

# The Hugo Valentin Centre

Master Thesis in Holocaust and Genocide Studies

## Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

*A comparison across time between the views of political elites and the  
general population*

Student: Paulina Budny

Term and year: VT 2023

Credits: 45

Supervisor: Roland Kostić

Word count: 34,714

## Table of Contents

List of tables and figures .....	4
List of Abbreviations .....	5
Abstract.....	6
Acknowledgements .....	7
Introduction .....	8
Research Question and Aims .....	8
Disposition.....	9
Previous Research .....	10
Theoretical Framework .....	15
Transitional Justice.....	15
Social Identity Theory .....	17
Societal Security and Ethnic Identity .....	19
Reconciliation.....	22
Specifications of Research Questions .....	25
Methodology.....	25
Case Study.....	26
Material .....	27
Methods .....	29
Limitations.....	32
Empirical Analysis .....	33
Historical Background.....	33
Background to Political Elites.....	35
Transitional Justice in BiH.....	36
Statements Made by Political Elites.....	38
Views on the Conflict.....	38
Views on Transitional Justice .....	42
Views on Insecurity.....	45
Views on State Structure .....	48

Views on Ethnic Identity .....	52
Views on Partners in Peace .....	55
Views Among the General Public .....	58
Views on the Conflict.....	58
Views on Transitional Justice .....	61
Views on Partners in Peace .....	64
Comparison of Views.....	66
Conclusions .....	69
Appendix .....	70
Number of Elite Statements by Category.....	70
Bibliography .....	75
Primary Sources .....	75
Secondary Sources .....	85

## **List of tables and figures**

Table 1. Overview of Political Elites .....	28
Table 2. Categories and indicators .....	31
Table 3. My People Fought Only Defensive Wars.....	58
Table 4. Definition of the Last War in BiH.....	59
Table 5. Serbian and Croatian Aggression in the War .....	60
Table 6. The ICTY as an Essential Precondition for Just Peace and Normal Relations .....	61
Table 7 Fairness of the ICTY Trials.....	62
Table 8. The ICTY as an Obstacle to Political Stabilization.....	63
Table 9. Impartiality of the ICTY.....	64
Table 10. Views on Shared Peaceful Future .....	64
Table 11. Should Perpetrators be Forgiven .....	65

## List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Definition
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
EU	European Union
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HDZ 1990	Croatian Democratic Union 1990
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHR	Office of the High Representative
PIC	Peace Implementation Council
RS	Republika Srpska
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SBiH	Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDA	Party for Democratic Action
SDP	Social Democratic Party of BiH
SDS	Serb Democratic Party
SNSD	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations

## **Abstract**

This thesis examines views on reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and how these have changed over time, in an attempt to elucidate if transitional justice can promote reconciliation in the aftermath of ethnic conflict in systems that entrench ethnonational insecurity. Drawing upon literature from the field of social psychology, the paper argues that the work of transitional justice mechanisms is interpreted through a sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict which hinders the intended effects from being realized. Data from two levels of analysis is utilized, with statements made by political elites and population surveys in order to identify trends in the views on reconciliation. While there is limited positive change observed at the population level, the same cannot be said of the elites. Ultimately, the results suggest that, in the case of post-Dayton BiH, transitional justice has been unable to promote reconciliation in the aftermath of ethnic conflict.

Keywords: Reconciliation, Transitional Justice, Bosnia and Herzegovina

## Acknowledgements

First of all I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor Roland Kostić for his guidance and invaluable help throughout the writing of this thesis, in addition to generously allowing me the use his data. I would also like to thank my family, friends and classmates for their encouragement these past six months. Sist men inte minst vill jag tacka dig mamma, jag skulle inte varit här utan ditt stöd.

## Introduction

### *Research Question and Aims*

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) during the 1990s was an ethnonational conflict, rooted in ethnic insecurity between Bosniaks, also referred to as Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), instrumental in ending the conflict, entrenched ethnonationalist competition into the political system, translating wartime aggression into the political arena. Thus, international intervention enabled a situation where ethnonational elites maintain fear and conflict narratives through institutional and symbolic means in order to retain power (Bojičić-Dželilović 2015; Belloni and Ramović 2020). All the while billions of dollars have been spent on transitional justice efforts in the country, consisting mainly of retributive justice in the form of the ICTY and the State Court of BiH's War Crimes Chamber, in addition to a myriad of local initiatives. In light of the vast amount of money, time and effort poured into post-war BiH, it is of interest to investigate if transitional justice, with its roots in the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, has been able to promote reconciliation and alleviate core conflict issues. The efficacy of any single transitional justice mechanism, although relevant, is not of primary interest here, rather it is the question of what transitional justice can achieve when the structural conditions leading to violence in the first place remain. Specifically for the case of BiH this becomes the research question: can transitional justice promote reconciliation in the aftermath of ethnic conflict in the systems that promote ethnonational insecurity? The assumption is that because the sociopsychological infrastructure created during the war remains, the work of transitional justice mechanisms will be experienced and filtered through a lens of societal beliefs that are inconducive towards reconciliation, which is in itself a process requiring the transformation of intergroup relations.

The thesis aims to contribute to the field of Holocaust and Genocide Studies by furthering our understanding of the conditions necessary for transitional justice to be effective, and the sociopsychological processes involved in reconciliation. This is essential to the field as it pertains to how societies deal with the aftermath of mass violence and genocide, highlighting the necessity of taking social identity into account, with implications for how, when and in what order policy-makers can or should utilize transitional justice measures. Furthermore, the selected case is directly relevant to the field as, although controversial, international judicial institutions have ruled that acts of genocide occurred during the Bosnian war. Additionally, the thesis will generate new knowledge as it consists of a comparison between views at the group and elite levels, and how these have changed over time, which as far as the author is aware has not previously been done in research on reconciliation in BiH.



The thesis will aim to tackle the research problem by investigating views on transitional justice and reconciliation, at two levels, at two points in time. The practice of transitional justice aims to provide a sense of justice for victims and to promote peace, democracy and reconciliation in societies dealing with the aftermath of conflict and systematic abuse (UN 2008). It is imperative that assessments of the extent to which these goals have been achieved is anchored in the experiences of the general population affected by conflict. Therefore, survey data on the views of local populations in BiH collected by Roland Kostić will be used. Local elites are both recipients of transitional justice and active in shaping its process and reception, their attitudes are therefore also to be examined. This will be done with the use of statements made by the leaders of the two largest political parties supported by each ethnic group. Comparing the views of ordinary citizens and elites allows for a greater understanding of what transitional justice can achieve when structural problems are built into the peace agreements elites are tasked with upholding. As it takes time for the effects of transitional justice to manifest, two points in time will be examined and compared, the years 2007 and 2019 for the statements made by politicians and 2005 and 2019 for the survey data.

## ***Disposition***

The thesis will begin with an overview of previous research on transitional justice and reconciliation in BiH. The next chapter is the theoretical framework, which discusses the liberal foundations of transitional justice, and its lack of consideration of social identity. The theoretical perspective of the thesis draws heavily upon social psychology, including social identity theory, and how it relates to societal insecurity and ethnic identity, in addition to how the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict maintains competitive relations and hinders reconciliation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of sociopsychological processes necessary for reconciliation to progress and the specification of the research questions. Next is the chapter on methodology, which clarifies what material is being used and how the data has been collected. It also provides an explanation for the use of methods, including content analysis and descriptive statistics in order to analyze the data. The final chapter consists of the empirical analysis, which is divided into five sections. The first provides a historical background on post-Dayton BiH, an introduction to the elites under study and a summary of the major transitional justice mechanisms in BiH. Following the historical background, the results of the analysis of the statements made by political elites are presented. The third section pertains to the analysis of the survey data, and the fourth includes a comparison between the results at the level of the elites and general population. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the

findings of the thesis, its limitations and provides recommendations for future avenues of research.

## **Previous Research**

There has been a great deal of research on transitional justice and reconciliation in BiH, the following section will attempt to shed light on the trends and general findings within the field and elucidate the contribution of the thesis.

Starting with the state of the country, Valery Perry (2019, 107, 114) argues that BiH can be categorized as a frozen conflict, meaning that core issues remain unresolved and highly salient, and that there is a looming threat of violence being renewed. The situation in BiH has similarly been categorized as an abeyant intractable conflict, where the violence is suspended or frozen due to the presence of an external third-party guaranteeing that the negotiated peace is kept (Oberpfalzerová, Ullrich, and Jeřábek 2019; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2005, 13). Other descriptors include it being an example of “failed success of international statebuilding” (Bieber 2015, 213), an “uneasy ceasefire” (Zoodtsma 2019, 146) and representing a “stable peace without reconciliation” (Kostić 2008, 399). In line with this, most scholars agree that the transitional justice process in BiH has not been successful. The country continues to suffer from widespread ethnic segregation, both mentally and physically, with most regions being clearly dominated by one ethnic group (Freeman 2012; Guzina and Marijan 2013, 248). The legacy of the war obstructs interethnic cooperation and hinders political, economic and social development (Fairey et al. 2020). Furthermore, reconciliation is a word that is rarely mentioned in good faith in BiH, and is an unpopular topic of discussion among political elites (Perry 2009; Kostić 2008, 396). Attempts to foster reconciliation may even be met with ostracization from one’s own community (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 259). In essence, the ethnicized political environment, poor socioeconomic conditions, and experiences of the war, have contributed to persistent fears within the population which make narratives of division more powerful than those of possible integration (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 261). It is argued that this stems from the DPA failing to address drivers of the conflict, instead cementing a structure that legitimized the acts of ethnic cleansing during the war and diminished the potential of the country to be constituted as a civic rather than ethnic state (Perry 2019, 111; Arthur 2010 288; Guzina and Marijan 2013; Freeman 2012).

Research conducted in the 2000s, at the height of international peacebuilding and transitional justice practices in BiH, finds that Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs have significantly different understandings of the war, external nationbuilding and the new state identity that was

being built in the process (Kostić 2008; 2012). As Rosa Aloisi (2020, 527) describes it, while the war among the factions has ended, it has been replaced by a war over memories, which is fought between local officials and victims, undermining peace and the fragile reconciliation process in the country. The content of the groups' different narratives of the war continue to be shaped by the lack of trust between local communities, and interactions remain colored by fear and resentment (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 257, 259). The absence of an accepted unified historical record is evident from political speeches, the divided school curriculums and discussions on the ground (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 251). Ultimately, there are still at least three different ethnicized versions of the truth, and these competing narratives continue to be a hinderance to reconciliation (Clark 2012; Strupinskienė 2022; Kostić 2008; Trahan and Vukušić 2020).

Trials are a staple of transitional justice, intended to have a variety of beneficial effects, as they are meant to discover and publicize the truth of past atrocities, punish perpetrators, promote and legitimize the rule of law and respond to the needs of victims (Strupinskienė 2022, 75). In addition they aim to prevent perpetrators from reoffending, deter others from committing similar crimes, and remove harmful elites or spoilers (Bar-Tal 2013, 394–95). The ICTY, in particular, was expected to contribute to the individualization of guilt, which would negate the need to hold entire communities responsible for crimes, establish an objective historical record of the war and create the political space for moderate leaders to emerge. However, studies examining retributive justice in BiH paint a grim picture of its impacts. Research finds that the ICTY did not contribute to any significant changes in the public narratives about the war (Trbovc 2020; Delpla 2007, 216), and that there is minimal, if any, connection between the work of the ICTY and processes of reconciliation in BiH (Clark 2009, 135; Meernik 2005, 277–78; Guzina and Marijan 2013, 257). Due to the high number of perpetrators it would be impossible to prosecute every single person responsible for crimes, therefore, when so many go unpunished guilt is collectivized rather than individualized (J. N. Clark 2008, 336). By creating a focus on the atrocities of the war and causing victims to relive the past without providing sufficient justice, it is argued that the ICTY became a hinderance to reconciliation, and sharpened boundaries between ethnic groups (Ramet 2012, 4; Arthur 2010, 272). Furthermore, there are instances of the tribunal having caused community backlashes or violent incidents, also suggesting that the ICTY either failed to promote reconciliation or hindered the process (Strupinskienė 2022, 75; 2017). Additionally, to prevent framing guilt exclusively in group terms, significant portions of all communities involved need to accept the legitimacy of accountability mechanisms, which has not happened as the ICTY and Court of BiH are viewed as biased political theater (Aptel 2011, 180; Guzina and Marijan 2013, 249). Based on unique survey data Kostić (2012) finds that the perceptions of the ICTY, its fairness and necessity as a precondition for peace and normal relations, differ among members of the

three ethnic groups. Likewise, Ramet (2012, 3) argues that retributive justice in BiH has not been fully satisfactory for any ethnic group, Serbs believed the courts are biased and unfairly singling out Serbian perpetrators, Croats felt prosecutions acted to criminalize what in essence was self-defense, and Bosniaks considered the sentencing of perpetrators from the other groups to be too lenient.

There is also research indicating that the tribunal did have positive impacts, one study of reconciliation in Prijedor finds that the ICTY did in fact contribute to reconciliation by fostering a wider push for accountability. This created an opening for victims and their families to mobilize, eventually resulting in interethnic cooperation with increased trust and empathy (Strupinskienė 2022). However, while around 70% of respondents claimed that reconciliation exists in Prijedor, their understanding of the term reflects a thin definition. Further, respondents who were not involved in reconciliation activities were negative towards these activities, viewing them as provocations bringing back painful memories when people are trying to forget the past (Strupinskienė 2022, 82). Moreover, Lara J. Nettelfield (2010a, 15) argues that retributive justice contributed to positive democratic development in BiH and the “creation of new postwar identities based on the rule of law and participation”. However, as previously stated, most studies do not come to this conclusion.

In addition to the ICTY is the War Crimes Chamber within the State Court of BiH, which was established in 2005 and meant to take over cases from the tribunal and slowly start independently prosecuting individuals (Karcic 2021, 211; Brammertz 2020, 37). However, the work of the War Crimes Chamber has been stagnating in the past decade with fewer and fewer indictments being made, many of which have failed, based on poor investigations (Karcic 2021, 212). While it is meant to continue to bring justice to the victims and strengthen the rule of law in BiH, it faces issues with a lack of transparency of basic information, criticism that high-ranking officials have not been investigated despite evidence against them, and significantly delayed proceedings (Karcic 2021, 213, 223). Survey data shows, once again, that attitudes are split among the three ethnonational groups in regards to the work of the Chamber, with for example only Bosniaks believing the trials to be fair (Kostić 2012, 660, 661).

There are those who claim that the most significant impediment to retributive justice having the anticipated positive effects were local political elites, who misused the process for their own political gain (Trbovc 2020, 560). The historical record produced by the trials has been, and continues to be, politicized. The public “truths” that exist about the past are mutually exclusive and contradictory, influenced by the nationalist discourses of political actors who employ their hegemonic power to assert their version of the war as *the* legitimate one. Regardless of what transitional justice mechanisms find, perceptions of the past are crafted by the dominant ethnonational elites (Trbovc 2020; Guzina and Marijan 2013). Political actors influence how collective memories are expressed in part by selecting what to commemorate and what to

ignore, which memorials to build, which buildings to renovate and so forth (Clark 2016; Bădescu 2019). The contentious narratives perpetuated by dominant political elites can even erode the progress of grassroots reconciliation work (Trahan and Vukušić 2020, 475). Some argue that this is intentional, that ethnic tension is instrumental in preserving the power of the elites, who accommodate each other's interests across ethnic lines in order to maintain the status quo and control over each respective community (Belloni and Ramović 2020; Bojičić-Dželimović 2015). According to Jelena Subotić (2009, 6) elites have essentially hijacked the justice process, using transitional mechanisms to achieve goals other than those they were intended for, such as getting rid of political opponents and obtaining international material benefits.

Moreover, there is a growing argument that to foster thicker reconciliation and meaningful change in BiH, transitional justice must go beyond trials to practices anchored in the affected communities (Haider 2021; Trahan and Vukušić 2020). There are many examples of initiatives promoted by local organizations across the country such as Most Mira's theatre activities, the multi-ethnic storytelling project *My Story*, and The Balkan Diskurs Youth Correspondent Program. However, elites have demonstrated a limited interest in such reconciliation activities, as is evident by the lack of support and funding for, and in some cases direct opposition to, grassroots projects (Haider 2021, 7; Moll 2020). Additionally, political actors across the Balkans have blocked the development of official national truth commissions and undermined the establishment of a region-wide truth commission (Bădescu 2019; Clark 2016; Dragović-Soso 2016). In BiH specifically the idea of a national TRC emerged in the 1990s and was met with political and societal resistance. The country has since seen several unofficial truth-seeking initiatives such as the Human Losses Project initiated by the RDC, which again, initially saw opposition from elites who did not accept their findings (Kurze 2017). There are also cases of initiatives being undermined or abandoned because of the absence of cooperation between NGOs from the two entities (Haider 2021).

While projects fostering short-term intergroup contact may be helpful in improving intergroup attitudes, they may not be sufficient to dismantle conflict narratives in a way that transforms participants' perceptions and understandings of how the different groups relate to each other (Burrows et al. 2022). Furthermore, it is questioned to what extent local initiatives are able to have wider impact beyond the immediate participants. Though there is some evidence that smaller projects can trickle upwards, it remains very difficult to impact the political, elite level (Garson 2020). Thus, the depth and longevity of the effects of participating in local activities is undermined by the participant's environment continuing to be based on segregationist and nationalist ideas. Without comprehensive governmental politics and support, community initiatives are not sufficient to bring about thick levels of reconciliation (Strupinskienė 2022).

However, it is important that blame is not only laid at the feet of local elites, as this presumes that if only there were more honorable politicians the transitional justice mechanisms would have produced the intended results, ignoring the inherent problems in that the process was from the beginning a result of external intervention, imposed and designed by foreign actors. Further, this view assumes that elites are always successful in convincing the public of supporting their views and policies, neglecting that elites cannot simply set agendas dominated by their own interests, there must be basis in what resonates with the public (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 252). Additionally, it is not the case that initiatives aiming towards reconciliation are solely undermined or hindered by ethnonationalist elites, the work of organizations and local actors focusing on reconciliation are not always widely supported within their own communities (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 260; Haider 2021; Strupinskienė 2022).

It is evident from the research that the impacts of transitional justice in BiH have at best been mixed. Significant improvements in reconciliation have not been achieved, and divisions remain both in the form of physical segregation and through competing views of the past. However, most of the research cited in the previous discussion has not been based on the views of members of the general population, but rather media coverage, court documents, interviews with elites or people already engaged in projects and activities aimed towards justice and reconciliation. For example Guzina and Marijan (2013, 247) primarily conducted interviews with “key informants, namely local bureaucrats working for the international organizations in Bosnia, civil society representatives and activists engaged in issues of reconciliation and peacebuilding”. This may lead to results that are not grounded in the lived experiences of local populations, the very people transitional justice is meant to serve, which is why this thesis aims to contribute to the field with the use of unique survey data.

While there are a number of studies on public opinion in BiH regarding transitional justice and reconciliation, the data tend to be older, and limited in scope or sample size. For example, there are surveys looking at only specific subgroups or mechanisms, such as the effects of dialogue projects in schools (Cleven 2020), students’ attitudes towards reconciliation in mixed and segregated schools (Meernik et al. 2016), the attitudes of soldiers towards the ICTY (Nettelfield 2010b), and the effects of youth participation in peacebuilding intervention on intergroup attitudes and construals of relations between ethnic groups (Burrows et al. 2022). Some research, using surveys conducted on the general population, is concerned with what respondents believe should take place in regards to transitional justice, but not an assessment of what has actually been done (e.g. Parmentier, Valiñas, and Weitekamp 2009; Wilkes et al 2013). Other studies find that authoritarianism, nationalism and ethnocentrism were the most important obstacles to reconciliation in BiH (Biro et al. 2004), that an increased degree of trauma experienced during the war decreased the belief in the possibility for trust and reconciliation (Jones, Parmentier, and Weitekamp 2012), that exposure to violence influences

people's transitional justice preferences (Hall et al. 2018), and that there is a positive relationship between a person's attitude towards the ICTY and level of reconciliation towards members of other ethnic groups (Meernik and Guerrero 2014). These are focused on characteristics and experiences of the individual, and how they affect views towards reconciliation and transitional justice, but as will be argued, reconciliation consists of sociopsychological processes that happen at the group level and it is at this level more scholarly attention is needed. The thesis will thus build upon the research of Roland Kostić (2007; 2008; 2012) by using an argument centering around the importance of social identity in transitional justice, combining population and elite level data. While studies have compared the views of the group and elite levels, or the views of the local population over time, to the author's knowledge there is no study that does both. This thesis will therefore contribute to the field by using unique data with a comparison across time and levels of analysis.

## **Theoretical Framework**

### ***Transitional Justice***

Transitional justice and its mechanisms have become staples of peacebuilding practice to the extent that their implementation is a default expectation following mass atrocities, supported by the argument that justice is an integral part of sustainable peace (Sharp 2019, 576; Arthur 2010, 272). A basic description is that transitional justice aims to provide justice for victims and promote peace, democracy and reconciliation in societies dealing with the aftermath of conflict and/or systematic abuse (UN 2008), in other words the "core problem of transitional justice is how to justly pursue societal transformation" (Murphy 2017, 160). However, there really is no consensus regarding what transitional justice entails, nor what its goals are. As exemplified, frequently terms such as truth, peace, reconciliation, democratization, rule of law, and justice are used when discussing transitional justice, but these are terms that themselves lack simple, agreed upon definitions or measurements (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2008; Clark 2013; Kritz 2009; De Greiff 2012). Instead, its purpose has tended to be "assumed rather than explicitly articulated in the theory and practice of transitional justice" (Lambourne 2014, 19), and it has been highlighted that "the field remains tremendously undertheorized" (De Greiff 2012, 31–32). It is also argued that transitional justice lacks a theory of change that is empirically rooted and underlying assumptions about the relationships between desired outcomes and the way interventions are expected to bring them about (Gready 2019, 7).

Furthermore, transitional justice is embedded in the liberal peace paradigm, meaning that it is not neutral. It does not simply refer to a set of mechanisms or technical measures, but prioritizes certain actors, practices and discourses over others (Jones and Bernath 2018, 1). Thus, with the assumption of liberal constitutional democracy and market economy as the automatic endpoints of transition, the practice of transitional justice has been preoccupied with civil and political concerns, the rule of law and the prevention of violence using mainly top-down, state-centric approaches (Gready and Robins 2019; Sharp 2019). As long as democratic institutions are built, the international community believes it has created the foundation for peace and reconciliation to develop, when in reality these externally created institutions are disconnected from citizens and dynamics on the ground (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 247–48). Additionally, emphasis is on acts of physical violence rather than chronic structural violence and unequal social relations, in essence pursuing negative rather than positive peace. In line with this, transitional justice responds to the symptoms of conflict but does not address root causes, nor does anything to challenge unequal and intersecting power relations and structures of exclusion at the local and global level (Gready and Robins 2014, 340; Hoddy 2021, 102).

Related to the liberal foundations of transitional justice is that its practice has been dominated by an elite international professional and donor network, which is ignorant of local needs. This is because certain knowledges and realities are prioritized over others, less value is placed on local knowledge compared to internationalized ways of knowing transitional justice (Jones 2015). This results in the international community only supporting local initiatives if they align with their goals and are compatible with their ideas of justice, in addition to an institutionalization and professionalization of the field which has created a justice through bureaucratic means (Jones 2015, 297). Though there has been a shift in recent years to acknowledge the importance of understanding the local context, and include locally rooted processes and actors, such attempts have also been criticized for co-opting tradition and relying on local civil society and elites rather than members of the general population (Gready and Robins 2014; Kochanski 2018). Local ownership in practice tends to be a misleading label, obfuscating the continued external influence. The privileging of local agenda setting also runs the risk of reproducing power structures and discrimination as well as lacking systemic reach (Gready 2019, 13).

The growing critique of transitional justice tends to highlight that socioeconomic aspects of justice and structural violence are sidelined in favor of civic and political goals, which fail to address the needs and priorities of victims (Evans 2016; Robins 2012; Vella 2014). However, what continues to be underserved within these academic debates is the role of identity and how it influences behavior, which is of particular importance within the context of ethnic conflicts. For example, since transitional justice has been a part of the liberal peacebuilding toolbox it entails a civic understanding of nationbuilding, assuming that all citizens, regardless of cultural



or ethnic differences share the same vision of political community, which simply is not the case (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 254). Rather, the politicization of ethnicity, and ingroup mentalities shape responses to transitional justice mechanisms. Traditional, formulaic, one-size-fits-all approaches do not work as they do not contend with the fact that transitional justice mechanisms are filtered through local populations' preconceived notions of identity, and that norms and institutions of transitional justice can be appropriated for the purposes of further delineating between in- and outgroups (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 254). The dynamics of ethnic conflicts differ from those of other conflicts, it therefore follows, that the means to address the injustices that occurred during ethnic conflict must also differ (Arthur 2010, 273). As noted, a common critique of transitional justice is the failure to address root causes of conflict. However, there is not always a consensus surrounding what these are (Friedman 2018, 704), this is particularly true of ethnic conflicts as each group will believe themselves to be justified in their use of violence and have their own narratives of victimization. If one posits that insecurity is a root cause of conflict, what that means, how it manifests and thus how it should be ameliorated will differ between groups.

### ***Social Identity Theory***

Pioneered by social psychologist Henri Tajfel, social identity theory (SIT), introduces the concept of social identity in order to explain intergroup behaviors, defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1974, 69). It begins with the understanding that individuals strive to “achieve a satisfactory concept or image of himself” (Tajfel 1974, 68). Important to SIT is self-categorization, and how this socio-cognitive process shapes the development of shared realities (Turner et al. 1987). A group’s social identity becomes psychologically salient in our minds when we identify with the group, and therefore our feelings, thoughts, behaviors and worldview are shaped by the norms that characterize the identity shared with others categorized as members of the same group. This results in viewing others through the lens of group membership and shared identity, which, in effect depersonalizes them, rather than being viewed as individuals they are defined in terms of being members of a group.

Further, it takes very little for these processes of categorization to take place, Tajfel and colleagues in the early 1970s conducted experiments in order to establish the minimal conditions “in which an individual will, in his behavior, distinguish between an ingroup and an outgroup” (Tajfel 1974, 67). The results were highly significant and showed that even though

group membership was arbitrarily assigned, individuals would award more money to members of the ingroup, and even aim to achieve the maximum difference in favor of the ingroup, despite the fact that this meant less money was awarded compared with other strategies (Tajfel 1974, 68). Many minimal condition group studies have been carried out since, and the results have been replicated hundreds of times (Belavadi and Hogg 2021, 4).

Moreover, according to social psychologists Sucharita Belavadi and Michael A. Hogg “intergroup behavior tends to be competitive due to the operation of social comparison process” (Belavadi and Hogg 2021, 2). These social comparison processes help delineate the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup members, or as Tajfel (1974, 67) put it “the existence or strength of the ingroup are thus seen as phenomena derived from the relations between the ingroup and its outgroups”. These processes tend to take the form of negative comparisons, where, in order for members of an ingroup to dislike or hold hatred towards an outgroup, they must previously have acquired a sense of belonging to a group that is clearly distinct from the other to which they hold negative views (Tajfel 1974, 66). Individuals compare themselves with those dissimilar to gain a higher status, positive identity and sense of self through maintaining distinctiveness from the outgroup and prevailing in competition. As noted, people have a strong drive to feel good about themselves and maintain stable self-esteem, and when the self is defined in terms of social identity this drive manifests as the pursuit of positive intergroup distinctiveness (Belavadi and Hogg 2021, 5). Who “we” are is shaped and understood in relation to who “they” are, and consequently as a result of the self enhancement motive, it then becomes important for “us” to be better than “them”.

Thus, in the context of group dynamics, the categorization of individuals into “us” and “them” is enough to create the need to prevail over the other and be better than them. In the real world this is complicated by the fact that social categories and groups often differ in terms of social status, meaning how they are evaluated and viewed by society. There will therefore, be intergroup competition regarding status and prestige, to promote or protect the relative status of the ingroup (Belavadi and Hogg 2021, 5).

The reduction of uncertainty is another aspect of how group memberships are psychologically important. To minimize uncertainty, clear boundaries between the in- and outgroups are necessary, and competitive intergroup relations are a way to crystalize these boundaries and understand where “we” stand in relation to “them” (Belavadi and Hogg 2021, 7). Furthermore, groups can never be fully secure of their status and social identity, even if a group is universally viewed as the superior group, it must always continue to work towards preserving its distinctiveness (Tajfel 1974, 77). The struggle over status and prestige may lead to the outgroup being viewed as threatening the position of the ingroup, with the possibility of violence resulting from extreme competitive relations. Interacting with this are other factors such as intergroup anxiety, which stems from negative expectations of intergroup interactions

and creates an obstacle for establishing positive contact (Stephan and Stephan 1985). This is heightened by minimal previous contact, negative outgroup stereotypes, history of intergroup conflict, large status difference between groups, and high levels of identification with the ingroup (Freeman 2012, 19). Essentially social psychology informs us that group identities are important to maintaining positive self-esteem and that the existence of in- and outgroups lead to competitive attitudes which shape behavior.

### ***Societal Security and Ethnic Identity***

Ethnic identities are different from other social identities in that “they are constructed around the idea of descent, as well as social and biological reproduction” (Arthur, 2010, 273) and are “composed of cultural attributes, such as religion, language, customs, and shared historical myths” (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 848). Therefore, while ethnic identities are socially constructed, in many contexts they cannot be chosen and unchosen by individuals. Another perspective is that identities are in fact chosen and not given, but once they are chosen they become absolute, and thus are both chosen, voluntary, and constructed, imagined, as well as perceived as absolute, given and fixed (Lindholm 1993, 15). Further, members of ethnic groups perceive their belonging to the group as influencing their status and fate in the sociopolitical and economic structure in which they live, and underlies feelings of belongingness, attachment and distinctiveness (Bar-Tal 2013, 13-14). Ethnic identities are therefore highly salient and a social identity that can easily be linked to insecurity.

The concept of societal security was put forth by Barry Buzan (1983) as one of five sectors of security, and expanded upon by the Copenhagen School of security studies (Wæver, Buzan, and Kelstrup 1993). It proposes society as a referent object, challenging the state-centrism of security studies. Society here refers to a politically significant social unit that provides a locus of identification for its members, such as a nation, ethnic group, clan or tribe, in other words, a group sharing a common social identity (Theiler 2010, 106). Societal security can be viewed as synonymous with identity security as it is concerned with the ability of an identity community to survive and sustain itself (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998; Roe 1999, 193).

To securitize, is thus to identify a threat to the social and cultural survival of an ethnic group, and a strategy to neutralize said threat (Theiler 2010, 107). It is to be noted that threats are socially constructed, and thus identities and relations to others influence what is deemed to be a threat or not (Roe 1999, 185). Once a social identity has been securitized, it is considered a thing whose continuance must be ensured (Roe 1999, 195-6), a threat against one’s group is inherently an existential threat whose nullification is an absolute priority. Therefore, extreme

defensive measures which would not be considered morally or politically acceptable in ordinary circumstances may be taken, for example, the defense of culture may often manifest through ethnic nationalism (Roe 1999, 194). This is another reason why elites may wish to securitize an issue, to be granted the approval to take extraordinary action.

There is a reciprocal link between group securitization, group consolidation and the status of the securitizing actor. Therefore, securitization can create a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy whereby securitizing discourses can generate the reality they depict, provided the audience accepts the statement. For this to happen, the securitizing actor must enjoy sufficient credibility and status among the audience, and the threats they are invoking must have a basis in pre-existing suspicions and anxieties (Stritzel 2007 in Theiler 2010, 107). Hence, while elites will manipulate fears and create threats for their own gain, these must resonate with the general public. The idea that ordinary people are easily deceived by leaders neglects the fact that many actively support their leaders' policies (Arthur 2010, 283). Likewise, the dynamic can be more bottom up, where insecure societies call upon their states for protection, this may for example be reflected in voting patterns (Theiler 2010, 107). Ultimately, contextual factors are necessary to explain why and when certain securitization discourses emerge and find broad acceptance.

If a given issue can be securitized it follows that it can also be desecuritized, i.e. taken "out of the realm of security conceptualization" into the area of "a-security" (Wæver 1998, 81). A-security refers to a condition where a given issue is not interpreted as having identity implications or is not thought of in identity terms at all (Theiler 2010, 111). It is theorized that two strategies can lead to desecuritization. The first seeks to convince the audience that the issue they believe to be threatening either does not pose a threat, or does not exist at all. The other is focused on the group itself, where the group's defining markers are redefined in such a way where the issue no longer poses an identity threat. Relatedly, Arthur (2010, 286-7) discusses how transitional justice can take identity into account by supporting processes of decategorization, recategorization and mutual differentiation, which would in practice appear to serve similar purposes:

In decategorization processes, people's ethnic identities are downplayed in favor of personal identities, such that people are asked to relate to one another on a purely personal level. In recategorization processes, people's ethnic identities are downplayed in favor of a more encompassing, "superordinate" category, such as gender or national identity. Mutual differentiation processes do not so much challenge the boundaries of ethnic categories, but rather ensure that differentiation does not entail demeaning the value of other groups.

Daniel Bar-Tal's (2007; 2013) research on intractable conflicts elucidates the sociopsychological processes that keep identity within the realm of security and make ethnic

conflicts more difficult to resolve. To meet the challenges of living in an intractable conflict, societies develop a sociopsychological infrastructure which serves as a prism through which society members understand the world (Bar-Tal 2007, 1434–36). The three elements of this infrastructure are collective memories, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tal 2007, 1435). Collective memories justify the conflict, present positive images of the ingroup, delegitimize the opponent, and portray the ingroup as the victim (Bar-Tal 2007, 1436, 1438). Although there is some basis in actual events, the collective memory of a conflict is not an objective telling of the past, but a biased, selective and distorted socially constructed narrative that functions to meet a society's needs (Bar-Tal 2007, 1436). Naturally, opposing groups maintain contradictory memories of the same events. The ethos of conflict has to do with a society's narrative about the present, its goals and images of the ingroup and outgroup (Bar-Tal 2007, 1438). Together the societal beliefs of collective memory and ethos of conflict complement each other and constitute a widely shared solid and holistic narrative, which in turn contributes to the maintenance and strengthening of social identity (Bar-Tal 2007, 1439, 1443). Beliefs about threats and dangers are embedded into collective memory and ethos, disseminated through societal channels of communication, and cultural and educational institutions, and are thus continuously circulated and reinforced (Bar-Tal 2007, 1440). Finally, is the development of collective emotional orientations, where emotional experiences become a societal phenomenon (Bar-Tal 2007, 1439). For societies involved in intractable conflict these tend to be dominated by fear, as well as hatred and anger, guilt or pride.

Intractable conflicts affect the nature, contents, and functioning of social identity, and cause people to increase their sense of identification with the ingroup in order to fulfill the need for belonging and security (Bar-Tal 2007, 1443). The sociopsychological infrastructure creates a sense of differentiation and superiority, sharpening intergroup differences (Bar-Tal 2007, 1441). It justifies and legitimizes the ingroup's acts of violence and attributes one's own immoral behavior to the rival's violence and external situational factors. The ingroup is praised and glorified, and presented as the sole victim of the conflict while all responsibility is placed on the cruel, inhumane and immoral outgroup. This differentiation allows for needed positive self and collective esteem and feelings of superiority. In turn, strong identification with the society involved in an intractable conflict contributes to the acceptance of shared beliefs.

Additionally, the memories and narratives within each group about the suffering endured by its members, may become a central aspect of the group's identity, forming a collective victimhood (Belavadi and Hogg 2021, 10; Oberpfalzerová, Ullrich, and Jeřábek 2019). Groups compete over the experience of collective victimhood and subsequently engage in competitive victimhood, where each group positions itself as the primary victim of the conflict, whose pain and suffering is greater than that of the outgroup (Noor et al. 2017). Narratives of victimhood

can enable group members to come together in times of perceived crisis and threat, while exaggerating intergroup divisions and hampering the troubled intergroup relations.

Furthermore, the sociopsychological infrastructure is widely shared and expressed in the major societal channels of communication, eventually permeating books, plays, films and other cultural products. Societal communications and cultural products reflect the beliefs, attitudes and emotions experienced by society members and simultaneously transmit, disseminate and validate them (Bar-Tal 2007, 1444). Leaders also use the sociopsychological infrastructure for the justification of decisions, policies and courses of action (Bar-Tal 2007, 1445). Subsequently, younger generations are exposed to this infrastructure through family, educational institutions and mass media, and come to internalize the same beliefs, attitudes, values and emotions by adulthood.

A consequence of the infrastructure is that it affects the way information is anticipated, selectively interpreted, recalled and acted upon (Bar-Tal 2007, 1446). Individuals search for and absorb information that is in line with societal beliefs and omit contradictory information or process it through bias, addition and distortion. Therefore, while the sociopsychological infrastructure enables better adaptation to the conflict conditions, it also acts as a barrier for resolving the conflict (Bar-Tal 2007, 1446-7). It becomes a prism through which society members construe their reality, interpret their experiences, collect new information and then make decisions about their course of action. In essence, as the conflict evolves, each of the opposing groups develops its own sociopsychological infrastructure, which over time comes to serve as the major motivating, justifying and rationalizing factor of the conflict (Bar-Tal 2007, 1447). Negative actions taken by other groups validates the infrastructure and magnifies the motivation and readiness to engage in conflict, confirming the held negative beliefs and justifies harming the opponent.

## ***Reconciliation***

Just as sociopsychological processes are central to maintaining conflict, they are also the key to building stable and peaceful relations between opposing groups. These are based on fully nonviolent, normalized, and cooperative cultural, economic and political relations where both sides have a vested interest in developing new peaceful relations and a secure coexistence (Bar-Tal 2013, 369). Change is needed not only in the worldview, beliefs, motivations, attitudes, and emotions of society members but also in cultural, societal and educational products, such as new symbols and narratives, ceremonies, information in mass media, films, textbooks, and leaders' speeches (Bar-Tal 2013, 370). A new sociopsychological infrastructure must replace

the one developed during the conflict, be shared by a majority and penetrate deeply into societal institutions, organizations, and channels of communication, creating a stable foundation for peace that is rooted in the psyche of the people. Thus, lasting peace cannot develop without structural processes that are interwoven with the psychological process, sociopsychological changes go hand in hand with sociopolitical changes (Bar-Tal 2013, 391).

These changes must begin in a pre-agreement phase in order to facilitate a peaceful resolution that is supported by society members, otherwise, they may not accept negotiated compromises and will still hold the same worldview that fueled the conflict (Bar-Tal 2013, 376). This leads to the maintenance of a cold peace, defined as a scenario in which relations between conflict parties remain unsettled as they adhere to signed peace agreements but do not continue to build stable and lasting peaceful relations between society members. These conditions are often supported by leaders and economic elites who see the maintenance of peaceful relations as in their interests, regardless of the quality of said relations (Bar-Tal 2013, 368).

According to Bar-Tal (2013, 376) reconciliation “constitutes the psychological societal process that is a necessary condition for building a stable and lasting peace” and lies at “the heart of the formation or restoration of genuine peaceful relationships between societies that have been involved in intractable conflict”. It refers to building new relations that allow for moving beyond the experiences accumulated before and during the conflict, and the formation of a new sociopsychological infrastructure that can accommodate past grievances, and construct new views about the rival, the conflict and the collective self. There are five themes of societal beliefs that need to be changed in the process of reconciliation, they are: societal beliefs about the about one’s own group, the group’s goals, about the rival group, relations with the past opponent, and about peace.

The first condition for reconciliation is a complete shift in views with regard to the rival group, who must be legitimized, differentiated, equalized and personalized (Bar-Tal 2013, 379). This enables the rival to be viewed as a partner to peace, and a human entity deserving of equal, just, and humane treatment. Relations need to transform to center around cooperation and peace, along with sensitivity and care about the needs of the other group. The transformation is based on the recognition that both sides have legitimate goals, needs and contentions, and that it is necessary that these be satisfied in order to solve the conflict and establish peaceful relations (Bar-Tal 2013, 379).

As the process of reconciliation progresses, a new common outlook of the past is required (Bar-Tal 2013, 381). Years of violence leave deep scars of grief, anger, a sense of victimhood and desire for revenge, the parties in conflict have also internalized opposing collective memories that focus on the evilness and wrongdoing of the other. Thus, reconciliation entails changing these by learning about the rival group’s collective memory and recognizing the

ingroup's role in maintaining the conflict and atrocities committed during it. It is through the process of negotiation and renegotiation about collective memories that one's own past is critically revised and synchronized with that of the other group, allowing a new narrative to emerge (Bar-Tal 2013, 382). Another crucial pillar of the new sociopsychological infrastructure for reconciliation is a sense of security, a basic human need. A lack of security causes frustration, fear, and dissatisfaction and may lead to extreme behavior including violence (Bar-Tal 2013, 390). Reconciliation demands a sense of security in the relationship with the former rival, no threat or danger should be coming from either side.

Finally, there must be equalized interactions between the parties, and political and economic restructuring that lead to new and cooperative links that stabilize peaceful relationships (Bar-Tal 2013, 393). In cases where the rival parties need to function under the same political system there must be internal institutional reforms, especially in the political, economic and legal systems. Political integration is key, and all groups must be included in the power system. While reconciliation is an informal process it still requires the participation of formal institutions with planning, policies and actions in order to be legitimate and institutionalized (Bar-Tal 2013, 378). The achievement of justice, peace and democracy should be viewed as complementary activities to sociopsychological changes within the societies, for which transitional justice is a useful tool in achieving, according to Bar-Tal (2013, 394).

Reconciliation can therefore be understood as a multifaceted, complex process consisting of sociopsychological, structural and political changes. While this discussion has centered on Bar-Tal's conception of reconciliation, it should be noted that there is no definitive definition of the concept, nor a consensus on how it can be evaluated or achieved, or even if it is possible at all. Karen Brounéus (2008, 294) defines reconciliation as "a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviors into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace", a definition formulated based on a review of the field. Priscilla Hayner (2011, 189) proposes three questions to be asked when assessing reconciliation: a) How is the past dealt with in the public sphere? b) What are the relationships between former opponents? c) Is there one version of the past, or many? According to Herbert C. Kelman (2004, 119) reconciliation is "the development of working trust, the transformation of the relationship toward a partnership based on reciprocity and mutual responsiveness, and an agreement that addresses both parties' basic needs", and in his view requires a change of identity through a process of internalization. It is evident that there are certain generally agreed upon themes, whereby reconciliation encompasses the transformation of relations between former adversaries, the development of shared narratives and a mutual goal of peace.



## ***Specifications of Research Questions***

Reconciliation can therefore be understood as a latent variable, not measurable in itself, but rather observed through other variables. Based on the theoretical discussion, reconciliation is operationalized according to indicators consisting of views on the following themes: the conflict, transitional justice, insecurity, the salience of ethnic identity, how the state should be structured and the outgroup as a partner in peace.

The theoretical framework creates the argument that transitional justice, regardless of which mechanisms are employed, will not be effective at fostering reconciliation in cases where the root causes of conflict and sociopsychological infrastructure created by the conflict remain. Sociopsychological processes and the importance of identity must be taken into account when designing and implementing transitional justice, as the work of such mechanisms will inevitably be interpreted on the ground by local populations in a way that confirm societal beliefs. In order to contribute to the understanding of the research puzzle, and the question of if transitional justice can promote reconciliation in the aftermath of ethnic conflict in the systems that promote ethnonational insecurity, the analysis will attempt to answer the following questions:

- i. Has transitional justice contributed to reconciliation in BiH?
- ii. Have there been changes over time to the sociopsychological infrastructure developed during conflict? Has this sociopsychological infrastructure been replaced with one of peace?
- iii. Do elites and the general population hold the same views in regards to reconciliation and transitional justice?

## **Methodology**

This study aims to find trends in how views on reconciliation have shifted over time in order to evaluate the efficacy of transitional justice. A case study of BiH will be conducted, with the use of survey data from 2005 and 2019, and statements made by political elites during 2007 and 2019, which allows for a comparison across time and levels of analysis. Content analysis and descriptive statistics will be used to analyze the empirical data. The following section discusses the material, methodological choices and limitations of the thesis.

## *Case Study*

Case studies focus on one or few cases with the ambition of understanding and capturing broader and more general underlying dynamics (Ruffa 2020, 1133). For this thesis, a single-case design has been chosen, which allows the researcher to shed light on a larger class of cases and test the causal implications of a theory, providing corroborating evidence for a causal argument (Gerring 2007, 20, 45). In short, the theoretical argument is that mechanisms of transitional justice will not produce the intended effects in postconflict contexts where identity based insecurity remains. Therefore, it is necessary that the case selected be one consisting of an ethnic conflict and a subsequently substantive transitional justice process. BiH fits these criteria, and is a critical case as it was subject to one of the most expensive and expansive externally led transitional justice processes. Proponents of traditional transitional justice, based in the liberal paradigm, would therefore expect such a supported transitional effort to be successful in providing justice and fostering reconciliation. However, the assumption based on the theoretical framework is instead that attitudes towards transitional justice mechanisms and views demonstrating reconciliation will not have shifted significantly in a positive direction. Rwanda presents the other potential case of ethnic violence followed by a similarly comprehensive and supported transitional justice process, however due to the autocratic nature of its government it is impossible to study the views of the general population when it comes to topics related to the genocide.

For the purposes of this thesis a single-case study method combining temporal and within-case variation is used (Gerring 2007, 31). Of interest are the views of Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, the three ethnic groups previously in conflict, and if these have changed over time in the direction of reconciliation. Comparing data from two periods in time is essential for testing the theoretical argument, as though one should be able to expect results from transitional justice to appear within a twelve to fourteen year period, these are not assumed to have manifested. Instead, the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict continues to shape intergroup relations, and the work of transitional justice mechanisms will have been filtered through this lens. A comparison of trends in the views from the elite and population levels allows for further testing of arguments being made regarding the state of reconciliation within BiH itself, and the role elites play in hindering the process and keeping identity within the realm of security. As previously noted, there are those who posit that the elites are an obstacle to national reconciliation as they promote competing ethnicized truths of the war, and maintain narratives that each group is still under threat. The statements made by leading politicians, are however, also a reflection of the beliefs of the general population, as they have been democratically elected and their rhetoric must therefore have some resonance with the public.

The comparison is asymmetric as while views on the six identified themes have been collected through statements made by politicians, the availability of survey data means that only views on the conflict, transitional justice, and a shared future are covered at the population level.

## ***Material***

There is a long tradition of analyzing text in order to gain information about the actors who produced them, as the point of text is to communicate something, thus, all text contains information that could be treated as a form of data (Benoit 2020, 462–63). Since the views of political elites in BiH are of interest, the use of textual data is particularly appropriate since it can be considered as “the most pervasive – and certainly the most persistent – artifact of political behavior” (Monroe and Schrodtt 2008, 351). In fact, it is argued that what political actors say provides more evidence of their true inner state than the behavior they exhibit (Benoit 2020, 462). The textual data used in this thesis consists of statements made by elites, available in English, regarding the Bosnian war, transitional justice, the structure of the state, insecurity, the salience of ethnic identity, and a shared future during the calendar years of 2007 and 2019.

The database used to collect the statements is Factiva, a news database produced by Dow Jones International that gathers news articles from more than 33,000 sources, from 200 countries in 28 languages (Sundberg and Harbom 2011, 103). It also includes transcripts from BBC Monitoring, which translates local radio, newspapers and television into English, and is the most frequent source of the content analyzed in this thesis.

Due to time constraints and scope limitations, the term political elite refers to the leaders of the two largest parties supported by each ethnic group. This creates a sample consisting of the elites who have most influence, being as they are either the leaders of the largest parties in government or of the largest parties of the opposition. In addition, the rhetoric they espouse will most reflect the sentiments that are most popular among the public. As the years 2007 and 2019 are examined, the election results from 2006 and 2018 have been used to determine which politicians are of interest. The elites under study are summarized in the following table. It should be noted that all parties have an ethnonationalist ideology, aside from SDP, which is social democratic and officially multiethnic, but is primarily supported by urban Bosniaks.

Table 1. Overview of Political Elites

Year	Elite	Party	Ethnic constituency	Political Position	Government or Opposition	Number of statements
2007	Sulejman Tihić	SDA	Bosniak	Right wing	Government	23
	Haris Silajdžić	SBiH	Bosniak	Center-right	Government	69
	Milorad Dodik	SNSD	Serb	Center-left	Government	132
	Mladen Bosić	SDS	Serb	Right wing	Opposition	12
	Dragan Čović	HDZ	Croat	Right wing	Government	22
	Božo Ljubić	HDZ 1990	Croat	Right wing	Government	10
2019 (Until 30/06) (After 30/06)	Bakir Izetbegović	SDA	Bosniak	Right wing	Government	27
	Nermin Nikšić	SDP	Bosniak	Center-left	Opposition	5
	Milorad Dodik	SNSD	Serb	Center-left	Government	83
	Vukota Govedarica	SDS	Serb	Right wing	Opposition	2
	Mirko Šarović	SDS	Serb	Right wing	Opposition	1
	Dragan Čović	HDZ	Croat	Right wing	Government	17
	Ilija Cvitanović	HDZ 1990	Croat	Right wing	Extra-parliamentary	0

Source: (Central Election Commission BiH n.d.; Kostić 2007, 47)

Searches were made in Factiva using each elite's name, both with and without diacritics when applicable, and the following keywords: ICTY, Tribunal, Court of B-H, Court of BiH, War Crimes Chamber, reconciliation, justice, Hague, trial, threat, security, war, peace, genocide, Srebrenica, apology, apologize or apologise. The search was also filtered for results in English and pertaining to BiH. This garnered 1,678 publications in 2007 and 1,356 in 2019. These results were sifted through, with publications not including quotes from the relevant politicians being excluded. In publications where the elites were quoted, the text was read and relevant statements were collected, with publications featuring statements by the elites that were unrelated to the research question being rejected. This resulted in the collection of 403 statements in total.

Survey research is an indispensable tool in social and political research, allowing the researcher to directly gain insight to public opinion (Johnson and Reynolds 2016, 295). This is

of particular importance for this study, as the general population is the intended beneficiary of transitional justice and assessments of reconciliation must be grounded in the lived experience of regular people. Surveys provide a systematic means for gathering information from a sample of individuals in order to describe attributes of the larger population (Eck 2011, 165). They are also enormously resource intensive, require a considerable investment in time, and in-depth knowledge of the relevant theoretical literature, the country or region to be sampled, and survey methodology (Eck 2011, 167, 179). Therefore, it is beyond the ability of the author to conduct survey research at the level of quality necessary to answer the research question, instead, survey data gathered by Roland Kostić in cooperation with IPSOS is used. The data from 2005 consists of a stratified random sample of 2500 adults with 900 from the Bosniak part of BiH, 800 from the predominantly Croat part and 800 from the Serb part of the country, due to the lack of postwar census data at the time. The 2019 data consists of a random sample of the whole population with a total of 1052 respondents. These were coded based on ethnic belonging, with those who identified as Muslim or Bosniak included in the Bosniak group, and those who identified as Bosnian excluded, as they identified with a civic rather than ethnic identity.

The use of survey and textual data from the same years would have been ideal, however the availability of data limited this possibility. Further, statements from 2007 capture the political landscape in the beginning of the period marked by increased political tension following the transition in the international community's strategy towards BiH moving away from extensive direct intervention. It was also preferable to be able to study the statements of politicians elected during the 2006 rather than 2002 elections, as they were less strongly influenced by external actors. Of importance is that the later data are both from 2019, when the latest available survey data was collected, which allows for a comparison of the most recent views on reconciliation possible.

## ***Methods***

Content analysis is a flexible method that can be employed and defined in a variety of ways. According to Lune and Berg (2017, 182) content analysis entails a "careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, assumptions, and meanings". Drisko and Maschi (2015, 7) refer to it as "a family of research techniques for making systematic, credible, or valid and replicable inferences from texts and other forms of communication". It is an unobtrusive technique that allows for the analysis of relatively unstructured data in view of the meanings, symbolic qualities, and expressive contents they have and of the communicative roles they play (Krippendorff 2018,

51). Content analysis is therefore selected as the method for analyzing the statements made by political elites, in order to identify the views towards transitional justice and reconciliation, and relevant subthemes within.

Content analysis can be both a qualitative and quantitative method, when used qualitatively, researchers focus on narratively describing the meaning of communications, in specific contexts, rather than using statistics or word counts (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 1). Qualitative content analysis can be described as a set of techniques for the systematic analysis of text, addressing their themes and core ideas, and can be used to identify and document the views, attitudes, and interests of individuals, small groups, or large and diverse cultural groups, which is the purpose of analyzing the statements by elites (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 2; Krippendorff 2018, 52). Furthermore, it allows the researcher to compare and contrast group differences, which will be done through the comparison of views between Bosniak, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat politicians (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 86). It is additionally an appropriate method for the analysis of political text where positions expressed are of interest, as is the case here (Benoit 2020, 468).

Any approach to content analysis must be systematic and requires carefully defined and transparently reported descriptions of how the researcher collected, coded, and analyzed the target material (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 4). Coding in content analysis refers to the human annotation of textual content based on reading the texts and assigning them categories from a pre-defined scheme (Benoit 2020, 470). According to Stefan Titscher et al. (2000, 58) categories can be understood as the operational definitions of variables, and the system of categories should be established before coding is undertaken, while other approaches to content analysis may develop categories that are revised and refined in an interactive, feedback-loop process (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 6). The main analysis entails the coding of data into categories, with the final steps of analysis being concerned with preparing the data in a way that clearly answers the research question, this centers on the reporting of descriptive categories or themes. In essence this involves the reordering and reorganization of the coded categories to summarize the key content in the data, which reveals the content of interest and importance to readers (Drisko and Maschi 2015, 109).

Therefore a set of categories was initially created based on the theoretical framework, consisting of the following: views on the conflict, views on transitional justice, views on insecurity, views on the salience of ethnic identity, views on the structure of the state and finally views on a shared future. Subcategories of indicators were devised to more easily organize the data.

Table 2. Categories and indicators

Categories of Views	Indicators
The Conflict	War of aggression Civil war
	Acts of genocide were committed during the war Acts of genocide were not committed
	Collective guilt for crimes during the war Individual guilt for crimes during the war
Transitional Justice	View that justice has been served View that justice has not been served
	Positive view of the ICTY Negative view of the ICTY
	Positive view of Court of BiH Negative view of the Court of BiH
	Positive view of ICJ Negative view of ICJ
	Cooperate with judicial mechanism Do not cooperate
Societal Insecurity	Sense of insecurity Sense of security
	War will return War will not return
State Structure	Positive towards ethnic entities Negative towards ethnic entities
	BiH should be split, pro secession BiH should stay together, anti-secession
Salience of Ethnic Identity	Ethnic identity salient Ethnic identity not salient
Partners in Peace	Views of outgroups as partners in peace Outgroups not viewed as partners in peace

The statements were coded using the program NVivo in accordance with a binary, for most categories as either a positive or negative statement. Furthermore, longer statements might speak to the themes of several categories and have therefore been coded multiple times. Reliability in content analysis is often achieved by the use of several coders who test the level of agreement between coders coding of the same subsample (Neuendorf 2017). Due to the nature of this study, it was not possible to have multiple coders, instead, to ensure an acceptable level of reliability the data was coded three times. The statements were initially coded during the process of data collection, and were subsequently reread, and when necessary recoded after the collection was complete, and then once more following a break from the material.

Additionally, the politicians tended to be unambiguous when expressing their views, which simplified the coding process.

As noted the final stages of analysis are concerned with the reporting of themes and key content in the data. The data will be presented in terms of the six established categories, themes within the data on each category have been identified and are discussed through a selection of statements that represent the views of each elite. It would be impossible to include all statements for all elites, particularly as some such as Dodik are overrepresented. In general views held by each individual are consistent, and statements are made multiple times with the same message, allowing for their exclusion from the text. The number of coded statements for each elite, within each category can also be found in the appendix, which demonstrate that statements have not been cherry-picked in order to present certain narratives.

Descriptive statistics will be used to present the survey data, in particular with the use of cross tabulation. This is deemed to be sufficient in order to gauge the shifts in views over time between the three ethnic groups. The trends found in the statements made by elites and survey results will then be compared in order to ascertain if similar trends can be found at both levels, and if these reflect progress in regards to reconciliation in BiH.

## ***Limitations***

A main limitation of the study concerns language, as I do not speak Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian and must therefore rely on sources that have been translated into English. The language barrier severely limits the amount of statements I was able to access, and there are inherent biases in what western media chooses to report on or what local sources they choose to translate. This, for example, makes it more difficult to gain statements from the elites representing smaller parties. One might also assume that more sensationalist statements are more likely to be covered by western media which could skew the sample, on the other hand, because the international community, was and is so heavily involved in maintaining peace in the country there may be some vested interest in portraying the BiH as a success story and therefore positive statements may be highlighted. Furthermore, news outlets are not detached observers and reporters of events, but sociopolitically embedded institutions that are active participants in social processes and have inherent biases (Hodgetts and Chamberlain 2014, 383). Many of the publications used for the elite statements consist of translations of news and radio reports, interviews, and newspaper articles in Bosnian media, by western organizations, primarily BBC Monitoring, which mean that there is a double bias, limiting the generalizability of the findings. However, the sample is still deemed large enough that even if it is not completely representative of all statements made by the selected elites it still represents trends in statements that indeed were



said and rhetoric that was used at the time. Additionally, because readily available statements are used, rather than for example conducting interviews myself, I am unable to ask particular questions of the politicians and must rely on what they have publicly said. Therefore there are not statements for all categories for each elite, which weakens the analysis, for instance no statements were found by Croat elites regarding views on the conflict. This is an unavoidable consequence of the choice of material. Finally, due to the lack of available survey data, there was not data at the population level for each theme identified in the statements at the elite level, therefore a symmetrical comparison is not possible. The themes only containing data from political elites was still included in order to gain a fuller picture of reconciliation at that level.

## **Empirical Analysis**

### ***Historical Background***

The war in BiH began in 1992 in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, with each ethnic group having its own vision of what independence meant. The war resulted in the displacement of half of the population and the deaths of roughly 100,000, almost 40% of which were civilian casualties (O’Leary 2014, x). Bosniaks represented approximately 65% of overall deaths and 80% of civilian deaths (Calic 2013, 140). The conflict came to an end as a result of the November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), itself a result of American-led peace negotiations, and represented a compromise among the mutually incompatible goals. The DPA included a constitution for BiH and divided the country into two entities with their own governments, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), consisting primarily of Bosniaks and Croats, and the Serb dominated Republika Srpska (RS). It recognized the three main ethnic groups as “constituent peoples” and created a complicated institutional structure with five layers of governance based around ethnic identity. Politicians are elected as representatives of their ethnic group and have no incentives to make cross-ethnic appeals. These conditions complicate effective governance, and consociation institutions often see themselves in a state of deadlock (Belloni 2009). Central to the war were incompatible views of the territorial boundaries of BiH and the rights of citizenship, these issues continue to lie at the heart of country’s political problems. Bosniaks fought to maintain borders and preserve and consolidate the state, and continue to view this as their best avenue to political and national survival. Croats and Serbs fear a Bosniak-dominated government, which could lead to the imposition of Bosniak political, cultural and religious views on the rest of the country and

therefore prefer extensive local autonomy and close ties to Croatia and Serbia (Belloni 2009 358).

The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), is an international body composed of 55 representatives of the international community, tasked with overseeing the implementation of the DPA. It also appoints the High Representative, in charge of the implementation of civilian aspects of the agreement, and provides him with strategic direction. At a PIC meeting in late 1997, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which originally had limited authority, was granted the so-called “Bonn powers” (Belloni 2009 362; Kostić 2011, 90). These allow the OHR to amend the BiH constitution, annul laws, impose institutional reform and remove elected officials who obstruct the DPA (Kostić 2011, 90). This opened the doors for significant direct intervention of the international community in the internal affairs of BiH in the name of peace and statebuilding. The US, in particular, took control and ownership of the process, and aligned with its own understanding of citizenship as a civic identity, led the nationbuilding project with the intention of establishing a unified Bosnian identity to replace the central role of ethnic belonging (Kostić 2011, 80). Western actors promoted local political parties who claimed to endorse western civic values of social organization and believed would work for their vision of BiH, giving them logistic and financial support (Kostić 2011, 92). Interventions with the intention of overcoming the dominance of ethnonational parties and changes to election laws essentially meant that external actors were steering the BiH elections during the early 2000s. Furthermore, Paddy Ashdown’s reign as High Representative from 2002-2006 saw an extensive use of the Bonn powers, with a reforms going beyond the original DPA. The external intervention meant that political accountability was detached from policy making, as international officials imposed policy on the Bosnian public without being accountable to them, nor responsible for the outcomes of such decisions (Belloni 362 2009). The overly active role of the international community in engineering the internal affairs of BiH has created a state that is by and large shaped by external agendas rather than local processes, a so called “inverted state” , and is disconnected from citizens and dynamics on the ground (Guzina and Marijan 2013, 247-48).

Eventually the PIC decided it was time for local ownership of the process. For example, Christian Schwartz-Schilling was appointed as the fifth, and what was meant to be the last, High Representative in 2006, and refused to impose legislation on the Bosnian Parliament. However, the actions of the US and OHR had not empowered local actors nor created the conditions which would allow them to be able to take charge of the DPA process, instead political crisis ensued (Kostic 2011, 99). According to Perry (2019, 110) the period of time since 2007 has been characterized by a weak and incoherent international approach, with a steady decline in reform and compromise in the resulting vacuum. Sofía Sebastián-Aparicio (Sebastián-Aparicio 2014, 1) describes how beginning with the reform of the DPA and

constitution initiated in 2005, BiH experienced an unstable period which saw the repeated failures of reform attempts such as the Prud Agreement and Butmir process. Foreign diplomats and analysts have even expressed fears that the country would collapse (Belloni 2009, 356). It is within the context of this transition from direct foreign intervention to political crisis that the data from 2007 is collected.

Aside from the general historical background provided, it is also necessary to give a brief account of the political context of the years 2007 and 2019, as statements made by political elites in regards to reconciliation and transitional justice in BiH usually took place in the wider context of ongoing political debates. In 2007 BiH was negotiating a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, as a part of the process towards eventual EU accession. This was stalled due to disagreements over police reform, a precondition for the SAA, a deadlock was created when Bosnian Serbs blocked the attempt to transform the entities' separate police forces into a single national one. As a result, Miroslav Lajčák, who followed Schwartz-Schilling as High Representative, used the Bonn powers to make legislative changes, and altered voting procedures in order to make it more difficult for the entities to block decision making at the national level (Sebastián-Aparicio 2014). This led to a confrontation with SNSD, the main ruling party of RS headed by Milorad Dodik, who saw this as an unacceptable attack on RS autonomy and integrity. Dodik temporarily withdrew Bosnian Serb ministers from state institutions, and Nikola Špirić, of SNSD, then Prime Minister of BiH resigned in protest (Belloni 2009 364-5). The PIC did not give Lajčák, the support that would have been needed to overcome this resistance and he ultimately accepted a weak compromise. In the end no cross-entity police was established. Lajčák, then said that politically the international community in BiH was a "dead horse" (ibid).

The second set of data is from 2019, during which BiH politics were marred by the inability to form a government following the October 2018 elections. This was complicated by the need for leaders from the three ethnic communities to come to joint decisions regarding the division of ministries and policies. Central to this was the disagreement about NATO membership, while Bosnian Serb leaders strongly opposed joining the alliance, Bosniak and Bosnian Croat leaders were adamant to submit BiH's Annual National Program which is a precondition for the activation of BiH's NATO Membership Action Plan (Kovacevic 2019).

### *Background to Political Elites*

The two most popular Bosniak parties in 2007 were the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) who were both in government. While conservative SDA, received most votes in the parliamentary elections of the two, its leader

Sulejman Tihić lost re-election to the Bosniak seat of the presidency. Instead the more nationalistic Haris Silajdžić, leader of center-right SBiH won. Silajdžić was originally a member of SDA and served as the first prime minister of FBiH as a representative of SDA, but left to form SBiH in 1996 (Sebastián-Aparicio 2014, 17). He was also the only wartime leader among the politicians studied. In 2019, SDA was the most popular Bosniak party, winning the both Bosniak seat of the presidency and most seats in parliament. It was and continues to be led by Bakir Izetbegović, son of Alija Izetbegović, leader of the Republic of FBiH and subsequent member of the BiH presidency. The second largest party supported by Bosniaks was the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which as stated is officially multiethnic but mainly receives votes from urban Bosniaks (Kostić 2011). Nermin Nikšić was the leader of center-left SDP which was also the main opposition party.

The Bosnian Serb party with most support in 2007 was SNSD, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, a center-left party led by Milorad Dodik. Dodik was at the time the prime minister of RS. Mladen Bosić was in 2007 the leader of the conservative SDS, the Serb Democratic Party, and main opposition party in the RS (Sebastián-Aparicio 2014, 18). In 2019 the same parties were the largest, with Dodik still leading SNSD, this time as the Bosnian Serb member of the presidency, and for much of the year Chairman of the presidency. SDS underwent a leadership change and was led by Vukota Govedarica until the 30<sup>th</sup> of June and by Mirko Šarović for the rest of the year.

Dragan Čović is the leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the most popular party among Bosnian Croats. He was the president of the conservative party during both 2007 and 2019. He was the Croat member of the presidency following the 2002 election but was removed by Paddy Ashdown in 2005 for abuse of power (Sebastián-Aparicio 2014). Čović was re-elected to the position in the 2014 elections, but subsequently lost to Željko Komšić in 2018. Komšić's seat in the presidency is controversial as although representing Croats he was elected by Bosniak, not Croat support. The second most popular party among Croats is HDZ 1990 or the Croatian Democratic Union 1990. It was formed by Božo Ljubić following his split from HDZ due to disagreements over the 2006 April reform package which included constitutional changes that did not sufficiently protect Croats according to Ljubić (Kostić 2011, 96). In 2019 HDZ 1990 was led by Ilija Cvitanović, but no statements made by him were found.

### *Transitional Justice in BiH*

Finally a short background on the main transitional justice mechanisms in BiH will be provided, including the ICTY, War Crimes Chamber of the State Court and the ICJ.

The UN Security Council established the ICTY in May 1993 in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with the task of prosecuting “those most responsible” for serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Agius 2020, 18). It was the first war crimes court created by the UN and the first international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. The ICTY issued its first indictment in November 1994 and did not issue new ones after 2004, instead focusing on transferring cases to local judiciaries (Agius 2020, 26). In total it indicted 161 individuals, 91 were sentenced, 18 acquitted, 37 had their indictments withdrawn or died during or while awaiting trial, 13 were referred to national jurisdictions and two cases are still ongoing (ICTY n.d.). Of the 161 indicted individuals, 72 were Bosnian Serbs, 25 were Serbs from Serbia, Croatia or Kosovo, 25 were Bosnian Croats, five Croats from Croatia and nine were Bosniaks (Ramet 2012, 1). It was officially closed in December 2017 following the completion of its mandate, in its place the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals performs the essential functions previously carried out by the ICTY.

The State Court of BiH was formed in 2003 with a special War Crime Chamber within it established in 2005 (Karcic 2021, 211; Brammertz 2020, 37). The chamber was composed of a mix of foreign and local staff, with the foreign staff leaving in 2012. The aim was to take over cases from the ICTY and slowly start independently prosecuting individuals. While the ICTY dealt with the majority of the more senior perpetrators such as major political, police and military officials, the domestic courts mainly processed direct perpetrators, who tended to be younger. According to the OSCE mission to Bosnia (2021), at the end of 2020 there remained a backlog of 571 unresolved cases involving 4,498 suspects. Since the Mission began to monitor the war crimes processing in 2004, a total of 594 proceedings involving 904 defendants have been completed.

In addition, the government of BiH put forth a complaint against Serbia and Montenegro before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), asking the ICJ to determine that the campaigns against civilians in the war was genocidal. The court rules in February 2007 that Serbia and Montenegro were not guilty of genocide nor complicity in genocide, though guilt in the failure of preventing and punishing genocide was established (Dragović-Soso and Gordy 2010).

Finally, there have been several attempts to create TRCs in the Balkans, including three attempts at creating a commission in BiH between 1997 and 2006, and the attempt to create a joint regional TRC. These have not materialized due to a lack of political will to constructively engage with the past, a complicated relationship with international actors with concerns that a TRC would interfere with the work of the ICTY (Dragović-Soso and Gordy 2010, 201-202). There was however, a truth commission established to investigate the events in and around Srebrenica, i.e. the Srebrenica Commission, which was established by the Parliament of RS in 2003 due to intervention by then High Representative Paddy Ashdown and a decision by BiH’s

Human Rights Chamber (Dragović-Soso and Gordy 2010, 202). The commission's final report, published in June 2004, gave an account of the role the RS army, police and Ministry of the Interior had played in the massacre, and provided the location of 32 mass grave sites, along with information concerning over 1,000 missing persons. The RS Parliament subsequently issued an apology to the families of the victims.

## ***Statements Made by Political Elites***

### *Views on the Conflict*

Collective memory is one of the three pillars of Bar-Tal's conception of the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict, and helps to maintain beliefs about social identity, threats and the relations to rival groups. Opposing groups uphold separate and contradictory memories of the conflict and each actor's guilt, and the transformation of these is therefore an important aspect of reconciliation, which requires a common outlook on the past (Bar-Tal 2013, 381; Hayner 2011, 189; Brounéus 2008, 294). The analysis will begin with statements made by political elites regarding the nature of the Bosnian war and events during it, in order to determine if views of the past have changed over time in a direction towards reconciliation. This includes the recognition of the ingroup's role in maintaining the conflict and atrocities committed during it, and a process of negotiation in which one's own collective memory is critically revised and synchronized with that of the other group(s) (Bar-Tal 2013, 382).

It is evident from the statements made by elites in 2007 that there was not a commonly held view on the nature of the conflict. According to Bosnian Serb Milorad Dodik, leader of SNSD and the then prime minister of RS, "it perfectly clear that all sides committed crimes in BiH" (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007h) and that "everyone suffered in the war in BiH, that there was no aggressor, and that there were people who defended their homes and that they died because of that" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ab). In contrast, Bosniak leader of SBiH and then Bosniak member of the presidency, Haris Silajdžić, referred to Bosniaks as the main target for aggression and genocide (*BBC Monitoring* 2007b), claiming that there were "clear aggressors and victims in the war" (Woodard 2007) and that "you know that we, as the victim, were blamed for something throughout the war in BiH, and that we are still blamed today because we are alive" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007s).

However, rather than comments on the conflict at large, leaders spoke more frequently on the topic of genocide, and whether or not genocide had taken place in Srebrenica, as affirmed by the ICTY. These statements also express diverging views between leaders from different ethnic groups. While the Bosniak leaders repeatedly claimed that genocide was committed

against the Bosniak population (Kukan 2007a; Cerkez-Robinson 2007; Bilandzic and Dervisbegovic 2007; *BBC Monitoring* 2007m; *BBC Monitoring* 2007k), Bosnian Serb leader Dodik expressed shifting views on the matter. In February 2007 the ICJ held that the massacre in Srebrenica constituted genocide, and while Serbia did breach the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent the violence from occurring, it was neither directly responsible for nor complicit in it. Following this judgement Dodik, expressed that “regardless of authorities who claim it, I think that there was no genocide and that it was not planned and that it was not committed. There are numerous material facts that can prove it, but I don't want to debate it now” (Cave 2007) and said "I reject all responsibility of the Serb Republic, its institutions and most of all of the Serb people for the qualifications given on Srebrenica" (*SeeNews* 2007). Dodik also criticized Bosniaks for using the term, “the abuse of the word genocide by the Bosniak politicians exceeds the limit of good taste, and, I dare say, it devalues the true victims of war” (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007c). However, while he tended to dismiss the accusations of genocide, he has also claimed that "the verdict is a fact and we accept all of its sections, including the one qualifying the crime in Srebrenica as genocide" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007l).

Additionally, the larger debates were not necessarily concerned with whether or not genocide had taken place, but what the repercussions of that should be. Silajdžić, leader of centrist SBiH, and Sulejman Tihić, leader of conservative SDA, used the ICJ judgement to question the existence of RS as an entity. They issued a joint statement which stated that the verdict “clearly necessitates reconsideration of the constitutional set-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including its administrative and territorial divisions” which are “untenable because they are a direct consequence of genocide” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007k). Silajdžić also said that “the question is how to implement the verdict, which was not a mere statement. There must be some repercussions, because genocide must not be legalized” (Skuletic 2007). He subsequently asked for UN assistance “to annul the results of the genocide” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ae), as well as separately suggesting that the US could help BiH with this, emphasizing that "people whom victims recognize as criminals are even in security structures" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ad). Dodik, in a joint statement with other Bosnian Serb leaders expressed “deepest condolences” to the families of war crime victims, especially those from Srebrenica, stating that "individuals must answer for their crimes before The Hague court or Bosnian courts” but also added that the verdict could never question the future of the Bosnian Serb entity (*AFP* 2007b). His firm stance that the territorial and administrative integrity of RS may not be challenged is further discussed in the section on state structure. Differing views on the events of the war are thus not only a question of competing collective memories, but have implications for the structure of the country, and thereby even further complicate reconciliation, as the admission of guilt on the part of Bosnian Serbs may threaten the existence of their entity.

Something they in turn view as essential over fear of Bosniak domination, as expanded upon in future sections. This is exemplified by a quote by Dodik stating:

We want, like the entire civilized world, our victims to be respected, and they were enormous. They fell for the Serb Republic, they fell for the same thing for which we are still struggling today very vehemently. The Serbs are not genocidal; the Serb Republic is not genocidal. The Serb Republic is the fatherland of those who suffered, and therefore, the Serb Republic has the right to live (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ab).

Another matter of contention is the different understandings of who bears the responsibility for crimes, if it is an individual or collective issue. Dodik highlighted that neither RS as an entity nor the Bosnian Serb people could be found collectively guilty as the crimes in Srebrenica were committed by individuals (*BBC Monitoring* 2007u). He says of Silajdžić, who does view RS as a whole as guilty, that “if he is a responsible politician, [he] should stop lying” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007u). According to Dodik:

Neither the Serbs nor any other ethnic group can take collective responsibility for the crimes that had been committed. An imposition of collective responsibility is a terrible threat, because it would mean amnestying those who really are responsible for the crimes, and at the same time stigmatizing the millions of those who have not committed crimes, which is impermissible (Risojevic 2007).

Bosniak leader Tihić, on the other hand, claimed that “no one can any longer accept the story about some kind of individual responsibilities, and the highest court on the planet has stated that clearly”, in reference to the ICJ verdict (Kukan 2007a). In a joint statement with Silajdžić it is said that “the task of officers of the Army of the Serb Republic, including General Mladić, was to operate on behalf of the authority of the Bosnian Serbs, especially on behalf of the Serb Republic”. It is with this logic that they argue for the need to reconsider the division of the country into entities and the abolishment of RS (*BBC Monitoring* 2007k). The statements suggest that at the elite level guilt has not been individualized among Bosniaks, who made up the largest share of victims, regardless of party affiliation. Furthermore, it begs the question of how guilt can be individualized, which the judicial mechanisms intended to achieve, when perpetrators are viewed as acting on behalf of a state, or organization. The statements made in 2007 overall indicate that the Bosniak and Serb elites have opposing views of the conflict itself, whether or not Bosniaks were subject to genocide, who bears the responsibility for those crimes and its consequences, in multiple ways there is not a common outlook on the past. No statements made by Bosnian Croat leaders were found in 2007 which may be a result of the significant judicial rulings at the time being concerned with Serbs and Bosniaks.



In 2019, Bosniak leaders spoke on the topic of genocide in reaction to Radovan Karadžić's sentence being increased to life in prison at an appeal court in the Hague. Bosniak Bakir Izetbegović, head of SDA, then the largest party within BiH, expressed some satisfaction that "the truth about the criminal enterprise of the army that was led by Radovan Karadžić" had been determined (*HINA* 2019e), but also noted that "unfortunately, the charge of genocide was upheld only for the Srebrenica massacre and does not include Prijedor and other towns that were exposed to crimes of a similar nature and intensity" (*HINA* 2019e). While Bosniak politicians maintain that Bosniaks were victims of genocide throughout BiH, the ICTY only affirms that they had been subjected to one local genocide. Additionally, Izetbegović voiced the opinion that "the foundations of Republika Srpska are built on the bones of the killed people, the victims of genocide" (*FENA* 2019d). He also directly criticizes the Bosnian Serb efforts of maintaining a certain collective memory of the conflict, including the new commissions set up by RS to re-examine wartime crimes, saying that:

Such commissions have a single purpose -- to serve this lie to the part of the Serb public that wants to live in a false conviction that Serbs could only be victims, and never criminals, and to serve it in a better, intellectual, and international packaging. This strategy of lies and self-deception is centuries-old (*BBC Monitoring* 2019e).

The quote exemplifies the role of collective memories of conflict for social identity, the effort to maintain the belief that the ingroup were solely victims helps retain positive self and collective esteem. Information contradicting these beliefs, part of the larger sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict, is rejected. Thus instead of accepting the findings of the 2003 Srebrenica Commission, which would mean accepting Bosnian Serb guilt, Dodik initiated new commissions. Furthermore, while Dodik in 2007 both acknowledged and denied that genocide had occurred, in 2019, then as the Bosnian Serb member of the BiH presidency, he was firmly of the opinion that Srebrenica did not constitute genocide, and rejected the findings and judgements of the ICTY qualifying it as such. He stated that "the Srebrenica crime is a staged tragedy with an aim to satanize the Serbs" and referred to it as a myth (*The Times of Israel* 2019). Though acknowledging that "terrible suffering" happened in Srebrenica, he expressed that "every people needs a myth -- and the Bosnians didn't have any. They tried to construct the myth of Srebrenica. It is a false myth -- this myth doesn't exist" (*AFP* 2019b). Dodik later elaborated on this idea explaining that:

An entire concept went after favoring the story about the Bosniak suffering in that area. From their saying that it was genocide, through completely minimizing the Serb victims, to that report with no Serb casualties. They turned Srebrenica into a myth around which the Bosniaks' ethnic identity is being developed. The same as the Serbs

have the Kosovo myth, they are creating the Srebrenica one, because there are no serious peoples without a myth. I can understand that (*BBC Monitoring European* 2019a).

This exemplifies the connection between the memories of the conflict and ethnic identity, the suffering endured by its members become a central aspect of the group's identity, forming a collective victimhood and strengthens ingroup identification and solidarity (Belavadi and Hogg 2021, 10; Oberpfalzerová, Ullrich, and Jeřábek 2019; Noor et al. 2017).

Dodik also argues that the proposal to ban genocide denial confirms that the genocide did not take place, "Why are they seeking this? Well, because they are not sure about this story. Why would a law about this be passed? Because they are not sure that they can cover it with facts. If there was genocide, there is no reasonable man who would not accept this label", also saying that not even the ICTY "was ever accurate about the number of casualties" (*BBC Monitoring European* 2019a). There were again, no statements found by Bosnian Croat leaders on the topic of the conflict or genocide.

Like in 2007, it is clear that there is no common agreement on the past, however, in 2019, there is an additional layer to the statements which speak to the active processes of upholding the opposing collective narratives and memories of war. It is not only that there are disagreements surrounding the basic facts of what happened, but also about the rival group's process of creating and maintaining the views on the conflict and how these are used for perceived political aims or as tools against the other group. This is likely the result of more time having passed since the events of the war, and signals that progress has not been made in terms of reaching a common view of the past, or even one that is not mutually exclusive among the political elites. Instead, in some cases such as Dodik's attitude towards the Srebrenica massacre, even more extreme views on the events of the war were expressed in 2019 compared to 2007. Transitional justice mechanisms have been operating in BiH for thirty years, however, from the statements one can conclude that the duration of these mechanisms and the increasing cumulation of trials has not resulted in the establishment of an accepted official narrative of the conflict. Verdicts have been interpreted according to the beliefs embedded in the sociopsychological infrastructure and reinforce group differences.

### *Views on Transitional Justice*

The following section will examine the statements made by elites regarding the mechanisms of transitional justice. These mainly reflect the views on events and mechanisms that took place

during the periods examined, as the political leaders tended not to make general statements about transitional justice or the ICTY as a whole.

As previously mentioned, the ICJ verdict that exonerated Serbia came in February 2007. Silajdžić, Bosniak politician and leader of SBiH, in particular had negative views on this ruling, stating that “it's clear that the judgment is incomplete” (Wood 2007), adding “it turns out there was genocide in Bosnia but it is not known who committed it” (*Irish Times* 2007). Over the course of the year disappointment with the verdict itself was combined with dissatisfaction with the consequences of the ruling. Silajdžić expressed that “the verdict has no consequences. What is a verdict without consequences, what court passes a verdict without consequences and what kind of UN is it that does not react to this verdict?” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007x). Alongside criticism of the international judicial institutions, he critiqued Serbia's failure to arrest key perpetrators such as Karadžić and Mladić (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007d). Tihic of SDA, expressed similar disappointment in the ICJ verdict, and noted that the court had not done its due diligence to ensure justice was served, such as ordering all necessary documents without deletions (*BBC Monitoring* 2007q).

While the Bosniak reaction reflected negative views towards international justice, Dodik made statements both rebutting the ICJ verdict and accepting its findings. Before the judgement was delivered he said that “whatever it will be, Republika Srpska will not accept the verdict and will not implement it,” (Max 2007) and that the ruling is “a result of an illegal and illegitimate lawsuit” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007h). However, he for example later in April noted that, “The ruling is a fact for us, and we don't want to change it. We had objections . . . but that's just our view. It was not for us to decide” (MacDonald 2007). Mladen Bosić, Bosnian Serb leader of SDS, the conservative Serb party serving as SNSD's main opposition, commented on the perceived political manipulation of justice in regards to the ICJ lawsuit:

It is clear that the main purpose was to get history revised, based on which they would then try to establish political goals, that is, request the abolition of the Serb Republic. It is clear that the Federation parties are trying, or will try very soon, to move to the Serb Republic terrain this failure to accuse Serbia and Montenegro. They will try to accuse the Serb Republic of what they tried to accuse Serbia of (*BBC Monitoring* 2007e).

The work of judicial mechanisms is complicated by ethnic insecurity, a guilty verdict is not only an acknowledgment of criminal responsibility but has implications for the structure of BiH as it threatens the existence of RS as an entity.

The only positive opinion expressed towards the ICJ ruling was by Bosnian Croat Božo Ljubić, leader of HDZ 1990, who said that it was “an important step towards reaching the truth and is a contribution to the future process of reconciliation” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007e). Overall,

the more common view was of judicial mechanisms as flawed political tools rather than institutions contributing to justice and reconciliation. Furthermore, the mutual discontent with the ICJ confirms the continuation of the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict. Contradictory views of the wartime events are demonstrated in that Bosniaks leaders deemed the ruling to be insufficient in establishing responsibility and the Bosnian Serb view is that the trial should not have taken place at all. Since the sociopsychological infrastructure affects the way information is processed and the prisms through which society members construe reality (Bar-Tal 2007), it follows that verdicts are interpreted differently by members of different groups. As both Bosniak and both Bosnian Serb leaders expressed similar views, which would suggest that identity and not ideology is a relevant factor.

Additionally, Dodik made several statements encouraging indicted war criminals to surrender to the Tribunal in the Hague, emphasizing that by remaining at large they are harming RS. For example “my message to them is that we will use every chance to capture them. I urge them to help Serbia and the Serb Republic and to surrender” (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007a), expressing that “we cannot have all the Bosnian Serbs and all people in Serbia suffer because of them” (*AP Newswires* 2007) and “I would like to see all war crime suspects at the Hague tribunal in order to take this item off the agenda once and for all” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007w). He also notes the work RS was doing to arrest those indicted by the Hague and provide the necessary documentation to the ICTY (*BBC Monitoring* 2007w; Vidakovic 2007). A trend that can be observed in Dodik’s statements, is that they are mainly concerned with the effects on the Bosnian Serb population, rather than the victims, so while the encouragement for the guilty to cooperate with international justice can be viewed as a positive indicator towards justice, it does not necessarily reflect reconciliatory attitudes.

In regards to justice at the domestic level only Dodik made comments on the Court of BiH, which were all negative. In response to the question “you are often criticized by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Court. Do you believe its sole mission is to mete out justice?”, Dodik said “I believe that less and less or practically not at all. I do not think that is their sole mission because several trials were staged”, and went on to call it a “kangaroo court”, insinuating that Croats and Serbs are unfairly treated (*BBC Monitoring* 2007an). He also wrote a letter to the BiH chief prosecutor claiming bias in war crimes prosecutions and that “I have to emphasize that different treatment of requests for criminal charges in war crimes cases, depending on who the victims of war crimes were, creates an unbridgeable gap and mistrust in the public on the one side and the B-H judicial bodies on the other” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007a).

In 2019, the views on justice continued to be negative. For example, Bosniak Bakir Izetbegović, head of SDA, spoke of the “unfair trials” of former commanders of the Army of BiH (Vujicic 2019). Leader of HDZ, the largest Bosnian Croat party, Dragan Čović, argued that the attitude towards the crimes against Bugojno Croats showed that the state did not treat

all victims equally, adding that “crimes are still being covered up” (*HINA* 2019h). Following the Karadžić appeal verdict both Bosnian Serb leaders expressed discontent, Vukota Govedarica of Bosnian Serb conservative party SDS, called the sentence “politically-motivated, unsubstantiated and scandalously unfair” (*BBC Monitoring* 2019d) and Dodik described it as “arrogant and cynical” (Drobnjakovic and Nikšić 2019). Demonstrating agreement crossing ideological lines. Dodik further commented on the ICTY and its Residual Mechanism stating that both he and RS at large do not trust the Tribunal (Drobnjakovic and Nikšić 2019; Hopkins 2019). He explained that “everyone knows that the court [in The Hague] is not fair, does not try people in accordance with the law, and does not work in favor of reconciliation,” (Hopkins 2019) and remarked on problematic procedures with “disappearances of evidence” (*FENA* 2019f). He also said “you [Bosniaks] also did all sorts of things, and then you brought over a court that only puts the Serbs on trial” and that “no one has ever proven anything for Karadžić” (*BBC Monitoring* 2019f). While Dodik viewed judicial mechanisms with enough legitimacy in 2007 to encourage individuals such as Karadžić to surrender, this had seemingly shifted in 2019, suggesting a further cementation of divergent narratives and memories of war. Furthermore, similarly to 2007, he expressed that the Court of BiH and BiH Prosecutor’s Office were biased against Serbs (*BBC Monitoring* 2019f; *AP Newswires* 2019b). Again, like in 2007 only a Croat elite conveyed anything positive about transitional justice, with Čović stating that “establishing the truth about victims was a way to remove mistrust between the country's different ethnic groups” (*HINA* 2019g).

Although fewer statements were made about judicial mechanisms in 2019, all but one expressed negative views of justice, suggesting that views and attitudes had not moved in the direction of reconciliation. The sustained belief that judicial processes are biased indicates that sociopsychological shifts have not occurred which would allow for the recognition of the ingroup’s crimes and a nuanced view where all sides held some level of responsibility. Rather, the collective victimhood is maintained, where the ingroup and outgroups are still viewed in terms of victim and perpetrator.

### *Views on Insecurity*

According to the theoretical argument, the efficacy of transitional justice is obstructed by ethnic identity remaining in the realm of security, which in turn hinders reconciliation. This is because reconciliation demands a sense of security in the relationship between former rivals, with no threat or danger coming from either side. The views of ingroup insecurity and the threat outgroups pose will therefore be examined in this section.

While 2007 was marred by continuous political crisis, elites from each ethnic group expressed that there was no risk of violence reoccurring. Bosniak leader, Silajdžić, noted that “war should not even be mentioned as a possible option for resolving any issues at all. Milošević’s policy was to solve any question by force, which is what led to this situation in [BiH]. If the political situation is tense, that cannot be said of the security situation” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ac). Dodik of SNSD said “war is out of the question, there is no war here anymore”, (*BBC Monitoring* 2007an) and “no one here is crazy to take to arms. I know that many would like that to happen so they could send the airplanes from the Adriatic against us” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007d). Bosnian Croat and head of HDZ 1990, Ljubić, commented, “we have a crisis in the country, that, yes, it has escalated, but that this is nothing new. The people of [BiH] should not fear another war because there are no capacities for it” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007aq). While it is conveyed that there is no risk of conflict, the statements, particularly the latter two, do not necessarily reflect a sense of security. Additionally, the need of politicians to assure the public that violence will not reoccur, is also indicative of the existence of insecurity.

Indeed, elites also expressed feelings of fear and insecurity that their groups were facing. Silajdžić, in the context of the debates on police reform stated that, “we are constantly receiving messages from returnees to the RS entity that their only remaining hope is a genuine reform of the police. These people are living in a constant and well-founded fear...” (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007d). He also said that the citizens of Srebrenica had told politicians “we want to be free, we want to be first-class and not second-class citizens. We do not want to live in fear. We do not want our houses to be searched for weapons non-stop... We live like in prison” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007n). Finally, Silajdžić has noted that “Serbs, however, are not the only group motivated by fear of their fellow citizens” indicating not only a fear among Bosniaks but also a recognition of the fears of an outgroup (Macdonald 2007).

According to Dodik ordinary Serbs in BiH “believe that Bosniaks wish a sort of revenge to take place through Bosnia-Herzegovina’s set-up. This is people’s perception, I am saying here what they think. Bosnia-Herzegovina is functioning based on the fears of the three groups, justified or otherwise” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007as). He also held the view that “people from the joint Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions in Sarajevo are trying in every possible way to disturb and destabilize the situation in the Serb Republic” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ar). During 2007 there were proposals to abolish entity voting, which, according to Dodik, would lead to the “establishment of an Islamic country” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007r) and BiH becoming “an ethnically clean Bosniak state” where “those who have their own mother countries should either leave the country or accept the reality that they are minorities that can be outvoted” (Skuletic 2007). Furthermore, he made comparisons with indicted war criminal Milošević noting that “what politicians from Sarajevo are doing today reminds me, and I have the right to say this, of

what Milošević had done at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007am). His statements signal a Bosnian Serb fear for their status in BiH and Bosniak domination.

The insecurity communicated by Croat elites similarly had to do with concerns about equal rights and Bosniak control. HDZ leader, Čović, stated “it is an undisputed fact that the Croats in B-H are not constitutionally equal” and “if they wanted to, the representatives of [SDA] and [SBiH] could topple any B-H Federation government... They can also vote in any government, even if all the Croat party representatives are against” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007o). Although the elites did not convey fears of direct threats of violence, it is still evident that ethnic identity remains securitized. Elites from each group express threats as viewed through the lens of ethnic belonging, from fears of the actions of other groups to the threat of unequal rights and the lack of representation.

Very similar views were expressed in 2019, with Bakir Izetbegović of SDA noting that “Bosniaks should not avoid giving testimonies but they do”, due to fear (*Federalna Novinska Agencija* 2019). Furthermore he remarks “we are hoping that the attitude to the Bosniaks and the Croats in the RS is going to change... The list of discriminations in that entity is painful and dramatic” (*BBC Monitoring* 2019c). Dodik, in reference to Bosniaks, like in 2007, claimed that “they are trying in every possible way to destabilize the RS” (*BBC Monitoring* 2019h). He says “they sent a clear message to us that we are not welcomed in B-H, and in such a B-H we do not even want to be,” (Lingo-Demirovic 2019) and, “the Bosniak political elite, and most of the public in the FB-H, thinks that all elements related to the RS need to be terminated” (*BBC Monitoring* 2019f). Dodik also claimed that SDA planned to create an Islamic state and introduce Shariah law (*Al Jazeera English* 2019). Likewise, similar to 2007, Čović of HDZ, noted the Croats’ lack of representation, referring to “the Croats who do not have a voice” in BiH (*BBC Monitoring European* 2019b). The same themes of insecurity are communicated in each group in both 2007 and 2019, which indicates that relations have not shifted in a direction towards reconciliation and that ethnic identity remains in the realm of security. Furthermore, while the same concerns endured, they were not in 2019 accompanied by statements ensuring that conflict would not reoccur. Instead, Izetbegović for example accused the Bosnian Serbs of trying to create a “mini paramilitary” (*AFP* 2019c), and Dodik said he had information about “the unlawful plans for the production of weapons and ammunition in the factories controlled by SDA”, supposedly for the market “but also if needed for anything else, God forbid” (*FENA* 2019g).

## *Views on State Structure*

Reconciliation requires the shift in relations allowing for rival groups to be viewed as partners in peace, recognizing that each side has legitimate goals, needs and contentions. According to Bar-Tal (2013, 378) in cases where the rival parties must coexist, political integration is key, and all groups must be included in the power system. The theme most remarked upon by elites was the question of how BiH and its political system should be structured. These views give an insight into the process of reconciliation as it reflects the extent to which the groups view each other as partners in peace sharing a joint future, and whether efforts are made towards cooperation, taking each group's needs into account. Additionally, proposals for how BiH is to function also serve to indicate the salience of ethnic identity, and whether or not political issues are viewed through the lens of ethnicity and security.

Political elites from each group voiced the opinion that the state of BiH, as it was organized, was dysfunctional and unsatisfactory, though they have different proposals for how this should be resolved (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007d; Bjelica 2007). As previously noted, the Bosniak leaders emphasized that the ethnoterritorial constitutional set-up of the country was a "consequence of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity" and therefore, a new constitution needed to be adopted (Cerkez-Robinson 2007; *BBC Monitoring* 2007m). This idea is frequently repeated by Silajdžić, leader of SBiH (Gec 2007; Finer 2007; *BBC Monitoring* 2007f; *BBC Monitoring* 2007j), who advocates for doing away with the entities and cantons (*Dow Jones International News* 2007; *BBC Monitoring* 2007m; *BBC Monitoring* 2007am) and instead creating a "multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, organized into regions in which no ethnic group is dominant and everyone is equal and enjoys protection of their legitimate ethnic interests" (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007d). He is firmly against suggestions of federalization, which would in his opinion ultimately lead to secession (*BBC Monitoring* 2007z). Statements made by SDA's Tihić, also express opposition to federalization "as it would mean a continuation of the process of ethnic ghettoization of BiH, relocating the population, and creating ethnically clean territories" (Kukan 2007b). For the Bosnian Croat elite the main concern regarding the political system was for the Croat people to become an equal nation (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007e; *Reuters News* 2007; *BBC Monitoring* 2007aa; *BBC Monitoring European* 2007g). According to Ljubić, leader of splinter party HDZ 1990, "we are in favor of a far-reaching constitutional reform of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because in a state like this neither are the Croats an equal ethnic group, nor is the state functional" (Bjelica 2007). Like the Bosniaks, they advocate for a new regional configuration, although there is some disagreement over how this should be done. The idea of adding a third entity was unacceptable to Tihić, since "the division into three could lead to further ethnic homogenization" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ao;



*BBC Monitoring* 2007ai). He supports the establishment of four to seven regions and further explains that they should not be primarily formed by ethnicity, “it is because of this that we went through all that we went through. A three-nation division of Bosnia-Herzegovina would not accord with the essence, spirit or history of Bosnia-Herzegovina” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007af; *HINA* 2007b). Čović, of HDZ, who favors four entities likewise expressed that three was not a viable solution as “that makes people think of partition” (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007i). Ljubić, on the other hand questioned “why should we not say that three federal units are also one of the possible solutions? What is impossible is a state with two entities because, mathematically speaking, three in two does not work, the same as a centralized, that is unitary, Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007aj). Dodik viewed federalization as the only sustainable model for BiH's survival (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007b) and notes that “achieving and sustaining democracy in multi-ethnic societies is difficult and carries special challenges” with the key to continued stability being a “decentralized federal system with considerable autonomy exercised by the local governments” (Dodik 2007). Additionally, he expressed support for Croats to have their own federal unit (*BBC Monitoring* 2007an; *BBC Monitoring* 2007at; *AFP* 2007a; *BBC Monitoring European* 2007i), as long as RS remains unaffected, remarking that “not an inch of its territory will be detached” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007an; *BBC Monitoring* 2007y; *BBC Monitoring* 2007al). The disagreements on how to organize the country can be summarized by a statement made by Ljubić who says “the dispute is a symptom of the fundamental issue in this country, which is a disagreement about its character. Our crisis is this: Are we one country or two? Is our future together or divided?” (Finer 2007).

Overall, in the debates surrounding how to structure BiH, the Bosnian Serb leaders were mainly concerned with RS at minimum remaining as it was, without ceding rights, power or territory (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007b). Dodik, during multiple occasions, presented his support for BiH as being contingent on what was being proposed for RS. For example, “regarding this insistence on the abolition of the Serb Republic, I can say only one thing, this government, the party that I lead and the people that I know accept Bosnia-Herzegovina as a joint state as long as the Serb Republic is not challenged or denied” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007b) and “I will respect the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution, as long as the constitution and Dayton respect the Serb Republic” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007as). Further, regarding secession he stated that “should the dissolving of Republika Srpska be requested, a referendum will be staged for its citizens to decide” (*HINA* 2007a), and “politicians in Sarajevo are working hard on the Serb Republic's secession and I would not like to interfere in their work” (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007b). Bosić, leader of SDS, the main opposition party in RS, makes statements along similar lines, that the abolition of RS is completely unacceptable (*BBC Monitoring* 2007p), and that the suggestions of a unitary BiH “will only deepen and prolong the crisis within BiH and

eventually lead to its disintegration” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ag). He however, criticized Dodik’s initiative for the federalization of BiH as dangerous “because it will give rise to unrealistic ambitions on the other side. And this is what is happening regarding the Croat political stance. They have recently come up with their territorial aspirations towards the Serb Republic” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007al).

It is evident that the elites have different goals when it comes to the restructuring of the state, and that ethnic identity cannot be separated from this issue. Additionally, even though elites from the same ethnic group had different views on how exactly the country should be structured they shared an overarching belief in the type of changes that need to occur, suggesting that ethnic identity rather than political ideology influences views on state structure. While the Bosniaks advocate for a solution that is not based around ethnicity it is clear that the other elites do not view this as a possibility. Bosnian Croat leader of HDZ, Čović, highlights that:

Obviously, no matter what we agree to, one nation will be in the majority; even if we had seven federal entities, someone would be in the majority. What is essential is how to satisfy the needs of the minority nation... and anyone who wants to ignore the fact that this state consists of three constitutive nations is not doing BiH any favors. History teaches us that we must appreciate reality” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007au).

Further, when ethnic belonging remains salient and the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict persists, suggestions of a civic state are filtered through the lens of ethnic insecurity and therefore viewed as a potential threat. A civic state is not viewed as a neutral state, but rather as one dominated by the ethnic relative majority. Dodik exemplifies this by remarking “I am for civic rights, but a civic Bosnia-Herzegovina is not realistic” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007d) and that:

Haris Silajdžić, Sulejman Tihić, and Zlatko Lagumdžija are all equally ardent proponents of the story about the civic organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are backed by the ultranationalist policy of domination of one people that presently constitutes a relative majority. In a civic state, that people would become an absolute political majority. Can anyone envisage a stable system with that kind of domination? (*BBC Monitoring* 2007an).

In 2019 there were fewer statements made about the internal structure of BiH, though the question of how the country should be divided is still not settled and continuously brought up in political debates. Bosniak and Croat elites primarily spoke on state structure in terms of Croat representation. Čović is consistent in his views that the three constituent groups need to have

legitimate representation at all administrative levels and highlighted the issue that “currently we have two Bosniak members of the presidency”, in reference to Željko Komšić, the Croat member of the presidency, who won the position because of Bosniak rather than Croat support (*BBC Monitoring* 2019j; *HINA* 2019f). Čović also speaks to the continued salience of ethnic identity:

I want to say openly that we are for a civil society that will uphold the highest standards of rights and freedoms. However, it is also true that we are a divided society, and because of all these differences, one can only manage through federalism... The three constituent peoples simply have to be equal. Playing around with the map of numbers and ‘citizenship’ to secure the dominance of one people is unacceptable and risky for BiH. In essence, we are in favor of the full equality of the Croat people together with the other two. Without a political, constitutionally equal Croat nation, there is no BiH (*BBC Monitoring European* 2019b).

He also remarks that “this simply cannot be tackled as a classic civic approach; our society is extremely divided and the relationship between civic and collective rights must be carefully made” (*BBC Monitoring* 2019n). SDA’s Bakir Izetbegović has criticized the Croat leadership for not supporting the civic principle and notes that it would be impossible to create a Croat entity due to the mix of Bosniaks and Croats in the FBiH (*BBC Monitoring* 2019k; *FENA* 2019i). Additionally, Nermin Nikšić, Bosniak opposition leader of SDP, accused Čović’s party of furthering ethnic division, “HDZ BiH says that it wants to fight for Croat equality, but it is offering a policy that introduces discrimination among the Croats themselves” (*BBC Monitoring* 2019b). Furthermore, SDA released a statement criticizing HDZ and its leaders for “the advocacy of ethnic divisions and segregation, or the celebration of the atrocities and war criminals that were at the helm of the so-called Herzeg-Bosna”, following their claims that “the creation of Herzeg-Bosna enabled the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and that this could be “a roadmap for constitutional solutions in BiH” (*FENA* 2019j).

While RS secession was spoken about in 2007, it was more heavily featured in the statements from 2019. In January SDA challenged the constitutionality of the name Republika Srpska, because it supposedly discriminates against the Bosniaks and Croats (*HINA* 2019c). Bakir Izetbegović stated “we accepted the name Republika Srpska because we wanted peace, but we never accepted that it would be an entity where we’d be humiliated” (McLaughlin 2019). In response Dodik noted that RS will take “rigorous measures” to defend itself, including “written laws allowing us to establish control over borders overnight” (*HINA* 2019c). He also said that “this is a way to push RS further away from BiH, and I ask them, please continue doing this” (*FENA* 2019c). Dodik reiterated that RS had all elements of statehood aside from a seat at the UN, and that the border between Serbia and BiH was unnatural because it was logical

for "one people to be together" (*HINA* 2019c). He continued to make several references to secession throughout the year and repeatedly referred to BiH as a "mistake" (*BBC Monitoring* 2019i), "failed state" (*Reuters News* 2019), "failed concept" (Smajilhodzic 2019) and said that "it should not have existed... and cannot survive" (*BBC Monitoring* 2019m). He remarks that the development of separate ethnic states would have been more successful and that "today Croats should be allowed to have their own entity. RS should be free to decide its status, and Bosniaks could organize themselves in the part they control, call it Bosnia, and concentrate on getting help from Muslim countries" (*BBC Monitoring* 2019m). It is reiterated that RS "would be far more successful and developed if we were not a part of [BiH]" (Smajilhodzic 2019; *World Service Wire* 2019).

The statements made about the organization of BiH demonstrate that progress in coming to an agreement has not been made over time, and that the DPA created a situation which does not allow for ethnic identity to be detached from politics or security. Each group continues to have its own, often mutually exclusive, beliefs about how the state should be structured. This both signals insecurity and obstructs processes of reconciliation, relations cannot transform to center around cooperation instead of competition when needs, including security and fair representation are not met.

### *Views on Ethnic Identity*

As evident from previous sections, ethnic identity continues to be highly salient within political discourse, and is interconnected with security concerns. For example, in the discussion surrounding police reform in 2007 Silajdžić, of SBiH, stressed that the police needs to be multiethnic "because there is no precedent in the history of multiethnic police committing a massacre or genocide, as was the case here" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ak) and proposed that the RS police be renamed "the police of the Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ap). Tihić said that "it is unconstitutional and absurd to introduce entity and ethnic voting into the work of the police: criminals have neither a faith nor a nation. The criticism expressed by the SDA does not have any ethnic tinge; it is aimed at creating a more functional police" (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007f). Ethnic identity is thus an inherent part of political life.

The salience of ethnic identity does not only underlie issues related to the governing of BiH but was also reflected in statements on other matters such as the media. Čović for example advocated for the need for a Croat public broadcaster maintaining that

Croat citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina need a channel in the Croatian language, that is very clear, they need a Croat television. Or your RTV system [public broadcaster]

should be organized in a different way. Or we should have one television in which we will all participate in the same way in order to satisfy our needs. If we have the Serb Republic Television today and the Federation Television, under this RTV system of yours, it is very logical that the Croat people should be asking for their own channel too" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007c).

The media is also viewed as biased, with Dodik for example claiming that Sarajevo based media outlets are designing a "pack hunt" against RS while the Communications Regulatory Agency had "above all the aim to punish many Serb Republic media" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007v).

In general, statements made by the Bosnian Serb elites underscore that ethnic identity is and will continue to be a point of division. According to SNSD leader Dodik, BiH "cannot be a single nation in any event and it will keep on being a highly divided society in that sense, one confronted along different political and ethnic lines" (*BBC Monitoring* 2007ah), and that "Bosnia is divided, not just on the surface, but essentially" (Finer 2007). Dodik elaborated on this idea explaining that

BiH is a divided country, not because of the war, but looking from the historical point of view, it has been divided in terms of the social, political, economic, cultural, religious, and other aspects. Silajdžić's intention is not to 'end the ethnic division' because in a country with three ethnic groups, division is a reality... BiH may have two paths. One is to have the other ethnic groups assimilated in the majority Bosniak group, which is impossible. The other one is to recognize the fact that three constituent ethnic groups live here, that the Dayton agreement and the Serb Republic exist, and to give the Croats certain political rights to encourage them to stay in [BiH] (*BBC Monitoring* 2007t).

Dodik also notes that "the Serb Republic citizens do not want to be used as guinea pigs in this experiment and will never accept that their clearly expressed, real identity be replaced by certain diplomats' imaginations", referencing the foreign attempt to create a unified Bosnian identity (Maunaga 2007). Bosić, the head of SDS and the Bosnian Serb opposition, argues along the same line of reasoning stating that "a nation cannot be created just because some ambassadors or countries want it. It is created through a long historical process. Everyone in the world, whatever they do or want to do, must know that BiH is a country consisting of three nations with their own recognizable features" (Maunaga 2007). He also claimed that his party, SDS, would "work toward getting back the old coat-of-arms and the national anthem of the Serb Republic, because the Serb people cannot identify with an imposed solution" (Veleusic 2007) and that the decision to abolish national symbols was a mistake (Dakic 2007). Regardless of ideological or political rifts, the Bosnian Serbs are in agreement that ethnic identity remains

both salient and a point of division within BiH, and that the Serb national identity is more important to them than the Bosnian one.

In 2019, there is a more prevalent theme of Bosnian unity and the intention to move past ethnic identity expressed among Bosniak elites. For example, SDA's Bakir Izetbegović claiming that BiH Independence Day "is a confirmation of the identity and maturity of a nation that is able to take hold of its own fate," (*FENA* 2019e) and that the SDA "defends Bosnia-Herzegovina and the people who feel it as their only homeland... paying no heed to the rubbish about ethnic teams. The SDA is playing for the BiH team, not the Bosniak team" (*BBC Monitoring* 2019e; *FENA* 2019k). Though the latter statement may also be interpreted as divisive considering that Bosniaks are the only group of the three not to have another clear potential homeland. Similar sentiments were expressed by Nermin Nikšić, Bosniak leader of opposition party SDP, who claimed that "Bosnia-Herzegovina's future does not lie in further ethnic divisions and discrimination; it lies in integration and equalization of rights of all citizens throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina" (*BBC Monitoring* 2019b). Izetbegović also repeatedly praised the multiethnic nature of BiH as a strength (*FENA* 2019h), noting "Bosnia has existed for more than a thousand years, and it has always been a cradle of spontaneously created mixture of cultures, religions and identities" and that it is "more than just a piece of land in the hilly Balkans, it is the idea that different faiths and cultures can live together" (*FENA* 2019l).

On the other hand Dodik's statements in 2019, similar to 2007, reflects a view whereby ethnic identity continues to be a source of division, he for example called the idea of a Bosnian nation "fictitious" (Domazet and Kulaga 2019) and referred to the existence of BiH as something Bosnian Serbs "endure" (*AFP* 2019a). He also says that "a certain philosophy exists in the European Union which rests on recognizing individual rights and for collectivity to somehow disappear through some genesis of political development. That however is impossible in [BiH]" (*HINA* 2019d). Further, Dodik often expresses working for the Serb people rather than the population of RS or BiH as a whole, such as saying "we want to participate in government and respect the will of the Serb people. Republika Srpska will respond in an adequate way to everything that is not the will of the Serb people," (Momic 2019) and "we are not going into formation of the common institutions at the level of BiH in order to just sit there, but to exercise the rights of the Serb peoples" (*BBC Monitoring* 2019l). The division is additionally exemplified by RS not observing BiH Independence Day or the BiH national day but instead celebrating RS day on January 9<sup>th</sup> and the anniversary of the formation of the RS Army (*BBC Monitoring* 2019f; *BBC Monitoring* 2019g). In Dodik's words, "The fact that it is an ordinary working day in Republika Srpska today without any ceremonies clearly shows what kind of holiday and what kind of statehood exist today. The holiday reflects the statehood" (*Sputnik News Service* 2019).

According to Arthur (2011) transitional justice could reach its aims in societies following ethnic conflict by contributing to processes of decategorization, recategorization and mutual differentiation, which essentially desecuritize identity. The statements made by elites suggest that neither process has occurred in BiH. Since ethnic identity is entrenched within politics and the structure of the country, ethnic identities have not been downplayed in favor of personal identities, such as in decategorization processes. In recategorization processes, ethnic identities are replaced by a more encompassing category such as national identity, although some Bosniak elites expressed support for this, several statements explicitly rejected the attempt to create a Bosnian identity, and highlighted that the existing ethnonational identities were preferred and unavoidable. Mutual differentiation processes entail ensuring that differentiation between groups does not coincide with demeaning the value of other groups, without challenging the boundaries of ethnic categories. The statements by elites suggest that the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict remains in place in BiH, so too do negative beliefs about the outgroups, meaning that comparison or differentiation is still value-laden and shaped by competitive rather than cooperative attitudes.

### *Views on Partners in Peace*

Finally, this section will pertain to statements made by elites which capture attitudes towards the outgroups as partners in peace, with a shared future. Statements expressing positive outlooks on these themes would signal that the reconciliation process is progressing, considering that it entails “the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviors into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace” (Brounéus 2008, 294), “the development of working trust” (Kelman 2004, 119) and relations that center around cooperation and peace, with the rival groups being viewed with sensitivity and care about their needs (Bar-Tal 2013).

In 2007 Silajdžić of SBiH, noted “first of all, I am not a representative of just the Bosniaks, but of all citizens who elected me” and argued that his goals for BiH “would bring prosperity to all of its citizens and no one would be endangered. In this situation permanent peace and stability would never be called into question again” (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007d). Dodik has commented on the necessity of creating “an atmosphere of strengthening mutual trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the entities had to work together for the European path of Bosnia-Herzegovina” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007av). Čović has also spoken on the need for compromise and collaboration between the ethnic groups (*BBC Monitoring* 2007au). These statements signal that elites view the establishment of relations centered around peaceful partnership as important for the development of the country, but more so as a future necessity rather than a

reflection of the current relations between the groups. Another positive indicator of the outgroups being viewed as partners in peace are apologies, as they demonstrate an acknowledgment of past wrongdoing and a sensitivity to the needs of the other. Dodik has publicly apologized on few occasions, for example that saying that “of course, if this is important at all and if it reaches anyone, on this occasion too I would like to apologize to all those who suffered because of Serbs or the Serb Republic” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007as) and that “all institutions have to apologize to those [in Srebrenica] who have lost their lives, to the victims and their families” (*Radio Free Europe* 2007). However, the impact of public apologies may be negated by the accompanying denial of crimes that Dodik has also voiced, as previously discussed. Additionally, following an apology he added that, “But we expect something like this to be said to us, as well, because many people suffered on our side, as well, and many have suffered the consequences of the war, which was as it was”, which may also be interpreted as deflecting responsibility (*BBC Monitoring* 2007g).

However, the more overarching trend in the statements were not suggestive of positive views on a shared future. For example, Silajdžić stated that “those who want to live here with us, they are welcome. We are all equal. Those who don't want this, they should leave Bosnia-Herzegovina” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007am). In reference to RS not recognizing BiH Independence Day as a holiday Silajdžić said that “they will be recognizing it, sooner or later” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007i) and accused RS of actively “destroying all the relations we had previously built” with the international community (*BBC Monitoring European* 2007d). When referring to comments made by Dodik, on the future of BiH, Silajdžić said “the intention is to punish Bosniaks once again because they have not been punished enough. The intention is to keep Milošević's project alive” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007s). This suggests that Bosnian Serbs are not viewed as a partner in peace, with their own legitimate goals, needs and contentions, nor are they in turn viewed as respecting Bosniaks, which is a vital aspect of reconciliation.

The reciprocation of this is evident in statements made by Dodik, who said “if they [Bosniak politicians] continue with grave offences, humiliation and underestimation of the rights and interests of the Serb people in Bosnia, every possibility of co-existence and common future will be destroyed” (Stanic 2007), and “most Bosniak politicians have a problem in that they seek revenge in every move they make. That is their main motive in politics” (*BBC Monitoring* 2007an). In addition to:

I want Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain but what Silajdžić and the others are doing will not get us anywhere. I heard the same statements from Milošević in 1990: those who will not accept this can leave; we are the majority, everything belongs to us. I hear the very same statements from Sarajevo now (*BBC Monitoring* 2007an).



The references made to Slobodan Milošević, would also suggest that Bosniak and Bosnian Serb politicians do not view each other as partners in peace, but as actors sewing division and as threats towards the respective ingroups.

Statements made in 2019, paint perhaps an even grimmer picture of the state of the views elites from different ethnic groups held of each other. In regards to the Karadžić verdict, Bakir Izetbegović of SDA said that:

In normal circumstances, such verdicts would lead to sobering up and reconciliation. For the time being, it is difficult to expect such a thing to happen in the Balkans and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not only did the establishment in the RS refuse to admit the verdicts and the truth about the war events, about the crimes and their own criminals. It is also trying to give up the things the RS has previously accepted under pressure of the civilized world. It is now creating some 'neutral commissions' of its own, which should reexamine earlier resolutions. (*BBC Monitoring* 2019e)

Continuing, that the decorations awarded to Karadžić and other war criminals by RS authorities are "truly unacceptable. It is rubbing salt in the wounds of the victims, as well as poking the civilized world in the eye" (*BBC Monitoring* 2019e). He also said that Dodik specifically is obstructing the reconciliation process (*FENA* 2019i). Further, the SDA has called on "the OHR to deliver on its promises in the face of genocide deniers and war crimes glorifiers in BiH that threaten peace and the establishment of inter-ethnic trust in BiH," in response to Dodik and the RS celebrating war criminals (*FENA* 2019m). This indicates that the relations between Bosniaks and Bosnian Serb elites have not improved over time, and that their views of each other have not shifted in the direction of reconciliation.

Dodik has called BiH "not a wish, but a compulsion" (Barimac 2019) and said that "just the same as we are enduring the existence of BiH, they will also have to get used to us. BiH is not the happiest place for us" (*FENA* 2019a) which suggests that relations can at best be described as characterized by mutual tolerance rather than viewing the other groups as partners in peace. According to Dodik, BiH was in the same situation in 2019 as it was in 1992, because of Bosniaks, as they "are unwilling to accept that other peoples live in BiH too" and "instead of opting for dialogue and the policy of what is possible, Bosniak politicians are opting for hysteria, which will blow only in their faces" (*HINA* 2019a). He also stated that "I watched when NATO was bombing television transmitters [in 1999], and that was very difficult for us to see. The Bosniaks think that this was good", which again does not suggest a view of Bosniaks as partners in peace (*BBC Monitoring* 2019f). Meanwhile, Dodik has celebrated and defended individuals convicted of war crimes against Bosniaks such as saying that Karadžić and Mladić "stood at the vanguard of defense of their people" (*BBC Monitoring* 2019a). In contrast to statements made about Bosniak politicians, Dodik spoke positively of Bosnian Croat Čović,

who attended the Day of RS celebrations in Banja Luka, stressing that “Čović's presence at the event was part of his commitment to building a dialogue with all the peoples in BiH” (*FENA* 2019b). Čović himself had not said much in regards to attitudes towards the other groups aside from the accusation that politicians in Sarajevo and media close to them had “made up a connection between war crimes and his presence at the ceremony in Banja Luka to serve Croatia with a thesis about Čović's negative role and, in doing so, they entirely covered up the truth about war crimes against Croats” (*HINA* 2019b). In summation, reconciliatory attitudes between the three groups are generally not expressed and in Dodik's words BiH “has the big burden of the past, without a common agreement for the future” (Hopkins and Hall 2019).

The statements made by political elites in BiH in regards to each of the themes under study indicate that, as theorized, reconciliation has not improved over time and that ethnic identity remains salient and securitized in the post-Dayton system.

## ***Views Among the General Public***

### ***Views on the Conflict***

The findings of the survey data will begin with the presentation of views of the war, which will indicate if collective memories of conflict have changed over time in a direction towards reconciliation. All tables present the data in percentages.

Table 3. My People Fought Only Defensive Wars

My people fought only defensive wars	2005				2019			
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
Totally agree	85.6	75.9	76.2	79.4	59.5	32	65.1	58.6
Somewhat agree	11.7	16.6	16.8	14.9	21.3	34	19.6	22
Somewhat disagree	1.8	2.9	4.1	2.9	3.3	22.7	4.4	5.5
Totally disagree	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.4	3.3	3.1	1.2	2.6
Do not know	1	4.1	2.6	2.5	12.7	8.2	9.7	11.3
N	900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

In both 2005 and 2019, the majority of respondents from each group somewhat or totally agreed with the statement “my people fought only defensive wars”, though the proportion was lower in 2019. There was a decrease in those totally agreeing and an increase in the share somewhat agreeing, with Serbs retaining the most similar views over time. When it came to disagreeing with the statement, the biggest shift can be seen among Croats, where in 2005, 2.9% somewhat disagreed, in 2019 22.7% of respondents had chosen that answer. In 2019, there were still very few Bosniaks or Serbs that disagreed with the notion that their people only fought defensive wars.

Table 4. Definition of the Last War in BiH

In your opinion, what is the best definition of the last war in BiH?	2005				2019			
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
Civil War	3.7	16.7	83.6	34.2	7.7	23.7	73.2	30.3
Aggression	95.1	73.2	9	59.8	79.9	55.7	13.7	56.3
Do not know	1.2	10.1	7.4	6	12.3	20.6	13.1	13.4
N	900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

The general trends in responses to the question of what the best definition of the Bosnian war is, remained the same over time, with the majority of Bosniaks and Croats viewing it as a war of aggression and the majority of Serbs calling it a civil war. In 2019, however, the disparity between these two answers decreased within each group. Additionally, a larger share of respondents chose to answer that they do not know.

Table 5. Serbian and Croatian Aggression in the War

Here are some claims about the war. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?		2005				2019			
		Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
The war was Serbia's aggression against our country	Totally agree	93.2	82.9	2.1	59.8	59.2	30.9	0.9	37.8
	Somewhat agree	4.7	6	0.4	3.6	17	23.7	2.2	12.9
	Somewhat disagree	0.2	1.3	2.9	1.5	5.7	13.4	2.2	5.3
	Totally disagree	0.6	3	89.2	30.8	3.4	11.3	81	29.1
	Do not know	1.3	6.8	5.5	4.4	14.8	20.6	13.7	15
The war was Croatia's aggression against our country	Totally agree	58.9	2.1	21	29	35.5	6.2	17.8	27
	Somewhat agree	28.2	6.9	23	20	26.1	14.4	16.2	21.8
	Somewhat disagree	4.9	5.2	18.2	9.4	15.6	27.8	17.1	17.3
	Totally disagree	5.7	77.6	27.6	34.9	4.8	29.9	30.8	15.6
	Do not know	2.3	8.2	10.2	6.7	18	21.6	18.1	18.4
N		900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

Individuals were also asked the extent to which they agree with the following statements “The war was Serbia's aggression against our country” and “The war was Croatia's aggression against our country”. In 2005, the responses when it came Serbia’s aggression were highly divergent between Bosniaks and Croats on the one hand and Serbs on the other. 97.9% of Bosniaks and 88.9% of Croats somewhat or totally agreed that the war was an act of Serbian aggression against BiH, while 92.1% of Serbs somewhat or totally disagreed. The overall trends remain in 2019, but with 76.2% of Bosniaks and 54.6% of Croats somewhat or totally agreeing with the statement, demonstrating less unified views. The shift in Serb opinion was smaller, with 83.2% disagreeing with the statement in 2019. Once again the proportion of respondent answering that they do not know was higher in 2019. Regarding the views that the war was an act of Croatia’s aggression, in both years only the majority of Bosniaks agreed with the statement, 87.1% in 2005 and 61.6% in 2019. Serb opinion in 2005 was almost equally split between respondents agreeing or disagreeing that the war was Croatia’s aggression against BiH. In 2019 however, a higher proportion of respondents disagreed, 47.9%, compared to the 34% that who agreed. In both 2005 and 2019, Croats disagreed with the statement, but with a smaller gap between the proportion agreeing and disagreeing.

Overall the views of the conflict remain divided between the three ethnic communities, but less so in 2019, suggesting that shifts in views are occurring, but very slowly. While the results indicate that differences in these views have softened over time, and a larger proportion of respondents chose to answer that they do not know, the overarching trend of division remain, with incompatible views of the conflict. It can therefore be concluded that a new common outlook on the past, which is demanded of the reconciliation process, has not been established in BiH. Croats represent the group whose views have shifted most over time in a direction towards reconciliation, as there is a greater acknowledgment of the ingroup's acts of aggression rather than solely being a victim of violence. It might have been easier for this sociopsychological shift to occur among the Croats because they represent the smallest group of the three, and are not as strongly labelled associated as a victim or perpetrator group. They are not viewed as the aggressor to the same extent as Serbs, and they were not overrepresented among victims, such as Bosniaks. It might therefore be hypothesized that these labels matter less to the social identity of Croats and as a result it is less of a threat to one's social identity to acknowledge ingroup wrongdoing. However, it should not be overlooked that most Croats do still view the war as an act of aggression, though not on the part of Croatia, and believe that Croats only fought defensively.

### *Views on Transitional Justice*

Table 6. The ICTY as an Essential Precondition for Just Peace and Normal Relations

Do you agree with the following statements about the court in the Hague		2005				2019			
		Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
The Hague war crimes tribunal was an essential precondition for just peace and normal relations	Totally agree	51.6	18.7	4.7	26	31.2	22.7	1.2	20.8
	Somewhat agree	28.7	38.4	11.1	25.8	33.8	33	9.7	26
	Somewhat disagree	5.1	11	15.4	10.3	10.5	16.5	15.3	12.6
	Totally disagree	11	27.7	63.3	33.5	6	13.4	52.3	21.6
	Do not know	3.7	4.2	5.5	4.4	18.5	14.4	21.5	19.1
	N	900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

When respondents were asked if they agree with statements about the ICTY, Bosniaks in 2005 mainly believed that “the Hague war crimes tribunal is a precondition for just peace and normal

relations”, with 80.3% somewhat or totally agreeing. Serbs on the other hand held negative views with 78.7% somewhat or totally disagreeing. Croats were relatively positive but more mixed than the other groups with 57.1% totally or somewhat agreeing and 38.7% totally or somewhat disagreeing. The same general trend is seen in 2019, but with less extreme division of views, instead 65% of Bosniaks agreed, and 67.6% of Serbs disagreed. A similar proportion of Croats, 55.7%, agreed and fewer disagreed compared to 2005, with 22.9% disagreeing in 2019. The greatest shift is seen among Bosniaks who are less positive about the necessity of the Hague but remain at an almost equal level when it comes to disagreeing with the statement.

Table 7 Fairness of the ICTY Trials

Do you agree with the following statements about the court in the Hague		2005				2019			
		Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
The trials at The Hague tribunal were fair	I totally agree	32.7	11.3	4.3	16.7	18.5	4.1	0.6	11.4
	Somewhat agree	35.2	31.9	9.2	25.6	37.9	27.8	3.7	26
	Somewhat disagree	9.3	15.2	11.2	11.7	16.8	38.1	9.3	16.5
	Totally disagree	19.8	36.7	68	41	8.6	18.6	72	29.9
	Do not know	3	4.9	7.3	5	18.2	11.3	14.3	16.3
	N	900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

Regarding the question of fairness, a similar trend is visible in 2005, the majority of Bosniaks agree totally or somewhat that the trials at the Hague are fair, while 79.2% of Serbs totally or somewhat disagree. The Croats were again of a mixed opinion with 43.2% totally or somewhat agreeing and 51.9% totally or somewhat disagreeing. While the overarching views remain the same in 2019, with the majority of Bosniaks agreeing, Serbs disagreeing and Croats showing more mixed opinions, though leaning towards the trials being unfair, fewer respondents among all groups agreed that the trials were fair.

Table 8. The ICTY as an Obstacle to Political Stabilization

Do you agree with the following statements about the court in the Hague		2005				2019			
		Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
The Hague Tribunal is primarily a political tribunal and as such constitutes an obstacle to political stabilization in the region	I totally agree	10.4	30.1	54.4	31	9.8	10.3	54.8	24.3
	Somewhat agree	21.7	19.1	25	22	30.5	26.8	16.5	25.7
	Somewhat disagree	25.9	21.5	5.2	17.7	21.4	29.9	7.2	17.7
	Totally disagree	32.9	19.1	7.9	20.4	16.1	16.5	5	12.6
	Do not know	9.1	10.3	7.4	8.9	22.1	16.5	16.5	19.8
	N	900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

When asked their opinion on the statement “The Hague Tribunal is primarily a political tribunal and as such constitutes an obstacle to political stabilization in the region” in 2005 79.4% of Serbs and 49.2% of Croats somewhat or totally agreed, whereas 58.8% of Bosniaks disagreed. While Bosniaks in 2005 were the only group to not view the ICTY as an obstacle to political stabilization, in 2019 Croats were the only group to disagree with the statement to a higher extent than they agree. Instead 40.3% of Bosniaks agreed compared to 37.5% disagreeing demonstrating a more negative view of the ICTY. Serbs remained relatively firm in the belief that the ICTY is a political tribunal with 71.3% agreeing.

Respondents were also asked whether or not they agreed that the ICTY favored each of the ethnic groups. In both years the most common response from Bosniaks and Croats were that they disagreed, regardless of which group was being asked about, though they disagreed most strongly when asked about their ingroup. The majority of Serbs on the other hand agreed that the tribunal favored both Bosniaks and Croats, but not Serbs. This might be explained by the fact that Bosnian Serbs represented the majority of defendants and convictions at the ICTY. A much larger share of Croat respondents agreed that the tribunal favored Croats in 2019, with 35.1% compared to the 2.4% in 2005, while fewer believed that it favored the outgroups. Serbs and Bosniaks also saw an increase in the proportion of respondents believing that the tribunal favored Croats.

Table 9. Impartiality of the ICTY

Do you agree with the following statements about the court in the Hague		2005				2019			
		Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
The Hague tribunal favored Croats	Agree	22.1	2.4	53.9	26.7	22.8	35.1	61.7	36.5
	Disagree	60.9	85.4	35.2	59.8	46.5	49.5	9.7	35
	Do not know	17	12.2	10.8	13.5	30.7	15.5	38.7	28.6
The Hague tribunal favored Serbs	Agree	31.3	43.2	6.7	26.8	24	34	1.9	17.9
	Disagree	52.9	41.1	85.7	60.2	47	45.4	79.4	57.3
	Do not know	15.8	15.8	7.7	13.1	29	20.6	18.7	24.9
The Hague tribunal favored Bosniaks	Agree	4	44.6	76.7	40.5	7.2	35.1	66.7	29
	Disagree	78.7	37.1	14.6	44.7	63.6	42.3	8.4	43.9
	Do not know	17.3	18.3	8.7	14.8	29.2	22.7	24.9	27.2
	N	900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

### *Views on Partners in Peace*

Table 10. Views on Shared Peaceful Future

Do you think that Croats, Bosniaks/Muslims and Serbs in BiH can live in peace without supervision, or has the suffering of war has made peaceful coexistence impossible?	2005				2019			
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
Can live peacefully without external supervision	69.3	70.9	58.1	66.1	54.9	57.7	64.5	58.3
The suffering made peaceful coexistence impossible	22.6	15.5	34.5	24.4	29.2	33	28.7	29.4
Do not know	8.1	13.6	7.4	9.6	16	9.3	6.9	12.4
N	900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

When asked “Do you think that Croats, Bosniaks/Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina can live in peace without the supervision of the international community, or do you think that the suffering of war has made peaceful coexistence impossible?” the majority of respondents from each group believed in both 2005 and 2019 that the ethnonational groups can



live in peace without supervision. However, the share of Bosniaks and Croats who believe that the suffering of war has made peaceful coexistence impossible increased in 2019, 22.6% to 29.2% and 15.5% to 33% respectively. Serbs on the other hand were slightly more positive towards the possibility of unsupervised peace in 2019. While it may be seen as a positive sign that the majority believe in peaceful coexistence, that these opinions have decreased among Croats and Bosniaks over time signals that transitional justice has not had the intended effects, and that the quality of peace experienced has not improved. It might also reflect that an additional fourteen years under the supervision of the international community has further contributed to the view that its presence is a necessity, fostering a dependency on external actors rather than the conditions for the population of BiH to take charge of peace in their country.

Table 11. Should Perpetrators be Forgiven

Should those who abused and killed your compatriots be forgiven?	2005				2019			
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
No, you should never forgive	61.2	36.6	50.1	50	53	42.3	25.9	43.3
One should forgive, but not forget	35.9	58.4	42.9	45.1	35.7	35.1	56.7	42.4
Yes, one should forgive and forget	1.7	3	4.3	2.9	5.7	14.4	10.9	8.2
Do not know	1.2	2	2.8	2	5.7	8.2	6.5	6.2
N	900	755	823	2478	583	97	321	1001

The question “Should those who abused and killed your compatriots be forgiven?” also demonstrate that shifts in reconciliatory attitudes over time differ between the ethnic groups. While 36.6% of Croats in 2005 believed that one should never forgive, 42.3% chose that option in 2019, and the 3% responding one should forgive and forget in 2005 became 14.4% in 2019. Serbs on the other hand saw the number of respondents choosing to never forgive decrease from 50.1% to 25.9%. Bosniaks responded similarly in 2005 and 2019, with a decrease in those responding “you should never forgive”, though it was still the answer chosen by the majority. While never forgive was the most popular option among Bosniak and Serb respondents in 2005, in 2019 it was the most common choice among Bosniaks and Croats. Overall a slight trend in favor of forgiveness can be observed.

In terms of views of the outgroups as partners in peace, Bosnian Serbs were the group that saw the greatest shift in the direction towards reconciliation. Bosnian Serb belief in the ability of the three groups to live together in peace, went from being the lowest of the three to the highest, and the proportion of Serbs who believe that one should never forgive those who hurt

compatriots halved from 2005 to 2019. Whereas the Bosniak and Croat results suggest a stagnant to negative development. As reconciliation is a mutual process, it is not enough for one of three groups to demonstrate progress in order to make claims about improvements in reconciliation.

The survey results generally suggest that views still remain divided, but that some of these divisions, in particular surrounding views of the war have softened over time. Rather than being completely stalled, the reconciliation process is progressing, but at a very slow rate. However, the results also suggest that the ICTY is not a main contributing factor to this, considering that views of the tribunal as a precondition to peace had decreased over time and more respondents disagreed in 2019 with the notion that the tribunal was fair. Instead, other factors may be influential, such as the passing of time, which for example means that there are respondents in 2019 that do not personally have memories of the conflict, and among those who do they may be less strong. Another explanation may be that people are more concerned with current daily struggles and the poor socioeconomic situation in the country than issues of the past. Previous research has posited that economic hardship has in fact contributed to cross-ethnic interaction and cooperation, and to Bosnians assigning less weight to group differences, as common ground can be found in the fight for labor rights and economic equality (Belloni and Ramović 2020).

### ***Comparison of Views***

The last section of the analysis will aim to compare the views at the two levels, and elucidate the findings in relation to the research questions. To answer the first research question, the results do not indicate that transitional justice has contributed to reconciliation in BiH. At the elite level, views have either remained the same or are more indicative of a negative development in reconciliation occurring over time. Additionally, the political leaders demonstrated that views regarding the conflict, transitional justice mechanisms, state structure, ethnic division and outgroups as partners in peace, differed depending on ethnic rather than ideological belonging. It is not only that the results illustrate that reconciliation is yet to be achieved overall, but also that the negative statements made about judicial mechanisms and the still opposing views of the conflict expressed in 2019, would suggest that transitional justice has not had a positive impact. This indicates that judicial mechanisms were not able to create an official historic view of the conflict, rather, verdicts were used as political tools to further division. It is arguably because the issues of state structure and insecurity are so entwined with ethnic identity that it was not possible for transitional justice to have a reconciliatory effect. Statements from 2007 explicitly speak on collective and individual guilt, Bosniak leaders rejected individual guilt and viewed RS as collectively guilty. The collective guilt is in turn

rejected by Bosnian Serb elites due to the implication of this guilt threatening the autonomy and existence of RS as an entity. There is fear expressed by both Bosnian Serbs and Croats in regards to domination by Bosniaks, who are the relative majority of the country. To admit guilt at the elite level is not just an acknowledgment of wartime behavior, but a political statement affecting the future of the structure of the country and the rights of an entire ethnic community. This suggests, as theorized, that at the elite level, transitional justice was not able to contribute to reconciliation in part because ethnic identity remains within the realm of security.

At the population level, results also suggest that transitional justice has not contributed to reconciliation, however, they are less conclusive. While the ethnic groups remain divided in terms of views on the conflict, the differences are less sharp in 2005 compared to 2019. At the same time, the opinions towards the ICTY were generally similar or more negative, suggesting that it was not the work of the courts that has contributed to this. An explanation for why views on the conflict moved in a positive direction among the general population, but not at the elite level could be that, as discussed, there are political implications for the expression of such views for elites that do not exist for the average person. Furthermore, previous research argues that it is in the interests of elites to maintain ethnic divisions in order to retain power, and to distract from other issues such as the poor socioeconomic conditions and high corruption in the country (Bojičić-Dželilović 2015; Belloni and Ramović 2020).

While the survey data on the views of the war related more to which group bears the responsibility for the aggression, the statements made by elites were less focused on the general conflict dynamics, but rather the issue of genocide, whether or not it was committed and what the repercussions of that were. A point to point comparison is therefore not possible, however, the data does still indicate that a common outlook on the past has not been established, and that among both the public and political elites, each group maintains its own collective memories of the conflict. This illustrates that the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict has not yet been replaced by an infrastructure of peace. However, as noted, some changes could be observed in the views of the public, suggesting that despite BiH remaining divided, slow progress is perhaps being made in terms of the renegotiation and critical revision of collective memory in a direction towards reconciliation. On the other hand the additional passage of time might mean that the collective memories of conflict begin to lose their salience. Additionally, although not included because there was no comparable data with 2005, in the 2019 survey respondents were asked “Do you agree with the court in The Hague that local genocide took place in Srebrenica?”. Whereas 80.3% of Bosniaks and 70.1% of Croats somewhat or totally agreed, a comparably low 12.2% of Serbs agreed, demonstrating that the opposing views of the Srebrenica massacre in 2019 are not exclusive to the political elite.

Regarding the theme of a shared future or of the outgroups as partner in peace, both similar and divergent trends can be observed among elites and the general population. For example,

the survey results show a decrease over time in the belief that the three ethnic groups can coexist peacefully without external supervision, and the content analysis revealed that elites express similar or worse attitudes towards reconciliation in all categories in 2019 compared to 2007. However, while Bosnian Serbs were the group with the greatest shifts in views in a positive direction, with a higher share of respondents believing in peaceful coexistence and forgiveness, Bosnian Serb politicians demonstrated the opposite. While elites, as discussed, may gain from espousing rhetoric of division, most individuals strive to maintain positive self-esteem. As SIT establishes, our social identities become central to this quest, and views of ourselves are intertwined with beliefs about the ingroup (Tajfel 1974). Therefore, as Bosnian Serbs belong to the group most associated with aggression during the conflict, perhaps there is a greater tendency developed over time to believe in forgiveness. On the other hand, the results also demonstrate that Bosnian Serbs do not view themselves as the aggressors. There may therefore be several factors at play, and more comprehensive research is necessary to explain these variations.

It can be concluded that while elites did not demonstrate an increase in reconciliatory attitudes over time, some changes were observed among survey respondents. However, as has been remarked, these suggest only slow and limited progress towards reconciliation as views were generally still divided between the groups.

According to Bar-Tal (2013) for reconciliation and peaceful, stable relations between opposing groups to be built, changes are needed in the worldview, beliefs, motivations, attitudes, and emotions of society members, and the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict must be replaced by one of peace. These transformations must begin in a pre-agreement phase, otherwise, society members will still uphold the same beliefs that fueled the conflict. In the case of BiH, the peace process has continuously been shaped by international intervention. The DPA was negotiated with and imposed by western actors, who gave themselves incredible power over the internal politics of the country with the establishment of the OHR and Bonn powers, in addition to helping elect politicians they preferred. The transitional justice process takes place within this context of western intervention, and is also a symptom of it. The ICTY was included in the DPA, and like the DPA was externally imposed and financed. Foreigners were part of the creation and running of the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of BiH, and contribute to the funding of local reconciliation projects. The western actors, in particular the US, did not fully consider the ramification of the ethnonational division when creating these institutions, and instead believed that they could create a civic unifying Bosnian identity (Kostić 2008; 2011). Thus, because the peace and transitional justice process in BiH was imposed and entrenched ethnic divisions, these sociopsychological changes were not able to begin before the DPA was signed, but were expected to come about under conditions that do not foster them.

## Conclusions

The thesis attempted to answer the research question *can transitional justice promote reconciliation in the aftermath of ethnic conflict in the systems that promote ethnonational insecurity?* The results suggest that, in the case of post-Dayton BiH, transitional justice has in fact been unable to promote reconciliation in the aftermath of ethnic conflict. Among the public and the elites, views on transitional justice mechanisms have worsened or remained the same over time, which would indicate that any progress made towards reconciliation is not due to the work of these mechanisms. This finding proposes that top-down, imposed solutions, particularly in the form of judicial mechanisms, regardless of how well staffed and supported, do not contribute to reconciliation when insecurity and the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict remains. An implication of this might be that in cases of identity based conflict, retributive transitional justice, should not immediately be employed, such as in BiH where the ICTY began operating before the war was over.

However, while results at the elite level illustrate a lack of reconciliation in all six themes examined, the survey data suggests that there has been some development in reconciliation between 2005 and 2019, particularly in terms of views on the conflict. These views, though still divergent between the ethnic groups have seen shifts in a direction towards a greater shared understanding of the past, which was somewhat unexpected. An inferential statistical analysis of the survey data, controlling for factors such as age, gender, income, and level of education might contribute to explaining this development, but was unfortunately not possible within the limitations of this thesis, and remains an area for future research. Furthermore, a larger set of survey questions, which would allow for a full comparison between all six themes of reconciliation identified may provide a richer understanding of the role that insecurity plays in obstructing the reconciliatory effects of transitional justice among ordinary citizens. This might also provide more insight into why the different ethnic groups saw different trends in how views changed over time.

Finally, the theoretical framework relies heavily on literature from the field of social psychology. While Bar-Tal (2007; 2013) for example explains how the sociopsychological infrastructure of conflict maintains conflictive relations between groups, and how this plays into reconciliation, these are discussed in terms of the dichotomy between two opposing groups, who each view the other as the perpetrators, and the ingroup as the victims of conflict. The case of BiH contains a conflict with three parties, which complicates these sociopsychological dynamics. A future avenue for research might be to investigate how conflict identities are changed by the existence of multiple parties, and how these eventually affect the processes of reconciliation.

## Appendix

### *Number of Statements by Category*

Conflict 2007

	Sulejman Tihic	Haris Silajdzic	Milorad Dodik	Mladen Bosic	Dragan Covic	Božo Ljubic
War of Aggression	1	3	0	0	0	0
Civil War	0	0	4	0	0	0
Genocide	2	17	3	0	0	0
No genocide	0	0	6	0	0	0
Individual guilt	0	0	10	0	0	0
Collective guilt	2	3				0
N	5	23	23	0	0	0

Transitional Justice 2007

	Sulejman Tihic	Haris Silajdzic	Milorad Dodik	Mladen Bosic	Dragan Covic	Božo Ljubic
Positive ICJ	0	0	1	0	0	1
Negative ICJ	2	5	4	1	0	0
Positive ICTY	0	0	0	0	0	0
Negative ICTY	0	0	0	1	0	0
Positive State Court	0	0	0	0	0	0
Negative State Court	0	0	4	0	0	0
Justice served	0	0	0	0	0	0
Justice not served	0	7	1	0	0	0
Cooperate with justice	0	0	9	0	0	0
Do not cooperate	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	2	12	19	2	0	1

Insecurity 2007

	Sulejman Tihć	Haris Silajdžić	Milorad Dodik	Mladen Bosić	Dragan Čović	Božo Ljubić
Insecurity	2	4	15	1	3	1
Security	0	0	0	0	0	0
War will return	0	0	0	0	0	0
War will not return	0	1	6	0	0	1
N	2	5	21	1	3	2

State Structure 2007

	Sulejman Tihć	Haris Silajdžić	Milorad Dodik	Mladen Bosić	Dragan Čović	Božo Ljubić
Positive ethnic entities	0	0	35	4	11	6
Negative ethnic entities	2	19	0	0	0	0
Positive BiH split	0	0	4	1	0	0
Negative BiH split	0	2	0	0	2	0
N	2	21	39	5	13	6

Ethnic Identity 2007

	Sulejman Tihć	Haris Silajdžić	Milorad Dodik	Mladen Bosić	Dragan Čović	Božo Ljubić
Ethnic identity salient	3	8	18	5	5	2
Ethnic identity not salient	0	1	4	0	0	0
N	3	9	22	5	5	2

Partners in Peace 2007

	Sulejman Tihic	Haris Silajdzic	Milorad Dodik	Mladen Bosic	Dragan Covic	Božo Ljubic
Outgroups partner in peace	2	4	8	0	1	0
Outgroups not partners in peace	2	8	23	0	0	0
N	4	12	31	0	1	0

Conflict 2019

	Bakir Izetbegovic	Nermin Niksic	Milorad Dodik	Vukota Govedarica	Mirko Sarovic	Dragan Covic
War of Aggression	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civil War	0	0	0	0	0	0
Genocide	2	0	0	0	0	0
No genocide	0	0	5	0	0	0
Individual guilt	0	0	0	0	0	0
Collective guilt	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	2	0	5	0	0	0



Transitional Justice 2019

	Bakir Izetbegović	Nermin Nikšić	Milorad Dodik	Vukota Govedarica	Mirko Šarović	Dragan Čović
Positive ICJ	0	0	0	0	0	0
Negative ICJ	0	0	0	0	0	0
Positive ICTY	0	0	0	0	0	0
Negative ICTY	1	0	8	1	0	0
Positive State Court	0	0	0	0	0	0
Negative State Court	0	0	3	0	0	0
Justice served	0	0	0	0	0	0
Justice not served	2	0	0	0	0	2
Cooperate with justice	0	0	0	0	0	0
Do not cooperate	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	3	0	11	1	0	2

Insecurity 2019

	Bakir Izetbegović	Nermin Nikšić	Milorad Dodik	Vukota Govedarica	Mirko Šarović	Dragan Čović
Insecurity	10	1	9	0	1	2
Security	0	0	0	0	0	0
War will return	0	0	0	0	0	0
War will not return	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	10	1	9	0	1	2

State Structure 2019

	Bakir Izetbegović	Nermin Nikšić	Milorad Dodik	Vukota Govedarica	Mirko Šarović	Dragan Čović
Positive ethnic entities	0	0	15	1	0	7
Negative ethnic entities	13	3	0	0	0	0
Positive BiH split	0	0	9	0	0	0
Negative BiH split	0	0	1	0	0	0
N	13	3	25	1	0	7

Ethnic Identity 2019

	Bakir Izetbegović	Nermin Nikšić	Milorad Dodik	Vukota Govedarica	Mirko Šarović	Dragan Čović
Ethnic identity salient	4	1	22	0	0	6
Ethnic identity not salient	2	0	0	0	0	0
N	6	1	22	0	0	6

	Bakir Izetbegović	Nermin Nikšić	Milorad Dodik	Vukota Govedarica	Mirko Šarović	Dragan Čović
Outgroups partner in peace	0	0	2	0	0	0
Outgroups not partners in peace	11	0	25	0	0	2
N	11	0	27	0	0	2

## Bibliography

### *Primary Sources*

- AFP*. 2007a. "Bosnian Serb PM Says Croats Should Have Their Entity," January 17, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020070117e31h004x6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007b. "Bosnian Serbs Reject War Crimes Challenge to Their Political Entity," March 7, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020070307e337003w6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019a. "Bosnian Serbs Fete 'national Holiday' Angering Muslims," January 8, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020190108ef1800m59&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019b. "Bosnian Serb Leader Says Srebrenica Atrocity a 'Myth,'" April 12, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020190412ef4c00gfp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019c. "Bosnia Envoy Criticises Serb Plan for Police Reserve," April 25, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020190425ef4p00e4d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Al Jazeera English*. 2019. "'Large Increase in Anti-Bosnian, Anti-Muslim Bigotry': Report," September 29, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AJAZEN0020190929ef9t000r w&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- AP Newswires*. 2007. "Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Calls on Remaining War Crimes Suspects to Surrender," February 27, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020070227e32r0016a&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019a. "Bosnian Serbs Show off Special Police Unit, Fueling Tensions," September 24, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020190924ef9o00hz9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019b. "Ex-Bosnian Serb General Indicted for Aiding Genocide," December 31, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020191231efcv00rpa&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Barimac, Edin. 2019. "Bosnian Federation Politicians Decry Serb 'National Day' Celebration." *BBC Monitoring*, January 11, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190111ef1b0028l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- BBC Monitoring*. 2007a. "Serb PM Urges State Prosecutor to Probe Bosnian Commander over War Crimes," January 15, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070115e31f0038p&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007b. "Bosnian Presidency Member Opposes Witch-Hunt of Wahhabis," January 17, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070117e31h002mh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007c. "Bosnia: HDZ Chairman Argues for Croat TV Channel," January 21, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070121e31i001me&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007d. "Bosnian Serb PM Insists No Abolition of Entity Police," February 24, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070224e32o000ul&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

- . 2007e. “Bosnia: SDS Party Anticipates Genocide Accusations Directed at Serb Entity,” February 26, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070226e32q00461&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007f. “Bosnian Presidency Muslim Member Hopes ICJ Verdict to Bring Order to Region,” February 26, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070226e32q00281&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007g. “Bosnian Serb PM Urges Continuation of Cooperation, Repeats Lawsuit ‘Illegal,’” February 26, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070226e32q003e9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007h. “ICJ Ruling Result of ‘Illegal and Illegitimate Lawsuit’ - Bosnian Serb PM,” February 26, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070226e32q002jp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007i. “Leader Alleges Anti-Bosnian Muslim Bias in Europe,” March 1, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070301e3310015p&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007j. “Muslim Leader Demands Special Area in Eastern Bosnia,” March 1, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070301e3310012x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007k. “Bosnian Muslim Leaders Slam Serb Rejection of Genocide Guilt,” March 7, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070307e337004ph&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007l. “Bosnian Serb Premier Accepts ICJ Genocide Ruling, but Rejects Collective Guilt,” March 14, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070314e33e003mn&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007m. “Bosnian Muslim Leader Admits His Political Goal to Abolish Serb Entity,” March 16, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070316e33g003xp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007n. “Bosnian Muslim Leader Predicts Srebrenica Developments to Be Internationalized,” March 17, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070317e33h000p1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007o. “Bosnian Party Leader Says Croats Do Not Need Third Entity,” March 28, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070328e33s003bh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007p. “Bosnian Party Leaders Comment on Prospects for Constitutional Talks,” April 6, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070406e346001up&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007q. “Bosnian Muslim Leader Defends Del Ponte in Hague-Belgrade Affair,” April 22, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070422e34m001gt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007r. “Serb PM Warns Reduced Entity Vote Would Make Bosnia ‘Islamic Country,’” May 24, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070524e35o001ux&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007s. “Bosnian Muslim Party Leader Refuses to Accept Blame for Failed Talks with Dodik,” May 27, 2007.

- <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070527e35r001gt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007t. “Bosnian Serb PM Argues Entity Vote Condition for Survival of Serbs,” May 30, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070530e35u003xp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007u. “Bosnian Serb PM Threatens End Contact with Muslim Leader Silajdzic,” June 6, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070606e366002ut&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007v. “Bosnian Serb Premier Describes Muslim TV as ‘Rabble-Rouser,’” June 10, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070610e36a001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007w. “Bosnian Serb Leader Welcomes Serb War Crime Suspect’s Arrest in Montenegro,” June 17, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070617e36h0012x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007x. “Bosnian Presidency Non-Serb Members Ask UN to Annul Srebrenica Genocide Results,” June 18, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070618e36i0035x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007y. “Bosnian Serb PM Dodik Vows to Defend Serb Entity, Favours Kosovo within Serbia,” June 21, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070621e36l000gr&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007z. “Bosnian Muslim Leaders ‘Strongly Oppose’ Croat Federalization Proposal - TV,” June 25, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070625e36p003xp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007aa. “Croat Parties Continue ‘Secret’ Talks on Future Set-up of Bosnia,” July 7, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070707e377001md&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ab. “Bosnian Serb PM Says Serb Entity ‘Fatherland of Those Who Suffered,’” July 15, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070715e37f000rt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ac. “Bosnian Presidency Member Silajdzic Warns against Ethnic-Based Solutions,” July 20, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070720e37k0028l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ad. “Bosnian Serb Party Leader Slams Muslim Leader for Voicing ‘Lies’ about Genocide,” July 23, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070723e37n00209&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ae. “Bosnian Presidency Member Sends Another Srebrenica Letter to UN,” July 30, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070730e37u003jt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007af. “SDA Chairman Tihic Spells out ‘Compromise’ for Bosnia’s Future Setup,” August 3, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070803e38300337&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

- . 2007ag. “Bosnian Serb Politicians Reject US Ambassador’s Call for ‘Unitary State,’” August 10, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070810e38a000b5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ah. “Bosnian Serb PM Rules out Bosnia Being Single Nation,” August 22, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070822e38m000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ai. “Bosnian Muslim Leader Rejects Police Reform Plan as Award for Ethnic Cleansing,” September 3, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070903e39300105&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007aj. “Bosnian Croat Leader Expects Muslims, Serbs to Endorse Police Reform Proposal,” September 5, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070905e395003ju&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ak. “Bosnian Muslim Leader Rejects Police Reform Plan as Rewarding Genocide,” September 12, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070912e39c002h4&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007al. “Bosnian Serb Parties Say Croat Declaration ‘Undercuts’ Serb Entity’s Foundations,” September 21, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070921e391003pd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007am. “Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat Leaders Comment on Possible Break-up of Bosnia,” September 25, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070925e39p00233&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007an. “Serb Entity PM Says Bosnian Muslim Leaders Pursuing Ethnic Dominance Policy,” September 29, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070929e39t000xd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ao. “Main Bosnian Muslim SDA Party Leader Discusses Constitutional Reform,” October 2, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071002e3a2003e9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ap. “Bosnian Party Leaders, EU Envoy Comment on Failed Police Reform Meeting,” October 12, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071012e3ac000b5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007aq. “Situation after PM’s Resignation Serious, but Not Dramatic - Bosnian Politicians,” November 14, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071114e3be000rt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007ar. “Bosnian Serb PM Says Sarajevo Politicians Trying to Prevent Presidential Poll,” November 19, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071119e3bj0035x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007as. “Leader Says Bosnian Serbs Not to Agree to Recognition of Kosovo’s UDI,” December 3, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071203e3c3001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007at. “Serb Entity Not to Agree to Bosnia Recognizing Kosovo’s Independence,” December 17, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071217e3ch001gu&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

- . 2007au. “Croat Leader Says Serbs Agree with His Plan for Federal Bosnia,” December 19, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071219e3cj002jp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007av. “Bosnian Serb, Federation Officials Discuss Entities Cooperation on EU Path,” December 21, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071221e3cl000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019a. “Serb Entity Leader Warns of Seceding from Bosnia,” January 25, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190125ef1p002bd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019b. “Bosnian Party Leader Accuses Opponents of ‘Political Blockade,’” February 5, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190205ef250025t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019c. “Bosnia Party Leaders Say to Form Coalitions by Mid-March,” February 18, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190218ef2i003ml&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019d. “Balkan Media at Odds over Karadzic Life Sentence,” March 21, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190321ef3l004xt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019e. “Bosnian Party Leader Predicts Government Formation Problems,” April 3, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190403ef43003h1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019f. “Bosnian Serb Leader Views Government Formation,” April 11, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190411ef4b004v1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019g. “Bosnian Presidency Seen Divided over Army Uniforms Plan,” May 20, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190520ef5k002s1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019h. “Serb Entity Rejects Bosnia Plans on Sending Police to Border,” July 9, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190709ef79002jp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019i. “Bosnia Presidency Chair Says Not Suing Croatia over Bridge,” July 25, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190725ef7p003h1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019j. “Croat Politician Sees No Way to Form Bosnia Government Fast,” August 13, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190813ef8d001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019k. “Bosnia Party Leader Sees No Room for Compromise over Nato Plan,” September 16, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190916ef9g002e5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019l. “Bosnian Serb Leader Comments on Attempt to Form Cabinet,” October 17, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020191017efah001up&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019m. “Serb Leader Calls for Bosnia’s Division into Three States,” October 23, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020191023efan002mh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

- . 2019n. “Bosnia Speaker Says EU, Nato Integration ‘Priority,’” November 4, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020191104efb4002ut&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- BBC Monitoring European*. 2007a. “Bosnian Serb PM Plays down Assassination Threats, Insists on Entity Police,” March 13, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070313e33d004mp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007b. “Bosnian Serb PM Says Federalization Only Sustainable Model for Country,” September 13, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070913e39d003xq&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007c. “Bosnian Serb PM Says No Link between Kosovo and Entity Status,” September 15, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070915e39f000gp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007d. “Bosnia: Silajdzic Says OHR Proposal at Odds with EU Police Reform Principles,” September 20, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070920e39k002jp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007e. “Bosnian Croat Parties Sign Constitutional Reform Declaration,” September 21, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070921e39l0035y&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007f. “SDA Chairman Says New Police Protocol Leads to Bosnia’s ‘Definitive Partition,’” October 5, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071005e3a5003e9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007g. “New US Envoy Meets Bosnian Croat Leader Covic,” October 19, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071019e3aj002mi&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007h. “Bosnian Serb Leader Slams Muslim Rival’s Meeting with War Crimes Suspect,” December 14, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071214e3ce00233&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007i. “Bosnian Daily Condemns Dodik’s Statements in Croatian TV Talk Show,” December 21, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020071221e3cl001xh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019a. “Bosnia President Says Joining Nato ‘Unacceptable,’” July 17, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190717ef7h001xh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019b. “Bosnian Croat Leader Upbeat despite Failure to Form Government,” September 24, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190924ef9o003s5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Belavadi, Sucharita, and Michael A. Hogg. 2021. “Social Identity and Intergroup Competition.” In *The Oxford Handbook of the Psychology of Competition*, edited by Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom Tor, and Andrew J. Elliot, 1st ed. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190060800.013.20>.
- Bilanzic, Beti, and Nedim Dervisbegovic. 2007. “UPDATE 1-Serbs Relieved, Bosnia Dismayed by Genocide Ruling.” *Reuters News*, February 26, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020070226e32q0011k&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Bjelica, Sanja. 2007. “Bosnian Croat Parties Urge New Federal Unit to Ensure Ethnic Equality.” *BBC Monitoring*, January 8, 2007.



- <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070108e318003jt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Cave, Peter. 2007. "Serbia Not Responsible for Bosnian Genocide: UN Serbia Not Responsible for Bosnian Genocide: UN." *Australian Broadcasting Corporation Transcripts*, February 27, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ABCTRS0020070227e32r000b8&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Cerkez-Robinson, Aida. 2007. "Bosnian Muslims Call for Change of Bosnia's Constitution after World Court Ruling." *AP Newswires*, February 26, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020070226e32q001oy&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Dakic, D. 2007. "Bosnian Serb Officials Criticize Court Ruling to Abolish Entity Symbols." *BBC Monitoring*, January 30, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070130e31u0038p&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Dodik, Milorad. 2007. "LETTERS TO THE EDITOR; Bosnia, Reform and the EU." *International Herald Tribune*, September 19, 2007, sec. Opinion. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=INHT000020070920e39j0001j&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Domazet, Zeljka, and Vedrana Kulaga. 2019. "Pundits Praise Bosnian Serb Head for Ties with EU Right Wing." *BBC Monitoring*, February 18, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190218ef2i001up&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Dow Jones International News. 2007. "Bosnian Pres Fails To Reach Accord With Serb Leader," May 24, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=DJI0000020070524e35o000x1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Drobnjakovic, Marko, and Sabina Nikšić. 2019. "Bosnia Divided over UN Ruling on Wartime Leader Karadzic." *AP Newswires*, March 20, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020190320ef3k014l6&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Federalna Novinska Agencija. 2019. "Izetbegović: Strong State Only Guarantee Evil Will Not Be Repeated," June 23, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190624ef6n00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- FENA. 2019a. "Dodik: I Did Not Invite BiH Armed Forces to Take Part in 'Day of RS' Celebration," January 8, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190109ef1800006&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019b. "Dodik: I Am Grateful to Covic for Trying to Build a Dialogue in BiH," January 11, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190112ef1b00002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019c. "Dodik: Republika Srpska Is a Constitutional Category," January 23, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190124ef1n00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019d. "Izetbegović: Bosniaks and Croats in RS Are Fourth or Fifth-Class Citizens," January 24, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190125ef1o00009&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019e. "Izetbegović and Džaferović Lay Flowers on the Occasion of BiH Independence Day," March 3, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190304ef3300006&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

- . 2019f. “Dodik on Karadžić, Situation in Serbia and Stopping Migrants at the Border,” March 18, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190319ef3i00006&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019g. “Novalić: Defense Industry in FBiH Is a Fast-Growing Economic Branch,” April 10, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190411ef4a00000a&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019h. “Lévy: Visit to the Alija Izetbegović Museum Brings Back Memories of a Great Man,” May 13, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190514ef5d000002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019i. “Izetbegović: We Are Proud of Everything We Have Done,” May 27, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190528ef5r000009&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019j. “SDA Main Board Conclusions: Politics of Milorad Dodik and SNSD Utterly Harmful,” September 6, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190907ef96000001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019k. “Izetbegović: SDA’s Priorities Are Integration and Reforms,” September 15, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190916ef9f000005&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019l. “Izetbegović: Alija Has Obligated Us to Prove Bosnia Is More than a Piece of Land,” September 23, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020190924ef9n000006&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019m. “SDA: Glorification of War Criminals Poses a Threat to Stability and Peace in BiH,” November 14, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=ASFDNA0020191115efbe000002&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Finer, Jonathan. 2007. “New Highway Bogs Down In Bitterly Divided Bosnia.” *The Washington Post*, September 1, 2007, sec. A Section. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WP00000020070901e3910000l&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Gec, Jovana. 2007. “Serbia Hails World Court’s Genocide Acquittal; Bosnian Muslims Angered.” *AP Newswires*, February 26, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020070226e32q001ia&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- HINA. 2007a. “Dodik Says Bosnian Serb Entity Will Not Agree to Kosovo’s Independence,” December 16, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020071216e3cg000dx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007b. “SDA Party against Proposed Federalisation of Bosnia,” December 19, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020071219e3cj000m9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019a. “Dodik Accuses Bosniaks, Says Situation in Bosnia Same as in 1992,” January 12, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020190112ef1c000jh&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019b. “Covic Says Hasn’t Talked to Plenkovic, Incident Was Manipulation by Sarajevo,” January 14, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020190114ef1e0012x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

- . 2019c. “Dodik Says Republika Srpska Can Secede Any Moment,” January 24, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020190124ef1o00001&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019d. “EU Welcomes Bosnian Presidency’s Consensus on Country’s EU Path,” January 30, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020190130ef1u001jl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019e. “Bosnian Serb Officials Reject Karadzic Verdict, Bosniak Officials Hail It,” March 20, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020190320ef3k0030d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019f. “Dragan Covic Re-Elected HDZ BiH Leader,” April 27, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020190427ef4r000xd&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019g. “Remains of Croat Victims of Travnik War Atrocity Buried,” June 8, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020190608ef68000rt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019h. “Bosnian Croats Seek Truth about War Crimes in Bugojno,” July 27, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=HINA000020190727ef7r000gp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Hopkins, Valerie. 2019. “Radovan Karadzic War Crimes Sentence Increased to Life in Prison.” *Financial Times*, March 20, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=FTCOM00020190320ef3k006pp&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Hopkins, Valerie, and Ben Hall. 2019. “Sarajevo Leader Sweeps Nationalism aside in Bosnia.” *Financial Times*, August 14, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=FTCOM00020190814ef8e000m9&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Irish Times*. 2007. “No Sign of Line Being Drawn under 1990 Horrors.” February 27, 2007, sec. Other World Stories. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=IRTI000020070227e32r0001a&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Kukan, M. 2007a. “SDA Leader Says ICJ Verdict in Bosnia’s Genocide Case to Affect Police Reform.” *BBC Monitoring*, March 5, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070305e3350030d&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2007b. “Muslim Party Leader Warns against Bosnian’s Federalization.” *BBC Monitoring*, August 14, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070814e38e001ur&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Lingo-Demirovic, Mirsada. 2019. “Serbs, Croats Accuse Bosniak Party of Attacking Dayton Accords.” *BBC Monitoring*, September 24, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190924ef9o003ux&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- MacDonald, Neil. 2007. “Bosnia’s Serbs to Lose Wartime Emblem.” *Financial Times*, April 11, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=FTCOM00020070412e34b0003t&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Macdonald, Neil. 2007. “Seeking a Formula for Co-Existence.” *Financial Times*, December 11, 2007, Surveys BOZ1 edition, sec. FT REPORT - BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 2007 - FRONT PAGE.
- Maunaga, Goran. 2007. “Bosnian Party Officials Comment on German Ambassador’s One Nation Remark.” *BBC Monitoring*, August 20, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redirect/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070820e38k002gx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

- Max, Arthur. 2007. "World Court to Deliver Genocide Ruling." *AP Newswires*, February 26, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=APRS000020070226e32q000xt&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- McLaughlin, Daniel. 2019. "Dodik Reiterates Threats to Split Bosnia; Pro-Russian Bosnian-Serb Leader Resists EU-Backed Efforts to Integrate Regions." *The Irish Times*, January 28, 2019, sec. World.
- Momic, Darko. 2019. "Bosnian Presidency Member Discusses Nato with Russian Envoy." *BBC Monitoring*, September 3, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190903ef9300461&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Noor, Masi, Johanna Ray Vollhardt, Silvia Mari, and Arie Nadler. 2017. "The Social Psychology of Collective Victimhood: Collective Victimhood." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 47 (2): 121–34. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2300>.
- Oberpfalzerová, Hana, Johannes Ullrich, and Hynek Jeřábek. 2019. "Unofficial Storytelling as Middle Ground Between Transitional Truth-Telling and Forgetting: A New Approach to Dealing With the Past in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCIV)*, August, 1–19.  
<https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/IJCIV.638>.
- Radio Free Europe. 2007. "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Hague Ruling Won't Bring Closure," February 27, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=RFEUR00020070227e32r0002x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Reuters News. 2007. "PRESS DIGEST- Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro- Sept 4," September 4, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020070904e394000ho&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- . 2019. "Political Quarrels Disqualify Bosnia from Europe's Top Body," April 9, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020190409ef4902oga&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Risojevic, Dragan. 2007. "Bosnian Serb PM Urges ICJ to Declare Jasenovac WW2 Camp Crimes Genocide." *BBC Monitoring*, April 24, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070424e34a003s7&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- SeeNews. 2007. "UPDATE 1 - U.N. Court Rules Serbia Not Responsible for Bosnia Genocide but Failed To Act," February 26, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=SEENW00020070227e32q0018i&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Skuletic, S. 2007. "Bosnian Muslim Leader Accepts US Proposal on Constitutional Reform." *BBC Monitoring*, May 25, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070525e35p001e1&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Smajilhodzic, Rusmir. 2019. "Stalemate in Sarajevo: Three Presidents but No Government." *AFP*, October 19, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPR000020191019efaj0012x&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Sputnik News Service. 2019. "Prominent Politicians of Bosnian Serbs, Muslims Exchange Barbs Over National Holiday," November 25, 2019.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=RVESEN0020191125efbp00cnl&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Stanic, Olja. 2007. "Bosnia Serb PM Warns Muslims 'Not to Play with Fire.'" *Reuters News*, June 7, 2007.  
<http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=LBA0000020070607e367001rx&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

- The Times of Israel*. 2019. "Israeli Holocaust Historian to Head New Srebrenica Commission," February 9, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=TMISRA0020190209ef29000ru&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Veleusic, Branka. 2007. "Bosnian Serb PM's Party to Participate in Talks If Referendum Clause Included." *BBC Monitoring*, August 1, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070801e381003s5&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Vidakovic, D. 2007. "Serb PM to Promote Vision of Bosnia as 'Complex State with Federal Units.'" *BBC Monitoring*, March 19, 2007. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020070319e33j00231&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Vujicic, D. 2019. "Serbia Daily Finds Link between Bosnia Party, 9/11 Attackers." *BBC Monitoring*, September 19, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020190919ef9j00336&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Wood, Nicholas. 2007. "Bosnian Muslims View Ruling as Another Defeat." *The New York Times*, February 27, 2007, sec. Foreign Desk; SECTA. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=NYTF000020070227e32r00023&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- Woodard, Colin. 2007. "Debate Surrounds International Community's Role in Bosnia ; The Departing Envoy Had Argued for Giving Locals More Responsibility. Critics Are Pressing for a Tougher Approach." *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 2, 2007, sec. WORLD. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CHSM000020070201e32200033&cat=a&ep=ASE>.
- World Service Wire*. 2019. "Serbs Should Pursue Unification - Leader of Bosnian Serbs," November 21, 2019. <http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=TASS000020191121efbl000jj&cat=a&ep=ASE>.

## ***Secondary Sources***

- Agius, Carmel. 2020. "The Last Testament of the ICTY." In *Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, edited by Carsten Stahn, Carmel Agius, Serge Brammertz, and Colleen Rohan. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862956.003.0002>.
- Aloisi, Rosa. 2020. "The Broken Path to Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Field Study of Memories." In *Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, edited by Carsten Stahn, Carmel Agius, Serge Brammertz, and Colleen Rohan. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, Incorporated.
- Arthur, Paige. 2010. "'Fear of the Future, Lived through the Past': Pursuing Transitional Justice in the Wake of Ethnic Conflict." In *Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in Divided Societies*, edited by Paige Arthur, 271–302. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511976858.010>.
- Bădescu, Gruia. 2019. "Making Sense of Ruins: Architectural Reconstruction and Collective Memory in Belgrade." *Nationalities Papers* 47 (2): 182–97. <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.42>.

- Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2007. "Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts." *American Behavioral Scientist* 50 (11): 1430–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764207302462>.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel. 2013. *Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Belavadi, Sucharita, and Michael A. Hogg. 2021. "Social Identity and Intergroup Competition." In *The Oxford Handbook of the Psychology of Competition*, edited by Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom Tor, and Andrew J. Elliot, 1st ed. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190060800.013.20>.
- Belloni, Roberto. 2009. "Bosnia: Dayton Is Dead! Long Live Dayton!" *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 15 (3–4): 355–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110903372367>.
- Belloni, Roberto, and Jasmin Ramović. 2020. "Elite and Everyday Social Contracts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Pathways to Forging a National Social Contract?" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14 (1): 42–63. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2019.1579160>.
- Benoit, Ken. 2020. "Text as Data: An Overview." In *The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations*, edited by Luigi Curini and Robert Franzese, 461–98. 1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP: SAGE Publications Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526486387>.
- Bieber, Florian. 2015. "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Failed Success." In *State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, edited by Soeren Keil and Valery Perry. Southeast European Studies. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Biro, Miklos, Dean Ajdukovic, Dinka Corkalo, Dino Djipa, Petar Milin, and Harvey M. Weinstein. 2004. "Attitudes toward Justice and Social Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia." In *My Neighbor, My Enemy*, edited by Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, 1st ed., 183–205. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511720352.013>.
- Bojičić-Dželilović, Vesna. 2015. "The Politics, Practice and Paradox of 'Ethnic Security' in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 4 (1). <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.ez>.
- Brammertz, Serge. 2020. "Making Complementarity a Reality: The Experiences of the ICTY and IRMCT Office of the Prosecutor." In *Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, edited by Serge Brammertz, Carsten Stahn, Carmel Agius, and Colleen Rohan, 31–47. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862956.003.0003>.
- Brounéus, Karen. 2008. "Analyzing Reconciliation: A Structured Method for Measuring National Reconciliation Initiatives." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 14 (3): 291–313. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10781910802017354>.
- Burrows, Brooke, Linda R. Tropp, Trisha A. Dehron, and Sabina Čehajić-Clancy. 2022. "How Intergroup Contact Shapes Intergroup Attitudes and Construals of Relations between Ethnic Groups: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 28 (3): 372–83. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000629>.
- Buzan, Barry. 1983. *People, States and Fear : The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security : A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Calic, Marie-Janine. 2013. *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies a Scholars' Initiative*. Edited by Charles W. Ingraio and Thomas Allan Emmert. 2nd ed. Central European Studies. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.

- “Central Electoral Commission BiH.” n.d. Accessed March 10, 2023. <http://www.izbori.ba/Default.aspx?CategoryID=48&Lang=3&Mod=0>.
- Clark, Janine Natalya. 2008. “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, and Reconciliation.” *Contemporary Justice Review: CJR* 11 (4): 331–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580802482603>.
- . 2009. “Judging the ICTY: Has It Achieved Its Objectives?” *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 9 (1–2): 123–42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683850902723454>.
- . 2012. “Reflections on Trust and Reconciliation: A Case Study of a Central Bosnian Village.” *The International Journal of Human Rights* 16 (2): 239–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2010.528205>.
- . 2016. “Transitional Justice as Recognition: An Analysis of the Women’s Court in Sarajevo.” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 10 (1): 67–87. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijv027>.
- Clark, Theresa M. 2013. “Assessing the Special Court’s Contribution to Achieving Transitional Justice.” In *The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its Legacy*, 746–69. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139248778.049>.
- Cleven, Erik. 2020. “Making Connections? A Study of Interethnic Dialogue in a Divided Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” *Ethnopolitics* 19 (2): 125–49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1647666>.
- Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall. 2005. *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- De Greiff, Pablo. 2012. “Theorizing Transitional Justice.” *Nomos* 51: 31–77.
- Delpla, Isabelle. 2007. “In the Midst of Injustice: The ICTY from the Perspective of Some Victims Associations.” In *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society*, edited by Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms, and Gerlachus Duijzings. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Dragović-Soso, Jasna. 2016. “History of a Failure: Attempts to Create a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997–2006.” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 10 (2): 292–310. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijw005>.
- Dragović-Soso, Jasna, and Eric Gordy. 2010. “Coming to Terms with the Past: Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in the Post-Yugoslav Lands.” In *New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies*, edited by Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Drisko, James, and Tina Maschi. 2015. *Content Analysis*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190215491.001.0001>.
- Eck, Kristine. 2011. “Survey Research in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.” In *Understanding Peace Research*, edited by Kristine Höglund and Magnus Öberg, 177–94. United Kingdom: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203828557-19>.
- Evans, Matthew. 2016. “Structural Violence, Socioeconomic Rights, and Transformative Justice.” *Journal of Human Rights* 15 (1): 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2015.1032223>.
- Fairey, Tiffany, Jelena Petrovic, Andrew James William Gow, and Rachel Kerr. 2020. “New Bearings in Post-Conflict Evaluation: A Principle-Based Approach.” King’s College London. <https://doi.org/10.18742/PUB01-041>.

- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2000. "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." *International Organization* 54 (4): 845–77. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551398>.
- Freeman, Charlotte M.L. 2012. "The Psychosocial Need for Intergroup Contact: Practical Suggestions for Reconciliation Initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Beyond." *Intervention (Amstelveen, Netherlands)* 10 (1): 17–29. <https://doi.org/10.1097/WTF.0b013e3283518de1>.
- Friedman, Rebekka. 2018. "Implementing Transformative Justice: Survivors and Ex-Combatants at the Comisión de La Verdad y Reconciliación in Peru." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41 (4): 701–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1330487>.
- Garson, Melanie. 2020. "Defying Gravity: Evaluating the Trickle-Up Effects of Reconciliation Programmes." *Ethnopolitics* 19 (2): 188–208. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1653017>.
- Gerring, John. 2007. *Case Study Research Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gready, P., and S. Robins. 2014. "From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 8 (3): 339–61. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/iju013>.
- Gready, Paul. 2019. "Introduction." In *From Transitional to Transformative Justice*, edited by Paul Gready and Simon Robins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316676028>.
- Gready, Paul, and Simon Robins, eds. 2019. *From Transitional to Transformative Justice*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316676028>.
- Guzina, Dejan, and Branka Marijan. 2013. "Local Uses of International Criminal Justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Transcending Divisions or Building Parallel Worlds?" *Studies in Social Justice* 7 (2): 245–63. <https://doi.org/10.26522/ssj.v7i2.1046>.
- Haider, Huma. 2021. "Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in the Western Balkans: Approaches, Impacts and Challenges." KD4 Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). <https://doi.org/10.19088/K4D.2021.033>.
- Hall, Jonathan, Iosif Kovras, Djordje Stefanovic, and Neophytos Loizides. 2018. "Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Transitional Justice: Exposure to Violence and Transitional Justice." *Political Psychology* 39 (2): 345–63. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12412>.
- Hayner, Priscilla B. 2011. *Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions*. 2nd ed. Book, Whole. New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203867822>.
- Hoddy, Eric T. 2021. "Peasants' Rights and Agrarian Violence in Transitional Settings: From Transitional Justice to Transformative Agrarian Justice." *Journal of Human Rights* 20 (1): 91–109. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2020.1850242>.
- ICTY. n.d. "Key Figures of the Cases." Icty.Org. Accessed February 16, 2023. <https://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases>.
- Johnson, Janet Buttolph, and H. T. Reynolds. 2016. *Political Science Research Methods*. Eighth edition. Los Angeles: SAGE Reference/CQ Press.
- Jones, Briony. 2015. "Stories of 'Success': Narrative, Expertise, and Claims to Knowledge." *Canadian Journal of Law and Society* 30 (2): 293–308. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cls.2015.13>.
- Jones, Briony, and Julie Bernath, eds. 2018. *Resistance and Transitional Justice*. First edition. Transitional Justice. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.



- Jones, Nicholas A., Stephan Parmentier, and Elmar G.M. Weitekamp. 2012. "Dealing with International Crimes in Post-War Bosnia: A Look through the Lens of the Affected Population." *European Journal of Criminology* 9 (5): 553–64. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370812454645>.
- Karcic, Hikmet. 2021. "'The Court Is Accommodating Our Murderers': Prosecuting Aged Defendants in Domestic Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Criminal Law Review* 22 (1–2): 209–24. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718123-bja10092>.
- Kelman, Herbert C. 2004. "Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective." In *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, edited by Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, 0. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195166439.003.0006>.
- Kochanski, Adam. 2018. "The 'Local Turn' in Transitional Justice: Curb the Enthusiasm." *International Studies Review*, December. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy081>.
- Kostić, Roland. 2007. "Ambivalent Peace." PhD Dissertation, Uppsala: Uppsala University.
- . 2008. "Nationbuilding as an Instrument of Peace? Exploring Local Attitudes towards International Nationbuilding and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Civil Wars* 10 (4): 384–412. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240802354482>.
- . 2011. "Education through Regulation?" In *Building Peace, Creating Conflict? : Conflictual Dimensions of Local and International Peace-Building*, edited by Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, 84–104. Lund: Nordic Academic Press.
- . 2012. "Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Whose Memories, Whose Justice?" *Sociologija* 54 (4): 649–66. <https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1204649K>.
- Kovacevic, Danijel. 2019. "Bosnia Fails Again to Form New State Government." *Balkan Insight* (blog). August 27, 2019. <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/27/bosnia-fails-again-to-form-new-state-government/>.
- Krippendorff, Klaus. 2018. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Fourth Edition. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Kritz, N. 2009. "Policy Implications of Empirical Research on Transitional Justice." In *Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research*, edited by H van der Merwe, V Baxter, and A Chapman. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Kurze, Arnaud. 2017. "Time for Change: Aid, NGOs, and Transitional Justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Transitional Justice Review*: 1 (5). <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss5/2>.
- Lambourne, Wendy. 2014. "Transformative Justice, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding." In *Transitional Justice Theories*, edited by Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun, and Friederike Mieth. Transitional Justice. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
- Lindholm, Helena. 1993. *Ethnicity and Nationalism : Formation of Identity and Dynamics of Conflict in the 1990s*. Göteborg: Nordnes.
- Lune, Howard, and Bruce L. Berg. 2017. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. Ninth edition, Global edition. Harlow, England: Pearson.
- Meernik, James. 2005. "Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia." *Journal of Peace Research* 42 (3): 271–89. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343305052012>.
- Meernik, James, Nenad Golcevski, Melissa McKay, Ayal Feinberg, Kimi King, and Roman Krastev. 2016. "Truth, Justice, and Education: Towards Reconciliation in the Former

- Yugoslavia.” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 16 (3): 413–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1193975>.
- Meernik, James, and Jose Raul Guerrero. 2014. “Can International Criminal Justice Advance Ethnic Reconciliation? The ICTY and Ethnic Relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 14 (3): 383–407. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2014.924675>.
- Moll, Nicolas. 2020. “Promoting ‘Positive Stories’ of Help and Rescue from the 1992-1995 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An Alternative to the Dichotomy of Guilt and Victimhood?” *Südosteuropa* 67 (4): 447–75. <https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2019-0036>.
- Monroe, Burt L., and Philip A. Schrodt. 2008. “Introduction to the Special Issue: The Statistical Analysis of Political Text.” *Political Analysis* 16 (4): 351–55. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpn017>.
- Murphy, Colleen, ed. 2017. “The Just Pursuit of Transformation.” In *The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice*, 160–92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316084229.006>.
- Nettelfield, Lara J. 2010a. *Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal’s Impact in a Postwar State*. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nettelfield, Lara J. 2010b. “From the Battlefield to the Barracks: The ICTY and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 4 (1): 87–109. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijp033>.
- Neuendorf, Kimberly A. 2017. *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. 2. ed. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Noor, Masi, Johanna Ray Vollhardt, Silvia Mari, and Arie Nadler. 2017. “The Social Psychology of Collective Victimhood: Collective Victimhood.” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 47 (2): 121–34. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2300>.
- Oberpfalzerová, Hana, Johannes Ullrich, and Hynek Jeřábek. 2019. “Unofficial Storytelling as Middle Ground Between Transitional Truth-Telling and Forgetting: A New Approach to Dealing With the Past in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina.” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV)*, August, 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/IJCV.638>.
- O’Leary, Brendan. 2014. “Foreward.” In *Post-War Statebuilding and Constitutional Reform*, by Sofía Sebastián-Aparicio. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137336880>.
- Parmentier, Stephan, Marta Valiñas, and Elmar Weitekamp. 2009. “How to Repair the Harm after Violent Conflict in Bosnia? Results of a Population-Based Survey.” *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 27 (1): 27–44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/016934410902700103>.
- Perry, Valery. 2009. “A Survey of Reconciliation Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Gap Between People and Politics.” In *Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies*, edited by Joanna R. Quinn, 207. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- . 2019. “Frozen, Stalled, Stuck, or Just Muddling through: The Post-Dayton Frozen Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” *Asia Europe Journal* 17 (1): 107–27. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0525-6>.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. 2012. “The ICTY – Controversies, Successes, Failures, Lessons.” *Southeastern Europe* 36 (1): 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187633312X616959>.

- Robins, S. 2012. "Challenging the Therapeutic Ethic: A Victim-Centred Evaluation of Transitional Justice Process in Timor-Leste." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 6 (1): 83–105. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijr034>.
- Roe, Paul. 1999. "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (2): 183–202. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343399036002004>.
- Ruffa, Chiara. 2020. "Case Study Methods: Case Selection and Case Analysis." In *The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations*, edited by Luigi Curini and Robert Franzese. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Sebastián-Aparicio, Sofía. 2014. *Post-War Statebuilding and Constitutional Reform*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137336880>.
- Sharp, Dustin N. 2019. "What Would Satisfy Us? Taking Stock of Critical Approaches to Transitional Justice." *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, August, ijj018. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijj018>.
- Stephan, Walter G., and Cookie White Stephan. 1985. "Intergroup Anxiety." *Journal of Social Issues* 41 (3): 157–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1985.tb01134.x>.
- Strupinskienė, Lina. 2017. "What Is Reconciliation and Are We There yet? Different Types and Levels of Reconciliation: A Case Study of Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Journal of Human Rights* 16 (4): 452–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2016.1197771>.
- . 2022. "International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Grassroots Mobilization for Justice: Insights from Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 28 (1): 74–86. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000476>.
- Subotić, Jelena. 2009. *Hijacked Justice : Dealing with the Past in the Balkans*. Ithaca ; Cornell University Press.
- Sundberg, Ralph and Lotta Harbom. 2011. "Systematic Data Collection: Experiences from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program." In *Understanding Peace Research : Methods and Challenges*, edited by Kristine Höglund and Magnus Öberg. London: Routledge.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1974. "Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour." *Social Science Information* 13 (2): 65–93. <https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847401300204>.
- Theiler, Tobias. 2010. "Societal Security." In *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer. New York: Routledge.
- Thoms, Oskar N T, James Ron, and Roland Paris. 2008. "The Effects of Transitional Justice Mechanisms: A Summary of Empirical Research Findings and Implications for Analysts and Practitioners." In , 92.
- Titscher, Stefan, Michael Meyer, Ruth Wodak, and Eva Vetter, eds. 2000. *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*. Translated by Bryan Jenner. London ; Thousand Oaks [Calif.]: SAGE.
- Trahan, Jennifer, and Iva Vukušić. 2020. "The Legacy of the ICTY: The Three-Tiered Approach to Justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Benchmarks for Measuring Success." In *Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, edited by Carsten Stahn, Carmel Agius, Serge Brammertz, and Colleen Rohan, 462–77. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862956.003.0025>.
- Trbovc, Jovana Mihajlović. 2020. "The (Lack of) Impact of the ICTY on the Public Memory of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In *Legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, edited by Carsten Stahn, Carmel Agius, Serge Brammertz, and Colleen Rohan, 559–70. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862956.003.0030>.
- UN. 2008. "What Is Transitional Justice?"

- Vella, Louise. 2014. “‘What Will You Do with Our Stories?’ Truth and Reconciliation in the Solomon Islands” 8: 14.
- Wæver, Ole. 1998. “Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community.” In *Security Communities*, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 69–118. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511598661.003>.
- Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, and Morten Kelstrup, eds. 1993. *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Zoodsma, Marieke. 2019. “‘I Was Hurt and You Were Hurt Too’ The Role of Religion and Competing Narratives in the Reconciliation Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In *Narratives of War: Remembering and Chronicling Battle in Twentieth-Century Europe*, edited by Nanci Adler, Remco Ensels, and Michael J. Wintle. Memory and Narrative. New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.