Constructing a Pseudo-Hitler? The question of the authenticity of *Hitlers politisches Testament*

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Constructing a Pseudo-Hitler? The question of the authenticity of Hitlers politisches Testament

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ABSTRACT

This article provides the first in-depth scholarly analysis of the collection of notes dated February and April 1945 colloquially known as ‘Hitler’s political testament’. This article uses sources from private and public archives in several countries to assess this issue of authenticity and concludes that these notes are most likely forgeries. The purported history of these documents cannot be trusted, the dating of several of the notes has clearly been manipulated, and the published text contain statements that cannot be authentic. The original notes were allegedly destroyed, which means that the published versions cannot be checked for accuracy. Until these notes have been conclusively proven to be genuine — something that is very hard to do without access to the original documents — historians should refrain from using them.

Introduction

The authenticity of the collection of notes colloquially known as ‘Hitler’s Political Testament’ purporting to record Hitler’s utterances in Berlin during February and early April 1945 — published first in French as Le testament politique in 1959, in English as The Testament of Adolf Hitler in 1961, and in German as Hitlers politisches Testament in 1981 — has long been contested and doubted. These notes are said to be a continuation of the so-called table talks recorded earlier during the war, and supposedly made by Reichsleiter Martin Bormann himself in Hitler’s bunker in Berlin. Many historians have nonetheless chosen to cite them as authentic. A notable exception is Ian Kershaw, who expressly refrained from using these notes altogether in his Hitler biography due to their dubious nature. However, Kershaw had not actually researched the background of these documents, but simply based his conclusion on an (albeit reasonable) evaluation of the known facts at the time. No scholar has thus ever seriously investigated this source critically before, and many misapprehensions about them therefore continue to abound within the field. Although journalist Willi Winkler has written this document off as a certain fake in his book Der Schattenmann, this judgement was based on insufficient evidence and does not adequately represent the many complexities of the case.
I have previously dealt with the history of the English edition of this text, i.e. *The Testament of Adolf Hitler*, and the very complicated and problematic history and translation process concerning the publication of this version. I show that although historian Hugh Trevor-Roper claimed he had seen photocopies of a text with Bormann’s signature on them in the late 1950s, he could never corroborate that this was actually the same text that was later published. François Genoud, the Swiss Nazi sympathizer who published *Le testament politique*, later claimed that he had returned these pages to his source, the former Minister of Industry and Chief of the Nazi German Reichsbank (National Bank), Walter Funk, who had destroyed them. Trevor-Roper did not find the story of how Genoud and his Nazi confidant, Hans Rechenberg, had acquired the text all that trustworthy, and noted that Bormann’s signature could very easily be forged. In addition, the non-existent German ‘original’ had first been translated into French, and this French text had then been re-translated into German. However, Trevor-Roper never told his readers about any of this. Instead, he stated unequivocally in the introduction that it was undoubtedly genuine. Many decades later, however, Trevor-Roper claimed in private correspondence that he had never cited the document due to lingering doubts about its authenticity. The reason that he never voiced his concerns in public was that he wished to be the person that Genoud would turn to when he had other documents that he wanted to publish.6

In 1978 Trevor-Roper even wrote to Genoud asking him to tell the truth about the authenticity of the *Hitlers politisches Testament* because several other scholars had told Trevor-Roper that they believed it was a forgery. Genoud then suddenly produced a copy of a letter dated 31 March 1959 which supposedly came from the former Chief of the German Reich Chancellery (Reichskanzlei), Hans-Heinrich Lammers, attesting to the fact that he vividly remembered having heard the Führer talk about these topics during his time with Bormann and Hitler in the bunker in Berlin, and especially in the way that they were formulated in the text Genoud had provided him with. Lammers also confirmed that Bormann would indeed have been able to reproduce Hitler’s statements almost ad verbatim since he was a kind of interpreter of Hitler’s wishes. It also had a signature that certainly looks like Lammers’ known signature.7 The document seems to be a good piece of evidence for authenticity, perhaps even a little too good. Firstly, we need to be aware of the fact that we cannot be sure that this document is authentic either. It is unclear why Genoud had not divulged the existence of this supposed authentication by Lammers decades earlier, considering the doubts about authenticity that these notes had produced over the years; Trevor-Roper does not seem to have asked him about it, either. That way this letter certainly came at an opportune time for Genoud. Moreover, even if we suppose that the letter is authentic, we have no way of verifying what text Genoud had shown to Lammers. If the letter is authentic, then Genoud had apparently felt that he needed to get his text validated, but how come he had then never shown it to anyone until 1978? Why did he not let Funk – the person who is said to have given him the document in the first place – verify the text, instead of asking a person who had never even seen or heard of these notes to vouch for them? Funk was still alive in 1959, but by 1978 he had already been dead 18 years. Coincidentally (or perhaps not), Lammers too had since died (in 1962) and was no longer around to be questioned by historians, or to confirm that the text actually published in German was identical to the one he had been shown.
When evaluating the reliability of Henry Picker’s *Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier* (one of the two published table-talk versions, and the first [1951] to be published in German) the German historian Kurt Rheindorf concluded that such Nazi ‘crown witnesses’ (*Kronzeugen*), chosen at the discretion of the publisher of the notes, could not be trusted. He noted, too, that they could not reasonably be expected to remember specific formulations that Hitler may or may not have used. It was fraudulent to appeal to such witnesses, according to Rheindorf. It is important to understand that Rheindorf was not doubting the authenticity of the table-talk notes as such, only the way in which Hitler’s utterances had been formulated by Picker. In the case of the text that Lammers supposedly validated, much more than only formulations are at stake, and Lammers’ letter from March 1959 thus cannot be used to confirm the authenticity of *Hitlers politisches Testament*. Both the timing and the content of the letter makes it suspect.

There are thus many reasons for why it is necessary to take a closer critical look at this text. This article intends to determine, based on an analysis of the available archival evidence and of the content of the text itself, whether or not *Hitlers politisches Testament* can be trusted to be what it claims to be, and if historians can justifiably use it as evidence for Hitler’s views at the end of the war. This article joins a number of other critical studies of purported Hitler documents, as well as related materials, that were at one point taken to be authentic, or reliable, by most scholars.

**The origin of the manuscript**

The fact that Genoud’s claims about the origin of the text, i.e. that it had been given to him by Walter Funk, were riddled with inaccuracies was already recognized by the mid-1970s. The German sociologist Eduard Baumgarten, who had been working together with Trevor-Roper in trying to wrestle the original German text from Genoud, noted to Trevor-Roper in July 1974 that Funk could not be trusted either. Funk had stated that he had been ordered by Hitler to transport the Nazi gold reserve from Bad Gastein to Thuringia on 17 April 1945, but a notation in Goebbels’ diary dated 9 April 1945 (this is in fact the last entry ever dictated by Goebbels, and it had not yet been published by July 1974) showed that what Funk had said could not be true. Goebbels’ diary showed that the gold reserve, which had already been hidden in Thuringia for some time by 9 April, had fallen into American hands, and Goebbels blamed Funk for having transported the gold (and art treasures) against Goebbels’ expressed protests to Thuringia from Berlin – i.e. not from Bad Gastein, long before 17 April, and apparently absolutely not on Hitler’s orders. Goebbels berated Funk for having let himself been convinced by his advisors to ship the gold reserve and art treasures to Thuringia from Berlin, and added that if he had been the Führer, then he would have known what to do next (*dann wüßte ich, was jetzt zu tun ist*); he then added that he assumed that no one would in any way be held responsible for this. In Germany it was now possible to do whatever one wanted, because there was no one who had the strength to punish such ‘crimes’ (*Verbrechen*) anymore.

A few months later Baumgarten told Trevor-Roper of a new book about Rudolf Heß, written by an American Spandau prison guard, in which Funk was said to have been given the assignment to transport the gold to the southern borders of Germany and that
he had ordered the gold to be buried there in April 1945. Baumgarten was talking about the book Heß by Eugene K. Bird published in German in 1974. Bird stated that Funk had been given the mission in early 1945 to transport more than 100 tons of gold to Thuringia, and that a part of the cargo was taken by American troops on 8 April. The rest of the gold reserve (consisting of 728 gold bars, weighing 25 kilograms each, and over a billion Reichsmark worth of bank notes, as well as other valuables and jewels) was shipped to Bavaria in the middle of April and buried near Walchensee.

But is there any truth to this? Funk had visited Goebbels on 27 January asking if he, considering the military situation, at least should evacuate the most important part of the Reichsbank’s reserve from Berlin. Goebbels thought this was a very bad idea that could only start a series of rumours, and the military situation was not bad enough to justify this action. He therefore refused to accept Funk’s suggestion. However, Goebbels mentions in his diary on 7 February 1945 that discussions were held among Bormann, Lammers and himself regarding the evacuation of only the most important materials to Thuringia. Funk was mentioned (by title) in connection with this, the implication being that while Funk should oversee this evacuation, he should of course remain in Berlin personally. Every evacuation of persons and material had to be cleared by Lammers, and every evacuation that had not received such prior authorization was to be regarded as treasonous and punished by death.

Exactly at what point Funk had gone against Goebbels’ expressed orders and transported the gold reserve from Berlin is not known, but it must thus have been sometime between 27 January and 9 April. But the idea that a part of the gold reserve had been evacuated out of Thuringia in mid-April, even on the face of it, seems absurd. The Americans had occupied the area by then, so how could the Nazis transport anything out of there? Moreover, Goebbels wrote in his diary that ‘our entire gold reserve’ (unser gesamter Goldvorrat) had been captured by the Americans. This proves that there was nothing left to transport to, and bury in, Bavaria. The gold reserve was found in a salt mine in Merkers on 7 April by the 90th Infantry Division of the US 3rd Army, and the Paris edition of the newspaper The Stars & Stripes wrote about the find on 9 April, the same day that Goebbels made his diary entry.

More importantly, there is no evidence that Funk could have laid his hands on a photocopy of Bormann’s notes anyway. In fact, no less than four people – Hitler’s secretary Christa Schroeder, his Navy adjutant Admiral Karl-Jesco von Puttkamer, his personal adjutant Otto Günsche, and his Air Force adjutant Colonel Nicolaus von Below – all told Baumgarten that Funk had been nowhere near the bunker in Berlin either in March or April 1945. According to Schroeder and Günsche, Hitler furthermore did not trust Funk enough to endow him with such an important document. The question was then: could Funk have got the text from Bormann directly? Or could Funk have received the manuscript from Hitler somewhere outside the bunker, for instance in Hitler’s private apartment? The answers to these questions were of central importance for the evaluation of the trustworthiness of these 18 notes, said Baumgarten.

According to Schroeder, all the people interviewed by Baumgarten had denied the possibility of these notes being the result of Hitler having dictated them to Bormann. However, Schroeder was of the opinion that they might have been summaries of statements written down by Bormann at some point, and that Bormann absolutely
was in a position to restate passages that Hitler had said word for word [a slight exaggeration to be sure, M.N.]. But, she added, even so it could be that the utterances had been assembled by another knowledgeable person. Another of Hitler’s secretaries, Gerda Christian, had actually been presented with a photocopy of one of the pages by Genoud, but was not convinced and did not think it was authentic. Hitler would never have dictated anything like this to Bormann, she thought. There is, thus, no reliable evidence that Funk ever possessed the photocopies in question. His involvement is only verified by Genoud, and Genoud cannot be trusted without corroborating evidence.

The Journalist Karl Laske has also pointed to the many uncertainties regarding Hitler’s politisches Testament and the possibility that it is a forgery in his biography of Genoud; he does so partly by referring to an admission that Baumgarten made during a seminar held at the IfZ in Munich in November 1977 where he stated that Genoud’s typed German manuscript contained a second hand-written text between the lines. That handwritten text was the version later published and an analysis had concluded that it was Genoud’s handwriting of 1958. Genoud had assured him that this handwritten text corresponded ad verbatim with the original German text. In other words, the text published as Hitler’s politisches Testament was in essence a palimpsest. Amazingly, this became a proof of authenticity in Baumgarten’s view. But the real ‘proof’ for him was the internal evidence of the text itself – i.e. it sounded so much like Hitler that it had to be Hitler. Baumgarten got this line of reasoning directly from Trevor-Roper. Why Genoud had written down that supposedly authentic text between the lines of another necessarily fake text we are not told. In fact, that question never seems to have been asked.

None of this was mentioned in Hitler’s politisches Testament. In the foreword the manuscript’s dubious history was kept from the readers who were simply told that Genoud had been given a photocopy of the original from Funk via his friend Rechenberg. Since nothing was said about the subsequent loss of the photocopies, or of the retranslation into German from the French, the readers were thus led to believe that Genoud still possessed the photocopy and that the book in front of them was in turn based upon that original text. Hugh Trevor-Roper repeated the Funk story in his prefaces both in 1961 and in 1981. It is interesting to note that when the Times published a short review on The Testament in 1961 it said that: ‘They were taken for safe keeping to a bank in Bad Gastein, and eventually rescued for publication.’ Where this information came from is unknown.

Hitler’s politisches Testament was thus finally published in 1981 by Albrecht Knaus Verlag, the same publisher that Werner Jochmann had used for Monologe. Genoud seems to have agreed to publish the former text because the earlier cooperation with Knaus had gone so well. In the summer of 1980 Knaus even asked Jochmann if he were interested in assisting with the publication, just as he had done with Monologe. Even though the authenticity of this text had been questioned and its history was murky, it would be a mistake to withhold Hitler’s last wishes from the German people, Knaus told Jochmann. At the same time Knaus asked Jochmann if he thought that they should include Trevor-Roper’s introduction from the English edition as well. Trevor-Roper had since become Lord Dacre, Knaus remarked, and his stature had certainly not decreased. In connection with this Knaus mentioned that he had also spoken to Eberhard Jäckel, who Knaus considered an authority on the subject because he had
recently (that same year, in fact) published Hitler’s collected writings and speeches from 1905 to 1924. Jäckel considered the evidence for authenticity convincing, arguing that this text contained matters of which only Hitler could be the source. It is possible that Baumgarten was involved in the project, although it is not known what he actually did, because Knaus had had a meeting in Frankfurt with him and Genoud.

Now, when we evaluate Jäckel’s statements regarding this text’s authenticity, it is important to know that he had been completely fooled by a forger of Hitler documents by the name of Konrad Kujau, who would become known as the man behind the Hitler diaries scam a few years later. Jäckel had reproduced no less than 76 forgeries in his *Hitler. Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905–1924*, and in the summer of 1980 he had also become convinced that the forged Hitler diaries were authentic after having seen one of them in September 1979 (he had even offered to edit them). Trevor-Roper would also make the tragic mistake of going on the record and authenticating these diaries. Jäckel was thus no better than any other person at determining authenticity on the basis of internal evidence, i.e. on an analysis of content and style. All of this in fact shows that this is not a reliable method that historians can use to determine questions of authenticity.

As already stated, it is not known what Jochmann replied, but it seems that he did not write the opportunity off because he called Knaus five days later and was interested in the matter. Knaus also sent him the German text (and the French and English versions as well) and asked if he thought that it would be ‘pompous’ to publish it with both the English introduction by Trevor-Roper and the French introduction by André François-Poncet, if they agreed to this. As far as we know, things went along as planned, both introductions were included, and Jochmann likely took part of this publication as well. There is a good possibility that Jochmann is the author of the *Vorbemerkung* (i.e. introductory remarks) to the book, which is attributed to ‘the publishing house’.

**Textual reasons for doubting authenticity**

While an analysis of the internal evidence of a text alone is not a reliable method to establish authenticity, we can use independent sources to evaluate whether the document is likely to be genuine. The point is that we can never determine if a text is genuine by simply looking at content because a good forgery is by definition good enough to fool even most experts by imitating the style of the original. Historians must be able to corroborate authenticity by other means, i.e. by investigating the original text (this includes forensic analyses of the paper, ink and so on), analysing the context (including the purported history of the document and all that we already know about the author from other sources), as well as by using independent evidence. In this case we do not have access to any originals, so we are wholly dependent upon the independent evidence. This evidence must then be compared to the text we want to authenticate, and only then can reference to the internal evidence be valid methodologically. While content that contradicts everything we know about an author’s views can be used (under the right circumstances – there are possible exceptions obviously) to invalidate a text, we cannot use content that corresponds to an author’s known views to validate it: a forger imitates the original in style and content. I bring this up here because it may
seem as if I am contradicting myself since I in fact do analyse the content (internal evidence) – out of necessity of course – while at the same time claiming that doing this is not a reliable method for evaluating authenticity. This seeming contradiction disappears once we understand that the text itself is only used in the process of comparing it to the independent evidence.

There are many things in *Hitlers politisches Testament* that indicate that Genoud had in some way or another forged this text. Baumgarten had noted that the dates on the last two entries, 26 February [actually there are two notes dated 26 February, M.N.] and 2 April 1945 (with no entry in March), corresponded exactly with the dating of Bormann’s letters to his wife as published in *The Bormann Letters*. Those, too, were dated 26 February. Then there was nothing in March, and then one on 2 April. This could of course be a coincidence, said Baumgarten, but it seemed unlikely even to him. In a moment of source-critical clarity he wrote that it seemed as if Genoud had at least concocted the chapter summaries that appeared before each note, and perhaps some of the dates as well.31 But that is not all. Out of the 18 notes in *Hitlers politisches Testament*, 13 have corresponding dates in *The Bormann Letters*.32 So how do we explain the lacuna during March in both sources? And why do the notes end and start on the exact same dates as the letters? It may be of considerable importance that Genoud in fact addresses this lacuna in *Le testament politique* and asked why there was a sudden end on 26 February and then a single note from 2 April; in fact, this is the only place where this is ever discussed in any of the published versions of these notes.33 It is obvious that the publisher’s introduction to *Hitlers politisches Testament* for a large part is based upon this introduction by Genoud. Several points included in Genoud’s French introduction, including the part about the interruptions appears, translated word for word into German, in the German edition.34 Trevor-Roper, on the other hand, speculates freely in his introduction, making this into a conscious choice on Bormann’s part, saying that by the end of February he had completed his notes and only added a postscript on 2 April.35 This seemingly contradicted Genoud’s questions in a glaring way; we are left with the impression that Trevor-Roper had information that Genoud, or the publisher Knaus, did not have. But of course he did not.

It seems as if Genoud was drawing attention to something that really needs no explaining on its own, i.e. without the parallel dates in *The Bormann Letters*. So what if there were a long break? There are even longer ones in *Monologe*, but Genoud never bothered to ask these types of questions about them. It seems to be begging the question. Asking why something starts and ends on a certain date is totally meaningless, unless one is (if only implicitly) referring to another case with the same interruptions. Only then does it become noteworthy and demand an explanation. But this is precisely what Genoud does not do – he never mentions *The Bormann Letters*. It seems, then, as if Genoud was, inadvertently, acknowledging his own bluff here – as if he was aware that this coincidence called for an explanation, and wished to forestall critical questions.

There are also many statements ascribed to Hitler in these notes that indicate forgery, or at the very least conscious mischaracterization of Hitler’s true views. In note No. 16, dated 26 February, Hitler is supposed to have said: ‘I purposefully spared the fleeing British at Dunkirk.’36 Initially, we might be inclined to take this statement seriously because Christa Schroeder seems to confirm this in her memoirs where she claims that Hitler spared the British on purpose, and that he once said to her that the
reason he let the British get away was that he wanted to save human lives. The idea that Hitler wanted to save human lives may have seemed plausible to an admirer of Hitler. However, to everyone else it should be obvious nonsense. Hitler never had any qualms about sacrificing human lives. This is part and parcel of Schroeder’s effort to defend, and in a sense rehabilitate, Hitler. She also claims that Hitler had suffered in his soul from the bombing of Britain. This is clearly absurd. But more important from a source-critical point of view is that Schroeder may in fact have got this idea from reading Hitlers politisches Testament. We thus cannot treat her statements as a piece of independent corroborating evidence. Moreover, the idea is factually incorrect.

Karl-Heinz Frieser brings this hypothesis up in his Blitzkrieg-Legende, and even quotes Hitlers politisches Testament as being Hitler’s words taken down in a protocol; although he states that out of all the suggested explanations for why Hitler issued his so-called ‘halt order’ to the German troops before Dunkirk on 24 May 1940, none has caused so much irritation as this one. It is easy to see how, in hindsight, people could connect the ‘halt order’ with these concerns. However, the idea that Hitler intentionally let the British escape at Dunkirk, and that the famous ‘halt order’ of 24 May 1940 was issued with this in mind, is a myth, probably originating with the ex-Chief-of-Staff of Gerd von Rundstedt, the Chief of Army Group A, when he was being interrogated by Lidell Hart after the war. Indeed, Rundstedt himself offered this explanation too shortly after the war. Firstly, the halt order only applied to the tank divisions. This is absolutely crucial for the evaluation of this statement. Instead, it was the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) that was supposed to finish off the encircled British forces. Göring telephoned Hitler on the 23rd arguing that it should be the ideologically convinced Luftwaffe, and not the conservative Wehrmacht, that dealt the final blow to the British. Secondly, this had coincided with a decision by Rundstedt to issue a preliminary halt order to Kleist’s and Hoth’s Panzers the night of the 23rd, in order to keep the German forces concentrated. Thus, it was ultimately Rundstedt, and not Hitler, who had made this decision. When Hitler then visited Rundstedt’s HQ on the morning of the 24th he simply found himself agreeing with a decision already made by Rundstedt. Only thereafter was Hitler’s halt order sent, which made Rundstedt’s preliminary order permanent. If anyone deserves to be blamed for the halt order, and the escape of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at Dunkirk, it is Rundstedt. But it was not a question of just letting the British off the hook. The Luftwaffe did its best to kill as many British soldiers, and sink as many ships, as they could, and the German infantry also tried to kill as many British soldiers as possible inside the encirclement. It has been noted that while the Luftwaffe had had colossal successes in the early stages of the campaign, it had also suffered enormous losses. The Luftwaffe was in fact in great need of a pause in order to regain strength. No less than 1005 aircraft had been lost, and Karl-Heinz Frieser argues that even though Göring may have influenced Hitler’s decision to agree to halt the tanks, it is likely that this only played a minor role.

The Wehrmacht (German Army) liaison officer at FHQ, General Gerhard Engel, noted in his memoirs that Göring had argued for the ‘Vernichtung der Briten in Nordfrankreich’, i.e. the destruction of the British in northern France, on the 23rd. The Army people in the FHQ were apparently upset by this [that this task should be left to the Luftwaffe, M.N.], Engel writes, but Hitler on the other hand was ‘begeistert’, i.e. excited. Hitler was stressing the ideological dependability of the Luftwaffe as opposed to
that of the Army. By the 27th Göring was claiming great success for the Luftwaffe’s endeavours. 45 Thirdly, and this corroborates Engel’s account, the idea that Hitler wanted to save the BEF is also amply contradicted by the order issued by Hitler on the 24th, which said that the next goal was to destroy the encircled British and French forces, and that it was the task of the Luftwaffe to make sure that they did not escape to England. 46 Most of the generals in the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, the High Command of the German Army) indeed did not understand the reasons behind the halting of the attack. They wanted to press on to the coast and finish off the Allied forces. But Hitler, supported by Rundstedt (to whom he had left the final decision regarding the halt) and Göring, disagreed. The decision perhaps suited Hitler also for another reason, namely that it proved a point to the OKH, not least to the critical Halder and Brauchitsch, that he, and nobody else, was the ultimate authority even on military matters. 47 Hitler had, after all, intervened and ordered a halt on 17 May, too. At that point Hitler had been very nervous about the security of the German southern flank, ranting to his generals that they were jeopardizing the whole operation. Peter Longerich ascribes both of these halt orders to Hitler’s wish to make a ‘Machtdeemonstration gegenüber der Heeresführung’. 48 This is considered to be Hitler’s ‘true’ motive for supporting Rundstedt’s halt order in Blitzkrieg-Legende. The OKH had, without Hitler’s knowledge, transferred Rundstedt to another part of the front. When Hitler discovered this on 24 May he immediately declared the OKH decision null and void. Hitler thus supported Rundstedt mainly because he could not stand that the OKH had tried to circumvent him. An example had to be made, and Hitler made sure to put the OKH in its place. 49 After two days, once it had become obvious that the evacuation was actually very successful, Hitler realized that he had made a mistake and ordered a full onslaught on Dunkirk. 50 Julian Jackson, in his work The Fall of France, actually refers to the note in The Testament. He rejects the notion of it being seriously meant by Hitler, but does not question its authenticity. 51 To be fair, very few historians have taken this statement in Hitlers politisches Testament seriously. One of the few Hitler historians that have lent this idea some credence is John Toland. He not only treats Hitlers politisches Testament as authentic, writing that Hitler ‘told Bormann that he had purposefully spared the English’, but he also refers to two other instances when Hitler supposedly said things to the same effect, namely to his ‘naval adjutant’ and to Hans Linge. However, Toland gives us no good sources for these statements so we cannot be expected to take them seriously; in the case of the naval adjutant there is no source at all, and in the case of Linge the reference is to secondary literature. Toland also interviewed Puttkamer, who unequivocally stated that any such idea ‘belongs to realm of fables’. But he then refers to two other persons that gave statements, while in no way corroborating the particular statement under discussion here, to the effect that Hitler liked the English and really did not want to go to war against them. One of these persons is the former French Ambassador to Berlin, André François-Poncet (interviewed by Toland in 1971), who, as we should recall, wrote the afterword to Le testament politique de Hitler. François-Poncet had thus read this statement and was well familiar with it, and so we could assume that his judgement and memory must have become tainted by this over the years. 52

And there is in fact yet another reason for us to be very suspicious about this text. On 13 February Hitler supposedly said: ‘I have fought the Jews with an open visor’ (Ich
habe die Juden mit offenem Visier gekämpft). This quite belligerent idiomatic German metaphor does not exist in French and English, even though a literal translation obviously conveys the meaning of it, so the English and French editions do not use a metaphor at all. The Testament of Adolf Hitler, which was based on the French, stated: ‘I have always been absolutely fair in my dealings with the Jews.’ Baumgarten thought this to be too refined a statement for Hitler to make. However, he considered the German version coarser and therefore completely authentic. The translation in The Testament of Adolf Hitler is an odd one, and not a very good one, it seems. There is nothing in the German that calls for the phrase ‘always been absolutely fair’ to be included. Rather, the German metaphor implies bravery and valour, not fairness. Moreover, the word ‘dealings’ is obviously not a good translation of the German ‘gekämpft’ (fought); it is much softer and not at all as aggressive. Here we must again remember that we have absolutely no evidence that the text published as Hitlers politisches Testament corresponds to the text in the purported original photocopies. We thus have no way to establish whether the phrase mit offenem Visier was in this document or not (if indeed such a document ever existed).

The evidence points to the published German text being a retranslation from the French, which could mean that this phrase was invented at that point. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Genoud would make the German text more aggressive when translating the text back into German. It seems much more likely that a passage would be softened rather than sharpened, especially considering that Genoud was a Nazi sympathizer and a Holocaust denier. But at the same time Genoud obviously did not worry about historians discovering this inconsistency since he agreed to publish the German text, and if he did not consider such discrepancies problematic (and we know from Libres propos/Hitler’s Table Talk that he did not care about this in the slightest) the rationale for using this reasoning for evaluating the various versions and their authenticity, which amounts to a kind of criteria of embarrassment, may not be valid. We also know from Genoud’s additions to Hitler’s critique against Christianity in his French translation that he did not at all shy away from sharpening statements ascribed to Hitler. So even though the sharpening seems to go in the opposite direction in this case, we must remember that a translated text is only a translated text, no matter what language it is being translated into.

It just so happens that Heim referred to this exact passage in a letter to Werner Jochmann in 1980. In connection with a discussion about the Nazi treatment of the Jews, Heim asked if Jochmann knew about Bormann’s note from 13 February 1945. This should not be interpreted as a confirmation of the authenticity of Hitlers politisches Testament because Heim had no knowledge about the history of this text. What is much more interesting is the fact that Hitler used the mit offenem Visier metaphor in Mein Kampf, although in another context, namely when he wrote about how religious and political matters should not be mixed. Hitler stated that one should not do, via a political party, what one did not have the courage to do ‘with an open visor’ (mit offenem Visier). This once again underlines the real implication of this metaphor. He also at one point says that the National Socialist ideology should openly confess its intentions to the world: ‘one should recognize us already on our visor’ (schon am Visier soll man uns erkennen), he wrote.
This fact can, of course, not be taken as proof that Hitlers politisches Testament is genuine either, since any forger (such as Genoud) would certainly have taken recourse to Mein Kampf when writing it. The mit offenem Visier metaphor, even though it is an idiomatic German phrase, was obviously not used very often by Hitler, and we know this because: (1) it occurs only once in Mein Kampf (although the metaphoric ‘Visier’ appears twice); and (2) it does not appear anywhere in either Monologe or Tischgespräche (which it reasonably should do if Hitler had a habit of using it). Nor is it used in Hitler’s unpublished second book. Thus, it appeared only in the text that contained Hitler’s first formulation of his political testament; how convenient, then, that it should also appear again in Hitler’s purported last statement to the world. This phrase is like a knot that neatly ties the political testament in Mein Kampf and Hitlers politisches Testament together, closing the loop.\(^{60}\) It is almost as if somebody is trying to convince the reader that it really is Hitler speaking in the text.

There is another occasion on which this particular phrase was used, however. In 1940 Otto Straßer published his book Hitler und Ich (Hitler and me, or Hitler et moi, as the original French title read), which was purportedly based on notes made by Straßer immediately after conversations with Hitler; at one point he even writes that his text was based on stenographic notes.\(^{61}\) It just so happens that Straßer has a whole chapter in his book with the title ‘Combat à visière ouverte’, and he also writes that after one of their many conflicts when Hitler purportedly threatened to send the SA thugs after him: ‘I decided to fight his hypocrisy with an open visor […]’.\(^{62}\) Adding to this, strengthening the argument that this text was forged, we have the fact that Hans Rechenberg, Genoud’s companion, was acquainted with Otto Straßer’s brother Gregor.\(^{63}\) Is this simply a series of coincidences? Perhaps. But that does not seem very probable on balance. At the very least these parallels should make us even more suspicious of its claims to authenticity.

Yet another reason for us not to trust the note from 13 February 1945 is that Hitler is there portrayed as having stated that the Jews were in fact not a race at all, but only a ‘spiritual community’ (Gemeinschaft des Geistes), and that from a genetic point of view there was no such thing as a Jewish race.\(^{64}\) This statement has been taken seriously by some scholars who have examined Hitler’s religious views, who have referred to it in support of their argumentation.\(^{65}\) But the view expressed here goes against everything we know about Hitler’s views on this topic. In Mein Kampf, for example, Hitler wrote the exact opposite of this, namely that the Jews were only a race and absolutely not a religious or spiritual community. The Jews lacked the necessary idealistic character to form such a spiritual community, and Hitler expressly ignored the distinction between ‘Volk’ and ‘Rasse’ that many of the racial ideologists, such as Hans F. K. Günther, espoused.\(^{66}\) Hitler repeated this position in the manuscript to his second book, and in notes dated 5 November 1941 and 27 February 1942 Heim records utterances to this effect too.\(^{67}\) Moreover, Hitler ended his verifiably authentic ‘Political Testament’ from 29 April 1945 by demanding that the new German leaders should strictly follow the race laws and brutally defend themselves against the Jews who poisoned all peoples.\(^{68}\) There would be no point in following rigorous race laws if the Jews were not a race. Indeed, without the assumption that the Jews made up a distinct race, the whole National Socialist project is without foundation. There would no longer be any need for
regulations against mixing of the races if the Jews were unable to propagate their so-called Jewishness through biological means, i.e. via the blood through procreation.

If we are to believe that this statement is genuine we must assume that Hitler stated the complete opposite view to every other recorded statement he had made on this topic on 13 February 1945, only to revert back to his old belief in his final statement to the world ever. That is certainly very hard to believe. Neither is it at all likely that Bormann would ever make a mistake of this magnitude. On the other hand, this discrepancy could also be said to be an argument for authenticity, because any forger that managed to get this point so backwards would not be worth his salt it seems. We seem to be stuck in a Catch-22 situation where no option is likely to be true. However, if the forger had a reason to skew Hitler’s views in such a way then we would have a good explanation. In fact, Genoud did have a strong incentive to change Hitler’s views on this topic. Genoud was involved in financing Arab terrorism during this time period, and Willy Winkler has noted that the text, which makes the case for decolonization of the Arab world, sometimes reads like a political manifesto from the 1960s. Winkler drew the conclusion that Genoud was simply putting his own words into Hitler’s mouth in order to have the Führer state the case for him. Genoud had also been involved in the defence of Adolf Eichmann after he was kidnapped by Mossad in Argentina and taken back to Israel to stand trial for his crimes. He had connections to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and certainly nurtured a hatred for Israel. By denying the Jews status as a distinct race, and thus a people and a nation, the basis for the state of Israel would also be shaken to its core. This would supply Genoud with both the motive and the opportunity to make this change even though it so obviously contradicted everything else Hitler had said on the subject. Genoud could of course not mention Israel or the Jewish state directly, since it did not exist in 1945. But he could jibe at it implicitly in this way. If his contemporary political agenda was more important to Genoud than historical accuracy, he may simply not have cared whether or not this corresponded to Hitler’s true views or not.

There is yet another fact that points to Hitlers politisches Testament being, at least partly, a forgery. Notes No. 12 and 13 are dated 20 and 21 February 1945 respectively, and these also coincide with dates on Bormann’s letters to his wife. The problem for the proposition that Bormann made these notes in the bunker in Berlin (let us remember that according to the German edition Hitler dictated these words to Bormann) is that Bormann was not with Hitler during these days. In fact, he was not even in Berlin. We know this because Bormann’s diary, which was found by Soviet troops during the last days of the war, places him en route to the Party Headquarters in Munich on the morning of the 20th, and he was in Munich for the rest of the day. In Munich he met with: Helmuth Friedrichs and Gerhard Klopfer, i.e. the two highest-ranking Nazi officials after Bormann in the Parteikanzlei; Friedrichs’ deputy, Heinrich Walkenhorst; Bormann’s adjutant, Wilhelm Zander (one of the three people who would later smuggle Hitler’s actual testament out of Berlin); and another official, Dr Schmidt-Römer.

Bormann was apparently back in the north on the 21st, because the diary has him meeting with his persönliche Referent, Hans Müller (the same Müller who noted down some of Hitler’s utterances in 1943 included in Monologe), in the HQ of the German General Staff Lager Zossen just south of Berlin. He was back at
'Hauptquartier Berlin' on the 22nd. Bormann’s letter to his wife on the 20th does not mention him being in Munich, but a good clue to his whereabouts the next day is given to us in the following seemingly cryptic passages in a letter dated 21 February, which states:

The chaos on the railways is frightful and seems to get worse! It is now 6 p.m. and they still do not know at the Anhalt Station what time the train from Munich will arrive! They don’t even know where the train is! [...] It is now 9 p.m., and I have just been told that the Munich train is in Jena! 10.30 p.m. – we have just been informed that there will be no train today from Munich to Berlin.

What this must mean is that Bormann was still in Zossen in the late evening on the 21st and he could not get back to Berlin until the 22nd, because there was no train to take him back. However, someone who did not know that Bormann had been in Munich and Zossen could easily misinterpret this to mean that Bormann was in Berlin waiting for the train. The above shows that the dating of the notes in Hitler’s politisches Testament simply cannot be authentic but must be fictional. This does not prove that the notes in their entirety are forgeries, but it does conclusively show that they were not made when they are said to have been made. This makes it very likely, considering all the other evidence that points in this direction, that these notes were fabricated.

Heim thought that the notes were authentic, but he did not believe that Hitler had dictated them to Bormann, he wrote to the American artist Karen Kuykendall in October 1975. Instead he thought that Bormann had done just like Heim himself had done in 1941–42, i.e. written down mostly from memory what he had heard Hitler say. He thought, characteristically for his Hitler worship, that the utterances were characterized by an amazing clarity and fantastic immediacy. Then, he stated that Bormann had most likely read his notes to the Führer who had then had the chance to make corrections where such were called for. Now, this is certainly very interesting. Heim was not present in Berlin in 1945 so he had no idea about whether the notes were authentic or how they, in that case, were made. But considering that Heim always stressed that Hitler never knew his own notes were being made it is quite extraordinary that he would assume that Bormann had read the notes to Hitler. There is no way that he could have known this, and there is no reason for him to assume it, unless Bormann had done so in the past, which seems to suggest that Hitler was well aware of Heim and Henry Picker making notes during 1941 and 1942, despite Heim’s assurances to the contrary. Ironically, Picker had claimed that Hitler was aware that notes were being made, and Genoud, most likely based on Picker, claimed so as well. Picker also claimed that Hitler had read some of his notes, and (in the afterword to the second edition of Tischgespräche in 1963) even that Hitler had given him permission to publish his notes after the war. Needless to say, Picker’s last claim is certainly a lie. However, the idea that Hitler at least knew that notes were being made appears rather plausible – in fact, it seems very unlikely that he was not.

But there were also those from the Nazi old guard who doubted the authenticity of this text, or at least parts of it. Willi Krämer, who had worked under Reichspropagandaminister Goebbels, wrote to Heim in February 1986 asking him questions about former pilot Hanna Reitsch’s book, Höhen und Tiefen 1945–1977. Krämer was convinced that statements made on pages 122 and 125 in the last note in
Hitlers politisches Testament dated 2 April 1945, which were cited by Reitsch, were forgeries, and he asked Heim to help him find out the truth. Krämer did not specify exactly what he was referring to, and there is no trace of Heim’s reply to Krämer’s letter in his personal archive at the IfZ.

There is thus not much at all that speaks for the authenticity of this text. It would of course have been valuable to have independent evidence that could corroborate that Hitler spoke on the topics we find in Hitlers politisches Testament on those particular days. The best bet for finding such independent evidence would be Goebbels’ diaries from 1945. Out of the 18 entries in Hitlers politisches Testament five – 4, 6, 7, 10 February, and 2 April – can be found in Goebbels’ diary as well. Comparison is made a bit confused due to Goebbels’ habit of dating his entries on the day on which he dictated them, i.e. the day after the event they describe. This comparison shows that there is no overlap in subject matter, and Goebbels’ diaries thus do not corroborate any of the content in Hitlers politisches Testament. This is of course not proof that Genoud’s text is a forgery, but it does not support its authenticity either.

In fact, there are 51 pages of Goebbels’ diaries missing between 13 and 27 February, and 25 pages are missing at the end of the entry dated 2 April (recording events on 1 April) and yet another 20 pages are missing from the beginning of the entry dated 3 April (which records events on 2 April). The edition of Goebbels’ diaries from 1945 published in 1977/78 begins on 27 February, i.e. the day immediately after the last February note in Hitlers politisches Testament, which is dated 26 February, and continues to present entries for the entire month of March, which is the period that is missing in Genoud’s text. This means that the 1977/78 version did not contain four of the five dates that Goebbels’ diary and Hitlers politisches Testament have in common, and the fifth date is only partially available. Genoud had bought the publication rights to Goebbels’ written Nachlaß already in August 1955, and in that capacity, he was involved in the publication of Goebbels’ diaries from 1945 in German in 1977 (and then in English with Trevor-Roper in 1978), but it is unknown how large a part of Goebbels’ diaries Genoud had access to at that time. Considering all the missing pages in Goebbels’ diaries, this period seems like a perfect place for a forger to insert fake Hitler statements.

Conclusion

This article has investigated the authenticity of the text published under the title Hitlers politisches Testament in 1981. Many historians have cited this document largely uncritically since it was published, despite the fact that there is no original document available. The many uncertainties connected to this source ought of course to have been pointed out first by Hugh Trevor-Roper in 1961, when the English edition, The Testament of Adolf Hitler, was published, and then by the publisher Knaus in 1981. That neither of them did so was certainly to shy away from their scientific responsibilities towards their readers. If they had done so there might have been no need for this article.

We have seen that the story of how Genoud got this text from the former Director of the Nazi German Reichsbank, Walter Funk, is untrue. Several witnesses have
independently stated that Funk was never in a position to be given these documents: he was not present in the bunker in Berlin and was not trusted enough to have been given such a document. Furthermore, Hitler’s secretaries, Christa Schroeder and Gerda Christian, did not think that Hitler had dictated anything to Bormann, even though they thought that it could perhaps be a summary of things that Hitler had said at some point or another.

However, I have shown that the text contains statements that cannot reasonably have been uttered by Hitler, and that cannot be the result of misunderstandings on Bormann’s part either. Such examples are the ideas expressed in the note No. 16 dated 26 February that Hitler willingly let the British get away at Dunkirk, and the statement in note No. 5 dated 13 February saying that the Jews were not a race but only a religious community. All the independent evidence both before and after this date completely contradicts these statements. In these sources Hitler explicitly says that the Jews were nothing but a race, and in fact incapable of forming a religious or spiritual community. This also strongly suggests that these statements are not genuine. The particular distortion of Hitler’s view of the Jews actually fit perfectly into Genoud’s political agenda to further Arabic nationalism, which has been well described in the biographies about him, since it could serve as a cogent argument against a Jewish nation-state – Israel. After all, race was the core of a nation and a people (Volk) according to the National Socialist worldview, which was an ideology that Genoud subscribed to.

The dating of several of the notes also shows that this text cannot be trusted. Two of them, notes No. 12 and 13 dated 20 and 21 February 1945, record statements made on days when Bormann was not in Berlin and thus could not have listened to Hitler speak. One of the most suspicious features of Hitlers politisches Testament is also that the dates on the three last entries – notes No. 16 and 17 dated 26 February and note No. 18 dated 2 April – correspond exactly to the dating of the letters published in The Bormann Letters in 1954. Five notes out of 18 are therefore suspect in having been tampered with. Added to this is the fact that Genoud addressed this lacuna in his preface to Le testament politique in 1959. The fact that Genoud never mentions The Bormann Letters in this context is like an inadvertent admission of guilt on his part: he seems to know that this demands an explanation, but cannot explicitly explain why without betraying his own deceit.

Trevor-Roper claimed to have seen photocopies of documents once, which he thought were the original notes. But he never had the opportunity to actually compare the content of these photocopies with the text that Genoud published in French in 1959 under the title Le testament politique, which was consequently translated into English. Trevor-Roper also expressed serious doubts about the veracity of these documents in his private correspondence. According to the evidence, it was the French text that was later also translated into German and published as ‘the original Bormann dictations’ in 1981. This German text appeared in Genoud’s handwriting between the lines of a typed document containing a completely different text.

Considering the many uncertainties regarding the history and origin of this document, the burden of proof should reasonably be on the person arguing for authenticity. Considering that we lack independent evidence with which to authenticate these notes, this burden of proof is effectively impossible to meet. Reference to the ‘internal
evidence’ is not a reliable or valid method for historians to use when trying to establish a text’s authenticity since this method has failed spectacularly in the past. A prime example of this is the forged Hitler diaries in the early 1980s thatfooled all the experts who analysed them, including the handwriting analysts, as well as the 76 forgeries included by Eberhard Jäckel in his source volume Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen. In the case of Hitler’s politisches Testament, we simply have too many indicators that should cause any careful and critical historian to doubt its veracity, and no independent evidence that clearly supports the claim of authenticity. Historians should therefore refrain from using this source, and should treat it as if it was a forgery.

Notes
1. This document should not be confused with Hitler’s political and private will and testament, which he dictated to his secretary Traudl Junge on 29 April 1945, and which are absolutely authentic.
2. Hitler’s politisches Testament; Le testament politique de Hitler; The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The German title explicitly states that Hitler dictated these words to Bormann.
7. Christ Church Library, Oxford (CCLO); Hugh Trevor-Roper Papers (HTRP); Vol. Soc. Dacre 6/6/2; Trevor-Roper to Genoud, undated but around New Year’s 1977 & Genoud to Trevor-Roper, January 6, 1978 & Lammers to Genoud March 31, 1959. For the original see: the private archives of Pierre Péan, Paris, France; Letter from Lammers to Genoud, March 31, 1959; Box 130.
8. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz; N 263 (Nachlaß Rheindorf); Vol. 380; Document No. 178; notes regarding Hitler’s Tischgespräche, September 27, 1951; Vol. 192; Document No. 10, notes from interview with von Below October 16, 1951. I want to thank Professor Wolfram Pyta for sharing his copies of Rheindorf’s papers with me.
10. CCLO; HTRP; Vol. Soc. Dacre 6/6/2; Notes by Baumgarten after his meeting with Rechenberg and Genoud, July 15, 1974, p. 1. See also page from Goebbels’s diary April 9, 1945 attached to this document. It is perhaps worth noting that Trevor-Roper, when writing down what Baumgarten had told him regarding this matter over the telephone, stated that Goebbels’ diary entry was from 19 April. This mistake made the timeline work for Trevor-Roper, since Funk then claimed to have transported the gold two days earlier (CCLO; HTRP; Vol. Soc. Dacre 6/6/2; Undated typed memorandum entitled “Französ Genoud” by Trevor-Roper, p. 1). I believe that the mistake is explained by the fact that Trevor-Roper misunderstood Baumgarten (the conversation was in German and over the phone), because “the ninth”, neunte in German, sounds similar to neunzehn (19 in German).
11. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. (TBGJ, II/15), p. 690 (April 9, 1945). It is interesting to note that this part of the diary is missing in the edited version of the diaries that was published by Hoffman & Campe in 1977 under the title Joseph Goebbels, Tagebücher 1945: Die Letzten Aufzeichnungen. The entry dated 9 April only includes the introduction covering the military situation. Since Baumgarten had access to the full version of this entry already in July 1974, this must mean that this part was not included in the edition of
Goebbels' diaries from 1977 either because of a major oversight or conscious exclusion. This book was then translated into English, edited and introduced by Hugh Trevor-Roper, and published in 1978 (The Goebbels Diaries, pp. 297–300). Trevor-Roper thus knew when he edited the English translation that this part was available.

12. CCLO; HTRP; Vol. Soc. Dacre 6/6/2; Letter from Baumgarten to Trevor-Roper, October 19, 1974, 2.
15. Ibid., 690 (April 9, 1945).
16. "Reich's Hoard of Gold, Cash Is 'Legitimate Prize of War,'" The Stars and Stripes (Paris Edition), April 9, 1945. This newspaper was produced for the US Armed Forces by the Information and Education Division.
17. CCLO; HTRP; Vol. Soc. Dacre 6/6/2; Notes by Baumgarten after his meeting with Rechenberg and Genoud, July 15, 1974, 1.
18. Ibid., 2.
19. Schroeder, Er war mein Chef, 275. Given all the uncertainties, Schroeder was of the opinion that Baumgarten had given up his book project out of a sense of decency (ibid.).
20. Ibid., 257.
22. Wissenschaftsfreiheit und ihre rechtlichen Schranken, 49.
27. Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ); ED 416; Vol. 2; Letter from Knaus to Heim, January 19, 1981.
28. For this, see: Harris, Selling Hitler, 118–21. For Jäckel's source volume, see: Jäckel and Kuhn, Hitler. Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen.
30. It might be interjected that an exception to this rule would be if the text contains matter that only the purported author could possibly know. But in order to establish if that is in fact the case, we would have to consult independent evidence, and thus the validation is not made using only internal evidence. Certainly, we cannot conclude with absolute certainty that a text is a forgery (or contains forged passages) even if it contains matter that completely contradicts everything we know about the author, but we would still be justified in rejecting it until such time that we find independent evidence that can corroborate it. Absolute certainty is not necessary, nor is it possible to attain (except in deductive logic). Historians, just as all empirical scientists, operate with probabilities and the probability for a hypothesis being either true or false is always higher than 0 and lower than 1. A hypothesis is increasingly more likely to be true the closer the probability of it gets to 1 (a .5 probability means that the hypothesis is just as likely to be false as it is to be true), and it is increasingly less likely to be true (or increasingly likely to be false) the closer the probability of it gets to 0. This is what it means to say that a hypothesis is either probable (in varying degree) or improbable (in varying degree).
31. CCLO; HTRP; Vol. Soc. Dacre 6/6/2; Letter from Baumgarten to Trevor-Roper, October 19, 1974, 2.
33. Le testament politique, 8.
37. Schroeder, *Er war mein Chef*, 272; see also p. 105.
38. Ibid., 105.
45. Engel, *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943*, 80–1. Even though Engel’s notes were made in the early 1950s, his remarks in this context are corroborated by other independent sources.
53. Hitler’s politisches Testament, 68.
55. CCL0; HTRP; Vol. Soc. Dacre 6/6/2; Baumgarten to Trevor-Roper, July 16, 1973, 5.
56. For this, see: Carrier, "Hitler’s Table Talk," 561–76.
58. *Hitler, Mein Kampf*, Band I, 349 [121]. The page number in square brackets indicates the page number in the first edition of *Mein Kampf*.
59. *Hitler, Mein Kampf*, Band II, 1689 [331].
60. In the second volume of *Mein Kampf* Hitler explicitly used the phrase “political testament” for the German nation about his political views; see: *Hitler, Mein Kampf* (Band II), 1681–1683 [327–8].
61. Straßer, *Hitler et moi*, 118. We have no reason to believe either of Straßer’s claims.
64. *Hitlers politisches Testament*, 68. The use of the phrase “vom genetischen Standpunkt” is also a bit suspect, since genetics was not a subject that in any way was a theme common to Hitler.
66. *Hitler, Mein Kampf* (Band I), ss. 777–9, 781–9 [317–25].
68. See Hitler, “Political Testament,” 2239.
69. Winkler, *Der Schattenmann*, 108–41; See also: Péan, L’extrémiste; and Laske, *Ein Leben*.
72. Ibid., 145.
74. University of Arizona Library, Special Collections (UALSC); Papers of Karen Kuykendall (PKK) MS 243; Series II; Box 2, Folder 5; Letter from Heim to Kuykendall, October 25, 1975, 1.
75. UALSC; PKK MS 243; Series II; Box 2, Folder 5; Letter from Heim to Kuykendall, October 15, 1974, 1.
76. Ibid., 1–2.
77. For this, see: Typed notes from an interview with Heim by Dr. Freiherr von Siegler in Munich 1 July 1952 for the IfZ (dated 2 July 1952), 2–3; http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/

78. Genoud, Libres propos, xxvii; Bundesarchiv, Koblenz; N 1166; Vol. 365; “Vermerk” by Picker, October 8, 1951. See also: Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche (1951), 12; Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche (1963), 509–10, 513, 515–16.

79. Reitsch, Höhen und Tiefen.
80. IfZ; ED 416; Vol. 2; Letter from Krämer to Heim, February 22, 1986.
81. TBfJG, II/15, 313–0, 346–53, 371–82, 662–6. Really it is just four and a half, because a lot of the entry for 2 April is missing.
82. TBfJG, II/15, 382–3, 666–7 (February 13 & 28, April 2 & 3 1945).
83. Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, p. 1. While the German edition from 1977 had followed the dating in the original documents, the dates in the English translation from 1978 were changed to the day that the entries concerns, i.e. one day before the date in the original diaries (see ‘translator’s note’ in: ibid., p. xliii).
84. Winkler, Der Schattenmann, 93–107, 202–13, 269–70.

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