Removing Quotas, Maintaining Representation:
Overcoming Gender Inequalities in Political Party Recruitment

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Abstract: Gender quotas are often referred to as temporary measures to be removed once the barriers for women’s political representation have permanently been broken. This article explores theoretically the potential for different quota types to be removed whilst maintaining a high level of women’s representation. We find that implemented party/legislative quotas with rank order specifications is the quota type that is most likely to both increase women’s numerical representation and to reform political parties’ recruitment practices in a gender-equal way.

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During the last two decades, quota policies have become an increasingly popular tool to come to terms with the persistent underrepresentation of women in parliament (Bacchi, 2006). Today, approximately 100 countries – democratic and undemocratic – have introduced some form of electoral gender quota (Dahlerup, 2007). In the debate on quotas, they are often referred to as temporary measures, or ‘jump-start mechanisms’, to be removed once the political playing field for men and women has been levelled (e.g. Rahat, 2009, Baldez, 2007, Meier, 2004). From this perspective, the implicit purpose of quotas is not only to increase the present representation of women in parliaments or change policy-making in a gender-equal way, but also to permanently break the barriers that women are encountering in political recruitment processes (c.f. Krook et al, 2009). Despite this much-talked about long-term aim of quotas, few studies have explicitly conceptualised this broader quota impact. Hitherto, there is little research on how quotas can be removed whilst maintaining a high level of women’s political representation (for an exception see Bhavnani, 2009). The possible link between quotas and political recruitment practices is yet to be established.

The aim of this article is to explore theoretically the possibilities for different quota designs to reform political recruitment practices and make them permanently more gender equal. Under what conditions can we expect the effects of quotas to last beyond the quota itself? To what extent do quotas really address the factors that allow male dominance in legislative bodies to persist? To address these issues, we build on literature on political recruitment and the crucial role of political parties. Scholars have named political parties the main gatekeeper for the political representation of marginalized groups, such as women (see e.g. Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). Thus, our assumption is
that women’s under-representation is not foremost a consequence of limited resources or a lack of political ambitions (c.f. Lawless and Fox, 2005).

We suggest two analytically distinct approaches as to which political party barriers quotas should address in order to permanently level out gender inequalities in political representation: one of them – the *psychological* perspective – puts focus on the mindsets of party gatekeepers, and the other – the *procedural* perspective - zooms in on the specific candidate selection procedures that parties use. Depending on which of the two perspectives that is emphasized, quotas should, in order to be removed whilst maintaining a high level of women’s representation, focus on altering different dynamics of political recruitment.

After providing a brief overview of the effectiveness of gender quotas, we present the two approaches as to which political party barriers that constitutes the root of the problem of women’s under-representation. We then continue by conducting an assessment of the theoretical possibilities of different quota types to address these problems. We show that depending on which of the two perspectives – psychological or procedural – that is used as a starting-point, different types of quotas have inherent possibilities to contribute to long-term solutions to the problem of women’s underrepresentation. The analysis represents a first step to assess how guarantees of women’s candidacies might persist to shape gender equal party recruitment practices.

**Gender quotas and their effectiveness**

Electoral gender quotas are not a uniform concept; rather, there are various types of quotas. This analysis focuses on the three most common quota provisions: reserved seat quotas, legislative candidate quotas (hereafter called “legislative quotas”), and party
candidate quotas (hereafter called “party quotas”) (Krook, 2009).² The former two are mandatory quotas (specified in a country’s constitution or in a law) that all actors in an election process have to comply with. However, whereas legislative quotas require political parties to put a minimum percentage of women on their candidate lists, reserved seat quotas stipulate that a certain number of the members of parliament are women. Party quotas, finally, are similar to legislative quotas; however, they are regulated in a specific political party’s own party statutes and thus voluntarily adopted by party activists. For our purposes, we lump legislative quotas and party quotas together in the same category, since their main difference lies in their formal legal status.³

A growing body of literature has assessed the extent to which quotas, by quickly altering the composition of parliaments, represent a jump-start mechanism – or “quick fix” – to women’s increased political representation. A general conclusion from these analyses is that quotas might, but do not necessarily, have a positive impact on women’s numerical representation. In other words, quota reforms have not resulted in a uniform rise in the number of women elected to legislative bodies (Krook, 2009).

Importantly, the effects of different quota types on women’s presence in elected bodies vary substantially. Mainly two quota provisions appear to be efficient in generating a numerical increase: First, recent and thorough analyses have shown that reserved seats, in contrast to previous accounts, appear to have had the most beneficial impact on women’s representation (Tripp and Kang, 2008). This does not necessarily imply that countries with reserved seats have the highest representation of women. It merely suggests that an introduction of reserved seats is more likely than any other type of quota to produce a large leap (in per cent) in the representation of women. In a sense,
this is not surprising, as this quota type is the only one that actually guarantees a certain number of women in legislative bodies (c.f. Dahlerup, 2007). Second, quotas to candidate lists are effective mainly when their wording highlights two aspects (Krook, 2009): requirements about the rank order of the candidates and sanctions for non-compliance (legislative quotas). In cases without rank order specifications, female candidates have commonly been put at the end of the list, without any real chances of being elected (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). As regards sanctions for non-compliance, it is also fairly common that political parties fail to fully meet the quota provisions; including those parties that have adopted them voluntarily (c.f. Guldvik, 2008). In such cases, the quota might be toothless. Thus, for legislative quotas it is important that there are effective sanctions for parties that do not comply with the quota provisions (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). In the case of party quotas it is instead merely important that quotas are at all adhered to and implemented inside the political parties.

**Political party barriers to women’s representation: Two analytical perspectives**

We suggest two different analytical takes on which political party barriers that quotas should address in order get to the root of the problem of women’s under-representation: a psychological perspective and a procedural perspective. A psychological perspective suggests that the roots are found in party gate-keepers’ perceptions that female prospective candidates are less electable than their male counterparts. A procedural perspective, on the other hand, focuses more on how specific characteristics of the
nomination procedures of the political parties disfavour the selection of female candidates. The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, as both put the considerations and decision-making of party gatekeepers in the centre of attention, albeit in different respects. Analytically and theoretically, however, there is a need to distinguish between the two, particularly if the aim is to evaluate the possibilities of different quota designs to permanently break the barriers preventing women from achieving equal political representation.

The psychological perspective assumes that women do not become political candidates because party gatekeepers perceive them (correctly or not) to be less electable than men. Even though research shows little evidence of a penalty for women candidates among voters (see e.g. Darcy and Schramm, 1977, Welch and Studlar, 1986), it is important to note that it is still possible that party gatekeepers assume that women candidates are more likely to lose the election than male candidates.7 Male candidates might be seen as being stronger, more competent or simply more in line with the established picture of a politician.

Party gatekeepers everywhere have to somehow gauge the electability of potential candidates before nominating them. Incumbents have a distinct advantage, as they have proven their political value (see e.g. Welch and Studlar 1996). The very fact that a large majority of the world’s incumbents are men thus limits the opportunities of women to enter the political arena. With this perspective, the solution is to field women as politicians and give them the opportunity to show that they are competent politicians and attractive to voters, in other words to give women the power of incumbency. By making women incumbents, quotas provide party gatekeepers with an opportunity to reassess
their perception of female candidates’ electability. Such reassessment could be based on parliamentary performance (individual women show that they are skilled legislators) and sometimes also on election results (the electoral value of individual women can be determined when they compete in elections, either against other women or against men). With the mindset of gatekeepers thus changed, they would be more prone to nominate female candidates even if the quota was to be removed.

The procedural perspective is different to the psychological perspective in that it regards the problem of the lack of women candidates as a more complex issue than having to do with psychological conceptions. First of all, it assumes, in line with research on gender equality reforms that perceptions of gender roles are persistent and notoriously difficult to change, deeply embedded in institutions and practices. It is likely that not even good intentions, where they exist, may suffice to change them (e.g. Pateman, 1989, Phillips, 1991). Tangible and detailed measures to ensure implementation of gender equality reforms are needed if established and well-known informal practices are to be replaced (c.f. Moser, 2005). Second, it takes into account the fact that the existing, usually predominantly male, party elite is in a position of power and that it is likely to want to stay in this position – indeed, it is often seen as a maxim of political science that politicians’ paramount goal is office-seeking (Downs, 1957).

Research has therefore emphasized the crucial role of candidate selection – the process by which candidates are chosen from among the pool of aspirants (Rahat and Hazan, 2001) – for understanding gendered representation patterns. Candidate selection can be conducted in many different ways, but its main purpose is to find candidates who can win the election. Selection processes that are primarily informal are generally seen as
problematic for women’s participation. Informal processes are found where internal party rules are either very few and brief or simply not adhered to and implemented. Informal institutions and personal cliques are generally less open to newcomers and to less advantaged groups on the political arena, women included. Instead, power tends to be passed on to someone from established, usually male-dominated, political networks, thus preserving the power of those who already have it (Guadagnini, 1993).

Consequently, one suggested solution to the problem of women’s underrepresentation is to formalize candidate selection procedures within political parties (e.g. Norris, 1996, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008). A formalized selection procedure is carried out according to written rules that are known to all. Such a procedure follows internal party rules that are ‘detailed, explicit, standardized, implemented by party officials, and authorized in party documents’ (Norris, 1996: 202). Such more “intrusive” regulations surrounding selection processes make it more difficult for party gatekeepers to bend rules in favor of particular candidates or members of their own networks (see also Caul Kittilson, 2006). By following formal criteria, gatekeepers are required to seriously consider the political merits of female potential candidates. It could also be argued that formalized, more bureaucratic procedures encourage open deliberation amongst gatekeepers. In order to follow standardized criteria, rational arguments, rather than prejudiced opinions, are likely to be put forward and weighed by others included in the selection process (c.f. Elster, 2005).
Gender quotas and political party recruitment

In order for quotas to be removed whilst maintaining a high level of women’s representation, they will have to address the political party barriers that historically have kept women out of legislative office. This section assesses theoretically the possibilities for different quota types to contribute to overcoming these problems.

Quotas from a psychological perspective

At the heart of the psychological perspective is the idea that party gatekeepers need to perceive women as electable, i.e. politically competent and attractive to voters, to find it rational to field them. To what extent, then, do different quota provisions have the possibility to accomplish this change in party gatekeepers’ perceptions?

Theoretically speaking, the interpretation from a psychological perspective is quite straightforward: The quota types that have been shown to significantly increase the number of women representatives – reserved seats and candidate list quotas with compliance/sanctions for non-compliance and rank order specification – are most likely to produce persistent high representation of women, lasting beyond the quota itself. Simply by increasing the number of women representatives, these two quota types have, from a psychological perspective, accomplished what they are there to do, both in the short and the long term. They have given women the power of incumbency and party gatekeepers something tangible – parliamentary performance and sometimes election results – on which they can base and revise their perceptions of the electability of women. In this respect, there is no tension between short-term numerical effects and long-term effects on political party recruitment. On the other hand, the quota types that have a hard
time increasing the number of women in parliament do also have difficulties in changing
the mindsets of party gatekeepers. In these cases, quotas do not contribute to give
gatekeepers an increased experience of female election winners, nor of women who
prove themselves qualified in the parliamentary work.

A natural experiment in India illustrates the argument that reserved seat quotas
generate “psychological effects” (although the analysis is not framed in such terms). By
analyzing local level politics, in which certain constituencies are randomly reserved to
female contestants, the analysis shows that the probability of a woman winning the
election is approximately five times higher in a constituency which used to be reserved
for women than in a constituency with no previous experience of quotas. The study
concludes that the quota experience has taught political parties that women indeed are
electable (Bhavnani, 2009).

The study thus suggests a potential impact on the mindset of gatekeepers. The quota
has had the effect that women are incumbents instead of newcomers on the political
arena. In the case of India, with its specific reserved seat system, women compete in
elections with other women. As a consequence, they are able to show party gatekeepers
not only that they are politically competent (through their parliamentary work), but also
that they can win elections. In other cases, such as in Kenya, women are elected through
appointment; thus, in such systems there is only one way open (through parliamentary
performance) to make party gatekeepers change their perceptions towards female
politicians.

Based on one study only, we can not draw any far-reaching conclusions regarding the
impact that quotas might have from a psychological perspective. However, the analysis
points at the potential for at least some quota types to have an impact also after they have been removed.

If, on the other hand, we pay attention to party research claiming that candidate selection constitutes one of the most important power-struggles in political parties (c.f. Gallagher and Marsh, 1988), we need to qualify the picture. Theoretically speaking, the psychological perspective overlooks the negotiations and power-struggles taking place inside the political parties. In order to take the complexities of internal party practices into serious consideration, the remainder of this analysis is devoted to scrutinizing the procedural perspective.

**Quotas from a procedural perspective**

While the past twenty years have made important contributions to understanding variance in representation of women by first pointing to the importance of the selection procedures of political parties and then focusing on the increasing importance of quotas, these two strands of research has, so far, rarely been connected (see however Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2008). A possible reason for this is the fact that quotas – to their very construction – emphasize the *results* of selection processes (i.e., that a certain number or share of the selected is women), rather than the process itself (i.e., how they are selected). By scrutinizing the possibilities for different quota designs to break gender inequalities in political party recruitment, using a procedural perspective, we attempt to bridge these two bodies of literature.

The procedural perspective implies that for a quota reform to get to the heart of the underlying problem of gender unequal structures within political parties – and actually lead to party candidate selection reform – the quota provision needs to bring about a
formalization of the ways in which party gatekeepers select candidates, by being quite intrusive. In other words, it needs to specify, in a detailed and concrete manner, how parties are to select their candidates. Next, we assess theoretically the possibilities for different quota types to have such an impact on candidate selection procedures.

Reserved Seats

Reserved seats are, to reiterate, a type of quota design that has been shown to produce a large increase (in per cent) of women in parliament, due to the fact that a certain number of seats are guaranteed. Interestingly, however, by the very nature of reserved seat quotas, they do not challenge male power within the political parties because the seats are not distributed in a selection process in which women compete against men. Thus, this type of quota design does not touch the party selection procedure in place. As a consequence, we find it theoretically unlikely that it will have any direct impact on selection procedures.

To give an example, in Tanzania women are selected to reserved seats by their political parties on the basis of the electoral result (Bauer, 2008). In other words, the political parties do not have to concern themselves with nominating women until after they have left the regular selection of candidates behind. There are also examples where political parties are not at all involved in appointing the reserved seats women. In Kenya, it is the president who appoints twelve seats in parliament of which six are reserved for women. And in Rwanda, presently world leader in women’s political representation, the reserved seats are distributed by a female dominated electoral college voting for a ‘women’s only’ ballot. There are no legal instructions that the women on these ballots
have to be backed up by political party organizations; thus, it is possible to select independent women candidates (Tripp et al, 2006).

It is thus an interesting paradox that the most successful quota in numerical terms is generally unlikely to contribute to long-term change of the political parties. Should a reserved seats quota be removed, there is nothing to say that the political parties have reformed their candidate selection procedures in a manner that would entice them to nominate more women.

**Party/Legislative Quotas**

Turning then to party and legislative quotas, it is of course of utmost importance that they are de facto adhered to, for the subsequent numerical representation of women as well as for the potential impact on party selection procedures. Where party representatives do not act in accordance with the quota stipulations, i.e. when they do not implement the quota provisions, there is no de facto quota. Thus, party or legislative quotas that are not implemented (whether they have a specified rank order or not) can simply not be expected to have an impact on either numerical representation or on selection procedures. They are quotas that exist only on paper. For instance, despite having legislative quotas in place, they were entirely ineffective in the Mexican election of 2000; therefore sanctions for non-compliance as well as rank order specifications were later established (Baldez, 2007).

This leaves us with quota types that are, in fact, implemented. Political parties that implement a quota policy will, at least, have to come up with names of women to put on the candidate lists. The women might not be placed in electable slots, and might therefore not pose real challenges to the established male candidates. In this way, implemented
party or legislative quotas without a rank order might not lead to higher numerical representation. But even so, they do, to some limited extent, increase the rule-boundedness when they require political parties to put women on the lists. As a consequence, party gatekeepers will have to identify, recruit and screen potential female candidates, and to argue for the internal ranking of the candidates. We thus suggest that any implemented party or legislative quota will – at least theoretically – have an impact on formalization and, if only marginally, institutionalize deliberation about female candidates among party gatekeepers.

Specifying a rank order, however, implies even more rules pertaining to that which is central to the party – to put people in electable positions. We therefore suggest that an implemented party or legislative quota with specified rank order impacts not only the numerical representation but also the formalization of political parties’ selection procedures. In other words, a mandated rank order specification implies, theoretically speaking, a higher degree of intervention in the selection procedure by specifying what the final list should look like and thus limiting the choices of party gatekeepers. As a consequence, selection procedures might become more rule-bound and the criteria for selection more transparent. For instance, the Bolivian quota law specifies that among a pool of three list candidates, candidates of both sexes have to be represented (Htun and Jones, 2002). An introduction of such a quota thus implies a significant reshuffle of the candidate lists.

A rank order specification is not only likely to strengthen the rule-boundedness itself, but is also intrusive in the sense that it might institutionalize deliberative practices (c.f. Elster, 2005) amongst the party elites in charge of candidate selection. In order to
structure ballots according to a rank order taking into account the sex of the candidates, selectors have a harder time to rely on informal understandings reached in “old boy networks” (c.f. Lipman-Blumen, 1976). Instead, party gatekeepers will – at least in theory – have to openly discuss and seriously consider female candidates with all what that implies in terms of weighing their merits and competences as well as considerations as to how their nomination may affect power balances within the party and the party’s chances of winning the election. A rank order specification is thus likely to be so intrusive that it compels party elites to bring arguments about candidates out into the light. It might encourage deliberative action and interaction as well as the putting forward of rational arguments. The effects of such a deliberative learning process are likely to persist beyond the quota legislation itself.

Empirical research on the Social Democratic Party in Sweden illustrates the argument about rank order. The party has decided to institutionalize the way the rank order is specified by producing two separate lists, one for women and one for men. In a second step they merge them with the ‘zipper method’ (every other person on the list has to be a woman). By having clear rank order specifications, the selectors are required to engage in discussion and deliberation about the suitability and qualifications of the candidates. Also, by using separate lists for men and women, they have avoided direct confrontation and power challenges between male and female candidates (Freidenvall, 2005).

On a cautionary note, the theoretical argument presented here rests on an assumption that several people are involved in the selection process. Deliberative effects are of course not expected in a case where the selectorate consists of only one person. There is, for instance, plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting that it is possible for certain
dominant party gatekeepers to circumvent intrusive regulations by single-handedly deciding to fill slots earmarked for women with female relatives that they can control (see e.g. Dahlerup, 2006). Thus, in certain specific instances, other selection characteristics (such as the size of the selectorate) are likely to shape the impact of quotas on the formalization of candidate selection.

**TABLE 1. QUOTA TYPES AND POLITICAL PARTY RECRUITMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quota type</th>
<th>Increase in numerical representation</th>
<th>Psychological: Impact on perceived electability of women</th>
<th>Procedural: Impact on formalization of candidate selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party/Legislative quotas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...without either</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance/effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanctions for non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance or rank order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...without</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance/effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanctions for non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance but with rank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...with compliance/effective</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (a little)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanctions for non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance but without rank</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with compliance/effective</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (more)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanctions for non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance and rank order</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To sum up the analysis, Table 1 shows that the assessed theoretical possibilities for different quota designs to be removed whilst maintaining a high level of female legislative representation depend partly on whether we apply a psychological or procedural perspective. With a psychological perspective, the same quotas that generate a numerical increase in women parliamentarians – reserved seats and party/legislative quotas with compliance/sanctions for non-compliance and rank order specifications – have the possibility of also generating a change in the mindset of party gatekeepers so that they revise their perception of the electability of women. From the procedural perspective, the quota type that appears to have the greatest theoretical possibility to alter candidate selection procedures is party/legislative quotas with compliance/sanctions for non-compliance and rank order specifications. The same quota provision but with no specifications for rank order is suggested to have a possibility, albeit smaller, to impact the formalization of the selection process. For other quota provisions, any changes in selection procedures are unlikely.

**Conclusion**

This article has addressed the question of how different types of electoral gender quotas can be removed whilst maintaining a high level of women’s political representation. The contribution is mainly two-fold. First, we identify and conceptualise two analytical approaches as to which political party barriers quotas should address in order to permanently level out gender inequalities in recruitment practices: a *psychological* and a *procedural* perspective. Second, we assess theoretically the possibilities for different quota designs to contribute to overcoming these problems.
The psychological approach presupposes that an increase in the representation of women will change the attitudes of party gatekeepers and, in time, make them more prone to select female candidates. From this perspective, the only function a quota needs to have is to numerically increase the representation of women. Two quota types seem to be most likely to accomplish such an increase: reserved seats and party/legislative quotas with compliance/sanctions for non-compliance and rank order specifications.

The procedural analysis suggests that implemented party/legislative quotas, i.e. quotas with compliance/sanctions for non-compliance and rank order specifications, have the greatest possibility to alter candidate selection procedures in a way that facilitates the election of women. Conversely, reserved seats and non-implemented party/legislative quotas seem to hold few possibilities for a change in selection procedures; they simply do not interfere with the established party recruitment structures.

The theoretical “mismatch” between reserved seats and the possibilities for alterations in party selection procedures suggests an important paradox: The quota type that has been shown to generate the largest leaps (in per cent) in women’s political representation is unlikely to have an impact on selection procedures. Thus, from a procedural perspective, reserved seats appear to have beneficial short-term consequences for women but few possibilities to eradicate gender unequal party structures. If, on the other hand, the solution lies more in people’s heads than in established procedures, then we might evaluate reserved seats differently. The mixed suggested effects of reserved seat quotas point at the usefulness of analytically distinguishing between a psychological and a procedural perspective.
The other main lesson is that party/legislative quotas with compliance/sanctions for non-compliance and rank order specifications are, regardless of perspective, the design for which there is no trade-off between short-term and long-term consequences. Because these types of quotas tend to significantly increase the number of women in parliament, there is reason to believe that they would play an important part in changing party gatekeepers’ perceptions about female candidates. Moreover, these types of quotas can be said to formalize candidate selection in the sense that they increase the number of rules and constraints on party gatekeepers. Importantly, we suggest that the merit with rank order specification lies in the deliberation and discussion that might follow upon its implementation.

To conclude, the lessons learned from this analysis are, of course, mainly of a theoretical character. Our intention has been to conceptualise the broader impact of quotas, by pinpointing the potential inherent in different quota designs to permanently level out gender inequalities in political recruitment. We believe that the scholarly debate would greatly benefit from taking this potential long-term impact of quotas into account. In particular, a distinction between a psychological and a procedural approach might contribute to structuring the debate in a useful manner. The methodological challenges of studying these possible broader impacts of quotas should not be underestimated. Future empirical research should therefore examine – but not limit its attention to – the few real-world examples of quota withdrawal (e.g. the Social Democratic Party in Denmark or Venezuela). Empirical focus should also be put on more recent quota reforms, and the possible changes that these have generated on political party dynamics related to recruitment practices. Combining empirical analyses with further theoretical development
is a key challenge, also from a policy perspective, considering the fact that gender quotas represent the widest reaching electoral reform in recent years (Krook, 2009). Meeting this challenge, a more comprehensive understanding of the broader impacts and full consequences of quotas is likely to be achieved.
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We define “gender quotas” as an affirmative action measure that establishes a percentage or number for the representation of women (Dahlerup, 2007). For an overview of the expansion of gender quotas, see e.g. Dahlerup, 2007 or Krook, 2009.

There are also quotas to aspirants (Dahlerup, 2006); however, in this study we exclude this quota type, which is less common than quotas to candidate lists (legislative or party quotas) or to reserved seats.

It could, however, be argued that formal legal status matters for the propensity to alter political recruitment practices. For instance, it is possible that parties that have adopted quotas voluntarily are more prone to carry through changes in selection procedures than those parties that are controlled by a specific law. However, research has shown that political parties often adopt quotas for strategic reasons, and not necessarily for caring about gender equality issues (Krook, 2009). Therefore, we suggest that there are no systematic differences across the two quota types in the propensity to bring about changes in recruitment practices.

Moreover, reserved seats have commonly been adopted in countries that used to have very low levels of women’s political representation.

Note that requirements for rank order apply mainly to a proportional representational (PR) electoral system with closed lists. Quotas have been most popular in this electoral system (Htun and Jones, 2002).

Importantly, some sanctions have proven to be quite ineffective. For instance, in France political parties have to pay a fine if they do not comply with the quota specifications. Parties have sometimes just chosen to pay the fine in order not having to put a certain share of women on the lists. In contrast, it is fairly common in Latin American countries that candidate lists are rejected if they break with the quota provision.

It should also be noted that research on this topic mainly focuses on Western industrialised nations. It is possible that there is a penalty for women candidates in other parts of the world.

It is not necessary that a gender quota subjects women to election. Some quota designs will appoint women without election. As for competition against men, this is mainly possible in a proportional representation (PR) system with open seats.

When quotas accomplish making women incumbents in single member constituencies it could also be the case that they thereby can make use of informal, albeit institutionalized, practices. One such possibility...
could be that incumbents in single member constituencies have the de facto privilege to select their own successor. Thus, in first-past-the-post systems, this possibility needs to be taken into consideration before assessing quotas from a psychological perspective.