

Attitudes toward competing voting-right requirements: Evidence from a conjoint experiment

Jonas Hultin Rosenberg, Johan Wejryd *

Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Democratic inclusion
Voting-rights requirements
Conjoint experiment
Public opinion
Franchise reform
Contributivism

ABSTRACT

The prevailing trend of treating voting-rights as a privilege for citizens has been challenged by a lively debate among democratic theorists. Growing numbers of resident non-citizens and non-resident citizens are likely to make voting-rights regulations more politically salient. Yet, these issues are largely missing in studies of public opinion and little is known about the support for the citizenship-requirement and its more or less democratic alternatives. Informed by normative democratic theory, this article opens the research field by conducting the first comprehensive study of attitudes toward competing requirements for voting-rights, using a conjoint experiment on a nationally representative sample of U.S. citizens. The results indicate that considerable proportions of respondents support a residency-requirement and a democratically dubious economic contribution-requirement, restricting voting-rights to taxpayers only. Nevertheless, the current citizenship-requirement is supported by a majority across sociodemographic groups, indicating sociological legitimacy of the current order and some but limited leeway for changes.

1. Introduction

Universal suffrage is the defining feature of democracy. But what does this ‘universal’ mean? The main democratic struggles in the last century concerned voting-rights requirements, aiming at removing barriers that excluded people based on sex, income, disability, race, etc. to extend the right to vote to include all adult citizens (Katz, 1997). As a result of these struggles, voting in national elections in advanced democracies nowadays includes most adult citizens, including citizens resident abroad (Ellis et al., 2007; Pogonyi, 2014). With the exception of a few countries that enfranchise all long-term residents, universal suffrage denotes the right to vote in national elections for adult citizens.

Citizenship as decisive for the right to vote has been politically taken for granted and considered democratically unproblematic. Nonetheless, democratic theorists have long since argued that according to democratic standards the right to vote should instead be extended to include

all those subjected to, or all those affected by, democratic decisions (Cohen, 1971; Dahl, 1989). The gap between what democracy ideally requires and what is practiced in existing democracies was easy to ignore as long as the set of people that were citizens in a given democratic state was taken to be perfectly overlapping with the set of people that were residents within the state and thus subjected to, and affected by, its decisions.¹ However, this overlap has become increasingly illusory as international migration increases the number of resident non-citizens and non-resident citizens. This poses a challenge to democratic practice as well as research on democracy.

This challenge has spurred a lively debate among democratic theorists. The debate covers both basic questions about the proper principles for democratic inclusion (Bauböck, 2018; Goodin, 2007; Miller, 2009) as well as applied questions primarily focusing on the right to vote for particular groups such as resident non-citizens in their country of residency and for non-resident citizens in their country of citizenship

* Corresponding author. Department of Government, Uppsala University, Box 514 SE-751 20, Uppsala, Sweden.

E-mail address: johan.wejryd@statsvet.uu.se (J. Wejryd).

¹ It should be noted here that the all-affected principle (AAP) is usually taken to stretch the boundaries of inclusion far more than the all-subjected principle (ASP). While the latter is often taken to require the inclusion of all those and only those residing within the territory of the state (see for example Beckman, 2012; López-Guerra, 2005) the former is sometimes taken to require the inclusion of everyone, in every decision everywhere (Goodin, 2007). However, this has been challenged by scholars arguing that plausible interpretations of ASP stretch the boundaries of inclusion to include also non-residents (see especially Goodin, 2016) and that the AAP is not necessarily as radically inclusive as often assumed (see Hultin Rosenberg, 2020). Differences aside, both AAP and ASP challenge citizenship as the proper requirement for the right to vote and imply that the boundaries of inclusion should be extended to include at least all resident within the territory of the democratic state.

(Beckman, 2012; López-Guerra, 2014; Rubio-Marín, 2006). As for the empirical research on democracy, there are a number of comparative studies on voting-right regulations (Arrighi and Bauböck, 2017; Blais et al., 2001; Caramani and Grotz, 2015; Earnest, 2008, 2015; Ellis et al., 2007; Katz, 1997; Pogonyi, 2014). These cover the current practices, the main trends, and the historical developments. Yet, studies on attitudes toward voting-rights for particular groups or voting-rights regulations in general are largely missing and potential popular support for change in more democratic directions remains to be brought to light.

By means of a conjoint experiment on a nationally representative sample of 980 U.S. citizens, this article maps attitudes on voting-rights regulations by asking respondents who shall be allowed to vote in federal elections. In the conjoint experiment, respondents have indicated whether or not franchise should be granted to fictional profiles differing in citizenship, residency, tax-paying, country of origin, educational attainment, and gender. This panoramic design allows us to simultaneously measure the relative support for three main requirements for voting-rights – citizenship, economic contribution, and residency – and for a number of different combinations of these, and to isolate the support toward them from confounding attitudes toward potentially associated attributes (such as country of origin and educational attainment). The conjoint experiment is designed to be easily transferable to other contexts in future studies.

The results indicate that a majority of respondents prefer citizenship to be taken as a necessary and sufficient requirement for voting-rights in federal elections for law-abiding adults. The current order is thus generally perceived as justified, indicating sociological legitimacy and little leeway for change. This result was quite expected given that the connection between citizenship and the right to vote has been established rather long in the US as well as in most established democracies (Katz, 1997). The view that universal suffrage denotes the right to vote for citizens is also recognized in international human rights conventions (ICCPR, 1966: Article 25). Nevertheless, the results also show that a considerable minority would prefer that voting-rights were restricted by requirements regarding residency and thus support change in a more democratic direction. However, an equally large minority supports change in a less democratic direction preferring that voting-rights were restricted by requirements regarding economic contribution. There is no significant difference in the support for restricting voting-rights to taxpayers between those respondents who indicate that they take democracy to be important and those that do not. One conclusion to be drawn here is that the support for democracy that is captured by conventional measures may conceal substantive groups that are at odds with basic democratic inclusion principles.

The article is structured as follows: After reviewing the existing literature on attitudes toward requirements for voting-rights, we introduce citizenship, residency, and economic contribution as competing or complementary voting-rights requirements. We proceed with a description of the survey design and the data before presenting the main results from the experiment. The concluding section summarizes the findings and evaluates their political implications and implications for future research.

2. Literature review

Popular attitudes are largely missing in the debate about democratic inclusion, and democratic inclusion is largely missing in the debate about popular pro- and anti-democratic attitudes.

As for political-sociological questions about attitudes toward requirements for voting-rights, there are only a few studies. Most of these are studies on the support for what could be described as exceptions focusing on age (Beck and Jennings, 1969; Birch et al., 2015; Larsen et al., 2016) and imprisonment (Brooks, 2004; Manza and Uggen, 2004; Pinaire et al., 2002) as reasons for disenfranchisement. There are, to our knowledge, only a few studies that investigate attitudes toward the citizenship-requirement and alternatives: one study that is limited to 13

focus groups conducted with teenagers in Austria (Walter et al., 2013), one quantitative study measuring the support for disenfranchising non-resident citizens among non-resident and resident Finnish citizens (Himmelroos and Peltoniemi, 2021), one quantitative study tapping citizens' willingness to extend the franchise to resident non-citizens (Koukal et al., 2021), and one quantitative study measuring the support for enfranchising resident non-citizens in their country of residency and non-resident citizens in their country of citizenship in 26 European countries (Michel and Blatter, 2020). Koukal et al. (2021) show that a larger share of foreigners and the cultural distance between natives and foreigners decrease citizens' willingness to extend the franchise to include resident non-citizens. Michel and Blatter (2020) find that a majority (58 percent) support the prevailing trend of extending the right to vote to include non-resident citizens in their country of citizenship, while only a minority (33 percent) support extending the right to vote to include resident non-citizens in their country of residency. Michel and Blatter (2020) make a novel contribution by quantitatively mapping the support for enfranchising these two groups. Their results give an indication about the support for the citizenship-requirement and the residency-requirement but the study is limited in some respects. Most importantly it covers only two kinds of requirements, it does not measure the support for different versions of these requirements, and it does not account for possible confounders.

Attitudes toward democratic inclusion are also most often omitted when measuring the support for democracy more generally (for an overview of different measures see, Quaranta, 2018). Typically, such pro-democratic attitudes are measured either by probing explicit support for democracy as a regime (e.g., Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015; Norris, 1999) or by probing subscription to a broader set of values (Inglehart, 2003; Welzel and Inglehart, 2005). Based on the insight that a general support for democracy as a regime in fact can be a support for several different types of democratic regimes, there has been a shift in focus in the empirical literature from measuring support for democracy to measuring support for different democratic institutions (Ferrín and Kriesi, 2016; Quaranta, 2018). This shift of focus enables a more multifaceted understanding of the current status of democracy. With the exception of Ferrín and Kriesi (2016), who measure the support for including immigrants prior to citizenship, even studies that go beyond measuring the general support for democracy as a regime or for democratic values typically omit questions about democratic inclusion. This is unfortunate for several reasons. Democratic inclusion has been the core issue of democratic struggles since the 1850s, it is theoretically salient as being part of the defining features of democracy, and it is potentially contested as indicated by disagreement among democratic theorists.

3. Competing requirements for voting-rights

In this article, we map the relative support for three competing requirements for voting-rights: the citizenship requirement, which is currently practiced in a vast majority of existing democracies; the residency requirement, which has been put forward by democratic theorists as a more democratically legitimate alternative; and the historically important and, as we will show, still relevant, economic contribution requirement. In this section, we put these into their historical and normative context.

3.1. The citizenship requirement and the residency requirement

Citizenship is a requirement for the right to vote in national elections in the vast majority of the countries of the world. There are a few exceptions, however. Chile, Malawi, New Zealand, and Uruguay enfranchise (long-term) resident non-citizens in national elections (Earnest, 2008). Other countries, like Australia and the U.K, enfranchise some resident non-citizens in national elections depending on nationality (Earnest, 2008). A greater number of countries enfranchise resident non-citizens in regional or local elections but disenfranchise this group

in national elections (Earnest, 2008). In the U.S, resident non-citizens are, or have been, allowed to vote in regional or local elections in some states. In national elections, however, federal law makes it unlawful for non-citizens to vote (18 USC 611).

Also, non-resident citizens have the right to vote in national elections in most countries (Ellis et al., 2007; Pogonyi, 2014), often as a result of a step-by-step transition. In the U.S, this started already in 1863 when the state of Wisconsin enacted a provision allowing absentee voting for soldiers fighting in the Civil War. Other states followed and the possibility of absentee voting was gradually extended to also include non-military personnel. Since 1975, the right to vote is granted to all non-resident U.S. citizens in U.S. elections (Ellis et al., 2007).

In other words, the main trend when it comes to voting-rights regulations in the U.S, as well as in the rest of the world during the 20th century, was to remove voting-rights requirements that excluded citizens based on gender, race, economic contribution, or residency. This has resulted in voting-rights regulations that enfranchise most adult citizens and disenfranchise all non-citizens in national elections (with important exceptions in many countries for people with certain intellectual disabilities and for convicted felons).

The democratic reasonableness of citizenship as a requirement for voting-rights has been one of the main areas of focus among theorists studying democratic inclusion. A few have defended the current citizenship requirement and argued for enfranchising non-resident citizens and disenfranchising resident non-citizens. The main proponent for this position is Rainer Bauböck (2018) who argues that democratic inclusion should be based on the relation between the individual and the political community. On his account, those who are citizens qualify as members of the national political community and should have the right to vote in national elections. However, the vast majority of theorists have challenged the citizenship-requirement and defended a residency-requirement that implies for voting-rights regulations in national elections that enfranchise resident non-citizens and disenfranchise non-resident citizens (see e.g., Angell and Huseby, 2017; Beckman, 2012; Blatter et al., 2016; López-Guerra, 2005; 2014). Proponents of this position have argued that all residents are subjected to the authority of the state and should therefore have the right to vote in its elections independent of citizenship status.

Citizenship and residency are thus two competing requirements for voting-rights. The choice between these two requirements has implications for the question of voting-rights for resident non-citizens in their country of residence and for non-resident citizens in their country of citizenship. The two could also be combined, either by requiring citizenship *and* residency for the right to vote, resulting in voting-rights regulations that exclude both resident non-citizens and non-resident citizens, or requiring citizenship *or* residency, resulting in voting-rights regulations that include both resident non-citizens and non-resident citizens. The citizenship and the residency requirement could thus be combined into four distinct requirements: requiring citizenship, requiring residency, requiring both citizenship and residency, and requiring either citizenship or residency. When studying attitudes toward requirements for voting-rights, all these four should be taken into account.

The paths to citizenship and hence the right to vote look very different in different countries that apply an unqualified citizenship-requirement. Citizenship is acquired by birth or by naturalization. Citizenship by birth is acquired either by birthplace (*jus soli*), by decent (*jus sanguinis*), or by a combination of both. The rules for naturalization vary from country to country, and naturalization is conditioned upon e. g., past and future residency, language skills, economic activity, cultural assimilation, and cultural affinity (Vink and Bauböck, 2013). In order to account for the possibility that there is a difference in the willingness to enfranchise different categories of citizens, the study maps the difference in support for enfranchising citizens that are citizens by birth and citizens that are naturalized citizens.

Analogously, the residency requirement is not studied as one single

requirement but as two different requirements: one that enfranchises all residents and one that only enfranchises long-term residents. There is a great deal of variation between the handful of countries that include resident non-citizens, spanning from New Zealand requiring one year of residency to Chile requiring 18 years. The question of what residence time should be required has also been addressed by democratic theorists defending the residency-requirement (see e.g., Beckman, 2012).

3.2. The economic contribution requirement

Alongside the citizenship requirement, which is currently practiced in a vast majority of existing democracies, and the residency requirement, which has been put forward by democratic theorists as a more democratic alternative, there are reasons to also study economic contribution as a requirement for the right to vote. The current practice of extending the right to vote to include all adult citizens replaced a practice where the right to vote was a privilege for men and conditioned on certain economic requirements related to property, income, and tax payment (Katz, 1997). Economic activities were sometimes seen as a proxy for other traits, such as economic incompetence or economic dependence, which were taken to be reasons for disenfranchisement. However, economic contribution has also been seen as decisive for democratic inclusion in and of itself. The underlying idea was that those who did not contribute economically to the public resources of the state, by paying taxes or otherwise, should not have influence over the use of these resources, because these resources belong to the contributors. J.S. Mill is alluding to this understanding of economic voting-rights requirements when suggesting that enfranchising someone that do not pay taxes amount to “allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets” (Mill, 1865: ch. 8).

Economic requirements for voting-rights were abolished either through rapid transformations or slow step-by-step transitions (Katz, 1997). In the U.S, disenfranchisement based on economic requirements was abolished altogether as late as 1964 when the poll tax as a voting-right requirement was ruled unconstitutional by the 24th Amendment (Podolefsky, 1998). At that time, the support for disenfranchising people who were not tax payers was fairly high (21 percent) also among people that expressed a massive support for democracy as a general principle (Prothro and Grigg 1960).

However, economic contribution is not just relevant because of its historical, pre-democratic, prominence. It has also been invoked in contemporary voting-rights discussions as an argument for extending the right to vote to resident non-citizens (see Song, 2016) and to non-resident citizens (see López-Guerra, 2014). A case in point is the slogan “No Vote, No Money” (in Spanish: “Sin voto, no hay dinero”), which is a recycling of the slogan “No Taxation, Without Representation” and issued by Mexican citizens living in the U.S. to support their claim for enfranchisement in their country of citizenship (see López-Guerra, 2014). This slogan connects the right to vote for citizens living abroad to their financial contribution to their country of citizenship. Above all, it is important to include the economic contribution requirement because it is an alternative to the citizenship requirement that is democratically more dubious than the residency requirement but still, as we will show, has support from considerable minorities. The economic contribution requirement has not been the subject of the same thorough inquiries as the citizenship requirement and the residency requirement, but democratic theorists that have mentioned it have dismissed it as a reason for inclusion based on its expected implications. The requirement has been argued to be over-inclusive – including people that should not be included (see Bauböck, 2007; López-Guerra, 2014) - and under-inclusive – excluding people that should be included (Angell and Huseby, 2017).

Aiming for a picture of the popular demands for change and the resistance against it – i.e., the sociological legitimacy of the prevailing primacy of the citizenship-requirement as well as the leeway for changes – we map the support for each of the requirements taken separately and

in all possible combinations.

4. Experimental design and data

We tap the attitudes toward the requirements for voting-rights by means of a *conjoint experiment*. This method is apt for adding nuances to multidimensional policy issues, as it allows for measuring and comparing how preferences toward a complex object – that is, in our case, potential voters – are affected by a number of different attributes of the object (see Hainmueller et al., 2014). The method returns isolated estimates of the causal impact of each attribute on the respondents' preferences, indicating, thus, the respondents' support for each attribute as a requirement for voting-rights. Conjoint experiments dissolve confounding between different measured attributes (Leeper et al., 2020), which makes it possible to discern independent measures of preferences toward attributes that may otherwise be taken as proxies for each other, such as citizenship, residency, and economic contribution. Compared to other survey techniques, conjoint experiments are found to yield results that more precisely resemble the actual choices of people facing complex decisions in natural settings (Hainmueller et al., 2015). Since the respondents are to rate and choose among objects that combine a number of characteristics, the respondents have to prioritize between alternatives where none of them may be fully politically correct; moreover, the respondents do not have to disclose which characteristics guided their choice (Jeannet et al., 2021; Hainmueller et al., 2014). Thus, social desirability bias is likely to be reduced, which is particularly relevant when measuring potentially sensitive opinions about enfranchisement and disenfranchisement.

4.1. Data and the procedure of the survey

Data were collected by Qualtrics in the U.S. between February 28 and March 9, 2018. The sample comprises 980 adult U.S. citizens sampled with quotas for respondents' age ($M = 45.6$ years, $SD = 17.1$), gender (52.9 percent women), and level of education (10.6 percent not having graduated high school and 28.2 percent having a bachelor's degree or more). 4.6 percent of the respondents were foreign born and the median household income in the sample was between \$35,000 and \$49,999 per year. For complete descriptive statistics of the sample and a description of the sampling procedure, see Supporting information, pages 1–4.

The survey began by tapping into the respondents' demographic background (being U.S. born, being a U.S. citizen, gender, education, employment status, and income), along with a standard item for their general support for democracy. Thereafter, the conjoint experiment followed, in which the respondents were to choose and rate profiles of fictional, potential voters. Each potential voter was described with six different attributes. The task is presented in Fig. 1.

The respondents were asked about their preferences regarding franchise for the fictional potential voter in the next federal elections, and they were asked about this by two kinds of questions. First, respondents were to *choose* one of the two profiles that they would most like to be allowed to vote, which constrained respondents to make trade-offs. After this, respondents were to *rate* each presented profile and indicate on a Likert scale 1–7 whether or not the profile should be allowed to vote. The respondents could thus express a preference for allowing or not allowing each profile to vote, independently of the other profile that was presented in the pair. In this way, the ratings supported the choice task by relieving respondents from some of the pressure that otherwise could be entailed in prioritizing between pairs of profiles. Most important, though, the ratings provide the best data in the test for assessing the support for voting rights requirement that would include or exclude certain groups from voting. Lastly, we use the ratings for

robustness checks, and combine the choices and the ratings in order to identify inattentive respondents that gave conflicting responses.² Each respondent was presented with six pairs of profiles on consecutive screens, resulting in 5,880 choices and 11,760 ratings of profiles.³

Three attributes are included in order to probe the support for citizenship, residency, and economic contribution as requirements for voting-rights. Economic contribution is operationalized as paying income tax.⁴ The country of origin of the fictional profiles is added as a fourth attribute, which allows us to account for possible differences in attitudes toward naturalized U.S. citizens and those who are U.S. citizens by birth. Of course, not all U.S. citizens that are not born in the U.S. are naturalized citizens. Some U.S. citizens that are born outside the U.S. are U.S. citizens by birth. But the majority of U.S. citizens that are born outside the U.S. are naturalized citizens (United States Census Bureau, 2019). The difference between U.S. born U.S. citizens and U.S. citizens born outside the U.S. is therefore a fair proxy for the difference between citizens by birth and naturalized citizens. Stating the country of origin for the fictional profiles also ensures that respondents do not take the indicated citizenship or residency of profiles as proxies for the profiles' origin. Analogously, education is added in order to avoid that citizenship, country of origin, or income tax paying are taken as proxies for competence. Gender is added in order to prevent confounding effects of certain combinations of attributes that might otherwise have brought on gender stereotypes. The six varying attributes that describe the fictional potential voters in the experiment are thus citizenship, residency, income tax paying, country of origin, education, and gender. Moreover, all profiles were described as being adult, and in order to ensure that for example citizenship or tax-paying were not taken as proxies for law-abidingness all profiles were also described as law-abiding.

The possible values for the respective attributes were chosen to be theoretically relevant, distinctive, and plausible in all possible combinations (cf. Hainmueller et al., 2015). As for citizenship and income tax paying, this is made by means of binary values (being or not being a U.S. citizen, paying or not paying income taxes in the U.S.). As for residency, we have included five distinct levels to be able to account for the possibility that preferences are not only guided by present residency but also by past residency or supposed future residency. Countries of origin were chosen to provide distinctive alternatives to the U.S. along a few relevant dimensions. They include low-, middle- and high-income countries and capture a wide range of perceived cultural closeness to the U.S. (cf. Koukal et al., 2021), as well as large differences in the rate of unauthorized stay among immigrants from the country (see Supporting information pp. 13–14). The full set of attribute values is presented in Table 1.

The order of these six attributes is randomized, to avoid the salience of attributes being affected by the order in which they are presented. The randomization assigns identical probability to all attribute values within each attribute, and any resulting combination is allowed.⁵ Consequently, there was close to no correlation between the attributes (Pearson's $r \leq 0.02$).

Two estimation strategies were used. First, we estimate the relative perceived weight of each different voting-rights requirement. This is

² By conflicting responses, we mean choosing one profile of two, but rating the other one more positively (see e.g., Jeannet et al., 2021).

³ Six repetitions lie within the conventional range of repetitions in conjoint experiments and far below the number of tasks by which substantial declines in response quality is found to be likely (see Bansak et al., 2018).

⁴ It should be noted here that the U.S. taxes its non-resident citizens in the same rates and manner as resident citizens (US Supreme Court, *Cook v. Tait*, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)).

⁵ There are thus $2 \times 5 \times 2 \times 5 \times 5 \times 2 = 1,000$ possible profiles in the test. For evidence of significant numbers of actual immigrants with seemingly atypical profiles among Somalis, Mexicans, and Filipinos living in the U.S., see e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015, supporting information, p. 1).

People have different opinions regarding who should be allowed to vote.

From the next page onwards, you will be presented with six pairs of potential voters. Each voter is described in a column with attributes. Please read the descriptions carefully. For each pair of potential voters, indicate which of the two you would most prefer to be allowed to vote in the next US federal election. Indicate the potential voter you most prefer even if you think that both or neither of them should be allowed to vote.

--

If you had to choose between the two law-abiding, adult persons below, who in your view should be allowed to vote in the next US federal election? Please read the descriptions carefully.

	Person 1	Person 2
Citizenship	US Citizen	Not US Citizen
Residency	Lived in Europe for the last 15 years	Lived in the US for the last 3 years
Income tax paying	Pays income taxes in the US	Pays no income taxes in the US
Country of origin	Born in Mexico	Born in Canada
Education equivalent to	Master's degree	Bachelor's degree
Gender	Man	Woman

Person 1

Person 2

Above you made a choice between a pair of potential voters. Now please indicate for each of these potential voters how important it is in your view that the person is or is not allowed to vote in the next US federal election.

Should person 1 be allowed to vote?

1 - No, definitely not 2 3 4 5 6 7 - Yes, definitely

Should person 2 be allowed to vote?

1 - No, definitely not 2 3 4 5 6 7 - Yes, definitely

Fig. 1. Example of conjoint task in the survey instrument, with introduction.

based on the salience that respondents put to each requirement for voting-rights is calculated from their choices among pairs of fictional profiles. The pairwise choices provide us with the most sensitive data for measuring and comparing the salience of individual characteristics, since they isolate respondents' preferences for certain characteristics from respondents' general preference for including many or only a few in the electorate (for a similar case, see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) on immigration preferences), and capture variation in attitudes also among those respondents who would like to exclude or include all presented profiles. The extent to which respondents take an attribute value as being relevant for voting-rights is expressed as the attribute's *Average Marginal Component Effect* (AMCE). The AMCE denotes how an attribute value (compared to a different value on the same attribute) affects the probability that a profile is preferred to another for being allowed to vote (see Hainmueller et al., 2014). The unit of analysis, thus, is not the respondent but each fictional profile. There has been a shift away from AMCEs to other estimation strategies in recent conjoint experiment studies focusing on comparisons between subsamples (see Leeper et al., 2020). However, as for conveying an overview of the respective attribute values' relative salience within a complete sample, AMCEs are still preferable. We calculate the AMCEs by means of dummy OLS-regressions of whether the profiles were chosen or not on their

respective attribute values, i.e., a linear probability model, and confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered on respondents. (For details on the calculation of and assumptions behind the AMCEs, see Hainmueller et al. (2014).) Given the low level of correlation between the attribute values, we estimate the main model by including all attributes in one regression.

Secondly, we estimate public opinion regarding different requirements for voting-rights. This is done by calculating the respondents' ratings of different groups of profiles. Specifically, we make subsets of profiles that share possible combinations of being U.S. citizen or not, being U.S. resident since at least three years or not, and paying income taxes in the U.S. or not. As will be shown in Fig. 2 below, these three attributes do not only capture the requirements addressed in the normative literature, but also the attributes that are deemed to be the most salient among the respondents. For each subset of possible combinations, we calculate the share of profiles that the respondents wanted to enfranchise or disenfranchise, along with confidence intervals computed on standard errors clustered on respondents. These estimates, thus, describe the support for allowing profiles to vote, given the chosen combination of attribute values of the profiles, and averaging across all other attributes. The preferred share is, in other words, a ratings-based version of the marginal means (cf. Leeper et al., 2020) that are

Table 1
Attributes and attribute values.

Attributes	Attribute values
Citizenship	Not U.S. citizen
	U.S. citizen
Residency	Lived in the U.S. for the last 15 years
	Lived in the U.S. for the last 3 years
	Tourist in the U.S.
	Lived in Europe for the last 3 years
	Lived in Europe for the last 15 years
Income tax paying	Pays no income taxes in the U.S.
	Pays income taxes in the U.S.
Country of origin	Born in the U.S.A.
	Born in Canada
	Born in Mexico
	Born in the Philippines
	Born in Somalia
	Born in the U.S.A.
Education equivalent to	Less than high school
	High school
	College degree
	Bachelor's degree
	Master's degree
Gender	Woman
	Man

Note: All fictional potential voters were furthermore described as being adult and law-abiding.

increasingly used in conjoint experiment studies. The ratings-based estimation derives appraisals of the profiles on the profiles' own merits and is independent of the competing profiles with which they appeared. Hence, while choices between profiles imply that respondents' inclination to affirm an attribute value will depend on the set of alternative values for that attribute, the ratings-based marginal means tap respondents' affirmation of the attribute value, independent of the alternatives. As opposed to conventional, choice-based marginal means, the ratings-based marginal means can be interpreted in absolute terms and without a reference to a contrasting category. The confidence

intervals are derived from an estimation of the predictive margins for each subset of an OLS regression of whether respondents preferred franchise for the profiles or not on the respective subsets.

Any random noise in the data would bias the ratings-based results toward ratings at the center of the Likert scale and for that reason spawn overestimations of the political contestation of the issues. Therefore, our ratings-based models exclude respondents who indicated inconsistent ratings and choices.

5. Results

We present the main findings in two steps. First, we present the salience that respondents place on the requirements for each voting-rights by measuring the causal effect of each attribute value on respondents' willingness to prefer one potential voter over another. Secondly, we examine the support for the primacy of the citizenship-requirement as well as for alternatives that would let voting-rights be affected, not only by citizenship but by residence or income tax paying as well. This examination draws on respondents' ratings and measures respondents' support for allowing voting-rights for profiles, depending on whether they are U.S. citizens, income tax payers, or a resident in the U.S, or any combination thereof.

5.1. Salience put to attributes as requirements for enfranchisement

Fig. 2 provides an overview of the reports of the effect of each attribute value based on the choices of all respondents. Each dot with a line indicates the difference in the probability of being preferred to be granted voting-rights in federal elections between a profile with one attribute value and a profile with a reference attribute value. The lines indicate confidence intervals on the 95 percent level. Dots without lines denote reference levels. The results indicate that profiles described as U. S. citizens are 35.6 percentage points (SE = 0.9) more likely than non-citizen profiles to be preferred as voters, which indicates a stronger




Fig. 2. Effects of attribute values on a profile's probability to be preferred for franchise.

Note: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for all attribute values on the probability that a profile is preferred to be allowed to vote in a choice between two profiles. AMCEs are calculated in one multivariate OLS-model for all six attributes (citizenship, income tax paying, residency, gender, country of origin, and education). Point-bars refer to confidence intervals on the 95% level, and the points without bars on the line indicate baseline variables. Confidence intervals are computed with standard errors clustered on respondents. All profiles were described as being law-abiding and adult. N = 11,760.

support for basing the right to vote on citizenship than on other attributes. Regarding the difference between birth-right and naturalized citizenship, this could be measured by comparing profiles that are described as U.S. born and profiles that are described as foreign born. When restricting the analysis to profiles with U.S. citizenship, we can measure the perceived difference between naturalized and U.S. born citizens. It turns out that U.S. born citizens are, on average, 7.8 percentage points ($SE = 1.9$, $N = 5,846$) more preferred than naturalized, Canada born citizens.⁶

The effects on the probability of being preferred for voting-rights are significantly lower but still strong for paying income taxes (19.2 percentage points, $SE = 0.9$) and being resident in the U.S. (14.9 or 21.8 percentage points, depending on the length of residency, $SE = 1.4$ in both cases). While respondents clearly take citizenship to be the attribute that is the most relevant for their reasoning about voting-rights, the effects of income tax paying and residence indicate that the respondents consider these attributes as well. It should also be noted that the salience put to income tax paying is significantly larger (on the 95% level) than the salience of having lived in the US for the last three years, and that all profiles—income tax payers as well as non-income tax payers—were described as being law-abiding.⁷ The high salience of citizenship and the lower but yet significant salience of income tax paying and residency are robust to all relevant specifications of the statistical models and the sample.⁸

The main focus in this study is on citizenship, including the difference between naturalized and birth-right citizens; residency, including the difference between short-term and long-term residency; and economic contribution. The other attributes are included in order to ensure that the measured effects are indeed effects of citizenship, residency, and economic contribution. As for the other attributes we will therefore only give two more comments. Regarding the results for educational attainment, it should be noted that the somewhat unexpected and potentially anti-democratic salience of education may call for research aimed directly at attitudes toward competence as an exclusionary voting rights requirement for adults. Beyond this, however, we advise against further interpretations of the results for educational attainment, since they reflect a very rough approach to the debate about competence and voting rights. Regarding gender, it should be noted that there is no sign of a relevant interaction between gender and income tax paying. Respondents who support a male bread-winner model would be more expected to demand income tax paying from male profiles than from female profiles. However, the recorded effects are insignificant and pointing in the opposite direction: the premium put to income taxpayers is 1.1 percentage points larger ($SE = 1.6$) for female profiles than for male profiles.

⁶ This estimate is probably a conservative measure of the positive effect of being U.S. born. Due to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, U.S. born persons who are not citizens either were born to parents staying unlawfully in the U.S., have renounced their citizenship, or had their citizenship revoked. This implied history of non-national U.S. born profiles may have turned some respondents against them, and thus deflated the positive effect of being U.S. born.

⁷ For a subset of non-citizen profiles born outside of the U.S., some respondents could theoretically have taken income tax paying as a proxy for profiles not being unauthorized immigrants, resulting in a premium to tax paying profiles for reasons that are only remotely connected to the profiles' perceived contribution. However, there are no signs in the data that such interpretation of income tax paying has driven the respondents' evaluation of the profiles (see Supporting information pp. 12–13).

⁸ See Supporting information, pp. 4–7 for 1) a calculation of ACMEs when run on a subset of respondents that gave no conflicting answers to choices and rating, 2) AMCEs based on separate regressions for each attribute, 3) separate AMCEs from each of the six rounds of tasks made by the respondents, and 4) ACMEs on ratings of the profiles.

5.2. Attitudes toward requirements for voting-rights

To which extent is there a popular support for enfranchising or disenfranchising different groups? To begin with, we estimate the support for disenfranchising groups that are now enfranchised, such as non-resident U.S. citizens. Secondly, we estimate the support for enfranchising groups that are now disenfranchised, such as resident non-citizens. Taken together, this estimates the support for the primacy of the citizenship-requirement as well as the leeway for alternatives.

The support for the citizenship-requirement and the leeway for change in a more exclusive direction is measured as the support for disenfranchising profiles that are described as U.S. citizens. Fig. 3 reports the attitudes toward disenfranchising U.S. citizens, categorized by their residency in the U.S. (since three or 15 years) and whether or not they pay income taxes in the U.S. Respondents indicated a wish to exclude 4.4% of the profiles that have in common that they are citizens, residents and pay income taxes, but take on any value regarding country of origin, education, and gender ($SE = 0.75$, $N = 868$).⁹ The support for disenfranchising U.S. citizen profiles was larger if these profiles were either not resident or not paying income taxes. Among those profiles that are U.S. citizens and residents but do not pay income taxes, 16.5% were preferred for disenfranchisement, indicating a substantive group of respondents that questions the right to vote even for resident citizens ($SE = 1.6$, $N = 857$). The support for disenfranchising profiles that are neither residents nor income taxpayers but are U.S. citizens was 27.6% ($SE = 1.6$, $N = 1,305$). Not included in the figure is a significant difference in the support for disenfranchising profiles that are naturalized citizens and profiles that are U.S. born citizens, with naturalized citizens on average being 1.5 times more often preferred for disenfranchisement (see Supporting information, p. 11).

While one could expect a bias among respondents toward restricting franchise to people similar to themselves, the results are strikingly similar between groups of respondents. When splitting the sample of respondents on the tapped sociodemographic characteristics, the majority against disenfranchising U.S. citizens persists in all subgroups (see Supporting information, pp. 15–19). Moreover, there are no significant differences in the results among respondents who indicate general support for democracy and respondents who do not (see Supporting information, p. 19). Summing up, the right to vote for all adult, law-abiding U.S. citizens is supported in a firm majority of the cases while, at the same time, considerable minorities support disenfranchising citizens who do not pay income taxes or are not residents in the U.S.

Regarding robustness, a tough test of the support for basing voting-rights exclusively on U.S. citizenship is provided by the ratings of the group of U.S. citizens that should be the least expected to have support for being enfranchised, according to the preceding choice-based test. The respondents preferred to disenfranchise a slight majority (53.8%, $SE = 13.8$, $N = 13$) in the very small group of atypically disliked U.S. citizen profiles that were described as residing in Europe the last 15 years, not paying income taxes, being born in Somalia, and with an education equivalent to less than high school. However, when the group of atypically disliked citizens is expanded by also including profiles with the second least popular values for residency (tourist in the U.S.), country of origin (Mexico), and education (equivalent to high school), the share of ratings that supports disenfranchisement falls far below a majority (32.6%, $SE = 4.0$, $N = 138$). Thus, the majority support for granting all citizens voting-rights is not a product of some profiles having particular traits or combinations of traits (such as being U.S. born or well educated), but it applies also for diverse groups with less liked

⁹ For profiles that, in addition to this, are U.S. born and highly educated, no single rating questioned their franchise. This suggests that the 4.4% support for disenfranchising tax paying, resident citizens is not a result of noise but of small groups' willingness to disenfranchise for reasons relating to country of origin or education. See Supporting information, p. 9.




Fig. 3. Support for disenfranchising groups of U.S. citizens in federal elections. Note: Circles indicate point estimates of the share of profiles within each subset that respondents preferred to be excluded from the right to vote in U.S. federal elections (i.e., that were rated 1–3 on the Likert scale 1–7). Bars indicate confidence intervals on the 95% level, with standard errors clustered on respondents. Confidence intervals are derived from an estimation of the predictive margins for each subset in an OLS regression of whether respondents preferred franchise for the profiles or not on the respective subsets. All profiles were described as being law-abiding and adult. Respondents who gave inconsistent combinations of ratings and choices are dismissed in the analysis. A model based on all respondents’ returns results with only minor and statistically insignificant differences to the main model (see Supporting information, p. 9).

characteristics. Moreover, the perceived primacy of citizenship over residency and income tax paying remains in models that exclude those profiles that are given neutral ratings (see Supporting information, p. 8). This implies that the recorded lack of support for disenfranchising citizens is not a result of large shares of indifferent respondents. Rather, the recorded lack of support for disenfranchising citizens reflects that citizen profiles receive explicit support for franchise in a majority of cases.

The leeway for changing the challenging the primacy of the citizenship-requirement in a more inclusive direction is measured as the support for enfranchising profiles that are described as not U.S. citizens. The attitudes toward enfranchising non-citizen profiles group are reported in Fig. 4. These profiles are categorized by whether or not they pay income taxes in the U.S. and by their residency in the U.S. (non-resident or resident since three or 15 years, respectively). We separate the results for profiles that are resident since three or 15 years to be able to account for two distinct normative underpinnings of claims for enfranchising non-citizen residents. Resident individuals are assumed to be affected by, or subject to, federal decision-making, and in relation to this we expect the respondents not to make any difference between profiles having resided in the U.S. for three or 15 years. However, regarding individuals’ links to the political community, respondents are likely to consider profiles that have resided for 15 years different from those having stayed only three years. Respondents who take the relation between individuals and the political community into account are thus assumed to give a premium to profiles that have been residents for 15 years rather than three.

Ideas about expanding franchise to non-citizens if these are resident or taxpayers are not supported by a majority. However, the minorities that want to enfranchise profiles based on their residency and tax paying are significant and deserve comments. As for the most supported of the six groups, 15 years’ resident and income tax paying profiles that are not U.S. citizens, the respondents indicated a preference for franchise in no less than 40.7% of the cases (SE = 2.0, N = 405). A comparison of the support for enfranchising non-citizen profiles based on residency, on the one hand, and tax paying, on the other hand, indicates that the support for these two alternative voting-rights requirements is similar. The support for enfranchising non-citizen profiles that either pay income taxes in the U.S. or are residents ranges between 21.5% and 24.2% (SE between 1.6 and 2.2, N between 436 and 1,329). No statistically significant differences are recorded between resident profiles that have stayed in the U.S. for a longer or shorter period. Rather, respondents who support enfranchising resident non-citizens seem to make little or no difference between short-term and long-term residency.

The support for enfranchising non-citizens is larger among women, young, and people with high education, that latter two suggesting that this inclusive take on franchise may gain increasing and influential support. Nevertheless, a significant lack of majority support for enfranchising non-citizens no matter their residency or tax-paying

persists across sociodemographic subgroups with two exceptions among groups of profiles rated by young and foreign-born respondents.¹⁰

6. Conclusions

Over the last two decades, democratic theorists have scrutinized normative questions regarding the requirements for voting-rights, challenging the prevailing political emphasis on citizenship and mainly opting to connect the right to vote in national elections to residency. In parallel, popular arguments are being made to enfranchise people because of their economic contributions. However, regarding attitudes toward requirements for voting-rights, the literature is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, it does not include any comprehensive study on general attitudes toward proposed requirements for voting-rights. Here, therefore, we assess the support for a wide set of possible requirements for voting-rights in a nationally representative sample (with regard to respondents’ age, gender, and level of education) of 980 U.S. citizens. By means of a conjoint experiment, we derive isolated estimates of respondents’ support for enfranchising law-abiding adults depending on whether or not these are U.S. citizens, resident in the U.S., pay income taxes in the U.S., as well as on their country of origin, level of education, and gender.

The results indicate that in the majority of cases, the respondents prefer franchise for all citizens even if they live abroad or do not pay income taxes in the U.S., indicating support for citizenship as a *sufficient* requirement for voting-rights. Although there is a majority for enfranchising citizens independent of their country of origin, the support for enfranchising U.S. born citizens is significantly higher than the support for enfranchising citizens born outside the U.S. This indicates that the respondents are slightly more willing to disenfranchise naturalized citizens than those who are citizens by birth. Citizenship is also viewed as being a *necessary* requirement for voting-rights by a majority, who prefer not to enfranchise non-U.S. citizens even if they are residents and/or pay income taxes in the U.S. These results indicate that a firm majority support the current requirements for voting-rights for U.S. federal elections, defending citizenship as the sole decisive requirement for voting-rights for law-abiding adults. The majority support for the

¹⁰ Concerning robustness, it is, once again, possible to put together an atypical group of profiles that is rated against the main results. Among the 13 instances of the presumably most favored non-citizen profiles (income tax paying, US born, resident in the U.S. for 15 years and holding masters’ degrees or equivalent), eight were preferred for enfranchisement. However, expanding this group by also including profiles with the second most popular values for residency (three years in the U.S.), country of origin (Canada), and education (equivalent to bachelor’s degree), the share of ratings that supports enfranchisement falls below a majority, though still statistically insignificant (44.2%, SE = 4.5, N = 120).




Fig. 4. Support for enfranchising groups of non-citizens in federal elections.
 Note: Circles indicate point estimates of the share of profiles within each subset that respondents preferred to have the right to vote in U.S. federal elections (i.e., that were rated 5–7 on the Likert scale 1–7). Bars indicate confidence intervals on the 95% level, with standard errors clustered on respondents. Confidence intervals are derived from an estimation of the predictive margins for each subset in an OLS regression of whether respondents preferred franchise for the profiles or not on the respective subsets. All profiles were described as being law-abiding and

adult. Respondents who gave inconsistent combinations of ratings and choices are dismissed in the analysis.

citizenship requirement is strikingly persistent over sociodemographic subgroups and in line with previously measured resistance against letting residency decide voting-rights in Europe (Michel and Blatter, 2020). As for normative principles of democratic inclusion, the respondents in this study lean toward something akin to the membership principle, defended by Bauböck (2018).

However, even though a majority support letting citizenship override other possible requirements for voting-rights, there are considerable groups that prefer that voting-rights depend on other criteria, not only residency but also economic contribution measured as income tax paying. The line preferred by most democratic theorists, namely that the right to vote should be extended to include all residents independent of citizenship, is shared by a significant minority who support enfranchisement of resident non-citizens who do not pay income taxes in the U. S. Regarding residency, there is no significant difference between the ratings of long-term and short-term resident profiles, which indicates that the respondents who support a residency-requirement find that three years residency is sufficient for enfranchisement. This result, in turn, suggests that the support for residency-requirement is not a response to perceived, slowly growing links between immigrants and the political community. More likely, the support for the residency requirement reflects an acknowledgment of residents being subjected to, or affected by, federal decision-making. If interpreted in this way, the rationale for supporting the residency requirement among the respondents of this study is in line with the arguments for this requirement put forward by democratic theorists adhering to the all-subjected principle (see e.g., Beckman, 2012) and the all-affected principle (see Hultin Rosenberg, 2020).

The contributivist line, that non-tax paying citizens should be disenfranchised, is also supported by a significant minority. It could be noted here that the support for disenfranchising people who are not taxpayers, measured in this study, is on par with the results reported by Prothro and Grigg (1960) in their study conducted in the U.S. at a time when the economic voting-rights requirement was not yet completely abolished. The importance of the contributivist line is further emphasized if we look at the support for enfranchising resident non-citizens. The results of this study thus suggest a considerable popular support for contributivist requirements that has been rejected as undemocratic by democratic theorists (see e.g., López-Guerra, 2014).

It should also be noted that although a large majority supports disenfranchisement based on citizenship, residency, taxpaying, or some combination of these requirements, a minority supports enfranchising non-taxpaying, non-resident non-citizens. This radically inclusive attitude is in line with the position defended by some scholars in the normative literature arguing for the inclusion of everyone, everywhere in every decision (see Goodin, 2007).

The most important implications of the study follow from the results regarding the tax-paying requirement and the citizenship requirement. The recorded partial support for the economic contribution requirement suggests that this position should be highlighted in future studies of

attitudes towards voting-rights requirements. There are no statistically significant differences in the support for the contributivist requirement, on the one hand, and the residency requirement, on the other hand. The support for the allegedly non-democratic contributivist requirement for voting-rights is furthermore significantly higher than conventional measures for undemocratic attitudes. Furthermore, it should be noted that the considerable support for excluding non-tax paying citizens persists in the group of respondents who are pro-democrats according to the most conventional operationalization of support for democracy. Thus, it seems that a consensus on the general importance of democracy may be combined with considerable groups supporting exclusionary ideas about the demos. The unexpectedly strong support for the contributivist requirement invites future research to study attitudes on different formulations of this requirement, for example by studying the support for enfranchising net contributors and disenfranchising net receivers.

The economic contribution of resident non-citizens and of non-resident citizens has been put forward by activists as an argument for enfranchising these groups. The results of this study may be taken as a support for that strategy since the support for enfranchising resident non-citizens and non-resident citizens is stronger if these are described as a taxpayer. However, when presenting such an argument, one should be aware that one is alluding to the democratically dubious contributivist principle that was one of the main targets of the democratic struggles during the 20th century.

The recorded, firm majority support for the primacy of the citizenship requirement should be discussed in relation to the notion of democratic theorists that the decreased overlap between, on the one hand, the group of people that are entitled to vote in national elections and, on the other hand, the group of people that are subjected to national policy constitutes a democratic deficit (Blatter et al., 2016). If taken as a deficit, it could be addressed either by disconnecting the right to vote and citizenship, or by reforming citizenship regulations in order to remove barriers for resident non-citizens to naturalize. The results of this study suggest that the former strategy is unlikely to gain popular support, thus emphasizing the democratic importance of citizenship-regulations. This suggests that future studies on attitudes toward voting-rights regulations should be made in connection with attitudes toward citizenship regulations. Lastly, the results speak for keeping an eye on the difference in support for enfranchising those who are citizens by birth and those who are naturalized citizens.

It should be noted here that this study maps attitudes on voting-right regulations in federal elections. Comparative empirical research shows that voting-rights regulations in local and regional elections often deviates from voting-right regulations in national or federal elections (Arrighi and Bauböck, 2017). Attitudes on regulations may vary accordingly and the results of this study should therefore not be generalized to the local and regional level.

The current citizenship-requirement is not challenged in political debate in the U.S. Therefore, a majority of the respondents have

probably not taken a position on this and competing voting-rights requirements prior to the survey. The study provides a picture of attitudes on these issues prior to political debate, which gives an insight into which paths future debates are likely to take, as well as a point of reference for future studies.

It is our hope that our study will inspire a wide range of further endeavors. The panoramic design of this paper is easily transposed to the suggested studies of attitudes toward naturalization-requirements or toward voting-rights requirements in relation to more fine-grained attributes, as well as toward requirements for voting-rights across countries and in local or regional elections—for country specific assessments and cross-country comparisons.

Data availability

Replication materials will be made available on the Harvard Dataverse.

Declaration of competing interest

None.

Acknowledgments

We thank participants at the colloquium Migration and Citizenship in Uppsala (2018) and the seminar for political sociology and political economy at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. Special thanks go to Axel Cronert, Peter Knutar, Nazita Lajevardi, Per Nyman, Katrin Uba, Kåre Vernby, and Per Zetterberg for helpful comments and technical support, as well as to the anonymous reviewers of Electoral Studies. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Center for Integrated Research on Culture and Society (CIRCUS), Uppsala University, and the Swedish Research Council (2018–01192_VR). The sponsors were not involved in any part of the research, writing or submission of the study. All errors remain our own.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102470>.

References

- Angell, Kim, Huseby, Robert, 2017. Should irregular immigrants be (rapidly) enfranchised? *Polit. Res. Q.* 70 (2), 363–373. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917695188>.
- Arrighi, Jean-Thomas, Bauböck, Rainer, 2017. A multilevel puzzle: migrants 'voting rights' in national and local elections. *Eur. J. Polit. Res.* 56 (3), 619–639.
- Bansak, Kirk, Hainmueller, Jens, Hopkins, Daniel J., Yamamoto, Teppei, 2018. The number of choice tasks and survey satisficing in conjoint experiments. *Polit. Anal.* 26 (1), 112–119.
- Bauböck, Rainer, 2007. Stakeholder citizenship and transnational political participation: a normative evaluation of external voting. *Fordham Law Rev.* 75, 2393.
- Bauböck, Rainer, 2018. *Democratic Inclusion: Rainer Bauböck in Dialogue*. Manchester University Press.
- Beck, Paul Allen, Jennings, M. Kent, 1969. Lowering the voting age: the case of the reluctant electorate. *Publ. Opin. Q.* 33 (3), 370–379.
- Beckman, Ludvig, 2012. Is residence special? Democracy in the Age of Migration and human mobility. In: Beckman, Ludvig, Erman, Eva (Eds.), *Territories of Citizenship*. Palgrave Macmillan, London and New York.
- Birch, Sarah, Clarke, Harold D., Whitely, Paul, 2015. Should 16-year-olds Be allowed to vote in westminster elections? Public opinion and electoral franchise reform. *Parliam. Aff.* 68 (2), 291–313. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsu019>.
- Blais, André, Massicotte, Louis, Yoshinaka, Antoine, 2001. Deciding who has the right to vote: a comparative analysis of election laws. *Elect. Stud.* 20 (1), 41–62.
- Blatter, Joachim, Schmid, Samuel D., Blättler, Andrea C., 2016. Democratic deficits in Europe: the overlooked exclusiveness of nation-states and the positive role of the European union. *J. Commun. Media Stud.: J. Common. Mark. Stud.* 55 (3), 449–467. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12491>.
- Brooks, George, 2004. Felon disenfranchisement: law, history, policy, and politics. *Fordham Urb. LJ* 32, 851.
- Caramani, Daniele, Grotz, Florian, 2015. Beyond citizenship and residence? Exploring the extension of voting rights in the age of globalization. *Democratization* 22 (5), 799–819. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.981668>.
- Cohen, Carl, 1971. *Democracy*. University of Georgia Press, Athens.
- United States Supreme Court, Cook, v, 1924. Tait, vol. 265. U.S., p. 47.
- Dahl, Robert A., 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Earnest, David C., 2008. Old Nations, New Voters: Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Democracy in the Era of Global Migration. SUNY Press.
- Earnest, David C., 2015. The enfranchisement of resident aliens: variations and explanations. *Democratization* 22 (5), 861–883.
- Ellis, Andrew, Navarro, Carlos, Morales, Isabel, Gratschew, Maria, Braun, Nadja, 2007. *Voting From abroad: the International IDEA Handbook*. International Idea.
- Ferrín, Monica, Kriesi, Hanspeter (Eds.), 2016. *How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola, Schündeln, Matthias, 2015. On the endogeneity of political preferences: evidence from individual experience with democracy. *Science* 347 (6226), 1145–1148.
- Goodin, Robert E., 2007. Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives. *Philos. Publ. Aff.* 35 (1), 40–68.
- Goodin, Robert E., 2016. Enfranchising all subjected, worldwide. *International Theory* 8, 365.
- Hainmueller, Jens, Hopkins, Daniel J., 2015. The hidden American immigration consensus: a conjoint analysis of attitudes toward immigrants. *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* 59 (3), 529–548.
- Hainmueller, Jens, Hopkins, Daniel J., Yamamoto, Teppei, 2014. Causal inference in conjoint analysis: understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments. *Polit. Anal.* 22 (1), 1–30.
- Hainmueller, Jens, Hangartner, Dominik, Yamamoto, Teppei, 2015. Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior. In: *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, vol. 112, pp. 2395–2400 (8).
- Himmelroos, Staffan, Peltoniemi, Johanna, 2021. External voting rights from a citizen perspective - comparing resident and non-resident citizens' attitudes towards external voting. *Scand. Polit. Stud.* 44 (4), 463–486.
- Hultin Rosenberg, Jonas, 2020. The all-affected principle reconsidered. *Soc. Theor. Pract.* 46 (4), 847–867.
- ICCPR, 1966. *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI).
- Inglehart, Ronald, 2003. How solid is mass support for democracy—and how can we measure it? *Political Science and Politics* 36 (1), 51–57.
- Jeannot, Anne-Marie, Heidland, Tobias, Ruhs, Martin, 2021. What Asylum and Refugee Policies Do Europeans Want? Evidence from a Cross-National Conjoint Experiment. *European Union Politics*.
- Katz, Richard S., 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford University Press on Demand.
- Koukal, Anna Maria, Schafer, Patricia, Eichenberger, Reiner, 2021. Enfranchising non-citizens: what drives natives' willingness to share power? *J. Comp. Econ.* 49 (4), 1088–1108.
- Larsen, Erik Gahner, Levensen, Klaus, Kjaer, Ulrik, 2016. Democracy for the youth? The impact of mock elections on voting age attitudes. *J. Elections, Public Opin. Parties* 26 (4), 435–451.
- Leeper, Thomas J., Hobolt, Sara B., Tilley, James, 2020. Measuring subgroup preferences in conjoint experiments. *Polit. Anal.* 28 (2), 207–221.
- López-Guerra, Claudio, 2005. Should expatriates vote? *J. Polit. Philos.* 13 (2), 216–234.
- López-Guerra, Claudio, 2014. *Democracy and Disenfranchisement: the Morality of Electoral Exclusions*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Manza, Jeff, Uggen, Christopher, 2004. Punishment and democracy: disenfranchisement of nonincarcerated felons in the United States. *Perspect. Polit.* 2 (3), 491–505.
- Michel, Elie, Blatter, Joachim, 2020. Enfranchising immigrants and/or emigrants? Attitudes towards voting rights expansion among sedentary nationals in Europe. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 1–20.
- Mill, John Stuart, 1865. In: *Considerations on Representative Government*. Longmans, London.
- Miller, David, 2009. Democracy's domain. *Philos. Publ. Aff.* 37 (3), 201–228.
- Norris, Pippa (Ed.), 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. OUP, Oxford.
- Pinaire, Brian, Heumann, Milton, Bilotta, Laura, 2002. Barred from the vote: public attitudes toward the disenfranchisement of felons. *Fordham Urb. LJ* 30, 1519.
- Podolefsky, Ronnie L., 1998. Illusion of suffrage: female voting rights and the women's poll tax repeal movement after the nineteenth amendment. *Notre Dame Law Rev.* 73, 839.
- Pogonyi, Szabolcs, 2014. Four patterns of non-resident voting rights. *Ethnopolitics* 13 (2), 122–140.
- Prothro, James W., Grigg, Charles M., 1960. Fundamental principles of democracy. *J. Polit.* 22 (2), 276–294.
- Quaranta, Mario, 2018. How citizens evaluate democracy: an assessment using the European Social Survey. *European Political Science Review* 10 (2), 191–217.
- Rubio-Marín, Ruth, 2006. Transnational politics and the democratic nation-state: normative challenges of expatriate voting and nationality retention of emigrants. *NYUL Rev* 81, 117.
- Song, Sarah, 2016. The significance of territorial presence and the rights of immigrants. In: Fine, S., Ypi, L. (Eds.), *Migration in Political Theory: the Ethics of Movement and Membership*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 225–248.
- United States Census Bureau, 2019. *American community survey*. Available at: <http://data.census.gov>.

Vink, Maarten Peter, Bauböck, Rainer, 2013. Citizenship configurations: analysing the multiple purposes of citizenship regimes in Europe. *Comp. Eur. Polit.* 11 (5), 621–664.

Walter, Florian, Rosenberger, Sieglinde, Ptaszynska, Aleksandra, 2013. Challenging the boundaries of democratic inclusion? Young people's attitudes about the distribution of voting rights. *Citizen. Stud.* 17 (3–4), 464–478.

Welzel, Christian, Inglehart, Ronald, 2005. Democratization as the growth of freedom: the human development perspective. *Jpn. J. Polit. Sci.* 6 (3), 313–343.