Intelligent for Peace?
Integration and Reconciliation among Diasporas

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Abstract:
This paper aims to investigate the effects of hostland integration on reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas. In recent scholarly debates, many argue that as a result of a lack of hostland social integration, diasporas are less moderate in their approach to homeland conflicts than those in the homeland. During periods of peace, ‘rebellion-specific capital’ in the homeland is thought to decrease as tensions ease, while the hatreds harbored by diasporas remain strong. This predominant view has recently been challenged by a new body of work suggesting that diasporas are not homogenous but are rather characterized by diversity both in terms of their political views and the political and economic effects of their transnational activities. While some tend to promote ethnic nationalism and war, others encourage peacemaking and peacebuilding.

While we know that there is variation in diaspora attitudes, previous explanations remain underdeveloped and lack a solid foundation in systematic empirical evidence. In this paper we develop an alternative theory to explain the relationship between hostland integration and diaspora attitudes. Until now most theories specified the need for hostland social integration to induce moderation among diasporas. Our argument, based on findings in social psychology and social work, is that structural integration empowers diasporas and through providing psychological coherence enables them to deal with the past and envision a common future with other groups both in the host and homeland. As the basis for examining our claims, we have collected a unique set of survey data on integration and reconciliatory attitudes among four diasporas in Sweden: Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Yugoslavs. We test the effects of social and structural integration on diaspora attitudes towards the nature of the recent war, societal organization, forgiveness and prospects for peaceful coexistence in their homelands. In order to investigate whether integration into Swedish society explains observed differences among diasporas in Sweden, we control for homeland background factors, for example refugee status and previous education, and demographic variables, for example gender and age.

Our results indicate that while social integration has little or no effect on reconciliatory attitudes among the respondents, structural integration has a strong and positive effect. We argue that structural integration based on language training, citizenship, education and employment empowers diasporas with positive attitudes and confidence that enable them to envision a common future with other groups both in the host and homeland.

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1. Introduction

The end of the superpower rivalry of the Cold War was followed by a wave of civil wars in the early 1990s. In order to explain what were perceived as increasing empirical trends in the number and human impact of wars, the concept of ‘New Wars’ was crafted in order to emphasize the supposedly novel character of the actors, financing and military conduct that drove contemporary armed conflicts (Kaldor 1999). This view has been the subject of lively academic debate (Cf. Berdal 2003; Kalyvas 2001; Newman 2004). In particular, recent scholarship has argued against the notion that observed trends in e.g. battle severity, civilians killed, forced migration and the ratio of civilian-to-military casualties support the notion of ‘New Wars’ (Cf. Melander et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the concept has gained acceptance in many academic and policy circles.

One of the key actors identified by ‘New Wars’ theorists and other scholars of the political economy of civil war is diasporas. Diasporas may be defined as migrants, and their descendents, who describe themselves as belonging to a common origin and homeland, and who engage in transnational activities. Along with primary commodities, contributions from diasporas are pointed to as a key source of rebel backing in the post-Cold War period (Cf. Collier 2000:8; Byman et al. 2001:41). Based upon a large-N study of civil wars, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler of the World Bank argue that diasporas greatly increase post-conflict risk, a finding widely circulated and regurgitated by themselves and their World Bank colleagues in numerous scholarly and policy writings. Their findings regarding diasporas have however been strongly criticized on methodological grounds (Hall 2008:7-8; Sambanis 2002:18; Tarrow 2007:589), and challenged by new global and quantitative empirical evidence on the effects of remittances on civil wars (Regan and Frank 2008). Nevertheless, against the backdrop of several prominent case studies and numerous literature reviews pointing to similar results, most scholars of armed conflict seem to agree that diasporas have largely detrimental effects on civil war risk, particularly in the post-conflict environment. As a result, there is an assumption in much of the literature that diasporas display extreme attitudes, and if given the opportunity will engage in transnational activities that impact negatively on homeland prospects for peace. Yet there is a growing body of case study evidence that suggests diasporas are in fact internally diverse in terms of their attitudes and impact on homeland peace (Cf. Cochrane 2007; Horst 2008; Lyons 2007; Smith and Stares 2007). While some tend to promote ethnic nationalism and war, others encourage peacemaking and peacebuilding.

In this paper we develop an alternative theory of the relationship between hostland integration and diaspora attitudes. In order to provide a more nuanced analysis of what has in peace and conflict research only been referred to as ‘alienation’, ‘marginalization’ or ‘exclusion’, we distinguish between structural integration and social integration. Structural integration may be distinguished from social integration as ‘social positioning’, e.g. citizenship, level of education or position within the labor market. Social integration refers to e.g. informal social contacts with natives and the endorsement of ‘prevailing moral standards and values’ (Snel et al. 2006:287). Many argue that social exclusion in the hostland leads

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1 In much of the literature the term ‘diasporas’ is used to refer to individuals, groups or organizations, often interchangeably. In this paper we use diasporas to refer to the individual level of analysis. See Hall (2008) for an overview of key concepts and debates.
2 Cf. Bigombe et al. (2000); Collier (2000); Collier et al. (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 2006). This result is quite important in the CH model, and is used to interpret their explanation for why the risk of conflict declines as peace is maintained (Collier and Hoeffler 2004:575).
3 Much of the qualitative evidence is anecdotal (Cf. Andreas 2004; Angoustures and Pascal 1996; Adamson 2005; Byman et al. 2001; Wennmann 2007). There are several intensive studies (Cf. Fair 2005; Fuglerud 1999; Gunaratna 2000, 2003; Hockenjos 2003; Wayland 2004), however researchers have tended to select cases where diaspora involvement in armed conflicts has had negative effects. See Hall (2008).
4 This useful distinction is typical of the Dutch integration literature. See Snel et al. (2006).
diasporas to adopt more extreme political positions\(^5\) while social integration leads diasporas individuals to adopt more moderate political positions\(^6\). Most authors argue that structural integration will affect the opportunity structure of diasporas, but not their political attitudes.

These explanations remain underdeveloped and lack a solid foundation in systematic empirical evidence. In this paper we develop an alternative theory to explain the relationship between hostland integration and diaspora attitudes. In order to test our claims in the context of post-conflict society, we examine the effects of integration on reconciliatory attitudes. Until now most theories specified the need for hostland social integration to induce moderation among diasporas. Our argument, based on findings in social psychology and social work, is that structural integration empowers diasporas and through providing psychological coherence enables them to deal with the past and envision a common future with other groups both in the host and homeland. As the basis for examining our claims, we have collected a unique set of survey data on integration and reconciliatory attitudes among four diasporas in Sweden: Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Yugoslavs\(^7\). We test the effects of social and structural integration on diaspora attitudes towards the nature of the recent war, societal organization, forgiveness and prospects for peaceful coexistence in their homelands. In order to investigate whether integration into Swedish society explains observed differences among diasporas in Sweden, we control for homeland background factors, for example refugee status and previous education, and demographic variables, for example gender and age.

Our results indicate that while social integration has little or no effect on reconciliatory attitudes among the respondents, structural integration has a strong and positive effect. We argue that structural integration based on citizenship, employment education and language training supports moderation among diasporas, and subsequently through their transnational engagement has the potential to encourage lasting peace in their homelands.

In the next section we briefly review previous claims regarding the effects of social and structural integration on diaspora attitudes in the literature on nationalism and civil war, and evidence for those claims. Thereafter we offer an alternative theory of hostland integration and diaspora attitudes. Thereafter we present our data and the design of this study, as well as provide a brief description of the context in which our data was collected. This is followed by our analysis of the data. In the final section we discuss our findings.

## 2. Theory

### Previous arguments regarding integration and diaspora attitudes

Current research on diasporas and armed conflicts tends to adopt the traditional view of integration from the field of migration studies. The view is that migrants move between territorially bound states, either staying for good (becoming an ‘immigrant’) or returning after achieving economic gains (becoming a ‘sojourner’) (Guarnizo et al. 2003:1215-1216). Identities are understood as mutually exclusive, so that acculturation in the hostland leads to decreased homeland oriented identities, and vice versa. Over time,

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\(^7\) Vertovec argues that ‘In order to have real meaning, claims and criteria surrounding diasporic boundaries and membership should be self-ascribed. It seems illegitimate for others to decide if a person is part of a diaspora if they do not regard themselves as part of such a group. Belonging to a diaspora entails a consciousness of, or emotional attachment to, commonly purported origins and cultural attributes associated with them. Such origins and attributes may emphasize ethno-linguistic, regional, religious, national or other features. Concerns for homeland developments and the plight of co-diaspora members in other parts of the world flow from this consciousness and emotional attachment’ (Vertovec 2005:3). The categories Bosniak, Croat, Serb and Yugoslav are thus self-defined by survey respondents.
immigrants are expected to assimilate and shed existing identities and ties with their homelands, leading to decreased transnationalism.

In line with the ‘classic’ view, many researchers investigating diasporas argue that homeland-oriented identities result from their lack of hostland integration (Cf. Anderson 1992:8-9; Anderson 1999; Brinkerhoff 2008; Fuglørud 1999; Zunzer 2004:9). But it is the process of social integration in the hostland that is viewed as central to explanations of diaspora extremism or moderation (Cf. Brinkerhoff 2008:76; Zunzer 2004: 44; Brown 2004: 52). According to such views, failure of hostland assimilation (Brinkerhoff 2008: 44) and political and cultural integration (Zunzer 2004: 44) may result in communities which, in terms of their norms, attitudes and behavior, are thought to be prone to ‘extremism’ rather than moderation, particularly if such diasporas are conflict-generated.8 In the words of Collier and Hoeffler (2006:24): ‘Once detached from the home society and living in a highly absorptive multi-cultural society, the cultural incentive is for the diaspora to preserve prominent aspects of its identity; extremist political allegiance is an inexpensive means of asserting that identity’. Furthermore, it is argued that this encourages further social marginalization, because ‘Nativist xenophobia and diaspora extremism feed on one another’ (Tarrow 2005:29).9

In relation to structural integration, with employment, a mobile phone, digital media, and a credit card, diasporas are thought to propagate the ‘exclusivist' identities (Kaldor 2006) that motivate ‘new wars'. With little accountability to their homeland counterparts (Anderson 1991), this action is thought to deliver financial and political resources to actors in armed conflicts and publicizes ‘grievances’ (Cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2006:24).10 For these reasons, they are referred to wholesale by some as ‘long-distance nationalists’ (Anderson 1991) or ‘regressive globalizers’ (Anheier et al. 2003).

To summarize, diasporas, particularly conflict-generated diasporas, are thought to be weakly integrated socially in the hostland due to their development of a homeland oriented identity, which is reinforced by the alienating and marginalizing hostland context. Maintaining their hatreds developed during war and displacement, structural integration empowers these diasporas to pursue transnational activities which impact negatively upon homeland peace.

To remedy this, it has been suggested that more social integration is needed in general (Brinkerhoff 2008: 44), with particular emphasis on the cultural and political norms highlighting liberal values of democracy and human rights in each host society (Brown 2004: 53). The underlying assumption is that culturally and politically integrated diasporas will play a crucial role in transferring liberal values to homeland societies

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8 It is argued that the attachment of diaspora to the homeland territory is theorized to be shaped by their often-violent displacement from, and myth of return to, the homeland, which provides a central narrative and set of symbols around which to organize diaspora identity. The need for such symbology leads to a transmission of an identity bound up in traumatic memories across generations through nostalgia and story-telling (Lyons 2007:532-3).

9 Deviating from the individualist perspective, Østergaard-Nielsen (2006:12) argues similarly that ‘radicalization feeds on marginalization. If an organization is excluded from dialogue with host-country authorities it has less incentive to modify its aims and strategies.’

10 Diaspora networks have been shown to facilitate the smuggling of money, weapons, raw materials, drugs, people and products between conflict zones and global markets, forming an important element of the war economy (Andreas 2004; Angoustures and Pascal 1996; Duffield 2001; Gunaratna 2003; Kaldor 2001; Wennmann 2005). Human resources have also supported insurgencies, as diaspora volunteers in the wars in Croatia, Bosnia or Kosovo illustrate (Kalyvas and Symbanis 2005:209-210). Diaspora lobbies have propagated the cause through political channels, while propaganda delivered via satellite television, electronic and print media reinforce the political will and facilitate recruitment among a broader audience (Cf. Adamson 2005; Fair 2005; Wayland 2004). Diasporas have advanced hard-line positions and in some cases these views have fed into homeland politics, providing the ideological basis of new wars, as movements for an independent Khalistan, Croatia or Kosovo attest (Fair 2005; Hockenos 2003). In many cases, even the core rebel leadership has been located abroad, organizing political and military strategies from the safety of foreign capitals. In a survey of major armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War, these diaspora political and economic resources eclipsed state support in over a dozen insurgencies across Europe, Africa and Asia (Byman et al. 2001:41). Some also point to the role diasporas have played in ‘spoil[ing]’ ongoing peace negotiations (Newman and Richmond 2006).
and thus contribute to homeland stability (Zunzer 2004). Many have argued that diaspora social norms have constructive and emancipatory affects, empowering their homeland counterparts through the flow of social and cultural capital (Cf. Levitt 1998)\textsuperscript{11}. Beyond voting, diasporas may have indirect influence in homeland elections by impacting homeland contacts. Voters in the home state often depend on remittances from their relatives abroad, and this economic influence spills over into ideological influence (Cf. Itzigsohn et al. 1999:328-9; Lyons, 537:534). Thus social remittances from democratic hostlands, attached to economic remittances or other forms of transnational activities, may provide a constructive homeland influence, promoting liberal agendas of human rights, democracy and social justice (Shain 1999; Landolt et al. 1999:295; Levitt 1998). Thus many have concluded along with Guarnizo et al. (2003:1239) that ‘By and large, transnational activism is a constructive phenomenon through which people respond to long-distance social obligations and belonging and seek to transform political practices in their sending countries’. From this discussion, we draw the following hypothesis:

H1: Diasporas with higher hostland social integration will display more reconciliatory attitudes

An alternative theory of the effects of integration on diaspora attitudes

In contrast, we argue that previous theory regarding social integration fails to acknowledge the essential mechanisms through which social identity is formed. Based upon extensive experimental evidence, Social Identity Theory (SIT) posits that group formation and perception is accounted for by two basic mechanisms, categorization and social comparison (Theiler 2003:261). Because reality is fluid, humans have the cognitive need to simplify the surrounding world in order to understand it, dividing things and people into fixed categories (Tajfel 1974). As humans internalize their categorizations of the social world, they internalize their belonging to a particular social category, or ‘in-group’. Part of an individual’s self-image is therefore derived from their membership in a social group (Tajfel 1974:69). This self-image then shapes individual actions. This cycle of internalization and externalization ensures group reproduction: ‘social practices, beliefs and institutions become deeply sedimented and thereby congeal and change only very slowly’ (Theiler 2003:254). As individuals externalize their representation of the community in this way and, at the same time, experience other individuals doing the same, the community becomes intersubjectively real. In other words, the group becomes a category of practice (Theiler 2003). As soon as individuals experience the group as objective reality, they internalize it anew. The resulting internalization is bound to be expressed again. Continued and simultaneous internalization and externalization create a cycle of group reproduction that occurs for as long as the group exists. A very important assertion of SIT is that once group members have internalized a group category and thereby acquired the relevant social identity, they generally want to preserve it.\textsuperscript{12} Perceived threats to the group, both threats to its status or its existence, are also threats to the self, and for the individuals concerned protecting the group means protecting the self as well. Response to threats against salient group identity, when a group does not have military means of defense, may instead include strengthening in-group cohesion. According to Weaver, if members of a group feel that the group identity is threatened one obvious line of defense is ‘to strengthen group identity by using cultural means to reinforce group cohesion and distinctiveness’ (Weaver 1993: 191).\textsuperscript{13} As empirical findings on external nation-building efforts show, strengthening group identity includes also strengthening war-related stereotypes and reduces prospects for inter-group reconciliation (Kostić 2007). In other words, attempts at top-down social

\textsuperscript{11} This research has however tended to ignore transnationalism’s pernicious qualities highlighted for example by scholars of nationalism and civil war (Cf. Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004:1186).

\textsuperscript{12} This is explained by the cognitive importance of categorization and by the group being part of us and bound up with our sense of self-worth (Bar-Tal 2000; Tajfel 1974; Theiler 2003).

\textsuperscript{13} For similar findings in relations to external post-war national building see Kostic (2007).
integration by the host state is very likely to result in more social distances and exclusion of diasporas instead of their inclusion.

Turning to structural integration, we argue that, rather than simply forming part of the opportunity structure of diasporas, incorporation into the labor market, education, and the provision of social benefits empowers diasporas with the positive attitudes and confidence necessary in order to deal with the past and envision a common future with other groups both in the host and homeland. This view is based upon research in the field of social work and draws upon the concepts of structural incorporation and the social rights of citizens (Cf. Williams 1998). The idea is that the consolidation of a national unity resting on rights of citizens is achieved, at least partly, through collective rights: e.g. access to labor markets, education, public health, social insurance and maternity provisions (Williams 1998: 116). The whole model rests on the existence of three different elements of citizenship: civil, political and social (Marshall 1950). The civil element of citizenship deals with freedom of expression, assembly and religious freedom; the political aspect deals with the right to vote and be elected; and social citizenship concerns the provisions of an economic safety net as well as the full enjoyment of the dividends of societal progress (Barbalet 1988). Exclusion and inclusion thus operate primarily on the level of citizenship and citizens rights within a given state rather than adherence to the prevalent ethnocultural norms. In other words, by defining citizens one defines who is entitled to the scarce social resources of the state. In this context, it is citizenship and social rights that create a sense of solidarity and belonging across generations as well as across different strata of society (Lewin 1998, Williams 1998). In other words, through the existing welfare practice, the state is able to transfer certain cultural practices underpinning these (Williams 1998). Furthermore, one could argue that this type of integration based on social rights and social security is less intrusive and more indirect in its practices, and thus less likely to provoke more cultural marginalization of minority diaspora communities striving to emphasize their own identity values vis-à-vis the identity of their host societies. Needless to say, this type of structural integration may be particularly useful in relation to conflict-generated diasporas, who are often characterize by a highly salient communal identity and an experience of violence and economic deprivation stemming from their conflict experience.

The importance of structural integration has been extensively studied in the field of health psychology as well as sociology. According to Kerr, modern society can be divided into the categories of the inner society and the outer society. The categorization is done in terms of productivity (Kerr 1969). Thus the inner society, the multidimensional modern cores, includes those who work as skilled laborers, bureaucrats, civil servants, managers and entrepreneurs, while the outer society consist of students, the unemployed and elderly. The key point is that belonging to the inner circle provides an individual with the possibility to influence their own life, but also with the feeling of being productive and effective, placing them in a meaningful life context giving them purpose (Tornstam 2005:93). In this regard, studies show that e.g. unemployment has a range of negative consequences on individual well-being such as reduced satisfaction with one’s own life (Warr 1978), low self-esteem and loss of self-respect (Branthwaite and Garcia 1985), deteriorating psychological health (Spruitt et al 1985), poorer physical health and higher mortality rates (Warr 1987). On the other hand, according to Jahoda, employment provides a structure for each day, week and year; creates a broader social horizon beyond connections to family and friends; cajoles individuals to participate in collective efforts; and defines their social status (Jahoda 1988:6). In other words, having employment gives individuals a high Sense of Coherence (SOC)14 in life. The theory and empirical findings concerning Sense of Coherence (SOC) stipulate that

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14 Sense of Coherence theory has been developed by Aaron Antonovsky who conducted his research on how Israeli women dealt with their menopause. During the course of his research, he discovered that a majority of women had a very good mental health despite the fact that many went through concentration camps and lost their families. According to hims, this was due to their ability to develop a high Sense of Coherence, which he defines as: “a global orientation that expresses the extent to which one has a pervasive, enduring though dynamic feeling of confidence that (1) the stimuli deriving from one's internal and external environments in the course of living are structured, predictable and explicable; (2) the resources are available to one to meet the demands posed by these stimuli; and (3) these demands are challenges, worthy of investment and engagement” (Antonovsky...
individuals with a high sense of coherence are better equipped to deal with daily stress, chronic life crises, traumas, and are generally healthier than the individuals with low SOC (Antonovsky 1979, Eriksson and Lindstöm 2006). In this regard, employment and other structural forms of integration may provide the members of diaspora communities with a higher sense of coherence, enabling them to move forward and deal with the homeland experiences in a more constructive, reconciliatory manner. We thus draw the following hypothesis:

H2: Diasporas with higher hostland structural integration will display more reconciliatory attitudes

We concur with Zunzer (2004:8) that ‘Given the current state of research, there is no evidence that diaspora communities structurally develop a more conservative perspective on politics in general or on the state of affairs in their home country.’ The remainder of this paper focuses upon examining the effects of social and structural integration on reconciliatory attitudes. In the next section we present the design of our study.

3. Data and Research Design

Data collection

Our data are the preliminary results of an ongoing sociological survey conducted among immigrants originating from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia living in Sweden. The current data presents tentative findings among the respondents (N=239). Securing a truly representative sample is virtually impossible as there is no precise data regarding the structure of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian diaspora populations in Sweden. Additionally, random sampling of diasporas in a traditional sense is impossible due to the lack of clearly defined ethnic neighborhoods. However, effort was made to produce a stratified sample by utilizing online Yellow pages searches and a list of most common Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian surnames. Each respective surname search resulted in a list of individual names with addresses, including also a map with their geographic positioning in Sweden. Surveys were mailed to the respondents, filled out at home and mailed back to us. Considering that many tend to remain in geographical proximity to their families, the guideline was intentionally distributed in different parts of Sweden. This increased our chances of measuring the attitudes of as many members of different families as possible, and in that way increases the representatively of the sample. Each survey was translated into the native language of the respondent (Serbian, Croatian, or Bosnian). Interviewees were asked a total of 63 questions. Below we describe the operationalizations of our key independent, dependent, and control variables.

Dependent Variable: Reconciliatory Attitudes

1990:7). According to him, SOC consist of three aspects; comprehensibility, manageability, and meaningfulness of life situations in which individuals find themselves. In other words, the SOC deals with the three aspects of individual feeling of being in charge of own situation, namely the aspects of “I understand, I can, and I want”. Understanding makes daily existence manageable, structured, clear and comprehensible. It make each day more predictable, and comprehensible, regardless of unexpected traumatic experiences that one may have to face. Management is about the resources an individual has at its disposal to deal with the events. These may include family, friends, God, teachers, doctors, etc. The concept of meaningfulness concerns the presence of will with an individual to deal with setbacks and difficulties, and to find meaning and essence in the situations they may have to face (Antonovsky 1979).

15 The surname lists were compiled through searching web pages in Sweden, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina primarily made by and for diasporas. Besides various discussion forums, such pages often include address books of persons and their country of residence.
The dependent variable in this study is the reconciliatory attitudes of diasporas. In order to capture diaspora attitudes towards reconciliation, we employ a number of indicators adapted mainly from Kostić (2007). Reconciliation may be defined both as a process and as the goal of that process. As a process, reconciliation means establishing a relationship built on mutual acceptance that is cooperative and sustainable (Ericson 2001; Galtung 2001; Villa-Vicencio 2006). This basic relationship is characterized by mutual trust, positive attitudes, and the mutual consideration of needs (Bar-Tal 2002). Mutual acknowledgement of past experience (Lederach 2002:24) and forgiveness (Long and Brecke 2003:1) form the starting point for such a relationship, which enables former warring parties to begin building a common future (Rigby 2001:12). Measures must be devised to establish whether the goal of the process of reconciliation has been achieved. Hayner (2001) suggests investigating the extent to which groups share an understanding of the past and articulate this understanding in similar ways. Furthermore, the extent to which they base their relationships on present realities as opposed to past events is of importance. These definitional elements are based on an understanding of reconciliation on an interpersonal level as opposed to a national level (Borer 2006). In measuring the reconciliatory attitudes of diasporas, we attempt to gain an understanding of the extent to which reconciliation exists among Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Yugoslavs in Sweden, and are thus focused on reconciliation as a goal. For the purposes of this study, we define reconciliation as including the following two elements: a shared understanding of the past and the envisioning of a common future. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the individual outcome variables measuring reconciliatory attitudes.

**Table 1 Dependent variables: The reconciliation index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports Serbia, Croatia, BiH in sports</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive wars</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffered more</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger culture</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading role</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation index</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Number of individuals**

239

*Notes: The variables are measured on different scales where higher values denote more reconciliatory attitudes.*

Questions on the survey related to a shared understanding of the past address how respondents define the recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, view ethnic cleansing, and believe in forgiveness. Regarding the definition of war, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed that their group waged only defensive wars. In a similar manner respondents were asked if their particular ethnic groups suffered more that others during the recent wars. In relation to ethnic cleansing, we asked the respondents to what extent they agreed that ethnic cleansing is never justified, or are there situations where it is acceptable. Finally, regarding forgiveness respondents were asked to choose their preferred option among the choices ‘never
forgive’, ‘forgive, but never forget’ and ‘forgive and forget’ in relation to the others ethnic groups that fought in the war.

Questions on the survey that relate to the envisioning of a common future address ethnic distances, views on ideal types of inter-ethnic coexistence in the homeland, the strength of one’s own culture vis-a-vis the other groups, the position of one’s own ethnic group in the Balkan region, and sport identifications. Ethnic distances were measured using an adapted Bogardus social distance scale, whereby the respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their readiness to share social space, befriend, or accept as a family member an individual from another ethnic group. Regarding ideal types of inter-ethnic coexistence in the homeland, respondents were provided with a scale, the most minimal choice being the situation where groups live side-by-side without much cultural exchange and interaction, while the maximum choice envisages free mixing of cultures and widespread intermarriages between members of different groups. Sport identification here refers to whether or not respondents support Serbian, Croatian and BiH teams (all three) when each is matched against Sweden. The final two indicators are measures of the ethnocentricity of the respondents; these ask to what degree they would agree that their group culture is superior to the cultures of other groups in the regions, and that their own groups should thus play a leading role. For this paper, all variables have been coded as both dichotomous and continuous variables to facilitate further regression analysis. The reconciliation index is an additive one combining scores on the dichotomous measures. The dichotomous measures were defined as strict tests of reconciliation with high cut off points. The reconciliation variable is thus a latent one consisting of ten indicators coded (and also tested) in multiple ways.

Independent and control variables

Sample characteristics for the independent and control variables are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 Independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural integration</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland background education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education completed</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school (grade 1-9)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary school</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/missing obs.</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland rural vs. urban background:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/missing obs.</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee or asylum</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age came to Sweden</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Came to Sweden before 1989 (Pre-war)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (female)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of individuals 239

Notes: The variables are measured on different scales where higher values denote positive answers or higher values.

Following Snel et al. (2006), we distinguish between structural integration and social integration. Structural integration may be distinguished from social integration as ‘social positioning’, e.g. citizenship, level of education, language competency or position within the labor market. Social integration refers to e.g. informal social contacts with natives and the endorsement of ‘prevailing moral standards and values’ (Snel et al. 2006:287). This distinction allows us to include a number of indicators for integration and will provide a nuanced analysis of what has heretofore been referred to only as ‘alienation’, ‘marginalization’ or ‘exclusion’.

Survey questions that address structural integration include legal status, reliance on welfare, employment in Sweden, earnings, education in Sweden and linguistic competence. Legal status identifies those who are Swedish citizens as opposed to those who are not. Reliance on welfare indicates whether or not the respondent has been on welfare benefits during the last five years. Employment in Sweden measures whether or not the respondent is employed as opposed to being unemployed or a housewife. Earnings measures whether or not the respondent earns more than SEK 10,000 per month. Education in Sweden measures whether or not the respondent has completed primary, upper secondary or university education (any of the three).
Questions that address the social integration of respondents measure contact with native Swedes, importance of Swedish norms and values, and various measures of internalization of Swedish identity. Contact with native Swedes is operationalized through three measures: the first indicates whether or not the respondent spends time daily with native Swedes; the second indicates whether or not the respondent has at least one native Swedish friend whom they can rely upon when it comes to important matters in life; and the third is an adapted Bogardus social distance scale (respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their readiness to share social space, befriend, or accept as a family member a native Swede). Those questions that address the importance of Swedish norms and values denote whether or not the respondent agrees that Swedish norms and values are most important in their daily lives, as opposed to the norms and values of their ethnic group in Sweden, or the norms and values of their ethnic group in the homeland; and whether or not one agrees with Swedes on the most important things in life, as opposed to agreeing with their ethnic group in Sweden or their ethnic group in their homeland. The questions that address internalization of Swedish identity measure three things: whether or not one chooses to identify oneself as belonging to the Swedish people; whether or not one chooses the Swedish national anthem ‘Du gamla, du fria’ as that which best expresses their feelings towards their home country; and lastly whether or not one chooses to support Sweden against Croatian, Serbian and BiH teams (all three) when these play against Sweden.

Furthermore, factors related to the homeland background of diasporas as well as demographic factors have been theorized as influencing their political attitudes. The importance of war-time experiences has been highlighted by several scholars. Forced migration produces ‘conflict-generated’ diasporas (Lyons 2004). Hatred formed during war and displacement is thought to remain strong among diasporas, whereas their homeland counterparts become tempered by the reality of war, and in peacetime, the experience of positive gains (Collier and Hoefler 2004:575). Lyons (2007:530) argues: ‘Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protracted nature of conflicts’. To capture this notion of conflict generated diasporas we include a variable that measures whether or not one came as a refugee or asylum seeker vs. for economic or other reasons (Refugee).

Other homeland background variables important to consider include age of migration from homeland to Sweden, urban vs. rural origins, and their level of education in the homeland (Cf. Guarnizo et al. 2003). In terms of age of arrival in Sweden, it is expected that the earlier one arrives in the hostland, the easier integration will be. Some have argued that higher levels of education in the homeland lead to increased abilities to integrate and greater engagement with the homeland. However rural to urban migration might render integration more difficult. Other control variables that are included are standard sociological variables such as age, gender and identity. For the purpose of our analytical model, all control variables are all recoded either into continuous or dichotomous variables.

The regression model for the effect of integration on reconciliation may be expressed as:

\[ R_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Social_i + \beta_2 Structural_i + \Psi X_i + \epsilon_i \]

Where \( R_i \) is the index of reconciliation for person \( i \), \( \alpha \) is an intercept, \( Social_i \) is the index of social integration and \( Structural_i \) is the index of structural integration. \( \Psi X_i \) is a vector of the control variables: dummy variables for identity (Yugoslav, Bosniak, Muslim, Croat and Serb); dummy variables for homeland background education (No education completed, Primary school, Upper secondary school and University); dummy variables for urban vs. rural homeland origins (Rural and Urban); dummy variables for refugee or asylum vs. economic or other reasons for coming to Sweden (Refugee); a dummy variable
for migrating to Sweden before 1989 (Pre-war); a dummy variable for sex (Female); the continuous variable Age to Sweden (1-8 scale); and the continuous variable Age (1-6 scale).

4. Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Croatian, and Serbian diasporas in Sweden

Before turning to the analysis, we first describe the context in which our survey was conducted. The wars in former Yugoslavia (1991-1999) were some of the most destructive conflicts in post-WWII Europe. The upheaval of society during the wars, particularly the Bosnian one, was tremendous, generating more than half a million refugees per year during 1992-1994 (UN 2002), of which more than half a million were to EU countries (Black et al. 1998:1). Given the complicated security and political situation, particularly in BiH, Sweden extended permanent residence (permanent uppehållstillstånd) to the refugees from BiH residing in Sweden during 1993-1994 (SCB 2002b:28). In 2007 citizens and residents from the former Yugoslavia totaled 128,652 or about ten percent of the foreign born population, of which 55,713 were born in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SCB 2007), the latter forming the fourth largest foreign born population in Sweden (Integrationsverket 2006:20). Political turmoil in places such as former Yugoslavia has since the late 1970s replaced economic ‘pull’ factors as the key reason for migration to Sweden. With this shift from labor to political migration there also began a deterioration of immigrant employment and earnings (Tezic 2003:4). Concerns have been raised that Sweden is faring poorly in terms of structural integration of these new immigrants (Cf. Kogan 2003).

Those arriving in Sweden in the 1990s, particularly from the Balkans, fair worse in terms of employment than immigrant cohorts arriving in earlier decades (Gustafsson and Zheng 2006). Immigrants in Sweden do generally have a higher reliance on benefits than natives (Åslund & Runeson 2002:21; Vilhelmsson 2002). But the reliance of ex-Yugoslav immigrants on welfare and unemployment is highest in Sweden (SCB 2002b:46, 89,92). When employed, poor working conditions are common, and many take jobs they are not educated for and that lie under their level of qualification (SCB 2002b:105,151). In terms of living standards, measured along multiple dimensions such as disposable income, house size, ownership of a washing machine or computer, ex-Yugoslav immigrants also fare worst (SCB 2002b:38, 60-71). In elections immigrants generally participate less than natives (SCB 2002a). However ex-Yugoslav migrants are least likely to take part in a political discussion in Sweden, and very few subscribed to a daily newspaper (SCB 2002b:69-119). These figures indicate that as refugees, disaffection with politics has lead to a stronger focus on daily life in Sweden. Immigrants have been found generally to live more often in ‘ethnic neighborhoods’ in close contact with other members of their ethnic group (Åslund & Fredriksson 2005:7). Interestingly though, ex-Yugoslav immigrants are above average in terms of social contacts with their neighbors in comparison to the average immigrant population (SCB 2002b:115). Relevant to integration is also the issue of health, which is related to reliance on social benefits as well as integration. Nearly half of ex-Yugoslav immigrants reported having health problems, and nearly one fifth report feelings of anxiety or fear (compared with three percent of native Swedes), or constant fatigue (compared with eight percent of native Swedes) (SCB 2002b:140). It is likely that many health issues, both mental and physical, stem from war-related experiences in home country, as former Yugoslav immigrants reported the least amount of victimization due to either violence or threat of violence in Sweden (SCB 2002b:120). But the extant literature provides little information to this affect.

16 A lack of data gathering on ethnic affiliation in Sweden makes a description of the particular situation of Bosniaks/Muslims, Serbs and Croats impossible. We however provide an overview of the situation of immigrants from former Yugoslav countries in Sweden, with some emphasis on BiH.
17 However, the number is likely much larger. In order to be registered as such, immigrants were required to elect to change their country of birth from ‘Former Yugoslavia’ to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those born in Former Yugoslavia form the second largest foreign-born population in Sweden.
In sum, immigrants from the former Yugoslavia appear particularly poorly situated in terms of structural integration, of which those from Bosnia fair worst. There is a lack of information in terms of their sociocultural integration in Sweden. Interestingly, the second generation fairs nearly as well as native Swedes on almost all living standard indicators (SCB 2002b:156). But they are children of parents who came at a time when the labor market was less discriminating towards their education and skills, accepting migrants to work in the expanding industries of the 1950-1970s. Many of the children of new immigrants of the 1990s have yet to reach adulthood, and thus it remains to be seen if this trend will continue. Finally, one particular issue deserves mentioning. Unlike many immigrants originating from Serbia and Croatia, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks may be seen as a prototypical case of ‘conflict-generated’ diasporas. Their displacement is characterized by war-related trauma. Present in the hostland for over a decade, they provide a particularly interesting test of our hypotheses regarding hostland integration and diaspora peacebuilding capability.

5. Analysis

We now turn to our analysis of the relationship between hostland integration and reconciliatory attitudes. We investigate how structural and social integration relate to individual reconciliatory attitudes among immigrants from Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia in Sweden. The results are presented in Table 3. In the first column we report regression results for the relationship between social and structural integration on the one hand and reconciliation on the other. In the second column we report the effect of integration on reconciliation with controls.

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18 One recent Swedish government report on integration in the 1990s thus concludes: ‘The Swedish society thus failed to give new immigrants as good a start as 1980s immigrants and to make easier their living standard trajectory’ (SCB 2002:156) [Author’s translation].
Table 3  Effects on reconciliatory attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent variable: Reconciliation index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td>0.130 (0.062)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural integration</td>
<td>0.340 (0.084)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>-0.749 (0.379)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>-0.511 (0.504)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>-0.403 (0.388)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>-0.821 (0.385)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.615 (0.466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school (grade 1-9)</td>
<td>1.017 (0.435)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary school</td>
<td>0.725 (0.346)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.837 (0.442)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.608 (0.222)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>-0.070 (0.261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age to Sweden</td>
<td>0.006 (0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-war</td>
<td>-0.181 (0.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (female)</td>
<td>-0.233 (0.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. The method of estimation is ordinary least squares. ¹Reference category: Yugoslav. ²Reference category: No education completed. ³Reference category: Rural.

Without controls, both Social integration and Structural integration have a significant and positive effect on the Reconciliation index.¹⁹ Thus at first glance both social and structural integration increase the level of reconciliatory attitudes among the respondents, though social integration has the weaker effect.

H1: Social integration and reconciliatory attitudes

In the second column the controls are added. When controlling for other possible confounding factors Structural integration remains significant at the 1 percent level, however its point estimate increases from 0.343 to 0.393. On the other hand, Social integration is no longer significant. Which control variables account for the difference between the two models with regard to the relationship between social integration and reconciliation? Excluding the dummy variables Yugoslav, Bosniak, Muslim, Croat and Serb identities reveals that these variables alter the relationship substantially.²⁰

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¹⁹ A one step increase on the Social integration index (0-7 scale) corresponds to a 0.130 increase on the Reconciliation index (0-10 scale) and is significant at the 5 percent level, while a one step increase on the Structural integration index (0-6 scale) corresponds to a 0.340 increase of Reconciliation and is significant at the 1 percent level.

²⁰ Without these dichotomous indicators of identity in the model the effect of the social integration index on the reconciliation index would be significant and positive, although its coefficient would be slightly reduced and its significance level would drop to the ten percent level. An almost identical change occurs when excluding urban origin from the model.
When introducing an additional independent variable $X_2$ into a multivariate regression affects the relationship between the independent variable of main interest $X_1$ and the dependent variable $Y$, two interpretations are possible. The relationship may be spurious; meaning that $X_2$ is a third variable that has a causal affect on both $X_1$ and $Y$. On the other hand $X_2$ may be a causal mechanism through which $X_1$ affects $Y$. But how can we know which interpretation is best? The ideal way of knowing is to examine the relationship through large or small-N diachronic data analysis. However, to interpret this cross-sectional regression analysis, we need consider what these explanatory variables mean, how they might be related in time and whether or not they might be considered as part of a single causal process.

The set of dichotomous identity variables represent answers to the question ‘To which people do you belong?’ Respondents thus identify themselves as represented by one of the six identity categories in Table 2 (the category ‘Swedish’ was also included on the questionnaire, however none of the respondents chose this answer). This answer most likely represents long-held identifications. Elsewhere on the questionnaire many respondents chose to identify the Swedish national anthem ‘Du gamla, du fria’ as best representing the way they felt about their home country. However, when it came to group belonging, no one chose to answer Swedish when contrasted to the alternatives. Thus while many of the respondents have developed feelings of Swedish civic nationalism, none have internalized the Swedish ethnic identity. Returning to the question of whether or not the inclusion of the set of dummy variables for identity indicates a causal mechanism or spurious relationship between Social integration and Reconciliation, the latter appears most likely. Long-standing identities are likely to be formed either prior to or over and against Social integration. Put another way, it is very unlikely that higher Social integration affects higher Reconciliation through the intervening social identity variables. Turning to urban vs. rural homeland origins (Urban), the spurious interpretation of the relationship between Social integration and Reconciliation seems again most sensible. Urban origin is, along with educational background, potentially an indicator of a more cosmopolitan outlook prior to migration; thus we interpret these as third variables affecting both prospects for social integration and reconciliatory attitudes as opposed to causal mechanisms.

**Control variables**

Turning to the controls, the above hypotheses regarding the positive effects of homeland background education and urban origin on reconciliatory attitudes finds support in the evidence.\(^{21}\)

Compared to respondents who identify themselves as Yugoslavs, those who identify as Bosniaks or Serbs on average exhibit less reconciliatory attitudes.\(^{22}\) This is in line with the above findings regarding the positive effects on Reconciliation of previous educational attainment and urban origin. The Yugoslav identity is by definition encompassing of Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian and other social groups associated with the former Yugoslavia. Choosing this identification most likely corresponds to the previous existence of an inclusive social identity and thus corresponds to higher Reconciliation. None of the other controls are significant in the complete model.

**H2: Structural integration and reconciliatory attitudes**

\(^{21}\) Changing from a rural to an urban origin corresponds to a 0.608 increase in reconciliatory attitudes and is significant at the 1 percent level. Moving from the reference category ‘no education completed’ to the attainment of primary school education is associated with a 1.017 increase on the reconciliation index and is significant at the 5 percent level. Upper secondary school is associated with a 0.725 increase and is significant at the 5 percent level. And attainment of a university education in the homeland is associated with a 0.837 increase in reconciliatory attitudes and is significant at the 10 percent level.

\(^{22}\) moving from Yugoslav to Bosniak identity is associated with a 0.749 decrease in reconciliatory attitudes and is significant at the 10 percent level. Moving to Serb identity corresponds to a 0.821 decrease in the social reconciliation index and is significant at the 5 percent level.
In order to test the robustness of the finding that Structural integration has a significant and positive effect on reconciliatory attitudes among Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian diasporas, the Reconciliation index is disaggregated and each indicator of reconciliation is tested separately using the same controls (there are ten separate indicators, see Table 1). While Reconciliation is an additive index of ten dummy variables designed to capture high levels of reconciliation, for these regressions eight of them are transformed into continuous variables. For the remaining two, support for Serbian/Croatian/BiH sports teams (Serbia/Croatia/BiH sports) and attitudes towards ethnic cleansing (Ethnic cleansing), this was impractical and thus these models are estimated using logistic regression. Table 4 summarizes the findings of these ten regressions. Only the results for the explanatory variables of main interest (Social integration and Structural integration) are presented.

**Table 4 Robustness checks: Ten dependent variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure of integration</th>
<th>Structural</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>R-Squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia/Croatia/BiH sports</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coexistence</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.032*</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>0.062**</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance</td>
<td>0.463***</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.084***</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive wars</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffered more</td>
<td>0.275***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger culture</td>
<td>0.289***</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading role</td>
<td>0.282***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: For logistic regressions the sample size is reduced: 207 for 'Serbia/Croatia/BiH sports' and 209 for 'ethnic cleansing'. */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. All regressions include the previous set of controls.*

For the logistic regression on attitudes related to forced expulsion of civilians, we estimate the change in the probability that a respondent will choose the statement ‘ethnic cleansing is never justified’ over other statements that indicate ethnic cleansing is justified for various reasons. The predicted change in the probability of agreement with the statement is examined when Social integration increases by one unit, from 3 to 4. Since the mean of social integration is 3.038, this increase is nearly perfectly around the mean value. For structural integration the mean value is 4.686 and thus we examine the predicted change from 4 to 5. For both measures of integration, when the other explanatory variables are held constant at their mean values the effect is significant and positive, though the coefficients are small. The second logistic regression estimates the probability of supporting Serbia, Croatia and BiH sports teams when matched against Sweden. For both Social and Structural integration the point estimates are insignificant.

For the rest of the regressions ordinary least squares is used to estimate the effects of Social and Structural integration on reconciliatory attitudes. Structural integration is significant at the one percent level in four and at the 5 percent level in two out of ten regressions. For the four regressions with significance at the one percent level (Ethnic distance, Suffered more, Stronger culture, Leading role), the effect is substantial. The finding that higher Structural integration denotes higher Reconciliation is thus further supported.
One might imagine that social and structural integration interact in such a way that influences political attitudes among diasporas. To test for this, and to provide an additional robustness check, we include an interaction term (Interact) for Social and Structural integration when regressing Social and Structural integration on the reconciliation index with controls. The results suggest that the two integration variables in fact do not interact in this manner in order to affect reconciliatory attitudes.23

For Social integration a more nuanced picture emerges. In contrast to the Social integration index, which did not have a significant effect on reconciliatory attitudes (Reconciliation) when controlling for the other explanatory variables, higher Social reconciliation corresponds to higher values on the Multiculturalism, Ethnic cleansing, and Coexistence scales and is significant at the one percent, five percent and ten percent levels respectively (higher values denote more reconciliatory attitudes). However in all three regressions the coefficients are small. In sum, the results of these regressions indicate a weak relationship with only a few indicators of reconciliatory attitudes and overall support the previous finding that the relationship between Social integration and Reconciliation is spurious.

5. Summary and Conclusion

Our results offer some very interesting findings regarding the effects of structural and social integration on reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas in Sweden. Many of the respondents in our study represent what one theory classifies as ‘conflict-generated’ diasporas. As our data show, most of the respondents immigrated to Sweden as a result of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As refugees the majority has some war-related traumatic experience, either through the loss of a family member or close friend, or having personally experienced wartime violence. There is thus ample reason to expect grievances among the population amplified by a lack of social integration.

Yet our findings challenge this notion. Contrary to the previous theory that higher hostland social integration will lead to more moderate diaspora attitudes, and thus more reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas in relation to post-conflict societies (H1), our findings indicate that social integration does not have an effect on reconciliatory attitudes, while structural integration has a significant and positive effect (H2). This relationship is surprisingly robust. Among the respondents in our sample, structural integration leads to more reconciliatory attitudes, while social integration does not.

These findings have important implications for host-state policy. Clearly, widely held views of the positive effects of social integration on diaspora attitudes through more cultural and normative absorption, although seemingly right from the policy perspective, do not in reality translate into the desired moderation in norms and attitudes. Instead, as Tajfel and others would argue, social integration policy may only cement the salient out-group identity of diasporas. Instead, it is labor market policy, education and social benefits that have the potential to really payoff in terms of encouraging reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas. Structural integration, through the mechanism of a higher sense of coherence, empowers diasporas to process and contextualize war-related experiences and make sense of daily life, and to deal with the new challenges they face in the hostland environment. It is probably this sense of context and purpose that allows for the development of forward thinking and a sense of optimism about prospects for meaningful life both in the hostland and in relation to homeland developments. This also points to the possibility of the host-state to influence homeland conflicts for the better through the structural integration of conflict-generated diasporas, i.e. the inclusion of diasporas in hostland prosperity has the potential to support homeland peace.

Our theory of the relationship between structural integration and reconciliation among diasporas also challenges prevailing notions regarding the nature of diasporas in the literature on ‘New Wars’ and the

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23 The coefficient of the interaction term is 0.007 and is insignificant. In the same regression social integration is insignificant and its point estimate is very small (0.055), while structural integration significant and its impact remains substantial (0.375**).
political economy of armed conflict. Given the dilapidated state of structural integration in war-ravaged societies, conflict-generated diasporas are likely to be more moderate in their approach to homeland politics and inter-group reconciliation in comparison to their homeland kin. To be sure, diasporas are internally diverse in terms of their reconciliatory attitudes, but on average they are more likely to be pro-peace, and thus to undertake transnational activities that promote peace, than their counterparts in the homeland. On the whole, they are peace-makers, not peace-wreckers.

In sum, this paper offers a more nuanced picture of diasporas, their structural and social integration, and reconciliatory attitudes. In order to further our understanding of the peacebuilding capability of diasporas, the relationship between reconciliatory attitudes and transnational activities calls for more investigation in the next stages of this project.

6. References


Kalyvas, S.N. (2001) ‘“New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars - A Vali


