs in Morocco. In terms of how EU documents promote Moroccan culture, I think that EU documents will promote Moroccan culture, however I also anticipate that the EU only wants to support it but does not regulate the Moroccan government in any way. Moreover, I expect to discover that there is an imbalance as to how EU agreements and documents promote EU culture versus promoting Moroccan culture especially since this imbalance of the trade of
cultural goods between the EU and Morocco is already felt by Moroccans. Finally I anticipate that specific cultural objectives and goals within EU external documents are lacking, leading to a lack of reflection on where and how EU external cultural relations can be improved in the future. In order to have a deeper understanding of how soft power, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, as well as cultural relations all relate to one another in accordance to our research question, this paper will define as well as explain how all these terms relate to one another.

The methods that will be used in order to address these research questions will be official EU documents since a macro-level approach has been adopted. Since this paper falls in the field of political science, approaches mapped out by Chodubski have been adopted, as well as critical discourse analysis. In chapter 3, how these methods relate to one another and their relevance to my research questions will be elaborated on.

**Chapter Outlines**

In order to answer the proposed research questions, applicable terms such as power, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, and cultural relations, as well as their relevance to the overall thesis and field of research will be explained and organized in chapter 2. After the necessary terms have been defined and explained, this paper's methods as to how we will superficially answer the proposed research questions will be outlined in chapter 3.

In chapters 4 and 5, the role and history of cultural policy in the EU and Morocco will be separately examined. Finally in chapter 6, the history and progression of EU-Morocco external relations will be evaluated, with specific attention being paid to the role and evolution of culture in EU-Morocco external relations. Once the history, evolution, and current role that culture plays in EU-Morocco relations has been outlined, chapter 7 will focus on the outcomes and analysis of the information gathered in chapters 4, 5, and 6. As the conclusion, chapter 8 will summarize the results of the paper in relation to the proposed research questions.
2. Theories of Power, and the Differences between Public Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy, and Cultural Relations

“Culture is the hidden gem of our foreign policy. It helps to promote dialogue and mutual understanding. Culture is therefore crucial in building long-term relationships with countries across the whole world: it has a great role to play in making the EU a stronger global actor.” - Tibor Navracsics ("A New Strategy to Put Culture at the Heart of EU International Relations” 2016, 1).

This chapter seeks to define essential theories that will be discussed throughout the thesis such as power, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, and how they all relate to one another. Researchers in their field have been used to not only define relevant terms, but also in order to navigate how these terms interact and relate with one another in international relations. Luke and Nye have been used for the power section; whereas Gullion, Tuch, Malone, and others were used to define public diplomacy, but also how it relates back to soft power specifically. For the sections on cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, Cummings, Ang, Gienow-Hecht, and especially Arndt were referred to in order to demonstrate the clear similarities and differences between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, as well as how they relate back to public diplomacy and soft power abilities. This section is necessary in order to establish the theories used in this thesis, and must be understood in order to answer this papers research questions.

Within international relations, power has always played a role in how nations interact with one another. Although there are various forms of power in international relations, for the purposes of this paper soft power, as defined by Nye, will be the focus. When one examines where these soft power resources lie within a state, we find them in a nations “…resources of culture, values and policies” (Nye 2008, 94). Nowadays, soft power is often consciously utilized by states through their public diplomacy instruments.

Propaganda is often used to describe public diplomacy, but the key difference between propaganda and public diplomacy is that propaganda is not credible and can be damaging to the states reputation, whereas public diplomacy is credible and can help a state to accomplish their desires and ambitions (Nye 2008, 101).

When it comes to how states utilize public diplomacy, one answer can be found in cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is the “…purposeful cultural cooperation between nations or
groups of nations” (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 366). In fact cultural diplomacy is a subsection of public diplomacy, and is therefore considered a soft power resource. Therefore, cultural diplomacy is a practice and an act that is done through the state. That being said, there has been a recognition of the increasing role that NGOs, IOs and private actors are playing within cultural diplomacy (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 368).

Finally, cultural relations are defined by Richard Arndt as relations that “…grow naturally and organically without government intervention…cultural diplomacy can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests” (Arndt 2005, 88:xviii). Therefore the main difference between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations is the role, or lack thereof, of the government in its creation and promotion. In the following sections, these terms and more will be examined and defined for the purposes of this paper. It is important to understand the know what these various terms mean, how they relate to one another, as well as what the subtle difference of using different terms can mean for soft power relations between the EU and Morocco.

**Power Defined**

Although there are various definitions of power such as by Dahl, Arendt and Parsons, their definitions will not be focused on in this paper due to their focus on cohesive, authoritative or violent aspects and definitions of power (Trunkos 2013; Penta 1996; Lukes 2004). Therefore, I will focus on the definitions of power by Nye and Lukes for this paper since they offer broader definitions of power to include aspects such as attraction and soft power which are more relevant for the purposes of this paper.

Not all exercises of power require actors to engage in conflict, meaning that there are various tools and sources of power that allow for one to wield power without conflict. Lukes goes as far to say that the most effective type of power is when conflict can be totally avoided in order to achieve one’s desired outcome. “… [I]t is highly unsatisfactory to suppose that power is only exercised in situations of such conflict. To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants” (Lukes 2004, 27). In other words, more powerful actors can shape the very desires and beliefs of less powerful actors, making them
believe they are acting on free will, when in fact the desires of less power actors are actually being formed by more powerful actors. Within Lukes argument for power, this is where culture has the opportunity to influence power relations since “… human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings” meaning essentially culture (Robinson 2006, 18).

Within the literature for the three dimensions of power from Lukes perspective, there is the opportunity for culture in the form of cultural diplomacy to be used as a tool of power since “cultural diplomacy …[takes] place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests” meaning no conflict in this use of power, but governments use cultural diplomacy in order to advance their own interest (Arndt 2005, 88:xviii). In order to give a broad and comprehensive overview of power, Nye’s formulation of soft power will also be explained and used throughout this paper.

Hard, soft, and smart power are terms that have been coined by the American political scientist Joseph Nye, that are essential to define and discuss when talking about cultural diplomacy. Although soft power is the term most relevant to this paper, hard and smart power will also be briefly explained as well. Nye defines power generally as “… the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want” and according to him, there are three ways to do this “threats of coercion (‘sticks’), inducements and payments (‘carrots’), and attraction that makes others want what you want” (Nye 2008, 94). If one was to label these forms of behavior, hard power would use threats of coercion, payments, and military forces in order to achieve their desired outcome, whereas a state wielding soft power would use their attractiveness in order to achieve their preferred outcome (Nye 2009, 160 & 161). Therefore, smart power, also coined by Joseph Nye, is the ability to combine hard and soft power tools (Nye 2009, 160). Soft power thereby can also be defined as “getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerce them” (Nye 2008, 95).

Soft power, alongside the ability to persuade, “… is also the ability to entice and attract. Attraction often leads to acquiescence. In behavior terms, soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets – tangible and intangible – that produce such attraction” (Butler, Wacker, and Nye 2008, 26). Not only is Nye’s concept of soft power the ability to persuade others to want what you want, but it also includes the ability for ones
habits, desired outcomes, or policies (i.e. tools) to seem attractive to others as well. Successful soft power tactics as a result include the ability for states and entities to use their assets and tools in order to seem attractive to others, and to use these attractive assets in order to achieve their desired outcomes.

States have to work against an always changing geo-political background when it comes to identifying and promoting their interests via soft power. For example “fifty years ago political struggles were about the ability to control and transmit scarce information. Today, political struggles are about the creation and destruction of credibility” (Hayden 2011, 12). This shift in the geopolitical sphere on political struggles is in thanks to what Nye refers to as “paradox of plenty.” The “paradox of plenty” is in reference to the mass amount of information that is available thanks to technological advances, and according to Nye since information is power, “a much larger part of the world’s population has access to that power” including the average citizen (Nye 2008, 99). This vast amount of information that has flooded the information market may also have an effect on the credibility of nation states. As Nye argues, although “reputation has always mattered in world politics” it is becoming less powerful because “… the role of credibility becomes an even more important power resource because of the ‘paradox of plenty’” (Nye 2008, 100).

The increased role of credibility in soft power wielding abilities can be especially damaging for a nation state because “information that appears to be propaganda may not only be scorned, but it may also turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a country’s reputation for credibility” (Nye 2008, 100). If a nation state is emitting information that is not seen as credible, both by other nation states and the masses, their attempt at mastering soft power fails and their attempts are seen as propaganda. Therefore, without credibility “the instruments of public diplomacy cannot translate cultural resources into the soft power attraction” (Nye 2008, 101). This idea is also reflected in Hayden’s work. For example he argues that “credibility and trustworthiness – measures that contribute to perceptions of an actor’s attractiveness – increases the relative importance of media and communication outlets for actors seeking to cultivate soft power” (Hayden 2011, 11). When a state is perceived as being credible, then their ability to cultivate and harbor soft power abilities increases dramatically.
When looking at nation states, soft power relies “on its resources of culture, values, and policies” (Nye 2008, 94). Culture, although not alone, is a primary resource for states to utilize in order to fully employ one’s soft power ability (Hayden 2011, 7 & 9).

Following Nye, I define culture as “the set of practices that create meaning for a society, and it has many manifestations” such as high and popular culture (Nye 2008, 96). So if culture is a resource for soft power, how is a country’s culture promoted by soft power? One answer is through public diplomacy.

As outlined by Nye, “public diplomacy has a long history as a means of promoting a country’s soft power” (Nye 2008, 94). If soft power is getting others to want what you want by attraction via your sources and tools as a state, then public diplomacy is the manner in which states promote their various “attractive” resources to other actors. According to Hayden; “… [since] soft power represents both resources for achieving objectives and measurable behaviors, policies like public diplomacy have become necessary instruments of soft power” (Hayden 2011, 9). Therefore, public diplomacy “…provides a crucial link between these two aspects; it is ‘an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries’” (Hayden 2011, 10).

From Lukes definition of the three dimensions of power, with the focus for this paper being on the third dimension, as well as Nye’s various definitions of hard, soft and smart power it is clear that there are various understandings and perceptions of power specifically with how it relates to culture. Both Luke’s and Nye’s formulation of power draw upon the lack of violence or conflict in order for states to accomplish their most desired outcomes. However, in Luke’s definition of power that is relevant for this paper, there is the sense that the less powerful actor is being manipulated in order to have the same desires as the more powerful, influential, actor. Although in Nye’s conception of soft power, attraction is also a tool to accomplish soft power, the idea of manipulation is addressed with the credibility of a state, allowing for a less manipulative tone to his definition of soft power. For the purposes of this paper, Lukes third dimension of power, and the focus of lack of conflict and the use of attraction will be used as sources of power, where the tool of this power will be cultural diplomacy. In order to have a clearer understanding of power within the realm of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy will
now be defined and examined as a source of Lukes third dimension of power and Nye’s conception of soft power.

**Public Diplomacy: A Tool to Utilize Soft Power or a State Driven Propaganda Tool?**

Public Diplomacy is a term that was coined by American Professor and retired foreign service officer Edmund Gullion in 1965 (Cull 2006). Gullion defined public diplomacy as

“…[dealing] with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications” (Cull 2006).

In terms of soft power, public diplomacy “remains a necessary instrument for those actors seeking leverage for their soft power assets” (Hayden 2011, 12). Public diplomacy, as a result, is the tool that nation states use to “leverage” and export their assets, such as culture, in order for actors to achieve their desired outcomes. Since public diplomacy is a tool for states to use to achieve their desired outcomes, it is also seen as source of power for states to utilize.

Additionally, as outlined by Tuch, public diplomacy is “a government’s process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (Gilboa 2008, 57). What should be underlined with Tuch’s definition of public diplomacy, is the involvement of the government in the process of sharing and spreading information about the culture from their state. Tuch’s definition implies that power is involved in public diplomacy since actors use a nation’s ideas, ideals and culture in order to achieve understanding in order to benefit the government, and its goals.

Furthermore, public diplomacy is also defined as the “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” according to Malone (Gilboa 2008, 57). In order for public diplomacy to fulfill its goals, it needs to change the opinion and thinking of the citizens of another country, which would then in turn also change the opinions and thinking of the government towards said actor. These
various definitions and understandings of public diplomacy indicate that public diplomacy is in fact a tool of power for states to wield over other states in order to achieve their desired outcomes.

Who is public diplomacy targeted at? Some academics claim that public diplomacy attempts “… to influence the behavior of a foreign government by influencing the attitudes of its citizens” (Signitzer and Coombs 1992, 139). Although public diplomacy is a discussion and interaction on the national level between nation states, the main audience are the citizens of the country in question. Nevertheless, Edward R. Murrow has argued that public diplomacy is the “interaction … with foreign governments but [also]… with nongovernmental individuals and organizations and often presenting a variety of private views in addition to government views” (Nye 2008, 101). While public diplomacy may have begun as interactions and discussions with governments, today it also involves non-state actors alongside state and private citizens. Although non-state actors do play a role in modern day public diplomacy, for the purposes of this paper, we will solely be examining relations between the EU and Morocco at the governmental level in an attempt to have specific and clear results.

Successful public diplomacy must come from a credible source in order for it to successfully fulfill the wishes of the state. Additionally, effective public diplomacy is not simply public relations but it “involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies” (Nye 2008, 101).

In addition to having credibility, “effective public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as well as talking… That is why exchanges are often more effective than mere broadcasting” (Nye 2008, 103). According to Nye, in order for public diplomacy to be effective if must fill three criteria: it must come from a credible entity, it requires governments to invest in building long-term relationships, and finally public diplomacy must be a two way street in which all actors are involved in the listening and talking process.

To summarize, public diplomacy is the mechanism in which states and governments utilize in order to export their soft power abilities and assets. Public diplomacy, as noted by Tuch, is also a government process of communication and therefore must include governments. Likewise in order for a state’s public diplomacy to be successful as outlined by Nye various aspects need to be fulfilled such as the source promoting and fulfilling public diplomacy tools need to come
from a credible source, governments investing in their relationships, as well as for the communication style of public diplomacy needing to be a two way street. Now that the definition and criteria for successful Public Diplomacy has been defined and established in relation to soft power, what needs to be explained is what tools are used within the field of public diplomacy to fulfill this criterion. One answer is culture, which is why term cultural diplomacy will be examined and defined in relation to public diplomacy and soft power.

**Cultural Diplomacy: The Secret Soft Power Tool for Nations**

Cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are inherently interconnected. If cultural diplomacy is specifically related to the “… purposeful cultural cooperation between nations” then this is therefore an asset of soft power that is being utilized via cooperation and communication (tools of public diplomacy as discussed in the previous section) (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 366). Milton Cummings infamously defined cultural diplomacy as “…the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding” (Stelowska 2015, 63). Therefore, for the purposes of my paper I argue cultural diplomacy is a specific type of public diplomacy, since states use cultural diplomacy as just one way to communicate with foreign peoples (and sometimes even their own) in order to bring about understanding, but also to promote their own national interests through culture.

Cultural diplomacy can also be used to directly influence citizens and a foreign government’s perception and understanding of another nation from the use of cultural policy and programs. As Arndt points out, cultural diplomacy is therefore a practice that is fostered by national governments and foreign diplomats, and therefore a function of the state (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 366). However, it should also be mentioned that within the realm of cultural diplomacy, there is an increasing argument that third party actors, such as NGO’s, IO’s, and private actors, are increasingly having a larger role within the process of cultural diplomacy (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 368).

As we have established in the last section on public diplomacy, public diplomacy is a tool for exerting soft power across nation states. Therefore if cultural diplomacy is a specific form of public diplomacy, then cultural diplomacy is also a tool for exerting soft power as well. This is also reflected in the work by Ang when she argues “[cultural diplomacy] can be a soft power resource” (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 368).
Additionally, since cultural policy in the EU and Morocco will be examined and compared, the idea of cultural imperialism should briefly be mentioned due to the colonial past that the EU, more specifically France and Spain, have with Morocco. Not only should this term be addressed because of the particular history between Morocco and EU states, such as France and Spain, but also because cultural imperialism has been linked to cultural diplomacy. For instance, “…some countries hold far more resources than others, they can combine different forms of power to perpetuate their domination” and “some scholars use the term ‘cultural imperialism’ to show that since the time of colonization, culture has been used not as a complement to coercive power, rather than as an alternative” (“Introducing Different Approaches to Cultural Diplomacy - Cultural Diplomacy” n.d.). Countries that have more resources, have more access to different forms of power in order to assert their dominance and carry out their desired outcomes. From a cultural imperialistic perspective, culture was never used alongside coercive power, but rather as an alternative in order to avoid threats in the form of coercive power.

There are two features typical of cultural imperialism, first a “dominant culture that views itself as superior imposes itself on another culture” and secondly the “cultural appropriation and displacement of culture artefacts can take the form of looting or stealing, as well as that or purchase at a price that does not reflect the real value of the artworks” (“Introducing Different Approaches to Cultural Diplomacy - Cultural Diplomacy” n.d.). The definition that is most relevant for this paper is the first feature of cultural imperialism, and that of a dominant culture imposing itself on another. Although I anticipate that the EU culturally imposes itself onto Morocco and there exists an uneven distribution of power, this field lacks specific research in relation to the EU and Morocco. Therefore, this is why this research paper is relevant within the realm of cultural and soft power studies between the EU and Morocco.

Academically, cultural diplomacy serves various definitions and interpretations. For instance, as academic Gienow-Hecht explains, there are three schools of thought towards cultural diplomacy: the first school of thought “…grapples with the tension between propaganda and diplomacy” and sees culture “as an instrument of state policy’ with limited private participation” (Gienow-Hecht, 9). With this first school of thought, cultural diplomacy is strictly seen as a method from the state, excluding third party actors such as NGOs and IOs, and is constantly struggling between what Gienow-Hecht refers to as propaganda and
diplomacy. The second school “accentuates the use of cultural diplomacy as an instrument to work at the exclusion of politics” because cultural diplomacy instead of being a tool of propaganda “represented a means to establish ties with countries that were politically unpalatable” (Gienow-Hecht, 10). Here with the second school of thought the arguments is that cultural diplomacy actually works separately from politics because cultural diplomacy is used as a type of bridge between states that normally clash. The third and final school “defines cultural diplomacy beyond the realm of the state” due to the involvement and activities of nonstate actors (Gienow-Hecht, 10). Clearly, with this third school of thought, the focus is that cultural diplomacy has evolved past the state and involves actors outside of the government such as NGOs, IOs, as well as civilians. For the purposes of this paper, the first school of thought by Gienow-Hecht is most relevant since cultural programs headed by the EU and Moroccan government will be studied. Although this paper recognizes the participation and importance of non-state actors in the cultural diplomacy arena, for the purposes of this paper, its scope, as well as my own resources only government cultural programs will be examined.

Cultural diplomacy has been defined as a specific, but not the only, tool for states executing public diplomacy in order to exert their soft power attraction. Although various definitions of cultural diplomacy have been mentioned, it can be summarized as the cultural cooperation between nations or groups of nations (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 366). Additionally, due to the historic and imperialism history between member states of the EU and Morocco, cultural imperialism was examined as well, and it was discovered that culture in this context was actually used as a compliment to coercive power, versus a tool for soft power. Now that cultural diplomacy has been understood, it must not be confused with cultural relations. Therefore, in the next section the connection and distinction between cultural diplomacy and external cultural relations will be explained specifically in relation to the EU.

From Cultural Diplomacy to EU External Cultural Relations

Before EU external cultural relations are explained, the differences and similarities between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations must be clarified. For example, it has been cited that “common terms such as ‘cultural diplomacy’, ‘soft power’ and ‘public diplomacy are rejected in [favor] of ‘culture in external relations’. This is to address the non-instrumental uses of culture” (MacDonald 2015, 187). Though the terms mentioned are necessary to rationalize for
the purposes of this paper, it is also imperative to explain the difference between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. Richard Arndt outlines this difference between cultural diplomacy and cultural relations as:

‘…the relations between national cultures, those aspects of intellect and education lodged in any society that tend to cross borders and connect with foreign institutions. Cultural relations grow naturally and organically, without government intervention…If that is correct, cultural diplomacy can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests (Arndt 2005, 88:xviii).

According to Arndt, cultural diplomacy has the motivation of a state behind it, whereas cultural relations is meant to be a concept that grows naturally and organically between states. Although one could argue that because the EU only has a supportive role in the field of culture, and thereby cannot have sole control of their cultural policy, meaning the EU does not engage in cultural diplomacy simply does not suffice (“Areas of EU Action” n.d.). Whether it is from the EU level or the member state level, government interest are being fulfilled through cultural policy at Member State and EU levels. Whether or not this would unquestionably be considered cultural diplomacy is one question, however the recognition of the role and interests of the state in both EU and Member States being fulfilled via cultural policy is undeniable.

In addition to Arndt’s understanding, Singh claims that cultural relations

“… describes the processes of transnational two-way engagement which includes the actions of all involved, whether they are state actors, or acting in civil society, cultural, education or non-state contexts” this means that cultural relations “can include public and cultural diplomacy but also refers to understandings and interactions among non-state groups” (Singh 2004, 14).

The EU is not a state entity, but rather a unique international organization since it comprises of elements making it “…partly an intergovernmental organization and partly a supranational organization” (“Extension: What Are International Organizations?” n.d.). Therefore, since the EU is considered an international organization, compromised of 28 European nation-states making up a unique political, economic, and cultural entity, I argue that the EU is in fact above cultural diplomacy since it does not have a common policy towards culture and plays a supporting role to member states. Morocco, on the other hand, since it is a sovereign state would in fact engage in cultural diplomacy activities and programs.
It should also be pointed out that even within the EU, the terminology between cultural diplomacy and external cultural relations differs from institution to institution such as the case with the European Commission and the Council (Isar 2014; “About Us - Cultural Diplomacy Platform” n.d.; “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018; “Council Conclusions on Culture in the EU’s External Relations with a Focus on Culture in Development Cooperation” 2015; “Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting within the Council, on the Promotion of Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue in the External Relations of the Union and Its Member States” 2008; “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations” 2016). For example in the European Commission documents, they are much more likely to use the cultural diplomacy term. On the other hand, the language within the Council is much more selective in terms of using “cultural diplomacy” as a term within its documents. For instance, the Council tends to highlight the role of the EU in international cultural relations, and member states in cultural diplomacy, most likely due to the fact that the Council represents the interests of member states at the EU level, and wish to preserve and clarify their competence in EU documents (“Council Conclusions on Culture in the EU’s External Relations with a Focus on Culture in Development Cooperation” 2015; “Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting within the Council, on the Promotion of Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue in the External Relations of the Union and Its Member States” 2008; “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations” 2016).

To conclude, this chapter has established that within the field of international relations and power relations, soft power is a term coined by Nye that describes how nations or groups of nations can utilize their attraction abilities in order to achieve their desired outcomes in international relations. However, in order for a state to utilize their soft power abilities, we have explained that states do this via public diplomacy which is the tool in which states use to promote their soft power attractions. Public diplomacy has been argued as a necessary instrument to promote and utilize a state’s soft power (Hayden 2011, 9). More specifically, when one examines what exactly an “attraction” of a state would be, a major example is culture.
Therefore within the sphere of public diplomacy there is also an even more specific field of cultural diplomacy, which is the state sponsored “purposeful cooperation between nations or groups of nations” in order to facilitate both understanding between nations (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 366). Therefore, since cultural diplomacy is a sub-type of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is therefore also a mechanism for states to utilize in order to promote their soft power abilities.
Figure 1: Structure of soft power, public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy in the EU

Figure 2: Structure of soft power, public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy in Morocco
3. Methodology

The following section will lay out this paper’s methodology as to how the proposed research questions will be answered. Firstly EU documents such as, treaties, joint agreements, declarations, conclusions, and so on will be the main source of document analysis for this paper, since we are taking a macro level institutional approach to answering these questions. These primary source documents will also be used to outline and evaluate the development and general history of both culture in EU internal and external relations, the role and structure of culture Morocco, as well as EU-Moroccan relations with a focus on how culture has developed in EU-Morocco relations. Once the official legal obligations between the EU and Morocco have been outlined, I will be able to answer my first, second, and third questions. This approach has been taken for this research paper since a macro-level approach has been adopted in order to evaluate EU-Morocco cultural relations specifically from a governmental perspective. The methods of this paper need to be outlined in order to clearly inform how this paper’s research questions will be answered.

For the purposes of this paper, a case study approach to evaluate the EU’s external cultural policy was taken with Morocco. This paper falls under the field of political science, therefore for my analysis, I will draw my methods for analyzing various EU and Morocco documents from Chodubski who explains that “[political] science…is the interpretation of connections, rules and laws already existing and occurring between events, facts, phenomena and processes” (Chodubski 2010, 32). This is exactly what this paper will use in order to answer the proposed research questions, how the rules and laws pertaining to cultural policy between the EU and Morocco are influencing one another.

Likewise, the history of cultural policy between the EU and Morocco will be outlined and examined because “…not knowing the past [invariably] results from misunderstanding of present times, is persuasive” (Chodubski 2010, 32). By outlining and evaluating how cultural policy has developed between the EU and Morocco, it will allow for a full analysis and understanding of where cultural policy is now between the EU and Morocco and where it looks to be going. “In this case, a valuable thing is to place events, social, political and [economic] processes in long term perspective” so that we can see what policies and practices are benefiting all parties, and which practices could be changed for the future (Chodubski 2010, 32).
Finally, it should be mentioned that “the duties of political science are: setting correctness of political phenomena and processes, identifying sources of conflict and the possibility of the social dispute occurrence, formation of phenomena and processes, and anticipating future development of social phenomena and processes” (Chodubski 2010, 36). These “duties” of political science also outline what we look to answer with this research paper by examining the process of how cultural policy between the EU and Morocco has developed over time, identify what areas of this policy (if any) are problematic, as well as looking towards the future of EU-Morocco cultural policy.

In addition to using approaches found in the field of political science, I will also use a critical political discourse analysis approach. “…[Political discourse analysis] is both about political discourse, and it is also a critical enterprise” (van Dijk 1997, 11). This is relevant for this paper because “…critical-political discourse analysis deals especially with the reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination through political discourse” (van Dijk 1997, 11). The research questions pertaining to this thesis revolve around the evaluation of soft power relations between the EU and Morocco in a cultural context by evaluating EU documents. Critical political discourse analysis therefore serves as the best manner in which to try and answer the proposed research questions because it is directly related with evaluating power relations. Specifically, I want to bring attention to the power abuse and domination attributes that can be understood and evaluated through critical political discourse analysis.

Moreover, “discourse analysis allows a more detailed insight into the largely discursive processes of agenda setting, and the relations between politics” which is necessary because “…such an analysis deals with the discursive conditions and consequences of social and political inequality that results from such domination” (van Dijk 1997, 44 & 11). As a part of my hypothesis previously mentioned, I anticipate that there will be an imbalance in power relations as to how EU agreements and documents promote EU culture versus promoting Moroccan culture. Since this theory allows for inequalities to be discovered and evaluated, it is the best theory to use for the purposes of this paper.

I suggest that a micro level approach should be taken in future research, and I suggest that specific cultural programs hosted by the EU and Morocco should also be evaluated due to their clear relevance to a research question investigating the power equality between the EU and
Morocco in relation to their external cultural programs. Future research should also focus on how these cultural programs effect the citizens of the EU and Morocco in order to evaluate to what extent cultural programs actually effect the opinions of citizens.
4. EU External Cultural Relations

This chapter seeks to outline and explain the evolution of culture and cultural policy in the EU. Although internal cultural relations will be touched upon, the primary focus of this section will be evaluating EU external cultural policy. This will be accomplished by examining and evaluating EU documents pertaining to culture in order to highlight how culture in the EU’s external policy has evolved over time. It is necessary to examine external cultural policy in the EU so that once we evaluate EU-Morocco cultural relations, we have a more comprehensive understanding of what the EU wishes to accomplish and expect through their cultural policy.

History of Culture in EU Law

Although culture as a tool for the EU was not formally recognized until the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1993, its role within the EU has continuously grown, been reshaped, and changed. For instance even after it was included in the Maastricht Treaty, it was once more included in the official framework of the EU under the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007 and implemented in 2009 (“EU Treaties” 2016). Within the Lisbon Treaty, the main objective of culture within the framework was to promote cultural cooperation within the EU, as well as “contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States” (“Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: Article 167” 2008). Although the concept of EU external cultural relations is mentioned once more in the Lisbon Treaty, it is essentially word for work as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty.

It should be clarified that within the EU, there is a difference between external cultural relations, as well as the promotion and facilitation of EU culture internally. Within both internal and external areas of cultural policy in the EU, both are constantly changing and evolving, reflecting the complicated formulation of both a European culture as well as what role specifically the EU should play in that culture. Additionally, since we are specifically examining external cultural relations between the EU and Morocco, the internal cultural policy of the EU will not be thoroughly examined in this paper. However the structural tensions that arise in the EU and are reflected in the external cultural policy of the EU will be explained in the following section.
Legal Cultural Policies of the EU

Legally speaking the EU does not have the primary role of coordinating cultural policy within its member states. In fact, the EU’s official capacity within the scope of cultural policy is that of supporting competence with the other member states. More specifically, member states have the primary legislative role, and the EU “can only support, coordinate, or complement the action of member states” ("Areas of EU Action" n.d.).

The supportive role that the EU has within the area of culture was first explicitly underlined in the Maastricht Treaty (1993), and was repeated and slightly expanded in the Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003), and Lisbon Treaties (2009). There are five points that the Maastricht Treaty outlined regarding the responsibility of the EU in the area of culture. In general, the area of culture within these treaties has not changed much, besides from the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty when it was specified that the “Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures” (Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts 1997, 39). Although culture has been included in official EU legal documentation, the role and responsibility of the EU in respect to culture has hardly changed since 1993, and it remains today a supporting body in respect to EU-Member State power sharing responsibilities in the field of culture.

More recently, with the adaptation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, “…there was a reorganization of the EU’s external relations work with the creation of the European External Action Services (EEAS), the European Union's diplomatic arm” (“External Relations” n.d.). With the adaptation of the Lisbon Treaty, competences within the field of external relations, which include culture, were expanded.

This is reflected in the establishment of the EEAS, which currently acts as the diplomatic arm and has the responsibility to promote EU culture via external cultural relations with other countries outside of the EU. Although external cultural relations in the EU have been constantly developing, there is a constant tension between Member States and on the EU level in the field of cultural policy. Since member states have the primary power in relation to organizing their own cultural diplomacy policy, at the EU all that can be done is supporting programming in
order not to overstep their responsibilities and allocation of power in the field of cultural policies.

**Role of Culture in EU External Cultural Relations**

With the legal framework regarding the cultural policy of the EU now identified, this paper will outline the framework in which culture is involved in EU institutions. Although “various cultural institutions have been inaugurated throughout Europe and throughout time such as the Alliance Française in 1883, the Dante Alighieri Society in 1889, the British Council in 1934, among others” it becomes even more imperative to distinguish which actors and institutions play a role in promoting European culture (Gienow-Hecht, 18). “In the last few years, four main institutional actors have been advancing the case for a substantive EU strategy for international cultural relations: the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union” (“The Pillars of the EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations - Cultural Diplomacy” n.d.).

Just three years after the Lisbon Treaty in 2006, several European national cultural institutions came together to form EUNIC (“Members” n.d.; “”Unique EUNIC: EU Cultural Relations " Now Available as a Documentary” 2019). Today there are 36 national institutes of culture and national bodies that engage with one another in the field of cultural relations and cultural diplomacy (“The European Union Network of Institutes of Culture (EUNIC) - Cultural Diplomacy” n.d.). EUNIC is a partner of the European Commission, and “it aims to become the delivery, research and training partner of choice for cultural diplomacy and cultural relations at European and international level by 2025” however for the moment EUNIC remains just a partner of the Commission rather than a EU body like the External Action Service (“The European Union Network of Institutes of Culture (EUNIC) - Cultural Diplomacy” n.d.). However on the other hand, although EUNIC aims to combine the powers of the various cultural institutions in the EU, due to the number of national interests involved in the EUNIC as well as the various approaches to cultural institutes at a national level “…there is no clear consensus on the missions of a cultural institute. For some a cultural institute’s role is to promote the culture of its country, whereas for others, it is mainly a tool to foster intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding” (“The Role of National Cultural Institutes - Cultural Diplomacy” n.d.).
Additionally, in 2007 the European Commission put forward an Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World with 3 objectives (“Glossary of Summaries - Culture” n.d.):

1. cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue;
2. culture as a catalyst for creativity (subsequently taken forward in some of the Europe 2020 strategy flagship initiatives);
3. and culture as a key component of international relations

These objectives were part of the Commissions ‘Communication on a European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World’, and this document is a milestone in the development of culture on an EU level because it “marked the first time the Commission emboldened itself sufficiently to articulate policy principles and to actually propose to Member States ‘objectives for a new EU agenda on culture’” (Isar 2015, 500). The objectives outlined in this report were a significant and positive advancement in terms of external cultural relations for the EU, because although the first two points could be interpreted for strengthening culture between EU member states, they can also be considered to be referencing the expansion as well as strengthening of the EU’s strategy in external cultural relations.

Moreover, in 2011 there was also the Preparatory Action ‘Culture in EU External Relations’ which was a report about “…culture in Europe’s international relations and [the report] … also explored the ways in which culture and cultural expression have been deployed already by European actors…[as well as analyzed] how third country stakeholders have partnered with these European cultural actors and how they view their relationships with Europe” (Isar 2014, 7). The outcome of this report was released in April 2014 and it recommended strategic approaches to culture in the EU’s external relations towards 54 countries, including Morocco, and was a significant milestone for international cultural relations in the EU (“Preparatory Action for Culture in External Relations” 2014). It was the first report of its kind to reflect on cultural relations between the EU and third party countries. Results of the report has allowed for the EU to recognize strengths and weaknesses in their external cultural policy, and for the purposes of this paper, with Morocco.

In June 2016, the EU High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission Frederica Mogherini and the Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport Tibor Navraesics (2014-Present) “put forward a proposal to develop an EU strategy to international cultural relations. The aim is to put cultural cooperation at the [center] of the EU’s diplomatic relations
with countries around the world” (Kendrick 2017). This Joint Communication proposes an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations that aims to advance cultural cooperation with partner countries across three main areas (“Culture - Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations” 2017):

1. Supporting culture as an engine for sustainable social and economic development;
2. Promoting culture and intercultural dialogue for peaceful inter-community relations;
3. Reinforcing cooperation on cultural heritage

With all of the EU’s efforts in relation to facilitating and cultivating cultural relationships with other countries cultural sectors, these are the three aims that the EU aims to accomplish via cultural cooperation.

With this new strategy towards culture in the EU’s external cultural relations, there was also the creation of the Cultural Diplomacy Platform in March 2016 in order to “…gather all the actors …of the European external cultural relations, and engage them on a continuous basis receive feedback, policy advice and support… [in order to] strengthen [the EU’s] ability to engage on an equal footing with our partners across the globe” (“About Us - Cultural Diplomacy Platform” n.d.). Essentially, the Cultural Diplomacy Platform acts in support of EU cultural programs by offering advice, counseling, as well as insight on how culture can further the EU’s interest abroad.

The role of culture in international cultural relations for the EU is still an ongoing project, and is continuously developing in terms as how the EU approaches culture, as well as the role it has with the EU’s international relationships. However after the June 2016 announcement, it is clear that from an EU perspective, culture is a centerpiece for its international diplomatic mission. With this announcement it was outlined that the EU plans to accomplish these goals by involving “Governments from partner countries, local cultural [organizations] and civil society, the Commission, the European External Action Service, EU Member States and their cultural institutes will all play an active role” (Kendrick 2017). Promoting EU culture involved multiple actors and institutions at all levels of government throughout the EU and its member states. Although this strategy is clearly in accordance with the EU’s legal limits in the area of culture, it also undercuts the EU’s attempts to promote culture though one EU institution because there are so many faucets of international EU cultural relations.
In May 2018 there was the release of A New European Agenda for Culture announced by the Commission. This “…New Agenda responds to the European Leaders’ invitation to do more, through culture … It aims to harness the full potential of culture to help build a more inclusive and fairer Union, supporting innovation, creativity and sustainable jobs and growth” (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 1). The three strategic objectives outlined by the New Agenda were focused on social, economic and external dimensions of culture. For the purposes of this paper, the external objective is the most relevant but the social and economic sections will be briefly explained as well.

In terms of the social dimension of culture in the New Agenda, the main focus was on both facilitating social cohesion as well as taking advantage of the “transformative force for community regeneration” within the EU thanks to the European Capital of Culture and the European Structural and Investment Funds (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 3).

In the economic dimension, it is firstly outlined how culture already contributes to the EU economy via jobs, growth and external trade; but also how by investing in the cultural and creative sectors there will be undeniable economic growth (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 4). In order to support this argument, the economy section is divided into three “eco-systems” in order to explain the impact culture can have on the economy: education and training, cities and regions, as well as cultural and creative industries (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 4).

Thirdly and finally, the external dimension the New Agenda recognizes the importance and the increasing role of culture in cultural diplomacy, international cultural relations, as well as “the role of culture as an important component and enabler” within international relations for the EU (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 7). The New Agenda “enables culture to be promoted more effectively as a vector of identity and cohesion, a driver of socio-economic development, and a factor directly nurturing peaceful relations, including through the people-to-people contacts resulting from education and youth projects” (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 7). Although this quote summarizes the general aims of the external dimension of the New Agenda, it should also be broken down. Firstly, the New Agenda will enable for EU culture to have a more unified and comprehensible meaning to external states and bodies. Secondly, culture can contribute to social and economic development outside of the EU, which can also contribute to states facilitating peaceful relations within their own country as well as with their neighbors. Thirdly and finally, the New Agenda also points out the importance of education and youth involvement in the success of cultural programs in external cultural relations for the EU, as well as fulfilling the other aspects mentioned in the external dimension.

In the external dimension, although the Western Balkans particularly stand out as the geographic location focused on, there are various other locations mentioned such as: the Middle East, Mediterranean countries, Northern Africa, Central Asia, enlargement countries, Eastern Partnership countries, as well as specific countries such as Japan, China, Afghanistan, and Iran (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 7–8).

What is most notable in the New Agenda is not only the clear need to invest in culture for the economic and innovation benefits, but also how it was structured. For instance, at the end of each strategic action, there was a clear outline of what the Commission needs to do in order to fulfill these objectives which has historically not been clear in EU cultural documents. On the other hand, when it came to the responsibilities of the Member States, it was very passive only suggesting and inviting member states to help the omission fulfill their objectives by administratively supporting.
Although this is to be expected since Member States do have sole competence in the field of culture, it nonetheless weakened the perceived goals, objectives, and power of the Commission in the New Agenda. Nonetheless, the list of objectives and responsibilities of the Commission at the end of each strategic section is an important step in the Commission, and the EU as a whole, taking responsibility for the cultural aims of the EU. Before this document, since the objectives and goals were unclear, it was possible for the EU to claim that cultural policy was always successful even if minimal outcomes were achieved. However since objectives were previously not so clear, it is extremely difficult to know if the minimum or maximum outcomes were achieved.

Most recently in December 2018 there was the announcement of the Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022. By the time that this thesis will need to be submitted the Work Plan for Culture will not be fully released, however some information and objectives have been released. For example this Work Plan for Culture is being released and being headed by the Council, which already provides for significant differences that should be identified.

Unlike the New Agenda, this Work Plan does not talk about or identify cultural diplomacy throughout the document, but rather uses “international cultural relations”, which as discussed earlier is a common trend between the Commission and the Council. On the other hand, like the New Agenda, this Work Plan also paves the path to have “…clear principles and set focused priorities with consistent implementation, to establish, with due regard for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, a Work Plan for Culture for the years 2019 to 2022” (“Council Conclusions on the Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022” 2018, 1). Although the official Work Plan has not been released, it is clear that consistent principles and goals for the Work Plan are a priority. This is strengthened when it is explicitly outlined that “better governance requires clear responsibilities and engagement by all actors involved” meaning not only do all actors need to have clearly outlined objectives, but especially for the EU all actors need to work together in order for the objectives and goals of the Work Plan to be successful. For instance there are five priorities specifically outlined (“Council Conclusions on the Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022” 2018, 2):

1. Sustainability in cultural heritage
2. Cohesion and well-being
3. An ecosystem supporting artists, cultural and creative professional and European content
4. Gender equality
5. International and cultural relations

Therefore for the purposes of this paper, the focus of the analysis of this Work Plan will be on what was said on international and cultural relations. Although this is just the proposal so the official concrete actions and clear implementation objectives are missing, what is outlined is the need for a “…bottom-up perspective, encourage people-to-people contracts and promote intercultural dialogue” as well as “full complementarity with Member States’ actions and actions carried out by the Council of Europe and UNESCO has to be ensured” (“Council Conclusions on the Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022” 2018, 3). Not only does the Council call for the involvement of civilians in the EU’s external cultural policy, but it also points out the importance to have a dialogue with other nations that the EU engages with culturally. This means that the EU and the nation in question, such as Morocco, should ideally have the same opportunities as the other to promote their culture abroad.

Although the Work Plan does not explicitly state how this will be accomplished, there is a calendar of when the EU plans to accomplish various goals such as when studies, workshops and conferences will be held. There is a section for all the priorities, including international cultural relations, and even though the calendar is vague, at least there is a calendar published and being shared therefore holding the Council responsible to accomplish these goals, events, and objectives (“Council Conclusions on the Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022” 2018, 11).

It will be important for other researchers in the future to examine the new Work Plan for mechanisms and tools the EU plans to use to encourage and keep this cultural dialogue equal between nations and the EU. Additionally, the recognition by the Council for the EU to recognize its place within culture policy in terms of with Member States, the European Council, and UNESCO is a recognition for the EU to not overstep its responsibilities or competences, within the field of culture.

In conclusion, despite the confusing and multi-layered approach that the EU takes towards culture internally and externally, there have been attempts with the latest proposals that mention culture to try and mainstream EU cultural policy, as seen in the New Agenda and the Work Plan for Culture. This is seen in the attempts the EU is making to outline specific goals
and objectives that the EU needs to fulfill in order to be successfully reaching their goals they outline in relation to culture in the New Agenda. What is also notable is the role of culture internally in the EU, versus the role of culture in external relations. For example, within the EU culture is meant to enrich and build on infrastructure that already exists. On the other hand, in external relations, cultural has the ability to be “… a driver of socio-economic development, and a factor directly nurturing peaceful relations” (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 7). The role of culture specifically in EU external relations will be elaborated on in chapter 7 of this paper, but understanding that culture has a different role internally and externally in the EU is important to define for this paper. Since culture in the EU context has been outlined, it is necessary to also examine how culture is structured and viewed in Morocco. Figure 3 on the next page provides a brief visual as to important EU documents pertaining to culture, the year they were enacted, as well as a brief explanation of their significance.
1993: Maastricht Treaty enacted
2006: EUNIC created
2007: European Agenda for Culture in a globalizing world released
2011: Preparatory Action ‘Culture in EU External Relations’ Report commenced
2014: Outcome of Preparatory Action report released
2016: Joint Communication proposing EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations
2018: New European Agenda for Culture released
2019-2022: Work Plan for Culture

1993: First time culture was formally recognized in EU law.
2006: When various cultural institutes from EU member states joined together to form EUNIC showcased cohesive European effort to showcase and facilitate common European culture.
2007: The “…first time the Commission emboldened itself sufficiently to articulate policy principles and to actually propose to Member States ‘objectives for a new EU agenda on culture’”(Isar 2015, 500).
2011: The Preparatory Action was meant to “…[analyze] how third country stakeholders have partnered with these European cultural actors and how they view their relationships with Europe” (Isar 2014, 7).
2014: The results of the Preparatory Action reflected that it was the first report of its kind to reflect on cultural relations between the EU and third party countries.
2016: Culture became a centerpiece for the EUs international diplomatic mission
2018: Aims to respond to European Leaders’ invitation to do more in the field of cultural policy (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018, 1). Additionally it marks EU policy becoming clearer when it comes to outlining specific goals and outcomes at EU and Member State levels.
2019-2022: Calling and outlining specific roles for Member States as well as clearer outlines and goals than the New Agenda, which has revealed is necessary for successful external cultural policy for the EU.
5. Moroccan Cultural Diplomacy

“Morocco is like a tree, whose roots lie in Africa, but whose leaves breathe in European air. (Le Maroc est comme un arbre, dont les racines se situent en Afrique, mais dont les feuilles en air européen.) -King Hassan II of Morocco (Njoku 2006, 1).

EU external cultural policy has been previously evaluated and defined, now the role of culture in Morocco’s government will be assessed. Likewise with the chapter on EU, culture in the context of internal and external relations for Morocco will be outlined and evaluated. Additionally, an explanation of Moroccan culture, and what that means, will be inspected. Not only will Moroccan government documents be used for this chapter, but also academic works will help guide the evaluation and analysis of the evolution and role of culture in Morocco. Not only does the role of culture in the Moroccan government need to be evaluated in order to understand how culture in terms of government policy is treated in Morocco, but it is also necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the role culture plays in Moroccan governmental policy in order to evaluate how it functions with the EU.

Although Morocco was a Franco-Spanish colony for 44 years until 2 March 1956, Morocco has developed a rich and varied culture all its own, blending together various backgrounds from Berber, Arab, African and European influences (Njoku 2006, 1–2). Although there was a constitutional reform in 2011 in Morocco, the King of Morocco Mohammed VI still remains the sole ruler of Morocco (BBC 2018). From the 2011 constitutional reformation there were cultural changes, the establishment of a Minister for Communication and Culture within the Moroccan government framework. The outcomes of the constitutional reform, the exportation of Moroccan culture to the EU, and how this has been influenced by EU-Moroccan agreements in relation to cultural policy will be examined.

General Information, Structure, and Culture of Morocco

Morocco’s culture is shaped by various influences, rituals, as well as customs. For example, Morocco’s modern-day culture “…possesses a diverse and lively history that witnessed a long succession of different ruling people such as the Romans, French, Spanish, Jews, Arabs and Berbers. This diversity is reflected through many aspects of Moroccan life, namely the languages, the clothing, the cuisine, and the culture” (“Cultural Diversity in Morocco: An
Omnipresent History” n.d.). Although today Morocco’s culture takes on aspects of various other countries and cultures, this has been an ongoing process for hundreds of years.

The oldest inhabitants of modern-day Morocco were the native Berbers, also referred to as Amazighs, and are considered to be the indigenous people of Northern Africa (“Cultural Diversity in Morocco: An Omnipresent History” n.d.). More specifically, Berbers have been a part of the Maghreb region area stretching “…from the Siwa oasis near the Egyptian and [Libyan] borders to the Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean and from the southern coast of the Mediterranean to the Northern areas of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso” (Aissati 2005, 60).

Although the Berbers have a long history inhabiting not only Morocco, but also the Maghreb, they have also struggled to have their language, culture, and even their existence recognized by various invaders, from the Arab invasions to the French and Spain occupations as well.

The Berber struggle to be accepted into Moroccan society is reflected in the “…the continued negligence of a legal status for the Amazigh language [which] seriously affects its future and diminishes its chances to be regarded as a language with an economical value” (Aissati 2005, 71). Although there have been strides in the most recent constitutional reform of 2011 to support the Amazigh language, this is a very recent victory for the Berber population in Morocco. Additionally, in “…in October 2001, the first higher institute for research on Berber was created in Rabat, Morocco, by royal decree, under the name of ‘Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe (IRCAM).’ This institute is the only one across Morocco with an official mandate to carry out research on Berber, elaborate school manuals, and deal with issues related to Berber” (Aissati 2005, 68). Although still an ongoing process, modern day Morocco is making efforts to incorporate and celebrate Berber culture through the traditional Amazigh language.

In addition to Berber history in Morocco, another aspect that has played a noteworthy role in Moroccan culture is Islam. Although today Islam plays a large role in the private and public spheres in Morocco, traditionally Berbers “were once pagan worshipers, [however now] the majority (98.7%) of the country now practice Islam. The rest of the population practice Christianity or Judaism” (“People of Morocco: Cultured and Diverse People” n.d.). Specifically, “the Berbers believed in the ill effects of the evil eye and the curse. They also believed in evil spirits called djoun… The Berbers also believed in good spirits who, if entreated, could aid the individual in achieving his goals” (Hagopian 1963, 72). Although Islam
is the religion of a majority of citizens in present-day Morocco, historically the indigenous
Berber population had pagan roots believing in various evils that would effect various aspects
of their life including agriculture harvests, health, professional or personal aspirations, among
various other aspects of life.

Islam originally came to Morocco during Arab invasions in the early eighth century, and has
had various impacts on Moroccan culture and society throughout the years (Hagopian 1963,
70). However, “Islam had been introduced in Morocco and in many instances it was imposed
upon the Berbers” (Hagopian 1963, 73). Islam was brought to Morocco on various occasions
however, until what has been coined the phase of “modern” Islam in Morocco, the political
structure and beliefs that Islam and the Arabs brought to Morocco never endured with the native
Berber populations. This is reflected with what has been coined as “modern” Islam because
during this phase of Islam the “Berbers [had been] called upon to follow the path from which
they and some of their Beduin counterparts might have strayed during the course of history that
was originally intended in Morocco” after the return of Mohammad V in 1955 to Morocco
after the French had exiled him in (Hagopian 1963, 79).

Since this unification through struggle of the Berber and Moroccan peoples, the strength of
Islam as a religion and influence on society can be seen in various aspects of life. For example
“the majority of souks, however, are closed during the lunch period and on Fridays” (“People
of Morocco: Cultured and Diverse People” n.d.). As part of the Islamic faith, Muslims must
pray five times a day, so stands and shops are closed for afternoon prayer. Moreover Fridays
are Muslim’s holy days, so traditional shops and markets are also closed on Fridays in order to
accommodate this holy day.

In addition to Islam, Arabs who came to Morocco also brought political structure to Morocco
since the Berbers did not traditionally have any “… universal political structure in Morocco,
but rather [they had] a number of similar political structures” (Hagopian 1963, 71). More
specifically, before Arab influence and political structure was brought to Morocco, “Berber
‘society’ in Morocco was made up of numerous autonomous and semi- autonomous segments”
(Hagopian 1963, 71). As a result, it has been argued that although “Islam did not provide the
basis for a Moroccan society in its early stages, but it is serving today as the main mechanism
for advancing the development of modern society” (Hagopian 1963, 80).
In addition to the Berber and Islamic traditions that Morocco has, there is also a particularly strong history and attachment to film in Morocco. For example, the film industry in Morocco plays a large role in the cultural material available for export to the EU especially considering that “it is acknowledged that thanks to state support, Morocco produces more films than does Belgium, Portugal, Denmark or Switzerland annually” (Helly 2014, 9). This tradition of film in Morocco is one of the oldest in the world with “Morocco’s cinema history [stretching] back to 1897 when Louis Lumière, one of the first ever film makers in history, made Le Chevrier Marocain” (“Morocco History, Language and Culture” n.d.).

Morocco’s culture is in no way limited to these three cultural features, however by examining some of these influential and historic aspects of Moroccan culture and society, we can now have a better understanding of what is at stake when we discuss Morocco’s cultural policy internally as well as externally especially in relation to the EU.

Morocco is situated in the northwest of Africa, having coasts on both the Atlantic and Mediterranean seas, and is considered to be a part of the larger Maghreb region of Northern Africa. Mohammed VI is the current King of Morocco, having rose to power in 1999 (BBC 2018). In 2011 following pressure from the “Arab Spring” a greatly reformed Moroccan Constitution was introduced that expanded the “powers of parliament and the prime minister but [left] the king with broad authority over all branches of government (BBC 2018). Since this constitutional reform in July 2011, the constitution has not been changed. Therefore, Morocco has been a constitutional monarchy since the 2011 referendum, however a majority of power still rests with King Mohammed VI (“Moroccan King in Referendum Win” 2011).

Within the general structure of the Moroccan government there is an executive, legislative, and judicial branch. Within the executive branch there is the Council of Ministers, which includes ministers, secretaries of states, the prime minister, as well as King Mohammed VI who presides over the Council of Ministers (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 15). The King also appoints the prime minister, based from the political party that has won a majority of votes (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 15). Under the legislative branch, there is the parliament that is composed of two Chambers: the Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Councilors who vote on “laws, controls the action of the government and evaluates the public policies” (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 17). Finally, the judicial branch
although “… is independent of the legislative power and of the executive power” still must answer to the King since he is “… the guarantor of the independence of the judicial power” (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 29). The general outline of the Moroccan government has been made, therefore we can examine and outline the specific role of culture within the Moroccan government.

Structure and Role of Culture within the Moroccan Government

Within the Council of Ministers in the Moroccan government there are 38 ministers, minister delegates, and secretaries of state (“List of Government” 2013). Under this list of ministries there is a Minister of Culture and Communication, currently headed by Mohamed El Aaraj where culture is run internally by the Moroccan government. In relation to institutions that are relevant to the Ministry of Culture and Communication, and officially stated on the administration portal of the Moroccan government, is the National Heritage Institute of Sciences and Archeology, Higher Institute of Theater and Cultural Animation, as well as the National Institute of Fine Arts (“Administration Centrale: Ministère de la Culture” n.d.). There are also Regional Directorate of Culture for various regions in Morocco from Fes to Rabat to Marrakech (“Administration Centrale: Ministère de la Culture” n.d.). Based on the various administrative offices solely for culture throughout Morocco, it is clear that Morocco is invested in promoting Moroccan culture within Morocco via their various cultural offices that are located one in each of Morocco’s 12 regions. In terms of external cultural relations the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs and [International] Cooperation supports international cultural relations and events” such as international festivals and various other types of cultural cooperation (Isar 2015, 70). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently headed by Nasser Bourita (“List of Government” 2013).

The Right to Culture in the Moroccan Constitution is mentioned in three articles: Article 5, Article 26 and Article 33. Article 5 concerns the protection of Arabic and Tamazight as the official languages of Morocco, as well as outlining that the Moroccan state will work to preserve the Hassani dialect (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 4–5). In Article 5, there is also the establishment of the National Council of Languages and of Moroccan Culture and is charged with the “… protection and the development of the Arabic and Tamazight languages and of the diverse Moroccan cultural expressions, which constitute one authentic patrimony and one source of contemporary inspiration” (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 5). This
is especially important for the diverse identity of Moroccans because in earlier versions of constitutional texts, there was only a selective identity based on Arabic and Islamic cultures that were promoted (Madani, Maghraoui, and Zerhouni 2012, 18).

Additionally, Article 26 stipulates that

“the public powers lend…their support to the development of cultural and artistic creation, and of scientific and technical research, as well as to the promotion of sports. They favor the development and the organization of these sectors in independent manner and on democratic and specific professional bases” (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 10).

Essentially, the Moroccan state will invest and support the development of Moroccan arts, culture, science, and technology. It is interesting, and should be pointed out, that the constitution specifically states that the government will have a supporting role rather than sole responsibility. As a result, the cultural sector in Morocco needs support from both local non-governmental organizations, as well as international partners and countries, in order to invest and also play a role with the Moroccan government. This language highlights the Moroccan governments openness, and willingness to work with other actors and nations in order to promote and support the cultural sector in Morocco.

Finally in Article 33, it is specified that public powers must take all appropriate measures to

“facilitate the access of the young to culture, to science, to technology, to art, to sport, and to leisure, all in creation of propitious conditions for the full deployment of their creative and innovative potential in all these domains” (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 12).

In order to facilitate the development and utilization of the mentioned sectors, a Consultative Council of Youth and Associative Action was created in the 2011 Constitution. With 65% of the Moroccan population estimated to be under 30 years old, and unemployment for the youth reaching as high as 26% for those ranging in 25-34 years of age, this predicament has led to numerous protests (Silverstein 2011). These protests were taking place before the adoption of the 2011 Constitution, and so this article, although addressing cultural creation and innovation, also touches upon the Moroccan governments attempt to “boost the participation of young men and women in the… cultural… life of the country” (Silverstein 2011).

Since the constitutional reforms in 2011 the role and structure of culture in the Moroccan government has developed as well. For example,
“culture in the past was overseen by the Ministry of the Interior, then by the Ministry of Sports and Youth, before being put under a dedicated Ministry of Culture. This evolution shows that the willingness to control the cultural sector has gone from a coercive approach to an increasingly regulatory and grants making approach. Such transition and evolution in the cultural policy field is still very much ongoing” (Helly 2014, 5).

Since 2011, the importance of culture in the Moroccan government has grown, as well as the manner in which the government approaches promoting Moroccan culture in a way that is less forced, and more discussion and collaboration based. This is also reflected in the Moroccan government specifically stipulating in the 2011 Constitution that Morocco would have a supportive role versus sole responsibility in the cultural sector.

Although the recognized role and increased importance of Moroccan culture has been highlighted in the reformed 2011 Constitution, the issue of protecting the rights of Moroccan artists in the cultural sector has become an area of tension. For instance, “… serious tensions are created by state policies encouraging free access to culture (through festivals) without sufficiently protecting artists’ rights and revenues through clearer and stronger regulations pertaining to intellectual property” (Helly 2014, 5). The intellectual, economic, and the rights of artists are all in danger through the free access that the Moroccan government provides via festivals in Morocco. Although this allows for artists to showcase and promote their art, what is lacking in Morocco cultural policy is economic protection for artists who participate in in festivals that provide free access to culture in Morocco.

In relation to Morocco’s cultural diplomacy strategy, “the concept of cultural diplomacy is quite new in Morocco, and some experts consider that given Morocco’s own cultural diversity, it is mostly relevant within Morocco itself, given the country’s internal cultural diversity” (Helly 2014, 6). This is reflected in the various points of culture in the 2011 Moroccan Constitution since they refer to how culture should be treated and approached in Morocco specifically. However, what is lacking is how Morocco should utilize cultural diplomacy tactics externally, especially in relation to the EU. This point has also been highlighted in the 2014 Preparatory Action: “…beyond the mantra of nation branding and national identity enhancement, it is still a bit unclear what cultural policy means in and for Morocco and Moroccans and, as far as the Preparatory Action is concerned, for external audiences” (Helly 2014, 6). While there is a more modern and shared driven approach to culture outlined in the
2011 Moroccan Constitution, there is still a lack of direction and objectives to fulfill both internally, and especially externally in the form of cultural diplomacy.

Although it is not clear what the external cultural policy approach for Morocco is, it has been noted that “…external cultural relations mostly occur in the cultural hubs of the big cities (Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh)” (Helly 2014, 11). In relation to the external dimension of Morocco’s cultural policy, it has also been emphasized that “[even though] there is no explicit strategy for culture in external relations, culture is dealt with in numerous policy areas either through direct state intervention or in a [decentralized] way, in connection for instance with local development, tourism, or education” (Helly 2014, 7). Although culture is not being directly handled by the Moroccan government, Moroccan culture is still being cultivated and promoted by various other sectors in Moroccan society. More specifically, it has been noted that “Universities [in Morocco] play a specific role [in Morocco’s cultural development] since they are able to develop international partnerships that can help establish connections between civil society and the cultural sector” (Helly 2014, 12). The role that universities in Morocco play in the cultural sector internally, highlights the key role that non-state and non-governmental actors play in the cultural sector.

In conclusion, although the role of the Moroccan government in the cultural sector has shifted and changed, especially after the adaptation of the 2011 Constitution, it is clear that “… the cultural sector in Morocco… needs to be strengthened… and that this could be achieved through a deeper and more equal partnership with Europeans and the EU” (Helly 2014, 15). Not only does the Moroccan government need to employ clearer standards and objectives for their cultural policy internally and externally, it has been recognized that the EU should play a role in supporting Morocco accomplish this. This is particularly important since it was been anticipated, and recognized, that the EU-Moroccan partnership is unequal in the cultural sector thereby requiring that the EU supports and offers more opportunities and support for Morocco. Although this is a precarious position for the EU to be in, considering the colonial relationship that Morocco had with various EU member states specifically France and Spain, it is clear that a more equal partnership is called for as well.
6. EU-Moroccan Cultural Policy

Now that the role of culture in the EU and Morocco have separately been evaluated, now the evolution of EU-Morocco relations specifically relating to culture will be inspected. In order to accomplish this, EU treaties, joint agreements, documents, and communications will be used in order to explain and show the evolution of EU-Morocco relations pertaining to culture. It is necessary to outline the evolution and analyze EU-Morocco policy pertaining to culture in order to understand how, if at all, their cultural policy is effecting the EU’s soft power abilities in the region. Moreover, with evidence pointing to an unequal partnership, especially pertaining to culture, this working theory needs to be examined further.

The structure of culture in the EU, governmental structure of Morocco, as well as the role culture plays in the Moroccan government has been outlined and examined for the purposes of this paper. Through this analysis we have discovered that within the EU, culture both internally and externally is constantly changing and being modified in order to reflect the goals and ideals that the EU wants culture to fulfill. Inversely, in Morocco culture is also very much an ongoing project, with notable strides in the field of culture made in recent years.

As mentioned, most recently with the Work Plan for Culture that is set to be released later in 2019, the priority the EU has for culture includes (“Council Conclusions on the Work Plan for Culture 2019-2022” 2018, 2):

1. Sustainability in cultural heritage
2. Cohesion and well-being
3. An ecosystem supporting artists, cultural and creative professionals and European content
4. Gender equality
5. International cultural relations

Additionally, after examining Moroccan policies towards culture, it was uncovered that cultural policy in Morocco has developed since the 2011 Constitutional reform, however there are still various faults found in cultural policy. For example, the concept of cultural diplomacy is still quite new in Morocco, and this ambiguity as to how Morocco should approach their cultural policies internally and externally is reflected, and noted, by external audiences such as the EU (Helly 2014, 6). It was also determined that various non-state actors play in important role in cultural policy in Morocco, particularly universities. This is to be expected considering that in
the Moroccan Constitution, it is outlined that the Moroccan government will have a supporting role in cultural policies. In order to fully examine the relationship culture plays specifically in EU-Moroccan relations, now the specific agreements and documents between the EU and Morocco will be outlined. During this process, an analysis of agreements and how they affect EU-Moroccan relations will be made as well.

**Treaty and Legal Obligations between the EU and Morocco**

The relationship between Morocco and the European Community began with the Trade Agreement in 1969 which paved the way for a broader agreement, the Cooperation Agreement of 1976, which aimed at “…establishing cooperation between the two sides and fostering Morocco’s economic and social development” (“EEC - Morocco Relations” 2018).

However, in terms of culture specifically, the first agreement between the EU and Morocco that included cultural cooperation was the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, which was a product of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference (“The Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” n.d.). This Euro-Mediterranean Partnership declared a “comprehensive partnership between the European Union (EU) and twelve countries in the Southern Mediterranean… [that aimed to turn the region] into a common area of peace, stability, and prosperity though the reinforcement …social and cultural cooperation” among other aspects such as politics and economics (“Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” 2011).


Under Title I, Article 3, and section 1, the agreement outlines that “a regular political dialogue shall be established between the Parties. It shall help build lasting links of solidarity between the partners which will contribute to the prosperity, stability and security of the Mediterranean region and bring about a climate of understanding and tolerance between cultures” (“EU-Mediterranean Agreement: Establishing as Association between the European Communities
and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the Other Part” 2000, 3). Although based on a political dialogue, this section does outline that the EU wishes to build a relationship with Morocco that promotes tolerance and cultural understanding between the EU and Morocco.

The AA also outlines under Title VI, Chapter II, Article 69, section 3, subsection d that “dialogue should cover in particular all issues connected with… schemes and [programs] to encourage equal treatment between Moroccan and Community nationals, mutual knowledge of cultures and [civilizations], the furthering of tolerance and the removal of discrimination” (“EU-Mediterranean Agreement: Establishing as Association between the European Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the Other Part” 2000, 16). Here, the AA not only lays out specific cultural cooperation, but a key concept here is that this section is specifically the promotion of equal and mutual knowledge of the cultures and civilizations found in the EU and Morocco.

Finally, under Title VI, Chapter IV, Article 74, this entire section is dedicated to the “Cooperation on Cultural Matters”. For example, section 1 of the AA outlines that:

“In order to boost mutual knowledge and understanding, taking account of activities already carried out, the Parties shall undertake – while respecting each other’s culture – to provide a firmer footing for lasting cultural dialogue and to promote continuous cultural cooperation between them, without ruling out a priori any field of activity” (“EU-Mediterranean Agreement: Establishing as Association between the European Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the Other Part” 2000, 16).

This section already highlights other points mentioned, but there is also the goal that each country will respect the others culture, and to promote cultural cooperation. Additionally, there are two other points made: one is the focus that should be played towards the youth, audio-visual means of expression, as well as the protection and dissemination of culture when the EU and Morocco are coordinating projects and programs (“EU-Mediterranean Agreement: Establishing as Association between the European Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the Other Part” 2000, 16).

The next development in EU-Moroccan relations was in 2003 when the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a community of 16 countries with the EU that aimed to “build on common interests with partner countries of the East and South and [commited] to
work jointly in key priority areas, including in the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion” (“European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)” 2016). Within the structure of the ENP, Action Plans (AP) are bilateral agreements between the EU and ENP partner countries that “sets out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities and serves as the political framework guiding the priorities for cooperation” (“European Neighbourhood Policy” 2016). With the case of Morocco, the EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan with the EU was signed and finalized in 2005.

Although this AP addressed culture and the need for cooperation and collaboration between the EU and Morocco, it failed to do so in any concrete measurable means. For example, the EU-Morocco ENP AP outlines that “Morocco and the European Union wish to deepen their political, economic, social and cultural relations, as well as their security cooperation” (“EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan” 2005, 1). The EU and Morocco plan to do this by, “[promoting] cultural and linguistic rights of all people of the Moroccan nation” (“EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan” 2005, 6). Although there is a section dedicated specifically to cultural cooperation, the problem with these objectives is that they are unmeasurable goals. For instance, the AP claims to want to “…[promote] language teaching and disseminating Moroccan culture in the EU…foster the creation of Morocco-EU cultural areas… [as well as promoting] productions by both parties and step up bilateral multilateral exchanges, in particular in the audiovisual and cinematic fields” (“EU-Morocco ENP Action Plan” 2005, 32). While these were not the only points made under the cultural cooperation section, they do highlight the lack of “how” the EU and Morocco will accomplish these goals, thereby weakening the overall AP since there is no way to measure or know if these goals and aims were actually accomplished.

In 2008, the relationship between the EU and Morocco once more developed. For example in 2008 the Euro-Mediterranean Process, also referred to as the Barcelona Process, was replaced by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) which “promotes economic integration across 15 [neighbors] to the EU’s south in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans region… It was an opportunity to make relations more operational with the initiation of new regional and sub-regional projects” (“Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)” 2016). Although the UfM is essentially focused on “fostering human development and promoting regional sustainable development”, their objectives of stability, human development and integration all have
cultural aspects attached to them, and is therefore relevant to this paper to mention (“Who We Are” n.d.).

Additionally in 2008, Morocco also received Advanced Status (AS) with the EU. More specifically Advanced Status (AS) “…[represents] a road map for the progressive, sustained development of bilateral relationships in the political, economic, financial, and human fields and for facilitating Morocco’s involvement in certain community [programs] and agencies” (Jaidi 2009, 1). Essentially the goal of the Advanced Status (AS) with the EU is that the EU will “strengthen political cooperation between Morocco and the EU” with the “… gradual integration of the Moroccan economy into the EU interior market through the provision of adequate financial support” (Jaidi 2009, 1). The Advanced Status with Morocco is meant to strengthen EU-Morocco relations through closer and more coordinated relations in various realms such as the economic, financial, political and human spheres. More specifically, the AS between Morocco and the EU has outlined three objectives to accomplish between Morocco and the EU:

1. To strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the areas of politics and security;
2. To progressively integrate Morocco into the EU internal market through legislative and regulatory convergence;
3. To extend the partnership to include new participants (“Morocco and the EU” 2016).

Within the AS agreement there are a few references to culture and cultural relations between the EU and Morocco. For example, the AS recognizes that the ability to strengthen political, economic, and cultural relations is possible due to previous agreements and treaties between the EU and Morocco, such as the AA and ENP (“Document conjoint UE-Maroc sur le renforcement des relations bilatérales/ Status Avancé” 2008, 1). Additionally, under Part 4 of the Human Dimension there are a few aspects of culture that are touched upon. For instance, the AS agreement claims that the working groups considers the development of the human dimension of EU-Moroccan relations to be paramount to current relations, and should involve various actors including civil society and non-state actors (“Document conjoint UE-Maroc sur le renforcement des relations bilatérales/ Status Avancé” 2008, 11). With the AS, the EU and Morocco have recognized the importance of having non-state actors involved in their cultural
relations. Although there is still a role for the state, by having non-state actors involved allows for the nations to distance themselves and have an arm’s length distance from cultural activities, which in turn allows for their programs to have more legitimacy than if they were solely governmental supported cultural programs (Schneider 2006, 194). The AS of Morocco in EU-Morocco relations sustainably intensified bilateral diplomatic and trade relations between the EU and Morocco making Morocco irreversibly tied to the EU (Kausch 2010, 2).

Inversely, had there have been critiques of EU-Morocco relations after Morocco receiving AS status because “a year and a half after the granting of the statut avancé [AS], however, the general declarations and the generous public discourse have been filled with only a few concrete, measurable commitments, timetables and benchmarks” (Kausch 2010, 3). Although the symbolic meaning of the AS agreement between the EU and Morocco outlined improved and deeper bilateral relations, in reality the measurement of these programs and “deeper relations” have been difficult to measure in concrete terms.

In 2013, the EU and Morocco renewed their 2005 AP to a new EU-Morocco Action Plan implementing the advanced status (2013-17). This new AP was initiated in order to accommodate the AS that Morocco had received in 2008 from the European Union. When examining the document, there were various mentions of cultural relations between the EU and Morocco, such as the recognition that within Morocco there needs to be an effort to consolidate “the cultural rights of the different components of the Moroccan nation and assure the protection of the practiced dialects in Morocco: Established for this purpose a Moroccan National Council of Languages and Moroccan Culture” (“Relations avec le Maroc: projet de plan d’action Maroc pour la mise en œuvre du statut avancé (2013-2017)” 2013, 14). Additionally, section 2.6 specifically addresses the Promotion of the Rights of Women where it is claimed that “implementation of the [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women] CEDEF and the principle of equal of rights and freedoms in the civil, political, economic, social, cultural, education, and environmental fields” (“Relations avec le Maroc: projet de plan d’action Maroc pour la mise en œuvre du statut avancé (2013-2017)” 2013, 15). Furthermore in section 4.5 cooperation between the Mediateurs in Morocco and the European Ombudsmen it claims that in an attempt to develop an action program for the convention under negotiation, including “the mechanisms for disseminating the culture of

Finally there is a section dedicated solely to culture in section 4.6 under Cultural Cooperation. There are various points under this section that are much more detailed than the previous 2005 AP. For instance in this 2008 AP there are various concrete objectives outlined such as the ratification of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, thereby increasing Morocco’s participation in various EU cultural cooperation programs (“Relations avec le Maroc: projet de plan d’action Maroc pour la mise en œuvre du statut avancé (2013-2017)” 2013, 25–26). Additionally, most other points under this section of the AP imply a working two-way relationship between the EU and Morocco such as “reinforcing cultural cooperation in favor of the promotion of intercultural dialogue” alongside “[promoting the] dialogue and cooperation in the preservation and enhancement of the heritage and the development of cultural industries” and finally with developing “Morocco’s role in promoting intercultural dialogue” (“Relations avec le Maroc: projet de plan d’action Maroc pour la mise en œuvre du statut avancé (2013-2017)” 2013, 25-26). With this AP there is a clear attempt to both have clear goals, as well as have the relationship between the EU and Morocco be as fairly balanced as possible by highlighting “intercultural dialogue” as well as encouraging Morocco to have a prominent role in that dialogue.

Most recently, there was a joint proposal for a Council decision for the “adoption of a recommendation on the extension of the EU-Morocco Action Plan implementation the advanced status (2013-2017)” essentially meaning that both the EU and Morocco outlined in this joint proposal their intentions as well as commitment to renew the EU-Morocco AP (“Joint Proposal for a Council Decision” 2018). Besides outlining legal formalities and background for the relations between the EU and Morocco, it also mainly establishes that the 2013-17 AP will “...constitute the basis of EU-Morocco relations for the current year [2018] and will allow discussion to take place to establish the direction of and the new priorities for the EU-Morocco Partnership in the years ahead” (“Joint Proposal for a Council Decision” 2018, 4). Although at the time this joint declaration was signed the 2013-17 AP was expired, during the development of the new AP that has not yet been released, this will be the acting conditions and regulations that the EU and Morocco will continue to follow. In the case of this paper, in relation to cultural policies, the 2013-2017 AP is the most recent agreement in EU-Morocco relations.
Although there have been large strides in developing cultural relations between the EU and Morocco, and policy has become more clear in its objectives as well as how to achieve these objectives, there have still been challenges in relation to promoting cultural relations between the EU and Morocco. For example, “… access to culture remains very unequal and limited outside the big cities of Rabat, Casablanca and Marrakesh” (Isar 2014, 70). Additionally it has been noted by Moroccans working in the cultural market for Moroccan goods that “many would like to see a more open European cultural market for Moroccan goods and a bigger effort made to increase awareness of Moroccan cultural diversity” (Isar 2014, 71). Furthermore, although a fairly balanced relationship was noted in EU-Morocco cultural policy” (“Relations avec le Maroc: projet de plan d’action Maroc pour la mise en œuvre du statut avancé (2013-2017)” 2013, 25-26), what should be questioned is why the EU and Morocco have an equal partnership when it is clear that the EU comes from a position of power. Figure 4 provides a visual explanation of the important EU-Morocco documents, the year they were enacted, as well as a brief explanation of its significance.
Figure 4: Significant EU-Morocco Treaty Milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Significance of treaty or document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Trade Agreement</td>
<td>1969: Paved the way for the Cooperation Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Cooperation Agreement</td>
<td>1979: Established economic and political cooperation between the EU and Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Euro-Med Partnership, also referred to as the Barcelona Process</td>
<td>1995: First EU-Morocco agreement to include culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Association Agreement entered into force</td>
<td>2000: Established “regular political dialogue” and attention was paid to culture, but not explicit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)</td>
<td>2003: Established partnerships with the EU and various countries to it immediate south and east.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>ENP Action Plan (AP) with Morocco</td>
<td>2005: Created in order to facilitate peace and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Barcelona Process relaunched as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)</td>
<td>2008: Signifies Morocco officially joining the ENP via the Action Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Morocco receives Advanced Status (AS) from the EU</td>
<td>2008: UfM meant to promote deeper economic integration among 15 neighbors found on the Mediterranean, including Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2005 AP replaced with a new AP taking into account Morocco’s AS with the EU</td>
<td>2008: Meant to strengthen political cooperation, continue economic integration, and generally promote overall relations and cooperation with Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Intention by the EU to extend EU-Morocco AP</td>
<td>2013: Takes into account AS and reflects an attempt to have a balanced cultural relationship with Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Intention by the EU to extend EU-Morocco AP</td>
<td>2018: Showcases the intention the EU has to renew AP with Morocco and continue to promote EU-Morocco relations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. EU-Morocco Cultural Relations: Reality or Façade?

Although EU-Morocco relations officially go back to 1969 with the Trade Agreement paving the way for current legislation and treaties, culture has played an increasing role in official EU-Morocco policy. That being said, within EU-Morocco policies, documents, and agreements, credible means to measure the progress and success of cultural objectives found in the current AP (2013) signed with Morocco, is still lacking. What will be discussed and evaluated in this section is what EU-Morocco cultural relations means for the soft power abilities of the EU and Morocco. In order to measure this, not only will EU-Morocco cultural policy be referenced to, but also how the potential of Moroccan culture and EU culture in each state. In addition to what is lacking in EU-Morocco documents and policy relating to culture, how this effects current EU-Morocco relations, as well as the interests that the EU has in refining cultural relations with Morocco will be discussed.

Cultural Diplomacy: An Efficient Manner to Exert Soft Power Values?

As discussed in chapter 2, cultural diplomacy is the “…purposeful cultural cooperation between nations or groups of nations” with a particular emphasis on the importance of the role of the state in cultural diplomacy (Ang, Isar, and Mar 2015, 366). Therefore in order to evaluate a countries cultural diplomacy practices in relation to their soft power abilities, it is logical to evaluate their policy with other countries, such as the case with the EU and Morocco.

After evaluating the EU’s policies regarding culture, specifically in the external sphere, it was found that “the role of culture in the EU’s external relations is being defined in a space of contestation between various notions and ideas of culture” (Bátora, 3). Cultural policy in the EU, both internally and externally, is a constant ongoing process due to the fact that the EU does not have sole competence within the field of culture, since a majority of power in this field rests with the Member States. The EU only has a supportive role in relation to cultural policy and promotion, leading to a constant power struggle between the EU and its Member States. This power struggle, in addition to the examination of EU cultural documents, has unveiled that the current strategy and power structure in relation to culture has resulted in the EU having a weak external cultural policy, as seen with the case with Morocco. When the EU has to share responsibility with its Member States and can only have a supporting role with
cultural policy, it is the overall cultural policy of the EU that suffers since there is a constant struggle for power and control over cultural policy.

Within various EU documents the term “external cultural relations” is used in Council documents whereas “cultural diplomacy” is more commonly used in Commission documents (Isar 2014; “About Us - Cultural Diplomacy Platform” n.d.; “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 2018; “Council Conclusions on Culture in the EU’s External Relations with a Focus on Culture in Development Cooperation” 2015; “Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting within the Council, on the Promotion of Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue in the External Relations of the Union and Its Member States” 2008; “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations” 2016). This is not only due to the shared competence that the EU has in relation to its cultural policy, but also because defining and showcasing “European culture” internally and externally is extremely complex and open to interpretation.

EU Ambiguities and its Influence on Morocco

Furthermore, it has been found that “… the role of culture in the EU’s external relations is subject to multiple ambiguities” three of which that specifically come to mind, first “...the very notion of culture in the context of the EU’s external relations is ambiguous” (Bátora and Mokre 2011, 2). Although some of these ambiguities can be attributed to the shared power tensions that arise between the EU and its Member States as previously discussed, this is not the only problematic aspect of EU cultural policy.

Secondly, there is “… the idea that there should be a role or multiple roles for culture [which] entails that there is a relatively clear set of expectations as to what culture if supposed to do in the EU, what it is to do for the EU and, indeed, how it is to play out in relation to those it is engaging” (Bátora and Mokre 2011, 3). In order for culture to have a clear purpose and fulfill its role as a soft power tool for the EU, there needs to be clear expectations and goals for the parties involved. Although this is no longer lacking as much within internal EU-documents pertaining to culture, as seen with the Work Plan for Culture, in the case of EU-Morocco
treaties that involve cultural aspects there is a distinctive lack of clear goals and objectives. This moves to both weaken the EU’s soft power influence in Morocco, but also moves to weaken the opportunity for Morocco to promote and export its cultural abilities to the EU. With a lack of goals and objectives in EU-Morocco cultural policies, I argue that this in fact allows for neo-colonial tendencies to be more probable in EU-Morocco relations. When the EU does not have a clear set of goals and objectives for their cultural policy in Morocco, it can be interpreted as neo-colonial because since the EU already comes from a position of power and privilege, and with no clear set of goals and objectives, the EU is free to do whatever in order to promote peace and stability via cultural policy with Morocco. Especially considering the colonial history that Morocco has with multiple Member States, such as France and Spain, it is particularly important that when the EU works with Morocco to facilitate peace and stability, that the EU is appropriately cautious and aware of this. Although Morocco is open to not only continuing, but also expanding their relations with the EU, as seen in the 28 June 2019 EU-Morocco speech, the EU must continue to be aware of this relationship in terms of Morocco’s past colonial history with various EU states.

Thirdly and finally “both of these sets of ambiguities raise issues as to the question of how culture is to be organizationally incorporated into the system of the EU’s external relations” (Bátora and Mokre 2011, 3). Although at the time this document by Bátora and Mokre was released, EU external cultural relations were generally much more vague, this paper still argues the same: that both the definition of culture at an EU level, as well as vague expectations and objections in both EU and EU-Morocco documents and treaties has led to a weak external cultural policy, and therefore a weak execution of soft power abilities.

In terms as to how culture is defined within the EU, it should highlighted out that the meaning of culture in EU-Morocco relations is different when compared to internal EU cultural policy. For instance, in relation to EU-Morocco cultural policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that includes Morocco declares that “comprehensive partnership between the EU and twelve countries in the Southern Mediterranean… [aims to turn the region] into a common area of peace, stability, and prosperity though the reinforcement …social and cultural cooperation” alongside other aspects such as politics and economics (“Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” 2011). When culture is being utilized in external relations with Southern Mediterranean countries, in particular Morocco, culture’s main role is to facilitate
peace and stability for the EU in the Southern Mediterranean region. It is interesting considering that Morocco has been cited in EU reports as entering into a phase of “modernization” rather peacefully in comparison to other countries experiencing the same modernization in the region (Helly 2014, 3). This leads one to question what peace and stability relations the EU wishes to establish with Morocco, especially considering Morocco is already relatively peaceful when compared to its neighbors in Northern Africa. I argue that cultural policy is used to facilitate peace and stability with Morocco, and more importantly with the rest of the region, is to export EU values such as democracy, human rights, cultural diversity, and women’s rights to name a few. This reflects the general trend that the EU also uses Morocco as a stepping stone for enabling EU influences and relations with the rest of Northern Africa and beyond.

It is in the EU’s interest to promote peace and stability through soft power faucets, such as cultural interactions, with Morocco because it allows for the EU to spread their values, such as democracy, human rights, cultural diversity, and women’s rights. For example, “better governance and effective promotion of democracy and human rights are essential objectives of the EU's external policy” meaning that these are the objectives for the EU utilizing their soft power (“European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Morocco 2007-2013” 2006, 3). In the case with Morocco specifically, “Morocco fully shares this overall political vision, a vision which poses new political, economic, social and even cultural challenges. Morocco is pursuing a process of [democratization] and consolidation of the rule of law, and is considered as the most advanced in the region” (“European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Morocco 2007-2013” 2006, 3). Not only is the promotion of democracy and human rights an explicit goal of the EU’s external policy, but it has also been fully accepted and embraced by the Moroccan government as seen in their 2011 constitutional reformation. Although Morocco is already considered the most advanced in the Northern Africa region in terms of pursuing democratization, the more it embraces EU values, such as democracy and human rights, the more likely these values can permeate other countries in the region.

Democracy and human rights are not the only values that the EU wishes for Morocco to adopt, it also includes cultural diversity and women’s rights. In relation to Morocco moving towards
embracing their cultural diversity “…a royal institute for Amazigh culture has been set up and, in addition to promoting this culture, it is responsible for integrating the Berber language in the educational system” (“European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Morocco 2007-2013” 2006, 9). More examples can also be found in the 2011 Moroccan Constitution where it was established that Berber language, Tamazight, would be recognized as one of the official languages of Morocco, and there was also to be the establishment of the National Council of Languages and of Moroccan Culture in order to preserve the authenticity of the language (“Morocco’s Constitution of 2011” 2018, 4–5). The principle of strength in diversity, a strong European value, is beginning to become adopted in Moroccan society is noteworthy, especially considering the discrimination that the Berber community has historically experienced in Morocco.

In relation to the expansion of women’s rights in Morocco “the final text of the Moudawana (‘Personal Status Code’) reform (2004) secured several important rights for women, including the rights to self-guardianship, divorce, and child custody. ‘It also placed new restrictions on polygamy, raised the legal age of marriage from 15 to 18, and made sexual harassment punishable by law’” (“Reforming Moroccan Family Law: The Moudawana” n.d.). Although directly relating the 2004 Moudawana reforms directly to EU soft power influence would deny the role of globalization, it is worth noting that at the time the Moudawana was adopted in Morocco, Morocco was moving towards closer cooperation with the EU after the EU launched the ENP in 2003. Besides, shortly after in 2005 the EU and Morocco adopted the ENP AP. The EU, although not solely, has had an influence on the development of women’s rights in Morocco.

This concept of peace and stability through culture has also been implied most recently by Frederica Mogherini in a speech she gave 28 June 2019 with Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita highlighting their commitment to continue their “strategic” relationship together. Mogherini said that, “Morocco is the key country in our communal region as well as the heart of two organizations who, for the European Union, are the natural and strategic partners: The Arab League on one side, and the African Union on the other” (“UE-Maroc : Relance d’une Relation Privilégiée” 2019). First when Mogherini references to the EU’s “natural and strategic partners” as well as “our communal region” she references to the Mediterranean region that various EU states make up alongside Morocco and other Northern
African states. The EU is not only determined to promote EU-Morocco cultural relations, but also to foster and strengthen Mediterranean culture overall.

The commitment for the EU to promote their “Mediterranean culture” with various other countries, including Morocco, is seen in the establishment of the Mucem in Marseille, which is a museum dedicated to Mediterranean culture and is meant to “… promote Mediterranean heritage, take part in the creation of new exchanges in the region and, during this period of profound upheaval, help to lay the foundations for the Mediterranean world of tomorrow” (“The Mucem” n.d.). It is in the interest of the EU, specifically via Member States along the Mediterranean such as France and Spain, to make efforts to promote and foster Mediterranean culture by promoting bilateral relations with Morocco because this allows for the EU to have a stable and friendly neighbor in the region. I argue that although there is an effort by the EU to genuinely promote and facilitate Mediterranean culture through traditional means such as through museums, like the Mucem, there is a greater goal of the EU to use its cultural policy with Morocco to promote peace and stability in the region.

This point is strengthened in this press release when it was claimed that there is a “will of [the EU and Morocco] to work together in a multilateral framework at the global level, in order to reinforce the trilateral cooperation between the European Union, Morocco, and its African continent partners” such as the Arab League and the African Union (“UE-Maroc : Relance d’une Relation Privilégiée” 2019). From Mogherini’s speech, and the press release overall, it is clear that Morocco serves as a stepping stone to the EU in order to promote peace and stability in the region through the Arab League and the African Union. Therefore it is important and strategic for the EU to be constantly strengthening cultural relations with Morocco because of their shared Mediterranean heritage, but also for the purposes of the EU having a close partner in various organizations that the EU is not a part of in order to promote peace and stability in the region.

**What Morocco Contributes to the EU**

Although it was just established the interests that the EU has to invest in its cultural policy with Morocco, it should be pointed out that Morocco also has interests to serve with their relationship with the EU. For example, although the EU could be using Morocco as a stepping stone for relations with other Northern African states, Morocco also receives substantial
support from the EU in the form of fiscal support as well as trade. Likewise “the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is the key financial instrument supporting our cooperation with Morocco for the period 2014-2020” and the “… ENI bilateral assistance was indicatively programmed between € 728 million and € 890 million, of which € 807.5 million have been allocated by the end of 2017” (“Morocco” 2016). It is also in Morocco’s interest to collaborate with the EU due to the mass funding that the EU provides to Morocco. This willingness and satisfaction on the part of Morocco in terms of working with the EU is reflected in the fact that plans to renew the past Action Plan with Morocco has been reiterated as of 28 June 2019 (“UE-Maroc : Relance d’une Relation Privilégiée” 2019).

Although the EU and Morocco both have their motivations for continuing to collaborate and work together, what remains unclear is how important culture truly is for both actors. However, since the EU is using culture as a wider tool to promote peace and stability in the greater Northern African region through Morocco, I would argue that in fact the EU is utilizing their soft power abilities because they are promoting their interests, via attraction and the European culture of peace and democracy. However that being said, there are still various issues and potential problems with cultural policy at the EU level. Therefore, although there are various resources for soft power such as ideology, values, public diplomacy, foreign aid, this paper has shown that in the case of culture policy as a tool for soft power purposes at the institutional level is not being utilized by the EU.

Although policy may not be utilized at the macro level in the EU, it should be examined why it is worth it for the EU to invest in their cultural policy with Morocco, and what the EU and EU citizens can gain from deeper cultural policy with Morocco. With the 2015 Migrant Crisis, the EU was faced with both an influx of refugees coming to the EU seeking asylum, but also a conflict of culture as seen in the various anti-migrant protests that have taken place since the 2015 Migrant Crisis (Gotev 2018). This highlights a growing suspicion and discontent among EU citizens towards refugees entering the EU. Additionally, when one examines specifically where refugees came from in 2018 to the EU, the top three main countries of citizenship were Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (“Asylum Statistics” 2019). Although none of these countries are specifically Morocco or in the Northern African region, within all of these countries Islam plays a role in the private and public sphere. Likewise, “…for Christian Europe, Islam was always the most formidable Other, ever since the eighth century” (Goody 2013). Muslims have
been the “Other” for Europeans for thousands of years, and this “Othering” as well as tensions between Muslims and Europeans is also presently reflected in the contestation by EU citizens after the 2015 Migrant Crisis. This is why there is a clear need, that can be fulfilled by Morocco, for life in an Islamic country to be shared and understood by EU citizens and the EU.

Therefore I argue it is in the interest of the EU and EU citizens to continue to invest and refine cultural policy with Morocco, especially in the case of tourism, because already “Spain is the second [most popular] market for tourists to Morocco after France and Morocco is the top destination for Spanish tourists outside Europe” (“Morocco Is Most Popular Non-European Tourist Destination for Spaniards” 2019). There is already a curiosity from EU citizens in Morocco, as well as a recognition that Morocco is safe and stable enough to spend holidays in. Tourism has the ability to teach Europeans about Moroccan and the greater Maghreb and Northern African culture, more intercultural dialogue is needed in order to teach and inform EU citizens about Moroccan, Maghreb, Northern African culture.

The ability for EU citizens to become more understanding about different cultures through travel, such as Morocco, is highlighted by research done in the field of learning through travel literature “…shows that travelers gather knowledge as they ‘understand, learn, discover, explore, and make sense of other places’”(Stone and Petrick 2013, 741). In particular, it is important for EU citizens to understand and experience a country like Morocco where Islam still plays a large role in day-to-day society, rather than only associating Islam with extremist behavior (Silvestri 2007, 2–3). It is essential for EU citizens to break this negative stereotype, especially in the context of an EU with an ever increasing population of Muslims living the EU (Hackett 2017). Morocco has a fundamental cultural role to play in Europe, and with EU citizens, in terms of strengthening the intercultural dialogue between Moroccan culture and EU feelings towards the larger Islamic region.

In conclusion, although it was difficult to measure in absolute terms the impact of treaties and documents due to the lack of publication from the EU and Morocco, it was found that within the cultural sector between the EU and Morocco “…relations [with the EU] will have to become more equal and reciprocal” (Helly 2014, 15). Besides whether or not EU-Moroccan policies are promoting each country’s culture in the other, it is clear that an effort to make relations more equal and reciprocal between the EU and Morocco is needed. This is also
reflected in how “…many [in the Moroccan cultural trade sector] would like to see a more open European cultural market for Moroccan goods, and a bigger effort made to increase awareness of Moroccan cultural diversity” (Helly 2014, 15). There is even a recognition that from a Morocco citizen perspective that the most recent AP (2013) is not doing enough to promote Moroccan cultural diversity in the trade sector. Although this could also be attributed to the fact that Morocco also struggles to have a clear and comprehensive internal and external cultural policy, it is a fact that in terms of the EU market, a large role is played in EU-Morocco documents. Moreover, this fact comes back to the “… idea that the role of culture in Morocco-EU relations should be rethought and upgraded by, as many said, fully using the country’s advanced status” (Helly 2014, 15). The role of culture clearly has a larger role to play in EU-Morocco relations, because it has been noted that already at the present time culture is not being utilized properly.
8. Conclusion

EU-Morocco relations for more than fifty years have progressively allowed for culture to officially have an increasingly larger official role. Through the evaluation of EU-Morocco cultural policy, it was found that EU-Morocco external cultural policy in fact combines both schools of external cultural thought that were outlined by Trobbiani.

For example, culture in EU-Morocco relations is utilized as a peace making and stabilizing tool for the greater Northern Africa region, allowing for the EU to use Morocco as a stable “stepping stone” for the rest of the Northern Africa, Africa, and the Arab world. This is reflected in the 28 June 2019 EU-Morocco press conference when plans to expand the current Action Plan (AP) were once again confirmed, and Frederica Mogherini made multiple references to Morocco being the EU’s primary ally and key to the rest of the region (“UE-Maroc : Relance d’une Relation Privilégiée” 2019). Likewise, since external cultural relations with Morocco is primarily seen as a peace keeping and stabilizing tool for the EU in Morocco and the greater Northern Africa region, this implies that Moroccan culture coming to the EU would be impaired since that would not promote peace and stability in the greater Northern Africa region. Although the cultural relationship between the EU and Morocco has been found to be unequal, I would argue that Morocco has an opportunity to promote their culture in the EU through the greater facilitation and investment into how Morocco contributes to the greater Mediterranean culture as previously explained.

Secondly in relation to Trobbiani’s schools of thought on EU external cultural approaches, EU-Morocco external cultural relations are directly related to the interests of the EU to promote stability and peace with the greater Northern Africa region as a measure in order to protect their borders, especially in relation to southern European states such as France, Spain, and Italy due to their geographic proximity to Northern Africa. Furthermore, the concept of using Morocco as a close partner to influence other states in the Northern Africa region on behalf of the EU is also noted by other academics due to Morocco being “… a key EU foreign policy laboratory in which the Union hopes to develop a new, more attractive formula for its relations with [neighboring] countries in the South where EU membership is not an option” (Kausch 2010, 3). These countries do not have the opportunity to join the EU, however the EU has a clear interest to promote and invest in their stability and peace for their own interest to reinforce and
protect their borders. The EU-Morocco cultural relationship from the 28 June 2019 press conference also implies that Morocco is satisfied enough with EU relations to renew the previous Action Plan they had with the EU, and even continue and deepen to future their collaborations and bilateral agreements.

Although the EU has ambiguities in terms to how it refers to its external cultural relations within EU documents, what has become clear through this research paper is that although the EU is constantly reformulating their cultural external relations, there are still various challenges and faults that the EU has encountered with their policy, in particular with Morocco. First there is the question of various terms used to describe the EU’s external cultural policy which leads to various ambiguities and shortcomings in their treaties since they are not able to hold themselves accountable. However, from the analysis this paper has done on the external cultural policy of the EU, it is clear that in the case with Morocco, the EU engages in cultural diplomacy because as defined by Arndt “cultural diplomacy …[takes] place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests” meaning governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance their own interests (Arndt 2005, 88:xviii). From our analysis on what culture means for EU-Moroccan relations, it is used as a peace keeping and regional stabilizing tool for the EU to use in Morocco. This means that according to Arndt’s definition of cultural diplomacy including government interests, the EU clearly engages in cultural diplomacy with Morocco due to government involvement.

However, the EU needs to be cautious of imposing neo-colonial tendencies onto Morocco due to the troubled colonial past Morocco has with EU member states such as Spain and France. That being said, in terms of cultural policy between the EU and Morocco, both countries struggle to have clear and measurable outcomes and goals in government policy relating to external culture. As the EU and Morocco look to the future to continue to strengthen their relationship and renew their Action Policy, it is necessary that the field of external culture is more objective and clear for the outcomes that the EU and Morocco wish to accomplish. This, as a result, will have a direct impact on not only the measurement of success of cultural relations between the EU and Morocco, but it will also allow for the EU and Morocco to both hone their soft power abilities when clear and measurable goals and objectives are laid out in treaties.
Annex I: List of Relevant Abbreviations and Terms

AA: Association Agreement

AP: Action Plan(s)

ENP: European Neighborhood Policy

AS: Advanced Status

UfM: Union for the Mediterranean

EUNIC: EU National Institutes for Culture

EEAS: European External Action Service
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