Welfare and Values in Europe:
Transitions related to Religion, Minorities and Gender
(WaVE)

Sweden:
Overview of the national situation

by Ninna Edgardh Beckman
1. Introduction

Based on its very low figures of religious attendance and traditional religious faith, Sweden has a reputation of being one of the most secularised countries in the world. True as this might be, what the image conceals is the strong and complicated role that religion still plays in Sweden, not least through history and culture. The modern history of Sweden has its foundation in national homogeneity, grounded in the principle of one people and one faith. This principle is closely connected to the Lutheran majority church, to which nearly 80% of the Swedish population still belongs, even though formally state and church were separated in 2000. The recent presence of other world religions and official policies tending towards multiculturalism adds new religious aspects to Swedish culture. Religion thus continues to play an interesting role in Sweden, behind the seemingly straightforward image of a country on its way towards complete secularisation.

The Swedish welfare state was built after the Second World War, based on the idea of ‘the home of the people’ (folkhemsidén). The basic principle of the model is that the state and local authorities guarantee the basic needs of all citizens. This principle is based on strong values of solidarity and shared responsibility. Decades of success for the system have since the 1990s been replaced by growing problems with keeping up the high level of benefits and services, a development, which is increasingly questioning also the values underpinning the whole welfare structure. Immigration is one factor, among many, challenging the system and immigrants have also been among those most affected by emerging new forms of poverty.

1.1 Previous research

The role of religious agents in welfare has not been a major area of research in Sweden. The simple reason for this is that religious agents have not had a significant role in the modern welfare system. In recent years a new interest has developed for other agents to complement public service provision, including voluntary agents and among them religious organisations. This development has been specifically addressed at Uppsala University with the research developed at the Uppsala Institute for Diaconal and Social Studies/Centre for the Study of Religion and Society, Uppsala University, where also the WaVE project is based. The project Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective (2003) with its Swedish case study (Beckman...
& Ekstrand & Pettersson 2006) will be an important starting-point for the WaVE studies. The
description below of the welfare system, the gender situation and the role of the majority
curch to a large extent build on these previous studies.

As for the situation of minorities and the relation between religion, welfare and values,
the overview relates to existing research from several areas. In order to communicate the
goals of the Swedish integration policy to the general public, the Swedish Integration board, a
governmental organisation operating at a national level, has published studies touching upon
issues brought together in the WaVE project. In the report “A common value base in a plural
democracy” (Sahlberg ed. 2004) the ethicist Elisabeth Gerle and the philosopher of religion
Olof Franck discuss conflicts of values occurring in relation to religion and gender equality.
Conflicts between individual rights and rights of groups are discussed in relation to the goals
of Swedish integration policy, which include the respect of difference, within the limits of the
democratic values set by society (Sahlberg ed. 2004, 11). The potential conflicts between
group rights and a common value base are discussed in direct relation to the situation of
religious minority groups in a report discussing state funding of religious organisations. A
specific paragraph in the law (§ 3, SFS 1999:932) stipulates that to be eligible for financing
the faith community has “to contribute to uphold and strengthen the basic values that society
is founded upon”. The degree to which this paragraph implies a real barrier has been an issue
of constant discussion, which is highly relevant for the debate on religion and common values
(Ekström et al 2006).

One specific aspect to be taken into consideration in the Swedish situation is the
observation made in the World Value Survey that, from a global perspective, it is not the
immigrants coming to Sweden that are “different”, but the Nordic populations, and among
them especially the Swedes. The difference is seen in a low adherence to traditional values
related to family and religion and a strong support for values of individual freedom and self
expression, which are quite unique in a global perspective (Pettersson & Yesmer 2005).

The Swedish welfare system is based on the three pillars of healthcare, social care and
education. It is especially in terms of the healthcare system and the school system that value
conflicts related to the welfare of (religious) minorities have occurred. Olof Franck (2005)
presents a possible philosophical-ethical understanding of the concept of “value base”
(värdegrund), which is more and more used in the Swedish context, especially in relation to
the school system. There is also the National Centre for Values Education at Umeå University (http://www.vgc.umu.se/), which has been assigned with a coordinating role. Göran Linde (2001) discusses how the value base can be dealt with in the public school and how it relates to Swedish ethnicity (2001). Value conflicts that have occurred in Christian and Muslim free-schools1 in Sweden are discussed by Elisabeth Gerle (1999), with a special emphasis on conflicts related to gender equality.

The Swedish authorities are responsible for both the financing and the operation of most of the healthcare system. This implies a homogeneity, which sometimes comes into conflict with the specific needs of ethnic and religious minority groups. Such issues related to Islam, e.g. concerning food, gender and possibilities for prayer, are discussed by Jan Samuelsson (1999), while Finnur Magnússon (ed. 2002) discusses ethnic and cultural aspects in the relations between professionals and patients in health and social care.

The increased immigration to Sweden since the 1970s has resulted in a rapid growth of research on immigration, some of it published through Swedish Government Official Inquiries. A gradual shift has taken place, from a monocultural “study of immigrants” to an intercultural focus on plurality and multiculturalism (Lorentz 2001). This shift mirrors a change also in the official policies of the Swedish authorities. In a recent governmental report the policy change from the 1970s up to today is described as a change from a policy of assimilation, to a period of immigration policy (with assimilation as more of a free choice), leading on to the present integration policy (aiming at equal rights, duties and possibilities for everyone in a multicultural society). The report argues for a new change to an active anti-discrimination policy (Det blågula glashuset 2005, 115). The more self-critical attitude towards Swedish integration policies is clearly expressed in the publications from the more recent Inquiry on Power, Integration and Structural Discrimination, highlighting different aspects and effects of immigration and integration policies. In contrast to earlier studies, the directives for the inquiry had as a starting point the existence of structural ethnic discrimination. The task was thus not to find out whether discrimination exists, but to analyse the mechanisms behind it and propose actions to counter it (Direktiv 2004). The final report formulated a deep critique of failures in Swedish integration policies (Inquiry on power, integration and structural discrimination 2006).
Reports on the situation of immigrants in Sweden are regularly published also by the Swedish Integration Board, as well as, by the National Board of Health and Welfare, which is the national supervisory authority for social services and public health.

There are several independent research institutes presently focusing on the situation of minorities in Sweden, among them the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations at Stockholm University (since 1983) and the Centre for Multiethnic Research at Uppsala University (since 1984). There are also several new research centres at more recent universities and university colleges. Researchers engaged in studies of international migration and ethnic relations have formed since 1992 a national network (IMER).

1.2 The contribution of WaVE

Few scholars of religion have been active in the IMER network (Roth 2003, 47). Among the work by scholars of religion in this area there is a recent overview covering the religious minority situation in Sweden, but without specifically addressing welfare issues (Andersson & Sander ed. 2005). There are also overviews covering the specific situation of Islam in Sweden (Svanberg & Westerlund 1999) and some studies specifically addressing gender issues in relation to Islam (Roaldh 2003, Sultàn-Sjöqvist 2006). In comparison, few reports have been published on the situation of religious minority groups in Sweden, even less within the framework of welfare and values. For the WaVE-project it is interesting to note that political scientists have observed a lack of knowledge on the interconnection between discrimination based on ethnicity and discrimination based on religion in the Swedish context (Det blågula glashuset, 72). This gap does not seem to be compensated for in ongoing public inquiries on discrimination, except for some critical studies of how religion is presented in school text books (Sawyer & Kamali ed. 2006). The contribution of the WaVE project concerning the interconnection between transitions related to religion, minorities and gender will therefore fill an obvious gap in the existing literature.

2. Characteristics of the national welfare system

In the typology of Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990) Sweden is characterised as a typical Social Democratic welfare regime, built on the principles of universalism, comprehensive risk
coverage, generous benefit levels, egalitarianism and full employment. There is in this type of regime also a high degree of, what Esping-Andersen (1999) calls, “de-familialisation”, meaning policies that reduce the individuals’ reliance on the family and maximise individual command of economic resources. This facet of the Swedish system has to do with the fact that it is closely connected to policies aiming at gender equality, with the goal that women and men “shall have the same opportunities, rights and responsibilities in all significant areas of life” (http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4096/a/26327, 14 June 2006). Swedish gender equality implies that women and men support themselves and combine work and parenthood when they have children. No entitlements are targeted towards women in their capacity as wives and taxation remains individual.

This specific feature of the Swedish welfare system leads Jane Lewis (1992) to conclude that Sweden is a “weak male breadwinner society”, moving towards “a dual breadwinner” model, while the Swedish historian Yvonne Hirdman characterises the present Swedish situation as based on a “gender equality contract” (Hirdman 1998). Hirdman’s theory is that dominant “gender contracts” structure gender relations in society, within a basic discriminating system of gender hierarchy and gender separation. According to Hirdman, Sweden admittedly has not obtained gender equality, but has at least achieved a political consensus around equality as an ideal. This political consensus and its dependence on the basic idea of gender similarity rather than gender complementarity is an important background for understanding value conflicts in relation to minority groups in Swedish society, who do not share the dominant values.

The general responsibility for welfare in Swedish society rests on the public sector and is regulated by law. During recent years, and especially in the aftermath of the economic recession during the 1990s, a shift has occurred giving more freedom to other agents to act on behalf of, in cooperation with, or in a complementary way to, the public authorities. This includes private companies, NGOs and families (the latter especially for the care of elderly relatives).

**2.1 Background to the present system**

The present welfare system has developed from a historical situation in a peasant society where family and church were the central welfare agents. Until the middle of the 19th century
Church and society were interwoven in a way that it is hard to imagine today. Church and state, parish and municipality were a legal unity. The responsibility of the family included most of what we call today welfare services: healthcare, social care and education. As the basic public authority, the Church was responsible for a large part of society’s complementary services, such as care for the poor, medical care and education. The role of the Church began to change in 1862, when new laws separated local government responsibilities from church responsibilities for the first time. Thereafter, a number of institutions were separated from the church, for example schools and care for the poor during the 19th century, and medical and social care during the 20th century (Beckman & Ekstrand & Pettersson 2004).

The 1930s became the starting point for the development of a new welfare model. The Swedish idea of society as a big family, “the home of the people” idea, was born as an answer to the need for social security networks that could replace the previous system based on family and relatives. This "home of the people" would not be based on charity, but instead financed by a tax system in which burdens would be shared according to ability. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of unparalleled economic growth in Sweden, during which an extensive tax-financed social welfare system was created. This included a series of reforms, many of which were later emulated elsewhere in the world.

As a part of this development the Church of Sweden’s role as a folk church was integrated within the framework of the Swedish welfare model. The Church became a provider of public welfare within the spiritual sphere with clear and legally defined boundaries in relation to the social welfare responsibility of the state (Beckman & Ekstrand & Pettersson 2004).

Another aspect of these changes has to do with gender. The enormous growth of the public sector was made possible by the gradual inclusion of the female half of the population in the labour force. In the beginning of the 1990s women and men in Sweden almost had the same degree of participation in the labour force. As a result of the recession during the 1990s the figures decreased for both men and women. In 2003, 79% of the women and 84% of the men were counted as part of the labour force. Women occupy about 80% of jobs in the public sectors of education, healthcare and social care (www.scb.se). This means that to an overwhelming degree women are the actual providers of public welfare services in society.
The principle of gender equality in Swedish politics dates back to the 1970s, the moment when the specific term *jämställdhet* began to be used to denote equality between women and men in society. In 1980 a new government authority, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman ([www.jamombud.se](http://www.jamombud.se)) was established as a result of the adoption of the Equal Opportunities Act. The act prohibits sex discrimination in the labour market; it also requires that all employers, whether in the public or private sector, actively promote equal opportunities for women and men in the working environment. All employers with a minimum of ten employees are required to prepare annual equal opportunities plans, as well as, plans of action for equal pay. The primary task of the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman is to ensure compliance with the Act through advice and information (Beckman & Ekstrand & Pettersson 2004). It is worth noting that the new government appointed in the general elections in September 2006 has declared its intention to create a common legislation and one common authority for handling all matters of discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, sexuality and disability. This would mean the end of a separate Equal Opportunities Ombudsman in Sweden ([www.regeringen.se](http://www.regeringen.se), November 2006).

### 2.2 Present challenges to the system

The Swedish model is currently facing several serious challenges. The greatest may be demographic change, with an aging population increasingly in need of support. The proportion of the population aged 65 and over in 2004 was 17.2%, which is close to the EU average. Life expectancy at birth was 82.7 for women and 78.4 for men, which is high in comparison (Eurostat 2004).

A second challenge is globalisation, which makes it more difficult to control market forces. Less control over capital incomes automatically threatens a welfare system built on tax financing. A third challenge is the EU demand for a balanced state budget. This demand challenges the priority of welfare for all people over state macro-economic objectives.

A fourth challenge comes from international migration and has to do with the potential conflict between generous welfare provision for all residents and a generous immigration policy. This challenge causes an intense debate, often touching upon value issues. The defence of the national welfare system sometimes turns into “welfare nationalism” that tends
to exclude non-native Swedes (Johansson 2005, 252). The issue was raised in a particular way in terms of the planned expansion of the EU, when the prime minister in November 2003 articulated his concern about a possible wave of “social tourism” towards Sweden, a fear which later was documented as unjustified (Doyle et al 2006).

A fifth challenge to the welfare system consists of people’s increasing expectations of perceived quality of life and fulfilment of individual needs. Individualisation of social services presupposes a variety of different alternatives to choose from. Such variation and flexibility is difficult to provide within the uniform Swedish model. A sixth challenge comes from the consequences of applying market models and competition to the organisation and management of welfare services and public management. With the ambition of making the public welfare provision more efficient and reducing its costs, management models from the commercial business sector are increasingly being implemented. While there are obvious gains to be made, questions have been raised as to how far it is possible to adopt commercial models in the management and provision of welfare services. In public debate it has also been questioned whether the implementation of the ideas of competition and commercial efficiency might contribute to negative effects on the work environment for personnel in welfare services, thus resulting in increasing days of sick leave. It is also questioned if models from the “profit sector” are threatening the core values of the supposedly “non-profit” public welfare services.

A seventh challenge to the Swedish welfare model is the increasing problems of unemployment and people who for different reasons are excluded from the labour market. The challenge lies in the fact that the Swedish welfare system has been built on low levels of unemployment, which have been difficult to achieve after the recession during the 1990s, even though Sweden still does fairly well in European comparison. In 2005 unemployment was 7.7% among women and 7.8% among men (Eurostat). An eighth challenge comes from the growing economic and social gaps and the “new poverty” that can be seen in society through new types of social exclusion.

Several of the challenges mentioned are connected to marginalisation processes that divide the population into a majority that fits well into the welfare system and a minority that is excluded from many of the benefits. Long-term unemployment and risk of poverty is still low in Sweden, but for specific groups and among them immigrants, the risks are higher.
(Schierup et al 2006, 195-230). Even though Sweden presents itself as a multicultural society, integration policies have not worked out as intended; the welfare of immigrant populations from non-European countries is a serious challenge. The difficulties of immigrants, especially non-Europeans, to establish and support themselves in Swedish society have been documented in a series of extensive reports (Statistics Sweden 2002, Rapport integration 2005, de los Reyes 2006). Alarming accounts have been published on the deterioration in welfare for, what has been called “visible immigrants” (Social rapport 2006), i.e. people who are perceived as looking different than native Swedes.

It is also clear that several of the challenges mentioned have an obvious gender dimension. “Burn out” syndromes have affected women more than men during recent years and significantly contributed to a rise in the amount of people on sick leave. Violence against women is an issue debated frequently and especially in relation to what is perceived as flaws in the legislation against rape and sexual assault, resulting in few verdicts against perpetrators and short periods of imprisonment. The “sexualisation” of public space is an issue, which has caught more, and more attention, as well as, sexual assaults committed through contacts established on the web. Among issues raised in the official campaigns for gender equality the gap in levels of income between women and men is an important issue, as well as, the low representation of women in boards of private companies (Beckman & Ekstrand & Pettersson 2004).

An issue connected both to minorities and gender concerns the protection of young immigrant women from violence from relatives, motivated by preserving the honour of the family. This issue has become especially heated in Sweden after several cases of “honour killings” of young women, where honour seems to have been the main motive. The debate was fuelled by a few brutal murders around the turn of the millennium (Honour Related Violence 2005, p 37). Most of the Swedish media have been very careful not to relate the motives behind this violence to religion (Roald 2003). The debate has revealed aspects of incompetence from the Swedish authorities in how to deal with the issues (de los Reyes 2003).

The above-mentioned challenges are all publicly debated and form the background for rethinking the Swedish model. Various solutions have been on the agenda in all political parties since the 1990s. It has been argued that Social-Democratic policies during recent years
have followed the same “Third Way”, as the UK’s New Labour. The emerging “New Swedish Model” approach, led by the Social-Democratic party, is by the same authors said to represent the ideals of the “embedded neo-liberalism” prescribed by the EU (Schierup et al 2006). This policy change has, however, not been enough to satisfy the non-socialist parties, who formed an “Alliance for Sweden” and succeeded to gain a majority over the Social Democrats in the general elections in September 2006, highly due to their promise to deal with the prevailing high levels of unemployment by creating a better climate for business interests (www.maktskifte06.se/, 2 May 2006). An interesting aspect of the shift is that the Alliance for Sweden gained their majority by leaving previous arguments for a more radical shift in welfare policies behind. The Alliance instead argued that it would be better at creating conditions conducive to welfare.

3. An overview of the minority presence in the country

Immigration to Sweden by citizens from other countries developed after the Second World War. In 1945 the number of people in Sweden born in other countries was as low as 100,000. By 2000 the number of foreign-born people went over the one million mark, in a total population of nine million.

During the 1950s and 1960s immigrants to Sweden came primarily from the neighbouring Nordic countries and from Southern Europe in order to find work. During the 1970s this type of immigration receded. Instead refugees started to come from places of conflict in Asia and South America. During the 1990s a large group of immigrants were refugees from the Balkans. Since the middle of the 1980s the majority of immigrants to Sweden have been refugees and people who have been granted residence permits to live in Sweden for humanitarian reasons. About half of all immigrants today are people with family ties to former immigrants (Nilsson 2004).

Swedish official statistics register neither religion nor ethnicity. The only way to identify ethnic groups of foreign origin is thus through their registered place of birth. By the end of 2003 there were 1,078,000 people in Sweden born in another country and an additional 800,000 persons who were themselves born in Sweden, but who had one parent (or two) born abroad. This means that 22% of the population in Sweden has a foreign background in the
sense that they are, either born in another country, or have at least one parent born abroad (Nilsson 2004). The numbers of foreign citizens in Sweden were 476,000 (2003).

By the end of 2003 the largest group of Swedish residents born in a foreign country came from Asia (295,000). The second largest group came from another Nordic country (279,000). The third largest group came from the former Yugoslavia (138,000) and the fourth largest group from one of the 15 older EU-countries, other than the Nordic countries (102,000). The 10 new EU-countries were represented with 78,000 residents, Africa with 62,000 and South America with 54,000. European countries outside of the Nordic and the EU-countries were represented with 32,000 residents and North America with 26,000 (Nilsson 2004).

There are also five groups in Sweden officially recognised by the parliament as “national” minorities. This gives them a right to special protection, including protection of their historical languages. These minorities are the Sami (15-20,000), who are an indigenous people, the Swedish Finns (450,000), the Tornevalers (50,000), the Roma (40-50,000 if including travellers) and the Jews (25,000). The protected minority languages are Sami, Finnish, Meänkieli (Tornedal Finnish) Romany Chib and Yiddish (www.regeringen.se, 11 April 2006).

The increase in the number of immigrants to Sweden is illustrated in many of the large cities, where there is frequently one or more areas regarded as a typical “immigrant suburb”, such as Rosengård in Malmö or Rinkeby in Stockholm. This geographical segregation affects both first and second generations of immigrants. Within the “immigrant areas” the ethnic mixture is normally wide. The problem of geographical ethnic segregation has caused a lot of debate over the years and has also resulted in academic studies (e.g. Molina 1997).

Formally all Swedish residents have the same right to public welfare services. In this respect there is no difference between minorities and the majority. The official national minorities have special protection for example with regard to their languages. The restrictions in rights that mostly affect immigrants are related to time and reasons for coming to Sweden. Some benefits are related to income and to the earning of an income for a certain duration, which may mean that an immigrant does not have the right to a specific benefit. The most
important limitation, however, is not set by citizenship, but by residence permit. Asylum seekers only have a right to medical care for acute illness and may be obliged to pay for this care. For children there are special and more generous rules, including the right to go to school. Nevertheless, the situation of children of asylum seekers is often precarious, especially due to the stressful situation they find themselves in. The status of approximately 20,000 people residing illegally in Sweden is especially difficult. This group consists of mainly three categories (Social rapport 2006, p 341):

- “hidden refugees”: people who have been denied asylum in Sweden, and are hiding from the authorities hoping for a new chance.
- “black labour”: people who come to Sweden to work without work permits.
- “victims of trafficking”: primarily women who come to Sweden illegally as a result of the sex trade.

Political parties negative to immigrants have so far had very little success in Sweden, even though the elections in September 2006 saw a rise in support at the local level for this type of politics. However, there are informal structures of discrimination pointed at in several reports from the Inquiry on Power, Integration and Structural Discrimination. This type of ethnic discrimination has severe consequences, especially when it excludes people from the labour market, as a range of social rights are based on income from paid labour. (Kamali ed. 2005, de los Reyes ed. 2006).

4. The characteristics of the majority Church

In some respects the Church of Sweden was separated from the State by the Church of Sweden Act on the 1st of January 2000. The Government no longer appoints bishops or other senior church officials, and the Parliament does not enact Church legislation. But the Church is still regulated by law, and has certain legally defined rights and obligations. The Church is, for example, still responsible for the funeral system as a whole, not only for the Christian part of the population. The Church authorities are thus required by law to offer places for burial acceptable also to other religious communities such as, for example, Muslims. In 2004, 68.5% of babies born in Sweden were baptised in the Church of Sweden and 88.2% of the deceased had their burial in a religious ceremony arranged by the church (Church of Sweden Statistics, www.svenskakyrkan.se).
The Church of Sweden is organised in three levels: national, regional, (diocesan) and local (parish). The local level consists of about 2,200 parishes. The parish level is seen as the base of the church. Most church activities are performed on this level. According to the Church Constitution, the parishes have four tasks: worship, teaching, social/diaconal work and mission. The parishes are normally territorially defined; members of the Church of Sweden living within a certain area constitute a parish. There are also a few non-territorial parishes. There is no possibility for members to choose which parish they want to belong to. You belong to the parish within which you live. In order to belong to the few non-territorial parishes, you have to meet certain criteria, which are very narrowly defined. There is a debate on the so-called principle of territoriality, but the General Synod has been reluctant to change the present system in any radical way.

The Church of Sweden is a relatively wealthy church, mainly due to the fact that all members have to pay a church fee (or church tax). This fee is collected by the state tax authorities and has the legal status of a tax, even if it is only applied to those who are church members. The Church also receives incomes from land property and is even a successful shareholder in several companies. A significant amount of money is also raised voluntarily each year. The number of employed staff is about 25,000 approximately 3,400 are ordained priests and 1,200 ordained deacons (Matrikel för Svenska kyrkan 2005).

The total wealth of the Church of Sweden is approximately 38 billion crowns (about 300 million Euros). This includes land property, church buildings etc. The main source of income (approximately 80%) is from church fees, which yields approximately 10 billion crowns per year. The total amount of costs for the Church of Sweden is about 12 billion crowns every year (Beckman & Ekstrand & Pettersson 2004).

There are no official statistics on the number of voluntary workers in the Church of Sweden. One major group is constituted by the approximately 60,000 people who function as elected members of different church councils and synods. Another large group is the members of church choirs. They are about 100,000, of which about 75% are women. Different church clubs and voluntary organisations, such as the Church of Sweden mission, are heavily dependent on voluntary work. The high number of employed staff, however, points to the fact that many church activities are organised by employees (Bäckström & Beckman & Pettersson 2004).
5. Religious composition in the country

The religious dominance of the Church of Sweden is most clearly expressed in that it has 7,053,000 members (Church of Sweden Statistics 2004), representing 78.3% of the population. Since 2000 the figures have been reduced by 50-75,000 members each year. Comparable figures of belonging to other denominations are hard to obtain. As already mentioned, religious belonging may not be registered in Swedish official statistics.

When it comes to estimating religious affiliation the most commonly used source is the public authority that distributes financial support to religious communities: the Swedish Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (SST). In 2004, 39 religious communities were eligible for such grants. In religious terms, they were of Christian, Muslim and Jewish origin and for the first time a Buddhist organisation (Sveriges Buddhistiska samarbetsråd) was also included.

The data below are based on figures from SST. A few observations are necessary to understand the figures correctly. According to the regulations SST distribute their grants according to the number of people “served” (betjänade) by the religious organisation. The concept “served”, meaning those who participate in an organised way, is used instead of “membership” because not all religious groups have individual membership. When exact figures are missing SST make estimations of the numbers of people “served”, based on reports on participation in activities etc. provided by the religious organisations. The application of the concept “served” explains the rather low figures provided by SST on the numbers of Jews and Muslims in Sweden. When higher figures are given (sometimes several times higher than the figures from SST) these are based on estimations of origin and cultural belonging rather than religious activity. In comparison with the number of members in the Church of Sweden it would be more relevant to use these figures, as membership in the “folk-church” for many people is more of a sign of solidarity with a Christian heritage than an active choice on religious grounds. In order to use the most solid figures, the statistics from SST are, however, selected and shown below.

It is worth noting that immigrant religions in Sweden tend to adapt to the way popular movements (folkrörelser) and the old Free Churches have been organised (Larsson 2005).
Some kind of national organisation is also needed for a minority to be eligible for state funding. Christian immigrant minorities are normally organised in parishes or dioceses. In the case of the Roman-Catholic Church the diocese of Stockholm represents the Roman-Catholic Church in Sweden. In the case of oriental and Orthodox churches the type of organisation varies depending on both the tradition and size of the minority. The largest one is the Syrian Orthodox Archdiocese of Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia. There is also a joint national organisation, *The Ecumenical Council of Orthodox and Oriental Churches*.

There are several national Muslim organisations in Sweden, and many local organisations. *The Islamic Collaboration Council* (*Islamiska samarbetsrådet*) has taken on the task of coordinating Muslim activities in Sweden and representing Islam in SST. The council represents four Muslim organisations: *The United Islamic Communities in Sweden* (*Förenade Islamiska församlingar i Sverige*), *The Swedish Muslim Federation* (*Sveriges muslimska förbund*), *The Swedish Islamic Communities* (*Svenska islamiska församlingarna*) and *The Union of Islamic Cultural Centres in Sweden* (*Islamiska kulturcenterunionen*), with a fifth one, *Islamic Shia-communities in Sweden* (*Islamiska Shiasamfund i Sverige*) as associated member ([www.sst.a.se](http://www.sst.a.se), 10 May 2006).

Another umbrella organisation is *The Swedish Muslim Council* (*Sveriges muslimska råd*), which, according to its home page ([www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se](http://www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se), 10 May 2006), brings together nine organisations, among them *Young Muslims* (*Sveriges Unga Muslimer*), *The United Islamic Communities in Sweden* (*Förenade Islamiska församlingar i Sverige*), the oldest Muslim organisation in Sweden, and *The Swedish Muslim Federation* (*Sveriges Muslimska förbund*), another well established Swedish organisation. A national organisation for Bosnian Muslims is also part of the Swedish Muslim Council.

Two organisations within the Church of Sweden received financial support from SST in 2004. These were *The National Evangelical Missionary Society* (*Evangeliska fosterlandsstiftelsen*) *The Mission Society Bibletrue Friends* (*Evangelisk-luthersk mission/Bibeltrognas vänner*). Members of Swedish free churches are sometimes also members of the Church of Sweden, although the amount of this type of double organising has been reduced after the connection between church and state was dissolved in 2000.
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<tr>
<th>Religious organisation receiving a grant</th>
<th>Estimated number of people “served”</th>
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<tr>
<td>The National Evangelical Missionary Society (Evangeliska fosterlandsstiftelsen)</td>
<td>47,000</td>
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<td>The Mission Society Bibletrue Friends (Bibeltroga vänner)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>The Mission Covenant Church of Sweden (Missionskyrkan)</td>
<td>128,000</td>
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<td>The Pentecostal Movement (Pingströrelsen)</td>
<td>123,000</td>
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<td>Interact (Evangeliska frikyrkan)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<td>The Baptist Union of Sweden (Svenska baptistsamfundet)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
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<td>The Swedish Alliance Mission (Svenska Alliansmissionen)</td>
<td>23,000</td>
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<td>The Salvation Army (Frälsningsarmén)</td>
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<td>The Methodist Church (Metodistkyrkan)</td>
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<td>The Adventist Church (Sjundeds adventistsamfundet)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Evangelical Lutheran Churches</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hungarian Protestant Church in Sweden</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Catholic diocese of Stockholm</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Churches</td>
<td>103,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Official Council of Swedish Jewish Communities</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Swedish Muslim Council (Islamiska samarbetsrådet)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1.** Religious organisations receiving support from the Swedish Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (SST).

Not all religious movements want or are eligible for applying for a grant from SST. Figures on the numbers of adherents to some of these in 2001 are given in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious movement/organisation</th>
<th>Estimated number of adherents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witnesses</td>
<td>23,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Faith Movement (Word of Life)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormons</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>8-10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>3-5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.** Religious organisations of considerable size that have not applied for a grant from SST. Numbers according to Skog (2001).

### 5.1 Welfare and minorities

No studies on religious minority groups establishing their own social organisations seem to exist. As a result of the general trend in Swedish society during the 1990s of accepting more diversity in the welfare sector, some health services for immigrants and some
confessional free schools have been established. Free schools are run on a private basis, but receive funding from the public authorities. There are presently 66 confessional free schools in Sweden out of which six are Muslim and three Jewish (Friskoledatabasen, www.skolverket.se, 10 May 2006). Although the figures show that these schools are very few, in relation to the school system as a whole, the issue of confessional free schools has caused considerable debate. Free schools as such are questioned, as they are perceived by some people as threatening the cohesion and integration of Swedish society. This threat is perceived as provocative when it comes from Islam, especially in relation to Swedish policies on gender equality (Gerle 1999).

The Christian Council of Sweden coordinates some activities in the social field, e.g. spiritual care in hospitals and prisons. In a similar way the Swedish Muslim Council tries to coordinate spiritual care for Muslims, with e.g. 10 imams visiting Muslims in hospital care. The Swedish Muslim Council has also taken an initiative to help people who are released from prisons and need help with re-integration in society. The organisation also relates to the Swedish Emergency Management Agency preparing society to manage serious crises. Another field of activity concerns the situation of families with disabled children, which constitute a very vulnerable group (www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se, 10 May 2006).

5.2 Places of worship

The establishment of a place of worship is very important for most religious groups. Most Christian churches in Sweden have such places. If they do not have their own place, they often use the localities of the Church of Sweden. Also Buddhists and Hindus have increasingly established their own places of worship ( Andersson & Sander ed. 2005). In 2004 Stockholm, Gothenburg (ahmadiya), Malmö, Uppsala, Trollhättan and Västerås had mosques specifically built for the purpose ( Andersson & Sander ed. 2005). A study from 1995 on the establishment of mosques in Sweden was, however, symptomatically called a study in “intolerance and administrative powerlessness” ( Karlsson & Svanberg 1995). Data from the mid-90s presented in the study indicate that about half of the Swedish population was at the time against the building of mosques. The debate had been going on for approximately ten years and although only a few mosques were built, one mosque had been burnt down (in Trollhättan). Since then several new mosques have been built and the issue now seems to be less frequently debated. However, new fires and other attacks have also occurred, which
indicates that there are still active and violent groups in Swedish society that do not accept the establishment of public buildings representing Islam.

6. Welfare, gender and the majority church

There are so far no studies made on the activities of the Church of Sweden as a whole in terms of welfare provision. This has probably to do with the fact that the provision of services performed by the Church is minor in relation to the services provided by the public sector. The changing situation for the Church of Sweden related to the separation of the church from the state in 2000 was covered in the project *From State Church to Free Folk Church*. The final report from the project includes a chapter on welfare (Bäckström & Beckman & Pettersson 2004) and two of the earlier reports from the project deal specifically with the role of religion in welfare (Bäckström 2001, Jeppsson-Grassman 2001).

6.1 The complementary role of the Church

After the formal separation of Church and state the Church of Sweden is now one of the main agents within the voluntary sector (or civil society) in Sweden. The role of the Church of Sweden in the welfare system is complementary. The relative importance of this complementarity may have increased as a consequence of the separation of church and state in combination with the state’s growing interest in cooperation with the third sector in Swedish society. This complementarity has two major aspects: direct activities and symbolic activities. The direct activities are mainly of a complementary character, for example bereavement counselling, running a shelter for homeless people with financial support from local authorities (e.g. in Gävle) or organising day-time activities for elderly people. The symbolic function of the Church in welfare is about giving the individual an opportunity to relate to a collective identity and also to something transcendent, which offers both ultimate security and a legitimisation of values of care and safety. This is very visible in times of catastrophe and crisis. The church also functions as a critical voice defending values of human dignity and solidarity (Bäckström 2001).

6.2 Church and public opinion
The folk church character of the Church of Sweden has sometimes made it difficult for the church to act politically within Swedish society. When the Church takes an active part in political debates this is often criticised based on the argument that the Church ought to concentrate on spiritual activities and not take part in daily politics. One of the more intense debates was caused by the Bishops’ conference in 1993 with the pastoral letter *Rich and Poor* (Biskopsmötet 1993). The bishops’ letter discussed global economy and its consequences for the poor and argued for a more fair distribution of economic goods between rich and poor countries. Another pastoral letter from the Bishops (1992) concerns how liturgical acts, such as baptism, weddings and funerals, should be handled in relation to immigrants.

A more regular way for the Church of Sweden to make its voice heard with regard to welfare issues is through the political culture in Sweden, focusing on agreement and cooperation. This is expressed in the tradition of the Government and other decision-making authorities sending out their proposals for comment (*remiss*) to a number of organisations before the proposals are brought to Parliament. The national Church council and the Archbishop or the Bishops’ Conference send their comments on a number of government proposals every year.

### 6.3 Church and gender

With regard to gender, the position of the Church of Sweden has changed significantly during the last 150 years. In the Swedish peasant society a woman was not recognised as a citizen in her own right, but as part of a male-dominated household. This social order was religiously legitimated according to Lutheran teachings on vocation, which defined the role of women in the household as wives, mothers, daughters, sisters or servants, under the supervision of the housefather. This teaching was most clearly expressed in the "house-table" (*hustavla*), which was a collection of biblical quotations that Luther had added to his catechism in order to clarify his teaching on the callings of the different estates (the spiritual, the political and the domestic). As the catechism was printed in the Hymnal and taught in the parish catechism meetings, the knowledge of the “house-table” became widespread. The “house-table” was based on a complementary understanding of gender. Man and woman were seen as having been given separate roles by God. While the role of the man was in public life, the woman had her task in the home, as wife, mother and housewife.
The sharp limitations to a public role for women were increasingly challenged from the middle of the 19th century. This also challenged the ideology of the Church. The historian Inger Hammar (1999) has shown how women in the first emancipation movement reinterpreted Lutheran theology in order to widen the sphere of women into the public domain. The establishment of diaconal mother-houses by the end of the 19th century played an important role in opening new working possibilities for women. An important precondition for the changes was the growth of evangelical revivalist movements, especially during the second part of the 19th century.

During the 20th century these traditional roles of women have been continuously challenged and overridden in the church, as well as, in society at large. The church has progressively accepted wider roles for women. Women were allowed to be priests through a decision in 1958 and since then a wide range of new occupations have also developed within the institution of the church, many of which are heavily dominated by women (Beckman & Ekstrand & Pettersson 2004).

The Equal Opportunities Act regulates matters in the church to the extent that the church operates as an employer, a fact that encouraged a discussion on principles for gender equality in the church synod. In 1995 a statement was adopted which stated that the Church of Sweden aims at gender equality in all its activities. A result of the adoption of the declaration on gender equality in the church synod is that a report on the present situation with regard to gender equality is to be presented to the church synod every fourth year, at the beginning of every election period (Beckman 1998).

7. Religious minority-majority relations

The role of the Church of Sweden in relation to religious minority groups is both interesting and ambiguous. The positive side is connected to its “folk-church” status. This is often interpreted as a task of being a church for everyone in Swedish society, including people who belong only nominally to the church and people who are members of other churches and religions. In practice this may mean that churches make their premises available for worship to minority groups. This is also recommended officially in a letter from the bishops (Biskopsmötet 2001). The negative side of the ambiguous relation of the Church with minority groups is connected to the fact that the Church of Sweden is so much wealthier than
the other communities, which means that its openness may sometimes be perceived as dominance, tending towards proselytism.

As a result of its dominant position, the Church of Sweden has on the national level taken on the task of informing the public about the situation and needs of both autochthonous minorities (especially the Sami, Roma and Swedish Finns) and immigrant minorities, especially Muslims. During recent years an urgent issue has also been how to develop forms of worship adapted for a multicultural society. This work has been especially important in urban parishes where in areas of large immigrant groups the majority church is suddenly approaching a minority situation (Lika olika som andra 2006).

The relationship between majority church and minority religious groups within the area of welfare is so far not directly covered in research. What does exist since the beginning of the 1990s is research on different aspects of the dialogue conducted between the Church of Sweden and representatives from other religions (e.g. Ahlstrand & Sandvik ed. 2001, Stenmark & Westerlund 2002, Selinder & Åmell 2005).

The relations between majority church and Christian minority groups take place within the framework of the Christian Council of Sweden, which gathers 25 member churches. Except for the Church of Sweden the organisation also includes the Catholic Diocese of Stockholm, more than ten Orthodox churches and several churches from the so-called Free Church Family (www.skr.org, 19 April 2006). The Christian Council is also actively engaged in the situation of refugees, issues of integration and inter-religious dialogue. An initiative called “The Easter Appeal” was developed in the spring of 2005 and concerned the treatment of asylum seekers, especially families that had waited for many years to receive a residence permit. The appeal gathered approximately 150,000 signatures from individuals and support from more than 60 organisations. It gained a lot of publicity and probably also influenced a temporary permission for asylum-seekers in hiding who have spent several years in Sweden, to have their case tried again (www.skr.org, 3 May 2006, Qviström 2005).

7.1 Gender and religion

The field of gender studies in religion is vast in Sweden and covers both Christian and other religions. There seems, however, to be very little research on the relation between
gender and the presence of other non-Christian religions in Sweden. One of the few exceptions is the international renowned scholar on gender and Islam, Anne-Sofie Roald, who has also conducted studies on the situation of Muslim women in Sweden (Roald 2003). A recent dissertation deals with the situation of female Muslim converts (Sultan-Sjöqvist 2006).

It is impossible to generalise on issues of gender causing debate in relation to minority religions, as these are so many and varied. Generally speaking, there is a perceived tension in Swedish society between gender equality and religion. This tension also concerns the Church of Sweden and especially a continuous resistance among groups of priests in the church against the ordination of women as priests (Beckman & Ekstrand & Pettersson 2006).

Minority religions are often perceived as “more religious” than the Church of Sweden, because being a member of such a group implies a more committed action than being a member of Church of Sweden. In this way minority religions are probably more likely to be perceived as problematic in relation to gender equality. As Grace Davie (2000) has noted, Sweden is characterised by “belonging without believing”: Swedes belong to a church, but do not have strong religious beliefs, nor do they attend Church services or activities on a regular basis. This means that to be a nominal Christian is to be “normal”, but to be an active Christian, especially in a minority group, and even more so to belong to another religion, is perceived as odd in the Swedish secular context, and thus viewed with suspicion.

There are two reasons for the specificity of Islam among minority religions and especially those dominated by immigrants. The first reason is that Islam has become a negative symbol of immigrants in Sweden, or to quote a report on the building of mosques in Sweden: “A new metaphor, ‘Muslims’, has more and more come to replace ‘immigrants’ as a code name for foreigners in Sweden” (Karlsson & Svanberg 1995, 21, c.f. Roald 2003, 85).

The second reason for the special role of Islam is that issues of gender also have become a symbol of what distinguishes “Swedish culture” from “foreign cultures” (Roald 2003, Brune 2004, Kamali 2005, 44). Gender equality has become a hallmark of Sweden and everything from EU to Islam is treated with distrust in this respect. Swedish gender equality policies are based on a view of women and men as basically similar. Public institutions (schools, hospitals etc) generally make no formal distinctions between women and men (Samuelsson 1999). The separation of women and men in public life in Muslim traditions (for example mosques,
where men and women pray in different sections) is, thus, automatically associated by many native Swedes with a degradation of the female sex.

Islam has through these processes been loaded with the negatives associated both with religiosity and being foreign, both of which are perceived as being “against gender equality” and, thus, against what is essentially Swedish.

Several issues have come to symbolise this basic conflict in public debate during recent years and has caused strong reactions from a wide range of people from leading politicians to ordinary people writing letters to the editors. The veil or niqab has become symbolic in Sweden, as in many other countries, of this problematic issue (Larsson 2005).

8. Conclusions

To summarise the report shows that there is a gap in Swedish research, which the WaVE project will attempt to fill. This gap concerns how conflict and cohesion in society are related to values connected to religion, minorities and gender. The Swedish study will be able to benefit from previous Swedish research on the intersections of gender and ethnicity with regard to issues of welfare. The specific contribution of the project will be related to the religious dimensions of the issues at stake.

Particular areas of potential conflict related to the objectives of WaVE in the Swedish case could be summarised in the following points. They concern how conceptions of being Swedish relate to:

- the idea of the “people’s home” guaranteeing the welfare of its citizens.
- gender equality, interpreted as the same opportunities, rights and responsibilities for women and men in all significant areas of life.
- belonging to the Church of Sweden, but without strong beliefs or frequent religious practice.

How these ideas contribute to conflict and/or cohesion in relation to the presence of new religious minorities in Sweden is of particular interest, on which we will expand in the local context of our case study.
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1 Free schools are run on a private basis, but receive funding from the public authorities.
2 A recent exception is Sultan 2006. For an overview of Swedish research on immigrants and religion see Nordin 2004.
3 Women and men from 20 to 64 years old who are either employed or registered as job-seekers.
4 The summary below is based on Beckman & Ekstrand & Pettersson 2004.