The memory of the Holocaust as a point of state ontological (in)security

A comparative discursive analysis of the United Kingdom and Poland

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# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 2

Acknowledgement .......................................................................................................................... 3

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4

Research Problem and Hypothesis ................................................................................................. 5

Disposition ................................................................................................................................... 6

Research Overview ....................................................................................................................... 7

  Ontological Security ................................................................................................................... 8

  Collective Memory ..................................................................................................................... 14

  Europeanisation of Holocaust Memory ...................................................................................... 17

Research Design ............................................................................................................................ 22

  Theoretical Model ..................................................................................................................... 23

  Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 29

Analysis ......................................................................................................................................... 38

  Historical Context .................................................................................................................... 38

  Analysis of Sources .................................................................................................................. 48

  Comparisons ............................................................................................................................. 62

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 66

References ....................................................................................................................................... 68

Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 72
Abstract

This thesis utilises the context of European Holocaust memory to test differences within the existing literature of the theory of ‘ontological security’. The differences centre on questions of identity preservation in the face of threats to a state’s ‘sense of self’. The paper builds a connection between theories within the field of collective memory and ontological security (a sub-field known as ‘mnemonic security’) and applies these to two case studies within the European context: the UK and Poland. These cases were chosen based on disparity of experience of the Holocaust within the European context in order to determine if these disparities may explain any potential variation in mnemonic security strategies. This is achieved with use of discourse analysis of state leader and representatives speeches (and other relevant discourse) given at Holocaust remembrance events in order to classify strategies in reference to the theoretical differences within the ontological security framework. It finds that differences in forms of memory exist, but their theoretical explanations within the framework are similar despite their disparities of experience. The thesis attempts to fill a gap of empirical evidence in regards to these arguments and in regards to discourse analysis of leader’s speeches and statements at said Holocaust remembrance events.
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Introduction

This study seeks to provide an understanding of how states use memory to help maintain a sense of ‘ontological security’. This shall be achieved by applying the theory of ‘ontological security’, a subfield of International Relations (IR), together with a process known as the ‘Europeanisation of Holocaust memory’. The most basic premise within the ontological security literature is that states care just as much about their ontological security, their ‘sense of self’, as they do about their physical security; and, that this ‘sense of self’ is subjectively created via relations with other states (Steele 2008). However, within the literature there exists a departure between key authors regarding how ontological security is maintained in the face of threats. On the one hand it is argued that actors act defensively to protect a specific identity to preserve continuity between the past, present and future self (Steele 2008; Mitzen 2006). On the other, it is claimed that instead actors are willing to be reflexive with their identity as long a positive sense of self is maintained (Browning and Joenniemi 2017). The latter suggests the former conflates the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘self’ leading to theoretical limitations. To test these two side of the same theoretical coin, this study seeks to address the lack of empirical application of these arguments upon the case study of Holocaust memory within two disparate cases: the United Kingdom (UK) and Poland. The reasoning behind coupling this theory with this case follows the footsteps of other theorists (Mälksoo 2009; 2015; 2019 & Subotic 2011; 2019) who have highlighted the connection between national memory practices and OS. Maria Mälksoo puts it succinctly in stating that “remembering in a particular manner is instrumental in order to sustain a coherent and consistent biographical narrative of a state” (Mälksoo 2015: p.224). A broad analysis of the development of Holocaust memory within each state, within the European context, shall be conducted with recourse to OS in order to explain how states use various memory practices to create, maintain and defend a positive sense of self in the face of various transnational pressures. By using discourse analysis to trace patterns and developments in speeches given by state leaders and representatives at Holocaust remembrance events, this paper seeks to understand the different strategies used by those states whose experience of, and relationship to, the Holocaust are vastly different. This is done to the end of both developing the existing theory of OS by applying it to real word cases and, in doing so, adding empirically to the field of the Europeanisation of Holocaust memory.

Research Problem and Hypothesis
This study is primarily concerned with developing and clarifying the current theoretical arguments within the ontological security literature, particularly its relationship with national memory and ‘mnemonic security’. The core problem which currently exists in the existing literature concerns how states deal with threats which cause feelings of insecurity; do they defend a singular identity (defensive) or do they abandon one identity for another in order to defend their sense of self (reflexive)? As the debate briefly introduced in the introduction shows, this problem exists fundamentally at the theoretical level however yet of course what effects the theory so also directs our understanding of empirical phenomena. As will be argued in the following section, collective and national memories play a central role in informing and creating the identities and self-narratives which underpin the ontological security literature. With this in mind, how different states negotiate with the same memory in the face of identity threats allows for explanatory variables to be located. For this problem to be properly elucidated, a theoretical model must be forwarded which is able to classify a particular mnemonic strategy as either defensive or reflexive for it to be then tested empirically against two case studies. The reason for choosing two disparate cases, within the context of the European memory project, is to test the model against possible explanatory variables. In this case, the UK represents not simply a Western European state, but a European state with little physical experience of the Holocaust (in that it occurred outside of the UK). Poland, on the other hand, had a great deal of physical experience of the Holocaust; the majority of death camps were in what is now modern day Poland, and a large percentage of Jews killed were Polish citizens. How does such a difference in physical experience effect the mnemonic choices each state makes in the face of threats? Another layer of intrigue which makes this case study a relevant testing ground is the transnational element of Holocaust memory as this contributes to the perceived need for states to ‘secure’ particular identities and, by extension, memories when contesting memories interact with one another. The hypothesis forwarded here is that, the strategy chosen will be effected by case type. Due to the UK not having been a physical site of the Holocaust it may have the ‘space’ necessary to detach the memory of the Holocaust from its own identity and self-narrative, and thus potentially be reflexive with its memory strategy. In the case of Poland, the direct physical connection means that its relationship to the European memory is much more explicit and complicated, reducing room for reflexivity. This relationship between the transnational aspect of the ‘Europeanised’ memory and the national memories of each Poland and the UK should serve as the main explanatory variable. That is to say, the Europeanisation of Holocaust memory necessarily abstracts and generalises so as to appeal to a broad range of states with
differing historical experiences and relationships to the event. This study argues that because Poland has a concrete physical relationship to the Holocaust this abstract European memory will cause conflict, especially given the memories prominent role as a foundational myth of Europe. An analysis of the development of Holocaust memory in each undertaken over a 18 year time period (2001-2019) in line with Europeanisation process, will allow for claims to be made in line with a theoretical model which can classify mnemonic strategies as either defensive or reflexive.

Disposition
There are three major segments to this study. The first is an overview of the existing literature relevant to this study; the aim of which is to both provide the relevant theoretical and empirical context as well as locating the lacuna that this study is attempting to fill. This is split into three smaller sections. The first is the theoretical foundation of ontological security, a theory with its roots within psychology but more recently gaining traction as a means to analyse the behaviour of states rather than individuals. This shall be followed by more clearly outlining the two ‘sides’ of the OS coin with reference to their respective proponents. This will be followed by outlining the second theoretical component of the study, ‘collective memory’, which acts as the bridge between ontological security and Holocaust memory. It is then possible to explore the existing literature concerning the empirical side of the study, namely the ‘Europeanisation of Holocaust memory’. This shall address the development of an institutionalised European memory of the Holocaust including the norms which it generated and the relationship between transnational and national memories. Included here will be an overview of the work of a those studies which have made the connection between a state’s OS and their national memories and narratives. Included here will also be an overview of existing literature specific to the case studies of the UK and Poland. Following this overview of the existing theoretical and empirical fields will be the second segment which both introduces the specific theoretical model applied within this study and sets out its practical application in regards to methodology and good research practices. The third and final segment contains the analysis. This shall first offer the historical context and development of Holocaust memory in each case to the end of linking together the relevant institutions available to each state in regards to mnemonic strategy setting; that is to say, to place the analysed texts in their context. Then the collected speeches and statements of state representatives which compose the respective states memory strategy shall be subject to discourse analysis in order to identify patterns and developments in line with the theoretical model. The aim of the model is to classify memory strategies as either defensive or reflexive by tracing their development over a
defined and relevant time period (2001-2019). The resulting conclusions will offer empirical evidence for, or against, either side of the argument adding to theory development through empirical testing.

**Research Overview**

The following section of this study sets out the relevant previous literature which provide both the theoretical and empirical foundations of this paper. The relevant previous literature to this study can be divided into three major sections:

1) Ontological Security
2) Collective Memory
3) The ‘Europeanisation’ of Holocaust memory

The first two sections may be considered theoretical whilst the third provides an overview of the empirical side of the study. A point which shall be made throughout this section is the overlapping themes between the theoretical sections regarding ontological security and collective memory. Whilst many of the themes speak to similar ends, the discourses associated with each are distinct which requires one to connect the dots between them. Therefore, interjected throughout, will be comments regarding how each relate to one another and the theoretical implications this has for the study as a whole. The overall aim of this section is twofold. The first is to provide the theoretical background from which a working theoretical model may be built from in the theory section of the paper. A major element of this is showing how memory practices relate to ontological security. It also sets out the differing schools of thought within the ontological security. As a primarily theory-driven study, the overview of the relevant theory necessarily becomes of greater focus. Thus whilst the specific model actually applied in this study shall be introduced within the methodology section, alongside discussions pertaining to its practical application, the overview of the existing theory will provide the bulk of the theoretical discussions. Secondly, and empirically, it provides the background for the case study in terms of the overall European context and the relevant transnational developments

**Ontological Security**

This sub-section briefly explores the wider context pertinent to the development of OS within IR so as to better highlight (and justify) the particular relevance, and choice, of
OS as the major theoretical component of this study. With the context in place, OS, as conceived of by Mitzen and Steele, shall be forwarded before addressing the ‘reflexive’ school of thought introduced by Browning and Joenniemi. Whilst this functions as an overview of the pre-existing research within the field of OS, the theoretical nature of this paper begets an in-depth approach to the theories forwarded; the end of such is to allow for a smoother introduction of this paper’s theoretical model in the up-coming methodology section. For the sake of both relevance and brevity, this section shall focus on the ‘security’ aspect of IR rather than a wider examination of other less relevant facets. The idea here is that one can gain a much clearer understanding of what is meant by ‘ontological security’ when it is placed alongside what could be termed ‘physical security’; the differences between them better illustrate the major focus of the ‘ontological’ aspect of the concept, alongside conceptualising what it meant by ‘insecurity’, ontological or otherwise.

As in other fields of research, IR can be split into several ‘schools’. One of the most known is the ‘realist’ school. In regards to the question of security, many know, or have at least heard of, the ‘security dilemma’, a seminal theory forwarded by Barry Posen (Posen 1994). The security dilemma claims that the securitisation practices of one state may appear as threatening to another, even if the original state never actually intended to be offensive due to the inherent lack of trust and knowledge between states in a system of anarchy, understood as the absence of sovereign powers (Posen 1994: p. 104-06). Central to the theory of the ‘security dilemma’ is a physical conceptualisation of the term ‘security’. The terms ‘offensive’, ‘defensive’ and ‘secure’ are all understood here in a military, zero-sum sense whereby security is essentially coterminous with ‘survival’ (Huysmans 1998: p.234). Inherent to a physical conception of security is a physical conception of the state, although exactly what that may entail is not necessarily homogenous amongst IR scholars. For example Jennifer Mitzen, in problematizing the realist perspective on physical state security, asks exactly what constitutes the state; is it the aggregate of its individual members, in which case, she asks, “What percentage of the population must die in order to conclude that the state is dead?” (Mitzen 2006: p.351). As shall be addressed later when more fully exploring Mitzen’s concept of security, the issue of defining the state as a body, or applying theories developed at the level of the individual to states, is a point of contention and departure. Moreover, alongside this focus on the physical aspect of security, which, so the realist arguments goes, underpins the relations between states, is a rationalist understanding of state actions. This means that if we can conceive of survival as the main aim of any given state, and that security
is the means by which survival is ensured, then the behaviours and actions of states can be understood as being rational undertakings towards this defined end. (Posen 1994: p.104)

As pervasive a view the above has been within the field of IR, it is not the only means by which to conceive of survival, and, consequently, security. As suggested by Buzan, Waever and de Wilder (1998), one can locate a debate within security studies between those who wish to widen the scope of what ‘security’ may entail, and others who wish to keep a narrow, military-orientated focus (Buzan et al 1998: p.2). In his article *Security: What do you mean?* Jef Huysmans (1998) sets about expanding upon the limited conception of security as physical survival. Huysmans argues that military focus of security which had hitherto dominated in IR had left the term ‘security’ undertheorized and underdeveloped. He argues that whilst there had been some more forward thinking theorisations of ‘security’ which aimed at moving the referent object from a mainly military focus to other issues such as “economic, societal, political and environmental” risks, this achieved little more than adding a different object before ‘security’, so whilst the referent object was moved, what ‘security’ actually meant, regardless of context, was left somewhat untouched (Huysmans 1998: p.227).

It is within Huysmans arguments that one can trace the origins of what has become ‘ontological security’. Huysmans argues that much can be gained from thinking of ‘security’ as a ‘thick signifier’, that is rather than ‘security’ having purely an analytical use it also “refers to a wider framework of meaning within which we organise particular forms of life” (Huysmans 1998: p.228). In this sense, Huysmans seeks to first understand what security may mean at its most essential level, which he contends can be boiled down to the fear of death, be it at the most basic individual level of one person against another, or taken to the extreme of nations who organise their relationships with one another based on whether they are friend or enemy. Fear of death, however, is a ‘double-fear’, on the one hand it is “fear of other people who have the power to kill… to die biologically at the hand of other people” and on the other “a fear of uncertainty, of an underdetermined condition“(Huysmans 1998: p.235). We fear death because it is the one thing that we can truly never know; and this uncertainty is frightening. Thus security becomes a means by which to mediate against this uncertainty, to ‘postpone it’. As we cannot objectify death, we objectify the threats which may cause it and term these ‘enemies’. The community becomes a means by which to more efficiently meet these ends, thus communities become defined by their threats. Huysmans states “the construction of the political self is internally bound to the construction of threats”, his own example being the “free world” defining itself against the “threat of communism” and vice versa (Huysmans 1998: p.236). The sum of this conceptual leap is that ‘security’ and
‘identification’ (political or otherwise) become not only linked, but dependent upon one another. If how we identify ourselves, which entails a knowledge of not only ‘I’, but of ‘we’ and ‘they’ is based on issues of security then how we both conceptualise and maintain identity, a knowledge of ourselves, becomes dependent on security; or better to say, our ontology, our sense of being, becomes a matter related to security.

The above short overview of the ‘broad’ vs ‘narrow’ security debate within the field of IR has been undertaken to provide the background from which to better understand the development of ontological security as a sub-discipline of security studies. Here, ontological security as forwarded by Mitzen and Steele shall be introduced before addressing the critiques offered by Browning and Joenniemi.

Two authors are most associated with the development of ontological security as a defined theoretical discipline within IR: Jennifer Mitzen (2006) and Brent Steele (2008). Whilst the two are not fully conterminous with one another, especially concerning the social dimension of identity and self-narrative creation – whereby Mitzen favours a socially oriented perspective and Steele forwards an individualist approach – (Zarakol 2010: p7.) they are in agreement over the major points relevant to this study, especially concerning their conceptualisation of identity preservation and consistent narratives as the focal point of ontological security (Croft and Vaughn-Williams 2017: p.16-17). Therefore whilst the two shall be introduced separately here, moving forward the two shall be linked as one ‘side’ of the coin, with Browning and Joenniemi on the other.

In the same vein that physical security, as conceived of by the realist tradition, is ‘extrapolated’ from the individual level so Mitzen also begins at the individual level in her conceptualisation of ontological security. Drawing heavily from Anthony Giddens, Mitzen claims that individuals care just as much about their OS as they do about their physical security, and in some cases the former even takes precedence over the latter (Mitzen 2006: p.342). In line with Giddens, Mitzen argues that individuals require “the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time – as being rather than constantly changing – in order to realise a sense of agency” (Mitzen 2006: p.342). The basic premise is that the world, as the individual may experience it, is inherently full of uncertainty and infinite possibilities, which when faced by the individual fills them with anxiety. In order to cope and function in everyday life, individuals must create routines which mitigate uncertainty by creating

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1 Whilst others, such as Huysmans, have developed the term, and whilst the term had previously been used within IR, Mitzen and Steele are accredited with fully developing the term and pushing it as a distinct sub-field with particular analytical benefits.
knowable relations with both their environment and others. *Routines* are understood here very much in a social sense, in that relations between individuals become routinized so as to maintain certainty. As these *routines* become the major means by which certainty is secured, and anxiety kept at bay, so the individual becomes deeply attached to them (Mitzen 2006: p.342). Behaviours and actions, which when reproduced become routines, have an important link to the individual’s sense of identity in that “the consequences of action will always either reproduce or contradict identities, and since identity motivates action its stability over time depends on it being supported in practice” (Mitzen 2006: p.344). A major consequence of such is that individuals may become so attached to certain routines, even ones which produce negative feelings, or even infringe on their physical security, that they have a hard time breaking from them (Mitzen 2006: p.347). She offers the example of a wife who suffers domestic abuse at the hands of her husband, but finds it difficult to leave as it would break her identity and routine as a ‘wife’, and that “she knows how to be herself through the couple’s routines” meaning leaving would cause great uncertainty (Mitzen 2006: p.347). What this means, importantly, is that because “routinized social relationships stabilise our identities *individuals become attached to the self-conceptions their routines support, regardless of their content*” (Mitzen 2006: p.347). This means that even negative feelings may be defended as long as the identity is preserved. This directly contradicts the realist argument that physical security trumps all other concerns, as in the example given above, the wife would be considered irrational not to leave as she risks physical harm by staying. Mitzen’s argument suggests she would still be acting rationally, but rather the ‘end’ is ontological, rather than physical, security and the ‘means’ (staying) is rational way to achieve this.

Applying this same logic to the state level, Mitzen argues that ontological security may offer an explanation of why states sometimes act ‘irrationally’, especially in regards to conflict. Drawing from the analogy of domestic violence above, Mitzen posits that states may become so attached to the routines produced through conflict that they choose to continue fighting even if peace (and therefore physical security) may be able to be secured. As identity is confirmed through routine, and is also subjectively created relationally to other actors (individuals or states) the ending of conflict may create uncertainty and ontological *insecurity* for the actor as how the actor understands itself is built upon securitising against the *enemy* or *other*. When the conflict is over, and the enemy no longer a direct threat, how one defines oneself is now in question; uncertainty begets insecurity and so on. Thus choosing to continue the conflict, even a conflict in which one has little chance in winning, becomes a
rational choice in maintaining ontological security through routinisation (Mitzen 2006: p.362-3).

Brent Steele (2008) builds upon Mitzen’s work, but goes further in regards to the concepts of identity and narrative. For Steele, “states pursue social actions to serve self-identity needs, even when these actions compromise physical security” (Steele 2008: p.2). For Steele, the overall aim of ontological security is to maintain “consistent self-concepts” which affirms “primarily how a state sees itself and secondarily how it wants to be seen by others” (Steele 2008: p.3). In order to achieve this, states create narratives about themselves which confirm a particular identity. Choices are made in accordance with this narrative which “gives life to routinized foreign policy actions” (Steele 2008: p.3). Because states ontological security is dependent on such a narrative, they may make choices to stay in accordance with this narrative even if this compromises physical security. For example, a state may involve itself in a costly act of humanitarian action on the other side of the world which puts the lives of its own citizens at risk whilst garnering no tangible tactical or military gains. In Steele’s account this may be explained if the state views itself and identifies as a humanitarian type and wishes for its actions to be consistent with its self-identity. It is important to note here that the creation and adoption of such narratives is not a random event, but is reproduced through action. That is to say the narrative informs the actions but the narrative may only exist if it is reproduced by actions undertaken in accordance with it. Steele suggests failure to act in accordance with such an identity would cause a feeling of shame, which effectively acts as the self-judging the self (Steele 2008: p.54.). One may contrast this to physical security which can be viewed in more ‘zero-sum’ terms where survival is the major aim and the failure to secure against a particular threat may mean the state/self would cease to exist. The major point that links Mitzen and Steele’s conceptions of ontological security together, is that ‘identity’ is the central component of security; it is identity which must be secured and defended as identity creates continuity from the past through to the present and future.

However, as argued by Browning and Joenniemi (2017) the above views of Mitzen and Steele are hamstrung by conflating the ‘self’ with that of ‘identity’, leading to a restrictive understanding of ontological security as “identity preservation” (Browning and Joenniemi 2017: p.32). Whilst agreeing that continuity of identity is a central aspect of OS, they posit that rather than a certain identity being something which must be rigidly defended:

“ontological security is not a question of identity per se, but rather of an actor’s capacity to cope with uncertainty and change – something which might actually entail
developing and altering the identity narrative, emphasizing one identity over another or shifting to a new identity entirely” (Browning and Joenniemi 2017: p.35).

For Browning and Joenniemi this understanding more accurately captures the relationship states have to their narratives and, by extension, their identities. They argue that viewing OS as identity preservation provides an unrealistic image of how states function in relation to one another, and in terms of how they wish to be viewed, by themselves and by others. As contemporary needs change, identity must be reflexive and adaptable. Rather than a particular identity being protected, the self is the main referent object: an identity may be adapted into something deemed favourable in order to protect the self from anxiety (the feeling of not knowing) and other negative feelings. The self is being protected from the feeling of anxiety rather than a rigid unchanging identity. Indeed this reflexivity is a central aspect of ontological security; to be able to change and develop over time, even if this means favouring (or at least being open towards) new identities over old ones. Browning and Joenniemi stress that another useful way to highlight the difference between this view and that of Mitzen and Steele comes from the former in defining their own distinction between the two: “we argued the self should be viewed as analytically distinct from the identities it reaches for in order to secure a sense of being in the world” (Browning and Joenniemi: p.44). If we term Mitzen and Steele’s conceptualisation of ontological security as ‘defensive identity’ then Browning and Joenniemi’s may be shall be termed ‘identity reflexivity’. It is this difference in direction that this study is attempting to clarify. It must be stated here that it is possible for both understandings presented here to co-exist. The ability to act reflexively is not necessarily a given (nor does its existence negate defensive forms) and it is accepted that states, like individuals do in some cases choose to act defensively and preserve a particular identity. What this paper is attempting to clarifying, is what may explain this variation if such differences actually occur in practice? As will be shown, collective and national memories are a key component in creating self-narratives and identity; by taking disparate cases and classifying their strategies as either defensive or reflexive it becomes possible to locate possible explanatory variables (if any variation does exist). Therefore this study seeks to provide clarification to such a theoretical difference through empirical testing.

Ayse Zarakol (2010) offers a potential explanatory mechanism in regards to the choices states make within the OS framework. In attempting to understand why Turkey and Japan continually refuse to accept and apologise for heinous crimes committed in the past, despite material and political gain for doing so, Zarakol also identifies shame as a key
explanatory factor. However, her conception of shame differs from that of Steele’s, which is concerned with ‘the self-judging the self’ when actions and behaviours are not consistent with the self-narrative. For Zarakol, a more accurate understanding would be that these acts cause shame understood as a "greater shame associated with being ‘Eastern’, ‘Asian’, ‘barbaric’ and ‘uncivilized’" (Zarakol 2010: p.20.). Thus it is a fear of being shamed by others, rather than the self, which delimits action. Whilst accepting guilt through an apology might lead to material gain, and gain respect from those demanding it, because such an admittance causes shame it is often disregarded. In this context an apology “is nothing short of a reformulation of state identity from representing a group of people who are not capable of such an act, to representing a group of people who are both capable and apologetic about it” which would underscore and give credence to the others negative view of oneself (Zarakol 2010: p.7.) It is not the act itself, but rather how this act is viewed by others and how this is then internalised by the actor in question. This is relational because “it is not tied to any particular action which may be dealt with by an apology but about a state of being which one cannot necessarily help” (Zarakol 2010: p.20.).

Whilst studies which focus on one case study to test theoretical claims regarding various facets of ontological security (and in a similar vein societal security), such as Crofts (2012) study on British identity in the face of Muslim immigration and Jalena Subotic’s study of Serbian identity and memory in regards to their 20th century history (Subotic 2018), there is a lack of a comparative focus of disparate cases in order to best explore possible explanatory variables. The following sections address the link between ontological security and collective memory and forwards the concept of ‘mnemonic security’ before setting out the empirical side of the paper.

**Collective Memory**

This study is concerned with the representation and use of memory and the social act of remembrance. Thus it is necessary for this paper to be built upon the theoretical foundations of what is known as ‘collective memory’. A wide array of studies and terms have dealt with the term ‘memory’ from psychologists to sociologists. Fully disentangling the competing understandings would be a major volume of work in of itself thus this sections seeks to offer a ‘working definition’ based on the work of some of the most influential authors within the field, especially in relation to ‘national’ and ‘state’ memories. There will also be discussions relating ontological security to collective memory, or, more specifically, how collective memory is a means by which OS may be secured.
Collective memory here is understood within the tradition set out by Maurice Halbwach. Jeffery Olick (1999) finds the work of Halbwach to be the nexus of a socially oriented understanding of memory. Here, Halbwach’s identifies the distinctions between ‘individual memory’, the psychologically driven process of actually remembering something; and of ‘collective memory’, which focuses more on the effect membership of a particular social group can have on an individual, whereby “group memberships provide the materials for memory and prod the individual into recalling particular events and forgetting others” (Olick 1999: p.335). Moreover, Olick also identifies an even more “radical collectivist moment” in Halbwach’s work where he makes a total distinction between those memories that an individual may themselves experience, albeit socially influenced (as explored above), and those memories which “are as much the products of the symbols and narratives available publically – and of the social means for storing and transmitting them - as they are the possessions of individuals” (Olick 1999: p.335). In that quote lies the crux of the matter when understanding ‘collective memory’; it becomes detached from solely the realm of the individual into something inherently social. It is this form of memory that is of interest to this study. The memory is ‘collective’ because it is not the sole ‘property’ of any single individual (in that it occurs only in their mind), but may be accessed by anyone within the confines of a particular ‘collective’ through interaction with relevant and available symbols and cultural expressions.

Following in the tradition established by Halbwach is German memory theorist Aleida Assmann (2016), and she much further elucidates the role that collective memory plays within the social context all the way through to the national level. It is worth noting here that Assmann favours the term ‘national memory’ due to the focus of her work being largely on the national level, which makes her work compatible with the state focus of this study. Assmann defines a ‘national memory’ as a “unifying construction that acts on society from above; it is grounded in political institutions and invested in a longer temporal duration of survival” (Assmann 2016: p.23). What is important about this definition is that is focuses on the top-down aspect of national memories, which utilise the various institutions available to a state (education systems, museums, mass media etc.). Moreover, it addresses the temporal aspect of national memory, in that it is something which outlives individual members and may exist across a multitude of generations. Assmann does locate other levels of collective memory which function ‘bottom-up’, in the sense that they are practiced and reproduced outside of national institutions (she names these ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ memories), however these lie outside of the direct focus of this paper (Assmann 2016: p.18-21).
Assmann’s conception of ‘national memory’ ties together with the work of Michael Rothberg (2009). Rothberg offers the analogy of thinking of collective memory as like a language, in that it provides individuals with a framework, or a “shared medium” from which they can understand both themselves, and their relations to others (Rothberg 2009: p.15). Rothberg also focuses on the contemporary utility of memory in the sense that the time when the ‘remembering’ is very much a constitutive element of collective memory; or, in his words “memory is the past made present” (Rothberg 2009: p.3). This framework, however, much like a language, is not necessarily accessible by anybody, but rather by those who can speak it. National memories, therefore, are there to be shared by those within the nation, not those on the outside, and much like a foreigner attempting to grasp a foreign language, much will only make sense to those on the inside. Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction of this section, there are many similarities with the themes addressed in the OS literature and collective memory. Consider the following segment given by Steele in his conception of the role of memory in the construction of a state’s ‘biographical narrative’ so central to his own concept of OS:

“Our connection to our past and the past of our fellow group members, our ancestors, our national treasures etc. provides us with the kinship that is important for our state of being as social agents. At the level of groups and nation-state, this is even more comforting as because it organises group behaviour, a narrative anthropomorphising the group into a coherent whole” (Steele 2008: p.57)

Much like the language framework forwarded by Rothberg, Steele understands memory as a means by which national identity is created and reproduced through the internal relations of constituent individuals. In this sense, memory becomes a central aspect of states narratives and identities and, consequentially, their ability to maintain OS through continuity and be a ‘coherent whole’. This is a key facet of the theoretical component of this study; that memory and narratives are inherently connected, and that narratives draw upon specific memories which then informs (and delimits) identity.

Returning to Assmann, she seeks to fully understand how national identities come to instrumentalise memories for certain ends. She forwards a useful conception of myth which inspires much of this paper’s understanding of national memories. Here, Assmann conceives of myth as “the form in which history is seen through the lens of identity” whereby by it becomes “the affective appropriation of one’s own history” (Assmann 2016: p.26). This
does not necessarily just equate myths with deliberate falsifications of history but rather a “foundational history that possesses a lasting significance… it keeps the past alive in contemporary society and gives that society an orientation for the future” (Assmann 2016: p.26). Again the connections between memory and the continuity of narrative introduced by Mitzen and Steele become clear. One concept that Assmann is particularly keen to forward, and one that relates to the empirical side of this study in regards to the Holocaust, is that of trauma. For Assmann, trauma and memories of defeat become as much, if not more, important to a national identity as positive memories of victory. The shared sense of trauma, of a collective struggle and shared suffering is what can shape a nation; it gives the nation a purpose, a reason to continue and to honour the victims of defeat and suffering (Assmann: p.27). Thus the experience of trauma provides particular memories with an emotive and central place in the construction of a nations identity and self-narrative. The focus on a ‘purpose’ for future action again speaks to the continuity between past actions, current actions and future ambitions. This mix of myth and trauma imbue events such as the Holocaust with added meaning, both within the collectives directly victimised by them and in extreme cases even by those whose connection to the memory is less clear. Assmann identifies the Holocaust as an example of this phenomena, particularly in how the memory of the Holocaust has become the “memory of Europe” in that it has become a negative foundational myth of the European identity (Assmann 2016: p.220). It is negative in that it acts as a ‘never again’ moment; the conditions which allowed for the Holocaust to occur are the exact opposite of what to be European should be now and moving forwards. What is key to note about this particular form of memory is that by its very nature a transnational memory which seeks to encompass various different national perspectives is by definition necessarily abstract. It would be impossible for such a memory to be at the same time coherent and singular whilst particular to multivariate positions. This is a key element in the case selection process, as the direct experience of trauma suffered by Poland is not present to the same degree in the UK, despite the prevalence of the memory in each. Assmann’s understanding of trauma and Zarakol’s concept of relational shame shall function as the major explanatory mechanisms within this study as they both offer explanations into state choices and, crucially, exist to differing degrees in each case. The theories explored above have upmost relevance in regards to how the Holocaust is remembered both at the national and transnational level, and the concept of collective memory is implicit within the empirical positions which follow. Lastly, the theory of collective memory functions here in an auxiliary fashion in comparison with OS which remains at once and the same time the primary theory and the subject of enquiry
through empirical testing. What an understanding of collective memory allows in this regards is to smooth the transition between OS and Holocaust memory by locating the mnemonic component of national identities and narratives.

**The Europeanisation of Holocaust Memory**

This final section of the research overview lays out the empirical component of this study, upon which the theoretical considerations above shall be tested upon. The aim of this section is to overview the previous work which has been conducted on a topic known as the ‘Europeanisation of Holocaust memory’. In doing so, three main issues will be addressed:

1. The construction and development of a ‘European’ (transnational) memory of the Holocaust.
2. The differing experiences of Western Europe and the former Communist states, mainly in the East.
3. The interaction between the national and transnational level; the relations between states in regards to national and transnational memories.

Achieving the above will not only introduce the empirical section of this study, but will also make clear precisely why such a case study fits the theoretical aims of the paper. The section will show that transnational memories, such as that developed at the European level concerning the Holocaust, have the potential effect of conflicting with the national memories (and consequentially narratives and identities) of individual nations. This conflict creates an environment in which nation states feel that their OS is being challenged, thus requiring them to adopt particular memory strategies to offset insecurity.

Whilst the different nations of Europe each had differing historical experiences of the Holocaust, and of differing developments of national level memories, it is possible to trace the beginnings of a ‘European’ memory of the Holocaust. Marek Kucia (2016) defines the process of the *Europeanisation of the Holocaust* as:

> “the process of construction, institutionalization, and diffusion of beliefs regarding the Holocaust as well as formal and informal norms and rules regarding Holocaust remembrance and education that have been first defined and consolidated at a European level and then incorporated into the practices of European countries” (Kucia 2016: p.98).

Emphasised here is not so much the specific content of the memory, but rather the fact that it is something which stands above and independent of national memories. That is to say, the memory becomes unitary despite the differences at the national levels. Kucia notes that for this process to have been able to been achieved, it required a great degree of
institutionalisation and the work of ‘memory entrepreneurs’ such as the EU and specific individuals (Kucia 2016: p.98). Kucia notes that whilst the origins of a ‘European memory’ of the Holocaust began in the mid-1990’s as many former communist nations began gaining independence and declaring their interest in joining the European Union, the real ‘institutional’ genesis took place in 2000 with the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, organised by the Swedish government and attended by representative of 46 states (Kucia 2016: p.105). The forum achieved the Stockholm Declaration which, for Kucia, is “the most important document constructing and institutionalizing transnational Holocaust memory and diffusing it” (Kucia 2016: p.105) which also became the mission statement of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), the main institution in regards to a transnational memory of the Holocaust. This process of institutionalisation of Holocaust memory for Kucia, produced four major ‘norms’ for states to follow:

1. Remember, research and educate the Holocaust, including the establishment of a national Holocaust Remembrance Day (27th January) and joining the IHRA
2. Preserve and commemorate physical sites of the Holocaust
3. Return property of Holocaust victims to them or their heirs
4. Recognise national responsibility for Holocaust crimes and publically apologise for these crimes (all Kucia 2016: p.107-8)

An interesting facet of these norms, certainly the latter three, is that due to the geographic nature of the Holocaust, these norms essentially become directed at Eastern European states due them being the main physical sites of the Holocaust; thus the norms, most importantly regarding recognition and preservation, become a ‘European’ norm applicable to only a segment of its members. Kucia’s study provides an extremely detailed account of the process of Europeanisation process, as well as highlighting the specific effect of these institutionalised memory norms on Eastern European states.

Klas-Goran Karlsson (2010) provides a more western oriented focus of the development of a European memory, within the wider context of a more general European identity formation which began in the aftermath of 1945. Whilst political ‘Europeanisation’ had occurred in the fall out of the Second World War, the ‘cultural’ wave did not occur into the 1990’s when the West had to negotiate with the reintegration of Eastern Europe back into Europe as a whole. The re-absorption of the former Soviet bloc back into the European family – which had based its new identity on the centrality of the Holocaust – forced a re-thinking
into what it meant to be European. Here Karlsson provides somewhat more of a comparative approach in identifying the ‘head start’ Western Europe had over former communist states. This is twofold; firstly in regards to individual national identities and secondly in relation to a transnational European identity. Connected to this, Karlsson also recognises the essentially western character prescribed to the original ‘European’ memory, in that it fit into the wider Western narrative of the Second World War as a whole, in which the defeat of the Nazis is the major point of reference, and where the narrative essentially ends, ignoring the effects of Communist rule in much of Eastern Europe during and after 1945 (Karlsson 2010: p.42).

Accounts of the eastern European experience are provided by Joanna Wawrzyniak and Pakier Malgorzata (2013) who claim that little cohabitation exits between within the historiography of the Holocaust within the east, and especially with the ‘west, hardly conducive to the goal of a pan-European memory and identity. In a similar vein, Ljiljana Radonic (2017) provides an analysis of museums and other memorial efforts (monuments) in former communist states to find if there exists any patterns between them. She locates the technique of the ‘double-occupation’ which seeks to equate the two totalitarianisms, and often use instances of anti-communism and fighting for independence as guises for nationalist movements often accused of Nazi collaboration. This fits the findings of Torbakov (2011) and of the processes identified by Kucia (2016).

Two authors in particular bring together place the Europeanisation of Holocaust memory within the OS framework. The first, Jalena Subotic (2018), seeks to use OS as means to understand the Croatian states attempts at dealing with their own Holocaust history and fascist past. She claims that post-communist European states are dealing with a sense of ontological insecurity insofar that there exists a tension between their desire to be seen and accepted as European and the perceived requirement that to join the European family, they must revise their own national memories, often used to exonerate their own guilt and complicity in the Holocaust. Therefore the desire to be fully European, could mean invoking and accepting guilt for heinous acts which they perceive would inhibit themselves from being viewed positively and being accepted by the rest of ‘cosmopolitan’ Western Europe. To counter this insecurity, Croatia inverted the memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust as “crimes against Croats, and not by them” (Subotic 2018: p.306) victimising themselves and removing space to speak about Croats as perpetrators, namely the fascist Ustaša regime.

Maria Mälksoo also makes use of the OS framework to conduct her analysis of the Baltic States and the means by which they have negotiated their return to the European
family following independence. Mälksoo also highlights the role of Poland as a ‘vanguard’ of
the ‘New Europe’ in their quest to end a western dominated hegemony of European memory
(Mälksoo 2009: p.654). For Mälksoo, Poland and the Baltic States relationship to the
European memory project has been defined by a contradictory scenario whereby at once and
the same time they are “seeking recognition from and exercising resistance to the hegemonic
‘core European’ narrative of what Europe is all about” (Mälksoo 2009: p.655). Furthermore
she provides the most explicit account of linking together OS and memory studies,
demonstrating the central role memory plays in developing the consistent narrative of self,
necessary for a state’s ontological security. She coins the phrase ‘mnemonic security’ as a
form of demonstrating that memory is a means, amongst others, at creating, maintaining and
defending a state’s OS (Mälksoo 2009: p.654).

In regards to the case studies of the UK and Poland, there have been previous
studies which go into great detail of the development of Holocaust memory within each,
although this is done without reference to OS nor to the ‘Europeanisation’ context. For
Poland, Joanna Wawrzyniak (2015) offers a detailed analysis of Holocaust memory during
communist rule and the huge influence the regime had over the memory of not only the
Holocaust but the war as a whole. This will be returned to in the historical analysis section.
Since 2018 and the controversy surrounding what have been termed the ‘Holocaust laws’ (this
will again be returned to), several studies have been conducted into the politicisation of
Holocaust memory within the Polish and Eastern European. One, by Jorg Hackmann (2018),
provides a detailed account of the multiple forms and institutions employed by the Polish state
in controlling and politicising Holocaust memory, including: museums, laws and
commemoration events. Whilst dealing empirically with similar themes to this paper, it is
again done outside of the OS framework. Joanna Michlic and Malgorzata Melchior (2013)
offer a much broader account of the post-1989 development within Poland, with specific
interest to how the Polish state has dealt with various challenges to its own desired memory
both internally and externally.

In terms of the UK, most studies are concerned with the explosion of interest in
the Holocaust which occurred in the 1990’s. Caroline Sharples’ and Olaf Jensen’s Britain and
the Holocaust (2013) offers a detailed collection of essays which trace the development of the
memory from the fallout of 1945 through to the modern day. The main themes which are
addressed in this collection attain to the lessons and values (often utilised politically) drawn
from the Holocaust, which came to the fore in 1995 and the 50th anniversary of the liberation
of Auschwitz. Moreover, Richardson (2018) applied discourse analysis on speeches by Prime
Ministers at HMD memorial events, and analysed BBC media productions concerning Holocaust remembrance. Richardson focusses on the multi-modal and often party-political nature of these speeches, and identifies the value and lesson-driven approach the UK has taken to Holocaust memory. Whilst these studies offer in-depth discursive analysis, they are nationally driven in scope and do not address the same themes of Europeanisation and OS addressed in this study. Much like the case with Poland, whilst detailed work concerning the collective memory of the Holocaust has been conducted on the UK, and whilst this work also connects the UK’s experience within the Europeanisation context, there is again little by way of comparative work, nor is OS used as an explanatory mechanism in understanding why the memory developed in a particular manner.

In summary, whilst the Europeanisation of Holocaust memory and the development of a collective European identity has been studied a great deal since 2000, there has yet to have been a comparative study of the mnemonic techniques utilised by states with disparate experiences. Whilst broader discussions relating to the differences between western and eastern Europe are included within Karlsson and Kucia’s studies, their focus lies more within the general process of Europeanisation rather than how this has effected individual nations. Furthermore, whilst the studies by Subotic and Mälksoo provide a clear account of how memory of the Holocaust relates to a state’s OS, there is still little in the way of comparison between disparate cases in regards to the lived experience with the Holocaust and how this may affect the memory strategies employed. In regards to Holocaust memory more generally, beyond Richardson and Göran Adamson (2000), the analysis of leader speeches at Holocaust memorial events is largely absent. At a more theoretical level, whilst the ontological security literature has been utilised, especially by Subotic and Mälksoo, as a means by which to understand the particular mnemonic strategies of states, this has been done without reference to the differences within the literature as outlined above. That is to say, those studies were empirically driven whereby the theory was utilised to explain certain phenomena whilst this study seeks to use the empirical cases to test the disparities within the theory itself.

**Research Design**

This section on research design offers the theoretical model applied within this study, alongside the specific methodology used to achieve this. The theoretical model is a means by which to both locate threats and classify different mnemonic strategies as either a ‘defensive’
or a ‘reflexive’ in order to test whether a particular technique is employed depending on case type. This will be supplemented by Mälksoo’s concept of ‘mnemonic security’ in order to connect memory practices into the OS framework. Drawn from the theoretical model will be the variables of the case study, and discussion will be had regarding the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Moreover the application of the theoretical model will be discussed in accordance with the methodology of discourse analysis, the means by which classification of strategies shall be determined.

**Theoretical Model**

The theoretical model here is designed to define what a threat to OS is, and then to designate responses to such a threat as either defensive or reflexive. Whilst the classification of the strategies will be done in reference to the respective authors, it will also be done in accordance with Mälksoo’s conception of ‘mnemonic security’ as this more accurately captures the ‘memory’ aspect of OS. Moreover the ‘mnemonic security dilemma’, as forwarded by Mälksoo shall be introduced as it highlights the interplay between defensive and reflexive techniques. It is also important to reiterate here the assumption this paper has built that memories play a constitutive role in the construction of the identities and narratives central to OS. Added to that, the empirical element attests to the important role the memory of the Holocaust plays into the identities of both the individual national case studies, and of the transnational European identity which both are a part of.

Implicit in the act of securitising, mnemonic or otherwise, is the recognition of a threat. Therefore it becomes necessary to fully define the type of threats relevant to the case studies which shall be analysed. Whilst the analysis shall be conducted at the national level of the UK and Poland, as explored above, these national level memories occur within the European context. As both the UK and Poland are members of the relevant European memory setting institutions (the EU, European Parliament and the IHRA) they are both impacted by the decisions each make. In this sense the international environment in which these processes occur are the best testing grounds for these concepts of mnemonic security. The combination of a pan-European Holocaust memory and of competing national level memories creates an environment in which states feel the need to secure their own memories when others own memories conflict with their own (Mälksoo 2015: p.226). Furthermore, particular ruptures can occur which may cause a greater sense of insecurity. It must be made clear here that such ruptures need only cause insecurity at the level of identity, not specifically of the memory of the Holocaust. That is to say, Holocaust memory is a means amongst others in which OS may be defended. In this sense one can classify two types of threats. The first type are threats
which are directly made at the level of Holocaust memory. For example a European Parliament Resolution which calls for recognition violence against Jews during the Holocaust is a threat to the OS of a state whose own narrative denies complicity in the event. In order for the state to maintain its mnemonic security, it must react with a strategy to counter act the anxiety and shame associated with being labelled a perpetrator. As this is a direct threat type, the reaction of the state is related to the threat itself, that is to say, both the identification of the threat and the corresponding response are deliberate and conscious. The second type is less directly related to Holocaust memory, but rather to more general threats to identity and biographical narratives which may be defended, in part, by reference to Holocaust memory. For example the situation many former communist states found themselves in when attempting to create a new identity for themselves after the rupture of the fall of the communist regimes. This ‘threat’ to identity was not about the memory of the Holocaust per se, but the states used the memory of the Holocaust, in various ways, in order to create and maintain a new identity (usually in the sense of creating a sense of victimhood or bravery).

Målksso’s conceptualisation of the ‘mnemonic security dilemma’ is very much illustrative of the first type of threat identified above. For Målksso:

“The securitisation of national remembrance also tends to replay the classical security dilemma as one state’s memory of a same historical event is not necessarily that of others, and the increase of a sense of ontological security of one state at securing its memory often comes at the concurrent expense of its neighbour’s sense of ontological security” (Målksso 2015: p.225).

This can produce the effect of creating ‘memory wars’ whereby mnemonic strategies become increasingly concerned with not only exonerating themselves, but doing so largely at the expense of another. The existence of the mnemonic security dilemma reduces the chances of reflexive strategies being employed as one must, like in the traditional dilemma, assume the ‘enemy’ will be offensive and act accordingly (Målksso 2015: p.225). That is not to say that reflexive strategies are impossible, but rather made less likely when the actor is engaged in a dilemma as so. One would also add, that the likelihood of being drawn into such a dilemma, as well as the level of threat associated with the success of the ‘others’ memory, depends very much upon the actors position in a relational sense. That is to say how one actor may rate the scale of a particular threat will in part be based on their judgement of the other parties standing in the European order. Furthermore the chances of the dilemma occurring, and of
ruptures arising, is likely to be increased by greater direct experience of the historical root of
the memory as there are far more opportunities for overlapping claims and accusations. This
attests to Assmann’s concept of trauma as these events are likely to be inherently tied to a
nation’s identity. Moreover, Mälksoo claims that even the very existence of an attempt to
create a transnational memory across states who have very different national experiences and
memories of the same events, only serves to further exacerbate the dilemma. As no one
unitary memory can realistically satisfy the various national memories it stands over, the most
it can achieve is increasing the ontological insecurity of the states who necessarily become
marginalised, which then begins the cyclical process all over again (Mälksoo 2015: p.226).

In defining what is meant to be classified under a ‘defensive strategy’ it is
immediately necessary to make a semantic point so as to avoid confusion. ‘Defensive’ here
refers to the process, as forwarded by Mitzen, of defending a particular identity which is itself
largely a product of routinisation of relations and behaviours. As was key to Mitzen’s central
argument, these routines may even be the cause of negative feelings, or at the level of
individuals, even compromise physical security. Therefore a ‘defensive strategy’ does not by
definition refer to attempts to defend oneself from negative associations or contents, but rather
to defend the continuity of routine which informs identity. In light of this one must distinguish
between memory forms and memory strategies. The former refer to the context specific
contents of the memories, which, in the context of the Holocaust, in the majority of cases
serve to elicit positive emotions, or at the very least serve to defend (in the normative sense)
against negative feelings. The latter refers to the wider strategy which threads the memory
forms. In this instance, the strategy refers to a longer term process whereby one particular
identity is preserved over other competing identities. In the case of the Holocaust this is
usually a positive, self-exonerating identity, but the point is that is does not have to be
positive in order to be a defensive strategy. A clearer way to explain the difference is to use
Browning and Joenniemi’s own understanding of Mitzen’s position as “identity preservation”.
In this sense a particular identity is what is being defended and preserved; the identity is the
referent object. Thus strategies will be classified as defensive if, over the time frame of
analysis, the memory forms utilised preserve a consistent identity. That is to say, one speech
cannot be alone classified as a ‘defensive strategy’ but as memory form which is a constituent
part of a wider overall strategy built up over a timeframe. It is also key to note here that in the
same vein that one speech cannot be classified a strategy, nor can one single speech be
evidence enough of a change in strategy. Identities in this sense are understood to be of a
particular ‘type’. For example, a state may identify as a victim, a rescuer, a bystander or a
perpetrator (although not limited to). It may even be a mix of these identity types, however, whilst certain identities may co-exist (such as bystander and rescuer) others necessarily contradict and negate one another (victim and perpetrator). The key here is that these types are accessible by any state regardless of lived historical experience, as long as they are able to, through memory forms, justify and argue for this identity, in this case through discourse and speech.

Central to Browning and Joenniemi’s critique of Mitzen and Steele’s conceptualisation of OS is not that they wrong, but rather that focussing on ‘identity preservation’ limits its analytical scope and does not account for cases which do exhibit reflexivity. Indeed, central to their argument is that rigid identity preservation, which often requires securitisation (usually against a defined ‘other’), itself often ends up leading to a changing of identity as the securitisation process necessitates some degree of change, else little is being done by way of securitising (Browning and Joenniemi 2017: p.39). Their argument suggests that as “the world constantly evolves” preserving a singular and consistent identity will only create anxiety and insecurity as those identities will be challenged by the new order of things (Browning and Joenniemi 2017: p.45). A link can be made here between the ‘evolving’ nature of the world, and the ruptures explored above in regards to ‘threats’. What Browning and Joenniemi do is turn the fear of anxiety, as understood by Mitzen, on its head by accepting that anxiety is a necessary component of the development of the self. To maintain OS, the self reflexively engages with the source of the anxiety and, in doing, may adopt another identity consistent with the state of the world. Here anxiety is reconstructed as a something which “need not necessarily be something to be assiduously avoided, but may actually be welcomed as offering chances for renewal” (Browning and Joenniemi 2017: p.45). Much in the same vein as in the case of defensive strategies, reflexive strategies are not so concerned with the content, but rather if these forms, over the same time frame as introduced above, exhibit signs of change and openness rather than rigid identity preservation. Thus a strategy will be classified as reflexive if, over the timeframe, there is a move between the constructed identities. That is to say, if a state which once identified, through utilising specific memory forms, as a rescuer but over the timeframe changed to, or in this case, admitted to, being a bystander this would be classed as reflexive. Moreover, this change could in theory happen more than once, or go between multiple identities. They key point is that the state in question shows that it is open to change and has the capacity to do so, and is therefore not defensive and attempting rigid identity preservation.
What, then, may explain for variation between strategy types? Drawn from reference to the empirical literature and to the concepts forwarded by Assmann and Zarakol, two main explanatory variables are being tested in this study: shame and trauma. These variables offer both explanatory power into variation, and have also dictated the case selection as the existence of each varies between cases.

The first explanatory variable that shall be tested here is based on Zarakol’s own concept of relational shame which is tied to West/East divide in case selection. This is the shame states feel, not necessarily for the committed act, but for how this, or acceptance of culpability, makes other states feel about the actor. The degree to which this shame exists (and to what extent a state wishes to accept culpability) is dependent upon how each state views its position in relation to others. In Zarakol’s own case, this was how Turkey and Japan each related to the ‘West’, and how they internalised the West’s negative connotations of ‘oriental’ and ‘eastern’ others as uncivilised. Subotic (2018) identifies the same pattern in regards to Croatian admission into the EU, whereby accepting the European standard of Holocaust remembrance also meant dealing with its own fascist past and actions during the Holocaust. In the context of the Europeanisation of Holocaust memory, one can locate a similar West/East divide, this time contained to Europe. As identified by Mälksoo (2019) Eastern Europe acts as a “problem of difference” for Western Europe whereby the democratic and liberal order of things which came to define the EU have been challenged by illiberal tendencies in the East (Mälksoo 2019: p.374). This is largely attributable to the existence of the communist system which ideologically and physically separated the continent, and pitched them as adversaries during the Cold War (Mälksoo 2019: p.376). These illiberal tendencies also include the lack of responsibility taken by Eastern states in relation to their 20th century past, including issues of collaboration in the Holocaust. This key issue is further stated by Mälksoo as so:

“Eastern Europe’ emerges as a warning of a creeping return of this retrospective ‘self’ as the region’s core states demonstrate an apparent disregard for the settled parameters of the European normative order, in which the ‘othering’ of authoritarianism along with the self-reflexivity and acknowledgement of the co-responsibility for the Holocaust in Europe have been the central animating forces behind the European integration project and the construction of the European identity” (Mälksoo 2019: p.375).
This relational circumstance potentially limits room for reflexivity on the part of Eastern European states as either they are viewed as illiberal for not accepting responsibility or they accept culpability and risk further confirming the negative view ‘core’ Europe has of them. If shame is induced regardless, it follows that states would act *defensively* as at least it provides the stability and continuity of self as understood by Mitzen. As the European memory was largely created through the lens of Western European states, and the transnational European identity was formed in relation both to this memory and with one another, states in the West are not as hamstrung by the same dilemma posited above as they are not trying to gain access to ‘Europe’. Thus the contradictory scenario faced by states such as Poland and Croatia are not present to the same degree in, for example, the UK and France further justifying disparate cases by introducing variation. That is not to say that Western state *will* act reflexively, but rather they are more likely to as they are removed from the dilemma.

The second explanatory variable is based on Assmann’s concept of *trauma* which is defined by historical experience. Whilst trauma may be experienced by states whose direct experience of the traumatic event are limited, perfectly illustrated by the European memory of the Holocaust, it still holds that those who directly experienced the trauma may be greater impacted and shaped by it. Assmann locates two types of trauma: *perpetrator trauma* and *victim trauma* (Assmann 2016: p.76-77). The victim trauma, especially in terms of the Holocaust, is somewhat self-explanatory in that the survivors experienced the horrors of the death camps and loss of loved ones. Moreover, this trauma can be multi-generational as the memory is passed on. This informs an identity centred on the experience of the traumatic event which, for Assmann, are even more powerful than memories and identities of victory as the memory often feeds into perceived contemporary disadvantages (Assmann 2016: p.27). Perpetrator trauma operates differently. It is not so much related to recalling the horror of the events themselves, but, interestingly, what she terms ‘trauma of shame’ whereby the trauma is experienced after the event due to the shame induced by perpetration (understood here closer to Zarakol’s than Steele’s conception). Possible defence mechanisms to defend against such ‘trauma of shame’ included denial of perpetration, or silence (taboo) of the topic (Assmann 2016: p.78). Given that the Holocaust occurred in largely Poland, there is a greater plurality of possible trauma (i.e. the existence of both victims and perpetrators) than in the UK where the physical connection was comparatively null and the plurality of experiences accordingly lessened. As explored above, state narratives and identities based on Holocaust memory seek to homogenise experience into an identity type (victim, perpetrator, bystander etc.) and the European memory necessarily abstracts multiple experiences into a unitary memory which
removes the space to identify as, or with, two conflicting identities (victims and perpetrators) leading to silencing the negative identity. Thus it follows that Poland would prefer defensive strategies which protect and stick to one singular identity (or multiple but co-existing identities) over reflexive options. The UK’s physical disconnection allows for it to more neatly adopt the ‘abstract’ European memory, as it does not exacerbate the same problem; it does not mnemonically homogenise a heterogenic experience. Therefore, in a similar fashion to the shame variable, the trauma variable holds that again the UK would be more likely to exhibit reflexive strategies, not that it will. The historical analysis section will further explain and justify the disparity and selection of the case studies based on these two variables. These explanatory variables both act as mechanisms and drivers of case selection. That is to say, the west/east divide in case selection allows for variation in both levels of trauma and of shame due to the differences of historical experiences between the two. To reiterate: whilst states had differing historical experiences the European memory necessarily unifies and, in doing so, abstracts. This abstract memory fits more with the UK’s own experience than with Poland’s heavily implicated and fractured experience. This variation – the model holds – should explain differences in strategy type, if any occur, due to the role of trauma and shame.

To summarise, with reference to the ontological security literature a model has been forwarded which 1) identifies threats, 2) classifies responsive strategies as either defensive or reflexive, and 3) offers the explanatory mechanisms of shame and trauma which are related to the case selection. The following section addresses the methodology of the study; how the theoretical model will be applied to the case studies in a controlled manner in order to best draw valid conclusions from the analysis.

**Method**

The aim of the following methodology section is to spell out the practical application of the above theories upon the case studies in question. Addressed within this section will be: the outlining of the cases (and their role as variables); the collection of data and sources; timeframes; and lastly introducing the use of discourse analysis as a mean by which to apply the theories above to the relevant data.

The research question that is study is attempting to clarify is: why do states employ different mnemonic strategies to maintain OS? To answer this question, the theoretical model forwarded above shall be applied to the case studies of the UK and Poland. There exist two possible outcomes, or dependent variables, in the forms of memory strategies (either defensive or reflexive); in order to answer why one strategy may be chosen over the
other this study makes use of John Stuart Mills ‘method of difference’ found in his *A System of Logic* (1856). In regards to this study, the major independent variables are historical experience and relational position within Europe, variables which neither case share. One can therefore claim that any variation in the dependent variable may be caused by the different independent variables. Whilst certain factors are consistent across cases (both are democracies, both are members of the same European institutions, and both have access to state institutions) the major differences occur at the theoretically relevant junctures, of *shame* and *trauma* as explored above. Thus any variation at the level of strategy type may be said to be caused by these differences. Whilst unlike a laboratory experiment it is not possible to control for every possible variation outside of the independent variables being studied, certain measures have been put into place which will be addressed throughout this section.

At its most basic level this study can be described as a small-n comparative study of two cases. When it comes to case selection there are several important questions that spring to mind and must be considered. Firstly, how many cases? On the one hand, only using two cases allows for a degree of depth and detail suited to a qualitative approach and in most cases not possible with large-N studies. On the other, using only two cases may run the risk of conclusions being too specific and non-generalizable. A safeguard against this is to make sure that the cases are representative of others, (allowing for more general conclusions about other cases beyond those being studied) and that the methods employed are valid and could, in theory, be applied to other cases in the same manner. Therefore selection of variables and methods is of great importance in terms of this studies claims of validity. Indeed, as identified by Przeworski and Teune “the goal of comparative analysis is to substitute names of variables for the names of social systems” (Przeworski and Teune 1970: p.8.). By this they mean that the cases chosen represent not simply that one case or society, but a more generalizable system. A caveat must be made in here in regards to the representative value of the UK in regards to ‘core’ and ‘western’ Europe, which on the face of it may seem strange given the 2016 decision for the UK to leave the EU, known as Brexit. The choice of case here is based on the UKs position in relation to Holocaust experience and subsequent mnemonic development rather than its position within the EU. Furthermore, as the testing of the theory is conducted on the basis of disparity of independent variables, the UK, as one of the European countries with the least physical experience of the Holocaust, the decision still stands. In regards to Brexit, the vote occurred in 2016, 3/4s into the timeframe, and as of 2019 was still a functioning member whose formal leaving had not yet occurred. Moreover, specifically in regards to Holocaust memory institutions, the UK remains a member of the IHRA (and
crucially was one of the founding members). However, the speeches collected after 2016 will be conducted in reference to the fact that they occurred after the vote, as this acts as one of the possible identity threats as identified by the theoretical model. The case of Poland is clearer due to its double-occupation and communist past in line with other former communist states in central and Eastern Europe. However, in regards to representability it must also be factored in that these cases were chosen on disparity and extremity of experience (UK little; Poland total) which necessarily means they are not entirely representative of other cases. This means the conclusions are limited more to the specific case studies and the interplay of the variables more than more generally to such ‘systems’.

The second question that then must be addressed is, which cases? There are several pitfalls one can fall fail of when selecting cases for a comparative study. One of the most common, according to King, Keohane and Verba (KKV 1994), is that of selection bias. For KKV, selection bias occurs when the researcher “subtly, or not so subtly, selects observations on the basis of combinations of the independent and dependant variables that support the desired conclusion” (KKV 1994: p.128). That is to say that cases (or observations) are selected on the basis of some prior knowledge or conviction of the researcher, and that, in their perception, such cases will suit the hypothesis given by the researcher. And that, most blatantly, other possible cases which could have been selected are ignored as it is likely that they will go against the ‘desired conclusion’. As selection in small-n studies rarely benefit from complete random selection in the same way that large-N studies often do (KKV 1994: p.126-7)\(^2\), one must accept and be aware that some degree of bias may, consciously or unconsciously, have influenced the case selection. To offset this bias it must be first recognised, and then the conclusions drawn must be adjusted to recognise the bias and any possible affects that it had. Furthermore, in regards both to case selection and variables, as noted by KKV “selection should allow for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependant variable” (KKV 1994: p.129). As even they note, such a rule should be so obvious as to not be needed, but nevertheless is sometimes not followed. As the dependant variable within this study is ‘mnemonic strategies’ within the given case study, and the independent variables are historical experience and relational position in Europe, it would not make any sense to choose cases which both sat on the same side (thus rendering the independent variable useless) nor to choose cases in which the forms of memory were either entirely similar (allowing for some national differences) or not challenged by the independent

\(^2\) In that they may not produce cases relevant to the variables being studied.
variables. As a comparative approach of only two cases, whereby the independent variables are a driving force behind case selection, it makes sense to choose cases based on their opposition and extremity.

Another important aspect to take into account is the timeframe of the study. The data of this study shall be drawn from the period beginning in 2001 and ending in 2019. The decision to set the timeframe for as long as a period as possible is to allow for the respective mnemonic strategies to be properly judged. As shown in the theory section, the major aspect of defining a strategy as either defensive or reflexive is based on a development of the memory; a development which cannot take place in a small timeframe, Whilst there is no definite answer to how long must be allowed for so as to test the variables at play, one can locate a beginning point. The year 2000 was both the convening of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, and the subsequent adoption of the Stockholm Declaration, two of the most important moments in the institutionalisation of a European Holocaust memory. Both the UK and Poland were present at the forum, and are signatories of the Declaration (and members of the IHRA). However, as the Forum took place during January 2000, it was not until 2001 that national governments could begin to hold their own commemoration days and events. The decision to stop the timeframe in 2019, is that given that this paper is being written in 2020, allowing for a one year period of ‘reflection’ to pass on the time of analysis means that the events can be better placed into their overall context, rather than engaging with potentially on-going and un-resolved matters. Any conclusions drawn from this study are made in the knowledge that they only are valid for the timeframe in question, and are not prescriptive beyond the timeframe.

In regards to data and data collection, as this study is concerned with that of the national state level, the dataset and the subsequent analysis of this study must reflect this. A dataset which does not deal with issues at the state level cannot, of course, tell us anything about how a state deals with issues of memory. Therefore it would be misguided to collect data which deals with purely individual forms of remembrance, or those forms not connected to, or within the influence of, the state. Data shall be drawn from the state and other relevant official institutions from within the UK and Poland. To achieve this there will be particular focus given to those statements provided on January the 27th, Holocaust Remembrance Day, due to the prominent status that is holds and the huge media presence that it commands. Due to the extra focus given to Holocaust Remembrance on this day, it provides the greatest opportunity for the state to project not only what is remembered, but how this memorialisation shall take place as well as the importance and prominence placed upon it. Moreover, January
27th is observed in both case studies and is inherently tied to the transnational component of this study as it was a norm established by the IHRA. As the analytical component of this study is concerned with speeches and discourse, it follows to choose mnemonic settings in which speeches by the relevant state actors are given. In the UK, the date is marked by Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) which is made up of thousands of local and regional events across the country. Each year, however, there is a ‘main event’ which is attended by high level state officials (often the Prime Minister) and a speech or statement is provided. Further context surrounding HMD will be provided in the historical analysis section. In Poland, whilst the day is also remembered it is less dispersed than the UK and there is no ‘umbrella’ institution such as HMD. The focal point of January 27th is an event held at the Auschwitz Memorial and Museum, which is run by the Polish state. The event is always attended by a state representative (of varying prominence) who gives a speech. Again, more information about the day will be provided in the historical analysis. What is key to note here, is that these two ‘events’ are the main settings in which mnemonic discourse (speeches and statements) are provided by the state. Furthermore, by focussing on these events, a degree of control is introduced as these events are both connected to the Europeanisation context and occur yearly in a similar setting and context, which allows for any similarities or differences between years (development) to be more clearly identifiable. Whilst the analysis will be primarily addressing these speeches, other speeches given at relevant memorial events, as well as discourse provided through other state channels will also be examined for a degree of plurality.

The speeches of relevant state officials will be the key data which will be analysed. When possible speeches by leaders (Prime ministers and Presidents) will be favoured as they a) provide the clearest example of the state and b) provide that particular memory form with a degree of authority and added meaning. However, when this is not possible (such on non-anniversary years where there is less focus and attention given to remembrance events) the speech of the government representative who is chosen to speak at the event will be analysed instead, as this still counts as state representation. Speeches and statements will be taken from an official source (such as a government website or relevant institutions website) so as to not take unofficial views as those of officials. In the instances where a speech is obtained from a non-official source (such as a new agency) this will be specifically made clear. The collection of data was achieved by using the internal search engines of the relevant state web pages. In the case of the UK this is the gov.uk website. This was supplemented by the HMD website which has highlights and reviews of previously ‘main events’ including video highlights.
which offer the chance to transcribe non-archived speeches. In the case of Poland, speeches
given by the President are archived within the personal Presidential website (president.pl),
although only for speeches given at the major anniversary events. The statements given by
Prime Ministers or ministry leaders are published in the relevant ministry website news
archive. This was complemented by the news archive of the Auschwitz Memorial and
Museum website news archive, as they provided a detailed press release of each remembrance
even (although the availability of usable speeches/statements varies year to year). Added to
this was searching the web archives of major news organisations who covered the events, who
sometimes provide a full transcript of a particular speech. In regards to Polish data collection,
due to language restrictions the data is limited to those speeches and statements which are
published in English. Whilst this limits the amount of available data it does better conform to
the transnational aspect of the memory strategies as, in line with Steele’s understanding of
self-narratives, the speeches are intended for an international, non-Polish speaking audience
adding to their utility in how Poland wishes to be viewed by others. In selecting data to be
collected, certain criteria was followed. To be considered, the form had to be more than a
single or a couple of short sentences or statements, as these are usually interjected with other
text not give by the actual speaker. In press releases short quotes given by a relevant actor are
considered within the press release as a whole rather than as separate entities which is the
distinction made here between speeches and statements. These statements may have been
delivered as part of a complete speech, but it is only possible to access what has been
published and archived. An example of the criteria in application can be given in regards to
the archived press releases provided by the Auschwitz museum. Since 1999, the have
provided a press release of the event held at the museum, however, only since 2005 have
these press releases included, in whole or in part, speeches and statements of state
representatives. Even in years where statements are given, they are in some case only a short
sentence, and in others simply praise the good work of the museums, which does not attest to
the memory strategies which this paper is concerned with. Moreover, in both cases there are
instances where press releases of the event are composed largely of quotes from a speech
which was available elsewhere and had been already collected either in full or fuller than
those in the press release. The form with the larger amount of original speech was collected
and the other considered ‘duplicate’ and disregarded. In light of this the data collection
returned 15 UK forms and 12 Polish forms which were substantial enough for analysis to be
conducted, within each case is a mixture of full speeches, statements and press releases. In the
analysis the form ‘type’ (full speech, press release etc.) will be made clear. The ‘types’ are defined as so:

- **Speech**: A substantial text given by the relevant actor at, or for, an event. Zero added interjections by others.
- **Statements**: These are shorter quotes given by the actor presented in an article or webpage covering the event. May have been given as part of a larger speech, but only now available as selected quotes.
- **Press Releases/Articles**: Where the text has been written either as representing an institution or authored by relevant actor(s). Written form not mixed with quotes from others.

Whilst all forms collected were analysed, for the brevity of the paper those forms considered most representative were analysed in full in the analysis section. The representative value of each is addressed in the analysis.

Whilst the decision to focus on speeches and statements provided on January 27th at either an HMD event (UK) or Auschwitz ceremony (Poland) has been justified above, and theoretically fit the desired data profile, there were certain issues which arose during the data collection process. Due to the limited time period available to the author, and due to exonerating circumstances such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the data collection was restricted to online search functions and archives. Thus data collection was at the behest of which speeches and statements had been chosen to be published online (through the channels introduced above) and which remained online in the case of those speeches from the early parts of the timeframe when the internet was not as all-encompassing as today. In both cases, for those years which were not an anniversary year and were in the former half of the timeframe (2001-2010) officially archived speeches and statements (which met the selection criteria) were few and far between. In the cases where no speeches/statements could be found for a particular year through official channels, popular web searches such as Google were used which in turn provided either full speeches, or large segments of quotes with editorial filler of the covering news agency. Blair’s 2001 and speech is an example of the former, and his 2005 speech an example of the latter. This latter speech is the only example whereby quotes are taken without either the context of the whole speech, or published by an official source. This is made clear in the analysis, and the full article is reproduced in the appendix and only the quotes are considered for analysis, not the article filler. This means was only attempted in the case of UK sources due to the author having knowledge of the news sources, and that in the Polish case language restrictions and a lack of knowledge of trustworthy Polish sources meant such an endeavour would not be academically fruitful. A consequence is that
the collected sources in both cases are top-heavy in the favour of post-2010 where there was a greater variety of available sources. Nevertheless, forms were also obtained from the former part of the timeframe, just in less volume. As this paper focusses on a broader development across the timeframe, enough data as collected to show and track this development.

This final section of the methodology sections seeks to link together the method of discourse analysis with both the theory of ontological security and the chosen case studies. In other words, why is discourse analysis a theoretically relevant methodology suited to uncovering answers to the research question, over other possible methods. In order to answer that question it must first be established why speeches of state officials and leaders qualify as memory forms which may be then classified, in conjunction with one another, as either defensive or reflexive. As forwarded in the theoretical overview, collective memories may take many different forms be they museums, education projects or even days and acts of remembrance (such as designated remembrance days). Whilst these forms of memory shall be made use of in the analysis section, in providing context for the speeches, they are less explicit than discursive forms in terms of creating the self-narratives identified by Steele. In regards to states, these self-narratives are constructed through those representing the states interests; put bluntly, states themselves don’t have a mouth to speak or hands to write with and thus their narratives are composed by those individual actors who represent the state in one official capacity or another. In representing the interests of the state, in this context in relational circumstances to other states, both the actors and the discourses that they create become inherently political. In recognising the political component of the discourse, it follows that political discourse analysis, a sub-set of discourse analysis forwarded by Norman Fairclough, will be well suited to this study. For Fairclough, the ‘political’ aspect is located both in terms of actors (politicians) but also in the process/events in which the discourse occurs (Fairclough 2012: p.17-18). It is also recognised that political discourse occurs in an institutional context whereby the relevant actors serve as representatives to something bigger than themselves as an individual (a political party, ideal or nation). The key component is in recognising the link between political discourse and political action, or as Fairclough terms it, “politics as action” (Fairclough 2012: p.18). In other words, when we analyse the words of a political actor, given in a political context, it must be understood that these words serve to enforce real world change and action; the goal of the discourse is to further a political goal. In the context of this study, political discourse is a means by which the relevant political actors come to use memory both as a means to create (and delimit) national identity and negotiate threats by discursively constructing one type of mnemonic strategy. Moreover, there exists a
clear tradition within the fields of collective memory and OS of employing discourse analysis as a means to understand and locate particular techniques and strategies. Steele (2008) employs discourse analysis in identifying (and subsequently analysing) the self-narratives of states by analysing speeches and texts of the relevant actors to the end of matching the projected narratives with the chosen actions (behaviours) of said states/actors in order to prove his argument regarding identity preservation in the face of threat (Steele 2008: p.76-114). More specific to the empirical focus of this study is the work of Mälksoo (2009; 2015; 2019) in her analysis of Baltic States relationship to the EU in regards to conflicting memories over the 20th century and what ‘European’ identity should be. Mälksoo’s analysis centres on excerpts of speeches given by the relevant actors whose speech discursively constructs narratives. Whilst behaviours and actions certainly play a constitutive role in the creation of memories and narratives, they are less explicit in regards to the projected meaning intended by the actor.

To summarise: the collected texts will be analysed in reference to the theoretical model to classify the mnemonic strategy as either defensive or reflexive based on their development over the timeframe. The analysis of the forms presented in the analysis section have been chosen across two levels. Firstly, they met the overall data selection criteria attesting to their relevance and substantiality. Secondly, the presented analysis have been designated as representative of the particular mnemonic techniques employed which, taken in conjunction with one another across the timeframe, constitute the overall mnemonic strategy. The techniques are identified by means of discourse analysis which understands the speeches/texts as politics in action and within the context in which they were given. As the cases act as independent variables, any variation in strategy type may be determined by these disparities; in this case historical experience and relational position. The results of such analysis will be used to draw theoretical conclusions pertaining to OS in the case of Holocaust memory. The remainder of the paper is dedicated to the historical context and the analysis of the collected data.
Analysis

Historical Context

This section provides the relevant historical context from which the analysis will draw upon. It will also provide a link between the historical context and mnemonic development within each case and the selected source materials and collected qualitative data. It first outlines the historical experience of each Poland and the UK in order to show what the memory strategies analysed are actually based on. That is to say, even in regards to the *myths* forwarded by Assmann, they are still based on real historical experiences and not plucked entirely from thin air. Even in the cases where interpretation of events does not necessarily stick to proper historical enquiry there still exists a historical point of reference. This is an important component of the study as the disparate positions and experiences of each case act as possible explanatory variables in regards to possibly memory strategies. Whilst both the UK and Poland are ‘European’ (geographically and politically) and are both members of the relevant transnational memory institutions (the EU and IHRA) each have vastly different lived historical experiences of the Holocaust, and greatly different developments of the memory of these events mostly due to the Communist regime in Poland which existed until 1989. As previously addressed, a key aspect of the ‘Europeanisation’ of Holocaust memory is that is attempts to create a unitary memory as if there existed a unitary experience. However, as will be addressed, the Holocaust physically occurred in much of central and eastern Europe (a large part in Poland) whilst western Europe, especially the UK, had little direct experience, and largely became aware of the Holocaust after it had already occurred. How does this variation effect the outcome of strategy type? The following section therefore both provides historical context and further develops the choice of cases based on their disparity. Moreover, it introduces the institutions within each case which set out the mnemonic strategies; such as the Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) in the UK and the Auschwitz Memorial and Museum in Poland and how each of these relate to the concept of national and state memories.

Poland

“Poland was a central site of the Second World War, the earliest victim of the National Socialist military attack, with the longest period of occupation, the territory where most of the Holocaust took place and the country with the highest percentage of human loss” (Pohl 2004: p.89).

The above quote, given by Dieter Pohl, sets out in the most simple terms the destruction suffered by Poland during the Second World War. Geographically placed between
both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Poland made up a large segment of what Timothy Snyder has termed the ‘bloodlands’ of Europe whereby, between the years 1933 and 1945, ‘fourteen million’ were murdered by the hands of the two totalitarian regimes (Snyder 2010: p.viii). Whist Snyder’s number of 14 million is contested (see Kuhn 2012) it is without doubt that the region suffered hugely, especially in comparison with the Western Front. A short overview of the Holocaust in Poland (within the context of the war as a whole) shall be provided before moving onto the development of Holocaust memory within Poland. This is by no means an all-encompassing history of the Holocaust in Poland, but an overview of the key historical points so as to provide the relevant context in regards to the memory of the events which later developed. The memory section shall be split into two sub-sections, the former dealing with communist Poland, conducted with particular recourse to Wawrzyniak (2015) and the latter with post-Communist Poland after 1989.

The opening of the Eastern Front is most often made with reference to Operation Barbarossa (1941) when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Yet it was two years prior in 1939, with collaboration between the future foes, that Poland became the ‘earliest victim’ of Nazi Germany. Shortly after invasion from the West by Nazi Germany came invasion from the East by the Soviet Union, and Poland soon fell only to be carved up into various factions. Parts of Western Poland were directly incorporated into the Third Reich, whilst the more central regions became a quasi-puppet state known as the Generalgouvernement and the easterly regions were absorbed into the Soviet Union (Pohl 2004: p.92-3). The dual invasion was the product of what has come to be known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, a deal made between the totalitarian powers which has received a great deal of attention in eastern Europe since 1989. Western Poland was deemed as ‘living space’ by the Nazis for the Aryan race leading to mass deportations of ethnic Poles and Jews (some 2.8 million Poles were forced into German territory as slave labour). Jews, however, were the primary target of German racial hatred, and in 1939 they made up some 10% of the Polish population (Snyder: p.122). Whilst it is true that Poles and other Slavs were considered surplus, and plans were drawn up for mass deportations (some of which were realised) it was only the Jews were targeted for complete destruction (Pohl 2012: p.98).

The most obvious connection between Poland and the Holocaust is that it is within Polish territory where the majority of the Nazi concentration and death camps were established. Whilst Jews had been killed sporadically by gunfire from 1939, and many more died from disease and malnutrition after being forced into the segregated ghetto system from 1940, it was not until 1941 that the systemic murder of Polish Jews began in the form of the
Final Solution (Pohl: p.98-99). Camps specifically designed to process and destroy Jews, from across all of occupied Europe, were established. Among them infamous names such as Auschwitz, Treblinka, Sobibor, Belzec and Majdanek. More than any other it is Auschwitz that has become the major symbol of the Holocaust.

Five and half years of Nazi occupation was ended in 1945 with the invasion of the Soviet Union. The majority of the Nazi death camps in Poland were liberated by the Red Army, including Auschwitz (January 27th 1945). Whilst precise figures are difficult to come by, most historians put the number of Polish Jews killed during the Holocaust within the 2.5-3.5 million range, alongside 1.5 million ethnic Poles. According to Pohl, if one were to take into account the losses of all Polish citizens, one would reach the 6 million mark (Pohl 2004: p.105). Figures provided by Michlic et al claim that ‘only’ 660,000 of these Polish deaths were caused by direct military involvement, highlighting the specific suffering of the civilian population (Michlic et al 2019: p.408.). A major point of controversy regarding the Holocaust in Poland, and a point that shall be returned to throughout this study, is the degree to which Poles collaborated with the Nazis in the destruction of Polish Jews. Whilst it is no doubt Poland was occupied during the war years, as claimed by Michlic, Poland maintained a well organised ‘secret state’ and had the largest resistance movement in Europe (Michlic 2019: p.409.). However many of the benefits of this resistance movement were not extended to Polish Jews who, in line with pre-1939 levels of anti-Semitism, were deemed ‘aliens’ to the Polish nation (Michlic 2019: p.409.). Various pogroms were undertaken by Poles during the occupation years, including the now infamous Jedwabne Massacre made known by Jan Gross’ study Neighbours, the conclusions Gross brings are extremely controversial within Poland (this shall be returned to). Following the defeat of Nazism, Poland fell under the influence of the Soviet system and was headed by a communist regime until 1989, when within the wider fall of communism across central and Eastern Europe, Poland became a democratic state.

The above aimed to provide an overview of the Holocaust in Poland within the historical context that it occurred. The following section shall deal with how these historical events have been understood within Poland both in the immediate aftermath of the war through to the modern day. This overview of the memory of the Holocaust in Poland provides for a better understanding of the forms of memory that shall be studied and compared and gives a sense of historical development and continuity to the mnemonic forms analyzed. One cannot begin to discuss the development of Holocaust memory within Poland without fully acknowledging the role of the Communist Party in its development. For Wawrzyniak,
the immediate post-war landscape of Poland was marked by the Communist Party attempting to secure control and legitimacy over the war-torn state, thus any understanding of memory and narrative must be understood that the aim of such was to create order and to legitimise the Communists as the ruling party (Wawrzyniak 2015: p.51.) Given that post-war Poland contained many different, often competing, groups including: surviving Jews, returning POWs, surviving Polish civilians, anti-Communist partisans and other non-Polish ethnic groups (including Ukrainians, Germans and Russians) it was clear that the Communist party needed to create homogeneity in order to survive (Wawrzyniak 2015: p.51-2). This was achieved by homogenising the role of the multivariate groups within Poland against the common enemy, namely Fascism and Nazi Germany. The ‘unity’ of these groups, working together to defeat Nazism, left little space for any individual group to claim any more or less suffering; the Poles as a nation suffered together and won together (Wawrzyniak 2015: p.52-55). The clearest example of such is that the Communist party merged together all of the various movements and unions of former soldiers and camp inmates into a unitary organisation named the ‘Union of Fighters against Fascism and the Hitlerite Invasion for Independence and Democracy’ clearly marking fascism as the point of reference for the new Communist identity (Wawrzyniak 2015: p.79.).

The situation as outlined above left very little room to recognise the particular fate and suffering of Jews who were simply understood as another victim of Nazism, amongst all others. This is best exemplified by the treatment of the death camps by the authorities under Communist rule. Auschwitz, contemporarily the international symbol of the Holocaust and Jewish suffering, was stripped of Jewish relevance and was understood very much within the context of Polish suffering. Moreover, exhibitions at Auschwitz in this period (1949 onwards) focussed more on the enemy (Fascism) than on the victims. Indeed the Holocaust, and Jewish victims, managed to be almost ignored entirely at the actual historical site it occurred within. This particular treatment of Auschwitz is revealing. Auschwitz-I was primarily a forced labour camp which was composed largely of enemy POWs and Polish prisoners, whilst Auschwitz-II, often known as Birkenau, was a death camp whose primary victims were Jewish. When Auschwitz became a museum under government control in 1947, the Polish element of the camp was favoured and the distinction between the camps, and the different treatment of the respective inmates, was eroded, the effect being the side-lining of the unique Jewish experience of the Holocaust (Michlic 2019: p.416).

With the fall of Communism in Poland in 1989, and the holding of free elections in 1990, the Iron Curtain relinquished its grip over Poland and over the memory of both the
Holocaust and war as a whole. This, however, did not mean that the overall memory changed. For Michlic, whilst the 1990’s were characterised by a wave of survivor testimonies and monographs, accompanied by a swathe of cultural depictions of the period in film, print and art (a period known as the ‘Renewal’) the dominant memory in Poland remained largely unchanged (Michlic 2019: p.421). What had changed, though, was the availability of new sources and that the discussion was now in the public sphere. The most explicit public discourse regarding the memory of the Holocaust within Poland came as a reaction to the 2000 publication of Jan Gross’ Neighbours. The book, which implicates local Poles in the destruction of the entire Jewish population of the village of Jedwabne, was a direct challenge to the dominant memory of Polish victimhood and innocence. The ensuing debate was public, heated and controversial. The reaction of the state was to have the Institute of National Remembrance (created in 1998) to undertake their own investigation into the event. Nevertheless, Poland was present at the Stockholm Forum, a signatory of the Declaration and a founding member of the IHRA in 1999. Due to the geographical placement of many of the major physical sites of the Holocaust being on Polish territory, there is an added degree of focus and attention paid to Polish treatment of Holocaust memory. Moreover, due to this fact, many projects which fall firmly within the scope of the IHRA and the Europeanisation project (many of which centre around preservation and documentation of sites) are conducted in Poland with the tacit permission of the government and institutions such as the INR. The preservation of sites, such as Auschwitz, is deemed as both a national and transnational responsibility.

The INR is one of the major institutions used by the Polish state to set out its Holocaust memory strategy. An area of great concern for the INR is the misuse of the term ‘Nazi Death Camps’ as ‘Polish Death Camps’, an error which may lead those uneducated in the topic to assume that it was Poland who was responsible for the running of the camps. They are responsible for the running of the website ‘truthaboutcamps.eu’ which goes into historical detail into the organisational structure of both the camps and occupied Poland. Interestingly, the main header of the page has links to two pages ‘Poles under German Occupation’ and ‘Repressions against Poles’ before making any mention of the Holocaust (Accessed 04/03/20: https://en.truthaboutcamps.eu/).

After ascending to the EU in 2004 (amongst 9 other former communist states) Poland, as claimed by Mälksoo, has, through the political organs of the EU and other European institutions, been pushing its own memory agenda in order to ‘prove its Europeaness’ and often makes use of the memory of the 20th century to achieve this point.
The major narrative goes that the pain and suffering inflicted on the Polish people places them in the heart of Europe as a victim of both Nazism and Stalinism. Indeed, as marked by Mälksoo, in 2007 at the EU Council of Ministers the Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski used the death of Poles during the war, at the hands of Germany, as justification for asking for extra EU representatives, which are normally based on population size (Mälksoo 2009: p654.).

Poland is regarded as one of the major proponents of what has been deemed ‘politicising memory’ (Hackmann 2018). The most explicit evidence of such a claim came in 2018 in what have come to be known as the passing of the ‘Holocaust laws’. An amendment to the same act which created the INR (in 1998), which was initially forwarded in 2016, passed on January 26th 2018, just one day before the January 27th memorial date. The amendment made it a criminal offence for those:

> “whoever publicly and contrary to the facts attributes to the Polish Nation or to the Polish State responsibility or co-responsibility for Nazi crimes committed by the German Third Reich [sic], … or for any other offences constituting crimes against peace, humanity or war crimes, or otherwise greatly diminishes the responsibility of the actual perpetrators of these crimes” (Hackmann 2018: p.602)

What made this amendment even more notable, was that it was made within the same article (55) which made denying the Holocaust a criminal offence, leading to accusations of drawing parallels between Holocaust denial and attributing Polish state responsibility. Due to the proximity to January 27th, the laws made international media and were eventually referred by President Duda for review until the criminal element was later removed (Hackmann 2018: p.603). Very much within the purview of the amendment were issues regarding Polish concentration/death camps as explored above. The main justification for the amendment, and the task for the INR in general, was the “protection of the reputation of the Polish Republic and the Polish nation” (Hackmann 2018: p.601). The laws illustrate the various tools available to a state in regards to memory strategies. Whilst others tools are more implicit in their application (such as favouring certain events over others for remembrance) the criminalising of certain historical perspectives is certainly one of, if not the, most explicit means by which a state may control and influence memory.

In direct regards to contemporary Holocaust remembrance events, Auschwitz, as the international symbol for the Holocaust, is the main site of remembrance within Poland,
where world leaders and other relevant actors come to pay their tributes on January 27th. Auschwitz Memorial and Museum is run by the Polish Ministry for Culture and National Heritage Protection (Accessed 07/02/20: http://auschwitz.org/en/public-information/organisational-rules-of-the-auschwitz-birkenau-state-museum/) although it receives additional funding from a wide range of international donors, including other states, private foundations and individuals and transnational organisations such as the EU. Indeed the preservation of the physical sites of the Holocaust is one of the central norms formed by the ‘Europeanisation’ process. The yearly memorial service is conducted under the ‘patronage’ of the Polish President who gives speeches at anniversary events, and is either present or represented on other years. As these events are attended by representatives of other states, they provide a clear ‘mnemonic strategy setting’ opportunity for the Polish state. Furthermore, as these other state representatives come from various states and from Jewish groups from around the world, the speeches are often either given in English, or translated both as they are given or fully reproduced online after the event, further attesting to their transnational focus. This section on Polish history and memory seeks to have provided the historical context of which the main analysis of this study is drawn from. Indeed the interrelatedness of history and memory means that the study of one must be conducted in reference to the other. An interesting and certainly relevant point in regards to transnational memory setting in this particular context is that the ‘Europeanised’ memory of the Holocaust largely stems physically from Poland. What effect is created when a memory is taken from its physical context, dealt with at the transnational level, and then sent back to the physical site? As shall be shown, such a problem is certainly much more relevant in the case of Poland when compared to the UK, whose physical connection to the Holocaust is far looser.

**The United Kingdom**

If the Polish experience of the Holocaust was defined by its physical connection to the events themselves, then the British experience is defined by a mnemonic connection after the fact. Unlike Poland, the UK was not the site of the Holocaust, nor was its own population the target of destruction. Thus the memory of the Holocaust in the UK focusses on different aspects of the period, again within the context of the conflict as a whole. This section shall first address the historical involvement of the UK in regards to the Holocaust, before tracing the development of Holocaust memory from the immediate post-war years, through to the modern day.
Whilst Poland was geographically centred between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the UK had a distinct geographic advantage compared to mainland Europe in that it had the defendable English Channel between itself and Nazi Occupied Europe. The major British memories of the war are equally spread between military and civilian experiences. The retreat at Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and the Invasion of Normandy stand out as the most notable military events whilst the Nazi bombing of English cities, most notably London during the Blitz and the ensuing rationing and evacuation of children to the countryside, rank as the most notable civilian experiences (Kushner 2013: p.52).

There exists within the literature of the Holocaust a typology of agents: the victims, the perpetrators, the bystanders and the rescuers and it is the latter two of these four ‘types’ that best describe the UK’s relationship to the Holocaust and its Jewish victims. In terms of bystander, the UK’s role in dealing with Jewish refugees both in the build-up to the outbreak of war, and during the Holocaust itself, has been given academic treatment even if it has not become part of the ‘mainstream’ narrative (see London 2000). In terms of rescuer, certain individuals and rescue missions have been focused on including the Kindertransport missions to rescue Jewish children as well as the British liberation of the Bergen-Belsen camp (Kushner 2013: p.51). Each shall briefly be addressed before addressing the formation of the UK’s Holocaust memory.

The UK’s spatial orientation to the Holocaust meant that its physical involvement was limited. What it could become though, as was hoped by many continental Jewish refugees, was a safe place out of the reach of the Third Reich. Moreover, as the Imperial power in the Palestine, and what would become Israel, the UK also held a unique position when it came to the question of Jewish immigration. Before, during and after the Holocaust the UK had a fluctuating position on its treatment of Jewish refugees. One of the most negative events came in 1947, after the scale of the Holocaust was known to the government, in the case of the Exodus. A ship of Jewish refugees attempting to gain access to Palestine, which was forcefully boarded by the Royal Navy, killing two Jewish passengers before sending the ship back to Germany where the remaining passengers were placed back in internment camps (Halamish 1998: p.90-91). In a more positive sense, there were the successful Kindertransport missions which rescued roughly 10,000 (mostly Jewish) children in 1938-39, mostly seen as a reaction to the Kristallnacht attacks (Baumel-Schwartz 2012: p.1).

Beyond the Kindertransport the most explicit physical connection between the UK and the Holocaust was the liberation of Bergen-Belsen by British and Canadian troops on
April 15th 1945 (Little 2013: p.172). As the only camp liberated by British troops it is the major physical connection between the nation and the event; unlike Poland which acted as a major physical site for the entirety of the war. Due to the limited historical experience, it is more fruitful to focus on how the memory of these limited events has developed and become somewhat unbound from the lived experience.

In line with much of Europe after 1945 the Holocaust, as a distinct event, was not of particular national interest in Britain. Whilst the Nuremburg War Trials went someway in bringing attention to the plight of Europe’s Jews, the Western powers focussed only on those camps which they had liberated (Bergen-Belsen and Dachau) whilst refusing to fully acknowledge the particular fate of the Jews, placing them in direct comparison with the camps other inmates (mostly POWs). This, for Erich Haberer, “minimised the Holocaust, marginalised the victims and misrepresented the complexity of the continent-wide implementation of the Nazi genocidal policies” (Sharples 2013: p.32.) Furthermore, the attention to detail and legal nature of the trials meant that, despite what was uncovered, they were unable to hold the attention of the wider public, many of whom had their own personal grievances to address and focus on (Sharples 2013: p.32-33).

The development of Holocaust memory within the UK must be understood in relation to the memory of the Second World War as a whole. The war is remembered with a sense of national pride, creating a myth of British morality and unity whilst ‘standing alone’ against an occupied continent (Kushner 2013: p.52). Moreover, the terrors of the Blitz created, much like in Poland, a sense of, at worst, competing victimhood and, at best, apathetic sentiments to the plight of others. A mixture of apathy and continent wide lack of knowledge led to the above being the status quo in the UK up until the 1990s. Whilst during the 1970s and 1980s there was academic treatment of the Holocaust, the dominant national memory of the Holocaust was very much underdeveloped when compared to other Western nations including France, the United States and West Germany (Stone 2013: p.212-13).

The real turning point in the UK’s memory of the Holocaust came in the 1990s when a blend of factors came together. Dan Stone (2013) identifies: the Yugoslav wars (especially Srebinica), the Rwandan genocide, and the fall of the Berlin Wall as factors behind making the Holocaust nationally relevant, especially as an ethical signifier in regards to the civilian casualties in the former two factors. Culturally, the release of Schindlers List (1993) also brought the Holocaust to the attention of the general public (Stone 2013: p.219). The effects of these factors culminated in 1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, and of the liberation of the camps. The anniversary and its commemorations, the
first ones of a national scale, were implanted into the UK’s ‘heritage’ and the Holocaust became a central part of the overall war narrative and memory (Stone 2013: p, 220). This new found attention with the Holocaust set the groundwork for the UK to be one of the founding members of the IHRA in 2000 as a result of the Stockholm Declaration. This was consolidated by the UK becoming the first country in Europe to legislate a National Holocaust Remembrance Day (27th January 2001) as recommended by the IHRA. Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) was a trust set up by the government to be responsible for the national commemorations, and is today a registered charity which receives government funding (Accessed 06/03/20: https://www.hmd.org.uk/about-us/). Since the first HMD in 2001, the day has been observed yearly, with a wide range of commemorative and educational events set up under the HMD umbrella. HMD is the main platform used by the UK government in terms of Holocaust memory, and speeches by government officials usually take place at HMD run events on January 27th, or the build up to. Moreover until 2015 the Queen was the main patron of the charity before being succeeded by Prince Charles, another indication of the ‘national’ prestige HMD holds (Accessed 28/04/2020: https://www.hmd.org.uk/about-us/our-patron/). For a sense of scale, in 2019 HMD reported 10,000 events had been conducted across the UK, which follows an upward trend in events since HMD’s 2001 inception. As these events include patronage and engagement from government officials from the national down to the local level (alongside yearly government funding) it can be stated that these are state sanctioned events which bare relevance to the aims of this study; although their main function here is in providing the direct environment in which the analysed speeches occur. Whilst the speeches given at these events are the most explicit means by which a particular mnemonic strategy may be laid out, the frequency and status of remembrance events also denotes the value and importance of a particular memory. As a final point to demonstrate the state institutionalisation of Holocaust memory in the UK, since 2010 there has been a dedicated role of Special Envoy for Post-Holocaust Issues, a role currently held by Lord Pickles, whose goal “is to ensure that the UK continues to play a prominent role in international discussions on all Holocaust-related matters” (Accessed 28/04/20: https://www.gov.uk/government/people/eric-pickles). To ensure that this goal is met, the UK government has pledged £75 million for the creation of a Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre in a prominent location next to Parliament. The decision for such a location, for Pickles, is so it will act “as a permanent reminder that legislators always have a choice, either to protect or to oppress human rights” (Accessed 04/05/20:
The decision to build the Memorial and Learning Centre may be considered one the major landmarks in Holocaust remembrance within the UK.

This section aims to have both provided the historical context of the UK’s relationship to the Holocaust and traced the development of Holocaust memory from 1945 to the modern day. In conjunction with the parallel section on Poland, this chapter has provided the relevant contextual backdrop from which the major analysis of this study can take place, namely by introducing the main institutions employed by each state in setting out their mnemonic strategies and the major areas of concern for these institutions. Moreover it has further elucidated the extremity of case types as a means to justify their selection, and the double role the case selection plays as possible explanatory variables.

**Source Analysis**

As proposed in the methodology section, the analysis of the collected speeches shall be conducted chronologically in order to best capture the developments which, when aggregated, compose the *memory strategy*. However, when relevant and theoretically fruitful, segments of speeches will be cross-referenced with one another outside of any time order to highlight the interplay between speeches. It is useful here to briefly remind ourselves of the distinction between *memory forms* – the individual, units of analysis such as individual speeches and statements – and *memory strategies* – the aggregated classification of a collection of *forms* over the timeframe – as the distinction best illustrates the broader approach the analysis takes. By use of discourse analysis it becomes possible to identify subjectivity, identity creation and value-drawing from within these *memory forms*. The key themes of each speeches shall be located and then placed in relation both to one another, and to relevant contextual information which may inform the particular discursive choices employed and be used to identify the possible threats which trigger a particular response. The major goal of this analysis section is to locate the overall memory strategy (defensive or reflexive) in line with that proposed in the theoretical model. To do this, specific attention will be paid to the creation of specific identities of the state in regards to the role which they played during the Holocaust, before then addressing whether these identities are routinely defended, or open to reflexivity. The analysis will first be conducted at the level of the individual cases, first the UK followed by Poland, before placing the two case studies in comparison with one another in order to ascertain if the possible explanatory variables set out above explain any possible deviation in strategy type.


United Kingdom

Since the adoption of HMD in 2001, the UK has commemorated the Holocaust annually. However, the commemorations which fall on particular anniversary years are given greater precedence and attention in the form of media presence (for example being broadcast live on the BBC) as well as the prominence of the government representative (Richardson 2018: p.348). For each text analysed, the speaker/author will be presented as well as their role (and political party membership) as this provides relevant context in terms of strategy development. All 16 of the collected forms have been analysed for this section, and the forms (be they speeches or statements) are all reproduced in full in the appendix. In order to provide detailed analysis, not every form’s analysis is presented in this section, but rather those forms considered most representative of a particular technique.

The first speech given within the timeframe of this study was given by Prime Minister Tony Blair (Labour) at the 2001 HMD main event, which was held at Westminster Central Hall and broadcast on live television. Given that this was the first event held after the Stockholm Forum and Declaration, it was of particular importance in regards to memory setting. Moreover, the speech occurred whilst acts of ethnic violence and genocide (Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo) were fresh in the public memory which, for Stone, goes some way in explaining the UK’s new found role in Holocaust memory due to their own involvement in Kosovo and lack of involvement in Rwanda (Stone 2013: p.219-20). In regards to Fairclough’s notion of politics as action the political context the speeches occur within are particularly relevant, as in this instance the speaker - the Prime Minister - possesses the power needed to act, meaning the speech is a means by which to justify and delimit possible courses of action. Blair’s speech sets out a strategy which focusses on the values and lessons which can be learnt from the Holocaust, and how these lessons may guide the actions of those now. Furthermore, he immediately seeks to connect Britain to the ‘positive’ aspects of the Holocaust, namely as a safe-haven for Jewish refugees. He opens his speech as so:

“Tonight we remember the Holocaust’s victims and we honour the survivors, some of whom are with us here. It was to Britain, amongst other places, that they came to rebuild their lives. Their memories have become part of our memories, our history” (Item A)

This is an important construction, given greater poignancy by it being opening segment which immediately connects Britain to the Holocaust in a positive light as a place of refuge. The

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3 Speech in full obtained from The Telegraph
double use of “our” in regards to memory and history is offered as a justification as to the national relevance of the Holocaust and its remembrance. Blair then turns to constructing an image of the Holocaust, presented in absolute terms of “horror”, “industrial might”, and “wickedness” before stating it as the “greatest act of collective evil the world has ever known”. This is then placed in the context of the “triumph of good over evil” a theme immediately repeated in the following section of “a struggle of good and evil”. The construction of the ‘eternal’ battle of good and evil places Britain on the side of good not only in the specific context of the Holocaust, but such inherent values are not temporally limited but create continuity in identity; to be good is a trait of who one is, rather than of what one does. The removal of the Holocaust from historical confines is a particular strategy often repeated. He then moves to place Holocaust memory in the European context:

“it also marked a turning point in European and human history. That is, served as a catalyst for the reconstruction of our continent founded on the values of democracy, liberty, equality, opportunity” (Item A)

This directly paints the Holocaust as the ‘negative foundational myth’ identified by Assmann. The Holocaust, as the symbol of absolute evil stands at the centre of the ‘new’ Europe; and remembering is a crucial aspect of this. The use of ‘values’ as something to be drawn from the Holocaust is again a trope utilised both throughout Blair’s own speech, and over the UK strategy as a whole. Lastly, as to further illustrate the contemporary utility of memory to the present is how Blair connects the Holocaust to other instances of mass violence when he says “Cambodia, Rwanda and the Balkans prove that hate-mongers and tyrants persist” placing British action in Kosovo within the good vs evil narrative the Holocaust creates. This is part of the process identified by Steele (2008) in regards to the self-narrative informing action; the narrative is constructed with reference to the past, and the actor must then conform to actions which confirm the narrative, or risk feeling shame. Here Britain acted morally, on the side of good, and it must continue to be seen to do so in the now and in the future. He concludes by firmly consolidating and justifying Holocaust memory into the UK’s own narrative in stating: “the Holocaust deserves this permanent place in our collective memory”. The Holocaust becomes our story and our memory which teaches and embodies our values. Moreover, the use of ‘permanent’ is another means by which to create the continual narrative the memory (and its lessons) signify. The narrative and identity which Blair seeks to create by employing the memory of the Holocaust is a value-driven lesson which informs the decisions of today. The only mention of Britain’s physical connection to the Holocaust is as a safe haven where Jews came to ‘rebuild their lives’. Any negative concerns regarding the restrictive refugee
policy are set aside, despite this being a potential point to learn from. Indeed the lack of attempt to create a physical connection attests to the creation of a rescuer identity whereby the ‘evil’ happened ‘over there’ as a contrast to the ‘good’ embodied ‘here’. In such a case trauma is only recognised as something experienced by the victims, who then came ‘here’ for refuge. The lack of a perpetration ‘threat’ means that the bystander/rescuer identity is not challenged.

In 2005, and in the second of his speeches analysed here, Blair continues on the themes explored above. The theme for 2005 HMD was Survivors, Liberation and Rebuilding Lives, which added to the fact that 2005 was the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, gave the ceremony added meaning. Like in 2001, the event was held at Westminster. The most direct link between the two speeches is the continuation of the eternal ‘good vs evil’ narrative. Blair states:

“It was death as an industry, not just the destruction of human life, but of human essence, done with a barbarity we can scarcely contemplate. This was no natural disaster. No act of God. But an act of deliberate, calculated evil such as humanity never in its existence knew before, and let us pray, never knows again.” (Item B)

Not only does this passage link with the previous speeches notion of true evil, but it also notes that “we can scarcely contemplate”. This serves two possible functions. The first is to subjectively create the ‘we’ who cannot imagine the evil because it is outside ‘our’ understanding of the world, our value system. The second is to further construct the Holocaust as something abstract which is removed from our daily system of understanding, and can only be accessed and understood as a system of values and lessons; this is further evidence by use of biblical rather than historical/factual language. The event was attended by several hundred Holocaust survivors which meant that the majority of the speech was directed towards them and served as a limiting factor in what Blair was to present.

A point of particular relevance for the classification of the UKs mnemonic strategy, is that it remains consistent despite the political allegiance of the government. Whilst there are some differences in presentation and the means utilised to achieve a particular narrative, the outcome is largely the same. Whilst Blair uses dramatic, hyperbolised and descriptive language, especially in relation to the evil and destruction of the Holocaust – which as noted by Richardson, was consistent with his oratory style in general (Richardson 2018: p.361) – a new focus came into being which favoured personal stories and a focus on individual survivors to make points to similar ends. That is to say, a switch was made from

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4 Largely reproduced with small editorial filler in the Daily Mail
general descriptions of evil to personal and real stories; however, whilst the means changed, the ends remained the same. To illustrate this point, take these two texts from several years later in 2012 and 2015 by new Prime Minister David Cameron, leader of the Conservative party. The former is a shorter statement provided by Cameron to be played at the 2012 HMD main event in his physical absence, whilst the latter is a longer speech given at the 2015 event. In his 2012 statement, Cameron gives the story of survivor Truda Levi:

“She was forced on a journey that can only be described as hellish. Through concentration camps, work camps and death marches. She saw and suffered some unspeakably evil things, but she survived to tell her story and pass it onto the next generation” (Item C)

Whilst there is continued use of ‘unspeakably evil things’ in line with Blair’s use of eternal evil, the very use of a survivor provides both added meaning to the text, but also connects the event to the modern day, making the event less abstract, but something connected to the present. Her story, and remembering, is presented as a goal of her survival, further justifying our (the next generation) focus and remembrance. Moreover, the audience is invited to experience the trauma through the story of the survivor; again, this is limited to victim trauma. This theme is more fully developed in his 2015 speech, which amongst Blair’s given in 2001, is the most explicit in regards to the overall strategy. Here Cameron introduces Jack Kagan whom he describes as “one of Britain’s many inspirational Holocaust survivors” after describing his dramatic experiences of imprisonment and escape, Cameron makes a connection to Blair’s opening lines in 2001 when he adds “after the war, Jack came here and made his home in Britain”, further highlighting Britain’s role as a place of refuge. Cameron again refers to Kagan as ‘our survivor’ which seeks to connect Britain to the positive role of rescuer/refuge, despite the fact that Kagan was a Belorussian at the time of the Holocaust, and had never been to the UK. That does not defer from the fact that he did become British after his moving there, but rather shows the means by which the British perspective is implanted into the story. The most interesting segment of this 2015 speech, however, is the way by which Cameron seeks to de-politicise the Holocaust, and relate it to an inherent aspect of the British memory and identity. After announcing plans for the Holocaust Memorial and Education centre, with “the leader of the opposition” and “cross party support” (whereby the government also pledged £50 million to the project) Cameron concludes by stating:

“Today we stand together – whatever our faith, whatever our creed, whatever our politics. We stand in remembrance of those who were murdered in the darkest hour of human history. We stand in admiration of what our Holocaust survivors have given to our country. And we stand united in our resolve to fight prejudice and discrimination in
all its forms. We will keep Britain’s Promise to Remember. Today, tomorrow and for every generation to come.” (Item F)

These concluding remarks offer some key insights into the strategy as a whole, and also links to Mitzen’s understanding of continuity and need for stability of identity. The first point of interest is in fully creating the subjectivity of the reader by the repeated use of ‘our’, given that this ‘our’ is despite differences in faith, creed and politics the reader is left with little other than nationality (British) to identify with. Again, use is made of “our Holocaust survivors” and what they, the victims of evil, have “given to our country”. Cameron employs a snappy rhetoric in delivering a slogan like “Britain’s Promise to Remember”, which must be understood within context of the plans for the Memorial and Education Centre. Cameron ends by again attesting to the temporal continuity of the memory and the values it holds, “today, tomorrow and for every generation to come”. This highlights the universality of the memory, in that it holds semblance for every generation to come. The memory of the Holocaust serves not only to act as a reminder of the events themselves, but something ontological in that they remind Britain who it is, then, now and in the future further developing its self-narrative. A theme that will be returned to in the comparative analysis is the value drawing from the UK forms manage to forward a positive message be it of “admiration” or standing together.

To offer some variation away from speeches given at HMD events, one may take this article co-written by Lord Pickles and Ed Balls (both members of the UKs Holocaust Memorial Foundation) and published in September 2018 in the London Evening Standard. This text is of particular interest as it offers an example of responding to an identified threat, and then how Holocaust memory is employed as a means to counteract it. Moreover, in being published into a newspaper, it further attests to a strategy setting by directly engaging the public. In noting that anti-Semitic attacks were at a record high in the first half of 2018, the authors then claim that “we’ve got to be brave at times like these, when it’s clear that our British values of tolerance and equality are coming under threat” and that the existence of such intolerance “is a huge failure to stand by the values of this country” (Item M). Whilst the values themselves are not stated, in the context of both the article as a whole and of the overall strategy, they are understood as those of a nation who stands on the opposite side of intolerance and discrimination. The memory of the Holocaust, in this instance symbolised by the Memorial and Learning Centre, is offered as a remedy of this failure as it acts as “a place for the whole country to learn about the past to build a better future.” (Item G) Again, this repeats the lessons and values tropes which are the major themes consistent across the UK strategy. One must also place this text, and the development of the Memorial and Learning
Centre as a whole, within the *politics as action* framework as it seeks to at the same time serve as a justification for the centre being built. In regards to the threats located by Pickles and Balls, they do not necessarily fit with those offered in the theoretical model. Indeed, one could claim that the position the UK finds itself in, whereby its historic connection to the Holocaust is limited, means that threats to its particular narrative and memory are seldom. In setting out their argument for the *reflexive* aspect of ontological security, Browning and Joenniemi argue that rather than anxiety “need not necessarily be something to be assiduously avoided, but may actually be welcomed as offering chances for renewal” (Browning and Joenniemi 2017: p.45). This suggests that reflexivity is a product of anxiety, or those ruptures which may potentially cause it. One aspect of the UKs strategy is that it largely follows the norms of the Europeanisation project as a whole, even if it does not explicitly reference it. The value and lesson oriented approach is consistent with the abstract nature of the transnational memory which, by necessity, cannot be based purely in national terms, and thus reaches for values in substitute. That is not to say that the UK doesn’t experience threats at the level of identity; indeed the 2016 Brexit decision could very much be understood in terms of a rupture to the continuous self/narrative identified by Mitzen and Steele (shifting from European to non-European, ostensibly politically but symbolically more so). But rather that value driven memory of the Holocaust is malleable to particular needs (as ‘our values’ or ‘British values’ are never explicitly defined) which in turn leads to the adoption of a defensive strategy on the basis of this identities utility. That is to say, the memory forms consistently construct the same narrative of British values being the opposite of the Holocaust, emphasised through connecting the British experience to those victims and rescuers who come to represent said values. Interestingly the occurrence of such threats occur within ‘our’ society, but the causes or existence of, is externalised as outside or against ‘our values’. Thus a wholly negative scenario (the rise of anti-Semitism) is still constructed to reinforce the ‘true’ and ‘good’ British identity drawn from the memory of the Holocaust.

The above is equally demonstrated in the HMD 2016 speech given by Greg Clarke (the Secretary for Communities and Local Government) representing the Cameron government. Clarke first addresses the general mood by describing HMD as “this most sombre and important of days” before bringing in the story of 10 British POWs who “saved Hannah Sarah Rigler [a survivor attending the event] from the Danzig death march, hiding her, feeding her, nursing her back to life” (Item H). As is consistent across the forms analysed, this positive British interaction is the only mention of British involvement in the speech. This does not deny nor belittle the occurrence of the stories chosen to be shared but
rather focusses on that which is not shared, which for Assmann is as a crucial part in the creation of national myths as what is shared and highlighted (Assmann 2018: p.26). A further subtle but revealing remark made by Clarke is the phrase “because Nazi Germany taught us…” (In regards to how genocides occur through the choices of those who fail to stop the perpetrators) which further consolidates the role of the Holocaust as a value-laden lesson (this time with Nazis as the teachers). In the HMD speeches which were analysed for this study, it was only the last within the timeframe, given by Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt (Conservative) in 2019 that showed any real tendency of reflexivity. Whilst initially following the convention of narrating the Holocaust through the story of a British hero or survivor, here by invoking the story of British spy Frank Foley (who issued fake passports for Jews to immigrate to the UK and US), Hunt then makes a deviation from the usual detached nature of the ‘lessons’ when stating:

“The bleak truth is that not everyone in the British government of the day possessed the same moral clarity or the will to confront the realities of Hitlerism. The policy of appeasement, no matter how well intentioned, was futile and morally bankrupt. We should reflect that it was not the state as a whole, but remarkable individuals like Frank Foley who did the right thing, made the correct moral choice, often in defiance of the rules” (Item O)

By disconnecting the role of the state from the actions of key individuals, Hunt moves away from the inherent nature of British values as the ‘good’ which faced up to the Nazi ‘evil’ and instead offers a more nuanced approach which offers the audience to understand the situation that individuals faced and the choices they could make. In this sense being ‘British’ is not offered as a homogenous identity characterised by the nation or state, but as something potentially fractured into multiple identities of rescuers and those who did nothing at all. This ability to call into question a fundamental aspect of the memory strategy is a sign of reflexivity due to offering an alternative identity through reconstruction of the hitherto presented narrative.

In summary, the UK’s mnemonic strategy is centred on three specific techniques. The first, is to construct the Holocaust as a part of the ‘eternal’ battle between good and evil. The second, is imbue the Holocaust with lessons which inform (and conform to) British values in line with Assmann’s ‘negative foundational myth’. The third seeks to frame the narrative into one where any British connection is a positive one, be it through heroes or those survivors who found refuge in Britain; moreover, this is often done by using the stories of those particular individuals although this is a trait more associated with speeches from 2012 onwards. The strategy would overall be classified as defensive, especially due to
the consistency shown across years, and between governments. When reduced to the essential techniques introduced above, there is a clear level of consistency to the analysed forms. Moreover, non-speech forms such as the Memorial and Learning Centre act in line with the strategy. Whilst Hunt showed the necessary elements for that form to be considered reflexive, it is a single paragraph given at one of the non-televised HMD events and cannot be considered fully representative. The major point is the ability to draw positive values from an inherently negative memory; this is a key difference in the upcoming case of Poland. A more in-depth discussion concerning the explanatory power of the variables will be considered in a comparative fashion with the results of the Polish analysis, which follows.

**Poland**

As forwarded in the historical context section, Poland’s historical experience of the Holocaust was a more varied affair than that of the UK. This variety is also reflected in the development of the memory of the Holocaust. A wider array of events are commemorated in Poland in regards to the Holocaust, but it remains the case that January 27th is still the major remembrance day, given added meaning due to Auschwitz being within Poland and these make up the bulk of the analysis, with one speech given at a nationally oriented event for a degree of pluralism. Like in the UK analysis, whilst all 12 forms were analysed (and are available in full in the appendix) those considered most representative of the relevant techniques have been presented in this section. The first of the January 27th remembrance day speeches which was analysed was given by President Kwasniewski (Social Democracy) at Auschwitz in 2005. The speech sets out some major themes which are consistent across the analysed speeches, regardless of government type. The Holocaust is first presented in descriptive, hyperbolic language with use of words and phrases such as “hell” and “monstrosity” and the perpetrators as “disciplined butchers” as well as attesting to the events incomprehensibility, “no words can render the entire terrifying truth about the horrors committed in this place”. Kwasniewski then moves to construct Poles as the first victims of Auschwitz before then opening up to the fate of other nationalities in describing the camp as “an enormous European cemetery”. The use of Auschwitz, and its memory and perseveration, as something of European value is a consistent narrative invoked across the strategy and attests to Mälksoo’s identification of Poland using the memory to push its ‘Europeaness’. The unique experience of Jewish victims is then made explicitly clear. However, the use of Jewish victimhood is then incorporated into the wider narrative of Polish suffering, take this segment:

“For us here in Poland this is a place of special reflection. We reflect on the martyrdom but also the steadfastness of our nation, which grappled with the invaders from the first
First, it invokes ‘martyrdom’ of the Poles who defended the nation specifically mentioning from the longevity of Poland’s involvement in the war. The “special bond… with the Jewish people” is a theme consistent across the strategy. It seeks to at one and the same time recognise the unique experience of Jews, but place them and their experience alongside Poles. This is especially relevant when the next passage of the speech refers to the “world which Poles and Jews had built on this land in collaboration” before then turning “to recall those great of spirit, the Polish heroes who demonstrated courage and solidarity with the Jews”. The effect of such claims to create a narrative in which, much like in the UK, direct actions of Poles are viewed positively and negative aspects are side-lined. This is of particular interest when contrasted with a previous speech given by Kwasniewski at a national ceremony held for the victims of Jedwabne held in 2001, where he directly apologises to the Jewish community on behalf of Poland. However, Kwasniewski still acts to construct the crimes as crimes by Poles against Poles, whilst at the same time removing state responsibility and marking the act as an aberration when stating “we cannot speak of collective responsibility burdening with guilt the citizens of any other locality or the entire nation. Every man is responsible only for his own acts”. This is technique is of course flipped when drawing inherent national values from actions of those individuals marked heroes. This apology is of particular interest because it acts in direct response to an identified threat to the Polish narrative, whereby the research and publicity garnered by Gross’s Neighbours meant that Poland needed to respond. However despite admitting the complicity of the Poles of Jedwabne, this is disconnected from the Polish identity and, furthermore, woven into the Polish victimhood narrative:

Let us all be the citizens of Jedwabne today. Let us feel what they feel! Let us remain with them in a common sense of grievance, despair, shame and solidarity. Cain could have killed Abel anywhere. All communities could have been tried in the same way. The trial of evil, but also of good. Of meanness and nobility. Righteous is the one who was able to demonstrate compassion in face of human suffering. How many Poles - also inhabitants of the neighbourhood also of Jedwabne deserve to be called righteous! (Item A)

Thus a challenge to the Polish identity of victim and rescuer, by implicating them in perpetration is at one and the same time recognised (by way of apology) but still presented to be part of the eternal struggle of the Polish nation, whilst even then bringing into the focus the “righteous Poles” in the story of Jedwabne, the symbol of Polish complicity. In doing so the overall identity of Poland as a victim remains the central narrative, and even evidence of
complicity is incorporated into the narrative. An opportunity for reflexivity, in the face of a clear identity threat, is therefore instead turned defensive. Indeed the ‘threat’ Jedwabne poses to the Polish identity has even been constructed as an attack of the Polish nation, itself a further construction of the victim narrative (Michlic 2017: p.297-9). This is clear example of both the trauma and shame variable at place, effected by Poland’s physical plurality of conflicting identities. The apology shows clear elements of Assmann’s perpetrator trauma and victim trauma. Even in admitting that some Poles (externalised) were perpetrators, the national identity is constructed within the victim category with “let us feel what they feel” attesting to the generational trauma of the memory. Thus the conflicting identities are compressed and the perpetrator identity side-lined. In regards to the Polish forms, this is the most explicit form of the positive value drawing, although it is fixed in a particular event compared to the more abstract nature exhibited in the UK forms.

Whilst across the timeframe the identity of victim and rescuer is defended, there is some degree of variation in regards to the techniques employed to achieve this. In his two speeches analysed in this study (2012 and 2015), President Komorowski (Civic Platform) is more explicit than Kwasniewski both in the construction of the rescuer and victim identities. Moreover, there is a more explicit intent to link the memory, and the European foundational myth into the narrative of Poland. In regards to the construction of the victim identity Komorowski (2012) links in the aberration of the Holocaust with the destruction of Poland and its role as a safe haven for Jews:

The Republic will never forget the victims of Auschwitz—above all because a significant proportion of them were its children: Polish Jews, Poles, Polish Roma. But also because, in setting up this extermination center, the German occupier dealt a horrific blow to our homeland. On the soil that for hundreds of years had prided itself on its reputation as a haven for the persecuted, a shelter for dissidents, and a country without burning at the stake, the invader erected a stake to burn more than a million people from all over Europe (Item E)

Here, all reference to victimhood is conducted through the lens of Polishness, even with reference to the “homeland” and “soil” which are organically tied to the nation. This construction of victim is the followed up with linking contemporary political justification for the actions of the INR in their goal to stop the use of “Polish concentration camps” to the victimhood narrative, when stating “as a nation of victims of Hitler, we understand the remembrance of the Nazi crimes committed against Poles, Jews, Roma, Russians, and other peoples of the world as our obligation.” Komorowski makes repeated use of the technique in his 2015 speech. He focusses on the role Poland plays in keeping the memory alive and, by
continual use of the victim identity, as the opposite of the evil the memory reminds us of. This is done through sentences such as “In a unique way, the Poles have been made custodians of this tragic memory” and, in the same manner, “this is why it is incumbent on Poland to play to the role of the unique depositor of memory of Auschwitz and the Shoah”. This focus on uniqueness plays into highlighting Poland’s ‘Europeaness’ by invoking its role as the custodian of Europe’s foundational narrative. This attests to the relational shame identified by Zarakol. Given the recognised centrality of Holocaust memory within Europe, by emphasising Poland’s role both positively within the memory, but also a ‘custodians’ the technique seeks to redress Poland’s perceived lack of ‘Europeaness’. As made clear by Zarakol, this notion focusses more on perceived shame of ‘who one is’ rather than on ‘what one did’. Komorowski uses the added attention the 2015 ceremony held as the 70th anniversary, to drawn upon the positive values to be drawn from the Holocaust in regards to rescuers, much like the technique often employed in the UK. He states

“Yet, the memory of Auschwitz is also a realization that even in the face of the greatest collapse of humanity the highest heroism is possible, or even sanctity. For example, the sanctity of Father Maksymilian Kolbe who sacrificed his life for the life of another inmate. For in this place, efforts were undertaken not only to destroy the world but also to save it” (Item G)

Whilst this particular technique is less consistent across the strategy as is the case in the UK, the positive value approach fits both the Polish rescuer narrative and alludes to the European myth of which Poland is the custodian. Komorowski remains consistent with the strategy set out by Kwasniewski, but deals less with reference to specific threats. He does, however, introduce a technique which seeks to draw parallels between the two totalitarian systems of Nazism and the Soviets, whilst also creating continuity between those past regimes and their modern day states (Germany and Russia). He states (2015) “for it was occupied Poland that was the object of the two totalitarianisms as they started in parallel carrying out their genocidal plans” before referencing the Nazi killing of Polish intelligentsia and the Soviet execution of Polish officers at Katyn. The construction of this segment describes these attacks on Poland as genocidal, before and without any mention to the Holocaust. Thus the Poles as victim narrative, here presented at an international Holocaust remembrance event, is particularly explicit. Such claims fall within the wider context of Polish, and other former communist nations, to equate Nazism and Communism via official European institutions such as the European Parliament (Mälksoo 2009: p.654). The double-victim narrative further delimits the space in which calls of complicity and Polish agency may be made which has the effect of favouring the victim identity over the perpetrator, even bystander identity. The
particular fate of the Jews is never diminished or denied, on the contrary it is constructed clearly in order to relate the Polish experience. That is to say, the Jews are the internationally recognised victims of the Holocaust and their story in much of Western Europe is known and recognised in line with the overall unitary European memory; what the Polish strategy attempts is to highlight this, and then seek to subtly equate the two experiences of Poles and Jews as the main victims of the war. Again, such a technique is a result of the dual trauma identified by Assmann.

The major identities of rescuer and victim were continued by the final President whose speeches were analysed within the timeframe, Duda (Law and Justice). Moreover, Duda also oversaw non-discursive mnemonic techniques to fit the rescuer narrative with the opening of the Ulma Family Museum of Poles Who Saved Jews in Markowa in March 2016. The museum focusses on Josef Ulma, Polish farmer who hid Jews from the Nazis, before being discovered and executed. Duda gave a speech (Item H) at the inauguration event of the museum, and it highlights the interplay between the various techniques available by the state in constructing a particular memory strategy. Duda claims the opening of the museum “was urgently needed by Poland, also in terms of historical fairness”, a reference to the perceived threat of Polish complicity. In the long and detailed speech Duda constructs Ulma as an “ordinary peasant” which is designed to suggest his type, and his actions, were the norm, consistent with the use of internalising positive values into the concept of the nation, and externalising negatives as aberrations. Throughout, Duda makes consistent reference to the fact that it was against the law to help Jews, and that this was punishable by death and “unlike anywhere else it was mercilessly enforced”, further attesting to the character of those who chose to rescue, and to further highlight Polish uniqueness. It also relates to the trauma experienced by Poles, by again recognising the particular fate of Jews and then linking in the Polish experience. By doing so the identities of both rescuer and victim (for the reprisals) are constructed against the Nazi perpetrators. This form particularly evidences the perceived need for Poland to be seen not only as bystander and victims, but as active rescuers (a trait linked as inherently Polish).

The Duda government has most explicitly chosen to construct, and bring focus to, the rescuer identity. This is again highlighted by a press release provided by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2019 which dedicates two paragraphs out of five to the construction of the rescuer identity, best exemplified by the following segment:
After the tragedy of such monstrous proportions, our faith in humanity is restored by the stories of men and women, Poles among them, who saved Jews from the Holocaust. Guided by their sense of shared human solidarity, the Polish Government-in-Exile and thousands of our fellow citizens were involved in helping Jews during the Second World War. It must be remembered that the punishment for doing so in German-occupied Poland was the death penalty. Poles account for the largest group among the Righteous Among the Nations (Item K).

The overall tone and themes directly match the standard given by Duda three years prior in 2016, and, given the smaller focus of the text, show the clear prioritising of Polish memory. The Duda government, the Law and Justice Party, were also responsible for the Holocaust Laws introduced in the historical context section. Whilst the strategy across the timeframe, which stresses the mixture of the victim and rescuer identities, it is in the period 2015-2019 that the both the techniques for achieving this strategy, and the overall focus on the memory of the Holocaust by the Polish state, has become greatly more explicit. Moreover, it becomes possible to locate a tactic of ‘attack to defend’ whereby Polish Holocaust discourse seeks to push attention onto other nations, not least Germany. Take this passage given by Prime Minister Morawiecki at the 2019 Auschwitz event given after describing the dual plan to annihilate Jews and Poles (Item J): “This annihilation, which took place then was not the work of the Nazis, but Germany ruled by Hitler”. This technique seeks to disconnect the actions from the ideology but onto the nation of Germany itself, a trend which develops across the timeframe in the willingness of the given speaker to use “German” rather than “Nazi” (Kwasniewski in 2005 sticks to the latter). Moreover, this further links to the inherent ‘types’ or identities of nations which Poland has created through its strategy; Poles simultaneously victims and rescuers and Germans as perpetrators. Whilst Germany does not deny any responsibility one can see the mechanisms of the mnemonic security dilemma in play.

To summarise and classify the Polish strategy, it is clear that it fits the defensive strategy of identity preservation as highlighted by Mitzen and Steele. Two major threat types can be identified. The first, directly at the level of Holocaust memory, was the public debate surrounding Jedwabne caused by Gross’s Neighbours. This directly challenged the narrative of victimhood and rescue clearly presented in the rest of the strategy. Whilst the charge was accepted by Kwasniewski (by way of apology), it was cleverly woven into the Polish narrative, and still highlighted the positive role of Poles as righteous and into the overall notion of victimhood. The second, was a general identity threat which employed Holocaust memory in order to defend itself in regards to Poland’s relational position within Europe as defined by Mälksoo but understood here in the framework presented by Zarakol. The lack of
feeling fully ‘European’ is countered by both fully highlighting the role Poland played during the war and Holocaust and then to its unique position as the guardian of said memory. By placing themselves in the centre of the foundational narrative, Poland also seeks to re-address its relational position in Europe by proving its ‘Europeaness’ (Mälksoo 2009: p.672). The fundamental narrative is consistent across the differing government types, even if forms and focus are more explicit in the latter part of the timeframe, and attest to the continuity forwarded by Mitzen. Moreover the means by which the memory is used to construct a self-narrative, which in turn is used to justify contemporary actions, is a clear demonstration of Steele’s own understanding of ontological security. Whilst anxiety producing threats were perceived by Poland, it did not exhibit the reflexivity noted by Browning and Joenniemi, as the identity remained consistent and defended even in the face of credible challenges. The final following section of the analysis contains a discussion of the impact of the variables on the outcome of strategy type, in a comparative fashion so as to best demonstrate the role of disparate cases.

Comparisons

The analysis of the Holocaust memory strategies employed by the UK and Poland across the time frame has shown that in both cases a defensive strategy was favoured over a reflexive one. The model hypothesised that Poland would be more likely to employ a defensive strategy whilst the UK would be more likely (relatively) to employ a reflexive strategy. This section will address the impact the variables had on the outcome, before a discussion assessing the value of the theoretical model in attempting to answer the research question. This will be followed by concluding remarks.

As the cases simultaneously acted as the testing grounds for the theory, and as potential explanatory variables, a comparative approach allows for insights into the role each played in the eventual outcomes. Whilst the comparative aspect of this study is focussed on the overall strategy type, it is of importance to note the specific forms used which constitute the strategy. In both cases the most common theme was the internalisation of positive aspects into the identity narrative and the externalisation of negative ones. That is to say, positive connections to the Holocaust (such as refuge and rescue) were adopted into the overall character and identity of the nation. This is an important part of how Steele understands the self-narratives that nations create for themselves, and how these self-narratives inform current day behaviour by delimiting other possible choices and inducing shame in the instances where actions are not performed in coherence to the narrative. This functions in much the same way as continuity of identity as conceived of by Mitzen. Whilst continuity is often understood as
lineal, in these instances it functions cyclically by re-affirming actions as consistent with the self-narrative, and each action then building upon one another. In this regards, negative aspects (such as perpetration or not having done enough) act as causes of both anxiety and of shame. They have the potential to cause anxiety because they break, or act as a rupture to, the continuous sense of self. The shame element may be understood at two levels. The first directly relates to Steele’s understanding of the ‘self-judging the self’ when performed actions are not undertaken in compliance to the self-narrative. Steele understands this in terms of choices performed by the actor/state rather than at the level of memory (in retrospect) such as admitting to a particular crime in the past, but this can still be applied in these instances as knowledge of that particular action (threat) may only become publically known in the modern day, and thus have to be understood as an action which was non-compliant with the self-narrative. In regards to the case study, this is best exemplified by the Jedwabne ‘threat’. Here, Kwasniewski, despite apologising, managed to weave the story of Jedwabne into the Poland’s self-narrative; even the admittance of the crime was seen as part of the process. The ‘externalisation’ was achieved by marking the perpetrators as outside the Polish nation and character, and the act as an aberration outside of the cyclical process understood above. At the second level, shame can be understood as relational as proposed by Zarakol. In this sense the act is not in of itself a cause of shame, but rather the concern is about how others will view the act, and then how that will, in this instance, affirm any negative feelings they may possess about the actor in question. It is this second form of shame which had a greater impact on both the form and strategy types analysed as it better relates to threat perception.

The major difference between the two cases, is that whilst both offered one example which could be viewed as that of reflexivity (Kwasniewski, 2001 and Hunt, 2019) these came about under different circumstances. Kwasniewski was reacting to a threat, in the form of the public debate caused by the publication of Neighbours, and was thus directly responding to potential feelings of anxiety and shame. For Browning and Joenniemi such threats and ruptures are inevitable part of life, and reflexivity offers a mean by which the self may be protected from such negative feelings by disassociating the self from the identities which produce such feelings. Of course, at the level of states it is not possible for Poland to disassociate itself from its identity of Polishness; but rather what Polishness is and means may be altered. However, as demonstrated in the analysis, whilst at face value the apology seemed to appear reflexive, by adopting the story of Jedwabne into the Polish victim narrative, such a shift did not occur. Indeed the development of the degree to which the Polish state explicitly pushed and defended the rescuer/victim identity suggests that the relational shame is a more
powerful variable than Steele’s self-shame, as the overall threat of relational positioning within Europe elicited a stronger response than the Jedwabne threat in 2001. On the other hand, in his 2019 speech, Hunt was not reacting to a particular threat in the same manner but rather took the opportunity to question the inherent British identity as rescuers and as a place of refuge. In doing so, Hunt did not act as presented above and internalise a positive aspect, but rather used the opportunity to highlight that it was individuals who acted, often at their own behest, rather than states and the inherent narrative-driven identity they possess. Whilst only a singular form amongst others which create the overall strategy, Hunt’s comments to move the British narrative away from the black and white ‘good vs evil’ narrative constructed prior. Hunt’s reflexive turn is enabled by the identity shift being between compatible identities of rescuer (those who did something) and of bystander (those who did not) rather than between non-compatible identities of victim and perpetrator.

A second difference in regards to forms, which offers further insights into theoretical value of the model, is the difference in relating to the Holocaust as a value-laden lesson. In the case of the UK, references were consistently made to the ‘lesson’ of the Holocaust, much in keeping with the ‘negative foundational myth’ identified by Assmann. Such a construction seeks to draw an element of positivity from the Holocaust, in the sense that at least something was gained; in this case a lesson about human depravity, and something to symbolise what we are not. This technique was relatively non-existent in the Polish case, with the use of the word ‘warning’ replacing lesson in contextually similar segments of the speeches. The reasons as to why illustrate a key element of the theory and the role of the ‘west Europe’/‘east Europe’ variable. As highlighted throughout this paper, the key difference between these two sides of Europe is their historical experiences of the Holocaust (with Eastern Europe being the major physical site) and of the development of both Holocaust memory, national identities (frozen by communist regimes in the east) and crucially of the transnational ‘European’ identity (which began in the west). As recognised by Kucia the main norms which were established by the Europeanisation project, were effectively only directed at eastern states beyond remembrance (due to the physical connection). The ‘what we are not’ element of the foundational myth, therefore, pertains to events which happened over there in the east. This builds into the relational shame component of the model in regards to, in this case, Poland’s perceived range of options in regards to its Holocaust memory strategy as a reflexive strategy risks both Poland’s identity as victim and removes Poland from the centre of the European project. This can be exemplified by the Polish strategy of using ‘Germany’ rather than ‘Nazi’ to connect modern Germany to the events, and in the wider concern with
‘Nazi Death Camps’ as illustrated in the historical analysis as Germany represents both the main perpetrators and the ‘core’ Europe. For the UK, the fact that the Holocaust can be effectively be abstractly reconstructed into a value-laden lesson which can be employed positively to invoke what the UK is not, and in doing so feed into the wider narrative of being ‘good’, is only made possible by its physical distance from the actual events and a lack of trauma relative to Poland. Even so, the UK still exhibits a defensive strategy as the abstract ‘lessons’ which feed into the British ‘values’ have become a central aspect of Britain’s identity alongside the narrative of the 20th century as a whole. The memory of the Holocaust thus becomes an anchor of British identity, and, more accurately, of British morality. The ‘good’ vs ‘evil’ narrative is an accessible and simple means by which the UK can ground current actions by looking back at the past. This narrative and identity is all the more necessary in regards to maintaining ontological security in the light of identity threats such as Brexit, and further research into the use of Holocaust memory in British identity creating post-Brexit will be of great interest as it seeks to move away from Europe politically.

This final section of the analysis asks: what does the above analysis mean for our understanding of ontological security? As illustrated in the theory section, the major difference in the ontological security literature concerns the role of consistent identities in maintaining ontological security in the face of potential threats and ruptures. Mitzen and Steele argue the maintenance and preservation of identity and self-narratives is how security is achieved by creating consistency and coherence in experiencing oneself wholly through time. Browning and Joenniemi, on the other hand, suggest that such rigid identity preservation could in fact be the cause of insecurity as certain identities are not able to adapt to changing times. Whilst the results of the analysis showed that both cases, regardless of which side of the variables they fell on, chose defensive instead of reflexive strategies, it does not mean that Browning and Joenniemi’s conception is wrong but instead tells us more about the particular role the memories of events such as the Holocaust play in the construction of national identities. The need to ‘securitise’ the memory of the Holocaust at once and the same time delimits space for reflexivity but also reduces the real sense of ‘security’ a state may possess as the negative identity, nor the threats, may be effectively dealt with. Indeed, central to Browning and Joenniemi’s understanding is that anxiety should be viewed as an opportunity; by closing of this opportunity to be reflexive, states run the risk of being stuck in a necessary cycle of securitising memories and identities which induce a constant sense of impending threat. Mälksoo (2009) also identifies this phenomenon in her analysis of the Baltic States ‘memory wars’ concerning the legacy of communism. The securitising of ones states memory
may infringe on the security of another, creating a cyclical need to choose defensive strategies rather than take the opportunity to break the cycle and shift identities. Seen in this way, the major mechanisms which can explain variation must still be viewed as relational perception amongst states, as this provides the space necessary to ‘de-securitise’ a particular memory and, consequentially, a particular identity as the threats posed by other states competing memories, and the implications of such, will be perceived to be of lesser consequence. Moreover, whilst the model and previous literature has predicted and focussed on the defensive and political nature of Holocaust in the east, Poland often being the primary example, less attention has been paid to the political nature of the memory in the west. Whilst the memory forms may not be as explicit and heated, explained by the trauma variable, it does not mean that it does not exist. As shown in the case of the UK, despite not needing to engage in controversial topics such as complicity and perpetration, the memory of the Holocaust has still become a central and political notion within UK national memory practices (the money being invested in the Learning and Memorial Centre serves as sufficient evidence for such a claim). Rather the means by which the memory is utilised as a symbolic reference point for the construction of values and lessons is constructed in a relatively implicit, but equally as constitutive manner.

Conclusions

This study has used the case study of the Europeanisation of Holocaust memory to test the differences within the OS literature in regards to the mnemonic strategies employed by disparate cases within the European context. The paper located a difference within the OS literature before highlighting the overlapping themes within both OS and the collective memory framework, especially in relation to the role memories play in the construction of identities and narratives. To test these differences, the OS framework was applied to the case study of the Europeanisation of the Holocaust due to the central role the memory played in the identity at both the transnational level of Europe, but also at the national levels of the UK and Poland. With reference to the existing literature, the two case studies were based on their disparity within the European memory context and their physical experience of the Holocaust, as both the existing theoretical and empirical research lacked the testing disparate cases and instead focussed either on individual cases, or on cases based on similarity. The major goal was to test whether such variables would have any effect on the mnemonic strategies each case chose in relation to its own memory of the Holocaust. With reference to the theoretical model which classified strategies as either ‘defensive’ or ‘reflexive’ the discursive analysis showed that in both cases a defensive strategy was employed. This outcome went against the
hypothesis of the paper which assumed that the UK’s physical distance from the Holocaust, and its role in the creation the European memory, would allow for the UK to adopt a reflexive position. What the analysis highlighted was that instead, the abstract ‘value-laden’ approach the UK took became deeply entangled with its own value and identity system, meaning that a serious re-negotiation of its strategy would be the cause of insecurity as it’s self-narrative and continuity would be challenged. The hypothesis was correct, however, in regards to Poland as its fear of relational shame did not allow Poland the space to be reflexive as it instead resorted to defensive tactics, even in the face of direct threats at the level of Holocaust memory and the double trauma identified by Assmann meant that Poland needed to pick one consistent identity rather than accept two conflicting identities. In light of the methodological issues addressed in the research design regarding availability of relevant sources online, further research within this topic, and within this framework, may be conducted with reference to physical archive spaces in order to analyse a wider range of speeches and other relevant mnemonic strategy components. Moreover, given the lack of empirical focus on leader speeches within the field of Holocaust memory, further case studies may also be integrated into the framework. A wider selection of state case studies may increase the chance of finding variation within mnemonic strategies which may then be used to ascertain confirming explanatory factors, or others not identified in this study. Speeches given in France by President Macron (2017) have shown that there is, under to-be-studied circumstances, scope for leaders to exhibit strongly reflexive strategies; in this case by the President starkly rejecting the le résistance narrative and identity hitherto constructed in the French memory of both the Holocaust and the Second World War. The conditions under which such a change in strategy may occur would be instrumental in further understanding the link between memory and ontological security.


**Chapters in books**


**Articles**


Olick, Jeffrey K. "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures." *Sociological Theory* 17, no. 3 (1999): 175-211.


**Online Sources**


Holocaust Memorial Day: [https://www.hmd.org.uk/](https://www.hmd.org.uk/)

Polish Government: [https://www.gov.pl/](https://www.gov.pl/)

Polish President: [https://www.president.pl/en/](https://www.president.pl/en/)
Appendix

*All spelling and grammar as given in the original source

**Ordered chronologically rather than as introduced

UK Forms

Item A: Tony Blair 2001


HERE is the full text of the speech Prime Minister Tony Blair made last night at the Holocaust memorial service at Westminster Central Hall:

"Tonight we remember the Holocaust's victims and we honour the survivors, some of whom are with us here. It was to Britain, amongst other places, that they came to rebuild their lives. Their memories have become part of our memories, our history.

"Tonight we have heard stories of horror, suffering and great courage. Of industrial might harnessed to evil and of the resilience of human spirit. Of course, history is littered with instances of people's inhumanity towards one another. What made the Holocaust so frightening was its goal, its unimaginable scale and its wickedness in attempting to use false science to further human destruction.

"The Holocaust was the greatest act of collective evil the world has ever known. It is to reaffirm the triumph of good over that evil that we remember it. "Each step humanity takes is the product of a struggle between good and evil. We know both exist in our nature. We remember it so as we do not forget what the human race at its worst can do.

"We also remember it so as we learn how it happened and never believe, in our folly, that it could not happen again. Indeed in some parts of our world it has happened recently. The appalling reality of the Holocaust caused a profound crisis in human civilisation.
"But I believe it also marked a turning point in European and human history. That is, served
as a catalyst for the reconstruction of our continent founded on the values of democracy,
liberty, equality, opportunity. Today we gather to light candles and bear witness in
remembrance.

"Because the passing of time makes it more vital than ever to remember the Holocaust and try
to learn its lessons. I hope and believe Western Europe has learned the lessons of its past. Yet
across the world, and closer to home, we still see the same forces of racism, extreme
nationalism and bigotry actively at work today.

"Cambodia, Rwanda and the Balkans prove that hate-mongers and tyrants persist in their
conviction that race, religion, disability or sexuality make some people's lives worth less than
others. But the Holocaust's deep scar on our history means that we cannot escape the
responsibility to oppose genocide today.

"So the Holocaust continues to be of fundamental importance and relevance to each new
generation. A reminder, particularly to young people, that the events of the Second World
War must never again be repeated. In remembering the Holocaust and its victims, we reaffirm
the kind of society that we all believe in. A democratic, just and tolerant society.

"A society where everyone's worth is respected, regardless of their or skin colour. A society
where each of us demonstrates, by our word and actions, our commitment to values of
humanity and compassion. A society that has the courage to confront prejudice and
persecution. That is our hope and that is why the Holocaust deserves this permanent place in
our collective memory."

Item B Tony Blair 2005

(Accessed 20/03/2020: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-335681/We-forget-warns-
Blair.html)

Prejudice must be confronted wherever it occurs, Tony Blair today told the Holocaust memorial
service in Westminster.

On the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, the Prime Minister said: "We must
never forget the holocaust victims."

We must never dishonour their memory by allowing the ugly poison of racial prejudice and
hatred to hold sway again.
"We must pledge ourselves to confront such prejudice wherever it seeks to disfigure our community and we must remember above all that the holocaust did not start with a concentration camp.

"It started with a brick through the shop window of a Jewish business, the desecration of a Synagogue, the shout of racist abuse on the street." We recall what humanity at its worst can do.

"And then, in keeping the memory of the holocaust in our minds and hearts, we allow the dead to live again, to teach us, urging us to work for a world free from such prejudice and hatred, for a future shared by all."

There was no need to repeat to survivors the significance of the date, the Prime Minister said in his Westminster Hall address.

"We know you will have many bitter memories, many recollection of personal tragedy," he said.

"You will recall people you knew, family and friends who died and who, now, across the years come back to you and make your grief fresh and vivid. We pay tribute to you."

Younger generations might ask what relevance the commemoration has for them, Mr Blair said.

"It reminds us of suffering beyond imagination, not just because of the miserable and wretched cruelty endured by the Holocaust victims, but because of how it was inflicted," he said.

"It was death as an industry, not just the destruction of human life, but of human essence, done with a barbarity we can scarcely contemplate.

"This was no natural disaster. No act of God. But an act of deliberate, calculated evil such as humanity never in its existence knew before, and let us pray, never knows again."

There was another reason to remember, the Premier continued.

"Let us, with humility, remember some of the extraordinary acts of courage by Jewish people and others during the holocaust.

"Some we know and have read about. But many others we will never know - the thousands of acts of kindness, sacrifice, fellowship, exemplary bravery that kept the spirit of human progress alive even in the uttermost darkness and helps even now to give us the faith to go forward."
Item C: David Cameron 2012

Video message transcribed by author

“Last year I had the privilege of meeting an extraordinarily courageous women. Truda Levi was just twenty when she was ripped from her family. She was forced on a journey that can only be described as hellish. Through concentration camps, work camps and death marches. She saw and suffered some unspeakably evil things, but she survived to tell her story and pass it onto the next generation. It is so important that stories like Truda’s continue to be heard and read and spoken about. That way the brutal truth about the Holocaust can never be dimmed and that is why Holocaust Memorial Day matters so much. It is about keeping the truth alive, guarding against prejudice in all its forms, and above all, showing respect to those who were killed and to those who survived. And as we reflect on this part of our history and the millions killed through genocide we must not forget the persecution and the hatred that still exist in our world today. We’ve got to learn from the past to improve the ways that things are now. As Truda said “we must remember the beauty of this world and ensure we do everything that we can to safeguard it”. So I want to thank everyone involved in marking Holocaust Memorial Day. Not just for keeping those memories alive but for building a better future for us all.”

Item D: David Cameron 2014


Can I just say an incredibly warm welcome to Number 10 Downing Street. I have to say, as Prime Minister in the last 3 and a half years I’ve had some extraordinary gatherings of people in this room, but I don’t think there’s been a more extraordinary gathering or a gathering I’ve been prouder to have than having you here tonight, on this Holocaust Day – a day when we remember the darkest hour of our human history, the Holocaust; a day when we decide to put away all and fight all forms of prejudice and hatred; a day when we think of the dreadful genocides that have taken place since the Holocaust. And it’s wonderful to welcome people here from Cambodia, from Rwanda, from Bosnia. It is an enormously proud day to have you in this room sharing these stories together.

And the stories I’ve heard tonight are just unbelievable stories. People who escaped from the Warsaw Ghetto. People – someone was telling me who was in 2 ghettos, 2 slave labour
camps, 2 concentration camps. People who came here as part of the Kindertransport. Someone who showed me their diary, which their grandfather had written in in July in 1939 in Prague, and wrote in that diary, ‘Wherever you go, be a great daughter to the country that gives you a home.’

What I can say to the 50 Holocaust survivors here tonight: you have been incredible children, incredible lives you’ve lived; you’ve lived 10, 20 lives over for all those who died and all those who didn’t make it. And you are an amazing example to all of us. The bravery that you show by going into schools and colleges and communities and talking about the Holocaust and what happened is just so brave, it takes my breath away. I would have thought it would be so easy to want to forget, to stop thinking, to stop talking, but you showed incredible courage and bravery. And having 50 of you here tonight makes me incredibly proud to be Prime Minister of a nation with such extraordinary people in it. So, thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Meeting you all makes me realise what a sacred task the Holocaust Commission has to carry out, and can I thank Mick Davis for chairing it, can I thank the Chief Rabbi, can I thank the survivors who are going to serve on it. We have the heads of some of our best museums. We have people from the worlds of television and film. We have politicians of all parties – we have Simon Hughes from the Liberal Democrats, Ed Balls from Labour, Michael Gove from the Conservatives – can I thank you all for the work you’re going to do. We’ve got fabulous historians, like Simon Sebag Montefiore. We’ve got so many people who are going to carry out this sacred and vital task.

And it is so important because there will be a time when it won’t be possible for survivors to go into our schools and to talk about their experiences, and to make sure we learn the lessons of the dreadful events that happened. And so, the sacred task is to think, ‘How are we best going to remember, to commemorate and to educate future generations of children?’ In 50 years’ time, in 2064, when a young British Christian child or a young British Muslim child or a young British Jewish child wants to learn about the Holocaust, and we as a country want them to learn about the Holocaust, where are they going to go? Who’re they going to listen to? What images will they see? How can we make sure in 2064 that it is as vibrant and strong a memory as it is today, with all of you standing here in this room?
That is the challenge that I have set them. It’s a vitally important task. I can’t think of a more talented group of people to carry it out, but please, as survivors, tell them what you think. Tell them what you want to be as part of this commemoration. You have spent so much time talking about your memories and reminding all of us how we must never forget. One lady I was talking to had already spoken to 6 schools today; I thought I’d had a tough day! That is an amazing thing to do, and you do this day in and day out.

So, I promise you this: the Holocaust Commission chaired by Mick Davis with all those people on it, and this government ready to help, and politicians of all parties ready to help – we will not let you down. Tell us what you think we should do and let us make sure we commemorate these dreadful events, and make sure that here in Britain no one ever forgets what happened and we swear together: never again.

Thank you.

**Item E: Nick Clegg 2014**


Speaking at the event, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg said:

We are indeed all here to remember. Because if we forget we endanger the future by risking a repeat of the past. It’s well known that guards in the Nazi concentration camps would torment their victims by saying ‘No one will believe you. No one will remember. And if you say it, no one will believe you or care what you have to say.’

So forgetting would be a betrayal of what those people endured in those horrific circumstances. It would be a betrayal of the values of reconciliation which is embodied in this memorial day. It would also deprive the generations of today and of the future of the knowledge of history which is such an important inoculation for tragedies in the future.

I know a little bit myself from my own family’s experience of the value of remembrance. My mother spent many years with her sisters in a Japanese prisoner of war camp in Indonesia. My brothers and my sister and I were aware of this as we grew up, but my mother sheltered us as small children of the horrific details, and it was only when we were older that she told us
about everything she’d been through. It made a lasting impression on me, of everything she’d been through, an enormous impression on my outlook on things.

So remembering the past, even if it’s of the past which thankfully this generation is not experiencing, is an extraordinarily important thread which binds us together as we face the challenges of the future. And I’m hugely grateful to the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust for all the work they’re doing. I think it’s enormously impressive that they’re organising around 2,000 events up and down the country.

It is a huge honour to meet you Ben Helfgott, and you Sabina Miller. I was talking to Sabina when we were listening to the lovely Maria Fidelis choir singing earlier, about your experience as a 16 year old girl fending for yourself in the cold wildnesses of the woods in Poland. Your tales, your resilience, your persistent good humour is an example to all of us, so thank you very much for being here.

I hope the ceremonies and events later in the day go well as well. And with that I would really like to thank everybody involved; thank you for being here, and I hope that year in year out we continue to remember the Holocaust for all of society and for all generations in the future. Thank you very much.

**Item F: David Cameron 2015**


Two years ago on a family visit to Berlin, I sat in the shadow of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and tried to explain to my children the horror of what happened in the Holocaust.

In the Museum there, is the story of Jack Kagan – one of Britain’s many inspirational Holocaust survivors. Jack’s sister, mother, grandmother and father were all taken from him and murdered by the Nazis. Jack tried to escape, got frostbite and had his toes amputated. But he would not be beaten.

After almost 5 months of tunnelling, he dug his way out of that camp and made it to the forest where he joined the Bielski Brothers in an extraordinary resistance that saved 1,200 lives.
After the war, Jack came here and made his home in Britain. And I was delighted when, together with Ben Helfgott, he agreed to join my Holocaust Commission last year.

But Jack is not here today. In October he suffered a debilitating stroke which left him once again in a battle for his life. His daughter Debbie is with us and I know everyone will join me in sending Jack our very best wishes.

Like so many of our incredible Holocaust survivors, Jack had been going into schools to share his testimony reliving the most harrowing moments of humanity, so that we should never forget. For years our Holocaust survivors have seen this as their duty to us. Now we must do our duty to them.

It is time for Britain as a nation to stand together and say “we will remember.” To say: “we will not allow any excuses for anti-Semitism in our country.” We not let any form of prejudice destroy the multi-faith, multi-ethnic democracy we are so proud to call our home. We will teach every generation the British values of respect and tolerance that we hold dear. And we will ensure that they can learn from the stories of our Holocaust survivors long after we are all gone.

That is why today – with the full support of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition – I am accepting the recommendations of the Holocaust Commission. And I thank Mick Davis and all the Commissioners – including Ed Balls, Michael Gove and Simon Hughes – who have given this work the cross-party status it so profoundly deserves.

Britain will have a proper National Memorial to the Holocaust in Central London. We will have a world-class Learning Centre that teaches every generation to fight hatred, prejudice and intolerance in all its forms. We will have an endowment fund – so that Holocaust education is secured for ever. We will have an immediate project to finish the urgent task of auditing, recording and future-proofing testimony. So the memory of Holocaust survivors and liberators is faithfully preserved for generations to come. And we will get on and do all this straightaway.

With cross-party support I am today setting up the United Kingdom Holocaust Memorial Foundation. And I am delighted that Sir Peter Bazalgette has agreed to be its first chair. The
government will kick-start a society-wide fundraising effort to deliver the National Memorial, Learning Centre and endowment fund by committing £50 million.

Today we stand together – whatever our faith, whatever our creed, whatever our politics. We stand in remembrance of those who were murdered in the darkest hour of human history. We stand in admiration of what our Holocaust survivors have given to our country. And we stand united in our resolve to fight prejudice and discrimination in all its forms. We will keep Britain’s Promise to Remember. Today, tomorrow and for every generation to come.

**Item G: Press Release (mixed quotes from multiple representatives) 2015**


On Holocaust Memorial Day 2015, Communities ministers have paid tribute to the survivors, whose commitment to living testimony has ensured that successive generations understand and do not forget the tragedy of Europe’s darkest chapter.

This year is significant as it marks the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau, the largest of the Nazi death camps.

Communities Secretary Eric Pickles who is attending the commemoration ceremony at Auschwitz-Birkenau, Poland said:

Today 70 years ago, the world awoke to the horrors of what man is truly capable of. The scale of the tragedy does not fade with time, but the personal memories grow fainter with each passing milestone.

Among the millions who died we remember the individuals, the men, women and children with hopes and aspirations extinguished and the families who suffered. But we must also celebrate the remarkable resilience of those who went on to rebuild their lives, the many who settled here in Britain, called this country their home and made us richer for their contribution.

We owe it to the survivors that their legacy never fades.
Held each year on the day Auschwitz-Birkenau was liberated by Soviet troops, this worldwide event commemorates all the communities that suffered as a result of the Holocaust and in subsequent genocides in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur.

Communities Minister Stephen Williams said:

This year, the theme of Holocaust Memorial Day is “Keep the memory alive”. By making this pledge we can all pay tribute to all those innocent lost lives in Nazi occupied Europe, in the killing fields of Cambodia, and the churches of Rwanda.

Today we remember all of the victims persecuted by the Nazis. This year we also mark the 20th anniversary of the genocide at Srebrenica. To imagine that such evil could take place in modern Europe during our lifetime, half a century after the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau reminds us that the lessons of history can be tragically short.

Holocaust Memorial Day reminds us of the vital importance of confronting the dangers of antisemitism, racism and discrimination in all its forms and the importance of never standing aside when we encounter prejudice and hatred.

Lord Tariq Ahmad of Wimbledon said:

A few weeks ago I visited Auschwitz-Birkenau for the first time. I saw the wrought iron work, the guard’s towers and the railway tracks. Auschwitz-Birkenau is more than bricks and mortar, it stands as a blight on the history of mankind in a dark chapter in human history. Yet today it also serves as a centre of education, it ensures that the lessons of the Holocaust are not forgotten and indeed become part of the learning of our future generations.

It is education that is crucial to fighting discrimination and through projects such as the Anne Frank Trust we are ensuring that young people challenge prejudice of all kinds and embrace positive attitudes, personal responsibility and respect for others and their beliefs.

**Item H: Greg Clark 2016**

(Accessed: 27/03/2020: [http://www.ukpol.co.uk/greg-clark-2016-speech-on-holocaust-memorial-day/](http://www.ukpol.co.uk/greg-clark-2016-speech-on-holocaust-memorial-day/))
Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is an honour to be speaking here this evening, on this most sombre and important of days.

It’s not only my privilege to represent Her Majesty’s government.

The government wishes, of course, to pay its respects to those whom we honour this evening, such as the 10 British prisoners of war who saved Hannah Sarah Rigler from the Danzig death march.

Hiding her, feeding her, nursing her back to health.

But it is also my privilege and responsibility to speak as a citizen, husband and father, one who wants his children to grow to maturity in a peaceful, tolerant and supportive society, free from the blight of sectional hatred.

This duty to speak up is one borne by each of us.

Because Nazi Germany taught us – hard though it is to say – that genocide happens not just through the choices made by those who perpetrate it, but through the choices made by those who fail to stop the perpetrators.

It’s not just that bystanders look away; it’s that they choose to look away. The soil of hatred is fertilised by indifference to wickedness.

That starts with tolerating small acts of hatred, such as casual stereotyping; only if “everyday evil” remains unchecked can wickedness take root, and grow, into the acts which blight humanity.

William Wilberforce urged Parliament towards the abolition of slavery by saying:

“You may choose to look the other way but you can never say again that you did not know”.

On Holocaust Memorial Day, on behalf of the government – and myself – I commit never to choose to look away.

We must all recognise hatred, and challenge it; wherever and whenever we see it.

Item I: Press Release (mixed quotes from multiple representatives) 2016
The Prime Minister David Cameron has today (27 January 2016) announced that the national memorial to the Holocaust will be built in the iconic Victoria Tower Gardens, next to the Houses of Parliament in Westminster.

The work to build a striking and prominent national memorial delivers one of the key recommendations of the Prime Minister’s Holocaust Commission last year. It is being taken forward by the cross-party backed UK Holocaust Memorial Foundation (UKHMF), chaired by Sir Peter Bazalgette. Board members include Alex Salmond MP, Lord Andrew Feldman, Ed Balls and Liberal Democrat Peer Lord Alliance.

An international design competition will be launched in the coming weeks and the memorial will be built by the end of 2017. Plans for an associated world-class learning centre to challenge prejudice in all its forms, will also be announced in the coming months.

The Prime Minister’s Holocaust Commission last year produced a report looking at how the country should ensure that the memory of the Holocaust is preserved and that the lessons it teaches are never forgotten. Along with a new National Memorial, its recommendations included a world class learning centre, a focus on promoting and furthering Holocaust education and a programme to record and preserve the testimony of Holocaust survivors.

Speaking at the start of Prime Minister’s Questions today, Prime Minister David Cameron said:

I know the whole House will want to join me in marking Holocaust Memorial Day. It is right our whole country should stand together to remember the darkest hour of humanity. Last year, on the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, I said we would build a striking national memorial in London to show the importance Britain places on preserving the memory of the Holocaust.

Today I can tell the House this memorial will be built in Victoria Tower Gardens. It will stand beside Parliament as a permanent statement of our values as a nation and will be something for our children to visit for generations to come. I’m grateful to all those who have made this possible and who have given this work the cross-party status it so profoundly deserves.
Chair of the UK Holocaust Memorial Foundation, Sir Peter Bazalgette said:

The task of the Holocaust Memorial Foundation was to find a site that would allow a striking, prominent and iconic memorial to be built. There is nowhere better to achieve this than beside Parliament. I stood there with a Holocaust survivor earlier this week and I will never forget his reaction when I told him of our plans. It demonstrated how we are doing the right thing for Britain’s Holocaust survivors in preserving the memory of humanity’s darkest hour. But just as importantly, we’re doing the right thing for our country by creating a permanent reminder of the need to fight hatred and prejudice in all its forms.

The Chief Rabbi said:

The historic announcement today, of the establishment of a permanent memorial to the Holocaust, next to Parliament, at the very heart of British democracy, will be warmly received by the Jewish community. Indeed, it sends the strongest possible message on behalf of the whole country, that the lessons of the Holocaust will forever form a part of our national consciousness and that the legacy of survivors will be secured for posterity.

Alex Salmond MP said:

It’s absolutely right there should be a permanent and iconic national memorial next to Parliament. This should be a catalyst for further commemoration and education on the Holocaust across the whole of the United Kingdom. I’m proud to be involved with this work and hope that I will be able to add a particularly Scottish dimension to how the Holocaust is marked and remembered as part of the overall project.

Ed Balls said:

One year ago, the Prime Minister’s Holocaust Commission called for a striking and prominent new national memorial. Today we begin to realise that ambition, pledging a truly iconic landmark in Westminster. It’s so important that when children come to Parliament and learn about the history of our great democracy and all that we stand for as a nation, they will also be able to learn about and remember what happened when racism, antisemitism and hatred was left unchecked and allowed to flourish.

Karen Pollock, Chief Executive of Holocaust Educational Trust said:
Twenty eight years ago when the Holocaust Educational Trust was founded, we may have hoped but would never have believed that Holocaust education and commemoration would have become so firmly embedded in this country – this memorial, which will be right in the heart of our democracy, sends a clear message about the determination of Britain to ensure the legacy of the Holocaust for generations to come.

With education comes remembrance – this special place will give people somewhere to remember and reflect. When we no longer have survivors among us, this memorial will help to ensure that their experiences are never forgotten.

Olivia Marks-Woldman, Chief Executive of the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, said:

The UK Holocaust Memorial Foundation shares our goal, to extend the reach and impact of Holocaust commemoration, in order to ensure that as a nation we never forget. Holocaust Memorial Day is the central focus for Holocaust remembrance in the UK and it is fitting that these announcements have been made today.

As we come together at over 3,600 events across the country, we have a chance to reflect on what has happened in the past and ensure we carry these lessons into a better future. A memorial in the heart of Westminster will add to the work already being done, and ensure a lasting commitment to Holocaust commemoration in the UK.

Communities Secretary Greg Clark said:

The new Holocaust memorial, at the heart of Westminster, will offer the nation the opportunity to pause and reflect, to ensure this and future generations learn the lessons of the atrocities that were perpetrated on humanity.

It will also be a constant reminder of the need to challenge hatred wherever and whenever it occurs, to help ensure it can never happen again”

*Item J: Philip Hammond 2016*


Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said:
On Holocaust Memorial Day, we reflect on the terrible events of the Holocaust and pay tribute to those who work tirelessly to ensure that this remains forever in our memories.

This year’s theme ‘don’t stand by’ prompts us to remember that the Holocaust and subsequent genocides happened because people stood by while prejudice grew into discrimination and discrimination into mass extermination.

We remember the people who risked their own lives to save their neighbours, colleagues, friends and, in many cases, complete strangers. We draw inspiration from their courage and humanity. The Holocaust teaches us about the dangers of allowing prejudice and discrimination to run unchecked. It’s our responsibility to ensure that future generations understand what caused the Holocaust and reflect upon its consequences.”

**Item K: Sajid Javid 2017**


72 years ago the world learned of the liberation of Auschwitz and the full horror of the death camps. And as we looked at the devastation wrought on the Jews of Europe, we swore that we would never let genocide happen again. We failed. Genocide happened in Cambodia. It happened in Rwanda. The 20th century ended with genocide in Bosnia. The 21st century began with genocide in Darfur.

Faced not only with such unimaginable evil, but also with our repeated failure to learn from it, it’s easy to ask “How can life go on?” I find the answer in the words that one young victim of the Holocaust wrote in her diary.

“I still believe people are really good at heart”. Anne Frank was right. People can be good. We can be better. We just need to be reminded of our failings, and not permitted to forget what happens when hatred is left to grow unchecked. So, life can go on because life must go on. Because we must remember. That’s why Holocaust Memorial Day is so important.

And that’s why I’m so proud to be leading the work on the new National Holocaust Memorial. It’s going to be built right outside Parliament, and concept designs will be unveiled at 10 Downing Street later on today. The memorial will remind us of those who died and
those who survived. But it will also remind us that the Holocaust did not begin in the gas chambers. It began with words. With discrimination. With ordinary people not standing up to hatred. And that’s a message that’s as relevant today as at any time in our history. A message that must be shared, that must be passed on to our children and our children’s children.

Because in the words of Zigi Shipper, one of 112 Holocaust survivors whose testimony has been recorded for the memorial project:

“I beg the young people, whatever you do, do not hate.

“Hate will ruin your life.”

Item L: Sajid Javid 2018


The theme of 2018’s Holocaust Memorial Day is “The Power of Words”. And that’s a theme that’s particularly apt for the times in which we live. Last month, as you may have seen, the Crown Prosecution Service announced that it was going to start treating online hate crimes just as seriously as their offline equivalents. So if you are reported to the police for hurling vile, hate filled abuse at someone on Twitter, the CPS won’t treat it any differently to abuse on the street.

We all know it’s absolutely the right move. But there’s a sizeable minority who say online abuse isn’t really abuse at all. That anyone complaining about remarks that are anti-Semitic or homophobic or racist should just turn a blind eye.

That’s nonsense.

Words have enormous power to do harm. Believe me, I’ve been receiving racial abuse my whole life.

There’s the direct effect on the individual, of course. The emotional trauma and psychological damage that hateful abuse can cause. The fear and self-doubt it can sow. But there’s also the bigger picture.
The wider impact.

Look at the Holocaust.

We all know where it ended: in the labour camps, the gas chambers, the death marches. But it began with nothing more than words.

With abuse.

With slanders.

With threats.

And when those words were allowed to go unchallenged, year after year, the consequences were catastrophic.

Only words, yes. But words that led to the deaths of millions.

Half a century later, in Rwanda, messages of hate filled the airwaves and the printed press, encouraging, even demanding, the slaughter that was to follow. One study found that the deaths of more than 50,000 Tutsis could be directly linked to the broadcasts of one radio station. 50,000 innocent men, women and children murdered because of words.

And the absence of words can also be dangerous. In Myanmar, one powerful woman’s refusal to raise her voice and speak out is having devastating consequences for the Rohingya people.

So history has shown us, again and again, that words can be used to cause and inspire hate, to encourage and justify violence. Words are powerful things that should be handled with care. But that power can also be a force for good.

Social media is often condemned as a platform for hatred, but the most liked Tweet of all time is Barack Obama sharing the inspiring words of Nelson Mandela:

“No one is born hating another person because of the colour of his skin or his background or his religion.”
And harnessing the positive power of words has long been a core part of Holocaust Memorial Day. Every year we hear the words of genocide survivors, sharing their most harrowing memories so that we understand the importance of saying no to bigotry.

Thanks to HMD, late January each year sees our school classrooms flooded with words. Words explaining what happened in the Holocaust, in Cambodia, in Rwanda, in Bosnia and in Darfur. Words impressing on the next generation their duty to remember. Words warning what can happen if they fail to do so.

In 2018, with continued support and funding of government, the HMD Trust will be reaching out to more people than ever before. It will be organising more events than ever before. And it will be publishing and sharing more words than ever before. Only words, yes. But words that have the power to prevent genocide.

Around the world there are memorials to genocides that feature the most powerful words of all. Words that spell out the human cost of failing to fight back against bigotry.

At the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam you can see her diary, yes, but also another book. It’s more than an inch thick, hundreds of pages of tightly printed words: the names of every Dutch Jew murdered by the Nazis.

Visitors to the Srebrenica memorial are greeted by a vast, curving wall. From a distance the grey stone appears to be filled with countless black lines. But as you move closer, you realise the lines consist of countless words. The names of thousands upon thousands of Muslims who were shot, stabbed, even buried alive. These words, whether printed on paper or carved in stone, speak to us of the individuals who died, the human tragedies behind the horrifying statistics of genocide.

They will soon be joined by the UK’s National Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre, to be built a short walk from where we are today. It will contain millions of words. Words that share testimony. Words that stand as a reminder. Words that serve as a warning. They’re only words, yes. But they’re words that tell a story we should never, ever forget.

*Item M: Published Article co-written by Ed Balls and Eric Pickles (originally published in London Evening Standard) 2018*
We are building a Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre next to Parliament to make sure we never forget the persecution and murder of the Jewish people of Europe and all other victims of Nazi persecution. We’ve got to be brave at times like these, when it’s clear that our British values of tolerance and equality are coming under threat.

In July, the Community Security Trust warned that anti-Semitic incidents remain at a record high, with more than 100 incidents recorded each month in the first half of 2018.

Neither of us can remember a time when there was more intolerance and hatred. This is a huge failure to stand by the values of this country.

This is the right time for us to act. That is why we are building the memorial and learning centre, a place for the whole country to learn about the past to build a better future.

It is hugely important, while the last Holocaust survivors are still with us, that we do everything in our power to ensure future generations hear their stories and understand the terrible consequences of hatred, prejudice and intolerance.

There is no better place than Victoria Tower Gardens, in the shadow of Parliament, to build the Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre. The Gardens are currently home to memorials to past struggles for justice and democratic causes. It will allow us to achieve our aim of holding Parliament to account.

We all need to speak up to Parliament, to remind our elected representatives of their basic responsibility to protect British people of all faiths and backgrounds.

After all, it was another parliament in Germany that legitimised the rise of the Nazi party and the laws that served as the first steps towards the Holocaust, the laws that took away rights from the Jewish people of Europe.

The Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre will tell visitors the story of the times we as a country stood up to intolerance and hatred. It is crucial, if this is to be a memorial for the 21st century, that future generations continue to be exposed to the lessons of the Holocaust.
It’s been more than 70 years since the first realisation of what happened in the Holocaust, since the first broadcast by Richard Dimbleby from the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, which profoundly shocked the people of this country.

The question now is where do we want to be in another 70 years’ time? Do we want to be a country where hatred and intolerance is rife, or one that stands up for the persecuted and downtrodden?

The proposed Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre is the key to building a new generation who will fight against fascism, intolerance and the subversion of democracy, wherever and whenever it occurs.

**Item N: James Brokenshire 2019**


Last Sunday, I had the privilege to join mourners from around the world to pay my respects to 6 unknown victims of the Shoah – including a child.

It was an incredibly moving moment, not just for the Jewish community, but for our entire country.

These holy souls or Kedoshim, were “torn from home” – somewhere that should have been a place of safety, comfort and security.

They lived and died through one of the darkest chapters in human history, but rest today in the loving embrace of our Jewish community here in the UK.

As I reflected on this, I was reminded of my father-in-law, who escaped Nazi Germany and came to Britain with the help of the MI6 agent, Frank Foley, who’s actions also saved the lives of thousands of other Jews.

But as we honour the millions of victims of the Shoah today, we remember those families who weren’t so lucky.

Those who never made it home.
Those who were brutalised and murdered.

Those whose lives were cut short and whose loss provides a stark and powerful legacy to us all.

A legacy that demands we challenge hatred and bigotry wherever it exists.

A legacy that requires that we say “never again” we really mean it.

Sadly, this is a lesson that we are still learning.

40 years ago, the Khmer Rouge claimed the lives of one quarter of the population through mass murder and starvation.

25 years ago, almost one million Rwandans were murdered in 100 days.

And horror returned to our continent as we witnessed the murder of over 8,000 mostly Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica.

We still imagine that these barbarities belong in the history books.

And yet today – 74 years since the Nazi death camps were liberated – antisemitism is on the rise, here and abroad.

And Jewish communities are once again living in fear.

This troubles me deeply and must trouble us all.

I want to reassure our Jewish community that you are an intrinsic part of what makes Britain Great and the government will always stand by you to challenge bigotry and intolerance…

…and reaffirm our commitment to ensuring that future generations never forget where hatred can lead, and that we will not walk by on the other side where it is present.

Our new National Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre will help us do that - a permanent reminder at the heart of our democracy.
Because we all know: tolerance and reconciliation begins at home and that we all have our part to play to ensure home is truly a place of safety, security and of strength.

**Item O: Jeremy Hunt 2019**


Ambassador, distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, I’m incredibly honoured to be here today as we remember those 6 million.

Seventy-four years ago, almost to the day, Soviet soldiers advanced into Poland and liberated Auschwitz. There, amid heaps of corpses, they discovered about 7,000 men, women and children, emaciated, starving, stricken by disease. These broken human beings were among the handful of survivors of the 1.3 million people who had passed through the gates of Auschwitz.

One of them, of course, was Primo Levi, who was found by Russian soldiers lying incapacitated with scarlet fever, indelibly tattooed with an identity number that he would bear for the rest of his life: ‘174517’. In his classic, If This Is a Man, he struggled to describe the essence of the crime wrought by the Holocaust. He said:

Language lacks words to express this offence, the demolition of a man.

In a moment, with almost prophetic intuition, the reality was revealed to us: we had reached the bottom. It is not possible to sink lower than this; no human condition is more miserable than this, nor could it conceivably be so.

Nothing belongs to us any more: they have taken away our clothes, our shoes, even our hair. If we speak, they will not listen, and if they listen, they will not understand. They have even take away our name, and if we want to keep it, we will have to find in ourselves the strength to do so, to manage somehow so that behind the name, something of us – of us as we were – still remains.

Primo Levi and other remarkable people summoned enough strength to preserve their dignity in defiance of relentless efforts to extinguish the last embers of their humanity.
In 2006, I had the life-changing experience of visiting Auschwitz myself with Holocaust Education Trust. The trip was led by the inspirational Rabbi Barry Marcus, who many of you will know.

Before going into the concentration camp, we visited a museum to commemorate the Poles who had sheltered Jews. The penalty, of course, was death, not just for the individual, but for every member of that individual’s family. More than 5,000 Poles took that risk. Many others across Europe looked away. What would each of us do if history repeated itself?

I’ll never forget standing on that railway platform where so many human beings’ fate was decided by a simple instruction to turn left or right.

I’ll never forget Rabbi Marcus singing in Hebrew as we reflected on the horror of what was around us. Nor will I forget the remarkable Polish guide who never once referred to Jews being killed: she always used the word ‘murdered’.

And a question that troubled me as I tried to take all this in is, would I have looked away? Would I have done the right thing? With 3 young children that I have now whose lives are just beginning, what would I have done?

So today as Foreign Secretary, it is an incredible privilege to honour some of those who did not look away, and who worked for the Foreign Office, or our sister organisation, the Secret Intelligence Service.

One of them was Captain Frank Foley, whose bust we shall shortly be unveiling. Frank Foley fought in the trenches during World War One before being recruited by the British government and dispatched to our Consulate in Berlin. Ostensibly, he was in charge of passport control; in fact, he was an SIS officer – something that the government has taken the exceptional step of publicly confirming.

After Hitler came to power in 1933, Foley used his official position to issue visas to thousands of Jews trying to escape Germany. He applied the rules with what might be called sympathetic flexibility.

British visas could only be given to people with financial guarantees, a requirement that ruled out many Jewish applicants. So Foley invented a variety of ways to get around bureaucracy.
Richard Lachs, a Jewish company administrator, was one of many desperate people with no chance of providing any guarantees. Penniless and unemployed, he had been hounded out of his job in Cologne and forced to take his family into hiding after the Kristallnacht pogroms.

He sought asylum in the United States, only to be rejected because the quota was full. So he then applied for British visas for himself, his wife and their 2 children, with no guarantees – and little hope of success.

Richard Lachs’s son, Werner, remembered what happened. “It was a Sunday morning,” he said. “A friend was there, and the post produced a letter from the British Passport Control Office in Berlin, requesting that my parents should send their passports to receive their visas. We just jumped up and down for joy.”

The Lachs family did not know it, but Foley found a way of overlooking the regulations. He appears to have decided that since someone else called Lachs had previously been granted a visa, that person’s guarantee could be taken to cover Richard Lachs and his family as well. “I am 99% certain,” said Werner Lachs, “that but for Mr Foley, I and my family might have become another statistic of the Holocaust”.

Today, Werner Lachs is 92. He has nine grandchildren, four great-grandchildren and he lives in Prestwich.

A few months before the outbreak of war in 1939, Foley arranged visas for a 24-year-old Jew called Gunter Powitzer and his infant son, Walter. Yet, by the time the documents were ready, Powitzer had already been interned in Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

So Foley went to the camp himself and demanded the prisoner’s release, explaining that since Powitzer now held a British visa and was entitled to British protection. Powitzer, who had recently been flogged, remembered how he was “bandaged, cleaned up and shaved” and presented to a “small man wearing glasses”.

“My name is Foley,” said the visitor. “I am from the British Consulate in Berlin.”

The following day, Powitzer was released from Sachsenhausen, reunited with his son and allowed to reach safety in what was then the British Mandate of Palestine. Had Foley not
acted, Powitzer would have stayed in the camp where 30,000 inmates would be murdered by 1945.

Nearly 70 years later, when a statue was raised to Foley in the Somerset town of his birth, a man called Asher Rubin wrote from Israel, “Frank Foley saved me and my father, Gunter Powitzer. Foley’s efforts are responsible for the lives of our family.”

I hope SIS will forgive me if I add that Foley made good use of what is euphemistically called ‘tradecraft’. He would direct Jews to reliable suppliers of fake passports. He would place them in touch with SIS contacts who knew exactly how to cross the Swiss frontier. And he kept up a steady barrage of requests to London for more visas and more permits for Jews to settle in Palestine.

Yet, as the Ambassador alluded to, the bleak truth is that not everyone in the British government of the day possessed the same moral clarity or the will to confront the realities of Hitlerism. The policy of appeasement, no matter how well intentioned, was futile and morally bankrupt.

We should reflect that it was not the state as a whole, but remarkable individuals like Frank Foley who did the right thing, made the correct moral choice, often in defiance of the rules.

So here I ask: what would each of us have done if we had been in his place?

Frank Foley died in 1958 having observed the code of his profession and kept silent about his service. Four decades passed before Michael Smith wrote his biography and he began to receive the posthumous recognition. In 1999, Yad Vashem decided to honour Foley as one of the Righteous Among Nations. One of the Jews he saved happens to be the father-in-law of my cabinet colleague, James Brokenshire. Others include the grandparents of an SIS officer who is serving today.

Thanks to Foley, many people were spared the ordeal that Primo Levi endured and chronicled. But even as we take pride in the memory of Frank Foley, we should never lose sight of the hard truth that when the crucial moment came and the moral test was posed, there were too few people like him.
So today, we draw inspiration from his example, and we hope that those inspired will thus never be the next people to look away in the face of atrocity.

Thank you.

Poland Forms

Item A: Aleksander Kwasniewski 2001


Dear Ambassador of Israel, Dear Rabbi Baker, Dear Representatives of Jewish Milieus, Dear Mr. Mayor, Dear Residents of Jedwabne, Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, Fellow Countrymen!

Sixty years ago, on 10 July 1941, crime was committed against Jews on this land, at that time conquered and occupied by the Nazi Germany. This was a dreadful day. Day of hatred and cruelty.

We know much about this crime, though not yet everything. May be we will never learn the whole truth. But this did not prevent us from being here today. To speak in an open voice. We know enough to stand here in truth - facing pain, cry and suffering of those who were murdered here. Face to face with the victims' families who are here today. Before the judgment of [our] own conscience.

This was a particularly cruel crime. It is justified by nothing. Among the victims, among the burned were women, there were children. Petrifying cry of people closed in the barn and burned alive - continues to haunt the memory of those who witnessed the crime. The victims were helpless and defenseless. The criminals had a sense of being unpunished since German occupants incited them to such acts.

We know with all the certainty that Poles were among the oppressors and assassins.

We cannot have any doubts - here in Jedwabne citizens of the Republic of Poland died from the hands of other citizens of the Republic of Poland. It is people to people, neighbors to neighbors who forged such destiny.
At that time - sixty years ago - Poland was to be wiped out from the map of Europe. There were no Polish authorities in Jedwabne. The Polish state was unable to protect its citizens against the crime committed with the Nazi permission, at Nazi instigation. But the Republic of Poland should persist in the Polish hearts and minds. And the standards of a civilized state, the state with ages-old traditions of tolerance and amicable co-existence of nations and religions should be binding on its citizens. Those who killed, beat, took part in the dead set, set fire - committed crime not only against their Jewish neighbors. They are also guilty towards the Republic of Poland, its history and glorious traditions.

We are standing on a tormented land. The name Jedwabne, by a tragic ordain of fate had become for its today's citizens a byword recalling to human memory the ghosts of fratricide. It is not only in Jedwabne that superstitious prejudice was enkindled into the murderous flame of hatred in the "furnace era". Death, grief and suffering of the Jews from Jedwabne, from Radzilow and other localities, all these painful events which lay a gloomy shadow on Poland's history are the responsibility of the perpetrators and instigators. We cannot speak of collective responsibility burdening with guilt the citizens of any other locality or the entire nation. Every man is responsible only for his own acts. The sons do not inherit the sins of the fathers. But can we say: that was long ago, they were different?

The nation is a community. Community of individuals, community of generations. And this is why we have to look the truth into the eyes. Any truth. And say: it was, it happened. Our conscience will be clear if the memories of those days will for ever evoke awe and moral indignation.

We are here to make a collective self examination. We are paying tribute to the victims and we are saying - never again.

Let us all be the citizens of Jedwabne today. Let us feel what they feel! Let us remain with them in a common sense of grievance, despair, shame and solidarity. Cain could have killed Abel anywhere. All communities could have been tried in the same way. The trial of evil, but also of good. Of meanness and nobility. Righteous is the one who was able to demonstrate compassion in face of human suffering. How many Poles - also inhabitants of the neighborhood also of Jedwabne deserve to be called righteous!

Let us recall all of them today with greatest gratitude and with highest respect.
Thanks to a great nation-wide debate regarding this crime committed in 1941, much has changed in our lives in 2001, the first year of the new millennium. Today's Poland has courage to look into the eyes of the truth about a nightmare which gloomed one of the chapters in its history.

We have become aware of the responsibility for our attitude towards the dark pages in our history. We have understood that bad service is done to the nation by those who are impelling to renounce that past. Such attitude leads to a moral self-destruction.

We who have gathered here today, with all the people in our country who have clear and sensitive conscience, with the lay and religious moral authorities, consolidating our adherence to basic values, paying homage to the memory of the murdered and most deeply deploiring the despicable perpetrators of the crime, give expression to our pain and shame, we manifest our determination to learn the truth, courage to overcome the evil past, firm will of understanding and agreement.

For this crime we should beg the souls of the dead and their families for forgiveness. This is why today, the President of the Republic of Poland, I beg pardon. I beg pardon in my own name and in the name of those Poles whose conscience is shattered by that crime.

In the name of those who believe that one cannot be proud of the glory of Polish history without feeling, at the same time, pain and shame for the evil done by Poles to others.

I wish with all my heart that the name of this village bring the memories of not only the crime but that it become the sign of the great self-examination, that it become the venue of reconciliation. Polish bishops prayed on 27 May "for all those who cherished anxiety and resentment towards the Jewish nation that they accept the grace of a change in their hearts". These words express only too well the feelings of a great part of the Poles. May, then, this change occur. Let us spare no effort for it!

The tragedy which took place here cannot be annihilated. Evil cannot be wiped out; Suffering cannot be forgotten.

The truth about what happen will not redress what happened. The truth is not so potent. But only truth - even the most aching and painful - will allow to purify the wounds of the memory.
This is the hope that we cherish. This is what we are here for today. We are saying today the words of sorrow and pain, not only because of human decency. And not only because others expect us to. Not because they will be a compensation for the murdered. Not because the world is listening.

We are saying these words because this is what we feel. Because we ourselves need them most of all. We are doing it to be better, stronger with moral strength, free from prejudice, animosities and hatred. To respect and to love men. To turn the wrong into the right.

**Item B: Aleksander Kwasniewski 2005**


Addressing the guests President Kwaśniewski said:

Where we are now gathered, no words can render the entire terrifying truth about the horrors committed in this place. But we must speak, remember, cry out: this was hell on Earth. Here, humiliation, fear, pain, suffering, death – they were the everyday. The monstrosity of this crime is overwhelming. Nazi “death factories” were planned in cold blood. Disciplined butchers fervently did their job to make sure, that the crematory stacks kept spilling out smoke. We still cannot forget that “people brought this fate upon people”. We can never accept this!

This place presents in its terrible entirety what Nazism really was. A mere two months passed since Hitler came to power, when the first prisoners were thrown into the camp of Dachau. Shortly after the aggression against Poland, the Konzentrationslager Auschwitz was established at Himmler’s orders. Already in June 1940 was the first transport of Polish political prisoners routed here. In the first year of Auschwitz’s existence 17 thousand Poles suffered behind the barbed wire of this camp. Even more came to be imprisoned later into the Occupation. They included such eminent persons as Tadeusz Borowski, Bronisław Czech, Xawery Dunikowski, Józef Cyraniewicz, Władysław Bartoszewski, Tadeusz Hołuj, Stefan Jaracz, Józef Szajna or August Kowalczyk.

As of 1941 the horror of Auschwitz became the fate of many nationalities. Transports starting
arriving from all over occupied Europe. People from various countries, languages and
deliveries gathered in a community of suffering, marked by the striped camp rags. Most of
these people met their death here. Auschwitz is an enormous European cemetery, holding the
ashes of one and a half million people of 25 nationalities.

Particularly terrifying was the fate of the Jews. Auschwitz-Birkenau is a symbol of the Shoah,
genocide committed by the Nazis upon the Jewish people. The largest death camp was exactly
here – build specially to kill. On a mass scale, industrialised, with precision. Together with
other death factories – in Belżec, in Chełmno on the Ner, in Majdanek, in Sobibór and
Treblinka – it continues to give testimony to the enormity of this crime. During the War the
Nazis murdered six million Jews, half of whom died in the camps. Total extermination was
also to be the fate of the Romany community. It is indeed a nightmarishly horrific chapter in
the history of Europe.

Our hearts weeping, full of grief, today we pay tribute to all those murdered in Auschwitz, to
all victims of the Nazi crime. For us here in Poland this is a place of special reflection. We
reflect on the martyrdom but also the steadfastness of our nation, which grappled with the
invaders from the first day of the War until the last. We reflect on the suffering of fellow men.
On the special bond connecting us with the Jewish people.

Brought by the Nazis, the Shoah was the end of the world, which Poles and Jews had built on
this land in cohabitation. The Jewish community had lived here for eight hundred years,
finding Poland to be a country of freedom and tolerance. Many generations of Polish Jews
delivered a magnificent spiritual, cultural, economic heritage – and contributed greatly to our
common history, at the same time drawing upon Polish influence and experience. This will be

This day is a good opportunity to recall those great of spirit, the Polish heroes who
demonstrated courage and solidarity with the Jews. To recall the members of the “Żegota”
Council for Aid to the Jews; to mention Irena Sendlerowa, who save the lives of thousands of
Jewish children; Jan Karski, who was the first to tell the Allies about the Shoah; or Henryk
Slawik, known as the Polish Wallenberg, whose efforts saved over ten thousand Jews from
the Nazi death machine.
Ladies and Gentlemen!

The Auschwitz-Birkenau camp was liberated on 27 January 1945 by Soviet troops. Some of the liberators are among us here today – those who saved the prisoners and uncovered the Auschwitz horror to the World. I had the honour today to present them with distinguished Polish decorations. With profound respect for the soldierly sacrifice of blood, Poland worships all the combatants, all who died a heroic death marching in the ranks of the Red Army to liberate our homeland from Nazi occupation.

We remember the enormous contribution of the Russians and other peoples of the Soviet Union to the victory over Nazism. We remember that it was on the eastern front that the outcome of World War II was determined to an enormous extent; that it was the Red Army, which seized Berlin. Twenty million killed – soldiers in action and civilians murdered by the Nazis – were a terrible price, which the nations of the Soviet Union paid for this historic victory. Together we bow our heads to their sacrifice.

We remember those, who survived the horror of the camp and today continue to live with the effects of their suffering, the diseases and often poverty and loneliness. It was exactly for them, with the motto “You will not be alone!” that the Polish-German “Reconciliation” Foundation and the victims’ associations established the Polish Union of Victims of Nazism last year. I am confident that the work of this new organisation will well serve the humanitarian, social and medical needs of the living victims of Nazism.

Auschwitz-Birkenau is a warning. This place is the terrible truth about the abysmal fall of humanity. We must find the strength to face up to this truth. We must always remember about it. It is our duty to pass this horrifying memento to future generations. Exactly because of this the despicable attempts to tamper with history, the so-called “Auschwitz Lie”, are being condemned and punished in all civilised countries. We must do everything for the monstrosity symbolised by Auschwitz-Birkenau never to happen again in the future.

Among us today are witnesses of events from 60 years ago. When I behold you I experience profound emotion, wonder and respect. I know that it is you, the guardians of this painful memory, like no one else know the value and need of peace, reconciliation, forgiving. And it is from you that the greatest learning can come to the next generations – young people
building a united Europe and a better future for this planet.

May today, from this place our common cry sound, the cry for a world without hatred and contempt, without racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, for a world, in which the word “human” will always ring with pride.

**Item C: Auschwitz Ceremony Press Release 2007**


On Saturday, January 27, 2007, the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum held ceremonies marking the 62nd anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz camp. The principal guests were several dozen former prisoners and 21 people from Oświęcim who aided prisoners during the years of the German occupation. They were awarded Knights’ and Officers’ Crosses of the Order of Poland Reborn.

In a letter to those who attended the ceremony, Polish President Lech Kaczyński wrote that “the world has never before appreciated fully their heroic sacrifices. They remained isolated with their memories. The world’s public opinion often treated the local residents as if they had been totally indifferent to the fate of the prisoners. It is imperative to protest against such wrongful imputations, which distort the facts and besmirch our history.”

President Kaczyński noted in his letter that the Germans expelled Polish civilians from the vicinity of the camp at the beginning of the war. Nevertheless, possibilities still existed for incredibly risky contacts between prisoners laboring outside the camp and local residents. “A large proportion of them took the trouble, heroically and with total dedication, to help those in need. This help consisted of supplying them with medicine and food, helping them to pass on secret messages to their families and reports from the camp resistance movement, and, finally, assisting escapees from Auschwitz Concentration Camp in an organized way.”

Ewa Junczyk-Ziomecka, undersecretary of state in the Chancellery of the President of the Polish Republic, awarded the medals. The full list of recipients contained more than 40 names, but health considerations made it impossible for some of the Oświęcim heroes to attend in person.
In overall terms, a great many residents of Oświęcim joined in aiding the prisoners. Museum historians have identified about 1,200 of them by name, of whom only 110 are still alive. A book published by the Museum, Ludzie dobrej woli. Księga Pamięci mieszkańców Ziemi Oświęcimskiej niosących pomoc więźniom KL Auschwitz [People of good will: Memorial book of the residents of the land of Oświęcim who aided prisoners of Auschwitz Concentration Camp], contained information about them.

Ewa Junczyk-Ziomecka recalled that the first prisoners of Auschwitz were Poles. She noted the fact that the liberation anniversary was concurrent with the 65th anniversary of the Wannsee conference, during which representatives of the Nazi German government worked out the details of the extermination of the Jews. This resulted in millions of victims, the greatest numbers of whom died in Auschwitz.

Junczyk-Ziomecka stressed that “the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp is a place about which people must never forget. . . . I welcome the plan to create a new main exhibition, as well as progress in the conservation and educational work carried out by the Museum. I know that administrative obstacles are still delaying the start of work to adapt the premises that will house the International Center for Education about Auschwitz and the Holocaust, which Poland established two years ago.

“With the utmost commitment, she added, the office of the President of the Polish Republic is counting on the promptest possible resolution of this situation, and on removing all the obstacles blocking the way to the creation of this Center. May this educational work constitute Poland’s gift to all humanity.”

Tomasz Merta, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, expressed similar views.

Museum Director Piotr M. A. Cywiński also addressed those in attendance. In his brief remarks, he noted that “so many are missing here today. The old people, and the children who did not even manage to become prisoners of the concentration camp, because their way led elsewhere once they left the ramp. Those whole families who today have no one to remember them today. All of those who were worked to death, starved, annihilated, burned to ashes. Those who never lived to see any anniversary of any liberation. Yet they longed so badly to do so.”
The main part of the ceremony was held only after dark, out of respect for the Sabbath. Jews made up 90% of the victims of the German camp. At the conclusion of the observances, candles were placed in front of the monument to the victims of the camp, at the Auschwitz II-Birkenau site. The Polish president’s representative lighted the first of them, together with former prisoners.

**Item D: Press Release Komorowski 2011**


The two presidents agreed that the atrocities of the Nazis must not be forgotten while at the same time their nations need to reconcile.

The General Assembly of the United Nations decided that the International Holocaust Remembrance Day shall be celebrated on 27th January.

During the main part of the commemoration, in the building of the central sauna where the Germans registered their prisoners, Bronisław Komorowski emphasized that Auschwitz-Birkenau is a globally unique focal point for the knowledge and memory of crimes. "We would surely prefer to remain silent in a place like this. We would prefer to pray silently to ourselves, everyone in his or her own way, and to contemplate the anatomy of the crime; we would like to consider the significance of this evil and to find the reasons underlying such atrocities. But there must be no silence here," Bronisław Komorowski said, emphasizing that the concentration camp in Auschwitz is one of the symbols of a tragedy which shook the entire world.

The Polish President believes the fact that the President of Germany attended the celebration of the anniversary is also important. "This is a token of the world now heading towards the good; in spite of this horrible experience, we are now, after many years (…) closer to removing from modern history of nations, states, and the world at large all those dreadful things which burdened the shoulders of at least several generations of people inhabiting this part of Europe. The venom of hatred and the unbearable pain will be no more," he said.

Christian Wulff, the President of Germany, said that the very name of Auschwitz symbolises the evil and harm Germans have done to millions of human beings. "These crimes fill us,
Germans, with disgust and shame. We are all historically responsible for them, regardless of the fault of particular individuals. It is our duty to make sure that such atrocities never haunt this world again," he said.

Before the main part of the ceremony took place, the presidents of Poland and Germany headed to the execution wall of the former Auschwitz I camp and paid honour to those who perished in the camp. Joint Christian and Jewish prayers were held at the Monument to the Victims of the Camp in the former Auschwitz II - Birkenau camp. Bronislaw Komorowski and Christian Wulff lit vigil lights there.

Before that, in Oświęcim, the presidents of Poland and Germany met with the youth in the International Youth Meeting House. Former inmates of the Auschwitz camp took part in a debate called "What is not forgotten... History of Europe, hope for Europe (Co pozostaje w pamięci... Historia Europy, nadzieja Europy)."

Item E: Bronislaw Komorowski 2012


The Organizers of and Participants in
the observances of the sixty-seventh anniversary of
the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau
concentration camp and extermination center

Esteemed Former Auschwitz Prisoners,
Esteemed Authorities and Residents of the
City of Oświęcim and the Oświęcim Area,
Dear Participants and Guests at the Ceremony,

I join with all who have gathered during the observances of the sixty-seventh anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp and extermination center. I bow my head before the former prisoners in attendance at the ceremonies. You are living witnesses to the “epoch of the furnaces,” people whose dramatic experiences should penetrate the consciousness of each generation in Poland and all around the world.

The Red Army units entering the grounds of the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp in January 1945 found fewer than eight thousand people behind the barbed wire. Retreating German
formations harried many times more on the brutal Death Marches into the depths of the Third Reich and the territories it occupied—and, ultimately, to other camps including Mauthausen. From January 27, 1945, the world began grappling with the horrific truth about what happened in Auschwitz—a truth that it had earlier been unwilling or unable to believe, which it did not want to admit to its awareness.

Since that time, decades have passed. It might seem that everything has already been said, that all the mourning has been lived through and all the grief exhausted. That is only true up to the moment when we find ourselves on the grounds of the camp. Then it hits us with all its force that the heart of darkness of World War II was right here, that the evil of Nazism revealed itself in its fullest ruthlessness here. Murder that did not spare pregnant women, children, and the elderly, the killing of thousands of innocent people with gas, the backbreaking labor, the cruel pseudo-medical experiments conducted on camp prisoners—the actions of the Nazi criminals revealed itself in all the iniquity that human beings are capable of inflicting on other human beings. That is why an obligation to confront questions about Auschwitz is inscribed in the human condition after 1945. We have no right to turn away from this place, no right to think that studying this history has become unnecessary. Auschwitz will always prick the conscience of every thinking, feeling person. It will remain a wound on the soul of Europe and the world.

Auschwitz is also an admonition, the most striking of all that history offers us. An admonition against hatred in its private and public dimension. An admonition against racism, antisemitism, and xenophobia. Against totalitarian rule built on oppression and lies. An admonition against every ideology that regards it as permissible to forget about morality, about empathy, and about respect for human beings and their rights and dignity. Here in Auschwitz, under the sign of the swastika and in the name of that ideology of theirs, the German perpetrators deprived people of their dignity in a systematic, refined way. They abased them, stripped them of hope, and plundered their names. Nothing except the number branded on the arm was supposed to remain of the unique individuality that is each person.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Republic will never forget the victims of Auschwitz—above all because a significant proportion of them were its children: Polish Jews, Poles, Polish Roma. But also because, in setting up this extermination center, the German occupier dealt a horrific blow to our homeland. On the soil that for hundreds of years had prided itself on its reputation as a haven
for the persecuted, a shelter for dissidents, and a country without burning at the stake, the invader erected a stake to burn more than a million people from all over Europe. We shall remember all those people who suffered death at German hands on the soil of our homeland.

We will also steadfastly oppose all attempts at relativizing historical facts, falsifying them, and explaining as "mental shortcuts" such expressions as "Polish concentration camps." We will steadfastly oppose such things out of a sense of elementary fairness, but also because, as a nation of victims of Hitler, we understand the remembrance of the Nazi crimes committed against Poles, Jews, Roma, Russians, and other peoples of the world as our obligation. We convey this remembrance to succeeding generations. The cry that rises from this place to the gate of heaven will never fall silent. Each of us must understand that the former Nazi German concentration camp and extermination center Auschwitz Birkenau will forever remain an unparalleled admonition. All honor to those who were murdered!

**Item F: Bogdan Zdrojewski (Polish Minister of Culture and National Heritage) 2013**


We meet here today, on the 68th Anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi German camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau, in order to open the new permanent exhibition entitled “Tragedy. Valour. Liberation”. Just as every year, our presence here is intended above all to honour the memory of those murdered in the camp. The immensity of the wrongs suffered by the prisoners of Auschwitz-Birkenau cannot be described in words.

Over a million people perished. Those who survived that devastating stay in the camp, now and forever, have to live with these traumatic experiences that cannot be forgotten. As we know, their children, and even grandchildren, experience anew the events that forever left a mark on the fate of their families.

We remember the Holocaust of the Jews, the suffering and extermination of Poles, Russians, Roma, Byelorussians, Ukrainians and citizens of almost all the countries of Europe. Their memory, their fate - it is our legacy.

Our role and commitment is to honour the memory of those events, which do not have the right to be repeated. Not only for the sake of the victims of the Holocaust, but also for the
sake of present and future generations, for which knowledge of the past must constitute as a memento.

The Polish state has taken on the commitment of caring for the memory of the Nazi crimes carried out in the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp. The Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation set up the Perpetual Fund, whose means allow for the continuous implementation of conservation works at the Auschwitz Memorial Site.

Today, thanks to donations and declarations of payments coming from countries around the world, we are on the way to achieving our goal. Half a year ago, in this same place, the work of the Global Conservation Plan was inaugurated, the effects of which are already starting to be seen.

Today, allow me to express my gratification with the presence of our Russian guests, for whom World War II is the bloodiest period experienced in the history of Russia. The permanent exhibition “Tragedy. Valour. Liberation” was prepared by the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Moscow in cooperation with the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum.

At this time, I would like to thank the employees of both museums and all those involved in preparing the exhibition for their efforts.

I wish to express my satisfaction, which comes from the fact that these many years of Polish-Russian co-operation have ended in success. I also hope that this will not be a one-off collaboration, but that it will become symbol of mutual understanding and a good example of a concerted effort to preserve the memory and historical truth.

**Item G: Bronislaw Komorowski 2015**


Ladies and Gentlemen,

And especially Those of you who have survived the Gehenna of Auschwitz,

All Distinguished Guests,

We are in a place where our civilization collapsed, in a place where the plan to take away man’s dignity was systematically put into practise. Where the German Nazi rolled out a genuine “death industry” and a man was reduced to merely a tattooed camp number. Ten
years ago a Shoah survivor, Merka Szewach, noted: “Here they imprisoned my family and they burnt them all. Here they took away my name and gave me a number. I was Merka Szewach no longer, I was a number.”

We are standing in a place which saw a beastly slaughter of over one million people: overwhelmingly Jews from almost all Europe, but also Poles, Roma, Soviet POWs and many, many others… We are standing in a place which reminds us about the vile Nazi ideology which undermined the pillars of the world. Precisely at his hour, 70 years ago the camp was liberated by soldiers of the 60th Army of the First Ukrainian Front of the Red Army. On that day in the afternoon, the 100th Lviv Infantry Division marched into the central part of the camp’s premises. Today we think about those soldiers with gratitude and respect.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Auschwitz-Birkenau came as an expression of a cruel contempt of man and of man’s dignity. What the oppressors also wanted to annihilate was memory. As Elie Wiesel, another Auschwitz inmate, put it: to kill again, this time by oblivion.

Each of you, Ladies and Gentlemen, the camp Survivors, who were rescued from the pandemonium of hatred and violence, each of you is a custodian of Auschwitz memory. You are the most important participants of the today’s ceremony.

To be a custodian of Auschwitz memory takes more than to remember the crime itself, it also includes a reflection on the sources of the crime prevailing in people, nations, ideologies and state policies. It is a memory of totalitarianisms, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, underpinning the 20th century collapse of our civilization.

In a unique way, the Poles have been made custodians of this tragic memory: for it was occupied Poland that was the object of the two totalitarianisms as they started in parallel carrying out their genocidal plans. In early 1940, the German occupation authorities decided to launch a so called AB Aktion: the destruction of Polish intelligentsia. At the same time, the Soviet authorities made a decision on the mass killing of Polish officers seen as representatives of the Polish elite: the Katyn massacre. Almost simultaneously, the Germans created, mainly for Polish inmates, a concentration camp in Auschwitz. It was then expanded on a large scale, being transformed into Birkenau annihilation camp. My country was made by the German occupier a place of terror of unprecedented intensity and a place of extermination of European Jews. The German Nazis made Poland a perennial cemetery for Jews and put an end to many centuries’ Jewish presence on Polish soil. This is why it is incumbent on Poland to play to the role of the unique deposer of memory of Auschwitz and the Shoah.
What does memory of Auschwitz mean for us today?

First, it is the memory of suffering and the Shoah. It is the memory of a wound, still open and sore. It is also the memory of a cursed place; the place which left a stigma on everyone who approached it.

Yet, the memory of Auschwitz is also a realization that even in the face of the greatest collapse of humanity the highest heroism is possible, or even sanctity. For example, the sanctity of Father Maksymilian Kolbe who sacrificed his life for the life of another inmate. For in this place, efforts were undertaken not only to destroy the world but also to save it. This is reflected by the words embossed on the medal awarded to the Righteous among the Nations: “Whosoever saves a single life, saves an entire universe”. Especially here, we are struck with the profound truth of these words.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

For more than 70 years, we have been trying to spread the word in the world about all the evil that was inflicted in this death factory and in other German death factories. In the name of truth we want to oppose any attempts of relativization of the Shoah in the contemporary world. I wish to thank those people who search for the truth and tell us about the victims and perpetrators of the crime. This has been, in particular, the object of the International Auschwitz Council and the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum. Thanks to the donors from all over the world, in recent years the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation has been making efforts to preserve the premises of the camp in their authentic shape. You contribute to the saving of this poignant sign of memory which also serves as a warning, the warning that should transpire from Auschwitz-Birkenau for the whole world.

Since to remember Auschwitz also means to remember about the need to stand up for our values: freedom, justice, tolerance as well as respect of human rights and civil liberties. Years ago, John Paul II stated here that “Auschwitz is an examination of conscience for the whole mankind”. He went on to warn: “One nation can never develop at the expense of another, at the expense of its subordination, conquest, oppression, at the expense of exploiting it, at the expense of its death.” Let us recall what are the results of breaking nations’ right to self-determination, inviolability of borders, contempt of human life and passive attitude in face of evil. From this very place we denounce all manifestations of hatred, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.

An Auschwitz survivor, Primo Levi, pointed out that “those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it”. It is our obligation: of Europe and indeed of the whole world to remember for the sake of the ones who suffered here, for your sake, Ladies and Gentlemen,
who have survived a camp gehenna. It is equally our obligation to remember for our own sake and for the sake of our future.

**Item H: Andrzej Duda 2016 (Opening of Ulma Family Museum)**


It was at night… They drove here on sideroads from the direction of Łańcut, as it was then recalled by the cart driver, a young peasant boy from one of Podkarpacie villages: the German police patrol and the blue police. Among them there was also the one, as it has been established with a fair degree of probability, also who had reported on the Ulms family and the Goldman family who were living with the former.

They stopped off the road. The house was on the outskirts of the village, with no other buildings in the vicinity. The policemen and the blue policemen directed themselves towards the Ulms' house. The, a gunfire was to be heard… They summoned the cart drivers and ordered them to look. They first murdered Chaim Goldman's sons, then himself, his then Józef and Wiktoria Ulms. One of the Germans told the cart drivers: "Look. This is how Polish pigs are slaughtered who help Jews". Thereafter, they did not know what to do with the children: the six children of Józef and Wiktoria. And the commanding officer of the German police said: "We will spare you the trouble in the village", and he killed them all, one by one. The author of this account said: “Gunfire, screams, lamentation were to be heard. It was shocking”. See also: [President: By saving Jews Poles survived in dignity](https://www.president.pl/en/news/art,123,address-by-the-president-of-poland-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-ulms-family-museum-.html)

Why would Józef Ulma and his wife behave this way, why would they decide take under their roof the Goldman family? Chaim, the head of family, approaching his eighties, a merchant from Łańcut nearby, his grown-up sons, his daughters and a granddaughter? Why would they take such a decision? Were they following the appeal of the Command of the Polish Underground State which stated that it is a moral obligation of the Polish people to come to aid to our Jewish compatriots, the citizens of the Republic of Poland, facing annihilation? Or was it because they knew Chaim Goldman and his whole family? Since all people knew each other in that local community. Or was the biblical story of the Good Samaritan that inspired them, as the story was later found underlined in their family Bible at home? Nobody knows... Nobody can tell. One thing is certain: Józef Ulma was an ordinary peasant, a farmer from the Podkarpacie region. An educated and intelligent man, he completed his primary education of
four classes, and thereafter a farming school. He was shown as a model farmer, he was a dedicated bee keeper, he also bred silkworms. By today's standards, he was a local opinion leader. And he certainly was one. People would seek his advice. He took pictures to record the life of his local community and of his own family. Also thanks to this contribution, the museum here is so persuasive and beautiful. It is full of pictures that Józef had taken: also full of pictures taken of his Jewish neighbours and guests, whom he had taken under his roof and with whom he died.

This is an extremely compelling museum. I am very grateful and I wish to thank in the name of the Republic of Poland and in the name of all my compatriots to all of them who contributed to the establishment of the museum. I wish to thank them who made sure that the Ulms, their family and all people who helped their compatriots of Jewish descent to survive the massacre of their people, as the Nazi destined back them for annihilation. Thank you for making this museum a memorial to them all. Thank you - for such a memorial was urgently needed by Poland, also in terms of historical fairness.

Our nations: the Polish and the Jewish one inhabited this land for one thousand years. This millennium of shared history was then subjected to a horrifying fracture, i.e. the Holocaust on Polish soil occupied by the Germans. The death camps which for a black chapter in the history of the Jewish People. Many people come to our country to see the Auschwitz Birkenau Camp and other testimonies of the massive annihilation which come as a warning for the whole world: what hatred and insane ideology mean, and what a man possessed with both can be capable of doing. Fortunately, also other places have been recently set up our country, pointing to what is good in history, what is beautiful in history, even the most tragic part of it. This museum is precisely such a place: the museum of brotherhood, charity, cooperation, the museum of shared space, homeland, and many a time of shared attachment.

Perhaps the reason why Józef Ulma took the Goldman family under his roof considering that their son took part in Polish defense war of 1939, like himself. Perhaps considering the fact that thousands of citizens of Jewish descent fought for Poland in 1918, 1919, 1920, 1939, and thereafter. They fought since Poland was our shared homeland where they were born, raised, were they lived. And, fortunately, the place where during the unspeakable tragedy of the Holocaust, in the days of putting into test of the "final solution of the Jewish question", as it was cynically termed by German commanders, thousands of Polish people were to be found
who lived up to the test, as brothers and citizens. Being charitable people who heeded the teachings offered to us all by Christianity: the teaching about loving one’s neighbour.

Fortunately, there were people who had sufficient love in spite of the great risk, the risk of imminent death, since unlike anywhere else, in Poland assistance to Jews was punishable with death, and unlike anywhere else it was mercilessly enforced. There were more people than Wiktoria and Józef Ulms and their children who perished this way. There were tens, hundreds of families, thousands of people who gave their lives for the assistance offered to their compatriots, co-citizens.

As we recall today those dramatic times and one thousand years of shared history, may our path across that epoch be charted out by what can be now seen in free and independent Poland, mindful of her own history. This is the museum of the History of Polish Jews POLIN in Warsaw which shed lights on those beautiful and those sad chapters, this is German Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz, but also it is the museum in Markowa, a very important site on our shared itinerary. The museum which features, albeit in a tragic format, the most powerful sign of the Republic of Friends: where a friend was ready to offer his life for a friend, a brother for a brother, man for man. May what we have heard today testify to the truth of it. Even the German example of terror, i.e. the slaughtering of the Ulms family and the Goldman family whom the former were hiding, would not drive other Markowa inhabitants, who also had families and wanted to survive, to give away the Jews they had been hiding. In spite of that tragedy, twenty one Jews continued to be sheltered in that village until the end of war.

This is a grand place for the history of the Republic of Poland for it manifestly exemplifies why we a Polish people can feel worthy. Among us, there were the ones who went beyond decency, who were heroic and who must be treated on a par with those who stood in arms and lost their lives in the fight for Poland's freedom. There I no difference: the former and the latter sacrificed their lives for another man and for freedom; since freedom equals dignity. The fact that they were hiding their neighbours, acquaintances, or even accidentally encountered people, was their objection to cruelty, contempt, hatred: all of the sentiment that was brought by German Nazi to the Polish land, the antisemitism with which they could not come to terms and would never come to terms till the end of their life.
As President of the Republic of Poland, I want to say loud and clear: anyone who preaches and incites hatred among nations, anyone who preaches, sows or incites antisemitism, tramples on the grave of the Ulms family, tramples on their memory, the ideals they pursued as the Poles and for which they sacrificed their lives: for dignity, decency, justice, and the most fundamental respect that every man deserves. May this museum, next to other existing, serve as a great testimony to everyone, of this tragic but also edifying memory, and a warning about what contempt and hatred can make of people.

In all those circumstances, it is good that the authorities of the Polish Underground State were able to show their resolve. The one who most probably betrayed the Ulms and their guests, their Jewish neighbours, would not live long after. They perished at night on 23-24 March, and the Polish Underground State executed the collaborator on 10 September of the same year: 1944. Later, another murderer was also captured: the one who was responsible for shooting three children. First condemned to death by the Polish court, he was then pardoned to serve life sentence, and then to 25 years of impediment. He died in a Bytom prison. It is good that the Polish state was capable of showing fundamental justice in the face of murder. Such a fundamental justice should be dealt to any murderer. In any just and law abiding state it so happens. And by the same token, none fair and law abiding state can condone inciting hatred, national phobias, or xenophobia. I trust that Poland will never condone it. As much as the State of Israel nowadays, as much as its founding fathers, taught by the dramatic Holocaust experience, decided never to leave any of their citizens abandoned and will go to great lengths to protect every Jew, we the Polish people and our state, we should follow the suit.

May the tragedy of what happened in World War 2 be a dramatic lesson, equally to the Jewish people and to our people; the lesson allowing us and generations to come to draw our conclusions, the future generations to whom we must relate the truth. The truth about the Holocaust, the truth about what was happening, the truth about the heroism but also sometimes the sad truth about wickedness. Since truth builds brotherhood among nations and allow to create friendly bonds. Since prosperous future can only rely on truth.

Item I Auschwitz Ceremony Press Release 2017

On January 27, more than 60 Auschwitz survivors met at the site of the former Birkenau camp to commemorate the 72nd anniversary of the liberation of the German Nazi concentration and extermination camp. The central theme of the anniversary event was “Time”. The President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda has assumed honorary patronage of the event.

The eyewitnesses of history were accompanied by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Beata Szydło, representatives of the Polish Government, ambassadors and diplomats, representatives of the religious clergy, regional authorities, local authorities, workers of museums and memorials, among others.

“This date, January 27th, has for years been marking a unique day. We are now in the place which is difficult to name and to define. There are numerous ways to do it. For some people what had happened here is a great tragedy, Calvary, other talk about death factory, but in fact, none of these words reflect what had actually taken place here. No word would ever express the evil which had happened here. In this place, a man deprived other man of humanity. Deprived not only of life but also of everything which defines us as human beings”, said Beata Szydło, Prime Minister of Poland.

“I want this voice to spread again today from this place, the place of torment, of annihilation of all human attributes. What happened in the German extermination camp was evil. Deceitful, cruel and unimaginable evil. The evil which can only be overcome with good”, she added.

“Remembrance and truth – it is our task, it is our weapon against evil. And this truth must be said out loud so that nobody will ever turn it into lie, which tries to act as alibi for evil. Auschwitz, Birkenau, Harmęże, Pławy – these were Polish towns and villages. Polish people, Polish families had lived here and they were expelled from their Polish homes. And here, on these lands of these Polish homes, German extermination camp was erected. This is the truth that we have to talk about. We must not be afraid of the truth and must not deny it”, emphasized Beata Szydło.

During the commemoration event two Auschwitz survivors, Batszewska Dagan and Bogdan Bartnikowski took to the floor.

Batsheva Dagan was born in 1925 in Łódź as Izabella Rubinstein. After the encroachment of the Germans, she fled with her family to Radom. In 1942, she escaped from the Radom ghetto
with false documents and made her way into Germany. After a few months, she was arrested and deported to Auschwitz, where she stayed until early 1945 when, along with other prisoners, she was evacuated to Ravensbrück and later to Malchow. On 2 May 1945, she was liberated by the British army.

“I’m in a sauna, in the place where a human was turned into a prisoner. And how this happened. I arrived as a young girl with braids on my head, I had my number tattooed on my left forearm. I see here many striped uniforms, but at the time there weren’t enough striped uniforms and I got a uniform of a Red Army soldier; uniform – I mean trousers, blouse and two left wooden clogs. And I had a rag on my bald head. And it was me. How could I look at myself, recognize myself. I was looking in the windows and saw a figure with my personality”, recalled Batsheva Dagan.

“Now I live, I survived, I lived to be with you 72 years after. I’ll say that I feel very happy, because life is the most beautiful gift we can ever get”, she said.

“After the liberation I was in Belgium, then I went to Palestine. At the beginning of my professional carrier I was a kindergarten teacher. Did Auschwitz influence my life? Yes, it did. It influenced my choice of career. Because I believe that education is a key to everything. How to raise the children for them to be able to differentiate between good and evil”, said Dagan.

Bogdan Bartnikowski was born in Warsaw in 1932. In the beginning of August 1944, he took part in the Warsaw Uprising, for which he was deported along with his mum on August 12, 1944 to Auschwitz. In January 1945, he was deported to Blankenburg, where he was subjected to forced labour, clearing the German capital of debris until the liberation in April of the same year.

“I am number 192 731. Next to the number, I have a mark with the letter “P”. Together it all means that I am Polnische bandite aus Warschau. I am 12 years old and I am a Polish bandit from Warsaw. Two days earlier, before I got the number, I had parents, I had a home. One could say that in all these occupation conditions I lived quite a peaceful life. But it was all two days ago, but I’m 12 today and have been in Birkenau for two days. I am walking down this long corridor, actually toddling in a crowd of naked, dirty, sweaty women who came here with me from Warsaw districts of Wola and Ochota districts during the night of 11th/12th August 1944”, said Bogdan Bartnikowski.
“I got a badge which says guest of honour. I don’t feel like a guest of honour. Here I always feel like a former prisoner or prisoner. Because when I’m walking down this corridor as we were entering now, I’m still walking naked. Exactly as it was then, because it’s deep in my memory. Not only mine. When I talk with my fellow prisoners from Birkenau, we are probably all marked by this cruel experience until we die. I’m not a guest here. I come here, I must come here, to be the witness of truth, to talk about this tragic history, to talk about what was happening here. Not only me, there are more of us who come here. These are difficult moments for us”, he emphasized.

Minister Wojciech Kolarski from the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland said: “The purpose of the Germans was total destruction of the Jewish nation as well as enslavement and ruthless exploitation of Slavic nations. The evil and Hitler’s crimes are unimaginable. In the face of sufferings and death inflicted on millions of people, we are terrified by the immensity of evil. But we must not close our eyes at it. Standing here, we must have enough courage to stay focused. The courage to discover the truth and spread it to the world. Because the truth about extermination, the truth about Auschwitz are necessary so that nothing like this repeats in the future”.

The Ambassador of the State of Israel Anna Azari, and the Ambassador of the Russian Federation Sergey Andreyev emphasized the role of the witnesses to history in their speeches. “We are the last generation with the chance to learn about the Holocaust from those who had a first-hand experience of its atrocities. Therefore, we need to put in the maximum effort to find and preserve as much individual history testifying to those terrible times”, said the Israeli Ambassador to Poland.

“They survived and transferred to us the memory of the crimes, which we can never allow to occur again. We have among us less and less of such people, as well as those they liberated from the death-trap. Each meeting with former prisoners and soldiers - liberators assumes a particular significance “, said Ambassador Andreyev.

In a direct address to former prisoners, the director of the Auschwitz Museum Dr M.A Cywiński said: “Today, on this day, I wish to thank you for every word of your testimony, for all your warnings, and for all that was inexpressible, which made us believe that we could cope with it - we the post-war generation - to carry into the future and share with subsequent generations the magnitude of your experience, which was passed down to us”.
He stressed that thanks to words of the witnesses of history we are now more aware the great responsibility that rests on those whose duty it is today to remember. “It is not true that history likes to repeat itself. It would be too easy. Too exemplary. History - just like a chameleon, has a unique gift of disguising threats. Therefore, there will come different times, shaped by new gusts of populism, different slogans of propaganda, various ideologies and attitudes of insensitivity. They are here already. However, today we are no longer unaware”, he said.

The second part of the ceremony took place at the Memorial to the Victims on the site of the former Auschwitz II-Birkenau. The rabbis and clergy of various Christian denominations jointly read psalm 42 from the Second Book of Psalms, and participants of the ceremony placed grave candles at the monument commemorating the victims of Auschwitz.

Earlier, on 27 January, survivors along with the management and employees of the Auschwitz Memorial laid wreaths in the courtyard of Block 11 in Auschwitz I. Afterwards, a Holy mass was celebrated in the Centre for Dialogue and Prayer led by Bishop Piotr Greger, Auxiliary Bishop of Bielsko-Żywiec.

On the occasion of the anniversary an exhibition was opened in the temporary exhibition hall in Block 12 on the site of the former Auschwitz I entitled “Archaeology”. The exhibition presented the original personal items of the victims of Auschwitz, discovered in 1967 during archaeological works in the area of the gas chamber and Crematorium III in Birkenau, which returned to the Memorial last year. Among the exhibits was a watch, which became the main Visual symbol of the celebration of 72nd anniversary of the liberation.

Until the liberation of the camp sites by soldiers of the Red Army, German Nazis murdered approx. 1.1 million people in Auschwitz, mostly Jews, but also Poles, the Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and people of other nationalities. Auschwitz is for the world today, a symbol of the Holocaust and atrocities of World War II. In 2005, the United Nations adopted 27 January as the International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

Item J Auschwitz Ceremony Press Release 2018


On 27 January 2018 more than 60 Auschwitz survivors met at the site of the former Birkenau camp to commemorate the 73rd anniversary of the liberation of the German Nazi
concentration and extermination camp. The President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda has assumed honorary patronage of the event.

The eyewitnesses of history were accompanied by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki, Deputy Prime Minister Beata Szydło, representatives of the Polish Government, Greek Minister of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Media Nikolas Pappas, ambassadors and diplomats, representatives of the religious clergy, regional authorities, local authorities, workers of museums and memorials, among others.

In 2018, we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the commissioning of four huge gas chambers and crematoria at the Auschwitz II-Birkenau camp. Consequently, the visual symbol of the anniversary will be a painting by a former Sonderkommando prisoner, David Olère who presented in his post-war paintings and drawings the tragedy of people murdered in the gas chambers.

During the commemoration event two Auschwitz survivors, Maria Hörl i Bronisława Karakulska, took the floor

Maria Hörl was born in 1942 as Galina Bulchakowa. In June 1943 she and her family were arrested during pacification of Belarussian villages. She was deported to Auschwitz together with her mother and three siblings from Majdanek camp on 15 April 1944.

"About my sister I did not find any information about her stay, how she looked like, what was happening to her in the camp. Maybe we were not together. It is only a fact that on January 19th 1945 she was alive. This was the last time when Mother saw us, because she could see us only once a week and it was for about half an hour. Mother was sent to Ravensbrück. From there straight to Russia" - she said.

Galina was liberated on 27 January 1945 and then taken to an orphanage. "From the camp we were transported to Harbutowitz. I did not know about it for many years. As late as during the first meeting with the Auschwitz Children I got to know about it from older ones. Our first meeting was organized by a Memorial curator Tadeusz Szymański. He started searching for documents concerning Auschwitz children. Thanks to him we could get informed about our past," she continued. In 1947 she was adopted by a married couple from Cracow. She found her real family dozens of years later.

Bronisława Karakulska (nee Horowitz) was born in Cracow in 1932. During the occupation she stayed with her parents and brother Ryszard in the ghetto in Cracow. After the ghetto was
liquidated, she was transferred to KL Plaszów and then employed in the Oskar Schindler's Enamel Works factory in Zabłocie. In October 1944, together with other female prisoners on the "Schindler's List", she was taken to Auschwitz and then deported to Brünnlitz, where she stayed until liberation.

"During my stay in Auschwitz, I was saved twice during the selection from withdrawal to the crematorium. The first time I was saved thanks to swallowing a diamond, which my mother gave aufseherin Orlowski. The second time my aunt saved me. I was hidden in a copper coal furnace, where I stayed for almost two hours. I owe the fact that I was saved from Auschwitz to Oskar Schindler, who convinced commandant Hoess that women and children are needed as workers in his factory. As of today, I am the only survivor saved by Oskar Schindler living in Krakow," she said.

Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that German crimes committed at Auschwitz were crimes during which the concept of evil and hatred were raised to a completely different level, unknown until then. "Theis evil, in its purest form, was directed against a man, directed against other nations. People who were brought here, were to be deprived of humanity. Humanity was not to be present here. And in some sense it was not. And I am not talking about those people were deprived of this humanity, not Jews, not Poles, not Roma, not Russians, only those who committed this horrible crime. They deprived themselves of the humanity," the prime minister said.

"This terrible crime that took place then, apart from separating itself from the world with barbed wire and a high wall, at the same time was also separated by ideology. Terrible, dark, horrifying, Hitler's, Nazi ideology. Therefore, there is not the slightest consent to any criminal ideologies, such as German Nazism or communism. And there is no permission for racism, antisemitism, for any such behavior. That is why we will remember all the mechanisms of death that were used then, because we owe this memory today to the living, but we also owe this memory fo the victims of those times," he emphasized.

"In the face of such a tragedy as the Shoah all politicians and rulers, but also all citizens, should ask - what comes next? What comes next? And the answer to this question is at the same time very difficult and easy. We all should fight and care for the truth, for justice and we should give hope to the world hope," concluded Prime Minister Morawiecki.

Minister Wojciech Kolarski from the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland said: "In the name of universal human heritage and future, we, the Poles, will always cherish
the memory of the victims of the Holocaust and testify about German crimes. From the very beginning we tried to alert the free world and reveal the truth about the Holocaust. The brave activity of Witold Pilecki, mentioned here, and the mission of Jan Karski are examples of the commitment of the Polish Underground State. The rescue was carried out by the Council for Aid to the Jews "Żegota", operating by the Government Delegation to Poland. Then and today we remember that three million people murdered during the Holocaust - almost half of all its victims - were citizens of the Polish Republic, our fellow citizens."

"Poles and Jews are exceptional custodians of the memory of the victims of the Holocaust and depositaries of the message that comes from this tragedy for the international community. Many people, communities and institutions fulfill these tasks with great dedication, with the key role of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, which has developed universal principles of preserving sites of extermination, and Yad Vashem in Jerusalem." he added.

Israeli ambassador Anna Azari, referring to the changes that are introduced in Poland to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance, which, she noted, has caused controversies in Israel, said: "I hope that as always, as good friends, Poland and Israel will find their way and a common language of remembering history together. Let us remember all those murdered in the Holocaust." "Israel understands who built KL Auschwitz and who built other camps. Everyone knows that it was not built by Poles," she added.

The Ambassador of the Russian Federation Sergey Andreyev said: "Auschwitz is the place where the cruel tragedy of the past should constitute a strict lesson for the current and future generations, where permanent immunity for the disease of historical amnesia should be produced. Here there should not be any doubts concerning the differentiation between the oppressors, the victims and the liberators. Let the frenzy of Auschwitz never happen again. Let the sky of peace dominate over us all."

The director of the Auschwitz Memorial Dr Piotr M. A. Cywiński emphasized that "the entire modern world is now living more and more as if they have not learnt much from the tragedy of the Shoah and concentration camps". „We are unable to efficiently react to new manifestations of genocidal frenzy. Starvation and death caused by continuous fights do not motivate our institutions and societies to act efficiently. Arms trade and exploitation of nearly free labour overwhelm the poorest regions of the world," he said adding: "At the same time, our democracies suffer from the increase in populism, national egotism, new forms of extreme hate speech. The remilitarization of relationships between the people desecrates our
streets and cities. Brown-shirt like groups profane our streets and cities. Did we really change so much within these two or three generations?"

"What is happening to our world? What is happening to us? Has the memory ceased to constitute a commitment? And if it is the hope which dies last, then where else is it to be rooted if not in memory? In the culture which tries to live without being conscious of death, is there still any place for the commemoration of victims?" he said.

"We do not want to answer these questions ourselves, it is easier to put them away, ridicule or discredit. And it does not matter what is happening in Congo, Myanmar or in a neighbouring district or stadium," he stressed.

The second part of the ceremony took place at the Memorial to the Victims on the site of the former Auschwitz II-Birkenau. The rabbis and clergy of various Christian denominations jointly read psalm 42 from the Second Book of Psalms, and participants of the ceremony placed grave candles at the monument commemorating the victims of Auschwitz.

Earlier, on 27 January, survivors along with the management and employees of the Auschwitz Memorial laid wreaths in the courtyard of Block 11 in Auschwitz I. On the occasion of the anniversary an exhibition was opened in the temporary exhibition hall in Block 12 on the site of the former Auschwitz I entitled “Letters... Collection of Władysław Rath". The exhibition presented a fragment of a large collection of documents related to Auschwitz and history of world war II, ghettos and other concentration camps. It was created by a Holocaust survivor Władysław Rath and handed over to the Museum by his family last year.

Until the liberation of the camp sites by soldiers of the Red Army, German Nazis murdered approx. 1.1 million people in Auschwitz, mostly Jews, but also Poles, the Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and people of other nationalities. Auschwitz is for the world today, a symbol of the Holocaust and atrocities of World War II. In 2005, the United Nations adopted 27 January as the International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

**Item K: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release 2019**


7 January, the anniversary of liberating the German Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau, marks International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust, officially proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 2005.
The former concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau remains one of the most important symbols of Holocaust remembrance. Together with thousands of graves, monuments and memorial sites across the world, it is a testament to the atrocious crimes and a tribute to their victims.

The first transport arrived at Auschwitz on 14 June 1940. It was made up of Polish political prisoners. The decision to transfer them to Auschwitz was dictated by mass arrests of Poles and the resultant overcrowding of prisons in German-occupied Poland.

Two years later, the camp became one of the centres used for the implementation of the Endlösung der Judenfrage (the “final solution to the Jewish question”) - the Nazi plan to murder Jews who inhabited the areas occupied by Nazi Germany. The Auschwitz-Birkenau camp was where 1–1.5m people were murdered, a million of them Jewish. Many were citizens of the Republic of Poland. Terror also reigned in hundreds of other concentration camps across Germany, allied Axis states and in areas occupied by them, in ghettos as well as during executions carried out on the streets of many European villages and towns. It is estimated that 6m Jews were killed during World War II. The Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp was liberated on 27 January 1945 after the Red Army entered occupied Poland.

The death of millions of Jews will always be a shame for humankind. After the tragedy of such monstrous proportions, our faith in humanity is restored by the stories of men and women, Poles among them, who saved Jews from the Holocaust. Guided by their sense of shared human solidarity, the Polish Government-in-Exile and thousands of our fellow citizens were involved in helping Jews during the Second World War. It must be remembered that the punishment for doing so in German-occupied Poland was the death penalty. Poles account for the largest group among the Righteous Among the Nations, a title bestowed by Yad Vashem’s Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority. Operating under the auspices of the Polish Government-in-Exile, the Council to Aid Jews "Żegota" was the only state organization in occupied Europe established specifically to save Jews.

Also Polish diplomats were involved in saving Jews. Thanks to the operations of the so-called Ładoś Group, several hundred Jews from the Netherlands, Poland, Germany, Austria, France, Slovakia and other European countries were saved from death in 1942–1943.
On January 27, more than 50 former prisoners of Auschwitz and Holocaust survivors met at the former Auschwitz camp to commemorate the 74th anniversary of the liberation of this German Nazi concentration and extermination camp. The event was held under the honorary patronage of the President of the Republic of Poland, Andrzej Duda.

The witnesses to history were accompanied among others, by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki, Deputy Prime Minister Beata Szydło, representatives of the Polish Government, the Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia Armin Laschet, ambassadors and diplomats, representatives of the clergy, regional authorities, local governments, employees of museums and memorial sites.

In 2019, we will commemorate the 75th anniversary of the creation of the railway siding inside the Auschwitz II-Birkenau camp along with the unloading and selection ramp, which extended almost to the gas chambers and crematoria II and III. From mid-May 1944, it received transports of Jews from Hungary, Slovakia, the ghettos of Litzmannstadt and Theresienstadt among others, deported by the Germans for immediate extermination. It was also a stop for transports carrying Poles from insurgent Warsaw, sent to Auschwitz via the transit camp in Pruszków. Consequently, the visual symbol of the anniversary was the work of former Auschwitz prisoner Adam Brandhuber “The arrival of the transport to the ramp”.

During the commemoration event, two former prisoners of the camp took to the floor: Janina Iwańska and Leon Weintraub.

Janina Iwańska was born on 12 June 1930, in Warsaw. She was deported to Auschwitz by the Germans from the Warsaw Uprising. During the evacuation of the camp, she was first transferred to the Ravensbrück camp, and then to Neustadt-Glewe.

'Anyone who enters the site of the camp in Birkenau passes by a wagon standing on the ramp. For the majority, it is merely a freight wagon that carried prisoners to the concentration camp. For me, this wagon is associated with something else. I saw this wagon for the first time in 1942 while travelling through Treblinka on vacation to my grandmother. People were sitting there, either already dead or waiting for death,' she said.
Recalling her deportation to Auschwitz in 1944, she said: 'When I got out of the wagon; I sensed a familiar smell from Treblinka, the smell of burnt bodies. I knew the same fate as those in Treblinka awaited me. With this mindset, I entered the building, where our hair was cut to the bare skin. After a bath, we were given striped uniforms and marked with a number and red triangle badge with the letter P, which indicated that we were political prisoners from Poland. I received the number 85595. Through a column of children, we were led to the children’s block,' she recalled.

At the end of her account, the former prisoner recited the poem “Oh, Void Complaints” by Adam Asnyk:

“It is the living we must follow,
And leave the former life beneath.
Abandon the persistence hollow,
Shake off the withered laurel wreath!

Unstopped the waves of life proceeding!
No aid in protests you may raise.
Oh, useless wrath and futile pleading!

The world shall follow its own ways. It is my wish that the young and future generations will not have to follow the path I had to go through.”

Leon Weintraub was born on 1 January 1926 in Łódź. During the war, he and his family were confined in the Litzmannstadt ghetto, and from there they were deported in August 1944 to Auschwitz, where Leon was separated from the rest of the family. After several weeks, he was transferred to Głuszyce, and then to the Dörnhau camp and subsequent labour camps.

'In Auschwitz, in this Nazi camp; a place symbolising the unprecedented cruelty in the treatment of people in the history of civilisation; a place, where the technique of mass and industrial murder was introduced, and where the Nazis implemented their ideology,' he said.

'I feel great pain and bemoan that in many European countries including our country, people march with impunity in uniforms similar to those of the Nazi. Such persons openly call themselves Nazis and identify with Nazism, propagating slogans similar to those of the Nazis. This ideology characterised by the sign of a broken cross murdered those it considered ‘sub-humans’. Acknowledging Nazism today is undoubtedly defining oneself as a murderer and
perpetrator of genocide because that is the inevitable outcome of such a mindset, which at first proclaims resentment and hostility toward others and defines racism, antisemitism and homophobia as virtues, as did the followers of Nazism. And to think that this is happening in our country, which encountered so much destruction and suffering during the Nazi occupation,’ he said.

‘On behalf of myself and the survivors, I represent here today; I wish to thank and express my sincere gratitude to the management of the Auschwitz Museum for their daily and indefatigable activities aimed at preserving the memory of the victims of the Nazi ideology and combating prejudices and hostility towards others,’ emphasised Leon Weintraub.

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki said during his address: ‘The years 1989, 1939 and 2019 are years of round anniversaries. Polish citizens gained independence 30 years ago. However, 80 years earlier, on the orders of Nazi Germany, Poles living in the II Polish Republic did not only lose their freedom but Polish Jews were sentenced to extermination, as well as Poles as their extermination was precisely calculated in the Generalplan Ost - to murder about 85 per cent. The remaining 15 per cent was to be turned into a slave workforce. This annihilation, which took place then was not the work of the Nazis, but Germany ruled by Hitler.’

‘The Polish state upholds the truth, which cannot be relativised in any way. I want to make such a promise of the full truth of those times because we must face the facts. So that the terrible and cruel death of those imprisoned here and in other German concentration camps... does not happen again,’ said Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki.

Minister Wojciech Kolarski from the Office of the President of Poland said: ‘We are gathered in the circle of eternal memory. We are here once again to give testimony that we will always speak about what transpired here. The President asked me to address the Survivors on his behalf and those of our countrymen. We promise you that we will never cease to propagate the truth about Auschwitz and the crime of the Holocaust. As it has been proclaimed since the day of the liberation of the camp and will continue for generations. We will pass it to our children and grandchildren, and they will further pass it to subsequent generations. In the name of a good future, we also wish to draw conclusions from the tragic history. Protect the world from the consequences of contempt and hate, from underestimating and justifying evil. It is the duty of our hearts and consciences, which must never be neglected.'
'Hanna Krall told me that the Holocaust brought out the real face of everyone - sometimes the best, sometimes the worst. These wagons were also such litmus paper. We are familiar with the story of poor people who threw everything they could into the wagons, but also of those who in the presence of the prisoners, poured out the water they paid for onto the ground. I believe that we owe memory to anyone who arrived here or died on the journey, but we should also describe the best and worst experiences of the witnesses of those events,' said the ambassador of Israel, Anna Azari.

'Auschwitz is the place where millions of people receive the vaccination against historical amnesia, which is so desired in our world today. May the madness of war and extermination camps never occur again. May a peaceful sky cover forever cover us all,' said the ambassador of the Russian Federation, Siergiej Andriejew.

'In the beginning was the Word. And then, when it was with the people, it turned out that the word could also destroy,' said the director of the Auschwitz Museum, Dr. Piotr M. A. Cywiński. 'And today words have the power. And it is so destructive. On the Internet, in discussion, on forums, in comments. In the media, titles, captions. In the groups of notions, where the people who are poor, cringing, running away... are presented as people with germs and diseases... In the juxtaposition of concepts, where it depicts people who are poor, intimidated, fleeing... with germs and diseases,' he emphasised.

- The words of hatred create hatred. The words of dehumanization dehumanize. The words of menace increase the threat. So why isn’t this taught at schools? So why does our law allow it? Why do homilies pass it over? Why do the media use the language of war to describe peace? We have already started paying for this. In Poland, in Europe, in the world, said Piotr Cywiński.

The second part of the ceremony took place at the Memorial to the Victims on the premises of the former Auschwitz II-Birkenau. The rabbis and clergy of various Christian denominations jointly recited psalm 42 from the Second Book of Psalms, and participants of the ceremony placed grave candles at the monument commemorating the victims of Auschwitz.

Earlier, on 27 January, former prisoners along with the management and employees of the Auschwitz Memorial laid wreaths in the courtyard of Block 11 in Auschwitz I.

Until the liberation of the camp by soldiers of the Red Army, German Nazis murdered approx. 1.1 million people in Auschwitz, mostly Jews, but also Poles, the Roma, Soviet
prisoners of war and people of other nationalities. Auschwitz is to the world today, a symbol of the Holocaust and atrocities of World War II. In 2005, the United Nations adopted 27 January as the International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust.