

FIGHT THE POWER

EFFECT OF POST-ELECTION ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION
UPON THE PROBABILITY OF INCUMBENT REPLACEMENT



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

ROBERT ANDERSSON

Master's Thesis

Spring 2023

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Supervisor: Annekatrin Deglow

Word count: 10 871

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to answer the research question as to whether post-election anti-government actions lead to increased probability of incumbent being replaced. The theoretical argument is that the anti-government groups can choose to use violence or non-violence to force the government to give concessions, the ultimate one being replacement of the incumbent. Both violence and non-violence are argued to have a positive effect on the probability of this to happen, but the latter should be stronger. Two hypotheses capture this:

H1: Anti-government violence increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced.

H2: Anti-government non-violence increase the incumbent's probability of being replaced more than anti-government violence does.

Using a logistic regression on 550 elections compiled from the NELDA and ECAV datasets, the first hypothesis is not supported due to lack of statistical significance across the models. The second hypothesis is supported as the non-violent independent variable receives statistically significant results, but these do not hold in the robustness test. Taking into account the suggestions from previous literature, the results do hint towards non-violence being the more successful option of action, but it cannot be concluded with certainty.

Keywords; Electoral violence, anti-government, opposition, post-election.

Dedicated to Nelly Andersson

A beloved grandmother who taught kindness and the belief in human good

Born 10 December 1923

Passed away 20 May 2023

Acknowledgements

Writing this master thesis would not have been possible without the influence from many important people in my surroundings.

To begin with, I wish to send my deepest gratitude to Associate Professor Annekatrin Deglow, the supervisor of this thesis, for all the constructive feedback, challenging questions, and encouragement during the writing period. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to PhD Student Gudlaug Olafsdottir who engaged me in the field of electoral violence in the end of my bachelor studies. Furthermore, I would like to send my deepest regards to the rest of the colleagues on the Department of Peace and Conflict at Uppsala University, for all the fantastic research and all the opportunities provided during my years as a student.

These years, and especially the time in the master's programme, would never have been the same without my classmates, to whom I want to express my greatest appreciation. I am extremely lucky to count among my friend's people who care for each other on such a deep level as you.

Most beloved, however, was my grandmother, Nelly Andersson, to whom this thesis is dedicated. For almost a century you showed with ease what human kindness can be, and your guidance, happiness, and cinnamon buns will never be forgotten.

Lastly, I wish to send a great Thanks to all the scientists and practitioners around the world, who work tirelessly to reduce armed conflict, violence, and human suffering.

Thank you all!

Robert Andersson

Uppsala, 26th of May 2023

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Theory	3
2.1. Literature Review	3
2.1.1. Electoral violence, fraud, and general consequences	3
2.1.2. The pre-election source of post-election violence and protest	4
2.1.3. Anti-government action: violence and non-violence	5
2.1.4. Success and failure of anti-governmental action	7
2.2. Research Gap and Question	8
2.3. Theoretical Argument	9
2.3.1. Central concepts	9
2.3.2. Post-election dynamics and causal mechanism	11
2.3.3. Main claim and hypotheses	14
2.3.4. Scope Condition	14
3. Research Design	16
3.1. Research Method	16
3.2. Datasets and Sample	17
3.3. Operationalization of Variables	18
3.4. Robustness Test	19
3.5. Limitations	20
4. Analysis	21
4.1. Descriptive Statistics	21
4.1.1. Summary of variables	21
4.1.2. Covariation of the independent variables	22

4.2. Regression Analysis	24
4.3. Robustness Test – Log-transformed variables	26
5. Discussion and Conclusions	29
5.1. Summary of the thesis	29
5.2. Conclusions	30
5.3. Suggestions for Further Research	31
5.4. Practical Implications	32
6. Bibliography	34
7. Appendix 1: Script of Code	37

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Schematic map of post-election dynamics	12
Figure 2: Illustration of the causal mechanism	13
Figure 3: Distribution boxplot of independent variables	23
Figure 4: Histogram Anti-government violence	26
Figure 5: Histogram Anti-government Non-violence	26
Table 1: Illustration of actors and methods	11
Table 2: Summary statistics of variables	22
Table 3: Regression analysis	25
Table 4: Robustness test	28

1. Introduction

Democracy can be regarded as the most sustainable, peaceful, and safe form of governance used in modern time. It has developed in symbiosis with the respect of human rights, health, and increased living standards. It is in its essence a system for non-violent conflict management, allowing for differences and of opinion and political will, reducing motives for internal violent conflicts. Internationally, it has been found that democracies do not go to war against other democracies (Hegre 2014; Hegre, Bernhard, and Teorell 2020). At the same time, democracy is not a utopia. The transition period to a consolidated democracy is often a violent and unstable time. Democratic institutions are new and weak, while autocratic groups or personas might remain in power or strive for it (Mansfield and Snyder 2009). Popular elections of leaders and parliaments are supposed to be the free and fair benchmarks of the strength of the democratic system, but in the transition period there is often a high risk of cheating in different forms. With high stakes of influence, some groups can be ready to commit fraud or violence to win (van Ham and Lindberg 2015; Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020).

To commit electoral violence is to use threat, indirect or direct violence against individuals, voting material, candidates, or the electoral institutions. In recent years, it has been studied by academic scholars as a subtype of political violence that is more specifically focused on influencing the electoral process or the electoral outcome. It can occur both before an election, on the election day or after the election (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020). In the pre-election phase, the incumbent or government is often the perpetrator or instigator with the goal to intimidate the opposition from voting sincerely or sometimes even to displace possible opposition voters. While finding that this method does increase the incumbent chances of winning in the short-term, scholars emphasize that the risk of political backlash also increases. In other words, fraud and violence leading to electoral victory can also lead to anti-government action in the post-election phase (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Andersson 2023).

Everyday oppression or harassment by an autocratic regime tend to target single individuals or groups at time, making resistance dangerous and unlikely to create lasting change. But election fraud and violence are a form of harassment against a large part of the population at a specific point in time, effectively reducing the collective action problem. When a protest begins, the danger of individual repression for each participating individual decreases as the

crowd grows (Tucker 2007). The protestors can then choose to use violent or non-violent means to reach their goals, which can cause very different dynamics and final outcomes. Some movements manage to attract large numbers of participants and international actors might pressure the government to give in. Other movements cripple under repression from the government, and in yet other situations, the risk of a full-scale civil war can increase (della Porta et al. 2018). Literature suggests that while all types of methods a movement can chose to employ has the potential to force incumbents to give concessions of power, non-violent movements seem to be more efficient. However, this literature is based on social movement protests in general and does not discuss the post-election phase specifically (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Furthermore, these studies are seldom able to discern in which circumstances the anti-government actions actually has an effect, and which methods of violence or non-violence that the opposition actually benefit from (Tucker 2007; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Andersson 2023).

All in all, it is still unknown how the choice of violence or non-violence affect the prospect of various outcomes, especially in the quite specific situation of post-election protests, leading up to the researched question posed in this thesis:

Do post-election anti-government actions lead to increased probability of incumbent being replaced?

This question is analyzed herein using quantitative statistical regression on data from the NELDA, National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021), and ECAV, Electoral Contention and Violence (Daxecker, Amicarelli, and Jung 2019a; 2019b) datasets, separating anti-government violent events and non-violent events. Pro-government action is similarly divided and controlled for, together with two indicators for fraud. The 550 post-election cases included provides results that largely falls in line with what the previous literature on general political protests and movements suggest (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022). While anti-government violence does not achieve statistical significance, non-violence does so and thus seem to have an impact on the incumbent's probability of being replaced. However, the significance does not pass the robustness test, whereby no strong credible conclusions can be drawn. As the lack

of statistical significance may be caused by an issue of multicollinearity, further studies are needed to answer the research question with stronger certainty.

2. Theory

2.1. Literature Review

This review of previous literature firstly goes through what electoral violence is and how the post-election violent dynamics can begin by the source of pre-election events. Thereafter, literature describing anti-government violence and non-violence is presented before the review concludes with literature upon the success and failures of different forms of anti-government action.

2.1.1. Electoral violence, fraud, and general consequences

Electoral violence is a coercive method using both threats, direct and indirect violence against individuals, voting material, candidates, or the electoral institution. It has been studied by academic scholars as a subtype of political violence, specifically focused on influencing the electoral process or the electoral outcome. The goal of the violence is often political exclusion in some form, be it from candidacy or election information to participation or electoral victory. It can occur both before an election, on the election day or after the election, and be perpetrated by a variety of different actors within, or external to, a society (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020). Often, it occurs in countries of democratic transition, where the electoral institutions and norms are still weak and where the outcome has high stakes. Only rarely does it occur in consolidated democracies and in complete autocracies there is generally not any competitive election occurring (Anderson and Mendes 2006; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020).

However, electoral violence is far from the only method of electoral meddling applied by incumbents, and on some occasion's other political players. Non-violent institutional manipulation and vote-buying are two examples of techniques has been of use. Which technique that is applied depends on the actor's perception of cost, benefit, and viability. For example, cheap alternatives such as institutional manipulation is more difficult to conduct

when institutional strength increases, thus increasing the use of vote-buying instead (van Ham and Lindberg 2015).

Scholars have also researched the potential general consequences of electoral violence and found that it can depress popular participation in the electoral process, stifle free speech and erode trust in the state (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020). Despite being condemned by voters, violence in the pre-election phase does seem to increase the probability of incumbents to win the election, while also carrying the large cost of destruction and loss of human lives. The incumbent is the general instigator of violence in the pre-election phase, often directly aiming at gaining vote shares by demobilizing the opposition, but the post-election period often see a different dynamic (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Andersson 2023).

2.1.2. The pre-election source of post-election violence and protest

Incumbents are generally the perpetrator of pre-election violence as well as fraud in other forms, but the use of these illegitimate methods of winning can spark post-election dynamics that makes it difficult for the incumbent to remain in power after the election (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Andersson 2023). Generally, incumbents seem to underestimate the risk of potential voter backlash and protests following their instigation of violence, by focusing on the short-term goal of securing electoral victory (Rosenzweig 2021).

The opposition often does not engage in protests or violence in the pre-election phase, as there still exists a possibility for the government to conduct a free and fair election. It is when the election has been held and the evidence of fraud or violence is certain that protests most often erupt, as there is at that time a lack of other means to influence the electoral outcome (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016). Often, the opposition also seem to be more prone to protest when they are the electoral loser and not when they win. In those circumstances, the tables seem to turn and the losing incumbents supporters become the protestors (Anderson and Mendes 2006).

Scholars have also found that when election observers report on perpetrated fraud and incumbent instigated pre-election violence the risk increases that post-election protest and violence will erupt. This is thought to be due to observers being perceived as a trustworthy neutral party providing reliable information. When the opposition or voter population receives this information, they can decide without doubts to challenge the incumbent (Daxecker 2012).

When disaggregating the post-election violence-data upon the perpetrator, more dynamic relations between pro-government forces and anti-government opposition groups becomes apparent. When election observers are present, governments are often unable to avoid blame for repressive violence due to the use of military or police equipment, methods, and insignia, thus risking international condemnation, while the opposition leaders more easily can avoid responsibility by blaming individual vigilantes. Therefore, in non-fraudulent elections observers decrease the repressive measures by the government. However, when fraud is reported by the observers both the government and the opposition are more likely to engage in violence (Smidt 2016). It is important to notice here that it does not seem that it is the electoral fraud itself that triggers the protest and violence, but the certainty and spread of the beliefs about the fraud (Tucker 2007). The reversed situation has also been found, where trust in the democratic system and institutions decrease the risk of post-election violence (Savoca 2017).

Scholars argue that post-election protests can force incumbent to pay expensive concessions, such as canceling election results or resign. Protests creates a signaling game of resolve between the government and opposition, making vulnerabilities and weaknesses visible. This in turn can lead to the incumbent being challenged also by other actors, such as receiving pressure in the form of sanctions from other states or facing the threat of military coups (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016). For example, military coups has been found to often occur in the post-election phase of pluralistic political systems when the election results demonstrates lack of support for the winner (Rozenas and Zeigler 2019).

2.1.3. Anti-government action: violence and non-violence

This far, anti-governmental protest and violence has been discussed in unison, but it is important to disaggregate the two actions before moving forward. Opposition groups can choose between a multitude of different methods to portray their dissent and aim to bring about change when confronted with a post-election situation they perceive unfair. These actions can be broadly divided between violent and non-violent, which generally tend to be followed by different forms of government response and final outcomes. The first step to understand why the opposition would choose violence or non-violence is to understand how they begin to take action at all.

During everyday life, governmental authoritarian behavior, harassment, or violence often occurs against singular individuals and in small doses. To oppose it would thus hold great individual risks while the chances of bringing about sustainable and systematic change is low. At fraudulent elections, however, the whole population is simultaneously experiencing the authoritarian treatment, which can become a focal point of popular dissent, especially if the fraud is perceived to have significantly changed the electoral outcome. Thereby, more people can demonstrate their dissent simultaneously, and as crowds grow the personal risk of punishment decreases. In other words, the cost of participation decreases while the likelihood of achieving systemic change increases, overcoming the collective action problem (Tucker 2007).

When the decision to act has been taken by the crowd, the choice of method must be made. Most collective actions begin as non-violent and then may turn violent due to the conflict dynamics. The field of social movements and civil war provides some clues of how this transition from protests to violence can occur. To begin with, there must be some background factors present, such as political destabilization and indiscriminate policing, followed by deterioration of security for the population. In other words, the government should need to violently repress the protest before the protest itself can turn into a violent movement. Thereafter, three inter-related effects can start. The first is an activation of military networks, either by the defect of security units or the joining of other elements with violent skills and equipment. These feed the potential of the protests, while the second effect, spiraling revenge, can provide motives. By perceiving the contemporary situation as linked to previous traumas, or the government repression as a threat, justifications of violence as either protective or as revenge can emerge. Thirdly, the presence of ethnicity or ideology can strengthen the social cohesion by providing a sectarian form of identification within the more and more violent movement (della Porta *et al.*, 2018, p. 23-46).

The Euromaidan protests of Ukraine in 2014 is a clear empirical example of this mechanism. Previously, protests in Ukraine had to a large extent been non-violent and they succeeded as such in 2004. However, in 2014 the government lacked the same international restrictions it had previously had, when aiming to get better ties with the EU, and applied harsh repression upon the protestors. This sparked the activation of military networks, vigilante groups of various kind, on the side of the protestors. This led in turn to what can be described as a low-intensity civil war rather than the otherwise recurring non-violent protests (Ritter 2017).

Other studies have found ethnicity to be important as a marker for identity to be one of the factors for eruption of civil war, but it also found that strong cohesion within the social protest movement actually could alleviate the risk of turning non-violence into violence (Mustasilta and Svensson 2023). It has furthermore been found that group composition can have an influence on the choice of method. In centralized groups, moderates in leadership positions can be able to keep radicals on the side, thus controlling violent outbursts. In decentralized groups, the risk is higher that radicals can take over which thus may increase the potential for violence (Daxecker 2009).

2.1.4. Success and failure of anti-governmental action

There are very few studies that directly seek to distinguish the success rate of protests or violence, and the causes of success, specifically in a post-election environment. However, scholars in neighboring fields have begun to disentangle similar questions.

To begin with, in constructing a dataset for Violent Political Protests, Svensson, Schaftenaar and Allansson found that anti-governmental violence in protest form concerning government, and not territorial issues, achieved their demands fully in 35.7% of cases, partially in 9.5% of cases and failed to gain any concessions in 54.8% of cases, counting effects occurring within twelve months after the protest event. However, the dataset uses a relatively high threshold for data inclusion, requiring 25 directly related deaths to occur within a conflict-dyad during one calendar year. This is the same arbitrary threshold used for defining armed conflict in the *Uppsala Conflict Data Programme* (Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022). It is reasonable to assume that the dataset of violent political protest excludes many cases of protests that has been characterized by violence which would classify as electoral, containing threats, direct or indirect violence against individuals, voting materials, candidates or electoral institutions, but not reaching 25 direct deaths (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022).

Should the anti-government actor choose to not use any form of protest movement but instead make use of only violent means, the related research field upon global terrorism has found that those groups designated as terrorists by the USA very rarely seem to achieve any of their set objectives and goals. This tendency can be connected to the nature of terrorist acts themselves. Targeting civilians decrease chances of gaining popular support and instead increases the support for the government. At the same time, governments turn unlikely to be

ready to bargain concessions due to the perceived maximalist claims by the group in question (Abrahms 2006). These findings, however, must be connected to the topic of this thesis with an ounce of care. Terrorism is but one form of political violence and other types might give other outcomes.

Research on the effects of non-violent protests and campaigns has reached further and closer to the question of this thesis. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephen have found that non-violent campaigns can put high pressure on governments by disrupting societal functioning but without threatening the physical well-being of the individuals in the government. This increases the government's willingness to give concessions in comparison to violent campaigns. At the same time, if a government choose to repress a non-violent movement by force, the risk increases for domestic and international backfire with reduced popular support and sanctions. Violent campaigns can also force concessions, but are less able to achieve the described effect, to gather popular support themselves and they may even cause other states to support the government (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Chenoweth further finds that half of all non-violent revolutions worldwide between 1900 and 2019 has been successful, while only 26% of violent campaigns resulted in success, which is an incredible difference (Chenoweth 2021, p. 1-26).

As a sidenote, it is always necessary to remember that the dynamic relations in a conflict of electoral outcome between the opposition and the government always has the risk of escalating into a non-controlled violent spiral. The risk is especially high when both sides make use of violence and recent history provides multiple examples, such as Syria, where protests and repression circles has descended into civil war (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022).

2.2. Research Gap and Question

The previous research has done well to cover vast dimensions of political violence, non-violence, and the government-opposition dynamics in electoral settings. Yet there are gaps in our understanding of the post-election dynamics. Most research has so far focused on the pre-election phase and assumed the government to be instigator, but new studies have nuanced this picture (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020). The separation of instigators between pro-government and anti-government has made clear that while the incumbent is often the perpetrator of violence is the pre-election phase, the opposition can answer with mass

protests, or other actions, in the post-election phase which might sometimes be violent (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Andersson 2023).

Several studies suggests that these protests, or other actions such as coups, is a source of concern for incumbents who have committed fraud or violence, as they can be able to refuse the incumbent power and force the government to make concessions. However, seldom are these studies able to discern in which circumstances the anti-government actions actually has an effect, and which methods violence or non-violence that the opposition actually benefit from (Tucker 2007; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Andersson 2023).

The neighboring fields of social movements and violent protests suggests that violent anti-governmental action in a general setting can have some effect to gain concessions fully or partially (Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022). But it also finds that the effects of non-violent action is much stronger for reaching concessions while also reducing the risk of successful violent repression by the government (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth 2021).

However, these findings are as said put in a general setting, and the specific post-electoral environment may provide specific circumstances that changes the suggested dynamics.

To summarize, there is a gap in academic knowledge concerning the effects that anti-governmental action, violence and non-violence, can have specifically in a post-electoral setting. The aim of this thesis is therefore to contribute to reduce this gap by asking the following research question:

Do post-election anti-government actions lead to increased probability of incumbent being replaced?

2.3. Theoretical Argument

2.3.1. Central concepts

Throughout the literature review a few different concepts has been used quite interchangeably due to the authors choice. So, before moving further it is necessary to define some of the key concepts that is used throughout the thesis, and how they relate to other phrasings.

To begin with, the *post-election phase* does not have a specific time limit but begins directly after the ballot offices has closed and the votes are to be counted. Events related to the election outcome can occur through a long time span, but to separate it from general political events it has to be a direct link to the election rather than only a resentment towards the government. Thus, post-election phase usually ends when it is no longer possible to refuse the election winner to step into the elected position (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021; Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020).

Previous literature has interchangeably used various phrasings to describe the pro-government side in a dichotomous division between actors in the electoral situation, with words such as incumbent, government, or electoral winner. Some of the previous literature tend to describe the incumbent as direct perpetrator or instigator of electoral violence. However, as Andersson (Andersson 2023) points out, it is often far from certain that the incumbent is in control of the violence or other actions of his or her supporters, even if benefiting from it. Therefore, this thesis will describe all actors who work toward the benefit of the government or the incumbent as *pro-government*, no matter how controlled or uncontrolled these actors are.

In a similar fashion all actors whose actions benefit the opposition is to be described as *anti-government*. It is often difficult to assign the role of instigator to specific parties, groups or leaders, especially as the actual decision-maker of violence or protest might keep distance to the actions in order to not be credibly blamed for eventual damage (Smidt 2016).

So far, two general types of behavior, violence and non-violence, has been discussed within the concept of anti-government action. The concept of *violence* in this thesis is derived from the definition of electoral violence used by Birch, Daxecker and Höglund (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020), collecting all actions of threats, direct and indirect violence against individuals, voting material, candidates, or the electoral institution. *Non-violent* electoral action is thus all actions that does not use threats, direct or indirect violence, but still aim at influencing individuals, candidates, or the electoral institution. The most common, or at least most discussed in the literature, type of nonviolent anti-government action seems to be peaceful protests. Of course, this distinction between violence and non-violence is also applicable to the pro-government side (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; della Porta et al. 2018; Chenoweth 2021, p. 1-26).

	Anti-government actor	Pro-government actor
Violent method	Anti-government violence	Pro-government violence
Non-violent method	Anti-government non-violence	Pro-government non-violence

Table 1: Illustration of actors and methods

The dependent variable of the research question is *probability of incumbent being replaced*. The use of the term *probability* is discussed in the Research Design chapter. But the use of the word incumbent instead of pro-government here is of importance. Pro-government refers to, as mentioned above, the whole spectrum of more or less controlled actors who is on the side of the government when committing their various actions. But it is not these groups that the anti-government actions are often directed against. It is the incumbent whose replacement they seek, thus, the phrasing *incumbent* is necessary to use. Lastly, the dependent variable aims to capture the chances that the anti-government action lead to the incumbent being *replaced*. The word does not imply what the official reason is the change of leader. It can be situations where the incumbent claims to voluntarily step away from power due to other reasons than demonstrations. However, it is not possible for this thesis to conclude what the real reasons may be, or in what form the replacement is officially phrased. The thesis merely aims to find a correlation between the occurrence of anti-government action and the chance of change of leader in the post-election phase.

2.3.2. Post-election dynamics and causal mechanism

To get a concise understanding of the background causes of violent and non-violent anti-government action can be described as following: In a post-election setting of an unconsolidated democracy, the risk of anti-government protests or violence increases if there exist a belief that the incumbent government is responsible for pre-election violence and electoral fraud (Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Smidt 2016; Andersson 2023). The anti-governmental actors choose to portray their discontent either with violent methods or non-violent methods. What they decide for depends on several different circumstances. Usually, it begins with non-violent protests that the government repress, in a context of political destabilization. This causes the security to deteriorate, and the anti-government actor can activate military networks with skills and equipment for violence. Having thus achieved the potential for violence, the movement can now gain motivation for

violence by spiraling revenge. Previous trauma or contemporary repression justifies violence as self-defense. Ideology or ethnicity can further strengthen social cohesion within the now violent movement by providing a sectarian identity marker (della Porta *et al.*, 2018, p. 23-46).

Of course, the government can choose to provide the opposition with concessions before the activation of military networks. But, having arrived at a situation where the anti-government actors can choose between the use of violence and non-violence, the government can also choose to violently repress the opposition which, if successful, can stop any further anti-governmental action, thus halting the continuation of the causal mechanism (della Porta *et al.* 2018, p. 23-46; AFP 2021). If the government is failing with their goal of the repressive measures, and the anti-government groups decide to use violence, the risk is that other states may support either the government or the opposition. Internally, the support for the government can remain and the opposition can find it difficult to conduct mass mobilization, however they may still be able to force the government to give concessions (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022). If the government tries, and fails, to repress a non-violent protest, the chances are higher that the popular and international support for the government decreases, and other states may condemn the government. Mass mobilization disrupts the functionality of society and pushes the government to give concessions or abdicate from power (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).




Figure 1: Schematic map of post-election dynamics

To put it schematically, a non-violent protest can emerge and demand concessions. But if the protests are repressed, they can die out, continue with non-violence, or turn into violent action. If continuing with non-violence, previous research suggests that concessions eventually can be granted (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth 2021, p. 1-26), but

more repression can also lead to the protest to fail (AFP 2021). If the action turns violent it can likewise be repressed or force concessions.

The last piece of the theoretical puzzle is how, by what causal mechanism, anti-governmental violence and non-violence force the government and incumbent to give concessions. Previous literature provides some argument that non-violent protests can disrupt everyday societal functioning and rise create political awareness. This creates a political pressure and gives spotlight to what the government will do. This also demonstrates lack of support for the government which can in turn increase the risk of military coups. Repression, especially of non-violent movements, can also lead to international pressure and condemnation (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; della Porta et al. 2018; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022). Anti-government violence works to force concessions with a similar mechanism but disrupts societal functioning more by physical destruction and damage than by the presence of large number of protestors.




Figure 2: Illustration of the causal mechanism

Concessions is a broad term that can include many different types of policy implications made by the government to seduce the opposing actor, in this case the anti-government side, and end the political pressure and societal disruption (della Porta et al. 2018). Which type and quantity of concessions that are necessary to achieve that depends on the goals of the adversary, or anti-government groups, as well as the dynamics and events that has been leading up to the situation. Incumbent replacement is but one type of concessions but should not be taken for granted that this is always the goal of, or enough for, the anti-government

groups. However, in the post-election phase after incumbent electoral victory, and in a situation where resentment has made people to take part in anti-government actions, at least one of the goals can often credibly be assumed to be incumbent replacement. Thus, if the incumbent is replaced following anti-government action, the goal is assumed to have been reached.

2.3.3. Main claim and hypotheses

From the literature review and the causal mechanism described above is derived the main claim of this thesis. That is that anti-government violence and non-violence in the post-election setting increases the probability of incumbent being replaced despite winning the election. This follows from the dynamics of the whole electoral process, where the incumbent can benefit with electoral victory by committing violence during specific circumstances in the pre-election phase (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Andersson 2023). Thereafter, in the post-election phase, the opposition can use violence or non-violence to refuse the incumbent to stay in power, by putting pressure on the government by disruption of societal function, while also increasing the risk of coups and international condemnation (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022). Thus, in essence, anti-government violence or non-violence in the post-election phase should increase the probability that the incumbent will be replaced from power. However, it is also derived from the previous literature that anti-government non-violent protest can have even stronger effect on the probability of incumbent replacement (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth 2021). Combined, this leads to the construction of the two following hypotheses:

H1: Anti-government violence increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced.

H2: Anti-government non-violence increase the incumbent's probability of being replaced more than anti-government violence does.

2.3.4. Scope condition

This thesis focuses on national elections in countries with a democratic transition process or at least countries with hybrid governance. That excludes consolidated democracies and

autocracies without competitive elections. Consolidated democracies can be excluded as the prevalence of electoral violence is very rare and the electoral institutions are generally trusted. The eventual outbreak of electoral violence in democracies should not produce outcomes comparable to the violence in countries of democratic transition. Thus, they are not applicable in this thesis (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Daxecker, Amicarelli, and Jung 2019a; 2019b). Autocracies that do not execute competitive elections are not applicable either. When there is no proper anti-government forces or opposition present, and if anyone disagreeing with the government does not have the possibility to gain influence through elections, the same importance is not put into the election outcome, as if there had been actual competition. Therefore, there should be lower amounts of electoral violence in these countries, not reflecting the influence of the electoral process. Furthermore, some of these countries simply lack any anti-government groups that can take action and thus it is not possible to measure what this thesis aims to do (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021).

Furthermore, the results of this thesis can only be generalized to cases where the incumbent won the election, and only these elections are included in the data. If the incumbent win, it can potentially spark anti-government action in the post-election phase, especially if the anti-government actors perceive the victory to be illegitimate. This can be the case if election monitors report that the election has been fraudulent, as discussed previously (Daxecker 2012; Smidt 2016). On the other hand, if the incumbent loses at least some of the groups that were anti-government before the election turns pro-government, which changes the group constellations and power dynamics of the post-election phase. It should also spur protests and violence with a different agenda and goal than otherwise. Groups that were anti-government before can aim to protect the power of the newly elected leader, rather than aim to replace the incumbent. Such a situation could also have the potential to incentivize the incumbent to instigate more post-election violence than otherwise, in order to refuse the newly elected leader the seat of power. Post-election situations with incumbent loss are still of importance to research, but for these reasons it is not possible to include those cases in the setup of this study.

Lastly, only national elections are included, and the results can only be generalized to these. Local elections do generally not have the same level of influence on political power distribution and may arouse other sets of dynamics than national elections (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021).

In summary, the results of this thesis should be generalizable to national elections of states with a democratization process or hybrid regime, in post-election situations where the incumbent won the election.

3. Research Design

3.1. Research Method

The research method of this thesis consists of quantitative cross-sectional statistical analysis, measuring the statistical correlation between the independent and dependent variable is measured while confounding variables are controlled for. Quantitative statistical methods are suitable to test hypotheses with large-N data from across a global environment and find generalizable outcomes on the dependent variable (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 92-102). Cross-sectional models give results that can possibly explain patterns found across a variety of cultural, ethnical, and political settings. However, it lacks the possibility to detect changes over time as would a time-series approach be able to. For example, a cross-sectional model is not able to explain differences in post-election dynamics chronologically across elections within specific states (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 92-94)

The unit-of-analysis in this thesis is *election*. That allows for aggregating the amount of violent and non-violent events occurring in each specific post-electoral phase and is based on the data structure of the NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021).

This thesis makes use of a logistic regression model as the dependent variable is dichotomous. Thus, the regression produces log-odds coefficients whose direction of effect and statistical significance can be directly read from the regression. However, the effect size cannot be interpreted directly without the use of post-estimation analysis, which lies beyond the time and resources available for this thesis (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 277-280). The result of the regression is further controlled for with a robustness test, described in more detail in the section below.

It is not possible for the chosen research method to discern if there is a causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables, only correlation. However, the suggested chronology of the events as described in the Theory chapter points decisively towards the assumption that the dependent variable of incumbent being replaced should follow after the independent variables of anti-government violence and anti-government non-violence.

Furthermore, the causal mechanism presents a possible linkage between the variables. At the same time, the different parts of the mechanism are not measured with the chosen research method, thus not answering if the causal story argued for is truly the way in which eventual correlation works. Another issue is that while the logistic regression includes controlling for potentially confounding variables, pro-government action and electoral fraud, it is not certain that the results are the source of omitted variable bias. In other words, it cannot for certain be established that there are no other confounding variables that have been left out (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 60-69).

3.2. Datasets and Sample

Data for the analysis is taken from the compatible datasets National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) and Electoral Contention And Violence (ECAV). NELDA covers all national elections with voters from the population in almost all states globally. It covers a time period between 1945 to 2020 and provides detailed information on the nature of the election with 58 different variables (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021). In this thesis, the NELDA dataset provides information for the dependent variable, control variables of fraud and data collection.

ECAV use some data from NELDA, such as identification of individual elections. But it also provides specific and novel information on events of electoral violence or other forms of contention, collected from news reports. However, it only covers the time period 1990 to 2012 and covers only countries with unconsolidated regimes that held competitive elections (Daxecker, Amicarelli, and Jung 2019a; 2019b). Data from ECAV provides information for the two independent variables by aggregation of actor-and-method-specified event data upon each election. In other words, for each election there is a count made for events of anti-government violence and anti-government non-violence. ECAV also contributes to data collection and the pro-government violence and non-violence control variables.

This thesis only aims to cover post-election events in competitive national elections of non-consolidated regimes, as described in the Scope Condition section. These events are sorted out by comparing election date and event date variables in the ECAV dataset. ECAV does not include consolidated democracies, counted as those countries that were members of the OECD in the year of 1990. The only exception to this rule is the case of Turkey which is included. Thus, the countries not included in ECAV is dropped. The NELDA dataset is used

to further select suitable cases. All elections where opposition is not allowed was dropped by the variable and nelda3, as was all elections where the incumbent party lost with variable nelda24. This case selection process returns 550 elections from the period 1990 to 2012, which is the time covered in ECAV. Not all these elections experienced post-election violence or protests, but when so happened the instigator of the event or the violence is detectable.

3.3. Operationalization of Variables

To test the two hypotheses upon the quantitative data the central concepts of the thesis must be operationalized into measurable variables. This is done by extracting, managing, and merging data for elections and events in the NELDA and ECAV datasets. In the final data matrix, there are 550 elections with 18 variables, five of which are used as identifiers, electiondate, stateid, ccode, country and year. The nelda3 and nelda24 variables is only used for data collection purposes while nelda11 and nelda49 indicates fraud in the election and functions as control variables. Nelda39 constitutes the indicator for the dependent variable and is renamed in the regression tables as *Probability Incumbent Replaced*. Anti-government violence and anti-government non-violence captures the independent variables while the pro-government violence and non-violence controls for all the events not committed by the anti-government groups. Finally, the anti-government and pro-government variables are also log-transformed to prepare for robustness checks.

The indicator of the dependent variable, nelda39, asks the question whether the incumbent is replaced or not. As only cases where the incumbent won the election is included in the data, a typical situation would thereby give the answer “No”. If the answer is “Yes”, the incumbent was replaced in the seat of power despite winning the election. The designation of election winner is based on the official results, not taking into account whether the results are a product of fraud or pre-election violence. One potential problem with nelda39 is that the indicator does not have a specified time limit. Therefore, it is difficult to take into account how far after the election that the incumbent is actually replaced or not (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021).

The indicators for the independent variables and the control variables of pro-government violence and non-violence are separated and aggregated stepwise. Firstly, the original ECAV dataset provides information on whether or not a specific event was violent or not. If it was violent, the ViolenceInitiator variable indicates the aggressor as read from the Actor and

Target variables. If the event was non-violent and the direction of the event is known, the instigator was the group found in the Actor variable. Cases with unknown instigator was dropped. Secondly, the number of events by each side and method that occurred on each specific election is aggregated and counted (Daxecker, Amicarelli, and Jung 2019a; 2019b).

The two variables for pro-government action, violence and non-violence, are separated and aggregated by the same method as the independent variables. The purpose is to control for the countering actions that a government or its supporters can take, that could possibly affect both the occurrence of further anti-government actions, the type of anti-government actions or, in the end, the probability that the incumbent is replaced.

Electoral fraud is, just as pro-government action, a possible confounding variable. Previous studies show how it can affect the independent variables by increasing the likelihood of anti-government action in the post-election phase (Daxecker 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Smidt 2016). Electoral fraud also affects the incumbent's position in power in two connected ways. Firstly, by increasing the chances for the incumbent to win the election in the first hand (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Andersson 2023). Secondly, by increasing the willingness of the incumbent to use all possible instruments to remain in power among events of anti-government violence and non-violence (Smidt 2016). In this thesis, electoral fraud is operationalized with two indicating variables, both derived from the NELDA dataset. The first is `nelda11`, which asks if there were any significant concerns before the election that it would not be free and fair. The second is `nelda49`, asking if any monitors refused to attend the election due to the belief that it would not be free and fair (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021). Neither of these indicators is a perfect measure of *actual* fraud committed, nor a measure of the belief that fraud *did* occur, but rather the pre-election belief that fraud *can* occur. While not perfectly aligning with the purposes of this thesis, these indicators are still deemed the most suitable in the datasets used to have a crude measure of electoral fraud.

3.4. Robustness Test

To ensure that the results of the regression analysis is not only due to the specific method, a robustness test using log-transformed anti-government and pro-government variables is provided. In the main regression, the number of events of each differentiated type is aggregated and counted for each election. Thereby, the change in value between one event

occurring and two events is given the same importance as if there would be a change in value from 51 to 52 events. However, it is possible that it matters less for the dynamics between the anti-government and pro-government sides if there is a change from 51 to 52 events, compared to if there is a change from one to two events. By log-transforming the variables counting number of events, higher importance is given to a change of smaller values than bigger values, whereby it is a useful tool to control that the results are robust (Gerring 2012, p. 319-321; Powner 2015, p. 167).

Other robustness test would have been a benefit to include, such as using other datasets with similar measurements. Thus, it would be possible to control that the results are not the source of the specific indicators used in the main regression but is actually the results of the presence of the theoretical concepts (Gerring 2012, p. 319-321; Powner 2015, p. 167). However, due to limitations in time and resources, such robustness tests are not included in this thesis.

3.5. Limitations

Using the research method described above, indicators and theoretical assumptions leads to a couple of limitations in what this thesis can achieve when it comes to scientific certainty. To begin with, the analysis only covers elections between the year 1990 and 2012 due to accessible data. However, the results can probably be generalized beyond that time limit, at least to the post-Cold war era, as the global circumstances are somewhat similar.

Generalization beyond that should be avoided at this stage.

Another issue that limits the thesis is the conceptualization made of the anti-government side. While the pro-government side can credibly be assumed to support at most only a few parties with similar goals and ideologies, the same assumption cannot be made about the anti-government side. There can be many parties in opposition with wide variance of ideologies. For example, if one group of supporters of anti-government leftist parties commit certain actions, it may not affect right-leaning anti-government parties in the same way as the groups affect their own position. Thus, if one group commit actions and another group benefits, the results may be spurious when measuring them together (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 285-288). The reason the anti-government conceptualization and operationalization is used in this thesis is that it is currently the most suitable available measure. It is crude, but it is a progress from not separating the actors of electoral violence when measuring (Smidt 2016; Andersson 2023).

A third issue of limitation is potential multicollinearity between the independent variables of anti-government violence and anti-government non-violence. They are clearly separated concepts and remains so as operationalized variables. Violence and non-violence are two distinct forms of action without blurry overlap. However, they might still correlate. The presence of non-violence may affect the use of violence in the dynamic conflict setting between the pro-government and anti-government side (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 263-270). To give a hypothetical example derived from the previous literature: If anti-government non-violent protest is faced with pro-government violence in the form of repression, there is an inherent risk that at least some of the anti-government groups choose to answer with violent methods (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022). Due to this risk to the results of multicollinearity the covariation between the independent variables is be presented and discussed in the Analysis and Discussion chapters.

The fourth and final limitation of the research method in this thesis arises due to the use of logistic regression. The log-odds coefficients that the regression produces only allow interpretation of the direction of the effect and the statistical significance, but not the size of the effect (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 277-280). To calculate the effect-size a post-estimation analysis would have been needed, but that is beyond the available time and resources designated for the thesis.

4. Analysis

4.1. Descriptive statistics

4.1.1. Summary of variables

In the 550 elections covered by the final data matrix, the incumbent was replaced in only 94, or 17% of the cases, and remained in the other 456 cases. That the number of cases where the incumbent remain is high is reasonable, as the incumbent did win the election in all the cases. The question lies on what occurred in the 17% of cases where the incumbent was replaced despite electoral victory.

There was a slightly higher prevalence of anti-government non-violent events than anti-government violent events, with a mean of 1 compared to 1.8 and a maximum amount of 90 events per a single election compared to 68. In total, there were 537 cases of anti-government violence and 997 events of non-violence. The variance of the standard deviation was also

higher for the anti-government non-violent variable than the violent, reaching 7.5 and 5.3, respectively.

There was generally less pro-government action in the post-election phase than anti-government. Violence reached a mean of 0.6 with 2.7 standard deviation and a maximum number of events per election peaked at 38. Contrary to the pattern on the anti-government side, there was less prevalence of non-violent events for the pro-government side. With a peak of events per election at 25, the mean was 5.6 and the standard deviation 2.3.

The variables for fraud show that in the majority of cases, there were no pre-election significant concerns about freedom and fairness, and in 89% of elections the international monitors did not refuse to go because of concerns with freedom and fairness. In 44% of the cases there were explicit concerns how the election would turn out to be in this aspect, but in only 5% of elections were the concerns so grave that any monitor refused to be present.

Variable	N	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
AntigovViolence	550	1	5.3	0	68
AntigovNonviolence	550	1.8	7.5	0	90
ProgovViolence	550	0.6	2.7	0	38
ProgovNonviolence	550	0.56	2.3	0	25
nelda39	550				
... no	456	83%			
... yes	94	17%			
nelda11	550				
... no	293	53%			
... unclear	13	2%			
... yes	244	44%			
nelda49	550				
... N/A	9	2%			
... no	489	89%			
... unclear	24	4%			
... yes	28	5%			

Table 2: Summary statistics of variables

4.1.2. Covariation of the independent variables

The independent variables of anti-government violence and anti-government non-violence has some correlation. If non-violence occurs and the pro-government forces uses repression, in

some instances it is not unlikely that at least parts of the anti-government groups wish to respond with violent measures (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022). On face value, the figure below shows that the strong majority of elections have non or very few events of both non-violent and violent events, and there are only a few countable outliers that has above 20 events occurring. Their patterns of distribution is also quite similar to each other. A Pearson's correlation test between the variables returns the correlation value 0.26. This means that the violence and non-violence do have some positive correlation, implying that when one increases, so should the other. Thus, there might be a problem of multicollinearity in the regression, which can lower the chances of achieving statistical significance following difficulties to calculate which of the independent variables that causes the effect on the dependent variable. This problem could possibly be minimized with a larger data sample, however that is not possible to achieve with the current setup of the research method (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 263-270).




Figure 3: Distribution boxplot of independent variables

4.2. Regression Analysis

In the regression analysis below three models are presented to demonstrate the changes in the coefficients. In the first model, only the two independent variables are included to represent the general connection with the dependent variable. The second model includes the control variables of various pro-government action, violent and non-violent. The third model also includes the control variables for fraud, nelda11 and nelda49.

For the independent variables, there are several matters of importance to notice. Firstly, the anti-government violence does not achieve any level of statistical significance and should therefore not have a measurable and scientifically certain impact on the dependent variable of incumbent's probability to be replaced. Furthermore, the sign of the variable is mixed across the models, not providing any strong suggestion of what the impact of violence could have been. Thus, the first hypothesis, that anti-government violence increase probability of incumbent replacement, is not supported.

The non-violent independent variable, however, does achieve 95% statistical significance across all models. With coefficients constantly reaching above 1.0 the results suggest that non-violent actions by anti-government groups can have a positive impact on the probability that the incumbent will be replaced in the post-election phase. This even as the incumbent was proclaimed winner in the election, following in the line of the second hypothesis: anti-government non-violence seem to increase the incumbent's probability of being replaced. However, it is suggestable by these results, not completely tested, that the effect of non-violence is greater upon the dependent variable than anti-government violence.

For the control variables of pro-government action, no statistical significance was achieved. It is therefore difficult to give any hints of how pro-government violence or non-violence could affect the political dynamics of the post-election phase. Two of the returned values of the control variables for fraud achieves statistical significance and gives a negative sign. This suggests that concerns for fraud expressed before the election can have an impact to reduce the probability of an incumbent to be replaced after election victory.

	Probability incumbent replaced		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Intercept	0.194*** t = -13.778	0.199*** t = -13.412	0.618 t = -0.664
Antigov Violence	0.992 t = -0.342	1.010 t = 0.416	1.009 t = 0.341
Antigov Non-violence	1.032** t = 2.399	1.036** t = 2.227	1.040** t = 2.344
Progov Violence		0.873 t = -1.249	0.889 t = -1.092
Progov Non-violence		1.021 t = 0.291	1.020 t = 0.270
nelda1unclear			1.256 t = 0.331
nelda1yes			0.495*** t = -2.673
nelda49no			0.414 t = -1.208
nelda49unclear			0.085** t = -1.960
nelda49yes			0.657 t = -0.470
Observations	550	550	550
Log Likelihood	-248.508	-247.161	-240.310
Akaike Inf. Crit.	503.016	504.322	500.619
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		
	Coefficients are log-odds		

Table 3: Regression analysis

4.3. Robustness Test – Log-transformed variables

To control that the results of the main regression table is not sourced only from the specific method of measurement, a robustness test with log-transformed variables is conducted. To log-transform the variables of anti-government and pro-government action follows the theoretical argumentation that the change in value from one event to two events are of more importance to the dependent variable than the change in value from higher numbers, such as from 51 to 52 (Gerring 2012, p. 319-321; Pownor 2015, p. 167; Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 277-280). As this argumentation lead to an assumption that cannot be strengthened enough on its own, the log-transformation is not included in the main regression table. At the same time, the data shows that the distribution of the variables of anti-government violence and anti-government non-violence is skewed. Both show a high number of elections with non or very few events occurring of each kind. Only a handful of events reaches beyond 20 events of each type. This is presented by the figures below, where the blue line represents the mean, and the red line is the median. This pattern of distribution can possibly demonstrate that the change in low numbers should be more important than the change in greater numbers. Therefore, log-transformation of the event variables is conducted in this robustness test.




Figure 4: Histogram Anti-government violence




Figure 5: Histogram Anti-government Non-violence

When comparing the main regression table with the table from the log-transformed robustness test, several numbers are of severe interest. While the signs of the independent anti-government variables are all positive, none of them in any of the models achieve statistical significance with 95% confidence. The only variable to achieve this is `nelda11` with the “yes” output, which has a negative sign. Thus, according to this table, only concerns for fraud negatively affects the incumbent’s probability of being replaced. No certainty can be given that violent or non-violent events would have an influence in the incumbent replacement.

	Probability incumbent replaced		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Intercept	0.186***	0.189***	0.522
	t = -13.079	t = -12.876	t = -0.885
Antigov Violence	1.289	1.429*	1.408*
	t = 1.453	t = 1.813	t = 1.670
Antigov Non-violence	1.091	1.154	1.188
	t = 0.591	t = 0.878	t = 1.035
Progov Violence		0.728	0.773
		t = -1.088	t = -0.865
Progov Non-violence		0.993	1.004
		t = -0.027	t = 0.014
nelda11unclear			1.240
			t = 0.311
nelda11yes			0.495***
			t = -2.698
nelda49no			0.463
			t = -1.044
nelda49unclear			0.093*
			t = -1.875
nelda49yes			0.722
			t = -0.362
Observations	550	550	550
Log Likelihood	-249.440	-248.722	-241.965
Akaike Inf. Crit.	504.880	507.443	503.931
Note:	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01		
	Coefficients are log-odds		

Table 4: Robustness test

5. Discussion and Conclusions

5.1. Summary of the thesis

The research question of this thesis has been the following: *do post-election anti-government actions lead to increased probability of incumbent being replaced?* The previous literature and theoretical argument suggested that anti-government action in the post-election phase should be able to replace incumbents even though they have recently won the election. Also, while violent measures can be of success, they face higher risk than non-violent measures to be answered with violent repression from the pro-government side, and violence may even lead to pro-government international support (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Therefore, it proved necessary to differentiate between the type of action taken by anti-government groups to be able to see valuable results. The separation of anti-government action into violent and non-violent methods led to the two hypotheses. The first one stated that *anti-government violence increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced*, and the second hypothesis claimed that *anti-government non-violence increase the incumbent's probability of being replaced more than anti-government violence does*.

To test these statements a logistic regression analysis was employed using quantitative global data from the NELDA and ECAV datasets (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021; Daxecker, Amicarelli, and Jung 2019a; 2019b). By aggregating event data on post-election and incumbent-victory cases from unconsolidated regimes in the time-period 1990 to 2012, 550 cases were tested. The dependent variable, probability of incumbent being replaced, was found to have 94 cases, or 17%, where the incumbent was replaced. There was a slightly higher prevalence of anti-government non-violence than violence both in the average mean value and the maximum number of events per election. At the same time, a vast number of elections did not see any events of any type, and just a handful of elections had more than 20 events of each type.

In the regression analysis, the violent and non-violent actions taken by the pro-government side was controlled for, as was pre-election concerns of electoral fraud. The findings of the regression show no support for the first hypothesis, that anti-government violence would increase the probability of incumbent replacement. The coefficient of anti-government violence did not achieve statistical significance in any of the models. However, anti-government non-violence did achieve statistical significance within 95% certainty across the models, partly supporting the second hypothesis. It is not fully supportive, due to the

formulation of the hypothesis that makes it relational to the first. It stated that non-violence would be more effective than violence. But as the effect of violence cannot be established, it is not possible to claim with certainty that non-violence fulfills this. At the same time, the results point in the direction that non-violent measures can successfully replace an incumbent in the post-election phase, while violent measures cannot, at least not to the same extent. This falls in line with previous research which suggests that non-violent political activities has higher chances of achieving concessions from the government than violent activities (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth 2021, p. 1-26).

However, it is not suitable to state too much about the different types of actions with complete certainty if deriving information solely from this thesis. When log-transforming the four event variables of violence and non-violence committed by the anti- or pro-government sides, the statistical significance within 95% confidence disappears. Therefore, it is important to be careful in interpreting the meaning of the results in the main regression and not over-state any possibilities or limitations in different forms of anti-government action.

5.2. Conclusions

To conclude, the two hypotheses presented in the Theory chapter has received answers. The first hypothesis, claiming that *anti-government violence increases the incumbent's probability of being replaced*, cannot be supported by the regression results. It cannot be said that violence from the opposition do have an effect on whether or not the incumbent is replaced in the post-election phase. The second hypothesis, stating that *anti-government non-violence increase the incumbent's probability of being replaced more than anti-government violence does*, cannot either with credibility be completely supported. There is a problem of formulation where the second hypothesis is somewhat related to the first. Furthermore, while the indicators for anti-government non-violence did achieve statistical significance in the main regression, it was not able to uphold it in the robustness test. This might be due to a problem of multicollinearity. However, the results do hint towards the findings of previous literature, which states that anti-government non-violence should be more efficient than violence (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth 2021, p. 1-26; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022).

To return to the research question: *do post-election anti-government actions lead to increased probability of incumbent being replaced?* From the findings of this thesis, there cannot be

derived a definitive answer. But it does seem like anti-government groups can portray some influence by using non-violent tactics after an election.

5.3. Suggestions for Further Research

The findings and conclusions of this thesis lead to many thoughts and ideas for further research, and below is compiled four suggestions and three methodological advices for scholars to disentangle. Firstly, this thesis has only studied post-election in which the incumbent had won the election. This was necessary due to the choice of dependent variable and research design, but also suitable for the theoretical argument as an incumbent loss would change the political dynamics in a more complex manner, creating different situations than incumbent electoral victory. Still, however, situations of incumbent electoral loss are of importance to study as it would nuance the results presented herein and open up for deeper understanding regarding post-election behaviors.

Secondly, the dichotomous division of the political spectrum into pro- and anti-government side is a crude measure. While the pro-government side can credibly be assumed to be somewhat united, the anti-government side cannot be given the same assumption without the risk of spurious results, as have been discussed in this thesis (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, p. 285-288). Therefore, future studies should aim to find a more nuanced measurement that considers which specific actor that is the source of the event, and where those actors are to be found in a national political map.

Thirdly, this thesis measured the impact of anti-government action upon the probability of incumbent replacement. However, incumbent replacement is but one of many forms of concessions a government could use to satisfy the demands of the anti-government groups. Thus, future studies should consider measuring other forms of concessions to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the post-election dynamics.

Fourthly, case study research can help both to establish a stronger and more certain causal mechanism, as well as looking into if value changes in small number of events is, or is not, of greater influence than similar value changes in higher number of events. This would allow for decisiveness rather than assumptions for deciding on using log-transformed variables or not.

Furthermore, this thesis displays three methodological limitations that future studies could benefit from solving. The first is that in this thesis a logistic regression analysis was provided,

but only the direction of the coefficient effects and the statistical significance was interpreted. A post-estimation analysis of the log-odds variables would have provided information on the actual effect size of anti-government violence and non-violence and is thus a warmly recommended method for other scholars.

The second advice is to aim to include more data in their regression models. In this thesis, the two independent variables of anti-government violence and anti-government non-violence has a 0.26 correlation. This opened for potential issues with multicollinearity which reduced the chances of achieving statistical significance. This could potentially be the issue that prevented statistical significance to be achieved for anti-government violence in the main regression table, and for all both independent variables in the robustness test.

Future research should also benefit from including other forms of robustness tests than the one that has been employed in this thesis. That would more strongly ensure the regression results are not only due to the specific research method or indicators. For example, the Archigos dataset, which is the source for some of the variables in NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012; 2021), can provide other indicators related to incumbent replacement (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).

5.4. Practical Implications

The results of this thesis should, as previously stated, be carefully interpreted, and tested again with another research setup. However, it does give a hint that can be useful for in practical situations.

The thesis argued that both anti-government violence and non-violence would have a positive impact on the probability of replacing an incumbent, but that the effect of the latter would be stronger. The regression results could not show a statistically significant effect for the use of anti-government violence, however anti-government non-violence did. The size of the effects has not been calculated, but these results do fall in line with the findings of previous studies. Anti-government violence seems to create too much of a backlash to succeed, lacking domestic and international support. Anti-government non-violence, on the other hand, seem to be able to gain domestic and international support, especially so if it is perceived that the government is using harsh repression on peaceful protests, and can potentially have greater

chance to be successful (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth 2021, p. 1-26; Svensson, Schaftenaar, and Allansson 2022).

In other words, if the anti-government actors show patience and stick to a rigid belief in non-violent methods, the chances could possibly be higher that they might prevail, than would they resort to violence.

6. Bibliography

- Abrahms, Max. 2006. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31 (2): 42–78.
- AFP. 2021. "Ten Years on, Bahrain Paralysed by Legacy of Arab Spring." *France24*, February 12, 2021. <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210212-ten-years-on-bahrain-paralysed-by-legacy-of-arab-spring>.
- Anderson, Christopher, and Silvia Mendes. 2006. "Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential." *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (1): 91–111.
- Andersson, Robert. 2023. "The Effect of Progovernmental Pre-Electoral Violence upon Electoral Outcome." *Pax et Bellum Journal* 10 (1). <https://doi.org/10.33063/pbj.v10i1.152>.
- Birch, Sarah, Ursula Daxecker, and Kristine Höglund. 2020. "Electoral Violence: An Introduction." *Journal of Peace Research* 57 (1): 3–14. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319889657>.
- Chenoweth, Erica. 2021. *Civil Resistance: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Daxecker, Ursula. 2009. "Opposition Movements, Liberalization, and Civil War: Evidence from Algeria and Chile." *Civil Wars* 11 (3): 234–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698240903157503>.
- . 2012. "The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-Election Violence in Africa." *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (4): 503–16. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312445649>.
- Daxecker, Ursula, Elio Amicarelli, and Alexander Jung. 2019a. "Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV): A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (5): 714–23. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234331882387>.
- . 2019b. "Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV) Codebook."
- Gerring, John. 2012. *Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goemans, Hein, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (2): 269–83. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308100719>.

- Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Susan Hyde, and Ryan Jablonski. 2016. "Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions." *British Journal of Political Science* 48: 459–88.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341600020X>.
- Ham, Carolien van, and Staffan Lindberg. 2015. "From Sticks to Carrots: Electoral Manipulation in Africa, 1986–2012." *Government and Opposition* 50 (3): 521–48.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2015.6>.
- Hegre, Håvard. 2014. "Democracy and Armed Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (2): 159–72. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313512852>.
- Hegre, Håvard, Michael Bernhard, and Jan Teorell. 2020. "Civil Society and the Democratic Peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64 (1): 3262.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719850620>.
- Hyde, Susan, and Nikolay Marinov. 2012. "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20 (2): 191–210.
- . 2021. "Codebook for National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset."
- Kellstedt, Paul, and Guy Whitten. 2018. *The Fundamentals of Political Science Research*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward, and Jack Snyder. 2009. "Pathways to War in Democratic Transitions." *International Organization* 63: 381–90. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090134>.
- Mustasilta, Katariina, and Isak Svensson. 2023. "Divided We Fall: Ethnic Cleavages, Movement Cohesion, and the Risk of Escalation to Civil War in Non-Violent Uprisings." *Civil Wars* 25 (1): 103–36.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2023.2177054>.
- Porta, Donatella della, Teije Hidde Donker, Bogumila Hall, Emin Poljarevic, and Daniel Ritter. 2018. *Social Movements and Civil War: When Protests for Democratization Fail*. New York: Routledge.
- Powner, Leanne. 2015. *Empirical Research and Writing: A Political Science Student's Practical Guide*. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press.
- Ritter, Daniel. 2017. "A Spirit of Maidan? Contentious Escalation in Ukraine." In *Global Diffusion of Protest: Riding the Protest Wave in the Neoliberal Crisis*, edited by Donatella della Porta, 191–214. Protest and Social Movements. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

- Rosenzweig, Steven. 2021. "Dangerous Disconnect: Voter Backlash, Elite Misperception, and the Costs of Violence as an Electoral Tactic." *Political Behavior* 43: 1731–54. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09707-9>.
- Rozenas, Arturas, and Sean Zeigler. 2019. "From Ballot-Boxes to Barracks: Votes, Institutions, and Post-Election Coups." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (2): 175–89. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318779423>.
- Savoca, Annette. 2017. "Democracy on Trial: The Role of the Losers in Post-Election Violence A Qualitative Comparison of Presidential Elections in Nigeria 2011 and Kenya." Master thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies, Uppsala: Uppsala University. <https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn%3Anbn%3Ase%3Auu%3Adiva-324979>.
- Smidt, Hannah. 2016. "From a Perpetrator's Perspective: International Election Observers and Post-Electoral Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 53 (2): 226–41.
- Stephan, Maria, and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security* 33 (1): 7–44.
- Svensson, Isak, Susanne Schaftenaar, and Marie Allansson. 2022. "Violent Political Protest: Introducing a New Uppsala Conflict Data Program Data Set on Organized Violence, 1989-2019." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66 (9): 1703–30. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221109791>.
- Tucker, Joshua. 2007. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions." *Perspectives on Politics* 5 (3): 535–51.

7. Appendix 1: Script of Code

```
# Basic set-up

rm(list=ls())

set.seed(1237658)

setwd("C:/Documents/01. Studies/01. Master Thesis/Data")

library(stargazer)

library(knitr)

library(haven)

library(readr)

library(readxl)

library(tidyverse)

library(vtable)

#+ opts, include=FALSE,eval=TRUE

knitr::opts_chunk$set(eval=TRUE, echo=TRUE, error=TRUE,message=FALSE,
warning=FALSE,comment = c(""))

#Import NELDA and ECAV datasets and prepare merge by renaming and dropping variables.

NELDA <- read_excel("NELDA 6.0/NELDA.xls")

ECAV <- read_excel("ECAV dataset_Version 1.2.xls")

nelda_data <- NELDA %>% select("stateid","ccode","country", "electionid","year", "nelda3",
"nelda11","nelda24","nelda39","nelda49")

ecav_data <- rename(ECAV, "electionid"="NeldaID")
```

```
ecav_data <- ecav_data %>% select("EventID","country","ccode",
"Electiondate","electionid",
"Date","Actor1Side","Actor2Side","Target1Side","Target2Side","EventDirection","EventViolence","ViolenceInitiator")
```

#Case selection: In NELDA, exclude non-competitive elections, elections without clear incumbent victory, elections not covered in ECAV and elections with unclear dependent variable. In ECAV, exclude pre-election events.

```
nelda_data <- subset(nelda_data, nelda3=="yes")
```

```
nelda_data <- subset(nelda_data, nelda24=="no")
```

```
nelda_data <- nelda_data %>% filter (year > 1989)
```

```
nelda_data <- nelda_data %>% filter(year < 2013)
```

```
nelda_data <- subset(nelda_data, ccode!=2 & ccode!=20 & ccode!=200 & ccode!=205 &
ccode!=210 & ccode!=211 & ccode!=212 & ccode!=220 & ccode!=225 & ccode!=230 &
ccode!=235 & ccode!=260 & ccode!=305 & ccode!=325 & ccode!=350 & ccode!=375 &
ccode!=380 & ccode!=385 & ccode!=390 & ccode!=395 & ccode!=740 & ccode!=900 &
ccode!=920)
```

```
nelda_data <- subset(nelda_data, nelda39!="N/A")
```

```
ecav_data <- ecav_data %>% filter (Electiondate < Date)
```

#In ECAV, separately count the number of violent and non-violent events upon each election. For non-violent events, event direction has to be clear.

```
ecav_vio <- subset(ecav_data, EventViolence=="1")
```

```
ecav_novio <- subset(ecav_data, EventViolence=="0")
```

```
ecav_novio <- subset(ecav_novio, EventDirection=="1")
```

```

GiveSide <- function(Side){
  return(ifelse(Side==0,"ProgovViolence",
    ifelse(Side==1,"AntigovViolence", NA)))
}

ecav_vio$InitiatorSide <-
  ifelse(as.numeric(ecav_vio$ViolenceInitiator)==0.1, GiveSide(ecav_vio$Actor1Side),
    ifelse(as.numeric(ecav_vio$ViolenceInitiator)==0.2, GiveSide(ecav_vio$Actor2Side),
      ifelse(as.numeric(ecav_vio$ViolenceInitiator)==1.1, GiveSide(ecav_vio$Target1Side),
        ifelse(as.numeric(ecav_vio$ViolenceInitiator)==1.2, GiveSide(ecav_vio$Target2Side),
          NA))))))

GiveSide1 <- function(Side){
  return(ifelse(Side==0,"ProgovNonviolence",
    ifelse(Side==1,"AntigovNonviolence", NA)))
}

ecav_novio$InitiatorSide <-
  ifelse(as.numeric(ecav_novio$Actor1Side)==0,
    GiveSide1(ecav_novio$Actor1Side),
    ifelse(as.numeric(ecav_novio$Actor1Side)==1,
      GiveSide1(ecav_novio$Actor1Side), NA))

ecav_vio <- drop_na(ecav_vio,"InitiatorSide")
ecav_novio <- drop_na(ecav_novio,"InitiatorSide")

ecav_vio1 <- ecav_vio %>% filter (InitiatorSide=="ProgovViolence")

```

```

Progov_vio <- count(ecav_vio1, electionid, wt=NULL, sort=FALSE, name =
"ProgovViolence")

ecav_vio2 <- ecav_vio %>% filter (InitiatorSide=="AntigovViolence")

Antigov_vio <- count(ecav_vio2, electionid, wt=NULL, sort=FALSE, name =
"AntigovViolence")


ecav_novio1 <- ecav_novio %>% filter (InitiatorSide=="ProgovNonviolence")

Progov_novio <- count(ecav_novio1, electionid, wt=NULL, sort=FALSE, name =
"ProgovNonviolence")

ecav_novio2 <- ecav_novio %>% filter (InitiatorSide=="AntigovNonviolence")

Antigov_novio <- count(ecav_novio2, electionid, wt=NULL, sort=FALSE, name =
"AntigovNonviolence")


#Merge all data from both datasets.

all_vio <- full_join(Antigov_vio, Progov_vio, by=c("electionid"))

all_novio <- full_join(Antigov_novio, Progov_novio, by=c("electionid"))

all_data <- full_join(all_novio, all_vio, by=c("electionid"))

all_data <- merge(nelda_data, all_data, by=c("electionid"), all.x = TRUE)

all_data$AntigovViolence[is.na(all_data$AntigovViolence)] <- 0

all_data$AntigovNonviolence[is.na(all_data$AntigovNonviolence)] <- 0

all_data$ProgovViolence[is.na(all_data$ProgovViolence)] <- 0

all_data$ProgovNonviolence[is.na(all_data$ProgovNonviolence)] <- 0


#Prepare log-transformed variables

all_data$AntigovViolence.log <-log1p(all_data$AntigovViolence)

all_data$AntigovNonviolence.log <-log1p(all_data$AntigovNonviolence)

```

```

all_data$ProgovViolence.log <- log1p(all_data$ProgovViolence)

all_data$ProgovNonviolence.log <- log1p(all_data$ProgovNonviolence)


#Summary statistics

vtable::sumtable((all_data[c("AntigovViolence", "AntigovNonviolence", "ProgovViolence",
"ProgovNonviolence", "nelda39", "nelda11", "nelda49")]),

  summ=c('notNA(x)', 'mean(x)', 'sd(x)', 'min(x)', 'max(x)'),

  summ.names=c("N", "Mean", "Sd", "Min", "Max"), out="viewer")


sum(all_data$AntigovViolence)

sum(all_data$AntigovNonviolence)


#Antigov Violence histogram

hist(all_data$AntigovViolence, main="Anti-government violence", xlab = "Event count",

  ylab = "Case count")

abline(v=mean(all_data$AntigovViolence, na.rm=T), col="blue", lwd=3)

abline(v=median(all_data$AntigovViolence, na.rm=T), col="red", lwd=3)


#Antigov Non-violence histogram

hist(all_data$AntigovNonviolence, main="Anti-government Non-violence", xlab = "Event
count",

  ylab = "Case count", breaks = 40)

abline(v=mean(all_data$AntigovNonviolence, na.rm=T), col="blue", lwd=3)

abline(v=median(all_data$AntigovNonviolence, na.rm=T), col="red", lwd=3)

```



```
#Correlation test between independents
```

```
boxplot(all_data$AntigovViolence,all_data$AntigovNonviolence,  
        main = "Antigovernment Action",  
        at = c(1,2),  
        names = c("Vio.", "Non-vio."),  
        ylab="Events",  
        las = 2,  
        col = c("blue","red"),  
        border = "black",  
        horizontal = FALSE,  
        notch = FALSE)
```

```
cor.test(all_data$AntigovViolence,all_data$AntigovNonviolence)
```

```
#Regression analysis
```

```
model1 <- glm(as.factor(nelda39) ~ AntigovViolence + AntigovNonviolence,  
              data=all_data,family=binomial)
```

```
model2 <- glm(as.factor(nelda39) ~ AntigovViolence + AntigovNonviolence  
+ ProgovViolence + ProgovNonviolence,  
              data=all_data,family=binomial)
```

```
model3 <- glm(as.factor(nelda39) ~ AntigovViolence + AntigovNonviolence  
+ ProgovViolence + ProgovNonviolence + nelda11 + nelda49,  
              data=all_data,family=binomial)
```

```

stargazer(model1,model2, model3,

  apply.coef=exp, t.auto=F, p.auto=F, report = "vc*t",

  single.row = F,out.header= FALSE,header=F,type="html",

  intercept.bottom = FALSE,

  covariate.labels = c("Intercept", "Antigov Violence","Antigov Non-violence", "Progov
Violence", "Progov Non-violence"),

  dep.var.caption = "",

  dep.var.labels = c("Probability incumbent replaced"),

  notes="Coefficients are log-odds",

  out="Regression 1.html")

```

#Robustness test: Log-transformed independent variables

```

model1.log <- glm(as.factor(nelda39) ~ AntigovViolence.log +
AntigovNonviolence.log,

```

```

  data=all_data,family=binomial)

```

```

model2.log <- glm(as.factor(nelda39) ~ AntigovViolence.log +
AntigovNonviolence.log + ProgovViolence.log +          ProgovNonviolence.log,

```

```

  data=all_data,family=binomial)

```

```

model3.log <- glm(as.factor(nelda39) ~ AntigovViolence.log +
AntigovNonviolence.log + ProgovViolence.log +          ProgovNonviolence.log +
nelda11 + nelda49,

```

```

  data=all_data,family=binomial)

```

```

stargazer(model1.log,model2.log, model3.log,

  apply.coef=exp, t.auto=F, p.auto=F, report = "vc*t",

  single.row = F,out.header= FALSE,header=F,type="html",

  intercept.bottom = FALSE,

  covariate.labels = c("Intercept", "Antigov Violence","Antigov Non-violence", "Progov
Violence", "Progov Non-violence"),

  dep.var.caption = "",

  dep.var.labels = c("Probability incumbent replaced"),

  notes="Coefficients are log-odds",

  out="Regression 2.html")

```