Explaining Gender-Based Political Funding

A quantitative cross-national analysis of the impact of electoral, political, and cultural factors on political funding

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I am deeply grateful to my friends and family who provided valuable discussion and encouragement during the various stages of this journey.
Abstract

Despite global progress on gender equality, women continue to be underrepresented in politics. One widely debated policy measure aimed at tackling this issue is gendered public funding – which has been adopted in more than 30 countries worldwide yet remains understudied in the literature on gender and politics. In this thesis, I address that research gap and examine the broader impact of electoral, political, and cultural factors on gendered political funding by conducting quantitative cross-national analyses. I used data from four different sources, such as the International IDEA Political Finance Database, the IDEA Quota Database, QOG, and V-Dem, to examine the relationship between these factors and the probability of gendered public funding adoption. It is evident from the findings of this thesis that the presence of quotas has a significant influence on determining the likelihood of adopting gender-specific public funding policies, with countries implementing quotas demonstrating a higher likelihood of adopting such policies. Contrary to theoretical expectations concerning electoral and cultural variables and earlier research, no significant effects are found. The thesis offers valuable insights into the interplay between political trends, electoral institutions, cultural dynamics, and financial mechanisms in shaping gender equality initiatives. While gender quotas may enhance the probability of gender public funding, exploring all relevant contextual factors is critical.

Keywords: gender targeted public funding; gender quotas; cross national; gender and politics; political; electoral; cultural; regression analysis
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1. Introduction

In today's political landscapes around the world, gender equality has become a crucial issue. Despite significant steps towards more gender equal societies in recent years, women remain underrepresented in influential arenas such as politics due to gendered power structures (Hawkesworth, 2005). Gender inequality in politics is perpetuated by several factors, including the lack of representation of women, the lack of access to resources, and the lack of support for gender-sensitive policies. There is a persistent disparity in the distribution of political funding among nations, reflecting and perpetuating existing gender inequities within political systems (Krook & O'Brien, 2012). For instance, women candidates are often more likely to receive lower campaign funding than men, which may affect their ability to run for office and win elections. There is a close relationship between gender dynamics and political finance that is essential for the development of a democratic society that is inclusive and representative. Political finance is a key factor in determining democratic processes' accessibility and effectiveness, which is why gender dynamics should be examined (Dahlerup, 2006).

It is against this background that a growing number of countries have adopted gender-based policies to promote gender-balanced representation in politics. A number of countries have also implemented quotas, namely gender quotas that establish a set number of women to be included in economic and political bodies (Hughes et al., 2017). The implementation of gender-specific public funding policies is another method of retaining women in politics, where public funding (state assistance) provided to political parties is linked to gender-related activities. While there has been extensive scholarly interest in quotas for parliaments (e.g. Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008; Krook, 2009), less attention has been given to gendered public funding.

According to Krook and Norris (2014), non-quota measures have not been extensively documented or investigated in order to achieve gender balance in parliaments. As suggested by Muriaas, Wang, and Murray (2020) there is a need to explore alternative measures to increase the number of women in parliaments such as gendered public financing. In the context of gender public funding schemes, political parties are encouraged to increase gender diversity among candidates by allocating higher or reduced
public funding based on a specified threshold. The concept of gender-targeted public funding refers to systems that either qualify a political party to receive some or all of its public funding, or which provide a certain amount of public funding to an eligible political party based upon gender-based provisions, or where some of the public funds are earmarked for gender-related purposes (Öhman, 2018). The existing research on gendered public funding has addressed a variety of relevant dimensions, offering critical insights into the complexities of political finance and its implications for gender equality in politics. Norris and Krook (2014) examine the challenges women face in accessing political funding and navigating existing finance structures. Anzia and Berry (2011) explore the relationship between "Money, Gender, and Candidate Success," indicating how financial resources affect women's electoral prospects.

**Figure 1.** The spread of gender-targeted public funding around the world

Further, Öhman (2018) provides a comparative analysis across countries, exploring the concept of gender-targeted public funding, and the introduction of such provisions, as seen in Albania, Croatia, France, Haiti, and Portugal, where such provisions are in place currently. From the global north to the global south, gendered public funding provisions are prevalent in countries in almost all regions of the world, including both older and emerging democracies. As per the IDEA Political Finance global database, there are gendered targeted public funding provisions in around 30 countries worldwide as shown in Figure 1, and this type of regulation has become increasingly common over the past two
decades. Public funding for gender equality activities was first earmarked by Finland to improve gender equality in 1974 (Öhman, 2018), which is not surprising since Nordic countries have always been at the forefront of gender equality efforts. However, it is interesting to note that none of the Nordic countries, including Finland, provide direct public funding for political parties tied to gender equality. Although the European continent leads the chart with 11 countries with gendered public funding, the American continent and the African continent also follow the trend with 8, and 7, respectively. Asia is at the bottom of the list, followed by Oceania, with three and one country offering gender-based public funding as can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1. Breakdown by continent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Is the provision of direct public funding to political parties tied to gender equality among candidates - IDEA Political Finance Database 2022

In view of this variability throughout the world, it raises questions such as, "Why are they adopted in some countries but not in others?". Which factors in the political system contribute to the implementation of such provisions, and what commonalities exist across countries of varying political structures. The effectiveness of a gender-based public funding program is likely to be influenced by several factors that have not been explored in research, which is where this paper makes a compelling case. This master thesis investigates gender-based public funding complexities through a quantitative cross-national lens.

The primary objective of this study is to assess the impact of electoral, political, and cultural factors on gender-based political funding. This paper holds great significance as by conducting a cross-national analysis, the paper reaches beyond single country cases and examines the factors that drive these provisions across countries. As part of this study, a number of factors are examined within three broad
themes to identify factors that have more than one impact on the allocation and accessibility of political resources across genders (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). Through analyzing gender-based public funding, we can gain a deeper understanding of what factors affect it.

In order to address the research question, this thesis provides insights into three broad areas by exploring: 1. How quota systems influence the distribution of political resources based on gender. 2. Analyzing the impact of electoral institutions and practices on gender-based funding allocations (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2012). And 3. determining whether cultural norms and perceptions impact women's access to public finance (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005). This study holds substantial implications for academia and policymaking as by unraveling the dynamics of electoral, political, and cultural factors, it aims to facilitate evidence-based policies and interventions aimed at promoting gender equality in public finance (Dahlerup, 2006). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first cross-national study using the global IDEA database to examine gendered public funding and is a significant contribution to scholarly discussion on gendered public finance. Aside from that, this research contributes to a better understanding of how gender dynamics play a role in political systems, paving the way for more equitable and inclusive political landscapes by exploring the nuances of gendered public funding within political systems.

My thesis is structured as follows. First, I outline the theoretical perspectives and expectations that will be used to guide the analysis in the form of a review of the relevant literature. The next part of this paper is an introduction to the research design, the description of the data collection procedure, the explanation of the variables and the selection of methodology for the study. I then present my results, which consist of bivariate and multivariate logistic regression analyses. I also present a more detailed discussion based on prior research in gendered public funding. Last but not least, I provide some concluding remarks and recommendations for future research. In summary, this master's thesis explores gender-based political funding, aiming to shed light on the complex dynamics of factors shaping political resources distribution across gender lines (Murray, 2014). As a result of rigorous analysis and inquiry, this study endeavors to contribute to the advancement of gender equality and inclusive democracy on a global basis.
2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. In the world of politics, what is political finance?
Politics finance refers to the money involved in politics, including the amount spent on campaigns, political advertising, and various electoral activities in the political environment (IDEA, 2014), as well as funds for lobbying governments. In recent years, political and campaign financing has gained increasing attention (Öhman, 2012; Scarrow, 2007) because political finance is a crucial aspect of modern politics, as there exists a complex relationship between politics and finance that has both positive and negative effects on the democratic nature and effectiveness of the political process (Öhman, 2013). In simple terms, political financing includes legal and illegal financing of ongoing political party activities and electoral campaigns, in particular campaigns involving candidates and political parties, but also campaigns involving third parties (IDEA, 2014).

According to Öhman (2013), in the field of politics, political finance occupies a position at the intersection of many crucial aspects of the political landscape, including corruption, democratic politics, free and fair elections, and effective governance. The financing of political parties and election campaigns can have a positive or negative impact on all of them. Political finance can present an unequal playing field for the wealthy and powerful, and since money is power, it is extremely difficult for individuals who do not have money to access power (Murray, Muriaas, and Wang 2023). The political discourse around the world has undergone a profound change in recent decades (Owen, 2017), and it is no surprise that money plays a significant role (Kirshner, 2003) in the electoral process (Kelly, 2012). The digital trend, according to IDEA (2021) has had a profound impact on how campaigns are run and has resulted in a shift from traditional campaigns to digital ones, which has also altered the dynamics of political financing. As a result, campaign costs have increased, making money a more important factor in electoral decisions. Money can buy political influence (Öhman, 2013), and access to the media, allowing those with money to shape the opinions of the public and shape policy (Duer, 2018). In response to the ever-increasing use of the internet and electronic media, parties invest in electronic media during campaigning, increasing their political influence (Owen, 2017).
The ways in which parties receive and spend money have therefore been the subject of significant public debate. The democratic process is meant to be inclusive and fair, but, unfortunately, under the surface, many political systems often work rather differently (IDEA, 2014). Money in politics is essential for ensuring that politicians are able to run effective campaigns. Without money, it would be very difficult for candidates to get their message out to the public, and the democratic process would be significantly undermined (Öhman, 2013). The influence of money in many countries prevents the political process from reaching democratic ideals. Money is a necessary component of democratic politics, but it can also be abused by some to influence policy decisions or buy votes (Ibid). The correlation between money and power is strong since it allows those with money to exert influence over those without. This can lead to a situation where money talks and the voices of the people are drowned out. Consequently, in the political arena, money can pose a threat to democratic principles (Amundsen, 1999).

*The Intersection of Political Finance and Gender*

Political finance has gained mainstream attention in recent years; however, it faces a number of challenges at the moment, and gender inequality remains one of the most serious political problems in the world today (Öhman, 2018; IDEA). The relationship between gender and political finance reveals a whole lot of complexities that need to be addressed, including women's unequal access to funds. The number of funds raised by women candidates in the United States is the same as that of men (Burrell, 2014), however in many other countries they face a disadvantage when it comes to fundraising (Sidhu and Meena, 2007; Cigane and Öhman, 2014). Several factors contribute to women's participation and success in politics, including funding mechanisms and regulations (Norris & Krook, 2011), and how a broad set of factors such as traditional gender roles, societal attitudes, and cultural norms impact women's accessibility to political funding and electoral success (Krook, 2018). There are also disadvantages for women when it comes to party funding, especially in male-dominated parties (Buckley and Mariani, 2021). Often, women are unable to access the same networks of financial capital as men, and even if they do, they may not have access to and support from the same channels. In the absence of equal access to resources, women find it difficult to run for office, and men are more likely to wield power both directly and indirectly (Murray, Muriaas and Wang, 2023). Murray (2008) outlines that
women face a number of gender-based disadvantages, including the gender pay gap, sexist abuse, the gender inequities in candidate selection processes, and family responsibilities. As a result, women are less likely to be able to fund their own political activities and are often dependent on male family members or political parties for financial support.

In light of all the challenges women face, over 30 countries have implemented gender targeted public funding policies in order to increase women's representation in politics (IDEA). Gender-based public funding is designed to improve representation in elected bodies, reduce gender inequality, and empower women in the political sphere. In order to provide equal opportunities for political participation, public funding is an integral part of democratic processes. When it comes to the impact of gendered public funding – which is what this study seeks to explore – there is a paucity of research. Gendered public finance has been studied in several ways, but a more comprehensive approach covering variables from a diverse range of areas is missing.

Previous research on gendered public funding

It is imperative to note that gendered public funding research is becoming increasingly prevalent in politics. To the best of my knowledge, the most recent work to analyze political financing research from a gendered perspective is Muriaas, Murray and Wang 2020, 2023. The authors examine the impact of political and campaign financing on women's campaigns in countries with proportional representation and majoritarian systems. According to their book, they examine rules for directing funds to women's campaigns, ensuring their participation, and reducing their financial burden. Murray, Muriaas and Wang (2020) argue that in order to increase women's access to politics, gender quotas have been implemented, with varying success, in countries like Ireland, where parties are penalized financially for failing to enact quotas, and South Korea, where parties are rewarded financially for successfully adopting quotas. Their work presents little evidence, however, that the results hold also in other contexts, particularly in Global South countries.

Alternatively, the Öhman (2018) comparative study suggests that an unspecified percentage of public funding in Ireland promotes women's participation. In contrast, public funding gets reduced if a party fails to meet a set definition of gender equality. Ireland's legislation anticipates the threshold increasing gradually, but only during general elections. After 2023, a 40% threshold will be used in Ireland.
(Brennan and Buckley, 2017). In the case of South Korea, the government has allocated 10% of its budget to gender-related programs. Although Öhman (2018) study provides a valuable contribution to the field of gendered public financing, it does not discuss the relationship between political finance and gender equality or how to reduce the challenges posed by this connection. There needs to be more reflection on the relationship between political finance, political, electoral, and cultural factors and how it is gendered. Therefore, a more comprehensive range of empirical research covering a broader range is highly desirable, which is what this study aims to accomplish.

There is a strong connection between public funding and gender equality (Öhman, 2018; IDEA). However, public funding alone may not be sufficient to promote women candidates since women are often less powerful within their parties when accessing and utilizing public funds (Tovar, 2007; WEDO). The relationship between gender and public funding is also rooted in broader political, electoral, and cultural structures (Figure 2), such as quotas, electoral systems, approaches to candidate selection (Öhman, 2018; IDEA), and gender stereotypes. In order to gain a deeper understanding of how these broader structures affect gendered public funding, it is crucial to categorize them so that their influence can be more fully understood. I have divided variables into three sets, political, electoral, and cultural, to simplify the analysis, and by using a cross-national approach, I intend to assess the impact of these factors on gender-based public funding. As far as gendered political financing is concerned, most studies have been conducted in individual countries rather than on a cross-national level, which is what I intend to achieve in this paper by exploring cross-national analysis.

**Figure 2: Structure of the Theoretical Framework**
2.2. Political Factors: Relationship between gender quotas and gender targeted public funding?

So far, I have discussed gendered public funding, and the trends in this field of research. Now, I will delve into three key mechanisms, starting from political factors that may influence gendered targeted public funding. The primary factor in the political category is quotas.

*Gender Quotas*

An electoral gender quota is a mechanism of promoting gender equality in political representation (Bush, 2011). The goal of such policies is to increase the number of women in decision-making bodies, such as parliaments and local councils, by requiring a certain percentage of seats to be reserved for women candidates. Since the 1980s, gender quotas have gained popularity due to their adoption in legislative elections across various countries in order to increase women's representation in decision-making roles (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005, 2010; Krook, 2009; Hughes et al., 2017). A total of 131 countries have adopted gender quotas by November 2021 (IDEA). The implementation and stages of quotas vary widely around the world, resulting in three main types of quotas: legislated candidate quotas, voluntary party quotas, and reserved seats (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005; Krook, 2007; IDEA). Particularly electoral quotas have received widespread attention from policymakers, with more than 130 countries currently implementing measures that mandate a certain proportion of women to be included in political assemblies (Hughes et al., 2017, p. 332). There has been a substantial amount of research in the field of gender and politics that examines the causes and consequences of electoral quotas, including the determinants of different quota models (Krook, 2014), the stakeholders contributing to quota adoption (Dahlerup, 2006; Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Krook, 2009), government spending (Clayton & Zetterberg, 2018), the implications of electoral quotas with respect to matters of policy output (Beaman et al., 2012; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008), and political interest and attitudes (Zetterberg, 2009).
Furthermore, research has demonstrated that electoral quotas can improve women’s representation in politics (Krook, 2009; Zetterberg, 2009), increase the visibility of women’s interests in policy making (Dahlerup, 2006), and help to reduce gender-based disparities in political representation (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008). A quota system creates a more level playing field for female candidates because it allows them to gain access to resources as well as gaining visibility on the campaign trail. As a result, women are more likely to be elected to office and have a greater opportunity to influence policy decisions. Quotas also create incentives for political parties to elect more female candidates, which further contributes to their representation in politics. Even though electoral quotas are being given greater attention than other approaches, they are difficult to implement due to their complex nature and political challenges. In Brazil, male party leaders undermined the quota law by not supporting and funding female candidates as much as male candidates, according to Wylie and Dos Santos (2016). According to Öhman, (2018; IDEA) gender quotas are a commonly discussed form of political regulation to enhance gender equality in elections but the relationship between gender-targeted public funding and gender quotas is not always evident.

Why gender quotas might matter for gendered public funding

Political finance and gender quotas are two interrelated themes that profoundly impact political landscapes— one of the key questions this study seeks to explore. Both areas are significant because they determine how much influence women have in politics. In order to increase women’s participation in politics, gender quotas have been used (Buckley and Mariani, 2021), but they are not a standalone magic bullet, and there is a need to “go beyond quotas” (Krook and Norris, 2014)—to consider other strategies, initiatives, and policies in combination with quotas that increase women’s representation in the political sphere (Muriaas, Amyg and Season, 2021). Women have faced numerous barriers to entry into the political sphere (Piscopo et al, 2022), including financial constraints. A quota system is used to regulate the number of women involved in politics, but they fail to identify structural mechanisms that prevent women from becoming more involved in politics, such as limited access to financial resources (Muriaas 2020). Women often struggle to raise sufficient funds for their campaigns, which puts them at a disadvantage compared to their male counterparts. Therefore, the relationship between gender quotas
and public funding is complex one, because studies (Matland, 2005; Franceschet, 2012) suggest that quotas are not always able to overcome the financial barriers that women encounter in order to increase their representation. A gendered financing mechanism is also introduced alongside gender quotas to alter how money is typically channelled into the political system, as there is a need to emphasize the implementation and relevance for political advancement (Muriaas, 2020).

Political finance and gender quotas are intrinsically linked because financial resources significantly impact gender quota policies. According to Buckley and Mariani (2021), gender quotas lead to a more equitable distribution of financial resources by parties. The impact of gender quotas on campaign finance depends in part on how they interact with the electoral system and the larger social, cultural, and economic environment that shapes political opportunities (Buckley and Mariani, 2021). Adequate funding is crucial for gender quotas as it supports women candidates and facilitates their campaigns. Buckley and Mariani in their research found that parties increased expenditures on women candidates after gender quotas were implemented, and gender quotas in Ireland had a surprising impact on campaign finances. Establishing the close connections between economic and gender inequality has provided a missing link between democracy scholars and scholars of gender and politics (Muriaas, Amyg and Season, 2021). Political finance and gender quotas are intertwined concepts that have significant implications for gender equality in politics. It is essential to strike a balance between these two aspects to ensure a fair, inclusive, and transparent democratic process that promotes gender equality. Over time, the diffusion of quotas and electoral financing has offered a unique opportunity for improving knowledge about the intersection of gender, political rights, and economic inequalities (Ibid.)

I expect that countries that adopt gender quotas are more likely to adopt gender-targeted public funding as the core of both policies aims to increase women’s participation in politics, as well as narrow inequality gaps. Considering this, providing women with gender-targeted funding is more likely to increase their participation in politics than just implementing gender quotas. While gender quotas and political finance have the potential to work together to promote gender equality in politics, the two also pose challenges that should be addressed. Scholars argue that gender quotas can undermine meritocracy by selecting less qualified candidates where party leaders determine which women are nominated. It can
act as a glass ceiling that prevents qualified women from being nominated (Wang and Muriass, 2019). Party leaders sometimes attempt to reduce quotas’ effectiveness by nominating women in non-electable spots (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). As a political factor, I intend to investigate whether quotas have a positive or negative impact on gendered political funding.

2.3. Electoral Factors: Impact of electoral factors on gendered public funding dynamics?

I will now discuss the second key mechanism, electoral factors, that may affect gendered public funding. I have included two factors in this category: electoral democracy and the PR system. I categorize electoral democracy and proportional representation (PR) systems as distinct electoral factors because of their unique characteristics and implications for politics. As a result of classifying these factors separately, I intend to distinguish the influence of the democratic process from the specific mechanisms by which votes are converted into political power, providing a more in-depth understanding of how electoral systems impact political funding strategies. (Blais & Indridason, 2007; Norris, 2004).

Electoral Democracy

Electoral democracy and gender-targeted public funding may be closely linked in shaping the political landscape, especially in promoting gender equality and representation, since electoral democracy provides citizens with a variety of mechanisms, including elections, for participating in decision-making processes. Dahl (1971) argues that competition and free and fair elections are essential to any democratic system since they provide citizens with a platform to express their opinions and hold leaders accountable for their actions. Gendered public funding promotes democracy and competitive elections since everyone has the opportunity to run and compete for office. A candidate's access to funds levels the playing field, reducing the influence of wealthy donors and allowing them to engage in meaningful campaigns and engage voters. In democratic systems, the electoral process allows for increased opportunities for women to participate as candidates and voters, contributing to the gradual increase in women's political representation. Women's ability to participate in the electoral process and secure seats in elected bodies is a crucial aspect of democratic functioning (Paxton, Hughes, & Painter, 2009).
Public funding for women and quotas are two strategies that can work together to increase women's representation within the democratic system. Even though I have classified quotas as a political factor in this paper, I want to emphasize that they occupy a central seat on the electoral stage as well and have an overlapping relation with electoral factors. Quotas set numerical targets for women's participation, whereas public funding ensures financial support for female candidates. Together, these factors are likely to contribute to the elimination of barriers women face in electoral politics (Krook, 2009). Furthermore, the implementation of gender-based public funding can contribute to the public's perception of democracy by demonstrating a commitment to diversity and inclusiveness. Therefore, accountability and responsiveness to citizens' diverse needs are enhanced (Bush and Zetterberg, 2020).

Electoral democracy and gender public funding are symbiotic, as democracy provides a framework for political participation, while gender public funding addresses gender disparities in representation (Muriass, 2014). A supply-side strategy for increasing female representation in a democratic system is electoral financing for women, according to Kayuni and Muriass (2014). Electoral democracy and gender public funding can work together to address gender disparities in representation through electoral financing for women. Therefore, based on the information presented above, I will examine whether electoral democracy and gendered public funding are complementary.

*Proportional Representation System*

A study of the relationship between proportional representation (PR) and gender-targeted public funding is relevant to the understanding of how electoral systems and financial mechanisms interact to promote gender equality in political representation. The proportional representation (PR) system has facilitated women's representation in politics (Paxton, Hughes, & Painter, 2009), leading to higher levels of gender equality in political representation (Muriaas, Amyg, and Season, 2021). A PR system, primarily when supported by public funding mechanisms, has been associated with a higher representation of women in politics (Piscopo, 2017). PR systems often lead to more diverse and gender-balanced legislatures than majoritarian systems. Women have greater access to the political process under PR systems since they require parties to ensure that all groups, including women, are represented. PR systems require political
parties to take into account the gender composition of their candidates to make sure they receive enough votes to ensure a successful election. In PR systems, where parties play a central role in candidate selection, public funding can be strategically used to support women candidates and promote gender equality (Murray, 2014).

Financial challenges faced by women candidates in electoral campaigns are addressed by gender-targeted public funding, and women's representation can be increased through institutional factors such as the PR system (Funk et al., 2021). Campaign expenditures influence election results in proportional systems (G.-J. Put et al, 2015), the closed-list PR system used for elections reduces personal candidate costs (Wang, Muriaus, Bauer, 2021), and women have achieved significant success under PR systems. These findings suggest that PR systems can provide an equitable playing field for female candidates, allowing them to campaign more efficiently and effectively. Based on the research that has been discussed in this section, I anticipate that the PR system will have a positive effect on gender-targeted funding.

2.4. Cultural factors in gender-targeted public funding

Finally, I will discuss the third key mechanism, cultural factors, that may affect gendered public funds. The categorization of the distribution of resources, in particular social resources, and gender biases against women within the cultural factor, is based on the recognition that cultural elements go beyond mere values and beliefs to encompass tangible elements of societal organization and power dynamics as well. When it comes to social resources, social capital, which consists of networks, relationships, and social connections, plays a crucial role. Through this categorization, I intend to explore how societal attitudes toward women in different countries influence political funding patterns. The analysis gains a more comprehensive understanding of how cultural elements, beyond normative values, impact political funding dynamics (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Distribution of resources

Throughout history, men have dominated the public sphere and politics. Due to their overwhelming numerical dominance, men's interests are generally considered universal. This is also evident in politics,
where in some countries, there is an established male-dominated democratic culture despite the opposing currents in society (Bjarnegård, 2013). In some countries, the culture is such that male candidates are seen as stronger, more competent, or simply more in line with the established picture of a politician (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2011), giving them leverage to access a large pool of social resources. According to Bjarnegård and Zetterberg (2019), what appear to be gender-neutral selection criteria in some societies often have unintended gendered consequences, consistently benefiting men over women. Majority male party leaders set these criteria in majority male-dominated patriarchal societies, who possess merits and experience comparable to those of their in-group (men); however, this creates an unequal distribution of social resources among genders. It is possible that these set criteria may have intended or unintended gendered consequences, as they may prescribe qualities that are more prevalent among men than among women. The argument I am making is that, in light of the research presented in this section, I anticipate that countries where there is a significant gap in resource distribution, especially social resources which consists of networks, relationships, and social connections within political structures are less likely to adopt policies that target gendered funding. However, not much research has been done on cultural factors that affect gendered public funding in detail. Moreover, the theories around the role of cultural factors are vague, and there is also a lack of theoretical frameworks when it comes to various unexplored cultural factors, which has also been a significant hindrance in writing this paper. Thus, to put it short, I am bit cautious in terms of my anticipations because of the lack of previous research that cultural factors might affect gendered public funding when taken into consideration.

Gender Biases against women

There is substantial proof that women's access to political power is influenced by gender stereotypes (Funk et al., 2021), as they face unfavourable odds when seeking elected office as a result of gender-based structures and biases. Gender bias (Piscopo et al., 2022) and societal barriers that prevent viable women from becoming elected to office are some factors that shape access to campaign funding (Clayton et al., 2020). Party leaders, usually predominantly male, are in a position of power (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2011) and hold the power to decide which women get nominated (Wang and Muriaas, 2018). The process exposes implicit gender biases in the recruitment process in some countries, identifying the
advantages reserved for (certain) men, regardless of whether these advantages are acknowledged. Informal networks play a significant role in the political recruitment process (Bjarnegård and Meryl 2015), and women candidates are usually perceived as not complying with specific criteria – local-ness, well-connectedness, or political style – deemed necessary to become 'acceptable' candidates in informally driven candidate selection procedures (Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2016). Based on the gender stereotypes in some societies, women are excluded from powerful intraparty positions; they are not given the same chance as men to build alliances or learn the "know-how" of politics (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2019). Therefore, financial support becomes difficult to obtain due to political barriers and public attitudes towards candidates in some countries (Murray, 2023). Thus, countries with lots of stereotypes against women politicians may likely adopt gendered campaign funding in order to reduce the inequality gap created by gender biases. However, I have mixed expectations of whether countries with gender biases against women will have a positive or negative effect on gender-targeted funding.

**Table 2.** Summary of expectations concerning the role of the Political, Electoral, and Cultural factors on gendered public funding

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gendered Public Funding</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quotas</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR System</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural</strong></td>
<td>Distribution of Resources</td>
<td>Gender Biases</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. Research Design

In this chapter, the research design is presented for a cross-national quantitative analysis of political funding based on electoral, political, and cultural factors. All aspects of the research design are considered, including the data collection procedures, the variables of interest, and the statistical analysis.

3.1. Data

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the data collection process for cross-national analysis of gendered public finance. I compiled my dataset using publicly available sources through the use of four datasets, in which the analysis covers around 130 countries, and it is cross-national in nature. It is imperative to note that all of these sources provide up-to-date information on the three sets of variables that are being studied. An analysis of the data is then conducted in order to identify any patterns or correlations. The results of the study are concluded with a series of recommendations for further research as a result of the findings of the study.

Firstly, the dependent variable is calculated using the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Political Finance Database. Since its launch in 2003, International IDEA's Political Finance Database has been the premier global source of comparative political finance data. I chose the IDEA Political Finance Database because it covers political finance regulations, practices, and disclosures across various countries. There are four broad categories in which the database provides answers to fundamental questions about political finance: a) Bans and Limits on Private Income, b) Public Funding, c) Regulations on Spending, and d) Reporting, Oversight, and Sanctions. The database was updated in 2012, 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022, when this study also collected information on gendered public funding. Neither countries that have introduced gender-targeted public funding after 2022 nor those that were updated in the dataset after 2022 are included in this study. As part of this paper, I have used gendered public funding, which is included in the second question and is listed as a sub-question in the database, number 36. Specifically, the question asks, 'Is the provision of direct public funding to political parties tied to gender equality among candidates?' As the world's first and most
comprehensive database of political finance systems, it provides a valuable resource for analyzing political finance systems worldwide.

In order to assess the relationship between electoral rules and political funding, the database contains countries with differing electoral systems (for example, proportional representation, plurality, and majority systems) and campaign finance regulations. The dataset includes several countries with varying cultural, socioeconomic, and historical backgrounds that provide insight into the influence of cultural attitudes, corruption perceptions, and economic conditions on political finance. IDEA database is then merged with IDEA gender quota database, The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, and Varieties of Democracy database. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse a variety of independent variables, and after identifying the variables in all four sources, I created my own data set for analysis by combining all the data sets. In order to ensure robustness, the database prioritises 130 countries with comprehensive and reliable information on political finance, and covers a wide range of countries, making it suitable for cross-national studies. It is imperative to note that all of these sources provide up to date data on the three sets of variables that are the subject of this thesis and are used in comparative studies.

3. 2. Dependent and Independent Variables

Dependent variable (DV)

The dependent variable (the “Pub_fund” variable) is a binary indicator of whether the countries in the sample were subject or not to gendered public funding. The data for this variable comes from International IDEA’s Political Finance Database. Those countries that provide direct public funding to political parties that promote gender equality are coded as 1. Countries that have no direct public funding for political parties tied to gender equality are coded as 0. As mentioned earlier, countries that were included in the political finance database later than 2022 were excluded from the sample to avoid ambiguity in the treatment variable.
Independent Variables

There are a variety of variables that have been included in this study so that the analysis can be as effective as possible. Three regression models are used to analyze the data based on three independent variables: political, electoral, and cultural. The purpose of each regression model is to determine the effects of each variable on the dependent variable, which in this case is the gender public funding. The results of the models aim to provide insight into how political, electoral, and cultural factors impact gender-targeted public funding. It is important to note that the three primary variables are further subcategorized into additional variables. There is the inclusion of quotas in the first variable, which is the political factor. The second variable, which is electoral in this instance, includes electoral democracy and proportional representation. Moreover, I have included gender biases and resource distribution in the cultural theme.

Political Variable

In this study, the variable ‘Quota law’ is used to assess whether the countries included in the sample currently have or have ever had gender quotas. International IDEA's Gender Quotas Database provides data for this variable. When a quota law is in place in a county, the number 1 indicates that the law is in effect. The countries that are not subject to the quota law are coded as 0. In order to conduct a quantitative cross-national analysis to investigate the influence of electoral, political, and cultural factors on gendered public funding, it is necessary to differentiate gender quotas as a political variable rather than an electoral one. As opposed to existing research, which focuses primarily on the impact of gender quotas on electoral outcomes, this study considers gender quotas as a political variable that extends beyond elections. Researchers argue that gender quotas have implications for the overall political landscape, influencing not only the numerical representation of women but also shaping institutional structures, decision-making processes, and power dynamics within political entities (Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008; Krook, 2009). Given the diverse nature of gender quotas as political intervention, this study aims to assess their distinctive impact on gender public funding practices while also considering electoral factors. As a result of adopting this nuanced approach, this research contributes to a better understanding
of the intricate relationships between gender quotas and political finance and is able to inform effective policy measures for promoting gender equality in the political arena.

Electoral Variable

When analyzing the impact of electoral, political, and cultural factors on political funding in a cross-national context, it is essential to consider democracy and the electoral system, particularly proportional representation (PR), as relevant electoral variables. Democracy is a fundamental principle of governance that shapes the institutional framework within which political funding takes place. Depending on the degree of democratic stabilization and the strength of democratic institutions, political finance mechanisms may be transparent, accountable, and regulated (Della Porta & Caiani, 2004). According to Norris (2004), electoral systems play a significant role in shaping the nature of political representation within democracies. In addition, the choice of an electoral system, particularly the presence of a proportional representation system, can influence the distribution of political power and party dynamics, potentially impacting the accessibility of funding for different political parties. I intend to gain insights into how institutional structures contribute to variation in political funding practices across nations by incorporating democracy and the electoral system as key variables in the analysis, thereby clarifying the intricate relationship between democratic governance, electoral mechanisms, and financial support for political activities (Norris, 2004).

The paper uses a measure of democracy, which is coded as ‘v2x_polyarchy’, referring to the electoral democracy index from the ‘V-Dem Codebook v12’. In the code book, it is explained that a democracy's electoral principle embodies the principle that rulers should be responsive to citizens. This is achieved through electoral competition for voter approval under conditions of extensive suffrage. There is no fraud or systematic irregularity in the elections, and elections determine the composition of the chief executive. There is freedom of expression between elections as well as an independent media that presents alternative viewpoints on relevant political issues. V-Dem views electoral democracy as essential to any other conception of representative democracy - liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, etc. The variable is calculated by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted
average of the indexes measuring freedom of association, thick, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage, and, on the other hand, the multiplicative interaction between those indexes. Between a straight average and strict multiplication, this equals the average of the two. This index is aggregated on the basis of Dahl's subcomponents, with the exception of the non-electoral component (Teorell et al., 2019), and the interval scale used is from low to high (0-1), and can take any number between 0, 0.5, and 1. As for the PR system, I took the data from the QoG database and coded as 'br_pvote'. A country characterized by a proportional representation electoral system is coded with a number of 1, while a country without such a system is coded with a number of 0. 'The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version jan22', which covers a wide range of countries, making it suitable for cross-national studies involving a variety of countries.

Cultural Variable

The variable power distribution is called "v2pepwrgen" from the V-Dem Codebook v12, and it measures how men hold nearly all political power and I have interpreted it as how social resources are distributed unequally. The scale of responses ranges from 0: Men having a near-monopoly on political power, 1 men having a dominant hold on political power, and Women having only marginal influence. 2: Men have much more political power, but women have some areas of influence. 3: Men have more political power than women. 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power. Scales are ordinal but are converted to intervals by the measurement model. A measure of bias against women is referred to as "wvs_menpol" in the QoG data. The codebook codes the variable as continuous, and the scale follows. 1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Agree 4. Strongly agree with the statement 'Men make better political leaders than women'. A significant limitation of operationalizing the cultural independent variable is that it may not precisely reflect the underlying reasons for bias.

3.3. Method

For the cross-national analysis of the results, I have used logistic regression as the primary method. In the study, the dependent variable, political funding, is dichotomous because it indicates whether a political party or candidate received financial support, making logistic regression an effective way of
modeling binary outcomes. In order to perform the logistic regression analysis, I have used the statistical program STATA. The logistic model is appropriate when the dependent variable is binary, and a non-linear model is preferred. The independent variables, however, are expected to have a linear relationship with the logit of the outcome variable while not being highly correlated with one another (Senaviratna & Cooray, 2019). As a result of this method, I can explore the probability of political funding based on a variety of variables, such as political (quotas), electoral (democracy and PR system), and cultural variables (such as gender bias and resource distribution). Using the logistic regression framework, I could estimate odds ratios, providing me with valuable insights into the strength and direction of associations between these factors and the likelihood of receiving gendered political funding. With logistic regression, I aim to discern nuanced patterns among electoral, political, and cultural variables, thereby contributing to a comprehensive understanding of the factors impacting political funding in diverse national contexts. The assumptions about homoskedasticity, linearity, and normality are violated if a linear regression analysis is applied to a dichotomous dependent variable (Menard, 2002). As a result, it is essential to note that the implementation of logistic regression analysis is helpful in resolving this issue. Moreover, the model provides a straightforward method for predicting the outcome based on the independent variables.

I conducted five bivariate regressions to investigate the individual associations between each independent variable and gendered political funding. The bivariate logistic regression allowed me to assess the impact of, for example, political, electoral, and cultural dimensions on the binary outcome of gendered public funding. As a result of using a bivariate approach, I discerned the unadjusted relationship between each factor and gendered political funding without having to take into account confounding variables. The results of the bivariate models provide a foundation for understanding the impact of electoral, political, and cultural factors on gendered public funding in politics. In order to provide a more comprehensive view of the determinants of gender-targeted political funding across diverse national contexts, I applied two multivariate logistic regression models that accounted for potential confounding effects. A multivariate logistic regression model stands as a pivotal methodological approach, and based on insights gained from bivariate analyses, the multivariate model
provides the opportunity to simultaneously examine the joint effects of multiple independent variables on the binary outcome of gender political funding. This analysis examines regression coefficients as well as their interpretations.

As an additional analysis, I conducted a predicted probability analysis to estimate the extent to which the independent variable can predict gendered public funding. I perform this analysis whenever a statistically significant relationship is found in the multivariate regression analysis. By interpreting this analysis, we are able to estimate the probability (Long, J. S., 1997) of gendered targeted public funding after a one-unit increase in the independent variable. Based on these probabilities, we can understand how electoral systems, political structures, and cultural dimensions affect political funding. As a result of this approach, my research findings have a more significant practical application, facilitating the decision-making process for policymakers and stakeholders based on a probabilistic understanding of the critical determinants of political funding across diverse national contexts.

Next, I describe the formulation of five bivariate logistic regression equations, each tailored to examine a particular independent variable in the paper. Based on these equations, I model the probability of specific outcomes within political funding using a logistic regression framework. Among the independent variables are quotas, electoral democracy, PR systems, distribution of resources, and gender biases. The equations strategically pair dependent variables with independent variables, dissecting their relationship. As a result of these bivariate models, I can assess the specific impact of electoral, political, and cultural factors on gendered political funding, providing a nuanced understanding of how each variable contributes to overall funding dynamics across various national contexts.

**Bivariate Equation:** The logistic standard model shown in Equation 1, where Gendered Public funding, represented as ‘GenderedPubFunding’ is a binary dependent variable, \(X_n\) includes all the independent variables (Quota, Democracy, PRSystem, DistributionOfResources, and GenderBiasesAgainstWomen), \(\beta_0\) is the intercept term, \(\beta_n\) is the coefficient of the independent variable, and \(\epsilon\) represents the error term.

\[
\logit(GenderedPubFunding) = \beta_0 + \beta_n X_n + \epsilon \quad \text{(Equation 1)}
\]
Next, I present two multivariate equations to represent the two different models. Model 1 is presented by Equation 2 and Model 2 can be seen as Equation 3. These multivariate equations demonstrate if the two models predict different results because one of my cultural variables had less than 70 observations. As far as model 1 is concerned, I only used political and electoral factors. Next, I included the cultural factor in model 2 to observe if any significant changes had been made to the overall model due to the cultural factor. By comparing the two models, I could determine whether adding the cultural variable improved the model's predictive power.

\[ \text{logit}(\text{GenderedPubFunding}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Quota} + \beta_2 \text{Democracy} + \beta_3 \text{PRSystem} + \epsilon \]  
(Equation 2)

\[ \text{logit}(\text{GenderedPubFunding}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Quota} + \beta_2 \text{Democracy} + \beta_3 \text{PRSystem} + \beta_4 \text{DistributionOfResources} + \beta_5 \text{GenderBiasesAgainstWomen} + \epsilon \]  
(Equation 3)

In the analysis of the impact of electoral, political, and cultural factors on political funding, the cross-sectional nature of my data presents inherent challenges. Cross-national data captures information at a single point in time, providing a snapshot of variables of interest across countries. Causality, however, is difficult to determine due to the absence of a temporal sequence that can assist in identifying cause-and-effect relationships. A simultaneous observation of electoral, political, and cultural factors as well as political funding raises the possibility of reverse causation, in which the observed outcomes may influence the independent variables. In addition, the presence of unobservable confounding factors may complicate my ability to infer causal relationships. To address these issues, I acknowledge the limitations imposed by the cross-sectional nature of the data.
4. Results and Analysis

As part of the initial exploration of the relationship between political funding and individual factors, 5 bivariate logistic regression models were employed to explore the relationship. For each independent variable, such as political, electoral structure, and cultural attitudes, I assessed its individual impact on gender-targeted political funding. Table 1 presents bivariate relationships between the 5 independent variables, and the dependent variable. In general, few regression coefficients for gender public funding are significant. The expectations I had because of previous theories were slightly different from the outcomes I have achieved.

Table 3 Bivariate analysis, Gendered Public Funding (GPF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotas</td>
<td>2.522***</td>
<td>2.522***</td>
<td>2.522***</td>
<td>2.522***</td>
<td>2.522***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.045)</td>
<td>(1.045)</td>
<td>(1.045)</td>
<td>(1.045)</td>
<td>(1.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
<td>-0.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR System</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Biases</td>
<td>-0.4099</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Standard error in parentheses. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01*
The logistic regression analysis in the first model in Table 3 explored the relationship between the political variable quota and the dependent variable gendered public funding. The results revealed a statistically significant relationship, as evidenced by the quota coefficient, indicating that a one-unit increase in quota corresponds to a 2.52-unit increase in the log odds of gendered public funding, which means that if we go from a non-quota country (0) to a quota country (1), the likelihood to adopt a gendered public funding policy is increasing. The regression coefficients of quotas are positive and at 99% level of significance. The results indicate that the presence of quotas may increase the probability of gendered public funding.

In the following sections, I will discuss Model 2 and Model 3, which provide intriguing insights. In model 2, where gendered public funding is regressed on democracy, the coefficient for democracy is -0.034, which has a large standard error; the negative coefficient means that autocracies are more likely to adopt gendered public funding. However, the lack of significance indicates that in the context of gender-targeted public funding, democracy may not significantly impact such policy. In the second model, DV is regressed on the PR system, and the coefficient is -0.22; the negative coefficient means that majoritarian systems are more likely to adopt such policies, but the result is non-significant. According to these findings, neither democracy nor PR systems are robust predictors of gender public funding.

In table 3, The coefficient is -0.053 in model 4, where gendered funding is regressed on resource distribution, indicates that the more gender unequal countries in terms of distribution of resources are likely to adopt gendered campaign funding but the result is not statistically significant. According to model 5, the gender bias coefficient indicates a negative relationship, with coefficient -0.40 indicating that countries with gender biases against women are less likely to adopt such policies, but the results are not statistically significant. This study demonstrates that neither resource distribution nor gender bias is a strong predictor of gender-targeted public funding, emphasizing the complexity of cultural influences on public funding. It may be necessary to investigate further and consider additional variables to enhance the predictive validity of the model. The bivariate relationships have been briefly discussed in this section. The quota variable turned out to be the only significant variable, and in line with my
expectations. I will now proceed to the next section where I will present the results of the multivariate logistic regression analysis that has been conducted.

4.1. Multivariate logistic regression analyses

Multivariate regressions were conducted for this section, and the reasons for this are as follows. Due to the overlap between my political variable Quota and my other independent variables, I ran multivariate regression to determine whether it is still significant or if the size of the relationship has changed. Particularly due to the fact that quotas are associated with other factors which might have an impact on them. The results of the standard logistic regression analysis are presented in the following section.

Logistic regression models explore the factors influencing gender public funding, providing insights into factors that impact political funding in the first model, which includes quotas, democracy, and PR systems as predictors. The coefficient of quota = 2.684344 and p = 0.011 as shown in Table 4, indicates that higher quota values are associated with increased chances of gender public funding. Compared to the bivariate model, the quota variable is still significant when considering other factors, and the coefficient size is not any lower. The results imply that quotas do matter. In contrast, democracy and the PR system did not appear to have significant effects, which was, however, not unexpected in relation to the bivariate relationship.

Alternatively, in the second model, which expands the analysis to include cultural variables, the chi-square test indicates overall model significance, with a Pseudo R2 of 0.2464 indicating significant model significance. Table 5 shows that while quota remains a significant predictor with a coefficient of 2.341961, p = 0.051, the other independent variables do not achieve statistical significance. This study confirms the nuanced relationship between political variables and funding outcomes, suggesting that quota consistently influences gender-targeted public funding, and the results hold significance through all models. In a multivariate model, quotas still hold predictive power regardless of including additional variables. To fully capture the complex dynamics of political funding, further research, and refinement of the model with unexplored variables are necessary.
Table 4  Multivariate analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>2.684***</td>
<td>2.341**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.050)</td>
<td>(1.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.7188</td>
<td>0.8880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.648)</td>
<td>(1.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR System</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>-1.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.555)</td>
<td>(0.857)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of Resources</td>
<td>-2.530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.300)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Bias against women</td>
<td>-1.102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.685)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Cons</td>
<td>-4.028</td>
<td>-4.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.153)</td>
<td>(3.786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td><strong>0.121</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.246</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Overall, the regression coefficients that are significant are found only for the political variable of Quota. It is for this reason that I will discuss this variable in more detail further on in the thesis. It is clear from the above explanation that quota and gendered public funding are positively related, confirming my
expectation regarding the research question. When analyzing logistic regression results, it is important to remember that the effect of each independent variable on the probability of a successful outcome is dependent on the other independent variables. There cannot be a linear prediction where the independent variables predict the same outcome. As a result of holding other independent variables constant at their means, I calculate the predicted probabilities of the relevant variables which is quota in this case. However, since PR is a categorical variable, its mean cannot be calculated, I hold it constant at 0.

**Table 5:** Predicted Probabilities of Public Funding based on Quota Presence

| Quotas | Probability | z      | P>|z|  | Non-Quotas | Probability | z      | P>|z| |
|--------|-------------|--------|-------|-------------|-------------|--------|-------|
| 0.303  | 3.19        | 0.001  |       | 0.040       | 0.95        | 0.344  |

The results in table 5 indicate that the political variable Quota has a significant impact on the probability of gendered public funding. If Quota is equal to 1, the probability of gendered public funding is approximately 0.303. There is evidence to suggest that, according to the model, the presence of a quota law is associated with around 30% likelihood that a quota country adopts a gendered public funding policy. Figure 3 shows the predicted probability of gendered public funding is lower for Quota equal to 0, approximately 0.040. Therefore, based on the model, the absence of a quota law is associated with a lower probability of gendered public funding.

**Figure 3:** Predicted probability of Quota with 95% level
As a conclusion, the model suggests that the presence of a quota is associated with a higher predicted probability of gendered public funding compared to the absence of a quota law. Predicted probabilities reflect the impact or association of the quota variable on the likelihood of gendered public funding policy. As a result of this research, it appears that quota laws could be an effective tool for reducing gender inequalities in public finance. Moreover, it suggests that quota laws should be implemented to ensure that public resources are distributed equally. It is therefore recommended that quotas be viewed as a viable tool for promoting gender equality in public finance.

4.2. Discussion

Based on the results of the above analyses, gender-targeted public funding policies are more likely to occur when quotas are in place. As an example of the effects of gender quotas on campaign financing for female candidates, Ireland is a particularly suitable case study. As part of the Irish government’s effort to address the issue of women’s underrepresentation in politics, a legislative gender quota was adopted in 2012. During general elections, a party must have a minimum of 30% women and 30% men as candidates. Those parties that fail to meet the quota will be deducted one-half of their state funds to fund party organizational activities. Essentially, quota law is tied to gender public funding, and quota law has a gendered public funding component, which makes them a perfect match as far as gender public funding is concerned. By addressing gender imbalances in representation, an initiative such as this legislation was intended to promote greater inclusion in the Irish political system. Buckley and Mariani (2021) provide evidence that following the implementation of the gender quota in Ireland, political parties increased expenditures on female candidates. This increased expenditure suggests that this legislation was indeed successful in promoting greater inclusion and gender equality within the Irish political system. The legislation also encourages parties to invest in female candidates, as they will receive less state funding if they do not meet the quota.
In contrast to other countries, where parties have resisted providing financial support to women (Ohman, 2018; Wylie and Dos Santos, 2016), parties in Ireland have provided strategic financial support to newcomer women to improve their competitiveness in elections. In this regard, Ireland is an excellent example of where parties invest financial resources in enhancing women's electoral prospects. As a result of gender quotas with a public funding penalty in Ireland, parties have been forced to invest more resources in women's campaigns. The result has been a higher proportion of women in the Irish parliament, demonstrating the success of gender quotas. The majority of female candidates in a country where men dominate politics are newcomers, and quotas have led parties to invest more resources in these candidates to compensate for their outsider status. It is an excellent example of how quotas have acted as a catalyst for investing in women and how money has been used as a way to compensate for other forms of disadvantage (Murray, Muriaas, and Wang, 2021)

**Figure. 4** Sum of party investment, by gender

Through the example of Ireland, which has implemented political quotas and a gender public funding policy, this paper sheds light on the nuanced dynamics of gender-inclusive policies in political landscapes. The primary focus of this paper is on the significant influence of gender quotas on the
adoption of gender-targeted public funding policies. Based on existing research, this finding supports the correlation between gender quotas and gender public funding and an increase in women's political representation (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009). There is no doubt that the robustness of the relationship demonstrates the pivotal role that institutional mechanisms play in the advancement of gender equality in political spheres. According to these findings, it would be more effective to increase women's representation at the national level through party-based gender quotas in countries where financial support for electoral success is crucial. These provisions could help to make gender quotas more effective, or, more precisely, to complement the overall goal of increasing gender equality in politics.

Furthermore, my analysis reveals the lack of statistical significance observed for other variables, such as electoral democracy, proportional representation (PR) systems, distribution of resources, and gender biases. This absence of significance prompts a deeper exploration of gender-inclusive policies' contextual nuances. While gender quotas serve as powerful catalysts for change, the influence of other factors on the adoption of gender-specific public funding policies may depend on the particular national context (Norris, 2004). Additionally, this paper provides insight into the types of countries more likely to adopt comprehensive gender-inclusive policies. A prominent role played by gender quotas in influencing the adoption of gender-targeted public funding policies indicates that countries committed to increasing women's political representation also tend to implement financial mechanisms that foster their participation. The alignment reflects a broader commitment to gender equality and demonstrates the interconnectedness of institutional reforms in promoting inclusive political environments (Murray, 2014).

5. Conclusion

In this thesis, I sought whether political, electoral, and cultural factors impact gendered public funding. Using cross-national data, I analysed four databases for the purpose of examining the relationship between these variables. The presence of quota laws significantly influences the likelihood of adopting gendered public funding policies, according to bivariate and multivariate logistic regressions analyses. A country with quota legislation is more likely to implement these policies than a country without quota
legislation. In contrast to prior expectations, PR system, democracy and cultural factors did not have such an impact. According to these results, while quotas are a valuable tool for promoting gender equality in political financing, further research is required to determine the nuanced dynamics underlying the adoption and effectiveness of gender-based public funding policies.

With this thesis, I have made several contributions. From a theoretical perspective, the study has contributed to a better understanding of the mechanisms behind gendered public funding. In terms of empirical evidence, it has contributed to our understanding of the significant impact of gender quotas on the likelihood of adopting gendered public funding policies across diverse countries. It has also explored a cross-national approach that has been largely absent from the literature on gendered public funding. Four different datasets were used in this thesis as part of the methodology, including the IDEA political finance database, the IDEA gender quotes, QOG, and V-dem. A first global analysis of the IDEA political finance database is presented in this thesis. By emphasizing the role of quotas in shaping gendered public funding policies, this thesis contributes to the broader discourse on gender and political finance. The ongoing discourse surrounding gender equality in political representation continues to be debated worldwide. This thesis provides valuable insights for researchers seeking to address gender disparities in funding for political candidates.

The results of my study offer valuable insights, but there are a few limitations that are acknowledged. Firstly, the cross-national nature of the research presents inherent challenges, including variations in cultural contexts, and political systems across national borders. When conducting quantitative cross-national analyses of the impact of electoral, political, and cultural factors on political funding from a cross-national perspective, several methodological factors must be addressed. It is imperative to remember the possibility of multicollinearity among the independent variables, where specific predictors may be highly correlated, which makes it difficult to isolate the effects of each individually. In the context of this paper, I divided the variables into three categories, but in a broad sense, all of these variables overlap in one way or another. Moreover, using aggregated data at the national level may mask variations within countries. Also, it is essential to note that the choice of variables and the way these
variables are operationalized may introduce measurement biases, which may negatively impact the results' robustness. The differences may affect findings generalizability and limit relationship analysis. Even though combining diverse datasets enhances the study's comprehensiveness, it raises questions about data consistency and measurement discrepancies. I faced several challenges while combining data from four different sources. Primary concerns include the heterogeneity of data collection methodologies and measurement criteria among these diverse databases. The definitions, coding practices, and timeframes to capture political, electoral, and cultural factors may vary depending on the database. In addition, one of the challenges I faced during the research process was the possibility of missing or incomplete data in one or more of the sources I selected. It is important to note that data gaps or inconsistencies, particularly in the cultural variables, hinder a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena under investigation and limit the generalizability of the findings. A second limitation is the time period of the analysis. Political and cultural dynamics evolve over time, and the study's approach may not reflect gendered public funding adoption dynamics. Lastly, the study focuses primarily on electoral, political, and cultural factors, leaving out potentially relevant economic and social variables. By incorporating a broader range of variables into future research, it may be possible to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing gender-based public funding policies. Despite these limitations, the study provides valuable insights into the complex relationship of factors that influence gendered public funding adoption throughout the world.

However, further research is needed, and future efforts should build upon these findings. Specifically, focus on several key areas to advance gender equality in political financing and to deepen our understanding of these issues. A future study should examine the long-term effects of gendered public funding policies on political representation and decision-making. In order to gain valuable insights, it would be beneficial to examine the impact of these policies on the career paths of women in politics, their ability to influence policy outcomes, and the overall advancement of gender equality goals. The intersection of gender with other socio-demographic factors, such as race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, can also help us understand how different dimensions of identity affect gendered public funding. The methodology of cross-national studies needs to be refined by addressing data challenges and
improving comparability across diverse contexts. By employing innovative data collection methods, such as qualitative interviews and case studies, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the lived experiences of women navigating political landscapes shaped by a gendered public funding policy. Since gender-targeted public funding is a relatively new policy innovation, its broader implications have not yet been fully explored.
6. References


Dahlerup, D., & Freidenvall, L. (2005). Quotas as a ‘fast track’ to equal representation for women: Why Scandinavia is no longer the model. International feminist journal of politics, 7(1), 26-48

Dahlerup, D., (2006). What are the Effects of Electoral Gender Quotas? From studies of quota discourses to research on quota effects. In International Political Science Association World Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, (pp. 9-14).


Gender Quotas Database | International IDEA (https://www.idea.int.developmentzone.co/data-tools/data/gender-quotas-database)


Money in Politics | *International IDEA*. https://www.idea.int/theme/money-politics


"V-DemCodebookv12"Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.


## Appendix A: List of Country Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Papua New Guinea</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
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Appendix B: Logistic Regression

The form of the logistic regression is \( \text{logit} (p) = a + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 \ldots + \varepsilon \) where one-unit increase in \( X_1 \) will result in \( \beta_1 \) increase in \( \text{logit} (p) \). The expression \( \text{logit} (p) \) is short for \( \log \left( \frac{p}{1 - p} \right) \) where \( P \) is the probability that \( Y = 1 \) which means success. \( \text{logit} (p) \) is therefore the log-odds ratio – the logarithm of the ratio of probability of success and probability of failure: \( \text{logit}(p) = \log \left( \frac{P[Y = 1]}{P[Y = 0]} \right) \). If we increase \( X_1 \), and the \( \beta_1 > 0 \), the log-odds ratio will increase since the success probability, where \( Y = 1 \) will increase compared to \( Y = 0 \) which makes \( Y = 1 \) more likely. Returning to the first sentence, a one-unit increase in \( X_1 \) will result in \( \beta_1 \) increase in \( \text{logit} (p) \). This means that \( P \) will increase by \( \exp (\beta_1) \), which is the natural logarithm of \( \beta_1 \).