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The UN as a Peace Enforcer

A Quantitative Study on the Prospects of Chapter VII-missions

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1 Introduction

How effective are UN peacekeeping missions mandated under Chapter VII in reducing combat violence in internal armed conflicts? Since its beginning, peacekeeping has evolved significantly. While previously being tasked with maintaining the peace after a peace agreement, many missions are today deployed during conflicts. The task in these missions is to reduce conflict intensity and pave the way for a peace agreement. A simultaneous trend has emerged where the UN Security Council (UNSC) has authorized an increasing number of missions under Chapter VII (Ch.VII) of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping missions are either mandated under Chapter VII or Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Howard and Dayal 2018:74). Ch.VII enables the peacekeepers to use force to a greater extent, while missions mandated under Chapter VI are authorized to engage in mostly peaceful strategies. The use of force in mandate implementation comes in conflict with the three doctrinal principles of peacekeeping; non-use of force, impartiality and consent by the conflict parties (United Nations 2008:31). Given the stakes involved in peacekeeping, it is crucial to understand the effects of this important trend.

Several qualitative studies have questioned this turn towards increasingly robust missions. Howard (2019), Doyle and Sambanins (2006) and Karlsrud (2015) argue the theUN is unfit to use compellent force as a mean of power. They claim peacekeepers will be the most effective when using more peaceful strategies to reduce the negative consequences of civil conflicts. In this study, I will attempt to answer the question whether Ch.VII-missions can reduce the combat violence in civil wars, (measured by the number of battle-related deaths. There have been numerous quantitative studies devoted to peacekeeping effectiveness. Most of them have found UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) to be very effective in general. But none of these have taken into account the use of force in different missions and how it affects the peacekeepers' effectiveness. Ch.VI and Ch.VII-missions have often been grouped into one category. As described above, several studies have investigated the effects of the robust turn and Ch.VII-missions in case studies, those studies have all been qualitative in nature. The UN's general abilities to enforce peace using Ch.VII mandates remain unknown. This study aims to contribute to the peacekeeping literature by strictly examining the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions mandated under Ch.VII. At present, all complex UN peacekeeping missions are mandated under Ch.VII, which illustrate the need to assess their effectiveness (Howard 2015:7).

I will argue the mandate to use force gives the UN leverage to influence the conflict parties in escalated conflicts. A robust mandate signals that the UN is committed to intervene when conflict parties express violent behaviour. The more pacifistic pathways in which peacekeepers exercise influence over conflict parties do not become irrelevant when peacekeepers are authorized to use violence. Larger mission will be more effective, because they can increase the cost of not cooperating imposed on the conflict parties even further.

Using quantitative data on deaths related to combat and peacekeeping operations in African 1989-2018, I will examine how well Ch.VII-missions manage to decrease the level of combat violence. The findings presented in this study indicate that Ch.VII-missions can decrease the level of combat violence from very high levels to medium levels, but struggles to decrease them further. However, further studies are needed to draw conclusions regarding Ch.VII-missions' de-escalating effects. Mission-effectiveness is dependent on adequate troop and police contributions and a significant reduction in violence is only reached with large deployments of peacekeepers.

This study will continue as follows. The next section will outline the academic debate regarding peacekeeping effectiveness and the use of violence by UN troops. Then the theory and causal mechanism will be presented. The following section will present the method and research design. The penultimate section will present the findings and analysis. The last section will make conclusions regarding the findings and suggest avenues of future research.

2 The Use of Violence by Peacekeepers

2.1 Previous research

Several studies have examined the effect of peacekeepers on ongoing civil wars. Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014) found that UN PKOs manage to decrease the number of battle-related deaths in ongoing conflicts. Larger missions with an adequate number of troops are more effective at reducing the level of violence. Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) argue that peacekeepers significantly reduce civilian deaths in civil wars by separating the combatants, thus decreasing the incentives to target civilians, as well as increasing the cost of targeting civilians behind the frontlines. Beardsly and Gleditsch (2015) claim that

peacekeeping effectively reduces the geographical spread of conflict, by restricting rebel movement and hindering the government of targeting the rebels. They also found robust missions to be more effective at preventing conflict spread. Hegre, Hultman and Nygard (2019) examine the aggregated effects of peacekeeping on civil wars, by including all pathways in which peacekeeping have been found in previous literature to affect civil wars. They found that the most effective missions are larger, well-funded missions with significant troop contributions. They also found that multidimensional and peace enforcement missions to be more effective than traditional and observer missions (ibid. 223). This corroborate the findings by Doyle and Sambanis (2006), who found that robust, multidimensional missions are more effective than traditional or observation missions, because the former manage to compensate for deficiencies in local peace building capacities. They too found that peacekeeping effectiveness depends on the availability of adequate resources and that peacekeepers increase the likelihood of successful peacebuilding substantially.

All these articles agree on three important statements. Firstly, peacekeeping can effectively reduce the number of deaths in civil wars. Secondly, a PKO's effectiveness depends on troop contributions and resources available to the mission. Thirdly, multidimensional and robust missions are more effective than traditional and observation missions. These findings are unlikely to emerge because peacekeepers were sent to the easiest conflicts. On the contrary, Kathman and Wood (2016), Melander (2009) and Fortna (2008), all found that peacekeepers tend to be deployed in the most difficult cases. However, none of these articles have differentiated between the effectiveness of different mandates, or the effect of when peacekeepers resort to compellent force.

This comparison has become increasingly more important as a trend has emerged where the UN Security Council has authorized more missions under Ch.VII (Howard and Dayal 2018:74-76). Peacekeeping operations are either mandated under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VI authorizes the peacekeepers to engage in mostly peaceful activities to maintain peace, such as mediation, shaming, outreach and various material incentives. The use of force is only allowed in self-defence. Chapter VII on the other hand authorizes the peacekeepers to use force to fulfil its mandate. A common understanding regarding the difference between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement, is that the former can use violence on a tactical level, while the latter can use it on a strategic or operational level (Hunt 2017:109-112). Although the ability to use force is still considerably restricted, some Ch.VII-missions have still blurred the line between peacekeeping and peace

enforcement (Hunt 2017; Tull 2017). The turn towards increased authority to use force is attributed to conclusions made regarding previous failures of UN peacekeeping missions. It was argued that previous failures (primarily to protect civilians) were because the peacekeepers were too restricted to use force (Tull 2017:169-170). The trend has meant more peacekeeping operations are now authorized to use force than ever before (Howard 2015:7)

Moreover, certain Ch.VII mandates inevitably entail seeing some groups as legitimate and some as illegitimate (Tull 2017:179; Hunt 2017:109). When Ch.VII-missions are deployed in some ongoing conflicts where there is still no complete peace agreement, peacekeepers have been authorized to actively neutralize spoilers. Often, this means the peacekeepers side with the government, while explicitly targeting specific groups considered to be obstacle in the peace process. Some Ch.VII-missions go further than others regarding their use of compellent force and how they target particular groups (Hunt 2017:110-112). In the case of the peacekeeping missions of MONUSCO and Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the UN has outlined specific groups that were considered spoilers and authorized the peacekeepers to neutralize them (Karlsrud 2015:45).

The use of strategic force by peacekeepers is a contested issue, as it comes in conflict with the doctrinal principles of peacekeeping, which are non-use of violence (except in self-defense), impartiality and consent by the parties (Karlsrud 2015:42; Hunt 2017:109; Tull 2017:168; United Nations 2008:31). It is therefore important to examine whether the turn towards stabilization and peace enforcement is positive regarding peacekeeping effectiveness. There are currently two strands of research that study peacekeeping effectiveness. One quantitative that often finds multidimensional, robust missions to be most effective, emphasizing the security guarantees provided by the peacekeepers. The other is qualitative, which usually question the effectiveness of the strategic use of force. Although they are not fundamentally contradictive, there are still gaps between them.

2.2 The Scholarly debate

The effectiveness of increasingly robust peacekeeping very much depends on the pathways in which peacekeepers exercise power on the parties in the conflict. The findings outlined above argued peacekeeping effectiveness depends on adequate troop contributions and that multidimensional and robust missions are more effective than traditional missions. Hultman

Kathman and Shannon (2014:741-742) argue that peacekeepers reduce the level of violence in ongoing conflicts by mitigating commitment problems (thus decreasing the risks of pursuing a political solution) and increase the cost of using violence. The peacekeepers accomplish this by using two types of strategies. Firstly, peacekeepers often deploy themselves on the frontline in the conflict, thus physically separating the conflict parties. The cost of military advancement increases (because of the large audience cost associated with challenging UN barriers) and each party's vulnerability to surprise attacks and accidental engagements decreases. Central is the peacekeepers' ability to offer security guarantees to the parties, allowing the parties to overcome commitment problems often found in civil wars (ibid.:737). The peacekeepers can also provide battlefield information to the parties, decreasing the risk any side think it has a clear advantage (ibid.742-742).

Secondly, peacekeepers often pursue strategies to disarm the parties, which decreases the parties' ability to gain an advantage using force. According to Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014), these mechanisms are contingent upon adequate number of troops, as larger missions can create more effective buffer zones and provide more battlefield information. Observer missions did not manage to decrease the number of deaths as effectively. Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) found that the same mechanism enables the peacekeepers to reduce the targeting of civilians in civil wars. By separating the combatants, peacekeepers decrease the incentives to target civilians, while also increasing the cost of targeting civilians behind the frontlines. As in their other article, they find that mission effectiveness depends on number of personnel deployed. With this in mind, it would seem plausible that an increased mandate to use force would enable the peacekeepers to reduce battle-related deaths more effectively. When using force strategically, the peacekeepers could increase the cost of non-cooperation even further, seek out and respond to threats to civilians and forcibly separate parties if necessary.

Conversely, some scholars argue peacekeepers neither can nor should use force strategically. Karlsrud (2015) argue Ch.VII-missions bring with them increased vulnerabilities of UN peacekeepers and civilian staff. While looking at the case of the Force Intervention Brigade (part of MONUSCO) in the DRC, Tull (2017:179-180) claims the mandate to use force to stabilize the country and target particular rebel groups undermined state building in the DRC (ibid.;179-180). Howard (2019) questions whether peacekeepers have the capacity or the resolve to exercise any significant military power. Despite having achieved considerable success in many armed conflicts, the UN's own studies show peacekeepers only

occasionally use their weapons when they confront violent groups (ibid.14). Instead of relying on their military power, Howard (2017) argues peacekeepers effectively exercise power in three main pathways. Firstly, through persuasion, which is a non-material, non-coercive way of trying to change the behaviour of others (ibid..36-46). In Namibia and the Central African Republic (CAR), she found that the UN effectively persuaded the parties through the use of mediation, shaming, civilian outreach, symbolic displays and training (ibid.32-34). The second way is through inducement, which is a material way of changing others' behaviour. For peacekeepers, this usually mean trying to exercise power through "providing and withholding material incentives" (ibid.:92), in the form of projects, trust funds (often in the form of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration DDR), market restrictions and reforming state institutions. Thirdly, through coercion, but not in a compellent or offensive form (ibid.:129). She argues peacekeepers can successfully use four types of coercion. One of them is deterrence, which prevents attacks on peacekeepers themselves, civilians and other conflict parties (ibid.:138). But Howard claims deterrence does not come from peacekeepers' ability to inflict substantial harm to any attacker, but through the threat of shame and exclusion from political and economic processes (i.e. through inducement and persuasion). Peacekeepers can also use defence of themselves and of civilians, as well as surveillance and sometimes arrests (ibid.:141-143).

Notably, Howard (ibid.:129-137) argues peacekeepers cannot use compellent force. This is because of the composition of a UN PKO makes it unable to wield force effectively. This argument is corroborated by Doyle and Sambanis (2016). Like Howard (2019), they argue UN forces are fundamentally incapable of fighting as a coherent unit, thereby unable to use force strategically (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:184-18). They highlight that PKOs lack a clear command structure and reliable battlefield intelligence. A UN PKO is made up of troops from a great number of countries. This provides the mission with legitimacy and facilitates consent by the parties (Howard 2019:129-130). But it also renders them ineffective at functioning as a coherent force as peacekeepers have little or no experience of training together. Together, these factors render peacekeepers unable to use compellent force to change the behaviour of others, according to Howard (2019) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

When peacekeepers use compellent force, Howard (ibid.) also argues the pathways in which the UN have proven to be effective become severely undermined. For persuasion to be effective, it is important that the peacekeepers convey a clear and coherent

message and that they possess deep understanding of the conflict parties. This increases the likelihood the message will be received. A relationship of respect is therefore crucial, otherwise the peacekeepers will struggle to be heard. It is also important that the message put forward is not contradicted by the peacekeepers' own actions. However, when the mandate to use violence expand, Howard (ibid.) argues the peacekeepers ability to convey messages is undermined. Confusion emerges about the UN's role as an impartial actor. It will be more difficult to establish a relationship with the peacekept and the UN's message of solving conflicts peacefully clash when they use compellent force on specific groups (ibid.: 187).

2.3 Theoretical Argument

The claim made by Howard (2019) that peacekeepers can only exercise deterrence mainly through non-violent means is somewhat contradicted by Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014). As mentioned earlier, they found observer and traditional missions were not at all as effective as multidimensional and robust missions. If peacekeepers exercise deterrence and persuasion mainly through non-violent means, then observer missions and traditional missions could theoretically also exercise some of this ability. Howard does not address why observer and traditional missions would lack the effectiveness of multidimensional missions. Granted, multidimensional missions take on other tasks that could influence the course of conflicts not taken on by traditional missions. But as Howard claims the main pathways used by peacekeepers are persuasion and coercion, traditional missions should arguably be able to achieve similar results when it comes to conflict de-escalation. Neither does she address the causal mechanism behind the findings that larger troop contributions manage to exercise more power on the parties. The importance of large troop contributions for de-escalating the conflict, combined with the limited effectiveness of traditional and observer missions, suggest that coercive power matters. Hultman, Kathman and Shanon (2014:747) argue the inability of UN observers to affect the conflict stem from their weak position to offer security guarantees and increase the cost of using violence.

Moreover, the number of Ch.VI missions have decreased significantly since 2011, in favour of Ch.VII (Howard and Dayal 2018). Howard mentions several conflicts where the UN managed to achieve great results with a Ch.VI mandate. But as the number of Ch.VII-missions have increased, the authorization of PKOs by the UNSC has also changed. Hunt (2017:108) claims that "UN peace operations are larger and more ambitious, deployed

to more hostile and complex conflict environments, than at any time in their history". It is therefore not given that Ch.VI missions are more effective based the comparison between Ch.VI and Ch.VII-missions. Howard (2019) does not address whether the tactics used by the peacekeepers of UNTAG in Namibia would achieve similar results if used by MINUSMA in Mali. This fact makes it problematic to compare missions with a Ch.VI mandate to one with a Ch.VII mandate, as they are often deployed in different contexts during different times.

On the other hand, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013), Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014), as well as Beardsly and Gleditsch (2015) do not address to what extent peacekeepers can wield force as a mean of power. The argument that peacekeepers exercise power through the security guarantee rests on the assumption that the peacekeepers should be able to wield some force effectively. Both Howard (2019) as well as Doyle and Sambanis (2006) proposed convincing arguments why the UN's ability to use compellent force would be limited. Moreover, the UN's own studies found that peacekeepers rarely used their weapons when confronting rebels. At least, this suggest peacekeepers have the ability to exert power in ways other than the use of force or threat of the same.

I argue that the mandate to use force gives the UN leverage to influence the conflict parties in escalated conflicts. The use of force as a mean of power does not necessitate the capability to match the conflict parties' military power, as Howard (2019:14) argues. The peacekeepers can still provide security guarantees despite not having significant military capabilities. Simply being able to inflict some damage might be enough, combined with the political cost that is involved when conflict parties come in direct conflict with UN peacekeepers. As the uncooperative party would have to fire back on the peacekeepers, they might rethink the decision to challenge the UN, if the peacekeepers have the mandate to engage militarily. Therefore, a mandate to use violence can allow the UN to send stronger signals to the conflict parties. If the peacekeepers do not have the authority to use force in these situations, then the conflict parties might think that acting uncooperatively carries no risks, since the peacekeepers will not intervene, and the parties can therefore avoid targeting UN troops. Conversely, when the UN have a mandate to use violence, they can give credible signals that the use of violence and working against the UN will carry consequences. Hultman, Kathman and Shanon (2014:743) argue the use of signals by the UN is an important tool for affecting the conflict. These signals tell the parties that they will not be able to avoid coming in direct conflict with the UN. In other words, even with limited military capacity, peacekeepers could still make use of their military power.

When the peacekeepers resort to violence, some of their peaceful strategies, such as mediation, civilian outreach, training and DDR-projects will be less effective. But I argue their role as an international organisation will not be weakened to the point that it is completely meaningless, and the less coercive pathways peacekeepers use can still be effective in Ch.VII-missions. Some parties in the conflict might still cooperate with the UN, so the peacekeepers retain some of their influence there. If the UN still manages to make some parties in the conflict recede violence, then the overall level of conflict might decrease enough to have a large impact on the overall level of violence. Even if the UN does not manage to end violence completely, the level of violence might still decrease because the parties now have incentives for pursuing peaceful strategies. The UN's unique position remains and being seen favourably by the world community still carries significant advantages. The first hypothesis will therefore be:

H1: Conflicts where UN peacekeeping missions authorized under Ch.VII are present will have lower levels of combat violence compared to conflicts without a peacekeeping mission.

If Ch.VII mandates are counterproductive, then they would fail to reduce the level of combat violence. The peacekeepers' effectiveness still depends on larger troop contributions, as they are able to patrol more and create buffer zones between the parties. The stronger the UN's presence, the larger the cost imposed on the parties. Their large presence sends a clear signal to the conflict parties that any transgression will be observed and punished. The peacekeepers' deterrent effect increases, as the threat of a significant military response by the UN is greater. The deterrent effect does not only prevent transgression, but also decreases the security dilemma, since surprise attacks are less likely. The second hypothesis will therefore be:

H2: Conflicts where larger Ch.VII-missions are deployed will have lower levels of combat violence than conflicts with smaller Ch.VII-missions.

2.4 Definitions

A Ch.VII-mission will be defined as a peacekeeping operation where the peacekeepers are authorized to use force when implementing the mandate. This type of mission is also authorized to use peaceful strategies as well. But the use of force is not limited to self-defence. Conversely, a Ch.VI mission will be defined as a peacekeeping operation where the use of force is strictly circumscribed to self-defence and defence of civilians in the peacekeepers' absolute vicinity. UN peacekeeping operations are not the only operations authorized under Ch.VII. Since this study is only concerned with peacekeeping conducted by the UN, a Ch.VII-mission will be defined as an operation conducted by the UN under the UN flag. Combat violence will be defined as deaths occurring as a result of armed engagements between two conflict parties. Civilian deaths in the form of collateral damage is included, but not the purposeful targeting of civilians.

3 Research Design

For answering *H1*, I will investigate how well Ch.VII-missions manage to decrease combat violence in internal armed conflicts. The independent variable will be a dichotomous variable measuring the presence of a Ch.VII peacekeeping operation. The dependent variable will be the level combat violence, operationalized as the number of battle-related deaths. For answering *H2*, I will investigate how the number of troops deployed in the mission will affect the level of combat violence. Here, I will compare Ch.VII against each other, as well as all conflicts with or without peacekeepers, based on number of personnel deployed. The independent variable will be the number of personnel deployed to each conflict. The dependent variable will be the level combat violence, operationalized as the number of battle-related deaths.

3.1 Scope Conditions and Case Selection

The proposed theory primarily concerns peacekeeping missions conducted by the United Nations. The UN has a unique role in that they represent nearly every country in the world, meaning they enjoy a unique form of legitimacy. Howard (2019) argues the strength and

weaknesses of UN peacekeepers to a large extent stem from the UN's unique position as a worldwide organisation. Other organisations have also taken on peacekeeping missions, but these organisations might have different forms of legitimacy. Regarding regional organisations, they might also be more homogenous in terms of troop deployment, thus increasing their ability to use compellent force.

The time period of the study will range from 1989-2018. It will begin in 1989 because this is the first year with detailed data on battle-related deaths. When investigating the effect of the number of troops, the time period will be 1991-2018, since the data on troop contributions are available for these years. To increase comparability between the cases, I will only look at African conflicts. This continent has seen numerous PKOs during this period, many of them in difficult contexts (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014:744).

3.2 Method

To examine the effect of different mandates, the study will examine all intrastate conflict-dyads in Africa 1989-2018 (1991-2018 when examining the number of personnel deployed). The study will compare the number of battle-related deaths per year on the dyad level. Each dyad will consist of a government and a rebel group. This study will use the ordinary-least squared regression to analyse the data (Kellstedt and Whiten 2013:171-191). The median for battle-related deaths per dyad and year is calculated to 136, while the mean is 612. The large difference between the median and the mean indicate that this variable is positively skewed. To mitigate problems arising from the skewed nature of these variables, they will be log-transformed (*ln*) (Johnson and Reynold 2005:443). For positively skewed variables that have a more exponential than linear dependency, log-transforming them allows them to be analysed with a linear model. When log-transforming data, the ordinary least squared-method can therefore still give sufficiently valid results. I will also compare log-transformed variables to variables measured in its original form to analyse what the results suggest. The dyads will be identified using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dyadic dataset (Pettersson, Högbladh and Öberg 2019). The standard deviation for battle-related deaths is calculated to 1955, which is much higher than the mean (612) and the median (136), indicating the variable is over-dispersed (UCLA Statistical Consulting 2020a). One possible method of comparison when variables are positively skewed would be negative binominal regression (ibid.).

However, that method produces results which can be complicated to interpret, and that method is therefore beyond the scope of this study. The dataset registers a conflict as active when the number of battle-related deaths exceed 25 in one calendar year (Pettersson 2019a). In some countries, several dyads will be active simultaneously. In those cases where a peacekeeping operation has been deployed to only one part of the country, only dyads active in that region will be counted as having a peacekeeping mission. For some operations, the mandate changes during the deployment from Ch.VI to Ch.VII. This will be acknowledged in the study.

3.3 The Variables

3.3.1 The Independent Variable – Ch.VII-missions and Their Composition

The study will use six models. The models are their variables are summarized in *Table 1*. The independent variable in *Model 1* and *2* will be the presence of a Ch.VII peacekeeping mission. This will be a categorical variable with two categories; Ch.VII-mission, and no mission. Although the UN Charter does not mention peacekeeping specifically, every peacekeeping mission is mandated under either Ch.VI or Ch.VII (Howard and Dayal 2018:74). A Ch.VII-mission will be operationalized as a mission with a mandate that explicitly mentions Chapter VII. Peacekeeping operations are not the only operations mandated under Chapter VII. Since this study only concern peacekeeping, I define Ch.VII-missions as only concerning peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN. Operations such as the UN-authorized intervention in Afghanistan 2001 will therefore be excluded (Security Council resolution 1386, 2001). Ch.VII-missions will be identified using the data compiled by Howard and Dayal (2018).

In *Model 3*, *Model 4* and *Model 5*, the independent variable will be the number of troops deployed in each mission. These models will compare Ch.VII-missions to each other. Three independent variables will be used; the number of troops, the number of police and the total number of personnel deployed (troops, police and observers, excluding civilian personnel). They will all be continuous variables. When log-transforming the independent variables in *Model 3,4* and *5*, the results were statistically significant, but not when they were analysed in their original measurement. This indicates the relationship is elastic, and *Model 3,4* and *5* will therefore have log-transformed independent variables (UCLA Statistical

Consulting Group 2020b). Data for the number of personnel deployed will be derived from the *Peacekeeping Dataset*, created by the International Peace Institute (2020), which contains monthly data on the number of peacekeepers deployed in each mission. Since the last entry was for October 2018, and the other datasets are in year format, each observation of this variable will be from October each year. In *Model 6*, the impact of UN personnel on battle-related deaths will be examined on all conflicts investigated in *Model 1* and *2*. Here, neither the dependent or independent variable will be log-transformed.

3.3.2 The Dependent Variable – Battle-Related Deaths

The dependent variable will be the level of combat violence, operationalized as battle-related deaths. This will be a continuous variable. *Model 2,3* and *5* will use the log-transformed version of the dependent variable since the data is positively skewed, as explained above. For *Model 1* and *6*, this variable will be analysed in its original form. The study will measure the number of battle-related deaths per calendar year in each dyad. The data will be sourced from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) dataset on battle-related deaths (Pettersson, Högbladh and Öberg 2019). This dataset operationalizes battle-related deaths as fatalities resulting from combat between two parties where at least one is a government (Pettersson 2019b). The study will thus use the operational definition of the UCDP-dataset. The dataset counts civilian deaths from collateral damage as battle-related but excludes the intentional killing of civilians. There will have to be at least 25 deaths in a year for the conflict to be included in the dataset. The dataset includes a high estimate, low estimate and best estimate of battle-related deaths (ibid.). The best estimate is an aggregated number based on the most reliable sources. This study will use best estimate number.

Table 1. Presentation of the Models and Their Variables

	Independent variable	*Dependent variable*
Model 1	Ch.VII-mission/no mission	Battle-related deaths
Model 2	Ch.VII-mission/no mission	*ln*(Battle-related deaths)
Model 3	*ln*(Number of troops)	*ln*(Battle-related deaths)
Model 4	*ln*(Number of police)	*ln*(Battle-related deaths)
Model 5	*ln*(Total number of personnel)	*ln*(Battle-related deaths)
Model 6	Total number of personnel	Battle-related deaths

3.4 Validity, Reliability and Source Bias

The independent and dependent variables are reliable ways of measuring the concepts of interest. Since peacekeeping operations are either mandated under Chapter VII or Chapter VI, this operationalization will be able to distinguish the mandate of each case. The same applies for the number of troops, as the UN differentiates between troops, police and observer deployments. Even though the number of deaths in conflicts can be difficult to establish, the data from the UCDP battle-related deaths-dataset is deemed to have sufficiently reliable information. As this study is interested in patterns on the large scale, the exact number of deaths is of less concern to the analysis than the comparison between the cases. The operational definition used by the UCDP battle-related death-dataset reduces the risk that different measurements are applied to different conflicts (Pettersson 2019b). It is more important to have a reliable operationalization that measures each case the same, rather than an operationalization that tries to capture the exact number, and accidentally include deaths in some cases that were not supposed to be counted (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013:100). The UCDP's best estimate number used in this study is likely a conservative estimate and sometimes may fall short of the actual number, but it is more reliable.

Regarding validity there are some points to consider. The mandate to use violence does not necessarily mean every Ch.VII actually uses compellent force on the ground. Some Ch.VII-missions use more violence than others. It would therefore be a possibility to divide this variable in more categories to better capture the actual use of violence. However, there might be an inherent bias problem in such operationalization. Ch.VII-missions that use more violence than others are likely to do so because they are deployed in more escalated conflicts. The difference in the use of violence might have less to do with difference in the mandate, and more to do with the context in which the operation is deployed. Dividing this category based on actual use of violence is thus problematic. Moreover, in this thesis, I am interested in the type of mandate and how it affects peacekeeping effectiveness. Consequently, this is deemed to be a valid way of operationalizing this variable (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013:101-102).

For the dependent variable, it is important to acknowledge that limiting the number of battle-related deaths in a conflict is just one, albeit important way, of measuring peacekeeping effectiveness. The UCDP battle-related deaths dataset does not include deaths resulting from combat between non-state groups. In some conflicts, this type of violence might be very prominent. Another important task for peacekeepers is to reduce purposeful targeting and killing of civilians, which is not included either in the UCDP battle-related deaths dataset. There are also other important ways of measuring peacekeeping effectiveness, such as the ability to end conflicts, which is not included here either. Since deaths related to combat are often central in conflicts, this measurement is chosen to measure the UN's ability to reduce violence (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014:744).

When measuring the number of deaths in conflicts, it is important to consider potential source biases, as there are often strong interests to both underestimate and overestimate the number of deaths. The sources used in the UCDP battle-related deaths dataset are analysed using consistent and predetermined steps in order to minimize biases (Pettersson 2019b). Information is derived from global news wires, global news monitoring and local news translated by the BBC and secondary sources in the form of NGO/IGO-reports, local news reporting and books. The different sources are triangulated and corroborated in order to ensure the best estimate.

3.5 Control Variables

To isolate the effect of the peacekeepers, it is important to control for factors other than battle-related deaths that might affect the level of violence. In their study, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014:745) controlled for if a peace agreement was in place. Even if the peacekeepers deploy in the midst of conflict, there might still be a correlation between a PKO and a peace agreement. An agreement might indicate the conflict parties have already expressed a willingness to solve the conflict through a political solution. If there is a correlation between peacekeeping operations and cease fire-agreements, then the peacekeepers effect on the civil war violence might be spurious. Although Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014:748) found that cease fire-agreement had little effect on the level of violence, since this study has a different comparison, it is arguably still important to control for this variable. The variable *cease fire agreement* will be coded as dichotomous, and data will be derived from the UCDP peace agreement dataset (Pettersson, Högbladh and Öberg 2019).

Another important variable to consider is the presence of foreign intervention in support for any of the conflict parties. Citing Thyne (2009), Regan (2000) and Walter (2002), Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014:745) argue biased interventions by third parties in civil wars have been found to both increase and decrease the level of violence. Moreover, third party interventions have also been found to shorten conflict, but also decrease the likelihood of a negotiated settlement (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008). In other words, third party interventions are likely to have a significant impact on the conflict. There is also a possibility that biased, third party interventions are in some way correlated with UN missions. To control for this, the dichotomous variable *biased third party intervention* will be used. Information on third party interventions will be sourced from the UCDP battle-related deaths dataset (Pettersson, Högbladh and Öberg 2019).

Lastly, population is a variable that also needs to be controlled for (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014:745). Fearon and Laitin (2003) found large populations were both correlated with higher likelihood of conflict and more battlefield violence. therefore, the variable *population* will be used, which will be the log-transformed (ln) population of the country in which the conflict takes place. Data for this variable will be sourced from data from the World Bank (2019).

4 Results

The regression measuring the difference between dyads with a Ch.VII-mission and dyads with no UN mission is presented in *Table 2*. *Models 1* and *2* are identical except in their measurement of battle-related deaths. In *Model 1*, the dependent variable is measured in its original measurement, while in *Model 2* it is log-transformed. The results show that the beta coefficient for the independent variable *Ch.VII-mission,* is statistically significant in *Model* 1 at a 95 % confidence level. In *Model* 2 it is not statistically significant.

Table 2. OLS-regression of the Effect of Ch.VII-missions Compared to No Mission in African Conflict Dyads 1989-2018

	Dependent variable:	
	Battle-related deaths (standard error)	*ln*(Battle-related deaths) (standard error)
	Model 1	Model 2
Ch.VII-mission	-379.605**	-0.090
	(206.019)	(0.157)
Biased intervention	140.371	0.751***
	(195.931)	(0.149)
Cease-fire agreement	-108.245	0.100
	(221.673)	(0.169)
ln(Populations)	147.890*	0.047
	(79.146)	(0.060)
Constant	-1,790.128	4.184***
	(1,330.382)	(1.015)
Observations	554	554
R^2	0.014	0.045
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.038
Residual Std. Error (df = 549)	1,906.353	1.454
F Statistic (df = 4; 549)	2.018*	6.425***
Note: The regression was made in R Studio.	Statistical significance: * p>0.1; ** p>0.05; *** p>0.01	

The coefficient for the *Ch.VII-variable* in *Model 1* is negative, and large. The average dyad with a Ch.VII-mission deployed has 380 less battle-related deaths per year. This is a significant reduction, considering the median number of deaths was 136 and the mean was 612. These findings suggest that Ch.VII-missions are effective at reducing the number of battle-related deaths in civil wars. The beta coefficient in *Model 2* is much smaller. When the dependent variable is log-transformed, the change in the dependent variable's original measurement is calculated by exponentiating the coefficient, subtracting one and multiplying by 100 (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group 2020b). This will give $(e^{-0,09} - 1)x100 =$

−8.606 meaning a Ch.VII PKO reduces battle-related deaths by an average of 8,6 % per year. The large beta coefficient in *Model 1* is to a certain extent a result of some very deadly conflicts. This great disparity is likely due to that several conflicts with no UN Mission have been very deadly, whereas fewer conflicts with a Ch.VII-missions escalated so seriously. This suggest Ch.VII can affect the violence in civil wars, by keeping the deadly violence to lower levels. *Figure 1* shows a boxplot of *battle-related deaths* in its original measurement. *Figure 2* shows the same boxplot, but the *battle-related deaths* variable has been log-transformed.

Figure 1. Distribution of dyads based on battle-related deaths (not log-transformed.)



Figure 2. Distribution of dyads based on battle-related deaths (log-transformed).



Figure 1 shows several outliers in the *No UN missions* category, while the *Ch.VII-missions* have much fewer outliers and with fewer deaths. In *Figure 2*, log-transforming the dependent variable meant the impact of the outliers has been greatly reduced. The mean number of deaths for both categories in *Model* 2 are very similar. This would explain why the beta coefficients in M*odel 1* and *Model 2* are so different. As the large beta coefficients in *Model 1* to a large extent is a result of the outliers, the average effect of a peacekeeping operation mandated under Chapter VII is likely to be closer to the beta coefficient in *Model 2*.

However, the lack of outliers in conflicts with a Ch.VII-mission is noteworthy. Despite being deployed in very difficult conflicts, no dyad in this category escalated in ways that several conflicts in the *No missions* category did. *Figure 2* shows both the 75th percentile and the maximum value in the *Ch.VII* category are lower than the *No mission* category. This would suggest that Ch.VII-missions, despite being deployed in very difficult conflicts, can prevent these dyads from drastically escalating and becoming extremely deadly. However, further studies need to be made regarding this effect in order to draw conclusions.

Moreover, there are reasons to think the beta coefficient in *Model 2* underestimates the effect of Ch.VII-missions. Firstly, several studies found that peacekeepers tend to be sent to the most difficult conflicts (Kathman and Wood 2016, Melander 2009 and Fortna 2008). Assuming those findings are correct, this design compares difficult cases with peacekeeping missions to overall easier conflicts without peacekeeping missions. This bias might have become even more pronounced in recent years, as the UN have begun to deploy in increasingly hostile conflicts. Currently the UN PKOs are deployed in very difficult conflicts in Africa; MINUSMA in Mali, MONUSCO in the DRC, MINUSCA in the CAR, UNMISS in South Sudan and UNAMID in Darfur. The findings in *Model 2*, suggesting the number of deaths in conflicts with Ch.VII-missions are lower than others, are therefore significant. Secondly, this model only measures active dyads. This means dyads where the number of battle-related deaths is less than 25 or where violence has ceased completely are omitted. This means that if the UN manage to decrease the violence to under 25, this will not show up in the model. There are reasons to think this might have been the case in some instances. An example of this would be UNOCI, a Ch.VII-mission deployed to Côte d'Ivoire 2004-2017. Only 2004, 2005 and 2011 saw more than 25 battle-related deaths, meaning the conflict was inactive the remaining years. But only year 2004, 2005 and 2011 are included in the data.

However, the beta coefficient in *Model 2* is not statistically significant, and the standard of error is larger than the coefficient. This suggest there is a great variation in the number of battle-related deaths that this variable cannot explain. The control variables measuring population and cease-fire agreements do not manage to capture the variation either. Neither of them is statistically significant. The goodness-of-fit for *Models 1* and *2* are low (indicated by low numbers of adjusted R^2), meaning the variables did not manage to explain the great variation in civil war violence very well. The variable measuring biased, third party intervention is statistically significant and positive. The effect is large as well, meaning biased interventions greatly affect the level of violence in civil wars. On average, a biased foreign intervention into a civil conflict would increase the number of battle-related deaths by 111 per dyad/year. Considering the median dyad saw 136 deaths per year, this is a dramatic increase.

Conclusively, this study finds some evidence supporting the proposed theory that Ch.VII reduces the number of deaths in civil conflicts. The findings suggest the average number of deaths in dyads with a Ch.VII-missions are similar if not slightly lower than those without a UN mission. Ch.VII-missions are not able to decrease battle-related deaths to a level well below medium levels of violence. Assuming UN peacekeeping missions are sent to the most difficult conflicts, this is still a significant result. This would imply Ch.VI-missions can maintain the level of violence in difficult conflicts at medium levels. By creating buffer zones in the conflicts, UN troops prevent difficult conflicts from escalating and the level of violence remain comparatively low. No conflict with a Ch.VII-mission deployed escalated dramatically. This suggest the peacekeepers manage to influence the course of the conflict and prevent spiralling violence by increasing the cost of using violence and reducing the parties' vulnerabilities. By having a mandate to use violence, the UN sends a signal that they will intervene when the conflict parties become a threat to security. Based on the result, it is however difficult to discern how much they reduce the number of deaths. There seems to be a great variation in the number of battle-related deaths which neither of the variables included managed to explain. Further studies are needed to draw conclusions regarding Ch.VII-missions' de-escalating effects.

Table 3 show the regression for the comparison between Ch.VII-missions based on the number of personnel deployed. In *Model 2* through *4*, both the independent and dependent variable are log-transformed. Such a design proved to give the most statistically significant result, suggesting the relationship between the number of personnel deployed and battle-related deaths is elastic in nature (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group 2020b).

Table 3. OLS-regression of the Effect of Number of Personnel deployed in Ch.VII-missions in Africa 1991-2018

	Dependent variable:			
	ln(Battle-related deaths) (standard error)			Battle-related deaths (standard error)
	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
ln(Troops)	-0.228**			
	(0.098)			
*ln(*Police)		-0.051		
		(0.039)		
*ln(*Total)			-0.288**	
			(0.145)	
Total				-0.026**
				(0.014)
Biased intervention	-0.009	0.178	0.032	116.841
	(0.294)	(0.284)	(0.294)	(196.081)
Cease-fire agreement	0.729**	0.619**	0.760**	-120.735
	(0.288)	(0.301)	(0.291)	(220.422)
Population (ln)	0.203	0.190	0.237	157.608*
	(0.144)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(80.386)
Constant	3.510	1.943	3.515	-1,955.917
	(2.431)	(2.563)	(2.453)	(1,349.202)
Observations	106	106	106	554
R^2	0.109	0.078	0.097	0.015
Adjusted R^2	0.074	0.041	0.062	0.007
Residual Std. Error	1.185 (df = 101)	1.206 (df = 101)	1.193 (df = 101)	1,906.322 (df = 549)
F Statistic	3.102** (df = 4; 101)	2.124* (df = 4; 101)	2.723** (df = 4; 101)	2.023* (df = 4; 549)

Note: The regression was made in R Studio.

Statistical significance: * p>0.1; ** p>0.05; *** p>0.01

Model 3 shows the number of troops being negatively correlated with the number of battle-related deaths. When both variables are log-transformed, the coefficient is interpreted as a 1 % increase in the independent variable will result in the coefficient change in percent in the dependent variable (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group 2020b). To reduce the number of deaths in a dyad with 50 % would thus require $\frac{50}{0.228} = 219\%$ increase in the number of troops, in other words a doubling of the mission size. This variable is statistically significant at the 95 % confidence level and the standard of error is smaller than the coefficient. This would imply a strong correlation between the number of troops and reduction in violence. In *Model 4*, the number of police deployed is also negatively correlated with the number of deaths. But the coefficient is not statistically significant, and it is also much smaller than in *Model 2*.

In *Model 5*, the total number of troops and police are investigated. This also shows a negative relationship, with a larger coefficient than *Model 2*, also statistically significant at the 95 % confidence level. To reduce the number of deaths by 50 % in a dyad would thus require $\frac{50}{0.288} = 173.6$ % increase in the number of troops and police deployed. This is a significant finding suggesting that there is a strong correlation between the number of personnel deployed. These findings also indicate several UN PKOs are understaffed and the UN would achieve greater results if more troops were deployed. There are also several important findings considering the composition of the mission. On their own, police officers have little impact on the number of deaths. But the regression also shows they are an important complement to peacekeeping troops, as the model comparing the total number of troops and police showed the strongest reduction in the number of deaths.

It is important to note that a significant reduction in battle-related deaths require a considerable increase in the number of troops. The elastic nature of the relationship between personnel and battle-related deaths suggest Ch.VII-missions need substantial troop deployments in order to have a decisive impact. Reducing the number of deaths by half required a 173 % increase in personnel. One possible explanation for this is that the UN troops can rely less on peaceful forms of power, such as inducement and persuasion. Instead they have to rely on their physical size and military power. This suggest that successfully upholding buffer-zones is necessary to substantially reduce the violence. More troops mean the UN can create and enforce more effective buffer-zones and effectively separate the parties. Larger troop and police contributions also enable the UN to give more powerful signals and increase the cost of

uncooperative behaviour. In these models, the goodness-of-fit is low as well, indicating the number of battle-related deaths varies greatly in a way the included variables are unable to explain. The *Biased intervention* variable have a smaller effect in *Model 3-5* than in *Model 2*. Two possible explanations for this are either that UN peacekeeping mitigates the negative effects of biased, third party interventions, or that these types of interventions are seldomly deployed in the same conflicts as UN peacekeepers. The *Population* is not strongly correlated with the number of deaths either. Noteworthy is that the *Cease-fire agreement* variable showed a strong positive correlation with the number of deaths in all models. The reason behind this might be that cease-fire agreements are mainly signed in deadly conflicts, while lesser conflicts rarely see them. Regardless, this indicate ceasefire agreements are very ineffective at reducing violence.

As a robustness test, a comparison is made using the total number of personnel deployed in *Model 6*. Here all conflicts are included and neither variables are log-transformed. Conflicts without a peacekeeping operation are counted as having 0 personnel deployed. This model produced a statistically significant beta coefficient of -0.026, meaning one peacekeeper reduces the number of deaths by -0.026. A peacekeeping mission with 10,000 personnel deployed reduce the number of deaths by 260. This can be compared to the median dyad that saw 136 deaths, with the mean dyad leading to 612 deaths. Not log-transforming the variable meant the relationship largely disappeared, although the beta coefficient remained negative. Since log-transforming the variables greatly reduced the impact of the deadly outliers in the *No UN Mission* category, this is not surprising. This suggest peacekeepers are able to decrease the number of deaths from very high levels to medium levels but are not able to decrease them further. This corroborate the finding in *Model 1* through *5*.

4.1 Analysis

To summarize, Ch.VII-missions reduce the number of deaths in conflicts. Conflicts with Ch.VII-missions did not escalate drastically, but the peacekeepers struggle to decrease the number of deaths well below medium levels. To assess the effectiveness of Ch.VII-missions, it is important to situate the findings in this study to those found in other studies. Compared to the findings presented by Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014), these numbers can appear mediocre. They investigated the relationship between personnel deployed and battle-related

deaths. They found that a troop deployment of 10,000 would reduce the number of battle-related deaths by 73 %, from 264 without a peacekeeping mission down to 72. There are three things two note here. Firstly, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon did not differentiate between Ch.VI and Ch.VII-missions. If Ch.VII-missions have been sent to increasingly difficult conflicts (Hunt 2017:108), it is not surprising that the effect of troops deployment is lower when looking at Ch.VII exclusively. Secondly, they investigated the relationship between peacekeepers and deaths with monthly observations. The number of troops deployed can vary over the year. By investigating the relationship on a monthly basis, the authors managed to better capture the effect of peacekeepers. Thirdly, they also accounted for years when the number of deaths decreased below 25. This showed any de-escalation effect produced by the peacekeepers. Not accounting for monthly differences in troop deployments or dyads with less than 25 deaths per year could mean this study underestimate the effect of Ch.VII-missions. These design choices were beyond the scope of this study. Additionally, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon used negative binominal regression to account for the large standard deviation in battle-related death, a method that is more suited to over-dispersed variables than ordinary-least squared.

However, the lesser effects found in this study might and probably do reflect actual smaller effect on conflicts by Ch.VII-missions. To a certain extent, this might be a result of Ch.VII-missions are deployed in more difficult conflicts than Ch.VI missions were deployed to during the period 1990-2010 (Hunt 2017:108). It might also be because the UN struggles to affect these difficult conflicts. Even though Ch.VII-missions limit violence in civil wars, the UN can still be more effective when using more pacifistic strategies. Based on the findings in this study, it is difficult to conclude whether the UN would achieve more by doing less. It would have been doable to compare the number of deaths between Ch.VI and Ch.VII-missions. However, the different contexts into which these types of missions were sent to makes such a comparison difficult, and the result would have likely been spurious. More research should be devoted to examining to which types of conflicts Ch.VII-missions and Ch.VI missions are sent to.

It is possible that the effectiveness of Ch.VI missions depends on the willingness of the conflict parties to be included in the peace process and that they care about their international legitimacy. In these cases, the peacekeepers can use the actors will to appear legitimate as leverage. In conflicts where the parties express willingness to cooperate, the use of violence is arguably not at all necessary. In certain conflicts however, some parties might be

more or less immune to persuasion, inducement and milder forms of coercion. Should UN troops respond with limited forms of coercion combined with persuasion and inducement, or should they take a clear stance against those parties? Recognition by the international community might not be a prioritised goal of the conflict parties. The level of conflict might be so escalated when the peacekeepers arrive, that the parties' cost of abandoning violent strategies is deemed too costly. The potential gains of pursuing violent strategies might be too great. In escalated conflicts it might be necessary to influence the parties with compellent force, as other forms of power might not be enough.

It is not necessarily the case that Ch.VI would have been more effective. This study examined the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in conflicts such as UNISOM II in Somalia, MINUSCA in the DRC and MINUSMA in Mali, and compared them to conflicts without peacekeeping missions. These are arguably some of the most difficult conflicts in Africa 1990-2018. Despite this fact, this study still found Ch.VII-missions decreasing the number of battle-related deaths. Even though the effect was lesser than found by Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014), given the circumstances, that is still a significant result showing Ch.VII have an important effect. Other organisations and coalitions might be more apt to perform this kind of peace enforcement-like missions, but this study shows the UN is still capable of making a positive impact. Even though violence still prevails in conflicts with Ch.VII-missions deployed, removing the peacekeepers would likely mean a worsening of the conflict situation. Like previous articles, this study found that larger troop deployments increase peacekeeping effectiveness. If the world community aims to decrease the violence in ongoing conflicts, the first step should therefore be to increase the number of personnel.

4.2 Alternative Explanations

The goodness-of-fit in all models used in this study were relatively low. Other factors are influencing the level of violence in civil wars. There might be other factors not controlled for that makes the correlation between Ch.VII-missions and the number of battle-related deaths spurious. More research needs to be done to increase the knowledge of what drives cycles of violence in civil wars. Although this study assumes the trend that peacekeeping missions are sent to the more difficult conflicts, it does not control for this. It is therefore difficult to estimate how much, if at all, that fact influences the results. There is still a possibility that

Ch.VII-missions are sent to easier conflicts or that they are deployed when the conflict is already de-escalating. This could mean the relationship found in this study is not causal. However, both Hunt (2017:108) and Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014:737) argue with supported evidence that the UN are deploying peacekeepers in increasingly difficult conflicts, and they do so during the midst of fighting. This suggest that the tendency of the UN to send peacekeepers to the most difficult conflicts found by Kathman and Wood (2016), Melander (2009) and Fortna (2008) has only increased.

This study did not account for the actual use of violence by peacekeepers, but the authority to use it. It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions regarding the casual effect on civil war violence by Ch.VII-missions. The leverage used by the UN on the conflict parties might be a result of the authority use violence. It might also be a result of the actual use of violence, and that the mere threat of force is not enough. In that case, it is crucial the peacekeepers actually have the ability to wield force in order to be effective. More research needs to be done regarding when and how peacekeepers use compellent force. There is also the possibility that the negative relationships between Ch.VII-missions and violence is almost entirely the result of more pacific pathways such as persuasion and inducement. The use of violence could have little or no effect, and even undermine the effect strategies such as mediation. However, this study was primarily interested in whether missions mandated under Ch.VII were able to affect the number of deaths, which it also found supporting evidence for.

Lastly, the negative effect on battle-related deaths might be result of another organisation deploying alongside the UN peacekeepers. If that organisation manages to leverage the conflict parties to stop fighting, then the effect of Ch.VII might be spurious. In their study Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014) controlled for the presence of a regional organisation deploying peacekeepers alongside UN troops as a robustness test, and the effect of UN peacekeepers remained largely the same, indicating the UN manages to exert influence on its own.

5 Conclusion

The aim of this study was to examine if UN peacekeeping missions mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are able to decrease combat violence in internal armed conflicts.

Peacekeeping has been found to be effective in general, but no quantitative study has investigated the effectiveness of Ch.VII-missions. I hypothesised that conflicts with Ch.VII-missions deployed had lower levels of combat violence than conflicts with no UN mission. I found evidence suggesting that Ch.VII-missions can prevent conflicts from escalating drastically, although the peacekeepers struggle to reduce the number of deaths below medium levels. Assuming peacekeeping missions are sent to the most difficult conflicts, this is a significant result, as it implies the UN can maintain difficult conflicts at medium level of combat violence. I also hypothesised that mission effectiveness depended on adequate troop contributions. I found that the relationship between personnel deployed and combat violence is elastic in nature. A substantial decrease in deaths thus required a substantial increase in personnel deployed. Peacekeeping troops enabled the largest contribution on violence reduction, but police officers made an important contribution.

Conclusively, I found evidence that Ch.VII can reduce combat violence in intrastate armed conflicts. Therefore, this study makes a contribution to the peacekeeping literature by offering evidence that suggests Ch.VII-missions are important for limiting the negative consequences of civil conflicts. Removing the peacekeepers would likely result in an increase in combat violence. If the findings in this study are correct, the positive contributions probably extend far beyond limiting combat violence. Yet, if the world community is committed in reducing the violence in civil conflicts, they should be prepared to make significant contributions to the peacekeeping operations.

There are still important research gaps that need to be filled in order for peacekeeping operations to reach their full potential. Little is known regarding when and how peacekeepers use violence when they are mandated to do so. The use of violence can be more or less effective in different situations. In some instances, it is possible that violence should be avoided altogether. If the peacekeepers' military capabilities are relevant for peacekeeping effectives, a logical implication would be that better equipped troops should be more effective. The implications for using assets such as heavily armed vehicles and advanced intelligence gather should be investigated. Lastly, the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations conducted by other organisations such as the African Union could be of interests, as the AU and the UN can have different strengths and weaknesses.

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7 Appendix

Descriptive statistics - Battle related deaths (DV)

	Min.	1st Quartile	Median	Mean	3rd Quartile	Max.	Standard error
Battle-related deaths	25.0	47.0	136.0	615.2	506.0	30633.0	1954.9

Descriptive statistics - Number of personnel deployed (IV)

	Min.	1st Quartile	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
Troops	15	8311	12190	11746	16404	28318
Police	0	816	1348	1631	2268	5037
Total	207	9321	14044	13605	18506	28318

Table 4. List of Peacekeeping Missions in Africa mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 1989-2018

Mission Name	Location	Year of authorization	Resolution
UNOSOM II	Somalia	1993	S/RES/814 (1993)
UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	1999	S/RES/1291 (2000)
MONUC	Democratic Republic of Congo	2000	S/RES/1291 (2000)
UNMIL	Liberia	2003	S/RES/1509 (2003)
UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	2004	S/RES/1528 (2004)
ONUB	Burundi	2004	S/RES/1545 (2004)
UNMIS	Sudan	2005	S/RES/1590 (2005)
UNAMID	Sudan (Darfur)	2007	S/RES/1769 (2007)
MINURCAT	Central African Republic and Chad	2007	S/RES/1778 (2007)
MONUSCO	Democratic Republic of Congo	2010	S/RES/1925 (2010)
UNISFA	Sudan (Abyei)	2011	S/RES/1990 (2011)
UNMISS	Republic of South Sudan	2011	S/RES/1996 (2011)
MINUSMA	Mali	2013	S/RES/2100 (2013)
MINUSCA	Central African Republic	2014	S/RES/2149 (2014)

Note: In cases where the mission began with a Ch.VI mandate and then shifted from Ch.VI to Ch.VII, the year of authorization and resolution indicates the shift to Ch.VII (Howard and Dayal 2018:appendix).

Scripts used in R (R Studio)

Model 1 **and** ***2***

```
ucdp.brd <- read.csv("ucdp.brd.csv", header = TRUE, sep = ";")
ucdp.brd$pko <- factor(ucdp.brd$pko)
ucdp.brd$intervention <- factor(ucdp.brd$intervention)
ucdp.brd$bd_best1 <- log(ucdp.brd$bd_best)

ucdp.pa <- read.csv("ucdp.pa1.csv", header = TRUE, sep = ";")

g <-read.csv("g.csv", header = TRUE, sep = ";")
g$Populationln <- log(g$Population, base = exp(1))

d <- merge(ucdp.brd,ucdp.pa,by=c("conflict_id","year"),all = TRUE)
d[is.na(d)] <- 0
d$cease <- factor(d$cease)

d1 <- merge(d, g,by=c("location_inc","year"))

ucdp.pa$cease <- factor(ucdp.pa$cease)
ucdp.brd$pko <- factor(ucdp.brd$pko)
ucdp.brd$intervention <- (ucdp.brd$intervention)

model <- lm(bd_best ~ pko + intervention + cease + Populationln, data = d1)
model2 <- lm(bd_best1 ~ pko + intervention + cease + Populationln, data = d1)
```

Model 3,4,5 **and** ***6***

```
pko <- read.csv("pko.csv")

f <- merge(ucdp.brd,ucdp.pa,by=c("conflict_id","year"),all  = TRUE)
f$cease[is.na(f$cease)] <- 0
f$cease <- factor(f$cease)

f1 <- merge(f,g,by=c("year","location_inc"))
f3 <- merge(f1,pko,by=c("year","location_inc"),all  = TRUE)
f2 <- merge(f1,pko,by=c("year","location_inc"))
f3$Total[is.na(f3$Total)] <- 0
f2$Total[is.na(f2$Total)] <- 0.01

f2$Troops1 <- log(f2$Troops)
f2$Total1 <- log(f2$Total)
f2$Police[f2$Police<1] <- 0.01
f2$Police <- log(f2$Police)
f3$Total1 <- log(f3$Total)

model2 <- lm(bd_best1 ~ Troops1 + intervention  + cease + Populationln, data = f2)
summary(model2)

model3 <- lm(bd_best1 ~ Police + intervention  + cease + Populationln, data = f2)
summary(model3)

model4 <- lm(bd_best1 ~ Total1 + intervention  + cease + Populationln, data = f2)
summary(model4)

model5 <- lm(bd_best1 ~ Total + intervention  + cease + Populationln, data = f3)
summary(model5)
```