The Happening of Tradition
Vallabha on Anumāna in Nyāyalilāvatī

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Abstract

The present dissertation is a translation and analysis of the chapter on anumāṇa in Vallaba’s Nyāyālīlāvati, based on certain theoretical considerations on cross-cultural translation and the understanding of tradition. Adopting a non-essentialized and non-historicist conceptualization of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika/Navya-nyāya tradition, the work focuses on a reading of the anumāṇa chapter that is particularized and individualized. It further argues for a plurality of interpretative stances within the academic field of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika/Navya-nyāya studies, on the grounds that the dominant stance has narrowed the scope of research. With reference to post-colonial theory, this dominant stance is understood in terms of a certain strategy called “mimetic translation”.

The study of the anumāṇa chapter consists of three main interpretational sections: translation, comments, and analysis. The translation and comments focus on understanding issues internal to the Nyāyālīlāvati. The analysis focuses on a contextual interpretation insofar as the text is understood through reading other texts within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika/Navya-nyāya discourse. The analysis is further grounded in a concept of intertextuality in that it identifies themes, examples, and arguments appearing in other texts within the discourse. The analysis also identifies and discusses Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsaka arguments within the anumāṇa chapter.

Two important themes are discerned in the interpretation of the anumāṇa chapter: first, a differentiation between the apprehension of vyāpti and the warranting of this relation so as to make the apprehension suitable for a process of knowledge; second, that the sequential arrangement of the subject matter of the sections within the chapter, vyāptigraha, upādhi, tarka, and parāmarśa, reflects the process of coming to inferential knowledge.

The present work is a contribution to the understanding of the post-Udayana and pre-Gangeśa Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika/Navya-nyāya discourse on inferential knowledge and it is written in the hope of provoking more research on that particular period and discourse in the history of Indian philosophies.

Keywords: Logic--India--History, Vaiśeṣika History, Nyāya History, Vaiśeṣika--Early Works to 1800, Nyāya--Early Works to 1800, Philosophy--Indic, Vyāpti, Anumāṇa, Tarka, Upādhi, Parāmarśa, Nyāyalīlāvati, Vallabhācārya 12th cent., H. Bhābha, D. Chakrabarty

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Ulf Sondell
in memoriam
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Acknowledgements

When I, as an undergraduate, begun to study Sanskrit my experience was that of a probing and stumbling through the worlds of the Sanskrit words, and I continually wished myself towards the moment when things would be explained, neatly clarified, and once and for all settled. This was, however, not to be. But the fact of this not being so became, instead, one of the most important lessons of my teachers: to learn to remain always suspended between the understanding that has been and the understanding that will be. For this lesson I am deeply thankful to my teachers: Klas, Barbro, and Gunilla. They have instilled in me a profound sense of delight and joy in the worlds to which the Sanskrit language is a gateway.

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Uppsala, November 2006

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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATV</td>
<td>Ātmattaṭṭvaviveka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Citsukhiṭ Tattvapradīpiṇī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Dinakarī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Dyutimālikī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOCat</td>
<td><em>Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the India Office Library</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Kiraṇāvalī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka</td>
<td>Kārikāvalī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KB</td>
<td>Nyāyālīlavatikāṇṭhābhāraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCat</td>
<td><em>Triennial Catalogue of Manuscripts, Collected During the Triennium 1925-26 to 1927-28, for the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library Madras</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Mānmanohara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBh</td>
<td>Nyāyabhūṣaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBV</td>
<td>Nyāyabhāsyavārttiṇika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>New Catalogus Catalogorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK</td>
<td>Nyāyakośa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKC</td>
<td>Nyāyakumudacandra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKd</td>
<td>Nyāyakandali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKM</td>
<td>Nyāyakusumaṇjali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Nyāyalīlāvati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>Nyāyamaṇjari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NoSM</td>
<td>Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NoSM II</td>
<td>Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts 2nd Series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>Nyāyaratna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Nyāyasūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSa</td>
<td>Nyāyasāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSB</td>
<td>Nyāyasūtrabhāśya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSD</td>
<td>Nyāyasidhāntaadīpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVTT</td>
<td>Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVTS</td>
<td>Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Nyāyalīlāvatiprakāśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Padārthadharmaśaṅgṛaha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM</td>
<td>Prameyakamalamārtana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Prakaraṇapañcīkā</td>
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</table>
Pv  Nyāyalīlavatīprakāśavivṛtti
RS  Rasasāra
SDS Sarvadarśanasamgraha
TCat Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the
Tanjore Mahārāja Serfoji’s Sarasvatī Mahāl Library Tanjore
TCM Tattvacintāmapi
TCMP Tattvacintāmaniprabhā
TD Tarkadipikā
TR Tārkkikaraṇā
TS Tarkasamgraha
TSD Tarkasamgrahadipikā
TSDN Nilakanṭhapraṇāśikā
TUS Tattvopaplavasiṇha
V Vyomavatī
VMB Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya
VC Vyāpti-carcā
VS Vaiśeṣikasūtra
1. Introduction

This is a history that will attempt the impossible: to look towards its own death by tracing that which resists and escapes the best human effort at translation across cultural and other semiotic systems, so that the world may once again be imagined as radically heterogenous.¹

D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe

1.1 Aim and scope of the study

When setting out to write a thesis on the philosophical discourse of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika one very soon meets with the insight that there is so much philological work yet to be done, so many texts yet to be translated and analysed. When choosing the Nyāyaliṅgavatī as the subject of this thesis I was guided by stray remarks on the originality and radicality of the text, but also by the fact that NL is a text that has received considerable attention from Navya-nyāya commentators.² There are at least 15 commentaries and a large number of sub-commentaries written on NL, indicating its importance within a changing tradition. I have chosen to restrict the thesis to interpretation of the chapter on anumāna (inference). The themes of inference in general and vyāpti (invariable concomitance) and vyāptigraha (grasping of invariable concomitance) in particular received an increasing amount of attention in the late pre-Gaṅgeśa Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discourse.

The overall aim of this work is to find ways to understand the anumāna chapter¹ of Vallabha’s Nyāyaliṅgavatī and in so doing negotiate a vocabulary for that very understanding. This overall aim contains two aspects: firstly to provide a translation of the text and point to interpretational problems made apparent in the process; and secondly to interpret Vallabha’s text contextually, that is, to understand the text through the framework of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and, to a certain extent, the Navya-nyāya discourse.

² Matilal (1977) p. 73. Tachikawa, (1981) p. 16, for example, calls Vallabha “revolutionary”. This is discussed below on p. 50.
³ The use of the word “chapter” is wholly pragmatical. The anumāna discussion in NL is a part of the chapter on guṇa, which in turn is part of a chapter dealing with the six padārthās. This is discussed below on p. 43, cf. also app. 1.
The translation contained within this work is a first translation, which means that there is no existent translation to which this translation can be related. Through analysing Vallabha’s treatment of anumāna I wish to shed light upon the pre-Gaṇgeśa Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discourse on inference. It is my hope that this work will provoke further research on the NL in particular, but also on the post-Udayana/pre-Gaṇgeśa Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discourse in general.

Embedded within the overall practical aim are certain theoretical points of departure. These are concerns related to understanding, that is, to my own interpretative stance and to already existent interpretative stances, which will be elaborated upon below in the theoretical part of this introduction.

1.2 Previous research

Research on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts written during the post-Udayana and pre-Gaṇgeśa period in general has not been as abundant as research on early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. And research on Vallabha’s Nyāyālakāvatāri is still of very limited extent. There are three different editions of the text itself and the Jaipur work, which is a modern Hindi commentary. The NL is, however, referred to in numerous secondary accounts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya philosophy, and there are also two articles dealing with, among other things, the definitions of vyāpti that are discussed in the NL. A lengthy discussion on the treatment of tarka in NL and its commentaries is found in Bagchi’s Inductive Reasoning. Vallabha and NL are also discussed in various works on the chronology and bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya authors and texts.

To my knowledge, no complete translation of the NL is available, although Mohanty has made an English summary of the text in vol. II of Potter’s Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy. In 1996 there appeared a Hindi work on NL at the University of Rajasthan followed in 2004 by a second volume. The first volume consists of two Hindi commentaries on the NL text, whereas the second volume, substantially briefer than the first, has one. The purpose of the work appears to be philosophical rather than philological.

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5 Bagchi (1953) ch. II. This is discussed in section 5.4.2 in this work.
6 These sources are discussed in section 2.1 in this work.
7 Potter (1995) pp. 613-629, the anumāna chapter is summarized on pp. 620-622.
1.3 Practical concerns

1.3.1 Outline

This thesis consists of three main interpretational parts: translation, comments, and analysis. Translation and comments are in chapter 4, and the analysis in chapter 5. The three parts operate with different methodological considerations and, to some extent, different source materials. The second chapter deals with preliminaries, that is, with information important for the understanding of the rest of the thesis. The third chapter is a non-critical edition of the Sanskrit text that has been translated. The last chapter contains a concluding discussion and outlining of future research. In this final chapter I have made an overarching summary of the interpretation, in order to formulate understandings of the text as a whole. In addition there are four appendices added to the thesis. Appendix 1 contains a list of contents of the whole NL; in appendix 2 I have outlined the corresponding structures of the buddhi sections in PDS and NL; appendix 3 lists relevant references found in NL and references to NL found in other texts; appendix 4 is an approximate chronological list of primary texts and authors mentioned in the present work. I have also added a glossary containing important Sanskrit terms.

1.3.2 Chapter 2: preliminaries

The second chapter, “preliminaries”, contains two parts: the first concerns historical and bibliographical information on Vallabha and NL, and the second is an introduction to the conceptual framework of anumāna in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and, to some extent, Navya-Nyāya. The first part is written with the aim of establishing Vallabha’s place in the succession of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya authors as exactly as possible. Such a succession is of relevance for the analysis in chapter 5. The second part is written with the aim of presenting a general outline of the use and meaning of concepts central to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and NL discourse on anumāna. A further purpose of this second part is to present the interpretations and translations that are employed within this thesis.
1.3.3 Chapters 3 & 4: text, translation and comments

1.3.3.1 Text and translation

The translation is divided into four sections corresponding to the four sections of the *anumāna* chapter in the Chowkhamba edition, i.e. *anumāna*, *vyāpīti*, *tarka*, and *parāmarśa*.

Since one purpose of this work is to identify interpretational problems, I have not done an explicitly explanatory translation of the text. I have, as far as possible, aimed at making visible not only the structure and character of Vallabha’s text but also the wide interpretational space the text allows for. The source of the translation is a Sanskrit text compiled from the three extant editions of the NL *anumāna* chapter. This non-critical edition does not deviate much from the Chowkhamba edition except in a few places where alternate readings have been chosen. Already at the outset of this work I chose not to make a critical edition of the text, mainly since I felt that this should be done by an experienced scholar trained in editorial work. I would like to stress, however, the ongoing need for a proper critical edition of the whole text of the NL and its main commentaries for the benefit of future research.

1.3.3.2 Translation of central terms

There are a number of terms in this work that are, in fact, not translated with single corresponding English terms. These are terms that are central to the understanding of the text, pertaining to concepts that have too complex or multiple meanings for them to be translated in any straightforward, single way. One reason for not translating such terms is that there is a great need for primary vocabularies expressive of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Navya-nyāya discourse. Furthermore, through not translating these terms, any meaning that would be lost in translation can be retained. Needless to say it is important to remember that these untranslated terms do not therefore remain uninterpreted.

Instead of giving a singular corresponding or analogue translation for each term I have made an extensive glossary in which I have tried to convey my interpretation of the complex meanings of the Sanskrit terms used within this work. In this glossary I have relied on the definitions given within the traditions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya.

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9 It is important to notice that the whole *anumāna* chapter contains four sections, *anumāna*, *vyāpīti*, *tarka* and *parāmarśa*. I have used the words "chapter" and "section" respectively to indicate the difference.

10 Thus repeating what Isaacson stated in 1995 when pointing out the need of editorial research on NL. Isaacson (1995) p. ii.

11 The theoretical reasons behind this method of non-translation will be further elaborated in section 1.4.2 below.
1.3.3.3 Comments
The comments follow the division of the translation so that each of the four parts of the translation, *anumāṇa*, *vyāpti*, *turka*, and *parāmarśa*, are followed by a comments section.

The purpose of the comments sections is to facilitate the reading of the translation. These sections deal with issues internal to the NL, that is to say, the argumental structure and contents of the translated text, interpretational problems, and alternative solutions to these problems. Both the translation and the comments draw on Śaṅkara Miśra I’s and Vardhamāna’s commentaries as sources of information. In some cases of apparent intertextuality, when passages of the NL rephrase, or are similar to, other texts, I have used these as sources of interpretation as well. Apart from the standard Sanskrit-English and Sanskrit-German dictionaries, I have also made use of the *Nyāyakośa* for definitions and discussions concerning specific terms.

1.3.3.4 A note on numbering the text, translation, and comments
In order to facilitate a parallel reading of the Sanskrit text, translation, and comments I have numbered the lines of the non-critical edition of the text. This numbering is followed throughout the translation and comments sections so that the numbers of the translated and commented passages correspond to the line numbers of the Sanskrit text. These numbers are put in brackets and are furthermore used in cases of cross-references in the running text as well as in footnotes.

1.3.4 Chapter 5: text analysis
The main point of departure for the analysis is to find ways of understanding Vallabha’s text. This is done partly through the reading of other texts. The analysis is, however, performed from a number of perspectives depending on the subject matter and argumental structure of the text. Since the text generally is argumentative, I have aimed, when possible, to lay bare the subject matter and school affiliation of the various positions that are expressed in the text. The intra-traditional debate is separated from the inter-traditional as it has been possible to identify the various positions. I have thus allocated separate sections to the Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsaka arguments identified in NL. I have, as said above, read and understood the themes and issues of the NL through reading other texts in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya discourse. This exercise entails a historical analysis of pre-, and to some extent post-NL texts. A guiding principle of the analysis has been to place NL at the focal point as it were, thus letting it serve as a given parameter of the analysis.
The analysis furthermore has had to operate with certain terms, terms that form a part of the vocabulary of understanding and which, by consequence, are the tools that serve to distinguish specific aspects of the analysed material. I use such distinctions for practical reasons, for the explicit purpose of promoting understanding. I do not in any way maintain that the distinctions are made within the analysed material and in isolation from the very act of understanding.

The analysis utilizes the paired terms “descriptive” and “prescriptive”. These two do not exclude each other, but rather point to different perspectives on one theme. Whereas the terms descriptive and prescriptive retain their everyday meanings in this work, I also use terms that might be seen as heavy, that is, terms that come with multiple layers of meaning. The term “phenomenological” is used in a broad sense implying an approach that aims for a precise description of a certain phenomenon. That is, in a phenomenological inquiry into knowledge, for example, the question asked is not “is knowledge possible?” but rather “how is it that I know?”. In a sense this also concerns the preconditions for knowledge. “Epistemological” is used to discern or isolate elements in the discussions of anumāṇa that pertain to rules and principles of knowledge. Whereas a phenomenological approach takes knowledge for granted, an epistemological approach tries to discern the boundaries of knowledge. An epistemological approach can, then, function as a set of rules or guidelines for a putative knower. The term “ontological” distinguishes aspects dealing with how something exists; this not only pertains to the nature or the essential character of something but also to different kinds of existence. The term “psychological” is used to discern aspects of the material that deal with internal mental processes. In particular this concerns the descriptions of the process of coming or not coming to knowledge in which doubt (śātikā, satiśaya) and certainty (niścaya) play important roles.

In choosing material through which to read Vallabha’s text I have been guided by the principles of intertextuality and of economy of time. I have thus not taken into account every Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika text contemporaneous with the NL, but have instead foremost chosen from authors mentioned by Vallabha himself, and such authors among them who have, at least roughly, dealt with the issues he also addresses. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjari is, to my knowledge, unmentioned by Vallabha, but there are useful thematic parallels between NM and the section on anumāṇa in NL. It has furthermore proven very rewarding to look into both the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and the Nyāyasūtra commentarial traditions and identify the various positions taken in these texts with reference to NL. I have furthermore used Navya-

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13 I am grateful to Patrik Nyman who supplied me with a draft of an unpublished translation of the passage on inference in NM.
nyāya sources insofar as there have been interesting parallels between them and NL. In general I have chosen Navya-nyāya texts from among those that come with a lucid secondary explanation and interpretation.

As for the section on Čārvaṇa arguments in NL, I refer to *Tattvopaplavasī tinha, Sarvadarśana saṅgraha*, and two Jaina sources: Prabhācandra’s *Prameya-kamalamārtanda* and *Nyāyakumudacandra*. These texts are chosen since they contain lengthy elaborate passages on Čārvaṇa views and because they suffice very well to show that NL, at least partly, fits into a common discourse on Čārvaṇa. The Mimāṃsaka discourse is represented by *Prakaraṇapañcika*, a text rich in material on discussions concerning means of knowledge. I have, however, mostly used secondary sources for the sections on Čārvaṇa and Mimāṃsaka.

The quantity of secondary sources dealing with the texts used in the analysis has in some cases been very limited, and as a consequence the degree of detail in the four sections on *anumāna, vyāpti, tarka*, and *parāmarśa* differs considerably. The analysis of *parāmarśa* is the section that suffers most from this situation. The secondary sources I have used are furthermore from different academic discourses, some of which are philosophical in nature, some philological/historical, and some of which combine these in varying degrees.

1.4 Theoretical concerns (postures)

1.4.1 Translation as interpretation

The underlying assumption for the translation in this work is that all translation is interpretation. To say this implies that there is no intermediate stage between a neutral translation and a subjective interpretation. All there is is interpretation. Interpretation, in turn, is thought of as being a vehicle of understanding; interpretation presupposes a desire to understand, “to make sense of” or see something not already seen. Interpretation in this sense makes understanding visible.

In order to stress the fact that there is a change in the relationship between the knower and the known when understanding takes place, understanding is described as a mode of being and not as an accidental mental act.

This understanding of “understanding” paves the way for two aspects of interpretation that, in my opinion, are necessary and important to bring to the

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16 D’sa (1994a) p. xiii.
forefront in this present work. First of all it is a fact that the I who understands the text does not remain an isolated elevated spectator of the text, nor does the text remain a singular witness of a past time and thought. The outcome of the encounter between the text and I is the interpretation, the translation. Both the text and I intermingle in that translation; the text and I stand in relation to each other. The second aspect concerns the idea that the text carries meaning that might be understood. I treat the text as an existing phenomenon, approaching the text as a text whose meaning I could grasp, in one way or other, aware of the possibility of someone else grasping it in another way. I have, in a sense, read the text as if it “speaks the truth”. I have not set out to critically examine any claim to truth or knowledge in the text. An interpretation, however, is always such that it opens up for one way of understanding and in that very act of disclosure it also closes other ways of understanding.17 Because of this an interpretation could never be decisive, that is, there are always other ways of understanding the text. In this sense the text is also always greater than any given interpretation or intention; the text goes on beyond both the writer and the interpreter.

1.4.2 Mimetic translation

The following section is in part descriptive of a certain phenomenon within the secondary discourse on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya, a phenomenon I construe as “mimetic translation”. By trying to understand this phenomenon I will also argue that it has narrowed the scope of research and that an opening up of the secondary discourse would prove fruitful for the understanding of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya. In short, I argue for the existence of a plurality of interpretative stances, and not in favour of one specific stance.

The academic discourse dealing with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya episteme has been, and is, to a great extent philosophical in nature. By philosophical I mean the activity of interpreting, evaluating, and creating philosophy. This should be understood in contrast to the philological activity of the historical interpretation, editing, and ordering of texts. These two fields of aims and activities are often combined in the academic discourse, and the scholars writing in it are often themselves well versed in European/American philosophy as well as Sanskrit and Indian philosophy. Thus the secondary sources of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya often have a twofold character, they are at once philosophical and philological in nature.18 Many of these secondary sources have an explicitly, or sometimes

17 Gadamer, (2002) p. 400, says; “All interpretation is highlighting.” This is said in the context of performative interpretation, but is, in my opinion, a good metaphor for philological translation as well.

18 Cf. Mohanty, (1997) pp. 163f., who has commented upon the blurred boundaries between philosophy and philology within Indology.
implicitly expressed intention of wanting to make Indian philosophy known to philosophers dealing with European/American philosophy. Philosophically inclined indologists seldom work in departments of philosophy but rather in departments of comparative religion, linguistics, or cultural studies.\textsuperscript{19} The formation of the situation of this academic discourse is, of course, dependent on a number of complex reasons. In a post-colonial analysis, however, it is seen as being connected to a eurocentric division of subjects and departments within academia, which in turn is related to the insistence that philosophy proper has only been conducted in Europe originating with the ancient Greeks, or is related to the even older, but still prevalent idea that “Indian thinking” in general is oriented towards mysticism or religion as opposed to the thinking of a Kant or a Plato.\textsuperscript{20} This in turn could be seen as related to the practice of viewing European/American philosophy, beginning with the Greeks, as a universal discourse in contrast to Indian philosophy that, on the other hand, always remains culturally bound. In short, this gives us “Philosophy proper” and “Indian philosophy”, “African philosophy”, or “Chinese philosophy”. “Philosophy proper” in this sense is not a phenomenon pertaining to a certain culture or era. It is universal and timeless, whereas the philosophies of different non-European/American cultures are historically interesting as cultural phenomena. Kant, then, could be studied as a free-floating individual with interesting thoughts that I can relate to today, while Ga\öge\ßa remains a late-medieval Indian Navya-nyåya author.\textsuperscript{21} King describes the ambivalent situation for “Indian philosophy” as “stuck between a rock and a hard place”. What King has identified by this is that “Indian philosophy” is always either a specific cultural phenomenon without any universal use or described in terms of, and reduced to categories decided by a universalized “American/European” philosophical discourse.

Some liberal-minded western philosophers might take the view that non-western thought should not be excluded from philosophy and that Indian materials (for example) ought to be included in contemporary debates. However, joining the debate means entering a philosophical arena that has already been established according to the hegemonic presuppositions and preoccupations of modern western philosophy.\textsuperscript{22}

It is within the above situation that a certain interpretative stance has surfaced within the secondary discourse. This phenomenon, that I call “mimetic translation”, has limited the scope of both philosophical and philological academic research on Nyåya-Vai\išēšika and Navya-nyåya. The

\textsuperscript{19} Such is the case in Sweden and, as I have understood it, in the rest of Europe as well.
\textsuperscript{22} King (1999) p. 240.
idea of “mimetic translation” has sprung from a reading of Bhabha’s analysis of colonial discourse, an analysis that has been re-interpreted in this work. Mimicry is expressed by Bhabha as:

…the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference… Mimicry is, thus the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline which ‘appropriates’ the other as it visualizes power.23

According to Bhabha mimicry is an expression of dominance and sovereignty. In this work mimetic translation is seen as a strategy of survival within an environment of such dominance. Mimetic translation could thus be understood as a consequence of, and a reaction within a situation that is characterized by a discourse of mimicry. This strategy is expressed in a tendency to “translate” a subaltern discourse (e.g. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) in terms of a dominant hegemonic discourse (e.g. American/European philosophy).24 That is, the only way of presenting “Indian philosophy” to the dominant American/European discourse has been to translate it into terms familiar to that very discourse. The problem pertaining to such translation is that the subaltern discourse will remain suspended in a state of “almost the same but not quite”, that is, not quite up to the standard the dominant discourse has already laid out, that is, not quite as brilliant or rational or formal or developed as that of the dominant discourse.25 Due to this state of affairs a mimetic translation is often conducted in a negative space; the subaltern discourse is described in terms of a “lack of” or “incompleteness”26;

Indian logicians, however, have a tendency not to speak of membership in terms of the relation between a set and its member. Instead they are apt to consider membership in terms of the relation between an individual manifestation and the generic character residing in it. This way of reasoning is closely connected with the fact that Indian philosophers have not developed [my italics] the concept of class as a set consisting of members.27

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24 “Translating” here is of course not only related to the activity of translating certain Sanskrit texts but also to descriptions of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika and Navya-nyāya episteme.
25 Cf. Ganeri’s “double-bind” that Indian logic risks falling into in a comparative project. Either Indian logic is not logic at all, or it is seen as logic but remains in the state of being almost as good but not quite. Ganeri (2001) pp. 21f.

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There are numerous examples of mimetic translation within the secondary discourse of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya. Matilal’s “The Character of Logic in India”, for example, contains a list of four common differences between “Indian logic” and “Western logic”. The list deals with four aspects of “Indian logic”: the tendency to psychologize, the tendency to include epistemology within logic, the tendency to relate logic to grammar and not mathematics, and fourthly the lack of a distinction between induction and deduction. These four points are apparently articulated from within a very modern, a very Fregean, as I understand it, idea of what “logic” should consist of. Matilal’s comments on the second tendency, however, are interesting because the precarious balance between “excuses” and “explanations” of “Indian logic” is related to the theme of mimetic translation.

The Indians psychologized logic, but perhaps without totally committing the blunder into which an emphasis on psychology may often lead. Thus one may claim that they psychologized logic, without committing the fallacy of psychologism. Alternatively, the claim could be that this was a different conception of logic, where the study of the connections between mental events and the justification of inferentially-acquired knowledge-episodes is not a fault. 28

In this passage the first two sentences could be understood in terms of an excuse, and the last in terms of an explanation. It is a good example of how a subaltern discourse must navigate in order to have a voice at all within the dominant discourse. I would like to emphasize, however, that this must not be read as a critique of Matilal’s work, which is outstanding. It is rather a critique of the situation in which Matilal is writing. Mimetic translation is not a shortcoming of any individual scholar’s research but rather a consequence of an overall structure. As said above, mimetic translation is seen as a strategy within a structure.

In part, the above example is a historical phenomenon. The embarrassment over psychologism and epistemology in “Indian logic” seems to have abated within the secondary discourse at the moment. Phillips, for example, refers to the tendency to psychologize without further comment and Siderits refers to the epistemological aspects without feeling obliged to make excuses. Siderits also points out that there is a certain rationale in such an interpretation.29

Now the idea that psychologism represents a fallacy in logical studies represents an expression of the idea that logic’s proper object of study is strictly formal relations among propositions, that logic does not include the empirical study of psychological processes. And to the extent that

svārthaṇumāna consists not of propositions but of cognitions, the study of anumāna is better thought of as an epistemological and not a logical investigation.30

Siderits and Mohanty have both suggested that the translation could be turned the other way around, which in my vocabulary would mean that the dominant discourse is explained and understood in terms of the subaltern discourse.31 Siderits suggests that when the distinctions with which one is working seem to fail or mislead then one should consider revising one’s very point of departure.

We should instead be asking such questions as whether the Aristotelian syllogism is an anumāna, or whether the proofs of Euclidian geometry represent a kind of tarka. We may not yet be ready to ask such questions. But we should at least strive to make sure our investigations are not based on assumptions that hinder the raising of such questions.32

The strategy of mimetic translation has, in my opinion, narrowed the scope of research on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya episteme. One good example of this is the understanding of the concept of tarka. Tarka has been interpreted in terms of a conception of logic that comes with certain restrictions, with the consequence that there are aspects of tarka that are left behind and not dealt with in the secondary discourse. These aspects of tarka could be understood in terms of being psychological, phenomenological, epistemological, and ontological, and their absence leaves tarka fairly incomplete or even shallow in the secondary discourse.33 The point I am trying to make here is not that a logical analysis of tarka is irrelevant or uncalled-for, but rather that there is need for a greater number of points of departure for the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya discourse. Furthermore, I think it is of the utmost importance to aspire to make visible one’s own objectives and the presuppositions of these objectives.34

As stated at the beginning of this section it is my wish to open up for a plurality of interpretative stances within a situation that, in my opinion at least, is more than ready for such an opening. This present work, however, is not philosophical, at least not in the sense that its goal is to evaluate the philosophy present in Vallabha’s text on anumāna. Neither is there any aim here to present the philosophy of Vallabha in terms of one or another

33 Cf. pp. 148f. below.
34 Davis (1981) is a good example of an attempt to at least be aware of, and explicit about his own understanding of an interpretation of tarka.
specific American/European philosophical discourse. This work is thus, in no sense of the term, one of comparative philosophy.

1.4.3 Development or change: a discourse of tradition

Tradition is used in this work to denote a particular “school” of thought, in this case Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya. There is no common Sanskrit term for “tradition” that is used in the philosophical texts to denote particular “schools” of thought, but there are a number of partly overlapping terms such as: siddhānta, tantra, mata, darśana, and sampradāya. The term most frequently used by Vallabha and his commentators appears to be tantra and samānātantra (common/shared tradition). Tantra is also used together with siddhānta in NS and its commentaries. Both siddhānta and tantra are used exclusively as well as includingly; there is accordingly a common siddhānta pertaining to all schools (sarvatantra) as well as a specific siddhānta pertaining to one school (pratitantra).

Within the field of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya studies there is, to my knowledge, very little explicitly written on how the tradition(s) could be conceptualized as tradition(s); that is, in what ways it could be possible to understand the phenomenon of writing within one or another tradition, or for that matter how such a phenomenon is construed of. Since one of the interpretational acts of this work is to read Vallabha’s writing on anumāṇa through the tradition(s) of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya, it is important to formulate the theoretical framework or point of departure for how tradition is understood in this study.

Although little has been written on the specific significance and understanding of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya as tradition(s) there are some generalized ideas of how “tradition” should be understood in the context of Indian philosophical schools. Both Mohanty and Krishna have criticized the tendency to view the different schools of philosophy as closed and static systems of thought. Krishna’s critique goes so far as to deny the possibility of even speaking of specific schools or traditions. Instead he prefers the expression “styles of thought”, and describes these as ever-

35 “School”, “system”, or “tradition” appear to be the most common words used to denote these in the secondary literature. Krishna, (1991) pp. 13f., uses ”style of thought” which, as far as I know, he is alone in.

36 For a discussion of the use of these terms in other discourses apart from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, see Halbfass (1990) pp. 264ff.


39 I have put the plural “s” in brackets in order to emphasize the ambivalence inherent in the two concepts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya. Cf. section 2.1.2.5 below.

40 This is not the case of the “vedic” tradition or the tradition of vedic exegesis, Māmāṇa. For some recent studies see for example D’sa (1994b), Roy (1996), and Jackson (2005).
changing, open-ended, dynamic enterprises in which each individual thinker can gain authority.\textsuperscript{41}

If ‘schools’ change, develop, differentiate and divide, they are never finished or final in respect to what they are trying to say. There could, then, be no fixed body of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Buddhist, Jain or Cārvāka positions except in a minimal sense. These would, on the other hand, rather be styles of thought which are developed by successive thinkers, and not fully exemplified by any. Nor would these styles be treated as exhausted by any group or groups of thinkers belonging to any particular historical epoch.\textsuperscript{42}

Mohanty also underlines the dynamic non-finality of a tradition, or \textit{darśana} as Mohanty calls the different schools of philosophy. But whereas Krishna sets out to deconstruct what he criticizes, Mohanty re-defines the terms for understanding \textit{darśana} by rejecting the idea that it is static. For Mohanty \textit{darśana} seems to be a systemic “conceptual framework” in which the individual operates as a vehicle for a tradition of truth already somehow at hand.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, the individual philosopher is not invested with the same relevance that Krishna assigns him; although tradition for Mohanty is always an interpreting activity on the part of the individual there remains an impersonalized background that is constituted as the “\textit{darśana}”.\textsuperscript{44}

It is true that a tradition consists, in large measure, of sedimented meanings which need to be rescued from anonymity, reactivated, and appropriated; but that is not incompatible with saying that a tradition is a tradition for one [\textsuperscript{45}]

Both Mohanty and Krishna could be understood as reacting against a conception of traditional discourse as mainly conserving and re-iterating. The consequence of such a view, according to Mohanty and Krishna, is that any given Indian philosophical tradition becomes reified and essentialized. The interest of this study is not to find a general idea of “tradition” encompassing texts written over the course of a thousand years, nor is it an attempt to identify originality or repetitiveness with reference to a certain preconceived, common, mainstream bulk of “tradition”. Instead it is to read the text from the point of view that tradition is an open-ended dynamic non-

\textsuperscript{43} Cf. Kahrs, (1998) pp. 3, 5, who holds a similar view, though expressed within the analytical tradition of philosophy of language.
\textsuperscript{44} Mohanty (1992) pp. 8ff.
\textsuperscript{45} Mohanty (1992) p. 9.
essentializable process that could be understood as negotiated and constituted in one single, particular text, and in relation to other particular texts. So, in contrast to Mohanty and Krishna, the focal point here is the particular and individual momentum of tradition. The conceptualization of tradition that is a point of departure in this work is articulated for a specific reading of a specific text. Rather than an impersonalized background of sedimented meanings tradition is understood as no more nor less than discourse itself. Discourse, in turn, can be understood as a verb and is used here in that sense, that is, the activity of discussing. Tradition, then, is not conceptualized as an abstracted core of constants around which, or in relation to which new interpretations are made with an unspoken or even unconscious aiming at preservation. I turn here, in consequence, to something else, to the activity of negotiation and constitution, trying to understand, by this, not a continuity nor a discontinuity, but rather the happening of tradition.\footnote{Cf. D’sa, (1994) pp. 75, 92ff., who speaks of an happening of tradition but also of tradition as discourse that identifies continuity in change. Both “tradition” and “discourse” are used differently in this work.} The discourse that is negotiated and constituted is available to us in the form of written texts like the Nyåyalåvatå. The NL however is not treated here as a moment of discourse that stands isolated for itself. It is thus not only a written text in itself, but is rather full to the brim with other texts, and thus engaged in a discourse that may, to some extent at least, be shared.\footnote{I use “text” in a wide sense, encompassing also an oral discourse that unfortunately is unavailable to us.} This phenomenon of a text containing other texts is called intertextuality.\footnote{A host of different definitions of intertextuality are used within the very diversified field of literary theory. See for example Allen (2000) for an outline of structuralist, post-structuralist, post-modern, feminist, and postcolonial approaches.} To contain other texts does not merely mean that other written texts are cited within the written text of NL, but also that the NL has themes, focal points, ideas, manners of expression, stock-examples, and lines of arguments that can be found elsewhere in one form or another. In this work I understand intertextuality as the locus of the event of tradition, that is to say, when treating tradition as “no more nor less than” discourse, intertextuality, as a significant aspect of that very discourse, can function as a space in which tradition takes shape.

In cutting loose the idea that an identifiable abstracted essence of tradition is significant for the understanding of that tradition, another idea loses its significance as well, namely that of the development or progress of tradition over time. The idea of development can be found within the vast arena of historical studies in which it is conceptualized as “historicism”.

\ldots{} we may say that “historicism” is a mode of thinking with the following characteristics. It tells us that in order to understand the nature of anything in this world we must see it as an historically developing entity, that is, first, as
an individual and unique whole—as some kind of unity at least in potentia—and, second, as something that develops over time… much written history still remains deeply historicist. That is to say, it still takes its object of investigation to be internally unified, and sees it as something developing over time.49

The idea of development is often expressed as if there was a point in the tradition at which one arrives and then settles, almost as if by predestination. When describing a development there must always be some understanding of a thing, a reified substance, that evolves through the course of time; in the context of a history of ideas this thing comes to be the ideas themselves. This development of ideas is often thought of in terms of progress, sometimes even as a teleological coming forth of some idea or other. These ideas are, in turn, seen as comprising the bulk of the tradition, or rather, the substance out of, or around which tradition is built as it were. For example;

This understanding of development is seldom so explicitly rendered as it is in the above quotation. It is more often at work as an implicit frame of interpretation. The main point here, however, is that the idea of tradition as a tangible, abstractable, unifiable whole leads to, or to avoid any causal connection, has as a running mate the idea of development, or progress, over time. It is only when one presupposes an essentialized tradition that the idea of development makes sense, that is, when tradition is seen as an event of dialogue or discourse there is no single thing present that is possible to abstract as a line of thought extending over time and pointing towards a future. To deny a historicist frame of understanding histories of ideas is, however, not to deny that change and novelty are essential parts of the understanding of histories but rather to deny that the change and novelty visible in the material aims towards a certain fixed point or pinnacle towards which every history aims.51 As Chakrabarty remarks;

51 This seems to be a common understanding of the changes in outlook that comprise the Navya-nyäya school. Cf. Phillips, (1997) p. 120, who speaks of Gaṅgeśa as a quantum leap. In Ingalls, (1988) [1951] p. 2, this is expressed very clearly in that he views the older school of Nyāya-Vaišeṣika as obstructing, perverse and foolish in relation to the modern outlook of Navya-nyäya. Cf. also Chakrabarty, (2000) pp. 244f., on the relation to the past within a historicist frame.
To critique historicism in all its varieties is to unlearn to think of history as a developmental process in which that which is possible becomes actual by tending to a future that is singular. Or, to put it differently, it is to learn to think the present—the “now” that we inhabit as we speak—as irreducibly not-one.52

To pluralize history, as I understand it, allows for a heterogeneity in place of a homogeneity; it allows for a possible understanding of the NL in its “now” as a fundamentally “not-one” axis of a revolving tradition. In that sense I do not begin with a view of the text as a vehicle for refining for example, rationality, to lead up to a concluding point that is “new” or “modern”. I begin instead with a dithering text, a text that is not-one, a text in which different things are going on simultaneously.

In the above I have attempted to describe the basic theoretical outlook, the point of departure, of this present work. This theoretical outlook is primarily conceptualized as generative rather than descriptive. A descriptive theoretical outlook runs the risk of becoming nothing more than a reified presupposition, whereas a generative theoretical stance is sensitive to an act of interpretation that is continuous. In this sense the reading of NL is conducted as if it is a moment, or “now” in Chakrabarty’s terms, of a tradition that consists in that very moment. The reading as if, on the other hand, is generated within the relation between me and the text, so that in the end there remains a circularity.

The hermeneutic circle says that in the domain of understanding there can be absolutely no derivation of one from the other, so that here the logical fallacy of circularity does not represent a mistake in procedure, but rather the most appropriate description of the structure of understanding.53

The circularity in this reading is, in my opinion, best thought of as a hermeneutical circle in which the point of departure is not really a place towards which it is possible to point, since there exists, in the circle, no real beginning and no real ending as it were.

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2. Preliminaries

2.1 Vallabha and \textit{Nyāyalilāvatī}

In the following I will provide background information concerning Vallabha and his work, \textit{Nyāyalilāvatī}. I have tried to compile every available account of the text and its author. This is, however, surrounded by some difficulties. The most apparent problem is that a great deal of the information given by various scholars is not substantiated by references, and sometimes the references that are given are insufficient. Another problem is that in some cases the information is only stated and not supported by arguments. These inadequacies have at times made it impossible for me to evaluate the information, and in some cases the references were plainly impossible to check. Despite this I have chosen to include these problematic cases and account for the difficulties in the current text or in footnotes. The reason for doing this is not only for the sake of accuracy, but also because it is convenient to bring all the bits and pieces of information together in one place. I have used the prefaces to the editions of NL and to the Jaipur work as sources of information, but when I refer to pages in the NL itself I have used the reprint of the Chowkhamba edition.\footnote{NL (1991). For details concerning all four editions, see p. 38 below and the bibliography.} Furthermore, for the sake of brevity, I use the name Vallabha without the honorifics \textit{sīt} and/or \textit{ācārya} throughout this work.

2.1.1 Vallabha

The following section contains a summary of the extant information concerning Vallabha’s date and place of living. Since there are no direct references to his dating, and for that matter his life in general, the conclusions that are drawn are inductive and should be treated as valid only insofar as no further evidence will be brought forth. The governing principle for this section is that the dating of Vallabha is more important than his placing. As for the dating, the primary concern is to reach as correct a succession of important Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors surrounding Vallabha as possible, rather than to establish the exact years during which Vallabha lived. One important thing to notice about the different dates given by different scholars is that in many cases it is not indicated anywhere if the
date refers to the birth, death or active period of the person dated. In the cases where the date is specified I have accounted for that in the current text.

2.1.1.1 The date of Vallabha

The most important argument in the discussion about Vallabha’s date is related to the succession of scholars surrounding him: Udayana, Vādindra, Citsukha, Vardhamāna, and Gaṅgeśa. There seems to be no dispute about which persons should be linked to the dating of Vallabha; the discussion rather concerns their different dates. In addition, there is also a discussion between a number of scholars concerning a poem in which the NL may have been mentioned.

According to Bhattacharya (1958) Vallabha belongs to the end of the 12th century A.D. He places Vallabha two generations after Udayana who is cited on numerous occasions in NL. Bhattacharya’s reason for doing so seems mainly to be that Vallabha does not refer to Udayana as “ācārya” in the NL, something he apparently should have done had the time interval between them been great. Bhattacharya furthermore states that the advātin Śrīharṣa (ca. 1150) does not mention Vallabha or NL at all, and he seems to mean that this indicates that they were contemporaries. Bhattacharya concludes that the date of Vallabha could not be later than 1175, since Vallabha is cited by the 13th century authors, Vādindra and Citsukha. It is however unclear to me why this exact date is chosen; Bhattacharya’s dating of Vādindra is ca. 1225 and of Citsukha ca. 1250. It is possible that he takes into account that a certain time-span was required for the NL to reach them because he mentions that neither Vādindra nor Citsukha lived in Mithilā. Bhattacharya furthermore points to the fact that the commentator of Citsukha, Pratyāgrāpa (1350), mentions NL as a recent (ādhunikā) work.

Matilal (1977), who mainly follows Bhattacharya, places Vallabha in the beginning of the 12th century. He does so on the basis of Śrīharṣa’s non-mentioning of Vallabha, which, according to Matilal, might indicate that they were contemporaries. Matilal also takes up the fact that Vallabha refers to Udayana as “kiraṇāvallikāra” and not as “ācārya”, although he mentions the fact that Vallabha refers to Vyomasiva (948-72) and his contemporary Vācaspati Miśra as “ācārya” as well.

Vidyabhusana (1920), Kaviraj (1924), and Bodas (1918) have all discussed the dating of Vallabha and establish his terminus ante quem with

55 This system of dating the secondary sources pertains only to the present section.
57 Bhattacharya (1958) p. 60.
59 According to the tradition Vallabha lived in Mithilā. See the discussion on this below p.37
60 Bhattacharya (1958) p. 60 and C (1915) p. 326. The passage is a bit unclear as to what the word recent pertains to, evam cirantananpramāṇaṁ dīśitaṁ idānīṁ ādheṇikonitaṁ dikkālaṁ sadhakānumāṇajātam anūdya mārkaroṁ –yac ceti.
reference to a Canarese poem. This poem, entitled Darśanasāra according to Bodas, was written in praise of a Yādava king by the name of Siṁhaṇa who reigned 1211(10)-1247(46) in Devagiri. They all assert that the NL is mentioned in this poem. Vidyabhusana refers to Bodas, and Bodas himself refers to a friend who saw this recorded in a manuscript of the poem in the library of Brahma-Sūri Śāstrī of Śravaṇa Belgole in Mysore. Kaviraj, on the other hand, does not give any reference at all.62 I have not been able to ascertain any of this information since the poem does not seem to have been edited. Kaviraj is the first among the scholars mentioned here to include Vādindra (Rasasāra) as a possible reference for establishing Vallabha’s date. He does not say where in the text NL is cited, but fortunately this information is given elsewhere and it will be discussed further down.63 There is a slight possibility that the scholar who saw the manuscript of Darśanasāra might have confused it with RS. First of all, these texts were written at the same time and place, furthermore the RS contains citations from NL.64 As for Vallabha’s terminus post quem, Vidyabhusana states that Vallabha could not have lived before the 10th century since he refers to both Udayana and Bhāsarvajña in NL.65 Bodas on the other hand states that Vallabha may well have preceded Udayana, but Bodas did not have access to any edition of NL and he dates Udayana to the end of the 12th century.66

In the forewords to the editions of NL Vallabha’s date is, to some extent, discussed and I have chosen to bring them together here since they refer to each other. In the foreword to the Bombay edition Telang places Vallabha after 1000 and before 1178/79. These years are founded on the citations from Udayana in NL and on Vardhamāna who wrote a commentary on NL. Telang’s dating of Udayana is based on the Lakṣaṇāvali, in which the year 984 (906 śaka era) is mentioned. His dating of Vallabha is based on the apprehension that Gaṅgeśa’s son Vardhamāna lived in 1178/79.67 Telang refers to the NK in which Gaṅgeśa is placed in 1100 śaka era, i.e. 1178/79 AD.68

In the foreword to the Chowkhamba edition Śāstrī also places Vallabha between Udayana and Gaṅgeśa, on the grounds that Udayana is cited in NL and Gaṅgeśa’s son Vardhamāna wrote a commentary to NL. The time span for Vallabha is given as between 1026/27 and 1256/57. On grounds that seem a bit elusive to me he states that Vallabha was in Mithilā during the years 1178/79, and Śāstrī refers to two different citations, one in Pañcaratna

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63 Kaviraj (1924) p. 124, n. (†).
64 See below discussion of Vādindra.
66 Bodas (1988) pp. XLII. Udayana’s date is briefly discussed below.
and one in a work titled Śrīṅgārasaptaṣatī. In the latter Udayana and Balabhadrā are referred to by the author, Govardhana, who in turn is mentioned together with the king Lakṣmaṇasena in the Pañcaratna. Lakṣmaṇasena reigned in Bengal 1178-ca.1205. It is, however, not clear what conclusion Śāstri has drawn from this material.

In the foreword to the Jaipur work R.P. Sharma has added no new information on the dating of Vallabha. Sharma states that Vallabha lived between 1100-1175 but does not discuss this any further than giving Udayana, Citukha, and Vādīndra as important references for the dating.

Another source for the dating of Vallabha may be Potter’s Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies, but there seems to be a slight mistake concerning Bhattacharya’s dating. In the list of pre-Gaṅgeśa authors and works the dates 1100-1150 are given with reference to Bhattacharya, who in fact has placed Vallabha in the second quarter of the 12th century (i.e. 1125-1175). A further source may also be Thakur’s history of Vaiśeṣika, but it is mostly a summary of the information from Bhattacharya and the Jaipur work.

In conclusion, the terminus ante quem for Vallabha may very well be formulated in relation to the dating of Vādīndra since he refers to Vallabha in his works. Vādīndra is, as far as I know, the earliest source available that mentions Vallabha. The date of Vādīndra is thoroughly examined and established by H. Isaacson. His dating rests on two main points, first of all a reference made by Vādīndra himself to his patron, the Yādava king Śiṅhāna who ruled between ca. 1210-1246. Secondly there is a reference to the year 1252 by Vādīndra’s student, Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, in his commentary Nyāyasārvavijñāna. Further evidence is a reference to king Śiṅhāna’s grandson and successor on the throne, Śrīkṛṣṇa, who reigned between 1246-1260, and Isaacson concludes that it is probable that Vādīndra was active during the reigns of both Śiṅhāna and Kṛṣṇa, approximately between 1230-1250.

It is, in my opinion, well grounded to establish Vallabha’s terminus post quem in relation to Udayana since Vallabha refers to his works in the NL. Bhattacharya, Matilal, Telang, Śāstri, and Vidyabhusana all mention this in their discussion about Vallabha’s date. These scholars, however, have

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69 See for example, Majumdar (1957) pp. 38ff.
74 See app. 3 in this work for a list of references to NL.
75 Isaacson has summarized the discussion of this and given references to all available sources. Isaacson (1995) pp. 1-4.
76 The passage entailing this date is, according to Isaacson, a bit unclear; the year could be interpreted as 1352. This is discussed and discarded by Isaacson and I have nothing further to add here. Isaacson (1995) pp. 2f.
78 See app. 3.
different specific datings for Udayana; Bhattacharya has 1025 as date of birth and 1050-1100 as the active period. Matilal agrees with Bhattacharya but adds, without stating his reasons, that he would like to give a twenty year earlier birth date. Bhattacharya does not agree with Telang, Šastrī, and Vidyabhusana who all have given the year 984, founded upon the *Lakṣapāvali* citation mentioned above. Bhattacharya has listed three main arguments for giving Udayana a later date. The most important of these arguments is found in a Tibetan source dating a certain Atiśa Dipaṅkara Śrījñāna who is reported to have been in Vikramašilā together with Jñānaśrī in the year 1039. Jñānaśrī is related to the first work of Udayana, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, in which Jñānaśrī is disputed. Udayana’s date is also discussed by Miśra who states that there is only a difference of 69 years between the two positions taken. According to Miśra the Tibetan date could very well be 69 years earlier since the views of Jñānaśrī could have been expressed at an earlier date than 1039. I am inclined to take some heed of Bhattacharya’s rather extensive argumentation regarding the dating of Udayana.

With the above in mind the possible time span for the dating of Vallabha is narrowed down to ca. 1100-1230. The former date is related to the end of Udayana’s active period and the latter to Vādindra’s approximate period of activity. It is in my opinion not possible to be more specific about Vallabha’s date; the arguments put forward by Bhattacharya and Matilal only point towards a wide time-span. The argument concerning Vallabha’s contemporariness with Śrīharṣa, based on his non-mentioning of Vallabha, might however be taken into account since Vallabha is discussed at length in another Advāita source, *Citsukhi*. This does not, of course, give us more than a probability. Vādīvāgīśvara, another contemporary of Vallabha, cites a certain Vallabha in his *Mānamanohara*. That this is the same Vallabha as is dealt with here is however uncertain. The Hindi-commentator to the text has apparently made the connection but with a question mark. Furthermore, the discussion on the *Darśanasāra* citation of NL is in need of more research.

The most important matter here though, is, as I mentioned above, to establish the succession of scholars within the discourse. And this is easily done with reference to the works cited in NL and the works in which NL is cited. According to the list appended below Vyomaśīva, Bhāsarvajña,

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81 Bhattacharya (1958) pp. 52f.
83 MM (1973) p. 47, *anenāmahattvasādhane "nutvasādhane sādhvyāpaka kartvāt sparasavattaṃ nopādhit iti śrīvallabhoktam nirastam*. This appears in the section on *manas* in MM. I have not found the citation in the NL section on *manas*, but it could either be an indirect citation or be situated somewhere else in the NL. For the dating of Vādīvāgīśvara see for example Thakur (2003) p. 310 and Matilal (1977) p. 72.
84 MM (1973) p. 47, *śrīvallabhācārya?*.
Vācaspati, and Udayana precede Vallabha, and Vādivāgisvara, Ėāndra,
Citsukha, and later on Gaṅgeśa and Vardhamāna succeed him, in that
preliminary order.85

2.1.1.2 The Placing of Vallabha

Bhattacharya has listed three arguments that support the theory that Vallabha
lived in Mithilā. First, Bhattacharya states that Vardhamāna, one of the NL
commentators, is informed about Vallabha’s family. Vardhamāna writes that
Vallabha pays homage to his father, Puruṣottama, in the introductory verses
to NL.86 According to Bhattacharya, Vardhamāna, who himself lived in
Mithilā, would not have known the name of Vallabha’s father if Vallabha
would not have lived there as well. Bhattacharya’s second argument consists
in Vallabha’s mentioning of a king of the Karpūṭaka dynasty in the chapter
on dravya, in the section on kāla in NL. The passage is a poetic description
of the lotus-hands of a Karpūṭaka king.87 According to Bhattacharya, this
dynasty ruled Mithilā from ca. 1100 to 1350.88 Finally Bhattacharya states
that Vallabha apparently had been in Varanasi since he refers to the city a
number of times in the NL, and according to Bhattacharya it is probable that
he studied there. This he infers from a passage where Vallabha states that the
drinking of Gaṅges’ water is helpful for the student’s mind.89

Bhattacharya provides the most extensive discussion of Vallabha’s
whereabouts. Telang, in the Bombay edition, gives no conclusive evidence
for placing Vallabha in Mithilā, but merely states that during Vallabha’s
time Mithilā was strewn with Naiyāyikas.90 In the Chowkhamba edition
Śāstri states that Mithilā is a possible place of living for Vallabha and in
connection with this assumption he refers to the Bombay edition.91 In the
Jaipur work, Sharma takes up the same arguments as Bhattacharya does, but
adds a discussion concerning Vallabha’s ācārya title. According to Sharma
he either received the title as an honorific or from the family tradition, both
of these possibilities were in practice amongst the Mithilā brahmins.92

In conclusion it could be stated that Vallabha’s place of residence may
very well have been Mithilā. The tradition has apparently placed him there,
and since there are no other indications as to where he may have lived I think
it justified for now to settle on Mithilā. Although Vallabha’s connection to
Mithilā could be a later addition to grant him authority within the Maithilā

85 See app. 4 in this work.
vānyadharmenānyam avacchindyāt kāśmiravartinā kutukmāragena
kārṇātacakravartikarakanam avacchindyāt.
90 NL (1923) p. 1.
Navya-nyāya tradition the question of whether Vallabha did or did not reside there is not of great relevance to the present work.

2.1.2 Nyāya-līlāvatī

In the following I shall account for the editions and commentaries of NL. There also follows a section dealing with the structure and, to some extent, the content of NL, while a complete list of contents is found in appendix 1. In this section there is furthermore a discussion concerning the school affiliation of NL. The question of different readings and manuscripts of the editions will be addressed below in chapter 3.

2.1.2.1 Editions of Nyāya-līlāvatī

NL has been edited three times; two of these editions are complete, one incomplete.

The first edition by V.P. Dvivedin, (Benares edition), is incomplete and appeared 1910 in Benares Sanskrit Series no. 151. The edition appears to contain the whole NL but when compared to the two complete editions there are gaps in the text and the edition is also slightly shorter than the Bombay edition below. There does not appear to be any preface to this edition.93

The second (Bombay) edition is complete and was prepared by M.R. Telang in Bombay, Nīrṇaya Sāgar press 1915. Telang has also written a preface to his edition. A second edition appeared in 1923.

The third (Chowkhamba) edition is complete and was edited together with two commentaries and one sub-commentary in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series. The editor is Harīhara Śāstrī and the introduction was written by Dundhirāja Śāstrī. This edition first appeared in 1927-1934 and was reprinted in 1991. The commentaries are Vardhamāna’s Nyāyalīlāvatī-prakāṣā, Śaṅkara Miśra I’s Nyāyalīlāvatīkanṭhābhāraṇam, and Bhagiratha Ṭhakkura’s Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāṣāvivṛti, which is a sub-commentary on Vardhamāna’s commentary.

There is a fourth source of NL that should be mentioned here as well, the Jaipur work, which is quite recent and appeared in the University of Rajasthan Studies in Indian Philosophy no. 3 (vol. I) in 1996 and no. 9 (vol. II) in 2004.94 The Jaipur work is written in Hindi and at first glance it may appear to be a critical edition of NL with two modern Hindi commentaries. The text of NL is, however, rather a copy of the text of the Chowkhamba edition; the purpose of the book is stated as being to clarify the text for Hindi-speaking philosophers and not as being of a philological nature.95 The

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93 I have had two sets of this edition but neither is printed with a foreword. The NL begins at the first page of the fasciculus and ends on the last page. The only visible mark of the editor, apart from the text is the alternate readings given in footnotes.
94 A third volume is forthcoming.
first volume consists of the introductory section on *padārtha* and the chapter on *dravya* up to *vāyur*; this corresponds to entries no. 1-6 in the list of contents given in app. 1 in this work. The second volume corresponds to entries no. 7-36 in app. 1, thus ending with *parāmarśa*. Both volumes are edited by R. P. Sharma who also wrote an extensive foreword to the first volume. To the text of the NL there are added two Hindi commentaries in vol. I, *Śāmbhavi* and *Candrakānti* written by D. Jha and C. K. Dave. In vol. II, however, only *Śāmbhavī* remains. Vol. I is consequently more substantial than vol. II. The Hindi commentary on the NL passages corresponding to the ones translated in this work are not extensive, and I have only made occasional use of it.

### 2.1.2.2 Commentaries

In the preface to the Bombay edition three commentaries and one sub-commentary are listed: the *Prakāśa* and the *Kanṭhābhāraṇa* already mentioned above, *Nyāyālīlāvatiḍidhiti* by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, and furthermore a gloss on the *Prakāśa* by Mathurānātha Tarkāvgīśa entitled *Nyāya-līlāvati-prakāśāviveka*.96

In the preface to the Chowkhamba edition seven commentaries and three sub-commentaries are listed. Apart from the already mentioned texts there are two *Rahasyas* by Mathurānātha Tarkāvgīśa97, a *Vibhūti* by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, a *Prakāśa* by Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhatṭa, and the *Vardhamānendu* by Vācaspati Miśra.98

In the preface to the Jaipur work as many as 15 commentaries and eight sub-commentaries are mentioned. The entire list is displayed below with added information on commentaries from various sources.99 The datings given in the list are from the Jaipur work if not otherwise stated.

1. *Prakāśa* by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya (1350-75).100 Edited in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.101

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96 NL (1923) p. 2.
97 In the Jaipur work one of these is listed as a sub-commentary on the *Prakāśa* whereas the other is a commentary on NL. See NL (1996) p. 19 and below.
99 NL (1996) pp. 19-22. The references to catalogues and places where manuscripts can be found are sometimes very vaguely stated in the Jaipur work. When it has been written “London library” I have surmised the “British Library”. But in the cases of Lahore, Mysore, Mithilā and Madras (Chennai) Libraries I have not been able to specify them. In some cases I have been able to add information to the sometimes deficient references given in the Jaipur work. When this has been done it is indicated in the footnotes. There is a list very much like this one in Thakur (2003) pp. 321ff. Thakur’s list however has at least one faulty entry (no. 1.4, p. 322) and his references are not clear.
100 The date given by the editor of the Jaipur work (1250) is far too early. See below in the discussion on the dating of the commentaries.
101 No. 1-15 in this list is from the Jaipur work, NL (1996) pp. 19f.
1.1. **Vistārika/Dīdhīti** by Ragunātha Śiromaṇi (1475). Manuscript found in Sarasvatī Bhavan Benares and described in the index of Haraprasād. There is an additional manuscript in the India Office Library. Also available in Tanjore.

1.1.1. **Rahasya** by Mathurānātha Tarkāvägīśa (1600). Manuscript found in British Library, London. Available in fragments only according to Thakur. According to Bahadur the manuscript of the *Dīdhītri rahasya* places Tarkāvägīśa later than 1675.

1.1.1.1. **Dīdhītri rahasya** by Mathurānātha Tarkāvägīśa.

1.1.2. **Dīdhīti viveka** by Bhavānanda Siddhāntāvägīśa (1600). The entire text is apparently available in the Sarasvatī Bhavan library in Benares.

1.1.3. **Dīdhīti** by Jagadāśa Bhaṭṭācārya (1600).

1.1.4. **Vyākhya** by Jagadāśa Tarkālavāga (1620). Observe that it is probably identical to no. 1.1.3. Bahadur states that Jagadāśa must have lived after 1631.

1.1.5. **Dīdhīti** by a student (1700) of Ragunātha Śiromaṇi. Found in the Tanjore, London and in Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Benares. In the Tanjore Library Catalogue the author is named as Rāmakṛṣṇabhaṭṭa and dated to 1550, the incomplete manuscript is however dated to 1700.

1.1.6. **Viveka** by Guṇānanda Vidyāvägīśa (1700). Found in Sarasvatī Bhavan, Benares and in the libraries of Mysore and Lahore.


1.3. **Rahasya** by Mathurānātha Tarkāvägīśa (1600). Manuscript found in British Library and Library of Lahore. Thakur adds Calcutta Sanskrit Library (ms. no. 455).

1.4. **Viveka/Prakāśa** by Jayadeva Miśra (after 1375).

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102 Also mentioned in Hall (1859) p. 70.
103 The “Haraprasād index” is probably vol. X or XI of NoSM (1871-90).
104 IOCat (1894) p. 668, no. 2083.
105 TCat (1931) pp. 4575ff.
108 Bahadur (1915) p. 278.
110 Bahadur (1915) p. 282.
111 TCat (1931) pp. 4573f.
112 Thakur, (2003) p. 322, states that the Nīrṇaya Sāgar Press has published this sub-commentary in 1915. This is most probably a mix-up of the different editions of the NL. As stated earlier in this work, the Bombay edition was published 1915 by Nīrṇaya Sāgar press but without any commentary.
114 Bahadur (1915) p. 267 refers to IOCat p. 668 nos. 2081f.


4. *Vardhamāṇendu* by Vācaspati Miśra II (1420-1490). Catalogued in Varanasi. According to Thakur this is a sub-commentary on Vardhamāṇa’s *Prakāśa*. Preisendanz remarks that this might be the case. Also mentioned by Shastri in the preface to the Chowkhamba edition.

5. *Vibhūṭi* by Raganātha Śiromāni. A copy is found in Sarasvatī Bhavan in Benares, in Mithilā library and British Library.

6. *Viveka* by Pakṣadhara Miśra (1500). Manuscript found in India Office Library, London. According to the IOCat this text is a sub-commentary on Vardhamāṇa’s *Nyāyaliṅgavatiprakāśa*.


8. *Anunaya* by Padmanābha Miśra, end of 16th century. Found in Adyar Library, Chennai (Shelf nos. 4o. B. 26 and 9 E. 90). According to Krishnamacharya this consists of an incomplete paper manuscripts in Devanāgarī.

9. *Vilāsa* by Rucidatta Miśra (1600). Found in Madras Library. According to Thakur and MCat this is a sub-commentary on Vardhamāṇa’s *Prakāśa*. The manuscript is however incomplete.


11. *Vyākhya* by Rudrabhaṭṭacārya. Mentioned by Paṇḍit Mahādeva in *Nyāyasāra*. According to him the text is in Lahore Library.

12. *Bhāvapariccheda* by Paṇḍit Mahādeva (1800). This is apparently known from an edition of the *Nyāyasāra* (p. 5 in Paṇḍita Granthamāla). According to Thakur the series is called *Pandita Patrika*, publ. in Varanasi.

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116 The dating is by Preisendanz (1994) p. 2.
121 IOCat (1994) p. 668, no. 2081-82.
123 The dating is given by Krishnamacharya (1944) pp. 114ff.
124 Krishnamacharya (1944) p. 111.
126 The catalogue reference is given by Potter (1983) p. 368.
127 Thakur (2003) p. 323. I have been unable to locate this edition of *Nyāyasāra*.

14. A commentary by Śaṅkarabhaṇghiratha is found in Mysore Library.

15. Rahasya mentioned by Śrīnivāsa (1880) in Nyāyasiddhāntatattvāmṛta p. 6 and 18 in Madras Sanskrit Series.

Bhattacharya tentatively states that a certain Prabhākara was the first commentator on NL, there is, however, to my knowledge no manuscript of such a commentary. Bhattacharya supports this statement by referring to the sub-commentary on Vardhamāna’s Nyāyalilāvatīprakāśa, in which the author Bhagiratha mentions in two places that Vardhamāna has cited Prabhākara.129 According to Bhattacharya there are also eleven references to Prabhākara, cited by Pakṣadhara in his Nyāyalilāvatīviveka. The Lilāvatīviveka is unfortunately not edited, but according to Bhattacharya there is a copy of the text at the India Office in London.130

As to the edited commentaries to NL the following years are given. Vardhamāna is dated 1345 by Potter and 1350-75 by Thakur.131 Bhattacharya dates Gaṅgeśa’s active period to ca. 1325-1350 and Matilal dates Gaṅgeśa to 1325.132 Śaṅkara Miśra is dated to 1450 by Matilal and Potter and to 1473 by Bhattacharya. This latter dating comes from a post-colophon in a copy of Śaṅkara Miśra’s Khaṇḍānātikā; the year is an indication that Śaṅkara Miśra was alive at that time.133 Bhagiratha Ṭhakkura’s date is ca. 1500 A. D. according to Bhattacharya, Īnggals, and Matilal.134 They all state that Bhagiratha’s younger brother became rāja of Darbhanga in 1557.135 I will not account for the discussion concerning the dating of Gaṅgeśa and subsequently of Vardhamāna, Śaṅkara Miśra, and Bhagiratha Ṭhakkura in any further detail.136 The most important thing is to have established their succession.137

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128 Potter (1983) p. 496.
130 Bhattacharya (1958) p. 75, the following references are given: foll. 2a, 5a, 15a, 18a, 39b, 49b, 58a, 61a, 78a, 93b. Cf. also no. 6 in the above list.
135 Ingalls (1988) p. 9, refers to an inscription found on a well near Janakapura.
136 Bhattacharya gives a thorough listing of reasons for his dating of Gaṅgeśa, see (1958) pp. 99-104. See for example also Mishra, (1966) p. 274, who has a slightly earlier dating of Gaṅgeśa, the end of the 13th century.
137 Cf. also app. 4.
2.1.2.3 Other texts by Vallabha

According to Bhattacharya, Vallabha wrote one or possibly two texts apart from NL. The first is supposedly a commentary on the 5th chapter of the Nyāyasūtra, which contains a discussion on different kinds of faulty rejoinders and grounds of failure in an argument. Bhattacharya cites Vardhamāna’s Anvikṣānayatatvabodha and Nyāyapariśiṣṭapraķśa in order to support his view. In these texts there are references to Vallabha that according to Bhattacharya indicate the existence of a commentary on NS. Furthermore Bhattacharya has found a reference made by Vallabha himself in the NL, where he refers to what is said in the Īśvarasiddhi. Bhattacharya maintains that this reference to Īśvarasiddhi cannot be explained as a reference to the īśvara section in NL since the subject matter of the reference is not treated there. In the preface to the Jaipur work the same arguments and citations as Bhattacharya’s above are presented, and hence nothing new is added. Thakur also repeats Bhattacharya’s discussion concerning these texts.

2.1.2.4 Character and structure of Nyāyalilāvatī

The NL is an independent text with the same overall structure as a classical Vaiśeṣika text. It has, however, been discussed whether it is a commentary on Prāṇaṭapāda’s PDS. According to Matilal the reason for this mistake is that the tradition has possibly confused Vallabha’s work with a commentary named Līlāvatī by a Śrīvatsa. Unfortunately no manuscript of Līlāvatī is found and therefore it exists only as a title. According to Kaviraj, NL is an independent treatise, and only if Śrīvatsa would prove to be the same person as Vallabha would this be different. This issue is also discussed in the introductions to the Chowkhamba edition and the Jaipur work. They both refer to Rājaśekara’s commentary to Śrīdhara’s Nyāyakandali where four commentaries to PDS are enumerated and of which the fourth, written by Śrīvatsa, is called Līlāvatī. They both conclude that it is unlikely that NL is the same text as Līlāvatī since NL is not written in the form of a commentary. Furthermore, they add, NL is not sufficiently traditional, with regard to its subjects, to be a commentary. In the preface to the Jaipur

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138 Bhattacharya (1958) p. 60f.
141 Bhattacharya (1958) p. 61.
144 Matilal (1977) pp. 67f.
145 Kaviraj (1924) p. 124, n. (*).
work Mišra concludes that NL could be seen as a commentary from the point of view of its being written in a new form with independent analysis, at the same time as it discusses the traditional Vaiśeṣika doctrine.\textsuperscript{147} It is, in my understanding, not very clear from Mišra’s discussion what exactly differs between a commentary and a non-commentary and his argument rather indicates a general view of the character of oscillating between “old truths” and “reinvention” that is present in varying degrees in almost every text within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya traditions except, perhaps, for commentaries that are mere glosses. Bhattacharya mentions the passage in the NKd as being a mistake, but it is not clear whether he means that the \textit{Līlāvatī} is in fact NL, and the mistake is then to list it as a commentary, or if he means that the mistake consists in having confused the \textit{Līlāvatī} with NL.\textsuperscript{148} Thakur seems to be of the opinion that the \textit{Līlāvatī} probably is the NL which he bases on the fact that there are so far no references to \textit{Līlāvatī} found in any Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts.\textsuperscript{149}

NL is divided into four chapters in the Chowkhamba edition and two in the Bombay edition.\textsuperscript{150} The two-chapter division appears however somewhat peculiar since the last section of NL deviates radically from the ordinary sequence of the Vaiśeṣika \textit{padārthas} (categories).\textsuperscript{151} The deviation appears after the discussion on the last category, \textit{samavāya} (inherence). Here NL contains a number of topics not easily fitted into the traditional scheme, and these sections appear to be Vallabha’s own addition to the traditional Vaiśeṣika way of arranging texts. In the Chowkhamba edition these last themes are allocated to three different chapters: \textit{Vaidharmya}, \textit{Sādharmya}, and \textit{Prakriyā}. I will follow the Chowkhamba edition in its division of the contents of NL, partly because it seems more practicable since the topics are shown in greater detail, but foremost because it illustrates well that it is only up to the discussion of \textit{samavāya} that NL roughly follows the same division of topics as in, for example, the PDS.\textsuperscript{152}

The first chapter of NL is titled \textit{padārthavibhāgapariccheda} and consists of 58 sections (\textit{prakaraṇas}), covering the six \textit{padārthas}: \textit{dravya} (substance), \textit{guna} (quality), \textit{karma} (motion), \textit{sāmānya} (generality), \textit{viśeṣa} (particularity), and \textit{samavāya} (inherence). The second chapter, \textit{vaidharmyapariccheda}, consists of five sections devoted to difference of properties. The third

\textsuperscript{147} NL (1996) p. 6.
\textsuperscript{148} Bhattacharya (1958) p. 55.
\textsuperscript{149} Thakur (2003) p. 313.
\textsuperscript{150} NL (1991) pp. 1f. and NL (1923) pp. 1ff. Since the other edition is incomplete it is not included here.
\textsuperscript{151} See app. 1 for the list of contents as it is displayed in the Chowkhamba edition.
\textsuperscript{152} Since a thorough analysis of the whole NL falls outside the scope of this thesis I have only made a superficial comparison with the PDS. Moreover, the similarities in structure between the two texts have been noted by Bhattacharya (1958) pp. 55f. and Kaviraj (1924) p. 124. On the other hand, the originality of the three last chapters of NL has been noted by Matilal (1977) p. 73 and by Bhattacharya as well.
chapter, *sādharmyapariccheda*, treats common properties in two sections and the last, *prakriyāpariccheda*, deals with refutation of various doctrines contrary to Vaiśeṣika and consists of 10 sections.153

The present study deals with the concept of *anumāna* (inference) and the related topics of *vyāpti*, *upādhi*, *tarka*, and *parāmarśa*.154 These are found in the first chapter under *buddhi* (cognition) which is a subsection of the section on *guna*. Sections no. 27-47 comprise the theory of *buddhi*, and the part that is analysed in this study is found in sections no. 33-36.155 When compared to the PDS there is a certain deviation with respect to the number of topics discussed in the *buddhi* passage of the NL. All the topics of PDS are included within the NL with the addition of *vyāpti*, *tarka*, and *parāmarśa*, which are treated in separate sections. Moreover, in NL there is an extended discussion on means of knowledge other than the usually accepted ones within Vaiśeṣika: perception and inference. The concepts of *nirvikalpa* (pre-predicative) and *savikalpa* (predicative), absent in PDS, are allocated to two separate sections, and the section treating *parārtahnumāna* (inference for others) is named *nyāya* (reasoning) and not *avayava* (limbs) as in PDS.156

### 2.1.2.5 Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Navya-nyāya, and *Nyāyayālavati*

The schools or traditions of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika rest on two different *sūtra* texts, and can in that sense be viewed as two distinct commentarial traditions. However, they are also in a lesser or higher degree homogeneous, depending on which text one chooses to study. Throughout their shared history they have mutually supported each other as well as there having been discussion of differentiated standpoint.157 It is common to say that Nyāya primarily deals with epistemology and Vaiśeṣika with ontology. This is perhaps best illustrated by the way the two *sūtra* texts deal with their subject matter. In the *Nyāyasūtras* (NS) the knowledge of that which leads to attainment of the highest good consists in an enumeration of means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), objects of knowledge (*prameya*) and 14 more categories dealing with reasoning.158 In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* (VS) the same goal is reached by knowledge of the six ontological categories of substance, quality, motion, generality, particularity, and inherence.159 Udayana wrote commentaries on both the VS and the NS and is therefore commonly used as a historical divide of a gradual merging of the two commentarial traditions.

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154 See glossary for untranslated terms.
155 See app. 1.
156 See app. 2 for a visual comparison between the order of the section of *buddhi* in NL and PDS.
157 See for example Mishra, (1936) pp. 37-50, who has listed 19 points of difference between Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.
The two schools are commonly referred to as having an old (pracīna) and a new (navya) teaching.\textsuperscript{160} When going outside the specific schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika there is another classification taking Buddhist traditions into account. In this classification there is an old period from NS up to Dignāga, a medieval period from Dignāga to Udayana, and a new period beginning with Udayana. This classification however is only concerned with logical and epistemological aspects of the above schools.\textsuperscript{161} In this work, which does not touch upon the Buddhist traditions, I have adopted the divisions of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya which will be further explained and discussed below.

Exactly when and how the old (pracīna) becomes the new (navya) appears however to be a disputed fact. According to some scholars, for example Bhattacharya, Matilal, and Wada the new school develops gradually from the time of Udayana, who in this view is the founder.\textsuperscript{162} The new school is then consolidated by Gaṅgeśa in his text \textit{Tattvacintāmaṇi}.\textsuperscript{163} The other point of view, held for example by Potter and Vidyabhusana, is that Gaṅgeśa is the founder of Navya-nyāya. Although Potter emphasizes that pre-Gaṅgeśa scholars have had a certain influence on this development.\textsuperscript{164} A further complicating matter is that there seems to be a division concerning the use of the term Navya-nyāya; according to Potter, it is either used to name texts that employ a certain vocabulary, formulated by Gaṅgeśa, or it is used to name texts written after or in Gaṅgeśa’s time notwithstanding the vocabulary.\textsuperscript{165} Matilal uses “Navya-nyāya” in a way similar to Potter but without the explicit time-reference to Gaṅgeśa. According to him the Navya-nyāya entails a blending of the former two schools with the Nyāya pramāṇa-theory and the padārthas of Vaiśeṣika. He adds that Navya-nyāya texts are characterized by their insistence upon making definitions as exact as possible, a feature that becomes exceedingly important in the later texts, such as \textit{Tattvacintāmaṇi}.\textsuperscript{166} Mishra’s position within the debate is also similar to Potter’s. According to Mishra, Gaṅgeśa is the founder of the new school mainly because of his methodology, but he also points out that Udayana has indeed left traits in the new school.\textsuperscript{167} Phillips holds this view as well, but as Wada also remarks, for reasons a bit differently stated than the

\textsuperscript{160} Gaṅgeśa refers to his own work as “navya” in TC (1901) p. 699:1. Sometimes the term “Navya-Nyāya” is used only of Ragunātha Śiromaṇi (1475-1555) and authors following him. See Ingalls (1988) pp. 5, 9.


\textsuperscript{165} Potter (1993) pp. 3f.

\textsuperscript{166} Matilal (1977) p. 101.

\textsuperscript{167} Mishra (1966) p. 238.
above. Phillips points out the novelty of Gaṅgeśa’s method and style in terms of a “quantum leap” but also stresses his dependence upon the predecessors, among whom Udayana stands in the foreground. Udayana, though, is portrayed by Phillips as a somewhat unpedagogical formal thinker in contrast to Gaṅgeśa. For Phillips the crucial point, however, is the changing of “partner in discussion” from Buddhist traditions to Māṁsā in general and the advaitin Śrīharṣa in particular. Gaṅgeśa’s discussion with Śrīharṣa is, according to Phillips, an important factor in bringing about the changes that become Navya-nyāya. At the same time, though, Phillips emphasizes Gaṅgeśa’s reliance upon Udayana’s work and a number of other pre-Gaṅgeśa philosophers. He adds that Gaṅgeśa is more of a “solidifier” than an originator of Navya-nyāya. On the other hand, again, Phillips states that the post-Gaṅgeśa tradition viewed Gaṅgeśa as an initiator of the new, and that we should follow this traditional stance. Wada, however, has criticized Phillips’s argumentation on the grounds that Phillips’s analysis of Udayana does not take into account the many similarities between Gaṅgeśa and Udayana. Wada then, on the other hand, emphasizes the continuative elements of the tradition from Udayana up to Gaṅgeśa, in particular the treatment of the concept of sambandha (relation). According to Wada, Udayana defines the world in terms of relation and this is a new feature brought into the tradition. As an example of this Wada mentions the definition of dravya (substance) that Udayana formulates by bringing in a relative general term, samaveta (inhering). This is contrasted with the definition of substance in PDS where absolute general terms are used as defining features. Wada argues that since relation is a central concern and tool for analysis in Navya-nyāya there is no reason not to view Udayana as the founder of Navya-nyāya.

With the above in mind it is not surprising that NL has been given various school affiliations by different scholars. An important thing to bring to notice, though, is that there does not appear to be any dispute among the above scholars that the NL is a Vaiśeṣika text in the sense that the structure of the text, and to some extent also the contents, exhibit classical Vaiśeṣika features. The dispute seems to be related to whether Udayana or Gaṅgeśa is the founder of the new school and hence if the NL, mostly by reason of its chronological position, should be counted among the Navya-nyāya texts or not. Vidyabhūsana states that NL is a Vaiśeṣika text, but adds that it has incorporated the Nyāya theory of pramāṇa. He seems to be under the

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impression that Vallabha accepted upamāna (comparison) and śabda (verbal testimony) as means of knowledge apart from the classical Vaiśešika’s anumāna (inference) and pratyakṣa (perception).174 But Vallabha clearly states that there are only two forms of vidyā—perceptual or inferential—and besides this he later on reduces both śabda and upamāna to inference.175 Matilal characterizes NL as a Vaiśešika text belonging to the Nyāya-nyāya period on grounds that are not clearly expressed. He remarks that the pramāṇa section in NL is somewhat expanded, and that this is indicative of the changes in the transition from old to new.176 On the other hand Matilal states further down that Navya-nyāya texts exhibit the blending of the two schools in such a way that they incorporate the Nyāya pramāṇas.177 And this is something that NL does not do, as was pointed out above.

According to Bhattacharya as well, the NL is a Vaiśešika text within the new tradition; he calls it a classic of Navya-nyāya and refers to the host of both pre- and post-Gaṅgeśa commentators whose attention it drew. On the other hand, Bhattacharya does not mention the pramāṇa section when pointing out Vallabha’s originality but rather the three concluding chapters as deviating from the traditional way of arranging texts.178 Although Potter calls NL a Nyāya-Vaiśešika and not a Navya-nyāya text, he underlines that the terminology used by the new school has its origins in the pre-Gaṅgeśa texts among which NL is one.179

Apart from the fact that NL is written in accordance with the Vaiśešika categories, and thus displays a structural affinity with PDS, there are further arguments for describing NL as a Vaiśešika text. Vallabha for example refers to both the differentiated and common positions of Nyāya and Vaiśešika respectively. In the first chapter, under the section dealing with padārtha (categories), Vallabha deals with abhāva (absence) as something that is part of the common doctrine (samāñatantra) in the same manner as manas (mind) is accepted as a sense organ in Nyāya. According to Matilal this indicates that Vallabha accepts abhāva as a separate category within his Vaiśešika system.180 But I cannot find any indication that he does that. In the concluding remarks of the first chapter Vallabha writes that the Vaiśešika categories are six in number.181 He deals with absence in greater detail under

176 Matilal (1977) p. 73.
180 NL (1991) pp. 35f., abhāvasya ca samāñatantrasiddhasyāpratisiddhasya nyāyadarśane mānasendriyatāsiddhavat atrāpy avirodhāt. Matilal (1971) p. 72. Matilal is a bit vague on this point saying that according to Vallabha “absence…was accepted as a separate category in the Vaiśešika system…” The treatment of absence as a category (padārtha) is, for example, not present in PDS, and is usually seen as one of the points of difference between early Nyāya and Vaiśešika. See for example Mishra (1936) p. 39.
the category of guṇa within the section on buddhi. In my opinion this discussion of absence in NL is instead indicative of a context-sensitivity that is expressed by Vallabha and which is further reinforced by the fact that he seems to treat both the NS and VS commentarial traditions as points of departure. This appears to be the conclusion of Bhattacharya as well.

It is important to bring to attention that the establishment of the new school is dependent upon the criteria used for defining and characterizing what this newness consists in, whether it be stylistic and/or dogmatic. A tendency within this discussion appears to be that Navya-nyāya is assigned a text as an indicator of the “logical” character of the contents of the text. Such a text then, bears the somewhat vaguely formulated mark of exact definitions and/or a concentration on the topics of means of knowledge. In short, it seems that a Navya-nyāya text in the above sense could also still be considered a Vaiśeṣika text. The term Vaiśeṣika is then used to designate the contents of the whole text, and not only the parts that are concerned with epistemology or “logic”. Phillips and Wada differ from the above in the sense that they try to find a more specific characteristic for the term Navya-nyāya; they both draw a more complex picture of how changes occur within the tradition(s) than has previously been done. However, the discussion on how traditions change and interrelate is dependent upon research on what is expressed in the texts written within the traditions, and within this sphere there is a great need for more research on more texts with this particular aim in mind. Some of the above mentioned secondary discourse also leaves room for questions about what it means to say that a certain text is written within a certain tradition; is it the structure of the text? Is it the content, the dogmatic positions, or the style of analysis? Is it in the intratraditional intertextuality or in the intertraditional intertextuality that this becomes clear, is it through both?

In the end then, an indefinite image of the distinctions between Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Navya-nyāya has surfaced from the above. It seems that there are no clear-cut partitions between these terms in the secondary literature, neither in a historical nor a dogmatic sense. In this work I have adopted a certain terminology out of a practical concern, aiming for clarity insofar as that is possible. I have used the terms partly in a historical sense and partly as designators of the different texts that are used as sources. “Nyāya” then implies texts written within the commentarial tradition of NS, and “Vaiśeṣika” the commentarial tradition of VS. These two terms are not frequently used within this work. The compound Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is however used a lot and it designates both of the traditions simultaneously.

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183 Bhattacharya (1958) p. 56.
184 Cf. for example Thakur, (2003) p. 313, who speaks of NL as a Vaiśeṣika classic but also as a “neo-logical” text, and Bhattacharya who states that the Vaiśeṣika NL is a classical Navya-nyāya text. See n. 178 above.
also including texts that are not commentaries on either VS or NS. Since Vallabha appears to move effortlessly in an intertextual environment encompassing both of these commentarial traditions, there seems to be little need to make a precise division between them. The distinction made between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya on the other hand operates to designate texts written by or after Gaṅgeśa. This distinction is purely practical; as made clear above the transformation into Navya-nyāya, however obvious the difference is between an “old” and a “new” text, took place over the course of at least 300 years, and is thus to be seen as gradual.

2.1.2.6 Conceptions of the Nyāyalīlāvati

In the introduction I pointed out that the NL has been described as a revolutionary text, and in the present chapter that there is a degree of originality ascribed to the structure of the text as well, as noted by Bhattacharya and Matilal. Potter mentions in his EIP that NL is an original work and Mohanty does the same. Mohanty, however, adds “sober and conservative” connecting it to Udayana but also tracing a preconception of Navya-nyāya terminology in it. Neither Mohanty, nor Potter discuss this in detail, nor do they contrast or clarify their use of the expressions “original” and “sober and conservative”. Phillips calls NL a “lucid exposition of Vaiśeṣika tenets, with some original argumentation”. Phillips does not elaborate further on this, mainly because he focuses on Śrīharṣa who, as said above, does not mention NL at all.

Tachikawa provides a slightly more elaborate discussion on the character of NL. He attributes radicality to Vallabha in relation to Udayana’s K and Praśastapāda’s PDS. In my opinion, however, his reasoning concerning this is problematic in two ways. First of all in the sense that he uses, as basis for comparison, three texts written in different genres. Udayana’s K is a commentarial text, NL is an independent work and PDS is placed somewhere in between these two types. It seems plausible to assume that a text written independently of a mūla-text would contain a greater leeway than a commentary, and on account of that, these three texts might not prove to be the best point of departure for comparison. Tachikawa furthermore speaks, slightly tentatively, of Vallabha and Bhāsarvajña as belonging to a radical tradition later followed up by Ragunātha Śiromani, the latter being a Navya-nyāya author who is described by Ingalls as letting go of all the “old”, “hampering” material that clung to the traditional, conservative writers. This, in turn, brings us to the second problem of using the term

\[\text{\footnotesize 185 Bhattacharya (1958) p. 55, Matilal (1977) p. 73.}\
\[\text{\footnotesize 186 Potter (1995) pp. 8, 613.}\
radical or original. When Bhattacharya ascribes “originality” to NL he does so in relation to a certain particular feature of the text, namely the structure. He has thus clearly defined a certain aspect of the material as original. Tachikawa however states that Vallabha is revolutionary and then lists examples from NL where Vallabha deviates from Praśastapāda and Udayana. In doing this Tachikawa identifies PDS and K as “tradition” and that which deviates from this “tradition” as revolutionary or “radical tradition”. Underlying such a distinction is a view of tradition as consisting of a number of ideas or opinions that are conserved over a period of time. “Tradition” is then simply the continuative aspects of the texts. The discontinuitive aspects, on the other hand, do not belong to “tradition” or split off into another radical tradition. Apart from the problem of naming two texts only as the bearers of tradition when there are many more texts written under the same caption, Tachikawa’s line of reasoning leads to an essentialized image of what “tradition” is among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. As stated in the introduction, there is no intention whatsoever in the present work to identify the NL as being radical, original, sober, or conservative. To do so would be problematic not only from an empirical standpoint but also from a theoretical one. Empirically it is impossible to judge the character of NL from an analysis of a couple of pages, nor does there seem to be enough material available and thoroughly analysed to contrast it with. More important though is the question of what kind of conception of tradition underlies the statements about originality and radicality. These words remain relational, presupposing a non-original, non-radical something to which they stand in relation. In this work, however, tradition is not conceptualized in such a manner, and thus the question of Vallabha’s alleged originality or conservativeness does not come up as relevant at all.

2.2 Introduction to anumāṇa in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

In order to facilitate for the reader I will present a general, ahistoric outline of how the central concepts of the NL chapter on inference are described within Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and, to some extent, Navya-nyāya. I will also discuss how these concepts are interpreted and translated within this work. This section could thus be thought of as forming a conceptual framework for

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190 For this purpose I have primarily used the TS with its auto-commentary TSD. This text is much later than the NL, but sums up the theories expressed within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Navya-nyāya tradition(s). TS is also a school-book and expounds its subjects in a general, pedagogic manner without going into detailed discussion. I have also used the PDS and NS as references to specific Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya thought.
the subsequent chapters. It is very important to bear in mind that the discussion concerning the inferential process (anumāna) and its sub-concepts such as vyāpti, upādhi, tarka, and parāmarśa is heterogeneous within the history of these tradition(s), and individual authors find individual answers to the problems discussed. This will however be taken into account in the subsequent chapters of this work.

2.2.1 Cognition and knowledge

The terms jñāna and pramāṇavidyā will be translated as cognition and knowledge respectively. Cognition is understood as an overarching concept that is specified further into subgroups, of which knowledge is one. Cognition is described as a characterization (guna) of the self (ātman); it is not thought of as an action, but as a product, and thus also as existing temporarily. Cognitions leave traces (sauṅskāra) behind, traces that can affect our future behavior because they effectuate remembrance (smṛti) and recognition (pratyabhijñā) which in turn are special kinds of cognitions.191 On the other hand, “feelings” such as desire, pain, aversion, and pleasure are thought of as objects of which we are conscious, i.e. objects of cognitions and not cognitions in themselves. These feelings are also thought of as different characterizations (gunas) of the self.192

Knowledge (pramāṇa) is one kind of cognition amongst several kinds and is in turn specified according to how many means of knowledge there are. In the PDS, i.e. the VS tradition, there is a differentiation between cognitions (buddhi or jñāna)193 that are vidyā and avidyā, knowledge and non-knowledge. Vidyā comprises cognitions that are defined as perceptive (pratyakṣa), inferential (laiṅgika), recollective (smṛti) and sagic (ārṣa).194 There are, in turn, two kinds of means of knowledge (pramāṇa), perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Non-knowledge is subdivided into four kinds of cognitions: doubt (saṅśaya), error (viparyaya), indefinitive (anadhyavasāya) and dream (svapna).195

TS, on the other hand, divides cognition (jñāna) into remembrance (smṛti) and anubhāva, a term almost impossible to translate.196 Anubhāva could

193 For the synonymity of buddhi and jñāna see NS 1.1.15 in for example Jha (1999) pp. 265ff. and PDS (1895) p. 171.
194 Since ārṣa is derivative of ṛṣi (seer or sage) I have here translated it as “sagic”, that is, as belonging to the seers. This cognition, though, might befall a normal person as well; one example of this is the little girl who knows that her brother, who has been away on a trip, will be coming home the next day. PDS (1895) pp. 186, 258. I will not go into detail concerning the different kinds of cognitions except for the ones important to the present work.
195 PDS (1895) p. 172.
196 In connection with the subdivisions of cognition and knowledge, the TS reflects the Nyāya and Navya-nyāya thought rather than the Vaiśeṣika as it is expressed in PDS. See TS (1969) p. 32.
mean apprehension, comprehension, or understanding and carries the meaning of being receptive, impressive, and productive. This could be contrasted to memory, which is cognition of something already received. *Anubhāva* in turn is subdivided into *yathārtha* and *ayathārtha*, which could be understood as objective and non-objective cognition in the sense that the objective cognition directly corresponds to an object (*artha*) whereas the non-objective one does not. The non-objective cognitions in the TS are doubt, error, and *tarka*. The objective cognitions in turn are four: perceptive, inferential, comparative (*upamiti*), and verbal (*śabda*). These four comprise the four means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that are distinguished within Nyāya and Navya-nyāya.

The word *pramāṇa* (knowledge) is tied to the derivatives *pramāṭr*, *prameya*, *pramāṇa*, and *pramāṇya*. All these derivatives form a semantic landscape consisting of “the one who knows” (*pramāṭr*), “the object of knowledge” (*prameya*), “the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*) and “eligible for a process of knowledge” (*prāmāṇya*). In order to apprehend the translation of *pramāṇa* into “knowledge” it is important to take notice of both the above given distinctions of “knowledge” and “non-knowledge” and the different kinds of means of knowledge that are distinguished as well. “Knowledge” is thus not used in any specific sense, but for its distinguished character, which, as has been noticed above, differs between Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. That is, in the interaction between these traditions, for example as it is visible in Vallabha’s NL, the differences are handled in such a way that the four means of knowledge present in Nyāya are reduced to two in Vaiśeṣika. The reduction has to do with the specific cause or instrument (*karaṇa*) that each and every means of knowledge has. The difference does not concern the validity of knowledge, but rather is a difference in analysis. That is to say, it is not the phenomenon of knowing that is questioned in the discussions but whether certain distinctions of knowing should be made or not.

Perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) is generated by six different instruments, the six sense organs. There are five outer organs and an inner one: sight, taste, smell, touch, and hearing are all outer senses; their objects are external

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198 TS (1969) pp. 33, 69, Bhattacharya (1983) pp. 143ff., 148. The concept of *tarka* will be dealt with further down. Cf. Nyman, (2005) p. 564, who in my opinion has sufficiently shown that the fairly common designation “true/not true” of *yathārtha* and *ayathārtha* is too narrow. Nyman’s second definition of the paired terms appears to be the closest to how they are understood here; *yathārtha* is then understood as being “true of its object, and its being so is conditioned by its object” whereas *ayathārtha* “is either not true of its object, or is true of its object but its being so is not conditioned by its object”.
200 See for example Wada (1990) pp. 29f.
201 Vallabha, for example, reduces both *śabda* (verbal statement) and *upamāna* (comparison) to cases of *anumāna*. NL (1991) pp. 526-531.
to the perceiver. The one inner sense is called manas, which is often translated with the word “mind”; this, however, is not used in the present work since “mind” implies some kind of conscious faculty. It is important to note that the conscious agent is thought of as ātman (self). Manas is instead to be understood in terms of a mechanical, unconscious, coordinative faculty. The six sense organs could be defined in terms of what kinds of relations (sannikāraṣa) they subsist in. A sense perception arises from a relation, a contact, between a sense organ and an object that in turn is connected to manas which lastly is connected to the self (ātman). In this sense manas is operating, in all perceptual cognitions, as a link between the sense-object-contact and the self. Manas is also at work within the process of remembrance.

There is yet another distinction of perception that is made, between worldly or ordinary (laukika) perception and extraordinary (alaukika) perception. Ordinary perception is caused by the above six kinds of sense organs and their relations to their respective objects, for example the contact between the eye and the pot when one sees a pot. Extraordinary perception is of three kinds, “perception of generalities”, i.e. having the mark of generality (sāmānyalakṣāṇa), “acquired cognition”, i.e. having the mark of cognition (jñānalakṣāṇa) and “yogic perception”, i.e. born of yoga (yogāja). The first two kinds function for every human being whereas the third is available to yogis only. The extraordinary perception of generalities operates through an extraordinary contact (sāmānyalakṣāṇasannikāraṣa) that enables us to perceive particulars as having certain generalities. When we see a pot, for example, we perceive it as having the generality “potness”, and the sāmānyalakṣāṇa gives us perception of every existing pot as having potness. The objects of this perception (i.e. all pots) are not available to us in the same manner as in ordinary perception but rather through the generality that inheres in every pot. Jñānalakṣāṇa is the case when one, for example, sees a strawberry from afar and at the same time has a perception of its smell which is not present as an object connected to the sense-organ of smell. Here the contact between the object (strawberry smell) and the sense organ (eye) is through a previously cognized strawberry smell.

The distinctions of cognitions that have been accounted for above could be viewed as descriptive in the sense that they function as explanatory devices of experiences that are apprehended as existing phenomena. Thus we do not necessarily need to understand these theories as arguments for the

204 Yogic perception will not be treated here since it falls outside the scope of this work.
206 Chatterjee (1950) pp. 218ff.
very existence of cognition and knowledge, but rather as an inventory of human experience, a reasoning that is *ex post facto* as it were.

### 2.2.2 Sāmānya, jāti and vyakti: generalities and particulars

The terms *sāmānya*, *jāti*, and *vyakti* could all be understood as ontological in the sense that they convey certain modes of existence. *Sāmānya* (generality) is one of the six ontological categories (*padārtha*) within the Vaiśeṣika tradition; it comes in two forms, a higher (*para*) and a lower (*apara*). *Vyakti* is generally understood as a particular entity, whereas *jāti* is understood as a generality, for example a particular pot in contrast to the generality “potness” or “the being a pot”. The terms *sāmānya* and *jāti* are to some extent used as synonyms within Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, although sometimes, especially in early texts, the former is preferred within Vaiśeṣika and the later within Nyāya. In some cases *sāmānya* is used of both higher and lower generalities whereas *jāti* is used for lower ones only. The single higher generality, “existence” (*sattā*), functions solely as a connector of everything that exists. The lower generalities on the other hand simultaneously have a differentiating and a connecting capacity. This could be understood in the sense that there would not be any apprehension of difference nor of community between entities without the existence of generalities; everything would either be totally different or the same. 207 A generality is thus not in any sense a quality added to a particular entity (*vyakti*), it is rather the foundation of our capability of cognizing a particular—at one and the same time—both as a separate entity and an entity with something in common with other entities. *Sāmānya* is, for Praśastapāda, founded in cognition, but hard to demonstrate since it is also a prerequisite of the very possibility of cognition. This way of reasoning is repeated throughout the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition by maintaining that activity of any kind, for example speech and inference, would be impossible without the existence of generalities.208

The relation pertaining between a particular entity and a generality is inherence (*samavāya*) and it is in this sense that generality could be spoken of as an ontological prerequisite or basis of the “being there” of the particular. Inherence is a relation that will break only as the relata of the relation breaks, so it is only when a certain particular ceases to be that the relation also ceases. For example, when a pot ceases to be a pot the generality “potness” is then no longer in the inherence relation with the pot. Another important aspect of the generality is that the generality itself is said

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208 Cf. section 5.2.3 below.
to be eternal, even if a particular pot is destroyed “potness” does not ever vanish.209

The translation of jåti/såmånya differs within the secondary discourse on Nyåya-Vaiśeṣika, and almost every scholar uses his or her own particular translation.210 Wada translates both concepts with “generic property”.211 Phillips translates jåti as “natural kind” and såmånya as “universal”.212 Matilal translates both as “universals” but also uses “generality” for såmånya.213 Halbfass uses “real universal” or “generic property” for såmånya and “genus” or “species” for jåti.214 Potter translates both jåti and såmånya as “universal (property)”.215 In this work I use the translation “generality” since it echoes less of Aristotle and thus narrows down the possibility of misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the term. Halbfass, when discussing the translation of såmånya as “universal”, mentions this danger of misunderstanding but still chooses “universal” on the grounds of “rich historical associations”, supposedly implying by this precisely that Aristotelian echo.216

2.2.3 Anumåna

Anumåna is the process of acquiring knowledge indirectly through the medium of perception. In the Vaiśeṣika tradition anumåna (inference) and pratyakṣa (perception) are the only means of knowledge available to us, whereas in the Nyåya tradition there are four means of knowledge: pratyakṣa, anumåna, upamåna (comparison), and śabda (verbal statement).

As described by Ananmbhaṭṭa in his TS, inference is the instrument of inferential knowledge (anumîti), which is produced by a confirmatory cognition called parâmarśa (consideration), which in turn partly consists of another cognition, namely the cognition of something as characterized by vyåpti (invariable concomitance). That is, if a person sees a plume of smoke rising from a mountain217 and infers from this perception that fire is present on that mountain, she has, according to Ananmbhaṭṭa, proceeded through a number of causally interrelated steps. The starting-point of this process is perception of smoke, followed by the recollection that fire is always present

210 I have here included recent translations, for a substantial list of variant translations from early time see Halbfass (1992) p. 115.
217 The example of smoke on a mountain is the most common stock-example of an inferential process in Nyåya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyåya texts. It is almost always used in explanations of the different aspects of this process. This example will also be used throughout this work.
where smoke is present which in turn is followed by the ascertainment that this smoke is the kind of smoke that is generated by fire and not, for example, smoke that is nothing more than fog. The cognition of parāmarśa, in this case, is the establishment of a relation between smoke, fire, and mountain as pertaining to this particular situation. That the perception of smoke leads to a cognition of, and subsequently to knowledge of, fire, is due to the relation between fire and smoke. This relation is called vyāpti (invariable relation or concomitance) and the knowledge of vyāpti is the cause of the effect, inferential knowledge (anumiti), whereas parāmarśa is the intermediate step bringing about this effect. Vyāpti is also, in one respect, the mark of an inference; it is the touchstone of certainty.218 If vyāpti did not characterize the relation between smoke and fire, the inference would not be an inference but a process that merely seems to be knowledge producing, a so-called pseudo-inference (ābhāsa). It is important to notice that an inference is always, per se, knowledge producing, there are thus no “false inferences” but rather processes that might appear to be inferences.

The inference is divided in two main categories, one kept in private, for oneself (svārthānunānam), and the second displayed to others as well (parārthānunāna). The parārthānunāna consists of the following five members or limbs (avayava, a a):

1. Pratijñā (that which is to be inferred): “The mountain has fire”.
2. Hetu220 (the reason or ground): “Because the mountain has smoke”.
3. Udāharaṇa, nidarśana (the example): “Whatever has smoke has fire, as in the kitchen”. (Whatever has absence of fire has absence of smoke, as in the lake.)
4. Upanaya, anusandhāna (application): “And so this (mountain has smoke pervaded by fire)”. (The cognition of parāmarśa.)
5. Nigamana (the conclusion): “Therefore it is so (that the mountain has fire)”.

The mountain in this inference is the possessor of, or simply place of smoke and is called “pakṣa”. The pakṣa can be understood in terms of being the inferential subject. Smoke is the “hetu”, “sādhanā” or “liṅga”, the reason or

219 The names of these limbs can differ in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. The different limbs of inference are discussed by Vallabha in a separate section of NL called nyāyaparāśa-prakaraṇam, see app. 1.
220 This term “hetu” should not be confused with the so called “hetu” or “liṅga” which is smoke in the above example. If not otherwise mentioned, “hetu” does not, in this work, refer to the second limb at all. Sometimes “hetuvacana” is used as a name of the second limb so as to avoid confusion.
221 This is expressed as follows; parvato vahnimāna, dhumavattvāt, yo yo dhumavān so so ‘gnimāna yathā mahānasah, tathā ca ayam, tasmāt tathā. TS (1969) pp. 52f.
mark through which the marked, fire, “sādhyā” or “liṅgin”, is attributed to the pakṣa. The term “liṅga” conveys a certain mode of apprehending smoke, namely that smoke is a mark or pointer in relation to the “liṅgin” which bears the mark. When using the terms “hetu” or “sādhana” a causal aspect is added, which is seen also in the ablative case that is used when expressing the second limb, which is named “hetu” or “hetuvacana”.

The relation of vyāpti is, in the above inference, the relation of smoke to fire, where every place of smoke is a place of fire and every place of absence-of-fire is a place of absence-of-smoke. It is important to note that this is not the case in the relation of fire to smoke, because there are places where there is absence-of-smoke but presence of fire, in, for example, glowing iron.

The “inference for oneself” could be understood in terms of an internal cognitive process whereas “inference for another” includes an element of verbalization of this very process. Due to this, some elements of the description of the internal process of inference coincide with the verbal declaration of this very process. This is the case, for example, in the fourth limb, which consists of the cognition of parāmarśā. This phenomenon is apparent in the concept of tarka as well. Tarka refers to a certain verbalized statement or formula as well as a certain cognition. Inference is in this sense analysed as at once descriptive and prescriptive, it is a description of the cognitive process that results in inferential knowledge and a prescription concerning how we are to conduct ourselves when aiming for that knowledge.

When translating anumāna as “inference”, one aspect of the meaning is lost namely the processual aspect, that this term is designating the whole inferential process. Therefore the most preferable translation is “inferential process”. However, this translation sometimes proves awkward, and thus I have used both variants within this work. As for the terms of the different components of the inferential process (pakṣa, liṅga, hetu, sādhana, and sādhyā) these will not be translated since they are so specific to this discourse.

2.2.3.1 Vyāpti

As remarked above, vyāpti is indicated by a positive and a negative example, the kitchen and the lake, the kitchen being an example of presence of smoke and fire, and the lake being an example of absence of fire and smoke. The

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222 The word “Hetu” is also used for “cause” or “reason”.
223 Cf. Gangopadhyay (1971) pp. 145f. This will be dealt with in greater detail below on p. 64.
225 See Mohanty (1992) p. 103. Cf. the section on parāmarśa and tarka below. This phenomenon is apparent in the concept of tarka as well. Tarka refers to a certain verbalized statement as well as a cognition.
226 Anumāna is a derivative of anu mā having the lexical meanings of “conjecture”, “guess” and “infer”.

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stating of an instance of the concomitance between presence-of-smoke and presence-of-fire and between absence-of-fire and absence-of-smoke indicates a higher degree of certainty of the knowledge generated in such an inference, but it is not always possible or necessary to provide both a positive and a negative example. Seen as a property or characteristic vyāpti resides in the sādhana, that is, the sādhana is the place of vyāpti, or the sādhana is characterized by vyāpti. The sādhana is divided into three kinds, a division pertaining to the member of udāharaṇa, which states how the relation of vyāpti is upheld in the inference. It is possible to establish vyāpti by three kinds of examples, a positive (sapakṣa), a negative (vipakṣa) and both a positive and a negative.227 The first kind is called kevalānvayin (only positive) and is exemplified by the following stock example:

1. Kevalānvayin (only positive)

Pratijñā:   The pot is nameable.
Hetu:       Because the pot is cognizable.
Udāharaṇa:  Like the cloth.228

In this case, it is only possible to give a positive example of the relation between cognizability (jñeyatva) and nameability (abhideyatva) since nothing whatsoever exists that is not cognizable. Every real, existing entity in the world possesses cognizability in the Vaiśeṣika ontology, and hence it is not possible to find a place where there is absence-of-cognizability, and thus vyāpti is established by connection or positivity only.229

The second kind is called kevalavyatirekin (only negative) and is exemplified by the following inference:

2. Kevalavyatirekin (only negative)

Pratijñā:   Earth differs from other things.
Hetu:       Because earth has smell.
Udāharaṇa:  Unlike water.230

Earth in this inference is the subject, the paksā; the sādhya is the “difference from other things” and the sādhana is “having smell”. Now, in order to establish vyāpti positively, it is necessary to find an entity having smell and

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228 TS (1969) pp. 54f.
having the property “difference from other things” at the same time. This, however, is not possible since the only entity that fits the above requirement is earth itself, and since earth is the subject of this inference, it would not yield any knowledge to posit earth as an example. Doing so would only result in a circular argument. Hence, the only way of establishing vyāpti is to give a negative example, an example of an entity in which absence-of-“difference from other things” and absence-of-“endowed with smell” are present. Such an entity could be any of the other substances, though in this case it is water (āp), in which we find both “not differing from other things” and “non-possession of smell”. And thus vyāpti is established by a negative example only.

In the case of the third kind, the anvayavyatirekin (positive and negative), it is possible to give one example of connection and one of discernment, or in other words, one instance where sādhanā is accompanied by sādhya and one instance where neither sādhanā nor sādhya are to be found. Annanībhaṭṭa gives us the following stock example:

3. Anvayavyatirekin (positive and negative)

Pratijñā: The mountain has fire.
Hetu: Because the mountain has smoke.
Udāharaṇa: Like the kitchen, unlike the lake.

As will be seen below, in chapter five, the invariable relation (vyāpti) of the sādhanā to the sādhya could be, and has been, described in different ways: there are three frequently-used terms or definitions of this relation, avinābhāva (not without the other), avyabhicāra (non-deviation) and svabhāvikā (own-nature). The so called avinābhāva relation could be understood as a relation where the absence of the sādhya is also the absence of the sādhanā, and the avyabhicāra as a relation in which the sādhanā is non-deviating from the sādhya, that is, the sādhanā is not found where the sādhya is not found. The relation of vyāpti could also be understood in terms of a “natural” relation (svabhāvikasambandha) that is upheld by the very nature of the relata, as in the case of smoke related to fire: smoke could not exist without fire; smoke (sādhanā) is caused by fire (sādhya). The relation of vyāpti is, however, not always understood as a cause and effect relationship. In the inference above, for example, where “nameability” is

231 In the Vaiśeṣika categorization only the substance of earth has the quality of smell. See Jha (1982) p. 65.
inferred from “cognizability”, the relation between these two is not causal: “nameability” and “cognizability” are generalities inherent in every thing that exists, that is, if something would not have nameability it would not be existent.

Vyāpti is generally translated by “pervasion”, “concomitance”, or “invariable relation”. It is, however, also treated as a well-known concept and is thus not always translated. In the translation and the running text I have used vyāpti as well as the translations stated above. What is important to notice is that vyāpti is understood as a particular kind of relation, and therefore the most preferable translation is “invariable relation”. The concept of vyāpti can be described by using different terms in Sanskrit, sometimes depending on which definition one favors: avinābhāva or svābhāvika. Other terms for vyāpti are niyama/niyata (i.e. restriction/restricted), pratibandha (i.e. connection).

2.2.3.2 Vyāptigraha: grasping the invariable relation

Since vyāpti is crucial to the validity of the inference the means of grasping or knowing vyāpti is central to the analysis of the inference. To grasp vyāpti is to grasp that the sādhya is always present where the sādhanā is present, and that the sādhanā is absent wherever the sādhya is absent. The crucial point here is the word “always”. It is thus not enough to know of this relation in a particular situation; it must be known in a general way, as pertaining to smoke in general. This is sometimes articulated as an apprehension of all past, present, and future instances of vyāpti. With this in mind it might seem strange that vyāpti is often said to be grasped somehow through perception. This obviously does not mean that a person has to have directly perceived all instances of smoke and fire together in order to detect vyāpti, since such a perception would be physically impossible. In general there are two ways of understanding how the perception of vyāpti is possible. Within Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika this perception is often explained in terms of “repeated observations” (bhṛyodarśana). That is, after having seen smoke together with fire a number of times, say in the kitchen of a house and in the garden of someone burning a pile of grass, one can form the idea that smoke is concomitant with fire. Then, the next time one sees smoke the idea of the concomitance comes to mind. In Navya-nyāya yet another understanding of this appears, based upon the extraordinary perception of generalities (sāmānyalakṣana), a perception that enables us to have a certain access to all smoke and fire particulars. There is, in this case, no direct contact between the objects of perception (smoke particulars) and the sense organ (the eye), and consequently this perception cannot be of an ordinary kind. Every

235 vi āp has the lexical meanings of “to reach or spread through”, “pervade”, or “permeate”.
236 NK (1996) pp. 426, 532. See also text [3-5] in this work.
smoke particular is perceived insofar as it is characterized by the generality "smokeness". This means that no individual characteristics of these smoke particulars are perceived but only that characteristic which is common to them all. The contact giving rise to this kind of perception is sometimes called sāmānya lakṣaṇa saṃsannikarṣa and sometimes sāmānya lakṣaṇa práty- āsatti. To translate vyāptigraha is rather unproblematic since the translation of graha into "grasping" is unproblematic. "Grasping" implies perception of some kind, but it also carries an aspect of understanding what is perceived. There is a tendency, however, visible in Gāṅgeśa’s texts, for graha to also imply certainty, being without doubt. Graha is not enumerated and defined in the divisions of different kinds of cognitions, something that would make for an easier interpretation. There are other terms used for cognitions as well that are not classified, such as "saṅvedana" and "vedana". I translate these as "apprehension" and "grasping" respectively. Just as the concept of vyāpti is described with several different terms, so also is vyāptigraha. Vallabha, for example, never once uses the term "vyāptigraha" in the chapter on inference in NL, although it is one of the main subjects of the text. Instead he uses "niyata saṅvedana" and "niyama saṅvedana".

2.2.3.3 Parāmarśa and causality

Parāmarśa means consideration or reflection that goes beyond or forward. It belongs in the process of coming to inferential knowledge, and has a causal efficiency within this process, as remarked above. This consideration is classified as a cognition that comes with two components, vyāptivīśīṣṭa (characterized by concomitance) and paksadharmaṭa (being a property of the inferential subject). It is verbalized in the fourth step (upanayana) of the "inference for others". It is immediately followed by the conclusion, and consists of a consideration of, or reflection on, the nature of the sādhana. If the sādhana is characterized by the invariable relation (vyāptivīśīṣṭa), that is, if it is a pervaded property and at the same time has the nature of being a property of the inferential subject (paksadharmaṭa), the inference will hit home and the conclusion will follow from this. In TS parāmarśa is phrased as follows: “This mountain is possessed of smoke which is pervaded by fire”.

238 Cf. above section 2.2.1.
240 These two terms could be translated as synonyms, cf. Lasic (2000) pp. 49, 123.
241 Cf. text [74, 77, 84] and n. 331 below.
242 parā mṛ has the lexical meanings of “lay hold of”, “seize”, “point to”, “consider” or “deliberate”.

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In connection with the role of parāmarṣa within the inferential process it is important to notice how causality is heterogeneously conceptualized within the discourse. That is to say, that there are differing positions held within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya concerning the understanding of the concepts of kāraṇa, karana, and vyāpāra.

According to Matilal the karana is understood as a kāraṇa of special value or of uniqueness by most of the propounders of nyāya tradition. A kāraṇa is in turn understood, in NK, as that condition under which an effect is produced and that condition in the absence of which this effect will not be produced. An effect such as inferential knowledge, for example, requires many kāraṇas, causes, in order to be produced. Kāraṇa comes forth as an overarching concept of causality which is further subdivided into specific categories.

A threefold division is found in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature from the time of the commentaries on PDS and onwards, a division which appears to be generally accepted by both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. This division distinguishes between samavāyikāraṇa (inheritance cause), asamavāyikāraṇa (non-inheritance cause) and nimittakāraṇa. The inheritance cause can be understood in terms of the relationship subsisting between cause and effect. That is to say, in such cases where the effect that is produced inheres in the cause this is described as an inheritance cause, as, for example, the pot-halves or the threads being causes of pot and cloth respectively. The non-inheritance causes are such entities that inhere in or are connected to the inheritance cause and have an influence on or a connection to the effect, for example when the guṇa (quality) of color in the threads gives the cloth its color.

The concept of nimittakāraṇa is often translated as either the “efficient cause” or the “instrumental cause”, but also carries with it a sense connected to being the basis or substrate and that of being regulative. The former translation is perhaps more fitting in case of the uncommon or specific (asādhāraṇa) kāraṇa and the later in the case of the common or general (sādhāraṇa) kāraṇa, which are both, at least according to Potter, a subdivision of the nimittakāraṇa. The common causes are such things as god (īśvara), time, and place, whereas the uncommon ones pertain to each

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244 Matilal (1997) p. 373.
246 Shastri (1964) p. 281.
249 Potter (1995) p. 57. On the other hand the TS states that that which is the uncommon kāraṇa among those three causes is the karana. Common and non-common hence appears not as a subdivision of nimitta but rather of kāraṇa. See TS (1969) p. 41. This is also mentioned by U. Mishra, (1936) p. 248, who refers to Tarkabhāṣa translated by Jha (1949) p. 10. Matilal, though, states that karana “generally” is a subdivision of nimitta. Matilal (1997) p. 376.
individual effect respectively. The *karaṇa*, then, is to be found among these uncommon causes and occupies a somewhat elevated place; it is often referred to as a “condition *par excellence*”. The discussions concerning *karaṇa* and its nature seem to have begun around the time of Uddyotakara, and the views regarding it vary considerable. Matilal has summarized the discussions and listed two major strands of thought with respect to how the *karaṇa* is unique among causes. In the first theory *karaṇa* is defined as the final cause, the cause that is most proximate to the effect, whereas in the second theory it is thought of as immediately preceding the effect through an operation named *vyāpāra*. With regard to the example of cutting down a tree with an axe, then, the contact (*sānyoga*) between tree and axe is the *karaṇa* in the former definition, whereas in the later the contact is understood as the *vyāpāra* and the axe as the *karaṇa*. The *karaṇa* in the second definition is the final cause, but it is so through its operation (*vyāpāra*) that comes between the *karaṇa* and the effect. The second view is, according to Matilal, almost generally accepted among the Navya-naiyāyikas. 250 In reference to the discussion on *parāmarśa* it is, in my view, important to notice that the definition of the causal role of *parāmarśa* is very much linked to the understanding of *karaṇa*.251

*Parāmarśa* is sometimes translated as “consideration” or “confirmatory cognition”.252 Both of these translations taken together convey fairly well, in my opinion, the use of the term *parāmarśa* within the analysis of *anumāna*, but this double aspect would prove an awkward translation, and therefore *parāmarśa* will remain untranslated in this work.

2.2.4 *Upādhi*

*Upādhi* could be understood as a concept used within two distinct spheres of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discourse. Ontologically it refers to a generality that is not a proper generality (*jāti*) within the system of categories (*padārthha*). Epistemologically it refers to a property of any relation that is contingent or “non-natural”, that is, a relation characterized by *upādhi* is seen as irregular and adventitious. It is the later kind of *upādhi* that is related to, and contrasted with *vyāpti*. 253

*Upādhi* is something whose presence points to a variable relation, in contrast to the invariability of the relation of *vyāpti*. It is important to note that whereas *vyāpti* is a relation, or rather the characteristics of a relation, *upādhi* is an entity that in turn affects the nature of a given relation. A classic example of this is the following pseudo-inference:

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251 See also section 5.5.1 below.  
Pratijñā: The mountain has smoke.

Hetu: Because the mountain has fire.

Upādhi: Wet fuel.\textsuperscript{254}

In this pseudo-inference the \textit{sādhyā} is smoke and the \textit{sādhanā} is fire, and if fire would stand in the relation of \textit{vyāpti} to smoke every instance of fire should also be an instance of smoke. But this is not the case since there is fire without smoke, for example in a glowing lump of iron. The knowledge of presence of fire does not, in this case, lead to the knowledge of presence of smoke; in other words, fire cannot function as a \textit{liṅga} (mark) of smoke. Fire produces or causes smoke only when there is moisture in the fuel used for burning, or put another way, smoke is dependent upon wet fuel in order to be existent. Wet fuel thus has an erratic existence in relation to fire; it is not an essential “natural” ingredient of fire, but rather a thing coming from the “outside” as it were. In a somewhat more technical manner \textit{upādhi} is defined as that which is “a non-pervader of the \textit{sādhanā} while being a pervader of the \textit{sādhyā}” (\textit{sādhyavyāpaka sati sādhanāvyāpakaḥ}).\textsuperscript{255} Wet fuel is an \textit{upādhi} since it is always present where smoke is present, but it is not always present where fire is present.\textsuperscript{256}

The presence of an \textit{upādhi} points to a failing \textit{vyāpti}, in the sense that the relation which is supposed to be invariable is in fact shown to be variable. In that sense an \textit{upādhi} points to a deviation (\textit{vyabhicāra}) in the relation of the \textit{sādhanā} to the \textit{sādhyā}. In an “inference for another”, that is, in a discussion where inferences are used, the \textit{upādhi} functions as an “undercutter”. An opponent can expose the proponent’s seeming inference as a pseudo-inference by pointing out the presence of an \textit{upādhi} in the relation between the \textit{sādhanā} and the \textit{sādhyā}.

In an “inference for oneself” the search for an \textit{upādhi} can function as a remover of doubt if an \textit{upādhi} is not found, and as a confirmer of doubt if found. In that sense \textit{upādhi} plays an important role in the process of establishing a certainty of \textit{vyāpti}. If the possibility of the presence of an \textit{upādhi} is taken away, the process of coming to inferential knowledge can continue. If the presence of an \textit{upādhi} is confirmed, the process comes to a halt and inferential knowledge is not generated.

As for the translation of \textit{upādhi}, Phillips has contributed an extended discussion on this in his translation of the \textit{upādhi} section in Gaṅgeśa’s TC.

\textsuperscript{254} TS (1969) p. 61.
\textsuperscript{255} TS (1969) p. 60. There are many different definitions of \textit{upādhi} within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, cf. Gangopadhyay (1971) pp. 146-164. Cf. also text [41-42] in this work for Vallabha’s definition.
Phillips above all directs his critique, and rightly so, towards the fairly common translations of *upādhi* as “additional condition” or “associate condition”. Both of these translations can lead to the misunderstanding that an *upādhi* has the power to change a pseudo-inference into an inference, which it might actually have in some cases, if one takes the *upādhi* as a *sādhana* instead of the faulty original *sādhana*.257 This, however, does not appear to be the function, that is, the use of an *upādhi*.258 Phillips’s critique is also leveled by Kitagawa, although he does not propose an alternative translation, as does Phillips.259 Phillips’s suggestion is “undercutting condition” or “undercutter”, and in my view this mirrors well the function of an *upādhi*. The translation is, however, not used in this work since it is formulated within contemporary European/American theories of logic and epistemology and in order to fully comprehend the semantic sphere of “undercutter” in Phillips’s work one has to be acquainted with predicate logic.260 Hence *upādhi* remains untranslated in this work.

2.2.5 Tarka

*Tarka* is a concept that has at least two distinct meanings within the Indian philosophical discourse, one general and one more specific/technical. In a general sense *tarka* means reasoning, a philosophical reasoning sometimes tied to the domain of debate.261 In a more specific way, which is the main concern in this work, it signals a certain kind of reasoning that can prove helpful within the process of knowledge. In some schools, for example Jainist ones, *tarka* is seen as an instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in itself.262

*Tarka* is explained in TS and TSD as reasoning that expresses a concomitance relation between two entities, not entities given in perception but imagined, or rather conjured up, and expressed in a hypothetical sentence. Annamibhaṭṭa describes this expression as following: “If there would not be fire, neither would there be smoke”.263 He does not elaborate on why this is used and in which situations, but the TSD adds that *tarka* is a help for means of knowledge (*pramāṇa pramāyājanayāyājanandahakatva*) and the sub-commentary *Nilakanṭhaprakāśika* explains further that *tarka* can function as a means to remove obstacles in the process of coming to knowledge.264

257 According to Phillips this is not the case with every *upādhi*. Phillips (2002) pp. 21, 27f.
258 Cf. section 5.3.2 in this work.
259 Kitagawa (1965) p. 432 (23).
261 *Tarka* appears in texts as early as the *Brāhmaṇa* and some of the *Upaniṣad*. See Vidyabhusana (1970) p. 23.
262 See for example Bagchi (1953) pp. 54ff. and Bhattacharya (1994) pp. 204ff.
Tarka could be explained as a kind of hypothetical or conditional argument brought into play when doubt stalls the process of knowledge. The reasoning is hypothetical in that it does not originate from an object that is perceived, from a factual situation. Tarka is imagined or visualized, that is, constructed within the mind of the person reasoning. The tarka, when functioning as supportive of an argument (antukālataarka), points to such an absurd or unbelievably contradictory consequence that the entertaining of the doubt or hesitation is dropped. When reasoning like this in the case of the inference on smoke and fire, the doubt consists of the contrary view of the idea about the concomitance between smoke and fire: –Could there be smoke without fire? And the tarka reasoning answers –no, if there is no fire, there could not be any smoke. The absurdity here would be the denial of the causal relation between fire and smoke, the fact that smoke actually is caused by fire. Although in particular cases of this relation it might not perhaps be likely that one entertains a doubt; if one sees smoke billowing out from a room one tends to call the fire-department rather than wait around doubting the presence of fire. There are limits to doubt and Udayana, for example, mentions in his Nyāyakusumāñjali that one should not entertain doubt in contradiction to ones’ own actions.\(^{265}\)

It might be clarifying here to separate between the form and function of tarka. The form of tarka points to how a tarka reasoning is expressed and the nature of that expression. In this sense it is, I think, helpful to speak of tarka as a hypothetical, or rather, conditional reasoning. In this sense it could also be divided into several kinds of tarka, which has been done throughout the history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya.\(^{266}\) But this does not convey the whole meaning of tarka within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discourse, because the function of tarka is not best understood in terms of being hypothetical. It appears that the function of tarka is as a sort of auxiliary component of the inference, something that can promote the reaching of anumiti (inferential knowledge) when doubt is stalling the process. It is very important to notice that it is only in the case of doubt that it is helpful. It is not a regular feature of the inferential process, and is thus dependent upon the individual entertaining or not entertaining doubt. A further clarifying matter in connection to tarka is the division of different kinds of cognition that appear in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.\(^{267}\) Tarka is characterized as a kind of cognition that is unreal in the sense of being non-objective. It is imagined and thus hypothetical. This has been pointed out as one of the reasons why tarka can

\(^{265}\) Udayana’s comment appears to answer an objection about the possibility of an endless series of doubt about concomitance. See Dravid (1996) pp. 245, 248. See also p. 142 in this work.

\(^{266}\) For different classifications of tarka see for example Potter (1995) p. 207, NK pp. 325f. and Bagchi (1953) pp. 151ff. Since Vallabha does not deal with classifications of tarka this will not be treated in this work.

\(^{267}\) Cf. above section 2.2.1.
never be regarded as a regular member (aṅga) of the inferential process, as for example parāmarṣa is. Neither could it be regarded as an independent instrument of knowledge, since its object is imaginary and hence, in that sense, unreal.

There are a number of different suggestions concerning the translation of tarka. Bharadwaja renders tarka as “contrafactual conditional”, Phillips has “dialectical reason”, Wada has “hypothetical argument” and “reductio ad absurdum”, Bagchi has “inductive reasoning”, “reasoning” and “reductio ad absurdum” as a description of tarka’s form. Potter, on the other hand, does not give any direct translation, he uses tarka but informs us of its hypothetical character. In this work I have chosen not to translate tarka since it is virtually impossible to find a corresponding word that does not gravely diminish its complexity. In that sense Bharadwaja’s “counterfactual conditional” covers a great deal of semantic space, but on the other hand it is too awkward a translation to use.

2.2.6 Concluding remarks on anumāna

Inference, in a wide sense also incorporating tarka and upādhi, could be understood as being both psychologically and epistemologically treated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. It is psychological insofar as it offers an analysis of the mental processes that take place when we come to know things, or when we do not come to know things. It is epistemological in the sense that it contains prescripts for validity and means for reaching certainty. This phenomenon has been and still is a point of discussion, and the interpretative distinctions that are made in the secondary discourse dealing with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika differ. Chatterjee, for example, makes an interesting distinction between psychological and logical grounds of inference. The concept of vyāpti and its validity comprises the logical, whereas the concept of pakṣatā (the being an inferential subject), and presence of doubt or absence of certainty, comprises the psychological. Pakṣatā forms a condition of the inferential process; without it there would be no inference at all. That is, without the mountain in the inference there would be nothing to infer about anything. The mountain functions as a pakṣatā only when there is a desire to infer. At other times it is just a mountain, so to speak. Siderits, on the other hand, distinguishes between logical and epistemological aspects of the

270 This view changes within the later tradition. In TS for example, this is no longer seen as a necessary condition of inferential knowledge, although it is not denied that doubt or desire may precede an inferential process. Cf. Bhattacharya (1983) p. 197 and Chatterjee (1950) pp. 255f.
271 Chatterjee (1950) pp. 254f. This is also mentioned by Mohanty (1992) p. 102.
analysis of *anumāna* where the epistemological aspect roughly equals the above in being prescriptive, and the logical concerns ideas about validity.\textsuperscript{272} Phillips, in his analysis of Gaṅgeśa, points out the psychological concerns that are interwoven with logical and epistemological considerations. Phillips does not, however, discuss these distinctions.\textsuperscript{273} As has been showed above, in the introduction, scholars like Mohanty and Matilal have pointed to the epistemological and psychological aspects of the treatment of *anumāna*, Mohanty emphasizes a phenomenological perspective whereas Matilal employs an analytical one.

\textsuperscript{272} Siderits (2003) pp. 304, 305.  
3. Sanskrit text

3.1 A note on notation and the lack of manuscript references

Below is the Sanskrit text of the NL chapter on *anumāna*, given in a separate section with a separate system of notation set apart from the rest of the present work. The footnotes display different readings in the three different editions of the text. In presenting a Sanskrit text here, I have used the Chowkhamba edition as my point of departure. This is the only edition with co-edited commentaries, and since these are used in the translation given here the Chowkhamba edition is an obvious choice. There are, however, some differences between the three editions, and I have chosen to give information, in footnotes, about the readings that differ from the edited text in the Chowkhamba edition. In some cases I have read differently than the Chowkhamba edition, selected one of the alternate readings or a reading from another edition. All of these minor changes are accounted for in the footnotes. The readings differing from the Chowkhamba edition are all chosen on grounds of understanding, that is, when the meaning of one passage becomes obscure with one reading and clear with another, the latter is chosen.

I would like to stress that the Sanskrit text provided in this work is not a critical edition; it could not be since it is not based on manuscript readings. It is, however, the text that has been translated, and therefore it seems important to include it in the present work, at least for the sake of clarity. No single one of the three extant editions of NL has any remarks on how many or which manuscripts of NL that have been used. There is furthermore no information on where the manuscripts are located or how old they are. This is, needless to say, a source of difficulty for a translational project such as this. There is however a possibility that the editors have used, at least partially, the same manuscripts, since the alternative readings given in footnotes sometimes coincide in all of the editions.

As said previously, I have followed the Chowkhamba edition in its division of passages of the whole *anumāna* chapter. Thus the Sanskrit text is divided into four separate sections: *anumāna*, *vyāpti*, *tarka*, and *parāmarśa*. There is, however, one irregularity in connection to this appearing in the NL text itself. The section on *tarka* does not end with the usual “*iti*” as do the other sections, and neither does the *parāmarśa* section begin with a question
or a statement of the subject matter as do the other three sections. I have, nevertheless, divided the last section on tarka and parāmarśa in two separate sections, following the Chowkhamba edition. This is also the division mentioned in the foreword to the Jaipur work as well. 274

3.1.1 Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used only within this present chapter. I have not used standard text-critical signs in order to avoid the text being mistaken for an edition. In this, clarity, as always, is the guiding principle.

Ch. Chowkhamba edition.


n. Alternate reading given in footnote in one of the editions.

t. Reading chosen in one of the edited texts.

° Marks the space within which the text is altered.

3.2 Transliterated text

(489) athā\textsuperscript{275} numānam ucyate. tad asiddham adhyakṣasyaivānumānatvāt. tathā hi tat pratibandhasiddhisāpeśaṃ. sa ca na sāmāṇyayoḥ, yatra dhūmatvām yad\textsuperscript{276} dhūmatvam iti vā niyāmyogāt.

vyaktyantarbhāvēna niyatātke katipayāntarbhbhāve na\textsuperscript{277} sarvopasānīhāravatī vyāpiḥ. (490) samagrāntarbhbhāvasya\textsuperscript{278} tu desākālavyāvadher bhūyodarśanānāṁ tatrābhāve (491) aśakyaśtrāt. ata eva na vyaktīnāṁ na cobhayor iti.

tasmād anākaliyatavyābhicēradahanāsahacaritadhūmādisaṁvedanavasena kṛśānumātraṃ atra smaryate\textsuperscript{279} tena ca\textsuperscript{280} smaryāmāṇenaṁsāṁsargārghat. saṁsārgavyāvahāre saṁvādavisarṇvādābhyām anumāṇatadābhbāsasyavasthītī astu.

maiavam. na hy ayam arthaḥ prayakṣagocaraḥ. tad abhāvāt. anumāna-prāmāṇyasvikāre tenaiva vyāghātāc ca\textsuperscript{281} nāpi sāṁśayikaḥ. anumānena sādhanadūṣanavyāvasthānupaprattēḥ.

evam evāsvēt iti cet, na, aniścī(492)trapratibandhatvān nedam anumānāṁ tathābhūtāṁ ca vyāptiniścayahetor abhāvād iti svayaṃ evānumānena dūṣanopasānīhārāt. vādiprātiśadāhanyoṣ ca pratyakṣena saṁvādānupaladheḥ. anumānasya prāmāṇyasāṁvādānupaladbheḥ.\textsuperscript{282}

anumānasya prāmāṇyāntarasāṁvāḍāṁ vinā prāmāṇyāvyāhārāgracaravīṇāṅgikārāt. sāṁsārgajānānasyaiva saṁsārgavyāvahāraḥhetuśtvāt. na ca pratibandhāvedanam. vyāktyāmnāyaṁbhītajātāṁbhīṣat. mātṛrāthasyāpi puraskṛtajātiyāvāṅkārtkātvakṣeyiśeṣanāṁ\textsuperscript{283} nupādānāṛ(493)patvāt. tādṛśasya katipayāviṣayabhūyodarśanājanamśāṁkārasacīvābhīyendriyavedvādyatvāt.\textsuperscript{284}

tathaiva śakter avasāyāt. anyathopādāṅdādivyāvahāravālayāt. na hi drśṭam upādeyam upātattvāt. nāpy anāgatam. anavagatattvāt. na ca tad evānumītam. anavagataniyamattvāt. (494) na ca jātiṁ anumeyā. tasyā anupādeyatvenānumāṇāvirodhāt. na ca jātiṁ kāraṇāsambandhānupā-

\textsuperscript{275} Ben. t. "atha" omitted.
\textsuperscript{276} Bom. t. "yacca", Ch. n. "yacca"
\textsuperscript{277} Ch. t. "katipayāntarbhbhāvena", Ben. t. "katipayāntarbhbhāve na". Ben. t. as alternate reading chosen.
\textsuperscript{278} Ch. n. "samāntarbhbā".
\textsuperscript{279} Ben. t. "mātram avadhāryate", Ben. n. "mātram avasmaryate".
\textsuperscript{280} Ben. t. "ca" omitted.
\textsuperscript{281} Ben. t. "vyāghātāḥ", "ca" omitted.
\textsuperscript{282} Ben. t. "anumānasya...ānupaladbhe" omitted.
\textsuperscript{284} Bom. t. "tādṛśasya".

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patter\textsuperscript{285} vyaktim ākşipati. hetau saty anantarabhāvasya hetvabhāve
astu jātimati vyaktir\textsuperscript{287} iti cet, na, upādeavyakter anavagamāt. tato jāti-
mattayāśeavyaktivirbhāsas tāvat siddhāh. anyāthā cetanamātra-
pravṛttivilayāpattē.
atra ca katipayavyaktigocarasaṁśkarāsaḥakṛtasya (495) cākṣuṣa\textsuperscript{288} eva
sāmarthyam. ananyathāsiddhānāvavyavyatiśekalāt.\textsuperscript{289} doṣasahākāraśād
asannihitapadārthā\textsuperscript{290} pratiḥāṣā iva viparyayapratipattīṣu, jāteś ca kāryatvena
sāhacaryavirodhāt. [īti] anumānam.

(496) kā punar vyāptī. sādhanaśyāhityam kāṛṣṇyena\textsuperscript{291}, na
(498)\textsuperscript{292} punar anupādhītvam\textsuperscript{293}, anaikāntike sopādhītvodbhāvanāpattē\textsuperscript{294}.

(500)\textsuperscript{295} nāpī sādhyaśāvavirodhāh. anavayini pratibandhāsiddhiprāptēḥ.
(501) kiṃ punar asyā laksāṇam. anupādhīkatvam\textsuperscript{296}. kiṃ punar upādhītvam.
(502) sādhyaakṛtinasahacakārīṇāḥ sādhanaikadeśāvṛttītvam.
ata eva ca\textsuperscript{297} na (510)\textsuperscript{298} kṛṭakatvā śādhane śāyavavatvam. vaiparītye vā
nopaḍhī\textsuperscript{299}.

sa (511) cāyām kvacī niścitobhayārūpaḥ. [yathā prameyatvē kṛṭakatvam.
kva cin niścitānātārarūpaḥ. yathā maitratanayatvē\textsuperscript{300} sākāyāhāra\textsuperscript{301} (512)
pariṇatīthi. kvacī niścitacaramārūpaḥ\textsuperscript{302} ]\textsuperscript{303} yathā pārthiḥtvē prasīthilasaṁ-
yogtvam.
aniścitobhayārūpo 'nirūpita rūpaḥ ca deśakālāsādhyaśetaravṛttītvam
anumānamātṛavyabhāvāra-vicchedakatvān nopaḍhīḥ.

(513) unnyate ca bāḍha\textsuperscript{304} vyābhicārānuśīkṣakābhāvapratikīla-tarkaiḥ,
yathā dahanetaratvāṃ kṛṭakatvāte prameyatvē kṛṭakatvam. maitratanayatvē

\textsuperscript{285} Ch. t. °pattir°. Alternate reading chosen according to Ch. n. °pattar° and Ben. t. °patter°.
\textsuperscript{286} Ch. t. °anupapalabdhē\v{h}} is corrected to anupalabdhē.
\textsuperscript{287} Ch. n. °vyāptiri°.
\textsuperscript{288} Bom. t. °sya sacakṣuṣa°, Bom. n. °sya cākṣu°.
\textsuperscript{289} I have added a danda since the sandhi suggests it.
\textsuperscript{290} Ben. t. °padārthasārthaprati°, Bom. n. °padārthasārthaprati°.
\textsuperscript{291} Ben. t. °kārtasārjena°.
\textsuperscript{292} p. 497 consists only of commentary.
\textsuperscript{293} Bom. n. °anāupādhītvam°.
\textsuperscript{294} Ch. t. °nāpattī\v{h}}. Alternate reading chosen according to; Ch. n. °nāpatte\v{h}, Bom. t.
°nāpattē°, Ben. t. °nāpattē°.
\textsuperscript{295} p. 499 consists only of commentary.
\textsuperscript{296} Ben. t. °anupādhītvam°, Bom. t. °anupādhītvam®°, Bom. n. °anupādhīkatvam®°.
\textsuperscript{297} Bom. t. °ca° omitted.
\textsuperscript{298} pp. 502-509 consist only of commentary.
\textsuperscript{299} Bom. t. °nopādhītvam°.
\textsuperscript{300} Ben. t. °tanaye°.
\textsuperscript{301} Ben. t. °sākāhāra°.
\textsuperscript{302} Bom. n. °caram svarāpam°.
\textsuperscript{303} Ch. n. °etan madhyasthātī pāthas tādapatrapustakā trītītah.° It appears that the text
between the brackets is corrupt in some way due to damage of the manuscript. The other
editions do not mention this or have any alternate readings.
\textsuperscript{304} Ben. n. °bādhavāvyabhāvāvyabhicāra°.
śākādyaḥhārapariṇātiḥ. upalabhyyamānasparśatve cākṣuṣatvam iti. [iti] vyāptiḥ.305

(514) Atha kas tarkaḥ. eka dharmābhyyupagame dvitiyasya niyata-prāptirūpaḥ.
(515) nanu kim etasya phalaṃ. vipakṣajñāsānivṛttiḥ śaṅkānivṛttiḥ vā (516) tannyūnatā vā.
nādyah. anumāṇād eva tat siddheḥ. na dvitiyāḥ. (517) anumāṇa-vaiyarythyāt.

niścayārthani 306 tad iti cet.
na. tata eva śaṅkānivṛttir api siddheḥ 307 na tritiyāḥ. nyūnāyā anyūnāyā vā anumāṇanivartaniyavyatvena tannyūnatvāpādana 308 vaiyarythyāt.
nanu anumāṇān 309 karaṇatvena vyāpāratayā tarkam apekṣata iti cet. na. dātrādau dṛḍhamuṣṭiṇispidanādvyāpāravatyreke chidānupattivat

(518) tarkājñānān 310 vinā śānāyāvāntaravypārāḥ syāt tad anupakārakām nedam anumāṇānagam. atrocyate. anumāṇānukūla 311 pratibhandha 312 niścayotpattau vyābhicāra-śaṅkānivṛttiḥtivānepaṣyopayogāt.

sa cāyam āhāyāroparūpāḥ. (519) āropitaḥetusamutthattvāt bādhitā-visayavāc ca. koṭidvayopanipātē (520) caikakotiparigrahasya yady arthatvāt.
tathāpi kiṁ bhūyodarsanāpeksayā, vyābhicārasandehasya tatrāt sattvāt. vipakṣa 313 bā 314 dhakasyaitadabhāve ‘pi tulyātvāt. upādhyabhāvāsyā cānukūlā- tarkavedavyatvād iti cet.

maivam. (521) prathamato niyatasarivandanaḥbhāvāt. anyathottaratra 315 sandēhānupapateḥ. brāhmaṇaḥvaratnatva 316 śādṛṣyānāṁ tathā saty avabhāse uttarakālam praçura 317 dārsanasya vaparītaśaṅkāmātraviccchedhalatāpateḥ bhūyaḥ sāhiyey tu niyatasarvandana-vayavasthitau tatprāmāṇyā eva (522) sandēhāt. tarkasya 318 tadapanodakatvāt.

(523) tad etad vyāptismṛtipakṣadharmaḥtāsānivandanātmaṃ.

anyānanubhavāt kāryasyāśmād evopapatteḥ.

305 Bom. t. “iti vyāpti”.
306 Ch. n. “niṣayatvān”, Ben. t. “niṣayatvān”.
307 Bom. t. “tatsiddheḥ”.
308 Ch. t. “nyūnatvāpāyana”, Ben. t. “nyūnatvāpādana”. Alternate reading chosen according to; Bom. t. and Ch. n. “nyūnatvāpādana”.
310 Bom. t. “jñāne vi”.
311 Bom. n. “kūlapraṭ”, Ben. t. “kūlapraṭ”.
312 Bom. t. “pratibandha”; Bom. n. “pratibandha”.
313 Ch. t. “vipakṣebadha”. Alternate reading chosen according to; Ch. n. “vipakṣa”, Ben. t. “vipakṣabhadha”.
314 Ch. n. “vipakṣavā”.
316 Ch. n. “brāhmaṇatva kāthātvaśiśā”, Ben. t. “brāhmaṇatva kāthātvaśiśā”.
318 Bom. t. “tarkasayitadapa”.
na ca liṅgaḥ saṁvedananāṁ vastutas tadvisayarāṁ vidūrāt tad-viśeṣānāvabhāse janakam, liṅgaṭvollekhitaya tujanakam ekavedanāṁ eva paryavasyaṭṭi vācyam.
niyama saṁvedananapaskṛtajātyuluḥkād evopapatteḥ(524). anyathā parāmarśe ṭye upapalavāt.
na ca pakṣadharmatā saṁvedanam hetor eva jātam ity upanayasya pīṇḍitaḥ visayateti vācyam.
tasya pariṅgatāpannāṁ liṅgamātraviśayatvād iti kecit. tan na (525)yathā vyabhicārāgrahe’ pi vyabhicāraḥsaṅkāyāṁ nānumānām, tathā vyāpyapakṣadharmayor vaijāẏāgrahe’ pi vaijāẏasaṅkāyāṁ nānumānām, hetor vyāpyatvāsiddhatvāt.
tasmād vyāpyapakṣadharmayor ekajātyaḥ vedanam anumitikāraṇaṁ vācyam. sa eva parāmarśa iti. anumānām. 330
4. Translation and comments

4.1 Introduction

The guiding principle of the present translation has been to try to retain the specific style of Vallabha’s text in the translation. It has been my wish that the economy of expression in the text should be visible in the translation. The high degree of implicitness of arguments and counterarguments is also something that I have tried to make visible. There is of course no principle that can be followed blindly, and hence there are passages where the translation moves quite far away from the original expression; this is done when clarity would otherwise be altogether lost. In principle I have tried to stay close to the Sanskrit expression in passages whose interpretation is tentative and still unclear. In passages with a working interpretation, however, I have allowed for a higher degree of explanatory translation. Needless to say, this is a task of weighing alternative routes against each other, as is all translation.

In the cases when the commentaries have been crucial to my interpretation, the relevant passages from the commentaries are cited in footnotes. Usually they are elaborated upon in the comments section following the translation. Both of the commentaries contain a number of typos, and in the cases where I have amended the text this is recorded in the footnotes. Both the KB and the P commentaries are quite uneven as to degree of explanatory comments, and sometimes entire passages of Vallabha’s text remain unaccounted for. This fact is of course reflected in the translation and comments section. There are also internal Navya-nyāya debates going on in the commentaries, especially in Vardhamana’s Prakāśa on the vyāpti section. These debates will not be addressed here; the commentaries are analysed only with regard to how Vallabha’s text is explained. During this work I have noticed a tendency to resort more often to the KB for explanation than to the P. This is due to the fact that I have found the KB easier to understand, and also that it generally contains more explanatory comments than P.

The purpose of the comments section is threefold. First of all the comments are included as an explanation of the contents of the translation, as a guide to the reading of the translation, and as an explanation of the interpretations made. Secondly they are intended to give the reader an understanding of the argumentative structure of the translation, to inform the
reader about who is saying what, when this information has been possible to provide. This also entails a kind of argument analysis in order to discern what kinds of arguments are employed, for example counter-argument, supportive argument, main-argument and so on. Thirdly, the purpose of the comments is to reveal interpretational problems and alternative routes. All three of these elements are not present in every single comment; they rather form an overall structure of the intention behind the comments section as a whole.

As for brackets in the translation, they have been used in order to clarify the Sanskrit text; most frequently in the vyāpti section. As will be apparent Vallabha’s text is generally very brief, nearly to the point of being summary.
4.2 Anumāna

4.2.1 Translation

Now the inferential process will be discussed.

[Cārvāka] It (i.e. inference) is not established since perception itself is inference. That is to say, [inference] is dependent on the establishment of an invariable relation.331 And this [relation] is not [established] between two generalities, because a restriction (niyama), [in the form] “where there is smokeness [there is fireness]” or “that which is smokeness [is fireness]”, is impossible.332

If [the relation is] restricted as being included amongst (i.e. holding between) particulars [then] when being included [only] amongst some particulars, the invariable relation does not comprise all the cases, because an inclusion of all [particulars] is impossible when repeated observations are absent in this case, due to the separation in time and space. Therefore [an invariable relation] is neither [established] between particular entities nor between both [i.e. a particular and a generality].333

Therefore, here (i.e. in the case of knowledge of fire) only fire is remembered by means of an apprehension of smoke etc. accompanied by fire whose deviation [from smoke] is not observed. And because there is no grasping of a non-relation of [smoke] with that (i.e. fire) which is being remembered335 [by means of the above apprehension], the determination [of

331 In NL the term “vyāpi” is seldom used for the invariable relation but rather the terms “niyata” (restricted), “niyama” (restriction) and “pratibandha” (i.e. connection). “Niyata” and “niyama” are derivative from ni yam, meaning, among other things, to restrain, control, govern, restrict, and regulate. Cf. also NK (1996) p. 426, tadvadanyāvṛttitvam. vyāpti iti yāvat (gaś siddhaḥ). yathā kārye kāraṇaṁtyamah ity atra kārye kāraṇavadanyāvṛttitvaruṇo niyamah. yathā dhūme vahinādanyāvṛttitvam.


334 A note on the translation of vyavahāra is indeed called for here. The use of this concept can in a sense be termed vague since it cannot be translated into a single corresponding word or concept. Vyavahāra has a general meaning of “practice”, “behavior” or “custom”. But it can also have the more specific meaning of “verbal behavior”. In the Nyāyakośa it is explained as the activity of using words. See NK (1996) pp. 825f. I have here chosen the wider translation including human behavior other than verbal, viz. mental and physical as well. For example behavior such as a person looking for the warmth of a fire when walking through a village and upon seeing smoke from a hut walking over to that place. Vyavahāra may also have a meaning near to cognizing or apprehending/understanding, and I think this should be included within the semantic sphere in this case. Cf. K (1971) p. 124: 4-5, 19-20, V (1931) p. 455:19-25.

this] as an inferential process or as the [mere] appearance [of such a process] can be made through corroboration or non-corroboration in respect to everyday practice of relation.336

[13-15]
[Vallabha] This is not the case. This (i.e. artha)337 is not within the range of perception, because that [perception] is absent there. Furthermore, because there is a contradiction precisely with this (i.e. your own view) when you accept inference as a valid means of knowledge. And this [practice of relation]338 is not doubtful, because [in that case] it would be impossible to establish either a refutation or a proof by inference.339

[16-21]
[Cārvāka]340 -Let it be just like that then (i.e. that it is impossible to establish either a refutation or a proving by inference).

[Vallabha] -No, because you yourself conclude a refutation [when stating] that “this is not inference because the invariable relation is not determined, and it is so because of the absence of a reason for ascertainment of vyāpti.” Because the corroboration of the proof (sādhana) of the proponent and the opponent cannot be grasped by means of sense perception. Because of a non-grasping of a non-corroboration of inference being a means of knowledge. Because without a corroboration by another means of knowledge it is not accepted that inference is [included within] the scope of an everyday practice of a means of knowledge. Because an everyday practice of a relation is caused by a cognition of a relation.

[22-26]
And it is not the case that there is no grasping of an invariable relation, because the appearance of a generality (jāti) encompasses all and every one

336 Pv (1991) pp. 491-492, asaṁsargeti. vyavahārasatvādāvasatvādāu cāviḍyamāṇa-vidyamāṇāsamsargāgahanibandhanāv iti bhāvāḥ. sattvādāna vācya iti. tvāyā tathāvāhyapagamād iti bhāvāḥ.

337 P (1991) p. 491, na hy ayam artha iti. tasmiṁ anākālītvyābhicāretyādānā pratipāditaḥ. That which is not within the range of sense perception appears to be “an apprehension of smoke etc. accompanied by fire whose deviation [from smoke] is not observed”.

338 KB (1991) p. 491, asaṁsargāgahādūhino 'yam vyavahāro 'nyathā veti sāṁśayika ity arthaḥ. I have amended the KB in the case of asaṁsargāgraḥa, it reads asaṁsargagrāha but that makes no sense.


341 The verb niścī has the meanings of “to ascertain”, “determine”, “decide”, “settle”, “to be convinced”, and “resolve”. It is important to bear in mind that this is a cognition; “niścīyata” is classified as “buddhi” in the NK (1996) p. 440. Cf. also text and translation [60, 67].

79
(mātra) of the particulars. As for the purpose of the word “mātra” this is used because of an exclusion of the characterizations of particulars different from the two indicated generalities [dhūmatva and vahnitva]. Because such an [invariable connection] is grasped by an outer sense assisted by mental traces that are produced from repeated observations of some particulars; because it is determined by the power [of the traces] in this manner. [Also] Because otherwise the everyday practice of appropriating etc. is destroyed. For that which was seen (i.e. by sense perception) is not to be appropriated, because it has already been appropriated. Nor is it a future [object] because it (i.e. a future object) is not perceived.

[27-30] Nor is that [future object] inferred, because the restriction (i.e. invariable relation) is not apprehended. Nor is the generality to be inferred, because in as much as it cannot be appropriated it is incompatible with inference. And it is not so that the generality implies the particular since the connection to a cause is not established. Because in the case of a generality it is not perceived that it exists when the cause is present, and it does not exist when the cause is absent.

[31-33] [Cārvāka] –Let the particular possess a generality. [Vallabha] –No, because a particular to be appropriated is not apprehended. Therefore the appearance of all particulars is indeed established as possessing a generality. Because otherwise the activity of every sentient being would be impossible.

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342 According to KB, (1991) pp. 492f., this is an answer to an anticipated objection concerning the use of the word mātra. vyaktimātreti. sarvvyaktity arthaḥ. nana jāityupagraheśa sāmāntyataḥ na tu vyaktimātrasye mātrapadān anarthakaṁ ity āha –mātrapadam anarthakam ity āha. 343 This passage, uncommented upon, appears in the exact same wording on p. 473. The discussion on that page concerns the existence of an all-knowing being, and is commented upon, but very briefly. KB (1991) p. 473, tathaiveti. sanskārasya svavibhavāmātre jñānajananasaṅkter avasāyād ity arthah. P (1991) p. 473, tathaiveti. bhāvyamātāravāyaka-jñānajananakatvenety arthah. 344 KB (1991) p. 493, upādānāṁ pravṛttiādipadān. The seen, drṣṭa, carries with it the implicatory meaning of experienced. drṣṭa are such things that are possible to apprehend through the senses. 345 P (1991) p. 494, upādeyatvena yadunmatāṁ tasya virodhāt jāter anupādeyatvād ity arthah. 346 The word used in this passage, “āksipati”, can mean “to exclude” but also “to imply”. I have here chosen the latter meaning. Cf. NK (1996) p. 116. 347 KB (1991) p. 494, astu tarhi jātimāti vyaktir ity atrānumeyety āha –astītī. 348 Cetana probably means people in general, i.e. the behavior of every human being.
[34-37]
And here (i.e. on apprehending an invariable relation), the sense of sight, assisted by mental traces whose object consists in several particulars, is capable [of apprehending the invariable relation], [it is apprehended] due to the force of positive concomitance and negative concomitance (anvaya and vyattireka) which could not be established otherwise. [It is not apprehended] due to the influence of [the cognition] being accompanied by faults in an erroneous cognition like the seeming appearance of a remote object, and [it is not apprehended] because the generality, as a result [of an inferential process], is incompatible with concomitance (sāhacarya). That was [the section on] the inferential process.

4.2.2 Comments
[2-4]
The opinion of the Cārvākas here initiates the discussion on inference.350 The Cārvāka opponent says that inference is not established as a separate means of knowledge apart from perception. The reason given for this statement could be expressed in an optional mode: if you, Vallabha, would want to state that inference is a separate means of knowledge, it would depend upon the verification of an invariable relation. This verification is then analysed from two possible angles, either the invariable relation holds between generalities or it holds between particulars. The two generalities smokeness and fireness do not share location, and it is therefore not possible to formulate any rule of an invariable relation such as “where there is smokeness there is fireness” or “that which is smokeness is fireness”. The argument runs from the implicit assumption that fireness is located in fire and smokeness is located in smoke and hence do not have a common location. From Vallabha’s viewpoint this is not the case since smokeness and fireness both are located in the mountain through the particulars, smoke and fire, in which they inhere.

[5-8]
In this passage the second alternative is tried, an invariable relation holding between particulars. In order to establish such a relation one would have to know of all particular instances of smoke and fire together. To know all particulars ever and everywhere is, of course, not physically possible. That the invariable relation comprises all the cases means that the conclusion of the relation should rest upon all the instances of observation of smoke and fire together, but since it is only possible to have access to a limited number

of particulars within a limited space and time, this possibility is ruled out.\footnote{The KB, (1991) p. 490, explains that vyåpti is then to be grasped through particulars in each other’s vicinity. \textit{sannihitavyåktinåtragatyåptigrahe sarvopasaññhårena vyåptigraha iti.}} A third alternative is finally refuted, that the relation holds between a generality and a particular.

\footnote{This is nicely put by the P (1991) p. 491, \textit{nany evam vahyanumåttabåhåve dhåmSadåsanåt katham agnyarthå pravarttety ata åha –tasmåd åti.}}

\footnote{P (1991) p. 491, \textit{na hy ayam artha iti. tasmåd anakålitavyabhicåretyådinå pratipåditaḥ.}}

\footnote{KB (1991) p. 491, \textit{asaśåsargågrådåhådåhino ’yam vyahåhåro ’nyathå verti såmnåyåka ity arthaḥ.}}

\footnote{KB (1991) p. 491, \textit{anumånam na pramånam iti yat sådhiتا aha cånumånapråmåpyam dåśitaṁ tad ahy aha anumåneti.}}
In answer to the above argument the Cārvākas just say: Let it be like this then, that there is no way of establishment, neither of a refutation nor of a proof. To this Vallabha answers that when the Cārvākas themselves refute inference as a means of knowledge they use an inference. This passage thus continues the above argument. Following upon this charge of self-contradiction are a number of reasons why the Cārvāka denial of inference as something other than perception is untenable.

The two discussants here, the vādin (proponent) and the prativādin (opponent), could be identified as Vallabha and a Cārvāka respectively. In a discussion such as this above, the partakers present their views by arguments, the one with faulty arguments loses, and the one with correct, effective arguments wins. In such a discussion it is, in Vallabha’s line of reasoning, impossible to discern whose argument is effective and whose not if the only recourse is to sense perception. Accordingly the P explains that it is necessary to agree upon the existence of inference in order to be able to have a discussion at all. In addition Vallabha seems to say that it is furthermore not possible to argue, when having perception as sole means of knowledge, that inference is not a means of knowledge. And, moreover, there is no other means of knowledge by means of whose corroboration the Cārvāka could establish that perception includes inference.

Vallabha concludes the passage by saying that an everyday practice of relation is caused by a cognition of a relation, and not, as the Cārvākas hold, by a non-apprehension of a non-relation. That non-apprehension of non-relatedness is unable to cause action has previously been argued by Vallabha in the NL. This discussion, with a Mīmāṃsaka opponent, concerns the cause of error (viparyaya). The opponent holds that the non-apprehension of non-relation generates error. Vallabha argues that even in the case of error, for example when mistaking a shell as having connection with silverness, there is a positive cognition of a connection. This cognition causes, in the person seeing the shell, motion towards the shell and also towards the knowledge that the shell is not in connection with silverness, that an error has been made.

With this passage another line of argument begins about the possibility to apprehend the invariable relation. Vallabha states that it is indeed possible to have knowledge of the relation of vyāpti. When a person sees smoke on a
mountain he immediately also knows the generality, “smokeness”, through sense perception as it were, and due to the mental trace (saṃskāra) he remembers that previously seen instances of smoke have always been accompanied by fire and thus knows of “fireness”. And his remembrance then is of smokeness invariably connected to fireness, a remembrance of vyāpti. The word mātra (all), above, is used to exclude other generalities und conducive to the inferential process, such as for example “being made of grass”. For Vallabha, it seems, it is the power (śakti) of the traces to yield a remembrance of smokeness and fireness and not of “grassness” or any other possible generality. So the perception does not, in a sense, consist of every particular instance of smoke and every fire, but rather of the very thing that is common to them all, smokeness and fireness. Without the ability to perceive generality amongst particulars, no activity could be possible. The knowledge of a generality enables us to relate present, past, and future particulars; this knowledge in turn explains our capability to desire and act upon things that are still hidden in the future. This activity would not take place if there were no apprehension of the generality and along with it of every particular that it inheres in. According to Vallabha’s argument here, the Cārvākas, having excluded the possibility of knowing the general, have no way of explaining the activity undertaken, for example the activity towards fire. The implicit counterargument from the Cārvākas appears to be that they are concerned with the particular, towards which action actually is conducted, and not the general. But Vallabha answers that since they do not have any possibility to know of an invariable relation, neither between particulars nor between generalities, they cannot know of particulars in the first place because there is nothing really there to connect the particulars.

The argument concerning the generality is here continued. It seems that the discussion in this passage contains implicit counterarguments from the Cārvākas, and for this I have relied upon the KB commentary. The subsequent implicit Cārvāka objection tries out another line of reasoning and suggests inference here as a way of knowing the generality. But Vallabha points out that a generality is not something which an act could be related to; activity, effort, and desire are, of course, always related to the particular. After this there seems to be yet another implicit argument from the Cārvākas. The interpretation of this, and of Vallabha’s answer, must however remain tentative. According to the implicit argument the generality

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360 I am very grateful for Pt. Venugopalan’s efforts to make sense of this passage.

361 KB (1991) p. 494, nanu pākah kṛtaśādyah pākaṁ pūrvapākavād ity atra pākaṁ evānumeyantac ca pūrvavṛhitam evety āha –na ca jātir iti.

is inferred from a previously existing particular, and then, by implication, the future particular is known. In KB cooking exemplifies a particular and “cookingness” (pākatva) the generality. Cookingness, then, is inferred from a previous cooking particular, and by implication the future cooking particular can be known, and hence be possible to act upon. Vallabha again retorts that this is impossible, since there is no cause-effect relationship between the reason (the cooking activity) and its effect (cookingness). The generality is hence not generated, or produced by the presence of particulars. Since there is no inferring of a generality, there can be no generality to imply a particular.⁶³

[31-33]
The Cårvåkas then try yet another angle and suggest that one knows the particular as possessing a generality. That is, from the knowledge of particulars we know that there must be a generality.⁶⁴ To this Vallabha says: no, it is not so, because action is always directed towards a particular, but this particular can not be known before there is a conception of a generality. And with that the discussion appears to have come full circle. Vallabha concludes that every particular is possible to know precisely because of the presence of a generality in it. This generality is thus a prerequisite of the possibility of activity in respect to particulars, and of course, of the possibility to infer.

[34-37]
Vallabha here clarifies his position. The invariable relation is apprehended by an outer sense, sight, aided by the traces that are generated by repeated observations of particulars. The positive and the negative concomitance could be phrased: “Everywhere there is smoke there is also fire (anvaya) and everywhere fire is absent smoke is also absent (vyatireka)”. Without the ability to apprehend all particulars through the presence of the generality it is not possible to apprehend the negative and the positive concomitance, without which in turn it is not possible to infer at all. The prerequisite for the inferential knowledge of fire is that there is an invariable relation of smoke to fire. To know this invariable relation one has to know that smoke, as we know it, is always—now and in the future—related to fire in this invariable way. This is possible to know because there is a generality, “smokeness”, which gives us knowledge about every particular that this generality inheres in, that is, every smoke-particular there is and ever will be.

⁶³ KB (1991) p. 494, nanu pākatvaṁ jāttir evānumeyā tatra ca kāraṇasya kṛteṣ sambandho 'napapanna iti tadākṣipya vyaktāv eva kṛtsādhyatvaṁ paryavasatiy atā āha –na ceti. tarhi pākatvaṁ kṛtsādhyam ity anumānabādhāṁ na syād eva kṛtas tadanantarāṁ vyakter ākṣepa ity āha –hetau satīti.

But the invariable relation is not apprehended in the case of error, for example when mistaking the fog above the lake for smoke. In this case there is an accompanying mental trace of smokeness, but the connection is mistaken due to some fault or other, for example bad eyesight, that makes something appear where it is not. The function in the text of this passage on non-apprehension of vyāpti however remains unclear.

Nor could the invariable relation be apprehended if one holds that the generality is something that we construe after having apprehended the particular. These last lines are nicely fitted to Vallabha’s previous discussion with the Cārvākas where they argue that the generality is something that we know of after knowing the particular, that is, an inferred generality. With this passage Vallabha concludes the argument concerning the inferential process as a separate means of knowledge.

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365 Cf. translation and comments [31-33].
4.3 Vyāpti

4.3.1 Translation

[38-40]
What then is vyāpti? [vyāpti] is the complete association of the sādhana with the sādhyā. However it is not the state of being without an upādhi, because the state of being with an upādhi would [have to] arise in the case of a deviating sādhana (anaikāntika).366 Nor is it (i.e. vyāpti) the absence of the absence of the sādhyā because in [inferences] which have [only] positive concomitance the invariable relation would not be established.

[41-42]
What then is its differentiating mark? It is the state of being without an upādhi. What then is the state of being an upādhi? [That which has the character of] complete association with the sādhyā has the character of being present in one part [of the locus] of the sādhana.367

[43-44]
And therefore “being composed of parts” is not [an upādhi] for the sādhana “being a product” [and the sādhyā “non-eternal”]. Nor is it upādhi the other way around (i.e. when the sādhana is “having parts” and the upādhi is “being a product”).368

[45-48]
And this [upādhi] sometimes has a form with both [aspects] ascertained. For instance [when] “being a product”369 [is upādhi] for [the sādhana] “cognizable”. And sometimes [the upādhi] has a form with one aspect (i.e. the first aspect) ascertained. For instance [when] “digestion of green vegetables” [is upādhi] for [the sādhana] “being a son of Maitra”. And sometimes [the upādhi] has a form with the last [aspect] ascertained. For

366 The translation of this argument remains tentative, cf. below comments [38-40].
367 This definition of upādhi has two parts: 1) Pervading the sādhyā and 2) Not pervading the sādhana. These two parts will be referred to below as the two aspects (the first and last) of upādhi. Cf. KB (1991) pp. 501, 505, sādhyakṛtsnavahacārināḥ sādhyāvyāpakasya sādhanaikadeśaśrūtvam śaṭānāvyāpakatvam ity arthaḥ.

368 I have used the commentaries here to fill in the gaps. P (1991) pp. 509f. at eveti. śabdo 'nityāḥ kṛtakatvād ity atra sāvayavatvān nopādiḥ śādhyāvyāpakatvāt. vaiparitya itī. paṭo 'nityāḥ sāvayavād ity atra na kṛtakatvam upādiḥ śādhanāvyāpakatvād ity arthaḥ. nisciti, and KB (1991) pp. 505, 510, at eveti. śabdo 'nityāḥ kṛtakatvād ity atra sāvayavatvān nopādiḥ, karmādau sādhyāvyāpakatvāt. vaiparitya itī. paṭo 'nityāḥ sāvayavatvād ity atra kṛtakatvam nopādiḥ śādhanāvyāpakatvād ity arthaḥ. I have amended the KB in the case of sāvayavatvān, it reads sādhanāvavatvam but that makes no sense.
369 The word kṛtakatva could equally well be translated with “being created”.

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instance [when] “loosely connected” [is upādhi] for [the sādhanā]“ of earthly character”.370

[49-50]
The presence in something different from the place [of the sādhanā], the time [of the sādhanā] and the sādhyā [of the sādhanā], which has both [aspects] unascertained and whose nature is indefinite is not an upādhi because it [would] destroy the practice of every inferential process.

[51-54]
And [an upādhi] is set up (unniyate)371 through obstruction [by other means of knowledge] (bādha), deviation (vyabhicāra), absence of conforming tarka (anukūlatakara), and a refutational tarka (pratikutālatakara), as “being other than fire” [is an upādhi] for [the sādhanā] “being a product” [and] as “being created” [is an upādhi] for [the sādhanā] “object of knowledge”. [And] as “digestion of green vegetables” [is an upādhi] for [the sādhanā] “being a son of Maitra” [and] as “being perceptible by the sense of sight” [is an upādhi] for [the sādhanā] “having touch which is being perceived”. 372 That was [the section on] vyāpti.

4.3.2 Comments

[38-40]
With this question Vallabha initiates the section on vyāpti. The definition of vyāpti that Vallabha gives is interpreted so that every sādhanā should share the same locus (sāmānādhi karana) as the sādhyā. This is, at least, the interpretation given in the KB. 373 Following this definition two other definitions of vyāpti are rejected. The first defines vyāpti as that which is characterized by an absence of upādhi, and Vallabha’s subsequent rejection


371 The word “unniyate”, also carries with it the secondary meaning of “being inferred” or “discovered through inference” and the primary meaning of “lead up to” or “bring out from”.

of this remains tentatively interpreted. The rejection may imply that Vallabha means that in the case of a certain faulty inference there is first an absence of vyāpti, and second an inquiry into the faulty inference and subsequently a pointing out of an upādhi that does make sense, and not the other way around. If pointing out an upādhi were the first thing to do, it would not be possible because in certain faulty inferences it is not the presence of upādhi that renders the inference faulty. This, at least, seems to be the interpretation given by KB. 374 In that case it seems that Vallabha finds fault with the negatively stated definition of anupādhitvam insofar as it concerns the nature of vyāpti. In a more specific reading, as is made by Chakraborty, Vallabha could be understood as implying that even though every instance of vyāpti could be said to have absence of an upādhi, it is not so that every instance of a failing vyāpti has an apparent upādhi. Or rather, it is not so that every failing vyāpti fails because of an upādhi. In the case of a deviating sådhana (anaikāntika), when the sådhana is there although the sådhyya is absent, vyāpti remains unestablished, but it is not always the case that there is an upādhi to point to in order to show this. For example when the sådhana is “being cognizable” and the sådhyya is “fire”, it is, according to Vallabha’s definition, an absence of vyāpti that causes the inference to fail. Since there are very many things that are cognizable where fire is not present, water for example, there is deviation in their relation. 375 In this inference it is very difficult to point to an upādhi, given the requirement that it must pervade the sådhyya but only partly co-exist with the sådhana, since the sådhana in this case is omnipresent. From the above it seems that Vallabha’s reading of the anupādhitva (without an upādhi) definition of vyāpti is such that if the nature of vyāpti is anupādhitva then the nature of absence of vyāpti must subsequently be sopādhitva (having an upādhi). But, since this is not the case in all failing instances of vyāpti the definition is too narrow.

The second definition of vyāpti refuted by Vallabha is that a sådhana characterized by vyāpti is such that it appears only in places that have absence of sådhyya. According to Vallabha, this definition fails to cover the so-called kevalānvayini (positive-only inference) where the sådhana and the sådhyya are omnipresent. In a kevalānvayini inference the sådhana and sådhyya are found in every place there is, so it is not possible to ascertain vyāpti if one works with such a definition. This is because there is no possibility to point to a place where both the sådhyya and the sådhana are absent. For example in the inference, “the pot is nameable because the pot is

374 KB (1991) pp. 499f., anaikāntikatatva hi vyāptivirahonnayakatvayā yadi duśananti tadā tatra sopādhikatvam, vad vyāptivirahah prathamah sa evodbhāvyate tathā anumeyam anudbhāvyonnayakodbhāvanāvasaraḥ, aprāptakālātva pateḥ. vyāptivirahurupatvayā ced duṣakatvam yadā kārṣṭryena sambhandho vyāptir ity āyataḥ kārṣṭyābhāvavadd yrttivyayānaikāntikatvasya kārṣṭryena sambhandhābhāvarupatvād ity arthah.
cognizable”, the absence of the sādhyā is not possible to find because everything that exists is by definition nameable (abhīdeyatva) nor is the absence of the sādhana to be found since every existent thing is by definition cognizable (jñeyatva).

[41-42]
In this passage Vallabha defines vyāpti as that which has the character of not having an upādhi.376 After stating this differentiating definition (lakṣaṇa) Vallabha goes on to define upādhi by giving a characterization which could be understood in a twofold way as: 1. pervading the sādhyā and 2. not-pervading the sādhana, i.e. sādhyavyāpaka and sādhanāvyāpaka.377 If these conditions are met by the assumed upādhi, vyāpti is ruled out since there are then places where the sādhana is present but not the sādhyā. One of the most common examples of this is the pseudo-inference whereby smoke is inferred from the presence of fire. The relation of fire to smoke is not characterized by vyāpti, and in this case it is indicated by the upādhi “wet fuel”. The counter instance given is that of a glowing iron ball, where fire exists but not smoke. The upādhi “wet fuel” pervades the sādhyā, i.e. it is present wherever smoke is present, but does not pervade the sādhana, fire, since it is not present in the case of fire in the iron ball.

[43-44]
This extremely abbreviated passage cites two examples of non-upādhi. Most likely this is stated in order to clarify what is meant by upādhi in the first place. Both KB and P have elaborated at length on these examples. The first example is ruled out as an upādhi since the sādhyā, “non-eternal”, is not pervaded by the upādhi, and the second is ruled out because the upādhi pervades the sādhanā, “having parts”. That is to say, they do not meet the above stated requirements of pervading the sādhyā and non-pervading the sādhanā.

The inferences have the following pattern:

1. Pratijñā: Sound is non-eternal.

   Hetu: Because sound is a product.

   Non-upādhi: Having parts.

376 That there are, in fact, two definitions here has, to my knowledge, only been remarked upon by Chakraborty (1978a) p. 217. This will be discussed further below on p. 129.

377 Cf. n. 367 above.
2.

*Pratijñā:* Cloth is non-eternal.

*Hetu:* Because cloth has parts.

*Non-upādhi:* Being a product.

The relation between the three factors in the first example is that everything that has parts is a product and is non-eternal but there are non-eternal, things not composed of parts, like *karma*. In the second example the *upādhi* actually pervades both the *sādhyā* and the *sādhana*, which disqualifies it. “Being a product” is coexistent with both “having parts” and “being non-eternal”. These inferences are both “without upādhi”, and hence they are characterized by *vyāpti*.378

[45-48] Here Vallabha gives three different forms of *upādhi*, with different levels of certainty. The full forms of the examples of the pseudo-inferences are given in the commentaries.

In Vallabha’s first form of *upādhi* both the pervasion of the *sādhyā* and the non-pervasion of the *sādhana* are well established, certain.

1. Both requirements are certain.

*Pratijñā:* Sound is non-eternal.

*Hetu:* Because of being an object of knowledge.

*Upādhi:* Being a product.

Here every produced thing is non-eternal and every produced thing is an object of knowledge, though there are knowable things that are not produced and thus the relation between being an object of knowledge and being non-eternal is not characterized by *vyāpti*.379

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379 KB (1991) p. 511, *yathetī. yathā śabdo* ‘*nityah prameyatvād ity atra kṛtakatvasyopādher ubhayārūpanicayāt…* I have amended the text here. Instead of *prameyatvād* it gives *kṛtakatvā* both as *upādhi* and *sādhanā*. P, (1991) p. 511, on the other hand gives *prameyatvā* as *sādhanā*. 91
The next pseudo-inference is a well-known stock-example and refers to the belief that when a pregnant woman eats too many green leafed vegetables her baby will be born with dark colored skin. The pseudo-inference tries to establish “the being dark-skinned” of a person on the grounds that he is Maitra’s son. Apparently, all sons of the woman Maitra are dark-skinned. Maitra however could have a son who is not dark-skinned as well since “the being dark-skinned” of a child has to do with what the mother has consumed during her pregnancy. This inference exemplifies Vallabha’s second form of upādhi where it is only possible to ascertain the pervasion of the sādhyā, that dark skin in a child depends upon the food eaten by the pregnant woman. The uncertainty lies in the non-pervasion of the sādhanā (being a son of Maitra); will Maitra always eat green vegetables during her pregnancies or will she not?\textsuperscript{380} The upādhi, however, works anyway by showing that the regularity between sādhyā and sādhanā is not, in this case, to be taken for granted.

Another well-known inference serves as an example of the third form of upādhi, where only the non-pervasion of the sādhanā is ascertained.

3. Only sādhanāvyāpaka is certain.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Pratijñā: } He is dark-skinned.
  \item \textbf{Hetu: } Because he is Maitra’s son.
  \item \textbf{Upādhi: } Being caused by eating greens.\textsuperscript{381}
\end{itemize}

It would be quite impossible to have the sādhanā and the upādhi as the same entity since that would be a complete concomitance. The very idea of the upādhi, as expressed here, is that it only partly coexists with the sādhanā.\textsuperscript{380} Cf. Frauwalmer (1970) p. 59.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Pratijñā: } This is scratchable by iron.
  \item \textbf{Hetu: } Because this has earthly character.
  \item \textbf{Upādhi: } Being loosely connected.\textsuperscript{382}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{381} \textit{KB} (1991) p. 511, \textit{anyatararūpaṃ sādhyavyāpakaḥ vaidyakā śākādyāhārarpri-nāmasyā upattikamaraśyāmatvarūpaṃ paryavastusādhyavyāpakaḥ vantiṣaḥ...}
\textsuperscript{382} \textit{KB} (1991) p. 511, \textit{idam lauhaḷekhayaṃ pārthivavād ity atra hīrake hetau satyapi prasīthilasasyogābhāvataḥ sādhanavyāpakaḥ vantiṣaḥ, vyahicāraśaṅkādhiyaḥ kātve sandigdhopādher api dūṣakatvāt sandigdhānākāntikavat.}

92
In this pseudo-inference one tries to establish that something is possible to scratch, or inscribe, with iron on the grounds that it is of “earthly character”\(^{383}\). There are however things of earthly character not possible to scratch with iron, such as diamonds. The relation between sādhana and sādhyya is thus not an invariable concomitance, but is dependent upon whether something is loosely connected or not. Because of the existence of diamonds the sādhana cannot be pervaded by being “loosely connected”. The sādhana-vyāpka of the upādhi is thus established, but the pervasion of the sādhyya is not. Is everything that is scratchable by iron loosely connected? Apparently this is not possible to establish, but the reason for this has not been possible for me to ascertain. I have not come across an explanation of this example in any other source.\(^{384}\) The KB explains it as a doubtful upādhi which is upādhi as well, and thus obstructs the inferential process.\(^{385}\)

This passage has proven very hard to interpret but I have nevertheless made a tentative interpretation. The upādhi could have the form of being altogether doubtful, in which both the pervasion of the sādhyya and the non-pervasion of the sādhana are uncertain and in which case it is not an upādhi. It would have the form of being indefinite, explained in the KB as “there might be some upādhi here”.\(^{386}\) This apparently entails a mere suspicion of an upādhi, but no particular, definite upādhi is pointed to. As for the rest of this passage I have interpreted the compound, “deśakālaśādhyetara-vṛttitvam”, as “the presence in something different from the place [of the sādhana], the time [of the sādhana], and the sādhyya [of the sādhana]”. This then, according to Vallabha, is not an upādhi. If one takes the stock-example of fire from smoke it would however be unclear whether the something that is different from the place of the sādhana is different from the mountain, i.e. the particular pakṣa, or from every single place of smoke in general. The former would at least satisfy the “sādhanāvyāpaka” restriction and could be the kitchen for example; this would also be something different from the time of the sādhana. What is meant by something different from the sādhyya remains however unclear to me. In the commentaries, the reason for this not being a real upādhi is self-contradiction (svavyāghāta).\(^{387}\)

\(^{383}\) The commentary uses the words “lauhalekhya” meaning “scratchable by something made of iron” but likh also imports the meaning “to write”. Cf. n. 382 above.

\(^{384}\) The example can be found in TC (1892) pp. 177f. and TS (1959) pp. 259f., but not in connection with upādhi.


\(^{386}\) KB (1991) p. 512, anirūpitarūpo bhavisyati kaś ciò atra upādhir īty evam rūpaḥ.

Alternatively one might interpret the compound as “presence of another sādhya in a [particular] time and place”. This “presence of the other sādhya in a [particular] time and place” cannot be an upādhi although it might seem to be one. In the inference of fire from smoke on the mountain one could mistakenly take the “kitchen-fire”, or equally “fire in the woods” (i.e. every fire other than mountain-fire), as a counterexample where smoke is present but not mountain-fire. The pseudo-upādhi in that case would be formulated as the above compound.

In the most straightforward reading the passage amounts to stating the fact that when there is no upādhi to present in an argument there is no way of resorting to the presence of an upādhi as a counter-argument. That is, one could not say—as a counter argument—there might be some upādhi here. If this was possible, every attempt at inferential knowledge would be impossible. And that is obviously not the case since there is such an activity amongst human beings; this at least seems to be an implicit point of departure of Vallabha’s argument.

[51-54]  
Here Vallabha describes four ways of finding an upādhi that will cause the inference to fail. Firstly, if there is a contradiction in the sense that another means of knowledge has given opposing knowledge, as in the case of the following pseudo-inference:

1. Obstruction by other means of knowledge (bādha).

Pratijñā: Fire is non-hot.

Hetu: Because of being a product.

Upādhi: Being other than fire.

Sense perception establishes that fire is hot and thereby the contradiction is apparent. The sādhyā, non-hot, is pervaded by everything that is not fire and the sādhana “being a product” is partly coexistent with everything that is not fire.

The second way of discovering upādhi is deviation, vyabhicāra. This is exemplified by the following:

2. Deviation.

Pratijñā: Sound is non-eternal.

**Hetu:**  Because of being an object of knowledge.

**Upādhi:**  Being a product.

The deviation of the sādhana “being an object of knowledge” is apparent since there are objects of knowledge that are eternal as well as non-eternal. In fact every existent thing is an object of knowledge, so the upādhi is easily found; a knowable thing that is not eternal is something that is a product. But a knowable thing can be eternal as well and hence not a product. 389 This is interpreted a bit differently by Potter in his account of Vallabha’s four ways of discovering upādhi. According to Potter the pratijñā is “sound is eternal”, because being a product does not pervade the sādhana, and because it is uncertain whether sound is a product or not. 390 But, in my opinion, this is problematic since “sound” is not the sādhyā. The sādhyā is “non-eternal”, and if it was “eternal” there would be no pervasion of the sādhyā by “being a product”. Eternal things are by definition not created, so it would not even be a case of an uncertain co-existence with the sādhyā, which is the first aspect of the definition. “Completely coexistent with the sādhyā” would not be possible to apply at all. Furthermore there is actually no difference in Vallabha’s expression between this inference given here and the inference given in the beginning of the explanation of upādhi as an example of an upādhi that is certain in both ways. All that is stated in Vallabha’s text is “prameyatve kṛtakatvam” on both these occasions. 391 The difference is in the commentaries; in the first example they have “śabdo ’nityaḥ” and in the second “śabdo nityaḥ”. 392 This might very well be a misprint such as we have seen in the commentaries to the vyāpti section. 393

The third way of finding an upādhi is through an absence of a so-called conforming tarka, a kind of hypothetical reasoning 394 that Vallabha deals with in the section following on this one. This is exemplified by the following pseudo-inference: 395

3. Conforming tarka.

**Pratijñā:**  He is dark-skinned.

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389 P (1991) p. 513, śabdo nityaḥ prameyatvād ity atra vyabhicārādārśānāt kṛtakatvam upādhiḥ. The KB commentary, p. 512, has, prameyatvād ity atra nitya–pi prameyatvasya sattvād vyabhicāreṇa kṛtakatvam upādhiḥ, and is apparently corrupt in some way.


391 NL pp. 511, 513.


393 Cf. above n. 381, 382, and 389.

394 See above section 2.2.5 on tarka.

Hetu: Because he is a son of Maitra.

Upādhi: Digestion of green vegetables.

As long as there is no tarka to support the statement that all sons of Maitra are and will be dark-skinned, this inference fails. Such a tarka would be “if he had no dark skin he would not be Maitra’s son”. As was said above the upādhi is uncertain in such a way that the non-pervasion of the sādhana is uncertain.

The fourth way of discovering an upādhi is through a refutational tarka (pratikūlatarka), another variant of hypothetical reasoning:396

4. Refutational tarka.

Pratijñā: Air has color.

Hetu: Because it is the bearer of perceptible touch.

Upādhi: Being perceptible by the eye.

The tarka would run as follows: “if something has color it will be perceptible by the eye”.397 The upādhi, “being perceptible by the eye”, pervades color but does not pervade that which is perceptible by touch.398

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4.4 *Tarka*

4.4.1 Translation

[55-56]

[Vallabha] What then is *tarka*? It is this (*rūpaḥ*): When admitting one property another follows invariably.

[57-58]

[Objector A] But what is its result? The cessation of the desire to know [whether the *sādhanā* may exist] in the domain of the dissimilar example (*vipakṣa*), or the cessation of a doubt [whether the *sādhanā* may exist where the *sādhyā* does not exist], or a weakening of it (i.e. of the doubt).\(^{399}\)

[59]

It is not the first, because this is established by the inferential process alone. It is not the second, because the inferential process [would be] useless.

[60]

[Objector B] But it (*tarka*) has the purpose of certainty [of cessation of doubt].

[61-62]

[Objector A] No, because the [ascertainment of] cessation of doubt is also established precisely from that [inferential process]. It is not the third, because the removal of a weakened [doubt] has no purpose, given that [doubt] whether weakened or not, can be stopped by inference.

[63]

[Objector B] But the inferential process by being an instrument (*karaṇa*) requires *tarka* as an operation (*vyāpāra*).

[64-66]

[Objector A] –No. It is not seen that there is absence of inferential knowledge from the *liṅga* when there is no cognition of *tarka*\(^{400}\), as [we do] in the case of a non-arising of cutting with a sickle when there is no


\(^{400}\) It is important to note here that *tarka* is in itself classified as a cognition. Cf. above section 2.2.5 on *tarka*.
operation of pressing the handle hard. Or, the cognition of itself [i.e. of the liṅga] may be the operation in relation to the liṅga [because] when this [tarkajñānam] does not assist that [inferential process] it is not a part (aṅga) of the inferential process. 402

[67-68]
[Vallabha] Here it is said that [the above is not correct] because when an ascertainment of vyāpti which is favorable to the inferential process arises, it [tarka] is useful through [promoting] the cessation of doubt about a deviation (vyabhicāra). 403

[69-70]
And this [tarka] is in the form of imposition of the imagined [property] (āhāryāropa). 404 Because it (tarka) arises from an imposed hetu, and because tarka has an object which is contradictory [to the sādhana and sādhyā]. And because when there are two alternatives, resorting to one alternative has a conditional meaning (lit. the meaning of “if”).

[71-73]
[Objector C] Nevertheless, why the requirement of repeated observation [in order to grasp invariable concomitance], since a doubt about deviation is present there [i.e. after repeated observations] also, [according to you]? 405 Because even in the absence of them (repeated observations) the hindering factor of the [presence of the sādhana] in the dissimilair example (vipakṣa) is the same. 407 And [furthermore] since the absence of upādhi is known through a conforming tarka.

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404 ärōpa has proven difficult to render in translation. āḥ in causative has the meanings of “procure” and “manifest” among others. I have here used “imagine” for āhāraya since it conveys the active, purposeful aspect of the concept as well as its “unreal” aspect. The cognizer, then, is not a receptor of cognitions but a creative agent with intentions. The causative meanings of ā ruh are: “to raise”, “deposit/place”, “produce”, and “attribute”. āropa has the meanings of “superimposing”, “assigning”, or “placing in or on”, but also carries the meaning of being secondary or supplementary. I have rendered this with imposition.
This is not the case; from the first observation there is absence of an apprehension of a restricted relation (i.e. invariable relation). Because otherwise there could not arise a doubt in the subsequent observations. Since this would have the undesirable consequence of removing all doubt about an opposite (vīparītā) of many observations at a future time, as when the similarities “brahminhood” and “jewelhood” are appearing. Because in the case of a determined apprehension of a restricted relation when two things are seen associated repeatedly, there is a doubt precisely about that determination being eligible for a process of knowledge (prāmāṇya).

4.4.2 Comments

Vallabha opens the section on tarka by giving a description of the conditional functioning of stating a tarka; if something is admitted then something else will follow. How this process ensues is explained in both of the commentaries. The relationship between the two things assumed is that of pervader and pervaded. It is phrased in the form “if there were no fire here then there would be no smoke”, that is, from the absence of the pervading entity the absence of the pervaded follows.

Three results of the functioning of tarka are given. The point of departure of this passage is a doubt concerning two alternatives, for example, presence of fire or absence of fire. That is, doubt whether there could be a place that has smoke but not fire. The first outcome of tarka is that the very wish to know another alternative to the inferential assumption is halted. In the case of the “smoke on the mountain” example this would consist in the desire to know whether there is some place that has smoke but not fire. That is, whether the domain of absence-of-fire could have an instance of presence-of-smoke. Vipakṣa, or dissimilar example, is cited as a domain where both the sādhyā
and the sädhana are absent.\textsuperscript{414} Secondly, in the doubt underlying the wish to know whether the other alternative is the case, i.e. absence of fire, the tarka functions so as to remove that doubt. Thirdly, when the doubt is so strong that the possibility of the other alternative gains prominence in the mind, and consequently halts the process of the inference, the use of tarka can be brought in. Its purpose in this case is to weaken the doubt about the possibility of there being no fire although there is smoke, so that the process of inference can continue.\textsuperscript{415}

According to P the rejection of the first outcome of tarka stems from the assumption that the desire to cognize something, whether inferential or perceptual, has no bearing upon the cognition at all. If, for example, there is a desire to see a pot where there is only a piece of cloth this desire does not prevent our seeing a piece of cloth. Similarly in the inferential process, after having gone through the step of parāmarśa, there is according to P no hesitation before arriving at the inferential knowledge, the result. It might be possible to understand this in the sense that given the proper conditions for an inference the inferential knowledge will inevitably follow.\textsuperscript{416} In light of this we can understand the rejection of the first alternative rejecting tarka viewed as an abolisher of the desire to know the other alternative, that is, absence of fire where smoke is present.

The second use, or rather result of tarka is rejected on grounds that the inferential process alone takes care of the doubt about the vipakṣa. If tarka would be used as such an instrument then inference would become useless.

In answer to this rejection it is said by objector B that tarka could have the role of ascertainment of cessation of doubt. The KB explains it as ascertainment of the elimination of the doubt, the very elimination accomplished by the inference.\textsuperscript{417} The role of tarka then appears to come into use after the doubt is set aside and thereby certifies its setting aside. This reading is however tentative.

Objector A refutes objector B’s suggestion on the grounds that such an ascertainment is accomplished by the inference itself.\textsuperscript{418} Objector A then

\textsuperscript{414} For explanation of vipakṣa see section 2.2.3.1 above.
\textsuperscript{415} Cf. n. 399 above.
\textsuperscript{416} P (1991) p. 516, vastuto virodhijñåså na jñånamåtrapratibandhikå, gha†ajijñåsunå cakṣur unmilanānāntaraṁ patasyäpi jñānāt. näpy anumīteḥ. tṛitiyalingaparāmarśānāntaraṁ virodhijñåśayānumitau vilambābhāvåt.
\textsuperscript{417} KB (1991) p. 517, śaṅkā nivṛtter niścayārthatvād ity arthaḥ.
continues by rejecting the third result of \textit{tarka} on the same basis as the previous rejections; inference takes care of the weakening by itself. Here the P adds, as an explanation, that it does so inevitably, that it is in some way built into the inferential process itself.\footnote{P (1991) p. 517, \textit{nyānakotikāśāntkāśnivartanārtham apy anumānasyāvaśāvakatvād.}}

[63]
Objector B suggests here that \textit{tarka} could be understood as the operation (\textit{vyāpāra}) of the inferential process (\textit{anumāna}) which is the \textit{karaṇa}, the instrumental or special cause.\footnote{Cf. section 2.2.3.3 above. Jhā, in NL (2004) p. 321, appears to understand \textit{anumāna} in this passage as \textit{parāmarśa}, which then would imply that \textit{tarka} is \textit{vyāpāra} to \textit{parāmarśa}. The P appears to do the same, P (1991) p. 517, \textit{anumānam iti. triyālingaparāmarśa ity arthaḥ}.}

[64-66]
The rejection of the above suggestion begins with a negative simile. In the case of using a sickle to cut something, the sickle is the instrumental cause (\textit{karaṇa}) and the firm holding of its handle is the operation (\textit{vyāpāra}) without which the cutting will never take place since the instrument would be disabled.\footnote{This example appears to be popular when \textit{tarka} is discussed. It is found in slightly different versions in Udayana’s K (2002) p. 513 and in NKd (1991) p. 407. The NKd passage, “\textit{dṛḍhamuśṭiniśpiḍito}”, is partly rephrased in NL, “\textit{dṛḍhamuśṭinispidana}”, cf. text [64]. The word for axe is “\textit{kūṭhāra}” in K and NKd whereas “\textit{dātra}” is used in NL. Since \textit{dātra} means an “instrument for cutting”, a “sickle” or some such, there is a slight difference in the examples, this however does not seem to be of great import. The axe-example furthermore appears in discussions concerning the meaning and distinction of different kinds of causes. Cf. comment on VMB (1980) p. 34 and VMB (1975) p. 31 (1.4.23).} But unlike this case of operation \textit{tarka} cannot have the same function in reference to \textit{anumāna}, since the outcome of an inference, namely the inferential knowledge, \textit{anumiti}, is present without any cognition of \textit{tarka}. The KB explains that when \textit{parāmarśa} is present, the outcome of inferential knowledge is present without delay, automatically as it were, which would imply that \textit{tarka} is not necessarily needed to conclude the process.\footnote{KB (1991) p. 516, \textit{anumitau liṅgaparāmarśe sati vilambābhāvān na tasya vyāpāratety āha – dātrādāv iti.}} The above passage, then, is in opposition to the earlier statement that \textit{tarka} has a necessary function in the process of \textit{anumāna}, that \textit{tarka} has the function of a \textit{vyāpāra}.

A somewhat peculiar statement here is yet another alternative in which the \textit{liṅga} functions as the cause of inferential knowledge, and the very cognition of the \textit{liṅga} itself functions as the operation.\footnote{KB (1991) p. 518, \textit{liṅgam eva kāraṇam tajjānaṁ vyāpāra ity arthaḥ}.} This would rule out the possibility of letting \textit{tarka} in as a necessary element within the inferential process proper, but it is difficult to understand exactly what is meant by this statement; there is no further detailed discussion on it in Vallabha’s text.
This passage signals the position of Vallabha. *Tarka* is a means to establish the grasping of *vyāpti* insofar as *tarka* eliminates doubt concerning a deviation of the concomitance. This position will be further modified by Vallabha in the final passage of this section. It is important to note that the doubt is in the event of a grasping of *vyāpti* that is already apprehended. *Tarka* then is an abolisher of doubt about deviation in this cognized *vyāpti*. In that sense *tarka* does not have a causal role in the production of inferential knowledge, and is therefore not an essential part of the inferential process, as has been suggested in the above objections. But *tarka* is, on the other hand, helpful in the grasping of *vyāpti*. This at least is how the KB seems to have understood it.

This passage is easily read together with the opening statement of the *tarka* section where Vallabha says, “when admitting one entity, another follows invariably”. So, when one assumes “no fire”, “no smoke” comes along as a consequence. This is furthermore stated negatively or in contradiction to the inference whose invariable relation one is doubting, in this case: “wherever there is smoke, there is fire”. The *tarka* is, so to speak, imagined the other way around, and this imagined situation is stated with the word “if”, that is to say, in a conditional manner. The two alternatives spoken about comprise the two alternatives to resort to when in doubt, either there is fire or there is no fire. When the alternative “no fire” is chosen it is tested with the *tarka* reasoning – “suppose that there actually is no fire there, well, then there could not be any smoke”.

This passage is phrased as an objection to the need for repeated observation in order to grasp invariable concomitance. The argument appears to be that there is doubt about a deviation in the relation between smoke and fire whether it is seen many times or just once. So even if repeated observations have not taken place, *tarka* could come in as a means to abolish the doubt about the opposite, that there could be smoke but no fire.

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425 KB (1991) p. 518, *kva cit tad anapekṣyāṁ vyabhicārāṁ tarkasya kāraṇatāṁ na syād ity adesaṁ śāṅkā śiṣyēva tad upayogāṁ. kva cīd vyāgṛtāṁ śaṅkaiva nāvataratī. na hi dhūmārthaṁ vahnim upādaśāno vahnim vināśi dhūmāḥ syād iti śāṅkate. yady api anupādaḥkavato graho vyāptigrahākāya ity uktaṁ tatāṁ pi tatrāṁ tarka eva upāya iti bhāvaḥ.*

426 See above p. 97.

According to KB the question seems to be in what sense one can require repeated observations in order to apprehend the concomitance between smoke and fire, when this could be grasped through tarka in one single observation.428 If there is a deviation of the concomitance then, it is present in the first observation as well as in following observations. An additional argument is then levelled which is apparently connected to the previous section on vyåpti. If absence of an upådhi indicates vyåpti then one can of course use a conforming tarka in order to ascertain that there is no upådhi and hence in order to ascertain vyåpti. In that case repeated observations would also be rendered unnecessary.

The P apparently connects the above passage to the discussion on the necessity of repeated observation for grasping vyåpti in the TC. The P at least uses an example that is existent in the TC as well; although one has repeated observation of the co-existence between “being of earthly character” and “being scratchable by iron” the invariable relation is still not ascertained.429 In the TC this argument is levelled by a Prabhåkara M¥må saka.430

[74-78]
Vallabha states that there is no grasping of an invariable concomitance from only one observation. The reasoning could be phrased as follows: a doubt about a deviation requires an idea of a concomitance; such an idea cannot come into the mind after only one observation and thus tarka cannot be of any help. Tarka requires an idea of concomitance against which a contradictory case can be formulated, at another stage in the process as it were. The second or third time one sees smoke from fire it is plausible to assume that where there is smoke there is also fire. It is then, in other words, plausible to form an idea of a concomitance of smoke and fire. If this was not the case doubt would be impossible in the first place. This forms the subsequent reason in Vallabha’s refutation of the objection. Without a grasping of an invariable relation there is not actually anything there to doubt.

The argument concerning “brahminhood” seems, at least according to KB, to be directed towards an implicit counter-suggestion that repeated observation might have the function of removing subsequent doubt about

deviation, although the concomitance is apprehended in one observation only.\textsuperscript{431} Vallabha’s answer to this appears to be along the same lines as above, namely that such a position would render doubt impossible. But since his use of the example of “brahminhood” and “jewelhood” is unclear, this interpretation must remain tentative. Vallabha ends this passage by stating that it is doubt about deviation that \textit{tarka} removes, doubt with regard to an already formed apprehension of a concomitance born of repeated observation. Repeated observation thus appears as a tool for apprehending \textit{vyāpti} but not for checking it or warranting it, which, on the other hand, is done by \textit{tarka}.

\textsuperscript{431} KB (1991) p. 521, \textit{nanu vyāptigrahah prathamadarśanata eva, vyabhicāraśāṅkā tu bhūyodarśānāpameyety ata āha –brāhmaḥatveti. tarhi brāhmaḥatvādinām api prathamadarśanavedyatavam eva syān na ca tathābhupagamo vastusthītir vety arthāḥ.}

104
4.5 *Parāmarśa*

4.5.1 Translation

[79-80]

[Mīmāṁsaka] The nature of this [inferential process]\(^{432}\) is apprehension of *pākṣadharmaṭā* and remembrance of *vyāpti* because there is no awareness of [anything] further (i.e. *parāmarśa*) [and] because only from this [apprehension and remembrance] is the effect (i.e. inferential knowledge) produced.\(^{433}\)

[81-83]

And this is not to be said: The apprehension of [something as] a *liṅga* has in reality that [liṅga] as its object. When it (i.e. something) [is seen] from afar without its characterization it is non-producing [inferential knowledge]. But by being delineated (*ullekhitā*) as “liṅga” the producing factor [of inferential knowledge] is determined as a single apprehension (i.e. *parāmarśa*).\(^{434}\)

[84-85]

Because it (i.e. apprehension of something as a *liṅga*) is established precisely from the delineation of the generality prior to an apprehension of a restriction (i.e. *vyāpti*) because otherwise it (i.e. apprehension of something as a *liṅga*) would be afflicted in the *parāmarśa* too.

[86-87]

And this is not to be said: The apprehension [of the *sādhaṇa*] as a property of the subject of inference (*pākṣadharmaṭā*) arises from the *hetu[ vacana]*,\(^{435}\) the *upanaya* has a combined object (*piṇḍitaviśaya*).\(^{436}\)

[88]

Some say that [this apprehension of the *pākṣadharmaṭā*] has the character of being obtained in the latter part of [the inference] since the object [of the *hetuvacana*] is the *liṅga* only.\(^{437}\)

[89-91]

[Vallabha] This is not the case. Just as when there is no inference when there is a doubt about a deviation (vyabhācāra), even when the deviation is

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\(^{432}\) KB & P (1991) p. 523, *tad etad iti. anumānam ity anuṣajyate.*


\(^{434}\) KB (1991) p. 523, *liṅgatvolvekhitāyā ekavedanaṁ vyāptiviśiṣṭapākṣadharmaṭāvedanam ity arthaḥ.*


\(^{436}\) For *upanaya* and *hetuvacana* see section 2.2.3 above.

not apprehended. In the same manner as when there is a doubt that the pervaded property and the property of the subject are of different kinds, even when there is no apprehension that they are of different kinds, there is no inference because the hetu is not established as a pervaded property.

[92-93]
Therefore it should be said that the apprehension that the pervaded property and the property of the subject are of the same kind is the cause of inferential knowledge. Precisely that is parāmarśa. That was [the chapter on] the inferential process.

4.5.2 Comments

[79-80]
Vallabha introduces the discussion of parāmarśa with a Mīmāṁsaka objection to the very use of this in the inferential process. According to this objection, the apprehension of the sādhana as a property of the subject, for example that smoke is on the hill, and the remembrance of vyāpti, that smoke is concomitant with fire, are enough to bring about inferential knowledge.

[81-83]
The objector, the Mīmāṁsaka, continues by raising a counterargument. In the interpretation of this passage I rely on the KB and P. In the commentaries it is noted that the consequence of the Mīmāṁsaka argument would be that one could actually, by chance as it were, remember that fire pervades smoke even though smoke is seen only as smoke and not as a liṅga (i.e. smoke invariably connected to fire) and through this, inferential knowledge would then result. This apparently serves as an underlying assumption for the counter-argument. The counter-argument could be understood in the following way. To see, or apprehend the liṅga as a thing only, is to see, for example, smoke stripped of its being a part of the implicatory liṅga-liṅga relationship. For example when seeing smoke as a liṅga it is recognized that fire comes along with the smoke and that smoke would be characterized as being produced by fire. When seeing smoke as just smoke, these

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440 For a more detailed description of the various stages in the inference, see section 2.2.3 above.
441 I presume here that “vastutas” in Vallabha’s text refers to the smoke as it is, without its being a liṅga, that is smoke in a very basic ontological sense, as a thing.
implications are not entailed. And when these are absent, no inferential knowledge is produced. On the other hand, the argument runs, when the smoke is characterized as a liṅga, when it is delineated (ullekhitā) by “liṅgatva”, inferential knowledge will be produced. Hence it is the apprehension of the liṅga that is the effective component in the production of inferential knowledge. The KB tells us that this single apprehension is the apprehension of the liṅga as pakṣadharmaṭā and vyāptiviśīṣṭa.443

So it would not be enough then to know of pakṣadharmaṭā and then remember the pervasion, as the Māṁsakas say, there must be a further cognition of the liṅga as a liṅga, in other words as something characterized by pervasion. In this sense the knowledge of fire upon the mountain comes not primarily from the perception of smoke on the mountain but rather from the cognition of this perceived smoke on the mountain as a liṅga, as something that has the character of being invariably related to something else (liṅgatva). This counterargument is outright rejected by the Māṁsakas.

[84-85]
Here the Māṁsakas continue with an answer directed to the above objection. In their view it would follow that it is from the apprehension of something as a jāti, i.e. liṅgatva, that the inferential knowledge is produced, and not, as it were, from a perception of a concrete thing, for example smoke. The KB supplies us with a rhetorical question in order to explain the second statement, “Why would not the case of smoke being grasped through a jāti apply to the parāmarśa as well?”.444 This might imply that the Māṁsaka objector says that the consequence of your jāti then would be that it is from the perception of a generality, for example smokeness, that inferential knowledge occurs. And that can obviously not be the case, since without perception of the thing functioning as a sādhana there could be no knowledge of the sādhyā. If you do not accept smoke as effective in the inferential process as a particular on the mountain then the argument would apply to your parāmarśa as well and make it untenable, because it is smoke that is also seen in your parāmarśa, not smokeness.

The understanding of this is still tentative; much is assumed implicitly, which of course makes for a difficult reading.

[86-87]
Once again the Māṁsaka fends off an objection. The upanaya is the fourth member of the inferential process, the location of parāmarśa. And the

444 KB (1991) p. 524, kiṁ cit tvena yatra dhāmagrahas tatra parāmarśa eva kiṁ na syād ity arthaḥ.
objector says that what is really there is a cognition that combines the pakṣadharma and the vyāptivīśīṣṭa, whereas in the hetuvacana, the second statement, only the pakṣadharma is cognized. This at least is how the P seems to understand it.445

[88]
I have made a tentative interpretation of this on the assumption that parāṅgatā (the later part) refers to the upanaya, the application. The function of upanaya then, as is explicitly stated in the commentaries, is to convey the pakṣadharma.446 The hetu alone is conveyed in the second member of the inference, the hetuvacana. This understanding of the second member as only conveying one aspect of the liṅga and not the pakṣadharma is found in Śridhāra’s NKd and it is mirrored in the P.447 It appears to be the case then that the commentary connects this passage in NKd with the passage in NL.

[89-93]
Here Vallabha gives the reason why vyāptismyti and pakṣadharma are not enough to produce inferential knowledge. Vallabha ascribes a causal function to parāmarśa by stating that it is the kāraṇa (cause) of inferential knowledge. The focal point of this argument is that the cognition of the pervaded property as the property of the subject is a necessary requirement of the process that leads to inferential knowledge. The reason for this, according to Vallabha, is that the character of the śādhanā as pervaded remains unestablished, and hence possible to doubt. The pervasion in general, for example between smoke and fire, is established in the remembrance of vyāpti, but that this pertains in a particular situation, as when seeing smoke on a mountain, must also be apprehended. This is, according to Vallabha, what happens in the cognition of parāmarśa, that the pervaded property (smoke) is the same as the property of the subject (smoke on the mountain).

447 NKd (1895) p. 250, hetuvacanam hetusvarūpamātraṁ kathayati na tasya pakṣadharmaṁ. And in P (1991) p. 524, tathā ca āṅgavacanena hetusvarūpamātraṁ pradarśayate na tu tasya pakṣavṛttivam apīti tasya pakṣadharmaupanayasya eva upanayasya phalam ity arthaḥ. This is further discussed in section 5.5.2 below.
5. Text analysis

5.1 Introduction
In the following I will analyse some of the main points of the *anumāṇa* chapter in NL. In doing so I have followed the disposition of subjects found in the NL as a division of four sections, *anumāṇa*, *vyāpti*, *tarka* and *parāmarśa*. The *anumāṇa* chapter taken as a whole does not contain any general discussion on the nature of *anumāṇa*. There is neither any definition nor any complete description of the process leading to inferential knowledge. This constitutes one of the difficulties I have encountered when analysing the text. The NL, like many other texts in the same genre, discusses certain aspects of the theory of *anumāṇa*, often in relation to an opponent’s viewpoints. The conclusions are, most of the time, expressed clearly enough, but the underlying premises or conditions of the discussion are almost always absent. In the below chapter I have tried to shed light upon the diversity and complexity of the discussions concerning *anumāṇa* and its related sub-concepts that take place in the NL and texts near to it in time and theory. The above-mentioned difficulty also applies when it comes to comparing texts with each other. It appears that the theme of *anumāṇa* is expounded and discussed from many angles, depending upon the context and whom one is addressing, and hence is not amenable to straightforward comparison. However important it is to mention this fact, this does not pose any immediate obstacle to a discussion of specific concepts, for example *vyāptigraha* or *vyāpti*, as long as one is aware of these limitations.

5.2 *Anumāṇa*

In the following I will highlight two main threads in the *anumāṇa* section which introduces the chapter on *anumāṇa* in NL: first, the grasping of *vyāpti*, and second, Vallabha’s debate on inference with the Cārvākas.

5.2.1 *Vyāptigraha* within the tradition(s)

Although there appears to be a great variety of different viewpoints concerning the grasping of *vyāpti*, two main strands of understanding this can be discerned within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya discourse.
Firstly there are theories according to which repeated observation of particulars is a necessary condition for the grasping of \textit{vyāpti}. In these cases \textit{vyāpti} itself is apprehended either by the medium of an outer sense, eye, ear etc. or the inner sense, \textit{manas}. The second theory, mainly held by later authors, works with a special perception, \textit{sāmānyalaksana} involving the apprehension of generalities whose function is to bind together all particulars of past, present, and future.\footnote{See TS (1969) p. 51, and TSD (1969) pp. 264, 267. Cf. Bhattacharjee (1985) pp. 10f.} The ability to perceive all particulars in which the same generality inheres, rests on a special kind of contact between the sense and the object which is given the term \textit{sāmānyalaksana\textunderscore pratyāśati}.\footnote{Sometimes also \textit{sāmānyalaksana\textunderscore sannikarṣa}, cf. section 2.2.1 above.} It is important to take notice of the fact that when a person perceives all particulars in this way she does not perceive each and every particular with its own different individual characteristics but only that characteristic which is common to them all, that is, the generality.\footnote{Cf. Bhattacharya (1978) (p. 57 and Chatterjee (1950) pp. 208f.} In this sense one does not always need to have repeated observations of particulars since they are all included under the general. This later theory is found elaborated in the TC and texts following upon that.\footnote{In the TC and the texts following after Gaṅgāśa there are diversified interpretations and varying degrees of acceptance of this special contact, \textit{sāmānyalaksana\textunderscore pratyāśati}. These Navya-nyāya issues will not be addressed here. See for example; Bhattacharya (1978) ch. IV, Dash (1999), Mishra (1979) pp. 643f. and Potter (1993) p. 61.}

In the NM it is mentioned that some believe that a kind of \textit{yogipratyakṣa} is required for the grasping of \textit{vyāpti}.\footnote{NM (1936) pp. 111f., \textit{apare punah anagnitvam sāmānyam antarenāpi yogipratyakṣa\textunderscore kalpanāṁ akurvanta eva mānasapratyakṣa\textunderscore sāgaṁyam anvayavyatirekaṁ āhuḥ…}} \textit{Yogipratyakṣa} is one of the three extraordinary (\textit{alaukika}) perceptions, the other two being \textit{sāmānyalaksana} and \textit{jñānalaksana}.\footnote{Cf. section 2.2.1 above.} Although this threefold division is not clearly specified until later on, it is apparent that at the time of Jayanta there were discussions of different kinds of perception in relation to the problem of grasping \textit{vyāpti}.\footnote{Cf. section 2.2.1 above.} It appears that Jayanta himself is of the view that the internal organ (\textit{manas}) grasps both the positive and negative relation; i.e. presence of smoke is always presence of fire and absence of fire is always absence of smoke.\footnote{NM (1936) p. 112, \textit{api na yogipratyakṣaṁ upayuyyate bhāvabhāvasāhacaryaṁ avadhāraya manasā niyamajhānaisiddheḥ ity alamś nirbandhena, tasmān niyamavat tad grahaṇopāyō ‘py astīti siddham.}} Jayanta furthermore seems to hold that \textit{vyāpti} is a relation between generalities. This is apparent in a discussion held with the Čārvākas concerning the possibility of inferential knowledge. The Čārvākas maintain that it is impossible to know of an invariantable relation between generalities

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
 \item \textbf{449} Sometimes also \textit{sāmānyalaksana\textunderscore sannikarṣa}, cf. section 2.2.1 above.
 \item \textbf{451} In the TC and the texts following after Gaṅgāśa there are diversified interpretations and varying degrees of acceptance of this special contact, \textit{sāmānyalaksana\textunderscore pratyāśati}. These Navya-nyāya issues will not be addressed here. See for example; Bhattacharya (1978) ch. IV, Dash (1999), Mishra (1979) pp. 643f. and Potter (1993) p. 61.
 \item \textbf{452} NM (1936) pp. 111f., \textit{apare punah anagnitvam sāmānyam antarenāpi yogipratyakṣa\textunderscore kalpanāṁ akurvanta eva mānasapratyakṣa\textunderscore sāgaṁyam anvayavyatirekaṁ āhuḥ…}
 \item \textbf{453} Cf. section 2.2.1 above.
 \item \textbf{454} The discussion of these concepts within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is described in Shastri (1964) pp. 462ff., 470f. For divisions of different kinds of apprehensions in NM see Gupta (1963) pp. 42-68.
 \item \textbf{455} NM (1936) p. 112, \textit{api na yogipratyakṣaṁ upayuyyate bhāvabhāvasāhacaryaṁ avadhāraya manasā niyamajhānaisiddheḥ ity alamś nirbandhena, tasmān niyamavat tad grahaṇopāyō ‘py astīti siddham.}
\end{itemize}
since there are no generalities at all, and Jayanta rejects this by saying that vyāpti is grasped because it is a relation between generalities.456

The Cārvākas serve as opponents also in the NBh section on anumāna and the viewpoints presented there are, according to Prets, similar to the ones in NM, although more elaborated.457 Prets has discerned three points of discussion in the NBh: the question concerning repeated observation (bhūyodarśana), the question concerning generalities, and the question of by what capacity an invariable relation is known, the inner sense or an outer one.458 Bhāsarvajña’s view appears to be that the apprehending of vyāpti takes place in the internal organ (manas), which grasps the totality of the cases (sarvopasaṁhāra) but this happens together with the outer senses that apprehend a specific case of invariable relation.459 In Prets’s reading, this…

…besondere Erkenntnis durch das Denkorgan ist immer eine allgemeine, eine alle falle in form der Gemeinsamkeit zusammensendende, die es gemeinsam mit der konkreten Wahrnehmung des Individualfalles ermöglicht, die notwendigkeit der logischen Verbindung [sic. vyāpti] zu erkennen, und die Erinnerung im konkreten zu beweisenden Fall enstehen lassen kann.460

It appears to be a twofold apprehension that makes the grasping of vyāpti possible for Bhāsarvajña, first the internal organ (manas) that grasps the relation between generalities and thus makes it possible to apprehend a general invariable relation holding at all times, and then the outer perception enabling a recognition of this in the particular case.461 A further interesting aspect of NBh is that repeated observation is not always deemed necessary for apprehending an invariable relation. Its role however is to leave mental traces so that one can remember the sighting.462

The concern with the capacity of the internal organ to apprehend a general invariable relation is visible also with Trilocana who sees vyāpti as a relation between generalities.463 This relation is grasped through the inner

456 NM (1936) p. 109, sāmānyadvārako ‘py asti nāvinābhāvanīścayah. vāstavān hi na sāmānyamā nāma kintu ca na visamyate. and p.111, na ca sakalātrihuvanavihariṇuddha- dhamānānāvajitāntāsākṣāti karanam upayujyate vjalanaṇāvādīsāmānyapurahsaratvatā vyāptigrāhānāt, yat tāktām sāmānyamā vāstavān nāstī tae chadbārthācaścānurāgatā pratisamādāhāyate.
457 Prets (1989) p. 404, n. 11. The Cārvāka viewpoints will be discussed below in section 5.2.3.
459 NBh (1968) p. 220, …cakṣurādītjanitāgniivisāṭdhūmājñānasahitasaya manasaḥ sarvopasanīhārenā vyāptigrāhakavatam…
463 Trilocana’s views are known through fragments cited by Jānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti, see Oberhammer (1964) pp. 132ff., Chakraborty (1978b) p. 385, Solomon (1986) p. 561, and Prets (1989) p. 404. Furthermore, Vācaspāti names Trilocana as his teacher and cites a number of
sense giving a mental connection to all the particulars perceived through repeated observation. The apprehension of the relation of vyāpti for Trilocana could be understood as grounded in the experience of generalities (sāmānyājāti) and backed up by repeated observations of particulars in which the generality inheres.

Vyomaśīva also says that the invariable relation holds between generalities when he addresses the problem of an infinite number of particulars. This grasping is coupled with repeated observations, and these two, he seems to say, create a certainty that there will be no deviation between hetu and sādhya (for example smoke and fire) in another place and at another time. Although Vyomaśīva does not here explicitly direct his discussion towards the Cārvākas, the mentioning of an infinite number of particulars in other times and places resembles the Cārvāka positions in NM, NL, and NBh.

Vācaspati deviates from the views of his teacher Trilocana insofar as he emphasizes an external, sense-perceptual apprehension of vyāpti. It is here important to notice, as Vācaspati does, that manas is the basis of every cognition; perception of vyāpti does not differ from regular perception in this. For Vācaspati repeated observations generate a mental trace (saśkāra), and this trace supports the sense organ in a situation where an invariable relation is to be grasped. This grasping is furthermore helped by the use of tarka in the case of doubt. Although Vācaspati does not explicitly mention whether vyāpti subsists between generalities or particulars it seems unlikely that he would say that it is not between generalities since he is advocating, just like Trilocana, the so called svābhāvika understanding of vyāpti. If this relation subsists “by the very nature of an entity” as opposed to being a contingent relation (sopādhika), this very fact seems to views belonging to him. This is treated in Potter (1995) pp. 396f. and Chakraborty (1978b) p. 385. H. Lasic has given an extensive list of references to information on Trilocana, see Lasic (2000) p. 78 n. 8, 9.


465 V (1931) p. 570, yady apy agniveseṣā dhūmavesesā cānanyenaśvasthitāḥ, tathāpi teśevāvasthitam agnītvam dhūmatvam ca sāmānyam upagrahakam astūt tadupagrahaḥaka-vaśāt bhūyodaraṇaḥbhālād agnīdhūmayor deśādyabhācāre[yś]. avyabhācāragrahaḥam. tathā hi prātmadhyānādhībhedaḥ kālasya bhede sanauvāsmādībhedaḥ ca deśabhede dhūmasyāgniṃ śahacaryapalabdheḥ deśāntare kālāntare ca dhūmo ’gnin vināpi bhaviṣyaṭity āśankā na syāt.

466 NVTT (1996) p. 136, tad idam avadhāraṇaḥ na mānasam, anapekṣasya manaso bhiyoe pravṛttvāt andhabadhir ādyabhāvaprasaṅgāt. bhūyodarśanasāpeksasya ca pravṛttvau pramāṇāntarāpyaḥ, na hi mano nimittam ity eva mānasāḥ pratyaṣaṃ bhavati. tathā sati na kīti cid amānasam, pratyaṃmātrasya mano nimittavāt.


468 Cf. p. 123 below.
presuppose that vyāpto is a relation on the level of generalities. However, this aspect of the invariable relation seems to fade into the background as other aspects of the relation come into focus in NVTT.\footnote{202, 202}  

Also for Udayana this relation between generalities appears to be presupposed rather than explicitly addressed, at least in the NVTS.\footnote{126} By Udayana the function of tarka, and thereby exclusion of upādhi, is more clearly tied to the possibility of grasping vyāpto. Furthermore, in Oberhammer’s reading, the role of repeated observations is treated by Udayana as secondary to that of tarka. According to Oberhammer the invariable relation (as svābhāvik) is in itself a relation between generalities whose particulars would, if it were not so, cease to be just the particulars they are. But this, in Oberhammer’s reading, does not give any warrant for the relation, since the understanding of the generalities in itself rests upon the possibility of an invariable relation, and that is the reason for bringing in tarka as a helpful device.\footnote{167, 178ff} It seems that Oberhammer has discerned a need for a higher degree of certainty concerning the grasping of vyāpto in Udayana’s position. This is also clearly expressed in discussion with the Cārvākas on the possibility of inference in the NKM.\footnote{126 below}  

In conclusion it is necessary to stress one further important factor to the different theories of vyāptigraha: the question whether vyāpto is a relation between generalities or particulars. As soon as vyāpto is linked to the generality it proves valuable for the capability to apprehend vyāpto. The problem of the impossibility of perceiving each and every particular is solved through the possibility of grasping the particular in its totality when grasping its generality. When seeing smoke one apprehends “smokeness” as well and thus one can connect every particular in which the generality inheres in the present, past and, future. It seems to be the case that the understanding of vyāpto as a relation between generalities is present within

\footnote{202 Cf. Potter, (1995) p. 202, who says that neither Jayanta nor Vācaspāti view vyāpto as a relation between generalities, although Potter is tentative when it comes to Vācaspāti’s view.}\footnote{126 The relation between Trilocana and Vācaspāti’s understanding of vyāpto will be further discussed in section 5.3.1 below.}\footnote{202 It seems that the NVTS is mostly concerned with the grasping of vyāpto through absence of upādhi and the use of tarka. The NVTS though is in need of further analysis regarding this matter.}\footnote{167, 178ff.}\footnote{126 below}
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from Jayanta and onwards, whereas it is not in the writings of the very early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika texts. It is not quite clear exactly when the theory of sāmānyalakṣaṇa appears in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. However the initial discussions in all probability took place before the use of a standardized term as is found in the TC and later Navya-nyāya. The most obvious problem here, then, is that there is no consensus regarding the terminology in the earlier texts. How Vallabha treats this subject will be discussed below.

5.2.2 Vallabha on vyāptigraha

Vallabha’s understanding of the grasping of vyāpti involves two different strands as it were. Firstly, he utilizes the generality as a connector of all particulars. This involves an understanding of vyāpti as ultimately subsisting between generalities, though it is not explicitly stated in the text. However, the bringing in of the generality as instrumental to the grasping of vyāpti points to an understanding of this process akin to the sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratītyāsattih theories of the Navya-nyāya. Secondly, Vallabha retains the necessity of repeated observations of particulars, a feature of the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, as a means of recognizing vyāpti. These observations lead to the formation of mental traces that assist the outer sense by which we experience vyāpti. The number of repeated observations required is, however, somewhat vaguely stated; the word Vallabha uses is “katipaya”, meaning a few or some. Towards the end of the chapter Vallabha states that it is indeed the organ of sight that grasps vyāpti, and that without the capability to apprehend all particulars by the generality it would be impossible to apprehend the negative and positive concomitance, anvyaya and vyatireka, that is: everywhere that fire is absent smoke is also absent, and everywhere that smoke is present, fire is also present. A further interesting thing mentioned in NL is the capacity or power (śakti) of the traces to enable us to remember the essentials, namely the characteristic of being smoke and the characteristic of being fire (vahnitva and dhūmatva). This passage seems to be an explanation of the process of grasping vyāpti rather than being a straightforward argument against the opponent in the text, that is, a descriptive aspect is added to the text.

In order to show that vyāpti is indeed grasped, and thus possible to ascertain, Vallabha sets out to establish the generality as a prerequisite for this grasping. The whole argument has a kind of spiral movement in the text.

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475 Cf. PDS (1895) pp. 205f. and Potter (1995) pp. 200ff. Although it is not taken into account here it is important to notice that the Buddhist logicians Dinnāga (ca. 500 AD) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 650 AD) were major partners in the discussions on the grasping of vyāpti and the nature of this relation. Cf. for example Bhattacharya (1986) and Kajiyama (1958).  
476 See text [22-24].  
477 See comments [22-26] and text [25].
but could be analysed as beginning with an establishment of the very existence of a generality. It becomes apparent that despite the fact that the generality is held to be perceptible, one cannot just point to a generality in order to show that it really is there. Instead it is so that the generality is perceptible because without it there would be no perception of particular entities whatsoever. The only way of proving generalities, then, seems to be to treat them as a condition for the cognition of particulars in general, and then build up an argument around how it can be such a prerequisite. In Vallabha’s argumentation it is activity that would be impossible to explain if there were no generalities. In this it also becomes apparent that there is indeed knowledge to be had from the presence of generalities, knowledge that enables us to act with respect to the future and the past. This knowledge is furthermore possible because the generality makes all of its particulars accessible: “Therefore the appearance of all particulars is indeed established as possessing a generality.” This, in turn, gives Vallabha reason to say that $vyāpti$ is indeed possible to grasp.

Another interesting aspect of Vallabha’s argumentation is how it indicates his general view of generality, a view very much consistent with the views expressed in the VS commentarial tradition. In Praśastapāda’s understanding, reinforced by Śrīdhara, the indication or justification of the existence of generalities is $buddhi$ (cognition). For Vallabha the very capability to apprehend particulars presupposes the presence of generalities. This becomes apparent when he responds to the Cārvāka suggestion that generalities are something surmised from the presence of particulars.

[Cārvāka] –Let the particular possess a generality. [Vallabha] –No, because a particular to be appropriated is not apprehended. Therefore the appearance of all particulars is indeed established as possessing a generality. Because otherwise activity of every sentient being would be impossible. And here (i.e. on apprehending an invariable relation), the sense of sight, assisted by mental traces whose object consists in several particulars, is capable [of apprehending the invariable relation], [it is apprehended] due to the force of positive concomitance and negative concomitance ($anvaya$ and $vyatireka$) which could not be established otherwise.

Vallabha says that the particular appears as ($nirbhāsa$) possessing a generality and that the generality is established as possessing all particulars.

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478 Vallabha uses the word “$nirbhāsa$” of both the particular and the generality. Cf. text [22] and text [32] above. I will not touch upon the concepts of $ālocanamātra$ pratyakṣa and $nir-vikalpa$/$savikalpa$ here since it would be to stray too far outside the purpose of this section. Cf. Halbfass (1992) p. 118.
479 Text [31-32].
481 PDS (1931) p. 133, NKd (1991) p. 64.
482 See text [31-35].
This might be understood in terms of a mutual dependence between generalities and particulars.

To conclude, for Vallabha the generality is instrumental in grasping vyāpti. We grasp smokeness when seeing smoke, and fireness when seeing fire, because smokeness is inherent in smoke, and fireness in fire. By this we may be able to connect, so to speak, all past, present, and future particulars of fire and smoke, and thus we can know all particulars. Together with repeated observations we can have an apprehension of the invariable relation. We grasp vyāpti because vyāpti is characterized by the generality of smoke (dhūmatva). KB interprets this in terms of sāmānyalaksanapraty-āsatti, the special connection enabling one to apprehend all present, past, and future particulars through the apprehension of smokeness in one smoke particular. Smokeness functions here as the binding factor, connecting the sense organ with all the particulars that have smokeness inhering in them.

In NL the generality as a means to grasp vyāpti appears to be at least as important as the concepts of tarka and upādhi. In this respect it is different from Udayana’s and Vācaspāti’s texts where the generality falls somewhat into the background. With Udayana there is also the subordinate role of repeated observations, made apparent in Oberhammer’s reading, which is not the case in NL. It seems, however, necessary to differentiate between the very apprehension of vyāpti and the warranting of the apprehension which is not done by Oberhammer but which could clarify the different foci of dealing with vyāpti. By such a differentiation one might say that Udayana is more concerned with establishing certainty, i.e. to not be in doubt, about vyāpti rather than explaining the process whereby it is apprehended in the first place. It is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Vallabha, on the other hand, appears to combine these two foci: the explanation of the process of the cognition and the means whereby the cognition is warranted. This will be made apparent in the subsequent sections on vyāpti and tarka. I would like to stress, however, that my conclusions concerning Udayana’s texts are made tentatively. In my opinion there is great need of further analysis of these sources, especially the NVTS.

483 Potter, (1995) p. 169, seems to be under the impression that Vallabha himself uses the term sāmānyalaksanapratyāsatti. At least he states that Vallabha “discusses the doctrine explicitly”. There is, however, no footnote indicating where Vallabha might have used the term.

5.2.3 Vallabha’s discussion with the Cārvākas

In the anumāna section of NL there are three interrelated arguments defending a Cārvāka view of the inferential process. Indeed, the entire anumāna section appears to be a discussion between Vallabha and a Cārvāka opponent where the Cārvāka opponent initiates the section with a lengthy pūrvapakṣa passage subsequently rejected by Vallabha. The school affiliation of the opponent is not explicitly stated in NL, but is noted in the KB.485 The initial argument comprises a general rejection of inference as a means of knowledge separate from perception on the grounds that it is impossible to establish. The second passage concerns the question of the invariable relation, something that, if established, would render the inferential process a separate means of knowledge. It is here said that inference is dependent upon the establishment of the relation of vyāpti. This line of reasoning is also present in Prabhācandra’s PKM and in the SDS where it is said that inference is possible only if vyāpti is ascertained.486 In the Cārvāka argumentation in the NL there are three alternative understandings of an invariable relation: either it subsists between generalities or between particulars or between a universal and a particular.

And this [relation] is not [established] between two generalities, because a restriction (niyama), [in the form] “where there is smokeness [there is fireness]” or “that which is smokeness [is fireness]”, is impossible. If [the relation is] restricted as being included amongst (i.e. holding between) particulars [then] when being included [only] amongst some particulars, the invariable relation does not comprise all the cases, because an inclusion of all [particulars] is impossible when repeated observations are absent in this case, due to the separation in time and space. Therefore [an invariable relation] is neither [established] between particular entities nor between both [i.e. a particular and a generality].487

No explicit reason is given for the statement that an invariable relation cannot hold between universals but, on the other hand, universals are commonly held to be non-existent by the Cārvākas; they are not observable, and this seems to be the underlying reason for not accepting vyāpti between universals. That is the case in TUS, where vyāpti between universals is rejected on the grounds that universals are impossible to prove. The alternatives of vyāpti between particulars and between a particular and a universal are also rejected in TUS.488 The invariable relation involving

485 See comments [2-4].
487 See text [3-8].
488 TUS (1940) p. 65. TUS is a text with a skeptical stance insofar as it denies all the instruments of knowledge the capacity to yield knowledge, including perception. In the editor’s note in the anthology Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Chattopadhyaya states that the discussion is a closed matter and that the TUS is not a Cārvāka text. See Chattopadhyaya (1994) p. xiv.
universals and particulars is also denied in Prabhācandra’s NKC, but on the grounds of universals being ubiquitous and hence impossible to bring into a relation in a certain place.\(^{489}\) There is an affinity in form between these above arguments and the ones in NL, but the grounds for stating them are different. In the KB it is said that the universals fireness and smokeness have different loci (\textit{adhikarāṇa}) and that it therefore is impossible to state that wherever there is smokeness there is also fireness.\(^{490}\) The impossibility of establishing an invariable relation between particulars is, as seen above, also raised by the opponent as an argument against inference. The condition under which an invariable relation between particulars can be known is a situation in which we can gain knowledge of every particular instance of the relation, that is, all cases of smoke and fire together. But this knowledge is not available to us since it is impossible to perceive this relation in every place it ever has and ever will hold. The P states that since there are an infinite number of particulars, repeated observation is not possible.\(^{491}\) The Cārvāka argument in NL brings out the implicit absurdity of the possibility to have perceptual access to every particular there is, past, present, and future. This argument is rather common; it appears for example in NM, PKM, and TUS. The possibility of repeated observation (\textit{bhūyodarśana}) of particulars is denied in NM on the grounds that it is not possible to observe every case. There might come a future observation deviating from the former pattern. It is also said that things can change in accordance with time and space.\(^{492}\) In TUS, it is stated that an invariable relation between particulars is impossible to establish since they have no common element and are innumerable.\(^{493}\) In the PKM the perceptual apprehension of \textit{vyāpti} is rendered impossible because the grasping of the entirety of the cases of concomitance is impossible. This in turn is due to the fact that the capacity of perception only enables one to grasp objects that are proximate (\textit{sannihita}).\(^{494}\) In this case, neither the form nor the content of this NL passage are very different from

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\(^{491}\) NL (1991) p. 491, \textit{vyaktinām ānāntyena bhūyodarśānābhāvād īty arthah}.
\(^{492}\) NM (1936) p. 109, \textit{bhūyodarśānagamāyāpi na vyāptir avakāplete, sahasraśo 'pi tuddeṣte vyabhicārāvadhāraṇāt. bahukṛtvvo 'pi vastvātma tahetī parinīcitaḥ. deśakālādibheṇā na dhṛyate punar anyathā}.
\(^{493}\) TUS (1940) p. 65.
\(^{494}\) PKM (1972) p. 473, \textit{na ca vyāptigrahaṇam adhyakṣataḥ; asya sannihitamāārthāvṛtthā- \textit{tvemāhīlapadārthākepi nu vyāptigrahaṇaḥ sāmārhyaḥ}.}
these other sources. Similar discussions concerning the infinite number of particulars and the obvious impossibility of having access to them all are present in NBh and V as well; it thus seems to have been a common enough topic in many Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts.\textsuperscript{495}

Finally, after having refuted the possibility of establishing \textit{vyāpti} there is a positive statement of the Čārvāka view of how knowledge of a fire upon a mountain is possible.\textsuperscript{496}

Therefore, here (i.e. in the case of knowledge of fire) only fire is remembered by means of an apprehension of smoke etc. accompanied by fire whose deviation [from smoke] is not observed. And because there is no grasping of a non-relation of [smoke] with that (i.e. fire) which is being remembered [by means of the above apprehension], the determination [of this] as an inferential process or as the [mere] appearance [of such a process] can be made through corroboration or non-corroboration in respect to everyday practice of relation.\textsuperscript{497}

The Čārvāka arguments against the impossibility of establishing \textit{vyāpti} are here concluded with a description of how one can explain activity towards fire from seeing smoke without acknowledging inferential knowledge of fire. According to the Čārvāka, a person who sees smoke rising from a mountain has a remembrance of fire because she has seen smoke from fire before, in a kitchen for example, and until now she has not ever seen smoke without fire; no deviation has been observed. The everyday activity, that is, of human beings acting as if there is a relation between smoke and fire, seems to be the indicator of whether this above process is a process of knowledge or not. The activity in turn seems to be based upon a non-grasping of a non-relation (\textit{asamīsargāgraḥa}).\textsuperscript{498}

The Čārvākas do not altogether deny the possibility of cognition of fire when seeing smoke or that there is such action amongst humans that indicates at least an idea about fire when seeing smoke. What exactly is it, then, that the Čārvākas deny when they say that inference is perception? It appears that what the Čārvākas reject is the idea that there is some element or stage outside of the domain of perception within the process of coming to know fire. They say that we can know fire to the extent that we seem to know it in our ordinary everyday behavior. What seems impossible to know is a universal relation, that is, that smoke, for example, is connected always and everywhere to fire. In my opinion this passage in NL is indicative of a tendency seen in later Čārvāka where a certain kind of inference is accepted

\textsuperscript{496} This is nicely put by the P (1991) p. 491. \textit{nanvevaḥ vahnyanumityabhāve dhūmadarṣanāt katham agnyarthi pravarttate āta āha –tasād iti.}
\textsuperscript{497} See text [9-12].
\textsuperscript{498} I have not found any similar argument in the other Čārvāka sources that have been discussed here.
as giving some sort of knowledge, at least practical everyday knowledge within the domain of perceptible entities.\textsuperscript{499} The position expressed in the above NL passage might seem to be problematic, since it neither expresses an outright total denial of any inferential activity whatsoever, nor does it speak explicitly about accepting an empirically verifiable kind of inference. In my opinion the passage requires a supplementary reading outside the scope of the text itself in order to be understood. Gokhale has made the following remark:

Cārvākas … are suggesting that perception may give us certain knowledge; anumāna of the empirically testable (utpannaprattiti…) kind can give us only probable cognition, which may turn out to be true or false after investigation.\textsuperscript{500}

It is possible to understand the Cārvāka opinion concerning inference, expressed in NL, in terms of a reaction against an argument raised against their rejection of inference. This argument, in short, is based on the observation that people in general do seem to act as if they had access to some knowledge regarding entities not given in direct perceptual experience.\textsuperscript{501} This argument is indicated in the P commentary to NL and stated as the rhetorical question of how it is possible that there is activity intended for fire when one perceives smoke.\textsuperscript{502} The Cārvāka answer, then, entails an understanding of this activity as grounded in perception, primarily the remembered experience, i.e. remembrance of perception of fire and a non-grasping of a non-relation. In short this is possible to understand as a limited kind of inference, without vyāpti, thus excluding the leap made in Vallabha’s inference that enables one to have knowledge of particulars not accessible through ordinary perception and verified in the end through tarka, a hypothetical non-empirical process of reasoning.\textsuperscript{503} The discussion between the Cārvākas and Vallabha could be understood as a discussion on the nature and definition of the knowledge process, and not as a Cārvāka rejection of the possibility of knowing fire when seeing smoke. From Vallabha’s point of view the Cārvākas reject inference since for Vallabha inference is always grounded in an apprehension of an invariable relation, vyāpti. From that

\textsuperscript{499} Bhattacharya, (1999) pp. 490ff., has argued that the general opinion amongst the Cārvākas from ca. 700 AD was to view perception as the primary touchstone of validity but insofar as inference dealt with verifiable subjects it was accepted. For an outline of the Cārvāka view on perception and inference and fragments expressing this see Franco (1991) pp. 154-163, Bhattacharya (1999) pp. 485-497, Koller (1977) pp. 155-164, and Jayatilleke (1963) pp. 71-80. For a complementary list of fragments see Bhattacharya (2002) pp. 597-640.

\textsuperscript{500} Gokhale (1993) p. 3. The passage mentioning the utpannapratiti kind of inference is found in NM (1936) p. 113.

\textsuperscript{501} Gokhale (1992) p. 123.

\textsuperscript{502} P (1991) p. 491, nanv evam vahnyaunamityabhāve dhūmadarsanāt katham agnyarthi pravarttaty ati āha –tasmād iti.

\textsuperscript{503} This will be dealt with below in section 5.4.2.
perspective the Cārvāka argumentation could be understood, not as denying the validity of knowledge of fire from smoke, but rather as denying the procedure of ascertaining this validity which, from Vallabha’s point of view, is vyāpti and from the Cārvāka viewpoint is perception.

Vallabha’s answers to the Cārvāka rejection of inference includes counterarguments found in other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. Gokhale has differentiated between two types of answers to the Cārvāka rejection of inference, that is, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inference, from the time of Jayanta. First of all there are arguments from what could be called a pragmatic point of view that emphasize that people actually tend to infer and seem to gain knowledge from this process, at least occasionally. In Gokhale’s understanding this argument promotes a view of inference as an “authentic means of knowledge”. The second response concerns the possibility of establishing the invariable relation with a high degree of certainty, in Gokhale’s words; “authentic inductive reasoning”.504 According to Gokhale, the answer based on contradiction, which is also one of Vallabha’s first arguments against the Cārvākas, belongs to the first kind of response. That is, it aims at establishing inference as a separate means of knowledge by showing that the opponent also utilizes inference without being aware of it. This kind of response to the Cārvākas is, for example, also raised by Bhāsarvajña who states that it is self-contradictory to deny inference, and furthermore that all practical behavior (vyavahāra) would be obstructed, or rather that any behavior whatsoever would be ruled out.505 This latter response is reminiscent of Vallabha’s discussion concerning the establishment of vyāpti, which he argues for by showing the necessity of accepting generalities. According to Vallabha, desire and activity would be impossible if there were no generalities since the very means of connecting past, present, and future would not be there.506 Vallabha’s response, though, can be classified in terms of Gokhale’s second kind of argument since he is arguing that vyāpti is accessible because of the existence of generalities. After having established that generalities in turn are readily accessible to us, Vallabha can proceed to establish that we also have access to vyāpti. In that regard Vallabha’s understanding of generalities becomes crucial in the discussion concerning the possibility of apprehending vyāpti. There seems, however, to be a problem in Gokhale’s understanding of the Naiyāyika response to the Cārvāka denial of the possibility to grasp vyāpti. This problem becomes apparent when Gokhale somehow equates the theories on the internal organ perceiving vyāpti, which is held by some of the above mentioned Naiyāyikas, with the understanding of some kind of “intuitive

505 NSa (1968) p. 223, atha dhūmādy anumāṇasyāpi tad dūṣanam evasyate, tadā sarvalokavyavahāravirodhaḥ svavacanapruṣūmirodhaḥ ca.
506 See comments and text [27-30].
perception” different from ordinary perception (laukika pratyakṣa). That is, he appears to hold that a conception of vyāpti as graspable by the internal organ is tied to the idea that the grasping of vyāpti is an “intuitive perception” of vyāpti. Gokhale’s conclusions apparently seem to be at odds with the position of Vallabha who explicitly and repeatedly states that vyāpti is grasped by an outer sense, i.e. the eye, but who, at the same time, also speaks of the ability to perceive all particulars in which the same generality inheres, which is evocative of an understanding of sāmānyalaksana. Gokhale is rather vague in his reasoning and does not explicitly say that it is the idea of sāmānyalaksana to which he is referring though the differentiation between “intuitive perception” and ordinary perception would suggest that. Irrespective of how one can possibly read Gokhale it is important here to clarify that although the inner sense (manas) is involved in the process of the special perception of sāmānyalaksana there is a great difference between, say Jayanta, and the ideas expressed in Navya-nyāya texts on this subject. Both in NL and in the KB it is clearly expressed that vyāpti is apprehended by an outer sense and this seems to be a common understanding in the Navya-nyāya discourse as well.

It is, in my opinion, clear from the above that the discussion with the Cārvākas in NL is part of a common discourse apparent in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts dating from the time of Jayanta onwards. A further possibility, which can only be tentatively held at the time being, is that the Cārvāka denial of the possibility to secure vyāpti might have been instrumental to the discourse on the concept of sāmānyalaksanapratyāśatti.

A further point of discussion taken up in the NL is related to another problem in the Cārvāka view, which may have promoted the gradual acceptance of a modified form of inference within the school. This problem, or rather, raised question, is the difficulty of establishing perception as the sole means of knowledge without resorting to another means of knowledge. In connection with this argument there is one interesting passage suggesting a sort of meta-view, expressed by Vallabha, concerning the very discussion that takes place between him and the Cārvākas:

Because the corroboration of the proof (sādhana) of the proponent and the opponent cannot be grasped by means of sense perception. Because of a non-grasping of a non-corroboration of inference being a means of knowledge. Because without a corroboration by another means of knowledge it is not accepted that inference is [included within] the scope of an everyday practice of a means of knowledge.

510 See text [18-21], cf. also Franco (1983) p. 148 and Koller (1977) pp. 156f., who both view this as important for the changes within the Cārvāka school.
511 See text [18-21].
Here Vallabha appears to say that the very discussion underway between himself and the Cārvākas would be impossible to have if one did not accept inference. That is, in a discussion one always uses inferences that go outside the sphere of being perceptually verifiable, and if this is not accepted all that remains is to be silent.

5.3 Vyāpti and upādhi

5.3.1 Vyāpti and upādhi within the tradition(s)

The nature and definition of the relation between the liṅga and the liṅgin is discussed from early on in the history of the tradition(s). By the time of Vātsyāyana, Diṅnāga, and Praśastapāda the terms avyabhicāra (non-deviation) and avinābhāva (not without the other) were apparently known to designate what was later called vyāpti. 512 Although it will not be treated in this study, it is important to note that many of the discussions concerning this relation were held with Buddhist philosophers, at first Diṅnāga and later Dharmakīrti. 513

According to Praśastapāda a liṅga is something that is always and everywhere connected with something else; this is exemplified as “wherever there is smoke there is fire, and wherever fire is absent smoke is also absent”. 514 The liṅga is here understood as an invariable mark or sign indicating the liṅgin. According to Diṅnāga the relation between these two could either be that of identity (tādātmya) or of causality (kāryakāraṇa-bhāva), but in PDS it seems that there is a number of relations, which could be understood in terms of an avinābhāva relation. 515

Trilocana uses another term for characterizing vyāpti, svābhāvikasambandha, often translated as “natural relation”, “wesensmässige Verbindung”, or “intrinsic relation”. This relation is maintained by the very nature of the relata. Smoke for example is by its very nature as smoke invariably connected to fire. The particular smoke is understood as something that points to or discloses something else, fire, through its very nature of being smoke (smokeness). 516 Such a relation is thought of by Trilocana as a relation devoid of upādhi, that is, devoid of having the character of being


\[514\] PDS (1895) p. 205, vidhītu tu yatra dhūmanas tatātṛignir agnyaḥbhāve dhūmano ’pi na bhavati.

\[515\] PDS (1895) pp. 205f. See also Randle (1930) p. 157.

\[516\] Cf. Oberhammer (1964) p. 145. Oberhammer describes the svābhāvikasambandha as “inhaltlicher implikation".
adventitious. A relation that is described as having an upādhi can never be “natural” because the parameters of the relation come from the outside as it were and not from the inside, that is, from the very nature of the relata.\(^{517}\) It seems to be the case that Trilocana is one of the first to bring the concept of upādhi into the characterization of vyāpti, but he does so without much further discussion or analysis.\(^{518}\) Since Vyomaśīva also uses the term svābhāvikasambandha it seems to be the case that at least that term was discussed before Trilocana’s time.\(^{519}\) The concept of svābhāvika-sambandha becomes the standard definition for both Vācaspati and Udayana, though they both differ in certain details and focus from Trilocana. Bhūṣarvajña, contemporary with Vācaspati, also seems to have a relation by “own-nature” in mind when defining vyāpti, though he does not use the term svābhāvikasambandha but rather the term avinābhāva. This at least is how Prets has read him.\(^{520}\) Slaje has pointed out that he does not use the compound svābhāvikasambandha, as do Vyomaśīva, Vācaspati, and Udayana, but rather the words svabhāvataḥ and svabhāvena.\(^{521}\)

As discussed previously Vācaspati holds that vyāpti is grasped by an external sense organ by means of repeated observation.\(^{522}\) The reason for this non-agreement between Trilocana and Vācaspati is, in Chakraborty’s reading, that manas, according to Vācaspati, only perceives internal objects, which vyāpti is not. Chakraborty expresses the difference in Vācaspati by stating that he is more “realistic” than Trilocana.\(^{523}\) In Oberhammer’s reading we find this interesting aspect of the difference between Trilocana and Vācaspati a bit more elaborated. With Vācaspati the grasping of vyāpti through generalities (sāmānya) falls into the background and another aspect comes to the fore, the svābhāvika relation as a relation free from upādhi. In Oberhammer’s analysis this is expressed as a shift from the ontological aspect of the svābhāvikasambandha towards a problem concerning the non-apprehension of upādhi and the use of tarka. This shift is in my understanding a change of focus from ontology to epistemology. For Vācaspati it is the non-apprehension of an upādhi that is important and not

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\(^{517}\) VC (2000) p. 32, asmākam tu bhūyodarśanasahāyaṇena manasā tajjatiyānāṁ sambandho grhito bhavati. ato dhāmo nāgnaṁ vyabhicarati. tad vyabhicāre dhūma upādhiraḥtāṁ sambandham atikrāmed iti. hetor vipaścaśāṅkāṁivartakāṁ pramāṇam upalabdhisānta-prāptopādhīhivahahetur anupalambhāḥhākyam pratyakṣaṁ eva. tataḥ siddaḥ svabhāvikāḥ sambandhāḥ.

\(^{518}\) Since Trilocana’s views come in fragments it is of course not possible to articulate a definitive analysis of his position. In this I have relied on Oberhammer’s reading. Cf. Oberhammer (1964) pp. 131ff.

\(^{519}\) See p. 126 below where Vyomaśīva is discussed.


\(^{523}\) Chakraborty (1978b) p. 389.

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the determination of the non-existence of an *upādhi* as for Trilocana.524 Oberhammer writes;

> Um dies zu zeigen, weist Vācaspati nach, dass, falls keinen bedingende Bestimmung (*upādhi* ) festgestellt werden konnte, ein Zweifel, ob es nicht eine solche gäbe, die der Wahrnehmung nicht zugänglich wäre, nicht möglich sei.525

Oberhammer’s point seems to be that Vācaspati emphasizes that if one cannot point to an *upādhi*, i.e. apprehend an *upādhi*, then the doubt is no longer possible. In this process the use of *tarka* is brought in by Vācaspati as that through which the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* is understood as non-contingent and thus as being without *upādhi*.526 According to Oberhammer Vācaspati has given the concept of *svabhāvikasambandha* a closer connection to the world of reals (*vastu*), which in Oberhammer’s language is expressed in terms of a higher degree of empiricism. By emphasizing that the relation of *vyāpti* is apprehended by an external sense organ, the relation, in Vācaspati’s understanding, loses the “intuitional” character it had in Trilocana’s description. That is, the inner mental process of apprehending the generalities is exchanged for an outer apprehension of the generalities.527 It is important to note here that both Oberhammer and Chakraborty differentiate between the Buddhist and Nyāya views of the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* by applying the concepts “extensional” and “intensional”. In Oberhammer’s understanding this is apparent in their different descriptions of the nature of the relation; in the Nyāya discourse the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* is intensional in the sense that it pertains between the generalities contained within the particular entities, whereas in the Buddhist understanding the particulars are summed up in classes between which the relation holds.528

Vyomaśīva and Śrīdhara explain *vyāpti* by the terms *avīnābhāva* and *avyabhicāra* in line with Praśastapāda. Both of them emphasize that the relation of *vyāpti* holds between generalities and not particulars. As noted in the previous section on *vyāptigraha* this is one of the points of difference concerning *vyāpti* that can be seen in the tradition(s).529 Vyomaśīva,

524 Oberhammer (1964) pp. 158f.
525 Oberhammer (1964) pp. 159f.
526 Oberhammer (1964) p. 160. Vācaspati’s view regarding *tarka* will be dealt with further below, see p. 140.
527 Oberhammer (1964) p. 163.
528 Oberhammer (1964) pp. 156, 166. Chakraborty (1978b) p. 388. It is important to note that in Oberhammer’s reading Vācaspati takes in the extensional ascertainment of *vyāpti*, through *avyaaya* and *vyatireka*, but does not give this method the primacy it is given in the Buddhist understanding of *vyāpti*. For an overview of the extensional-intensional debate in relation to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika see Mohanty (1992) pp. 125-131 and Chatterjee (1996) pp. 135f. This issue will not be dealt with in the present work.
529 NKd (1895) p. 206, V (1931) p. 570, cited above in n. 112.
however, also uses the term svābhāvikasambandha, something that Slaje has pointed out in an article on the chronology of some of these philosophers. If Vyomaśīva predates Trilocana, as is suggested by Slaje, this would show that svābhāvikasambandha was discussed before Trilocana. 530 There are two further interesting aspects of Śrīdhara that are very much in line with his predecessor (almost contemporary) Vācaspati. Firstly, he seems to understand the relation between hetu and sādhya as a natural relation (svabhāvena sambandha), and secondly, he brings the concept of upādhi into the discourse on vyāpti. It seems to be the case that Śrīdhara conceives of vyāpti as a relation that is a co-existence of hetu with sādhya and is free from an upādhi, and this character of being free from an upādhi is in turn established by repeated observation. 531

For Udayana the concept of tarka comes to play a significant role in ascertaining absence of upādhi and thereby in ascertaining the svābhāvikasambandha. 532 Through this both the upādhi and the tarka take on a more precise function and description in Udayana’s thinking and this is one of the changes in relation to Vācaspati and Trilocana. 533 Another interesting aspect of the ATV and NKM is that the svābhāvikasambandha is defined as “absence of upādhi” (nirupādhītvam); upādhi, in turn, is defined as “that which has the character of pervading the sādhya while having the character of not pervading the sādhana”. 534 The negative definition of vyāptes is inherited from Trilocana and Vācaspati, but the definition of upādhi is a new element brought in by Udayana. It is, in my opinion, quite clear that the epistemological problem of ascertainment of vyāpti draws further attention by Udayana and that the focus is put in that direction. In the NKM this is, for example, seen in that this theme is addressed in a discussion with the Ārvāṇas in much the same manner, although not with the same arguments as we find by Vallabha described above. 535 Udayana actually gives two kinds of definitions of upādhi, first asking what it is and then asking for its differentiating mark (lakṣaṇa). 536 Oberhammer distinguishes these two definitions calling the first one a description of the nature of upādhi and

531 NKd (1991) pp. 486, 488, svabhāvena hi kasya cād kena cā saha sambandho niyato nirupādhītvam, upādhiḥkṛto hi sambandhah tad apagamān nivartate na svābhāvikah… nirupādhītvam ca tasya bhūyodarśānābhyyāśāvaseyyam ity antaṃ bhūyaḥ saabhāvagṛhīhanaballabhuvā savikalpapatratyakṣena so ’dhyavasyāyata iti.
533 Tarka is dealt with in greater detail below in section 5.4.1.
534 ATV (1940) p. 403, kah punar ayanta pratibandhah, svābhāvikasambandhah, kah svābhāvārthah, nirupādhītvam kah punar upādhiḥ, sādhvyavayopakṣaṁ nimittaṁ. kim vāxya lakaṣānam, sādhanāvāyopakṣe sati sādhyavyavayopakṣaṁ. NKM (1912) p. 30(3), tatropādhis tu, sādhanāvāyopakṣe sati sādhyavyavayopakṣaṁ.
535 This is most apparent in Dravid (1996) pp. 244ff. Cf. NKM (1912) p. 30(3).
536 See above n. 534.
characterizing the second one as describing the formal logical (formal-logisch) function of upādhi.\footnote{Oberhammer (1964) p. 166.}

Oberhammer reads Udayana as bringing in a new aspect of upādhi into the discourse and thereby as positioning himself at the peak of philosophical development, a place where “formal logic” apparently is situated.\footnote{Oberhammer (1964) pp. 166f., 180.} Regardless of the claim of evolutionary primacy I think Oberhammer misses the point when bringing in the concept of formal logic, especially when doing so without explaining in what sense the second definition deals with “formal logical” aspects. In my view the definition of upādhi could be understood in terms of the importance of ascertaining vyāpti which seems to gradually become a more pressing matter as the discourse unfolds. Of course, given the definition of vyāpti as “being without an upādhi”, it becomes crucial to establish a method of finding and knowing exactly what an upādhi is. But this is better described as an epistemological zeal rather than in terms of “formal logic” so that the trend of “epistemologizing” the relation of sādhya and hetu can be traced within the discourse from Trilocana and on as gaining more and more attention. This will also be apparent when turning to Vallabha’s treatment of vyāpti below.

As for the definitions of vyāpti and upādhi there is a great variety in the discussions subsequent to the NL. Although this will not be treated in detail here, it is, in my opinion, important to take note of this phenomenon.\footnote{Cf. Vattanky (2003) pp. 30ff., Gangopadhyay (1971) pp. 150ff., 156ff.}

5.3.2 Vallabha on vyāpti and upādhi

Vallabha gives a twofold definition of vyāpti in the NL, the first being, “the complete association of the sādhanā with the sādhya” and the second, “the state of being without an upādhi”.\footnote{See text [38, 41].} In connection to the first definition Vallabha also rejects two other definitions.\footnote{In the KB, (1991) p. 498, we find the following comment on this passage: tīkākṛt abhinātā vyāptisvarūpam nirasayati. “tīkā” most likely refers to Vācaspati’s or Udayana’s commentaries on NS in which they both give the svabhāvika definition of vyāpti.} The first of these, that is, “anupādhitvam” is found in Udayana, Vācaspati, and Trilocana and is a specification of the svabhāvika definition of vyāpti mentioned above. Interesting to note is that this definition is then reinforced by Vallabha as constituting his second admitted definition.\footnote{See the list of definitions appearing in NL later in this section.} The other refuted definition, “the absence of the absence of the sādhya”, has not been possible to trace to a certain text or author, but on the other hand this, and the other two above definitions as
well, appear in the NR list of eleven definitions, in the NSD list of seventeen definitions, and in the TC list of 21 definitions of vyāpti. In the NR and NSD the “kārtsnyena” and the “anaupādhika” definitions are found, and in the TC these two and the “absence of the absence of the sādhya” are found. In the case of NR, the commentator, Nṛsiṁhayajvan, links NL to the kārtsnyena definition by referring to “lilāvatīkāra”, but such a connection is not made in the TC, NR, or NSD. Although nothing is mentioned in the NSD or the TC about Vallabha being the proponent of the kārtsnyena definition it is nevertheless attributed to Vallabha in the secondary literature, with the exception of Wada who only admits that it may belong to Vallabha.

Definitions of vyāpti appearing in NL:
1. Vyāpti is the complete association of the sādhana with the sādhya (held by Vallabha).
2. Vyāpti is the state of being without an upādhi (held by Trilocana, Vācaspatai, Udayana, and Vallabha).
3. Vyāpti is the absence of the absence of the sādhya (appears in TC and NR).

The first definition in this list appears in slightly different forms in the NR, NSD, and the TC. In NR it is stated as kārtsnyena sādhanasādhyasaṁābhāvo; in the NSD it is kārtsnyena hi sāmānyena prakāreyena sambandho; and in TC kārtsnyena sambandho. Since both the NR and the TC discuss different interpretations of the definition it seems apparent that they read it as vague. The main problem with this definition appears to be the sense of the word kārtsnyena, whether it is attributed to the sādhya or the sādhana, and also what exactly the relata in such a relation would consist of. There is, in my opinion, no possibility to establish with certainty whether the

543 It must be noted that if one connects the definition in NSD with Vallabha’s definition then the dating of Śaṣadhara (1125) given by Matilal cannot be correct. Or, this definition was present elsewhere than by Vallabha and thus cannot so readily be ascribed to him only. Cf. Matilal’s introduction in NSD (1976) p. 11. In this work the dating 1300 AD is used for NSD, cf. app. 4.
545 DM (1953) p. 44.
547 See text [38-41].
definitions appearing in NR and TC are intended to be the same definitions as the one appearing in NL, though the probability of this is high, especially if the NR is consulted since NL is mentioned in the commentary. Furthermore, the definition is vague in the sense that it is interpretable in many ways, the formulation of it can be altered, and there are as many as four variants of the definition given by Vardhamāna in his discussion in the commentaries to NL, NKM, K, and NVTS. The above second definition is stated in the NR as anauñādhikatvarū and in TC anauñādhikā sambandhāḥ; there is no essential difference between them. The third definition in the above list is a variant of the so-called vyāpti-pañçaka definitions that are found in the TC. These are definitions of vyāpti in terms of non-deviation (avyabhicārītatva). The definition could be understood in terms of the non-deviating sādhana; in the case of vyāpti the sādhana is absent in places that have absence of the sādhya.

In connection with the anauñādhikatva definition of vyāpti in NL there is also a definition of upādhī: “[That which has the character of] complete association with the sādhya has the character of being present in one part [of the locus] of the sādhana,” This is similar to Udayana’s definition: “that which has the character of pervading the sādhya while having the character of not pervading the sādhana”. The underlying principle of Vallabha’s definition of upādhī is the concept of pervasion (vyāpti) just as in Udayana’s; the only difference is that Vallabha does not use the terms vyāpaka and avyāpaka.

The by now quite obvious problem in the vyāpti section is that the two definitions (no. 1 & 2) given by Vallabha apparently oppose each other, that is to say, in the discussion on def. 1, def. 2 is rejected, and then later on def. 2 is reinforced as lakṣaṇa. Although Vallabha rejects Udayana’s definition of the nature of vyāpti as being without upādhī he utilizes this very concept in his second definition. I have chosen an interpretational path of charitable reading of the text, since I do not think it probable, or constructive, to read this apparent contradiction as a mistake by the author of the text. This appears to be the path taken by Chakraborty as well who, to my knowledge, is the only scholar who has taken notice of and tried to explain these two definitions. Chakraborty distinguishes between two aspects of the definitions of vyāpti in Vallabha’s text. The first definition (no. 1) tells us

551 NR (1953) p. 49, TC (1892) p. 77.
553 This definition is discussed in comments [38–40].
554 See text [43].
555 ATV (1940) p. 403. Cf. also n. 534 above.
556 There is of course also the possibility of mistakes made in the writing/copying of the manuscripts.
something about the essential feature of vyāpti, in other words, of what vyāpti is made of. The second aspect of Chakraborty’s understanding is that Vallabhā uses the concept of upādhi in order to explain vyāpti in the last definition (no. 2). Chakraborty’s differentiation between the two definitions of vyāpti could, in my opinion, be understood partly in terms of a definition of what vyāpti is, its nature or essence, in short its ontological status, and secondly in terms of how it is singled out from anything else, how it is known or recognized, its epistemological status.558 According to the KB the purpose of the laksāna appears to be knowledge, or rather cognition, of the entity defined, in other words, how or through what vyāpti is recognized.559 Chakraborty does not touch upon this problem in any elaborate way, but does, in my opinion, mention a very important aspect of the second definition:

The implication of Vallabhā’s definition is that the relation in its entirety is ascertainable only when the absence of a condition is in evidence and not otherwise, and therefore, it is in the fitness of thing [sic] that Vallabhā, in connection with his discussion of the determination of vyāpti, introduces a detailed treatment on [sic] the nature of condition (upādhi).560

And indeed, upādhi seems to be the main focus of the section on vyāpti in NL. Rather than concentrating on the nature of vyāpti, Vallabhā explores the very means to ascertain it through the concept of upādhi. In this sense the section on anumāna in general and the one on vyāpti in particular are fitted together, united in a sequential undertaking to describe the process of recognizing and ascertaining vyāpti.561 Furthermore, if we take Oberhammer’s reading of Udayana’s twofold definition of upādhi at face value, it is possible to delineate a similar differentiation of levels in the two definitions given by Vallabhā. As mentioned above Udayana does describe the concept of upādhi both in terms of its nature, as an ontological description, and in terms of how it is discernible. The second definition, then, in my vocabulary at least, serves as a kind of epistemological tool.562 This is, in my view, what Vallabhā does with vyāpti. He defines its nature but soon abandons that track and goes on to the apparently more pressing matter of how vyāpti is ascertained in the process of coming to inferential

558 Vallabhā himself does not mention the word svarūpa in connection with his first definition. Matilal, (1998) p. 166, briefly mentions the second definition and, in my view, appropriately translates the word laksāna as the differentiating mark.
561 This will be further discussed in the concluding chapter of this work.
562 Cf. Tachikawa, (1981) p. 29, who notes that “definition” for Udayana is to differentiate, that is, to indicate by what the defined entity is singled out from every other entity.
knowledge.\textsuperscript{563} Frauwallner has taken notice of this twofold method of definition in connection to Gaṅgeśa’s two definitions of \textit{upādhi}.\textsuperscript{564}

Er [Gaṅgeśa] benützt nämlich die alte Unterscheidung zwischen Wesen (\textit{svarēpam}) und Merkmal (\textit{lakṣaṇam}), um ähnlich wie bei der Umfassung zwei Definitionen vorzulegen. Und das ist auch sachlich voll berechtigt. Die erste Definition gibt nämlich an, was das Wesen der zusätzlichen Bestimmung [\textit{upādhi}] ausmacht, dass sie dazu dient, das Fehlgehen des Grundes aufzuzeigen. Die zweite Definition behandelt ihr formales Verhältnis zu Grund und Folge.\textsuperscript{565}

Phillips, on the other hand, interprets the distinction between the two kinds of definitions of \textit{upādhi} given by Gaṅgeśa slightly differently. According to him Gaṅgeśa’s first definition entails the nature of the \textit{upādhi}, the nature of being an entity in whose presence a relation is shown to be variable. It also entails how the \textit{upādhi} does that. This conveys the logical aspect of the \textit{upādhi} in Phillips’s vocabulary. Gaṅgeśa’s second definition aims at the possibility of recognizing an \textit{upādhi} by providing its distinctive feature (\textit{asādhatraṇaḥdharma}).\textsuperscript{566} The difference could thus be understood to lie in how something exists and \textit{whereby} what one can recognize that existent. In their understanding of the \textit{svarēpa} definition Frauwallner and Phillips are essentially of the same opinion, though Phillips interprets the nature of \textit{upādhi} as being “logical”. It is, however, in their different understandings of the \textit{lakṣaṇa} definition that things become interesting. It seems to be the case that Frauwallner takes the second definition as conveying some sort of logical or formal aspect of \textit{upādhi}, whereas Phillips understands it as a help to recognize an \textit{upādhi}. In my opinion and vocabulary it would be convenient to separate the two definitions of \textit{vyāpti} given in Vallabha’s text with their two levels of ontology and epistemology. This understanding in turn does not differ essentially from Phillips’s understanding of the difference between Gaṅgeśa’s twofold definition of \textit{upādhi}.

But even though one could understand Vallabha’s two definitions of \textit{vyāpti} as operating on two levels, a problem remains. This problem is also inherent in Chakraborty’s above remark concerning his understanding of the function of the absence of \textit{upādhi} as an indicator of the possibility to

\textsuperscript{563} There is a nice mirror effect between the formulation of Udayana’s \textit{upādhi} definitions and Vallabha’s definitions of \textit{vyāpti}. Cf ATV (1940) p. 403, \textit{kāḥ punar upādhiḥ. sādhyaprayojanam nimmittataram. kiṁ vasya lakṣaṇam. sādhanāvāyāpaktave sati sādhyasyāvāyāpakatvam}. And NL (1991) p. 496, \textit{kā punar vyāptiḥ. sādhanasya sādhyasyāhityam kārtṣṇaṁ khe. kiṁ punar asyā laksanam. anupādhiḥkavatvam}. The two definitions run as follows: TC (1982) pp. 282, 284, \textit{atrocyate yady vyabhicārītvanā sādhanasya sādhyavāyābhicāritvam sa upādhiḥ. lakṣaṇanī tu paryavasitasādhyavāyāpakatve sati sādhanāvāyāpakatvam}. These will be further discussed towards the end of this section.

\textsuperscript{565} Frauwallner (1970) p. 45.

ascertain vyāpti. This seems, at least superficially, to be at odds with the explanation Chakraborty gives of Vallabha’s initial refutation of Udayana’s anāupādhika definition. The rejection of Udayana’s definition is extremely brief, but according to Chakraborty Vallabha says that in the case of the anāikāntika one fails to find any upādhi although it clearly is a fallacious inference, an inference where vyāpti is unascertainable. If one follows Udayana’s definition that vyāpti is anupādhita, then, Vallabha seems to say that an absence of vyāpti should reveal an upādhi in order for the definition to work. This initial refutation of anupādhita might perhaps also be voiced in connection with anupādhita in the second definition.567 The question to ask in that case is: what exactly is the function of upādhi according to Vallabha? It does indeed seem to be something that is to be ruled out along the way towards certainty, something that, if present, points towards failure or confirmation of doubt regarding the presence of vyāpti. But it also seems as if this is not enough, at least not in the cases of failing inferences where vyāpti is indeed not present, but where no upādhi is in sight either. In order to understand the point Vallabha is making it becomes, as said above, crucial to understand the working of upādhi. Following on the characterization of vyāpti as anupādhitaka is a discussion on different forms of upādhis through stock-examples of fallacious inferences. Vallabha gives us three kinds of upādhis and four ways to discover them, but in an extremely short-handed manner that calls for further explanation. With the aid of Śāṅkara Miśra’s and Vardhamāna’s commentaries, and because the examples are well known, it has been possible to determine the pseudo-inferences Vallabha utilizes in these passages.568 The three kinds of upādhi that Vallabha mentions are:

1. An upādhi where both the pervasion of the sādhyā and the non-pervasion of the sādhana are ascertained.
2. An upādhi where the pervasion of the sādhyā is ascertained and the non-pervasion of the sādhana is not.
3. An upādhi where the non-pervasion of the sādhana is ascertained and the pervasion of the sādhyā is not.569

One question, however, arises when considering these three kinds of upādhi and that is in what sense they fulfil the definition given by Vallabha himself. It is only in the first kind that both parts of the definition are fulfilled, the pervasion of the sādhyā and the non-pervasion of the sādhana. In the second and third form of upādhi only one of these two is ascertained. Vallabha

568 Potter (1995), pp. 205f., has described Vallabha’s classification of the four ways to discover upādhi but not the three different forms of upādhi.
569 See text [45-48].
continues by enumerating four different ways of discovering upādhi, and one could assume that the factor coming in to play here, though unmentioned, is doubt in some form or another. In all three forms of upādhi there is to a greater or lesser degree a suspicion that is so strong that further investigation is called for. This investigation seems to be conducted through the identification of various faults that come with a pseudo-reason, and in turn through these faults an upādhi is detectable, or constructed. At least it seems as if when a fault is found one can begin to construct an upādhi.

And [an upādhi] is set up through obstruction [by other means of knowledge] (bādha), deviation (vyabhicāra), absence of conforming tarka (anukūlatarka) and a refutational tarka (pratikūlatarka)...570

The upādhi that is only partly ascertained, as in the second and third kind, still functions as an upādhi, and thus obstructs the process of coming to knowledge. It does so by halting the process through the realization that the actual inference in progress was, after all, not a good path to pursue. Through the inclusion of these “uncertain” forms of upādhi a certain approach towards this phenomenon emerges—an approach that in part could be understood in terms of understanding upādhi as a description of a psychological condition within the process of coming to knowledge when this very process fails or could be undercut.571 The presence of the two “uncertain” forms of upādhi indicates, in my opinion, such an attitude.

Even though no fully ascertained upādhi is found, the process could still be halted, as is pointed out in Vallabha’s initial refutation. That is, an inference could turn out to be a mere pseudo-inference regardless of an exact delineation of an upādhi. In that case, anaupādhika cannot define the essence/nature of vyāpti, but what it can and does do is guide the person coming to knowledge, or the person in discussion, towards certainty of vyāpti, since vyāpti could never ever be present where an upādhi is present. The answer then, to the question whether or not Vallabha’s objection to anaupādhika as a svarūpa definition might also be applicable to the laksana, is no. The two definitions describe different aspects of upādhi, which could be understood as ontological and epistemological.

There are some interesting parallels between Gaṅgeśa’s treatment of upādhi and Vallabha’s. First of all, as pointed out above, Gaṅgeśa gives two definitions of upādhi in TC and one of these, the laksana, is a variant of Vallabha’s and Udayana’s laksana. In Phillips’s translation upādhi is

570 See text [51].
571 Cf Phillips, (2002) p. 27, who translates upādhi with “inferential undercutting condition” partly because Gaṅgeśa talks about it in “psychological” terms as “blocking inferential awareness”.

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“that which while pervading what amounts to the probandum (of an original inference) fails to pervade its (putative) prover... What amounts to the probandum is the probandum as delimited by (or qualified by) a property that makes it (i.e. anything that exhibits it) known (as that probandum property, prasiddha)”572

This definition works with the same parameters as Udayana’s and Vallabha’s but with an addition, or rather, a specification of the sādhya (probandum for Phillips). Gaṅgeśa gives three examples of what the specification, “property” for Phillips, could be. In some cases it is the sādhana, in some “having the character of substance (dravyatva)”, or in some “having the character of being in the kitchen”. In the last example it is the case of inferring smoke from the presence of fire that is shown to be impossible because of the upādhi “wet fuel”. The sādhyā, smoke, is apparently known as a sādhyā in relation to fire since it has the character of being in the kitchen. 573 This conveys that it is not such a strange thing to try to infer smoke from fire since they usually are found together.

The most interesting parallel between Vallabha and Gaṅgeśa, though, is the subject of certain and uncertain upādhis, which is a concern running through both texts. For Gaṅgeśa there are two kinds of upādhi, the certain kind, such as “wet fuel” and the dubious or uncertain kind (saññidgīdhopādhi), such as “digestion of certain kinds of vegetables” (from the “Mitrā” pseudo-inference). The uncertain kind can in turn be of three kinds: the two kinds that Vallabha has, and a third in which both the sādhāvyāpaka and the sādhana vyāpaka are uncertain. All of these halt the inferential process and thus all of them function as upādhi.574 Gaṅgeśa then also takes up the epistemological aspect of upādhi, explained above as a focal point of the passage in NL.575 Through this second similarity between Vallabha and Gaṅgeśa the difference between Udayana and Vallabha also becomes apparent. In the NVTS Udayana does not seem to speak about uncertain kinds of upādhi in the same straightforward way as Vallabha. After having stated his definition of upādhi, Udayana recites three examples of upādhi, one of which, “wet fuel”, is grasped directly (sāksat) as a pervader of the sādhyā.576 This however does not seem to be the case in the other two examples, the “Mitrā” and the “scratchable-by-iron” inferences, which are treated by Vallabha as the two kinds of uncertain upādhis.577 Although

575 Gaṅgeśa’s dependence upon earlier thought, in general, in the treatment of upādhi is noted by Phillips (2002) p. 2. Frauwallner, (1970), has connected Gaṅgeśa’s treatment of upādhi foremost to Udayana and Manikantha Miśra. Cf. also for example TR (1903) p. 69 and NR (1953) p. 96 in which the twofold division of upādhi also appears.
576 The NVTS treats upādhi in several passages under sūtra 1.1.5, see n. 532 in this work.
577 NVTS (1996) p. 190, tac ca sādhyābhimatadāhūmaśāyāmatve prati vyāpakatvam ārdrendhanānapānaparipatibhedayor avīśiṣṭam. avīśiṣṭai ca sādhanābhimatadahana-
Udayana does not explicitly state that these two are uncertain upādhis, this could be seen as an implicit point of departure. Neither Frauwallner nor Phillips point to any such explicit statement in Udayana that would clarify this matter. There is, however, a statement in ATV that reads: “there are two kinds of upādhi, doubtful and certain”. Frauwallner comments on Gaṅgāśa’s division as follows: “Er unterscheidet nach altem Brauch zweierlei zusätzliche Bestimmungen, die festgestellte und die zweifelhafte.” There is no further specification of the “old way” of discerning two kinds of upādhi in Frauwallner’s text nor is there any reference to an “old text” in which this is done. However, in connection to the passage with Gaṅgāśa’s division, both Frauwallner and Phillips point to a discussion in NVTS concerning the possibility of unknown upādhis. This is brought up by Gaṅgāśa as a defense against the possibility that if one admits an uncertain upādhi, then one also admits that there could be a possible upādhi for any inference, even that of inferring fire from smoke, which would have the consequence of halting every inferential process there is. This possible upādhi is remarked upon and rejected by Vallabha as well;

The presence in something different from the place [of the sādhanā], the time [of the sādhanā] and the sādhya [of the sādhanā], which has both [aspects] unascertained and whose nature is indefinite is not an upādhi because it would destruct the practice of every inferential process.

The difference between Vallabha and Gaṅgāśa regarding this certain/un-certain division lies in the fact that for Gaṅgāśa even the kind where both aspects of upādhi are uncertain halts the inferential process. But Gaṅgāśa’s uncertain kind of upādhi does not seem to correspond to Vallabha’s indefinite form, at least not in my reading. The indefiniteness (anirāpiṭā) seems to consist in one not even being able to point to a possible upādhi but only thinking that there might be an upādhi out there somewhere, of which one is not aware. And this is not the case in the example Gaṅgāśa gives of a pseudo-inference with an uncertain upādhi, the example being the “Mitrā” pseudo-inference. This example is, however, differently interpreted by Vallabha who states that only one of the pervasions of the upādhi is uncertain, namely the pervasion of the sādhya. Since Phillips already has

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579 ATV (1912) p. 30(3), sa ca dvividhāḥ, sāṅkṣiptopādhir nīscitopādhiḥ ca.
581 See text [49-50].
583 See text [46].
accounted for the finer points of Gaṅgeśa’s treatment of upādhi I will not touch upon that any further. An interesting point to make in conclusion though, is that it is possible to discern different levels in how upādhi is treated that might correspond to the two levels of defining upādhi, the ontological and the epistemological. The ontological level here encompasses the logical insofar as the essence of upādhi is to point to a deviation in the relation of the sādhana to the sādhyā. The epistemological encompasses the psychological insofar as the awareness of an uncertain upādhi halts the continuation of the process of coming to inferential knowledge. The focal point for Vallabha in turn could be understood in terms of an epistemological and a psychological concern by encompassing the theme of certainty of vyāpti. The prescriptive aspect of Vallabha’s treatment of vyāpti is clearly visible as instructions for how to find, or set up, an upādhi.

5.4 Tarka

5.4.1 Tarka within the tradition(s)

The focus of the following section is twofold; it deals partly with the classification of tarka and partly with the function of tarka within the inferential process. The classification of tarka focuses mainly on tarka’s ontological status. The function of tarka, on the other hand, could be understood as related to an epistemological discussion.

The discussions on the classification of tarka in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts are in general highly variegated. In NS it is described as supplementing reasoning (nyāya) in such a way that it might point to something leading to knowledge when one is uncertain. In the NSB one can see that tarka is not reduced to one or another means of knowledge, nor is it a distinct means in itself. Tarka is placed as one of the 16 categories, as a specific type of reasoning with a specific role, whereas in the VS and in Praśastapāda’s PDS it is not mentioned at all. It is, however, apparent from the NBV that there is a discussion going on concerning the classification of tarka, since a number of different views on this are recorded there. According to the NBV some hold that tarka is either doubt or certainty and not anything unique, others say that tarka is inference in the same manner as “ānvikṣā”, “hetu” and “anvaya” are inference, and yet others again say that tarka is inference but somehow dependent upon further reasoning (yukty āpeksṣam).

585 This will be further discussed in section 5.4.3.
586 NS (1997) p. 36 (1.1.40), avijñātatvate ‘rthe kāraṇopapattīnas tattvajñānārtham āhas tarkaḥ. Tarka is also treated in śītra 1.1.1.
587 NSB (1997) p. 16.

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As for the Vaiśeṣika texts, it is in the commentaries on PDS that tarka is taken up. According to Vyomaśīva tarka is not a separate form of avidyā (non-knowledge) since it is not apprehended as distinct from doubt and certainty.\(^{589}\) In the NKd tarka is also discussed in connection to avidyā. Śrīdhara adds at the end that some hold the view that it is a kind of doubt, but his own view is not so clearly stated.\(^{590}\) The opponent in the text, however, holds that tarka is something other than doubt or determination and thus is a form of avidyā.\(^{591}\) Both Śrīdhara and Vyomaśīva seem hesitant to add tarka as a fifth separate kind of avidyā but, on the other hand, they both deal with it in reference to avidyā which could be taken to indicate that neither of them would want to give tarka the status of being vidyā (knowledge) either. According to Bagchi, Śrīdhara in fact argues against a Naiyāyika who grants the status of knowledge to tarka, in Bagchi’s words, “species of knowledge”. In Bagchi’s reading, both Śrīdhara and Vyomaśīva would want to place tarka under perception or inference, as knowledge proper, and not as the Naiyāyika kind of halfway knowledge that is not actually proper knowledge (pramāṇa).\(^{592}\) In the V we find a rhetorical question indicating this position where Vyomaśīva asks how something could be a separate cognition when it is the fruit of specific cognitions such as perception.\(^{593}\) Bagchi’s analysis rests on the assumption that tarka has no “intrinsic” validity of its own within Nyāya even if it does perform a helpful function in the process of coming to knowledge, and furthermore is seen as a distinct category. There is, however, a problematic slide in Bagchi’s own reasoning where he goes from cognition to knowledge, and then to validity, and he seems to somehow equate at least cognition and knowledge.\(^{594}\) Thus Bagchi writes;

…the Naiyāyika must admit that whether as an independent instrument for establishing the logical ground, or as an auxiliary condition, reasoning has got an intrinsic validity of its own.\(^{595}\)

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589 V (1931) p. 533, saṁsārayeṣya-cayavyatirekohajñāna-saṁvedanā. This view is also mentioned in the NBV so it seems that it was prevalent before the time of Vyomaśīva but still not alluded to in PDS, see NBV (1997) p. 133. Vyomaśīva uses the word āhā here which appears to be used synonymously with tarka. Cf. NK (1996) p. 322. See also NS (1997) p. 36 (1.1.40).


592 Bagchi (1953) pp. 72ff. Cf. also section 2.2.1 above on classifications of knowledge and cognition.

593 V (1931) p. 533, kathan tarhi jñānāntaraṁ pratyaksādiphalatvād ity alam.

594 Bagchi (1953) pp. 57, 72.

595 Bagchi (1953) p. 75.
Since Bagchi does not clarify his own use of the concepts of cognition, knowledge, and intrinsic validity or, for that matter, which concepts in Sanskrit he has in mind when using these words, it becomes very difficult to discuss his readings of Śrīdhara and Vyomavati. What might emerge from NKd and V, though, is that they argue against a specific categorization of tarka, and that Vyomaśiva at least might suggest that it is possible to reduce it to perception.\(^{596}\) Whether their discussion is about “intrinsic validity” remains however unclear as does also the very meaning of “intrinsic validity”.

Turning then to Udayana’s K it is apparent that according to him tarka is apprehended as something different from doubt (samśaya) and determination (nirñaya); it originates from doubt but is not yet determined. Tarka then, for Udayana, lies somewhere in between doubt and determination, but it nevertheless appears distinct.\(^{597}\) Udayana thus stands for a change in the understanding of the classification of tarka through his incorporation of the Naiyāyika analysis where tarka is not subsumed under one or another means of knowledge, or, as in the NBV, where it is clearly separated from both doubt (uncertainty) and determination (certainty).\(^{598}\) The classification of tarka becomes a bit more elaborate in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts in the sense that it is divided into five types. It seems that this enumeration is initiated in Udayana’s Āttmatattvaviveka and is repeated and discussed in texts following upon that.\(^{599}\)

As for the role of tarka in the process of coming to knowledge, this is also addressed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. In the NS commentarial tradition, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, and Udayana seem to be in general agreement that tarka is helpful in attaining knowledge, though there are some variations in how this is described. Vātsyāyana describes tarka as reasoning that can prove helpful when there is doubt in the process of coming to knowledge (pramāṇa) through a means of knowledge (pramāṇa); it is helpful in such a way that it can confirm or not confirm the doubt.\(^{600}\) Uddyotakara does not seem to deviate from this view in stating that tarka mends or reconciles (saññadhatte) the pramāṇa without it being a pramāṇa in itself.\(^{601}\) He says furthermore that tarka can help in distinguishing the domain of the pramāṇa. It can be a factor in a decision whether a cognition is fit or

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596 Cf. V (1931) p. 533, athendriyārthasannikṣāyā eva pramāṇānaḥ āhootpattau.
597 K (2002) p. 513, anubhūyate hi samśayaṁ nirñayaṁ cāntarā samśayaṁ pracṛtyo nirñayaṁ cāprāptaṁ...
598 See NBV (1997) p. 133 where the words “nirñayaṁ cāprāptā...” are used to explain why tarka is separated from certainty. This comes again in the NVTT (1996) p. 264, samśayaṁ pracṛtyo nirñayaṁ cāprāptaṁ...
599 ATV (1939) p. 863. See for example Bagchi (1953) ch. IX and Potter (1995) p. 207. This will not be further discussed here, since Vallabha does not treat tarka in this aspect.
unfit, but cannot produce a determined cognition (anavadhāraṇa).\textsuperscript{602} Tarka is then in no way seen as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa), though it may very well be helpful in the process of attaining knowledge. The reason for this seems to be that the object of tarka is artificial or imagined (āhārya)\textsuperscript{603} and that it is not a determined cognition (nirṇaya or avadhāraṇa). Whilst a means of knowledge has an object that is real, and the knowledge is hence objective (yathārtha) and determinable, tarka is classified as non-objective (ayathārtha)\textsuperscript{604}, either in itself or as a variety of doubt or error, both of which are ayathārtha as well.\textsuperscript{605} Udayana, for example, states that tarka is not determined (nirṇaya) since it has the character of not having an object (ayathārtha).

The causal status of tarka in relation to anumāṇa seems to be that of a helping hand. It cannot in itself function as an instrument/cause (karaṇa) of knowledge (pramāṇa) but can have the function of an intermediate operation (vyāpāra). In the case of a doubt, the instrument cannot function until the doubt/uncertainty is removed, and the remover would be tarka, which would, in such a case, function as vyāpāra. The concept of vyāpāra in reference to tarka is mentioned by Vācaspati and Udayana.\textsuperscript{606}

Udayana furthermore relates the knowledge of the invariable relation to tarka, in that it can be of help in discovering upādhi. In the NKM, doubt about deviation, that is to say, doubt about the presence of an upādhi, is said to be removed by tarka.\textsuperscript{607} This Udayana also does in ATV; although the passage on tarka is very brief he says that tarka is of assistance in repeated observation.\textsuperscript{608} And, thus, it seems that the aspect of tarka as being helpful for establishing vyāpti in particular was brought under closer scrutiny some time before Udayana. This tendency is visible with Vācaspati who states that tarka is useful when there is doubt about the presence of the hetu in a place where the āndhyā is absent. Tarka does not, however, seem to be used in order to create certainty about the relation of vyāpti, but rather to point out that the relation is free from upādhi. To clarify, tarka is understood as functioning indirectly as a promoter of inferential knowledge, by showing that the relation of vyāpti is non-contingent, and is not primarily functioning

\textsuperscript{602} NBV (1997) p. 16.
\textsuperscript{603} The use of āhārya in describing tarka is found in Udayana, NVTS (1996) p. 304. As far as I know this word is not used in texts preceding Udayana, but I would like to stress that the history of the use of tarka within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discourse is a field in need of further research. Bagchi mentions āhārya in connection with Udayana’s thinking on tarka but not in connection to anyone preceding him.
\textsuperscript{604} This is expressed very clearly and neatly in TS (1969) pp. 33, 69. See also Matilal (1986) p. 79.
\textsuperscript{605} K (2002) p. 514.
\textsuperscript{607} NKM (1912) p. 23(3), see also Dravid (1996) pp. 251f. who reads Udayana in this way.
\textsuperscript{608} ATV (1939) p. 863, ...anvayavyatirekabhūyodarśanasāhāyakam ācaram anuttaras tarkah.
as an abolisher of doubt. The *tarka* shows how one *must* take the relation as invariable; if there would not be any fire in this place there could not be any smoke there.\(^{609}\) Udayana describes a more precise functioning of *tarka* than Vācaspati, in that *tarka* is directly connected to ascertainment of the *svābhāvikasambandha*, but also, according to Oberhammer, in terms of a changed perspective regarding the process of finding or not finding an *upādhi*. For Udayana this is not so much related to the non-finding of an *upādhi* as to the doubt whether there could be an *upādhi* that one has not found out about yet, but that might be possible to find. This kind of doubt is resolved through the employment of *tarka*.\(^{610}\)

The narrowing of focus regarding *tarka* is even more clearly visible in the later post-Gaṅgeśa, Navya-nyāya texts.\(^{611}\) In these texts a distinction appears between two kinds of *tarka*, or, rather, two objectives of *tarka*: the *visayaparīśodhadakatarka* and *vyāptigrāhakatarka*. This division is accounted for in the NK and is also mentioned in D and in the P.\(^{612}\) As far as I know the two concepts are not mentioned by Gaṅgeśa.\(^{613}\) According to NK the *visayaparīśodhadakatarka* is formulated as follows; “if the mountain would be without fire then it would be without smoke”, and the *vyāptigrāhakatarka*; “if smoke would be deviating from fire then it would not be produced from fire”.\(^{614}\) The first kind of *tarka* is particularized, in one sense at least, whereas the second is a general statement about the relation of smoke in general to fire in general. That the second statement leads to a grasping of *vyāpti* is rather obvious, but the first statement is also, in a sense, related to an understanding of *vyāpti*. The difference between them lies in the content of the cognition. In the first kind the cognition concerns a particular, whereas in the second it concerns a general object. In Bagchi’s understanding these two kinds of *tarka* are somehow in opposition to one another. Vācaspati and Udayana, he says, are advocating the *visayaparīśodhaka*, whereas Vallabha and Gaṅgeśa choose the second kind. It seems that according to Bagchi Vācaspati and Udayana promote the *visayaparīśodhatakara* since they see *tarka* as a condition for the removal of doubt and as such paving the way for

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\(^{611}\) Oberhammer, (1964) p. 146, points out how both *tarka* and *upādhi* gradually becomes key concepts within the discourse of *vyāpti* from Vācaspati and on.


\(^{613}\) At least not in the section on *tarka* in TC (1982) pp. 192-208.

\(^{614}\) NK (1996) p. 325.
knowledge. There are, however, problems inherent in Bagchi’s reasoning. First of all there is nothing in the references Bagchi gives that could support a view of these two forms of *tarka* as being mutually exclusive, and secondly there is no mention of the division in any of the texts written by Vācaspāti, Udayana, Vallabha and Gaṅgeśa. At least I have not found any and Bagchi does not seem to have found any either, since he refers to texts written by Vardhamāna and Dinakara. The division of *tarka*, one could presume, more likely has to do with objectives rather than innate nature. That is to say, advocating one of them does not automatically imply rejecting the other. It is simply a matter of emphasis, as Vattanky says;

Hypothetical reasoning is of two kinds: that which examines the existence of a particular thing (*visayaparīśodhakatarka*), as for instance ‘if something has no fire, it will have no smoke’; and that which brings about the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāptigrāhakatarka*), as for instance, ‘if smoke deviates from fire, it would not be produced by fire’. Naturally the second kind of hypothetical reasoning is discussed in K.M.D.R.

Vattanky further points to a discussion in the commentaries on *Kārikāvali* where it is said that *visayaparīśodhakatarka* is incapable of removing doubt about deviation since the cognition “no fire” does not lead to the cognition of *vyāpti* between fire and smoke. In Vattanky’s reading of D the *visayaparīśodhakatarka* seems to be beside the point when one wishes to establish a grasping of *vyāpti*. The two kinds of *tarka* are not in any way represented in D as excluding one another; they are just two different kinds of reasoning. Furthermore D describes *tarka* as being established (*siddha*) by virtue of being a remover of a definite desire to know or through the experience of reasoning (*tarkayāmi* i.e. “I reason”). In Vattanky’s reading, the desire to know the deviation, “smoke is perhaps not caused by fire and thus might not always be concomitant with fire”, is removed by *tarka* since *tarka* produces aversion to that alternative. This interpretation might be of importance in the reading of Udayana’s position, though one must certainly tread carefully when reading backwards in time as such a reading would do. I will return to this issue in the following.

As for Gaṅgeśa, it is obvious that *tarka* is related to the grasping of *vyāpti* in TC, not as a regular feature of the inference but rather as a helpful device

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615 I am not certain of having understood him correctly here. Bagchi, (1953) p. 19, writes “…reasoning serving as a condition for elimination of obstruction of the subject matter, which is called *visayaparīśodhakatarka*.”

616 Bagchi (1953) pp. 19f.


618 D (1916) p. 455, *tattva ca mānasatavyāpyo jāti viśeṣas tarkayāmitya anubhavā* jijñāsāvisēsanaṁvātakayātāṁ vā *siddha iti* tarkas ca dvividho *visayaparīśodhako* *vyāptigrāhakaś* ceti. See also Vattanky (2003) p. 428.

in the case of doubt about the presence of an upādhi, and thus doubt about deviation (vyabhicārasyaṁśāya). And in line with Udayana, Gaṅgeśa also holds that one cannot doubt in such a way that it would contradict one’s own behavior. This argument is taken up by both Udayana and Gaṅgeśa against the charge of infinite regress in using tarka as a means to grasp vyāpti. Since tarka presupposes the grasping of vyāpti one could continue by doubting the vyāpti expressed in the tarka and so on. That tarka in itself rests upon a concomitance relation is taken up in NKM with regard to a Cārvāka opponent. According to Phillips, who has done readings of Maṅkaṇtha Miśra, Gaṅgeśa, and Śrīharṣa, Gaṅgeśa’s discussion of tarka seems to be mostly directed towards counterarguments coming from the Advaitin Śrīharṣa who severely criticized Udayana’s position. The discussion concerns whether tarka could be used as means to grasp vyāpti, something that Śrīharṣa denies. Tarka is also a theme in the section on means of grasping vyāpti (vyāptigrāhakopāya) in TC where a Prabhākara Mīmāṁsā is the opponent. This, however, will be further discussed in the section below.

5.4.2 Vallabha on tarka

Vallabha does not address all the above mentioned aspects of tarka in NL. He has, for example, no fivefold classification of tarka in the manner of Udayana. In general it is tarka’s capacity to secure a grasping of vyāpti that seems to form the central concern and conclusion. This is evident from where in NL Vallabha deals with tarka. Tarka is not placed under the heading of avidyā, as in the commentaries on PDS, but rather under vidyā, seemingly emphasizing its close connection to the preceding section of vyāpti. As mentioned earlier, the vyāpti section that primarily deals with upādhi ends with the statement that tarka is a means to discover an upādhi. In addition to this aspect of tarka Vallabha also describes how tarka is formed and what form it takes, that is to say its being based upon a concomitance relation and its being an imagined imposition (āhāryāropa). Furthermore, he describes tarka as resulting in a cessation of doubt about a deviation (vyabhicārasaṅkā). Apart from these positive statements there are also points of discussion in Vallabha’s text, and these form the main problem when analysing the section on tarka. It has proven difficult to establish which of the passages that are

622 NKM (1912) p. 30(3).
624 TC (1892) pp. 210f.
625 See above p. 138.
626 See above p. 137.
expressions of Vallabha’s objections and which are not. Vallabha’s own view is expressed fairly clearly with the words “atrocyate” in text [67-68] but prior to that there is a quite lengthy discussion that cannot readily be ascribed to him. This concerns three possible outcomes of the use of tarka and its causal status. The question concerning these three outcomes is formulated as follows:

But what is its result? The cessation of the desire to know [whether the sādhana may exist] in the domain of the dissimilar example (vipakṣa) or, the cessation of a doubt [whether the sādhana may exist where the sādhya does not exist] or, a weakening of it (i.e. of the doubt). 627

Bagchi ascribes the three outcomes to Udayana, Vācaspati, and Jayanta respectively, which is problematic for several reasons. 628 Udayana’s position is not so readily reduced to the first outcome as formulated above, and both Oberhammer and Chakraborty have argued that Vācaspati did not hold the view in the second outcome. Furthermore, how Vallabha himself in turn construes the positions of Vācaspati, Udayana, or Jayanta is not something we can reconstruct from this very brief passage in NL. Bagchi claims that it is Vallabha who is denying these three alternatives and the view that tarka could function as a vyāpāra. He states in the beginning that; “Udayana’s position has been subjected to an elaborate criticism”. 629

First of all I think Bagchi’s reading of Udayana’s position could be modified a bit as has been remarked earlier. Udayana apparently did not think that using tarka for grasping vyāpti excluded his view that tarka functions by eliminating desire to know the opposite. Both of these views are expressed by Udayana as I have shown above. 630 Furthermore, as noted above, there seem to be indications in the D that tarka can both function as a remover of the desire to know the deviation and have the consequence of yielding a grasping of vyāpti at the same time. 631 There are of course differences between D and Udayana, but nevertheless, in my view, a modification would point out that Vallabha and Udayana do not stand in such stark opposition to each other as Bagchi seems to hold. 632 There is both a resemblance and a difference between them; Udayana asserts that it is the desire to know the opposite that is removed by tarka, and Vallabha says that it is the doubt about a deviation that tarka removes. But on the other hand they both emphasize the importance of tarka in grasping vyāpti, both sharing

627 See text [57-58].
628 In the case of Jayanta, Bagchi writes that the third outcome is possibly held by Jayanta. This position will not be treated here. Bagchi (1953) p. 18.
629 Bagchi (1953) p. 16.
630 See above p. 140.
631 See above p. 141.
632 Bagchi (1953) pp. 18f.
the view that absence of upādhi is the mark of vyāpti.633 This resemblance is in my opinion too important not to take notice of. It is furthermore plausible to say that Vallabha relates tarka to the grasping of vyāpti to a higher degree, as it were, or perhaps one could say more pointedly, than Udayana does. In doing this Vallabha’s text could be seen as indicating a more specific formulation of what exactly it is that tarka does.

A further problematic aspect of Bagchi’s reasoning is that he states that Vallabha asserts vyāptigrāhakatarka in opposition to viṣayapariśodhakatarka, which Udayana apparently asserts. Neither of the above two concepts are used by Vallabha himself in the discussion of tarka, but in spite of that Bagchi refers directly to NL to support this view. Both of these concepts, as varieties of tarka, obviously seem to have been introduced later than the time of Vallabha.634 And Bagchi has, in fact, subsequently, added Dinakari and the P on NL as references to this twofold division of tarka.635 The only passage in the P on NL that mentions these two concepts is the commentary on the objection to the idea that tarka functions as a vyāpāra within the inferential process. I think it would be highly problematic to hold that Vallabha has these two concepts in mind.636 But this is, however, not to say that Vallabha does not assert that tarka is helpful in securing invariable concomitance since it removes doubt about a deviation. To say this practically amounts to a truism, but the problem is that we cannot, of course, know whether Vallabha had the above division in mind. What the passage indicates, though, is a more specific role for tarka as being helpful or supportive within the process of coming to knowledge, a role more akin to that of later texts rather than that of those preceding NL. On the other hand, we should not forget that there is a great difference between NL and D in the sense that, for D, repeated observation is not always needed in the process of grasping vyāpti.637 For Vallabha, repeated observation appears to be a prerequisite for the apprehension of vyāpti, whereas tarka seems to warrant the apprehension.638 The discussion in TC of whether or not repeated observation is necessary in grasping vyāpti is akin to that in NL. The fact of tarka being used for ascertainment of vyāpti does not render repeated observation redundant according to Vallabha. There is an idea of concomitance between two things after one has seen them together, but the doubt as to whether this concomitance is invariable or not could not be

633 See above p. 139.
634 It is, for example, not mentioned in the Tārkikaraksā section on tarka which otherwise has a lengthy passage on tarka. TR (1903) pp. 185-204.
635 Bagchi (1953) p. 19. The page in the P referred to is 5, but there is nothing on tarka at that page in the NL edition that Bagchi uses so it seems to be a misprint. The P mentions both terms on p. 517.
638 Cf. text [74-78].
solved by further observations. There could be a hundred observations of concomitance but still no invariability. When there is doubt about a deviation (vyabhicāraśankā), this doubt is duly confirmed, or not confirmed, by tarka. For Vallabha, it seems, repeated observation has the function of giving the putative knower an idea about concomitance, something that tarka alone could not do, itself resting upon the idea of concomitance. In Gangopadhyay’s reading Gaṅgeśa appears a bit more elaborate in this discussion than Vallabha. Gangopadhyay explains that repeated observation is sometimes needed, but is dependent upon the knowledge of the putative knower. If someone knows that smoke is caused by fire, there is no need for more than one observation.639 The reason for grasping vyāpti is twofold: a perception of co-existence (sahacāradarśana) together with absence of cognition of deviation (vyabhicārajñānaviraha). How this is achieved seems to be a question of the ability of the knower. The cognition could, in turn, be either certain or doubtful, and tarka, for Gaṅgeśa, is sometimes used for resolving such doubtful cognition.640

Even though a reading of Udayana and Vallabha could hypothetically show an implicit idea of them asserting the two different kinds of tarka, Bagchi fails to formulate sufficient arguments for showing that these two aspects of tarka are mutually exclusive. And moreover, if it is justifiable to say that Vallabha asserts vyāptigrāhakatarka when reading the tradition backwards how is it that we cannot do the same with Udayana? This question is by no means answered by Bagchi’s arguments, since he does not point to what exactly it is in Udayana’s position that implies the position of visayapariśodhakatarka. How is it then that the denial of the three consequences and the denial of tarka as vyāpāra are positions that cannot readily be ascribed to Vallabha?

To begin with, he does not seem to need to deny them in order to assert his own position, because there does not appear to be any opposition at all between saying that tarka removes the desire to know the opposite (vipakṣa) through creating an aversion towards it and thereby ensuring a grasping of vyāpti, and hence thereby also removing doubt about deviation—a deviation in turn implied by a presence of an upādhi. The so called opposite (vipakṣa) is of course different in the above two kinds of tarka, pertaining to a particular in the case of visayapariśodhakatarka and to a concomitance relation in case of the vyāptigrāhakatarka, but the mental process of doubting and removing the inclination to go with the doubt does not seem to differ. 641

Secondly, the section on tarka in NL has but one single position marker indicating the view of the author, namely “atrocyate”, after which it becomes

640 TC (1892) p. 212, tarkasya vyāptigrahamūlaḥatvenānavastheti cet, na, yāvad aśāṅkaṁ tarkāṇusaranāt. yatra ca vyāghātena śāṅkaiva nāvatarati tatra tarkāṁ vinaiṣva vyāptigrahāḥ.
641 See above p. 140.
easier to discern arguments belonging to Vallabha and arguments belonging to an opponent. But in the text preceding that there is not any indication of positioning on behalf of the writer. The “atrocyate” might indicate that all that was previously said is not taken into account, since an altogether different approach is set up. The passage preceding “atrocyate” might be understood as a rendering of discussions that have already taken place, and towards which Vallabha turns and says, “in this matter none of the above hits the mark, neither the objections nor the answers. Here is what I have to say”. In this sense it is plausible to understand Vallabha as rejecting Udayana, Vacaspati, and Jayanta, not in the sense of a rejection of specific statements but as a change of focus.

Thirdly, in the case of tarka having the status of vyāpāra, which apparently seems to be the position of Vallabha’s Nyāya forerunners, there is no explicit indication in the text that such a view would be opposed to the view expressed in Vallabha’s concluding statement of the section. On the other hand, there is nothing to indicate the opposite either. The axe/sickle simile appearing in the rejection of this suggestion seems to be common enough when describing the concept of vyāpāra, and it appears in both K and NKd in reference to tarka. In the K it is used to describe how tarka assists an instrument of knowledge. In the NKd the axe simile is used by an opponent in the text, apparently to fortify the view that tarka should be admitted as a separate category of avidyā, but also to show that it has some causal function within the process of coming to knowledge.Vyāpāra goes unmentioned in this passage but, on the other hand it states that the instrument needs assistance (anugraha) in order to function. Udayana ascribes tarka the function of vyāpāra but he does not seem to say that the inferential process requires tarka at all times. In the NKM, at least in Dravid’s reading, the inferential knowledge can be produced even though there is doubt, but bringing in a tarka would yield more certainty. This indicates a view of tarka as indeed helpful, but not always necessary when it comes to inferential knowledge. The objection in Vallabha’s text is apparently directed at a view in which tarka is required (apeksata) for the production of inferential knowledge. And in the answer to this it is obvious that what is rejected is an idea of tarka as always required. In relation to the opponent’s argument in NKd, the argument in NL appears inverted, denying precisely that which is supported by the opponent in the NKd.

642 Cf. text [57-66]
643 This is also seen in the NK where it appears under the vyāpāra heading. NK (1996) p. 830. It is referred to in Matilal (1997) p. 374.
–No. It is not seen that there is absence of inferential knowledge from the liṅga when there is no cognition of tarka, as [we do] in the case of a non-arising of a cutting by a sickle when there is no operation of pressing the handle hard. Or, the cognition of itself [i.e. of the liṅga] may be the operation in relation to the liṅga [because] when this [tarkajñānām] does not assist that [inferential process] it is not a part (aṅga) of the inferential process.647

In the case of the sickle there is simply no cutting if the sickle is not held firmly in the hand but this is not the case when tarka is absent; there is still inferential knowledge, but neither is it the case that tarka is of no assistance at all. To read Vallabha as rejecting the idea that tarka is always required within the process of coming to inferential knowledge seems to be the most plausible reading for the moment, since no further comment on it follows except for the “atrocyate” passage.648 A weak, but nevertheless interesting connection to this is found in the Ka. In the Ka and its commentaries tarka is used when repeated observation does not solve the doubt, but such a procedure is not necessary at all times. The cause of grasping vyāpāti is said to be the non-apprehension of deviation and the apprehension of co-existence. How this is obtained appears to differ from case to case, sometimes repeated observation is needed and sometimes, when that is not enough, tarka is needed.649 It appears to be the case that when tarka is used as a means to grasp vyāpāti it does not have a regular place in the inferential process; it is brought in when needed. The KB commentary on the above NL passage seems to say that in some cases, when doubting would contradict actions undertaken, the doubt is not entertained.650 But this must remain a tentative interpretation; there is great need of further detailed reading of the different positions maintained within the tradition(s). Returning to the question of whose position is rejected in the axe/sickle simile passage, the answer to that also remains tentative. There is an interesting case of intertextuality between Udayana’s K and NL, this could either indicate that the passage is a rejection of Udayana or simply reflect the frequency of using this example when relating the concept of vyāpāra. But as Bagchi points out, the view that tarka functions as a vyāpāra is found in both Udayana’s and Vācaspati’s commentaries on NS.651 It has become apparent that there are a number of problems connected with the reading of Vallabha’s section on tarka. I have tried to show above that the structure of the argumentation preceding “atrocyate” in the tarka

647 See text [64-66].
648 See above p. 143.
650 KB (1991) p. 518, kva cit tad anapeksāyāṁ vyabhicārāt tarkasya kāraṇatā eva na syād ity adesaṅyaṁ śaṅkā nivṛttav eva tad upaśogatā, kva cid vyāghrāt śaṅkā āva nāvataratā, na hi dhīmārthaṁ vahnim upādādāno vahnim vināpi dhīmān syād iti śaṅkate, yady api anupaśādhiṅkatavāgraḥ vyāptigrahāḥ kāya itukati tathāpī tatrāpi tarka eva upāya iti bhāvaḥ.
passage is rather a delineation of the discourse than a discussion in which Vallabha positions himself. But since the secondary analysis of the treatment of *tarka* within the tradition(s) comes in bits and pieces, the research situation is difficult and the interpretation is tentative. The question remains as to how the ascription of *vyāpāra* to *tarka* could be understood. Does it imply that *tarka* has a necessary causal role in the inference, or is it used to accentuate the subservient, non-independent role of *tarka* in the inference? To ascribe to *tarka* the role of a *vyāpāra* could, in my opinion, imply that that is the role *tarka* has in the inferential process *when there is doubt*, but when there is no doubt *tarka* is simply not used and plays no role at all.

5.4.3 Concluding remarks on *tarka*

From the above it seems that *tarka* has occupied a somewhat indefinite place within the early tradition of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, indefinite in the sense that there appear to have been a great number of different views concerning its classification, as is seen, for example, in NBV. This is also obvious in the early Vaiśeṣika where there is no mention of *tarka* at all until the commentaries on PDS. It also seems that by the time of Vācaspati and Udayana the picture has come together to a higher degree. This is most clearly visible in Udayana’s combination of the two discourses of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika respectively. Udayana also introduces a fivefold classification of different kinds of *tarka*. As has been seen in the ATV and NKM he furthermore ties *tarka* to the grasping of *vyāpti*. Vallabha in turn appears to move yet further away from the early Vaiśeṣika treatment of *tarka* simply through the place he assigns it in NL. *Tarka* is, in the NL, explicitly tied to the process of coming to inferential knowledge, in particular to the concept of *vyāptigrāha* since it removes doubt about a deviation (*vyabhicāraśatākā)*. This shift of focus towards a somewhat more pointed interest in *tarka* as securing the grasping of *vyāpti* is visible in the Navya-nyāya division between *vyāptigrāhakatarka* and *viṣayapariśodhatarka*. As said above there are still a number of problems attached to the reading of NL and to the understanding of *tarka* in general in the secondary analysis of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya. In the following I will attempt to tentatively shed some light on the more general problem of understanding what *tarka* is and what kind of position it occupies within the tradition(s).

As has been seen, *tarka* is very much related to doubt. It has been classified in relation to whether it is separate from, or a kind of doubt. The function of *tarka* has also been expressed in terms of annihilating doubt or annihilating the desire to know the opposite. But in order to understand the treatment of this concept in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya sources it seems necessary to assume that *tarka* is dealt with from a number of different perspectives within the tradition(s). Using the above sources, including NL, as a point of departure for analysis I think it is possible to differentiate at
least four aspects of the treatment of tarka. First of all, tarka is treated as a secondary component of the inferential process (anumāna), secondary in the sense of being not necessary, but helpful in the generation of inferential knowledge. In this case it is the function of tarka that is in focus, which conveys an epistemological concern. Secondly tarka is described as a verbal statement expressed in a certain way, perhaps even formally, as a kind of reasoning. This aspect conveys the form of tarka. Thirdly tarka is characterized as a special kind of cognition (ayathārtha), and as an imagined imposition (āhāryāropa). This aspect could, I think, be characterized as describing the ontological status of tarka, ontological in the sense of how tarka is present in the world. Lastly it is also conceptualized as an abolisher of doubt or even as a kind of doubt. This doubt is a state of mind described as an uncertainty about two or more mutually exclusive positions, for example “fire or no fire?”, “could there be smoke without fire?” or “is smoke concomitant with fire?”. This last aspect might be understood as a psychological aspect, as describing a certain mental state, whereas the ability to abolish doubt or desire for the opposite “no fire” has to do with the function of tarka. This has been nicely described by Udayana in his NKM:

Because tarka is employed insofar there is doubt. Through this [tarka] the desire to uphold the undesirable is cut off in the event of an argument afflicted by upādhi or deviation, [deviation itself] depending on that [upādhi]. The desire for the opposite is cut off, and the knower (pramātā) calmly arrives at an [understanding of a] liṅga whose association [with the liṅga] is grasped through repeated observation.

The phenomenological character of the different views on tarka has not been given much attention in the secondary literature on tarka. Tarka as a means of securing a so-called induction and tarka as a logical implication have been dealt with, but not tarka as a description of how human beings proceed when they come to know certain things. Since there is a great difference in outcome between describing something as an already existing phenomenon and to prescribe an ideal situation for reaching knowledge or validity, it seems important to make a further distinction here. Mohanty has aptly identified a similar twofold division of focus in Nyāya as an explanation of the fact that doubt has a central place in their theories of logic;

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652 This formal aspect of tarka is dealt with by Bharadvaja (1976), (1977) and (1981), Barlingay (1965) pp. 128ff., Davis (1981) and Mohanty (1992) pp. 116f. These sources discuss whether tarka is to be regarded as a formal argument or not and what befitting name it could get within the discourse of European and American logic.

653 NKM (1912) p. 23(3), yāvad āśākaññ tarkapravṛtteḥ, tena hi vartamānenopādhiṅkoṭau tādāyatta vyābhičārakoṭau vāniśthān upanayatecchā vicchidyate. vichinnavipākṣeccaḥ ca pramātā bhūyodarsanopalabhadhāsāhācaḥ saḥ lingam anākulo 'dhiṣṭhati...

[Nyāya] is as much interested in the psychological conditions of the origin of a certain type of knowledge, say for example of inference, as in the conditions of its logical validity.655

This division of interest, which in this work is called the division between descriptive and prescriptive purposes, is also important when comparing different viewpoints on tarka. In my opinion, both of these aspects are present in the above material, and cut right through the above fourfold division of perspectives on tarka. The descriptive aspect is most obviously linked to the capacity of tarka to forestall or remove doubt, or to remove the desire to proceed with the doubt but also to the description of the hypothetical form that tarka takes.

The impetus for outlining this twofold division of description and prescription and the four aspects of tarka described in the above sources is that it might promote further understanding. By distinguishing different purposes and different aspects of tarka in the tradition(s), tarka remains a multifaceted concept in the secondary discourse as well. As long as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika/Navya-nyāya discourse on tarka is dealt with as only treating tarka as prescriptive or formal nothing is conveyed about how the ontological status of tarka is conceived of, or for that matter how tarka is construed in relation to doubt, certainty, and determination.

5.5 Parāmarśa

Just before the inferential knowledge arises there is a cognition of the sādhana as a property of the inferential subject (pakṣadharmatā) and as a pervaded property (vyāptiviśiṣṭa). That is to say, a cognition of the smoke that is on the mountain as smoke that is invariably related to fire. The understanding of these two “smokes” as being of the same kind (ekajātiya) leads, according to Vallabha, to inferential knowledge.656 This step in the inferential process is called parāmarśa (consideration), or sometimes tṛtiyaliṅgaparāmarśa (the third consideration of the liṅga). The first cognition of the liṅga takes place when seeing smoke as something indicating fire. The second cognition is the understanding of vyāpti, of the invariable relation between the liṅga and liṅgin. The third cognition links these two together in a particular situation, for example on the mountain, and in this sense one can understand parāmarśa as a confirmatory cognition.657 In the five-member

656 See text [92].
classification, inference for others (pararthanumana), it is called application (upanaya) and constitutes the fourth member of the inference.  

5.5.1 Pararma within the tradition(s)

The discussions on the importance of pararma within the inferential process appear to have begun with Uddyotakara, who takes up the causal relevance of pararma within the inferential process. According to him the pararma, aided by the memory of the connection between the linga and lingin, is immediately followed by the result, inferential knowledge. Uddyotakara does not specify pararma as a kara or a vyapara, but he does says that it is the most predominant (pradhana) part of the process of reaching the goal of inferential knowledge. The reason for this importance seems to be the fact that pararma is immediately followed by inferential knowledge.

Srirdhara does not deal with the causal capacity of the fourth member of the inferential process (upanaya) as much as the actual content of it. According to him, the anusandhana, the term for upanaya in PDS, NKd, and V, tells us about the connection between the hetu and the paksa. In other words it conveys the paksadharmat, the character of the mountain as smoky. This in turn, seems to be what is said by Praastapada who explains the anusandhana as a statement of the presence of the linga in the paksa. He says that in the example (nidarsana), the third member, the linga is stated but without its power (sakti). This might point to its being stated with its power in the anusandhana, a power that, in turn, is interpreted by Srirdhara as conveying that the linga is a property of the paksa. The difficulty here in interpreting Praastapada is that he apparently uses the word “anumeya” in two different senses. According to Vyomaiva it is alternately used as mening paksa and sadhya.

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the later explanation of *parāmarśa* though without using the term itself. The function, then, of the fourth member in Randle’s reading is that the *hetu* is recognized as characterized by *vyāpti* and as being a property of the *pakṣa* (i.e. *vyāptiviśīṣṭa* and *pakṣadharmatā*).663 Vyomaśīva also states that the *pakṣadharmatā* is brought forward in the *anusandhāna*, but adds that concomitance is grasped through this as well. This is mentioned by Vyomaśīva as a response to an opponent who rejects the idea of a use of the fourth member. In response to this Vyomaśīva says that although the second member of the inference, the *hetuvacana*, functions as a cause (*kāraṇa*) it does not convey, or promote, the internal concomitance (*antarvyāpti*). In order to establish an inference free from the fault of *bādhita*, the *anusandhāna* is necessary. That is, to establish a non-deviation the fourth member is necessary.664

In the NS commentaries this idea of *parāmarśa* as being a combination or a bringing together of two things is more clearly expressed. Uddyotakara explains that the fourth step in the inference points out the similarity between the character of the *pakṣa* and the character shown in the example (*udahāraṇa*) to be invariably connected to the *sādhyā*.665 This is something that both Udayana and Vācaspati seem to agree with.666 In K and NVTS Udayana mentions that the fourth member entails the pervasion (*vyāpti*) and the character of the *pakṣa*, though the discussion does not seem to primarily deal with this but rather whether the third consideration of the *liṅga* is necessary in inference for oneself (*svārthānu-mānam*).667 There is also one earlier mentioning of *liṅgaparāmarśa* in the K where it is stated that the consideration of the *liṅga* is *anumāna*. Furthermore it seems, at least from a reading made by Suzuki, that Udayana says that the invariable concomitance is once again cognized in the *liṅgaparāmarśa*.668

As for the causal role of *parāmarśa* within the inferential process, a change seems to have occurred in how it is viewed. In the NSM there is a record of an earlier view (*pracāya*) and a new (*navya*). In the *pracāya* view, the *karaṇa* of inference was seen as *lingajñāna*, the cognition of the *liṅga*. What happens in the fourth member of the inference, then, is that the third consideration of the *liṅga* immediately brings about the effect, the inferential

663 Although Randle states it as "S is M-which-is-P". Randle (1930) p. 170. Cf. Atushi (1962) p. 20, who also reads Praṇastapāda as implicitly encompassing the idea of *liṅgaparāmarśa*.
664 V (1931) p. 614, nuna vyartham anusandhānavacanaḥ tadantarenāpi hetuvacanāt gṛhita-vyāptikāt sādhyasiddheḥ. na, anena vinābdhitavisayatvasyāpratipattāḥ. hetuvacanānāt kāraṇamātropasthāpakaṁ, na tu gṛhītabahirvyāiptikāyāntarvyāiptipratipādakam iti.
667 K (2002) p. 556, NVTS (1996) p. 192. The text passage from K is almost the same as the passage in NVTS, the only deviation is "tyajyate" which appears in K but not in NVTS. –na, pakṣadharmatā hi vyāptāt saha pratisañhitānunāmopayogini, tādṛśi copanayena (tyajyate) pradarśyate…
knowledge. Parāmarśa functions in this process as a vyāpāra, an operation through which the karaṇa itself is functional. This view was criticized by the Navya-naiyāyikas because if the cognition of the liṅga is the karaṇa then no liṅga situated in the future or, for that matter, in the past could be able to produce inferential knowledge. In the later tradition the knowledge of vyāpti (vyāptidhī) is seen as the karaṇa and its intermediate operation as parāmarśa.669 But, apparently, there is no unified view of “the later tradition” because Vattanky says that “…the later Naiyāyikas accepted consideration as the karaṇa of inferential knowledge”.670 This view is also adhered to in the TS, and Bhattacharya, in his comments on TS and TSD, states that this view is common among those who follow Gaṅgeśa.671 On the other hand Chatterjee states that according to Gaṅgeśa the knowledge of vyāpti is the karaṇa whereas the consideration functions as the last or final cause, the caramakāraṇa.672 Gaṅgeśa uses the concepts of karaṇa, kāraṇa, caramakāraṇa and vyāpāra to designate the causal role of consideration.673 This need not, of course, be a problem since in a sense kāraṇa encompasses both karaṇa and vyāpāra. This appears to have been observed by Goekoop who says that parāmarśa is the “approximate cause”, karaṇa, which in turn could be seen as the vyāpāra.674 Gaṅgeśa states at the end of the passage on parāmarśa that the knowledge of vyāpti is the karaṇa, and that parāmarśa is the vyāpāra through which inferential knowledge ensues, and this parāmarśa in turn has the character of being the final cause.675 Another opinion of the later Naiyāyikas seems to be that the karaṇa of inferential knowledge is the internal organ (manas). This is mentioned by Vattanky and is found in a Prabhā on TCM written by Yajñapati Upādhyāya.676

If one turns to NK, the meaning given for kāraṇa is exactly the one that we find in NL, namely that parāmarśa is a kāraṇa of inferential knowledge. That parāmarśa functions as the kāraṇa of inferential knowledge is furthermore referred to as a Nyāya idea.677 Parāmarśa is also called the caramakāraṇa in NK, that is to say the last cause preceding the effect, inferential knowledge.678 These things could be said by all the Navya-

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672 Chatterjee (1939) p. 263. Chatterjee in turn refers to the whole section on parāmarśa in TC (1892) pp. 521-551.
673 TC (1892) pp. 2, 530, 551.
674 Goekoop (1967) p. 56.
675 TC (1892) pp. 550f., yat tu vyāpārābhāvān na parāmarśa karanam iti, tat tathaiva, kin tu vyāptijātāni karanam parāmarśo vyāpāraḥ, na ca parāmarśasya saṁskāro vyāpāraḥ, parāmarśasya ca caramakāraṇatvena saṁskārotpaṇanasmayā’numityutpaṇāt.
678 NK (1991) p. 278.
naiyāyikas referred to above, irrespectively of how they understand kāraṇa and vyāpāra.

That parāmarśa has a causal role to play in the inferential process, that it is a necessary element within that process, seems to be a general feature of both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Navya-nyāya traditions. There is, nevertheless, an apparent difference between the earlier and later traditions. Parāmarśa is viewed as kāraṇa or as vyāpāra in post-Gaṅgāśa texts, whereas in texts preceding TC it is seen as the vyāpāra. It has not been possible to establish with certainty which of the above later views is the most frequent.

As for views regarding the content of parāmarśa there is a difference between the NS commentaries up to Udayana and the VS commentaries from Uddyotakara and on. The view that parāmarśa entails a combinatory cognition of the hetu as being a property of the inferential subject (pakṣadharmaṇā) and as being characterized by pervasion (vyāptiṣiṣṭa) is found by Uddyotakara and Udayana in the two respective commentarial traditions.

It has not however been clarified what the ascription of vyāpāra to different aspects of the inferential process really implies. In the previous section on tarka it was noted that vyāpāra has been used in connection with tarka as well, and how this could be understood is not yet clear.679 What has transpired, though, from the reading of the tradition(s) concerning the causal understanding of tarka and parāmarśa is an image of causality as a complex and plural process not easily generalized, an image which, perhaps, should not be generalized, given the presence of diverse views in the texts.680

5.5.2 Vallabha on parāmarśa

Vallabha ends the section on parāmarśa by saying that the understanding of the pervaded and the character of the pakṣa as being one and the same is parāmarśa, and that is the kāraṇa of inferential knowledge. Given that kāraṇa refers to cause in general, and hence is a concept overarching the sub-concepts of kāraṇa and vyāpāra, Vallabha does not specify exactly what kind of cause parāmarśa is.

It seems clear though that Vallabha’s treatment of the concept of parāmarśa is more akin to that of the Nyāya and Navya-nyāya texts rather than PDS, NKd, and V. In none of these three sources has it been possible to locate the explicit idea that parāmarśa is the cognition of the pervaded property and the property of the pakṣa as being one and the same, which is the concluding statement of Vallabha. Randle, on the other hand, does say that the idea might be implied in some of these sources.681 There is, though,

679 See above p. 139.
an affinity between Vyomaśiva and Udayana’s idea that the fourth member is important in establishing concomitance and Vallabha’s idea that the concomitance remains unestablished without parāmarśa. But this, I presume, could be said by anyone who gives the fourth member a pivotal role within the inferential process. On the other hand, it might indicate that vyāpti and the grasping of vyāpti receive a greater amount of attention.

A further interesting aspect of the parāmarśa section is the presence of a view also found in NKd, namely that the hetuvacana, the second statement in the inference conveys the nature of the hetu only (hetusvarūpamātram) and not the hetu as a property of the pakṣa (pakṣadharmatā). That cognition, however, takes place in the parāmarśa according to Śrīdhara. This view is expressed in the NL as follows:

Some say that [this apprehension of the pakṣadharmatā] has the character of being obtained in the latter part of [the inference] since the object [of the hetuvacana] is the liṅga only.

This view is negated by Vallabha in the final conclusive statement of the parāmarśa section where he ascribes the fourth member another function, namely to show that the vyāptivīśiṣṭa and the pakṣadharmatā are one and the same thing. This view is indicated in the NS commentaries, as stated above. Vallabha furthermore gives parāmarśa the role of a kāraṇa within the inferential process, which could be understood in connection with the Māṁśaka discussion preceding it. In that discussion the parāmarśa is seen by the Māṁśakas as redundant, whereas Vallabha’s statement secures a necessary, and thus causal, position of parāmarśa as it is displayed in the fourth member of the inferential process. There is then no apparent need in the discussion to further specify kāraṇa. Furthermore there is a similarity between Vallabha and Gaṅgeśa in their stating of parāmarśa as a kāraṇa.

I think, however, that one additional point is important to notice about the treatment of parāmarśa in NL, namely the epistemological value Vallabha ascribes it. In the concluding passage Vallabha states:

Just as when there is no inference when there is a doubt about a deviation (vyabhicāra), even when the deviation is not apprehended. In the same manner when there is a doubt that the pervaded property and the property of the subject are of different kinds, even when there is no apprehension that they are of different kinds, there is no inference because the hetu is not established as a pervaded property.

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683 NKd (1895) p. 250, see also Jha (1982) p. 532. Cf. also comments [88].
684 Cf. text [88].
685 TC (1982) p. 408. See also text [92]
686 See text [89-91].
In one sense this passage gives *parāmarśa* a role of providing assurance. If the person going through the process of inference does not assure herself that there is absolutely no difference between the smoke on the mountain and the smoke that is pervaded by fire, the process will halt and will not become inferential knowledge. In my opinion the text not only has a prescriptive character, but also a descriptive character. In a sense the text conveys that this is what takes place when we come to know things: we vacillate between certainty and doubt throughout the process, and left unchecked, doubt will interrupt it. That is the situation where the function of *parāmarśa* lies according to Vallabha. This is accentuated by the insertion of the clause “even when not apprehended”. The mere doubt, that is, the mental state of uncertainty blocks the natural course of the knowledge process. That would at least be one aspect of what it means to say that the cognition of *parāmarśa* is necessary to the inferential process.

5.5.3 Vallabha’s discussion with the Mīmāṃsakas

The Mīmāṃsakas were to become one of the major adversaries of the Nāyaka-nyāya after the Buddhist decline, and this change is also traceable in the NL *anumāna* chapter. In NL the main part of the *parāmarśa* section is devoted to refuting the Mīmāṃsaka view that the *parāmarśa* is unnecessary in the inferential process. According to them the remembrance of *vyāpti* and the apprehension of *paksadharmatā* are sufficient for producing the effect, inferential knowledge. Instead of the five *āngas* (members) of the inference found in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika there are only three members in the Mīmāṃsaka kind. These three are as follows:

1. Pratijñā (that which is to be inferred): “there is fire on the mountain”.
2. Hetu (the reason or ground): “since there is smoke on the mountain”.
3. Dṛṣṭānta (the example): “wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen”.

In this scheme the remembrance of *vyāpti* is spelled out in the third statement, and the apprehension of *paksadharmatā* in the second. The third combinatory cognition of *parāmarśa* required by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is seen as redundant. Discussions regarding the status of *parāmarśa* occurs

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for example in V, TSD, in TC, and in NSM. In the V the opponent’s argument appears to be similar to the one in NL, the anusandhāna is unnecessary because the sādhya is established from an apprehended concomitance and from the second member (hetuvacana). The reasons for the use of parāmarśa stated in NL, however, differs from the ones conducted in all the above sources, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as well as Navya-nyāya, even though the purpose appears to be the same, namely to defend the necessity of the consideration.

The discussion on parāmarśa in NL consists of one main argument and two subsequent objections, of which one has a rejoinder. First of all the Mīmāṁsakas states that there is no further cognition than that of the hetu characterizing the inferential subject and that of a recollection of invariable concomitance. These two cognitions alone lead to inferential knowledge. The objection raised to that view claims that it would create a situation where cognition of smoke as a mere thing could lead to inferential knowledge, which is not the case since smoke must be understood as a liṅga, as that smoke which is characterized by being pervaded by fire, a pervasion subsisting between the generalities “smokeness” and “fireness”. The cognition of the liṅga in turn is secured in the combined cognition of the hetu as a property of the inferential subject and as a pervaded property. This objection is rejected by the Mīmāṁsakas because according to them it would lead to a situation in which it is the generality that leads to inferential knowledge. This is, of course, an untenable consequence, since it is the cognition of smoke as a particular that subsequently leads to inferential knowledge. The generality “smokeness” in turn, when understood as invariably connected to “fireness” is also a part of that process. In the parāmarśa cognition, smoke on the mountain is seen, and then smoke is also seen as characterized by invariable concomitance. If, the Mīmāṁsaka argues, it is the generality alone that produces inferential knowledge, the idea of parāmarśa would have to be given up since it entails a cognition of the particular instance of smoke. The second objection raised is left unanswered in the text, though it is denied by the Mīmāṁsakas. In a sense this clause does not serve as an objection to the Mīmāṁsaka view since it is not formulated as an argument but rather as a statement; the hetuvacana only conveys an apprehension that the hetu is a property of the inferential subject.

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692 Cf. above p. 152 and V (1931) p. 614, nanu vyartham anusandhānavacanat tadantarenāpi hetuvacanat gṛhitavyāptikāt sādhyasiddheḥ, na, aṇena vinābhādhitaviśayatvasyāpratipatteḥ, hetuvacanat tu kāraṇamātropasthāpakam, na tu gṛhitabahir vyāptkasyāntavyāpti pratipādakam iti.

whereas upanaya conveys a cognition of a combination of this apprehension and the remembrance of invariable concomitance.

The brevity and style of argumentation of the section on parāmarśa in NL suggest that it could be understood as a kind of “account of the current state of affairs” where the entire scope of the discussion is to be found elsewhere and is thus only hinted at in Vallabha’s text. It is however interesting to note that the section on parāmarśa forms the final section in the anumāna chapter as well as forming the final element in the process of coming to inferential knowledge. This mirroring effect will be further discussed in the concluding chapter of this work.
6. Concluding discussion

In this work I have translated, commented and analysed the NL chapter on *anumāṇa*, divided into sections treating the topics of *anumāṇa*, *vyāpti*, *turka* and *paraṁarṣa*. In this the final concluding chapter I think it appropriate, however, also to provide overarching images of the whole chapter. The purpose of the outlines below is neither to exhaust the themes that could be formulated from a reading of the *anumāṇa* chapter, nor to provide an exhaustive list of texts with which the NL aligns or could be read parallel to. The following discussion is rather to be seen as a sketch or drawing of the ways in which the text emerged, in the reading, as understandable.

6.1 Thematic outlines of *Nyāyaśāstra*

From the reading of the NL *anumāṇa* chapter the possibility of grasping the invariable concomitance, and the need to ascertain this grasping beyond a reasonable doubt has emerged as forming one theme. Although it is a general concern, the grasping of *vyāpti* is treated in various distinct aspects so that the outcome of the entire *anumāṇa* chapter forms a whole with clearly visible parts. A second thematic feature of the text is furthermore visible in the very sequence of subject matters within the chapter. I have conceptualized this theme as a description of the inferential process itself.

6.1.1 The grasping of *vyāpti*

First of all, the grasping of *vyāpti*, as it is treated in NL, could be understood in terms of a description of the actual awareness of an invariable relation, that is, a description of the cognitive process of coming to awareness about such a relation. In this respect *vyāpti* is described as being accessible by perception. This perception is in turn dealt with by Vallabha from two interrelated perspectives. The perception is achieved through repeated observation, that is, a repeated perceptive experience of the co-existence and co-absence of the *sādhana* in relation to the *sādhyā*.

694 The prerequisite of our ability to understand that this is a concomitant relation, however, is that generalities inhere in the observed particulars. Since the generalities

694 Cf. text [24, 35].
encompass all and every particular they inhere in, it is possible to perceive that the relation is invariable and thus general, pertaining to all individual particulars there could possibly be.  

Secondly, the grasping of vyāpti can also be understood as being treated by Vallabha in terms of certainty, verification, and identification. The question of identification, which is dealt with in the vyāpti/upādhi section, is closely related to the idea of grasping vyāpti previously dealt with, but it takes up another aspect of this subject, identification of vyāpti through definition. The identificatory definition of vyāpti is absence of upādhi (anaupādhitatvat). Furthermore, on the level of verification, upādhi could be understood as functioning as a device whose presence indicates a failure or fault in the cognitional process. The tool for arriving at certainty concerning the presence or non-presence of an upādhi is, in turn, tarka. Through tarka one can arrive at certainty, either described as absence of doubt concerning deviation (vyabhicāra) or as awareness of the presence of an upādhi, and hence as halting the inferential process. Insofar as there is absence of doubt concerning deviation the putative knower proceeds to the last step, parāmarśa, that is, connecting the general knowledge of vyāpti to the particular situation where it is being applied and thereby reaching inferential knowledge.

I would like to suggest that when the grasping of vyāpti is taken as an overall subject of analysis for Vallabha, then this concept could be subdivided into two separate aspects: the apprehension of an invariable relation (niyatasa/vedana), and the ascertainment of this very relation (tatpramāṇa), that is, its being eligible for a process of knowledge. The aspect of apprehension of vyāpti entails, in the NL chapter on anumāna, a description of how this apprehension is possible, namely through repeated observation of particulars and due to the presence of generalities in particulars. This possibility of apprehension does not, however, seem to suffice for a warranting of vyāpti. There could be doubt, to a certain extent at least, and insofar as doubt is present it halts the process. In order to become an effective tool for inferential knowledge, vyāpti needs further endorsement, and this in turn is supplied by the workings of upādhi, tarka, and parāmarśa. Whereas the mere apprehension of vyāpti is descriptively outlined, the text takes, on the other hand, a prescriptive turn when taking up the identificatory aspect of vyāpti. This prescriptive character is, for example, seen in that the treatment of different kinds of upādhi and ways to

695 Cf. text [22].
696 Cf. text [51].
697 Cf. text [51, 67-68, 77-78].
698 Cf. text [89-93].
699 Cf. text [77-78].
discover them comes forth as a neat toolbox made available for future *upādhi* hunters.\footnote{Cf. text [51-53].}

6.1.2 The inferential process

In the concluding section of the analysis of *parāmarśa* I noted a mirror effect pertaining to the very place of *parāmarśa* in the sequence of subjects dealt with in the *anumāna* chapter. In my opinion it is possible to view the arrangement of the whole chapter as running parallel to the sequence of the process of coming to inferential knowledge. This process begins with the apprehension of an invariable relation and ends with the cognition of *parāmarśa*, which is immediately followed by inferential knowledge. Between these stand the two operations of *upādhi* and *tarka*, both of which function so as to identify and certify an invariable relation. *Parāmarśa*, in turn, functions so as to identify the non-difference between the pervaded property and the property of the inferential subject and thereby also to certify the invariable concomitance. From this point of view the whole process of coming to inferential knowledge can be seen as being characterized by the handling of doubt that surfaces and stalls it if not removed. Through *parāmarśa* and *tarka*, and thus indirectly through *upādhi*, the putative knower is either freed from doubt or convinced of its accuracy. Furthermore, when reading the sequential treatment of *anumāna*, *vyāpti*, *tarka*, and *parāmarśa* as analogous to the inferential process, the very location of *tarka* within the *anumāna* chapter could be understood in terms of focusing on the descriptive aspect of the process.

6.2 *Nyāyalīlāvatī* and tradition

When working with a concept of tradition that is non-essentializing and non-stageist the call for generalized remarks and conclusions fades into the background whereas the particular and plural emerge as important foci. The conceptualization of tradition that has been a point of departure for the reading of NL is not understood in terms of a noun, a substance, or an essence but rather as a verb, a process, or a happening. In this the understanding of the *anumāna* chapter in NL becomes not an understanding of one singular phenomenon, but of a phenomenon in its plurality. That is, the analysis of the text has not taken the NL as consequently and singularly following previously written texts, and as such also pointing consequently and singularly ahead to future texts not yet written. Nor has the reading been conducted in relation to an abstracted core of tradition with the aim of producing general conclusions about the degree of “traditional” and “non-
traditional” viewpoints held by Vallabha. The analysis has rather focused on particular subject matters in NL and in relation to particular subject matters in other texts. From one perspective the text does not follow any particular other text or predecessor in this analysis, but instead aligns with different topics from different texts. In the anumāna section there are parallels to PDS and NKd in the treatment of generalities. In the Čārvāka discussion in NL there are parallels to V, NBh, and NM in terms of counterarguments, as well as to TUS, PKM, and NKC in terms of Čārvāka arguments. In the vyāpti section the text could be understood as relating to Vācaspāti’s and Udayana’s discussions concerning upādhi and vyāpti, the most apparent parallel being Udayanas definitions of these two terms. In this section it also proved rewarding to utilize the TC in interpreting both Udayana and Vallabha’s upādhi discussions. The tarka section aligns thematically more with Udayana and the NS commentarial tradition than with PDS, V, and NKd. Both Gaṅgeśa and Udayana proved rewarding also in this reading. There is, however, an interesting rephrasing of NKd in the example of the axe/sickle in the tarka section.701 The NKd seems to reappear in the parāmarśa section, though the connection is neither as clear as it is in the tarka section nor does it have same function.702 In the tarka section it seems to be the view of the opponent in NKd that is denied, whereas in the parāmarśa section it appears to be the view of Śrīdhara that is denied. The most apparent theme in the parāmarśa section is, however, the establishment of that very cognition as a causal factor within the inferential process, in response to a Māṇḍūksaka objector who denies this. The discussion with the Māṇḍūksakas concerning the necessity of the parāmarśa cognition is present in the Navya-nyāya discourse, though the arguments used in these sources to a great extent differ from the ones used in NL. There is furthermore a parallel to Vyomaśiva but only insofar as he also argues for the necessity of parāmarśa, he does not, however, use the same reasons as does Vallabha.

6.3 Future research

That there is a general need for research on specific texts written within the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya discourse is something that has become apparent during the writing of this present work. What is also needed however is more particularized research that focuses on individual authors and their texts. As Daya Krishna puts it when writing about the injustice inherent in incorporating particular texts within a perceived static system of thought disregarding individual expressions:

701. Cf. n. 421 above
702. Cf. comments [88].
Unless this is realized, writings on Indian philosophy will continuously do injustice either to the complexity of thought of the individual thinker concerned, or to the uniqueness of the style of thought they are writing about. If such an injustice is to be avoided, then the history of Indian philosophy will either have to be the history of individual thinkers in relation to one another, or the history of styles of thought as they have grown over a period of time.703

My primary concern with the future could, in view of this, be summarized in two activities: to tend to the particular, and to negotiate vocabularies for understanding that particular. When tending to the particular the areas that resist interpretation might become not only visible to us but also manageable. In practice this amounts to treating the texts we interpret as particular texts and not as signs of something else, that is, an abstracted core of tradition in relation to which the text stands as a reflection. To negotiate vocabularies for the particular and its interpretational consequences is something that, in my opinion, needs to be done in a plural way; plural, not in the sense that each researcher should present multiple ways of understanding the materials of research, but rather in the sense that we should encourage a plurality of interpretative stances within the field of research on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya-nyāya. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, to negotiate vocabularies for understanding requires explicit reflection upon, and awareness of, the interpretative activity that we are engaged in.

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Appendix 1: List of contents of NL

(1) vibhāgaparicchede\textsuperscript{704}

1. padārthoddeśaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
2. (dravyavibhāgaparīkṣāyām) prthivīparīkṣāprakaraṇam
3. “ avayaviparīkṣāprakaraṇam (prāsaṅgikam)
4. “ jalaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
5. “ tejahparīkṣāprakaraṇam
6. “ vāyuparīkṣāprakaraṇam
7. “ indriyaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
8. “ śāriparīkṣāprakaraṇam
9. “ viśayaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
10. “ sṛṣṭisamhārayavidhau (pralayaparīkṣāprakaraṇam)
11. “ “ īśvaraparīkṣāprakaraṇam
12. “ “ paramāṇuparīkṣāprakaraṇam
13. “ “ ākāśaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
14. “ “ kālaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
15. “ “ digparīkṣāprakaraṇam
16. “ “ jīvātmapiarīkṣāprakaraṇam
17. “ “ manahparīkṣāprakaraṇam
18. (guṇavibhāgaparīkṣāyām) saṁkhīyaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
19. “ “ parimāṇaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
20. “ “ prthaktvaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
21. “ “ dviprthaktvaparīkṣāprakaraṇam (prāsaṅgikam)
22. “ “ saṁiyogaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
23. “ “ saṁiyogāvyaśayaśvattparīkṣāprakaraṇam (prāsaṅgikam)
24. “ “ vibhāgaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
25. “ “ paratvāparatvaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
26. “ “ buddhiprakaraṇe saṁśayaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
27. “ “ “ viparyayaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
29. “ “ “ “ svapnaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
30. “ “ “ “ (pratyakṣe) yogapratyakṣaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
32. “ “ “ “ savikalpakaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
33. “ “ “ “ anumānaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
34. “ “ “ “ vyāptiparīkṣāprakaraṇam
35. “ “ “ “ tarkaparīkṣāprakaraṇam
36. “ “ “ “ parāmarśaparīkṣāprakaraṇam

\textsuperscript{704} NL (1991) pp. 1-3. This list is a transcription of the list of contents in the Chowkhamba edition.
37. " " šabdabhaṅga-prakaraṇaṁ
38. " " upamāṇabhaṅga-prakaraṇaṁ
39. " " arthāpattibhaṅga-prakaraṇaṁ
40. " " saṁbhavabhaṅga-prakaraṇaṁ
41. " " aitiḥyabhaṅga-prakaraṇaṁ
42. " " abhāvaprakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
43. " " apavarga-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
44. " " nyāya-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
45. " " hetaṁbhāṣa-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
46. " " smṛti-vidyā-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
47. " " ārṣa-vidyā-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
48. " " gurūt-vapakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
49. " " dravat-vapakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
50. " " sneha-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
51. " " saṁskāra-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
52. " " dharma-dharma-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
53. " " śabdaprakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
54. " " gunavibhāga-ni-yamapra-pakaraṇaṁ

55. karmavibhāga-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
56. sāmānyatadvibhāga-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
57. viśeṣa-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
58. saṁvāya-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ

(2) vaidharmyaparicchede

59. vyatirekī-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
60. vyatirekivīśeṣa-prakṛṣṭa-prakaraṇaṁ
61. padārthalakṣaṇa-prakaraṇaṁ
62. dravyalakṣaṇa-prakaraṇaṁ
63. guṇalakṣaṇa-prakaraṇaṁ

(3) sādharmyaparicchede

64. śadpadārtha-sādharma-yākṣeṇaprakaraṇaṁ
65. padārtha-sādhrnasamādhaṇaprakaraṇaṁ

(4) prakriyāparicchede

66. dravyaprakriyāyām dvāyukṣasiddhiprakaraṇaṁ
67. pākajaprakriyā-prakaraṇaṁ
68. dvitvāsāmkhyotpattiprakriyā-prakaraṇaṁ
69. parimeṣna-prakriyā-prakaraṇaṁ
70. dviprthaktvaprakriyā-prakaraṇaṁ
71. saṁyogaprakriyā-prakaraṇaṁ
72. vibhāgaprakriyāprakaraṇam
73. paratvāparatvaprakriyāprakaraṇam
74. (prāsaṅgikam) jñātatāprakriyāprakaraṇam
75. saṃskāraprakriyāprakaraṇam
Appendix 2: Structure of *buddhi* section in PDS and NL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PDS</th>
<th>NL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>buddhi</td>
<td>buddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avidyā</td>
<td>(avidyā)707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samśaya</td>
<td>sanśaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viparyaya</td>
<td>viparyaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anadhyavasāya</td>
<td>anadhyavasāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svapna</td>
<td>svapna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vidyā</td>
<td>(vidyā)</td>
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<tr>
<td>pratyakṣa</td>
<td>pratyakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nirvikalpa</td>
<td>savikalpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anumāna</td>
<td>anumāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vyāpti</td>
<td>tarka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parāmarśa</td>
<td>śabda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upamāna</td>
<td>ārtihya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sambhāva</td>
<td>abhāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arthāpatti</td>
<td>apavarga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anumāna</td>
<td>avayava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svapna</td>
<td>nyāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nyāya</td>
<td>hetvābhāsa</td>
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<tr>
<td>hetvābhāsa</td>
<td>nidarsana</td>
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<tr>
<td>nidarsana</td>
<td>nidarsanābhāsa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anusandhāna</td>
<td>pratyāmnāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nirnayasya mānāntaravakhandane</td>
<td>sāttvika</td>
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<tr>
<td>sāttvika</td>
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<tr>
<td>śrīmālī</td>
<td>śrīmālī</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

705 PDS (1895) pp. 17-23.
707 *avidyā* and *vidyā* appear in the text of NL but are not given separate captions.
Appendix 3: Important references in and to NL

Important references in NL


Important references to NL

2. Citsukha in Citsukhī/Tattvapradīpika pp. 196:11-197:1, 326:4. In the Jaipur ed. of NL there is a list of 10 citations of Vallabha, but another edition of Citsukhī is used. Since there is no clear reference I have not been able to identify these citations.
4. Vādivāgīśvara in Mānamanohara p. 47.

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709 TS (1985).
710 C (1915).
712 C (1915). These references are places where the commentator states that Vallabha’s opinions are discussed in the Citsukhī, but without Citsukha mentioning Vallabha or NL by name. According to Dasgupta (1932) p. 147 and Bhattacharya (1958) p. 55, Vallabha and NL are frequently discussed in Citsukhī. With this and the above in mind, it seems very probable that there are more places where Vallabha is cited than are noted here.
714 MM (1973). See above p. 36 for a discussion of this.
Appendix 4: Approximate Chronology of authors and texts mentioned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Text</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaṇāda</td>
<td>ca.200 BC</td>
<td>Vaiśeṣikasūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gautama</td>
<td>ca. 200 AD</td>
<td>Nyāyasūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vātsyāyana</td>
<td>450-500</td>
<td>Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinnāga</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Praśastapāda</td>
<td>550-600</td>
<td>Padārthadharmaśāntigraha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uddyotakāra</td>
<td>550-610</td>
<td>Nyāyabhāsyavārttika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharmakirti</td>
<td>650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayarāśi</td>
<td>770-830</td>
<td>Tattvopaplavasīthi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayanta Bhāṭṭa</td>
<td>840-900</td>
<td>Nyāyamaṇjarī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vyomaśiva</td>
<td>800-950</td>
<td>Vyomavatī</td>
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<tr>
<td>Śalikanātha Miśra</td>
<td>800-950</td>
<td>Prakaraṇapañcikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trilocana</td>
<td>870-930</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāsarvajña</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>1) Nyāyasāra 2) Nyāyabhūsana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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716 Matilal (1977) p. 54. It should be noted that this date is wholly approximate.
717 Matilal (1977) p. 78.
718 See Franco (1994) p. XI.
719 The chronology of Jayanta, Vyomaśiva, Trilocana, Vācaspati, and Bhāsarvajña here suggested has been under discussion and is not definitive. Cf. Bhattacharya (1958) pp. 25-30 and Slaje (1986) pp. 245-274. Slaje has based the chronology upon the discussions concerning mokṣa, anadhyavasāya, prayakṣa, and svābhāvikasambandha that are found in these texts. One problematic aspect of Slaje’s chronology, however, is that it presupposes a linear development regarding the ideas about these subjects. Cf. also Perry (1995) pp. 18ff. Perry has emphasized that Bhāsarvajña should be placed after Trilocana on the evidence of a citation in Bhāṭṭa Rāghava’s commentary on NS where it is indicated that Bhāsarvajña follows a doctrine of Trilocana. See Nyāyasāravācāra (1976) p. 59, yatvamataṃ tat-trilocanācāryasammatam.
720 For alternative datings see Verpoorten (1987) p. 38 n. 207.
721 According to Slaje, (1986) p. 274, Trilocana might have been a younger contemporary of Jayanta and Vyomaśiva.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vācaspati</td>
<td>950</td>
<td><em>Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrīdhara</td>
<td>950-1000</td>
<td><em>Nyāyaśikā</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prabhācandra</td>
<td>980-1065</td>
<td>1) <em>Prameyakamalārtāna</em> 2) <em>Nyāyakumudacandra</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sucaritamiśra</td>
<td>ca. 1000</td>
<td><em>Mimārśinsāslokavārttikalāśikā</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jñānaśrimitra</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Udayana</td>
<td>1025-1100</td>
<td>1) <em>Ātmatattvaviveka</em> 2) <em>Nyāyasūryaśa śiśi</em> 3) <em>Nyāyavārtti katātparyāśuddhi</em> 4) <em>Kīraṇāvalī</em></td>
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<td>Vādivāgīśvara</td>
<td>1100-1150</td>
<td><em>Mānamanohara</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Varadarāja</td>
<td>1100-1150</td>
<td><em>Tārkikaraśa</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vallabha</td>
<td>1150-1175</td>
<td><em>Nyāyaliśāviti</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrīharṣa</td>
<td>1150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citsukha</td>
<td>1225/1250</td>
<td><em>Citsukha</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vādindra</td>
<td>1230-1250</td>
<td>1) <em>Mahāvidyāvidambana</em> 2) <em>Rasasāra (Gūnakiriṇāvali- tičā) 3) Tarkasāgra (Kāṇāda- sūtrambandhana)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

722 Whether Bhāsarvajña is a younger or older contemporary of Vācaspati is disputed. Slaje, (1995) p. 274, asserts the former and Bhattacharya, (1958) p. 28, the latter. Slaje, however, proposes 950 as the earliest possible date for both Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspati.

723 Prabhācandra’s dating is discussed in NKC (1991) vol. II pp. 50ff.


726 Bhattacharya (1958) pp. 52f. The alternative dating is 948. This is discussed in the present work on p. 36.

727 Prabhācandra’s dating is suggested as probable by Bhattacharya (1958) pp. 2ff.


732 This chronology is suggested by Isaacson (1995) pp. 6f.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Śaśadhara</td>
<td>1300(^{733})</td>
<td>Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaṅgeśa</td>
<td>1325-1350(^{734})</td>
<td>Tatvācintāmaṇi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Vardhamāna        | 1345/1350-75\(^{735}\) | 1) Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa  
                        2) Anvīkṣaṇayatattvabodha  
                        3) Nyāyaparasīṣṣṣṭapraṇāśa |
| Śaṅkara Miśra     | 1450/1473\(^{736}\) | Nyāyalīlāvatīkaṃṭhābhāraṇa               |
| Baghīratha Thakkur | ca. 1500\(^{737}\) | Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśāvivrti               |
| Annamīṃhaṭṭa      | ca. 1600\(^{738}\) | 1) Tarkasaṅgraha  
                        2) Tarkasaṅgrahadipikā          |
| Viśvanātha Tarkapaṭīcānana | 1630\(^{739}\) | 1) Kārikāvalī  
                        2) (Nyāya)Siddhāntamuktāvalī    |
| Dinakara          | 1660\(^{740}\) | Dinakari                                 |
| Ramarudra          | 1680\(^{741}\) | Ramarudrī                                |

\(^{733}\) Matilal’s dating differs radically from Bhattacharya’s. See Matilal’s foreword to NSD (1976) p. 11 and Bhattacharya (1958) p. 90.  
\(^{739}\) Matilal (1977) p. 110.  
Glossary

äbhāsa
The mere appearance of something. Sometimes used in the meaning of pseudo-reason (*hetvābhāsa*), that is, a pseudo-inference. Cf. *hetvābhāsa*.

abhāva
Absence. Absence is of four kinds: prior, posterior, mutual, and absolute.

abhideyatva
The state of being possible to name. One of the three characterizations that are common to all existing entities. Cf. *asti*va and *jñeyatva*.

adhikāraṇa
Locus, place, substratum, bearer. Cf. *sādhāraṇa*.

ābhāryāropa
Imposition of the imagined. Cf. *tarka*.

ākāśa
Ether or space. The medium of sound. Non-atomic substance in the Vaiśeṣika ontology. Cf. *dravya*.

alaukika
Non-worldly, extraordinary. Used of cognitions that only certain people are capable of having, for example yogis. Also of cognitions that do not have direct contact between sense organ and object. Cf. *laukika*, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *yogaja*, *yogipratyakṣa*, and *jñānalakṣaṇa*.

anadhyavasāya
Indefinitive cognition, indeterminate awareness. Classified as *avidyā* in Vaiśeṣika. Cf. *avidyā*.

anaikāntika
Variable, unsteady. Said of a failed inference where the relation between the *hetu* and *sādha* is variable. Used as a description of *vyabhicāra*.

āṅga
Member or limb of the “inference for another” (*parārthānumāna*). There are five limbs: *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya*, and *nigamana*. Cf. *avayava* and *vacana*.
**anirūpita**
Not outlined, without form, indefinite.

**anubhava**
Apprehension, awareness, understanding. A cognition that is receptive or productive. One of the two forms of cognition. Subdivided into objective and non-objective cognitions. Cf. *smṛti, jñāna, yathārtha*, and *ayathārtha*.

**anukūlatarka**
A conforming *tarka*. A hypothetical, imaginary, line of reasoning that dispels doubt by showing the absurdity of the consequence of the doubt. Cf. *pratikūlatarka*.

**anumā**
Inferential knowledge, the result of an inferential process. Cf. *pramā*.

**anumāna**
Inferential process. Inference. One of the four Nyāya means of knowledge and one of the two Vaiṣeṣika means. Cf. *pramāṇa*.

**anumiti**
Inferential knowledge, the result of the inferential process. Cf. *anumāna*.

**anupalabdhi**
Non-grasping.

**anusandhāna**
The Vaiṣeṣika term for the fourth member of the inferential process. Synonymous to the Nyāya *upanaya*.

**anvayavyatirekin**
Positive and negative. A kind of inference in which it is possible to give example of both the co-presence and the co-absence of *sādhanā* and *sādhyā*. Cf. *kevalānvayin* and *kevalavyatirekin*.

**anvikṣā**
Enquiring, examining, following with the eye.

**anyathāsiddha**
A remote or accidental factor in the causal process, for example the father of the potter in relation to the making of a pot.

**artha**
1) Meaning. 2) Object. 3) Purpose.

**ārṣa**
Sagic. One kind of cognition that is classified as
knowledge in Vaiśeṣika. Cf. vidyā.

**asādhāraṇa**
Uncommon, specific. Not sharing the same substratum, not having the same place or locus. Cf. nimittakāraṇa and sādhāraṇa.

**asamavāyikāraṇa**
Non-inherence cause. Cf. kāraṇa and samavāyikāraṇa.

**asamsargāgraha**
Non-grasping of a non-relation. Sometimes an apprehensional mistake when one believes that there is a relation although none is there.

**astitva**
“Is-ness”. One of the three characterizations that are common to all existing entities. Cf. abhideyatva and jñeyatva.

**ātman**
Self, of which cognitions are qualities, guṇas. The self is thought of as eternal and falls under substances in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology of categories (padārtha). Cf. dravya.

**avayava**
Member or limb of the “inference for another” (parārthānumāna). Cf. aṅga and vacana.

**avidyā**

**avinābhāva**
Not without the other. A term for vyāpti which is understood as a relation in which the absence of the sādhya is also the absence of the sādhaṇa. Cf. vyāpti.

**avyabhicāra**
Non-deviating. A term for vyāpti which is understood as a relation in which the sādhaṇa is non-deviating from the sādhya. Cf. vyāpti.

**ayathārtha**
Non-objective cognition, of which there are three kinds: doubt, error, and tarka. Cf. anubhāva, śaṅkā, viparyaya, and tarka.

**bādha**
Contradiction, opposition. A fault pertaining to a

bhūyodarśana  Repeated observation. Repeated perception of the same phenomenon.

buddhi  Cognition, consciousness, identified with jñāna.742

cakṣuḥ  Eye, perception. One of the six sense organs. Cf. indriya.

cetana  1)Mind, intelligence, reflection. 2)Mental, conscious.

darśana  1)Seeing, looking at, perceiving. 3)Viewpoint, and in that sense doctrine or system of thought, sometimes used of the different philosophical schools.

dharma  1)Entity or property. 2)Character. 3)Good, virtuous. Cf. sādhūraṇa.

dharmin  Bearer or basis of a character or entity. Cf. sādhūraṇa.

dhī  Apprehending, cognizing.

dravya  Substance or fundamental entity. Substances are seen as eternal. The substances in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology are nine, the atomic substances of earth, water, fire, and air, and the non-atomic of ether (ākāśa), space, time, self, and internal organ (manas).

dṛṣṭa  Seen. That which is perceived.

gocara  Field (of the senses), range (of the senses) or domain.

guṇa  Quality, attribute, or particular character.743 Non-fundamental entity, which is seen as non-eternal, that is, coming into and going out of existence. Cf. pādārtha, ātman, and rūpa.

742 In PDS the following are synonyms: “Buddhir upalabdhir jñānam pratyaya iti paryāyah. PDS (1895) p.171.
743 For a discussion on translation, see Halbfass (1993) p. 114.
**hetu**

1) Reason, cause. 2) The object from whose presence another object is inferred, the reason for inferring. Cf. liṅga, sādhana. 3) The second limb in inference for another. Cf. ānga and parārthānumāna.

**hetvābhāsa**

A seeming hetu, a faulty hetu, of which bādha and vyabhicāra are varieties. Cf. ābhāsa and vyabhicāra.

**indriya**

Sense organ. There are six kinds of sense organs, one inner, manas, and five outer: eye, ear, tongue, skin, and nose. Cf. sparśa, caksuḥ.

**jāti**

Generality, that which enables us to perceive entities as being of the same kind and as being different from each other. Cf. sāmānyā. Jāti and sāmānyā could be seen as differing from each other insofar as sāmānyā is assimilating whereas jāti is differentiating also. The concepts can, however, be used as synonyms. Cf. vyakti, sāmānyā, and sattā.

**jñāna**

Cognition. Sometimes translated as knowledge or judgment. Of two kinds in Nyāya, memory and awareness/apprehension. Cf. smṛti, anubhava.

**jñānalakṣaṇa**

An extraordinary kind of perception in which a previous contact between sense organ and object is what causes the perception. Cf. alaukika.

**jñeyatva**

The state of being possible to cognize. One of the three characterizations that are common to all existing entities. Cf. astitva and abhideyatva.

**karaṇa**

Cause. Sometimes the most efficient cause preceding the effect. Sometimes the final cause. Sometimes translated as “instrumental cause”. Cf. vyāpāra and kāraṇa.

**kāraṇa**

Cause. An overarching concept of cause, defined as that condition under which an effect is produced and that condition in absence of which that effect will not be produced.744 Cf. karaṇa, samavāyī-, asamavāyī-, and nimittakāraṇa.

---

kārya  Effect.

kevalānvayin  Only positive. A kind of inference where it is possible to give an example of the co-presence of the sādhanā and sādhya only. Cf. kevalavyatirekin and anvaya-vyatirekin.

kevalavyatirekin  Only negative. An inference in which it is possible to give an example of co-absence of sādhanā and sādhya only. Cf. anvayavyatirekin and kevalānvayin.

lakṣaṇa  Characteristic mark, differentiating mark, definition. Cf. svarūpa.

laukika  Worldly, ordinary. Used when classifying cognitions that are ordinary. These cognitions are constituted by direct contact between the sense organ and the object of the cognition. Cf. alaukika.

liṅga  The mark or indication, one aspect of the hetu/sādhanā in which the mark points to something marked. Smoke as a liṅga points to or indicates fire. Cf. liṅgin, vyāpti.

liṅgin  That which is marked or indicated, one aspect of the sādhya. Cf. vyāpti and liṅga.

manas  Inner sense or internal organ. Often translated with “mind” but within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika discourse this is inappropriate since manas is not conscious. Consciousness is ascribed the self (ātman) whereas manas is like the outer senses in its capacity to perceive. Apart from that, manas also functions as an intermediary between the self and the outer sense organs. Cf. indriya and dravya.

mata  Thought, viewpoint or thinking.

nigamana  The conclusion. The fifth limb of inference for others. Cf. aṅga and parārthānumāna.

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| **nimittakāraṇa** | Often translated as either the “efficient cause” or the “instrumental cause” but also carries with it a sense connected to being the “basis” or “substrate” and one of being “regulative”.

Is divided into two kinds: common (śādhāraṇa) and specific (asādhāraṇa). Cf. kāraṇa. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>nirbhāsa</strong></td>
<td>Appearing before the perceiver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>niścaya</strong></td>
<td>Certainty, determination. Could, in a sense, be understood as a cognition when contrasted to doubt. Cf. śāṅkā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>padārtha</strong></td>
<td>Meaning, object of a word. “Category” within the ontological description of the world in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. The categories are substances, qualities, activity, generality, individuality, inherence, and absence. Cf. dravya and guṇa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>pakṣa</strong></td>
<td>1) Subject of an inference. The place of which the hetu and sādhya are characteristics. 2) One side in a discussion. Cf. pakṣadharmatā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>pakṣadharmatā</strong></td>
<td>The state of being a characteristic or property of the pakṣa. One aspect of the cognition of parāmarśa in which the hetu, for example smokeness, is characterizing the pakṣa, mountain. Cf. parāmarśa, pakṣa, and vyāptiviśīṣṭa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>parāmarśa</strong></td>
<td>Consideration or confirmatory cognition of the liṅga. Entails two aspects of the hetu in the inferential process, firstly the being characterized by invariable concomitance and secondly the state of being a property of the pakṣa. The understanding that these two aspects belong to the same hetu is parāmarśa. This cognition takes place in the fourth member of the inference, the application (upanaya). Cf. vyāpya, pakṣadharmatā, and vyāptiviśīṣṭa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**parārthānumāna**  
Inference for another. The inferential process displayed verbally, as a number of statements. Used, for example, in discussions. Cf. anumāna, āṅga, avayava, and vacana.

**prakāra**  
Enables us to recognize an entity in a certain manner. “Potness”, for example, enables us to recognize a pot as characterized by being a pot. Sometimes translated with “epistemic qualifier”.\(^{747}\)

**pramā**  
Known, knowledge. Cf. anumā.

**pramāṇa**  
Means of knowing, instrument of knowledge. Nyāya has four: pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, upamāṇa, and śabdā. Vaiśeṣika has two: pratyakṣa and anumāṇa.

**pramāṇya**  
Eligible for a process of knowledge. Sometimes translated with “valid”.

**pramātrī**  
The knower. The knowing person.

**prameya**  
That which is to be known. The object of knowledge.

**pratibandha**  
\(^{1}\)Connection, a term for vyāpti. Cf. vyāpti. \(^{2}\)Obstruction, impediment.

**pratibhāsa**  
Appear as something to the perceiver.

**pratijñā**  
Declaration, proposition. The first member of an inference, the thesis, that which is to be known, inferred. Cf. āṅga and parārthānumāṇa.

**pratikūlatarka**  
Refutational tarka. A tarka that indicates the absurdity of an inference and thereby renders it a pseudo-inference. Cf. anukūlatarka and tarka.

**pratyabhijñā**  
Recognition. A kind of cognition (jñāna).

\(^{747}\) Wada (1990) p. 53.
**pratyakṣa**
Perceptible/perception. Possible to know through a sense organ. One of the four Nyāya means of knowledge. One of the two Vaiśeṣika means of knowledge. Cf. pramāṇa, cakṣuḥ and vidyā.

**pratyāsatti**
Contact. Sometimes of the special contact that enables us to perceive generalities. Cf. sāmānyalakṣaṇa and sannikarṣa.

**pūrvapakṣa**
The forepart, the first. Often of the opponent’s position in a text, the counterargument which the author replies to and discusses.

**rūpa**
Form or color, a quality. Cf. guṇa.

**śabda**
1) Sound. 2) Verbal statement. Sometimes rendered as reliable statement. One of the four kinds of means of knowledge in Nyāya. Cf. pramāṇa, yathārtha.

**sādhana**
That which is effective. Often used of hetu in reference to the inferential process. Cf. sādhyā and liṅga.

**sādhāraṇa**
Common, specific. Sharing the same place or locus, having the same bearer or substratum. Cf. dharma, dharmin, nimittakāraṇa, adhikaraṇa, and asādīkaraṇa.

**sādhyā**
That which is to be effected, the thing to be known by inference. Cf. liṅgin and sādhana.

**śakti**
Power, efficiency.

**sāmānyya**
Generality. Cf. jāti and vyakti.

**sāmānyalakṣaṇa**
An extraordinary kind of perception that enables us to apprehend all particulars in which a certain generality inheres. Cf. alaukika and pratyāsatti.

**samavāya**
Inherence. A relation that cannot be broken without the relata losing their existence. For example the relation between cloth and threads. Cf. samyoga and sambandha.
**samaväyikāraṇa** Inherence cause. When the effect is inhering in the cause. Cf. kāraṇa and asamaväyikāraṇa.

**sambandha** Overarching concept of relation which could be specified. Cf. samaväya, sannikāraṇa, and saṁyoga.

**saṁśaya** Doubt. A kind of cognition that is classified as non-knowledge in Vaiśeṣika. Cf. avidyā and śaṅkā.

**saṁskāra** Traces or dispositions created by previous impressions (i.e. cognitions) on the self (ätman).

**saṁvāda** Corroboration, agreement.

**saṁvedana** Apprehension, understanding, grasping.

**saṁyoga** Contact. A relation that can be broken without the relata loosing their existence. Cf. samaväya and sambandha.

**śaṅkā** Doubt. A kind of cognition that is ayathārtha, non-objective. Cf. jñāna and ayathārtha.

**sannikāraṇa** A kind of relation. Often the relation between an object of perception and the organ of perception.

**sattā** Existence, the state of being existent. The higher generality connecting everything that exists. Cf. jāti.

**siddha** Proven. Established.

**siddhānta** That which is established. The lore or tradition.

**smṛti** Remembrance, one form of cognition. Cf. jñāna and vidyā.

**sparśa** Touch. One of the six sense capacities. Cf. indriya.

**svābhāvika** Characterized by own-nature. A term for vyāpti that is understood as a relation pertaining to the nature of the relata, that is, the relation pertains therefore to the very existence of the relata. Cf. vyāpti and upādhi.
svapna  Dream-cognition, classified as avidyā in Vaiśeṣika. Cf. avidyā.

svarūpa  Own-form, nature. That which makes a thing one specific thing and not just any thing. Cf. lakṣaṇa.

svavyāghāta  Striking against oneself. Self-contradiction.

tarka  Hypothetical reasoning or counterfactual conditional. One kind of ayathārtha, non-objective cognition. The tarka cognition has the form of being made up, imagined, cf. āhāryāropa, ūha, partikālatarka, and anukālatarka.

udāharaṇa  The example. Third limb of the inference for others. Cf. aṅga and parārthānumāṇa.

ūha  Reasoning, sometimes used as a term for tarka. Cf. tarka.

upādhi  1) Non-natural generality, as opposed to jāti. 2) An entity whose presence points to a relation as being variable or contingent as opposed to an invariable relation. Cf. jāti and vyāpti.

upamāna  Comparison. One of the four Nyāya means of knowledge. Cf. pramāṇa.

upanaya  The application. The fourth limb in inference for others which consists in the cognition of parāmarśa. Cf. aṅga, parāmarśa, and parārthānumāṇa.

vacana  Statement. A term for the limbs in the inference for another. Cf. aṅga, parārthānumāṇa, and avayava.

vastu  Real thing. Concrete entity.

vedana  Grasping, apprehension.

vidyā  Knowledge as opposed to non-knowledge in the Vaiśeṣika classification of cognition. Of four kinds: perceptive, inferential, recollective, and sagic. Cf. pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, smṛti, and ārṣa.
**vipakṣa**  Opposite. In the inference of fire the *vipakṣa* is the place where there is no fire, for example the lake. When speaking about *tarka*, the opposite is the imagined imposition, “no fire”. Cf. *vyatireka*.

**viparyaya**  Apprehensional error, perceptual error. A kind of cognition that is classified as non-knowledge in Vaiśeṣika or as a non-objective cognition in Nyāya. Cf. *avidyā* and *ayathārtha*.

**virodha**  Opposition, absence.

**viṣaya**  Object, domain. Range or subject matter.

**viṣayaparīśodhaka-tarka**  A kind of *tarka* that concerns a particular case. Cf. *tarka*.

**viśeṣa**  Distinction, qualification, characteristic, difference.

**viśeṣaṇa**  Distinguisher, qualifier, characterizer, differentiator.

**viśiṣṭa**  Distinguished, qualified, characterized, differentiated.

**vṛtti**  Presence, occurrence.

**vyabhicāra**  Deviation. The *hetu* can be proved to be deviating if there is an instance where the pervaded entity appears without the pervader. In that case the inference fails to produce knowledge and is seen as a pseudo-inference. Cf. *hetvābhāsa*.

**vyakti**  A particular entity. Often contrasted with the generality. For example a pot as a particular, and potness as its generality. Cf. *jāti*.

**vyāpaka**  Pervader, the entity pervading in the invariable relation of *vyāpti*. For example fire in relation to smoke. Cf. *vyāpya* and *vyāpti*.

**vyāpāra**  Intermediate operation, the causal factor that enables the instrument or efficient cause to effectuate something. Cf. *karaṇa*. 
**vyāpti**  
Pervasion, invariable concomitance or invariable relation. The relation between two entities in which one pervades the other or they pervade each other. That is to say, the range of existence of the pervaded entity is overlapped in its entirety by that of the pervader. The range of the pervader is not necessarily overlapped in its entirety. Cf. liṅga, liṅgin, sādhyā, sādhana, upādhi, avyabhicāra and svābhāvika.

**vyāptigraha**  
The grasping or apprehension of vyāpti.

**vyāptigrāhakatarka**  
A kind of tarka in Navya-nyāya that promotes the grasping of vyāpti. Cf. tarka and vyāpti.

**vyāptiviśṭṭa**  
The state of being characterized by vyāpti. One aspect of the cognition of parāmarśa where the hetu is grasped as being concomitant with the sādhyā. Cf. parāmarśa and pākṣadhartā.

**vyāpya**  
Pervaded, the entity pervaded. For example smoke in relation to fire. Cf. vyāpti and vyāpakā.

**vyatireka**  
Separation, absence, negative. Opposite to anvaya. Cf. anvavyatirekin, kevalānvayin, and kevalavyatirekin.

**vyavahāra**  
Verbal practice, everyday practice. Verbal, mental, and physical activity. Can also mean understanding and cognition.

**yathārtha**  
As the object. Objective cognition of which there are four: perceptive, inferential, comparative and, verbal. Cf. anubhāva.

**yogaja**  
Born of yoga. Of the extraordinary perception attainable by yogis only. Cf. yogipratyakṣa and alaukika.

**yogipratyakṣa**  
Extraordinary perception attainable by yogis only. Cf. alaukika and yogaja.
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\textit{ALB} & \textit{Adyar Library Bulletin} \\
\textit{BI} & Bibliotheca Indica \\
\textit{BORI} & Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute \\
\textit{BSS} & Bombay Sanskrit Series \\
\textit{ChSS} & Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series \\
\textit{ChSSSt} & Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies \\
\textit{GOS} & Gaekwood’s Oriental Series \\
\textit{HOS} & Harvard Oriental Series \\
\textit{ICPR} & Indian Council of Philosophical Research. \\
\textit{IPQ} & \textit{Indian Philosophical Quarterly} \\
\textit{JIBS} & \textit{Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies [Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū]} \\
\textit{JICPR} & \textit{Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research} \\
\textit{JIP} & \textit{Journal of Indian Philosophy} \\
\textit{KSS} & Kashi Sanskrit Series \\
\textit{NCG} & Nyāyacaturgranthikā \\
\textit{ÖAW} & Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften
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