Welfare and Values in Europe: a comparative cross-country analysis

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Introduction

This report applies a comparative lens to the material emanating from the 13 case studies conducted in the project on Welfare and Values in Europe: Transitions related to religion, minorities and gender (WaVE). WaVE responds to the call for research on ‘Values and religions in Europe’, which invited studies aiming ‘to better understand the significance and impact of values and religions in societies across Europe and their roles in relation to changes in society’. WaVE proposed to grasp these somewhat vague and intangible notions by examining them through the prism of welfare. Specifically, the project aim was to focus on the domain of welfare provision (who provides what to whom, and for what reasons; and who seeks what, from whom and for what reasons) and to trace the impact of values and religions on majority-minority relations within this context. What patterns can we see in welfare provision which lead to greater social cohesion or to tensions within diverse societies? What tendencies are there towards ‘conflict’ or ‘cohesion’ due to values that are embedded in majority and minority welfare provision and needs? As suggested by the project’s subtitle, three major and interconnected dimensions of social change in Europe are identified and examined through the prism of welfare – change related to religion, minorities and gender.

The situation noted in the WaVE State of the Art Report (Fokas 2006) remains the same three years later, at the end of the WaVE project: a snapshot of European society today reveals a number of controversies pivoting on conflicts – perceived or real – between minorities and majorities in Europe. The examples are many. Debates on the proper balance between freedom of speech and religious sensitivity have been persistently

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1 This report is based mainly on the data and analyses offered by the WaVE researchers in their case study reports (Deliverable No. 9). It has benefited enormously from the comments made by WaVE project members on the first and second drafts. Still, the report reflects the author’s own interpretations of the material, and any resultant weaknesses in the report are her sole responsibility.
renewed, following reprinting of the cartoons of Mohammed in various publications and again in the Danish *Jyllands-Posten* (in turn, closely followed by the bombing of the Danish Embassy in Pakistan). Details of the citizenship tests introduced in various countries to assess whether the values of immigrants are compatible with those of the majority society continue to be debated, as we have seen cases where even members of the majority population fail to pass the test (Gest 2007), as well as extensive analyses on what the citizenship tests mean in terms of our openness to cultural diversity (Butler 2008). Meanwhile, ‘Fortress Europe’ – type comments by European leaders have proliferated in recent years, as politicians face the challenges posed by mass migration. When these challenges intersect with a global economic crisis, as is the case at the time of writing, immigrants tend to become scapegoats for labour market frailty, and slogans such as ‘British jobs for British citizens’ are increasingly prevalent.

And although the economic crisis tends to overshadow identity politics to a certain extent at the current juncture, negative attention to the Muslim presence in Europe continues to permeate most of the aforementioned debates and, more directly, to be visible through such issues as the wearing of headscarves in public schools, and tensions concerning the building of mosques. The Muslim presence in Europe is indeed a catalyst for debates on values conflict, and an especially interesting (and profitable) focal point for the mass media, which tend to overemphasise the ‘Muslim factor’. However, this generalized image is highly inadequate. First, conflict over religion and values is not limited to minority-majority relations, nor to Islam in Europe. In Europe at least, we are also witnessing parallel to – or as undercurrents of – these developments major tensions between religious and secular worldviews. Debates between secularists and religionists, or *post*-secularists, are proliferating, as are popular books on these themes (for example, Richard Dawkins’ *The God Delusion*). Meanwhile, there is significant tension within religious and secular worldviews so that neither can be viewed as a monolith. Further, the generalised image of a values conflict centred on Islam misses critical nuance – for example, the extent to which conflicts of *interests*, rather than conflicts of values, are at

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2 A *Times* journalist in the UK administered the citizenship test to 100 random British citizen respondents in late 2007, none of whom passed the test.

3 A study by Roccas (2005) suggests that there is a striking correlation between religiosity and values and, in fact, there is more similarity of values between different faith groups than between religious and secular people of the same cultural backgrounds.
play in different circumstances. Attention to such nuance in the WaVE case studies has challenged the generalized image of an Islam-based values conflict.

In fact, as will become clear in the following pages, our research indicates that most majority-minority interaction in the domain of welfare lies somewhere between the categories of ‘conflict’ and ‘cohesion’, in a large grey area which requires careful navigation. Here we find such resource factors such as time, space, and money as operative in the actual interaction between majorities and minorities, and more every day factors such as the role of the media, communication (which often boils down to the issue of language, and the minority’s knowledge of the majority language), immigration policy, employment policy, and the role of ‘professional helpers’ (those who administer welfare policies, the first point of contact for many minorities with majority individuals). Besides particular factors, we also have different ‘dimensions’ of conflict or tensions – for example, between different minority groups (rather than between majority and minority), or between different generations of the same groups. The same applies regarding dimensions of cohesion. Meanwhile, our research questions the very notions of conflict and cohesion and identifies complex (rather than dichotomous) relations between the two whereby, for example, conflict may be a necessary precursor to longer-term cohesion. Critical to our work in the WaVE project is careful attention to this large grey area, comprised of active resource factors, and pointing to different dimensions of conflict and cohesion beyond majority-minority relations and to different relationships between conflict and cohesion.

The twin aims of this report are to highlight certain patterns found in the case study data collected in the WaVE project and, upon this basis, to offer insights gathered regarding practices, tendencies, mechanisms etc. leading to conflict or cohesion, or influencing the large grey area in between, in minority-majority relations.

The report is structured as follows. First, the WaVE project research design will be set out and certain implications of our methodology choices will be explained. Second, a brief explanation will follow of the concepts of welfare and values as motivators of our research. Third, in a section entitled ‘findings’, (necessarily selective) results from the research conducted will be presented in three main sections, roughly divided in
accordance with the project’s general themes (though the themes overlap in many cases): Religion -- what is the role of religion in the context of welfare and values, in terms of religiously provided majority welfare⁴ and/or religiously defined minority welfare needs?; Minorities -- what is the experience of minorities within this framework, in terms of problems in access to welfare provided, differing welfare needs, and/or establishment of their own welfare networks?; and Gender -- are there specific minority and/or majority gender values influencing the provision and/or use of welfare? Are there gendered welfare needs and if so, how do these influence minority-majority relations?

This brief presentation of certain themes from the research results will be followed by reflections on social cohesion in its relation to welfare. Here the focus is on two themes which call for careful analysis, and around which many of the cross relevant sub-themes cluster: majority policy (and practices) in relation to minorities; and minority social networks and integration. Finally, the report closes with an exploration of factors arising from the data which influence minority-majority relations either positively or negatively.

Opportunities and challenges of the research design

The study was carried out in twelve European countries: Sweden, Norway, Finland, Latvia, England, Germany, France, Poland, Croatia, Italy, Romania, and Greece. A number of factors unites these cases. Albeit for different reasons, significant changes in national welfare systems have been taking place in all of the countries under study. Likewise, religion is somehow in a state of flux in the various country cases, a state which is variously influenced by European and global developments in this regard (with different levels of ‘spill-over’ effect). Meanwhile, all of the countries under study have experienced momentous transformations resulting from globalisation and, specifically, from migration (imm or em). The way that the latter fact unites the cases in the WaVE study is almost tangible through the links between various case studies, with Romanian

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⁴ Note, by ‘religiously provided welfare’ I mean welfare provided by religious institutions or groups, rather than welfare provided through religious means or with religious messages (the two do not necessarily overlap).
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immigrants being studied in the Italian case; Greek immigrants studied in one of the German cases; and Polish immigrants in both the Greek and English cases.

At the same time, this vast geographical scope offers a kaleidoscope of the European situation in terms of: different majority religious traditions, and different levels of religiosomy/secularity; a broad spectrum from weak to strong welfare states (most evident on a north-south perspective); widely varied gender regimes and gender norms; and contexts of immigration versus emigration (most relevant on an east-west axis).

The post-communist contexts examined deserve special mention (Croatia, Romania, Latvia and Poland). The transition from the communist welfare state to the current welfare systems in each case is a momentous one. The experience of these countries is fundamentally different from our other country cases as regards minority presence (centuries old – which by and large also means a lack of state welfare measures designed specifically for minority needs) and the prevalence of emigration rather than immigration as is most relevant in the other cases in the WaVE project. Further, accession, or potential for accession, to the European Union is a prevalent factor of change in these cases.

In order to facilitate our aim to grasp welfare and values ‘on the ground’ and as expressed in practise, we chose to conduct in-depth fieldwork in one medium-sized town in each country case. In most cases, the town selection was influenced by that in the previously conducted Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective (WREP) study5, but in all cases the main criteria for selection were the size of the town (medium-sized relative to the national situation) and a minority presence broadly representative (where possible) of the national situation insofar as majority-minority relations could be examined. The towns selected are: Gävle (Sweden); Drammen (Norway); Lahti (Finland); Ogre (Latvia); Darlington (England); Schweinfurt and Reutlingen (Germany)6; Evreux (France); Przemysl (Poland); Sisak (Croatia); Padua (Italy); Medgidia (Romania); and Thiva (Greece). The fieldwork in these towns took place between September 2006 and December 2007.

5 On this project, see the link via that of the Centre for the Study of Religion and Society www.crs.se.
6 Two case studies were conducted in Germany: one a town traditionally with a Catholic majority (Schweinfurt) and the other in a town traditionally with a Protestant majority (Reutlingen), though in both cases today faith statistics offer no clear majorities.
The study is qualitative and inductive in its approach. Specifically, researchers were set the task of observing majority-minority interaction in the domain of welfare and, based on patterns observed, to offer analyses on the causes of conflict and/or cohesion between majorities and minorities (focusing on mechanisms in each case), and to draw suggestions regarding local, national, and European-level policies arising from their analyses. The research process began with a thorough ‘mapping’ of the towns under study, in terms of all of the groups present in the locality (majority and minority), a description of how the local welfare system operates (who are the main actors in local welfare and what are their main activities?), and a consideration of the basic forms of interaction between these various groups (are there any notable examples of tension, or cohesion, within and between various groups, in domain of welfare?). This mapping process was an important basis upon which the researchers could make informed decisions about how to choose the sample for a second stage of the fieldwork, the in-depth research.

Contextuality was a guiding principle in our research design, so that in each case researchers focused on particular groups and themes bearing special relevance in each town context. Accordingly, the diversity of the case study towns and countries is reflected in the diversity of the research areas covered across the cases. The list of minority groups studied forms a complex grid of religiously, ethnically and/or linguistically, gender, or otherwise defined groups. The list across the 13 cases includes Muslims (both ‘old’ and ‘new’, native and immigrant, first generation to fourth generation), Roman Catholics, Protestant groups (mainly Evangelical and Pentecostal), Russian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholics; Roma and travelling communities, Finnish and German repatriates (recent returnees from the former Soviet Union and former eastern bloc countries), Russian-speaking communities, and Polish, Ingrain, Albanian, Romanian, Nigerian, Pakistani, Indian, Turkish, Bosnian, Ukrainian, Russian, Algerian, Moroccan and Greek immigrants; female labour migrants; and male labour migrants. Meanwhile, the list of themes focused on in the various cases is also

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7 The latter suggestions form the foundations of the ‘EU policy recommendations report’ (D15).
8 The project’s Methodology Guidelines (WP2, D3-5) guided researchers to be sensitive to internal versus external definitions of groups, as well as to their own prejudices of socialisations which might influence their perspectives.
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diverse, including immigration policy, reproductive health policy, care for the elderly, educational programmes, employment policy and administration of benefits to the administration of reproductive health, etc.

The advantages to our particular research design are many. First, qualitative studies offer the opportunity for gathering much, varied, and in-depth information. By conducting qualitative studies in particular towns, we have been able to glean nuanced information about our cases, and to find that information embedded in its natural context. Following the guidance offered in the project’s Methodology Guidelines (WP2, D3-5), the material gathered reflects more closely the local realities on the ground in each case. Further, as a result of having contextuality as our guide, whereby – as noted above – researchers were given the task of selecting particular groups and themes bearing special relevance in each town context, the research offers a more complete and realistic perspective of the range of arenas of minority-majority interaction and thus a better grasp of the types of problems that might be encountered, and types of solutions found, in the efforts towards social cohesion in diverse societies across Europe.

These significant opportunities offered by WaVE’s research design also entail particular challenges and limitations. First, as explained in the State of the Art report and in the Methodology Guidelines, defining certain terms in a universally applicable manner across these diverse cases was exceedingly difficult – e.g., ‘majority’ and ‘minority’, ‘welfare’, and ‘values’. These, together with other concepts critical to the WaVE research such as ‘social cohesion’ and ‘religion’, were managed with an open approach: we did not choose one definition to follow for all case studies and, rather, allowed for a rich variety of definitions of these terms to arise from the various contexts (each national and local context). This open approach was certainly more challenging for the researchers, and renders comparison more difficult, but it forms an important part of the contextuality which was a guiding principle of our research.

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9 The WaVE researchers owe special thanks to Pål Repstad for these insights, shared in his ‘Notes on the advantages and limitations of qualitative methods’, presented at the WaVE junior researchers’ meeting in Padua, 14-17 September 2006. As Repstad notes, ‘natural’ belongs in inverted commas because there is inevitably an element of the researcher’s construction and interpretation of the information.

10 An example simply to illustrate the point: in the Evreux case, discussion of the notion of ‘cohesion’ tended to lead to discussion of cooperation (e.g., a sign of cohesion between majority and minority would be cooperation between the two in the welfare domain).
A second challenging aspect of our approach is that qualitative studies are necessarily limited insofar as the possibilities of generalisation are concerned: we cannot, based on our in-depth research in our selected towns, generalise our findings to apply to the various national contexts, or even to other towns within each national context. The same applies to the possibilities for comparison: the diversity of the cases, and of the selected groups and themes in each case study, defies neat and systematic comparison.

However, by applying a comparative lens to the data gathered across all the cases, we can and do seek to identify common or different patterns of phenomena and their causal relationships (or lack thereof), and we hope this will lead eventually to a deeper understanding of how greater social cohesion can be achieved between (and within) majorities and minorities in diverse societies.

**Welfare and Values – setting the scene**

Welfare, it may be argued, is a quintessential European value. Each European nation has its own characteristics in this regard, with different hierarchies of welfare values in each case – gender equality for example stands out as a core value in Swedish welfare, whilst people take to the streets in Greece and France over proposed changes to free universal tertiary education as a basic element of national welfare\(^\text{11}\). Meanwhile, European state welfare provision is, at root, aimed at social cohesion, inasmuch as welfare systems are based on structures of interdependence between the members of a community, as embedded in citizenship laws and expressed through a sense of belonging. Increasingly however, in the context of growing diversity, debates arise regarding whether diversity in itself inhibits the ability of welfare systems to foster social cohesion\(^\text{12}\).

Should we strive to preserve diversity, or to promote integration? This is a dilemma often – however naively – seen strictly in either/or terms. According to Rogers Brubaker

\(^{11}\) To be precise, in the Greek case the reactions are largely against the degrees of private universities receiving equal accreditation as those of the public universities.

\(^{12}\) We did not have a guiding common definition of social cohesion in the WaVE project, but a number of researchers chose to adopt that of Berger-Schmitt (2000), whereby social cohesion entails reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion, on the one hand, and strengthening of social relations and interaction, on the other.
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(2001), the differentialist turn of the last third of the twentieth century may have reached its peak, and rather than interest in preserving diversity, increasingly we are seeing a ‘return of assimilation’. Debates have centred on whether the new multicultural contexts across Europe signify the end of the European welfare states as we know them (Banting and Kymlicka 2004; Kymlicka 2005). An underlying question is whether multicultural welfare policies lead to greater social cohesion and solidarity or, on the contrary, whether they simply lead to an undermining of welfare systems all together. Traditionally, opposition to immigration and multiculturalism was voiced from right-wing factions throughout Europe; today, such opposition is developing within the left also, as a perceived threat to the welfare system (Kymlicka 2005). In his consideration of whether there is a ‘trade-off’ between heterogeneity and redistribution, Kymlicka examines patterns of social spending in relation to levels of immigration in various contexts throughout Europe, and he concludes that there is not, in fact, a ‘trade-off’ (rather, it is the pace of immigration which may play a role in leading to smaller increases in social spending). At the same time, he admits that ‘one of the most compelling challenges facing national welfare states is how to maintain and strengthen the bonds of solidarity in increasingly diverse societies’ (Kymlicka 2005, 22).

In the context of such debates, it is important to seek to understand the relationship between diversity and social cohesion: if indeed diversity is thought to threaten social cohesion, then in what way exactly? Robert Putnam offers us useful clues in this regard. In an article entitled ‘E Pluribus Unum [roughly synonymous with the EU motto ‘unity in diversity’]: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century’ (2007), Putnam argues that over the long run (in the next several decades), increased diversity is not only inevitable but desirable; that in the short to medium run, however, ethnic diversity challenges social solidarity; and in the medium to long run, successful immigrant societies create new forms of social solidarity and ‘dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities’ (2007: 138-9). The nature of the challenge posed by diversity to social cohesion in the short run is, according to Putnam, the development of anomie and social isolation: ‘diversity does not produce “bad race relations” or ethnically-defined group hostility, our findings suggest. Rather, inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin ... Diversity, at least in the short run,
seems to bring out the turtle in all of us’ (2007: 150-1). In other words, it is not a direct majority-minority division which develops but, rather, a more general limitation to social solidarity overall (even within the majority) ... as is also suggested in the questions posed by Kymlicka above.

These discussions have developed in a North American context, but they apply equally well to the European context, and they provoke the question relevant wherever diversity has developed: is it the mere presence of difference that is the operative factor in the challenge to social cohesion, or is it the presence of different, perhaps competing, values? In posing this question in the WaVE project, we encounter the conceptual hurdles that challenge most researchers of values. As van Deth and Scarbrough (1998) observe, ‘values’ is an elusive concept, and agreement about its content and meaning hard to find. However, through an exploration of common aspects of different definitions, they propose the following: values cannot be directly observed; they engage moral considerations; and they are conceptions of the desirable (1998: 28)13.

From quantitative studies and values surveys we have information about the values claimed by different groups of peoples (the World Values Surveys and the European Values Surveys are amongst the most prominent of such studies). But these are often abstract notions, and tell us little about whether, in practice, differing values are in fact leading to conflicts and thus damaging social cohesion. Values do not exist ‘in the air’, as it were, but are grounded in everyday life and interaction, and they need to be examined this way – on the ground and through qualitative research – if they are to shed any light on actual, lived social cohesion and/or conflicts. As van Deth and Scarbrough argue, ‘values are embedded in other things – in ways of thinking, talking and acting, in judgements, decisions, attitudes, behaviour, and the like. We can conceptualise values as separate from these other things, but we cannot “get to them” separately from their place in other things. Values cannot be researched on their own because they do not stand on their own’ (1998: 31). Here we encounter the bridge developed in the WaVE project between welfare and values through the questions it poses: what values are embedded in majority and minority welfare provision and welfare needs? And what are the results in

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13 I am grateful to Olav Helge Angell for bringing this text to our attention.
terms of ‘conflict’ or ‘cohesion’ between majorities and minorities (or, indeed, within society at large)? And, finally, what role – if any – is played by religion in the above?

I turn now to our findings related to these questions.

**Findings**

**Religion**

_Majority religion welfare actions and attitudes towards minorities_

The large role played by majority churches in welfare provision across Europe has been established in other research (and by several members of the WaVE research team though the WREP project). In fact, the majority church in some cases provides ‘gap-filling’ welfare services that even the state does not provide – e.g., in Thiva the only homes for the elderly are church-run and in Lahti the only children’s afterschool clubs are church-run; in Przemysl, the same applies to facilities for the homeless. In the latter two cases, this strong role of the church is likely to stem from the place of these churches in relation to national identity and to the state; these churches are seen to a large extent as part of the state, hence – for better or for worse – their welfare services are seen as part of the state welfare apparatus. According to one Greek Orthodox monk, this is certainly ‘for the worse’, as the church should not be viewed as ‘an arm of the state’. A second reason for this strong role of the church, however, is the relative weakness of the state welfare system, leaving as many gaps as it does in both national cases. Interestingly though, the Finnish case offers an interesting example of such gap-filling even where the welfare state is comparatively very robust. In Lahti, for example, churches help to conceal state weaknesses by offer basic language courses to immigrants.

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14 This section is based on my interpretation of the case study reports. Examples are taken from individual case studies where they relate to particular points being made, but these examples should not be interpreted as representative of the case study as a whole. The reader is encouraged to read each case study report individually from the WaVE website (www.waveproject.org). I do not formally cite each case study report, and I also include information here which is not in the case study reports but which came directly from individual researchers in their feedback sent on the first draft of this report.
To what extent is it problematic that majority churches are the sole local providers of certain welfare activities? One potential problem is that in several cases (Przemysl, Medgidia, Thiva, and Sisak), the majority faiths are involved in addressing the most basic of minority needs, such as offering food, clothing and blankets, and in each case, most such activity is very much ad hoc and driven by particular individuals rather than embedded in a systematic approach to welfare provision. Of course, ad hoc means *not* universal, thus receipt of such welfare assistance may depend on luck, who one knows, etc. In the case of Thiva, for example, Pakistanis and Indians are not privy to some of the most generous of religiously-provided welfare because their limited Greek and lack of social interaction with the majority population, which means they are not informed by word-of-mouth, as are the other minority groups benefiting from such services. At the same time, the informality of such welfare services may also be seen as an advantage, in their relative flexibility and ability to ‘work between the cracks’ between unbending organisational, institutional and bureaucratic limitations.

A second potential problem in majority church-provided welfare services is the notion that the help comes with ‘strings attached’, and an expectation that the recipients – regardless of their faith orientation – will also participate in religious services and activities offered alongside the welfare assistance. The welfare provision of the Catholic Church in Przemysl is described as having ‘some religious elements’: in one home for single mothers and children, there is no official requirement that the boarders take part in the rosary prayer, but they express a sense of pressure to participate – if not external pressure, than internal, out of a sense of gratitude and indebtedness towards the nuns who run the home. In Schweinfurt, one representative of a church welfare service states: ‘it is understood that we talk about God here and when one goes along with that it is ok. Even if a man entertains Buddhist thoughts, that is his choice, but he has agreed to go along’. Meanwhile in Gävle, where one assumes a much more discrete majority church presence, the influence of a Christian ethos and culture on the education system is still considered so strong as to be problematic to some non-Christian minorities (and, indeed, perhaps more so to very vocal secularist groups). One symbolic example is the use of Lutheran churches for public education graduation ceremonies. Here we find resonance in the observation of Statham et al (2005: 429) that ‘although European societies see themselves are broadly secular, Christian religions often play important institutional, social and
political roles, regardless of how many or how few people actually believe or practise the religion. These institutional arrangements define pre-existing conditions and the political environment into which migrant religions have to find a space for their community’. Indeed, the welfare domain is highly revealing of a broad range of norms across Europe, seemingly banal until they encounter difference, such as may occur with mass immigration.

The Italian case offers a much more blatant example of majority religions norms influencing minority welfare and, critically, also majority welfare, via Catholic Church attitudes to abortion. There, tensions arise over immigrant women’s high rates of, and demands for, voluntary termination of pregnancies, and the Church’s influence over reproductive health in general. The fact that a large percentage of the demand for this service comes from immigrant women is breeding ground for ill-feelings, particularly on the part of the civil servants working with reproductive health issues, towards the minority population seeking abortions. Meanwhile, the fact that a large percentage of doctors (80% and seemingly growing year upon year) refuses to perform abortions on the grounds that their (majority Catholic) faith condemns it, indicates the Italian norm of publicness of religion in the doctors’ open practice of conscientious objection against performing abortions. The issue thus permeates both the public and the private domain, as the Catholic Church’s influence is conspicuous even within welfare provision structures. At the same time, this case also highlights the internal plurality of majority religion, as within the Catholic Church liberals and traditionalists struggle against one another over the issue of reproductive health. Indeed, the Italian case offers us an example of how values conflicts may arise within a particular group (here, the majority) rather than between the majority and minorities.

According to Hunsberger and Jackson (2005), more religious people express prejudice (in terms of self-reported negative attitudes towards stereotypic perceptions of various categories of ‘others’) than non-religious individuals. Theoretically, this could negatively influence the openness of religious welfare provision to minorities, insofar as religious organisations reflect individual members’ prejudices. Still, such a claim would have to be assessed against differences across national, religious and generational categories to avoid a monolithic perspective of ‘religious people’.
More interestingly for our purposes, Hunsberger and Jackson’s study suggests that religion-based prejudice against minorities is likely to be intensified if and when members of the majority religion perceive themselves to be in conflict with other religious (or nonreligious) groups for limited resources: for example, ‘the (often erroneous) perception that immigrants create competition with members of host populations for jobs can create prejudice against these immigrants’ religion in particular’ (Hunsberger and Jackson 2005, 818). In other words, what could easily be interpreted as a conflict of religious values is, in fact, a conflict of interests, over limited resources. The case of Sisak offers one example of such prejudice, with certain respondents complaining that anyone who is not Catholic is not considered Croatian and, hence, is not offered equal rights, particularly in the area of employment competition. The Evreux case offers a counter-example, of cohesion and cooperation between Catholic, Protestant and Muslim representatives in a particular part of town, focused on helping to protect undocumented immigrants from being discovered and potentially deported.

 Minority religious needs and practices

First, it is important to point out that in terms of minority religions, minority status in and of itself often leads to group identification on the basis of religion; this is likely to be enhanced for immigrant communities, as they tend to be somewhat detached from core public institutions promoting civic values and tend, instead, to rely on their religious institutions and family networks as a ‘community support system’ (Statham et al. 2005). One recurrent observation in the WaVE study is that the (externally imposed) religious identification of groups is often stronger than the internal realities of the given groups merit. In other words, minority groups which may perceive of and identify themselves with reference to a broad range of categories are often perceived of and defined by others (e.g., the majority population) one-dimensionally with reference to their religious identities. This tends to be a product of one of two things (or a combination of these): ‘representatives’ of these groups are often more religiously vocal and conservative than the average member, and the mass media tend to emphasise the religious definitions of these groupings over other definitions. In other words, what we as researchers may define
as majority religious needs may, by the groups themselves, be expressed as ethnically or otherwise defined needs.

In terms of the examples we have identified as religiously-defined minority needs, a main issue that arises in many of the cases is the need for cultural competence of welfare workers and authorities in the welfare arena (an issue to be addressed more thoroughly below), which would include knowledge of religious traditions, needs, etc. The Gävle case offers an example of effort in this direction in the introduction of an inclusive calendar at a local school where the religious holidays of all faith groups represented in the school are observed. Culture is easily mixed with the religion in this area of specific minority needs, and one example serves to prove the point: Drammen homework assistance programmes, originally introduced to provide after-school assistance to minority children in areas where their learning was weaker than that of majority students, evolved in one case (that of a separate ‘boarding-school’ version of this programme) to include lessons in culture and tradition, and religious lessons. Provision of food in schools in accordance with religious traditions is, indeed, one type of a religiously-defined welfare need.

But it is notoriously difficult to distinguish, from an external perspective, between religions and cultural needs. And, perhaps arbitrarily, some of what we have labelled as the latter appears in the section below.

**Minorities**

*Minority welfare needs – met and unmet*

The range of minority welfare needs across the cases under study is extremely broad. This to some extent reflects the breadth of development of national welfare systems (discussed above), but it is also of course a factor of the status of the minority individual or group (financial, marital and educational status, age, documented or undocumented immigrant; employed or not; skilled or unskilled, etc.). In Germany, individuals who immigrated as guest workers now face difficulties tending to their needs with extremely low pensions that this group is allowed. The Romanian case is perhaps the most acute,
where extreme poverty (amongst both majorities and minorities however) and an especially weak welfare system (with only four social workers in the entire town of just under 44,000 individuals). The Greek and Italian cases reveal similar characteristics by virtue of their large contingents of undocumented immigrants, for whom ‘illegal’ status renders concepts such as health and general welfare benefits offered by the state as something of a luxury: their welfare priorities are acquiring residence and work permits, accommodation, and employment – in short, the right and ability to remain, live and work in their respective immigration destinations. In most cases, undocumented immigrants are barred from access to much (if not all of) state welfare provision. Medical emergency services are usually an exception, offered universally to all in need, but even here practice often differs from theory. Thus, depending on the status of the minority individual, and in conjunction with the welfare situation of the host county, there may be a whole range of systemic barriers to welfare access.

However, generally in these case studies there are more practical rather than systemic barriers to minorities’ access to welfare, whether state-provided or otherwise provided. One poignant, and repeated, example is lack of information about available programmes reaching minority communities, usually because of their poor knowledge of the majority language but also because of limited communication with majority individuals and structures. This problem surfaces prominently in most of the WaVE case studies. One illustrative example comes from the case of Thiva, where one programme for Greek-language training was advertised through posters in store windows throughout the town, but these were only in Greek and, accordingly, inaccessible to those in most need of the language courses. In the case of Darlington, the provision of information and the recommendation by midwives (trusted individuals with whom some degree of contact was inevitable) was needed for some minority women to seek out certain welfare provisions offered in the locality.

In yet other cases, minority communities are fully informed, but the provision offered is not quite what they need, or want. The strong focus on the family and religious or ethnic community provides an important clue as to why this is the case: in Reutlingen, for example, there are relatively few Greek and Turkish immigrants using state services of care for the elderly. In both cases, ‘sending’ ones family member to such state institutions
is taboo, often interpreted as a lack of love and respect for these elders (the latter being a very highly-ranked value in these cultures, as noted also in the Darlington and Medgidia cases). In Schweinfurt, the example arises of one minority-run welfare organisation (‘Friendship’) places emphasis on the importance of German language capability for returnees from the former Soviet Union but faces the problem of a lack of motivation on the part of recipients, who complain about their limited change of finding work in Germany in any case (so why learn German?), and explain that the have a sufficiently large circle of family and friends who speak Russian, so there is no immediate need to learn German.

Overall, a frequently expressed minority welfare need is for culturally aware and linguistically capable (in the minority language(s)) professional helpers. In Drammen, the need for psychologists in these categories is noted. In Darlington, minorities’ requests along these lines have been heard by officials, who in turn find it difficult to recruit welfare professionals from minority cultural, ethnic or religious backgrounds (indicating a potential vicious cycle: the family and community-oriented approach of minority groups means all needs should be cared for within the family, but when needs arise that can’t be cared for in the family, it is difficult to find competent same-culture help, because the culture does not encourage welfare activity beyond the immediate family). In Reutlingen, there’s a broad discussion about ‘intercultural care’ for the elderly, but a real solution of how to manage it has not yet emerged. Because minority groups by and large avoid making use of homes for the elderly, where at all possible, these institutions are ill-equipped, in terms of intercultural knowledge, to handle the relative few cases of minority users. Thus, a vicious cycle ensues, as minorities are thus less likely to consider use of these homes for the elderly. The Schweinfurt case, though, offers a successful example of a Turkish member of the town Advisory Council on Foreigners who acts as a ‘cultural broker’ for Turkish and Muslim users of welfare services by resolving a seemingly constant flow of misunderstandings that arise between the workers in the services, on the one hand, and the minority users, on the other.

In Evreux, the lack of cultural competence of welfare structures – but also of the broader society – stand outs as especially problematic: in particular, the indication of minorities by their ethnic, rather than religious, identities by the welfare structures and the public at
large. In Gävle, the Family Centre established by the local authorities fails to attract the desired participation of the targeted groups of immigrants in the activities established for them (courses in cooking, meetings places for immigrant women, etc.). According to the Swedish research team, this could have to do with the fact that these programmes are a clear reflection of dominant Swedish values: ‘they are directed more towards giving than towards listening for the voices of the newly arrived persons as citizens with both resources and needs’. (A similar plan in Darlington for cooking classes for Traveller women, was abandoned for fear of offending the women concerned).

One possible factor in lack of communication between majority welfare institutions and minorities, and limited knowledge of the latter’s needs, is spatial segregation as occurs in many cases. In Evreux, Medgidia, Thiva, and Gävle in particular, there are strong tendencies towards ghettoisation of particular groups. The trajectory of the development of each of these ghettos is different but results similar in terms of symbolic distance from the majority population (even where ghettos are in the centre of town). Such symbolic, and very often real, distance is especially conspicuous in the case of the Roma, and particularly so in the Polish case study. Here the relationship between the local majority and the Roma is described as ‘lack of mutual adaptation and understanding’ – a description which could apply to the Roma in other case studies as well. Lack of education is pinpointed as a root of the problem, but the majority and the Roma explain this differently: the ‘stricter’ majority perspective is that the Roma are uninterested in education and lazy; the ‘softer’ majority perspective is that the Roma lack mobilisation and lack sufficient appreciation for education; the Roma themselves cite a lack of understanding of Roma children’s needs and verbal abuse of the children, weak health and unwillingness to attend due to the poor treatment received there, and lack of clothing or equipment needed. And this impasse of lack of mutual adaptation and understanding remains in place. This evidence corroborates with results of research which reveals the circularity of the relationship among stereotypes, labelling and politics, in the case of the Roma (Sigona 2005), a vicious cycle which is difficult to break.

Finally, certain majority welfare-providing efforts can lead to more problems rather than solutions. The Darlington case offers an interesting example of how good intentions can go astray: local authorities, forced to meet national integration targets, may be required to
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take decisions against their better judgement (the latter being based on their closer contacts with and understanding of the local community, as may be opposed to the drafters of national integration policies), and thus end up placing minorities in uncomfortable positions which, in turn, may lead to tensions and conflict between groups. In one case, local authorities were obliged to act against their better judgement (which is based on local knowledge), in order to implement a national-level policy calling for a meeting between diverse minority groups which were unlikely to see eye to eye. The plan backfired by producing more discord than anything else. A recurrent theme, then, is the need for greater understanding and awareness of characteristics and needs of minorities on the ground and the development of policies accordingly. The insider knowledge and first hand insights of local level representatives of welfare agencies should not be underestimated, or ignored.

Minority networks – tending to own needs

Most minority communities have their own welfare networks, though these vary significantly in levels of formality and structure. To a large extent, these networks develop along the lines of particular needs of the minority communities as they arise. For example, the aforementioned homework assistance programmes in Drammen were established by the local Turkish minority in order to offer extra assistance as the need arose for Norwegian language learning. Minority parents have praised the programmes for their role also in keeping their children safe and protected and off the streets, where drug use is a problem in the locality. One of the homework assistance programmes was in fact further extended to act as type of boarding school, only for boys. The latter provoked an intense media reaction, criticising the separatist tendencies perceived in this development, and in some cases feeding fears of possible extremist tendencies. Possibly as a direct reaction to the debates provoked by the establishment of the boarding school, the Drammen local authorities decided to establish after-school homework assistance programmes in all its schools.

In general, the minority desire for their own welfare institutions is perhaps most acute in the realm of education. Separate Saturday schools have also been established in Reutlingen for the children of USSR repatriates, seeking more creative, art-focused
courses, but also intended to teach children the Russian language and, in general, a more rigorous and robust teaching style than that – according to this group – offered by the German education system. The Russian-language high school in Ogre serves the purpose of uniting the Russian-speaking population and preserving Russian cultural values (the schools are not new, but the Russian-speaking population actively seek their continued operation). The case of Przemysl Roma, though, offers a counter-example of a separate school being established by the local authorities, but against the will of the Roma themselves who preferred that their children not be thus segregated; the school eventually closed because of lack of attendance.

Whether separate minority welfare institutions (including educational services) lead to greater integration into or segregation from the majority society is a matter of debate. In Gävle, immigrants are encouraged by majority institutions to form their own organisations in democratic forms so as to better integrate into the Swedish welfare society and its structures and procedures. Trends in formation of social networks around a culture of origin reflect what Castles and Miller (2003: 39) describe as helping people to ‘maintain self-esteem in a situation where their capabilities and experience are undermined’ (See also Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). One minority representative in Schweinfurt describes minority initiatives, particularly in the realm of education, in just these terms: maintenance of minority culture in conjunction with enhanced education is required for minority self-esteem which, in turn, will lead to increased participation of minorities in the public sphere.

In the case of Reutlingen, in the realms of education and social work, minority communities express their eagerness to organise their own welfare networks rather than simply receiving help from others, and they rally for more public funding for their own programmes. For instance, youth crime is one particularly challenging problem in the locality; certain minority groups feel they could be used effectively as a resource, establishing their own initiatives against youth crime which would be more effecting in addressing the causes of such crime within their communities. This is one of many examples in which minority communities seek recognition as a resource, for what they have to offer to the broader community (and it links well to the Gävle illustration above,
regarding the need to listen carefully to minorities’ expressed needs and recognise their own resources they can offer in addressing social problems).

In fact, in Przemsyl and in Lahti, there seems to be well-developed activity along these lines. In the former, participation in welfare provision is presented as an important part of social integration. Minority organisations – particularly Protestant groups – wish to be recognised not only as a useful resource, but as a partner – an equal contributor to the resolution of local welfare needs, together with the local state structures. Symbolic of their exclusion in this domain is their difficulty in securing public spaces for their welfare activities. Indeed, space – access to public spaces by minority organisations, is another significant factor in minority integration which goes hand-in-hand with needs for recognition and for operation of their own welfare networks (this issue arises in several case studies). Space in this sense has both physical and metaphorical significance.

The situation in Lahti regarding Protestant groups’ welfare activities is similar to that in the Polish case, in terms of minority activity in the welfare domain seen as a way to integrate minorities into local society. In this case however, some minority faith groups (e.g., Pentecostals) have their own venues and they sometimes offer these for use by immigrant groups, thus encouraging their volunteering and citizen participation.

**Gender**

**Gender and majority values**

Some of the most mediatised and socially divisive welfare challenges in Europe are arising around the gendered needs and values of religious minorities (and, especially, of Muslim women): these range from the headscarf issue (as a barrier to education and employment of Muslim women) to more controversial issues, as polygamy, female circumcision, sharia divorce – which ‘contradict most liberal states’ legal and moral understandings of equality, between individuals, and men and women’ (Statham et al 2005, 431). In fact, much of what is often (however inappropriately) described as a ‘return’ of religion has been channelled through issues to do with the body and rights of
minority women (headscarves, forced marriages and honour killings, etc)... issues which have provoked broader debates about sexuality and women’s bodies in the public sphere.

These particular issues do not appear in the WaVE research data, though they likely exist in the background through their influence on respondents’ perspectives (a ‘spill-over’ effect of European and global-scale issues which may not even be present at the national, much less local level). One exception is in the Schweinfurt case, where one woman encounters criticism regarding her wearing of a headscarf. She states, ‘I love Germany. No question. And I could not live anywhere else. But then people question why I wear a headscarf. They say I want to bring Islam to Germany. No, I want this country the way it is.’

Other than this one case, relevant issues that do arise are, for example, the wish of Muslim women in Reutlingen to be able to use a public swimming hall only for girls and women, as they will not allow their daughters to participate in mixed groups, but at the same time want for them to be able to learn to swim. Calls for separate sex swimming lessons also factor into the Gävle case. In fact, the Swedish case is perhaps the most conspicuous in terms of welfare values related to gender, with promotion of gender equality and individual autonomy intrinsic to the welfare system as a whole. Here majority-minority ‘tensions’ arose in relation to this in the educational domain: specifically, the Swedish value of same and equal rules for men and women, boys and girls, was challenged by requests for separate swimming courses for the two sexes by a small number of Muslim immigrants. Meanwhile, Swedish openness to sexuality met with resistance from Muslim parents in Gävle not wishing for their children to shower and change in front of others (nudity being avoided), and also reacting to the use of naked drawings and models in biology classes. Also in the domain of the Family Centre established in Gävle, contrasting gender values are evident in the relative inactivity of fathers (not only Muslim but from immigrant groups in general) in contributing to the care of young children (e.g., taking care of small children so as to free the mother to attend support group meetings; instead, the mothers tended to bring the small children with them if attending such meetings).
It is tempting to interpret all of the above through the lens of a gendered value conflict related to Islam. However, such developments are by no means restricted to Islam and to Muslim communities: in other case studies conservatism and gendered values are introduced by different minority groups, and indeed by majority individuals in more patriarchal societies. Stereotypes and culturalist interpretations abound. E.g., Nigerian men are described by one ‘welfare worker’ in Padua as uninvolved in the care for children. Such stereotypes are often produced and reproduced by welfare agents, and in some cases they are also promoted by the minorities themselves as some migrants tend to present their own cultures in a static way.

Also, such stereotypes can go both ways, as minority groups issue their own judgements of majority society in the realms of gender and family values, or of younger generations within their own minority group. For example, certain Polish and Romanian women in Thiva judge their own value in relation to Greek women on the basis of who cooks and cleans more for their men. Greek and Turkish women in Reutlingen note that the younger generation women were not playing a sufficiently strong role in the home caring for the family. In Sisak also, older Muslim women emphasise the need for preservation of their cultural values and criticise younger women in this respect, and particularly younger men who marry Croat women and adopt Croat values and tradition etc. Meanwhile, in Lahti Lutherans praise the immigrant communities for their strong family values as compared with the majority Finnish tendencies, which are considered less family oriented.

This brings us to the question of generational values clashes as regards the roles of men and women. Beyond the above examples, in the Reutlingen and Darlington cases as well, conflicts or potential conflicts are identified by respondents over different gendered values from one generation to another. These developments resonate with debates within western European majority communities over what has been controversially labelled the ‘selfish [female] sex’, which is considered responsible for gaps in care for children and the elderly: the accusation in the representative literature is that ‘the elderly and vulnerable are paying the price for a generation of professional working women’ (Wolf 2006). In this sense, many minority women consulted in the WaVE study find exposed to two accusatory views pointing in opposing directions: internally to their communities they are criticised for not providing continuity in their cultural values and traditions.
(including gendered values), and externally they are often criticised as the bearers of those aspects of culture considered most foreign and often antithetical to ‘western European values’. This corroborates with the observation by Yuval-Davis et al (2005: 519), that it is immigrant women who are most often implicated in the maintenance of (or, at least, in the failure to ‘overcome’) traditional practices such as arranged marriages, authoritarian gender and generational relations, and religious practices.

*Gender between religious and secular values*

The above are mainly examples of gendered values to do with culture and tradition. There are also cases of explicit gendered values linked to religion, as we have seen above in the case of Padua, where tensions develop between majority and minorities over reproductive health issues strongly influenced by the Catholic Church. However, the issue unfolds to reveal other fault lines than that between majority and minority: secular versus religious values; progressive versus conservative religious values; and women of all religious and ethnic backgrounds uniting behind women’s right to choose, on the one hand, aligned on the other against those advancing conservative religious values insofar as voluntary interruption of pregnancy is concerned. Here the high percentage of immigrant demand for abortions is used to question the rights of all women. In this particular ‘grey area’, women of various religious and ethnic backgrounds (including Catholic) united in opposition to a particular conservative Catholicism.

*Women’s and men’s access to and provision of welfare services*

In several cases, it is clear that within minority communities, women have the first and perhaps only contact with the local welfare system, through needs arising in relation to pregnancy, childbirth and child-rearing. As such, the importance of welfare services offered for women, in terms of potentially influencing minority welfare as a whole, is considerable. In Darlington for example, minority women’s first contact with welfare services is often through pregnancy or childbirth, from which point they are introduced, through referrals, to a world of options such as language and other courses. Trust factors as highly important here, established only through initial positive experiences in their contact with the system and which could then lead to allowing ‘foreigners’ to care for
their children while they work. In Padua also, women’s reproductive health needs expose them to other areas of help and influence, for them and for their families in general. And in the Polish case, women are sometimes the only ones to have contact with the welfare services, as they are more likely to seek help for their own needs and will struggle on behalf of the entire family for their needs as well. All of the above are good examples of interconnections (here, between gender and minority status) fostering positive interaction between various groups rather than problematic outcomes (Staunes 2003).

The ‘women’s solidarity’ in the Padua case has been described above. The case of Przemysl offers another positive example in the Ukrainian Women Association, of minority women coming together to tend to minority women’s needs – in other words, women are the main providers and recipients of welfare aid. In the Finnish case, Ingrain women too are active and well connected in social networks and are recipients of local welfare aid, whereas Ingrain men are described as passive. In Thiva, the Pakistani and Indian populations are almost exclusively men; they have formed their own associations and do not seek welfare support from local authorities and local voluntary institutions – mainly, however, because they lack information about these (as noted above, due to communication and language barriers).

Reflections on welfare and social cohesion

Majority policy (and practice) towards minorities

There are several policy areas (policy broadly defined and not limited to state apparatus) in particular which arise repeatedly in the WaVE material, including language and communication; the role of media; immigration and minorities policy; the role of the individual (interpersonal contact); and the role of ‘professional helpers’ (those enacting local welfare policies). These themes have been addressed above in more or less detail; below the aim is to reflect on the material specifically from the perspective of majority-minority interaction and barriers to or facilitators of social cohesion. Each point stands alone as a significant factor in much minority-majority interaction, but it is also useful to
note their interconnectedness which, for seemingly almost arbitrary reasons, can lead to conflict and tension between minorities and majorities.

One especially prevalent minority need which is strikingly problematic in many cases is poor knowledge of the majority language – a banal point seemingly but with multifaceted repercussions. Communication and language problems in the various cases entail problems to do with frequency and type of contact with local welfare services; difficulties in majority language learning availability (lack of majority language capability significantly influences the well-being of minorities in several cases); and, in general, lack of understanding, on the part of the majority, of minority culture and minority needs. In this environment, stereotypical and culturalist perspectives thrive, often with the support of the local and/or national media.

The Latvian case offers an interesting example of the interconnectedness of the role of the media and language limitations. In Ogre media plays a crucial role in majority-minority relations because Latvian and Russian-speaking people live in completely different information environments. The two groups follow different print media and television and radio stations which often present the same information from entirely different perspectives. These media sources are mostly national, but they have a tremendous impact on the local level too. Thus, the Latvian researchers describe the media as one of the most important sources of conflict between majority and Russian speaking minority in Latvia.

In the findings section the role of the media appears frequently, particularly as linked to stereotypes but also to the inflammation of problem points. Most interesting, though, is what we do not see in the findings, which makes us more aware of the particular role played by the media in majority-minority relations, because the picture gleaned from our case studies is quite different to that described in the introduction to this report, and that seen in national and global media. In some cases, the content is the same (no unrest over the Mohammed cartoons or citizenship tests, but values differences arise over modesty and sexual freedoms), but in general our research data offer a much more nuanced picture of the everyday significance of religious values in majority-minority relations. Certainly we were not overwhelmed with an image of Islam as causing barriers to cohesion...
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between Muslims and majorities in our individual cases. By and large other minority groups proved more challenging to local majorities than Muslim groups did in any country where they were studied (e.g., Roma and Pentecostals, in cases where they were included in the study).

**Immigration policy** as a factor in majority-minority relations is especially conspicuous in the Italian and Greek cases, but bears relevance for other cases as well. The situation of undocumented immigrants is especially precarious and, most importantly, immigration policy is often such that they are unable to resolve this situation. For example, in Thiva (as in the rest of Greece, as immigration policy is set at the national level), undocumented immigrants currently in the town have no possibility of achieving work and residence permits as no new permits are being issued (not since the last period during which permits were issued, in 2001). Yet there is a strong demand for immigrant labour, much larger than could be met only by those documented immigrants living in the town. The undocumented immigrants simply compete for the same jobs and are often offered them at lower wages, with no access to social security of course, and constantly facing the possibility of deportation. This situation is supported by the fact that the underground economy has come to rely on illegal, uninsured, labour.

Here a lack of state resources is also quite evident: in Thiva only two civil servants working in the office handling the applications for work and residence permits, working with only paper files and no electronic system. Frustration with the situation leads many immigrants in such contexts to question the values of the majority state (though complaints were not waged by immigrants against the population at large – just against the Greek state).

These are patterns visible in the Italian case as well, and certain elements may be found in all other country cases experiencing illegal immigration. Just as many local economies have tended to adapt to the presence of undocumented immigrants, so too the local populations in such cases recognise the need, in individual households also, for migrant labour. Within this particularly difficult (for many immigrants) situation, interesting examples of majority-minority cohesion arise in our research which corroborates with the
‘contact hypothesis’ – i.e., that increased contact with people of other ethnic and racial backgrounds will lead to increased tolerance and social solidarity. The WaVE research has offered examples of increased and closer contact leading to fondness of one’s neighbour, even if prejudices remain about the ‘other’ members of the particular ethnic or religious group; of majority individuals helping minority individuals through the difficulties related to immigration policy (often in employer-employee contexts, landlord-tenant relations, or amongst neighbours); and of a sense of solidarity developing between minority and majority individuals in opposition to the problems of ‘the system’. In all of the above, we should recognise the important role of the individual and interpersonal contact (particularism). In this and in several other domains of welfare provision, our research has shown the critical function of particular individuals in majority-minority interactions.

Finally, and intimately connected to policy on immigration and minorities as well as to the role of the individual, is the role of ‘professional helpers’ or, as Michael Lipsky (1980) calls them, ‘street-level bureaucrats’\(^\text{15}\). According to Lipsky, welfare policies (presumably including immigration policies) are not best understood as made in legislatures\(^\text{16}\). Rather, much more relevant to minorities’ realities are their daily encounters, in crowded offices, with street-level bureaucrats: he argues that ‘the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out’ (1980: xii). These civil servants are, characteristically, limited in their abilities to meet minority needs due especially to the ratio of workers to clients or cases, and to time. Lipsky’s arguments apply exceptionally well to the Thiva and Padua cases, but also to the Medgidia case (where, as noted above, there are only four social workers in working in the town municipality and serving the town as a whole) and to the case of Darlington. In cases where illegal immigration is prevalent, the problems around the professional welfare workers negatively influence many aspects of minorities’ experiences, delaying

\(\text{15} \) These are civil servants working in schools, the police, welfare departments, and other agencies whose workers interact with and have wide discretion over the benefits and the allocation of public sanctions (Lipsky 1980: xi). I am grateful to Pål Repstad for bringing this text to our attention. See also Psimmenos and Kassimati (2003).

\(\text{16} \) Lipsky writes about street-level bureaucracy in general, but I am applying his arguments here specifically to the domain of immigration – i.e., as would apply to the Padua reproductive health centres and the Thiva office for foreigners.
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their legal entry into the labour market and, therefore, extending their precarious positions in their host societies. Here too, then, an underlying theme is particularism.

Further, it is important to pay attention to ‘the other side of the coin’ – namely, the dissatisfaction such situations entails for the professional welfare workers in question, who are inevitably overworked, underpaid and frustrated over their inability to even nearly do their jobs properly. Moreover, dissatisfaction and frustration on their part often translates into less than friendly attitudes towards the minorities whose needs they are to serve, and may also translate into frustration with the minorities themselves and to development of (or submission to latent) stereotypes. Frustration may also arise amongst welfare workers in situations where they feel the recipients of their efforts are not worthy of the help – as, for example, has been observed in the Polish case with reference to the Roma. And in all such cases, an added problem is that these welfare workers, who could play such a useful role in helping to improve policies towards minorities by informing institutions and political leaders of major pitfalls, are often too frustrated and overburdened to play such a positive role.

Minority social networks and integration

We now turn our attention to another theme related to welfare and social cohesion – the social networks of minority groups and the role of these networks in minorities’ integration into majority society. The focus on the family in the domain of minority care and welfare provision forms a ‘red thread’ linking most of our case studies. An array of sub-themes flows from this. In the vast majority of the cases, minority groups reveal tendencies to focus on caring for their own, starting with the unit of the immediate family, and spreading out to extended family and friends and to the local ethnic or religious or linguistic community to which they belong. In other words, they practice the principle of subsidiarity (which notably is also a core (claimed) principle of the European Union). In many cases, minority groups attach to this caring function a passing on of language, culture and traditions. These tendencies sometimes become the centre of debate, with the following two clashing perspectives. On the one hand, these types of social networks are thought to support minority integration into majority society by
increasing minority self esteem, recognising and encouraging the use of their own resources, and symbolically at least setting minority welfare services in the same domain as other majority-provided welfare services (in other words, treating minorities as equal partners in the welfare domain). On the other hand, such minority social networks are perceived as structures which further segregate and isolate minorities from majority society. There is no easy resolution of this debate.

The same argument focusing on the dangers of segregation could be used in other cases of segregated minority educational facilities – e.g., the Ukrainian school in Przemysl, the Russian high school in Ogre; and the Przemysl Roma school. In the first two cases, the establishment of separate educational facilities seems to have worked in the direction of improved relations with the majority society and greater integration of the groups in question, whether this is because of the increased confidence felt by the students attending these schools, or because of the educational programmes’ special focus on (and success in fulfilling) their particular areas of need (e.g., intensive majority-language courses), etc. In the third case, the school closed down due to lack of attendance on the part of the Roma children due to, in part, precisely a resistance to such segregation. In their totality, such cases raise deep questions about values of integration and social cohesion, on the one hand, and the practical means of reaching these, on the other. In several majority communities, such segregation is seen as divisive, an unhealthy and negative form of ghettoisation at worst, and at best, a shunning of majority institutions, culture and traditions. But, for many minority groups, these educational (or otherwise welfare-related networks and programmes) of their own play a significant role in their integration into majority society. In the Reutlingen example, we saw minority communities seeking to make their own contribution to the fight against youth crime, arguing that they have their own resources which form a useful contribution to society as a whole. The work of Shrover and Vermeulen (2005) is helpful in imparting insight into the deeper significance of immigrant organisations as ‘an indication of how immigrants see themselves and the rest of society, of how these differences are perceived by others; a translation of which is found in government policy’ (831) (the point was also made above, with reference to Castles and Miller 2003; here the work of Bhikhu Parekh and Charles Taylor on recognition is especially relevant).
A second main reason for minority preference for their own welfare networks may be the symbolic establishment that this entails and the sense of belonging that comes with the gaining of a community’s own space for their welfare activities. This is also an issue of dignity, and it is in conformity with norms of majority society, which organises itself into its schools, programmes, etc.

A third reason may be the simple fact that having their own welfare networks allows minorities to ‘to do things their way’, family and tradition-focused. It is this last reason which especially gives rise to debate and controversy around the question of differing, and possibly conflicting, majority and minority values. But the question also arises: who is to say that minorities’ way is ‘wrong’? Here the multiple modernities approach to diversity instructs us to broaden our perspectives in order to be able to include alternative forms of modernity arising in other cultures. At the same time though, in seeking to analyse ‘the minorities’ way’ as right or wrong, which voices will be listened to? Minority groups are certainly not monolithic and internal divisions abound. The risk is that, from an external perspective (and as noted above), it is easy to hear mainly the most vocal of representatives who are often also the most (religiously and otherwise) conservative, and who tend to receive more media attention.

Further, these debates raise a broader question of who is best placed to determine what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ segregation? Is emphasis on caring for one’s own an endorsement of segregation, or an admirable value? Is it ideological, or practical? (or are these different for different groups?) And how critique-worthy is, for example, the desire to protect children from social ills present in majority society? The other side of the coin is a difficulty in determining where to draw the line – i.e., a ‘healthy’ preservation of traditions that can lead to increased minority group confidence, or to continuation of ‘unhealthy’ (according to the majority) practices such as arranged marriages (or for example marriages between cousins, which are a recent focus of debate in the UK because of the numbers of health problems arising in the children born from these marriages).

In some of the case studies, mention was made of the changed attitudes to Muslims in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 (though this does not apply equally to Muslims in the
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post-communist countries studied). Indeed, increased media attention to debates around Muslim groups has raised fears about extremism and terrorism, honour killings, etc. and, as a result, it seems it is often the case that assumptions about Muslims influenced by such issues are projected onto all aspects of Muslim life and seeming segregation. However, special effort needs to be made in order to resist such easy conclusions. For example, the study of Greeks (Christian Orthodox) and Turks (Muslims) in Reutlingen indicates a strong tendency in both groups to preserve their own identity and to segregate themselves, in varying degrees, from the majority society (although in the Greek case this self-segregation does not preclude integration into majority society; the Turkish case reveals a bit more difficulty, potentially due not least to Turkish non-accession to the EU). To a large extent, this is simply a normal function of immigrant or diaspora, or in any way ‘displaced’ societies – a tendency towards preservation of cultural and/or religious identities and norms in the process of closing one’s self or family (or extended kin group) from the outside and unknown other in order to protect from these influences.

This raises the question of how tolerant majority societies really are to difference. Are majority societies working towards integration, or assimilation, or in fact towards segregation? Our research results point to an ambiguity on this point. Programmes labelled as aiming towards integration do indeed often seem to mask deeper value orientations which create ambitions for the assimilation instead. This does not necessarily (nor often, in our cases) result in substantive conflict between majorities and minorities. Nor, however, does it help to abate misunderstandings between the two, or to address, as fruitfully as possible, the welfare needs of minorities. Further, it fails to take sufficiently into account the positive resources that minority groups represent, one of which could in fact be a focus on the family.

Conclusions

As noted at the outset, the aims of this report are to highlight certain patterns found in the case study data gathered in the WaVE project (this in the ‘findings’ section), and to offer insights upon this basis regarding practices, tendencies, mechanisms etc. which lead to ‘conflict’ or ‘cohesion’, or which influence the large grey area in between, in minority-majority relations. In these last few paragraphs an attempt is made towards the latter. Our
opening questions in the introduction section will serve as a guide: What patterns can we see in welfare provision which lead to greater social cohesion or to tensions within diverse societies? What tendencies are there towards ‘conflict’ or ‘cohesion’ due to values that are embedded in majority and minority welfare provision and needs?

*Patterns in welfare provision leading to greater social cohesion or tensions*

The factors which can be identified as having more or less positive results in the direction of increased social cohesion are, by and large, somewhat ambiguous. For example, the fact that *majority religion welfare provisions often fill major gaps left by the state* is positive in the sense that at least these important services are made available to minorities. However, the services sometimes come with ‘strings attached’, in terms of expectations that recipients will also partake in ‘religious goods’ offered alongside the welfare aid (church services, prayer meetings, etc.). Also, majority religion welfare services often operate in an informal, ad hoc way, so that there is still not universal coverage of the particular welfare needs they address. Second, *the role of the individual and interpersonal contact* is critical in the meeting of many minority welfare needs: relations developed with neighbours, employers, particular civil servants, etc. are often extremely effective in getting around bureaucratic or other barriers to their access to welfare, and are also important in fostering a sense of cohesion with the majority individuals in question. However, again here we find particularism rather than universal coverage, and luck (i.e., who do you happen to know) playing a large role in whether minority needs are met or not. Third, and most ambiguous, is *the role of minority social welfare networks* of their own. As explored in the previous section, whether or not such networks lead to greater social cohesion or, rather, to segregation of the minority groups is debatable and depends on one’s vantage point. Minority groups, however, tend to perceive of such networks as effective in a. dealing with their primary needs (e.g., maintaining their culture and religion and (sometimes as a result) family cohesion; b. allowing them to be used as resources and thus ideally to be treated as equal partners in the welfare domain; and related to the latter, c. strengthening their self-esteem. (The role of minority social welfare networks could also be listed in the following section, as a factor leading to negative results in terms of social cohesion).
In terms of factors which lead to more or less negative results in terms of social cohesion between majorities and minorities, these are in many cases interrelated. A lack of cultural competence amongst majority individuals and institutions providing welfare to minorities often leads to inappropriate, or at least to less effective, welfare provisions. We find many cases of external labelling, so that the labels applied to minorities by the majority welfare services are often different from the minorities’ self-definitions. Related to the above are tendencies towards stereotyping and culturalism, whereby in the absence of cultural competence as regards minority identities and needs, culturalist reductionism and stereotypes abound, leading again to off-mark and ineffective welfare provisions, and negatively influencing the potential for healthy majority-minority interactions and relations. One frequently encountered factor exacerbating this problem is the media, which often create or promote stereotypes, essentialise minority identities, and over-emphasise conflict and tensions. Another factor influencing lack of cultural competence and stereotyping is the spatial segregation of many minority groups – here both physical and metaphorical distance between minorities and majorities (even in cases where ghettos may be in the centre of town) significantly limit substantial interaction and thus understanding between majorities and minorities. And related to the latter are language and communication barriers, which have been addressed at length in the previous sections but must be emphasised again here as extremely important factors in majority-minority relations.

Meanwhile, we also encounter failures to use insider knowledge, where available. For example, local level welfare workers are often better placed to influence welfare policy which, however, comes from the national level and sometimes ignores the insights and expertise of those working at the local level. Another problem area relates to the role of professional helpers, those civil servants administering public welfare to minorities who are often overburdened and ill-prepared for the challenges of handling minority needs. The latter is intimately linked to immigration policy, which is often so poorly formulated (particularly in its ability to handle undocumented immigrants in a healthy manner), also exacerbates the problems of the professional helpers, and of course much more so negatively influences minorities’ experiences of the local authorities and their access to public welfare services.
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Tendencies towards ‘conflict’ or ‘cohesion’ due to values in welfare provision and needs

The most conspicuous values conflict in the domain of welfare arises in relation to minority social networks. The values embedded in many such networks (tending to their own; conservative cultural or religious values – e.g., sexual modesty and segregation of activities for boys and girls; etc.) sometimes clash with majority values in particular settings (e.g., liberal approaches to sex; freedom rather than limitations to do with women’s (and men’s) bodies; integration of all social networks into a broader shared national system; etc.). Also, the mere existence of some such networks is, from certain (majority) perspectives, seen as a segregating factor and as a wish of the minorities to separate themselves from the majority society. However, we have also seen examples of conflict over such values clashes which, in the end, are precursors to greater social cohesion as both the majorities and minorities in question come to better understand and appreciate one another’s perspectives. Here contact (communication) -- though perhaps tense in the beginning – is a necessary start for resolution of different perspectives.

Certainly women’s bodies and rights become the focal point for debates regarding conflicting majority and minority values, though by and large the content and intensity of the debates in our research are quite different to what is portrayed in the media. This is an interesting area forming a juxtaposition with tensions between religious versus secular values also, as alliances may develop between women of all religious and ethnic backgrounds in opposition to religiously conservative pressures.

Values conflicts also arise in the form of generational clashes within minority groups. These clashes often have a gender dimension, as differences arise over the role of younger women in the household and the extent to which they cook and clean, etc. These examples help to remind us that the minority groups are not a monolith, nor static. Further, we have encountered a level of complexity in the generational dimension, whereby one cannot assume a relative conservatism of older generations verses liberal perspectives of younger generations: in some cases, the opposite is actually the case. Related to the above are differences in domestic values which sometimes arise between majorities and minorities, with minorities in particular negatively assessing the values in this domain of the majority (and, again, most of all of majority women).
Finally, in terms of welfare values leading to cohesion, a first and most banal point is simply the extent to which **majority welfare provision is aimed at social cohesion** – in other words, welfare provision extended to minorities in an effort to better integrate them into society, offering rights and benefits which, hopefully, will lead to an enhanced sense of belonging. In spite of all the flaws and weaknesses in these efforts (many of which are outlined above), such an aim and value can still be detected as a driving force behind much majority welfare provision. A similar point can be made regarding **minority welfare provision as aimed at social cohesion**, as in many cases minority (religious, but not only) welfare services play a significant role in offering help to both majority and minority individuals in various domains (e.g., alcohol abuse). Here we see a solidarity developing around particular welfare needs. Finally, our research has indicated several positive examples of **women’s solidarity**, in particular, developing around particular needs. Here the values expressed are women’s rights and women’s **ability** to help support one another’s needs, and the alliances which develop often cross ethnic and religious boundaries and unite women of different backgrounds behind their shared concerns.

This reference to patterns emerging through the research and of insights gathered is not – and cannot be – exhaustive. Indeed, the information generated by the WaVE project is extremely rich and complex, with one of the major lessons emerging being that the European situation insofar as welfare and values is concerned is, in fact, far more complex than is often thought, and portrayed by the media but also by much academic literature. The WaVE project’s reliance on street-level information, through the case study approach and intensive qualitative study, has proven critical to the ability to generate insights faithful to the situation on the ground in various national and local contexts.
### ANNEX 1

**Groups and Themes/Areas Studied**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study town</th>
<th>Groups studied</th>
<th>Themes/areas studied</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gävle (Sweden)</td>
<td>Iraqi/Muslim; Thai/Buddhist; Chile/Catholic; India/Hindu; Roma/many of whom are Pentecostals</td>
<td>a) a public school in an area of Gävle with a high degree of immigrants, and b) the recently established Family Centre run by the local authority in cooperation with the Church of Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drammen (Norway)</td>
<td>Turkey (from various parts of the country)/Muslim</td>
<td>a) educational institutions b) newspaper contents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahti (Finland)</td>
<td>Ingrians; Pentecostalists; Muslims from various backgrounds; Russians/Orthodox and repatriates from the former USSR</td>
<td>Welfare activities of the Pentecostal Church, the Salvation Army, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogre (Latvia)</td>
<td>Latvian speaking population; Russian speaking population (Russians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians); smaller minority groups (incl. Roma)</td>
<td>interactions between these groups (with a special focus on the youth) in the local municipality and its organisations, other establishments of social assistance and social care, NGOs, educational establishments, religious organisations, and other public places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlington (England)</td>
<td>1) The established Bangladeshi/Bengali community, which is also a Muslim community, concentrated in one area of the town. 2) The Traveller/Gypsy community, which has been present in the area for many generations, but is a fairly invisible minority.</td>
<td>issues of children, the elderly, and women’s roles and situation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Welfare and Values in Europe: Transitions related to Religion, Minorities and Gender (WAVE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Institutions/Groups</th>
<th>Activities/Research Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Schweinfurt (Germany)** | 1. The *Evangelisch-Methodistische Gemeinde* (EMK), a Protestant Free Church.  
2. *Levi e.V.*, an association of the Protestant Church and the different connected to Protestant Free Churches.  
3. Three of the four main Muslim groups present in Schweinfurt: DITIB, Milli Görüş and the *Alevitisher Kulturverein e.V.*  
4. *Russische Landsmannschaft e.V.*, the association of ethnic Germans from the former USSR. | Welfare provision activities of each of these institutions/organisations, and the patterns of use of these services by various groups |
| **Reutlingen (Germany)** | Turkish/Muslims; Greek/Christian Orthodox; Germans from the former USSR/Protestant, Catholic, Jew and non-religious | Care for the elderly and intergenerational relationships |
| **Evreux (France)** | 1. The established Muslim community, concentrated in the Madeleine area.  
2. The long-term established Protestant community  
3. Ethnic minorities, not related to a religion | The welfare providing organisations of each of these groups |
<p>| <strong>Przemysl (Poland)</strong> | Polish/Roman Catholics, Ukrainian/Greek Catholics and Roma/ Pentecostals. | The welfare providing organisations and activities of each of these groups, as well as content analysis of their webpages, of the local press, and of their church sermons. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Group(s)</th>
<th>Focus Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sisak (Croatia)</td>
<td>The City Council of Bosniac National Minority, The Group of Bosniac Women; the Islamic Community (comprised of mainly Bosniacs, but also Albanians, Roma and a few Arabs); and the Evangelical Protestant Church (comprised of Croats, Serbs, Roma and even Muslims)</td>
<td>1. the current situation in Sisak (main social problems), local welfare system and subjective definition of welfare; 2. the visibility of minority groups through their involvements in local socio-cultural events and relationships with majority/or other minority groups, primarily through the dimension of welfare; 3. the inner dimension of a minority community (the structure of the group, the hierarchy, inter-relations, cohesion, activities); 4. the identity and the personal experience of belonging to a minority (in every-day life and in the welfare system); 5. gender issues (gender relations in the private and public domain, the role of women in the welfare system, violence against women).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padua (Italy)</td>
<td>Nigerian and Romanian immigrants</td>
<td>access to local welfare services and their availability to immigrants in the area of reproductive health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medgidia (Romania)</td>
<td>Romanians/Orthodox; Turks-Tatars/Muslims; Roma (Horhane)/ ‘neo-Protestants’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiva (Greece)</td>
<td>Albanian/Muslim population; female migrant labourers from Eastern Europe; male migrant labourers from Pakistan and India</td>
<td>Interaction between these groups and the majority population in the area of employment (beginning with their experience of the regularisation process and including social security access)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


Gest, Justin (2007) ‘Q. How many of 100 Britons passed the citizenship exam? A. Not one’, The Times, 29 September (available online at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2554235.ece)
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