The EU’s Collective Use Of Force

Exploring the Factors Behind its First Military Operations

Katarina Engberg
Abstract

The EU has since 2003 carried out six military operations. This thesis seeks to determine the circumstances under which the EU will, or will not, undertake military operations. It does so through the study of two main cases of EU military operations: the case when an operation was planned in the Lebanon war 2006 but did not occur, and the positive case of EUFOR RD Congo that same year which did occur. Three additional cases are presented. An analytical tool built on the techniques of defence planning and concepts derived from the scholarly literature is applied to the cases for the purpose of identifying the main driving and inhibiting factors behind the operations. The functional theme of the use of force and the organizational theme of the multilateralisation of intervention serve as the main scholarly concepts. The interaction between the intervener and the local actors, as well as between political and resource factors, is introduced in order to create an integrated framework for the analysis of the dynamics at play in the EU’s use of force. The limitations to the "jus bellum" tradition is noted in the analysis of the EU’s operations that have situated themselves in a low-to-middle bandwidth in terms of interests and risks at stake. Among the findings, the growing importance of local actors in shaping the room for the EU’s deployment of military force stands out, as do resource constraints, in the EU’s case primarily in the form of its limited command and control structures but also through the oversretch of the global pool of expeditionary forces felt around 2006. As seen from the organizational perspective, the EU’s first military operations can best be understood in the context of the increasing role of regional security providers in an unofficial division of labour with regard to the multilateralisation of intervention.

Keywords: EU, collective security, use of force, multilateralisation of intervention, regional security provider, local actors, resource factors

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In memory of my mother Aina Engberg (1910–1972)
for whom higher education remained an unfulfilled dream.
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Preface and Acknowledgements

An issue of political relevance

The utility of force in the management of conflicts is a matter of the highest political importance. The Obama Administration’s grappling with fateful decisions over the conduct of the Afghan war provides a recent example of the centrality of the theme (Woodward 2010, Junger 2010). The gap between political strategy and the advice offered by the military profession in the form of counterinsurgency strategies (Petreaus and Amos 2007) seems particularly difficult, and important, to close.

As this thesis went to print at the beginning of May 2011, the UN-mandated and NATO-led intervention of Libya provided yet another example of the centrality of the issue of military intervention.

There is no one handbook for politicians to reach out for, when trying to sort out the relationship between ends and means, or between the political goals to pursue and the military instruments to ascribe in order to meet these goals. The lack of informative literature is the consequence of many factors. One is the insufficient dialogue and knowledge deficit that exists between political decision makers and practitioners in the defence sector. And while senior officers today can be academically certified, few civilians, let alone academics, make the journey in the other direction.

There is also the inherent difficulty of establishing the linkage between ends and means in the use of force in conflicts marked by civil, or intra-state, wars. To this can be added the more mundane consideration that conflict management in general more often than not is characterized by learning by doing. The valuable analyses of the right political strategy to apply, and the consequential tools to choose, often tend to appear as afterthoughts to what has already happened. In the meanwhile, new bewildering security phenomena have already started to build on the horizon.

This does not mean that things cannot be learned, and learning is indeed the purpose of this study. Its main objective is to examine the experiences to be drawn from the EU’s first military operations in the 00’s. This was a time situated between the management of the fall-out of the European wars and empires that marked the end of the Cold War, and the need to adjust to the relentless pressures of the forces of globalisation of the 21st century.

This study is not, however, a report card, but rather a portrayal of the organization as young in the role as a collective and regional provider of secu-
rity in the form of military forces. It goes without saying that the Europeans are not new to the use of force, but the launching of the EU’s six military operations from 2003 onwards has required the collective deliberations of 27 member states, or rather 26, since Denmark has opted out from defence co-operation. This is a new development well worth pondering. Which are the driving and inhibiting factors behind these operations? What are the dynamics at hand? The EU’s military operations are interesting objects of study in and of themselves, but they also provide a prism through which other, larger issues can be observed.

The underlying assumption here is that the EU may be *sui generis* with regard to the degree of pooled sovereignty\(^1\) between nation states, but that it forms part of and reflects a larger context. If that is correct, then this exercise is likely to yield a better understanding not only of the dynamics behind the EU’s use of force, but also that of the general utility of force in crisis management and of the EU’s role in an unofficial global division of labour with regard to the multilateralisation of intervention. The latter has been a prominent feature of collective security since the end of the Cold War. Understanding the dynamics behind this development is of great importance in shaping the future of collective security.

**A particular note**

At the outset, a few words shall be said regarding the author’s relationship to the topic of research. Having moved between academia and government during parts of my career, it is at this point difficult to ascertain the exact admixture and sequencing of conceptual thinking gained from my periods of study with knowledge and experiences gained from my periods as a practitioner. It has been an iterative process where the mundane execution of governmental work in the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, the Swedish Ministry of Defence, the Swedish Representation to the European Union and the Swedish NATO Delegation has been enlightened by periods of academic studies in Sweden and in the US. Experiences gained during periods of work have, in a similar vein, influenced the search for and development of explanatory theories to the intractable and immensely complex “reality” in the form of the EU’s military operations. Trying to understand “what really happened” has spurred me to undertake this research.

Much of the empirical evidence was acquired during my time as Minister for Defence Affairs at the Swedish Representation to the European Union and the Swedish NATO Delegation in Brussels. The years spent in Brussels have allowed for cultural immersion (King et al. 1994, p.37) necessary for the gathering of empirical material. It facilitated the search for relevant ma-

\(^1\)The concept has been developed by Moravcsik 1999, see Section 2.2.2.
terial. It is in some cases the first time that some of these stories are being
told. The cultural immersion does, however, also carry with it the risks aris-
ing from a symbiotic relationship between the author and the object of study.
To ensure the necessary distance, it has become particularly important to
compare and correct observations made during my time in Brussels with
material obtained through interviews with key actors and the study of the
scholarly literature on the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP.\textsuperscript{2}

The complexity of the issue at study does not lend itself to simplistic pre-
judgements. It has spurred my curiosity to study and interpret patterns in the
thick political environment that characterizes collective decision-making by
the 27 EU members regarding military operations. I have often been sur-
prised by the findings derived from my scholarly revisiting cases of EU mili-
tary operations because of the layers of complexity that emerged as issues
were explored further. New information has led me to add elements and
change perspectives. This insight then leads to an additional remark, namely
that what I have unearthed in this study is only my best available knowledge
at this point. The results could, and should, be probed and questioned by
future investigation into the field.

It is my hope that the insights gained may benefit and stimulate the research
of other scholars. This has been another reason for my trying to create trans-
parency and shed light into an area of difficult access to scholars. Defence
policy is of considerable importance to society at large and to elected offi-
cials making fateful decisions on the use of force.

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The Department for Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University has,
from the first time I stepped into its premises at Östra Ågatan almost a quar-
ter of a century ago, offered an enticing combination of intellectual creativity
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My adviser Peter Wallensteen, Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace
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the fame of the Department. My assistant supervisor Bengt Sundelius, Pro-

\textsuperscript{2} ESDP was renamed CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) with the introduction of
the Lisbon Treaty. Since most of the study covers the period previous to that, it will refer to "ESDP"
fessor of Government, Uppsala University and Head of the Department of Security and Strategic Studies of the Swedish National Defence College when this journey was initiated, the Uppsala Department’s Associate Professor Mats Hammarström, Associate Professor Kristine Höglund and Associate Professor Jan Ångström all contributed comments and advice that I did my very best to accommodate. Proposals and views expressed by colleagues at the Department’s research seminar, as I presented drafts of chapters, added to the exercise.

This thesis results from a collaboration between Uppsala University, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research and the Swedish National Defence College. Professor Jan Willem Honig, and the research seminar of its Department of Security and Strategic Studies, discussed outlines for the dissertation and possibly relevant scholarly literature.

The thesis was made possible through the generosity of the Swedish Ministry of Defence that allowed me to dedicate the time necessary to fulfil this task. I am most grateful to the Ministry and its leadership for this. The Ministry is not responsible for the content of this thesis, for which I assume the personal responsibility.

For scrutinizing individual chapters for factual content, I thank Rear-admiral Stefan Engdahl, Sweden’s Military Representative to the European Union’s Military Committee 2006-2010 (chapters 3, 4, 5), Captain (N) Lennart Danielsson, Head of the EU’s Staff Group to NATO’s SHAPE 2003-2007 for Operation Concordia (2003) and Operation EUFOR Althea (2004-2007), who discussed and reviewed the Additional Cases in Chapter 5, and Colonel Jan Mörtberg, Head of the Swedish National Defence College’s Department of Security and Strategic Studies (chapters 3 and 4). The conclusions, assessments and eventual remaining errors are, of course, my own.

I wish to include another scholarly institution in this list of academic acknowledgments: Harvard University. This is where I first, again over a quarter of a century ago, received some of the academic background necessary for writing this thesis. Harvard generously allowed me to return as a research associate with the Program on Transatlantic Relations of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (WCFIA) as I searched the libraries and data bases of the university for relevant literature.

Steven Bloomfield, Executive director of WCFIA, Karl Kaiser, Director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations and Kathleen Molony, Director of the Fellows Program, all helped to make this happen. I presented an outline for the thesis at the joint seminar of the Program on Transatlantic Relations and the Future of the European Union Study Group at the Center for Euro-
pean Studies (CES) and received many valuable comments. I would like to thank Professor Jorge Domínguez, Vice Provost for International Affairs, for having supported the research idea when presented to him in 2005, and for having remained supportive throughout this endeavour. Professor Stanley Hoffmann has been an interested and most stimulating discussion partner. The research seminar at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs provided scholarly impetus, and its Director, Professor Graham Allison, Steven Miller, Director of its International Security Program and Associate Professor Monica Toft all took time to discuss possible areas of research and complementary literature.

A particular professional group at Harvard merits a special expression of gratitude: the librarians, an increasingly endangered species. The librarians of Harvard’s Widener Library gave advice and endured my complaints as I was emerging from the deepest pockets of the basement, where the sinister titles of war and intervention tend to be stored away as a result of the classification system. The professional staff of the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s Library helped me search for material on the shelves and in the data bases of obscure scholarly publications. Surely, even when an increasing number of titles now are coming on line, the qualified support of librarians will still be needed, albeit in a different context.

And so for my husband, Johan, who has shared the dour spring 2011 of the social state of emergency that has characterized the finalization of this book. The work is done, summer is upon us and life returns to normal. Thank you for your patience, Johan.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Purpose of this Study

The academic literature specifically analyzing the dynamics behind the EU’s military operations is only in the making. This contrasts to the wealth of academic studies of the dynamics of intra-state or civil war produced since the end of the Cold War, and the development in the defence sector of doctrines for the use of force often applied to precisely these sorts of conflicts. The doctrines summarize lessons learned in operations and reflect the practitioners’ grappling with a complex reality. The dialogue between academia and the practitioners of the defence sector on the relationship between the ways and means of terminating conflicts marked by civil wars and the use of force in this context, is lacking. This study aims to contribute to a better dialogue between the two.

There are, for sure, many studies of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy, ESDP, but they are primarily focused on security policy and political factors, while the “D”, as in defence, with its resource implications, is treated lightly. And while there are a number of studies of individual operations, there are few comparative studies that offer more general observations. Some academic studies situate the topic of research in relationship to the domineering schools of thought in political science. While this study is certainly influenced by concepts from political science and international relations, the purpose is not to identify with anyone particular of them, but rather to use the concepts to produce new knowledge about the dynamics behind military operations.

The state of the research reflects in part the fact that the EU’s first military operations occurred only in 2003 in the form of Operation Concordia in Macedonia and Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC. They were followed by Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH, initiated in 2004 and still ongoing, Operation EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR in Chad 2008 and Operation NAVFOR Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden since 2009 and still continuing. Some 16,500 military personnel have altogether served under the EU flag. The novelty of the EU’s military operations and their limited numbers make

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3 For a valuable overview of ESDP, see Grevi et al. 2009
4 This study shall return to the specifics of this issue under 2.2.2
5 The author’s estimate is based on Grevi et al. 2009, see Annex 3
them convenient objects of study. While the impact of policies often can be
difficult to ascertain, military operations offer the advantage of leaving a
clear imprint in the form of deployed forces, which make them amenable to
study.

There are plenty of books analyzing the process of decision-making re-
garding the use of force, but not much concerning the substance of the deci-
sion and the connection between political goals and resource allocation, the
latter often treated as “a black box”, or simply as the category of “capabili-
ties”. The combination of studies of the strategy to be had and the capabili-
ties to ascribe to the specific strategy is a common theme, but these studies
are mostly future oriented in their policy prescriptions.\footnote{This study shall return to the specifics of this issue under 2.1.1} This study aims to
investigate the interaction between “ends and means”, or between political
goals and resource allocation in military operations conducted by the EU. A
particular searchlight shall be put on resource factors.

Moreover, much of the study of the use of force departs from considera-
tions made by a state actor, typically a Western state, while decisions made
by collective actors such as the EU attract less interest. This is all the more
remarkable since the multilateralisation of intervention has become a domi-
nant feature of international security since the end of the Cold War.

And while the “actor” is the domineering subject of the scholarly re-
search, the “target” of intervention is often treated as an object with little
impact on developments. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Introduc-
ing the element of interaction between the intervener and the target of inter-
vention is another aim of this study.

To summarize, this study aims to do the following:

First, by introducing the element of interaction between factors that are
often treated as separate categories in the scholarly literature, I hope to de-
velop an integrated framework of analysis of the dynamics at play in the use
of force. Of particular interest is the relationship between the intervener and
the target of intervention and between political and resource factors. The
research into this area will be supported by concepts derived from the litera-
ture on the use of force, intervention and peace and conflict research.

Second, by focusing on the EU as a collective and regional security pro-
vider in the context of the multilateralisation of intervention, I hope to add to
the literature on the use of force by collective security providers in general.
Individual European nations are not new to the use of force, but this is the
first time that the EU member states have had to make these decisions as part
of a collective body. The literature regarding the multilateralisation of inter-
vention and the role of regional organizations in this regard will provide
scholarly concepts for this part of the study. Conceptual elements from the
literature on European security and defence policies will be used to highlight some EU specific features with an emphasis on the “D”, as in defence.

In addition, I will combine concepts from the literature with my experience as a practitioner from defence planning in elaborating an analytical tool based on the techniques of defence planning that will be applied to case studies of EU military operations. Two main case studies will be provided as the bases for identifying the main findings of this study: a non-case, the Lebanon war in 2006 and a positive case, Operation EUFOR DR Congo in 2006. They offer a convenient dichotomy and the advantage of having taken place within the same time-frame of six months. In order to cover the main variations of EU led military operations in terms of command and control arrangements, three additional cases will be advanced: Operation Concordia, Operation EUFOR Althea and Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

If proven useful, the analytical tool can be developed further by other scholars that want to study the dynamics behind the use of force by collective security providers and may in addition inform the development of the techniques of defence planning.

Thus, this study can hopefully provide building blocks for the development of a theory regarding the dynamics not only behind the EU’s decisions on the use of force, but that of collective security providers in general.

This is an area of academic interest, but also of direct relevance for policymakers looking for in-depth analysis that can enlighten their decisions on the use of force. This is the wider purpose of this study. I want to use my academic skills to develop knowledge that can help bridge the divide between political decision makers and practitioners in the defence field.

To achieve this overall aim, this study sets out to answer the following research question:

**Under what circumstances does the EU undertake military operations?**

Of particular interest for the analysis of these circumstances, is the study of the interaction between the intervener and the target of intervention and between political and resource factors. In order to provide a general context for the interplay of these factors, they will be situated in the wider framework of the analysis of the multilateralisation of intervention.

In order to answer this research question, central concepts from the literature will be used. The empirical material in the form of cases of EU military operations will be analyzed with the help of the analytical tool. As was mentioned above, two main cases have been selected and will be carefully ana-
The findings gained from the cases will be presented and discussed. Conclusions will be drawn and the research question will be answered. After that will follow a discussion about the possible implications for the EU’s military operations, and thoughts about the implications for future research.

1.2 Overview of the study

In Chapter 2, Previous Research, the academic literature on the Use of Force and Collective Security will be reviewed against the background of concepts of importance for the topic of this study. The first Section 2.1 on the functional theme, the use of force, consists of two segments, reflecting the two pairs of factors that are central to this study: the relationship between ends and means and between the intervener and the target of intervention. The second Section 2.2 regarding organizational themes will reflect on the multilateralisation of intervention and the EU’s use of collective force in this context. Political as well as resource factors will be covered in both sections.

In Chapter 3, Bridging the Divide, the value as well as the limits to the scholarly concepts for the analysis of the EU’s military operations will be ascertained in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, this study proposes to establish a bridge over to the study of the EU’s military operations through the use of the techniques of defence planning. This section prepares the ground for the next Chapter 4.

In Chapter 4, the Research Design will be presented. In Section 4.1 an analytical tool for the analysis of the cases will be elaborated. It is based on the techniques of defence planning and has been illuminated by concepts from the scholarly literature. Together, these elements will constitute an analytical tool for selecting indicators from the cases of EU military operations. The basis for the selection of cases of EU military operations will be explained in Section 4.2 and a discussion will follow in 4.3 on the use of sources for the purpose of this study.

In Chapter 5, the cases of EU military operations will follow, first, in the form of the two main cases: the non-case of the Lebanon war 2006, Section 5.1, and EUFOR RD Congo that same year in Section 5.2. Second, the additional cases Operation Concordia, Operation EUFOR Althea and Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta will be presented in Section 5.3. A narrative will be given for each of them. The analytical tool will then be applied to the narrative in order to select the main factors from the cases.

In Chapter 6, a comparative analysis based on all the cases will follow in Section 6.1. The observations and findings regarding the functional and or-
ganizational themes will be presented in Segments 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, respectively.

In the concluding Chapter 7, the research question will be answered in Section 7.1 and conclusions will be drawn in Section 7.2. The implications for the EU’s military operations will be discussed in Section 7.3 and some proposals for future research advanced in the final Section 7.4.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Introduction

The complexity of the research object at hand has been emphasized in this introduction, as has been the apparent lack of scholarly literature that can provide guidance in the study of the EU’s military operations. The analysis requires both a comprehensive way of thinking about the problem and a method for analyzing the empirical material. The two should mirror each other in terms of methodology, albeit applied for different purposes.

The object of study situates itself at the nexus of conflict development and decisions made by a collective actor, the EU, regarding the use of force in addressing these conflicts. Conflict dynamics and the collective decision-making by the EU are both complex phenomena, in and of themselves. Combining them makes the exercise even more demanding. Since causal inferences are difficult to determine in general in the analysis of conflict dynamics, systemic theory that offers one overriding explanation is not expected to provide much of a guidance (Levy in Crocker et al. 2001).

A scholarly method of analysis should thus possess a flexibility that can help capture multiple causal inferences, while, at the end of the exercise, also enable us to draw conclusions of explanatory value. A classical level-of-analysis approach (Waltz 1959) provides a good starting point, but it is desirable to move beyond a stale comparison between the relative importance of the respective levels, and instead combine causal variables from different analytical levels. The main task is to understand how variables at different levels of analysis interact and to identify the contextual conditions that affect those interactions and draw conclusions on the relative weights of different factors. (Levy in Crocker et al. 2001)

This is not a topic that yields itself easily to the definition of dependent and independent variables. And while it is possible that future research will be able to determine just that, this study aims to disaggregate the dynamics behind the EU’s military operations, and then put the pieces together with the aim to answer the research question and to provide building-blocks for a theory regarding the EU’s collective use of force.

This Chapter then searches for building blocks to an analytical framework that can be used to explain the forces that drive or inhibit the EU’s use of military force in particular situations. There is no one single body of schol-
early work that is directly applicable to this study. It will therefore combine concepts from various currents of thought and academic work that can be expected to shed light on the dynamics behind the EU’s military operations. This interplay between the intervener and the target of intervention and between political and resource factors in the context of multilateral organizations is of particular interest. While the academic literature cannot be expected to provide in-depth analysis of specific military resource factors, some of the political and societal factors are treated in ways that are beneficial to this study. Studies concerning the role of the target of intervention and the relationship between the target and the intervener are in short supply and the existing ones should be properly reflected. The assumption made is that the EU is subject to the same influences that affect the ability also of other actors to use the military instrument in the management of conflicts. The literature concerning the multilateralisation of intervention is likely to contain concepts of interest to the study of the EU’s military operations.

This search then goes in two different directions of the existing scholarly literature: first, the literature that deals with the functional and general themes of the use of force which obviously includes the relationship between the intervener and the target, and between political and resources factors, second, the literature that covers organizational and substantial themes where the resource issues also are found. It is important to note that the distinction between the functional and the organizational themes does not represent separate entities of the object of study, the EU’s military operations, but rather serves as two different entrances into the investigation of the same object.

Thus the Chapter is organized as follows:

**Functional Themes: Use of Force**
- Ends and Means
- The Intervener and The Target of Intervention

**Organizational Themes: Collective Security**
- The Multilateralisation of Intervention
- The EU’s Collective Use of Force.

The various layers of literature will take us from the general functional theme, the use of force in the management of conflicts, to the role of the EU as a collective and regional security provider of military force in the context of the international system, or society (Bull 1984).
2.1 Functional Themes: The Use of Force

The literature regarding the first functional theme, The Use of Force, represents a rather distinct body of scholarly work, albeit comprised of and overlapping with different currents. There is, for example, the vast literature pertaining to the field of strategic studies that has certainly influenced this study. The titles of direct relevance are accounted for in this chapter, while some others that provide a useful and general background, for example Schelling’s seminal *Arms and Influence*, 1960 and Lidell Hart’s *Strategy*, 1967, are listed in References.

The nature of the topic of this study is such that many doors could be opened into related areas of research. Most of these doors will, however, have to remain closed in the interest of keeping the focus on the study of the dynamics behind the EU’s collective decisions to deploy military forces. The literature on “intervention” is of particular interest in this regard. This is another large body of scholarly writings, but for this study a few themes will be chosen that are of particular importance, namely the ones that can illuminate the interaction between political ends and means in the form of resources, and between the intervener and the target of intervention in the context of multilateral intervention.

It is important to note that the concept of “intervention” has undergone change over time. Martha Finnemore (2003) describes intervention as a post Napoleonic War phenomenon. Major states then began to regard outright conquest as a costly means of dealing with perceived threats in the domestic politics of other states (p. 121).

Definitions of intervention in the aftermath of the Second World War were confined to the deployment of military personnel across recognized boundaries for the purpose of determining the political authority in the target state (p.10), as separate from war.

Tillema (1989, p.187) defines intervention in the Cold War context as “direct combatant and combat-preparatory military operations conducted upon foreign territory by units of a state’s regular military forces”.

Finnemore describes the changing definition of the concept of “intervention” post Cold War as including the violation of territorial borders, massive humanitarian disaster, and massive terrorist attacks. She notes that the coupling of security with human rights has implications for international behaviour: “What used to be simple atrocities are now understood as threats to international peace and security... intervention is thus becoming difficult to separate from nation building” (p.129). Her analysis enlarges the traditional understanding of “intervention” to a concept that nowadays is almost synonymous with military operations. This is also the way the notion of “intervention” will be used in this study.
2.1.1 Relating Ends with Means

Central to the literature on the use of force and strategic studies is the discussion on the relationship between political goals, ends, and the use of military instrument, means, to achieve those goals. This study will probe the academic concepts on the relationship between ends and means in its discussion on the relationship between political goals and the application of military resources in the context of the EU’s military operations.

Most of the literature dealing with ends and means for intervention departs from the concept and legality of jus bellum, or criterion for the use of force elaborated by St Augustine (Augustine 1972, 427). His principles for just wars were later developed by Grotius (Grotius 1925, 1625) and Thomas Aquinas. They include: the right authority to initiate war, the right intention, the use of force as a last resort, that war should commence with an open declaration, that force should be applied in a proportionate manner and has the feasibility of succeeding.

The application of these principles often assume an international system characterized by a Westphalian construct of sovereign states. This is a school of thought that lends itself nicely to seemingly clear cut definitions of causal linkages behind the use of force and the identification of dependent and independent variables for scholarly purpose. It favours analyses of a tight relationship between ends and means, or between political goals and the application of military means in the Clausewitzian (1976, 1842) sense.

The period after the Cold War has given birth to a torrent of literature on the concept of and criteria for “humanitarian intervention”, reflecting the absorption of the traumas of the Somalia and Balkan wars, the genocide in Rwanda and the series of wars in DRC. This literature continues to be cast largely in the jus bellum/Westphalian tradition, but it does also grapple with new concepts such as the blurring of the distinction between external and internal security and the existence of failed states. Both are phenomena that tend to undermine the concept of “sovereignty” that has been central to the jus bellum tradition.

The limits to cost/benefit analysis

Inherent to much of the theories on intervention, regardless of whether they reflect US concepts guided by realist considerations during the Cold War, or the literature on humanitarian intervention, is the assumption that the key variable to the likelihood or desirability of intervention is the value of interests relative to costs. Since this study is interested in disaggregating driving and inhibiting factors behind military operations and study their complex interplay, this is a form of analysis that can be expected to yield interesting

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7 For a background on the tradition of Just Wars, or Jus Bellum, see Dan Smith in Wallensteen, ed. 1998
ideas. Which is the constellation of factors, such as interests relative to costs, that is likely to drive or inhibit military operations?

Haass (1999) refers to the US failures in Beirut 1983 and Somalia 1993 in drawing the conclusion that “the United States can stay involved either if costs are low or if interests are high. What cannot be sustained are high-cost, low-interest engagements”. This perception of the existence of a tight relationship between costs and benefits informs the traditional doctrines for decision-making regarding military intervention.

These doctrines consist of a checklist of criteria, based on the *jus铃ium* tradition and Clausewitz’s principles. A succession of US doctrines influenced by the outcome of the Vietnam war typically runs through the checklist of interests at stake in a conflict and relate them to the preferred choice of diplomatic or/and military tools. One example is the “Powell doctrine” which, on the one hand, imposed clear constraints on the use of force and, on the other hand, recommended that “overwhelming force” be used in case the decision was made to use the military tool. The experiences from the Balkan wars eventually led to the relaxation of the constraints on the use of force in the form of the “Albright doctrine”, characterized by the increasing reliance on air power, a reflection of US experiences in Somalia and the wish to minimize casualties.

The importance of trying to maintain a semblance of order in the discussion on the use of force was reflected in “the Blair doctrine” presented by the UK prime minister in his 1999 speech in Chicago (Freedman 2008, 2006). Blair ran through a checklist of criteria for intervention: a sure cause, the exhaustion of all diplomatic options, the feasibility of sensible and prudent military operations, preparedness for a long-term commitment and the involvement of some national interest. Freedman notes that the “Blair doctrine” was more permissive than the Weinberger and Powell doctrines.

Some of the same basic tenets of reasoning of classical intervention theory can be discerned in the literature on humanitarian intervention. Although undertaken for very different reasons, they both depart from the *jus bellum* tradition. Seybolt (2007) makes a normative argument in stating that humanitarian military intervention must have a reasonable prospect of success, measured in the numbers of saved lives, for it to be morally justifiable. Establishing criteria for measuring the number of saved lives is indeed the main purpose of Seybolt’s book, which leads him to conclude, among other things, that the Kosovo intervention was not justified.

Essential for the intervention to be successful, according to the definition by Seybolt, is the mustering of the necessary political will informed by interest, since “The difficulty and danger of trying to defeat perpetrators means that the intervener must have political motives in addition to humani-

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8 For example, the Weinberger Doctrine, the Powell Doctrine, the Albright Doctrine
9 For Blair’s own account of these events, see Blair’s memoirs, 2010, *A Journey*
tarian ones” (p. 246). He defines interests in this context as being both humanitarian and political. Seybolt decries what he calls the troublesome tendency of actors to intervene in areas of perceived interests, but states that the element of interest is necessary to improve the likelihood of success, which for him is a normative criterion for humanitarian intervention.

Another precondition for success, according to Seybolt, is that the intervener’s military means must be proportional to the need to protect civilians. In other words, the intervener must be disproportionately strong compared to the local actors. Seybolt musters, in short, some of the realist arguments of the relationship between strong interests and military strength in favour of his morally based criterion for humanitarian intervention – the likelihood of success as measured in lives saved.

We have, in the above, noted some perennial features to the reasoning of whether to intervene or not, even if the objects of study and purposes for intervening have undergone profound changes over time. It would be difficult to argue with this neat cost-benefit analysis plotted in imagined matrices of high/low interests related to costs. It is, obviously, unwise to undertake interventions or military operations in areas of low interest where you can be forced to pay high costs, typically defined as “treasury and lives”. The problem is that, although these are generalisations that help organize the reasoning around the use of force, they often fail to capture the complexity of the post-Cold War environment in which multilateral organizations such as the EU may consider to use the military instrument.

The elasticity of the category of “interests”

The concept of “interest” merits a particular segment. The elasticity of the concept of “interests” has been highlighted by several authors, one of the most prominent of them being Alexander George (in Holsti et al. 1980, p. 234):

“…national interests has become so elastic and ambiguous that its role as a guide to foreign policy is highly problematic and controversial...(it)...lends itself more readily to being used by our leaders as political rhetoric for justifying their decisions and gaining support rather than as an exact, well-defined criterion that enables them to determine what actions and decisions to take.”

In revisiting twelve cases of US interventions, Haass (1999) concludes that only one of them, the Gulf War/First Iraq war, would qualify as being of “vital interest” to the US, with the rest being only of “important” or “minor” interest. And even when “vital interests” were perceived to be at stake, as was the case with the First Gulf War, there was a need to “build the case” for an intervention within the American Administration itself. To Haass, this raises the important issue of considering other, non-military instruments for dealing with conflicts such as Kosovo and Somalia.
Haass makes several observations of importance for this study. First, there is the paradox that even an unrestrained US in the post Cold War period found it increasingly difficult to build political consensus around the need to use force, second, that there are more interests to protect than resources to protect them with and, third, that the need to choose remains critical. Haass’s observations with regard to US predicaments could possibly be applied to the EU and other actors contemplating the use of force in the post Cold War world. This is a topic that will be discussed further in Section 2.2.

Finnemore (2003) situates herself in a social constructivist school of thought, borrowing from sociology and behaviourism in analyzing the changing norms of intervention. Finnemore questions what she calls the hypothesis in much security scholarship, derived from realism and macro economics, that state interests can be treated as constants over time. Instead, she argues, intervention is constituted socially, and understanding the practice of how this happens is essential to understanding much of the behaviour in world politics. New beliefs about social purpose reconstitute the meaning and rules of military interventions, and ultimately change intervention behaviour (pp. 14-15).

From her case studies of the evolution of “the basic features of intervention’s normative terrain” over time, she extracts three main themes: the malleability of strong state interests, the normative devaluation of force over time, and the growing importance of rational-legal authority in governing the use of force.

What is striking, and of interest to our study, is the similarity between Finnemore’s observation of the need to establish a “strategic social construct” and Haass’s analysis of the necessity to “build a case” for intervention. Interests seem to be increasingly hard to define, the utility of the use of force more difficult to ascertain, and hence the need to extract some certainty from a complex situation through its interpretation becomes central to the whole endeavour. Shedding some light over this process of “social construct”, or ways of “building the case” for the use of force is important to the subject of this research. The issue will reappear throughout the various sections of this study.

Based on findings from the literature, it can also be noted that the relationship between ends and means in interventions, here understood in the broad sense, has undergone change. The previous assumption that the relationship was a tight one has given way to a discussion on the disintegration of that relationship. This is a topic of direct relevance to this study.

2.1.2 The Intervener and the Target of Intervention

The analysis of the interaction between the intervener and the target of intervention, was pointed out in the Introduction to this study as central to research regarding the EU’s military operations. Many of the situations of
intervention described in the literature differ from the modest military operations carried out by the EU. In the search of concepts of relevance for this study, this segment will cast the net more widely to include peace and conflict research and the discussion on the utility of force.

The decreasing utility of force

While a large portion of the literature is concerned with the strategy and principles of legality employed by the “agent” considering intervention, the role of “the target” attracts less interest. So does the study of the interplay between the nature of conflicts and the utility of force, which is at the heart of the topic of this study.

One exception is van Creveld (1991) who delivers a blasting critique against, what he calls, the domineering schools of thoughts based on the Clausewitzian principles. van Creveld states that out of the 160 armed conflicts since 1946, three-fourths have been “Low Intensity Conflicts”, resulting in 20 million dead. van Creveld argues that many of these conflicts have not been fought by states for well defined “interests”. Instead, they have been instigated by non-state actors for a mixture of secular “interests”, but also “abstract ideals such as law, justice, and the greater Glory of God, all served in various combinations with each others.” (p.142)

Only a handful of books has tried to offer a comprehensive analysis of the utility of force in “non-industrial wars”, to use van Creveld’s expression. This is a broad category that covers military operations, ranging from the unilateral US intervention in Iraq to humanitarian intervention. The complex interplay between political and military factors in “non-industrial wars” is a salient theme of considerable relevance for this study. Levite et al. (1992, p. 6) note:

“All wars are not politics by the same “other means”. Classical wars tend to be fought with strategies that are primarily military and secondarily political. The armed forces of the attacking state seek to defeat the armed forces of the target...In foreign military interventions the relative balance is reversed, becoming what can be analytically characterized as a political-military strategy: the goals pursued are much less readily translatable into operational military objectives, while prevailing militarily is less of a sufficient basis for achieving these objectives. The intervener thus must seek not only to defeat the adversary in the battle field, but also to build political support for his local ally. Moreover, although conventional military capabilities have some utility, the fighting goes more to the unconventional, particular counterinsurgency guerrilla warfare and anti-terrorism”.

Lawrence Freedman (2008, p.7, 2006) points to similarities between the realities facing military forces deployed in “wars on terror” and in “humanitarian interventions”:
“Describing and quantifying the risks has become harder, complicating the calculus of costs and benefits that policy-makers face when embarking on any military operation. Even when military action is chosen, operations undertaken in politically complex settings can be full of surprises and lead to new missions and new rationales.”

It has, consequently, become hard to present the deployment of military force as part of a single coherent campaign, into which a variety of types of activity might be integrated. Rupert Smith (2005, p. 371), with ample experience from the Balkan wars, describes the current condition as a world of confrontations and conflicts rather than peace and war. Military operations, often undertaken at the tactical level, cannot be expected to solve the problem, nor should military campaigns be carried out with disregard for the political context. Smith emphasizes the need for politicians and the military to adjust context and plan throughout the operations as the situation evolves (p. 372).

Various attempts have been made by nations as well as multilateral organizations to determine at the doctrinal level the utility of force in “non-industrial wars” and to readjust the linkage between ends and means. 10 Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, recalibrated, 11 for example, in 2010 whatever was left of the “Powell doctrine” by saying that “overwhelming force can be counterproductive if used recklessly...in meeting contemporary threats”. Instead it should be used “in the proper capacity, and in a precise and principled manner”. Mike Mullen complained that “US foreign policy is still too dominated by the military” and suggested that military force be used in the era of counterinsurgency “only if and when the other instruments of national power are ready to engage, as well”.

The decreasing utility of force and military deployment in asymmetric conflicts was, according to Toft (2010, p. 222), reflected already in the UK inspired UN Peace Support Operation, PSO doctrine of the mid 90’s. Toft notes that two-thirds of the 134 civil wars that have occurred between 1945 and 2000 have ended by the victory of one side over the other. Another assessment (Kreutz 2010, p. 246), covering the period 1990-2005, concludes, however, that only 13,6 per cent of intra-state wars end in victory.

10 The US has made specific efforts to elaborate policies that try to link ends and means in the management of asymmetric conflict. US thinking has been enshrined in the US Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, 2010 National Security Strategy and The U.S. Army/Marine corps counterinsurgency manual (Petraeus and Amos, eds. 2007). The latter is the most unusual product of cooperation between the US military and academia in the form of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Carr Center for Human Rights, and is currently being implemented in Afghanistan.

It has proven difficult to elaborate cohesive policies and strategies for situations characterized, in Toft’s words (Introduction in Toft and Imlay, eds. 2006), by the diffusion of threats, the need to cooperate with others, while enjoying less domestic support.

Seen from a slightly different perspective, Regan (2000, p. 138) notes that outside intervention, covering cases of both political and military interventions, in conflicts (89 out of 138 since 1945) has only a 30 per cent chance of “succeeding”, if “success” is defined as bringing about a six month (or longer) respite from fighting”. Furthermore, conflicts with outside intervention lasted considerably longer than those without. Regan is not sure, however, whether this is because the interventions prolonged the conflicts or whether interventions are attracted to those conflicts that have been long running.

Explaining the intractable nature of some civil wars and offering consequential solutions is, naturally, a difficult thing to do. It is, in this context, useful to draw on peace and conflict research. Few new conflicts have occurred since 2004, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Pettersson et al. 2009, Harbom 2006), but the remaining 32 are deeply entrenched:

“International efforts at conflict resolution now encounter protracted conflicts that are more difficult to resolve as they have been entrenched in the social fabric an the parties have learned to block peace efforts…in such conflicts the warring parties are more likely to pursue maximalist goals and to show little interest in negotiations.” (Harbom 2006)

The conclusion that can be drawn from this observation, is that the international community appears to be able to prevent armed conflicts from escalating to wars, but unable to end the number of conflicts. Instead, it is confronted with deepening regional conflict complexes, for example in central Africa and Africa’s Horn (Harbom 2006). This is an observation of interest since some of these same conflicts will feature in Chapter 5.

The growing importance of “the target” of intervention
Arreguin-Toft (2005, p. 3) has studied the role of “the target” in conflicts during the second half of the 20th century, when the number of asymmetric conflicts won by strong actors started to fall off significantly, as compared to previous periods, to about half of the asymmetric conflicts. Arreguin-Toft borrows from Waltz’s (1979, p. 127) theory of state socialization and presents his thesis that “strategic interaction” accounts for the outcome. As global interaction in general intensifies, “the weak” have learned from “the strong” how to apply “opposite-approach” strategies.

Without trying to exhaust this topic, there are, of course, additional explanations to the “empowering” of local actors, such as the decreased cost of
technology and the general diffusion of power throughout the international system.

The growing importance of “the target” influences the relationship between “the actor” and “the target” of intervention. Whether a particular actor is a suitable agent of intervention varies substantially, according to Heinze (2009), with changes in the international distribution of power, prevailing political circumstances or other agent-specific factors. While principles for humanitarian intervention concern references to international law, the suitability of agents entails, what he calls, a heavy dose of pragmatism (p. 111).

The “non-material characteristics” of “the target” relative to “the intervener” was crucially important in the case of Darfur, according to Heinze (2009). His study of the “prevailing political context” at the time leads him to conclude that there were fundamental obstacles after the Iraq war to a Western intervention in Darfur, or more generally, in Muslim or Arab states. African or Middle Eastern actors seem better suited for this kind of task, in the view of Heinze.

Military “prowess” is, of course, of relevance for the suitability of agent, but there are other “non-material” factors as well at play. Heinze cites “moral standing and overall trustworthiness of the interveners” as examples:

“The relationship between multilateralism and the humanitarian credentials of the agents...can affect its overall legitimacy...an agent with strong humanitarian credentials would, theoretically, not require multilateral legitimation to the same extent as one with weaker humanitarian credentials in order to muster the requisite legitimacy to mount an effective humanitarian intervention” (p. 12).

Heinze cites the example of Nigeria whose successive and at times questionable interventions in West Africa gained legitimacy when they were folded into the Economic Community Of West African States, ECOWAS, and legitimized retroactively by the UN. Doubts about the intentions of a specific agent can, it seems, be allayed by its adherence to a regional or sub-regional organization.

Finnemore (2003) notes that military interventions since the end of the Cold War have been shaped in fundamental ways by the large and growing number of international organizations such as UN, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, OSCE, involved in them.

The increasing doubts about the utility of force in today’s conflicts and the changing relationship between the actor and target of intervention, are concepts that will be of use for this study. The legitimizing importance of UN-mandated use of force, and under special circumstances that of regional organizations, is an issue this study shall return to in the next Section 2.2.
Methods of study

In the search for literature that can help establish the framework for the analysis of the interplay of factors behind military operations, the work of Levite et al. (1992) represents a valuable contribution. The choice of methodology may explain their ability to provide an in-depth analysis. Levite et al. quote Roseneau (1969) in saying that most scholarly work on intervention is focused on getting in.

Thorough analyses of decision-making regarding the use of force (Haass 1999, 2010, Levite et al. 1986, Allison 1971) reveal that it would be more appropriate to talk about a series of decisions, or sometimes non-decisions, interacting with the development of the conflict. There are several explanations to this fractured sort of decision-making, one being the sheer complexity of conflict developments and the subsequent difficulty of sustaining a coherent process of decision-making regarding reactions to these. Human behaviour accounts for an other important input into this cocktail of factors. The elements of randomness and dysfunctionality also play a role.

Levite et al. follow Roseneau’s advice with regard to the method of study and divide the flow of developments into the different phases of 1) getting in, 2) staying in and 3) getting out. They describe this as a method of protractedness that provides the multidimensionality necessary for a comprehensive approach that allows Levite et al. to draw general conclusions, based on six case studies, regarding driving factors behind intervention.

Levite et al. (p. 320) carried out these six case studies12 according to the proposed method and discerned four factors that are conducive, or drive, military intervention:

“- First, opportunities to intervene are created by internal political instability...the number of states low in relative internal viability is all too obvious...broader historical forces have...(since the end of the cold war)...given rise to explosive “politics of identity” in many parts of the world that are not only threatening the domestic stability of numerous existing governing regimes, but also calling into question the very legitimacy of the structure and identity of many nation-states,
- second, as long as there are the opportunities to intervene, states will have an incentive to do so,
- third, the capabilities part of the mix is that more and more states possess greater and greater military power and thus are...capable of projecting sufficient military power to undertake military interventions,
- forth, international control remains well short of strict prohibitions...UN and regional organisations have been seeking to develop stronger norms against unilateral military interventions and more effective mechanisms for

12 The United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Syria in Lebanon, Israel in Lebanon. India in Sri Lanka, and Cuba and South Africa in Angola
Although Levite et al. made the observations already in the beginning of the 90’s, they resonate well with the realities of the mid 00’s, the period of interest to this study. They should be kept in mind as this study proceeds to the analysis of the driving and inhibiting factors behind the cases of EU military operations in Chapter 5.

This study is not interested in the process of decision-making *per se*, but it will apply the method of *protractedness* introduced by Levite et al. as a way of capturing important qualitative changes in the dynamics behind the EU’s military operations. It will do so based on the assumption that some of the more interesting causal inferences can be expected to result in changes to decisions.

### 2.2 Organizational Themes: Collective Security

One of the purposes of this study is to situate the EU’s military operations in the framework of the multilateralisation of intervention. In doing so, this study seeks to inform research on the EU’s military operations with concepts and insights derived from scholarly work on collective security. Conversely, its aim is to enrich the wider debate through the research focus on the EU. In the following section, the search for concepts that can enlighten the study of the interaction between intervener and the local actors, as well as between political and resource factors,\(^{13}\) will be kept in mind as this study enters the wider world of collective security.

#### 2.2.1 The Multilateralisation of Intervention

The collectivization of intervention through its multilateralisation was, during the Cold War period, perceived as a distant and desirable goal to be pursued as an orderly alternative to an anarchic world order. Or in Hedley Bull’s (1984) words:

> “Intervening states will almost invariably seek some form of collective authorization, or at least de facto endorsement, of their policies. It is by no means clear that the trend which, considering this century as a whole, might be said to be discernible towards the collectivization of intervention, is bound

\(^{13}\)The most relevant resource factors in this context are: expeditionary forces available for multilateral intervention, command and control structures and financial resources
to continue to grow in force. What is clear is that the prospects for interna-
tional order will be brighter if it does so.”

Stanley Hoffmann notes (in Miller and Vincent 1999) that Bull was inter-
ested in the cultural change which produces a different perception of com-
mon interests in a context of coexistence and co-operation that would mark
the passage from “a mere system to society or from narrower society to one
that includes many more members”.

Evan Luard argues (in Bull 1984, p. 157) that the collectivization of in-
tervention should not be called intervention at all, but the pacification of
civil conflict, a situation not foreseen by the UN Charter:

“Collective intervention...is by definition intervention that has
been authorized by some international body having widespread legiti-
macy...Intervention by such an organization, duly authorized, is widely seen
as proper, even desirable. This does not mean that a specific case of military
intervention may not be disapproved...Collective intervention is undertaken
for collective purposes. Typically these might include such aims as stabiliza-
tion, the restoration of peace, the maintenance of the status quo, the exclusion
of great power rivalries. These collective purposes do not normally include
bringing about the change in the political balance in a particular state, which
is perhaps the prime purpose of unilateral intervention...Because collective
intervention differs so radically from unilateral intervention, it could indeed
be argued that the action that is undertaken by international bodies should not
be classified under the term “intervention” at all...Collective intervention has
been called for in a number of cases to pacify a civil conflict. This is...a form
of intervention which was probably scarcely anticipated at the time when the
Charter was framed: and seemed to be prohibited by the terms of Article 2
(7).”

Departing from the discussion on the definitions of collective intervention,
this study shall now situate this topic in its time-specific context of the de-
velopments after the Cold War.

**The beginning and the end (?) of the “universalist moment”**

We learned from the previous section that the multilateralisation of inter-
tervention had become essential to legitimize the use of force since the end of
Cold War. The historical changes ushered in a “universalist moment”
(Wallensteen 2007) characterized by a stronger emphasis on peaceful settle-
ments, as opposed to defeat and attempts to impede conflicts from escalat-
ing.

It is important to note that it was the changed political circumstances and
greater availability of means that constituted part of the basis for the “uni-
versalist moment” and not any growing number of conflicts. The dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, led to a
temporary spike in the incidence of civil war, but the numbers of civil wars
have declined since the mid 1990s (Harbom 2006, Harbom and Sundberg 2008). They have, however, remained the dominant feature of global conflict. The total number of armed conflicts since 1989 is 130 and 36 were active in 2009. All of them were internal conflicts and four of them related to US efforts at reducing terrorist threats. (Petterson et al. 2009)

The UN Security Council became unblocked after the Cold War, and UN led peacekeeping, comprising primarily forces from the developing world, underwent a rapid growth. The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union diminished the importance of territorial defence throughout Europe. Military resources released from Cold War positions were cut back, but some became available for military conflict resolution (Watkins 2007). The combination of a UK maritime stand-by force and the UN peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone in 2000 provided a successful example of how force could be used to stop the escalation of civil conflict. The experience was reflected in the Brahimi Report’s call for the creation of rapid deployment forces that could support the UN’s traditional peacekeeping operations. Overall, there was a five-fold increase in the number of UN interventions, conducted by the organization itself, or in the form of UN-mandated interventions carried out by regional organizations, individual states or coalitions of the willing.

These were expansive times in terms of collective intervention. The US/NATO led intervention in Kosovo 1999 crystallized the practice and the British intervention in Sierra Leone 2000 confirmed its existence, according to Ortega (2001). In Kosovo, NATO member states had launched Operation Allied Force without a mandate from the Security Council, SC, but the intervention was later implicitly recognized by UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999, and the SC imposed upon the FRY, a demand for withdrawal of forces from Kosovo and established an international security presence. In Sierra Leone, rebel forces had resumed violence after ECOMOG’s withdrawal. UK intervened to evacuate citizens, secure the use of Freetown airport, give technical advice to UNAMSIL and stabilize the situation. SCR 1299 endorsed the efforts to support UNAMSIL.

The explanation of the collectivization of intervention covers various factors. One is the phenomenon of transnational challenges and threats. The distinction between civil conflict and international conflict has been eroded as a consequence of globalisation. The great powers were initially slow to recognize the strategic implications of civil wars. (Guéhenno in Crocker et al. 2001).

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However, the spill-over effects in the form of ethnically cleansed refugees from the Balkan wars eventually brought home the insight in European capitals that civil war did affect central interests such as the flow of migrants. The 9/11 attack on the US homeland from groups using the territory of a failed state embroiled in civil wars resulted in a decade long US led “war on terror”. A torrent of strategy documents produced at the beginning of the 00’s reflected the lessons perceived and learned in this regard.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1999, the US President Clinton gave a speech in which he outlined the dangers of letting conflicts fester and spread. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the UK Prime Minister Blair that same year developed in his Chicago speech the ”doctrine of international community”. In 2000, Kofi Annan’s Millennium Report expressed support for the idea of humanitarian intervention,\textsuperscript{16} codified 2005 by the UN.

The developments seemed to indicate the emergence of ”collective interests” as enshrined by the UN, complementing traditional national interests. A subtle and gradual convergence between the national interests of Western states and global interests were, in the view of Ortega (2001), evident during the 1990s. The most reliable way to define global interests was to link them to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. In the absence of a global government, the global interests would have to be defined on a case-by-case basis as a result of multilateral negotiations and implemented in a decentralized fashion.

That this represents a demanding exercise is reflected in the Brahimi Report:

\begin{quote}
“Willingness of Member States to contribute troops to a credible operation of this sort also implies a willingness to accept the risks of casualties on behalf of the mandate. Reluctance to accept that risk has grown since the difficult missions of the mid-1990s, partly because Member States are not clear about how to define their national interests in taking such risks, and partly because they may be unclear about the risks themselves.”(II.E.52)
\end{quote}

Regan (2000) remarks that given the potential impact of intervention policies on regional or global stability, we have very little systemic understanding of their effect, and even less about the conditions under which they are undertaken. The multilateralisation of intervention became a convenient tool by agents seeking the legitimisation of interventions in traditional spheres of influence. It was a means of sharing burdens and responsibilities in conflicts, after the unilateral intervention’s first phase, or because civil

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{15} For examples, see References: Official documents
\textsuperscript{16} The concept was developed in The Responsibility To Protect Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa ON, Canada. International Development Research Center. December 2001
\end{flushright}
wars were deemed to be of less than vital interests, possibly of long duration and involving a broad range of actors and diverse sets of skills (Regan 2000, p. 135).

The literature thus presents a number of plausible, complementary and sometimes contradictory examples of possible drivers behind the multilateralisation of intervention after the end of the Cold War.

**Changing perceptions**

It would be wrong to assume that the multilateralisation of intervention has been the product of harmonious and logical developments. The term “the universalist moment” does in reality cover developments of contradictory nature during the 90’s and 00’s. The changing perceptions will be accounted for in the following since they are important for the analysis of the multilateralisation of intervention. A few remarks considering the constraints on military forces will follow thereafter.

The consequences of the debacle in Somalia for the inaction of the international community in view of the genocide in Rwanda is a central topic in the academic literature. Lucas (2001, p. 35) holds that lessons learned from Somalia certainly impinged on the non-intervention by the international community in the Rwandan genocide:

“...when the international community looked at Rwanda, everyone agreed that this was a terrible disaster, and yet the absence of procedures for assigning responsibility and appointing risk meant that each national player had to assess its own interests (or lack thereof) and decide unilaterally whether to cooperate with the United Nations in providing military assistance, or simply ignore the problem”.

Seybolt (2007) makes a similar observation:

“The UN military force was severely undercut by M(Member) S(States) that did not want to face the costs and risks which aggressive action would have required...Troop-contributing countries are more likely to pull out of a UN operation than a non-UN coalition because they can blame the UN and do not have to take responsibility for failure ”.

The responsibility of individual member states is another contested issue. Rudiger Wolfrum assesses (in Keren and Sylivan 2002) the fall-out of the unsuccessful Somali experience for the UN. It prompted the US to reduce its commitment to engage with military forces in other states unless it is in full control of the operation. Instead there followed an increasing reliance on air power, as could be noted in the ensuing Kosovo and Afghan campaigns. For the UN this meant that after a few post Cold War years of positive experiences, the willingness of the Security Council to intervene was restrained and outbreaks of ethnically motivated violence and civil war was dealt with
largely on an ad hoc basis (p. 97). This resulted in a lack of coherence and – since many of the interventions can hardly be regarded as successes – further fuelled the reluctance of states to authorize and to participate in UN actions.

Leonie G. Murray (2008) refutes the idea that the new and more restrictive criteria for the use of force set out in the US policy document PDD25 was entirely to blame for the failure of the international community in Rwanda. He spreads the blame and responsibility more widely:

“France, and to a lesser extent Egypt, supported the ethnically biased and corrupt Habyarimana government…Belgium had good intelligence regarding the likelihood of genocide and did not act to prevent it…the Belgian government conducted a shameful campaign aimed at the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR simply in order to cover its own ignominious retreat…the UK was reluctant…bogged down in the Balkans…the UN Secretariat (took) a cautious and misleading approach to Rwanda both in the formulation and deployment of UNAMIR, and in relation to the genocide itself…(out of)…dread of US reaction…Much of what the accepted wisdom has to say about the circumstances surrounding the Clinton Administration’s abandonment of peacekeeping policy, and the consequent liability of the administration for the failure of the International Community to act to check the Rwandan genocide appears to be wrong”.

While the failure of many can be pointed out, callous cynicism does not explain fully the complicated relationship between the UN, member states and regional organizations. Shallow knowledge and lack of experience also play a role. Berdal (1994) deplores that in the important relationship between the UN and the US, periods of misguided idealism have been followed by unwarranted gloom. A more nuanced understanding of the various roles that the UN can perform with US help is required to bridge the gap between idealism and cynicism.

What transcends from these examples from the literature is the sheer complexity that characterizes experiences gained from multilateral interventions during the last two decades. There is, for sure, the sharp learning curve of elaborating policies and ascribing appropriate means for intervening in civil wars, but also the apparent lack of mechanisms for regulating the multilateral management of these conflicts. Part of the dysfunctionality seems to be unintentional and part intentional, as a way of simply preserving a convenient flexibility. The complicity of many different actors defies simplistic explanations of the state of affairs. The recognition that multilateral interventions are complex phenomena should guard against any temptation to rush to quick conclusions when the concept is applied to the topic of this study. The concept of “multilateralisation of intervention” describes an important but far from homogeneous phenomenon. Regan’s observation that

17 For chilling accounts of the UN deliberations in the lead-up to the Rwandan genocide, see Gharekhan 2006, and Berdal 2008
we have very little systematic understanding of intervention policies shall be kept in mind as this study proceeds.

**Resource constraints**

Before continuing, a remark on the importance of the limits and constraints on expeditionary forces available for multilateral interventions. Since multilateral organizations can only dispose of forces made available to them by nation states, it is important to realize that the amount of global armed forces constitute a limited pool to be tapped by nation states and multilateral organizations alike with, at times, competing interests.

The Brahimi Report noted already in 2000:

“…developed States tend not to see strategic national interests at stake. The downsizing of national military forces and the growth in European regional peacekeeping initiatives further depletes the pool of well-trained and well-equipped military contingents from developed nations to serve in the United Nations-led operations.”(Point III C. 105)

Signs of overstretch of the forces available for military crisis management started to show already around 2003, the year of the first EU military operations, and became apparent a few years later. The limitations to forces cannot be described only by their absolute numbers, but also of the time they can be deployed in an area of operation, an expression of so-called sustainability. Expeditionary forces with high readiness of the sort that the UN has requested from Western countries have, generally speaking, lower sustainability than peacekeeping troops. High readiness and prolonged sustainability are opposing poles in defence planning. The idea, often advanced in the debate on European capabilities, that the 1, 8 million troops enlisted in European armed forces could readily be transformed into expeditionary forces with high readiness, does not take inherent resource constraints, demographic and financial, into account. Only the larger European countries can field more than a few battalions of this sort at any time. The sustainability of these forces will eventually reach their limit, as has been experienced by the British, Canadians and Dutch in the Iraq and Afghan wars.

The last US combat troops withdrew from Iraq in July 2010, leaving 50,000 behind, and a gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan was planned to start in July 2011. UN peacekeeping forces had reached 125,000 personnel in 2010, when signs of fatigue started to show as it became increasingly difficult to raise more resources, in spite of the fact that populous countries such as China and Indonesia started to field increasing number of troops.
The leaders of DRC and Chad asked for the departure of UN troops from their country.\footnote{Interviews by the author at UN HQ in New York, May 2010, with representatives of DPKO and the Swedish Permanent Representation to the UN}

**Selective (and saturated) security**

There are few conflicts that offer themselves as obvious candidates for intervention. An element of interpretation takes place. Even in cases were vital interests are being perceived to be at stake, such as for the US in the first Iraq war, there are alternative outcomes, since, in the words of Haass (2009), a different set of decision makers could have come to different kinds of conclusions. And then, there are conflicts involving genocide such as the Rwandan war, violating basic tenets of international law, that are left to burn themselves out at the cost of hundreds and thousands of lives and to produce devastating aftershocks in neighbouring countries, for example DRC.

In trying to understand the driving and inhibiting factors behind military operations undertaken by a regional organization such as the EU, it is important to examine the phenomenon of selective security. Which conflicts get selected and how is the selection being made and by whom? While a coherent system for selection shall not be expected to exist, some patterns are discernable.

Roberts and Zaum (2008, pp. 77-78) state that the mere universality of the UN’s potential roles results in selectivity in practice. It is not possible for the UN to be embroiled in all conflicts, so a selection takes place. It would therefore be better to recognize and discuss the phenomenon of selectivity.

The record of the Security Council since 1945 is one of selectivity, but a more complex pattern of selectivity has emerged after the Cold War. The Security Council plays a role in this regard, but so does the limited willingness of states to provide resources to resolve conflicts (Roberts and Zaum 2008, p. 8). The UN Charter itself describes various aspects of selectivity to collective security. Self-defence is recognized as a principle in its Article 51, without any obligation for the UN to take action in an area that is primarily left to states or alliances.

The nature of the UN’s limited command and control arrangements and, as a consequence, lack of access to rapid deployment forces are natural impediments to a comprehensive role for collective security. The sensitivity of conflict prone states towards the pre-planning for potential interventions in their countries, contributes further to ad hoc decision-making by a few key players, with the resulting selectivity.

Yet another form of selectivity flowing from the “universality” of the UN is the recognition in the Charter (Article 52 (1)) that regional arrangements can be useful for maintaining international peace and security “as are appro-
appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”.

The provision of regional “subsidiarity” envisioned in the Charter was of limited practical importance during the Cold War but has become central to today’s management of conflicts under UN auspices. The role of regional arrangements in the area of peace and security was recognized in “An Agenda for Peace”. The subsequent growth of the number of regional and subregional organizations endowing themselves with mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, has vindicated the vision presented in “An Agenda for Peace” (Peck in Crocker, Hampson, Aall, eds. 2001, p. 562). The growing web of cooperation between the regional and subregional organizations is another important feature worth noting.

The existence of regional organizations is, however, unevenly spread throughout the world. Their role for peace and security is in most cases (NATO being an exception because of its origin as a defence alliance) only one of several functions. The functionality of regional organizations is related to their closeness to the conflicts, their possession of the many instruments needed for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Another advantage is the provision of regular fora in which different perspectives, problems and resolutions can be shared (Peck 2001).

Other studies (Nye, Donahue 2000) have demonstrated that nation states and networks have benefitted from the forces of globalisation, to the detriment of multilateral organizations. Keohane and Nye (1977, 2000) have expressed concerns that the political base of intergovernmental organizations and international regimes will be too weak to sustain high levels of governance. At worse, this could lead away from institutions for governance, back to the state, as after 1914. More likely, however, is the creation of “soft legislation” and effective governance of specific issue-areas by transnational and transgovernmental networks, or “networked minimalism”.

The growing importance of regional organizations as security providers in “the pacification of civil conflicts” is central to explaining the drivers behind the EU’s military operations. This is a concept of importance that shall be kept in mind as we move over to Section 2.2.2.

2.2.2 The EU’s Collective Use of Force

This Section will combine the concepts from the previous one with concepts used in the scholarly discussion on the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP, here with an emphasis on the “D” as in “Defence”.

The EU rarely, if ever, discusses its defence policy and its military operations in the terms of “collective use of force”. The “D”, to the contrary, is in the public discussion mostly enveloped in concepts such as the EU’s “com-
prehensive” approach to crisis management or dealt with in the context of capability development. The purpose of studying the EU’s military operation under the heading of “The EU’s Collective Use of Force” is to lay bare the functional theme and, by doing so, also allow a comparison between the EU’s collective use of force and that of other actors.

First, the historical changes that have set the scene for the emergence of ESDP will be outlined, as reflected in the scholarly literature. Then, some central concepts regarding the character of and political drivers behind ESDP will be discussed under two different headings, “Classical themes” and “The current academic debate”. Together, the three different headings will prepare the grounds for the following chapters of this study.

The historical context

In analyzing the EU’s military operations, the historical context has to be brought into perspective. The multilateralisation of intervention since the end of the Cold War was an important theme in sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.1. It served both as a way of legitimizing intervention and redistributing responsibilities and burdens. The role of regional security providers was a salient theme in that context.

If tested against the actual development of the ESDP, the following can be noted with regard to the EU’s role for the multilateralisation of intervention. European Political Cooperation, the basis for cooperation in the field of security and defence cooperation, was enshrined in the Single European Act 1986. The so-called Petersberg tasks, describing generic European missions, were formulated by the West European Union, WEU19 in 1992 and included in Article II of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as the overall aims of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP. The Petersberg tasks (humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, peace-making) reflected and codified de facto participation by European states in “collective” and “humanitarian” interventions (Ortega 2001) in the form of, for example, Operation Comfort in Northern Iraq, Operation Turquoise in Rwanda 1994 by France and the evacuation of Europeans by Belgian and French troops from Zaire in 1991. The Petersberg tasks are currently inscribed in Articles 42.1 and 43.1 of the Treaty of the European Union, TEU.

The empirical background confirms the assumption that the multilateralisation of intervention and the role of regional security providers is essential to explaining the development of ESDP.

The end of the Cold War caused other groundbreaking changes to European security. The sense that the Europeans one day would have to grow out of the specific US “security protectorate” created by the Second World War

19 The WEU was established in 1954 the by the Paris Agreements, with the purpose to adhere to the three main objectives in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty of 1948. The WEU will cease to exist in July 2011.
and the subsequent division of Europe, is as old as the post war arrangements themselves. The American Congress has asked for a better burden-sharing between the US and Western Europe since the inception of the Atlantic Alliance. Specific levels of European defence expenditure have been tied to specific levels of American troops stationed in Western Europe. The European ambition to create a defence community as a corollary to the Coal and Steel Union has been present in European thinking throughout the Cold War, as manifested in the creation of the West European Union, WEU.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact led to a diminished importance of territorial defence and to a reduced American military commitment to European security (Hoffmann 2000, Howorth 2007, Strömvik 2005). France and the UK in a series of bilateral talks in the late 80’s discussed defence cooperation, including the coordination of targeting by French and British nuclear submarine fleets (a proposal later declined by the British). Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand in 1990 announced far-reaching cooperation on security, defence and nuclear matters (Engberg 1990). Some of the same issues would again appear on the Franco-British defence agenda when defence cooperation was increased between the two countries in 2010 as a result of the effect of the financial crisis on defence budgets.

The outbreak of the Balkan wars confirmed the need for the Europeans to fill the void and to assume a greater responsibility for the continent’s security. France’s experiences from the Rwandan war 1994 confirmed the need to bolster European security cooperation. In 1998, the French and the British governments launched the Saint Malo Declaration, setting the stage for further development of the European security and defence cooperation. The US had gradually reduced its troop levels in Europe and by 2002 the US National Security Strategy stated that Europe was “largely at peace”. Other, more restless and geopolitically important parts of the world, such Asia and the Middle East, called for American attention.

Classical themes
This study shall now turn to some classical themes of interest for research regarding the EU’s collective use of force.

The concept of “security community” (Deutsch 1969) can help explain some internal European drivers. Deutsch identified economic and political transactions as an important currency in building security communities. Adler and Barnett (1998) reinterpreted Deutsch’s concept of security communities and applied them to the EU. The authors situate themselves between the ”logic of anarchy” and the “logic of community”, or between realists and idealists and describe themselves as ”constructivists”. Borrowing from sociology they urge students of international relations to ”recognize the social character of global politics”. Global politics can be transformed as a consequence of changes in domestic, transnational, and interstate forces.
The mutual identification of peoples sharing a common sphere would, according to Adler and Barnett, constitute a new form of regional governance in between the anarchical arrangement of sovereign states and a system of rule endowed with strong norms, institutions and transnational identities. The EU would thus constitute an advanced example of regional governance.

The importance for geopolitics versus economics as drivers behind the EC, and later the EU, is another classical theme in the literature on European cooperation and integration. This is an interesting debate since the geopolitical approach is of relevance not only for the discussion on the drivers behind ESDP, but also because it touches on issues such as the relationship between sovereignty and supranational elements in the governance of the EU, including ESDP.

Possibly the most scathing of all criticism against the importance of geopolitics as a driving force behind the development of the EU has been presented by the British historian Milward (1992). His critique is of interest to this study not so much in its deliberations on the importance of geopolitics versus economics but rather in its discussion on sovereignty versus supranationality. He describes national economic needs of European nation states as the prime driving force behind all major developments, including the Coal and Steel Community. In the aftermath of the war, European co-operation saved the European nation states from the shambles left by the Second World War, in Milward’s view. The expansion of the welfare state in post-war nation states created a new impetus for integration. It is thus the development of domestic politics that will determine whether European nation states will favour further integration, including supranational elements, or not. The surrender of national sovereignty, an abstract concept, according to Milward, is not a problem in that context. It will continue to happen if that is the only way for European nation states to survive.

Moravcsik’s (1999) research of European integration builds on Milward’s (1992) analysis of the importance of the nation state as a rational actor that defers sovereignty to the supranational level as a way of handling the growing economic interdependence. This approach serves as a rebuttal of the sui generis theory regarding the character of the EU. Rather, lessons drawn from the development of the EU can, in this perspective, as much serve to explain the EU itself as the international system, or society (Bull 1977), to which it belongs.

Moravcsik draws on ”regime theory” (Cooper 1987, Vernon 1971, Keohane and Nye, 2000, 1977, Keohane 1984) in his analysis. International regimes encompass rules, institutions and practices and the focus of attention is the unit of transaction, rather than formal institutions. Regime theory borrows heavily from economics in describing the patterns of thickening economic transactions that create interdependence, a sort of bonding, or global governance. The perspective is transnational, rather than regional, as in theo-
ries of security communities (Deutsch 1969). The two are, however, not mutually excluding, but rather reinforcing.

Rather than supplanting entirely the importance of traditional elements of the international system such as the nation state and the existence of geopolitics, regime theory has thus contributed to developing a more sophisticated understanding of the international system/society where nation states cohabit with sub-state actors and global governance that may include supranational elements. The insights gained and concepts derived are likely to improve our understanding of the general context in which the EU situates itself.

While drawing on regime theory in explaining the broader context, Moravcsik focuses the attention on the choices that states and social actors face in the bargaining process that will ultimately lead to agreements in the EU. Moravcsik is thus concerned with describing how national policies are being formulated on the first, domestic level in an interplay between the interests of different actors. Governments then bring "the national interest" to the bargaining table’s "second level" were "asymmetric interests" between nation states are being traded. Among the more interesting findings is the study of the governments’ choices of institutional solutions for cooperation. His concepts of "delegated sovereignty" to supranational institutions and "pooled sovereignty" to intergovernmental bodies as a means of governments to tie domestic actors’ and future governments’ choices, have become central to describing the EU’s development.

It is interesting to note, that Moravcsik’s concept of “pooled sovereignty”, emanating from a liberal intergovernmantalist view, has influenced the debate on the nature of ESDP, although decision-making by the method of supranational Qualitative Majority Voting, QMV20 in the 00’s was applied only to one area of ESDP, the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, EDA, created in 2004.21

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20 Art. 16 of the Treaty on the European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates in Article 16:
4. As from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union.
A blocking majority must include four Council members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.
The other arrangements governing the qualified majority are laid down in Article 238(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
5. The transitional provisions relating to the definition of the qualified majority which shall be applicable until 31 October 2014 and those which shall be applicable from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 are laid down in the Protocol on transitional provisions.
21 The current Article 9 in the EDA’s Joint Action (which is currently undergoing change) states:
2. The Steering Board shall take decisions by qualified majority. The votes of the participating Member States shall be weighted in accordance with Article 23(2) TEU. Decisions to be adopted by the Steering Board by qualified majority shall require at least two thirds of the votes of the participating Member States. Only the representatives of the participating
The British diplomat Richard Cooper (1996, 2003), Director General of the Council Secretariat’s Directorate DG E during the 00’s, argues that the European states have lost their geopolitical instincts and have instead created a system of political cooperation bent on the further development of the wellbeing of their citizens, promotion of trade and the peaceful resolution of conflicts:

"anarchy remains the underlying reality in the security field for most parts of the world”. In Europe, by contrast, ”the co-operative structures…reinforce sovereignty by reinforcing security. If the post modern system protects your security better than the balance of power did, then it strengthens your ability to exercise your sovereignty…Making peace is as much a part of sovereignty as making war. For the post-modern world, sovereignty is a seat at the table”.

Stanley Hoffmann (1966, 1995) is another prominent critic of the interpretation of geopolitics as a driving force. European integration has been centred to areas of ”low politics”, while ”high politics” of security and defence policies have been kept out of supranational entities. The imperative of nation states with diverging interests dominate in this realm, according to Hoffmann.

With the hindsight of a couple of decades, the concepts of “high and low politics” can be tested against the paragraphs covering security in the Lisbon Treaty. They can be described as a patchwork of articles (some of them elaborations of similar articles in previous treaties). National security (for example territorial integrity) is, according to one paragraph, in the purview of sovereign nation states. The central Article 42.7 in the Treaty of the European Union, TEU, states:

“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.”

Member states that wish to forge ahead with a closer security and defence cooperation, so-called structured cooperation, can do so. There exists yet

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Member States shall take part in the vote.

3. If a representative of a participating Member State in the Steering Board declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. That representative may refer the matter, through the Head of the Agency, to the Council with a view to issuing guidelines to the Steering Board, as appropriate. Alternatively, the Steering Board, acting by qualified majority, may decide to refer the matter to the Council for decision. The Council shall act by unanimity. (COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency)
another solidarity clause in the area of internal security, Article 222, related to acts of terrorism or large scale catastrophes.

Together, these articles cover the parts of ESDP that can rightly be described as “high politics”. They reflect the necessary political compromises made between different national policies rather than the existence of a coherent “EU policy”. The true value of the formal commitments covering solidarity between member states in case of armed aggression remains to be tested in reality.

In the search for explanations to the EU’s actual use of force in the form of its rather modest military operations, we are likely to move into territories less confined by “high politics” as defined in the paragraphs referred to above. They are better covered by the description of the Petersberg tasks mentioned before, comprised in Article 42 and 43 of the Treaty of the European Union, TEU. While it is difficult to characterize these tasks according to a simple yard stick of high and low politics, it would be safe to say that most of the Petersberg tasks do not pertain to “high politics”.

The concept of “high politics” is, nevertheless of some relevance for the analysis of ESDP. The possession of military resources continues to reside firmly in the hands of the nation states and play a role for internal EU bargaining and decision-making concerning the EU’s military operations. The participation in EU led military operations requires a parliamentary vote in many of the member states.

The puzzle of the mix of high and low politics may be solved with the resort to Milward’s assessment that the much touted concept of “national sovereignty” is an abstract one and that governments will be ready to trade some of that sovereignty away if they feel that this is in the interest of the nation state.22 One could here add that the “geopolitical” wish for the EU to become a truly global actor, as well as the mere need to save some money through the pooling of shrinking diplomatic services and armed forces, offer two plausible explanations to nation states’ seeming willingness to tolerate supranational elements in this area of intergovernmental cooperation. This need has, in the wake of the financial crisis, multiplied proposals for defence cooperation between member states (Giegerich 2010).23

As an example of this pragmatic attitude, one could recall the introduction of voting by supranational QMV into one security area traditionally perceived of as belonging to the core functions of the nation state – Justice and Home Affairs. The challenges presented to governments by transboundary terrorism and criminality in 2005 helped whisk away the previous reluctance of EU member states to increase the supranational elements in the so-called

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22 For interesting discussions concerning the relationship between the intergovernmental and supranational elements of ESDP, see Howorth 2007 and Ojanen 2006
23 It shall be noted that in the area of EU capability co-operation, one distinguishes between pooling, sharing and specialisation. Pooling here is not synonymous with Moravcsik’s concept “pooled sovereignty”
third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs. It is also telling that ESDP, firmly within the second pillar, was chosen by the European Council, gathered at Hampton Court 2005 after the Dutch and the French “no” to the proposed Constitution, as a promising venue for exiting the crisis. The reason for the forward leaning security agenda was that the EU’s role in this regard enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of two-thirds of European citizens, according to repeated public opinion surveys. European citizens expect the EU to do more, not less, in the area of security, both internal (Justice and Home Affairs) and external (ESDP). It was therefore chosen by the Hampton Court Council to “kick-start” the EU during the constitutional crisis.

The current academic debate

It is common in the academic debate on ESDP to use concepts derived either from the relative importance of the various layers in the international system (Haaland Matlary 2009) for shaping the policies or the role of realism versus democratic peace as motivating drivers.

de Vasconcelos (2010) describes ESDP as an “international public good” that the EU can provide to the rest of the world. The EU has proven that it can conduct international relations differently. Jolyon Howorth suggests that the distinctiveness of the EU lies in “norms-based effective multilateralism and the promotion of a world in which human rights, human security, international institutions and international law will replace the law of the jungle”.

ESDP could, in this perspective, be understood as forming part of the liberal or rationalist tradition of democratic peace. National interests must be taken into account, but military intervention should not be based solely on national interests but also on collective interests. Europe’s standpoint has, in fact, been very influential in the process of creating a new principle of limited intervention (Ortega 2001).

To others (for example Gegout 2009) ESDP is all about wrapping successfully the national, often French, interest in the common European flag as a means of sharing the costs and risks of the operation or as a way to promote ESDP.

While France is a preeminent player for the ESDP, and certainly tries to advance some of its interests in this context, the French national interest cannot solely explain why a number of EU member states have rallied behind the EU’s military operations. The motives of the small to medium size EU member states are seldom investigated24. There may be many reasons for this, one being that it may be easier to stick to the well-known notion of the importance of the “directoire” for the development of ESDP rather than to investigate the motives of two dozen “lesser” member states. Some authors

24 For a few exceptions, see Jeppson 2009, Witney 2008 and Bailes, Herolf, Sundelius, eds. 2006
make a positive assessment of the EU’s military operations (Chivvis, 2007, Howorth 2010) while others tend to discard the EU’s military operations as unimportant altogether.

The historical and organizational themes are important as concepts for explaining the development of ESDP. The end of the Cold War allowed the EU to play a role for the multilateralisation of intervention and to assume a greater responsibility for security on the European continent. General concepts such as “security community” and “pooled sovereignty” can contribute further to our understanding of ESDP.

The concept of “high politics” is of relevance in analyzing some of the elements of ESDP, but the concept is of limited value for the investigation of the EU’s current collective use of force in the form of its modest military operations, which tend to situate themselves in the low-to-middle bandwidth with regard to interests involved and risks taken. Reducing them to manifestations of “low politics” does not seem adequate either.

Reducing the explanation of ESDP to the realpolITICAL pursuit of a few states or, to the contrary, the normsbased delivery of public goods for the benefit of a troubled world, does not capture the complex dynamics at hand. And as has been stated in the beginning of this chapter, the relative importance of the various layers of the international system is a method of limited use for analyzing the EU’s collective use of force.

While some of the academic concepts concerning ESDP are of interest for this study, others are less useful for the investigation of the EU’s actual use of collective force in the form of its modest military operations. This is, consequently, an area that calls for further research that moves beyond some of the more common concepts of political science and international relations.

As an end to Section 2, it can be concluded that in the search of building blocks for a tool to analyze the EU’s use of military force, the existing literature generated a series of useful insights, notably on the meaning of intervention, on the links between ends and means, and on the relationship between the actor of and the target of intervention. These will help in building an analytical tool. Furthermore, there are some insights that relate to the multilateralisation of intervention, and that are particularly pertinent for the case of the EU. Thus equipped, this study moves on to add to the literature some concepts that have not been typically manifested in the predominant schools of thought.
3 BRIDGING THE DIVIDE

3.1 The Divide

The concepts derived from the academic literature above are valuable in the analysis of the EU’s military operations. They do, however, remain on a rather general level and need to be complemented by a further disaggregation of driving and inhibiting factors in order to acquire a more in-depth understanding of the dynamics behind the EU’s military operations.

The academic literature does, for example, seldom provide a deeper analysis of the complex interplay between political decisions and military resource factors, which, however, are of particular concern here. The dialogue between academics and professionals from the defence sector on this matter is sorely lacking. This is a particularly salient shortcoming as the literature abundantly makes clear that military crisis management since the end of the Cold War has been inherently political-military in character (see, for example, Freedman 2006, 2008).

The importance of the interaction between the intervener and the local actor has been another important theme in this study. Before returning to this matter, a short discussion concerning the importance of “political will” for the conduct of military operations will follow.

The importance of “political will” for decisions on military interventions and, conversely, the need to “break the will” of the opponent, is a recurrent theme in the academic literature. Gow (1997) has described the main cause of the inability of the international community to stop the civil war in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY, as “the lack of will” to underwrite policy with the commitment of armed force. The UK and the US carry the main blame, in the view of Gow. The war represented a failure for European attempts at testing their Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP. EU’s involvement was not without merit, however, as it sped up the development of CFSP and provided the prototype for possible future co-operation between regional and global bodies.

As important as the factor of “political will” might be in clarifying cases where strong values and interests are at stake, the argument does not go particularly far in explaining cases within the “low-to-medium bandwidth” of

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25 “Resources” here refers primarily to expeditionary forces (personnel and materiel), command and control structures and financial resources
interests and risks at stake, where the EU situated itself with regard to military operations in the 00’s. Furthermore, the argument about the importance of “political will” can be elliptic in character, since it represents the end product of processes that consist of a the interplay between political and resource factors. A deeper understanding of this relationship is paramount to providing decision makers with a better background for their decisions.

Political decision makers ignore military resource constraints at their peril. Large scale operations involving expeditionary forces can only be sustained for so long, as shown by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Officers focusing on the need to break the will of the military opponent may, inadvertently, break the will of their political commanders instead. “Frictions” occur constantly between political intentions and the resources applied to fulfil these, reshaping in the process both intentions and resources.

This study will move beyond the convenient dichotomy between the “why and how”, not because the distinction is irrelevant altogether, but because it covers only clear cut categories of “why” or “how”, and fails to capture the interaction between the two categories and the way they colour each other. Some resources are constrained from the outset by political decisions, such as the scope of the command and control structures available to the EU. Others are finite, such as the pool of personnel or financial resources accorded by parliaments. And while the EU’s ambitions may have been limited, the resources needed to realize them can be decisive at the margins for countries otherwise engaged. For the many small countries in the EU, the modest ambitions of the EU may suit them well as a way of pooling limited resources, but their contribution may be taxing for the individual country.

“Political will” cannot, consequently, be a one-size fits all explanation to decisions regarding military operations. Neither would the application of “political will”, assuming that it were available in unlimited quantities, be expected to eliminate all resource impediments to a successful military operation. That is why the analysis of the interaction between political and resource factors is central to this study.

Since this study analyzes a phenomenon that sits at the nexus of conflict developments and the responses to those, the interplay between the “the actor” and “the target” is of interest. One of the purposes of this study is to introduce a more dynamic way of analyzing this relationship. The literature regarding intervention before the end of the Cold War tends to treat the “target” as an object of the will of “the actor”, or “intervener”. Scholarly analysis of developments after the Cold War reveals a more complex picture in which “the target” is gaining in influence in the interaction with the intervener. In order to better reflect the changing relationship, this study will hereafter describe “the target” instead as “local actors” who can be as much subjects as objects in the relationship with “the intervener”.

47
By introducing the interaction between the two pairs: political and resource factors, and intervener and local actors, an integrated analytical framework has been created for the study of the dynamics at play in the EU’s use of force.

Yet another dimension will be introduced to this analysis: developments over time, an element which is often absent in the scholarly literature. There is considerable interest in the academic literature in analyzing the one decision of initiating a military operation, but less attention is given to the analysis of developments of decision-making regarding military operations and the consequent room for alternative outcomes. Thorough analyses of decision-making regarding intervention (Haass 1999, 2009, Levite et al. 1992, Allison 1971) reveal that it would be more appropriate to talk about a series of decisions, or sometimes non-decisions, interacting with the development of the conflict.

There are several explanations, one being the sheer complexity of conflicts and the subsequent difficulty of sustaining a coherent process of decision-making regarding reactions to these. Human behaviour accounts for another important input into this cocktail of factors. The elements of randomness and dysfunctionality should not be underestimated either. They should, to the contrary, be recognized in scholarly work as elements that coexist and influence the seemingly orderly activities of humans.

Some of the more interesting causal inferences can be expected to result in changes to decisions. The introduction of protractedness in this study in the form of developments over time will provide a multidimensionality necessary for the sort of comprehensive approach (Levite et al. 1992) that can help capture important qualitative changes. In order to facilitate the reading of this text, the term borrowed from Levite et al. will hereafter be called protraction.

Interaction between factors and protraction over time are thus essential tools to this analysis. As mentioned in the Introduction to Chapter 2, the interaction between variables at different levels and the contextual conditions that affect those interactions, are central to this study. The creation of an integrated analytical framework shall help in the study of the relationship between factors, while the concepts emerging from the literature concerning organizational themes shall further the understanding of the contextual conditions that affect those interactions. The role of regional security providers such as the EU in the multilateralisation of intervention is an example of such a contextual condition.

With the basic structure for the study now in place, there is a need to refine the methods of study in order to disaggregate further the dynamics at play in the EU’s use of force.
3.2 The Bridge

In order to complement the findings provided by the academic literature, the techniques of defence planning will be introduced. Defence planning is a technique with no semblance of normative or academic thinking. Its complementary role to concepts derived from the literature lies in its ability to help elaborate an analytical tool that can be used to process and analyze the empirical material to be presented in Chapter 5. It is primarily a tool for selecting indicators from the empirical material and for introducing a dynamic method of analysis of the interaction between factors. The concepts derived from the literature will help assess the importance of individual factors and analyze the relationship between some of them, as reflected in the themes in Chapter 2. Another overriding importance of the academic concepts is to inform the interpretation in chapters 6 and 7 of the results gained with the help of the analytical tool.

Some concepts from the academic literature will overlap with political factors accounted for in defence planning, for example the view of the “local actor”, the term chosen for the purpose of this study. This overlap of some factors results from the fact that both defence planning and the academic literature cover conflict developments, albeit for different purposes. The purpose of the analytical tool is only to register the factor, not to enter to the study of it. This will be done in the following chapters.

As has been noted in Chapter 2, the academic literature tends to cover primarily political factors, while military resource factors attract less interest. The advantage of using techniques from defence planning is that they register also such resource factors and try to integrate them into assessments of potentially opposing parties, i.e. in a calculation that combine political intentions with the access to resources. Furthermore, defence planning accounts for elements that pertain specifically to the conduct of military operations, for example the tasks to be carried out and the means for doing so, all elements that are absolutely essential to the analysis of the EU’s military operations.

The techniques used will thus offer the advantages of registering resource factors and combining them with political factors in an interactive way. To the interpretation of all this, this study shall return in chapters 6 and 7.

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26 The concept of “local ownership” is central to the literature on development aid, sanctions (Wallensteen and Staibano 2005) and peace-building. The importance of “the target of intervention” was noted in Section 2.1 Previous Research. Although these concepts are all interrelated in a way, the study of interaction between “Intervener” and local actor in the context of the EU’s military operations has not been subject to systematic study.
The State of Defence Planning

Now, it is important to give a short background regarding defence planning. It is a technical instrument used for different purposes: 1) to undertake force planning, i.e. to translate scenarios into requirements in terms of necessary resources. Force planning will inform: 2) plans for the conduct of military operations, often called operational planning and 3) decisions on cost effective procurement of defence materiel.

With no academic pretence to it, defence planning nevertheless reflects experiences gained both from military operations and procurement processes. These will, in turn, shape future decisions on the use of force. The indicators used for the purpose of defence planning can be of interest for this study as tools for selecting the most relevant factors from the empirical material.

Defence planning techniques will be used to build an analytical tool that can be applied to the cases in the form of EU military operations. If proven effective by this exercise, it can by used in the analysis of the interplay between the driving and inhibiting factors that shape decision-making on military interventions by collective security organizations.

As is the case with military operations, the craft of defence planning has not left many marks in the scholarly literature. There are manuals for defence planning and studies concerning operational analysis that aim to define technical requirements, but it is difficult to find any comprehensive scholarly work on defence planning as a field. Suffice then to say that the description in the following of the techniques of defence planning that will be used for the purpose of this study constitute a brief exposé aimed at explaining the techniques and tools used for the purpose of this study.

There is no one domineering school or doctrine of defence planning, although considerable coordination, or attempt at creating interoperability, exists in particular between NATO and the EU, with 21 of its members also being NATO members, and between these institutions and nations with a developed national defence planning process of their own, such as the UK and France. It is a common practice for the more resourceful member states to transform specific nationally produced scenarios into generic ones that are computed into the multilateral processes of defence planning.

Concepts of thought on defence planning have undergone change over time. Planning during the Cold War reflected the era of “industrial war”. Experiences from the Crimean War formed, for example, the basis of the so-called Lancaster Equations used by NATO and Western powers during the

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first part of the Cold War as instruments for defence planning for a potential war along the “Central Front” on the inner-German border. So-called “system analysis” was brought in by McNamara from Ford Motor Co and applied to the planning for, among other things, potential nuclear wars and the Vietnam war. Gradually, during the latter part of the Cold War, more sophisticated computer modelling, simulation and planning supplanted the industrial techniques as the basis for defence planning.

The period since the end of the Cold War has seen the gradual emergence of new planning techniques in the EU that try to merge the civilian and military aspects of the planning in a “comprehensive approach”. The name indicates that a comprehensive conflict management involves and coordinates many different political and resource tools, ranging from development to defence. This process is only in the making and by no means mature. Attempts at creating overarching doctrines for “the comprehensive approach” have not yet proven their value. The accumulation of “lessons learned” is likely to produce valuable inputs to thinking in this field.

Hierarchy and Sequence of Documents

The documents that regulate defence planning represent both hierarchy and sequence. They range from documents at the highest political level down to those of practitioners in the defence sector. The sequence often starts with public, political documents such as “White Papers”, or defence bills, passed by parliaments. Next in order are policies or strategies issued by governments and institutions. Public documents issued by parliaments and governments are meant to provide the political guidance necessary for the defence professionals to carry out the operational planning for military operations. The documents regulating the details of operational planning are seldom available to the public.

The documents adopted by political entities typically contain an analysis of the international situation and the identification of the consequential threats and risks to security. Then, the political intentions regarding the ways these challenges shall be met are spelled out. Finally, the possible implications in the form of resource allocation are indicated. While this is the ideal state of things, few institutions and nations have the ambition of conducting a full blown process of defence planning, either because their defence ambitions and resources are limited, or because they entrust the defence and security organizations to which they belong to undertake at least part of that effort. Reason for the absence of a public regulation of defence planning in other instances may simply be that democratic control in a particular country has not yet been established over the defence sector. Constructing the parliamentary processes for the political control over defence planning and

\[28\] The UK has been at the forefront of developing the concepts of “comprehensive approach”. NATO’s strategic concepts nowadays also include a comprehensive approach.
budget is, for example, an essential part of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Integration, DDR and Security Sector Reform, SSR.

The US has well established routines with regard to defence plans and policy and produces the public documents of National Intelligence Reports, the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defence Review. Sweden continues, as a reflexion of its Cold War policies of political and military non-alignment and the subsequent need for national planning processes, to produce White Papers on defence policies to the Swedish Riksdag, although these are nowadays heavily influenced by Sweden’s interaction with institutions such as the EU and NATO. Based on the defence bills, the executive branch in some cases issues political guidelines for the operational planning to be elaborated by the military profession. Different institutions apply varying degrees of dialogue between the executive and the defence professionals in the ensuing process of specifying defence planning.

On a more technical note, there exists a considerable confusion with regard to the techniques of defence planning even between nations and institutions that profess interoperability, such as NATO and the EU. A couple of manuals for defence planning were produced during the Cold War, but there exists no formal guide to the exercise of defence planning for the new times. There is, for example, no one common definition of concepts and terminology. Different entities apply time perspectives in variable manners. While long-term perspectives are often used in the planning for procurement, a short to medium term perspective is applied to operational planning. With the increased demand on military crisis management, the time-perspective of the planning for procurement has tended to be shortened and more compressed. Some entities integrate the time perspectives into a continuum, while others keep them apart, etc. The scope for confusion even between major institutions is consequently considerable.

The EU’s Defence Planning

The EU does not possess a full blown defence planning process that translates the general language of the European Security Strategy into political guidance for the purpose of defence planning. This is the consequence of a variety of factors, such as the novelty of security and defence policies to the EU, deliberate attempts in some capitals to limit the EU’s capacity in this regard, and the mere sensitivity of the issue. The adherence of member states to the requirements resulting from the process in the form of the identification of deficiencies to be covered is, by and large, voluntarily. This is different from NATO were so-called force goals to be met are presented to member states.

A defence planning process in the EU has been created through the pragmatic building of elements of such a process. The description in the following reflects the state of the EU’s defence planning around the time-line of this study, 2006. This is done for the purpose of defining some of the cir-
cumstances under which the EU’s military operations were undertaken at the
time and that will be reflected in the case analysis in Chapter 5. Things have,
naturally, evolved since then.

As mentioned earlier in this text, defence planning starts with a political
strategy document issued at the highest political level. The European Secu-
rity Strategy, ESS, established in 2003 and updated in 2009, provides the
overall political guidance for EU’s planning for civilian missions and mili-
tary operations. The rationale behind the ESS constitutes a cocktail of altruther-
istic motives, or values, and more hardnosed interests. The EU is supposed
to constitute a “force for good” in global conflict management and resolution
and to contribute to solving and thus keep conflicts away from Europe.

The Europeans shall, furthermore, share and pool resources, thereby
achieving synergies between, and economies of scale, for dwindling Euro-
pean military resources. The ESS has some superficial resemblance to other
strategies produced around the same time, such as the US National Security
Strategy. They reflect the general push at the time, away from territorial
defence towards expeditionary forces to be used for global crisis manage-
ment, albeit for varying political motives. The convergence of the “strategic
cultures” of the UK, France and Germany is, for example, noticeable in their
respective guiding documents for security and defence policies (Jonas and
von Ondarza 2010).

The political guidelines of the ESS have been translated into possible
missions and operations in the form of the Petersberg tasks mentioned in
Section 2.2.2. In their current form in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 43.1 TEU),
they read:

“ The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may
use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmaments operations,
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these
tasks may contribute to fight against terrorism, including by supporting third
countries in combating terrorism in their territories”.

The Petersberg tasks have, for the purpose of defence planning, been trans-
formed into five scenarios:

- “separation of parties by force” (sustainable for six months)

29 This version of the scenarios based on the Petersberg tasks has been derived from Biscop
and Coelmont 2010. It should be noted that many of the concepts used in this scenario are
also academic in nature or have given rise to considerable academic treatment. For instance,
conflict prevention (Wallensteen 1998), embargoes (a large sanctions literature, see Wallen-
steen and Staibano 2005)
- “stabilization, reconstruction and military advice to third countries” (including peacekeeping, election monitoring, institution-building, SSR, support in fight against terrorism, sustainable for at least 2 years)

- “conflict prevention”, (including preventive deployment, embargoes, counter-proliferation and joint disarmament, sustainable for at least 1 year)

- “evacuation operations” (of up to 10,000 non-combatants, to last up to 120 days)

- “assistance to humanitarian operations” (sustainable for up to 6 months).

The scenarios serve as one input for defence planning for the use of the EU’s military instruments and for cooperation in the field of defence materiel. The EU’s prime military instruments consist of a “Balkan-like” stabilization force of some 50-60,000 personnel and the rapid response force of two EU BG of 1,500. The stabilization force is complemented with air and maritime forces and command and control structures. It shall be available within 60 days and can be deployed for at least a year. The EU BG shall be available within ten days after the political decision and have a sustainability of four months. The two different forces are meant to be able to interact in contingencies, with the EU BG serving as “as a bridging force” that can halt escalation while awaiting the arrival of the stabilisation force.

The need for a planning process on the civilian side has given birth to Civilian Headline Goal, CHG, based on the same five scenarios described above and borrowing from the planning techniques of the military profession.

One of the main tenets for defence planning in the EU is the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal process. It was created in 1999 with the aim to harmonize specification for the “Balkan-like” stabilisation force. The findings are gathered in the Requirements Catalogue. The gap between the identified needs and commitment made by member states are published in the Progress Catalogue. A special mechanism, the European Capabilities Action Programme, ECAP, was set up to address the shortfalls that included helicopters, intelligence and reconnaissance, command and control systems. In 2004, the original target was replaced with a new Headline Goal 2010. One of the main purposes of the European Defence Agency, EDA, created in 2004, was to facilitate the addressing of the capability gaps identified though the defence planning process.

The translation of generic planning, that does not mention specific countries or conflicts, into so-called advance planning for specific, albeit potential contingencies, has been a hotly debated issue in the EU. The sensitivity of the matter stems from the reluctance to name specific countries and places, and the weariness in some capitals to transfer authority for the plan-
ning of sensitive issues to the “Brussels bureaucracy”. The issue is closely related to the nature of the EU’s command and control structures, a matter to which this study shall return in Section 4.1 as well as Chapter 5. Hesitations with regard to advance planning have, however, gradually been overcome. As a result of the so-called post-Wiesbaden process in 2007, a new division for advance planning, MAP was created in the EU’s Military Staff. It was later folded into the Crisis Management Planning Directorate, CMPD, now part of the European External Action Service, EEAS.30

The EU lacks a public and intermediate document of the kind mentioned at the beginning of this section, that clearly establishes the linkage between the tasks described in the Lisbon Treaty and the ESS with the defence planning documents. A “Long Term Vision” was produced in 2006, with the aim to look 10-20 years into the future in order to determine the challenges to be met and the needs to be covered through defence materiel coordination by the EDA. The Long Term Vision, produced through a discreet process of interaction between the defence sectors of capitals and the Brussels structures, can be described as an “intermediate document”, between general political direction and more precise guidance, in this case for the purpose of long term defence materiel planning. The document resembles NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance, published during the same period. A dialogue between the authors of the Long Term Vision and NATO’s Transformation Command in Norfolk, US, ensured the compatibility between the different projects.

EDA has by now absorbed many of the elements of defence planning described above. The so-called Capability Development Process, CDP, serves to coordinate the combined requirements resulting from the LTV, lessons learned and national processes.

Elaborating on the Techniques of Defence Planning

Although there is no coherent school of thought regarding defence planning, and in spite of the fact that the EU itself has not yet produced a fully coherent process for that purpose, elements from the craft of defence planning will be borrowed in order to establish the indicators that will serve as tools for selecting factors from the empirical evidence.

The intention is obviously not to carry out the full analytical exercise of defence policy and planning that will result in concrete plans for military operations or procurement, but rather to use some elements of the discipline in order to facilitate the selection of indicators. It will here be boldly assumed that some fundamentals are at hand in the planning for military operations since the exercise reflects “lessons learned” from previous instances of

30 For an analysis of the EU’s planning structure, see Simón 2010
the use of force. Defence planning is basically an iterative process between experiences gained and decisions to be shaped.

While a real defence planning process would go on to simulate the interplay between factors in order to establish the necessary operational requirements and produce plans for the conduct for operations, this study will stop half-way, as it were, and borrow some of the techniques to help design tools for selecting the main factors that have shaped EU decisions on military operations. The purpose of this study is to analyze operations that have already taken place, and obviously not to plan for future military operations. Furthermore, while defence planning for the purpose of a nation or a collective defence organization is an ambitious undertaking, encompassing many different factors and their interaction, the aim is here to establish a framework that is “good enough” for the study of the EU’s modest military operations.

Such a framework for a study of collective military operations would have to consider several dimensions. First of all it has to include factors that are either internal or external to the organization. Then it has to consider the various elements that relate to the targets and the resources factors that are particularly illuminated in this work. However, they have to be combined with other factors that also have a potential explanatory power (political and military factors, alone or in combination). Finally, we ask whether they are either driving an organization towards an operation or inhibiting it. This simple structure is presented in Table 1 and operationalized in the following Chapter 4.
4. RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter the Research Design will be presented. In Section 4.1 an analytical tool for the analysis of the cases will be elaborated. It is based on the techniques of defence planning and reinforced by concepts from the scholarly literature. Together, these elements will constitute an analytical tool for selecting indicators from the cases of EU military operations.

The basis for the selection of cases of EU military operations will be explained in Section 4.2 and a discussion will follow in 4.3 on the use of sources for the purpose of this study.

The Research Design forms the basis for the presentation and analysis of the cases in chapters 5 and 6 for the consequent drawing of conclusions in Chapter 7.

4.1 The Analytical Tool

Now, for the elaboration of the analytical tool. 31 First, a reminder, that it does not represent any codified model for defence planning, but rather uses the techniques of defence planning for the purpose of building an analytical tool that can be used to analyze the EU’s military operations. As was stated in the Introduction to Chapter 2, the method of analysis shall possess a flexibility that can help capture multiple causal inferences while at the end of the exercise also enable the study to draw conclusions of explanatory value. The study of interaction between factors and the protraction of developments over time were mentioned as methods of analysis. These methodological departing points will be kept in mind as the construction of the tool proceeds.

First, in developing the analytical tool, so that it becomes useful for the question asked in this work, a dichotomy will be created through the registration

31 Background for the development of the analytical tool was gained in my capacity of Senior Advisor at the Department for Assessment and Analysis and the Department for Operations at the Armed Forces Headquarters and as Expert to the Swedish Defence Commission and Director for Strategic Planning in the Ministry of Defence.
of driving and inhibiting factors behind the EU’s military operations. They will constitute the basis for establishing the **driving** (+) and **inhibiting** (-), variables along the x-axis.

Second, in order to determine the relevant indicators along the y-axis, elements will be borrowed from defence planning. The purpose of the indicators is to constitute the instruments for selecting factors from the empirical cases of EU military operations. The selection and the elaboration of indicators will also be informed by concepts derived from the academic literature in Chapter 2. The driving and inhibiting factors extracted from the cases in the next Chapter 5 with the use of the indicators will form the basis for comparative analysis in Chapter 6 and conclusion in Chapter 7.

Now, let’s move on to the indicators themselves. Most exercises of defence planning, from the highest political documents to the secret documents for actual defence planning, start with an analysis of the **external** threat and risk environment that forms the background against which **internal** decisions on policy and planning are made. This is also something that much academic literature would emphasize (Vertzberger 1998). The analytical tool will follow this logic, since it aims not at describing only the end result, which may indeed appear as the product of pure “political will”, but to provide a tool for analyzing the interaction between factors that will in the end produce a “political will”. Note also that the perspective is that of a collective organization, in this case that of the EU. The tool is, however, generic in character. The main headings will therefore be called: **A. Factors External to the Organization** and **B. Factors Internal to the Organization**.

Both the **external** and **internal** dimensions contain, broadly speaking, **political** and **resource** factors. While some are indeed distinctly political or relate to available resources, others constitute a mixture of the two. They will be labelled political-military, or, in short, **pol-mil**.

The distinct subcategories of **1. Political**, **2. Pol-mil** and **3. Resource** indicators will appear under the two respective main headings in the model, **A. Factors External to the Organization** and **B. Factors Internal to the Organization**. In reality, they often “colour” each other and represent a continuum rather than highly distinct categories, but they will be kept apart for the purpose of analysis.

In combining the driving and inhibiting variables with the main headings and their subcategories, the analytical tool appears as follows:
Developing the elaborated analytical tool
Defence planning is situated at the nexus of conflict developments in “the target” entity and the decisions made by “the actor” entity on how to react to these developments. Since neither the actual developments of conflicts, nor the political reactions to these can be predicted with absolute certainty, defence planning aims at diminishing uncertainty and to prepare the political and resource tools for potential reaction, rather than to provide a precise guide for action. The broad categories of factors accounted for under the main headings will have to be narrowed down in order to make them more operational for the purpose of this study.

The first main heading is A. Factors External to the Organization. Under A.1 Political, the main political factors in the conflict area will be captured. Defence planning will naturally register “the opposing” party or parties, its intentions and resources. The academic literature points to the growing importance of “the target”, or local actors, in conflict developments, so this aspect must be properly reflected in this exercise. The concepts of “opposing party” in defence planning and “local actor” in the academic literature, will for the purpose of this study be dubbed the “View of the warring parties”. How the warring parties view an outside intervention, in this case an EU military operation, merits a subtitle (1.1). The importance of the multilateralisation of intervention is another point borne out by the literature. Hence, the need to spell out the View of relevant actors (1.2) in this regard, both institutions and nation states.

Under A. 2 Pol-mil, the Character of the conflict (2.1) is a factor of importance both for defence planning and academic studies. Here, for the purpose of analyzing the EU’s military operations, it is the assessment of the tasks that will be derived from the management of the conflict that lies at the centre of the analysis. The EU is risk adverse in its pioneering phase of mili-

Table 1. The Analytical Tool for Understanding Collective Interventions:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Structure</th>
<th>Driving (+)</th>
<th>Inhibiting (-)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Factors:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Factors External to the Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Pol-Mil</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Factors Internal to the Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Pol-Mil</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Resource</td>
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tary crisis management and can be expected to operate within the low-to-middle bandwidth of political and operational risks. Although the EU in principle is prepared to undertake operations that cannot initially muster the legitimisation of the UN, but is deemed to be in conformity with international law, the need for a **UN mandate (2.2)** has, in reality, been a *sine qua non* for EU military deployments during the 00’s. The general **Tasks (2.3)** given for the mission and military operation will often flow from the given UN mandate and will determine the likelihood of an EU involvement. Conflict management requiring a mix of civilian and military tools and the rapid deployment capabilities are, for example, conducive for an EU role. Combat operations in inter-state war are less likely to see contributions in the form of EU led forces.

Under **A. 3 Resource**, the **Military Forces (3.1)** present in the area of conflict can be expected to be a factor of importance. Do they represent a risk? Do other institutions, such as the UN, already have a political or military precedence in the area? Such factors are likely to influence the likelihood of an EU operation taking place or not.

The second main heading is **B. Factors Internal to the Organization**, in this case the EU. **Under B. 1**, the **Values (1.1)** and **Interests (1.2)** at stake must be taken into consideration, although it should be kept in mind that the EU at the pioneering stage of ESDP reflected in this study would be unlikely to get involved in operations involving high stakes in the form of strong interests. As has been made clear by the scholarly literature, the identification of interests in today’s conflicts can be difficult to ascertain. Linking, in the next step, the possible interests to the application of military means has often proven difficult, a matter discussed in the segment concerning the utility of force in Chapter 2.

The difference between “values” and “interests”, and between national and collective such, would merit further consideration for a more in-depth analysis, but is not required for the purpose of this study beyond the review of the academic literature made at the beginning of this study. Nye (1999) notes that a democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and interest-based foreign policy. The EU is arguably one of the protagonists in fusing national and common interests as the basis for collective intervention. This does not necessarily happen, however, through the establishment of “Grand Strategies”, but rather as the product of a pragmatic and decentralized process that tend to codify, as much as direct, developments in the field.

Another word of caution refers to the importance of self-professed “values” of nations and organizations. In the case of the EU, the respect for human rights and international law are fundamental to the organization and this is not the place to question the EU’s commitment to these values. There is reason to believe that the EU by and large is respected as a security provider by third parties and a welcome partner in collective security cooperation. It
is, however, important to note that the EU’s self-perception is not always shared by local actors in the conflict area, a factor captured, as mentioned above, under A.1.2.

Bearing in mind these limitations, the indicators of **Values** and **Interests**, as defined by the EU itself, will be reflected in the empirical part of this study and accounted for as **B.1.1** and **B.1.2**.

Under political factors, the degree of socialization of common policies between the EU members, or the degree of **Internal cohesion/division (1.3)**, is an important factor borne out by the empirical material. The EU is new in making collective decisions on the use of force and some members hold privileged positions in other parts of the international system. Disagreements over the Iraq war were still simmering at the timeline for this study, contributing to tensions between EU members. This indicator will reflect some of the realities mentioned above. The overlap of national and common interests in the EU co-exists, naturally, with stark national ones.

Under **B 2.**, it can be expected that **EU civilian precedent (2.1)**, in the form of the organization and its individual members, in a conflict area can play an important role. The EU’s large programs for aid and conflict prevention are well established and form part of the EU’s “comprehensive approach” to crisis management. While the **Tasks (2.2)** identified for the operation often flow from the mandate and tasks given by the UN, their further elaboration will be made by the EU in view of the pending assumption of responsibility for the endeavour. An overlap between the guidelines given by the UN for the operation and the Petersberg tasks, will point to an EU involvement.

**Resource factors** will be accounted for under **B.3.** Clausewitz’ *dictum* that war is the continuation of politics with other means does not mean that all military instruments have a political meaning. But some may indeed be indicative of the driving and inhibiting factors that are of interest to our study. The imprint of the force, its actual configuration and command and control structure, will therefore be studied. Precedent, both civilian and military, seem to play a role for the likelihood of an actor carrying out a military operation. The period of study covers the break-through for the EU’s military operations, so the records of precedent is a limited one, but possible to study. The correlation with previous operations carried out by the EU and/or individual European countries will be reflected under **Military precedent (3.1)**. While this is an indicator that could possibly belong also to the category of pol-mil indicators, military precedents tend to create facts-on-the-ground of rather concrete nature than can influence the likelihood of future military operations.

The availability of relevant EU resources are factors of major importance, including the crucial issue of access to appropriate **Command and Control structures, C&C, (3.2)**. Although the EU’s military operations are mostly small in size, the competing demands on available **Military resources (3.3)**
can be expected to play some role for the likelihood of an EU military opera-
tion occurring or not.

Finally, Financial resources (3.4) will be taken into account. Defence budgets are constructed differently in different countries, but financial means covering operational costs tend to be presented as a specific budget line that can vary over time, as separate from the large fixed costs that are typical for the defence sector. Operational costs have increased substantially since the end of the Cold War as the result of an increasing number of operations and, at times, a high operational tempo. The difficulty of financing increasing operational costs marked defence politics in many of the troop contributing countries during the 00’s. The financial mechanisms for covering operations were, during the Cold War, supposed to “lie were the fall”, which was an acceptable principle as long as core national interests were supposed to be involved. This is no longer the case as nations contribute to “the common good”. The creation of mechanisms for common funding has been slow in coming. The EU established in 2003 the so-called Athena mechanism to that end. It covers, however, only circa ten per cent of the operational cost of participating countries. The rest is borne by member states themselves. It is the contributions through the Athena-mechanism that will be accounted for under 3.4.

In combining the two main variables of driving and inhibiting variables with the framework for selecting indicators, an elaborated analytical tool can be produced.
### Table 2. The Elaborated Analytical Tool for Understanding Collective Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Factors:</th>
<th>Driving (+)</th>
<th>Inhibiting (-)</th>
</tr>
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Indicators:

**A. Factors External to the Organization**

1. **Political**
   1.1 View of the warring parties
   1.2 View of other relevant actors

2. **Pol-mil**
   2.1 Character of the conflict
   2.2 Mandate of the mission/operation
   2.3 Tasks of the mission/operation

3. **Resource**
   3.1 Military forces in place

**B. Factors Internal to the Organization**

1. **Political**
   1.1 Values
   1.2 Interests
   1.3 Internal cohesion/division

2. **Pol-mil**
   2.1 Civilian precedent
   2.2 Tasks of the mission/operation

3. **Resource**
   3.1 Military precedent
   3.2 Availability of C&C
   3.3 Availability of relevant forces
   3.4 Availability of financial resources
Introducing timelines

The two dimensional model will be complemented with yet another dimension in the analysis of developments over time, as proposed by Levite et al. (1992). This will allow the analytical tool to capture the fractured nature of decision-making and to disaggregate the seemingly clear cut decisions on the use of force, as they transpire from official political communiqués. Factors that cause changes to decisions can be expected to be qualitatively superior to other factors in terms of their explanatory value. Hence the need to reflect them in the analytical tool.

After having disaggregated factors and introduced timelines, the factors will be put together again and the emerging patterns analyzed. The findings from Chapter 5 with the help of the analytical tool will be combined with findings from Chapter 2 and integrated in the comparative analysis of Chapter 6 and conclusions in Chapter 7.

The application of the analytical tool should help bridge the gap between the academic literature and the actual planning and decision-making, and make the transition over to new territory in the form of a better understanding of the interaction between the driving and inhibiting factors that shape collective decision-making regarding military intervention.

With the analytical tool in place, this study shall now proceed to a discussion on case selection and sources that will, in turn, pave the way for the case analysis in Chapter 5.

4.2 Case Selection

Any findings with regard to the dynamics behind the EU’s military operations will have to be “tentative” since we are, in a way, “present at the creation” of EU led military operations. There is no precedent before 2003, when the two first operations (Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, and Operation Concordia in Macedonia) were launched and the future remains unknown. What we can study is thus the unfolding of events during a limited period of time. It is, nevertheless, the novelty of the phenomenon of EU led military operations that makes them particularly interesting to study.

The EU as an entity has had to grapple, for the first time, with the political and resource issues involved in making stark decisions on whether to intervene or not. It goes without saying that individual member states of the EU are no newcomers to this field, neither as individual nations nor as members of institutions such as the UN or NATO. The novelty lies in the fact that they now also make these collective decisions within the realm of the EU.

Without accepting the logic of defence policy as pertaining to the area of “high politics” (Hoffmann 1966, 1995) one can, nevertheless, assume that the threshold for member states’ participation in the EU’s military operations
is fairly high, since it involves stark decisions regarding the commitment of human and financial resources and ultimately the use of force.

We can, for the above reasons, expect the nature of decision-making on the deployment of military forces to be rather disciplined in nature. This may help us focus the searchlight in the otherwise rich and opaque political environment in which decisions are made. The cases of military operations offer the advantage of leaving a clear imprint of policy implementation in the form of the deployment of military forces into a conflict. This makes them discernable and amenable to observation and study.

**Defining “EU military operations”**

First, some necessary definitions. This study will not concern itself with operations that include forces from EU member states but are led by other institutions, such as UNIFIL II in the Lebanon.

Furthermore, this study will not cover the numerous cases of civilian or civilian-military missions\(^{32}\) that are the “forte” of the EU’s soft power.\(^{33}\) The largest of them all, the Kosovo mission EU LEX will, for example, not be analyzed, since it is an entirely civilian mission. Neither will civilian-military missions with the participation of military personnel, for example in the form of military observers, as in the Aceh or Georgia missions, be included. This does not mean that EU led military operations occur in an isolated, purely military context. They have, to the contrary, all taken place in the larger context of the EU’s primarily civilian and civilian-military efforts, the so-called comprehensive approach.

**Command and control**

The definition of command and control arrangement is another factor of importance for the selection of cases. The EU does not have any operational headquarters of its own in Brussels, but relies on some individual member states in this regard.\(^{34}\) The question of whether the EU shall, in fact, possess an Operational Headquarters has been highly contentious, loaded with political meaning both with regard to issues of national sovereignty and the EU’s degree of autonomy within the trans-Atlantic security system and in relation to NATO. At the so-called Tervuren meeting outside Brussels in April in 2003, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed that the EU should have an Operational Headquarters of its own. The idea was vehemently opposed by the UK and met with suspicion in Washington where it was viewed as an attempt at creating a NATO parallel and competing struc-

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32 These missions are sometimes referred to as “operations”. In this study, a distinction will be made for the sake of clarity between civilian and civilian-military missions, on the one hand, and military operations, on the other hand.

33 The EU is currently running eleven civilian-military, or civ-mil missions and has completed seven such missions. For an overview, see Grevi et al. 2009.

34 The UK, France, Germany, Greece, Italy.
tures. France has argued for an EU Operational Headquarter in Brussels, while the UK has emphasized the importance of NATO’s command and control structure and the ear-marking of national headquarters for EU purpose. Germany has favoured a construction that would include both civilian and military components, reflecting the EU’s “comprehensive approach” to crisis management. A compromise regarding the EU’s command and control structures was eventually reached that put in place the structures used at the time of the main cases of this study. The EU’s command and control structures have since evolved.

It is of importance for this study to note that EU led military operations come in two forms in terms of command and control structures:

1) operations led in its entirety by the EU, so-called “autonomous operations” (Artemis, Operation EUFOR RD Congo, Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR (Central African Republic), Operation EUNVAFOR Atalanta) and 2) “Berlin plus operations”, where the EU resorts to NATO’s command and control structures (Operation Concordia and Operation EUFOR Althea). In this case, it will be the EU’s Staff Group at SHAPE that will constitute the Operational Headquarter under NATO’s Deputy SACEUR. These distinctions will be important as we start developing the indicators of the analytical tool.

For an operation to qualify as “EU-led” in the context of this study, it will have to be directed on the political level by the Committee for Political and Security Policy, PSC, consisting of ambassadors representing member states, and on the military-strategic level by the EU’s Military Staff, EUMS, and the EU’s Military Committee, EUMC, comprised of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of member states.

**Possible cases**

With the above definition of EU military operations, we can identify the number of military operations that have been carried out so far as the following:

1) Operation Concordia in Macedonia, 2003, 2) Operation Artemis in DRC, 2003, 3) Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia 2004, still ongoing, 4) Operation EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 5) Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR (Central African Republic) in 2008 and 6) Operation NAVFOR Atalanta, the first EU naval operation ever, initiated in 2009 and still ongoing. All operations have, out of political choice, been limited in scope and, with two exceptions, Operation EUFOR Althea and Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, also with regard to their duration. Some 16,500 soldiers have, all in all, served under the EU flag in the six military operations carried out during the 00’s (see Annex 2).

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35 For a background on the development of the EU’s command and control arrangements, see Howorth 2007 and Simón, 2010
The fact that we are dealing with a population consisting of few cases is not necessarily a bad thing. This will provide us with a focus that improves our possibility to conduct efficient research characterized by the systematic collection of the same information across carefully selected units (King 1994 p. 45). We might, in fact, want to narrow down the number of cases further.

Operation Artemis in DRC and Operation Concordia in Macedonia 2003 were in a sense test cases, launched while the EU was still building up its structures for managing military operations. They served as the bedrock for establishing both institutional structures and “facts-on-the-ground”, thereby facilitating future operations.

Operation EUFOR Althea and Operation EUFOR RD Congo were both running during 2006, a fact that could facilitate comparisons. They represent two different forms of command and control structures. Operation EUFOR Althea pertains to the subgroup of Berlin plus-operations in which the EU borrows command and control structures from NATO, while Operation EUFOR RD Congo was an EU “autonomous” operation carried out in cooperation with the UN. Operation EUFOR Althea was initiated already in 2004, some changes occurred in 2006, and is still ongoing.

Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR is another example of an autonomous operation in Africa. The operation was launched in 2008, after a prolonged internal discussion. As with Operation EUFOR RD Congo, it was the UN that called for a force, this time with the aim to stabilize the situation for the internally displaced persons in the border area between Chad and Sudan. The role of the EU was more autonomous, in comparison to the "subcontracting role" of EUFOR DR Congo to MONUC in the DRC, but questions were raised about the post-colonial French hangover in the area. It is interesting as an example of how small nations can play a considerable role for ESDP. Ireland provided the Force Commander and 500 military personnel.36

Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta represents the first EU naval operation ever. It is an autonomous EU operation, albeit inserted into a larger context of global cooperation with the participation of, among others, China, Indonesia, Russia.

The Selection of Cases

Operation EUFOR RD Congo will be selected as the main case, since it represents an example of an EU autonomous operation, deployed at the request of UN DPKO in cooperation with the UN Force MONUC. It offers the advantage of being a finalized operation with known results – the Congolese presidential election was brought to a peaceful and successful end in the fall of 2006, after confrontations between the contesting parties. Operation EUFOR RD Congo took place within the context of the larger, long running and comprehensive EU mission in the DRC, EUSEC RD Congo, which encom-

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36 For a study on Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR, see Seibert 2010 and 2007
passes vast resources applied to Security Sector Reform, SSR, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Integration, DDR, and aid. Operation Artemis, the fore-runner of Operation EUFOR RD Congo, will be mentioned in this context, as will the French President’s “Non” to UN SG Ban Ki-Moon’s request in late 2008 for an EU-led intervention in Eastern DRC.

The case of Operation EUFOR RD Congo will not, however, suffice in order to deduct enough variables of real explanatory value (King et al. 1994, p. 107) since it, for obvious reasons, is likely to yield examples primarily of one of the two variables - the driving factors and less of the second variable - the inhibiting factors. We will therefore add a “non-case” of military operation: the Lebanon war in 2006. The possibility of dispatching an EU-led force to Lebanon was briefly discussed, but then discarded in the Summer of 2006. The discussion did, however, lead to preliminary ‘prudent planning’ in the EUMS, which distinguishes this case from other tentative discussions on possible EU led military operations. The ‘non-case’ will hopefully increase our knowledge about the second variable, the inhibiting factors and, as a consequence, increase the explanatory value of the exercise. Furthermore, it offers the advantage of having happened within the same time-frame, 2006, as Operation EUFOR RD Congo.

Operation EUFOR RD Congo and the Lebanon war will be selected as the main cases. They offer a convenient dichotomy between one positive and one negative case, and both situate themselves within the same six months period during the latter part of 2006. The focus on the two cases may help in identifying some central causal conditions. The study will depart from the Lebanon case, since it can be expected to be the most complex and rich case. It constitutes an unregulated conflict with a high level of violence and with the participation of a variety of actors from the UN to Hezbollah. It will help develop the indicators of the analytical tool in an iterative process between model and case that will not, however, be accounted for in detail in this study.

Still, since multiple causation and thus inference can be expected to characterize this study, we will add on cases if we expect them to provide new insights, and to ensure that the main variation in terms of command and control arrangements are covered. In this vein, Operation EUFOR Althea and Operation NAVFOR Atalanta will be dealt with as additional cases. Operation Concordia will be mentioned in the context of Operation EUFOR Althea.

### 4.3 Sources

The empirical material for the case studies in Chapter 5 consists of political pronouncements, the study of process and of policy implementation which, in this case, is equivalent to the deployment of forces. A narrative will be
given for each case, based on hard primary sources in the form of relevant documentation, complemented with interviews with key decision makers. The scholarly literature of relevance in the study of the EU’s military operations has been used to complement, corroborate and correct observations based on the empirical material. In the end of each case, conclusions will be drawn that will serve as the basis for comparative analysis in Chapter 6 and the conclusions of this thesis in Chapter 7.

I have been helped in this research project since I knew where to search for relevant information. This has allowed me access to a wealth of material, processes as well as to key actors. My close relationship to the object of study does, however, also raise the issue of bias. A word has to be said about the possible consequences for the accuracy of this study of my participation in part of the process relevant to the case studies. Some of the empirical material was gathered during my time in Brussels. It is the venue for the meetings of the many subcommittees of the Council of Ministers, made up of representatives of the member states of the European Union. Among them were the meetings of the Ambassadors for Political and Security Policy, PSC, and the EU’s Military Committee, EUMC, the latter consisting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the member states. The GAERC meetings of foreign and defence ministers represented another important format for deliberations on the EU’s military operations.

All this has allowed for a “cultural immersion” (King et al. 1994, p.37), but carries also with it the temptation to jump to conclusions. It has been important to compare and correct observations made during my time in Brussels with those obtained through the interviews and the study of scholarly work in the field of ESDP.

The complexity of the issue at study does not lend itself to simplistic pre-judgements but has instead spurred my curiosity to study and interpret patterns in the thick political environment that characterizes collective decision-making by the 27 EU members regarding military operations. I have often been surprised by the findings emerging from revisiting cases of EU military operations because of the layers of complexity that emerged as issues were explored further. New perspectives and explanations were added to the point that I at times had to reinterpret my preliminary observations. The interviews conducted with UN representatives did, for example, add completely new information to the Lebanon case in Chapter 5 and caused me to reinterpret observations made from the Brussels perspective. This is then also a reminder that the results presented are no more than my best available knowledge at this point. The findings could, and should, be probed and investigated further.

37 Or, rather 26 since Denmark has an exception from defence matters and does not participate in the main defence decisions
My position as a Swedish representative in some of the deliberations that are the object of study has made me attentive towards applying a particular Swedish perspective. As a practitioner, I have certainly observed developments from a different angle than that of somebody representing any of the capitals of the major European member states. As a scholar, I have been conscious of potential pitfalls resulting from any particular perspective. Since the purpose of the study is not to pass a report card or evaluate the benefit of the operations, but rather to observe the collective deliberations of the EU, I hope that I have been able to keep the necessary distance to the object of study to allow for uninterested observations made of the whole, rather than of its parts.

Now, for a general background on the ways the research was conducted and some proposals for guidance for those that would wish to undertake a similar endeavour.

It was my observing the unfolding of events in Brussels that made me aware of the many conflicting factors that influence decisions on the EU’s collective use of force. In order to reconstruct this process for scholarly purpose, a chronology of events was established. The documents accounted for in this study were then organized according to the chronology. It soon became clear, however, that it was not possible to capture the main features without complementing the material with interviews of some of the key actors not only in Brussels, but also in European capitals and at the UN in New York.

The most important interviews were conducted with the UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Ambassador Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, representing the Presidency of the Council of Ministers at the time of the main cases, and the then Director General of the EU Military Staff, General Jean-Paul Perruche. Together, they were selected as they represented the triangular relationship between the UN, the Presidency of the EU and the EU Council Secretariat in Brussels that shaped the EU’s decisions on the use of force. A regular dialogue with and interviews of representatives of the EU Council Secretariat provided additional background. The dialogue with NATO’s Secretariat in Brussels and at SHAPE in Mons has been valuable for my understanding of Operation EUFOR Althea.

The interviews, listed under References, became a fascinating journey into new and for me unknown landscapes. Additional facets to issues were revealed that changed perspectives as well as explanations of events. The complexity of the process behind the collective use of force begs the question of who, if anybody, has the total overview and “situation awareness” required for enlightened decision-making.

With regard to sources, a couple of observations that may be helpful for scholars who would like to investigate the topics dealt with in this study. There is readily available information regarding the EU’s military operations
accessible on the EU’s website. Decisions regarding the EU’s military operations taken by GAERC, the Council of Ministers (foreign and defence), are clearly documented. Some of the more interesting studies of lessons learned by the EU’s Military Staff are not, however, public. The EUMS’ bulletin “Impetus” provides an overview over the EU military affairs. The EU Institute for Security Studies, EUISS, regularly publishes collections of European defence core documents, as well as studies on CFSP, its policies, missions and operations. The scholarly literature on the EU’s military operations is only in the making, but a couple of books referred to in this study did provide valuable contributions that helped complement, ascertain and correct observations made. Media accounts can be of some help, but they do often reflect public statements rather than hard facts.

While I have benefitted from my inside knowledge of the events examined in this study, it could, in principle, be possible also for other scholars to undertake a similar endeavour. That would, however, require some basic understanding of defence issues in order to analyze, for example, the linkages between political and resource factors. So while officers get academically certified, scholars interested in defence matters would need to make a similar effort to study and understand the ways military operations are planned and conducted.

For an in-depth analysis of the dynamics behind the EU’s military operations, scholars will have to undertake a pain-staking reconstruction of events through interviews with key actors. It is desirable that these interviews are undertaken as soon as possible after the occurrence of events, since the passing of time will necessarily erase from the mind many of the more interesting details. In view of the complexity of the processes, interviews should be made with key actors from various strands, civilians as well as military officers. Each of them will bring different perspectives that will shed new light on the object of study. These are the rules of thumb that I have applied to this work.

38 For a thorough study in part based on interviews, see Major 2008
5. CASE ANALYSIS

As has emerged from Chapter 4, two cases have been selected for closer analysis. Section 5.1 will deal with the EU’s planning for an operation in the Lebanon war in 2006, an intervention that did not take place (thus termed a “non-case”). Section 5.2 takes up the intervention that actually took place, in the same year, the operation in DRC, Operation EUFOR RD Congo. For each of these cases the analytical tool is used in parallel analyses (5.1.2, and 5.2.2, respectively) and case-specific conclusions are drawn. In Section 5.3 three additional cases are advanced in order to ensure that the main command and control arrangements for EU led operations are covered. This chapter paves the way for the comparative analysis in Chapter 6 and conclusions in Chapter 7.

5.1 The Lebanon War 2006

5.1.1. Narrative

Introduction

This case seeks to determine which were the inhibiting and driving factors behind the option of an EU led military operation as part of a solution to the Lebanon war in the summer of 2006. It has not been possible to discover any publications that depict the EU’s deliberations on its military role in bringing the Lebanon war to a close. A version of this case, “To Intervene or not to Intervene? The EU and the Military Option in the Lebanon War of 2006” has been published in Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 11, No 4, pp. 408-429 December 2010 (Engberg 2010).

The special value of this non-case is that can be expected to yield findings in particular with regard to inhibiting factors. It is also a particularly rich case with its many interacting elements. The case will be based on a narrative of the unfolding of events between the outbreak of the conflict on 12 July 2006 and the end of the conflict on 11 August the same year. The narrative is built on interviews with some of the key actors, documentation from

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40 For a Chronology of events, see Annex 3
the EU and the UN and the article mentioned above. The narrative is divided into three phases, framed after some major events: Phase 1) “A window of opportunity for an EU-led force”, 12 July-21 July, phase 2) “Closing the window”, 22 July-3 August and phase 3) “In comes UNIFIL II”, 4 August-11 August.

The analytical tool will be applied to the narrative in two stages. First, by selecting factors from the narrative, and second, by plotting these factors across a matrix (Tables 3, 4, 5). The emerging pattern will then be interpreted and form the basis for some general conclusions.

The unfolding of events

a. Phase 1, “A window of opportunity for an EU led force”, 12 July-21 July

The outbreak of the conflict

The period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Lebanon war in the summer of 2006, had seen some modest signs of political progress towards peace both on the Palestinian and the Israeli side. Reconciliation between the different Palestinian factions had taken the form of the “Prisoners’ manifest”. The “realignment” within the Kadima party indicated the distant possibility of an Israeli disengagement not only from Gaza, but also from the West Bank. Spoilers, on both sides of the conflict, divide were looking for ways of derailing the process.

At the same time, tensions were rising between, on the one hand, an emerging anti-Iranian coalition led by the US, including some prominent Arab states, and, on the other hand, Iran with its connections to Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran was at the time faced with the prospect of UN-imposed sanctions as a response to its nuclear program. Ambivalence reigned with regard to a possible military response to Iran’s nuclear program, in case diplomacy failed. The US and France were trying to mend their differences over the Iraqi war and had found a common cause in Lebanon. The killing in 2005 of the Lebanese politician Hariri, whom the French president had personally convinced to go into politics, galvanized US/French resolve to try to dislodge Syria from Lebanon.

Israeli authorities had closely followed what they claimed being the delivery, financed by Iran and at times through Syria, to Hezbollah of a generation of new missiles with ranges that could pose a threat to Tel Aviv proper.41 Rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza strip and Southern Lebanon reinforced the belief in Tel Aviv that something had to be done, sooner or later, in order to remove the threat.

41 According to Israeli intelligence, Iran had since 2000 delivered, mainly through Syria, the Zelzal-2 missile with the range of 200 km, Fajr-3 (43 km) and Fajr-5 (75 km) to Hezbollah. Source: The Military Balance 2007, IISS, Oxfordshire: Routledge
The abduction by Hamas on 30 June of the Israeli soldier Shalit, led to Israeli military incursions into Gaza. Hezbollah opened a second front, by kidnapping and killing Israeli soldiers and launched rocket attacks on Israel from Southern Lebanon. Israel initiated an air campaign on 12 July on Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.

G8\textsuperscript{42} summit 16 July in Saint Petersburg
The escalation of events in the Middle East propelled international institutions into a hurried meetings and production of declarations. The G8 summit in Saint Petersburg on 16 July was dominated by developments in the Middle East. G8 leaders blamed the upsurge in Middle East violence on “extremists” and demanded that Hezbollah released the captured Israeli soldiers. The G8 stated that Israel had the right to exist but called for restraint. US President George W. Bush reiterated that Israel had the right to defend itself. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the US was deeply concerned about civilian casualties in Lebanon, but that an immediate cease-fire would not solve the problem. The French President Jacques Chirac called for “a show of moderation” in the Middle East and for the disarmament of Hezbollah. German Chancellor Merkel suggested the creation of a new military observer force for Lebanon. (Engberg 2010)

The Arab League considered the peace process in the Middle East dead. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said that Israel would not win an offensive against Lebanon and urged for an immediate cease-fire. Iran expressed solidarity with Syria and Hezbollah and warned Israel that it would face unimaginable damages if it widened the front. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, OIC, called for an immediate end to Israeli “bloodshed”. (Engberg 2010)

EU set in motion
Finland’s foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja had, in his capacity as representative of the Finnish Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2006, met the Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni already on 3 July in Helsinki, in order to discuss the escalating crisis in the Gaza. The Finnish EU Presidency issued a statement and an extra meeting with the Political and Security Committee, PSC, was convened on 13 July. Support was given to the idea that the High Representative Solana should visit the region before the upcoming GAERC on 17 July and then report back to the meeting. Work started on the preparation of special MEPP (Middle East Peace Process)
conclusions at the GAERC. Consular cooperation and the evacuation of EU citizens were initiated. 43

Solana travelled to Beirut on 16 July, where he met Prime Minister Faud, Siniora and the president of the Parliament, Nabi Berry. Solana framed his visit as a show of solidarity with the beleaguered Prime Minister and the Lebanese government. He was, in fact, the first representative of the international community to visit the Lebanese Prime Minister. Solana evoked Lebanon’s privileged relationship with the EU, enshrined in the EU’s neighbourhood policy towards the country. Support was given to the Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan’s decision to visit, simultaneously, the region. Solana referred to UN SC resolution 1559 as a means of ending the occupation, the presence of a foreign country and the militias, and the possibility of the Lebanese government to restore the government’s possibility to exercise its responsibilities. Solana appealed to Israel to:

“not...enter into a logic of war, even as a response to actions that are provocations...Entering the logic of war will not resolve the problem of the region...and will continue to cause suffering among the people. We would like the response to what we see as an unacceptable provocation to be in conformity to international law, in conformity to the principle of proportionality, compatible with respecting the lives of innocent civilians and not inflicting unnecessary suffering...I want to strongly urge those who have the possibility to exercise influence to stop the violence, to do so and to do it immediately...Europe has always supported the independence, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of a free and prosperous country.” 45

Meeting of Gaerc 17-18 July

The Finnish Presidency in the form of Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja reported to the GAERC meeting on July 17-18, 2006, that he had been continuously on the phone, including with the parties in the region. He had been particularly concerned with the loss of European coherence at the UN. He thought the G8 statement included a useful reference to the Quartet46 and that one should work for a meeting sooner rather than later. The EU needed to look broadly at the region and to move from crisis management to conflict resolution. (Tuomioja 2008)

Solana reported to the meeting from his visit to Beirut. He referred to Israel’s and Hezbollah’s negotiating positions and expressed the hope that the UN could find some common ground. Siniora had expressed the hope to reassume, in the future, the national dialogue. Such an effort would, how-

43 Erkki Tuomioja in interview with the author in Helsinki, 20 October, 2008 (Tuomioja 2008)
44 Press statement of Javier de Solana EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in Beirut, Beirut, 16 July, S203/06
45 Idem
46 Quartet on the Middle East, established in 2002, comprising the UN, the US, the EU and Russia
ever, have to be set in a regional context. The EU could not watch its neighbourhood explode and do nothing. European interests were at stake and the EU needed to play an active role. US was central in pressing Israel to engage in mediation. The UN Security Council, UNSC, needed to be engaged, as well as the Quartet. Since the US was not yet ready to engage, the EU had to do something itself. The idea of monitoring the dividing line between Israel and Hezbollah was suggested. Solana was asked to continue his diplomatic activities and to put forward proposals for further action. (Engberg 2010)

Another important subject was the situation of EU citizens in Lebanon, of which there were tens of thousand. The Presidency had been coordinating Consular cooperation and means of safe passage out. Erkki Tuomioja thanked Germany who represented the Presidency in Beirut, the Commission, France and Cyprus in particular. The Commission announced that it had, in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, ENP, launched an action plan for humanitarian relief to Lebanon of €18 million for reconstruction and for Gaza €20 million of the so-called Temporary Mechanism to help supply food, fuel and water treatment. (Engberg 2010)

The discussions on Council Conclusions to be produced at GAERC were strenuous. Most member states were already at the time prepared to demand an “immediate cease-fire” to the fighting. The UK, in support of US positions, thought, however, that Israel needed more time to achieve its military goals. (Tuomioja 2008) With consensus being the guiding principle of decision-making in the field of ESDP, no reference was made in the Council declaration to any cease-fire. Instead, it contained calls for “an immediate cessation of hostilities”.47

Another contentious issue was the characterisation of Israel’s use of force. An initial proposal from the Presidency to use the word “condemn” was rejected by the UK. (Tuomioja 2008) Instead, GAERC repeated the demand issued by G8 for Israel to “exercise utmost restraint and not to resort to disproportionate action”.48

An EU led Force?

After the GAERC meeting, Solana departed immediately, on 19-20 July, to the Middle East, Israel, the Palestinian territories and Egypt. In Israel, Solana met Prime Minister Olmert. This represented a change of scenery, since Prime Minister Sharon used to refuse to meet the EU’s High Representative. Olmert made clear that Israel could envisage an international monitoring force as part of a peace agreement, but that UNIFIL was not the model. The force would need a stronger mandate and should be combined with elements

48 Idem
of the Lebanese Army. There was also the need for a monitoring force on the Syrian-Lebanese border to stop the re-supply of Hezbollah. Olmert invited the Europeans to provide troops and Solana to come back with a proposal for such a force. Solana also met with Abbas in Gaza, president Mubarak in Egypt and the Secretary General of the Arab League, Abu Gheit. All supported the idea of creating an international force once a cease-fire would have been arrived at, provided that it had a UN mandate. (Engberg 2010)

Solana’s visit to the region had led him to conclude that any long term stabilisation required a regional approach. He estimated that the military offensive would continue for weeks rather than days, since the Israeli had the support of the US and thought that the military goals could be achieved. The Sunni/Shiite balance was undergoing change throughout the Middle East. One would have to talk to the Syrians, but also think forbidden thoughts about talking to the Iranians and Hamas. Turkey could possibly serve as an interlocutor. Another conclusion was that a conceptual EU paper should be elaborated on a possible European contribution to a force. Some clarifications on the issue was also necessary in view of the upcoming Rome meeting of the so-called “Lebanon Core Group” and Solana’s, Annan’s and Rice’s discussions on the margins of the meeting on a possible solution to the crisis, of which a force was thought to be an essential part. The assumption that the EU could possibly play a future role, if and when there was a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, added to the centrality of raising the EU’s role, including a military one, in bringing the Lebanon war to an end. (Engberg 2010)

The institutional command and control arrangements for a force were unclear at the time, as were the force’s mandate, mission and Rules of Engagement, ROE, and troop configuration. It was, nevertheless, obvious that the bulk of the forces would have to be European, since they were already present in UNIFIL and possessed the necessary rapid deployment capabilities that should be essential to the new, more robust force. The European forces would have to be complemented with substantial components of forces from non-Western, preferably, Muslim countries. The force would work closely with the Lebanese Armed Forces, LAF, in order to strengthen and not undermine them. After completion of the mission, it was important to rapidly handle over to the Lebanese forces. France, or alternatively Turkey, were from the beginning of the conflict candidates to be the “framework nation” of the military operation. France’s pivotal role for the political process made it the prime contender for that role. (Engberg 2010)

Considerations concerning possible European assistance had been underway in the EU Council Secretariat in parallel with the development of the conflict. According to General Perruche, the then Director General of the EU’s Military Staff, EUMS, there were early indications pointing to the

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49 General Perruche in interview with the author in Paris, 10 February, 2009 (Perruche 2009)
possible launching of an Israeli operation. The Israelis had publicly warned Hezbollah and the attack did not come as a surprise. Furthermore, Solana had indicated that the Middle East was a central piece of EU’s agenda and had therefore asked EU’s intelligence branch SitCen and the EUMS if the EU could do something in order to help de-escalate the conflict and stabilize the situation. Solana’s request for a meeting to discuss “situation awareness” with the intelligence branch SitCen and the EUMS, unlocked the possibility for the EU Council Secretariat to start considering possible options for an EU role. (Perruche 2009)

According to the EU’s procedures, the EUMS is only entitled to start studying military options when 1) tasked so by Solana, with later confirmation by the Political and Security Committee, PSC, 2) or directly by the PSC. This institutional lock on EU’s advance planning capabilities had been put in place for several reasons: one being that it might be controversial for EU’s “military bureaucracy” to independently start planning for operations not yet considered by political authorities, another being the premeditated intention of some EU members states to curb EU’s ambition with regard to strategic planning, perceived as being in the purview of capitals. (Perruche 2009)

In view of the inherent uncertainty with regard to future military options, the internal work in the EUMS initially covered alternative approaches. One was that EU should be an instrument for conducting “force generation”, even if another organization, possibly the UN, would be in charge of the command and control structures. The more ambitious planning covered alternative institutional arrangements, including an EU led operation, with possibly France as the “framework nation”, i.e. providing the necessary Operational Headquarters for the operation in the form of Mont Valérien in France and a Force Headquarters in the theatre. Another option was a so-called Berlin plus arrangement by which NATO would provide the necessary Operational Headquarters in the form of NATO’s military headquarters SHAPE. In accordance with pre-arrangements made under Berlin plus, the already existing EU Staff Group in SHAPE would be put under the command of NATO’s Deputy SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander European Forces) and receive “augmentees”, or personnel, from EU member states. (Perruche 2009)

It was, however, clear to the planners that no operation would be possible until “the Israelis had finished their work”. Speculations ranged from several weeks to two months with regard to the possible duration of the Israeli campaign, a period during which the US predictably would block any decisions in the UNSC regarding an international force. The Israelis initially opposed a UN force, since they made UNIFIL I responsible for allowing Hezbollah to install itself unhindered in Southern Lebanon. On 25 July Israeli forces attacked a UN military observer post on the border to Israel and killed four observers. Hezbollah’s operations in the immediate vicinity of the post was evoked by the Israelis, but the attack was widely interpreted as a demonstration of Israel’s discontent with the UN and its apparent inability to
stop Hezbollah. The Israelis instead intermittently called for a European or a NATO force that could disarm Hezbollah. (Engberg 2010)

General Perruche doubts that NATO member states would have agreed to taking on the task of disarming Hezbollah, as asked for by the Israelis, and for the EU such a mission would have been out of the question. General Perruche was able to study closely the difficulty of disarming non-state actors during the conflict in Somalia, where he served 1992-1993 as a colonel and spokesperson, attached to the French forces. General Perruche:

“Disarmament of non-state actors can only happen after an agreement between the parties, as in Aceh where the EU successfully managed a disarmament mission as part of the overall agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM, the Aceh resistance movement. It will in the future be difficult to carry out disarmament operations if you do not have the support of local actors. It’s not like before, when you could “reduce the rebels” and solve the issue locally. Hezbollah has the support of Iran. That’s why Solana says that the solution has to be political and that the military component will have to be managed carefully, otherwise it can be counterproductive.” (Perruche 2009)

The problem was thus neither the mandate nor the mission since it was clear from the beginning that no deployment could be envisaged without a UN mandate based on an agreement between the parties. In addition, the availability of troops was not an obstacle. The fact that in the end, 80 per cent of the forces in UNIFIL II were European proves the point, in General Perruche’s view. The EU’s Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 defence planning process indicated that the necessary forces were at hands, including helicopters, provided that the political will was there. The EU could, in theory, use its brand new military instrument, EU Battle Groups, EU BG, in a “bridging operation” to a larger force that would take more time to generate. But the only EU BG in readiness was assigned to be the strategic reserve to Operation EUFOR RD Congo50, which in turn drew on a French Battle Group which figured on EU’s roster for available EU BG. The German Operational Headquarter in Potsdam served as the European Operational Headquarter for the force which liaised with and was imbedded with the UN-led force MONUC in DRC. (Perruche 2009)

A theoretical alternative was to use elements of NATO’s Response Force, NRF, such as the Franco-German brigade (Eurocorps) which was at the time in readiness. Such a force would, however, naturally be associated with NATO and therefore face objections from some of the parties, in particular Hezbollah. Furthermore, one would “loose” the force to a prolonged mission and the Germans would probably say no because of its reluctance to get involved in high profile military operations, particularly with ground forces,

50 The Operation EUFOR RD Congo was conducted in the fall of 2006. It will be the subject of the next case in this study.
in conflicts involving the Israelis. Also, using elements of the NRF would have required a Berlin plus arrangement, a possibility discarded since it would possibly take long time to have Turkey and Cyprus agree on the arrangement, based on the experiences from the Bosnia war and the transfer of authority from NATO to the EU. (Perruche 2009)

Another EU option for generating the necessary forces, used in the case of Operation EUFOR RD Congo, was to conduct a “force generation”. Possible troop contributing countries were France, Italy, Spain (who, however, had few available forces after an earlier increase of troop levels in Afghanistan and had no military precedent in the region), Finland and Sweden. There were precedents for working out arrangements for attaching such a force to troops coming out of Turkey, India and other non-EU countries. Without further clarifications with regard to the political framework for the operation and the mandate for the force it would, however, be difficult to generate a force. Solana, nevertheless, had called potential contributing member states, including France, Germany, Italy and Spain, and asked if they were prepared to field forces. (Engberg 2010)

The main obstacle to setting up any EU-led force resided in the lack of a self-evident command and control structure, necessary for a Lebanon operation, arguably of considerable risk and possibly of long duration. There was a considerable risk for “mission creep” because of the existing uncertainty with regard to the agenda of the parties. With no Operational Headquarters, OHQ, of its own, the EU would have to search for other solutions.

According to General Perruche, the idea of using a Berlin plus arrangement as a means of building a European chain-of-command, was invoked but quickly abandoned in discussions between EU member states. There were both practical and political obstacles to such a solution. The existing tensions between Cyprus and Turkey, as mentioned above, represented one impediment. It was, furthermore, doubtful that a Berlin plus arrangement would have been a workable solution for political reasons since NATO would not have been acceptable to all parties. (Perruche 2009)

During the study period of the possibility to conduct an EU led operation, General Perruche through informal contacts could verify that it was not possible to use the “framework nation” concept, because none of the five possible nations (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Greece) that had declared an OHQ to the EU, were prepared to assume the responsibility for such an uncertain operation. Consultations on the possibility of an EU member states assuming the role as “framework nation” took place roughly between mid-July and 20-21 July, in the recollection of General Perruche. The French, who were asked to play the role, were at the time already engaged in several operations (Ivory Coast, Afghanistan, Kosovo), which put strain on their Operational and Force Headquarters. No nation was prepared to assume the responsibility for an operation with an unpredictable level of risk and dura-
tion. The experience points to the limits of the concept of “framework nation” (Perruche 2009):

“If you accept to be a “framework nation”, that entails responsibility for your country and visibility in front of the International Community. If things go wrong, all eyes are turned towards your country. The question of securing an EU chain of command is not only a military issue, but also a political thing. Of course, the two are connected. You want to know that you have the necessary command and control capabilities to control the situation for political reasons. No country will accept to be a “framework nation” in an operation where the level of risk and confrontation is higher than the level it can deal with nationally.” (Perruche 2009)

General Perruche is of the opinion, that a formula whereby a EU chain-of-command would be embedded in a UN mission, along the same lines as the solution implemented in the case of Operation EUFOR RD Congo (with a European chain-of-command existing alongside, but co-ordinated with the UN chain-of-command, see Section 5.2), could have worked if there had been an EU HQ in Brussels. This was, in the opinion of General Perruche, a solution that could have satisfied European needs for command and control over the European forces during a possibly dangerous operation, while at the same time being acceptable and even welcomed by the UN. General Perruche:

“We could have managed an EU-led operation embedded in the UN on the condition that we had had a credible EU led chain-of-command which reflected the preparedness of EU member states to assume jointly the responsibility for the operation. The absence of a permanent chain-of-command in the EU in the form of an Operational Headquarter impedes the EU from assuming that responsibility. EU was not ripe”. (Perruche 2009)

The option of France becoming the “framework nation” would resurface at the beginning of August, when it became clear at the GAERC meeting of the EU foreign ministers on 1 August that the Europeans would provide 80 per cent of the UN mandated force. The option had, however, in reality been closed since around 21 July, even though this was not clear to all. The French were again pressed by Solana who wanted the EU to make a contribution. But the French remained adamant. (Engberg 2010)

This is an illustration of the many things that can go on simultaneously, and on different levels, in an institution as complex as the EU. Some of the central actors in the EU’s foreign policy establishment were apparently not aware of the existence of the discrete dialogue conducted between representatives of EUMS and the French General Staff. The inherent complexity of the EU allows for, at times, necessary deniability, but at the expense of transparency.
General Perruche confesses that the fact that the EU could not, in the absence of a European chain-of-command, make a contribution under EU flag to the allaying of the Lebanon war, constituted one of his main frustrations during his tenure as Director General of the EUMS.

b. Phase 2, “The window is closing”, 22 July – 3 August

Rome meeting 26 July
Because of UNSC’s and the Quartet’s limitations in dealing with the crisis, due to the position by the US and UK, the so-called “Core Group on Lebanon”, created in 2005, was called by Italy to a meeting in Rome 26 July. The former head of the EU Commission, Romani Prodi, who had recently been elected prime minister in Italy, was eager to prove Italy’s European credentials and wanted his country to assume a bigger role in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

The meeting offered a possibility to assess the degree of EU cohesion and divisions, as well as the likelihood of advancing a UNSCR that would call for a cease-fire. Rice planned to visit the Middle East after the meeting, which was perceived as an indication of possible progress. Erkki Tuomioja had called almost all of the member states’ foreign ministers in advance, including in particular the new members in Central and Eastern Europe to make sure they were onboard. The Czech Republic and Poland were particularly attentive towards US views on the conflict. According to Tuomioja, the US, Canada and the UK found themselves isolated in their resistance to a call for a cease-fire at the Rome meeting. Italy tried, but failed, to include, as proposed by France, a demand for an immediate cease-fire in the final statement. Rice and Becket worked jointly, invoking their special command of the English language, to water down the text. Tuomioja noted that the US position put limits to what could be included into the text and achieved at the time at the meeting. (Tuomioja 2008)

The statement from the Rome meeting called for “..Israel to exercise its utmost restraint”, expressed its determination to “…work...to reach with the utmost urgency a cease-fire that put an end to the current violence and hostilities. The cease-fire must be lasting, permanent and sustainable...An International Force in Lebanon should urgently be authorized under a UN mandate to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in providing a secure environment...In addition, the need for a meeting of partner countries to discuss a joint approach to security assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces and security services was widely supported”.52

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51 Comprising the UN, the World Bank, EU: the Presidency (Finland), the High Representative and the Commission, US, Canada, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Lebanon, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the UK.
52 International Conference for Lebanon, Rome, July 26, Co-Chairmen Statement
Before the Rome meeting, the Presidency had issued a declaration on behalf of the EU, calling the attention to the humanitarian situation and urging “the parties to stop the hostilities. The statement also included a reference to “An International Force in Lebanon...(which)...should urgently be authorized under a UN mandate to support the Lebanese armed forces in providing a secure environment”. Erkki Tuomioja argued at the meeting that the departing point for a force was that it should be UN-led with a strong European component and that France or Turkey should be the “lead nation”. NATO was not a politically viable solution in the Middle East and an EU lead was not discussed in earnest. If such a discussion occurred, it must, in the view of Tuomioja, have been a primarily internal French debate. Tuomioja noted that Chirac initially had assumed France’s prime responsibility for the force and had offered to contribute 3,000 soldiers. The French president eventually shrunk from this position. It was important that the force was not composed entirely by Europeans. To that effect, Tuomioja phoned Indonesia and Turkey and asked for contributions. Turkey was used also as a back channel to Hamas. (Tuomioja 2008)

Siniora expressed disappointment at the result, while Solana and Prodi said to the press that a solution and a cease-fire “was getting closer”. Annan, Rice, Solana, Siniora met at the margins of Rome in a separate meeting to discuss a solution to the conflict. (Engberg 2010)

The EU Troika\textsuperscript{53} visit to Israel, Gaza and Lebanon 27-28 July

During the Troika visit to the region, Erkki Tuomioja was able to verify that the EU was warmly greeted by all parties to the conflict. The construction of the border crossing point EU BAM Rafah between Gaza and Egypt had reinforced the EU’s role as an interlocutor on security matters in the region. Israel and the US understood the value of the EU’s presence and contribution. Lebanon’s prime minister Siniora conveyed his high expectations on the EU. This general acceptance of EU as an interlocutor in the region helped the Presidency in its work to elaborate council conclusions for the upcoming, on 1 August, extra GAERC. No member state wanted to be seen as a spoiler of the common effort to produce council conclusions on the Middle East. Solana kept a UK/US proposal for council conclusions in his drawer. Secretary General Annan maintained close contacts with the EU at the time. (Tuomioja 2008)

During its visit to the region, the Troika had to dispel the interpretation by some parties that the Rome meeting had given “a green light for continued fighting”. Erkki Tuomioja emphasized that the message from Rome instead was to stop the violence and reach an immediate cease-fire. There could be no return to \textit{status quo}. UNIFIL’s mandate was outlived. There was a need

\textsuperscript{53} Erkki Tuomioja, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, EU Special Representative, EUSR, for the Middle East, Marc Otte
for a better equipped force with a stronger mandate, prepared to intervene with the purpose of implementing 1559 and to remove Hezbollah from an area that could endanger Israeli territory. The political elements for a solution was there: cease-fire, international force, Lebanese sovereignty etc. (Tuomioja 2008)

The Israeli government said that the campaign would continue for another two to five weeks. Tuomioja expressed concern in his meeting with the Israelis (government and opposition), that Israel’s operation could lead to more sympathy and support for Hezbollah and terrorism. Furthermore, Israel’s attack on a UNIFIL outpost, which led to the death of four UN observers, including a Finnish citizen, would not facilitate the recruitment of personnel for the force. Shimon Peres told Tuomioja that the Israeli government for the first time in its history was acting in a more restrictive manner than urged for by the US. Other members of the government argued that the force should be deployed to ports and an arms embargo be imposed to prevent arms deliveries to Hezbollah. EU was asked to include Hezbollah on its terrorist list. In Lebanon, the Troika met with representatives from civil society that warned against giving the impression that the stability force would be imposed on Lebanon. If that was seen to be the case, different groups would fight the force. (Tuomioja 2008)

On the wider diplomatic front, Tuomioja suggested that the German foreign minister Steinmeier visit Syria, which met firm opposition from France. President Chirac had been personally involved in convincing the Lebanese politician Hariri to return to Lebanese politics. Hariri’s killing in 2005 at the hands of presumed Syrian sponsored terrorists, reinforced French opposition to diplomatic contacts with the Syrian regime.

Towards the end game

The UNSC met on 27 July to pass a statement on the death of four UN observers. An explicit condemnation was not possible to achieve, however, due to US resistance. In a Presidential Statement, the Security Council said that it was "deeply shocked and distressed by the firing of the Israeli defence forces on a United Nations Observer Post in Southern Lebanon on 25 July 2006, which caused the death of four UN military observers".

On 28 July, the British Prime Minister Blair and the American President Bush launched an initiative on the deployment of an interposition force that could assist the Lebanese government in removing Hezbollah from the South. It was important that no gap was left between the Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of a force that could be explored by Hezbollah. The

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54 Germany had held the Presidency during the first part of 2007 and was thus part of the so-called Troika, comprising the three EU presidencies in suite, according to a rolling scheme

55 Presidential Statement, 27 July 2006
The proposal contained no linkage to a political framework for the solution of the conflict. (Engberg 2010)

The French felt, according to Le Monde, upstaged by the UK/US initiative that was likened to the unilateral policies without international legitimacy carried out in the lead up to the Iraq war.56

On 28 July, the DPKO called for a consultation meeting with troop contributing countries on 31 July to discuss a possible Stabilization Force in Southern Lebanon. The Americans emphasized again the danger of leaving a gap between a declaration of cease-fire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the deployment of an international force in cooperation with LAF. That indicated the need for a rapidly deployable force. NATO was a possible candidate to field the force, but other solutions could be discussed. France, Italy and Spain, countries that had indicated substantial contributions to the force, thought that the meeting had been called prematurely by DPKO, before the upcoming GAERC (1 August) meeting and negotiations on a UNSC resolution. France refused to attend the meeting which had to be cancelled. (Engberg 2010)

The Israeli air attack on 30 July on the Lebanese village Qana produced an international outcry and intensified demands for an end to the conflict. It precipitated an endgame, already well under way, to the conflict. The UNSC met in an extra meeting on 30 July to discuss the event. In the ensuing statement, the UNSC did not, due to US opposition, explicitly condemn the event or call for an immediate cessation of hostilities, as called for by Annan, but instead “strongly deplored” the attack and called for “an end to the violence”. Annan expressed his disappointment with the UN’s passivity in view of the escalating conflict.57

In view of the pending expiration of the UN mandate for UNFIL, a declaration was passed on 31 July on the provisional extension of the mandate to 31 August. In a parallel development, the UNSC on 31 July passed a resolution calling for sanctions against Iran.

French ambivalence

At the beginning of the Lebanon war, the American and French presidents had, according to the French newspaper Le Monde on 1 August, 2006, agreed on how to handle Hezbollah. But tensions grew as the conflict dragged on and France started to stake out a more independent course. There were early disagreements on the proper time to call for a cessation of hostilities or cease-fire, but also regarding the mission of an international force, France’s role in it, the linkage between decisions on a political framework for bringing the conflict to an end and the deployment of a force.

56 Le Monde, July 29, 2006
Israel’s foreign minister Tipzi Lvini had, for example, urged France to play a leading role for the force. The aim would be to help the Lebanese government implement 1559 and to disarm Hezbollah. France had taken the initiative to 1559, helped Lebanon liberate itself from Syrian dominance and should now “conclude its magnificent work in Lebanon”.58

In the view of the then head of UN’s DPKO, Ambassador Jean-Marie Guéhenno59 the war did not go as the Israelis had expected:

“The Israelis had not managed to disarm Hezbollah. Instead, they were dragged into a quagmire and were starting to search for an elegant way to get out of it. Any credible force that could relieve the Israelis would do. Hence the call for France to step in and assume the responsibility for a force. The idea of sending an EU-led force was a “non-starter” with Hezbollah, and therefore Lebanon. The EU was seen as too close to Western powers. The EU needs to become more self-aware of the way it is perceived. Only UN was acceptable under the circumstances.” (Guéhenno 2008)

In French media, the French Foreign Minister Dousty-Blazy declared that a cease-fire and political agreement must precede the deployment of troops. The force should, in the view of the French foreign minister, have three tasks: control a cease-fire, create conditions for the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces, LAF, in the South and to train LAF.60

President Chirac had, at an initial stage of the crisis, offered a substantial French force of 3,000 personnel to the endeavour, but had subsequently become more vague about the French commitment. (Tuomioja 2008) There were several reasons for this. One was France’s described fear of being pushed into what was perceived as a dangerous role shaped by the US and Israel. Another reason was, according to Ambassador Guehénno, France’s, and particular its military establishment’s resistance, based on bad Balkan experiences, to put troops under UN command and control structure. SG Annan had made multiple calls to Solana and pledged the commitment of European troops as a means of bringing the war to a close. The French were thus under the pressure not only from the Americans but also from Secretary General Annan. Ambassador Guehénno:

“I put pressure on the French to help end the war and to commit troops. Kofi Annan also put pressure, there was an outrage against the war. The French did not want the UN because of bad Yugoslav experiences. In particular the French military had bad memories of the UN, although the Europeans were actually the ones who had imposed a double-key in Yugoslavia, because they had troops on the ground while the US did not, and they were concerned that the inappropriate use of air power under US pressure would put their ground forces at risk. The centralised and excessive civilian control over tactical

58 Le Figaro, 29-30 July, 2006  
59 In interview with the author in Stockholm, 11 October, 2008 (Guéhenno 2008)  
60 Le Figaro, 31 July, 2006  

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military decisions in Yugoslavia was not the result of some UN habit of micromanaging, but a consequence of the lack of strategic unity in the Security Council. In Lebanon, the French had to reconcile conflicting concerns and objectives. France is a traditional friend of Lebanon and Chirac was strongly opposed to the Syrian interference in Lebanon. In New York, cooperation was good between the US and France, but the US did not want to have a resolution before the Israelis had ended the war. The French were close to the Americans, but the continuous postponement of a resolution did not look good, and they wanted to be a bridge to the Lebanese. Also, the French wanted to be a key player in bringing about a political solution, but they would have probably preferred not to send troops under UN command to Lebanon. That was however not a tenable position.” (Guéhenno 2008)

**Extra GAERC 1 August**

The GAERC met on the eve of important negotiations in New York, where serious negotiations between the French (Lebanon) and Americans (Israel) on concrete, but still opposite, resolution texts were underway. The proper time to call for a cessation of hostilities or cease-fire, the sequencing between the deployment of a force and the decision on a political framework, still constituted the bones of contention. The bombing of Qana had, however, increased the likelihood of a UN-resolution. It had, according to Tuomioja, become clear that Israel could not achieve its military goals, but that the military campaign instead reinforced Hezbollah’s position. Annan had called and asked the EU to be more active in the setting up of an international force. France was, at the time, keeping a low profile on that issue, while Italy’s foreign minister d’Alema tried to seize the leadership role. (Tuomioja 2008)

The Presidency reported from the Troika’s trip to the Middle East and emphasized that the EU was greeted as a valid interlocutor by all parties. The EU had to react to that. Its credibility was at stake. EU was the main provider of the humanitarian effort and would provide the bulk of forces if there were an international force. The goal of the Presidency at the time was to achieve unity in the EU camp and to manifest the EU’s independence. (Tuomioja 2008)

Solana said that he expected the UNSC to take major political decisions later in the week, starting from the French draft on which the US was ready to work. Israel and the US said that there could be no cease-fire without an international force, while the Europeans wanted to see the conditions for a force in place before agreeing to contribute to it. (Engberg 2010)

France presented the draft UNSCR: an immediate cessation of hostilities, then a durable cease-fire including political agreement to deal with the border, abductees and prisoners. The focus would be to restore Lebanese sovereignty, the Taef accords, UNSCR 1559, including the disarmament of Hezbollah. Disarmament should be the result of a political rather than a mili-
tary process. An international force could not be expected to do what the Israelis had failed to do – disarm Hezbollah.61

The main question for GAERC was whether the EU’s member states, and in particular the UK, were ready to embrace any of the to key formula regarding an end to the war: cessation-of-hostilities or cease-fire. UK thought, for its part, that the extra GAERC (as proposed by Italy and Spain), was unnecessary and risked undermine negotiations in New York. Other member states hoped that the GAERC would enable the EU to provide a show of unity62 and to shore up France’s negotiating position in dealing with the Americans. (Engberg 2010)

Over luncheon, ministers discussed a Presidency proposal for a draft declaration asking for an immediate cease-fire. Erkki Tuomioja describes, what he calls, “the media game” taking place in the backdrop of the meeting. The UK in particular had leaked their objections to the draft resolution to Reuters, claiming that Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland supported them. The countries concerned said that the version presented of their position was “totally unacceptable”. When presented with the article, UK foreign minister Beckett made clear that the article did not reflect what she was going to say. She declared then that UK was on the track to reach a cessation of hostilities and that the UK also supported the French draft resolution which contained three elements: the cessation of hostilities, political agreement and an international force with EU-contribution. (Tuomioja 2008)

Many ministers argued that the situation called for an immediate cease-fire, others that it was more important that the cease-fire should be permanent and proposed a step-by-step approach to it. The German minister Steinmeier argued that the choice of the formulation “cessation-of-hostilities” would give the EU more influence over Israeli behaviour. (Tuomioja 2008).

The compromise resolution was reflected in the Council conclusions which called for:

“an immediate cessation of hostilities to be followed by a sustainable cease-fire...the Council fully supports the efforts of UN Secretary General and the Security Council to be rapidly convened to define a political framework for a lasting solution agreed by all parties, which is a precondition for deployment of an international force. Such a force requires a strong mandate from the UN to act in support of political settlement and Lebanese armed forces. Once this framework has been established, EU member states have declared their willingness to contribute to such an operation together with international partners.”63

Italy pledged 3,000 troops and Spain promised to commit a substantial force.

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61 Notes taken by the author in Brussels in the summer of 2006
62 Five EU MS were part of the UNSC at the time: UK, FR, DK, GR, Slovakia
63 Press statement from the Council of the European Union, 1 August, 2006
c. Phase 3, “In comes UNIFIL II”, 4 August – 11 August

New York: end of the conflict

In New York, the US Ambassadors Bolton and the French Ambassador de la Sablière continued negotiations during the first days of August. Ambassador Guéhenno describes what he calls “the strategic change” that paved the way for a breakthrough in the negotiations 4 August:

“I was involved in the discussions that led to the resolution. An early draft would have let the Israelis remain north of “the blue line” after the cessation of hostilities – which would have legitimized their presence there. The Lebanese were wondering what to do to prevent that. I suggested that if they wanted to change the dynamics in the UNSC, they had to do more than diplomatic demarches, they had to be ready to create new facts on the ground. The obvious bold gesture would be for the Lebanese to accept to move south of the river Litani, all the way to “the blue line”, which they had refused to do for decades. To my surprise, the Lebanese decided to do so. That changed the dynamics of the negotiation. If the Lebanese were going to deploy south of the Litani, a quick deployment of a UN force was necessary before they did so, which only the Europeans could provide. The French then realized that they could not be the architects to a political solution if they did not provide forces. The deployment of the Lebanese army to “the blue line” was a strategic change. Before, the UN had no de jure interlocutor in the South, now the UN/Lebanese army had to discuss on a daily basis, and the Lebanese had to assume responsibility. Hezbollah had to decide whether to challenge the Lebanese government or lay low. Gen Suleiman, the Head of the Lebanese Armed Forces, understood that the breakdown of LAF had paved the way for civil war. The deployment of Lebanese forces to the South could allow for some reintegration of Hezbollah into the armed forces, if the internal Lebanese political process went further. The withdrawal of the Israelis was carefully choreographed in order not to allow them to get in touch with the Lebanese. The Israelis destroyed much of Hezbollah’s infrastructure in the South, tunnels etc. They were surprised that UNIFIL stayed on during the war, although that was very difficult. But that was a key element to the quick deployment of UNIFIL II”. (Guéhenno 2008)

The US and France jointly presented their compromise for a UNSCR on 4 August. Consultations were initiated on 5 August and the UNSC met to discuss the proposal on 6 August. The text, in the critical para 4, “Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations.” In para 6, the text outlines one of the principles as “security arrangements to prevent resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between “the blue line” and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Lebanese
armed forces and of the UN mandated international forces deployed in this area”.

The formula thus reflected the compromise reached by the US and France: the calls for disarmament of Hezbollah were traded for Israel’s right to exercise its right to self-defence and to carry out defensive operations, i.e. the downgrading of Hezbollah infrastructure and the imposition of an arms embargo in the form of an Israeli (naval and air) blockade.

Lebanon expressed hesitations with regard to the apparent lack of demand for an Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. France emphasized that this did not amount to any acceptance of a continued Israeli presence on Lebanese territory. The UNSC discussed and amended the text in order to make it more palatable to the Lebanese. Hezbollah, represented in the Lebanese government, objected to a Chapter VII mandate. (Engberg 2010)

UNSCR 1701 was passed 11 August with a robust mandate, but without explicitly mentioning Chapter VII. The resolution called for the disarmament of Hezbollah and other paramilitary forces south of the Litani river. The withdrawal of the Israeli Army would take place in parallel with the Lebanese Army/UNIFIL advance in the South. This left, in practice, a three week gap between the cessation of hostilities (11 August) and the injection of the first tranche of the UN force (2 September). By 1 October all of the Israeli armed forces had withdrawn south of “the blue line”.

The force, UNIFIL II

UNIFIL was reinforced from 2,000 to 15,000 personnel. UN troop contributing meetings were held on 17 August and on 28 August in New York. Deployments were made between 2 September and 4 November, when UNIFIL II had reached its full capacity of 15,000 personnel. Forces from EU member states made up the bulk of UNIFIL II, with France, Germany and Italy all providing forces in the order of 2,200-2,500, Italy 1,100, Poland 500, Belgium 400 and Finland, Greece, Ireland, Sweden around 200 each. The EU used its own logistical arrangements for deploying its forces rapidly into the theatre. Gowan (2007) remarks that UNIFIL looked like an EU-led multinational force with a UN logo, not a traditional UN mission.

Norway joined the European group with 100. Germany’s substantial contribution centred on a naval force, marking German readiness to shoulder responsibilities in a region traditionally sensitive to German deployments, but with a low-profile, low-risk form of participation. Efforts to mobilize forces from Muslim countries resulted in Indonesia 851, Turkey 681, Malay-

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64 Draft UNSC Resolution/Projet de Résolution du Conseil de Sécurité
65 The Military Balance 2007, IISS, Oxfordshire: Routledge
Spain’s hope to play a major role was dimmed as France and Italy assumed the role of “lead nations”. The French were ambivalent and divided in their view of the UN, as we have learned earlier in this text. They were nervous to be seen as too central to a potentially dangerous and long lasting operation. The UN lead in terms not only of mandate, but also of command and control arrangements, in that sense offered an institutional shelter that could absorb the shockwaves, in case something would go wrong. But France, and in particular its military establishment, had also been reluctant to relinquish national control and to put its forces under UN command and control. The reluctance of France and Italy was allayed through the formation of a military-strategic cell at the UN DPKO, in New York, a precondition set for French and Italian engagement, jointly with a demand for a chapter VII mandate. A French and Italian general intermittently filled as liaison officer.

The experience will, according to Ambassador Guéhenno, be used as an element in reforming the UN HQ. While in reality a mere liaison arrangement, in the view of the Ambassador, elements from traditional J5 departments in military HQs will be borrowed in order to boost the military-strategic cell. Political-military coordination will be increased, Crisis Management Concepts, CMC, streamlined. UN will keep open the possibility of national secondments from troop contributing countries to the strategic-military cell when new missions are deployed. As important as the formation of the political-strategic cell was the formulation of Rules of Engagement, ROE, a work done with the help of the troop contributors, in particular some French officers. With regard to force planning, the numbers were political and in reality too high for the area. The UN resolution stated that the force would “assist the Lebanese” in disarming Hezbollah and that in reality put a ceiling on what the force could do. (Guéhenno 2008)

UNFIL II has, according to Ambassador Guéhenno, had a positive impact in Lebanon. It deters Hezbollah from being too visible in the South and it has altered the political equation of political forces in Lebanon. There are, however, unrealistic expectations about what the force can really do. It contributes to political constraints on the warring parties. The French brought Leclerc tanks, artillery, so-called organic elements. But UNFIL II can only complicate, not prevent a hostile act, if one of the parties would choose to break the current status quo. (Guéhenno 2008)

**Epilogue**
The outcome of the war is still being debated and has been cast in new light as the result of the Gaza war, with casualties estimated at around 1,300.\(^{67}\)
Some argue that Hezbollah won the war, since it was not defeated, but to the contrary rearmed and reinforced its political position in Lebanon. Through the siege of the Lebanese government buildings and the occupation of Beirut’s international airport in 2007, and the reshuffling of the Lebanese Government in 2011, Hezbollah reinforced its political standing. Others would argue that Hezbollah was taught a lesson, including the cost to the civilian population in Lebanon, which deterred it from opening a second front during the Gaza war 2008-2009. The Israeli conduct of the war, in particular the squandered land offensive, was severely criticized in an official Israeli inquiry, the Winograd Committee, which barely spared prime minister Olmert his position. The lessons learned by the Israeli authorities were applied to the conduct of the Gaza war. In March 2009, the UK established channels for dialogue with Hezbollah.

What role could the Europeans play in the future? Erkki Tuomioja is of the view, that there existed a “window of opportunity” for the EU to play a positive role during the Lebanon war and to follow-up efforts to get the Middle East Peace Process, MEPP, going. The US, burdened by the Iraq war and with its close ties to Israel, was unable to forward the peace process. In the Quartet, the US was alone while the three others had a common position. The EU had to step in and was greeted as a valid political interlocutor by the US, Israel, Iran, the Lebanese government, including Hezbollah. The goal for the Presidency was to achieve unity within the EU camp, and to manifest the EU’s independence. The EU’s interests in the region was to achieve peace and stability, but the EU had, apart from that, no major interests. The evacuation of EU citizens from the war zone was, of course, a particular interest. The EU had always contributed with money, now it needed to raise its political profile. EU’s activism at the time has been followed by passivity. (Tuomioja 2008)

Ambassador Guéhenno expects the EU to play a military role in the Middle East in case there is an agreement between Israel and Palestine. An eventual force would, however, have to be more robust than UNIFIL II. EU is acceptable to both Palestinians and Israel. The Palestinians, though, would probably see an EU force as a complement to the UN, while the Israelis would want to be assured by the US. It could be more difficult to have NATO accepted. Excluding NATO could, however, reflect negatively on the organization. (Guéhenno 2008)

67 In the Lebanon war, which lasted 34 days, 39 Israeli civilians and 117 soldiers were killed and 743 Lebanese civilians, 34 soldiers in the Lebanese Armed Forces, 68 Hezbollah fighters. Source: “Military balance 2007”, IISS. Oxfordshire: Routledge
68 See, for example ”Israel’s goal in Gaza” by Thomas Friedman in International Herald Tribune, 16 January 2009
5.1.2 Analysis and Conclusion

In this section, the analytical tool will be applied in two stages. Firstly, by selecting indicators from the narrative and, secondly, by plotting these factors across a matrix in tables 3, 4 and 5 that correspond to the three different phases of the conflict. The emerging patterns will then be interpreted and form the basis for some general conclusions.

Applying the analytical tool

The first option was a hypothetical “EU led operation” with an EU member state (France) constituting the “framework nation”, thus providing the necessary elements to a European chain-of-command. This solution was discussed informally between the Director General of EUMS, General Perruche and his French interlocutors until around 21 July, when the French decided to decline the offer. The option of an “EU led operation” remained, nevertheless, valid in the public debate, until the US and France reached an agreement in New York on 4 August on the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces, LAF, to “the blue line”, jointly with the introduction of UNIFIL II. The move was carefully co-ordinated with the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces. Israeli defensive operations, including the application of arms embargo operations and the destruction of part of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and inventory in Southern Lebanon were allowed to continue for a couple of weeks. By October 1, operations had ceased altogether.

Another option for an EU-led force had been the application of the Berlin plus formula, a possibility discussed and then discarded during the first weeks of the conflict. This option will be considered in the following analysis, but only as a sub-alternative.

Three phases with regard to the constellation of driving an inhibiting factors behind the possibility of an “EU led operation” can be discerned:

**Phase 1)** 12 July (date of the outbreak of the conflict) – 21 July (when France declined to be a “framework nation” of an “EU led operation”). The main EU actors (France and UK, both P 5 members) were at the time still in disagreement on the proper time to call for a cease-fire and the sequencing between a decision on the political framework for an operation and the decision of the force proper.

**Phase 2)** 22 July – 3 August, when cohesion between the main EU actors (also reflecting a changing US stance) started to coalesce with regard to the proper time to call for cease-fire. The French leaders were still indecisive with regard to the submission of their forces to UN command and control.

**Phase 3)** 4 August – 11 August (end of conflict), when the US and France agreed on the political framework for and the configuration of the force:
UNFIL II plus LAF, in coordination with the phased withdrawal of the Israeli forces, IDF.

It is difficult to make comparisons over time, since a number of complex issues keep mutating. Comparisons can more easily be made between phases 1 and 2, while some fundamental changes have taken place in phase 3 that make comparisons more difficult or irrelevant altogether. The main difference is that the option of an EU-led force does no longer exist. Some factors will nevertheless be registered as a means of comparing a hypothetical EU-led force against the force that actually happened – UNIFIL II. It is important to bear in mind that the case studied during all phases is an EU-led force, although this in reality was an option only during phase 1. The basic tenet of this study is that it is a “non-case”, which by nature then is a hypothetical one.

In some cases in the following, both + and – will be applied to the same indicator. This will happen when an actor is ambivalent, or, as in the case of the US and Israeli support for a European force, this represents a “mixed blessing” since the implied mission was for the Europeans to “disarm Hezbollah”.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the analytical tool will be applied in two stages. First the factors seen in the narrative are pointed out, then they will be plotted to the matrix.
Applying the analytical tool

A. Factors External to the Organization

1. Political

1.1 View of the warring parties:
- Lebanese government: Siniora welcoming (+), Hezbollah possibly negative (-)
- Israel for the first time welcoming a European force, but of a force that could disarm Hezbollah. Mission a “mixed blessing” (+, -)

1.2 View of other relevant actors:
- Muslim world, Western forces only acceptable with the participation of troops from Muslim world. Ambivalence (+, -)
- US, phases 1 and 2, positive to a European dominated force, but one that could disarm Hezbollah. Mission a “mixed blessing” (+, -), phase 3, favouring a UN-led force (-)
- The traditional Israeli/Palestinian conflict had metamorphosed into a larger Middle East conflict with elements of struggle between pro- and anti-Iranian forces (-).

2. Pol-mil

2.1 Character of the conflict:
- Close to Europe. Easy to project forces (+)
- High intensity conflict. Not an automatic obstacle (+, -)

2.2 Mission:
- UN-mandated (+)
- Chapter VII, assumption during phases 1 and 2 (+), phase 3, after UNSCR no mentioning of chapter, but references to a “robust mandate” (+)

2.3 Tasks:
- Task according to the Israelis: disarm Hezbollah, phase 1 and 2 (-), phase 3, UN mandate for a UN-led interposition force (+)
- Mix of civ-mil tasks conducive to an EU operation (+).

3. Resource
3.1 Military forces in place:
- UNIFIL already in place during phases 1 and 2 (+, -), UNIFIL II, phase 3 (-)
- Lebanese Armed Forces, LAF, not deployed to the South, phases 1 and 2 (+), Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to the South, phase 3 (-).

B. Factors Internal to the Organization
1. Political
1.1 EU Values:
Among the most frequently quoted, primarily by Solana, values at stake were:
- the risk to international law (Israeli conduct of war not in conformity with the principle of proportionality)
- the risk of undermining UNSC role
- the logic of war will not benefit Israel and will cause suffering among people
- defend Lebanon’s territorial integrity
- not let other fight their proxy wars
- solidarity with Lebanon who has a privileged relationship with the EU
- try to mediate and contribute to conflict resolution
- domestic outcry in EU countries.

The examples above will be compressed into one category: values, “EU a force for good” (+).
1.2 EU Interests:

- affirm EU as a global and regional actor
- contribute to stability in the greater Middle East
- impede the EU’s neighbourhood from exploding
- contain the risk of the spread of terrorism to the EU (the consequences of Mohammed cartoons were still fresh in the memories of EU member states)
- evacuation of EU citizens from the area
- secure energy supplies.

These examples will be compressed into one category of: interests (+).

1.3 European cohesion/division:

- One third of the UNSC from the EU. Phase 1, UK/France P5 divided with regard to the proper time to call for a cease-fire (-), phase 2, unity coalescing (+), phase 3, in accord (but over a new configuration) (-)

- France ambivalent. Phases 1 and 2, France and the US seemingly in agreement initially on how to handle the crisis, based on cooperation with regard to Lebanon and Iran, but split over Israeli conduct of the operation in Lebanon and the role the force. EU important for France as backbone in dealing with the US. (+), phase 2 (+), phase 3, France and the US in agreement. UN prime political body for France (-).

2. Pol-mil

2.1 Civilian precedent:
- EUSR Otte, EUPOL COPPS, EU BAM Rafah (+)

2.2 Mission (according to EUMS):
- Interposition force, phases 1-3 (+)
3. Resource

3.1 Precedent:
- No military precedent (-).

3.2 Availability of command and control:
- No EU Operational Headquarter available (-).
- Berlin plus (using NATO’s headquarter SHAPE) discussed during phase 1 (+), but discarded during phases 2 and 3 (-).
- France reluctant to put forces under UN command during phases 1 and 2 (+), ready to put forces under UN-command, phase 3 (-)
- France considers the possibility to be the “framework nation” for an EU led operation during phase 1 (+), phase 2, option not available (-), phase 3, the chosen solution: UNIFIL II + defensive Israeli operations + deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces to the South meant lower demands on command-and-control arrangements for the European troops. French and Italian generals to the military-strategic cell in UN headquarter (-)

3.3 Availability of relevant European forces:
- Europeans main contributor to UNIFIL (+)
- No major, rapid European force under EU command available, EU BG engaged in DRC (force generation, plus strategic reserve) (-)
- NATO’s Eurocorps (FR, DE) in state of readiness as part of NATO’s Rapid Response Force, NRF. Phase 1, solution discussed (+), option discarded during phases 2 and 3 (-)
- European forces available trough “force generation”, phases 1-3 (+)

3.4 Availability financial resources:
- not discussed.

Now, let us have the second stage of the application of the analytical tool. This is presented in a more succinct form in Tables 3, 4 and 5, following the three phases of the conflict. From this, we move straight to the Conclusions.
### Table 3. Applying the Analytical Tool to the Matrix. Phase 1, 12 July – 21 July

**Main Factors:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Factors External to the Organization</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
<td>Driving (+)</td>
<td>Inhibiting (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 View of the warring parties:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lebanese gov./Siniora</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Hezbollah</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Israeli gov.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 View of other actors:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Muslim world</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- US</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Metamorphosing of the conflict, pro/anti-Iranian</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pol-mil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Character of the conflict:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- close geographic distance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- level of intensity, high</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Mission:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN mandate, chapter VII</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3 Tasks:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- task, according to Israel: disarm Hezbollah</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- civ-mil tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Resource</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Military forces in place:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- UNIFIL in place</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lebanese Army not deployed to “the blue line”</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Factors Internal to the Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1 Values: “EU a force for good”</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 European interests</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 European cohesion/division:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- European P 5 split</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- France ambivalent</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Pol-mil</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Civilian precedent</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Mission (according to EUMS):</td>
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<tr>
<td>- interposition force</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 No military precedent</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2 Availability of C&amp;C:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- no EU OHQ</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Berlin + (NATO) considered</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- France reluctant to put forces under UN command</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- France considering the role of “framework nation”</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3 Availability of relevant forces:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Europeans main troop contributor to UNIFIL</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- EU’s only available Battle Group engaged in DRC</td>
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<td>- NRF (Franco-German brigade) discussed</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- European troops available through force generation</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Table 4. Applying the Analytical Tool to the Matrix. Phase 2, 22 July–3 August</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Main Factors:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Driving (+)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Inhibiting (-)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Factors External to the Organization</td>
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<tr>
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<td>- Hezbollah</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Israeli gov.</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 View of other actors:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Muslim world</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- US</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2. Pol-mil</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Character of the conflict:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- geographic distance, close</td>
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<td>- level of intensity, high</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Mission:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- UN mandate, chapter VII</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3 Tasks:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- disarm Hezbollah (according to Israel)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- civ-mil tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Military forces in place:</td>
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<td>2. Pol-mil</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 EU civilian precedent</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Mission (according to EUMS):</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.2 Availability of European C&amp;C:</td>
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<td>- no EU OHQ</td>
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<td>- France reluctant to put forces under UN command</td>
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<td>- France decline becoming “the framework nation”</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- European troops available through force generation</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5. Applying the Analytical Tool to the Matrix. Phase 3, 4 August–11 August

**Main Factors:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Driving (+)</th>
<th>Inhibiting (-)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>- Hezbollah</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Israeli gov.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 View of other relevant actors:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Muslim world</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- US</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metamorphosing of conflict, pro/anti-Iranian forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Pol-mil</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Character of the conflict:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- geographic distance, close</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- level of intensity, high</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Mission:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN mandate, robust mandate</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Tasks:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- task: interposition force</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- civ-mil tasks</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Resource</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Military forces in place:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- UNIFIL II to be deployed</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lebanese Army to be deployed to “the blue line“</td>
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<td>B. Factors Internal to the Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1 Values: “EU a force for good”</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 European interests</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3 European cohesion/division:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- European P 5 united (UNIFIL II)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- France no longer ambivalent</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>2. Pol-mil</td>
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<td>2.1 EU civilian precedent</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>2.2 Mission:</td>
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<td>- UN defined, robust chapter VI</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>3. Resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 No military precedent</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>3.2 Availability of European Command and Control</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- no EU OHQ</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Berlin + (NATO) discarded</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- France ready to put forces under UN command</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3 Availability of relevant forces:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Europeans main troop contributor to UNIFIL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- EU’s only available Battle Group engaged in DRC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- NRF (Franco-German brigade) discarded</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- European forces available through force generation</td>
<td>X</td>
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Conclusions

The pattern emerging with the help of the analytical tool will have to be interpreted with care. It should be regarded as a portrait, rather than an x-ray. We are studying a complex issue and one that is in constant development over time. The focus of this study, the case of an eventual EU led operation in Lebanon, is a moving target. It exists as an option during a limited period of time. Conditions for fielding such a force kept changing during the rather compressed timeframe of roughly a month, from the outbreak of the war on 12 July, to its conclusion on 11 August. Also, we are studying a hypothetical force without clear contours and therefore subject to interpretations by the author and the author’s main sources of information who may, or may not, bring a subjective perspective to the issues at study. We will thus have to bear in mind, that further investigations could have yielded new information that would have cast new light on decisive developments. Since this is not a book on the Lebanon war, this study will make do with the material at hand and regard the findings as sufficiently accurate for the purpose of this study. This study is therefore an invitation to further studies and discussions that can increase our understanding of the EU’s military role in the Lebanon war.

Yet another caveat, is the rather unrealistic proposition at the basis of our case study, that the EU, with only seven years of experience of its European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP, should be ready to shoulder the responsibility for a high risk military operation in the volatile Middle East. Most students of ESDP or/and the Middle East could discard that as a highly unlikely proposition, without resorting to detailed studies of the case.

Still, that is what this study sets out to do. Not because of the likelihood that such an operation would take place, but because the feasibility of such an operation was considered for a fleeting moment, or to be more precise, between 12 and 21 July or 3 August, depending on the insights that various actors possessed at the time. This was enough to leave an imprint, if not a highly visible one, on the historic record of the Lebanon war, an imprint that can be studied, bearing the caveats described above in mind. The value of the Lebanon non-case is precisely that it yields some valuable information about inhibiting factors behind the EU’s military operations, a subject central to the overriding purpose of this study: to investigate the driving and inhibiting factors behind the EU’s military operations.

The division of the time span into three phases is framed on two, for the possibility of an EU led force, decisive developments: 1) the French decision around 21 July not to be the “framework nation” of an EU led force, 2) the US-French agreement around 3 August on the configuration of a UN mandated force in Southern Lebanon. The first date marks the end to the possibility of establishing an EU led force and the second the date of the establishment of the conditions for the force that would in fact be deployed, UNIFIL II. In the intervening period, conditions were gradually created for all
parties, including Israel and the US, to agree on the need to bring the war to an end.

These turning points provide us with some clues with regard to which inhibiting factors in the typology that are the more important ones. The first inhibiting factor – the non availability of an EU member state that would be prepared to serve as “framework nation” and provide the otherwise lacking European command and control structures, stands out. The EU does not possess the proper command and control structures to assume the responsibility for prolonged and potentially dangerous operations. This should not come as a surprise to any student of ESDP. The arrangements put in place with regard to OHQ’s establish in fact a ceiling on the EU’s ambitions, which cannot exceed the capability for command and control of the individual five national Headquarters that have been assigned to the EU. The mission envisaged, if not coherently formulated, during the first two phases of the war was the rapid injection of high readiness forces that could be deployed on the heals of withdrawing Israeli forces. This was a demanding task that required stealthy command and control structures. There were, for sure, differing opinions amongst the main actors about the task to be carried out. Israel and the US were calling for a force that could disarm Hezbollah, a task deemed impossible by European planners who instead envisaged an interposition force, albeit built around rapidly deployable European forces.

The lack of appropriate European command and control structures stands out as a decisive inhibiting factors during phases 1 and 2, when the possibility of an EU led force was still considered, although the option in reality was not available during phase 2.

Access to the necessary European forces was never a problem, according to General Perruche. The Europeans in the end did provide the bulk of forces to UNIFIL II. We will accept the General’s claim that this was not an inhibiting factor, although one could possibly argue that the forces needed for the hypothetical rapid deployment of forces in the wake of an Israeli withdrawal, would have been more scarce than the forces deployed for the less demanding task fulfilled by UNIFIL II.

More difficult to ascertain, are the purely political factors such as the degree of cohesion and decision on the European side and, even more evasive, the exact position of the warring parties on the presence of a European force. First, with regard to European cohesion/division, the main fault line was in the UNSC, where France and the UK held different views on the proper time to call for a cease-fire, but made efforts to keep the strain under control in the realisation that differences would narrow over time as all warring parties would start to look for a negotiated solution to the conflict. That happened during the end of phase 2. What the French wanted to avoid at all cost, was to be forced into assuming the responsibility for a force without the existence of any previous agreement between the warring parties. The UK/French held differing positions during phase 1 and much of phase 2, but
opinions started to coalesce at the end of phase 2 as the US and Israel started to look for a negotiated end to the conflict. The change of the UK position became apparent at the GAERC meeting on 1 August, reflecting a changing mood also in Washington and Tel Aviv.

The UK/French division in P 5, apparent until the end of July/beginning of August, was clearly an important inhibiting political factor. The uniting of minds coincided with the US/French agreement on an international force, some ten days after the French had shut the window of opportunity for an EU led force.

We have no first hand material in this study that can verify Hezbollah’s stance on the possibility of deploying an EU led force in Southern Lebanon. Solana was, during his visit to Lebanon on 20 July, presented with veiled warnings from non-governmental representatives of Lebanese society who said that any international force that would try to disarm Hezbollah would be met with fierce resistance. It is difficult to ascertain that such a warning was aimed at a potential EU led force, which possibly did not figure as an obvious alternative to Lebanese actors at the time. Repeated Israeli calls for an international force that could disarm Hezbollah may have contributed to suspicion with regard to Western, including European intentions. The fact that EU planners, in the words of General Perruche, never considered anything else than an interposition force deployed after an agreement between the parties and embedded in a UN command and control chain, was a fine print that was almost certainly lost on the warring parties.

Furthermore, Ambassador Guéhenno claims that the EU, in spite of its self-perceived role as a political “force for good” in mediating an end to the war, lacked self-awareness of how it was perceived by Hezbollah. An EU-led force was, according to Ambassador Guéhenno, a non-starter because the EU was seen as too close to Western powers. The EU’s stance on Hamas was one likely component of that outlook. Another was the support of individual EU member states of the Israeli and US position on the war. Only the UN was acceptable under the circumstances, according to Ambassador Guéhenno. With the reservation that it would be highly unlikely for the former Head of DPKO to say anything else, it is probable that he is providing an accurate depiction of Hezbollah’s position. Israel had wanted another force than UNIFIL because it had, in the view of the Israelis, allowed for Hezbollah to install itself in Southern Lebanon. A UN force would certainly be the preferred option by Hezbollah, who during the ensuing negotiations in New York between the US (Israel) and France (Lebanon, including Hezbollah) had worked to water down the mandate of UNIFIL II from Chapter VII (which had been one of the preconditions set by the French for putting their forces under UN command, the creation of the military-strategic cell being the other) to merely a “robust mandate”.

It is difficult to determine how Hezbollah would have viewed an EU interposition force with a European chain-and-command and embedded in the
larger UN force, along the same lines as EUFOR RD Congo was embedded in MONUC in DRC during the fall of 2006. This possibility never aroused because the French decided to put their forces directly under UN command. What we can study is Hezbollah’s possible view of an EU-led force before the US and France reached an agreement at the beginning of August. We will, in spite of the lack of irrefutable empirical evidence, chose to list **Hezbollah’s negative position as an important political inhibiting factor behind an EU led military operation**.

The acceptance by the warring parties is likely to be a pre-condition for many EU led military operations. Clear cases of crimes against international law, for example in the case of genocide, and with legitimization by the UN to deploy without the consent of all warring party and in accordance with the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, could form one exception. This does not exclude cases of enforcement operations where an EU force could use force against one of the parties, in accordance with a preordained UN mandate. Another hypothetical exception, could be the need for the EU to extract EU citizens from war zones.

**Another related inhibiting factor, was the non-existence of an EU military presence in the potential theatre of operations.** EU might in the future assume a military monitoring role in case there is a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. That distant possibility did possibly play a role in EU’s wish to assume a military role in the solution of the Lebanon war, in addition to the usual role as a mediator and provider of humanitarian aid. The EU had, in fact, established a first ESDP presence in 2005 in the form of the border mission EU BAM Rafah on the border between Gaza and Egypt and the EUPOL OPPS police training program on the West Bank. The UN’s longstanding military presence made it difficult, however, for the EU to play more than a complementary role to the UN. Furthermore, the decision on the part of the Lebanese to deploy for the first time all the way down to “the blue line”, in addition to the co-ordination between the deployment of UNIFIL II/LAF and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, removed the need for any other forces or operations.

More difficult to determine in the search for driving and inhibiting factors, is the role played by France’s different and shifting political considerations during the war. France’s pivotal role, jointly with that of the UK, transcends from the narrative. It is abundantly clear that the French at times were divided, had a hard time reconciling their diverging internal and external interests and that French positions developed over time. This represents a realistic portrait of a European nation of middle size (in an international context), but with a privileged position in the UNSC, a pivotal role in the EU and a central role in the Middle East, who is trying to ride the tiger of so many conflicting interests, including their own.

That the French in the end decided to throw in their lot with an enlarged UN force and not with an untested EU led force embedded in the UN force,
is no more than the predictable outcome. It is interesting, however, that the option of an EU led force was at all considered, albeit for a brief period, in the informal contacts between the EUMS and its French interlocutors. The idea possibly had its advocates not only in the EU’s Council Secretariat, but also amongst those segments of France’s political and administrative establishment that saw the reinforcement of ESDP in the interest of both the EU and France. The threshold for testing the EU’s military resilience in the hot Lebanese war was, however, naturally high. Prudent military considerations concerning the dangers that such an operation would have entailed for the “framework nation” played a central role and overruled the concern felt by parts of the military establishment about submitting French force’s to the UN’s command and control in volatile Middle East. France’s decision not to become the “framework nation” of an EU led force in Lebanon was certainly an inhibiting factor.

Political considerations also played a role. France was pivotal to the EU’s role in the Lebanon war, but France also wanted to preserve its privileged position as one of the P 5, its special bilateral relationship with Lebanon and a central role in the Middle East. To be an architect of the political solution, this required the submission of French forces to UN command, in the words of Ambassador Guéhenno. As an added benefit, from the UN’s point of view, the creation of UNIFIL II marked the return of major European forces to the UN fold after years of diminishing European participation in the UN’s expanding peacekeeping operations. France’s many interests do, however, cut two ways. It benefits France, but at times also the EU who cannot expect anytime soon to have a collective seat of its own on the UNSC. France’s ambivalence regarding an EU military role in the Lebanon war translates into both driving and inhibiting factors and will be listed in the analytical tool, but not figure in our main conclusions.

Another, yet more evasive factor to pin down, was the metamorphosing of the Middle East conflict from its traditional Israel-Palestine configuration into something larger, with the formation of pro- and anti-Iranian fronts throughout the Middle East. France’s cooperation with the US, for example in the attempt at dislodging Syria from Lebanon, should be seen in this context, as well as their common interest in reinforcing the position of the so-called moderate Arab nations and forces.

The EU was in the summer of 2006 trying to assume a role in the conflict more commensurate with the European interests and values at stake. This was certainly a driving factor behind the EU’s attempts also to play a military role. The allure of possibly having a role in a future settlement of the Israel/Palestine conflict, may have contributed. In 2006, the conflict had, however, taken on a new and larger dimension which made the EU’s goal more elusive. The EU had, for sure, become party to the deliberations on Iran’s nuclear dossier, but the high stakes involved also meant that much of the negotiations became the purview of privileged bilateral relations. One
could possibly argue, that the metamorphosing of the conflicts in the Levant into something larger, was an inhibiting factor. Another, more optimistic interpretation would be that the EU did in fact raise its political profile and positioned itself for a more prominent role, including a military one, if and when there would be a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

To summarize:
the most important driving factors was:

1) The EU’s ambition to raise its profile and to play a role more commensurate to European values and interests at stake.

The most important inhibiting factors were:

1) Hezbollah’s possible reservation with regard to an EU led military operation

2) The lack of cohesion between the European P 5, France and the UK.

3) The lack of an EU chain-of-command that could secure command and control

4) France’s decision not to be “the framework nation”, but to put its forces under UN command and control.

5) The non-existence of an EU military precedent.
5.2 Operation EUFOR RD Congo

5.2.1 Narrative

Introduction

This case seeks to determine which were the main driving and inhibiting factors behind the EU’s Operation EUFOR DR Congo in the fall of 2006. This is a positive case of an operation that occurred almost in parallel with the tentative discussions on an EU led operation in the Lebanon war, the topic of the previous non-case in Section 5.1. The nearly simultaneously course of events of the non-case and the case will facilitate the comparative analysis in Chapter 6.

DRC has been the focus since long time for EU policies and initiatives. The EU is the main provider of humanitarian aid to the country. As part of its “comprehensive approach”, the EU has undertaken various civilian and civilian-military missions in the area of DDR and SSR. Operation EUFOR DR Congo was preceded by Operation Artemis in 2003, and succeeded by a request by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in December 2008 for a renewed EU intervention in Eastern Congo. These events will be accounted for briefly in the Prologue and Epilogue to the main case Operation EUFOR RD Congo.

The main case will be presented in the form of a narrative, built on interviews with some of the key actors, representatives of the EU’s Council Secretariat in Brussels and in New York, members of the UN’s Department for Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO, and members of the Swedish Permanent Representation to the UN. Documentation from the UN and the EU will be presented, as will relevant scholarly literature. Notes taken by the author at the time of the events will complement the documentation. The EU’s deep and prolonged involvement in DRC is reflected in a number of scholarly work, most of them concerned with the EU’s civilian effort, but a couple also with the EU’s military involvement. Some of them were mentioned already in Section 2.2.2.  

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69 For a good and complementary analysis of this case, see Major 2008. In that analysis, the major documents and decisions related to the case are recorded. This case study will focus on the internal deliberations of member states and the planning process in the Council Secretariat related to Operation EUFOR RD Congo
70 For a Chronology of events, see Annex 4
The narrative will be divided into two phases, framed on some major events: Phase 1), “Catch 22, 27 December – 22 March 2006, and phase 2), “Planning, intervention and withdrawal”, 23 March – end of year 2006. The analytical tool will be applied to the case in two stages. Firstly, by selecting factors from the narrative, and secondly, by plotting them across a matrix (Tables 4 and 5). The emerging pattern will be interpreted and form the basis for general conclusions.

Prologue
The EU in June 2003 launched its first autonomous operation, Artemis, in DRC. The intervention was undertaken in response to a request made by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. He asked for an EU rapid response force that could support the UN force MONUC, unable to handle the situation in the violent prone area around Bunia in the Ituri province. The mission, under Chapter VII, was to stabilize the security situation, improve the humanitarian situation, protect the airport, refugee camps, UN and other civilian personnel. France was the “framework nation” for the operation, supplying 1,800 of the 2,200 soldiers. Sixteen other nations were involved and the operation was run out of a French Operational Headquarter, OHQ, and a Force Headquarters, FHQ. The operation contributed in halting the escalating violence in the Kiwu Province.

The Unfolding of Events

a. Phase 1, ”Catch 22”, 27 December 2005 – 22 March 2006

A Christmas letter
On 27 December 2005, in the dying days of the UK Presidency of the EU, the UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Ambassador Guéhenno, sent a letter to the UK Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, requesting a EU ”deterrence force” in the support of the UN mission MONUC during the electoral process in 2006 in DRC. The letter stated that ”This contribution could take the form of a suitably earmarked force reserve that could enhance MONUC’s quick reaction capabilities”. 72

The proposal was made against the background of the successful organization of theCongolese authorities in 2005 of a referendum on the Constitution, the first poll in 40 years. The action of the UN force MONUC, jointly with that of the Congolese armed forces, FARDC, improved the security situation in the conflict ravaged East. The results in Kinshasa had, however, deviated from the generally positive response, raising some concern with regard to the organization of the presidential elections in 2006.

The spectre of unrest as candidates or populations would reject election results formed the background to the UN request for a deterrence capability that could bring qualitative added value to MONUC in managing a crisis situation. According to the initial plans, the election period would begin in April, a plan later revised to July. The eventual extension of the election period was dependent of whether the result would warrant a second round or not.

Internal work in the EU Council Secretariat started in the first week of January in order to formulate the many questions that needed to be answered with regard to, for example, tasks, time lines, size, command and control structures, area of deployment, key enablers, logistics, liaison arrangements with MONUC, choice of Operational Headquarter and Force Head Quarter etc.

The EU needed, however, further clarification from DPKO with regard to the proposed force. The High Representative, Javier Solana, requested additional information from DPKO during his visit in New York on January 16 with regard to the format and purpose of the suggested operation. Solana indicated to UN Secretary General Annan that the EU in principle gave a positive response to the UN suggestion for an EU reserve force during the elections in the DRC. The EU intended to study the modalities for the force and discuss it with the DRC President Kabila. Some of the points raised were clarified in conversations between representatives of the EU’s Council Secretariat and the UN’s DPKO in the margins of Solana’s visit to New York. Emphasis was put on the ability to react quickly and credibly. Close coordination with MONUC was deemed as essential. The duration of the operation was expected to be four months in order to safeguard the transition of power. Kinshasa was indicated as the main theatre of operations because of its centrality to overall political stability. 73

The posture of the force was from the very beginning an important sticking point. The force could either be deployed in its entirety to Kinshasa N’Djili Airport, or retained outside DRC but with arrangements made for rapid deployment in case of need. The UN preferred option was for a partial deployment to DRC, a posture that could, on the one hand, speed up the deployment of the whole force, but also held the advantage of providing a visible and thus deterring presence of the European force in DRC itself.

The so-called key capabilities were defined as to a) secure the N’Djili airport, b) provide air-to-ground surveillance capability, c) provide Signal Intelligence, SIGINT, capability and to ensure a limited evacuation capability of so-called entitled personnel. With regard to the sensitive command and control arrangements, it was stated that the EU and the UN forces would remain

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under their respective command and control arrangements. The importance of coordinating between the two organizations was emphasized.\footnote{Idem}

**Political agendas**

There was some evidence to suggest that the UN, apart from securing a safe environment during the Congolese elections, wanted to test the EU’s willingness to use its brand new instrument, the EU’s Battle Groups, EU BG, at the service of the UN. The UN had in its Brahimi Report (III.A) called for rapid reaction forces that could stall the escalation of violence in conflict-prone areas. The hope was that the EU BG should be put at the disposal, and even under the command of the UN. The UN had in particular expressed its interest in drawing on EU BG as a strategic reserve for strained UN forces in the case of a rapid deterioration of a conflict with UN presence.

The UN had evoked the difficulty of achieving predictability in its ability to draw on the forces of regional organizations and wanted to develop as far as possible the pre-arrangements necessary in this context. A diminishing Western role in the UN’s bludgeoning peacekeeping operations made a European contribution even more urgent, in the view of UN representatives. The first Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management concluded in 2003 regulated the overall relationship.\footnote{For a list of joint UN-EU declarations and reports, see http://www.europa-eu-un.org} The UN’s weariness of dealing with regional organizations instead of nation states, strained the relationship.\footnote{Interviews by the author in New York, May 2006 and May 2010 with representatives of DPKO, EUMS liaison officers and members of the Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN}

The idea of an EU force in DRC had been catapulted onto the public political scene through President Chirac’s traditional New Year’s speech to the French diplomatic corps in Paris on January 10, in which he stated that the EU should be ready to support DRC in case of a request to that effect came from the UN and the AU. The EU’s role in the Artemis operation in DRC in 2003 made the EU a natural contender for the role, according to Paris.

The general EU view was that the EU had invested heavily in DRC through its development aid, security sector reform program (EUSEC), a police mission (EUPOL) and the Artemis operation. The EU was the main provider of humanitarian aid to DRC. Additionally, there was a need to inject some substance into a somewhat strained EU-UN relationship.\footnote{Idem}

The founders of ESDP, the UK and France, were interested in seeing some concrete manifestation of the political intentions expressed in the Saint Malo ESDP declaration in 1998 and in the European Security Strategy, ESS, published in 2003. The EU’s role as a global actor was a central theme in the ESS. France in particular wanted the EU to manifest its ability to carry out an EU autonomous operation. It had, since the end of the Cold War, been the
wish of major partners of Germany such as the US, the UK and France to unlock German military resources for the increasingly more demanding tasks of global military operations. It was also the German Government’s intention to have Germany assume a larger role in international crisis management through careful and deliberate steps.

The UN request was raised by President Chirac in his meeting in January with the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who was surprised but reacted cautiously positively to the French proposition. She made it clear, however, that a truly multinational formation was a prerequisite for Germany to play any leading role. Germany’s participation in international military operations had begun with the dispatch of a contingent under UN auspices to Somalia in the early 90’s, but each new step in the direction of the participation of German forces in military operations caused soul-searching debates in a nation still pondering the lessons of World War II. Adding to the anxiety was the fact that a German Battle Group figured on the rooster for the EU BGs declared to have "full operational capability" as of January 2006. The EU BG had been designed for quick reactions with, if necessary, a mere ten days of mobilisation.\footnote{The account is based on the author’s interviews with representatives of the EU’s Council Secretariat in 2006 and early 2007 (Engberg 2006-2007a)}

The use of an EU BG was one of the options for mobilizing forces for an operation of this sort. Another was to use an EU BG as a nucleus to which national contributions from member states could be added. A third option available, was to conduct a so-called force generation as a means of having member states pledging their troop commitments. There were several obstacles to using the EU BGs. Firstly, the German BG was, according to the Germans, not fully fledged, comprising only 700 soldiers and designed for evacuation tasks, which did not fit very well with the initial UN request for a "deterrence force". With three months to go to the elections, there was, in the view of the Germans, room for a regular "force generation" in which more countries could be mobilized to share the military and political burdens of an operation.\footnote{The account is based on the author’s notes taken in Brussels in the Spring of 2006 (Engberg 2006b.)}

Secondly, and more important, it would be no easy task to have the Bundestag agree on a German military engagement in DRC. The preceding German Red-Green government had managed to gradually move the political majority in Bundestag towards a more accepting view of international military operations with Africa being the prime focus. Strong forces in the CDU had opposed the development on the grounds that Africa was alien territory for Germany and that the eventual burdens of military operations should primarily be carried by the former colonial powers in the area.\footnote{The account is based on the author’s interviews with representatives of the EU’s Council Secretariat in 2006 and early 2007 (Engberg 2006-2007a)}
Some German politicians had felt that the operation had been sprung on them by French representatives in the UN and in Paris. The proposal had been made directly by the UN to the EU without previous consultations with concerned parties, including the Congolese president Kabila. Chancellor Merkel had first objected to the surprise proposal put forward by the French President of sending and German-French BG to DRC and instead suggested that the force should be supplied by three equal parts coming from France, Germany and other EU member states. (Engberg 2006b)

German hesitations concerned the wisdom of taking part in international military operations in general and to take on the lead role for planning such an operation for the first time since World War II in particular. Resistance to international operations had previously been strongest in CDU, the party at the helm of the "Grand Coalition", but SPD harboured many critics against an operation in Africa where German soldiers risked being embroiled in what was seen as messy post-colonial conflicts involving child soldiers. German interests in Africa were deemed limited and to the extent outside military involvement was thought to be necessary, that was primarily the responsibility of the former colonial powers. The Greens, supporters in the previous Red-Green government of Germany’s participation in international operations, reluctantly supported the operation while Linke and liberal FDP were against. (Engberg 2006b)

Ambassador Guéhenno refutes, however, the proposition that the Germans were upstaged by the French:

“They thought so, they were terrified. They wanted to be informed beforehand, but that its not the way it works. I knew Solana. The Germans were taken by surprise, but in the end they got maximum credit for minimum involvement. I wanted the EU to help the UN. Why would I push for something that could back-fire, that could harm the relationship? This was a perfectly manageable thing. The Artemis operation was risky, that one I calculated carefully. The British rushed the issue as it was the end of the year and their Presidency. This was not a Machiavellian plot to go around the Germans. They read more into it than was there.” (Guéhenno 2008)

The German foreign and defence ministers had a first meeting to discuss the issue on January 17. While the Bundeskanzleramt and the Foreign Office shared a positive attitude, the Defence Ministry was reluctant to intervene in DRC and instead favoured the German operation in Afghanistan and a potential operation in Nagorno-Karabach. It became quickly clear that any operation would have to be multinational for Germany to take part in it. Furthermore, German representatives in Brussels underlined the importance of outlining an "exit strategy" for the European force. The fact that President Kabila had not been informed was another irritant. The EU’s Council Secretariat was asked to provide further clarifications with regard to the UN’s intentions with the force. (Engberg 2006-2007a)
Contacts between the EU and UN proliferated as the UN Under Secretary General Ambassador Guéhenno met the EU’s High Representative Solana and the PSC in Brussels 26 January. Belgium voiced concern that the discussion about an EU force in itself would transmit an unfortunate impression of instability in DRC when there were, in fact, no indications of such a state. The UK made clear that it did not intend to partake.

An EU mission was sent to Kinshasa 30 January – 2 February and an EU exploratory mission led by the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Ambassador Ajello, went to New York/DPKO 1 February to 3 February. Solana called Kabila to inform about the EU’s intentions. By doing so, he laid the ground for a meeting between the UN Special Representative Ambassador Swing and Kabila in which the latter expressed his “verbal approval” of an EU involvement. Based on the findings of the missions, an “Option Paper for a possible EU support to MONUC” was produced by the EU Council Secretariat on 9 February. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

Catch 22

The debate on the Option Paper of the EU members states centered on the tasks. Germany favoured a focus on task 7, “Support to MONUC Stabilisation” instead of the “deterrent force”, as asked for in the original UN letter. On 17 February the need to appoint a “lead nation” and allocate an Operational Headquarter, OHQ, accordingly was highlighted as a prerequisite for initiating a more detailed planning of the operation. The obvious candidate, Germany, refused however to take on the responsibility before more nations had committed substantial contributions to a truly multinational force that could share the political and resource burdens. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

The announcement on 22 February of the postponement of the Congolese elections from April to July, bought some precious planning time for the EU. In the absence of progress, Solana was forced to proceed on February 24 with an ad hoc force generation based on a background paper, listing the necessary components and indicating potential contributions from member states. Solana called the defence ministers of Sweden, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, Finland and Ireland.

In the speaking points prepared for Solana, the operation was described as a way of giving meaning to the European Security Strategy through action and to underpin the relationship between the EU and the UN. The EU had invested heavily in the Great Lakes region and in the DRC Peace Process and it was necessary to protect and insure this investment. The assumption was that Germany would provide the Operational Headquarter, OHQ, and France the Force Headquarter, FHQ. The tasks outlined for the force featured Recovery of indicated personnel (5 in the Options Paper), Securing the Airport (6) and Stabilization (7). (Engberg 2006-2007 a)

Based on the speaking notes, Solana proceeded to request for contributions that could complement the envisaged French and German forces, se-
curing one third each. For each member state requested to contribute, a special message emphasizing its specific role and importance was presented. Solana received cautiously positive responses from the member states contacted, but no firm commitments. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

Solana met representatives of CDU and FDP in the German defence committee on 7 March and tried to convey the importance of German participation. He was, however, faced with reluctance and defiance from some of the German politicians. Part of the German press delivered scathing critique of the alleged "diletantism" of the EU Council Secretariat’s preparation of the dossier. The Council Secretariat argued that they had its hands tied by the so-called Tervuren agreement that limited its ability to proceed with the planning of the operation. This should instead be the task of the OHQ of the lead nation. (Engberg 2006-2007a, Major 2008)

Another attempt at producing the requested multinational configuration of the force was made during an informal meeting of the EUMC on 13 March. Germany committed 400-450 so-called Personnel Recovery, or evacuation, Capability and additional German staff for the French FHQ. On 15 March, France and Germany held a bilateral meeting in Brussels in which they agreed on support to the UN. Germany the same day called an Informal Planning Meeting to be held on March 20 in the German Ministry of Defence in Berlin. The foreign and defence committees of Bundestag met on 16 March in Berlin to discuss the matter. On 17 March an adviser to Chancellor Merkel contacted Swedish representatives and pleaded for a Swedish contribution. The participation of countries such as Sweden and Ireland was deemed an advantage in order to deflect possible critique of post-colonial influences. (Enberg 2006b)

The Informal Planning Conference in Berlin produced few clear pledges, but provided the necessary assurances about the multinational character of the operation that enabled the German government to give the green light in the last week of March for Potsdam to assume the role of Operational Headquarters for EUFOR RD Congo and to initiate formal planning. Bundestag was expected to make the final decision on the operation early May. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

In Brussels, some final touches were put on the necessary planning documents. A so-called EU Comprehensive Overview of DRC had been presented to the PSC on March 16, outlining the wider context of the EU’s effort in DRC. The EUMC provided the final military advice on the Options Paper and the Council approved on March 23 the concept for a possible EU support to the UN mission in DRC (MONUC) and decided to start planning and preparation on that basis, including financial support through the so-called Athena-mechanism. Planning for police support would also be pur-

80 For an account of the German press debate, see Major 2008, p. 25, note 67
81 For background concerning this agreement, see Howorth 2007 and Simón 2010
sued. On 28 March a letter of agreement was signed between the UN in form of its Secretary General Annan and the EU in the form of its High Representative Solana.  

b. Phase 2, “Planning, intervention and withdrawal”,  
23 March – end of year 2006

Bureaucratic deliberations
Solana in the beginning of April discussed the operation with the UN Secretary General Annan in New York. They agreed that there was a need for a UN resolution covering EUFOR RD Congo’s support of MONUC and that the EU should take over MONUC’s SOFA. Some African representatives expressed the view that they had not been consulted, but Solana referred to EUSR Ajello’s dialogue with the countries in the Great Lakes region. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

A so-called Initiating Military Directive concerning the strategic direction of the operation was issued on 11 April. It stated that the EU would contribute to stability during the electoral process by a visible advance element and an over the horizon “on call” force in Gabon to provide reassurance and deterrence: indirectly through support to the FARDC and Congolese police, and directly through the employment of force in support of MONUC if requested by the UN and decided by the EU. The operation would terminate no later than four months after the date of the first round of elections in DRC. The Key Military Tasks were defined as:

1) Establish an advance element, including the FHQ in Kinshasa

2) Conduct military information operations in accordance with the Information Strategy and in close co-operation with MONUC HQ

3) Be prepared to conduct personnel recovery of electoral agents, international observers and UN staff involved in the election and who are in imminent danger

4) Be prepared to support MONUC stabilization operations at limit specific geographical points of application

5) Be prepared to contribute to the protection of the N’Djili airport.

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In a paragraph concerning exit strategy, which at the end of the operation would prove to be an issue of major importance, it was stated that in case Operation EUFOR RD Congo should be deployed with the same tasks beyond the end-date, the Council would need to re-define the end-date. A so-called strategic reserve force was indicated in the form of elements of a French BG, including German elements, which figured at the rooster for EU BG in readiness. The document noted that MONUC was a Chapter VII operation. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

On April 26 the UNSC adopted the resolution S/RES/1671 (2006) authorizing EUFOR RD Congo to support MONUC during the elections. The force, operating under a Chapter VII mandate, was charged to:
- support MONUC to stabilize the situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities
- to contribute to the protection of civilians
- to contribute to the protection of the airport
- to ensure the security and freedom of movement of personnel as well as the protection of installations of EUFOR RD Congo
- to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger.

The appointed Operational Commander General Viereck elaborated the EU Operational Commander’s Concept of Operations, CONOPs, and Combined Joint Statement of Requirement, CJSOR. Force generation conferences were held in Potsdam on 3 and 10 May. 15 member states and one so-called third country, Turkey, participated. Shortfalls were noted with regard to strategic and tactical transport, including helicopters for MEDEVAC. Some of the shortfalls were eventually covered. The AU was invited in a letter by Solana to send a liaison officer to Potsdam and SADC to the FHQ in Kinshasa. On 12 June, the Council agreed on conclusions to launch the operation. The force was comprised of three components: 1) an advance deployment in Kinshasa, 2) an on-call force stationed in Libreville/Gabon, 3) a strategic reserve in Europe. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

An EU Activation Order Message, EU ACTORD, was sent by the Op-Commander on 14 June. On 16 June Transfer of Authority, TOA was made and Full Operational Capability was achieved on 29 July, one day before the first round of elections was held in DRC. Operation EUFOR RD Congo would acquire so-called full strength in theatre with 2,400 soldiers from 21 member states plus Turkey. The biggest troop contributors were France (1,090), Germany (780), Spain (130), Poland (130), Belgium (60) and Sweden (55). (Engberg 2006-2007a)
Clashes in Kinshasa – Operation EUFOR RD Congo set in motion

Soon after the deployment Operation EUFOR RD Congo, including the four drones, made a “show-of-force” for civilian and military dignitaries. During the election campaign, Operation EUFOR RD Congo had become the target of accusations of supporting Kabila to remain in power. In order for the forces not to become targets of violence, the Force Commander Damay adopted what was described as a clear line of maximum of alert with a minimum of visibility. The four drones (one had been shot down but replaced) provided important information regarding the assembling of potentially violent crowds.

The first round of elections (presidential and local) were held on 30 July. As it became clear that there would be a second round of elections on 29 October, violent clashes broke out on 21 August in Kinshasa between Vice President Bemba’s guards, the police and the presidential guard. The Presidential team had been disappointed with the weak results for President Kabila in Kinshasa and the general outcome that would result in a second round. President Kabila had given his presidential guard green light to react to any alleged provocation from Bemba. The clashes resulted in severe casualties as tanks and artillery were used. During the fighting, Bemba and a group of EU Ambassadors had been confined to Bemba’s palace. Only under heavy protection from MONUC could the President of the Independent Electoral Commission Malumalu reach the building of national television to make the official announcement of the result of the elections that had given 44, 81 per cent of the votes to Kabila and 20, 03 per cent to Bemba.

Operation EUFOR RD Congo in Kinshasa, comprised of Spanish troops and Polish military police, was activated and reinforcements were flown in from Gabon on August 22, including three helicopters, 60 special operation forces (France, Portugal and Sweden) and 200 soldiers (Germany, the Netherlands). Operation EUFOR RD Congo and MONUC were reinforced with a South African battalion deployed from Rwanda. They managed to separate the warring parties and to calm down the situation. The operation was well received in DRC and proved Operation EUFOR RD Congo’s impartiality. The force could, as a result, patrol on foot and enjoyed the confidence of the population. Operation EUFOR RD Congo showed its ability of quick reaction and resolve to fulfil its mission. EUPOL played an important role in securing the police organization in Kinshasa during the riots.

The second round of the election was held on October 29 without any reported incidents. Final results were expected around 28 November and the installation of the President was planned for 10 December. The mandate for Operation EUFOR RD Congo would expire on 30 November, but the bulk of the force would remain until 10 December. The legal ground for self-

83 The events described in this segment have been covered by several authors, for example Major 2008, Keohane in Grevi et al. 2009, Gegout 2008, Vines 2010
defence between 30 November and 10 December was raised. A discussion emerged in the EU as to whether the mandate for Operation EUFOR RD Congo should be extended beyond 30 November. Solana, EUSR Ajello, The Force Commander of Operation EUFOR RD Congo and the Council Secretariat favoured a prolongation of the mandate at least until 5 December which would require a UN resolution to that effect.

While most member states supported the idea, the proposition was rebuffed by Berlin. Negotiations continued between the French and Germans in New York, but with no result. As a minimal solution to the unclear status of Operation EUFOR RD Congo beyond November 30, the EUMC produced a military advice concerning ROE during the last phase of the force’s presence in DRC. No more incidents occurred during the remaining stay of Operation EUFOR RD Congo and the arrangements put in place were consequently not tested.

Lessons learned

In the EU–report to the UN the following conclusions were drawn:

"10. During the mission execution phase, the deterrent effect of EUFOR presence in DRC was a significant factor in limiting the number of incidents. Reinforcement by additional force elements from the over the horizon component in Gabon was undertaken on a number of occasions when the security situation on the ground merited an increase in deterrent effect. In addition, a number of deployment operations to the geographically agreed points of application in the DRC was undertaken, both to act as rehearsals for potential situation driven deployments and also to increase the geographic spread of the force’s deterrent affect.

11. The incident with the greatest destabilising potential occurred on 21 August 2006 with an attack on Vice President Bemba’s residence. EUFOR intervention, in close cooperation with MONUC, was deemed to have been decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. This in turn proved to have a wider effect for EUFOR who, by their intervention, confirmed their position of neutrality in the eyes of the Congolese population and thus reinforced their credibility.”

The political restrictions in place and the protracted planning process were reflected in the lessons learned by the EUMC and EUMS. While recognizing the operation’s overall success for ESDP and the EU’s ability to conduct an autonomous military operation, a series of flaws were identified. The first round of elections had initially been envisaged for April 2006, which meant that planning took place under significant time pressure. Furthermore, formal planning could not start until formal political decisions had been taken.

As a result of this “Catch 22”, the planning process was stalled for a month in order to satisfy German demands that the formation would be multinational. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

This meant the EU had to forgo some of the established crisis management procedures. Timetables were compressed and various planning documents were folded into hybrid versions. The fact that the build-up of the OHQ and the FHQ were not synchronized, resulted in parallel planning processes. As a result, the Operation Commander addressed operational and tactical level planning for a protracted period. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

The failure to balance the division of responsibility between the Operational Commander and the Force Commander restricted the freedom of action of the Force Commander. First, there was no logic sequencing of the planning and deployment, and second, no clear and early delineation was made of the respective limits of the OHQ and FHQ responsibilities. This hampered the subsidiarity of the FHQ and the Force Commander’s freedom of action and subjected him to what he saw as some micromanagement of the OpCommander. The forces in Gabon and the special operations forces were, for example, under the command of the OHQ in Potsdam. Finally, national caveats hampered the Force Commander’s freedom. (2006-2007a)

Another aspect was the lack of understanding between the EU and the UN as to the requirements of the UN for EU support (objectives, tasks, timelines). The political decision to conclude the mission based on a fixed end state, without reference to end state, proved to be inflexible and left the EU unable to respond to the changing timetable of the election process. As a result, the operation terminated while Operation EUFOR RD Congo was still in theatre. Operation EUFOR RD Congo’s redeployment undertaken after the 30 November (end date) without legal basis to use force outside the context of self defence, represented in the minds of some representatives of the Council Secretariat a high level of risk to the outcome of the operation. Among the more important lessons to be learned for future operation was thus the importance to clarify the relationship between the end date, the end state (the goals that shall be achieved) and the exit strategy. (2006-2007a)

The Council Secretariat in its assessment noted that the UN request for support to MONUC came with no pre-warning, either to the EU or the Congolese authorities, and had not been subject to any informal so-called pre-staffing of consultations between the Secretariats. One lesson would be to establish procedures for regular working relationship between DPKO and the Council Secretariat’s representation at the UN in New York. Another was the importance to ensure that member states unilateral, or bi/tri lateral planning for possible intervention in the area of operation (for example plans for evacuation) is transparent with the EU in order to allow for a coordinated contingency planning. (Engberg 2006-2007a)

At the informal meeting of defence ministers in Wiesbaden 1-2 of March, 2007, the point was made by some member states that the process of prepar-
ing and handling of a UN request should be made transparent to all member states. The reinforcement of the Council Secretariat’s Representation in New York and the elaboration of procedures for consultations between DPKO and the Council Secretariat would be one way of addressing the problem. As a result of the so-called post-Wiesbaden process, the EU ability to plan for and conduct military operations was modestly improved.

A more general discussion concerning the benefits of Operation EUFOR RD Congo ensued. Both UN and EU assessments made the point that forces from MONUC and Operation EUFOR RD Congo had separated the warring parties and calmed down the situation. Operation EUFOR RD Congo proved to be a more capable force than MONUC. But was the force really necessary? French capabilities were decisive but could possibly have been available in the theatre and MONUC could have been reinforced directly in case of need. A South African battalion from Rwanda had, for example, contributed to the support of MONUC.

Two key actors for the process, Erkki Tuomioja and Ambassador Guéhenno ponder the lessons. Foreign Minister Tuomioja:

“I recall the operation as unproblematic. EUFOR was a success in the sense that it provided a capable force in case things would go wrong. It played a preventive role. During the Finnish Presidency of the second half of 2006, two Troika meetings between the AU and the EU were held. I went to Kinshasa and EUFOR for a briefing. No real incidents had occurred. I met foreign minister Bemba, but a planned meeting with Kabila did not materialize. The Congolese did not express any negative views, but they were not overly enthusiastic. The EU’s contribution was welcomed, but not decisive. The UN wanted to have the EUFOR as an additional force. It is difficult for the former colonial powers to play a direct role in Africa. Belgium is too small, France is weaker than before. The Europeans are welcome in Africa and in its dealings with the AU in the multilateral format of the EU. Even if most African countries nowadays have good relations with the former colonial powers, the EU provides a support in that relationship.” (Tuomioja 2008)

Ambassador Guéhenno:

“The Artemis Operation helped us carry out the operation during the Congolese elections. Artemis was a difficult mission and it was carefully planned. The then head of the French General Staff, General Bentégeat played a useful role. The presence of a European force during the election was less necessary, a form of gesticulation, but it worked extremely well as a deterrent as the locals thought that all the European armies would come down on them, in spite of the fact that a mere platoon was deployed in Kinshasa. Potsdam as OHQ was a charade and cut away from Brussels. The operation was in fact run in the theatre by the French FHQ. More important than the

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85 Notes taken by the author at the meeting
86 Simón 2010
87 Later, 2006-2010, to become Head of the EU’s Military Committee
OHQ were the Rules of Engagement and Concept of Operations. The EU set-up is not very effective, but I hope that the EU will evolve and develop its initial planning and strategic goals.” (Guéhenno 2008)

Epilogue

Soon after the departure of Operation EUFOR RD Congo in March 2007, Kabila moved on Bembas forces in operations that led to casualties in the order of hundreds. Bemba left the country for Belgium. He was in 2008 extradited to the International Criminal Court in Haague on the grounds that his forces, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, MLC, had committed war crimes in the Central African Republic in 2002.

In view of the escalation of violence in north-eastern DRC, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in December 2008 requested EU help in the form of a rapid intervention force that could provide a bridging force to MOUNUC that was waiting for reinforcements in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1843. The UK and Germany opposed the idea. The British did not want to risk have its BG, that at the time was in readiness for EU operations, involved because of the UK’s engagement in Afghanistan. Germany’s objections were basically the same that led to the hesitations in the lead-up to Operation EUFOR RD Congo and its absence during Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR. (Gowan in Grevi et al. 2009, p. 125, Vines 2010) The French President Sarkozy publicly rejected the UN request. The French reply seems to have been influenced in part by the danger of confronting Rwandan national armed forces that were operating in the same region. French risk assessment and experiences from the Rwandan war figured in the background. This is a mini non-case that points to the limits to post-colonial redemption through the EU.

Vines (2010) advances the proposition that the European non-intervention produced a positive outcome in that it forced Rwanda and DRC to cooperate in the area.

5.2.2 Analysis and Conclusions

As in the non-case of the Lebanon war, the analytical tool will now be applied to the case of Operation EUFOR RD Congo. This will happen in two stages. Firstly, the driving and inhibiting factors seen in the narrative will be printed out in the ensuing text. Secondly, the factors will be plotted to the matrix in Tables 6 and 7 that correspond to the two different phases of the conflict. The emerging patterns will be interpreted and form the basis for some general conclusions.
Applying the analytical tool

A. Factors External to the Organization

1. Political

1.1 View of the warring parties:
- Kabila and Bemba were ambivalent toward an EU operation during the first phase since they had not been informed beforehand. Kabila was perceived as the favoured candidate by the West. It is difficult to ascertain any exact value to their attitudes, but Kabila is likely to have been less reluctant (+, -) than Bemba (-). It took the intervention of Operation EUFOR RD Congo for it to prove its impartiality (+ for both candidates during the second phase).

1.2 View of other relevant actors:
- The civilian population in Kinshasa suspected Operation EUFOR RD Congo to be partial during the first phase (-), but changed its mind after the intervention in the second phase (+)
- The UN favoured and to some extent orchestrated the creation of Operation EUFOR RD Congo (+ for both periods)
- The AU was positive throughout the whole period (+)
- Some African representatives in the UN expressed initially resentment for not having been consulted (-) in the first phase, but changed their mind as a UN resolution was passed (+) in the second phase.

2. Pol-mil

2.1 Character of the conflict:
- The geographic distance did not pose any major problems since the terrain was familiar to the Europeans. Some were already present in the theatre (the French) and the force to be deployed was limited in size (+)
- The level of intensity was expected to be manageable by the European forces since the task involved possible crowd control and the separation of limited military forces (+).

2.2 & 2.3 Mandate and Tasks:
- UN mandate, Chapter VII (+)
- The general UN assignment of a “deterrent task” was acceptable to the EU, but the lack of specification caused considerable confusion for EU planning during the first phase (+, -). The tasks were eventually clarified in the EU/UN dialogue in the second phase (+)
- The mix of civ-mil tasks requested in the DRC corresponded well to the EU’s profile as expressed in its policy document “Comprehensive Overview for DRC” (+)
3. Resource

3.1 Military forces in place:
The UN:
- The presence of MONUC was a prerequisite for Operation EUFOR RD Congo (+)

3.2 The warring parties:
- The military capabilities available for the warring parties was not any major impediment for the limited sort of task envisaged for Operation EUFOR RD Congo (+).

B. Factors Internal to the Organization

1. Political

1.1 and 1.2 Values and Interests:
- The EU was the main provider of official humanitarian aid to DRC. The EU had expressed its strong will to protect the investments made in DRC in the form of development aid, SSR, EUPOL and Artemis. These investments reflected European values (+) and interests (+)

1.3 European cohesion/division:
- The Europeans had through its ESS expressed their ambition to play a global role in crisis management, but tensions among the Europeans were palpable during the first phase (-). Unity coalesced during the second phase, although differences remained with regard to the relationship between end state/end date (+)

2. Pol-mil

2.1 Civilian precedent:
- The EU had a deep civilian engagement through development aid, SSR and EUPOL (+)

2.2 Mission:
- The surprise proposal by the UN and consequent reluctance by the Germans to take on the role as “lead nation” caused serious problems for the EU in planning the mission during the first phase. The delay in the Congolese election schedule saved the EU from outright failure ( – in the first phase). Some confusion remained in the EU during the second phase with regard to the delineation of tasks between OHQ and FHQ and the plans made for evacuation by individual member states. That was an inconvenience which did not, however, result in any serious consequences. More problematic was the confusion with regard to end state/end date that reigned in the last weeks of the operation, during the second phase. In spite of the limitations described, the mission will be described as a (+) in the second phase.
3. Resource

3.1 Military precedent:
- The EU had a military precedent in DRC through its Artemis operation (+)

Availability of European C&C:
- The assignment of a European OHQ in the form of Potsdam was delayed during the first phase (-), was mobilized for the second phase (+), but was inactive during the last weeks of the operation.

3.2 Availability of European forces:
- The non-availability of European forces during the first phase (-) was caused by the lack of an OHQ, but necessary forces were mobilized for the second phase (+). The early departure of German forces left some uncertainty with regard to the final weeks of the mission.

3.3 Availability of financial resources:
- No decision during phase one (-). € 23 million through the Athena-mechanism during the second phase (+). Germany contributed € 26 million, France € 27 million.

The analytical tool will now be applied in its second stage through the plotting of the factors to the matrix in Tables 6 and 7. The number of tables reflect the two different phases of the case Operation EUFOR RD Congo.
**Table 6. Applying the Analytical Tool to the Matrix. Phase 1, 27 December 2005 – 22 March 2006, “Catch 22”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Factors:</th>
<th>Driving (+)</th>
<th>Inhibiting (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Factors External to the Organization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1 View of the warring parties;</td>
<td></td>
<td>X X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Kabila</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Bemba</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 View of other relevant actors;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civilian population (in Kinshasa)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The UN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- The AU</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Some African representatives in the UN</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Pol-mil</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Character of the conflict;</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- geographic distance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- level of intensity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2&amp;2.3 Mandate and Tasks:</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- UN-mandate Chapter VII</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- tasks according to the UN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- civ-mil tasks</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Resource</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Military forces in place;</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- the UN</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- warring parties</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Factors Internal to the Organization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.1. Values</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 Interests</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3 Internal cohesion/division</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Pol-mil</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Civilian precedent</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Resource</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Military precedent</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Availability of C&amp;C</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Availability of relevant forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4 Availability of financial resources</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 7. Applying the Analytical Tool to the Matrix. Phase 2, 23 March – end of year 2006, “Planning, intervention and withdrawal”**

Main Factors: | Driving (+) | Inhibiting (-) |
---|---|---|

### A. Factors External to the Organization

#### 1. Political
1. View of the warring parties;
   - Kabila
   - Bemba
2. View of other relevant actors;
   - Civilian population (in Kinshasa)
   - The UN
   - The AU
   - Some African representatives in the UN

### 2. Pol-mil
2.1 Character of the conflict;
   - geographic distance
   - level of intensity
2.2 & 2.3 Mandate and Tasks;
   - UN mandate Chapter VII
   - tasks according to the UN
   - mix of civ-mil tasks

### 3. Resource
3.1 Military forces in place;
   - the UN
   - the warring parties

### B. Factors Internal to the Organization

#### 1. Political
1.1 Values
1.2 Interests
1.3 European cohesion/division

#### 2. Pol-mil
2.1 Civilian precedent
2.2 Mission: mandate, tasks, rules of engagement

#### 3. Resource
3.1 Military precedent
3.2 Availability of C&C
3.3 Availability of relevant forces
3.4 Availability of financial resources
Conclusions

The conflicts that have ravaged the Great Lakes region in the last dozen years, have been described as Africa’s thirty years war, an image that conjures up one of the most devastating and destructive periods in Europe’s history. The UN led peacekeeping force MONUC in DRC has represented the most tangible example of the outside world’s military engagement and attempt to stem the violence. MONUC is by and large made up of forces from developing countries. The Europeans intervened at the request of the UN in 2003 through its Artemis operation in the Eastern province of Kiwu where it stopped militia-based violence from escalating. The operation served as a sort of prototype for the creation of the EU’s future rapid reaction forces, EU Battle Groups, EU BG.

The gradual stabilization of the DRC under the Kabila regime set the stage for the electoral processes, including local and presidential elections, to be held in 2006. Past experience indicate that the organization of elections in democratizing countries can be a process fraught with dangers as disgruntled, and often ethnically based, parties or spoilers try to derail the process and contest the elections results. It would, in this context, be natural for the UN to plan for preventive actions, including by military means, that could diminish the danger of violent eruptions. Requesting a capable European rapid reaction force during the Congolese elections provided indeed added value to the UN and MONUC. The UN assessment of the potential for violence during the Congolese elections and the possibility for the EU to contribute to preventing that violence, was certainly a driving factor. Furthermore, there were signs to indicate that the UN wanted to test the EU’s willingness to put its new rapid reaction capability to the UN’s disposal.

There were capable European, mostly French, forces in the region that could, in principle, have provided that sort of added capability. It was, however, inconvenient for France, intent on diminishing its post-colonial legacy and sharing the burdens with African and European partners, to bear the brunt of the operation. The participation of military forces from the former colonial powers was a sensitive issue to the African parties. The two candidates Kabila and Bemba had not been informed beforehand of UN and EU plans and intentions. Part of the local population suspected that the forces were partial and in favour of “the West’s candidate” Kabila. All these factors testify to the sensitivity of military interventions in Africa by formerly colonial powers. The formation of multilateral force under EU command

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88 France had proposed that its training program for African forces, RECAMP, be transformed into an EU program. The EU was also putting increasing resources into building up the AU’s African stand-by-force. The main Western providers of bilateral military support to African countries, the US, the UK and France had since the turn of the century started to coordinate their effort through a common clearing-house. For an appraisal of the EU’s current support to the so-called African security architecture, see Pirozzi 2009.
was a more acceptable solution to the local parties, although Operation EUFOR RD Congo had to earn its credibility as an impartial force through its intervention during the August days of violent disturbances in Kinshasa. **The suspicion of parts of the local population with regard to the EU’s intentions was an inhibiting factor during the first phase, but one that was overcome in the second.**

The EU as an entity as well as individual European countries had invested heavily in the stabilisation of DRC through development aid, Security Sector Reform and the police mission EUPOL. The EU had through its European Security Strategy professed itself to be a global actor intent on preventing and managing conflicts also through the use of military means. The creation of the EU BG, declared to be fully operational by January 2006, added to the expectations that the EU would become more pro-active in general and in Africa in particular. One could possibly argue that the EU’s raised ambitions in combination with the new means created in the form of EU BG created expectations that themselves became a driving factor behind the operation in the sense that it created an opportunity that could be seized upon by influential actors. **The EU’s vested interest in the Great Lakes region, its professed interest in promoting stability in Africa and the creation of the EU BG, were all driving factors in the sense that they created expectations, both external and internal to the EU, that the EU would play a role.**

While a French-only operation of this limited size and risks involved, probably could have been run out of a French Force Headquarters in the theatre, it would take the effort of an Operational Headquarters in Europe to make it a truly multinational force. The resource limitations imposed on the EU’s capacity in this regard were two-fold: the EU was still building up the structures necessary to manage its ESDP-agenda and the Tervuren compromise had put a cap on its ability to carry out strategic military planning in Brussels. Initial German hesitations to assume the leading role for the operation before having secured a multinational formation, created a Catch 22 that paralyzed the EU’s planning capability and caused subsequent delays in mobilizing the necessary forces. **Germany’s reluctance to be “mobilized” and to assign its OHQ in Potsdam was an inhibiting factor that delayed the force generation in the first phase, but one that was overcome during the second phase.**

While political factors (Tervuren compromise and German hesitations), were at the origins of the resource limitation with regard to command and control arrangements felt during the first phase of the operation, they were real and palpable in their consequences. The postponement of the Congolese election schedule saved the EU from outright failure of being unable to mount the operation in time.

Operation EUFOR RD Congo apparently played a useful deterrent role through its “show-of-force” on the streets of Kinshasa and the appearance of
the (Belgian) drones in the skies above the city. Its importance for quelling the violence has been debated. The term “added value”, used by the UN, captures the role performed by the Europeans. A certain “double command” and the imperfect delineation of tasks between the OHQ and FHQ caused frictions. The operation was, in the view of the French Force Commander Damay, saved by some luck that did not expose the weaknesses inherent to the operation.

The surprise sprung on Germany caused frictions and delays, but it can also be argued that the months that elapsed during the “Catch 22”-period were necessary for the Europeans to build political and military cohesion in an area of cooperation still under construction. The interest by several actors, among them France, to mobilize Germany for international military crisis management was a driving factor. The decisive part is, of course, what conclusions that were drawn from the experience by influential actors such as Germany. Did or did it not improve the EU’s ability to react swiftly to future calls for EU contributions to UN led military operations? A new test case was soon to emerge in Chad, were the EU eventually would send a force, Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR, to which Germany did not contribute any soldiers89.

Selective and saturated security
There are few conflicts that offer themselves as ideal for intervention. A selective interpretive element is at hands in determining when to intervene and not to intervene.

The DRC offered a convenient possibility for a legitimate, well motivated and low risk, limited, albeit high-value preventive and deterrent intervention. It took, however, the “interpretive capability” of a set of influential actors in the international system, among them the UN Under Secretary General Ambassador Guéhenno, the EU High Representative Solana, the UK Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw to define the Congolese election process as a potential conflict that would warrant a preventive and deterrent military intervention by the EU. It was an example of selective security.

To summarize:
The most driving factors were:
1) The UN assessment of the risk of potential disturbances and escalation of violence during the Congolese election
2) UN interest in testing the availability of EU forces for UN missions in general and the mobilization of an EU quick-reaction force for the particular purpose
3) Vested EU interests in the Great Lakes region
4) EU self-definition in ESS as a global actor, Africa in focus

89 For an assessment of the Operation, see Seibert 2010, 2007
5) The availability of the EU BG
6) French and other interests in propelling the Germans onto the scene.

The most important inhibiting factors during the first phase, “Catch 22”, were:
1) Reluctance on the part of Kabila and Bemba
2) Suspicion amongst local population, in particular in Kinshasa
3) Reluctance of the Germans to be propelled
4) The subsequent delay in assigning an OHQ
5) The subsequent delay in mobilizing EU forces (one third) other than the French and German (two thirds) that would make the force truly multi-national, a condition set for German participation.

The inhibiting factors were overcome during the second phase.

The conclusions drawn in this section will form the basis for the findings presented in Chapter 6 and conclusions drawn in Chapter 7.

5.3 The Additional Cases

As was made clear in Chapter 4 there are Additional Cases whose main value is that they reflect and inform the organizational themes of this study. They are, first, Operation Concordia and Operation EUFOR Althea. They will be dealt with in a sequence, since Operation Concordia in many ways was a fore-runner to Operation EUFOR Althea. The third additional case is Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta. The three Additional Cases will be summarized in a more general way in this Section, while the application of the analytical tool and the conclusions will follow in Chapter 6.

The cases will here be presented in the form of a narrative built on interviews with members of the EU’s Council Secretariat, documentation from the EU and, in the case of Operation EUFOR Althea, notes taken by the author while in Brussels, and a couple of scholarly studies.90

Operations Concordia and EUFOR Althea91

The end of the Bosnian war was, in a sense, an outflow from the regulation of conflicts during the Cold War, where the imposition of solid victory was

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90 For overviews regarding Operations Concordia and Operation EUFOR Althea, see Gross and Keohane, respectively, in Grevi et al. 2009
91 I am grateful to Captain (N) Lennart Danielsson, Chief of the EU’s Staff Group at SHAPE, NATO, between 2003-2007 (2003 for Operation Concordia and 2004-2007 for EUFOR Althea) for having discussed the additional cases with me. I am, naturally, responsible for the content and conclusions and any remaining errors.
the preferred solution (Wallensteen 2007). The US defeated Serbian forces and subsequently led the negotiation of a peace agreement - the Dayton agreement 1995 and established the conditions for the deployment of a peace enforcement operation in 1996 under a UN-mandate.

The force, SFOR, was initially under NATO command and then, in December 2004, renamed Operation EUFOR Althea and transferred to EU command, in accordance with the so-called Berlin Plus arrangement between the two organizations, whereby the EU borrows command and control structures from NATO. The consecutive drawdown of EU forces was partly conditioned on the degree of stability in neighbouring Kosovo and accompanied by an increase in EU-led civilian missions aimed at preparing Bosnia for future EU membership. The EU had a clear and undisputed, but subordinate, military role in Bosnia’s transition from war to peace. It played a prominent role for the integration of Bosnia into the EU, the ultimate protection against the risk of renewed conflict.

**Operation Concordia**

The EU had contributed to the brokering on August 13 2001 of the so-called Ohrid Agreements. They fended off violent clashes between the main ethnic groups in Macedonia. On 30 March 2003, the EU took over a small NATO mission in Macedonia (Allied Harmony) and renamed it Operation Concordia. It became the first test of the EU’s fledgling military structures and the newly established Berlin Plus arrangements whereby the EU can access NATO planning and assets in operations in which NATO is not engaged. Operation Concordia was transformed into the EU Police Operation Proxima on 15 December 2003.

As a consequence of the needs that had arisen with the Concordia Operation, the EU Council on 23 February in 2004 decided to establish the financial, so-called Athena mechanism, consisting of an EU fund aimed at covering "common costs" for operations, for example in the form of base structures or strategic transport. The costs are distributed in accordance with Gross National Income, GNI, keys. Costs incurred by individual member states are supposed to "lie were they fall". € 6, 2 million was allocated from the Athena-mechanism to Operation Concordia after the termination of the operation.

**Operation EUFOR Althea**

By the end of the 90’s BiH was by and large pacified, with only minor incidents occurring around 1998-99. Uncertainty with regard to the future status of Kosovo and the potential for violent flare-ups and spill-over remained. This state of affairs became, at times, also an argument that could be up- or down-sized depending on the wish to reduce or uphold troops levels in BiH. The US, the main actor in terminating the Balkan wars and designing the Dayton agreement in 1995, started at the end of the 90’s to prepare for a
withdrawal and for a handover of residual tasks to the Europeans under NATO and EU-flag, respectively.

On June 28-29 the NATO summit in Riga decided to conclude NATO’s SFOR operation in BiH by the end of 2004. On 12 July, the EU decided to conduct a military operation in BiH. On 22 November, the UN in its UNSC Resolution 1575, welcomed the EU’s intention to launch a mission with the aim to take over the responsibility from SFOR in BiH.

On 1 Dec, the EUFOR Force Head Quarters was established at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo, collocated with NATO HQ. On 2 December, NATO concluded its mission and handed over to Operation Althea. The EU took, in principle, over the NATO structures and troop volumes. A group of smaller EU countries under the lead of Finland, including Sweden, Ireland, Turkey, Slovenia, Austria and the Czech Republic, assumed responsibility for the previously US led regional command and control structures in Tuzla, while the UK and the Netherlands remained in Banja Luka and Germany, Italy and Spain in Mostar.

EUFOR Althea consisted of 7,000 troops from 33 different countries, 23 EU member states and 9 third parties, such as Turkey, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway and Canada. It operated under a Chapter VII mandate provided by the UN. The key objectives of Operation Althea were:

- to provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in the Dayton Agreement
- to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH.

In accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangement, NATO’s DSACEUR, the British general Reith, was appointed EU Operation Commander and the EU Staff group at SHAPE, under the direction of the Swedish Captain (N) Lennart Danielsson, was assigned the task of EU OHQ. A routine was established for 6-monthly reports by the OpCommander to the EU’s PSC on the state of the mission. The British General Leakey was appointed EU Force Commander in Sarajevo. Reciprocal arrangements between the EU and NATO were elaborated in 2005-2006 with the creation of an EU Cell at SHAPE, featuring primarily non-NATO EU members, and the presence of NATO liaison officers, consisting to considerable degree of non EU members such as Turkey, at the EUMS. The modalities later facilitated EU-NATO cooperation beyond the Berlin Plus formula in, for example, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Africa.

NATO maintained a reduced HQ in Sarajevo based at Camp Butmir, focusing on "non-executive tasks”, such as the reform of the ethnically divided Bosnians Army, intelligence, the search for Persons Indicted For War Crimes, PIFWIC’s, in accordance with the Dayton Agreement, and the preparation of BiH for membership of Partnership For Peace, PFP and ultimately of NATO.
The delineation of tasks between the EU and NATO were initially not elaborated, but were worked out successively during 2004 amid some friction. The partition of the headquarter building between the EU and NATO was solved through the creation of two separate entrances with a joint reception desk.

The EU encountered some problems with its internal coordination between Operation EUFOR Althea’s Integrated Police Unit, IPU, and the Police Mission EUPM. Solana had at the initiation of Operation Althea urged its Force Commander Leakey “to make a difference”, which Leaky interpreted as a call for Operation Althea to get involved with anti-corruption policies and nation-building, tasks also in the purview of EUPM.

The EUPM handled in 2006 over responsibilities for the executive tasks to local BiH police forces, while maintaining some non-executive tasks.

In the spring of 2006, the UK announced its plan to withdraw from Operation EUFOR Althea, in view of the pressing demands on UK forces in Iraq’s Basra region. For other countries, eager not to be drawn into the Iraq war, their troop presence in the Balkans provided an argument against involvements in more costly and risky operations.

OpCommander Reith introduced in his 6 monthly report to the PSC for the first half of 2006, a proposal to start reducing the troop numbers in BiH. The proposal was discussed by foreign- and defence ministers on 13 November, but uncertainty over the Kosovo status process held back the decision. On 11 December, the Council decided to reconfigure Operation EUFOR Althea and to introduce the first step towards a reduction.

The PSC decided on 25 February 2007 to execute the plan and the new force achieved its Full Operational Capability, FOC, on 28 April. It comprised 2,500 soldiers on the ground, backed up by over-the-horizon reserves, including stand-by forces from KFOR in Kosovo, ready to reinforce, in case of need. The arrangement had been a prerequisite for the reductions. On 19 November, the Council reiterated that the troops would be kept for as long as needed to respond to the eventual flare up of hostilities.

In December 2009 a debate at the GAERC revealed different perspectives on the force. The UK advocated EUFOR Althea to ”hang on” and ensure the Dayton agreement, in particular the retention of the so-called ”Bonn Powers” bestowed on the EU HR, who was ”double-hatted” as the Dayton-mandated Office of the HR. He had special authority to apprehend also elected officials, if case of breach with the Dayton Agreement. Operation EUFOR Althea represented a symbolic value as the only Berlin Plus operation. Neighbouring Balkan EU states advocated prudence in view of the remaining uncertainties in the Western Balkans.

Sweden and France argued for the further reduction of Operation EUFOR Althea in order to force the local parties to assume their responsibility for the deteriorating situation in BiH. Spain, eager to reduce its presence, was replaced by Austria, allowing that country to assume the position as Force
Commander, a position which otherwise would have befallen Turkey, since it fielded the largest contingent after Spain. On 26 April 2010, a new SSR mission was given to Operation EUFOR Althea in the form of the training and monitoring of the BiH Armed Forces. At the beginning of 2011, EUFOR Althea consisted of 1,700 personnel. The force maintained the executive task of contributing to a safe and secure environment in complement to the non-executive role of contributing to the capacity building and training of the local forces.

The common costs through the Athena-mechanism was € 71.7 million.92

**Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta**93

**Introduction**

The strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden, neighbouring some of the world’s most important Sea Lanes of Communication, SLOCs, is reflected in the considerable military presence, from the Suez Canal, via the Red Sea and through the Gulf of Aden. The terrorist attack on the US in 2001 resulted in the deployment of US forces to Djibouti, the home of a long standing French base. Counter-terrorism activities, sparked already by the bombings of US embassies in East Africa 1998, were scaled up.

The failing state of Somalia has been central to global security concerns since the 90’s. A series of spectacular acts of piracy, threatening SLOCs along some of the world’s most important trade routes, as well as humanitarian supplies to Somalia, led to a sharp increase in anti piracy activities during the latter part of the 00’s. Operations previously undertaken by individual nations coalesced into multinational efforts, eventually growing into a global formation.

In October 2008, NATO launched its Operation Ocean Shield. In December that same year, the EU initiated Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the EU’s first naval mission. In January 2009, the US Navy maritime surface and assets assigned to US CENTCOM assumed the main elements of the Combined Task Force 151, with primarily counter-terrorism tasks. Many other navies from countries affected by the piracy activities (for example India, Singapore, Russia, China) joined the effort in what was arguable a singularly vast form of international maritime co-operation, the International Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia. A self-regulating mechanism based on UN web sites for the coordination of merchant shipping allowed naval forces to offer escort to merchant ships.

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92 Estimate made by Keohane in Grevi et al. 2009
93 I am grateful to Captain Lennart Danielsson, Chief of the EU’s Staff Group at SHAPE, NATO, between 2003-2007 (2003 for Operation Concordia and 2004-2007 for EUFOR Althea) for having discussed the additional cases with me. I am, naturally, responsible for the content and conclusions as well as any remaining errors.
Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta was launched in support of UN Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 adopted in 2008 and 1897 in 2009. The mandate for Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta was formulated as to:
1. provide protection for vessels chartered by the WFP,
2. provide protection for merchant vessels,
3. employ the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery.

Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta provides necessary resources to protect ships aimed at sustaining the African Union’s mission to Somalia, AMISOM, or deploying AMISOM reinforcements. In April 2010 the EU launched its mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) in Uganda.

The EU applies a ”comprehensive approach” to the Horn of Africa. Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta is just one of several instruments. The EU supports the Djibouti process for peace and reconciliation in Somalia, facilitated by the UN and provides financial help to AMISOM through the EU Commission’s Peace Facility Instrument. The EU’s Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia for 2008-2013 allocates € 215, 8 million under the EC’s 10th European Development Fund (EDF) for governance, education and rural development.

The strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden has since long merited the presence of Western, including European, military naval forces in the area. France has, for example, bilateral military ties with Djibouti and the UK with Kenya.

The establishment of naval command and control structures for Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta broke new grounds both in terms of EU internal arrangements and with regard to the EU’s articulation with the outside world. The UK headquarters at Northwood, ear-marked for EU use, were assigned as OHQ. The FHQ was during the first part of 2010 run out of the Swedish frigate HMS Carlskrona. The sprawling EU command an control structures included American liaison personnel managing the linkage between NATO information systems and non-NATO European systems. Individual ships pertaining to Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta occasionally slipped out of EU command and control arrangements, operating directly under national command and control and jurisdiction. This happened, for example in the protection of national fishing assets.

The EU liaised with a vast network of cooperating partners, including the US, Russia, the African Union and individual Asian nation such as China, manifesting its increasing naval reach and interest in protecting vital SLOCs.

Participating EU members were (April 2010): The Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, and Portugal. In August 2009, Norway joined the operation. Croatia, Montenegro, hoping to improve
their EU bid, participated, as did Ukraine. Russia rejoined EU-Russia military cooperation for the first time since the Georgia war. The force consisted of circa 1,800 personnel.

Joint costs of €8.3 million, related to the costs for deployment to the area and for the use of OHQ’s and FHQ’s, were covered through the financial Athena mechanism.

The jury was still out on the effects of the EU (and global formation) undertaking in the Horn of Africa at the conclusion of this study. Piracy activities were forced by the containment operation to re-deploy wider out, to the Indian Ocean. The EU is currently trying to find and eliminate bases for pirates. The number of incidents has diminished, but the sums obtained through piracy acts has increased. There were fears that the ransoms obtained also helped financially supply terrorism activities in the wider Gulf of Aden area.

The conclusions regarding the additional cases will be drawn in the next Chapter 6, Comparative Analysis.

To conclude, having presented and analyzed the two main cases and three additional cases, this study will proceed to Chapter 6 were the findings and observations will be presented and analyzed as a basis for answering the research question in Chapter 7.
6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In the following chapter, the cases will be compared with the purpose to highlight and analyze the findings. Under Section 6.1 the cases will be compared with the help of the analytical tool, and in Section 6.2 the main observations and findings from the cases will be identified and their importance in relation to the functional and organizational themes of this study will be analyzed.

In segment 6.1.1 the conclusions derived from the two main cases in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 will be integrated in order to discern and interpret the driving and inhibiting factors resulting from a cross-case comparison. This will be done through the application of the analytical tool in two phases:

1) the elaborated analytical tool from Table 2 will be applied to the conclusions made in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 and the main factors will be marked in bold,

2) the factors marked in bold will then be plotted across the matrix in order to get a better overview of the main factors.

In Section 6.1.2 the analytical tool will be applied in its first phase to the additional cases presented in Section 5.3. Since the degree of elaboration is not the same as in the main cases, the analytical tool will only be applied in its first phase.

In Section 6.2 the results will be discussed and summarized in general observations regarding all the cases. In the last segments, the findings will be analyzed in relation to the functional and organizational themes.

6.1 Comparing The Cases

6.1.1 The Two Main Cases

In comparing the conclusions from the cases, some positive and some negative factors stand out as more important than others. The main factors emerging from the two main cases, Lebanon and Congo RD Congo, are marked in bold in the following.
Applying the analytical tool

A. Factors External to the Organization

1. Political

In the case of Lebanon, the group of actors favouring a European intervention was heterogeneous, reflecting differing interests.

Kofi Annan in repeated contacts with Solana tried to enlist European contributions, possibly under UN lead, to the expected enlarged military mission in Lebanon. The goal of DPKO to bring back the Europeans to the UN fold militated against an EU led configuration. Also, the UN was the main venue for negotiations (-), primarily between the US (Israel) and France (Lebanon), for ending the conflict.

In case of Lebanon, the Israelis and the US called for a European intervention, preferably under NATO flag as a way out of a military campaign under serious stress. The intervention was assumed to happen even in the absence of a political framework for ending the conflict and with one of its tasks to disarm Hezbollah.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, was not interested in a more muscular European led force (-) that they suspected to be tasked to downgrade their remaining capability, but preferred instead a more pliable UN force.

In the case of DRC, external political factors were mostly favourable.

The UN had made an assessment (+) that pointed to the need for a stabilization force in the form of a rapid deployment force that could add value to the UN force in place, MONUC. Furthermore, there are signs to indicate that the UN wanted to test the availability of the EU’s Battle Groups (+).

In DRC, the initial reluctance of local political actors towards an EU led force, was overcome as a result of consultations with President Kabila and by the EU. The force eventually proved its impartiality on the ground. These were factors that were shaped by a proactive EU stand.

2. Pol-mil

The different attitudes of local actors reflected, among other things, the character of the two conflicts.

In Lebanon, the stakes were high, since the assumed stabilisation force, EU or UN-led, was expected to be deployed on the heels of a violent conflict between two parties, Israel and Hezbollah, the latter also part of the Lebanese government that the US and France supported. Israel’s goal was to downgrade Hezbollah’s possession of missiles and send a signal to Syria and Iran, the assumed providers of these weapons. The US, while sympathetic towards these goal, shared the French ambition of not bringing down the Lebanese government in the process.

The ambiguity of the different and sometimes conflicting goals of the warring parties, in combination with Israel’s bombing of UN positions along “the blue line”, made the potential operation a challenging one. One can,
however, assume that if the EU were to lead an operation accompanying an Israeli withdrawal, it would only have done so after a political agreement for ending the conflict had been reached in the UN. That would have implied Hezbollah’s support, which would have been difficult to achieve. Even under the best of circumstances, the operation would have been a challenge (-), albeit probably a manageable such to the EU.

In DRC, the potential conflict was expected to result not from armed conflict between heavily armed warring parties, but rather from tensions between political/ethnic factions disputing the election results. In case of violence, the level was expected to fall well within the confines of what the local Congolese forces, MONUC and EUFOR RD Congo could manage. The situation could thus be understood as an opportunity (+), rather than a challenge.

3. Resource
The strong UN precedent (-) in the Lebanon was certainly an obstacle if not an impediment to an EU lead role in the area, in spite of the fact that the bulk of forces had been European. The DPKO intention of bringing the Europeans back into UN led peacekeeping was an inhibiting factor. An EU led force was a competing element.

In DRC, the UN and DPKO had, to the contrary, an interest in mobilizing the brand new EU instrument of rapid deployment, the EU BG (+), for its purposes, along the lines of the Brahimi Report. It would be another test of the European willingness to contribute to the UN effort with a complementary force that represented an added value to MONUC.

B. Factors Internal to the Organization

1. Political and 2. Pol-mil
With regard to Lebanon, the EU with Solana at its helm, endeavoured to assume a role in the Middle East more commensurate with its values and interests. The EU had been the main provider of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians and the Lebanese, had invested repeatedly in the Palestinian civilian infrastructure and in its neighbourhood policies with Lebanon. The mass evacuation of European citizens, often with dual citizenships, from the Lebanon, testified to the interests involved. Although the UK and some other EU member states tacitly supported the US stance on the conflict, the general feeling was that the EU as a collective differed with US Middle Eastern policies at the time. Differences between EU members over the proper time to call for “a cease-fire/cessation of hostility” for the conflict hampered the EU. Raising the EU profile would be a means of assuming a political position more commensurate with EU investments in the field of humanitarian and civilian or civ-mil crisis management, a way of promoting another Middle Eastern policy than the prevailing and to position the EU in
case there would be an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. With consensus being the principle of decision-making in the EU, the pro-Israeli stance of some of the member states and the EU’s decision on branding Hamas a terrorist organization, meant that the EU’s self perception didn’t necessarily coincide with that of local actors such as Hezbollah.

The collective EU interests and values can be situated in the low-to-middle bandwidth of interests and values, with one exception. The need to evacuate EU citizens was a vital interest.

France, a member of the Security Council, with a French Ambassador at the helm of DPKO and its special relationship with Lebanon, decided that it needed to put its forces under UN command in order to be part of the political architecture (-). Furthermore, the interest of integrating Hezbollah (-) into a future Lebanese government, militated against and EU-led military operation.

In DRC, the EU had made huge investments in humanitarian aid, civilian, civ-mil and military crisis management well in accordance with its professed ambitions in the ESS. This was a case that fitted nicely within the bandwidth of the EU’s self proclaimed identities and ambitions. The urge of the EU to find a way out of the constitutional crisis, may have prompted the interest of launching a new ESDP-mission. The fact that Germany would be the framework nation of the EU BG in readiness as of Jan1, 2006, may have provided an added impetus for France and the UK to mobilize the reluctant third of the “big three” in terms of European military resources. German resistance against assuming a leading role and to step forward to plan the first external military operation since the WW II and to share burdens thought to be the responsibility of the former colonial powers, were overcome in time for the delayed elections. The delay could be described as the necessary process for political socialization within the EU and for producing a more coherent European position.

The EU’s collective values and interests can be situated in the low-to-middle bandwidth of values and interests.

3. Resource

In the Lebanon, the Europeans had over time provided the bulk of forces in UNIFIL. Strong bilateral military ties existed between Lebanon and, in particular, France, but also the UK. Attempts by the EU to establish a Security Sector Reform Program with Lebanon was thwarted by nations anxious to preserve their privileged bilateral relationships with Lebanon.

In DRC, the EU precedent (+) in the field in the form of Artemis and the presence of French forces in the region (+) facilitated the deployment of Operation EUFOR RD Congo. In DRC, the EU had a precedent in the form of Operation Artemis which did not represent any competing alternative to the UN who had, to the contrary requested the EU subcontract in the form of European rapid deployment forces, a capability that the UN did not have of
its own. The availability of EU BG can, in a way, have served as a driving factor.

The lack of mature command and control structures represented the main resource constraint in both cases. The EU depended on an individual member states to take on the role of framework nation and to mobilize the necessary OHQ.

In Lebanon, France was the main candidate for taking on the framework role and its decision would be decisive. Forces in the French General Staff did not want, based on the negative experiences from the Balkan war, to put its forces under UN command in Lebanon where the Israelis had bombed UN posts. An EU command and control seemed for a while as a possible way out of the predicament. There was possibly also an ESDP lobby in the French Foreign Ministry that favoured an EU-solution as a means of raising the profile of ESDP.

The French deemed, however, that the EU was too weak an organization to be able to absorb the shocks waves in case something would go wrong (-). This was yet another reason, apart from the wish to be part of the political architect mentioned above, to put French forces under UN command. The UN could more readily absorb the shock-waves in case things would go wrong. Special arrangements were made in the UN in order to accommodate French concerns with regard to weak command and control systems. Furthermore, the interest of integrating Hezbollah (-), a part to the Lebanese government, into Lebanon’s armed forces required their deployment to the South, a solution that was incompatible with an EU-led force in the area. The two alternatives were not considered during the same time sequence, but the goal of integrating Hezbollah may have influenced the initial decision to discard an EU alternative.

In DRC, the immaturity of the EU’s command and control structure was not a major impediment. It was a less demanding operation and the primary importance of the OHQ was to generate the necessary multinational forces, while the French FHQ in the theatre bore the brunt of the operational burden. The indicated EU OHQ in the form of the German OHQ Potsdam was mobilized after an initial delay (+). The delay represented one of the few inhibiting factors, but it was overcome in time for the Operation EUFOR RD Congo.

If the main factors marked above in bold are plotted across the matrix, the following pattern appears:
### Table 8. Applying the Analytical Tool to Compare the Two Main Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Factors:</th>
<th>Driving (+)</th>
<th>Inhibiting (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases: Lebanon</td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Indicators:

**A. Factors External to the Organization**

1. **Political**
   - 1.1 Hezb neg Bemba/Kinshasa
   - 1.2 UN assessment UN main venue Integrate Hezb

2. **Pol-mil**
   - 2.1 opportunity challenge

3. **Resource**
   - 3.1 UN test EU BG UN precedent

**B. Factors Internal to the Organization**

1. **Political**
   - 1.1 Influence MEP Force for Good
   - 1.2 Euro periphery Vested interests Use ESDP
   - 1.3 Engage Germany France part of pol. architecture Germany reluctant pol. architecture

2. **Pol-mil**
   - 2.2 French risk assessment Divisions over time for “cease-fire/cessation of hostility”

3. **Resource**
   - 3.1 EU precedent No EU precedent
   - 3.2 OHQ/FHQ available (after delay) No OHQ/FHQ available (French no)
   - 3.3 European forces EUBG/French forces bulk of UNIFIL
The emerging pattern in the matrix of the main driving and inhibiting factors will form the basis for the general observations to be made in Section in 6.2.

6.1.2 The Additional Cases

The analytical tool will now be applied to the narrative given for the Additional Cases only in its first phase, as a means of selecting factors. The conclusions drawn from the Additional Cases will be made in Section 6.2.

Operations Concordia and EUFOR Althea

In the following, the analytical tool will be applied in its first phase to the additional cases Operation Concordia and Operation EUFOR Althea.

A. Factors External to the Organization

1. Political

At the turn of the century, the Western Balkans were by and large pacified. Local actors had been pacified by the proceeding wars and played no major role in the shaping of decisions of transfer from US/NATO to EU led forces.

The US prepared to withdraw and handle over the task of further stabilization of the region to the Europeans. A few years into the century, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded increasing US and UK military resources.

The US initial role as the main intervener meant that the US retained, through the Dayton Agreement, considerable political leavers on all other actors, for example with regard to the timing of and pace of reduction. The US preserved its bilateral military programs with countries in the region.

2. Pol-mil

The conflict had burnt itself out at the time of European engagement. The potential for future ethnic unravelling remained, however. The Western Balkans forms part of Europe and has the potential of being integrated into the EU.

The task of the international community can be described as stabilization and nation-building, all tasks well suited for the EU. The missions, mandate and tasks represented no challenge to the EU.

3. Resource

The EU basically took over NATO forces and structures in place. NATO stand-by forces in Kosovo, both the operational standby forces and the tactical reserve, provided guarantees of reinforcement in case of renewed violence.
B. Factors Internal to the Organization

1. Political and 2. Pol-mil
At the height of the Trans-Atlantic controversy over the Iraq war, Americans and Europeans alike found a project of co-operation in the pacification of the Balkans.

The Europeans, who had failed to stop the wars, could apply their soft powers and initiate the process of integrating the Balkan countries.

Operations Concordia and EUFOR Althea served as the bedrock for:
- launching the first EU operations, and for
- establishing the EU internal financial Athena Mechanism, eventually emulated by NATO.

3. Resource
Operations Althea and Concordia became the bedrock for:
- establishing and elaborating EU-NATO command and control cooperation in the form of Berlin plus. It served as a symbol for the Berlin plus arrangement between the EU and NATO.

It established a division of labour between US/NATO and EU follow-on forces in a European region. There were never any absolute shortages of European forces.

The UK closely followed US priorities with regard to the redeployment of forces from the Balkans to Iraq and, later, by resisting further reductions of Operation EUFOR Althea, on the grounds that it preserved the linkage to the Dayton Agreement.

Germany deployed for the first time after WW II forces on the soil of another European country, and one that had suffered under Nazi occupation.

A group of small and medium size EU member states played an active role in assuming responsibility in Operation EUFOR Althea. Balkan EU members resisted the reduction of Operation Althea as did the UK.

Financial costs were covered through the Athena mechanism and national contributions.

Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta
Below, the analytical tool will be applied in its first phase to the Additional Case Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

A. Factors External to the Organization

1. Political and 2. Pol-mil
Non-state actors and networks operating from the bases of a failed state displayed their growing financial clout and ability to disrupt vital SLOCs.
A global configuration, with UN mandate, tried to ensure SLOCs of vital supplies and humanitarian aid to Somalia. A US led coalition, CTF-115, conducted a combined antipiracy and counterterrorism effort.

3. Resource
No Western ground troops were based in Somalia. This was the consequence of fatal US experiences in the early 90’s in Somalia and the unacceptability of Western troops in the area. Instead, AMISOM provided ground troops, financially supported by the EU Commission’s Peace Facility Instrument. The EU trained Somali security forces through the US inspired EUTM program.

B. Factors Internal to the Organization

1. Pol
EU values were expressed through the support of the UN sponsored government in Somalia and of the humanitarian aid to Somalia.

Vital interests were at stake in the protection of SLOCs, global trade routes and the supply of resources. Reducing the growth of terrorist activities was another consideration. The protection of fishing interests was suggested by Spain. This was not, however, part of the operation’s formal task. The increased presence of global naval assets provided, nevertheless, a certain protection not only of Spanish, but also of Korean and Taiwanese fishing vessels.

2. Pol-mil
The mandates and tasks were manageable for the EU. They were defined to: 1) provide protection for vessels chartered by the WFP, 2) provide protection for merchant vessels, 3) employ the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery, + support to AMISOM and Somali security forces, EUTM.

One of the major hurdles was constituted by the lack of interaction with Kenyan justice system in the handling over of suspected pirates.

3. Resource
Operation EUNVAFOR Atalanta became the bedrock for the formation of the EU’s first naval operation. It was the first test of the UK OHQ Northwood in an EU context. It should, however, be noted that the technical importance of the test was limited. Maritime operations requires lighter command and control arrangements than ground operations. It is an agile operation with no need for infrastructure and host nation support arrangement.
The EU participated for the first time in a network based global maritime formation. The available European naval forces, adapted to the contributions offered by member states, did only correspond to one third-one-fourth of the resources necessary to cover the area efficiently. Sea surveillance aircrafts, a Coast Guards capability, proved to be a particularly scarce resource. Financial resources were obtained through the Athena mechanism and national contributions. The conclusions to be drawn from the Additional Cases will be integrated into the observations regarding all cases in the next Section 6.2.

### 6.2 Observations Based on All Cases

A cross-case comparison between the cases must take into account that the degree of explanatory value of the two main cases, the Lebanon war and EUFOR RD Congo, is higher than for the three additional cases, Operations Concordia, EUFOR Althea and EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

First, the two main cases represent EU led autonomous operations in areas of conflict or potential for conflict. Operations Concordia and EUFOR Althea followed on the heels of war termination by the US and NATO forces. Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta is an autonomous operation inserted into a global network of forces pursuing operations that would have been carried out in part by coast guards in developed and well-resourced countries.

Second, the two main cases occurred around the same time and have been subject to research that is comparable in terms of depth and the methods applied. Furthermore, I observed them up-close and made the research while the events were unfolding. The research conducted will provide the basis for solid findings regarding the functional and organizational themes of this study.

The additional cases have, to a considerable extent, been reconstructed with some distance to the object of study. The fact that the additional cases have not occurred simultaneously diminishes the explanatory value of observations made from them. Their main value was to ensure that the main variations of EU led operations were covered, and to shed light on the unofficial division of labour that has emerged in the context of the multilateralisation of intervention.

**To summarize:**

The two main cases provide the basis for solid findings regarding the functional theme of this study, the use of force, but also for the organizational
theme regarding collective security. The additional cases provide the basis primarily for the discussion of the implications for collective security.

From the two main cases, the following observations stand out from the application of the analytical tool, as made clear by Table 8. The main functional factors that have driven or inhibited the EU’s military operations are:

1) The view of local actors, 2) Conflict as an opportunity or a challenge, as defined by the EU, 3) The role of military precedent, 4) The availability and constraints on military resources, 5) The state of the EU’s command and control structures.

Of the five mentioned factors, 1, 2 and 5 stand out.

Among the organizational findings and observations regarding driving and inhibiting factors behind the EU’s military operations, the following are of particular importance:

1) The importance of the UN when the organization is the main venue for negotiations and when the risks are high to the nation assuming the responsibility for command and control functions, 2) The importance of regional security providers in the context of the multilateralisation of intervention, 3) The development of an unofficial division of labour with regard to collective intervention, 4) The EU would, as seen in this context, constitute an advanced form of regional governance, well suited for internal and historical reasons to assume a role in this division of labour, 5) The centrality of selective and saturated security for the ways multilateral intervention is being structured and the mechanisms for doing so, 6) The importance of resource constraints to the global pool of military forces available for military crisis arrangement.

A final remark relates to the distinctions made for the purpose of this study, for example between factors external and internal to the organization, between political and resource factors or between the intervener and the local actors. The results obtained in this chapter of case analysis indicate that these are at times artificial distinctions, as actors move freely in the international system/society and are as much internal as external in nature. Interveners and local actors are embroiled in a complicated interaction that makes them resemble wrestlers rather than “actors” and “targets”. Political goals shape the choice of resources, and the availability or restraints on resources shape and condition political goals.

This study shall now proceed to elaborate on the findings from the case analysis presented above. In doing so, it shall relate the findings to the themes established in Chapter 2: functional themes dealing with the use of force (6.2.1) and organizational themes dealing with collective security (6.2.2.).
6.2.1 The Significance of Local Actors and Resources

1) The role of local actors. The growing importance of local actors has shaped the room for the EU’s military involvement. The attitude of local actors has, in some instances, been an inhibiting factor.

There is good reason to highlight the increasing importance of local actors for the dynamics that will lead to or inhibit military operations in general, including those carried out by the EU. The importance of local actors is derived from the general diffusion of power throughout the international system/society. Examples of important vectors for power in this context are the spread of technology in the form of weaponry and the reduced costs of communications. The interaction within the international system/society allows for unexpected encounters of actors and thus combinations of factors. The so-called non-material characteristics of the relationship (Heinze 2009) between the intervener and the local actor is, consequently, a factor of importance. The EU’s lack of self-awareness in this regard has in some cases inhibited its ability to impact on the attitude of local actors.

2) Conflict as an opportunity or a challenge. The conflicts chosen by the EU for intervention should, as viewed from the EU’s vantage point, preferably look like an opportunity rather than a challenge. A high level of violence in an unregulated conflict represents a high threshold to climb for any intervener, while a tense situation with the potential for escalating violence is a different thing altogether. The novelty and modesty of the EU’s military operations has enabled the EU to identify some conflicts as opportunities. This has worked as a driver during the pioneering decade. This finding testifies to the importance of “the interpretive element” for collective security, i.e. the ways conflicts are chosen or disregarded for intervention.

3) The role of precedent for military operations. Political and military precedence of an actor in a conflict area plays a role for the likelihood that a military operation will be undertaken. For the EU, being the ”new kid on the block”, its inexperience as a collective actor has represented an impediment.

The EU has tended to intervene where European nations have done so before, while the threshold for intervening in new areas is naturally high. The existence of European military precedent has acted as a driver for some of the EU’s military operations, primarily in Africa.

The lack of precedent in other areas has inhibited the EU’s first autonomous military operations. A well established UN presence in an area provides the UN with some authority to determine whether an EU led military operation is desirable or not. Where the US and NATO intervened to terminate the Balkan wars, EU led forces have constituted follow-on forces. The failed European attempts at playing a military role in the Balkan wars in the
90’s did, however, create facts on the ground that facilitated the establishment of ESDP and the EU’s military role in the Balkans in the 00’s.

4) **The availability of and constraints on military resources.** The creation of common EU forces, among them the EU BG, created an impetus for the use of these forces. This driver was, however, tempered by the overall strains on the availability of European forces caused by the Iraq and Afghan wars. The constraints on the availability of troops for the EU’s first limited military operations have, however, been relative rather than absolute in nature, with the exception of British forces.

The two tendencies of driving and inhibiting factors with regard to military resources tended to cancel each other out.

5) **The state of the EU’s command and control structures.** The EU’s command and control structures have been built up from 2003 and onwards. They are limited by both political design and their immaturity. The limitations to the EU’s command and control arrangements inhibited the EU from taking on a more ambitious role, with regard both to the nature of the mission and the use of the EU BG. It hampered the planning and conduct of the more modest operations. It was an inhibiting factor in the mid 00’s, the timeline for the two main cases.

By the end of the 00’s, the growing maturity of the EU’s command and control structures and increasing importance of IT made them less of an impediment for modest operations. For more demanding operations, for example involving the EU BG, the current arrangements remain an impediment, since the use of the national OHQ’s for EU purpose depends on decisions in the respective capitals of these countries.

6.2.2 The Role of Collective Use of Force

1) **The multilateralisation of intervention.** The multilateralisation of intervention has been a salient feature since the end of the Cold War. It has served many and sometimes opposing purposes, such as the promotion of democratic peace, the purpose of legitimizing intervention, at times post factum, and the need to share costs and risks. During the 00’s, the number of conflicts did not increase, but the remaining conflicts were more difficult to solve, be it by political or military means. The increased political possibility after the end of the Cold War to intervene in states "low in viability" (Levite et al. 1992) was tempered by the difficulty of succeeding. The utility of force was problematic to ascertain in many cases.

There is no coherent understanding of the phenomenon of collective intervention, as it has developed since the end of the Cold War. (Regan 2000) Its practice has been established through ad hoc decisions, often reflecting
the latest, and sometimes misunderstood, experience. The lack of a coherent and transparent understanding of the dynamics behind the multilateralisation of intervention has inhibited the development of collective security.

2) **Regional organizations as security providers.** The collectivisation of intervention since the end of the Cold War has opened up a functional role for regional security providers, such as the EU and the AU. This has acted as a driver for the EU’s military operations.

The growing security cooperation between the EU and the AU has allowed for a more equitable relationship between European and African states. It has been an instrument for addressing the “non-material relationship” (Heinze 2009) between the intervener and the local actors. The increasing cooperation between the EU and the AU has facilitated the EU’s military operations in Africa. It has served as a driver.

The folding of different European nations into the collective body of the EU has allayed, if not overcome entirely, fears in parts of Africa with regard to post-colonial machinations from some of the EU member states. There are, however, limits to post-colonial redemption through the EU. The post-colonial legacy has at times been an inhibiting factor.

An unofficial division of labour with regard to the multilateralisation of intervention has developed in which the EU has become a global actor while, at the same time, serving as a regional subcontractor to UN-mandated missions. This is particularly evident in conflicts when the UN is the main venue for negotiation and where there has been a UN military precedent in the field. The UN has not, however, been able to access the rapid reaction tool of the EU BG.

The distinction between the local, regional and global levels has become less meaningful, as actors move freely in the global system/society. The global agenda has become crowded as regional organizations such as the EU and NATO take on a global role.

The nearly spontaneous developments of an international division of labour with regard to military crisis management has not been accompanied by any serious attempt to adapt the mechanisms of cooperation accordingly. The state of the mechanisms for coordinating this division has been particularly inhibiting in the interface between the UN and regional organizations, recognized in principle by the UN Charter but without any proper place at the global negotiating table where nation states continue to dominate. Well positioned actors can “play the institutional piano”, but they are also subject to accidental and sometimes bewildering experiences that defy control.

This state of affairs is dysfunctional and obviates transparency with regard to the ways selective and saturated security is structured, i.e. the ways

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94 For an interesting analysis with valuable proposals for pragmatic improvements of the UN-EU relationship, see Major 2008
conflicts are chosen or disregarded for intervention. This has been an inhibiting factor.

3) **The EU’s collective use of force.** The end of the Cold War reduced American security interests and military presence in Europe and opened up a void for the Europeans to fill. The Balkan wars underlined the need for a common European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP.

ESDP was facilitated by the nature of the EU as a “security community” of shared values and low transaction costs. ESDP served as the basis for European nations to face common security challenges, retain a position in the global system, promote “democratic peace”, defend some hardnosed realpolitical interests, provide global public crisis management goods and pool dwindling resources.

The diminished importance of territorial defence in Europe released resources for military operations outside the EU and created conditions for the growth of expeditionary forces. ESDP provided a convenient template for creating greater synergies between European forces and to reduce the cost of externalities.

A division of labour emerged between the EU and other participants in collective security, as described under the previous point. New instruments, such as the EU BG, came on line, stimulating an interest by the UN to use the new rapid reaction force, an instrument sorely lacking in the UN’s arsenal. In Africa, the EU became a subcontractor to the UN in areas with French military precedent. In the Balkans, a candidate region for EU integration, EU forces played the role of follow-on-forces to NATO.

In the anti-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean, EU forces entered into cooperation with new global partners such as China, interested in maintaining the sea lanes of communication, or SLOCs, and the uninterrupted flow of global trade.

The EU’s internal mechanisms lagged behind the new realities of military crisis management carried out in cooperation with other multilateral organizations. These were restrictive, if not outright inhibiting factors.

When the EU’s military operations came on line by the mid and late 00’s, an overstretch of the global pool of expeditionary forces became apparent. It was caused by overextension, decreased defence spending, soaring defence costs and limitations to the pool of human resources available for expeditionary forces.95

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95 The Chairman of the European Union Military Committee, General Håkan Syrén, in a keynote address Common Security and Defence Policy in the Twenty-first Century, given to the Royal United Services Institute, RUSI on 13 January, 2011, noted:

"September 11 and the following conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused attention and commitments to the global arena. For many years the contributions of EU Member States to
For the EU, this meant that in particular the UK, one of the initiators of ESDP, came to play a limited role, with the exception for the first phase the EU’s Balkan operations and for EU NAVFOR Atalanta. France, the other main contender for leading the ESDP effort, played a prominent role for the conduct of the EU’s military operations, often in cooperation with small to medium sized member states. Germany, caught between residual pacifism, a resistance to get involved in African operations, and its growing military engagement in Afghanistan, played a reluctant, if essential role. Germany proved particularly restrictive with regard to the use of the Athena-mechanism for financing deployment costs of the EU’s military operations.

The small to medium size EU member states tended to provide follow-on-forces to these of the larger players, interested in shifting resources to areas of potential new geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and Asia. Some countries (for example Poland, Sweden, Ireland) found the EU template a convenient one for co-ordinating their resources, transforming their defence sector, and obtaining greater political influence.

The EU offered an attraction pole for “third countries” (for example Norway, Ukraine, Croatia, Turkey, Switzerland, Russia), interested in taking part in the EU’s military operations and also as a way to engage politically with the EU, some of them in a bid for EU membership.

The professed ambition and scope of military operations undertaken by the EU during the 00’s were modest. These operations situated themselves in the low to middle band-width in terms of interests, ambition and size, a function both of established political goals, resource constraints and the fact that the 00’s were pioneering times for the EU’s military operations. The limited ambition and size of the EU’s military operations made it at times difficult to ascertain their exact effect, but they were also less vulnerable to some of the difficulties encountered by other actors in the use of force during the 00’s.

The phenomenon of the emergence of EU military operations in the 00’s can only be understood in the context of collective security. They served the EU, but also many interests and communities beyond and larger than the EU itself. There have been multiple organizational drivers.

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NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo have outnumbered the contributions to CSDP-operations by a factor of ten to one.”

96 In particular, if the initiatives seemed to emanate from structures reflecting the privileged French and UK positions on the UN Security Council in which Germany is not represented.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Here, in Chapter 7 the results of the study will be summarized. In Section 7.1 the research question will be restated and the contributions of this study recalled. In Section 7.2 the research question will be answered and conclusions will be drawn. Based on this section, the implications for the EU’s military operations will be discussed in Section 7.3, and future directions for research will be proposed in the final Section 7.4.

7.1 Answering the Research Question

This study asked the following research question:

**Under what circumstances does the EU undertake military operations?**

This was deemed to be important as the EU has become an actor in collective security and as the number of comparative investigations into its military operations have been few and largely descriptive. Thus it was relevant to raise a more general question.

In order to answer the research question, the following was done:

*First*, an analytical framework was introduced for the analysis of the dynamics at play in the EU’s use of force. The study was supported by concepts derived from the literature on the use of force, intervention and peace and conflict research. It integrated the element of interaction between factors that are often treated as separate categories in scholarly literature. Of particular interest was the interaction between political and resource factors and between the intervener and local actors.

*Second*, the study focused on the EU as a collective security provider in the context of the multilateralisation of intervention. The literature regarding the multilateralisation of intervention and the role of regional organizations provided the main scholarly concepts for this part of the study. The literature on European security and defence policies specified some concepts that were used to highlight EU features with the emphasis on the “D”, as in defence.
In addition, concepts from the literature were combined with my experience as a practitioner from defence planning in constructing an analytical tool that was applied to case studies of EU military operations. Two main cases, one non-case, the Lebanon war 2006, and one case, Operation EUFOR Congo RD 2006, were selected in order to offer a convenient dichotomy for the empirical part of the study. Three additional cases were added to ensure that the main variations in terms of command and control arrangements, one of the prime criteria for the selection of cases, were covered. Based on a cross-case comparison with an emphasis on the main cases, core findings were advanced that will form the basis for conclusions with regard to conditions for EU action to be drawn in the following Section 7.2.

7.2 Conclusions: Conditions for EU Action

Before proceeding to conclusions, two caveats will be inserted at this point. First, the results obtained from the cases are time-specific and the conditions prevalent are not likely to be reproduced in their entirety. Second, it is important to bear in mind that the seemingly logical outcome of things, as presented in this scholarly study, in reality coexists with elements of randomness. This is an insight that shall guard against the expectation that events will reproduce themselves according to some kind of irrefutable logic.

With those two caveats in mind, this study shall now answer the research question: **Under what circumstances does the EU undertake military operations?**

Based on the findings identified in the comparative analysis of cases in Section 6.2, all things being equal, the following conclusions can be drawn:

The EU is likely to undertake military operations when the consent of some of the influential local actors can be secured. This consent can be gained, as was the case of EUFOR RD Congo. In the absence of the consent of influential local actors, as was the case of Hezbollah in the Lebanon war, an operation is less likely to happen. The judgement of influential EU members can also play a role in the assessment of the attitude and role of local actors. This seems to have been the case when Ban Ki-Moon asked for an EU intervention in Eastern Congo at the end of 2008. France would have run the risk of confronting regular Rwandan forces in the area, a risk that France was not prepared to take for historical and political reasons. This “non-case” illustrates the importance of “the interpretative element” for selective security, i.e. the ways conflicts are chosen or disregarded for intervention.
The EU can be expected to undertake autonomous military operations when a conflict can be identified as an opportunity rather than a challenge both in terms of the interests at stake and with regard to the tasks and missions defined for the operation. The likelihood of a military operation is high when both interests and tasks situate themselves in the low-to-middle bandwidth, as was the case of EUFOR RD Congo. When interests are low-to-middle and the potential tasks are challenging, as was the case of the Lebanon war, the EU is less likely to undertake military operations.

It cannot be excluded that the EU could intervene in situations marked by high risk, if interests are strong, for example in case of a conflict in Europe or on the European periphery, the need to evacuate citizens from a conflict area or for the purpose of halting a pending genocide, if legitimized by the international community. These are, however, exceptions from the general observation made above.

The EU is likely to undertake operations where individual European nations or the EU have done so before. In areas of former European colonial presence, the support of other regional security providers such as the AU and ASEAN will increase the likelihood of EU military operations. The non-consent of relevant regional security providers will make an EU operation less likely, unless vital interests are at stake for the EU.

Furthermore, the EU will undertake military operations when resources are aligned in terms of command and control arrangements, the main resource constraint identified by the cases. This was the case in Operations Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo and EUNVAFOR Atalanta, all autonomous operations. In Operation EUFOR Althea, the EU relied on NATO command and control structures in accordance with the Berlin plus formula.

When an operation can be expected to lead to high pressure on the country that exercises the function of “framework nation”, as would have been the case for France in an EU led operation in Lebanon, the preference is to rely on institutions such as the UN that can function as “shock absorbers”. The EU is unlikely to undertake military operations under these circumstances.

The availability or constraints on resources in terms of ground forces and financial means are factors of obvious importance. They have offered relative rather than absolute constraints for the rather limited EU operations undertaken up till this point, with the exception for that of UK forces. The EU is unlikely to undertake more ambitious operations when there exists an overstretch with regard to ground forces available for global military crisis management, as is currently the case.

For the resources to be aligned in accordance with the reasoning above, it takes the cooperation between at least one of the three major powers in the EU - Germany, France, the UK - and a group of small and medium seized countries. If all three are unavailable, as seems to have been the case when Ban Ki-Moon asked for an EU military operation in Eastern DRC in 2008,
albeit for very different reasons, the EU will not undertake military operations.

The unofficial division of labour with regard to multilateral or collective intervention determines the space for EU military operations. The EU is likely to undertake military operations when they are complementary to that of other actors. This is the case, for example, when the EU can serve as a regional subcontractor to UN operations, as has happened in Africa. The EU, at the same time, is a global actor that competes, jointly with many others, with the UN in formulating the global agenda that has, as a consequence, become crowded.

Complementary EU operations can also take place when EU forces act as follow-on-forces to NATO forces in areas on the periphery of, as in the case of Operations Concordia and EUFOR Althea, or adjacent to Europe where the Alliance has terminated war by force.

The EU is not likely to undertake military operations when the UN is the main venue of negotiations, as was the case with the Lebanon war or when the task set is to terminate war by force, as was the case in the Balkans.

The EU is unlikely to undertake military “stand-alone” operations, and this for reasons related both to politics and resource limitations. The EU will undertake complementary military operations if inserted into a division of labour between collective security providers and as part of a “comprehensive approach” that includes both civilian and military means in the management of conflicts.

7.3 Implications for the EU’s Military Operations

Before embarking on this section, one has again to recall that the results of this study are time-specific and reflect conditions prevalent during the first trial or, more heroically, pioneering decade of the EU’s use of force. This was a time situated between the management of the fall-out of the European wars and empires that marked the end of the Cold War, and the need to adjust to the relentless pressures of the forces of globalisation of the 21st century.

The EU’s military operations took off at a time when regional organizations started to assume an increasing role as security providers in an unofficial international division of labour with regard to military crisis management. The defence effort of the EU was primarily oriented towards external crisis management, while territorial defence was absent from calculations, at least until the Georgia war in 2008. At the same time, ESDP proved resilient to internal constitutional crises in the 00’s, an indication possibly of relevance also for the future.
With so many dynamic forces at hand, the security landscape of the 10’s may look very different from the one we just put behind us. The following is thus only the prolongation of trends observable in the 00’s with all the inherent limitations to such an exercise.

In the absence of any threat to its territorial integrity, the EU as a collective actor is in the 10’s likely to look for opportunities rather than challenges in crisis management. The EU will undertake mostly modest military operations as part of a comprehensive crisis management approach. Coordination with regional or subregional security actors, such as the AU and ASEAN, is going to play an increasing role in shaping the political scene of intervention.

As was stated in the previous section, more ambitious operations carried out against the will of local actors will happen in case strong interests are at stake, for example the need to evacuate European citizens, to secure free sea lanes of communications or to stop a pending genocide, if legitimized by the international community.

European precedent will condition the areas of intervention, with continued emphasis on residual tasks in the Balkans and emergencies in Africa. The threshold for military operation has, however, been lowered in the Levant. The civ-mil ESDP missions in Aceh and Georgia have lowered the threshold for EU involvement in South-East Asia and Southern Caucasus.

In the absence of any major emergencies that will call for action, the EU’s effort will be influenced by general doubts regarding the utility of force in conflict management and resource constraints. The pool of available ground troops will remain constrained both for political and resource reasons until, at least, the mid 10’s. An eventual drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and the gradual recovery from overextension may, jointly with an eventual further integration of European forces in the wake of the financial crisis, ease constraints on army forces by the end of the decade. The continued supply of naval and air force resources may invite operations based on these.

The limitations to European command and control structures will be less of a problem for ambitions on the current level but will inhibit more ambitious operations, short of, for example, the need to evacuate European citizens for which the EU BG can become a valuable tool and the designated EU OHQ’s in Mont Valérian, Northwood or Potsdam consequently mobilized.

The EU’s military operations serve interests and communities beyond and larger than the EU itself. The EU has still room to grow in order to fill the functional space for a European security provider in an international division of labour for military crisis management. That space may, however, be confined as regional organizations assume greater responsibility for the security in their regions, and as new Asian players start to field forces of similar quality to that of Western forces.

The lack of representation for regional security providers in the make-up of the UN, will remain an inhibiting factor for the elaboration of a more ra-
tional division of labour. It obviates a transparent order with regard to the inevitable selective security that characterizes the international system/society. The importance of regional security providers for collective security should be recognized in the deliberations on reforms of the UN Security Council. The UN should move beyond the limitations of the nation states in the management of conflicts and accommodate regional security providers.

The mechanisms for co-ordination between the UN and regional security providers should be adjusted accordingly and the dialogue on common interests improved and made available for public discussion.

The forces of globalisation will offer new opportunities as the EU enters into new networks of cooperation with global and regional actors. But these forces also represent a challenge to multilateral cooperation, as emerging powers clamour for a greater share in international governance and sub-state actors probe the existing order. The nature of the transition from the old to the new order will determine the ability of multilateral organizations such as the EU to continue to provide security.

On balance, there would seem to be a likelihood of more military interventions by the EU in the years to come.

7.4 Future Directions of Research

Before making proposals for further research, there is a need to pause and reflect again on possible shortcomings and omissions. Throughout this study, I have been aware of the danger of jumping to conclusions based on my observations as a practitioner. While most observations were made during my times in Brussels, many have emerged as a result of this study. Some findings have been surprising, testifying to the complexity of the topic at hands. This is then a reminder of the limits to “conventional wisdom” and an invitation to further research. What I have unearthed in this study is only my best available knowledge at this point. The results could, and should, be probed and questioned by future investigation into the field.

There is also the inherent difficulty of investigating something that is new and consists of a limited population, the EU’s six military operations. The observations are by nature time-specific and generalisations based on them are difficult to make. The EU’s first military operations in the 00’s could prove to be a trial without continuation or, on the contrary, the initiation of something grander to come. Few things are more difficult to predict than the developments of conflicts and the reactions to these by the international community. Bearing in mind these uncertainties, and thus the need to condition the findings based on a few cases, it would, nevertheless, seem important for scholars to grapple with the explanations to and implications of the
EU’s first military operations. In the next paragraphs, the contributions made by this study towards the building of knowledge will be accounted for. Then, and as a consequence, a couple of proposals for future research will be advanced.

This study has made a contribution towards building knowledge in the following ways:

It identified the apparent lack of comparative studies of the circumstances that will lead to, or inhibit, the EU from undertaking military operations. In addressing this deficiency, an analytical tool for the integrated analysis of the EU’s military operations was built. Building blocks were borrowed from relevant academic studies and then combined with the techniques of defence planning for the purpose of selecting indicators that could help process and analyze the empirical material in the form of cases of the EU’s military operations. Valuable academic concepts, such as interaction (Levy in Crocker et al. 2001) and protraction (Levite et al. 1992), were used in order to inject the necessary agility to the analytical tool. Resource factors, central to defence planning but often absent in academic studies, were introduced in order to complement the political factors.

The findings presented in the study supported previous research in the identification of the increasing importance of local actors (Heinze 2009, Arreguin-Toft (2005). It contributed to this research area through the investigation of the relationship between the intervener, in this case the EU and the local actors. While this interrelationship in some cases represents a zero-sum game, as was the case in Lebanon and DRC 2008, it can be shaped in other cases, as proven by the case of Operation EUFOR DR Congo in 2006. The findings corroborated previous research concerning the importance of the cooperation between regional security providers in addressing “the immaterial relationship” (Heinze 2009) between the intervener and the local actors. The study contributed to developing the concept through its application to cases of military operations that do not impinge on the sovereignty of the local actors, which has been the case for the EU’s first military operations.

The findings confirmed the critique presented in part of the literature that the jus bellum tradition is of limited relevance for the military management of many of today’s conflicts (van Creveld 1991). As a means of departing from the traditional analysis of intervention as cast in cost-benefit models, this study introduced the concept of “low-to-middle bandwidth” in terms of interests at stake and risks taken. It noted the lack of academic search-light into this murky area of military crisis management, less suited to the application of “Grand Strategy”. The importance of selective security (Roberts and Zaum 2008) in this context was highlighted and the concept of “saturated security” was proposed. The study emphasized the importance of the “interpretive element” in collective security for the ways conflicts are defined as an opportunity or a challenge in terms of military crisis management.
By introducing the study of the interaction between political and resource factors, and refining the concept of resources through the introduction of the techniques of defence planning, the study produced a better understanding of the relationship between “end and means” in military crisis management. The importance of command and control arrangements was borne out by the findings. By introducing the concept of a limited global pool of resources available for military crisis management, the constraints felt by the EU in the conduct of operations could be observed.

The concept of the multilateralisation of intervention proved useful for the purpose of the study (Regan 2000, Ortega 2001). The findings pointed to and coined the concept of an unofficial division of labour with regard to the global military crisis management. The EU’s role in this division of labour was investigated and its role was described as that of a global actor and regional subcontractor to the UN, and as a producer of follow-on-forces to NATO after war termination. Concepts drawn from research into the networked character of the international system (Keohane and Nye 1977, 2000, Nye and Donahue 2000) were helpful in providing a more flexible model for the study of interaction between different actors.

Previous research into the area of ESDP has departed to a considerable degree from notions of the EU as *sui generis*. The findings indicate instead, that while the EU may represent an advanced form of regional governance (Adler and Barnett 1998), it is an example of the growing importance of regional security providers for collective security as noted by several scholars (for example Peck in Crocker et al. 2001). With regard to EU internal dynamics, the findings revealed that the combination of at least one of “the big three” and a group of small and medium sized countries is a prerequisite for the EU to undertake a military operation. And while the study of the interaction between “the big three” continues to be of major importance for the topic at hand, the composition of the larger coalition of EU member states taking part in EU military operations also merits scholarly attention.

Based on the experiences gained from conducting this research, a couple of proposals with regard to the implications for research will follow.

First, there is a need to address the apparent lack of a coherent understanding of the phenomenon of collective, or multilateral, intervention that has developed since the end of the Cold War and as pointed out by Regan (2000). Future studies could look into the ways conflicts are chosen or disregarded for international intervention, the so-called interpretive element. Explicit and implicit criteria for the selection and non-selection of conflicts subject to intervention are important as objects of study, as are the mechanisms for doing so.

A special effort should be made to develop non-cases of intervention in order to probe the concepts and conclusions of academic work. The elements of randomness and dysfunctionality should be recognized and investigated in the context of multilateral intervention.
The development of an unofficial division of labour with regard to multilateral intervention is another area of interest, in particular with regard to the articulation between regional security providers and between them and the UN.

The utility of force in conflict management needs to be studied through the fusion of “war”, or “strategic studies” with research on ESDP and that of military Peace Operations.

Second, in order to improve the understanding of the phenomenon of multilateral intervention, an analytical framework for integrating previously separated categories and analyzing their dynamic interplay should be developed. The two most important pairs of interacting factors for the analytical framework are: a) political and resource factors and 2) intervener and local actors.

For the analysis of political and resource factors, it is important to combine the studies of political strategy with that of lessons learned from operations. Most of the multilateral interventions situate themselves in the low-to-middle bandwidth in terms of interests and it is often difficult to ascertain the appropriate military means to apply. An improved understanding of this “grey zone” of intervention, or military operations, seems to be important. The similarities and differences between operations carried out by different actors, such as the UN and the EU, would offer an interesting research area. An improved understanding of the interaction between “ends and means” could be another goal for this research. This will in turn require an improved dialogue between academic institutions with that of professional institutions dedicated to the study of military operations, such as defence colleges.

The study of the relationship between interveners and local actors is often cast in the political science categories of “actor” and “target”. This traditional categorization underestimates the role of local actors and does not account for the interaction between two parties that are themselves both subjects and objects to conflict developments. Scholars could develop new concepts that better reflect the real weight of the two parties and their interaction.

To conclude, a word about the analytical tool developed and applied to the cases. It helped me identify the driving and inhibiting factors behind the EU’s military operations and proved to be a useful tool for capturing the complex interplay between these factors. Based on the results, I was able to present findings from the study of cases of EU military operations and to indicate the implications for collective security providers in general. It seems that the analytical tool could be of value to other scholars interested in doing research into the area of multilateral intervention. This would, however, require the further development and operationalization of the analytical tool.

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97 For an interesting discussion on the benefits of integrating the research of Peace Studies and War Studies on military interventions in internal wars, see Larsdotter 2011
in order to improve its methodological value. I would greatly appreciate academic efforts in this regard.

This exercise has allowed me to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics behind the use of force by collective organizations at the beginning of the 21st century. The findings of EU operations and analysis of implications for collective security providers constitute building blocks of a theory for the area. While some findings are EU specific, many are generic in character. It is my hope that this contribution can be discussed, questioned and elaborated upon by other students in the field, academics as well as practitioners. Understanding the dynamics behind the multilateralisation of intervention is of great importance for shaping the future of collective security.
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- Colonel Sverker Ulving, EUMS liaison officer to the United Nations, the EU Delegation to the United Nations, New York, May 2010
- Dennis Besedic, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, DPKO, May 2010
- Members of the EU’s Council Secretariat, in particular DG VIII and the EU’s Military Staff, EUMS, in Brussels, in 2006 and early 2007 (Engberg 2006-2007a)
- Notes taken by the author in Brussels in the Spring of 2006 (Engberg 2006b).
**Annex 1: Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTORD</td>
<td>Activation Order Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capability Development Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHG</td>
<td>Civilian Headline Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSOR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Statement of Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management Planning Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Council Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG E</td>
<td>Directorate General: External Relations, CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC/RDC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU BG</td>
<td>European Union Battle Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Military Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>European Union Forces République Démocratique du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>EU Police Mission in BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Force Armées Démocratique du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFM</td>
<td>Fact Finding Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHQ</td>
<td>Force Headquarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIFWIC</td>
<td>Persons Indicated For War Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Integrated Police Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>Joint Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>MEPP</td>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in DR Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>Military Strategic Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OpCdr</td>
<td>Operational Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUA</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
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<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership For Peace</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualitative Majority Voting</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>SitCen</td>
<td>Joint Situation Centre</td>
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SLOCs  Sea Lane of Communications
SOFA  Status of Forces Agreement
SSR  Security Sector Reform
TEU  Treaty of the European Union
TOA  Transfer of Authority
UN  United Nations
UNMAIL  UN Mission in Liberia
UNAMSIL  United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UN DPKO  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNIFIL  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG  United Nations Secretary General
WEU  West European Union
WFP  World Food Program

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<th>Artemis</th>
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<td>469</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>472</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>111</td>
<td>691</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>330</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,088</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,297</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,319</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,715</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,722</strong></td>
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</table>

*Source: Anne-Claire Marangoni. ‘Le financement des opérations militaires de l’UE : des choix nationaux pour une politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?’, EU Diplomacy Paper no. 6, College of Europe, November 2008. (Estimates gathered on the basis of working documents from the French military staff).*

These figures are 2008 estimates. They only indicate military personnel, do not necessarily indicate peak strengths for each national contribution, and do not take rotation into account. The precise amount of contributions is constantly evolving. Total for *Concordia, Artemis* and all of the operations have been added by the editors on the basis of data available in the reference document. Figures for EUNAVFOR Atalanta are not included.

Comment by the author of the study: The estimated average of military personnel deployed in EUNAVFOR Atalanta is 1,800. Numbers of individual national contributions are not available. The total number of military personnel deployed in the EU’s military operations, based on the table above and this estimate, should then amount to circa 16,500.
Annex 3

Chronology: Lebanon war, June – October, 2006

June

Hamas rocket attacks against Israeli settlements
24 Israeli capture of Hamas members in the Gaza strip
28 Hamas attack inside Israeli territory, abduction of Israeli soldier Shalit, Israeli incursions into Gaza, arrest of Hamas officials

July

12 Outbreak of the conflict: Hezbollah kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, rocket attacks on Israel, Israeli air campaign in Southern Lebanon
13 Extra meeting with EU’s Political and Security Committee, PSC
14 Evacuation of EU-citizens start
15 Israeli attack on Syrian border
16 G 8 in Saint Petersburg
   Extra meeting Arab League
   Solana in the Middle East
   Hezbollah attack on Haifa, Israel’s third city
17-18 Meeting of the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council, GAERC
19 French UN ”non-paper”
19-20 Solana in the Middle East
20 Annan-initiative to UNSC-meeting. Annan-declaration: ”cessation of hostilities”
21 UN ”flash-appeal” for humanitarian assistance, safe corridors
   Activation of EU’s crisis co-ordination mechanism, MIC, EU civil protection teams to Lebanon
21 France declines the offer to become the “framework nation” for an EU led operation in Lebanon
25 Israeli strike on UN post, 4 observers dead
26 Rome Conference with the “Lebanon Core Group”
27 First UNSCR on Lebanon (the death of UN observers)
27-28 EU-troika in the Middle East
30 Israeli strike on Qana, extra meeting UNSC,
30 UNIFIL 1- mandate expires, temporary prolongation
31 US attempt at calling UN troop contributing meeting, France refuses
31 UNSC vote on sanctions against Iran
August
1       Extra GAERC
4       US/French agreement on proposal for UNSC resolutions
7       Meeting of Arab League in Beirut
11      UNSC resolution 1701, political framework and mandate for UNIFIL II, end of the conflict
17, 28  Troop contributing meetings for UNIFIL II in New York
25      Extra GAERC
31      Donors’ Conference in Stockholm

September
2       Deployment of UNIFIL II starts (concluded 4 Nov)

October
1       Israeli Defence Forces, IDF, withdraw south of “the blue line”.
Annex 4

Chronology: Operation EUFOR RD Congo, August-November 2006

2005

December
25  Letter form the UN Under Secretary General Guéhenno to the EU Presidency requesting an EU “deterrence force” in view of the upcoming Congolese elections

2006

January
10  President Chirac launches the idea of an EU force
16  The EU High Representative, Javier Solana, in consultation with DPKO in New York regarding the eventual force
17  German foreign and defence ministers discuss the matter
26  High level contacts between DPKO and the EU in Brussels
30  EU fact finding mission sent to DRC

February
9   Option Paper for possible EU support to MONUC produced by the EU Council Secretariat
22  Postponement of Congolese election announced
24  Solana proceeds to ad hoc “force generation” with member states

March
14  French-German bilateral meeting in Berlin leads to agreement to support the UN
16  The Foreign and Defence Committees of the German Bundestag meet to discuss the matter
20  Informal Planning Meeting held in the German MoD in Berlin
23  Decision by the European Council of EU support to the UN
28  Letter of agreement signed by Annan and Solana

April
25  UNSC resolution S/RES/1671 (2006) authorizing the EU to deploy forces in DRC to support MONUC during the election process
27  The EU Council adopts the Joint Action (JA) 2006/319/CFSP providing the framework and legal basis for the operation

May
3, 10  Force generation conferences held in German OHQ in Potsdam
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>German Government decides on the participation of 780 troops in Operation EUFOR RD Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The European Council approves the operational planning and rules of engagement of the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>German Bundestag decides on the deployment of the German soldiers for Operation EUFOR RD Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The EU Council launches the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>EUFOR DR Congo achieves full operational capability, FOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First round of elections (presidential and local) held in DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Violent clashes between election contenders in Kinshasa. EUFOR RD Congo intervenes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Second round of presidential elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Mandate of EUFOR RD Congo expires</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Kabila inaugurated as President of DRC</td>
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