CAMPAIGNING WITH (NON)VIOLENCE:

A QUANTITATIVE STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF REGIME ON TACTIC TYPE IN UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICS

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INTRODUCTION

What factors influence campaigns’ decisions between using violent or nonviolent means to achieve their political goals? Identifying such determinants may contribute to academic research, as well as to political initiatives that attempt to promote human rights by creating policies that support nonviolence over violence. This thesis investigates one such factor – regime type – and how it affects the type of tactic utilized in unconventional politics. A prominent example is the pro-democracy movement taking place in Hong Kong, which began with protests on March 31st, 2019. While these large-scale demonstrations have been predominantly peaceful, violent tactics have been utilized by some participants (Boyajian & Cook, 2019: 1-3). How do structural conditions within Hong Kong and mainland China impact the choice of tactic? During the Arab Spring a series of anti-government demonstrations took place in North African and Middle Eastern countries in the early 2010s (Walker & Tucker, 2011: 5-6). The protests in Egypt and Tunisia were largely nonviolent while Libya and Syria experienced violence. Could there be a pattern between the type of governance and the tactics used in campaigns in these countries? It is these events and questions that inspired this thesis and culminated in the research question:

*How does regime type affect the type of tactic (violent or nonviolent) used in unconventional politics?*

Previous research has largely studied violent and nonviolent campaigns in isolation, without adequate cross-examination of these phenomena (Cunningham, 2013: 291; Groshek & Christensen, 2017: 351). Therefore, both violent and nonviolent campaigns will be included in this study. Previous literature has been primarily conducted through case studies, and there is a need for more quantitative work (Schock, 2013: 286). In response to this gap, this study will utilize a large-N quantitative design in order to contribute more generalizable theoretical work to this field. The findings about the relationship between regime type and tactic type may contribute to policy regarding how to create structures that promote the use of nonviolence over violence.

This thesis hypothesizes that a country being more democratic will lead to more nonviolent tactics (relative to violent ones) being utilized in unconventional politics. An overview of the theoretical argument behind this is that democratic-leaning regimes experience
shifts in the political opportunity structure more often than in autocratic-leaning regimes, due to elections. Elections allow political alignments to shift by introducing new actors to power who may alter political alliances or be sympathetic to campaigns, which can provide opportunities for people to engage in unconventional politics (Tarrow, 2011: 164-165). This increase in political opportunities due to elections, in combination with the threat of state repression if violence is used, provides incentives for campaigns to use nonviolent tactics. The results of the regression provide support for the opposite of the hypothesis, finding that democratic-leaning regimes experience more violent tactics than nonviolent ones. However, the goodness-of-fit measurements of the models are low, meaning that these results should be interpreted with skepticism.

The thesis is divided into five sections, this introduction comprising the first. Next follows the theory, motivating the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The third section presents the research design, followed by the presentation of results along with a discussion. The last section is the conclusion, which summarizes the thesis.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Literature Review & Conceptualization

In a stylized model of reality, there exist three different strategies in order to achieve political goals. One strategy is to use existing political structures within a regime (such as voting), known as conventional politics. Outside of conventional politics exist unconventional politics, which is an attempt to gain leverage over the state in order to extract concessions outside of typical institutional structures. Within unconventional politics there are two strategies: the first is to use nonviolent means, and the second is to use violent means (Cunningham, 2013: 292). Conventional politics are the least costly as these types of actions are within the normal structure of the state, and participants are less likely to experience repression. However, if participants deem they are unlikely to achieve their goals through conventional politics, they may employ unconventional strategies instead (Cunningham, 2013: 293-294).

The dependent variable of this study is the type of tactic (violent vs. nonviolent) used in unconventional politics. Tactics are performed by an actor, or by what one could call a
‘campaign.’ A campaign is “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013: 416). The conceptual definitions of nonviolent and violent tactics used in this thesis are based on those by Chenoweth & Lewis (2013: 418-419). A nonviolent tactic is a tactic of unconventional politics that does not use threat of, or actual physical harm towards an opponent. This could be actions such as demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, or marches. A violent tactic is a tactic of unconventional politics that uses threat of, or actual physical harm towards an opponent. Examples include military coups, armed insurgencies, or terrorist attacks.

Although both violent and nonviolent tactics are within the same realm of unconventional politics, they differ in many ways. Perhaps the most significant difference is related to mobilization, defined by Schock (2013: 282) as “the process of acquiring resources, people, and support for a campaign.” Since the strategy of unconventional politics attempts to achieve goals by imposing costs on the government, using nonviolent means requires mass mobilization to be effective. In contrast, using violent means only requires a small number of mobilized persons as violence itself creates costs on the state by challenging the notion that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Cunningham et al., 2017: 472; Cunningham, 2013: 294).

Cunningham (2013: 293-294) discusses how the choice between using violent or nonviolent means depends upon a cost-benefit analysis of how costly each strategy is, compared to the likelihood of success. This is related to the ‘political opportunity structure’ discussed by Tarrow, which is comprised of opportunities and threats to contentious politics (2011: 160-164). He writes that contentious actions will increase when opportunities and resources for challengers exist, at the same time that these peoples’ interests are threatened (Tarrow, 2011: 160). Opportunity should be conceptualized as “the probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome,” while threat can be defined as “the costs that a social group will incur from protest, or that it expects to suffer if it does not take action” (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001: 182-183). Opportunities and threats together create the structure within which unconventional politics play out. The theory of political opportunity structure is criticized by Press (2006: 6-9) as having too much focus on external structural factors and therefore neglecting the role of individual activists’ initiatives. The role of individual agency is also discussed by Cunningham et al. (2017: 471) in regards to individual costs of partaking in contention, in the claims part of their theoretical framework. Although individual agency
certainly may be important for unconventional politics, this thesis is interested in structural conditions such as regime type and therefore uses the political opportunity structure theory despite this critique.

Previous literature has investigated the effects of various variables on the likelihood of a group choosing violent or nonviolent tactics in political conflict. Research has found that nonviolence is more likely in countries that have fully or partly free media systems or when international non-governmental organizations (INGO) are present (Cunningham et al., 2017: 479; Groshek & Christensen, 2017: 349). Cunningham et al. (2017: 477) find that autocracies and anocracies are more likely to experience nonviolent campaigns than democracies are. They also find a diffusion mechanism, meaning that if there is an ongoing nonviolent campaign in the country’s neighborhood, the country itself is more likely to experience nonviolent tactics relative to violent ones. This holds true for violent campaigns as well— neighboring armed conflicts over government increase the likelihood of the same type of conflict within the country itself (Cunningham et al., 2017: 479). While this result is contingent upon governmental incompatibilities, Cunningham (2013) focuses on territorial incompatibilities when investigating what factors influence the choice of violence or nonviolence by self-determination groups. She finds that factors such as lower state capacity and internal fragmentation within groups are more likely to result in violence, while less geographically concentrated groups are more likely to engage in nonviolence (Cunningham, 2013: 299-300). While previous research has found that there are various variables affecting the likelihood of a campaign using violence or nonviolence, just one factor will be examined in this thesis.

The independent variable in this study is regime type, and this concept along with the extreme values it can assume will now be discussed. ‘Regime’ is conceptually closely related to ‘government,’ ‘polity,’ and ‘state,’ among others. While the state is often thought of as the authority within physically determined territorial boundaries, ‘regime,’ ‘government,’ and ‘polity’ are not as differentiated from one another (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016: 1). In order to clarify ‘regime’ for the purposes of this thesis, the conceptual definition used is ‘the form of government or set of rules that dictates how a society operates.’ Within the concept of regime there exist different types that it can take on, which exist on a broad political spectrum. While they do not exist in simple dichotomy, the spectrum does range from democracy to autocracy and therefore it is these concepts that will now be discussed.
Democracy is a thick concept comprised of many different aspects and can be defined in a number of ways. Some of the main characteristics of democracy named in various definitions are free and fair elections, equality among citizens, various freedoms, protection from the tyranny of the majority, and constraints on the government’s executive power (Coppedge et al., 2019: 39-41; Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016: 14; Tarrow & Tilly, 2015: 57). For this study, democracy is conceptualized using the Varieties of Democracy’s (V-Dem) explanation of electoral democracy, “…the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country” (Coppedge et al., 2019: 39).

At the other end of the political spectrum exists autocracy, which can also be defined in numerous ways. Often this regime type is conceptualized simply as in contrast to democracy such as by Tilly (2007 in Tarrow & Tilly, 2015: 57), which is not a precise definition and leads to ambiguity. Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers (2016: 15) have a clear and delimited definition, “In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints.” This definition helps to clarify what autocracy actually is. However, for this study autocracy will be conceptualized using V-Dem’s explanation above. While democracy exhibits the characteristics described, autocracy is lacking in these and thereby performs poorly in terms of legitimate elections.

Regime type is related to state repression, which is another key element within unconventional politics. State repression entails actions by the state that increase costs for challengers in order to maintain the existing state of affairs or power distribution (Ritter & Conrad, 2016: 86; Tilly, 1978 in Chenoweth, Perkoski, & Kang, 2017: 1952). Chenoweth, Perkoski, & Kang (2017: 1958-1960) identify some consensus findings between the state repression and nonviolent resistance literatures, two of which are relevant for this study. They find that the intensity of state repression depends on the regime type, where democracies are less likely to use extralegal forms of repression. They also find that nonviolent dissent evokes less repression as compared to violent means of contention. This is related to Stephan & Chenoweth's (2008: 11-12) discussion of backfire against the government if it represses a nonviolent
campaign, while repression against a violent campaign is more accepted domestically and internationally.

There are two gaps in previous literature that this thesis attempts to contribute to. The principal gap is that in previous literature, violence and nonviolence have been studied mostly in isolation. This has partially been due to the assumption that because both methods have the same objectives, they should be theoretically similar to each other. However, this is not necessarily true and therefore more cross-examining research needs to be conducted (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013: 415; Cunningham et al., 2017: 468; Cunningham, 2013: 291-293; Groshek & Christensen, 2017: 351). This study contributes to this gap by investigating both violent and nonviolent tactics in the dependent variable. Another gap in previous literature is that most research has been conducted qualitatively, through case studies (Schock, 2013: 286). This study contributes to this gap by conducting a large-N quantitative study instead.

**Theoretical Argument**

To reiterate, in this study the independent variable is regime type and the dependent variable is tactic type (violent vs. nonviolent). This thesis focuses solely on the realm of unconventional politics and will theoretically draw on the opportunities part of the opportunity-threat structure, via the political opportunity structure. The political opportunity structure is made up of multiple different factors which are related to the characteristics of a regime. These are “(1) opening of access to participation for new actors; (2) evidence of political realignment within the polity; (3) availability of influential allies; and (4) emerging splits within the elite” (Tarrow, 2011: 164-165). Although these are distinct factors, they are quite interrelated and can shift based on changes in others. Therefore, all four aspects inform the theoretical argument, but the most important one is shifting political realignments. This factor is most closely related to the presence of influential allies, as a change in political realignment creates space for new people to come into power who may be sympathetic to challengers (Tarrow & Tilly, 2015: 60).

Shifts in political alignments occur differently in various countries, depending on the type of regime. Autocracies have restricted political participation and are therefore not as accountable to the people. That these leaders seek to remain in power is a common assumption within the literature, and is part of the reason as to why autocracies do not experience shifts in political alignments as often as democracies do (Chenoweth, Perkoski, & Kang, 2017: 1957). Leaders in
democracies are held accountable to their citizens, most importantly through elections for office. Shifting political alignments within a democracy occur chiefly through electoral change, as variation in support for different political parties may create uncertainty among both elites and supporters, thereby providing opportunities for potential challengers (Tarrow, 2011: 165). Nonviolent campaigns and elections are related in five different ways in democracies. Firstly, campaigns can shift their activism towards a sympathetic party. Secondly, campaigns can take a stand against election practices or decisions they do not support. Thirdly, campaigns can impact “parties’ electoral fortunes.” Fourthly, campaigns can produce polarization as they force political actors to shift their agendas towards the extremes in order to meet the demands of the challengers. Finally, elections can increase or decrease the level of support of a campaign due to its alignment with certain parties (Tarrow & Tilly, 2015: 63-64). These five different relations illustrate the processes through which elections and nonviolent campaigns can affect each other in democracies. Because political alignments shift more often in democracies than in autocracies, opportunities for nonviolent contention arise more often.

Due to the increased opportunities for contention, I expect campaigns in democracies to choose nonviolent tactics over violent ones more often than campaigns in autocracies would. It is also important to consider the role of state repression in this choice of nonviolence. Using violent tactics in unconventional politics has been found to induce more intense state repression as compared to using nonviolent tactics (Chenoweth, Perkoski, & Kang, 2017: 1960). In addition, nonviolent campaigns have been found to be successful twice as often as violent campaigns in achieving political goals. This is because using nonviolent tactics increases the campaign’s legitimacy, and because state repression is less likely when the campaign does not use violence (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008: 8-9). Based on the negative consequences of state repression if violent tactics are utilized, I therefore expect that if opportunities exist to use nonviolent tactics (which they are more likely to do in a democracy due to shifting political alignments) a campaign would choose to use these rather than violent ones.

A summary of the discussion of theory will now be presented. This study is focused on unconventional politics (as opposed to conventional politics), and within this exists both violent and nonviolent means. The choice of whether or not to engage in unconventional politics depends on a cost-benefit analysis that is based upon perceived threats and opportunities. The opportunities part of this is manifested through a political opportunity structure, composed of
four different factors that are linked to regime characteristics. All of these are relevant to the theory, but the most important is shifts in political alignments. It is situated within these two themes (unconventional politics and political opportunity structure) that the specific theory underlying this study comes in. More democratic regimes experience shifts in political alignments more often than autocracies do, due to elections. These shifts allow opportunities for contention to arise. Due to the role of state repression if violent means are utilized, campaigns should choose nonviolent tactics over violent ones in democracies. See figure 1 below for a visual representation of the theory.

The theory outlined focuses on democratic regimes, but a brief discourse on autocracy and its connection to the discussed political opportunity structure is warranted. In an autocracy, there are fewer opportunities for contention to take place due to shifts in political alignments. Political alignments do not shift as often in an autocracy as compared to a democracy, because there are fewer and less legitimate elections and due to the assumption that leaders in power want to remain in power. Not only are there fewer opportunities via political realignment, but the risks of engaging in unconventional politics are higher in autocratic-leaning regimes. Autocracies are more likely to use more intense repression than democracies (Chenoweth, Perkoski, & Kang, 2017: 1958). Fewer opportunities and more repression affect mobilization capabilities, which is a significant difference between choosing violent or nonviolent means. For a nonviolent campaign to be successful, it requires mass mobilization. In contrast, a violent campaign has a higher chance of success with fewer participants, illustrated by e.g. a terrorist attack (Cunningham, 2013: 294). Mass mobilization for a nonviolent campaign is arguably less likely to take place in an autocracy, due to fewer opportunities and higher risk of state repression. Therefore, the theoretical argument presented above utilizing the theory of political opportunity structure only holds for democratic-leaning regimes. This discussion culminates in the hypothesis:

H1: When unconventional politics occur, campaigns will be more likely to choose nonviolent (as opposed to violent) tactics in more democratic regimes.
**RESEARCH DESIGN**

**Datasets & Case Selection**

Four different datasets are merged in order to create the dataset used for this large-N quantitative study. The dependent variable and one control variable are taken from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project. Data on the independent variable is taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset. Data on the remaining control variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

The decision on which unit of analysis to use was informed by the theory as well as data availability. The NAVCO Data Project has three different datasets, each coded at different units of analysis. NAVCO 1.0 uses campaign-level, NAVCO 2.0 uses campaign-year, and NAVCO 3.0 uses event-day as levels of analysis (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b: 416; Chenoweth, Pinckney, & Lewis, 2018: 526). This study uses campaign-year as the unit of analysis and therefore relies on the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. As the phenomena of interest is tactic type, using a disaggregation below campaign-level provides more information since tactics can change during the lifespan of a campaign. However, the lowest level of event-day is too disaggregated as the NAVCO dataset must be merged with other datasets for the independent and control variables.
that are on the country-year level. In summary, the unit of analysis is the campaign-year due to the compatible merging of datasets as well as being an appropriate level of disaggregation.

The population of cases relevant for this study is the cases that meet the criteria to be included in NAVCO 2.0’s dataset. These criteria are campaigns “…that at one time or another held “maximalist” goals of overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination. They are also “mature” campaigns, in the sense that they have at least 1,000 observed participants and a coherent organization linking tactics to one another over time.” Although this criteria of maximalist goals narrows the population of cases, Cunningham (2013: 300) finds that having maximalist goals increases the likelihood of a group engaging in unconventional politics. Therefore, there is a theoretical motivation for using this dataset, in addition to the issue of data availability. The NAVCO 2.0 dataset is limited to the years 1945-2006, and within this time period there are 250 campaigns that meet the criteria to be included (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 2). However, two of the control variables used come from World Bank datasets that have a smaller time frame, 1960-2018 and 1970-2018. Therefore, the time period of this study will be from 1970-2006, and the full population of cases within these years will be included.

**Operationalization**

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is the type of tactic (violent vs. nonviolent) used in unconventional politics. The same, or similar, dependent variable has been used in previous studies. Groshek & Christensen (2017: 341) operationalize violent and nonviolent campaigns using NAVCO 2.0’s dataset, which includes a dichotomous variable for the predominant method of resistance. Cunningham et al. (2017: 475) and Cunningham (2013: 297) operationalize their dependent variables similarly. They both use NAVCO’s data to categorize campaigns as nonviolent but use Uppsala Conflict Data Project/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset to code incidents of civil conflict. Cunningham (2013: 297) uses a threshold of 1000 battle deaths for civil war in order to better compare this to incidents of nonviolent campaigns, as NAVCO has a threshold of 1000 participants for a campaign to be included. The
operationalization used in this study will be the same as Groshek & Christensen's (2017: 341), as NAVCO 2.0’s dichotomous variable ‘Primary Resistance Method’ will be used.

The conceptual definition of violent and nonviolent tactics discussed in the theory section above is based on Chenoweth & Lewis' (2013b: 418-419) own definition, presented in the article accompanying the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. They operationalize nonviolent campaigns by reviewing the literature, triangulating this information using multiple sources, and then having their findings reviewed by experts within the field. They operationalize violent campaigns by reviewing the literature and using datasets, such as the Correlates of War and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 3). This operationalization is a valid measure of the concepts, as it captures the theoretical phenomena described by their definitions well. As the theoretical definitions used by the authors are very similar to the ones used in this thesis, I argue that this operationalization is valid.

While the operationalization overlaps with the theoretical definition resulting in high validity, there may be some issues of reliability. The issue arises due to NAVCO’s coding of “primary type of resistance method used in a campaign year” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 9). Allowing for this gray area may be problematic in terms of reliability because campaigns that do use some mixed tactics could be interpreted differently by different people and therefore be coded differently. Chenoweth & Lewis (2013a: 3) write in the codebook that “When a campaign relies primarily on nonviolent methods such as these as opposed to violent or armed tactics, the campaign can be characterized as nonviolent.” They also code based on “peak events” rather than attempt to factor in every minor event occurring during one year. However, the process of determining “peak events” as well as what constitutes “relying primarily on” is not made explicit, which makes the coding rules unclear for users of the dataset. Therefore, there could be an issue of reliability for the NAVCO coders. While it is important to take this into consideration when analyzing results, the operationalization is sufficiently valid and reliable for use in this study.

The authors discuss the issue of underreporting bias – with focus on nonviolent campaigns – and how they attempt to mitigate this. Some users of NAVCO’s work may be concerned that the nonviolent campaigns included in the dataset are biased towards success as these are more commonly reported on. However, Chenoweth & Lewis (2013a: 4-5) claim that by including both violent and nonviolent campaigns and by having a threshold of 1000 participants,
this bias is evenly distributed between both types of campaigns. In addition, they have asked field experts to review and contribute to the dataset in order to ensure that all relevant campaigns (especially failed nonviolent ones) were included (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 4-5; 2013b: 420).

In the dataset used for the regression, the dependent variable will be lagged one year after the other variables. The reason for this is to establish correct time order, i.e. that the dependent variable takes place after the independent variable. This is necessary in order to help ascertain that it is in fact the independent variable that is causing the dependent variable, and not the other way around (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 55).

**Independent Variable**

The independent variable is the regime type of the country in which the campaign takes place. As discussed in the theory section, ‘regime’ and its values along the spectrum of ‘democracy’ to ‘autocracy’ are thick, multidimensional concepts. Therefore, operationalization of these concepts is more challenging. Cunningham (2013: 298) measures democracy as a dichotomous variable based on if the state has a Polity IV Project score equal to or greater than 6. Groshek & Christensen (2017: 343) also use the Polity IV Project, but utilize the full ‘Polity2’ score which is on a scale from –10 to +10, from full autocracy to full democracy. Cunningham et al. (2017: 476) also use the Polity IV Project but create their own operationalization of regime type using sub-indicators resulting in a 14-point scale, which is then divided into three ordinal values for different regime types. Although the Polity IV Project is widely used – especially the ‘Polity’ score for regime type – it is not without downsides. The ‘Polity’ score which provides a one-number value for regime type is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score, although these variables are measured in different ways using different sub-indicators. The authors caution users of the simplicity of this score and encourage dataset users to instead utilize the individual democracy and autocracy scores (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016: 16-17). Due to this caution, this common operationalization will not be used for the independent variable. Instead, the indicator for ‘Electoral democracy index’ from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset will be used to measure regime type, and is still a single-number score which is desirable for purposes of this study.

Not only is this indicator a one-score alternative to the common ‘Polity’ variable, but this variable also fits the theoretical argument better. As democracy is such a multidimensional
concept, the conceptual definition presented in the theory section attempts to identify one feature of democracy that is most relevant for the theory. The theoretical argument utilizes one aspect of political opportunity structure theory, which is shift in political alignments. Therefore, the most important aspect of democracy for this thesis is elections, as it is through legitimate elections that political alignments change. This is operationalized using V-Dem’s ‘Electoral democracy index,’ which is a continuous variable with values ranging from 0 to 1 (low to high) and is measured by aggregating five indices (Coppedge et al., 2019: 39). “The Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression and alternative sources of information (v2x_free_altinf), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two” (Coppedge et al., 2019: 112).

The theoretical concept of democracy used in this thesis is based on V-Dem’s explanation of its ‘Electoral democracy index.’ Therefore, if V-Dem’s measurement of democracy is valid so is the operationalization used for this study. However, a potential issue with this variable is the fact that it is an aggregate of other aggregates, each containing multiple indicators (Coppedge et al., 2019: 39). This may reduce the validity of the measure, as it is far removed from the original observations. However, due to the fact that it is focused on one primary aspect of democracy – elections – which fits the theoretical argument well, this indicator will still be used.

The low-level indicators that the ‘Electoral democracy index’ is based on are what V-Dem classifies as C-type indicators, meaning that these indicators are assigned values by multiple country experts. These are scored by answering questions requiring subjective judgments, resulting in a potential reliability problem. However, V-Dem has strict criteria for selecting appropriate country experts and each indicator for each country-year is coded by at least five country experts, which minimizes reliability issues (Coppedge et al., 2019: 115).

The use of subjective scoring is also closely related to bias issues. Having five different experts rate each value and combining these scores reduces bias as compared to if only one person were to code each value. In addition, the authors behind V-Dem discuss the issue of bias thoroughly in the article accompanying the dataset. They acknowledge that coders will have
various levels of bias and reliability and attempt to address this by issuing a questionnaire to all coders in order to identify biases regarding judgment calls (C oppedge et al., 2019: 120-123).

Control Variables

The control variables used in this study are GDP per capita, international non-governmental organization (INGO) support for a campaign, and tertiary education level. GDP per capita is included as a control because higher income and democracy are associated with each other (C oppedge, 2012: 258-259). Therefore, in order to establish that it is regime type and not income level that is causing the dependent variable, GDP per capita will be included in the model. Due to data availability GDP per capita will be a country-wide measure, using data from the World Bank. In order to increase validity, ideal data would be on the income level of people active in the campaign, as a country-wide measure of GDP per capita does not necessarily mean that the participants have this income level. However, such data does not exist for NAVCO 2.0 campaigns and therefore a country-wide measure will have to suffice. Following convention, this measure will be log transformed in order to reduce skewness in the distribution of data. GDP per capita can vary extremely widely between the richest and poorest countries, therefore in order to somewhat normalize this distribution it will be log transformed.

International non-governmental organization (INGO) support for a campaign will be included as a control variable because receiving formal support from an INGO may affect what type of tactic is used by the campaign. Additionally, regime type may affect the presence of INGOs within a country. Therefore, since it seems plausible that INGO support may affect or may be affected by both the dependent and independent variables it seems reasonable to control for this. Cunningham et al. (2017: 476) include ‘Civil society strength’ as a control variable and operationalize this by counting the amount of INGOs in a country-year. The concept used in this thesis differs somewhat, as it focuses specifically on INGO support for a campaign and therefore uses NAVCO 2.0’s variable ‘INGO Support for Campaign.’ This is a dichotomous variable where a code of 1 means that the campaign has received support from INGOs such as advocacy, training, resources, or staff, and a code of 0 implies otherwise (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 16). While this is a valid measure, the reliability may not be that high as the coding seems to be somewhat subjective. The coder makes decisions regarding if prominent INGOs have supported
the campaign *substantially*, which may cause reliability problems if various people have coded different campaigns and have different interpretations of what these terms mean.

Finally, tertiary education level will be included as a control because involvement of educated people in a campaign increases the likelihood that it will use nonviolent means (Dahlum, 2019: 297). Dahlum (2019: 287-288) creates her own variable for education level of protestors, relying on multiple secondary sources. The data on education used for this thesis will be from the World Bank and will be a country-wide measure. The data is a percentage of enrollment in tertiary education (The World Bank, 2018). As discussed above in the context of GDP per capita, this is not an ideal measure as the education level of the campaign participants is not necessarily the same as a national average which decreases the validity of the measure. Despite this, it is still an adequate measure for a control variable.

**Method**

The hypothesis will be tested through a quantitative large-N study. The independent variable of regime type is continuous taking values on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 is most autocratic and 1 is most democratic (Coppedge et al., 2019: 39). The dependent variable of tactic type is dichotomous, with a predominantly violent campaign coded as 0 and a predominantly nonviolent campaign coded as 1 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 6). Due to the dichotomous dependent variable, the statistical method used for analysis will be logistic regression. A linear probability model could have been used, but there are conceptual and statistical downsides to this. The method of logistic regression is a better fit because it is non-linear, but this also makes interpreting the coefficients more difficult which will be discussed in the results section (Pampel, 2000: 2, 16-17).

**RESULTS**

**Descriptive Statistics**

The descriptive statistics of the variables will be examined in order to provide an overview of the dataset used for this study, which includes 583 observations. The dependent
variable, lagged tactic type, has a fewer number of observations because when it was lagged one year after the other variables, the first year of each campaign was excluded as it did not have a preceding year from which to take the value.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Tactic Type</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO Support</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Education</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>13.510</td>
<td>13.782</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>9.432</td>
<td>68.534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the independent and dependent variables have somewhat skewed distributions, but to differing degrees. There are more autocratic-leaning regimes than democratic-leaning regimes in the sample, therefore the median is 0.237 (on a scale from 0 to 1). However, there are a few highly ranked democracies which pull the mean up, to a value of 0.361. These are the United Kingdom from 1971-2006 and Spain from 1979-2006.
Lagged tactic type is a dichotomous variable with a mean of 0.156. This means that 15.6% (80 observations) of the sample has a value of 1, which are nonviolent campaign-years. The other 84.4% (433 observations) of the sample are violent campaign-years. This is quite a skewed distribution in favor of violent campaign-years, which some people may argue is an issue of underreporting bias regarding nonviolent campaigns. However, this issue is addressed by the NAVCO coders and was discussed in the operationalization section above.

Regression Analysis

Due to the non-linear nature of the logistic regression model used, the coefficients in the regression table (see table 2) are in log-odds. This means that the coefficients are not directly interpretable because they are ‘logit transformed,’ but their statistical significance and direction of relationship can be examined (Pampel, 2000: 18).

To reiterate, the hypothesis of this thesis is that when unconventional politics occur, participants living in more democratic regimes will be more likely to use nonviolent tactics, as opposed to violent ones. The theoretical argument for this is that democratic-leaning regimes experience shifts in the political opportunity structure (specifically political alignments) more often due to elections. More political opportunities, in combination with the threat of state repression if violence is used, provide incentives to use nonviolent tactics.

Regression Examination

First the output of the logistic regression will be examined, and thereafter an interpretation of the statistics will be provided. Model 1 is a bivariate regression with the main independent variable, regime type, and the dependent variable, lagged tactic type. In this model
the relationship is not statistically significant at all. The relationship is negative within the sample. Model 2 is a multivariate regression where three control variables are included. Logged GDP per capita is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, and the other three variables are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The direction of the relationship of the main independent variable remains negative, which is in opposition to the hypothesis. The direction of the relationships between the three control variables and the dependent variable is positive.

There are two goodness-of-fit measurements included, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the pseudo R² statistic. The AIC is used to compare different models, where the one with the lowest AIC value is deemed to be most appropriate (Ames & Brezinski, 1987: 452). The pseudo R² statistic is similar to a normal R² statistic, but adapted to logistic regression (Signorell, n.d.). Both of the goodness-of-fit measurements demonstrate that model 2 is more appropriate than model 1 in explaining the variation in the dependent variable (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 179-180). While the AIC is only useful in comparing models, the pseudo R² statistic actually says something about model fit on its own. Model 2 has a pseudo R² value of 0.23510, meaning that the model explains approximately 23.5% of the variation in the dependent variable.

**Regression Interpretation**

It is interesting that the main independent variable, regime type, changed from no statistical significance in model 1 to statistical significance at the 99% confidence level in model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bivariate (1)</th>
<th>Multivariate (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged Tactic Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>-0.621</td>
<td>-2.508***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
<td>(0.763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO Support</td>
<td>1.461***</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP/cap</td>
<td>0.357**</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Education</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.464***</td>
<td>-4.122***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-221.247</td>
<td>-190.661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaike Inf. Crit.</td>
<td>446.494</td>
<td>391.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.00689</td>
<td>0.23510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Coefficients are in log-odds*  
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01*
2. In order to determine if some specific control variable(s) are causing this change, additional regression models were conducted where each control variable was tested individually to see if it affected the main independent variable, as shown in table 3.

### Table 3. Additional Regression Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lagged Tactic Type</th>
<th>INGO</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>TEd</th>
<th>No INGO</th>
<th>No IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
<td>-3.096***</td>
<td>-2.908***</td>
<td>-3.708***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.513)</td>
<td>(0.685)</td>
<td>(0.676)</td>
<td>(0.745)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO Support</td>
<td>1.816***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP/cap</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.749***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.477***</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.061***</td>
<td>0.038***</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.009***</td>
<td>-5.849***</td>
<td>-1.624***</td>
<td>-4.344***</td>
<td>-3.308***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.839)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.974)</td>
<td>(0.921)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>513</th>
<th>513</th>
<th>513</th>
<th>513</th>
<th>513</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-204.774</td>
<td>-204.108</td>
<td>-204.110</td>
<td>-199.823</td>
<td>-196.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.13613</td>
<td>0.14103</td>
<td>0.14102</td>
<td>0.17199</td>
<td>0.19380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Coefficients are in log-odds*

Models 3-5 include the main independent variable and one of the control variables. In model 3 regime type and INGO support are included, and the control is statistically significant while the main independent variable is not statistically significant at all. In model 4 regime type and logged GDP per capita are included and both are statistically significant. In model 5 regime type
and tertiary education are included and both are statistically significant. Because including only INGO support in model 3 made regime type not significant, this relationship was further explored in models 6 and 7. Model 6 includes all variables except INGO support, and each one is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Model 7 excludes regime type and tests only the control variables, and here only INGO support is statistically significant above the standard 95% confidence level.

These models demonstrate that the variable INGO support may have a strange effect on the data seeing as how the other variables lose significance in various models, seemingly related to this control. This may be related to why regime type is not significant in the bivariate regression in model 1 but gains significance in the multivariate regression in model 2. This could potentially be an issue of multicollinearity, meaning that there is a high correlation between the variables regime type and INGO support (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 238). However, if multicollinearity was taking place between these two variables, I would expect regime type to lose significance when INGO support was included, not gain significance as it does from model 1 to 2 (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 239). Additionally, the other control variables lose significance in model 7 which indicates that INGO support may have an effect on them as well, which reduces the likelihood that the issue is one of multicollinearity between INGO support and regime type. It is also important to address the goodness-of-fit of these models. The least appropriate model is number 3, where only regime type and INGO support are included. Models 4 and 5 are only slightly better. Model 6 which excludes INGO support improves the goodness-of-fit even more, but is in general quite low, explaining only 17.2% of the variation in the dependent variable. The direction of the relationships between each variable and the dependent variable remains the same as in the original models 1 and 2.

When comparing these additional models (3-7) to the multivariate model including all the variables (model 2), we see that the goodness-of-fit is highest for model 2 with a pseudo R² value of 0.23510 and an AIC of 391.322. Because model 2 has the best goodness-of-fit and each of the variables reaches statistical significance, it is this model that will now be interpreted substantially despite the somewhat strange effect of INGO support in other models. As mentioned above, the magnitude of the coefficients cannot be interpreted as they are logit transformed but the statistical significance and direction of relationship are relevant. Each of the control variables has a positive relationship with the dependent variable, lagged tactic type. This means that if a
campaign receives support from INGOs, it uses more nonviolent tactics (relative to violent ones). If a country has a higher GDP per capita, it uses more nonviolent tactics. If a country has a higher rate of enrollment in tertiary education, it uses more nonviolent tactics. The main independent variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable, which means that as a country moves from autocracy (0) towards democracy (1) it uses more violent tactics. This is the opposite of the hypothesis. The constant in a regression represents the value of Y (dependent variable) when X (independent variables) is equal to zero. In model 2 the constant has no meaning because one of the controls is GDP per capita, which cannot equal zero. The pseudo R² statistic is 0.23510, meaning that the model accounts for approximately 23.5% of the variation in the dependent variable. This is quite a low goodness-of-fit statistic, and therefore the results from the regression should be viewed with skepticism as to their real-world accuracy.

Discussion

Alternative Explanations

This opposite finding to the hypothesis could be the result of many different reasons, such as data issues. One reason for this result could be due to the type of campaigns studied. The NAVCO 2.0 dataset only includes campaigns with maximalist goals, defined as “goals of overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a: 2). Perhaps these types of goals are so drastic and contrary to the will of the regime that it would be nearly impossible to achieve them without engaging in violence. If this were the case, the theoretical argument outlined in this thesis could still hold true, just not on the cases included for study. In order to investigate this, the same theory would need to be tested on campaigns with non-maximalist goals. Other potential data issues that may affect the finding of the regression are the control variables. The possibility that INGO support is manipulating the data has not been completely ruled out. Including different, or more, control variables may also affect the results of the regression. This is not just a potential data issue but is also connected to theory, as it is theory that determines which control variables to include in the model.

The finding contrary to the hypothesis could also be related to theoretical issues. A potential alternative explanation is related to the role of conventional vs. unconventional politics.
and is somewhat connected to the preceding discussion of maximalist goals. The research question investigated in this thesis is situated within the realm of unconventional politics. However, perhaps the reason for why it was found that violent tactics are used more in democracies is that there is already enough room for nonviolent dissent within conventional politics. Citizens may already be able to express and attempt to achieve their political goals peacefully through institutional channels, due to rights such as freedom of speech or media openness. Therefore, the few political goals that exist outside of this system in the domain of unconventional politics may be so fringe that they must use violence to attempt to achieve their goals. Another alternative explanation for why the regression resulted in a finding opposite to the hypothesis may be connected to the role of state repression and mobilization capacity. Although democracies may use less harsh repression than autocracies, engaging in unconventional politics nearly always evokes some type of state repression, even in democracies (Chenoweth, Perkoski, & Kang, 2017: 1957-1958). Perhaps this repression (albeit low) is enough to deter people from participating, and therefore makes the mass mobilization required for nonviolent campaigns unlikely. If mass mobilization is not possible, the remaining option is to engage in violence as it is effective in creating costs against the state with a smaller amount of participants (Cunningham, 2013: 294).

**Limitations of Research Design**

The choices made in the research design include decisions about what method to use, which cases to include, and how to operationalize variables. The method selected was a large-N quantitative design using a logistic regression. The main limitation of this design is that it does not address the causal mechanism, but only looks at causal effects between the independent and dependent variables. The cases in this study were campaigns with maximalist goals, mostly due to data availability. This limits the scope of the results to only these types of campaigns, and as discussed above perhaps including non-maximalist campaigns would change the results.

The main limitation of the study is the low goodness-of-fit measurements, meaning that the models used did not explain a large proportion of the variation in the dependent variable (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013: 179-180). This is problematic in terms of how much one actually can interpret from the results. Decisions made in the research design may have impacted the values of the pseudo R² and Akaike information criterion statistics. Perhaps different, or
additional, control variables could have been included in order to increase the goodness-of-fit. Another potential factor affecting goodness-of-fit could be how the variables were operationalized.

**Robustness Test**

A robustness test will be conducted due to the low goodness-of-fit measurements. Because the regression models conducted above had low pseudo R² and AIC values, the independent variable of regime type will be operationalized differently to see if the results change. The original operationalization utilized V-Dem’s ‘Electoral democracy index,’ and the robustness test will operationalize regime type using the Polity IV Project’s ‘Polity2’ variable.

The theoretical reason for using V-Dem rather than Polity for regime type was that the theoretical argument underlying this study focuses on one primary aspect of democracy—elections. V-Dem’s ‘Electoral democracy index’ captured this better than Polity’s ‘Polity’ or ‘Polity2’ measures, which attempt to give one score for the thick, multidimensional concept of democracy. However, the original models have low goodness-of-fit statistics and therefore I am exploring if this is due to the operationalization of the independent variable. Using Polity’s ‘Polity’ or ‘Polity2’ variables is well-established as a measure of regime within the literature, and it is for this reason that I am conducting a robustness test using this operationalization.

As previously discussed in the operationalization section, the downside of using the ‘Polity’ or ‘Polity2’ variables is that they are simplified, as they are the result of subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. Despite this drawback, these variables are convenient as they are a single value and are therefore commonly used in quantitative research (see Cunningham et al., 2017; Cunningham, 2013; Groshek & Christensen, 2017). ‘Polity2’ is a revised version of the ‘Polity’ variable, which ‘fixes’ some of the missing values by converting them to conventional ‘Polity’ scores in the range of –10 to +10, from completely autocratic to completely democratic (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2019: 16-17).

As illustrated in table 4, the independent variable does not reach statistical significance in the bivariate regression (model 8), just as in model 1 with the original operationalization. In the multivariate regression (model 9), all of the variables are statistically significant. Regime type has a negative relationship with lagged tactic type, meaning that as a regime becomes more democratic it uses more violent tactics as opposed to nonviolent. Each of the control variables
has a positive relationship with the dependent variable, which is the same result as in the original multivariate model 2. The AIC for model 9 is 389.8 and the pseudo $R^2$ statistic is 0.240, meaning that the model accounts for approximately 24% of the variation in the dependent variable. This is nearly the same as in model 2, where the AIC was 391.3 and the pseudo $R^2$ statistic was 0.235. In summary, the robustness test resulted in the same direction of relationships as the original operationalization using V-Dem, and the goodness-of-fit measures were very close. This demonstrates that the results are robust, meaning that the finding in opposition to the hypothesis is still accurate even though the independent variable was operationalized differently. This increases the trustworthiness of this finding. However, it is still important to consider the low goodness-of-fit measure when interpreting the results.

### Table 4. Robustness Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Lagged Tactic Type</th>
<th>Bivariate (8)</th>
<th>Multivariate (9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity2 (Regime Type)</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.082***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO Support</td>
<td>1.837***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP/cap</td>
<td>0.336**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Education</td>
<td>0.028**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.678***</td>
<td>-4.825***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(1.065)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>511</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-221.156</td>
<td>-189.916</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaike Inf. Crit.</td>
<td>446.312</td>
<td>389.832</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.00766</td>
<td>0.24038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Coefficients are in log-odds*

* $p<0.1$  ** $p<0.05$  *** $p<0.01$

### CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate what factors impact campaigns’ decisions in choosing to use violent or nonviolent tactics when engaging in political action outside of normal institutional channels. Previous literature resulted in theories based on cost-benefit analyses and
political opportunity structure but lacked cross-examination of violence and nonviolence. In response to this gap, this thesis included both aspects which resulted in the research question: *How does regime type affect the type of tactic (violent or nonviolent) used in unconventional politics?* The hypothesis was: *When unconventional politics occur, campaigns will be more likely to use nonviolent (as opposed to violent) tactics in more democratic regimes.* The theoretical argument behind this was that in democratic-leaning regimes, shifts in political alignments occur more often due to elections. This results in more opportunities for unconventional politics to occur, which in combination with the repression likely if violence is employed, should result in more use of nonviolent tactics. However, after conducting a logistic regression the results disconfirmed the hypothesis and actually supported the opposite finding that violent tactics are used more often (relative to nonviolent ones) in democratic-leaning regimes. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with caution as the goodness-of-fit measurements were low.

The preliminary findings of this thesis result in an interesting tension between democracy and violence. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights supports nonviolence by protecting the rights and freedoms that can be violated by acts of violence such as the rights to life and security, while also protecting democratic ideals (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948: 1, 6). The results of this study (although they should be interpreted cautiously) demonstrate that when people attempt to achieve political goals outside of normal institutional channels more violence – not less – is used as regimes become increasingly democratic. The fact that one of the human rights (democracy) we promote appears to cause a violation of another human right (nonviolence) is inherently problematic in terms of policy implications and needs to be further investigated.

In order to improve the trustworthiness of the preliminary findings of this thesis, additional research on the same topic should be conducted. Future research could still utilize the political opportunity structure theory to link the independent and dependent variables used in this study but theorize a different directional hypothesis. As discussed in the results section, it may be possible that the theory holds true for non-maximalist campaigns. Therefore, future research could test the same theory but on other types of cases. In addition, qualitative research needs to be conducted in order to investigate the accuracy of the causal mechanism, as quantitative work only establishes causal effects between the independent and dependent variables.
REFERENCE LIST


APPENDIX

To access the dataset and codebook used for this thesis (or the entire R script), please contact me at: annasvedin@yahoo.com