

Explaining the Dynamics of Management by Objectives and Results Post-NPM: The Case of the Swedish National Executive

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Abstract

This research concludes that the Swedish institution of Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) has changed as a result of a top-down reform. The aim of the reform, which was to reduce the number of requests for performance information that the government makes to the central government agencies, has been successfully implemented. In analysing the national government's requests for performance information from 182 central government agencies (N=1752), this study confirms earlier claims of MBOR de-escalation. De-escalation is explained by stakeholder learning and the new policy that re-interprets performance management in terms that fit the ideals of New Public Governance. This research concludes that the size of an agency's budget has a positive effect on the total number of requests and the government's interest in quantitative performance indicators. Agency tasks that are relatively easy to measure and count have a significant positive effect on the number of government requests. Task is more important than budget size when governments decide what mix of indicators to request from a specific agency. In this respect, the Swedish government adjusts its requests for information to the agencies' tasks. The results from this study contribute to the ongoing debate on the application of performance management in a post-New Public Management setting.

Introduction

This research examines how Swedish governments apply Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR) to control central government agencies in the national executive. The focus is on the dynamics of MBOR, and it explains what is found to be a case of de-escalation. MBOR is a specific idea which concerns delegation and control. It has managerialist roots and is also based on principal-agent theory in relation to assumptions regarding incentives (cf. Aucoin 1990). As an ideal type, MBOR includes a principal that uses clear goals to instruct subordinate agents, while allowing a high degree of autonomy concerning the use of resources and procedures. The principal abstains from controlling input but controls output and outcome. *Ex post* control activities such as reporting,

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evaluation and accountability processes focus on performances and results (Moynihan 2006, with reference to Schick 1999). Despite the suboptimal effects that have been associated with performance reporting (cf. Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002; Arnaboldi, Lapsley and Steccolini 2015), management with a focus on performance is still central for governments in Western democracies (Binderkrantz and Christensen 2009; Askim 2015; Van de Walle et al. 2016; Andrews et al. 2016; Greve, Lægveid and Rykkja 2016; Hammerschmid et al. 2016; Askim, Bjurstrøm and Kjærviik 2019).

The part of MBOR studied here is *ex post* controls; more precisely, the focus is on the government's requests for performance information from central government agencies. The main question is: how has this part of MBOR in the Swedish executive developed over time, and why? The early literature on the dynamics of MBOR depicts evolvement – that is, systems that grow or escalate over time. This dynamic is often claimed to generate higher cost than value for stakeholders (cf. Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002, with reference to Smith 1995; Pollitt et al. 2010). The picture of MBOR systems as escalating is put to a thorough empirical test here. This research is in line with recent scholarship aimed at understanding how the dimensions of MBOR institutions escalate *or* de-escalate in what appears to be a cyclical manner, and recent discoveries that such expansion can be reversed (Kristiansen et al. 2017; Kristiansen 2015, 2017). Moreover, the research presented herein informs the debate on the grand designs of public management. Efforts have been made to clarify and compare these public administration “paradigms”; that is, Classical Public Administration (CPA), New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (cf. Torfing and Triantafillou 2013). The demise of NPM has been announced (Dunleavy et al. 2006); however, more convincingly, NPM has been identified as a “hardy perennial” (Pollitt 2016, 434). New trends in public management are identified with some regularity and observed to be implemented in layers, as well as discovered to form hybrids with already existing models (Christensen and Lægveid 2011; Pollitt 2016; Askim 2015). With its focus on results and the *ex post* reporting of performance indicators, MBOR predates NPM. It is also a part of NPG's broad perspective on accountability, which encompasses “those performance management systems that measure not only according to standards set by central political authorities, but also per mutually negotiated objectives that make sense to local public sector staff” (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 16). NPG entails both a top-down, control-oriented focus on results, and a negotiated order that is best understood from a bottom-up or hybrid perspective on public management.

To understand the ways in which managerialist instruments are featured in contemporary grand designs of public administration, it is necessary to study these instruments over time. In this context, we examine the Swedish government's requests for performance information from its central government agencies during the period 2003–2017. This period features an established MBOR model, a critique of the model's core features, and, as a consequence, a reform aimed at de-escalation of the MBOR institution. In relation to the discussion on CPA, NPM and NPG, it is noteworthy that the Swedish government defined its reform targets in the “negotiated style” of NPG described by Torfing and Triantafillou (2013), inviting the agencies to have more

autonomy in deciding what and how to report to the government (Government Budget Bill 2008/09:1, 292).

This study has two interrelated aims. The first is to investigate MBOR dynamics in Sweden and the outcomes of the reform by analysing the annual requests for performance information issued to a total of 182 central government agencies over a fifteen-year period. This analysis concerns both the number of requests made for performance information and their quality. It is possible that a reform aimed at de-escalation will be more successful for some types of performance information than for others. Previous research has found quantitative performance indicators to be resistant to change (cf. Pollitt et al. 2010; Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). It is consequently of interest to distinguish between the requests made in terms of what types of information the government asks for.

The second aim is explanatory, focusing on factors endogenous to the MBOR institution, i.e. the interplay between performance measurements, stakeholder learning and changes in behaviour (Kristiansen et al. 2017). Our interpretation is that this perspective includes agency-specific factors that influence the government's propensity to request performance information. Earlier research shows that the government's interest in performance varies with agencies' tasks and with the size of their budgets. Tasks differ in terms of how easy they are to measure (e.g. count) and how much expertise is needed to understand the performance information that is reported (see, for example, Pollitt 2006). Furthermore, earlier research suggests that agency budgets influence government interest in performance information: the larger the budget, the more interested the government will be. Large budgets make agencies salient in the eyes of the government. Earlier research has included task and budget sizes as explanations of governmental control of agencies (cf. Verhoest et al. 2010; Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014), but lacked general conclusions regarding their importance. A recent extensive study has included different agency tasks as fixed effects in models explaining how different types of agency autonomy relate to each other, that is, with another aim and without discussing further the effects of specific tasks (Ahlbäck Öberg and Wockelberg 2020). Our empirical contribution to this discussion is that we base our analysis on a large-N study, in which the effects of different tasks on the government's *ex post* control of agencies are studied in detail.

The design of this research combines a single country case analysed over time with a within-case comparative analysis. We use the unusually large Swedish pool of central government agencies to study agency-specific effects on MBOR application. The main data source is the annual appropriation directives issued to agencies; that is, formal steering documents. To situate the case and the top-down reform of MBOR, we also analyse other types of primary sources and draw upon existing research.

A main result is that important parts of the Swedish MBOR institution de-escalated due to a top-down reform. This result confirms earlier claims of de-escalation (Kristiansen 2017), and contradicts the claim that quantitative performance indicators are resistant to abolishment (cf. Pollitt et al. 2010; Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). The observed dynamic is explained by stakeholder learning. Moreover, upon disaggregating data, we find that agency budget size

explains the number of requests governments make. For some tasks that are easy to count and measure, a positive effect on the number of requests is observed. Importantly, agency task, but not budget size, explains the mix of indicators that governments ask for. Taken together, these results inform the ongoing debate on the application of MBOR in a post-NPM setting, supporting earlier observations of layering and hybridity.

The next section presents the theoretical frame of this study, including expectations for the empirical results. The third section presents the main data source and methods. The fourth section provides the empirical results in two steps, followed by a discussion in the last section.

Theoretical framework

This section presents research on the dynamics of MBOR systems, moving beyond the ideal-type version of MBOR. It discusses MBOR dynamics in terms of escalation and de-escalation, and presents the explanatory frame of this study.

MBOR dynamics

In the introduction, MBOR was discussed as an *ideal type*; that is, as a theoretical construct with a specific combination of input and output controls (Moynihan 2006, with reference to Schick 1999). In the following discussion, we use an analytical definition of MBOR suitable for empirical studies of MBOR dynamics. MBOR institutions, or in general terms performance management regimes, contain the following core elements:

“... a combination of (a) measurement of performance using PIs [performance indicators]; (b) incorporation of PIs and information in contracts, annual reports, rankings, benchmarking figures, and so forth, and use of performance information; and (c) the institutional actors (stakeholders) which are involved in administering such interventions.”
(Kristiansen et al. 2017, 995)

Kristiansen et al. (2017) use the core elements presented in the quote above to identify several dimensions that can change. These dimensions capture, for example, the escalation of volumes of performance information requests, changes in what is measured and how, and government interest in qualitative and quantitative indicators, respectively. In many studies of performance management, performance measurement and indicators are described as being in constant, or growing, demand (Lapsley 2008). Requests for quantitative indicators are described as being particularly persistent over time, and performance information systems are reported to be expanding in terms of the volume of performance indicators asked for and reported on (Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002, with reference to Smith 1995; Pollitt et al. 2010). In relation to this established perspective, recent counter claims of de-escalation become interesting. These claims build upon the perspective of MBOR dynamics as multidimensional. Change can occur in terms of performance measurement, in the actual use of performance indicators and/or in terms of the stakeholders involved in different parts of the system. Studying MBOR application in the

Danish national executive, Kristiansen et al. (2017) find that dimensions can escalate and de-escalate over time, including the number of performance targets observed in performance contracts. Moreover, escalation in one dimension can be countered by de-escalation in another. This type of dynamic is found in a comparative study of the MBOR discourse in three Nordic countries, concluding that

“... [t]he pendulum swings from an MBOR discourse focusing on autonomy and a simple MBOR system in the early years, toward a discourse focusing more on control and a more sophisticated, detailed, and comprehensive system in the 1990s, and then back toward a simpler system (and more autonomy), especially in Sweden, but in Denmark, too, and to a minor degree in Norway in recent years.” (Kristiansen 2015, 563)

Explaining dynamics: The interplay of endogenous factors

To explain MBOR application and its dynamics, we concentrate on factors that are endogenous to the Swedish MBOR institution. Such historical-institutional approaches to MBOR focus on the interplay between

“... (a) measurement of performance using PIs, (b) incorporation and use of performance information, (c) the behaviour the performance management system stimulates, and (d) the stakeholders related to the performance management system” (Kristiansen et al. 2017, 996).

Applying this framework in case studies of MBOR dynamics in the Danish national executive, scholars concluded that stakeholders' learning about the need to reform a comprehensive system is decisive for de-escalation (Kristiansen et al. 2017). Endogenous explanations are also important in studies of escalation. A comparative study of performance indicators in the health sector concluded that the introduction of indicators will create a need for more indicators (Pollitt et al. 2010). While analysing performance measurement in firms, Meyer (2002) identified how performance measurements in use can drive a demand for new measurements. Again, feedback and learning are the mechanisms: a response to performance measurement is the adaptation of a behaviour caused by some sort of learning, which in turn diminishes the variation across performing units. As a result, performance measurements undermine their own relevance when all units perform equally. Ideally, new indicators can replace obsolete performance measures and reintroduce the possibility of distinguishing between performances (Meyer 2002, Ch. 2). However, organizations are more or less skilled in transforming their measurements:

“Firms have sought to improve performance measurement by cascading financial measures from the top to the bottom of the organization, rolling up non-financial measures from the bottom to the top, and seeking new measures thought to contain information not in existing measures. The strategy of cascading financials downward while rolling up non-financial

measures has been successful mainly in firms partitioned into large numbers of homogenous business units. For other firms, this strategy has resulted in a glut of measures” (Meyer 2002, 49)

In Meyer’s scenario, the degree of internal diversity of an organization affects how difficult it is to avoid “glut” in performance measurements. People in ministries in charge of requesting performance measures from central government agencies are not facing homogeneous firms of the type discussed by Meyer: central government agencies are rarely divided into a large number of homogenous units; that is, they do not feature the type of organizational factors that can work against an accumulation of performance indicators. Since central government agencies are not “firms”, we can expect a high and, over time, growing number of requests for performance measurements. At the same time, it is possible that agency-specific factors will influence the government’s behaviour and its demand for performance information.

Agency-specific factors and MBOR

When MBOR is applied in a national executive such as the Swedish executive, the main stakeholders are the government and its ministries on the one hand, and the central government agencies on the other. Central government agencies have different tasks and are unequally important in the eyes of the government. Thus, general predictions about MBOR can hide interesting variation across agency-specific factors. Limited knowledge is available about whether, how and when agency-specific factors influence the ways in which governments control agencies (but see Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014; Askim, Bjurstrøm and Kjærvik 2019; Ahlbäck Öberg and Wockelberg 2020). Based on Dutch survey data (N=206), Van Thiel and Yesilkagit (2014) concluded that the relationships between agency tasks and different types of agency autonomy are complex, as “the effects might differ for different tasks and for different types of autonomy” (Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014, 334). The Dutch survey did not support a distinct relationship between agency tasks and government’s ex post control of agencies. Other empirical studies have concluded that politicians’ interest in (and ability to use) performance indicators is dependent upon how easy it is to understand the tasks performed and the measurements used to describe them. When performance requires high levels of scientific expertise to be evaluated, governments’ requests for information can be relatively low (Pollitt 2006; Verhoest et al. 2010; Moynihan et al. 2011; Christensen and Lægread 2013; Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014).

An agency’s task is distinct from the policy area an agency operates in, and agencies performing the same type of task are found in many policy areas. Thus, this research bases its conceptualization of agency tasks on the type of work agencies do, using an adapted version of the categorization created by Van Thiel and Yesilkagit (2014). A distinction is made between research and information tasks. Here, the research category contains agencies that are explicitly commissioned to conduct analyses based on scientific methodology. Agencies with the main task of collecting and analysing information as a service to the government, to other agencies or to the public are placed in the information

category. In this latter category, we also place agencies that, in Van Thiel and Yesilkagit's (2014) categorization, would belong to "political" tasks – that is, agencies that provide "policy advice". In the Swedish case, such a category is not valid; it is not feasible to uphold the distinction between information and policy advice. Finally, for added clarity, the task that is commonly called "regulation" is here labelled inspections and scrutiny. (This terminology is better suited to describe tasks aimed at upholding the rule of law than the "regulation" label, which indicates that agencies are making law rather than upholding it.)

Our ideas about tasks and requests are inspired by the logic implied in earlier research – that is, that tasks that are relatively "simple, understandable, and measurable" (Pollitt 2006, 29) attract the government's interest to a greater degree than tasks that are hard to count, measure or interpret. Table 1 presents this logic applied to the central government agencies in our study. We define the application of law to decisions in case processing (e.g. the decision to approve a student loan) to be a type of activity that is easy to count using quantitative indicators. Central government agencies with this as their main task are found in the categories of decisions in individual cases, judicial and supervision and inspection. Case-processing activities of a similar kind are found in the tribunal category, but tribunals differ when it comes to the extent and quality of the cases, and we expect them to be less controlled *ex post* by the government. Following the same logic, we expect that research and information require (more) advanced analytical skills to perform, report and interpret, and hence are difficult to capture in quantitative terms. Thus, we expect governments to make relatively few requests for performance information from agencies belonging to these categories. The same is hypothesized to be the case for agencies with maintenance as their main task; here, we examine agencies responsible for complex infrastructures and expect that this activity is difficult to measure, count and interpret.

Table 1. Tasks and requests

Task	Performance information requests
Decisions in individual cases (application of law, e.g. taxation, subsidies, certification)	Many
Research (universities, others conducting scientific research)	Few
Judicial (courts; boards for appeals, the police)	Many
Supervision and inspection (including scrutiny and audit)	Many
Information (collecting and analysing)	Few
Tribunal (quasi-judiciary, e.g. ombudsmen)	Few (?)
Maintenance (of buildings; databases; cultural heritage, infrastructures)	Few
Other	*

Comment: While e.g. ombudsmen in the tribunal category process cases, they also have other tasks and, arguably, an independent standing towards the government that could lower the number of requests. Other is a category containing a broad range of agencies; hence, it is difficult to formulate expectations for this category.

Finally, it is likely that the government finds some agencies to be more important, or salient, than others. Salience can be studied in terms of the attention paid to an agency in the mass media or in parliament (see e.g. Askim, Bjurström and Kjærvi 2019). Another factor with a presumed relationship with salience is agency size (Pollitt et al. 2004; Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014; Verhoest and Wynen 2018). Agency size can vary in many ways, such as with the number of employees or with the size of an agency's budget. When budget size is used to measure salience, the argument is that, all else being equal, big budgets will attract political interest (Pollitt 2006; Verhoest et al. 2010; Ahlbäck Öberg and Wockelberg 2020). In this research, we assume such a link and expect large budgets to have a positive relationship with the government's requests for performance information.

Data and methodology

This section presents the case examined in this study, the main data source and the variables of interest.

The case

This study of the Swedish context adds a new case to the literature on MBOR escalation, which has thus far been dominated by studies on the UK and, as of lately, Denmark. The Nordic countries are similar in terms of political institutions, traditions and culture. Within this group, the Swedish national executive stands out with its executive dualism, that is, its organizational model that entails small ministries and many – often resourceful – central government agencies, and its lack of ministerial responsibility. This setting is arguably highly compatible with performance management models, such as attempts to create a politics-administration divide and extensive delegation to the agency level. On the one hand, this makes the Swedish executive a least likely case when it comes to MBOR de-escalation. On the other hand, Sweden does not feature unique versions of the public management reforms that are common to Western democracies. Rather, such reforms are similar across the Nordic countries, which are described as influencing each other's policies (Greve and Ejersbo 2016). Thus, findings from this Swedish case study are of general interest for scholars and policymakers, at least in the Nordic countries.

The Swedish case has two additional features that makes it well suited for a study of MBOR dynamics. The first is a reform aimed at de-escalating MBOR. The MBOR model in operation was introduced in a one-size-fits-all manner in the early 1990s and became the standard mode for Swedish ministry-government agency interaction. The model had its origin in the American program budgeting of the 1960s and was imported and advocated by well-positioned bureaucratic elites. For a long time, critical perspectives on MBOR failed to influence central stakeholders (Sundström 2006). However, the period studied herein features a reform launched by the right-wing government in 2009. This reform concerned both the number of performance information demands made and their quality. The government wanted performance management to be

“... more long-term and strategically oriented. The number of performance information demands made in appropriation

directives will be limited. The demands that performance in terms of effects should be reported on a yearly basis should only be used in cases where the agencies themselves can influence these [effects].” (Government Budget Bill 2008/09:1, 291, translation by the authors)

In addition, the government aimed at allowing central government agencies more freedom regarding what to report, stating that it was

“... not necessary for the government to give yearly instructions to the central government agencies concerning what to report. This is something that an agency can decide for itself in relation to its basic commission and with reference to what is stated in its agency instructions [...].” (Government Budget Bill 2008/09:1, 292, translation by the authors)

The intention was clearly that governments should decrease the requests for performance information that were expressed in the annual appropriation directives. The general idea was that agencies should focus their reports on the policy goals that were expressed in their agency instructions. This aim was also expressed in an amendment of the Ordinance that regulate annual reporting (Ordinance on the amendment of the Ordinance 2000:605 on Annual Report and Budget Documentation (FÅB)) (SFS 2008:747). The government’s ambition echoes the negotiated accountability of NPG (Torfing and Triantafyllou 2013), inviting agencies to exercise influence over performance measurements. A type of consensus-oriented order has been observed in earlier empirical studies of performance management in Sweden (Pollitt 2006). At the same time, the government stated that the need to place “special demands on reports” prevailed for “several” agencies (Government Budget Bill 2008/09:1, 293, translation by the authors). A second feature making the Swedish case interesting is its excellent opportunities to gather data. The benefits following from the principle of open access to public documents will be discussed in the next section.

Data source

The Swedish case offers rich empirical opportunities for a large-N study of MBOR evolution. First, its “dual executive” features a high number of central government agencies operating within all policy sectors, which allows for considerable variation in our analyses. Second, our research benefits from open access to public documents. The main data source is 1752 appropriation directives issued by successive Swedish governments to a total of 182 central government agencies during the period 2003–2017 (Appendix, Table C). Following a generic template, these appropriation directives describe the goals and tasks of the central government agencies, as well as the demands for performance information that these goals and tasks generate, according to the government. The documents also contain information on financial matters, such as the agency’s budget and other financial conditions. In addition, they sometimes describe special commissions given to central government agencies. The Swedish government issues annual appropriation directives as a part of the budget process. These directives can be amended during the year, although such

changes typically concern smaller details. To maximize comparability across central government agencies, the first appropriation directive issued for an upcoming year for a respective agency was hand coded in this research. For the same reason, the coding of requests for performance measurements was limited to the main part of the document – that is, the part describing an agency’s regular activities. The data was collected and hand coded under the supervision of the authors. The authors developed a comprehensive coding manual, which was fundamental in the training of the coding team (six coders). Initially, the coders practised on selected appropriation directives before the actual coding of the material started; the purpose of this practice was to reach a high level of reliability – that is, to obtain the same result regardless of coder – before the actual coding started. Throughout the coding process, weekly reliability checks took place to prevent coder drift. Any discrepancies in the coding were discussed by the research team and resolved together; as a result, the final set of codes for analysis was based on multiple researchers’ and coders’ input, rather than on just one person. The authors coded the variable agency task jointly by triangulating sources, which included the main task described by the government in the agency’s instruction; the task described by the agencies themselves on their website; and (in some cases) the task described in a survey collected by the Swedish Agency for Public Management (SAPM) (Statskontoret 2017, Appendix 2). For some abolished agencies, we used the National Encyclopaedia. When more than one type of task was described for an agency, the task first described in, for example, the agency instruction was regarded as primary. (For more details regarding the agency task categories, see Appendix, Table B.)

The extensive data permitted high validity and reliability, and made it possible to run statistical analyses while retaining an adequate number of observations to control for relevant variables. To this end, regressions were run using continuous and/or dummy variables, as well as fixed effects. The data was collected from a type of document that is public in Sweden but rarely accessible in other countries. This research analysed 65 percent of a total of 2688 original appropriation directives issued to central government agencies during the studied time period (Appendix, Table A).

According to the Swedish government, appropriation directives are one of its most important ways of controlling central government agencies (*Finansdepartementet, Budgetavdelningen* [Ministry of Finance, Budget Department] 2002, 3). These documents are rich sources for an extensive study of formal performance information requests made by the government to central government agencies. That said, this data source has limitations. One is that an observed change in performance information requests made in appropriation directives can be balanced by a (here unobserved) change in some other type of formal steering document. However, the reform did not change the fact that appropriation directives are where specific requests for performance information regarding regular activities are communicated to central government agencies. In sum, to fulfil the aims of this study that concern top-down, formal control mechanisms, we have collected rich data that enables advanced statistical analyses. In effect, our results are detailed and stable in a way that is uncommon in this line of research. To capture other types of control, such as informal control mechanisms, or to add a bottom-up perspective to the Swedish case,

interviews and the collection of other formal documents would be required. Such an extension of the empirical perspective can possibly be accomplished in future research and could entail for example different stakeholder's influence over the drafting process where performance information requests are formulated.

Variables and statistical models

Performance information is an important dimension of MBOR institutions in terms of both the volume and the quality of performance information. This study includes both the number of requests made by the government and the character of the information requested, the latter in terms of the demand for quantitative indicators. This distinction between volume and quality enables detailed conclusions to be formed about MBOR dynamics. The statistical analyses presented here focus on three dependent variables: the total number of requests made, the number of quantitative performance indicators, and the share of quantitative indicators. These variables capture different perspectives on requests as trends over time. Their relevance originates from the discussion of escalation and de-escalation presented above, suggesting that different dimensions of MBOR can develop in opposite directions. Trends in the total number of performance information requests are used to conclude whether this part of the MBOR institution escalates, de-escalates or does not change over time. This variable thus provides a valid measure of the reform's aim to de-escalate the number of performance information requests. This variable is defined as the number of requests for performance information made in the regular activities section of the appropriation directives given annually to central government agencies. Using the same source, the demands made for quantitative performance information are counted. The motive to study this second dependent variable is that it enables us to test the general claim that quantitative measures of performance are difficult to abolish, as well as specific claims concerning the relationship between agency tasks being easy to count and an increased propensity to ask for performance information about these tasks. Finally, the ratio of requests that concern quantitative indicators is calculated to represent the specific mix of indicators requested by the government. This ratio makes the different trends of requests distinct. It is also a valid representation of the government's goal to adjust its management to agency-specific circumstances.

The statistical models feature two main independent variables: agency tasks and budget size. As has been discussed above, budget size is expected to have a positive relationship with the government's interest in measures of agency performance. The assumed mechanism is salience, and we hypothesize that, all else being equal, the larger the budget, the more requests for performance information will be made by the government. An alternative interpretation is that budget size is a proxy for agency size and, as large agencies do many things, there are many activities to seek information about. While this is not the argument that we draw upon when we model our statistical analyses, it is an idea that follows the same logic: the larger the budget, the more requests. The measure of budget size used herein represents the funding (block grant) allocated to the agency via the central government budget (and hence excludes other types of revenue).

The regression models contain two control variables as fixed effects: year and ministry (as in the ministry making the performance information requests). It is relevant to account for variation across time (year) in our models, given the fact that we know that the government expressed an ambition to decrease its requests for performance information during the period studied here. Variation across ministries can be caused by organizational culture or traditions, and ministry controls are added to all our models. Thus, by including these variables as fixed effects in our models, we eliminate possible biases caused by omitted variables that could influence the demand for performance information. Descriptive statistics are found in Table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

Variables	N	Min	Max	Mean	Standard deviation
Number of requests	1752	0	2334	71.18	145.148
Number of requests for quantitative indicators	1607	0	1827	32.35	98.80
Percentage of requests that ask for quantitative indicators	1589	0	100	36.20	27.28
Agency task (dummy variables)	1752	0	1		
1. <i>Decisions in individual cases</i>					
2. <i>Research</i>					
3. <i>Judicial</i>					
4. <i>Supervision and inspection</i>					
5. <i>Information</i>					
6. <i>Tribunal</i>					
7. <i>Maintenance</i>					
8. <i>Other</i>					
Log total block grant, thousands of SEK	1596	6.69	19.36	12.28	2.36
Years (dummy variables)	1752	2003	2017		
Ministry (dummy variables)	1752	0	1		

Results


This presentation of results includes descriptive analyses of the requested performance measurements and of the government’s propensity to ask for

quantitative performance indicators. The observed trends are analysed from within the theoretical perspective that concentrates on the interplay between performance measurements, stakeholder learning and observed change. Finally, regression analyses are applied to determine the relevance of agency-specific factors for the government's interest in performance measurements.

MBOR dynamics in the Swedish national executive: de-escalation

The trend for the total number of requests made for performance measures (Figure 1) is negative. Over time and on average, Swedish governments ask for less and less performance information from central government agencies. This negative trend appears to be long term and stable. What appears to be an effect of the 2009 reform can be observed. The government's ambition to decrease the number of requests is visible as a large drop in requests registered in appropriation directives for 2009. Furthermore, a general negative trend that preceded the reform was intensified in 2009. The mean for 2009 is half the size of the mean reported for 2008. The trend after 2009 is negative, but with a much less dramatic decline. Figure 1 also reports the trend for requests asking for quantitative indicators, which are reported as total numbers; this trend is also negative over time. It is hence possible to conclude that successive Swedish governments in this study are scaling down their demand for quantitative indicators.

Figure 1. Requests for performance information (2003–2017).




Comments: The black line represents the total number of requests, as means per year; the dotted line represents the total number of requests that ask for quantitative indicators, as means per year. Number of observations per year can be found in Table A in Appendix.

Figure 2 presents the percentages of requests asking for quantitative performance indicators over time. Calculating this ratio gives a more distinct picture of the developments. Some of the earlier research presented above predicts that quantitative indicators are in persistent demand and that they will be harder to abolish than other measurements. If this is so, it should be possible to observe that the ratio of these indicators increases as the total number of requests decreases. This is, however, not the case, except for a small increase in the ratio

for the year after the reform (Figure 2), which appears to be a “blip in the curve” rather than a long-term positive trend.

Figure 2. Percentage of requests asking for quantitative performance indicators (2003–2017).



Explaining de-escalation: stakeholders’ learning

The part of the Swedish MBOR institution that is studied here – namely, performance measurements – clearly de-escalated during the period of 2003–2017. The observed de-escalation appears to be an effect of the government’s ambition to reform MBOR. The political idea and current formal policy have been to grant agencies more autonomy within the MBOR system (Kristiansen 2015). The ambition to reform the system in this direction has apparently been successful. How can the observed developments be explained? In our interpretation of the present case, stakeholders within the MBOR institution changed their behaviour due to learning; that is, due to feedback about the unfeasibility of the system. The virtues of the MBOR model in operation were put to question in the mid-2000s. At that point, the management of central government agencies was discussed and transformed (Jacobsson et al. 2015). In June 2006, an inquiry commissioner with the purpose of evaluating the institution of performance management was appointed by the Social Democratic government. This investigation would draw on lessons from applying MBOR in Sweden, as well as on international experiences. The terms of reference for the 2006 inquiry identified problems in the performance information dimension of MBOR: too many requests for performance information were made; demands were made on annual reports about performances, even though doing so is sometimes unreasonable; and the reported performance information was not being used to inform decision-making (Government’s Terms of Reference [to the Inquiry Commission] 2006:30). The inquiry report confirmed this problematic picture, concluding that requests for performance information had escalated, and that central government agencies spent a large amount of resources on reporting (*Statens offentliga utredningar* (SOU) 2007:75). In 2008, the right-wing coalition government announced its ambition to make annual

agency reporting a less prominent dimension of the management model (Government Budget Bill 2007/08:100, 59). As has been described at length above, this reform was intended to introduce a strategic type of management that included a decrease in the number of performance information demands.

The government was the central stakeholder in this reform process. The reform, as such, was announced in brief terms in budget bills (for 2008 and 2009, respectively). The critical analysis underpinning the reform, as well as its content, was acknowledged in the government budget bill for 2009, which referred to the commission of inquiry and the broad support its conclusions received. At first glance, this gives the impression that the government learned from the commission of inquiry. However, the learning process had started at an earlier point in time, as the need to de-escalate was defined in the terms of reference given to the commission of inquiry in 2006. The fact that de-escalation had already been presented as an important change of direction prior to the actual reform can explain why de-escalation is also observable (albeit on a smaller scale) in the years before 2009. Moreover, the government that started this process was different than the government that launched the actual reform. This situation thus involves key stakeholders in a learning process, where the stakeholders include two consecutive governments as well as central government agencies reporting problems with the model and, later, supporting the reform. The decision made in 2006 to conduct an investigation of the model appears to be pivotal. While many reports had been written on MBOR before, the type of critical approach used in the inquiry had not been used before. Problems that had historically been addressed as implementation problems were now discussed as originating from the model as such and from its core assumptions (Sundström 2006; Jacobsson et al. 2015). Although we are unable to establish why this model-level critique surfaced, it is noteworthy that the Commissioner of the Inquiry was a high-profile former cabinet member, a member of the bureaucratic elite and a supreme-court-level judge. Moreover, the inquiry was staffed with policy experts from ministerial and agency-level core functions; that is, they belonged to the institutionalized setting for policy development in this area. Taken together, the content of the terms of reference for the inquiry, the appointment of the inquirer, and the staffing of the drafting office indicate that powerful stakeholders had a strong wish for the MBOR institution to de-escalate. Consecutive governments continued to work towards implementing this idea. In sum, since the mid-2000s, the political and bureaucratic elite (e.g. the policy experts) have embraced the idea of MBOR de-escalation.

Agency-specific factors

This far, we have analysed the case of MBOR evolution during the period 2003–2017 at an aggregated level. Next, we will take a closer look at agency-specific factors that are likely to condition how these management models are applied.

Table 3. Results of OLS regressions explaining requests for performance information.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Dependent variable	Number of requests	Number of requests	Number of quantitative indicators	Number of quantitative indicators	Percentages quantitative indicators	Percentages quantitative indicators
Intercept	59.979*** (16.194)	-238.382*** (24.691)	12.128 (10.860)	-129.078*** (17.734)	25.947*** (3.020)	23.155*** (4.888)
<i>Task</i>						
Decisions in individual cases	36.940*** (9.282)	.085 (9.634)	32.847*** (6.327)	16.973** (6.905)	11.119*** (1.761)	10.755*** (1.901)
Research	-6.968 (15.048)	18.885 (14.517)	6.121 (9.956)	17.931* (10.147)	13.697*** (2.763)	11.936*** (2.789)
Judicial	40.412*** 4(13.554)	70.333*** (13.662)	64.161*** (9.784)	71.190*** (10.069)	32.068*** (2.796)	31.041*** (2.852)
Supervision and inspection	-13.100 (10.530)	9.217 (10.407)	-3.568 (7.313)	5.942 (7.645)	2.023 (2.040)	-1.237 (2.112)
Tribunal	-23.840 (18.189)	29.765* (17.694)	-10.541 (12.600)	16.004 (12.946)	-1.600 (3.497)	-1.481 (3.558)
Maintenance	6.804 (25.240)	-35.682 (31.346)	23.414 (16.623)	4.573 (21.786)	24.183*** (4.613)	16.698** (5.984)
Other	59.725*** (14.240)	60.094*** (14.907)	3.701 (9.543)	-1.964 (10.393)	-2.700 (2.649)	-2.621 (2.856)
Budget size ^a		27.082*** (1.612)		12.379*** (1.166)		.054 (.322)
R ²	.097	.249	.074	.146	.157	.177
Adj. R ²	.311	.231	.053	.124	.138	.156
N	1752	1596	1607	1474	1589	1456
<i>Fixed effects</i>						
Ministry	X	X	X	X	X	X
Year	X	X	X	X	X	X

^a Variable is logarithmized.
 Significance levels: * <.10; ** <.05; *** <.01, two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses.
 Reference categories: Task = Information; Ministry = Ministry of Finance; Year = 2003.

Turning to the regression models presented in Table 3, the goal is now to investigate the effect of agency task and budget size, respectively, on three dependent variables: the number of requests made, the number of requests for quantitative indicators and the percentage of demands that ask for quantitative performance information. The latter variable captures potential variation in how the government mixes requests for different types of indicators.

We expected tasks involving the application of law in case processing to generate more requests than other tasks. Starting with Model 1 it can be seen that some – but not all – agency task dummies have significant effects on the total number of requests the government makes. Significant positive effects of task dummies are observed for the following categories: *decisions in individual cases*, *judicial* and *other*. Compared with the omitted task dummy (*information*), these estimates represent a greater number of requests being made. This finding is in line with our expectations for both the *decisions in individual cases* and

judicial categories, which involve tasks that entail countable case processing based on the application of law. The *other* category is difficult to interpret in substantial terms; it contains a broad collection of agencies such as the Board of Judges, the Election Authority, the Swedish Armed Forces and a type of temporary agencies tasked to manage the abolishment of other agencies. While also falling into the category of case-processing agencies, the *inspections and scrutiny* dummy as well as the *tribunal* dummy produce negative effects on the number of requests, but these are not significant.

The estimates reported for the tasks *decisions in individual cases* and for *judicial* show that the government requests relatively large amounts of performance information from these agencies. The differences between these agencies on the one hand and agencies within the *research* category on the other hand are apparent. However, when the other agency-specific variable of interest here, *budget size*, is introduced (Model 2), it has a strong, positive and significant effect on the number of requests made by governments. Moreover, the estimate for *decisions in individual cases* is no longer statistically significant when budget size is taken into account. These results indicate that the costs involved in many agencies' businesses drive the government's request for performance information, rather than the agencies' respective tasks. The strong and significant effect of *budget size* does not diminish the strong positive estimates for the *judicial* or *other* dummies, respectively. Rather, the independent effect of *judicial* is larger when we control for budget size.

In Models 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the number of requests made that ask for quantitative performance information. Two agency tasks have statistically significant effects in both models: *decisions in individual cases* and *judicial*. The *budget size* variable produces a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable (Model 4), a result that is similar to the results reported from Models 1 and 2, but with the difference that, regarding quantitative indicators, the introduction of *budget size* into the model does not change the importance of the *decision in individual cases* dummy.

Models 5 and 6 investigate the conditions under which the government mixes quantitative requests with other types, and the percentage of requests asking for quantitative indicators constitutes the dependent variable. Again, task dummies for *decisions in individual cases* and *judicial* tasks produce significant positive effects. Interestingly, in Models 5 and 6, the task categories *research* and *maintenance*, respectively, also have positive significant effects on the dependent variable. Importantly, the *budget size* variable is simultaneously reported as having no significant effect on the dependent variable.

In sum, budget size is more important than agency task in explaining the number of requests regarding performance information, including the number of quantitative indicators that the government asks of the central government agencies. All else being equal, the larger the budget, the greater the demand for performance information. However, this conclusion does not hold when the aim is to explain the mix of indicators the government asks for (Models 5 and 6). At this point, many agency task dummies produce independent and significant effects, regardless of agency budget size. Thus, adjusting the mix of different types of indicators to ask for, the government does not consider an agency's budget size, but rather its task.

All task dummies are interpreted in relation to the omitted variable *information*, which is excluded based on the assumption that this task is not of a kind that is intensively monitored by the government through performance information. With this assumption, it is reasonable that the estimates for the *decisions in individual cases* dummy are positive rather than negative, in comparison with the omitted variable. The *judicial* task category stands out in all the models, producing estimates that are positive in comparison with the omitted task dummy and that are significant on the highest level. It is probable that this finding has to do with both the type and number of cases these types of agencies process; they are likely to be of a similar kind as those in the *decisions in individual cases* category. It could also be expected, however, that central government agencies in the *judicial* category would have the same type of independent standing as ombudsmen and inspection agencies, and that this could protect them from extensive *ex post* control. The successive Swedish governments in this study, however, do not grant this type of autonomy to agencies within the *judicial* category.

Discussion

The aim of this article is twofold: first, to investigate MBOR dynamics in the Swedish case, including the outcomes of a reform aimed at de-escalation; and second, to explain MBOR dynamics as a product of endogenous factors, namely, stakeholder learning and agency-specific factors. This section presents the main findings and relates them to earlier research on MBOR evolution and to the ongoing debate on performance management as a feature of contemporary grand designs of public administration, that is, CPA, NPM and NPG.

Starting with the dynamic nature of MBOR, scholars have suggested that performance measurements are not only persistently in demand, but also likely to grow in number and escalate over time (Lapsley 2008; Meyer 2002). A counter claim, however, is that this type of system escalates and de-escalates over time, like a “pendulum” swinging (Kristiansen 2015). This study finds that, while the Swedish government is (still) interested in performance measurements, during the period of 2003–2017, the government de-escalated this part of MBOR. This finding is thus in line with recent research on MBOR evolution in Scandinavia, where de-escalation has been observed (Kristiansen 2017; 2015). We also conclude that, in the present case, quantitative performance indicators are not resistant to change. As the governments in our study ask for less and less information from central government agencies over time, the quantitative indicator ratio is stable over time. This conclusion contradicts earlier findings (see e.g. Pollitt et al. 2010; Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002).

Turning to the explanatory aim of this study, we conclude that the reform launched in 2009 that aimed at de-escalation was effective, but also that de-escalation is observable before 2009. This long-term trend is explained by central stakeholders learning about problems with the MBOR model and acting upon this feedback as early as the mid-2000s. In this process, a pivotal decision was made when the government in 2006 appointed a high-profile commission of inquiry with the mandate to put core assumptions regarding the MBOR model to question. Since then, consecutive governments, expert policy advisors and

central government agencies have supported the idea of strategic governance and a lighter version of performance management.

Our explanatory aim also includes the effect of agency-specific factors on the government's behaviour – that is, on the government's propensity to request performance information. It is concluded that budget size explains the number of requests governments make regarding performance information, including the number of quantitative indicators. Of the different agency task categories studied, only *judicial tasks* have a significant effect, regardless of budget size, in all our regression models. The task category *decisions in individual cases* is found to have a significant effect on the total number of quantitative indicators, even when budget size is taken into account. Although budget size is found to be important for the number of indicators requested, it does not explain why governments mix different types of indicators in specific ways. This becomes clear upon studying the proportion of requests that concern quantitative indicators. In this case, agency task was the main explanatory factor. It is not only the tasks that typically involve the application of law that have significant effects on the proportion of quantitative requests, but also *research-* and *maintenance-*related tasks. This finding indicates that the government is applying MBOR in a strategic way or, at least, that it adjusts its application to the character of the tasks that are to be reported. In sum, this study shows that, while budget size is positively related to the number of requests governments make, agency task is important when the government decides how to mix types of indicators to ask for. In this finding, this study contradicts – or, perhaps, rather complements – Van Thiel and Yesilkagit's (2014) conclusion that budget size, not agency task, explains the application of *ex post* control instruments such as those studied here.

The presence of performance management in CPA, NPM and NPG is part of a growing research field. On this note, it was already known that performance management was used in the Swedish executive well before NPM. With the research presented here, we can also establish performance management as part of post-NPM, not only in policy documents and rhetoric about strategic governance, but also in practice. Moreover, the ways in which the Swedish government presents its version of de-escalated MBOR (Government Budget Bill 2008/09:1, 292) is reminiscent of the “negotiated style” of NPG described by Torfing and Triantafillou (2013). The Swedish government invites the central government agencies to have more autonomy in deciding what and how to report to the government. In addition, adapting MBOR to agency-specific factors indicates that the one-size-fits-all application of MBOR introduced in the 1990s was not in practice during the period studied here.

A critical reflection regarding these results is whether the de-escalation of performance management is balanced by other types of changes. As noted above, Swedish governments have expressed a wish for the policy goals for agencies to be more long term, and are using the formal tool of agency instructions to this end. In addition, during the period studied here, it became more common to appoint a single head to manage an agency. According to policy, this model is chosen when the government needs to exercise control over an agency (*Finansdepartementet* 2007). Finally, informal contacts are identified as being crucial for ministry-agency relationships.

The stakeholders in this case responded to feedback. The obvious formal endorsement from above and the consensus-oriented context are factors that are assumed to enable changes of the model in operation (Halligan 2013, 357). Moreover, the Swedish government wanted substantial but not radical change – that is, important quantitative and qualitative changes in the application of the model, but not the abolishment of the model as such. Although change is possible, de-escalation of performance information requests is not necessarily easy or without risks for stakeholders. Therefore, the results reported here have practical implications. The ambition to stop asking for performance information must be guided by wise decisions regarding what to continue requesting. Furthermore, we agree with others who have pointed out that the current de-escalation can be followed by escalation, and that stakeholders need to be aware of this inherent instability (Kristiansen et al. 2017).

The findings reported in this article are in part unexpected, but similar developments have been reported from Denmark. To be able to draw stable conclusions about trends and explanatory factors, additional extensive studies based on objective data collected in other countries are needed. This research builds upon data and methods that are far from mainstream. The research design made it possible to study developments over a long period of time and across a large number of different central government agencies. It is reasonable that this empirical strategy was able to reveal relationships that have been hidden or undiscovered in earlier research – that is, in studies that typically build upon perceptual data or intensive, small-n designs.

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Appendices

Table A. Number of state agency appropriation directives included in the study, related to the total number issued by the government in that year.

Year	Number of appropriation directives included in our dataset (= number of agencies)	Total number of appropriation directives issued by the government	Share of appropriation directives included in this study
2003	139	189	74 %
2004	142	200	71 %
2005	140	196	71 %
2006	137	188	73 %
2007	138	189	73 %
2008	137	188	73 %
2009	134	182	74 %
2010	132	179	74 %
2011	131	175	75 %
2012	130	172	76 %
2013	131	169	77 %
2014	65	167	39 %
2015	65	168	39 %
2016	65	165	39 %
2017	66	161	41 %
	1752	2688	65 %

Comment: The total number includes appropriation directives issued to central government agencies. Appropriation directives to regional government agencies are excluded.

Source: Ekonomistyrningsverket [The Swedish National Financial Management Authority] 2019.

Table B. Agency main task, distribution across categories and total number of observations.

Task	Number of agencies
Decisions in individual cases (application of law, e.g. taxation, subsidies, certification)	384
Research (universities, others conducting scientific research)	108
Judicial (courts; boards for appeals, the police)	149
Supervision and inspection (including scrutiny and audit)	279
Information (collecting and analysing)	599
Tribunal (quasi-judiciary, e.g. ombudsmen)	74
Maintenance (of buildings; databases; cultural heritage, infrastructures)	34
Other	125
Total	1752

Table C. Central government agencies included in this study.

Number	Agency name in Swedish	Agency name in English
1.	<i>Affärsverket svenska kraftnät</i>	Swedish Grid for Electricity
2.	<i>Alkohol och läkemedelssortimentsnämnden</i>	Alcohol and Pharmaceuticals Product Range Board
3.	<i>Allmänna reklamationsnämnden</i>	National Board for Consumer Complaints
4.	<i>Arbetsdomstolen</i>	The Swedish Labour Court
5.	<i>Arbetsförmedlingen</i>	Swedish Public <i>Employment Service</i>
6.	<i>Arbetsgivarverket</i>	Swedish Agency for Government Employers
7.	<i>Arbetslivsinstitutet</i>	The National Institute for Working Life
8.	<i>Arbetsmiljöverket</i>	Swedish Work Environment Agency
9.	<i>Avvecklingsmyndigheten för Arbetslivsinstitutet</i>	The Resolution Authority for the National Institute for Working Life
10.	<i>Avvecklingsmyndigheten för Fiskeriverket</i>	The Resolution Authority for National Board of Fisheries
11.	<i>Avvecklingsmyndigheten för Integrationsverket</i>	The Resolution Authority for the Swedish Integration Board
12.	<i>Avvecklingsmyndigheten för ombudsmännen mot diskriminering</i>	The Resolution Authority for the Office of the Ombudsman against Discrimination
13.	<i>Avvecklingsmyndigheten för SRV, KBM och SPF</i>	The Resolution Authority for SRV, KRM and SPF
14.	<i>Avvecklingsmyndigheten för statens strålskyddsinstitut och kärnkraftinspektion</i>	The Resolution Authority for the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate
15.	<i>Banverket</i>	Swedish National Rail Administration
16.	<i>Barnombudsmannen</i>	The Ombudsman for Children in Sweden
17.	<i>Bokföringsnämnden</i>	The Swedish Accounting Standards Board
18.	<i>Boverket</i>	National Board of Housing, Building and Planning
19.	<i>Brottsförebyggande rådet</i>	National Council for Crime Prevention
20.	<i>Brottsofffermyndigheten</i>	Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority
21.	<i>Centrala Etikprövningsnämnden</i>	Central Ethical Review Board
22.	<i>Centrala försöksdjursnämnden</i>	Central Committee for Animal Research
23.	<i>Centrala Studiestödsnämnden</i>	Swedish Authority for Financial Aid for Studies
24.	<i>Datainspektionen</i>	The Swedish Data Protection Authority
25.	<i>Diskrimineringsombudsmannen</i>	The Equality Ombudsman
26.	<i>Djurskyddsmyndigheten</i>	The Swedish Animal Welfare Agency
27.	<i>Domarnämnden</i>	The Board of Judges
28.	<i>Domstolsverket</i>	The Swedish National Courts Administration
29.	<i>Ekobrottsmyndigheten</i>	Swedish Economic Crime Authority
30.	<i>Ekonomiska rådet</i>	The Economic Council of Sweden
31.	<i>Ekonomistyrningsverket</i>	National Financial Management Authority

32.	<i>Elsäkerhetsverket</i>	The National Electrical Safety Board
33.	<i>Energimarknadsinspektionen</i>	Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate
34.	<i>Ersättningsnämnden</i>	The Redress Board
35.	<i>Exportkreditnämnden</i>	National Export Credits Guarantee Board
36.	<i>Fastighetsmäklarnämnden</i>	National Board of Swedish Estate Agents
37.	<i>Finansinspektionen</i>	Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
38.	<i>Finanspolitiska rådet</i>	Swedish Fiscal Policy Council
39.	<i>Fiskeriverket</i>	National Board of Fisheries
40.	<i>Folke Bernadotteakademin</i>	Folke Bernadotte Academy
41.	<i>Folkhälsomyndigheten</i>	The Public Health Agency of Sweden
42.	<i>Fonden för fukt- och mögelskador</i>	The Fund for Humidity and Mould Damage
43.	<i>Forskningsrådet för arbetsliv och social</i>	The Council for Working Life and Social
		Research
44.	<i>Forskningsrådet för miljö, areella näringar och samhällsbyggande</i>	Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning
45.	<i>Fortifikationsverket</i>	National Fortifications Administration
46.	<i>Forum för levande historia</i>	The Living History Forum
47.	<i>Försvarets materielverk</i>	Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
48.	<i>Försvarets radioanstalt</i>	National Defence Radio Establishment
49.	<i>Försvarets underrättelsenämnd</i>	The Defense Intelligence Agency
50.	<i>Försvarexportmyndigheten</i>	Swedish Defense and Security Export Agency
51.	<i>Försvarmakten (ÖB)</i>	Swedish Armed Forces
52.	<i>Förvarsunderrättelse-domstolen</i>	The Defense Intelligence Court
53.	<i>Försäkringskassan</i>	Swedish <i>Social Insurance</i> Agency
54.	<i>Gentekniknämnden</i>	The Swedish Gene Technology Advisory Board
55.	<i>Glesbygdsverket</i>	Swedish National Rural Development Agency
56.	<i>Granskningsnämnden för radio och tv</i>	Broadcasting Commission
57.	<i>Handelsflottans kultur- och fritidsråd</i>	Swedish Government Seamen's Service
58.	<i>Handikappombudsmannen</i>	Swedish Disability Ombudsman
59.	<i>Havs- och vattenmyndigheten</i>	Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management
60.	<i>Högskoleverket</i>	Swedish National Agency for Higher Education
61.	<i>Inspektionen för arbetslöshetsförsäkring</i>	Swedish Unemployment Insurance Board
62.	<i>Inspektionen för socialförsäkringen</i>	The Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate
63.	<i>Inspektionen för strategiska produkter</i>	National Inspectorate of Strategic Products
64.	<i>Inspektionen för vård och omsorg</i>	The Health and Social Care Inspectorate
65.	<i>Institutet för arbetsmarknadspolitisk utvärdering</i>	Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market Policy
66.	<i>Institutet för rymdfysik</i>	Swedish Institute of Space Physics
67.	<i>Institutet för språk och folkminnen</i>	Institute for Language and Folklore

68.	<i>Institutet för tillväxtpolitiska studier</i>	Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies
69.	<i>Insättningsgarantinämnden</i>	Swedish National Deposit Guarantee Board
70.	<i>Integrationsverket</i>	Swedish Integration Board
71.	<i>Justitiekanslern</i>	Office of the Chancellor of Justice
72.	<i>Jämställdhetsombudsmannen</i>	Office of the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman
73.	<i>Kemikalieinspektionen</i>	National Chemicals Inspectorate
74.	<i>Kommerskollegium</i>	National Board of Trade
75.	<i>Konjunkturinstitutet</i>	National Institute of Economic Research
76.	<i>Konkurrensverket</i>	Swedish Competition Authority
77.	<i>Konstnärsnämnden</i>	Swedish Arts Grants Committee
78.	<i>Konsumentverket</i>	Swedish Consumer Agency
79.	<i>Kriminalvården</i>	Swedish Prison and Probation Service
80.	<i>Krisberedskapsmyndigheten</i>	Swedish Emergency Management Agency
81.	<i>Kronofogdemyndigheten</i>	Swedish Enforcement Authority
82.	<i>Kungliga biblioteket</i>	Royal Library (National Library of Sweden)
83.	<i>Kustbevakningen</i>	Swedish Coast Guard
84.	<i>Lantmäteriet</i>	National Mapping Agency
85.	<i>Livsmedelsekonomiska institutet</i>	Swedish Institute for Food and Agricultural Economics
86.	<i>Livsmedelsverket</i>	National Food Administration
87.	<i>Läkemedelsförmånsnämnden</i>	Pharmaceutical Benefits Board
88.	<i>Läkemedelsverket</i>	Medical Products Agency
89.	<i>Marknadsdomstolen</i>	The Swedish Market Court
90.	<i>Medlingsinstitutet</i>	Swedish National Mediation Office
91.	<i>Migrationsverket</i>	Swedish Migration Board
92.	<i>Moderna museet</i>	Museum of Modern Art
93.	<i>Myndigheten för handikappolitisk samordning - Handisam</i>	The Swedish Agency for Disability Policy Coordination
94.	<i>Myndigheten för internationella adoptionsfrågor</i>	Swedish Intercountry Adoptions Authority
95.	<i>Myndigheten för kulturanalys</i>	Swedish Agency for Cultural Policy Analysis
96.	<i>Myndigheten för radio och tv</i>	Swedish Broadcasting Authority
97.	<i>Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap</i>	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
98.	<i>Myndigheten för tillväxtpolitiska utvärderingar och analyser, Tillväxt</i>	Swedish Agency for Growth Policy Analysis
99.	<i>Naturhistoriska riksmuseet</i>	Swedish Museum of Natural History
100.	<i>Naturvårdsverket</i>	Swedish Environmental Protection Agency
101.	<i>Nordiska Afrikainstitutet</i>	Nordic Africa Institute
102.	<i>Nämnden för offentlig upphandling</i>	The National Board of Public Procurement
103.	<i>Nämnden för statligt stöd till trossamfund</i>	The Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities

104.	<i>Ombudsmannen mot diskriminering på grund av sexuell läggning</i>	The Ombudsman against Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation
105.	<i>Ombudsmannen mot etnisk diskriminering</i>	Office of the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination
106.	<i>Patent- och registreringsverket</i>	Swedish Patent and Registration Office
107.	<i>Patentbesvärsmatten</i>	The Swedish Court of Patent Appeals
108.	<i>Pensionsmyndigheten</i>	Swedish Pensions Agency
109.	<i>Polarforskningssekreteriet</i>	Swedish Polar Research Secretariat
110.	<i>Post- och telestyrelsen</i>	National Post and Telecom Agency
111.	<i>Premiepensionsmyndigheten</i>	Swedish Pensions Agency
112.	<i>Presstödsnämnden</i>	The Press Subsidies Council
113.	<i>Revisorsnämnden</i>	Supervisory Board of Public Accountants
114.	<i>Riksantikvarieämbetet</i>	Swedish National Heritage Board
115.	<i>Rikspolisstyrelsen</i>	Swedish National Police Board
116.	<i>Riksutställningar</i>	Swedish Exhibition Agency
117.	<i>Rymdstyrelsen</i>	Swedish National Space Board
118.	<i>Rättsmedicinalverket</i>	National Board of Forensic Medicine
119.	<i>Sameskolstyrelsen</i>	The Sami Education Board
120.	<i>Sametinget</i>	Sami Parliament
121.	<i>Signalspaningsnämnden</i>	The Signals Intelligence Board
122.	<i>Skatteverket</i>	Swedish Taxation Agency
123.	<i>Skogsstyrelsen</i>	National Board of Forestry
124.	<i>Skolverket</i>	Swedish National Agency for Education
125.	<i>Smittskyddsinstitutet</i>	Swedish Institute for Communicable Disease Control
126.	<i>Socialstyrelsen</i>	National Board of Health and Welfare
127.	<i>Statens biografbyrå</i>	National Board of Film Classification
128.	<i>Statens bostadsnämnd</i>	The National Housing Committee
129.	<i>Statens energimyndighet</i>	Swedish Energy Agency
130.	<i>Statens geotekniska institut</i>	Swedish Geotechnical Institute
131.	<i>Statens haverikommission</i>	Swedish Accident Investigation Authority
132.	<i>Statens inspektion för försvarsunderrättelseverksamheten</i>	The Government Inspection for Defense Intelligence
133.	<i>Statens institut för ekologisk hållbarhet</i>	Swedish Institute for Ecological Sustainability
134.	<i>Statens institut för kommunikationsanalys</i>	Swedish Institute for Transport and Communications Analysis
135.	<i>Statens institutionsstyrelse</i>	National Board of Institutional Care
136.	<i>Statens jordbruksverk</i>	Swedish Board of Agriculture
137.	<i>Statens järnvägar</i>	Swedish State Railways
138.	<i>Statens kulturråd</i>	National Council for Cultural Affairs
139.	<i>Statens kvalitets- och kompetensråd</i>	National Council for Quality and Development
140.	<i>Statens kärnkraftsinspektion</i>	Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate

141.	<i>Statens museer för världskultur</i>	National Museum of World Culture
142.	<i>Statens nämnd för internationella adoptionsfrågor</i>	Swedish National Board for Intercountry Adoptions
143.	<i>Statens räddningsverk</i>	Swedish Rescue Services Agency
144.	<i>Statens skolinspektion</i>	The Swedish Schools Inspectorate
145.	<i>Statens strålskyddsinstitut</i>	Swedish Radiation Protection Authority
146.	<i>Statens utsädeskontroll</i>	Swedish Seed Testing and Certification Institute
147.	<i>Statens va-nämnd</i>	The Swedish Water Supply and Sewage Tribunal
148.	<i>Statens veterinärmedicinska</i>	National Veterinary Institute
149.	<i>Statens växtsortnämnd</i>	The Swedish National Plant Variety Board
150.	<i>Statistiska centralbyrån</i>	Statistics Sweden
151.	<i>Statskontoret</i>	Swedish Agency for Public Management
152.	<i>Steriliseringsersättningsnämnden</i>	Sterilization Compensation Board
153.	<i>Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten</i>	Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
154.	<i>Styrelsen för ackreditering och teknisk kontroll (SWEDAC)</i>	Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment
155.	<i>Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete (SIDA)</i>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
156.	<i>Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar</i>	National Board of Psychological Defense
157.	<i>Svenska institutet</i>	Swedish Institute
158.	<i>Svenska Unescorådet</i>	The Swedish National Commission for Unesco
159.	<i>Sveriges geologiska undersökning</i>	Geological Survey of Sweden
160.	<i>Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet</i>	Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
161.	<i>Sveriges meteorologiska och hydrologiska</i>	Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute
162.	<i>Säkerhets- och integritetsskyddsnämnden</i>	The Swedish Commission on Security and Integrity Protection
163.	<i>Säkerhetspolisen</i>	Swedish Security Service
164.	<i>Tandvårds- och läkemedelsförmånsverket</i>	The Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency
165.	<i>Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut</i>	Swedish Defense Research Agency
166.	<i>Totalförsvarets pliktverk</i>	Swedish National Service Administration
167.	<i>Totalförsvarets rekryteringsmyndighet</i>	Swedish National Service Administration
168.	<i>Trafikanalys</i>	Transport Analysis
169.	<i>Trafikverket</i>	Swedish Transport Administration
170.	<i>Transportstyrelsen</i>	The Swedish Transport Agency
171.	<i>Tullverket</i>	Board of Customs
172.	<i>Turistdelegationen</i>	The Swedish Tourist Delegation
173.	<i>Ungdomsstyrelsen</i>	Swedish Agency for Youth and Society
174.	<i>Universitets- och högskolerådet</i>	Swedish Council for Higher Education
175.	<i>Universitetskanslersämbetet</i>	Swedish Higher Education Authority
176.	<i>Utlänningsnämnden</i>	The Aliens Appeals Board

177.	<i>Utlänningsnämndens avvecklingsorganisation</i>	The Resolution Authority of the Aliens Appeals Board
178.	<i>Valmyndigheten</i>	The Election Authority
179.	<i>Vetenskapsrådet</i>	Swedish Research Council
180.	<i>Åklagarmyndigheten</i>	Swedish Prosecution Authority
181.	<i>Överklagandenämnden för studiestöd</i>	The National Board of Appeal for Student Aid
182.	<i>Överklagandenämnden för totalförsvaret</i>	Appeals Board for the Total Defense