Liberation of the Ecclesia
Liberation of the Ecclesia
The Unfinished Project of Liturgical Theology

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Abstract

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This dissertation is a critical study of the paradigm of Liturgical Theology. Focus in this systematic inquiry has been on the Russian school with the focal point in the works of Alexander Schmemann, who was active in the late 20th century. The main question of the thesis concerns the relation between theory and practice in Liturgical Theology.

It is claimed that the relation between theory and practice corresponds to the relation between ritual action and communicative action. The former concerns the identity founded on the unavoidable alterity immanent in life, but also transcending life through a holistic encounter with life, which enables us to express a holistic attitude to life and the entire world. The latter concerns the equally unavoidable rationalization of life which gives rise to a continuous atomization of life through science and the process of acquiring facts and data.

The thesis makes use of different theories for the reaching of an explanatory theory in connection to theory and practice. Foremost the Theory of Communicative Action in the works of Jürgen Habermas and the re-interpretation of disclosure by Nikolas Kompridis is used. It is claimed that ritual action is connected to a primary disclosure attached to otherness with the intention of revealing the identity of the Ecclesia. Without identity, we are left with a never-ending debate and a continuous atomization where every answer exponentially provokes more questions. Communicative action then is connected with a secondary co-disclosure with the intention for the reaching of mutual understanding, making subjects accountable and responsible. Without communicative action we are bound on a long walk into the never ending sea of being. The missionary imperative in the Ecclesia is dependent on the co-existence of ritual action and communicative action.

Keywords: communicative action, disclosure, ecclesia, emancipation, identity, lifeworld, liturgical theology, ordo, ortho, otherness, rationalization, ritual action, theory and practice.

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To Nonna, Makrina and Xenia
Content

Preface 9

Introduction 13

PART ONE: Rationalization of Theology 25
  1. The theological calling within the Church 33
     A. The Spiritual Vision of the Coming Kingdom 35
     B. The Eucharistic Ecclesiology 40
     C. Catholicity and Ecumenicity 51
     D. Khomiakov, the Slavophiles and the Principle of Sobornost’ 59
  2. Liturgical Theology 69
     A. The Paradigm of Liturgical Theology 69
     B. Liturgical Theology as an Instrument for Emancipation 78
     C. Emancipation as Understanding 81
     D. Shifting from Private Piety to Common Participation in the Kingdom 84
  3. The Ambiguity of Liturgical Theology 92
     A. The Theological Calling from within the Church 92
     B. The Ordo Localized 99
     C. A Genetic Vision of the Present 103
     D. Proletarian, communitarian and quotidian 106
     E. The Double Ambiguity of Liturgical Theology 111

PART TWO: Rationalization of the Ecclesia 115
  4. Beyond the Classical Subject 117
     A. The End of the Classical Subject and the Way forward 119
     B. Neo-Palamist Tradition 120
     C. Neo-Palamist Ecclesiology 128
     D. Liturgical Theology and Neo-Palamist Ecclesiology 145
  5. Communicative Action and Inter-subjective Theory 148
     A. Habermas’s Inter-subjective Theory and Emancipational Understanding of Reality 149
     B. Ritual Action 161
     C. Theology and Philosophy 171
     D. Ecclesia and Lifeworld. Communicative Action and Liturgical Theology 179
**6. Ecclesia as Lifeworld** 189
A. Ecclesia as Lifeworld 190
B. Passing from Ritual Action to Communicative Action 195
C. Rationalization: Passing from Existence to Experience 203
D. Colonization of the Ecclesia 210
E. Actions for Reversing the Colonization of the Ecclesia 215
F. The Unfulfilled Process of Rationalization 216

**7. The Reification of the Ecclesia** 219
A. Theory and Practice 219
B. Discourse and Practice in Habermas’ Later Reasoning 227
C. Reification and Colonization 234
D. Reification in the Works of Schmemann 237
E. The Ambiguity of Liturgical Theology 243

**PART THREE: Reconstruction of Liturgical Theology** 259

**8. Disclosure and Intersubjectivity** 262
A. Habermas and World Disclosure 262
B. Overcoming the Opposition between World Disclosure and Reason 266
C. A Comprehensive Conception of Reason and World Disclosure 272
D. Identity as similarity and dissimilarity 278

**9. Liturgical Theology, World Disclosure and Intersubjectivity** 284
A. The Birth of the Church 284
B. The Calling of Conscience from Within 293
C. The Transformative Agency of the Ecclesia 297
D. A Renewed Understanding of the Inter-Subjective Dimension of the Ecclesia 299
E. Overcoming the Dichotomy 305

**Summary and Conclusions** 311

**Bibliography** 315
PREFACE

Science cannot offer us anything that makes our existence meaningful or bearable.¹


This dissertation is the end of a long journey. Due to private reasons I was supposed to take one year off from my research but instead it turned out to be almost nine years in effect. During these nine years I was serving the Church working in a Study Association with the purpose of educating the laity. My focus was not in establishing mere facts but connecting these facts with meaning. I remembered reading a quotation from Peter Nilson, an Associate Professor of Astronomy, stating that science is not capable of offering us anything that makes our existence meaningful or bearable. During these years outside the academe I realized that there is an inherent difference between meaning and learning as well as a dialectical relation between them. Serving the Church I realized that there is simply no meaning without the Church, for those engaged in and with the Church.

My interest of the relation between meaning and learning was further developed when I took part in the discussion on the difference between Ecclesiology and Ecclesiality, which my professor, Sven-Erik Brodd, developed in his article ‘Ecclesiology and Ecclesiality [in Swedish]’.² All this intrigued me and when I reentered the academe taking up my old dissertation on Liturgical Theology in the works of Alexander Schmemann I slowly began to realize that his persistence on moving theology from the academe to the People of God, assembled for prayer, challenged the academical curriculum, but at the same time he made himself dependent on the same academe for making this move. I also realized that he was unable to complete this move and my initial interest began as a search for a viable explanation to this unfinished process.

The result turned out to be a complex network of relations between meaning and learning, theory and praxis, as well as knowledge and interests. The next step in my research was to find an intelligible structure to organize these relations, enabling me to complete the unfinished

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¹ The quotation is originally in Swedish, see Nilson 1991, *Stjärnvägar*.
project of Liturgical Theology in the works of Schmemann. Eventually I ended up proposing a theory of a two-fold axis in theology. The first axis consists of ritual action for establishing solidarity and identity in the Church, which I identified as a lifeworld, a concept clarified by the works of Jürgen Habermas, and the other axis consists of communicative action for establishing mutual understanding and consensus. Together these two axes ensure that ecclesial life develops and progresses, as well as making it possible to combine the academe with the Church, but also differentiating the academe from the Church and at the same offering an intelligible structure for vivifying academic theology.

Working out a theory for comprehending these two axes has not been an easy task since I have been forced to draw theories from different scholarly fields and even different paradigms, simply because one of the major findings in my research is the importunate insistence on separating these two axes from each other. Therefore I have been forced to reconstruct as well Habermas as Schmemann to make my thesis workable. This has meant an increased complexity but something I hope my readers will find to be a challenge and not only a discouragement.

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Instead of relating to the original German or Russian texts I have tried to make my references to the English translations, but whenever my arguments depends on reading the original text or if the translation is inadequate in sustaining a proper understanding I have made my references to the original text together with the English translations. Sometimes, of course, there are simply no translations and therefore no English references. I have also transcribed all Russian and Greek texts into Latin script except when it occurs in a quotation; this counts also for the bibliography. Furthermore I have used the author-date system for my documentation but complemented with title concerning the notes to make it easier to connect the notes with the text.

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There are so many whom I wish to thank, but first of all I wish to express my gratitude to all those who actually read my dissertation. Secondly I wish to give my utmost love to my three daughters who have been with me all through the process. Thirdly I wish to express my thanks to those
who have taken part in the process of wrapping up this dissertation. First of all to my tutor Professor Sven-Erik Brodd who never forgot me during these nine years; and then to Mattias Martinsson and Tiit Pädam who contributed to the thesis; pater Ulf Jonsson who made valuable comments on Habermas; Magnus Nordqvist who is responsible for the actual publication; David Smensgård for adjusting my English; Daniel Öhrvall for the beautiful cover; and finally my colleagues at the seminary of Ecclesiology for being so patient with me.

I also wish to express my regards to those who have sustained me in the overall project of theology; Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana for setting me on the right track; father Misha Jakšić, father Mikael Liljeströmm, Murat Posluk and Bishop Dositej for being there during all these years in protection, support and help.

Michael Hjälm
Monastery of St Catherine, Mount Sinai, summer of ’11
INTRODUCTION

To rediscover the initial and organic unity between the liturgy and the sacrament, the liturgy through the sacrament and the sacrament through the liturgy, as one dynamic reality in which symbol – the liturgy – is always fulfilled in the sacrament – such then is the condition for the recovery of that perspective which alone can lead us beyond the deadends of our present situation. ³

Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy, 1973

Alexander Schmemann, Dean of St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary in New York (1962-1983), was deeply critical, like his predecessor Georges Florovsky, of the western captivity of the Eastern Orthodox tradition, which effected a metamorphosis of the liturgical consciousness. In this western captivity the liturgy has become a separate activity, as one “means of Grace” among others, according to Schmemann, and the people of God, laikos, summoned in the name of God, for the sake of heaven, has been turned into cosmicoi, a laity divorced from the clergy.⁴ This has led to a double crisis in both the understanding of theology as well as the practice of the Eucharist.⁵

This in turn has the evolutionary consequence of the fatal divorce in the life of the Church between liturgy, theology and piety, according to Schmemann, which marks the post-patristic period of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the reduction of the rule of prayer, lex orandi, to cult, described only in cultic categories. This captivity has continued in modernity. Deprived of her own theology the Church has misinterpreted her own Tradition, confusing secondary ethnical traditions with the essential self-understanding of the Church, the one and holy Tradition. Confused in the temporary conditions of the world the Church becomes a prisoner of her “empirical needs” and the pragmatic spirit of this world, Schmemann continues.⁶

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Therefore we have to rediscover the one dynamic reality of the Church, which unfolds itself in the epiphany of the Church, the Eucharist. We need to understand, according to Schmemann, that theology has its upbringing in the Church, rooted in her experience, an experience connected to the practice of the Church, the liturgy. The ecclesiastical consciousness as well as the “worldview” of the Christians participating in the life of the Church is informed, shaped and guided by the liturgy.7

We need, Schmemann continues, to regain the Eucharist not just as a “means of Grace”, but as the very Sacrament of the Church, and the Church needs to be the natural “term of reference” of theology, rooted in the experience of the Church. What really is needed is an inner transformation of the theologian, an inner transformation of the theological mind, in a deeper sense the conversion of the theologian. Only through such a transformation can we gain a theological integration bringing with it a common vision of the Church and her theology.8

The transformation has to begin in connecting the praxis of the Church, the liturgy, focused in the Eucharist, with the theory and reflection on the Church, according to Schmemann; connecting the life of the Church with ecclesiology.9 Here Schmemann touches on one of the most ancient and yet most contemporary question in modernity: how to mediate between theory and practice. Almost every attempt of mediation has been questioned in modernity, criticized for lacking enough consistency. The “place” of this reconciliation or mediation, according to Schmemann, is the Eucharist. Here the Church experiences and expresses her theology as the otherness of God, as the coming Kingdom, the eschaton, which reveals the meaning of the Church as a passage to the Kingdom.10

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Through his emphasis on the otherness of God Schmemann also reveals the ancient ambiguity between otherness and practice. The ambiguity goes all the way back to Plato and his parable of the cave. Our spatio-temporal world in this allegory is a cave illuminated by the radiance of the pure ideas outside, but attainable for us as shadows. If we want to

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approach the realm of ideas we need to free ourselves from the spatio-temporal existence in the cave and leave the shadows behind, embracing the light, but every-day life forces us to return."

This parable carries with it a double understanding of reality. On one side we have the “pure ideas”, and the very “Being” of things in themselves, the ontological understanding; in the Christian perspective illuminated from the Trinitarian relation, attainable in the image of God, mankind. On the other side we have the acting agents going back into the cave, in order to realize these ideas in the spatio-temporal realm, by the practical affirmation of diversity and otherness, the ontic understanding.

The relation between otherness and praxis challenges the entire project of Liturgical Theology in the works of Schmemann. The very possibility of mediating between theory and practice, or otherness and practice, has been criticized in late modernity. This issue has been dealt with in length by Jürgen Habermas.

The Alleged Conflict between Otherness and Praxis

Praxis is concerned with reform of everyday-life, according to Jürgen Habermas, who understands everyday-life in connection to practical reason, and a language built to cope with that challenge. Praxis, according to Habermas, is a responsibility to act versus a responsibility to otherness. So within the works of Habermas, there is not only a difference between praxis and otherness but even an opposition. Praxis according to this understanding involves responsible actors and not only “beings”. Without such a perspective, philosophy, according to Habermas, would be constrained to solely revealing, to a disclosure, with no responsibility for change and improvement."

Ontology without regard to praxis, or the ontic, according to Habermas, means the exclusion of the spatio-temporal structures of everyday-life. In the realm of the Church it would lead to ecclesial life becoming aestheticized, if we follow Habermas’ line of reasoning, with the effect of moral rigorism. All in all Habermas is reluctant to privilege the ontological over the ontic, of philosophy over politics, and here we should add ecclesiology over ecclesiality."

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11 The parable of the cave appears in Politeia, book VII.
Even though one could argue that the ontic necessarily emanates from the ontological, or ecclesiality from ecclesiology, we cannot avoid taking up the challenge left by Habermas; how is disclosure related to everyday-life, life praxis, ecclesial praxis, or the rational organization of social relations?

The Liturgical Movement and Ecclesial Praxis

The relation between theory and praxis is contained already in the Liturgical Movement, beginning in the early nineteenth century. The movement began as a search towards recovering the worship of the Middle Ages, but developed into a renewal of the liturgy by uncovering the roots of worship beyond this era.  

The first attempt was made when Dom Prosper Guéranger refounded the abbey of Solesmes in 1832, trying to restore the ancient Gregorian chant. These first steps were soon paired with a renaissance of patristic studies, with the systematization of the church fathers and the publication of Jean Paul Migne's *Patrologia Latina* and *Patrologia Graeca*. The discovery of the ancient manuscripts, such as *Didache*, *Apostolic Tradition* and *Hippolytos Church Order* made the ancient 'rule of prayer’ available for studies in a wider range of disciplines.

It was not until the initial faze was supported by the Vatican that the idea of renewal gained enough energy to suffice for a future change, and this had its opening with Pope Pius X who issued the Motu Proprio *Tra le sollecitudini* 1903, encouraging a stronger participation on behalf of the laity in the liturgy. As a consequence Pope Pius X convened *Congrès National des Oeuvres Catholique* in Malines, which marks the beginning of the Liturgical Renewal in the Roman Catholic Church. One of the major participants was Lambert Beaudin who became an early front figure. His work *La Pieté de l’Eglise* had a profound impact on the movement.

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Even though the movement expressed a need of a liturgical renewal, hardly any practical experiments were initiated in France where it had its beginning. It was not until it reached Austria and Germany that practical experiments took place, beginning with Maria Laach in Klosterneuburg and abbot Ildefons Herwegen.20 One of the most influential scholars from Maria Laach was Odo Casel, who initiated *Ecclesia Orans* in 1918. In France practical experiments emerged during the Second World War and continued to develop. Despite a gradual coupling with Austria and Germany there was still a difference in perspective. In France they maintained a focus on studies through publications such as *Dictionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne de liturgie*, while Austria and Germany were more focused on reform. 21

The movement was quickly intertwined with the dream and call for Christian unity in post-war Europe. This strive towards unity, contained in the so called Ecumenical Movement, made the encounter between different denominations necessary and uncovering the roots of Christianity became a way towards reaching ecclesial unity. This meant that the Liturgical Movement already in its outset became cross-denominational.22

After Vatican II the movement was reimbursed and interwoven with the common spirit of aggiornamento in the Roman Catholic Church. The liturgy was reshaped with a focus on the assembly instead of devotion. The Eastern Orthodox Church was not untouched by the movement, but instead of reform there was a growing interest of understanding the liturgy. The Eucharist came to be understood among Eastern Orthodox scholars, as what could best be described, as the Sacrament of our Ecclesiality. In Paris, where initially the study of ritual instead of reform was in focus, the Russians, and foremost Nicholas Afanassiev, developed the discourse of Eucharistic Ecclesiology. They came to identify the Church with the Eucharistic assembly; “Where the Eucharist is, there is the fullness of the Church; vice versa, where the fullness of the Church is not, there no Eucharist can be celebrated.”23

Alexander Schmemann, one of Afanassiev’s students, extended the discourse of Eucharistic Ecclesiology, merging this paradigm with the insights from the Liturgical Movement, viewing the liturgy in itself as

22 Koenker 1951, ‘Objectives and Achievements of The Liturgical Movement in The Roman Catholic Church Since World War II’.
a primordial experience and a grammar for comprehending theology, thereby establishing the paradigm of Liturgical Theology.

Liturgical Theology

As a notion Liturgical Theology made a public appearance in the Roman Catholic Church 1937 in Cappuyns’ paper "Liturgie et théologie" presented the same year during the liturgical conference in Mont César, but as Thomas Fisch concludes “[h]ere and elsewhere, however, the terms ‘liturgical theology’ and ‘theology of worship’ are used as synonyms.” It was not until 1957 with the article "Liturgical Theology: Its Task and Method", by Alexander Schmemann, that there was a distinction between them in West. This distinction was further developed and came to its full articulation, according to Thomas Fisch, in Schmemann’s response to Bernhard Botte and W Jardin Grisbrooke in 1969. In the Eastern Orthodox Church it was introduced, as Job Getcha points out, by Kiprian Kern already in 1925 in an article in the journal for theological students in Belgrade. Later in 1928 Kern put together a publication entitled, "Lily of Prayers. Collection of Articles on Liturgical Theology".

The setting behind Schmemann’s understanding of Liturgical Theology began as early as 1949 with the article "On Understanding Liturgy [in Russian]." Here was the original offspring of what later on would be coined as "Liturgical Theology." From 1949 onwards Schmemann wrote several articles that would eventually end up in his doctoral dissertation ten years later at Saint–Serge in Paris, entitled “The Church’s Ordo: Introduction to Liturgical Theology [in Russian],” later on translated into English in 1966 by Asheleigh E. Moorhouse. This signified the emergence of a new paradigm in Christianity still overwhelmingly present in the discourse of theology. The English edition was preceded

24 Cappuyns 1938, 'Liturgie et théologie'.
26 Schmemann 1957, 'Liturgical Theology: Its Task and Method'.
29 Schmemann 1949, ‘O liturgii, i: O ponimaniy liturgii’.
31 Schmemann 1966, Introduction to Liturgical Theology.
by another book, *For the Life of the World*, intended as a study guide for the 1963 Quadrennial Conference of the National Christian Student Federation, in Athens, Ohio, where he dealt with man as *homo adorans*, the worshipping man.\(^3\)

In this latter publication Schmemann challenges the dichotomy between the secular and the sacred as a Christian heresy born out of a misunderstanding of the mission of the Church. Instead he proceeds by saying that “in Christ, life – life in all its totality – was returned to man, given again as sacrament and communion, made Eucharist.”\(^3\) The sacramental character of “life in all its totality” rendered a subsequent second edition, 1966, with the alternative title *The World as Sacrament*.\(^3\) A third extended edition was published 1973 in New York; *For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy*.\(^3\)

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Schmemann's appointment as Dean of St Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary in New York 1962 was a watershed in his career and opened the way to many contacts around the world. The same year he was invited together with Nicholas Afanassiev, among others, as an orthodox observer to the Second Vatican Council. This, together with his engagement in the Ecumenical Movement, brought him renown in World-Christianity.\(^3\)

A second watershed in his career was the end of Vatican II and the renewal of the liturgical interest, which made Schmemann even more popular among Roman-Catholic scholars, which would last even beyond his death. Several lectures and articles were published in Roman Catholic circles and the paradigm of Liturgical Theology gained a wide audience,\(^3\) and *For the Life of the World* was translated into several languages.\(^3\) Before the end of his life he concluded the book *The

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33 Schmemann 1963, *For the Life of the World.*
36 He delivered his report on Vatican II at the quadrennial sobor of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church in America 1963, which in turned was commented upon in New York Times 11/16/1963.


_Eucharist: The Sacrament of the Kingdom_, published posthumously 1987, where he completes his theological enterprise.39

Schmemann understood the liturgy not only as a source for theological reflection or as merely an object for theological study. Instead he understood the liturgy as a primary theology, simply being the ontological condition, the essence of the Church, providing a grammar for understanding and comprehending theology. Therefore Liturgical Theology arises in and as liturgy, and never leaves it.40 *Lex orandi est lex credendi* or _ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi_, ‘the rule of prayer determines the rule of faith’, already expressed by _Prosper of Aquitaine_ in the fifth century, marks the paradigm of Liturgical Theology for Schmemann.41

Liturgical Theology as One of Three Ways of Doing Theology

David W. Fagerberg made a thorough study of the method and theological understanding behind the paradigm of Liturgical Theology in his 1992 book with the title _What is Liturgical Theology? A Study in Methodology_.42 There he identifies three ways of doing theology, but only one would be considered as Liturgical Theology. In the first instance he deals with ‘Theology of Worship’. Fagerberg draws the conclusion that “[t]he concern of theology of worship is worship, while the concern of liturgical theology is liturgical rite as an instantiation of the Church’s lex orandi.”43 Theology of worship, according to Fagerberg, is an abstraction “without regard to a particular liturgical structure or even a liturgical family or tradition.”44

In the second instance he deals with ‘Theology from Worship’ which concerns expressing doctrine in liturgical form. It assumes that there exists a reality or attitude which preexists its expression. Liturgical Theology is different in its outset since it first of all considers the liturgical rite and not an abstraction about liturgy and theology, and secondly that it does not acknowledge _a priori_ any pre-existent attitude or reality outside the liturgical rite, done by a community.45

39 Schmemann 1987, _The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom_.
40 Schmemann 1966, _Introduction to Liturgical theology_.
41 Cf. de Clerk 1994, _“Lex orandi, lex credendi”: The original sense and historical avatars of an equivocal adage_.
42 Fagerberg 1992, _What is Liturgical Theology?_, p. 67.
44 Fagerberg 1992, _What is Liturgical Theology?_, p. 135.
In 2004 Fagerberg produced a second edition, *Theologia Prima: What is Liturgical Theology?*, wherein he understands Schmemann’s description as an organic understanding of liturgy. The word “liturgical”, according to Fagerberg, denounce any connections with liturgics, understood as a study of rubrics or manuals without a correlation to the whole of the corporate liturgical community, or “an object to observe or a resource to quarry from, or a milieu to work out of”, since neither of these suffice to answer the more fundamental question on meaning contained in the liturgical rite. In the debate with W Jardin Grisbrooke Schmemann claimed that any liturgical change has to be understood organically as developed within the liturgy, and not imposed from outside, from a pre-existent reality or attitude.

Fagerberg also connects liturgical theology, in the works of Schmemann, with a certain ecclesiology. First of all “leitourgia, is a charisma, a gift of the Holy Spirit. This gift is given in the Church …” This gives liturgical theology a pneumatological aspect with the Holy Spirit as the source of liturgy. Secondly this charisma expresses itself as an eschatological dimension. Even though Schmemann does not deny that the Christian liturgy exists in cultic form the eschatological dimension transforms this into a new awareness that could be best understood as “the abolishment of cult as such”. The Church, according to Schmemann, is the presence of the new creation, of the world to come. This means that the Church is the community of the coming Kingdom. The loss of this “eschatological corporate identity”, according to Fagerberg, is exactly what Schmemann implies by a liturgical crisis.

**The Ambiguity of Liturgical Theology**

In the debate with Bernhard Botte and W Jardin Grisbrooke, Schmemann made the full distinction between ‘liturgical theology’ and ‘theology of liturgy’. This, however, also made the ambiguity of liturgical theology much more apparent. In an article in St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly Botte professed the ambiguity in the following way:

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History is not enough, for it supplies data but is not competent to issue value judgments.  

The alleged ambiguity is the difference between ‘by what’ and ‘by whom’. History supplies data, ‘what’, but these are valued and ordered by ‘someone’, ‘who’. Schmemann briefly answered Botte by declaring Botte’s reasoning to be a misunderstanding of Schmemann’s initial stance. He himself did not advance an immediate need for an external reform but a renewed understanding of liturgy, the meaning contained in the liturgical act, the leitourgia:

The time thus is not for an external reform but for a theology and piety drinking again from the eternal and unchanging sources of liturgical tradition.

W Jardin Grisbrooke reiterated the question in a somewhat different way to Botte: The first question, “By whom is this understanding of the liturgical tradition to be attained?” and the second question “By what means is it to be attained?”, both advance Botte’s initial ambiguity. The third question seems to touch on the same misunderstanding as that of Botte: “Understanding of the lex orandi ‘will lead — organically — to the necessary purifications and changes and this without any break of continuity’ without any crisis’ … by whose authority are these changes to be made?” ‘By whom’ concerns responsible actors making a value judgment, rationally organizing the Church, and ‘by what’ concerns methods and materials, empowering responsible actors to act.

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On one hand Schmemann does not encompass the problem initially posited by Botte. He only sees the misunderstanding between an external reform and the internal reform, which he comprehends as a vivified understanding of what it means to become Church in the leitourgia. On the other hand he does affirm the distinction between ‘who’ and ‘what’, but instead of an ambiguity he glimpses a dichotomy to overcome. First of all he affirms the difference and does “not imply a reduction of the faith to liturgy or cult, as was the case in the mystery cults in which faith
was aimed at cult itself, had its saving power as its object." Secondly he argues for an essential interdependence between faith and liturgy and not “two distinct ‘essences’ whose content and meaning are to be grasped by two different and independent means of investigation, as in modern theology in which the study of liturgy constitutes a special area or discipline: ‘liturgiology’.

Faith seems to belong to the realm of ‘by whom’, either an individual’s faith or the community’s. Liturgy, or more precisely the leitourgia, seems to be the historical occasion, realizing the faith of ‘someone’ and thereby becomes attainable for study, becoming the means for the community’s self-reflection. For Schmemann, overcoming this dichotomy is the foundational departure for Liturgical Theology, and he contends the need for a holistic reconciliation between liturgy, theology and piety; a reconciliation between ‘by whom’ and ‘by what’ in the full sense.

In addition to this, Schmemann also asserts the aspect of otherness in this reconciliation by appealing to the recovery of the eschatological aspect of the Church through an integrated understanding of a holistic reconciliation:

For it is precisely in and through her liturgy — this being the latter’s specific and unique “function” — that the Church is informed of her cosmical and eschatological vocation, receives the power to fulfill it and thus truly becomes “what she is” — the sacrament, in Christ, of the new creation; the sacrament, in Christ, of the Kingdom.

The reconciliation between ‘by whom’ and ‘by what’ seems to address the question of mediation between theory and practice as well as the mediation between otherness and practice, and this poses the real challenge and mission for Schmemann as well as for the entire paradigm of Liturgical Theology.

Aim and Purpose

Schmemann dedicated his life to resolving this ambiguity, of understanding ecclesial praxis in relation to ontology, the essence and otherness of the Church. By focusing on the mediation between theory
and practice in the works of Schmemann I aim to reveal the ambiguity and potential lack of consistency in the paradigm of Liturgical Theology. I will then proceed to suggest a possible solution to these problems by using the findings of modern sociology, especially in the Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) by Jürgen Habermas. The overall question of this study is therefore:

*How is the relation between theory and practice realized in the works of Alexander Schmemann, and is it consistent enough for the success of the paradigm of Liturgical Theology?*

**Outline**

In an attempt to answer this question I will divide this dissertation into three parts. In the first part I will investigate how Schmemann deals with this dichotomy more closely and then compare it with how other scholars of Liturgical Theology have dealt with the same issue. I will argue that Schmemann and the entire paradigm of Liturgical Theology lack a thorough understanding of the relation between theory and practice. In the second part I will use Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action and argue that the ambiguity cannot be resolved through a mediation of theory and practice on a theoretical level. In the third part I will offer an alternative discourse of reasoning understanding the dichotomy of theory and practice, as well as otherness and practice, and the triadic structure of liturgy, theology and piety, as fundamental and through their distinction they become a source for subjective internalization, thereby constituting the symbolic structure for the life of the Church. In the end I will argue that the mediation is possible on a practical level through an internalization by responsible subjects.
PART ONE

Rationalization of Theology

Here I am, fifty-two years old, a priest and a theologian for more than a quarter of a century – what does it all mean? How can I put together, how can I explain to myself what it all implies, clearly and distinctly; and is such a clarification needed?  

Alexander Schmemann, January 29, 1973

A lifelong quest in search of clarification ended on December 13th, 1983, after Schmemann had been seriously ill for a long time. Alexander Schmemann dedicated his life to the Church and left a substantial heritage for future generations as Dean of St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary in Crestwood, New York, a post which he held from 1962 until his untimely death. Under his direction the seminary advanced as one of the prime orthodox seminaries in the western hemisphere and gained an unprecedented reputation. He was also instrumental in the formation of the independent Orthodox Church in America (OCA), which was elevated to the rank of autocephal, April 10 1970, by the Mother Church, the patriarchate of Moscow. He endowed the Orthodox Church in America with great expectations, even though his final “hope of a united Orthodox Church” of the American continent still has not reached its conclusion.

Schmemann was born in Estonia 1921 in a traditional church-oriented Russian family, with Baltic German ancestors on his father’s side, but was brought up in Paris among the Russian émigrés that contained much of the Russian intelligentsia. As a young boy he spent several years as a military cadet and later on enrolled at the Russian gimnaziia. During the years at the gimnazia he developed an understanding and interest in the liturgy that continued all through his life. According to his wife,

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62 A short biography was delivered through John Meyendorff 1984. See Meyendorff 1984, ‘A Life Worth Living’
64 Meyendorff 1984, ‘A Life Worth Living’, pp. 8-9
65 Schmemann 2007, My Journey with Father Alexander, p. 75.
Juliana Schmemann, whom he married in 1943, he had a persistent and firm character already in his youth.67

1940 he began his theological studies at *Institut de Théologie orthodoxe de Paris*, more commonly known as Saint–Serge after its patron saint. Following the graduation at Saint–Serge he became an instructor of Church History and was soon after ordained as a priest by Archbishop Vladimir (Tikhonitsky) in 1946.68 The institute was at that time the leading orthodox theological seminary in the west, with several of the major theologians of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Because of the closure of the theological schools in Russia the institute soon became the leading school of Russian theology, and they maintained their position despite the re-opening of the Moscow Theological Academy 1944, after the concordat with Stalin.69

As the leading orthodox institute in the western hemisphere they soon became involved in the ecumenical movement. The 'Faith and Order’ conference in Edinburgh 1937 was therefore in many ways the beginning of the Golden years of Saint–Serge.70 Metropolitan Evlogii had already in the consecration of the institute set the outline of its coming inter-action with non-orthodox churches, Roman-Catholic as well as Protestant. July 18th, 1924, Metropolitan Evlogii addressed the congregation:

> Remember what a significant part of the means for this holy enterprise was given by foreigners. We must show them the beauty of Orthodoxy. May this church be a place of brotherly intercommunion and the rapprochement of all Christians … Here prayer shall be unceasing, not only for all Russian peoples labouring and heavy-laden, and scattered abroad in the sorrow of exile, but for the peace of the whole world, for the welfare of God’s holy churches, and for the union of them all.71

This enlightened Exarch together with the fact of their autonomous status of an independent house of theology made it easier to have an ecumenical openness than it was in the national Churches of Russia and Eastern Europe. The institute took the opportunity and was very much involved in dialogue with theologians of other denominations, especially Roman-Catholics.

In 1951 Alexander Schmemann left Paris for America, invited by Georges Florovsky to teach at St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary in New York. The seminary was then housed in the protestant Union Theological Seminary. The reasons for his move are scarce in his own writings but in the memoirs of Juliana Schmemann she states that the seminary life at Saint–Serge was run by a small “inner circle”, with the intent of preserving a part of Russia before the revolution. The older teachers hardly had any contact with the students, and younger faculty members were not allowed to attend faculty meetings. This is further attested by John Meyendorff who speaks of a “secluded Russian education” with a dream of returning home to their native homeland Russia.

Among the younger teachers and many of the students “hopes for an Orthodox revival remained strong.” This was also true with Schmemann who had a special concern for the survival of the Church which meant an “existential today” that was more than just concentrating on the past. Today meant for Schmemann, according to Meyendorff, neither “a defence of the state, or cultural appendix of ‘Russianism’”. Schmemann instead understood his work as an Orthodox mission to the West, but in full encounter with Western Christianity. Ethnical boundaries of orthodoxy had left the Great Church isolated from the West. Here in the Diaspora he understood that a living Church needed to be fully rooted in the Orthodox Tradition, but at the same time open for the theological ideas of Western Christendom.

Schmemann saw his vocation as a theologian and as a priest as being a witness of Orthodox Tradition not in opposition to the West but fully indebted, thereby using the very western ideas he encountered in the service of orthodoxy. This was also why, according to Meyendorff, he opposed the return to the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, with a hope for a unified French-speaking local church in France under the Ecumenical Patriarchate. “Most Russians”, again according to Meyendorff, “however — including the older generation of St Sergius professors — rather saw the Constantinopolitan allegiance negatively, as

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75 Meyendorff 1984, ‘A Life Worth Living’, pp. 6-7
a shield against Moscow’s control — not as an opportunity for a mission to the West.”

Juliana Schmemann as well as John Meyendorff conditions this to be an important element for his move to America.

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Encountering Western Christendom and the modern man was not about adopting the context inside the Church — rather to explore the inner meaning of the church’s mission in a pluralistic or at least heterodox context in the tides of tomorrow. In the book “Church, world, mission” he understands the situation of the 20th century as a crisis and he gives us his view of the ultimate meaning of this by saying:

Thus the ultimate meaning of our present crisis is that the world in which the Orthodox Church must live today, be it in the East or in the West, is not her world, not even a ‘neutral’ one, but a world challenging her in every essence and being, a world trying consciously or unconsciously to reduce her to values, philosophies of life and world-views profoundly differently from, if not totally opposed to, her vision and experience of God, man and life.

This single meaning displays for us not only the crisis of the Church but as much the personal crisis he carried with him from Paris to America. The Russian émigrés came from a world dominated by a monoculture. After being abolished by the Russian revolution and being set aside from that world in Paris, the first generation was convinced of returning in the near future. One understands through the memoirs of Juliana Schmemann that the bonds to the motherland Russia were strong even in his own family. His brother, according to Juliana, “remained at the Cadet school, immersed in Russia and with an ever growing desire to fight for, die for, struggle for his native land. His whole passion was to remain faithful to Mother Russia.”

In the midst of everything later in his life Schmemann kept his concern for the fate of Orthodoxy in Russia, but it became evident already in Paris that the world they perceived to be theirs was no longer there. It had ceased to be a reality and the contextual challenge was now a global challenge. The contextual challenge in the West was not of

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77 Meyendorff 1984, ‘A Life Worth Living’, pp. 5-6
79 Schmemann 1979, Church, World, Mission, p. 9.
80 Schmemann 2007, My Journey with Father Alexander, p. 20.
temporal existence, as something time would erase; rather the opposite was true. It challenged the very essence of their culture and especially the Eastern Orthodox Church. It was necessary to face up to the challenge and there was simply nowhere to hide.81

Schmemann’s move to America was also conditioned by other factors. Georges Florovsky returned from Czechoslovakia to Saint-Serge in 1947, where he had been teaching before the war.82 Florovsky was the great “ecumenical” father who instigated the first encounters between theologians of the West and the East in the World Council of Churches. He believed that orthodox theology had in recent centuries been disassociated from the authentic Tradition of the fathers. Through a “Western captivity of the Orthodox mind” theological institutions had been established from a purely western pattern. In this manner East had adopted the view of the Church as a “confessional body” instead of a communion of local churches, thereby introducing a malaise that would be difficult to discard. Therefore he propagated for a “neo-patristic synthesis”, meaning that we have to “restore the patristic spirit” in our time.83 This vision was well off with the zeal and mission of the young Schmemann. Later when Florovsky assumed the chair as Dean of St Vladimir’s in New York he asked Schmemann to join him. Despite other options he never really hesitated and left for America.84

The move to America could therefore be described as emancipatory from two perspectives. On the one hand Schmemann was inspired by Florovsky to reclaim the authentic tradition of the Great Church, releasing the Eastern tradition from its western captivity, albeit by using western ideas to effect this emancipation, and, on the other hand, liberating the Church from the ethnical boundaries of Russianism. The older generation in Paris and also the first generation of immigrants in America was not ready for the two-fold emancipation proposed by Florovsky, and for several reasons Florovsky had to withdraw from the chair as Dean of St Vladimir’s. The second generation, however, was more favorably disposed toward change, which meant a success for Schmemann as Dean of St Vladimir’s, which lasted for more than

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twenty years. Eventually the vision of the emancipation of the Church by Florovsky and the second generation at St Vladimir’s even made its way back to Europe, a move that may not have been possible without the missionary endeavor over seas. America is still influential in the world of orthodoxy and the impact of Florovsky and Schmemann is still alive.

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In the wake of the totalitarian regimes that had risen before World War II, not least the fall of the Third Reich, the idea of freedom and emancipation effected the ecclesial environment of all denominations. Orthodoxy was no exception, and Saint–Serge took a leading role in this process of emancipation, but all this had its beginning already in the late nineteenth century. The Russian Orthodox Church before the revolution is known to later generations as the Church of the Tsar. The Romanov monarchy was in principle ruler of both the State and the Church. He was seen as the inheritor of the Byzantine Empire and as such he was a living icon of Christ the Pantocrator.85

In the year 1700, after the death of Patriarch Adrian, Peter I delayed the election of a new Primate of the Church and instead established in 1721 a collective supreme administration, the Holy and Governing Synod. The Synod remained for almost two centuries the supreme administrative body in the Russian Orthodox Church. Later the office of the so-called Procurator was introduced as the most influential in the Church. The Procurator was to be a layman and represented the Tsar in the Synod, and in reality it was he who wielded the actual power and not the monarchy. No bishop was allowed to confront the Tsar without the approval of the Procurator. Furthermore, appeals could not be made to the imperial court unless the Synod had failed to reach a unanimous decision and then only at the discretion of the Procurator.86

In effect, the Church had been subordinated to the Empire for more than two centuries before the siege of the Church by the Bolsheviks. A first attempt at ecclesiastical independence took place in 1906 when the ‘pre-Sobor’ asked for ecclesiastical self-government. The request was finally bequeathed by the Great and long awaited Sobor in 1917, which was made possible by the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and the Revolution. It turned out to be a short lived freedom, however, and the subordination

85 Jfr Mitropolit Nikanor 1903, Besedy i slova, pp. 207–8.
86 Curtiss, 1940, Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of the Empire 1900–1917, p. 40.
to the Tsar was replaced with subordination to the Bolsheviks. The idea of self-government at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century was therefore replaced with the idea of freedom from a new and much more violent Empire that would last almost a century.

The liberation of the Church was more than structural self-government; it was a dream of releasing the Eastern Spirit that was so intimately connected to the slavophiles. The Sobor was a victory for the slavophiles that could have paved the way for an emancipatory perspective but, on account of the Bolsheviks, it never became a reality. The dream was to be perpetuated, instead, by the orthodox diaspora, not least at Saint–Serge.

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The vision and dream in the works of Schmemann of releasing the Eastern Spirit will be the subject of part I. In the aforementioned quotation Schmemann singled out one threat coming from this new global order, namely reductionism. He saw a loss of a living relation between now and then. On the one hand Tradition is simply reduced to the past in the sense that the past becomes the single criteria of Tradition and its content. On the other hand reduction is the separation of the past from Tradition thereby you allow yourself to virtually ignore the past if it is not “acceptable”, “valid” and “relevant” for today. For Schmemann this dual threat actually constitutes the theological mission and concerns the two-fold emancipation of the Church.

To seek the ways of avoiding and overcoming these dangers, of assuring the correct “reading” of Tradition and therefore the proper understanding by the Church of her own past, has always been one of the essential tasks of theology, of the theological calling within the Church.

The theological calling within the Church constitutes the substantial meaning of Schmemann’s work and his mission, and his reason for moving to America. How this programmatic “calling within” is realized and what the intents in Schmemann’s works are, will be the precise concern of part I of this dissertation. In the first chapter I will sketch an historical background of Schmemann’s vision, arguing that his major focus is the

87 Curtiss 1940, Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of the Empire 1900–1917.
88 Cf. Curtiss 1940, Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of the Empire 1900–1917; and Lowrie 1954, S. Sergius in Paris: the Orthodox Theological Institute.
89 Schmemann 1979, Church, World, Mission, p. 15.
90 Schmemann 1979, Church, World, Mission, p. 15.
independence and emancipation of the Church. Thereafter in the second chapter I will outline the paradigm of Liturgical Theology, relating it to the historical background and the thematic independence of the Church, showing that in Schmemann’s work it is a tool of emancipation, creating a dichotomy between theory and practice. Finally in the third chapter I will analyze the paradigm of Liturgical Theology comparing it with other theologians in the same paradigm, arguing that there is an inherent ambiguity.
1. The theological calling within the Church

The whole meaning of the Eucharist is to constantly blow everything up from inside by referring it not only to the transcendent, but to Christ and His Kingdom.91

Alexander Schmemann, October 16, 1975

The aftermath of World War II, its temporal and spatial context, played out as a time of darkness in the East for the Church, but in the West as a time of light in the wake of the peace treaty. This created a dichotomy between East and West running through the spatio-temporal existence of Europe. The Eastern Orthodox diaspora experienced this as a remembrance of the ancient and primordial East, but a memory lost in the historical geography with Eastern Europe transformed by a new and entirely different Empire after the Revolution. Recovering this ancient memory of the Eastern Spirit was transformed into survival under the yoke of this new Empire. Instead the very possibility of releasing this spirit was transferred to the West where the spirit of freedom made it possible.

The release of the ancient spirit of the East in the time after the Revolution was to be connected with Saint–Serge in Paris. It became East released from the fate of Eastern Europe in the mid twentieth century, but it was still connected to an Empire, the lost kingdom of Petrine Russia and the renaissance connected with this lost but commemorated Empire. The seminary was caught between these two realms, amid the Tsardom and the Bolsheviks. Some even nurtured a return to the old Petrine Empire with the Tsar as the supreme protector of the Church and yet others, like Schmemann, challenged the very idea of the Empire as protector of the Church. Instead they argued that the Church was independent with its own principles. This gave rise to a completely new vision, where the Church was released both from the imperial bonds of Petrine Russia as well as the bonds to the totalitarian regimes.

Schmemann clearly associated himself with those sharing the same vision of an independent Church. Juliana Schmemann singles out one of the professors in her memoirs whom Schmemann engaged himself with in lengthy discussions.92 Through Nicholas Afanassiev the more

92 Schmemann 2007, My Journey with Father Alexander, p. 41.
decisive intellectual foundation was given, whose idea of “Eucharistic Ecclesiology” became Schmemann’s own, but above all they shared the idea of an independent Church both in relation to the Empires of the world and concerning its intrinsic principles.93

The intrinsic principle of the Church was then connected to the liturgical interest of Schmemann that was further developed by the influence of Archimandrite Kiprian (Kern), who taught patristics at the institute and became his close friend and spiritual father. In the parish of Ss Constantine and Helen in Clamart the spiritual foundation was laid for his theological understanding of the relation between liturgy and theology.94 The liturgy helped Schmemann to uncover the Church beyond any Empire of this world and to fulfill the release of the Eastern Spirit.

Both Afanassiev and Kern had brilliant minds, but above all they both had a “skeptical mind” and distanced themselves from “blind” nationalism.95 Schmemann was further influenced by Professor A. V. Kartashev, who belonged to the establishment of the pre-revolutionary Russia, to whom he owes his historical method and scholarly touch, and also the understanding of the naïve nationalism that embraced many older professors.96

Saint–Serge became a place to love, *topophilia*, which engaged a new generation of Eastern Orthodox scholars immersed in the time and the place of the Church emancipated from any worldly Empires, but in some sense in collision with a previous generation that shaped and informed the young Schmemann. Therefore I will begin by describing this collision and how this new paradigm emerged in Paris, beginning with one of the founding fathers, Sergei Bulgakov.

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I will therefore start (A) by describing the spiritual vision of Russian theology from the outset of Sergei Bulgakov and his idea of human labor. I will argue (B) that the consequence of the spiritual vision is the idea of Eucharistic Ecclesiology, for the first time expressed by Nicholas Afanassiev, but with the intention of ecclesial emancipation and of safeguarding the independence of the Church. Then I will continue

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(C) by arguing that the idea of Eucharistic Ecclesiology depends on the distinction between Ecumenicity and Catholicity, which in itself (D) depends on the principle of sobornost, influential in the entire Russian school of theology, including Schmemann. From this historical and ecclesiological background Schmemann develops the paradigm of Liturgical Theology.

A. The Spiritual Vision of the Coming Kingdom

Saint–Serge was the great exponent of orthodox theology in the West. Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944), the first Dean and one of the founding fathers of the institute, had a profound influence on the seminary and laid out the foundation for the spiritual vision of Russian theology in the first half of the twentieth century, but he was also in many ways considered controversial, not least by Moscow.97

His vision was the beginning of the emancipatory perspective of the Eastern Orthodox Church. This vision emerged before the Revolution and Bulgakov shared its basic tenet with the revolutionaries, that of a release of the masses, of empowering the people and of democratic reform. He was, however, highly critical of the state capitalism that emerged from socialism. The revolution was a result of a rapid growth of capitalism and the exploitation of “the toiling masses”, according to leading figures of the Marxist movement. Bulgakov began his work between the excess of capitalism and the rise of socialism. He criticized both of them and presented instead his own philosophy of economy: human labor that only fulfils selfish needs or the need of the state is not adequate enough for a moral society.98

By the end of the nineteenth century Bulgakov was an ardent Marxist and atheist, but through his work on his doctoral dissertation he changed conviction and became highly critical of the Marxist ideology, turning instead to Kantian idealism and political liberalism. This move to idealism also meant a rejection of positivism, something he shared with many members of the Russian intelligentsia in the early part of the

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97 His sophianic theology drew the condemnation of the Moscow Patriarchate. For the debate see Bulgakov 1936, ‘Zur Frage nach der Weisheit Gottes’; Lialine 1936, ‘Le débat sophiologique’; Schultze 1940, ‘Der Gegenwärtige Streit um die Sophia, die Göttliche Weisheit, in der Orthodoxie’. The idea was already present in 1917, see Bulgakov [1917] 2009, Svet nevechernii. His sophianic view rendered him a condemnation on four occasions; by the Karlovtsy Synod March 18 1927, by the Moscow Patriarchate September 7 1935, by the Karlovtsy Council September 17 1935, and finally once again by the Moscow Patriarchate December 27 1935.

twentieth century. Historical materialism had failed to provide answers and therefore Bulgakov, and others, turned instead to metaphysics. His political view was expressed in an article on “The Economic Ideal”, where he questions the idea of political economy as autonomous, arguing instead that it is rather heteronymous, since every political economy is founded on a particular world-view. Bulgakov criticizes two extremes in this sense. On the one hand we have hedonism where everything is considered material, and on the other hand there is asceticism which denies the material reality. Bulgakov’s vision balances between the two, which in turn is connected to his rejection of the idea of a constant progression, inherent in positivism. His rejection of determinism and positivism is the foundation of his critique of Marxism.

This has certain implications for his understanding of religion. First of all Bulgakov argues that Marxism is a secular religion. The essence of Marxism, according to Bulgakov, is the denial of the individual human spirit, which in turn is a denial of religion, but as such it becomes a new religion where the individual human spirit is replaced by the utopian communitarian vision of socialism. Bulgakov argues instead for a human being as religious per se. Religion, Bulgakov continues, is the fulfillment of being personal, as the highest value of the human being. In this sense Bulgakov understands socialism as a secular religion with its highest value being the fulfillment of communism, and as such Karl Marx becomes the spiritual father of this secular religion.

According to Bulgakov, by denying the human being and the individual spirit, Marxism denies human freedom and becomes deterministic. This becomes the point of departure for Bulgakov’s philosophy. He compares the Marxist understanding of human nature with that of the Cappadocian fathers; St Basil the Great, St Gregory of Nyssa and St Gregory of Nazianz. The latter, according to Bulgakov, understands the nature of the person as coexistent with the individual expression of that nature and as indistinguishable from each other. Therefore Bulgakov denies the existence of a mere human nature, instead arguing that there are only individual human beings sharing a common nature of humanness. Bulgakov uses the concept hypostasis to explain this. The person is a hypostasis with a human nature, which are inseparable from each other. In the same way he denies the concept

100 Cf. Bulgakov 1907 Karl Marks kak religioznyi tip; and Bulgakov 1979, Karl Marx as a Religious Type: His Relation to the Religion of Anthropotheism of L. Feuerbach.
of homo economicus as nothing more than a mythological creature, and rejects the deterministic idea of human nature which informs this concept. The effect is a de-personalized human being as an object or as an instrument in the overall project of progress.  

In place of this de-personalized political economy, Bulgakov tries to establish a Christian basis of economy. His theory begins with the basic realities of life. The struggle between freedom and necessity, Bulgakov argues, is the reality we live by. It is a struggle for food and material needs. Life therefore is a struggle against nature as material necessity. Economy is part of this struggle, and as such it is a function of death. Human labor is simply the struggle against the forces of nature, motivated by the fear of death. Human labor involves, however, both objectivistic aspects as well as subjectivistic aspects of life.

Human labor combines the mechanistic character of nature with the human endeavor of a subject. Through this merging, human labor transforms nature but nature retains its attributes. This becomes the basis of Bulgakov’s description of the incarnation. In the incarnation the Divine nature is joined to the flesh, and flesh becomes divinized but retains its essential attributes as flesh. In both cases it is the personal and subjectivistic nature that transforms the objectivistic nature. Nature becomes humanized and as such reflects the personal nature of individual human beings in the same way as the incarnation carries the mark of the Son as one hypostasis of the Trinity. This also becomes the basis of his ecclesiology.

Bulgakov’s ecclesiology has a tripartite structure; the Eucharist, Eschatology and the World. The blood and water that poured from Christ’s side on the cross represents the Eucharistic element and the element of the baptismal water, but there is a distinction in modality, according to Bulgakov; “the blood and water that came out of His side were not Eucharistic in intent.” Bulgakov plays with the medieval idea of the Holy Grail, but instead of relating it to the Eucharistic cup he perceives the Holy Grail to be the World, receiving the water and the blood, the humanity of Christ — thereby diffusing His own substance

into the world, which are not given “for the communion of the faithful, but for the sanctification and transfiguration of the world.”\textsuperscript{104}

For Bulgakov the outpouring of the blood and water of Christ makes all of creation indelibly bound to Christ, the baptism of the world, impelled to receive the eschatological transfiguration by the Spirit. Without this outpouring the World would not be able to withhold the Pentecostal coming of the Spirit. The Old Testament speaks of the Sun turning to darkness and the moon to blood, on the Day of the Lord. This imagery imparts to us an understanding of the powerful intensity that brings about the reconstitution of the World as Holy Grail. Thereby the whole of creation becomes Eucharistic, and by imparting His divine humanity into this world Christ abides in the whole cosmos, binding Himself to the world making it His throne, where His presence can prepare the World for the complete Transfiguration in the Parousia.\textsuperscript{105}

This blood and water made the world a place of the presence of Christ’s power, prepared the world for its future transfiguration, for the meeting with Christ come in glory.\textsuperscript{106}

It is precisely the Holy Spirit who accomplishes the transfiguration of the universe: the energy of the Holy Spirit destroys the sinful, imperfect old world and creates a new world, with the renewal of all creation. This is the power of the Fire that burns, melts, transmutes, illuminates, and transfigures.\textsuperscript{107}

This radical view of the Transfiguration of the world into the Holy Grail receives its fulfillment in the communion of the faithful. The Church is the centre of God’s eschatological outpouring of Grace, which receives its proclamation and anticipation in the Eucharistic gathering, and the partaking of the selfsame flowing blood and water of Christ.\textsuperscript{108}

In Bulgakov’s vision of the World being transformed by the coming Kingdom, there is an inherent critique of imperial ecclesiology and those arguing that the Empire is the protector of the Church. The Church is the visible sign of this transformation in the same way as Christ is the visible sign of flesh divinized. Bulgakov’s philosophy is a strong defense of freedom as a characteristic of both humanity and the Church. It is a transformation of the objectivistic nature where creation and human


\textsuperscript{105} Cf. Bulgakov 1945, Nevesta agnca; and Bulgakov 2002, The Bride of the Lamb.

\textsuperscript{106} Bulgakov 2008, The Holy Grail and the Eucharist, p. 44.


\textsuperscript{108} Cf. Bulgakov 1945, Nevesta agnca; and Bulgakov 2002, The Bride of the Lamb.
labor are marked by subjectivistic nature of the human being and the Church.

There is no room for any separation between Creation and the Kingdom of Heaven in Bulgakov’s work, on account of the transformation of the objectivistic nature of created order, by the freedom of the Church and of the idea of personal freedom. On the contrary, Christ has adopted this world in such a way that it cannot be separated from the eschatological destiny and its fulfillment. This world is the unique object of the Transfiguration, changed into the Chalice of the blood and water of Christ. This all-embracing cosmological ecclesiology is also one of the significant topics of the Eucharistic Ecclesiology developed by Afanassiev and later by Schmemann. It also influenced Georges Florovsky (1893-1979), a contemporary of Afanassiev, even though he was highly critical of certain elements in Bulgakov’s theology.\(^{109}\)

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Schmemann was immersed in this spiritual vision of the coming Kingdom, overtly present at Saint–Serge from its outset. Already in one of his early articles “On understanding the liturgy” Schmemann presents the spiritual vision of the liturgy as an eschatological vision. The liturgy is the entrance into the Kingdom of God. The connection Bulgakov makes between the coming Kingdom and the world is that God has adopted this world, of which the Church is the visible sign, a connection that is reiterated in the way Schmemann describes the mission of the Orthodox Church. The presence of the coming Kingdom coincides with the Eucharist as the end, the eschaton. The end, then, transforms this world into receiving the end as fulfillment. Although paradoxical, in Schmemann’s work the end becomes the beginning of something new.\(^{110}\) Here we clearly see the force of the Church as the subject in the World, but also how individual Christians are made into subjects.

In his work *For the Life of the World* the end is described in terms of perfect joy as something abiding when all protocols have been signed, all duties have been performed, and everything is complete. What remains is the fulfillment which can only be realized in the heavenly Kingdom when Christ comes in glory. At the same time this joy is already present as an expectation, accessible through the Holy Spirit as a sweet smell

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\(^{110}\) Schmemann 1949, ‘O liturgii, I: O ponimanii liturgii’.
from the end of all times. The reduction of life in the Church begins in the reduction of this joy as one thing among others, and the coming Kingdom is transformed into a doctrine instead of a living reality. This reality has to be experienced by the human person, who is capable of carrying this joy till the end of the earth. This joy is the visible sign of the individual as participant in the Kingdom and not merely an object for its Glory. Personal freedom is as essential for Schmemann as for Bulgakov.111

In the same way the idea of the human person struggling against the nature of necessity in this World is developed in Schmemann’s work. As with Bulgakov, Schmemann’s point of departure is in the materialistic philosophy of Feuerbach, describing the necessity of life, using the image of the Bible where man is described as a hungry being. Schmemann states, plainly, that, “[m]an must eat in order to live”, but then he compares the necessity of this World with the transcendence of the coming Kingdom. He draws a rhetorical parallel with what happens when we have reached all our practical goals. Schmemann’s answer is not a denial of material creation, but as with Bulgakov the answer is that the material, profane and natural world is being transformed into the Chalice of the Body and Blood of Christ. The difference is that Schmemann does not consider the World as the Chalice or Holy Grail. Instead he considers the liturgy of the Eucharist as the visible sign, sufficient for the complete transformation of the World, without the need of the metaphysical idea – i.e. as a non-empirical category – of the World as the Holy Grail.112

B. The Eucharistic Ecclesiology

From this spiritual vision the idea of Eucharistic Ecclesiology emerged in the curriculum of Saint–Serge. It was Afanassiev who coined the expression in 1952, but as an idea it was already in present in the works of Sergei Bulgakov as we have seen above. Afanassiev was the great inspiration and his followers continued his mission with expectation. This was also the case with Schmemann who began his academic career as a student of Afanassiev’s at the Russian Orthodox institute in Paris.113

In 1930 Afanassiev was recruited to the newly established institute as professor of Canon Law. When the institute became involved in the

111 Schmemann 1963, For the Life of the World.
112 Schmemann 1963, For the Life of the World. When I use the term metaphysical I mean a category that is primarily non-empirical in character; which would be the case with the world as the Holy Grail.
Ecumenical Movement. Afanassiev was one of the major contributors from Saint–Serge, an engagement that gave him a certain standing in history.114

The institute and the ecumenical environment created a common milieu that inspired both Afanassiev and the young Schmemann, but they also had a direct impact on each other with the scene of Saint–Serge in the background. On the one hand Alexander Schmemann introduced Afanassiev to the Liturgical Movement. On the other, Afanassiev inspired Alexander Schmemann to investigate the relation between the Church and the State, culminating in his Bachelor thesis on Byzantine Theocracy.115 Above all they were both heavily influenced by the patristic renaissance with its entreaty to return ‘back to the sources’, in many ways initiating the so-called Ecumenical Movement. The renaissance was also the preamble to Vatican II as well as the Liturgical Movement. In this turbulent time, in the turmoil of the peace treaty of Europe, theologians had a profound interest in searching for the roots of the theologically motivated Church.116 Schmemann was of the understanding that this search has its beginning and end in the ecclesial self-expression of the liturgy.117

They both carried the conviction that agreement between separated churches would not emerge from academics alone but also had to be established in the ecclesial life of the Church. Both Catholics and Orthodox had to focus on what unifies, returning to the sources, and letting the love of the Spirit act upon them. Only thus could unity become a reality. Their ecumenical efforts and their works on ecclesiology occasioned them each invitations to participate as official observers in the final session of the Vatican II. They were both instrumental in the mutual lifting of the anathemas between the Roman-Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox 1963.118

From the outset, Afanassiev himself paid great attention to the relation between the power of the State and the independence of the Church. He entered the world of academics between the revolutions in Russia and the ongoing change from being a Church under the Tsar to

115 Nichols 1984, Theology in the Russian Diaspora. His teacher and tutor was A. V. Kartashev, professor in Church History.
becoming a patriarchal Church with its own head. The pace of events was continually dictated by the relation between the Tsar and the Church, and later between the Bolsheviks and the Church. An underlying question was whether or not the Church could ever gain its freedom.\(^\text{119}\)

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The conditions of the Petrine Empire and the totalitarian regime of the Bolsheviks inspired the young Afanassiev in his search for the intrinsic being of the Church. As Peter Plank asserts, however, the situation in the Ukraine, particularly the murder of Metropolitan Vladimir, was the actual event that triggered Afanassiev’s pursuit of a Church beyond law and jurisdictions, independent and self-reliable.\(^\text{120}\)

When he moved to Serbia, on account of the war, Afanassiev encountered a dynasty less autocratic than that of the Romanovs, and a much more independent Church. Later, in Macedonia, he continued to further his understanding of the Church in relation to the world. Here he published his thesis on ‘The power of the state in the ecumenical councils’. In his thesis he argues that the emperor played a part in enabling the councils, but had no formal power over these.\(^\text{121}\)

The theme of an independent and self-reliant Church reappears in Schmemann's work and concerned him deeply. Nonetheless, there is a difference. Afanassiev was mostly preoccupied with the question of the Church’s freedom in relation to the State; Schmemann, from an American perspective, engaged himself with the issue of the Church’s freedom in relation to the ongoing process of secularization where man becomes a thing.\(^\text{122}\) This theme is similar to what Bulgakov argues for in his critique of the idea of *homo economicus*.

If the imperial idea posed a threat to the independence of the Church in Afanassiev’s European context, then Schmemann singled out a new challenge: the ongoing process of *secularization*. Schmemann identified this phenomenon as mainly Christian, but it is nevertheless a tragedy and Schmemann even regarded it as a sin.\(^\text{123}\) Secularization, Schmemann continues, causes a reduction of the Church on two levels; the reduction

\(^\text{119}\) Plank 1980, *Die Eucharistieversammlung als Kirche*.
\(^\text{120}\) Plank 1980, *Die Eucharistieversammlung als Kirche*.
of the person and the reduction of the parish. These reductions diminish the Church by separating it from its meaning and fulfillment, making it dependent on the proximity of this world.\textsuperscript{124}

The reduction of the \textit{personal} character of man is a reduction “of his life and his religion to history and sociology”, Schmemann articulates in an article published in 1965. The historical reduction makes truth relative in the eyes of the world; what was once true may not be true today. The sociological reduction has claims that man is determined by his sociological context. Together these two reductions makes man unable to present himself as a person before God, but salvation in orthodox tradition, according to Schmemann, is entrusted to a person and not merely to man. To reduce the person to mere man is to enslave the person to the “impersonal” nature, where man becomes an object to himself.\textsuperscript{125}

In the Christian teaching man is always a person and thus not only a “microcosm” reflecting the whole world, but also a unique bearer of its destiny and a potential “king of creation.” The whole world is given—in a unique way—to each person and thus in each person it is “saved” or “perishes.” Thus in every Saint the world is saved and it is fully saved in the one totally fulfilled Person: Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{126}

“The parish constitutes the main battlefield of the war between Orthodoxy and the growing secularization of the American Orthodox”, Schmemann argues in the same article. The second reduction, that of the parish, is therefore the more striking of the two. From being a natural community gathered for service it has, according to Schmemann, become an organization to fulfill the needs of its members.\textsuperscript{127} Instead of being a communion of holy people, gathered in the name of the Lord, its main purpose has become to uphold the ancient culture of the old “nation”, often with an ethnocentric focus. The final outcome of this double reduction, stemming from secularization, is the surrender of the Church, for the needs of the people, making it a “philosophy of life”.\textsuperscript{128} This meant a loss of the Church’s independence, not to an Empire but to a far more expansive threat: the objectification of the Church where the Church becomes an object in itself.

\textsuperscript{124} Schmemann 1973, \textit{For the Life of the World}, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{125} Schmemann 1965, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America. III’.
\textsuperscript{126} Schmemann 1965, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America. III’.
\textsuperscript{127} Schmemann 1965, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America. III’.
\textsuperscript{128} Schmemann 1965, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America. III’.
In his book *For the Life of the World* (1963), reprinted in an extended version in 1973, Schmemann visualizes the solution by making an analogy: when we enter into the Life of Christ, into His Resurrection, we add another dimension. This does not mean that we abandon the other dimensions, but they are fulfilled in this new dimension. If you look at color images, two dimensionally, they are lacking life and depth. The same goes for life without the dimension that Christ offers us in His Resurrection. The solution then is not to abandon this world. On the contrary, this world is already fulfilled in Christ, but not in us. We need to enter into this dimension of fulfillment in order to be fully Church and fully Man. The solution therefore emerges as a responsibility, first on a personal level and then as a community in order to be subjects.

According to Schmemann, secularization poses a threat to the Church not because it challenges religion, rather it is in itself a religion, with its intrinsic answers of life and death. It is a religion for those who are tired of the world being explained in the categories of another world, of which we know nothing. The secularized religion is compelled to withdraw from any relation to “otherness” or the “other” world. The only world we know is the one we live in. Secularization is the very “explanation” of death with the terminology this cessation of life gives us.

Schmemann and Afanassiev ardently defended the idea that the Church had its own logic that transcends the multitude of cultures and the different epochs in history. Still the Church is always at risk of adopting the context inside the Church making her surrender to a contingent and momentous context. For Afanassiev the concern was not to surrender to the imperial identity; for Schmemann the struggle was not to give in to secularism—a struggle fought out on the battlefield of everyday life. The Eucharist provided the pattern for this logic but for each of them, the result was slightly different. Schmemann focused on the “otherness” of the Eucharist, the coming Kingdom, which proclaims eternal joy and the fulfillment of this life, while Afanassiev was more concerned with safeguarding the ecclesial fullness of the local Church.

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Until January 7th 1940 Afanassiev had been teaching as a lay professor, whereupon he was ordained a deacon, taking up the presbyterate the following day. In July of the following year he wished to be of service to the Church and therefore left Paris for Tunis to take care of the parish there. It was during these years in northern Africa that he wrote his major work *Tserkov’ Dukha Sviatogo* (The Church of the Holy Spirit). It was, according to Mme Afanassieva, the fruit of the visionary glimpse of the ‘eucharistic ecclesiology’ that he had already 1932-33.  

His vision was a church beyond politics and inspired by the ecumenical encounter — characteristically the last chapter of the book was entitled *Vlast’ liubvi* (The power of love). Afanassiev thought that the Church was different from a human institution and in the preface it is written:

> The historian does not live outside time, above all if he is an historian of the Church. If his work is to be something of ecclesial significance, then he must serve the Church. In his writing he must remember, therefore, that the Church possesses her own principles: she is not a human organisation but a divine institution. It is the will of God that acts in her through the channel of the Spirit, and not the will of man. She lives and acts with the help of those gifts of the Spirit that God gives without measure. We are ‘citizens of heaven, from where we await our Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ. The Church is ‘the Church of the Holy Spirit’, and, whilst still being in this age, she belongs to the beginning of the last days.  

In 1934 Afanassiev wrote his first work on ecclesiology ‘Dve idei vselenskoi Tserkvi’ (Two Ideas of the Church Universal). In this article he argues that there exist today, and in history, two different kinds of ecclesologies. On the one hand we have the ‘Cyprianic universality’, the beginnings of which he traces to letter 55: ‘The one church throughout the whole world is divided into many members […] in multa membra divisa est’. This means, according to Afanassiev, that the one Church exists empirically as distinct ‘church communities’, tserkovnie obschiny, but the Body of Christ is the totality of these ecclesial communities.

Cyprian, Afanassiev argues, was the first to apply the imperial idea to the Church as a separate empire. Cyprian saw the Church as a truncated

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134 Afanassieva 1971, ‘Kak slozhilas’ Tserkov’ Dukha Sviatogo’.
135 Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vselenskoi Tserkvi’.
136 Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vselenskoi Tserkvi’.
137 Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vselenskoi Tserkvi’.
138 Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vselenskoi Tserkvi’.
140 Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vselenskoi Tserkvi’, p. 57.
cone with the episcopate as being one, representing the different communities of the world. Afanassiev labels the ecclesiology of Cyprian as 'Cyprianic universality', meaning that Cyprian perceived the Body of Christ as the totality of the empirically distinct 'church communities'. The empirical community then becomes just a part or a limb of the Body of Christ, and has not the fullness of the Church.141

Afanassiev criticizes this linkage to the Empire on at least three crucial points. Firstly in order for the comparison between the Empire and the Church to be successful they need to be similar, but the Church is guided by its own principles, and the only reason for this comparison is to safeguard its independence in relation to the Roman Empire.142 Secondly the Roman Empire has ceased to exist and therefore there are no reasons to believe that we need to defend the independence of the Church in the category of an Empire. It would lead to a represtation, watching over an isolated historical occasion, without paying enough attention to the present.143 Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, the imperial idea fails to answer the more fundamental question of how these distinct empirical 'church communities' are related to each other, since, according to Afanassiev, even universal ecclesiology attest to the existence of these empirical communities.144

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On the other hand we have the ‘Ignatian universality’, which, according to Afanassiev, stands in direct opposition to the Cyprianic ecclesiology. In Afanassiev’s view, Ignatius ascribes the fullness of the universal Church to each ecclesial community.145 This is evident, he argues, in Ignatius’s letter to the church at Smyrna: ‘Where Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic Church’, and this presence is previously attributed to the Eucharistic sacrifice in the same letter: ‘Just as in the Eucharistic sacrifice, the whole of Christ is present, so in each ecclesial community there is the body of Christ in its plenitude [pleroma].’146 This means that the one Church is to be found in each one of the distinct ecclesial communities, and cannot be the totality of tserkovnie obschiny.147 Afanassiev makes

141 Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vselenskoi Tserkvi’, p. 46.
144 Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vselenskoi Tserkvi’.
the point by saying: ‘One plus one is still one’, since there are not two Christs.\footnote{Afanassiev 1992, ‘The Church which Presides in Love’, p. 109.}

Ignatius also has another criterion for the presence of Christ and that is the bishop: ‘Wherever the bishop appears let the congregation be present’.\footnote{Ignatius, \textit{Ad Smyrnaeos}, 8, 2; \textit{Ad Philadelphenos}, 4, cited in Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vseleskoi Tserkvi’, pp. 26-27.} Afanassiev argues that in the early Church reconciling these two criteria did not pose a problem as they coincided for the most part, as Ignatius himself attests to:

Be careful to use one Eucharist, for there is one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, and one cup for union with his blood, one altar, as there is one bishop with the presbytery and the deacons my fellow servants ...\footnote{Ignatius, \textit{Ad Smyrnaeos}, 8, 2; \textit{Ad Philadelphenos}, 4, cited in Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vseleskoi Tserkvi’, pp. 26-27.}

In the contemporary Church, however, this is usually not the case. Therefore Afanassiev sees the Church as presently deviating from the early Church. Nonetheless, when he talks about the local church he refers to the diocese headed by a bishop, even though he is aware that the Eucharistic sacrifice and the presence of the bishop are usually two separate things.\footnote{Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vseleskoi Tserkvi’, pp. 28-29.}

The purpose of his thesis is to demonstrate the difference between an imperial ecclesiology dependent on the idea of an Empire, and the ancient ecclesiology that was not in need of an Empire – be it a Petrine or Vatican Empire. He argues instead that the Church is guided by its own principles and receives its fullness in the Bishop and the Eucharist.

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When he returned to Paris from Tunis Afanassiev deepened his patristic knowledge. Schmemann, while a student of his, introduced him to \textit{The Shape of Liturgy},\footnote{Dix 1943, \textit{The Shape of Liturgy}.} by Gregory Dix. Upon reading it, Afanassiev reworked his book \textit{Tserkov’ Dukha Sviatogo} and added the patristic apparatus.\footnote{Plank 1980, \textit{Die Eucharistieversammlung als Kirche}, p. 36.} The rendezvous with Saint–Serge, coupled with the ‘ecumenical’ environment, prompted a further development in his ecclesiology first becoming apparent in Afanassiev’s essay \textit{Trapeza Gospodnia} (The table of the Lord). It was here that he fully explored the ‘eucharistic ecclesiology’ and stated the principle associated with it: ‘Where the eucharistic
assembly is, there is the Church, and where the Church is there is the eucharistic assembly. He makes the case by trying to visualize a dynamic ecclesiology, where the Church becomes Church again and again, and the Eucharist emerges as what would best be described as the sacrament of our ecclesiality.\footnote{Afanassiev 1952, \textit{Trapeza Gospodnia}, p. 10.}

Afanassiev’s overriding emphasis, in this essay, is on the gathering of the Church or the Assembly as such. It is the Assembly that is the beginning of the constitution of the Church. It is in the full sense an empirical ecclesiology, with the empirical community in focus. In fact he defers any metaphysical speculation on behalf of the empirical reality. The unity of the local Church could here be described as unity-in-identity on different levels. On one level all members are part of the royal priesthood and as such all are identical, even the one standing behind the altar. On another level the one standing behind the altar is necessary for the Church to be Church or the Eucharist to be Eucharist. All ecclesial communities contain a head or proestos, and a body of people belonging to the royal priesthood; to be exact, the baptized. Therefore, just as, in the community, the individuals are identical to each other, all ecclesial communities are identical to each other, having a head and a body.\footnote{Afanassiev 1952, \textit{Trapeza Gospodnia}, p. 10.}

The impact of the fullness of the local Church culminates in a decentralized ecclesiology, where the Church is fulfilled in the place and at the time of the gathering instead of imitating an Empire or becoming instrumental to any worldly kingdom.

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Schmemann’s final work, \textit{The Eucharist}, published posthumously in 1987, is a tribute to the Eucharistic Ecclesiology, developed in the Russian Orthodox tradition, amongst foremost is Afanassiev.\footnote{Schmemann 1987, \textit{The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom}.} This work promotes the Eucharistic Assembly as the sacrament of the Kingdom, but not necessarily in a metaphysical way.\footnote{Schmemann 1987, \textit{The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom}, p. 13.} Schmemann is eager to make the liturgical event, the \textit{leitourgia}, his source for understanding the local Church and is reluctant to use any external sources beyond the \textit{leitourgia}.\footnote{Cf. Schmemann 1969, ‘Liturgical Theology, Theology of Liturgy and Liturgical Reform’, p. 223 and Schmemann 1987, \textit{The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom}, p. 35.}
The leitourgia has its foundation in the order of prayers, lex orandi, which is more than mere words. The order is all that is needed for the Assembly to become the Church in deeds and words, again and again, thereby becoming identical with the Catholic Church in all times.\footnote{Schmemann [1966] 1975, Introduction to Liturgical theology, pp. 13-21.} Schmemann uses the term ordo in relation to this foundation of the local assembly. The true identity of the Church, according to Schmemann, is revealed by uncovering the Ordo. Therefore Schmemann essentially defers any metaphysical speculation outside this ordo.\footnote{Cf. Schmemann [1966] 1975, Introduction to Liturgical theology, p. 20; and Schmemann 1969, ‘Liturgical Theology, Theology of Liturgy and Liturgical Reform’. The latter article could be seen as a defence of the leitourgia as the ultimate source.} His ecclesiology is in the full sense both empirical and based on unity-in-identity.

In his search for the true identity the first question Schmemann deals with is the individual reality of the Church. Even though Schmemann admits that there is a need for transcending the local Church on a metalevel, he is eager to specify that this transcendence in itself has to be rooted in the liturgical event, in the subjective experience of being Church, i.e. the leitourgia.\footnote{Cf. Schmemann [1966] 1975, Introduction to Liturgical theology, p. 28; and Schmemann [1963] 1990, ‘Theology and Liturgical Tradition’, p. 18.} Schmemann shares, with Afanassiev, the basic idea of a decentralized ecclesiology but focuses more on experience than on structure.

Schmemann presents a dynamic theory of the Church, with recourse to the idea of hypostasis. This terminology was used in the sense of “objective reality” by the ancient Greeks, such as Aristotle, as opposed to outer form, or even illusion. In early Christian works it was used to denote “substantial reality” often confused with the term ousia (essence). It was not until the Cappadocian fathers that the formula “three hypostases in one ousia” was commonly accepted as the Orthodox doctrine on the Trinity, thereby making a distinction between hypostasis and ousia. From the middle of the fifth century onwards the idea of hypostasis was further developed, coming to mean “individual reality”, as a sequel to the council of Chalcedon.\footnote{Cf. Chadwick 1951, ‘Eucharist and Christology in the Nestorian Controversy’; and Chadwick [1967] 1993, The Early Church.}

Schmemann uses the term hypostasis in a more apophatic way, though still retaining the sense of individual reality. Schmemann contends that “the Church has no ‘hypostasis’ or ‘personality’ of her own, other than the hypostasis of Christ”. Since Christ has joined all of creation to him, when the Logos took flesh, all of creation has been
attached and unified with the Church. It is necessary for Schmemann to make this clarification in order to make this world relevant for the Church. “In the patristic perspective”, Schmemann continues, the Church is the gift of new life, “but this life is not that of the Church, but the life of Christ in us, our life in Him”. The Church is not a new life in the sense of another life. Instead, Schmemann is eager to point out, “she is the new life of the ‘old’ nature, redeemed and transfigured by Christ.” So the Church is coexistent with Christ and through Christ coexistent with all of creation. This cosmological perspective strongly resembles the cosmological ecclesiology of Bulgakov.

Still, in comparison to Bulgakov’s thinking, there is a difference. Schmemann never departs from the leitourgia for a more speculative theology. On the one hand, therefore, the “Church” is the Assembly as such, and Schmemann persists in the understanding of the Assembly as a sacrament, the “Sacrament of the Assembly”. This Schmemann has clearly inherited from Afanassiev, but although Schmemann makes the Assembly the primary structural component of the “Church”, Schmemann find it important to add that the Assembly has to receive the new life, or the new dimension, the coming Kingdom, the Eschatological dimension, in order for the Assembly to be sufficient. Without the local assembly there is simply no recipient of this new life, and without creation there is no Assembly, but on the other hand the Body of Christ can never be a part of this world, as it condemned Christ, the bearer of new life, and therefore condemned itself to death. The Church, according to Schmemann, is always in danger of absolutizing the contingent, making her the “prisoner of her ‘empirical’ needs and the pragmatic spirit of ‘this world’ which poisons and obscures the absolute demands of the Truth.” Therefore the Assembly is not sufficient without this new life.

Through the image of infusion these two perspectives are merged into one. The Church does not give us new life, according to Schmemann, but this new life is given in her, and that makes us an “organism”. The Eucharist here is a living sacrament infusing new life.

165 Schmemann 1987, The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom, p. 43.
166 Schmemann 1973, For the Life of the World, p.27.
and thereby transfigurating the Assembly into the Church — the same transfiguration that will embrace all of creation in the Day of the Lord\(^{169}\).

The experience of eschaton makes the Church independent not only in a theoretical sense but even more in a spiritual way. The Church is concerned not with worldly affairs but with the transfiguration of this world in order to receive the coming Kingdom. In Schmemann’s work the Eucharistic Ecclesiology therefore makes the Assembly, loci ecclesia, the place of the Church, and Eschatology the additional dimension of this world. The eschatological dimension is diminished in the works of Afanassiev in his ardent pursuit of a non-metaphysical ecclesiology. Schmemann is disinclined toward metaphysical speculation outside the liturgical Ordo, but with the addition of a blown out Eschatology there is clearly a metaphysical dimension to his ecclesiology, which strongly resembles the Eschatology present in Bulgakov’s work. The reason for this is the common root of the human being as a subject transforming the objective world into a human labor marked by the personal freedom inherent in the human being. For Bulgakov it was focused on the relation between Marxism and Christian faith, for Afanassiev it was determined by the struggle for the independence of the Church in relation to the empires and the totalitarian regimes, and for Schmemann it was rooted in the spiritual independence attempting to avoid the instrumentalization of the Church for the worldly well-being in the juxtaposition of the sorrows in this world.

C. Catholicity and Ecumenicity

When the second Vatican Council was in progress a change of interest took place and both Afanassiev and Schmemann began to explore the ministry of the Church on the universal level, which meant a further development of their ecclesiology. This interest was ignited by Oscar Cullman’s book *Petrus: Jünger, Apostel, Märtyrer* (1952).\(^{170}\) In 1960 Afanassiev published the essay ‘L’église qui preside dans l’amour’.\(^{171}\) It gained an international reputation and was listed in the *Nota praevia of De Ecclesia*, one of the major works on the Church that the second Vatican Council produced.\(^{172}\)

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171 Afanassiev 1960, ‘L’église qui preside dans l’Amour’.
In this article, ‘The Church which Presides in Love’, Afanassiev takes his view on the Universal Church one step further and criticizes the contemporary understanding of ‘The Mystical Body of Christ’. It has become, he argues, something of a self-evident fact. The Universal Church is the Mystical Body of Christ parceled out in local communities. But the relationship between these communities is still not clarified and some argue that they are parts of a larger whole. Others reason that the local community represents the totality, *pars pro toto*, and some see it as *ein Splitter*.

According to Afanassiev, criticizing this universal ecclesiology in the context of Roman-Catholic theology would today seem to put in question the foundational beliefs of the Church. Universal ideology is, however, not just an attribute of Roman-Catholic theology; it is also present in the orthodox world. Afanassiev provides a single example, namely the Great Council of 1917–18 in Moscow: ‘... the diocese is defined as one part of the Russian Orthodox Church, when governed by a bishop according to canon law.’ For Afanassiev this means that the council supported the view that the local Church is merely a part of a larger whole.

Although admitting that there is a natural development in Byzantium to organize the Ecumenical Church in certain units, Afanassiev nevertheless maintains that Byzantium always regarded the diocese as fundamental. The historical genesis of this decay, according to Afanassiev, is the appearance of the principle *kēdemonía pántōn*. In the Pre-Constantinian Church the dioceses were organized into metropolitan units, but the metropolitanate decayed under the Constantinian Church and the power of the patriarchs increased on their behalf. This meant that the metropolitans became more or less delegates of the patriarchs in relation to the local churches. When Byzantium was already falling apart the principle of one organic whole entered the sphere of ecclesiology and this unity was to be headed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, but because of the historical development it never became a reality.

Afanassiev saw an important connection between the Empire and Universal Ecclesiology. It is the imperial idea that influences both the principle of *kēdemonía pántōn* and Cyprian in formulating a Universal


Ecclesiology. “We moderns”, Afanassiev continues, “can no longer imagine the enormous fascination of the Imperial idea, as leading church figures felt it then.” 176 The critique is intended to undermine the Universal Ecclesiology, leveling the claim that it is an inadequate represtination, insufficient not only for this generation but even for the time of its invention, at least with regard to the principle of kēdemonía pántōn.

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The charge leveled against Cyprianic universality of being an act of represtination could be considered as a formal critique fundamental to any discussion. The second point of critique is, however, more precisely theological and based on his historical analysis. Afanassiev compares the concept ‘Catholic Church’ with the concept ‘Ecumenical Church’, and by putting these concepts in the context of ‘Cyprianic universality’ versus ‘Ignatian universality’ he develops a theological as well as an historical analysis. 177

In Cyprian Afanassiev finds evidence for his thesis that ‘Catholic Church’ and ‘Ecumenical Church’ means the same thing, empirically speaking, in the ‘Cyprianic universality’. Cyprian sees the empirical Church as being a number of distinct ecclesial communities spread out in the world, i.e. the Ecumenical Church, and is faced with the question; how are these communities united? The answer is taken from St Paul and his doctrine on the Body of Christ as an organic nature. 178 But in St Paul it is attributed to the relation between human individuals, whereas Cyprian attributes it to the relation between different church communities; “the church in the whole world is divided into many members”. These members are then tied together (coniuncta) and joined (conexa) like the branches of a single tree, and together form the Catholic Church, not individually but together. 179 The consequence of this theory, Afanassiev argues, is that each of the distinct ecclesial communities takes part in the Catholic Church only through the Ecumenical Church. This signifies

179 Epist. LV , XXIV, 2; cf. Epist. XXXVI, IV, 1. “Omnes enim nos dect pro corpore totius ecclesiae cuibus per varias quasque provincias membra digesta sunt, excubare.”
that for Cyprian the ‘Catholic Church’ is equivalent to the ‘Ecumenical Church’, in the empirical world.¹⁸⁰

Later on in his article ‘The Church which Presides in Love’ he presents the ‘Ignatian universality’, previously developed in the earlier article, Trapeza Gospodnia. He refers to this ecclesiology as ‘Eucharistic ecclesiology’, and it differs in that the Church’s fullness and unity does not depend on quantity, but instead on the uniqueness and oneness of Christ, who is always One and the same. Christ cannot be divided and therefore wherever Christ abides there is the fullness of Christ, and there is the Catholic Church.¹⁸¹

The Eucharist is where Christ dwells in the fullness of His Body: the Eucharist could never have been offered in a local church if it had been no more than one part of the Church of God. Where the Eucharist is, there is the fullness of the Church; vice versa, where the fullness of the Church is not, there no Eucharist can be celebrated.¹⁸²

In yet another earlier article ‘L’apôtre Pierre et l’évêque de Rome’ he explains the difference between exterior universality and interior universality. The latter he attributes to the fullness of each distinct ecclesial community as the dwelling place of Christ, i.e. the Catholic Church. The exterior universality is the effect of the Church’s mission, which in itself is a quality of catholicity. The Ecumenical Church is therefore dependent on the intrinsic quality of each distinct ecclesial community, and not the other way around.¹⁸³

For Afanassiev the Universal Church in the writings of Cyprian is but an idea, one that did not exist in the apostolic age. In the early post-apostolic Church every local Church was autonomous and independent. There is no precedent for regarding this autonomy as something brought about by chance. Instead Afanassiev argues that it is hard or even impossible to defend the Cyprianic universality without attributing it also to the apostolic and early post-apostolic Church.¹⁸⁴

The empirical church is therefore the distinct ecclesial community, tserkovnie obschiny, and the Ecumenical Church that is spread throughout the world exists only in as much as there are certain local churches at a certain place and at a given time. Here we can perceive the

whisperings of Plato and Aristotle, of whether or not the idea can exist independently of the thing. Afanassiev is convinced that they cannot. The Church does not exist independently of the different local churches in time and therefore the Universal Church cannot exist beyond the ecclesial communities in history. All in all this is an ardent defense of both a decentralized, non-metaphysical and non-imperial Church.

Figure 1 (Afanassiev): Vertical line: Catholicity; Horizontal line: Ecumenicity.

The conceptual distinction between Catholicity and Ecumenicity has virtually disappeared in the works of Schmemann. The reason for this disappearance is that he takes a different approach both in method and in scope. Afanassiev, as previously stated, takes more of an apophatic approach; he wishes to denounce the imperial idea and the Universal Church associated with it that he identifies in Cyprian. ‘Ignatian universality’ is therefore hardly a fully elaborated ecclesiology, rather an example of the ‘Cyprianic universality” opposite. The focus in Afanassiev’s work is on the Universal Church with the intent of defending the fullness of the local Church.

Schmemann instead wants to elaborate Eucharistic Ecclesiology, keeping to the perspective of the local Church. He focuses therefore on the nucleus of the Church, the Assembly as such, and what it means to be Church. In this core he finds the praying church, *Ecclesia Orans*. By Ecclesia he understands the gathering of the people that together become more than what they would be merely as a sum of individuals. As a community they are called out, *ek kalein*, to fulfill the Church in a particular place and in a particular time, *epi to auto*.

According to Schmemann, this does not constitute an institution, but rather the very living reality Christians encounter whenever they celebrate the Eucharist. The best way to describe this would be to see it as a journey or procession. This world has rejected Christ, but still He is the “heart beat” of the world, the “expression of life as God intended it”. Therefore the world has rejected itself. The world has thrown itself into darkness, lost the possibility that God has given the world for its salvation; the world is now moving towards its end. At the same time Christianity is “the proclamation of joy, of the only possible joy on earth.” We rejoice in the end of this world and welcome the beginning of the new, but this world is the object both of what will end as well as what will be a new beginning. This world, Schmemann argues, will in the end be transformed into something new, the coming Kingdom.

The sole purpose for the Eucharistic assembly, as Schmemann eagerly points out, is to enter into the joy of Christ, and for that reason the Eucharist can justly be called the Sacrament of Joy. The leitourgia is the manifestation of that joy, of the coming Kingdom, the One who is Christ. The liturgy begins already when we leave our homes as Christians, leaving the world behind us in order to manifest the world to come.

The service of the liturgy begins with a real separation from this world through the solemn doxology; “Blessed is the Kingdom of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit”, thereby announcing our entrance into another world, the coming Kingdom. In order to become the Temple of the Holy Spirit we must do as the early Christians: we need to

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ascend to Heaven, as Christ has ascended.\textsuperscript{191} This is the Catholic Church, according to Schmemann, the Ascended Assembly of Christ.

When the service has ended we return to this world, but now we are illumined, reflecting the light of the Transfiguration, as Schmemann explains, and we carry the light of the Kingdom, the transformation, into this world, making the impossible possible. This is the mission of the Church as Schmemann understands it.\textsuperscript{195} The cycle is repeated again and again, daily, weekly in the Lord’s Day, and yearly in the seasons of the Church.\textsuperscript{195} The independence of the Church is once more in focus, an independence more encompassing than being merely structural, seeing as it also highlights the priority of the Church, which illuminates the world, and not the other way around.

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If we compare this structure of reasoning with Afanassiev we can clearly see that there is a resemblance but also a distinction. When Afanassiev talks about identity Schmemann is eager to take the discussion one step further reflecting on the precise meaning of identity, and looking at the precise order of the liturgy. When Afanassiev talks about Ecumenicity Schmemann is keen to understanding how the Ecumenical Church is realized in and through the Assembly. Afanassiev sees the outgrowth of the Church in history and geography as the effect of the Catholic Church, making the Ecumenical Church, but he does not delve deeper into how this happens to be. For Schmemann, on the other hand, this is precisely what occupies him.

The Catholic Church is a process whereby we are leaving this world, and ascending to Heaven, to the Kingdom of Joy, the Coming Kingdom. When we enter the world again we reflect the light of Christ, just as on the Day of the Transfiguration, the same light that will transform this world into the coming Kingdom. The mission of the Church is therefore to carry this light to the four corners of the earth until the end of time. Instead of the juxtaposition of Catholicity and Ecumenicity as in the works of Afanassiev, in Schmemann we have the process of leaving and entering.

\textsuperscript{191} Schmemann 1973, \textit{For the Life of the World}, pp. 31-32.
The other comparison is the disinclination towards any metalocal awareness — instead emphasizing the empirical side of ecclesiology. Through the perspective of a local and empirical ecclesiology they alter the perception of theology as emanating from above to the perception of theology as originating from below. This has the intention of transforming the local Church into a subject instead of an object. In Afanassiev the focus is always on the concrete Assembly instead of the Mystical Body of Christ, transferring the initiative to the local Church instead of an abstract Universal Church. Schmemann has the same focus but centered more on the tangible service of the liturgy, the prescriptions and regulations that are passed on from previous generations, what Schmemann calls the Ordo, trying thereby to understand the composite of the Assembly, and in that way transferring the initiative to those participating in the liturgy.194

The worship of the Orthodox Church is conducted according to Ordo, that is, according to definite regulations, according to an order or rite established once and for all.195

The Ordo according to Schmemann is given “once and for all”, but not in the sense that every prescription or regulation is catholic and binding. We need to make a distinction between “what is local (and often accepted as ‘universal’) and what is universal (and often accepted as ‘local’).”196 The universal value of the Ordo reveals the true identity of the Church beneath the temporary and local. In order to make this revelation attainable we need to uncover the Ordo. This is the task of Theology, according to Schmemann, and the challenge is to maintain the focus on the self-expression of the Church, the Ordo, abiding in the Church itself, instead of a speculative theology outside the Church.197

D. Khomiakov, the Slavophiles and the Principle of Sobornost’

Afanassiev and Schmemann were deeply moved by the Russian Soil and its adaptation of conciliarity, sobornost’, which was so embedded in the Russian Orthodox mind. Sobornost’ together with a patristic interpretation of the Universal Church constitute the foundation of their ecclesiology running through both of their lives.

The Russian understanding of the conciliar principle was above all influenced by Aleksei Stefanovich Khomiakov, who lived in the mid nineteenth century and was the most influential among the so-called slavophiles. They sought the ethos of pre-Petrine Russia and their interest in the Church was very much an interest of what was genuinely Russian, but Khomiakov had a more profound interest. He sought a deeper understanding of the Russian soul which was primarily a religious interest and only secondly national.198

The slavophiles tried to defend the Russian ethos from the influences of the West in order to secure its culture. That is why Khomiakov so vehemently criticized western culture.199 In some sense he over-emphasized the differences, especially in his well-drawn generalizations,

198 There is a great amount of literature on Khomiakov. See Gratieux 1939, Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophile; Suttner 1967, Offenbarung, Gnade und Kirche bei A. S. Chomjakov; O’Leary 1982, The Triune Church.
199 Gratieux 1939, Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophile.
but at the same time his influence on Russian Orthodox ecclesiology cannot be overestimated.

His philosophy was predominantly holistic, something that he had learnt from Schelling. By holistic he meant communal in a very concrete sense. The human being was created for a communal life. The dominant themes in his writings are ‘love’ and ‘freedom’. To Khomiakov these were interconnected. Freedom can only exist if there is also a mutual love present, and love can only exist if there is enough freedom. Together they constitute an ideal setting for a communal life, which he saw in the small peasant communities in Russia, where the human soul could develop her freedom in interconnection with the mutual love of the community.200

Khomiakov’s originality lay in that he also saw these communities in union with each other, and one community together with other communities constituted a larger community and so on. True union can never be the result of force or involuntarily decisions. It can only come from freedom and mutual love. Khomiakov therefore let union stand in opposition to the monolithic.201 This is also attested to by one of his disciples, Christoff:

… a union in love of all individual members, of all existing communes, of the communes of all ages, and of the visible and invisible Church.202

This ‘communality’, obschinnost’, was fundamental to his ecclesiological vision, but later it became renowned as sobornost’. According to Khomiakov the Church is a transfigured community, obschina, permeated by the Holy Spirit, with Christ as the bond of mutual love and freedom. As such it is the perfect community for transcending all communities in union. Sobornost’ could then be described as a kind of transcended ‘togetherness’, where the Church gathers, sobirajece, the individuals into communities and communities into other communities.203 Here we have the genesis of the pneumatological and qualitative conditions of the Church, articulated by Afanassiev, but above all the Russian understanding of Catholicity as a transcended togetherness. This is

200 Gratieux 1939, Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophil.
further attested to by the way the Russians translate *katholikē ekklēsia* into *sobornaia tserkov’*.

Khomiakov saw this ‘togetherness’ as a reality in the Orthodox Church,\(^{204}\) and, inspired by a strong feeling for the Russian ethos, he criticized the West for not being able to combine the principle of union with that of freedom.

\[\ldots a \text{ unity \ldots} \text{ more authoritative than the despotism of the Vatican, for it is based on the strength of mutual love. There a liberty is to be found more free than the license of Protestantism, for it is regulated by the humility of mutual love. There is the Rock and Refuge.}\(^{205}\)

From the principle of *sobornost’* and the gathering of communities into a larger community Afanassiev develops a pragmatism of the Universal Church in the article ‘The Church which presides in love’, where he defends the idea of a ministry of priority. Primacy is needed in every form of conciliarity, according to Afanassiev, if it is to be more than just an idea, existing within the empirical reality. This is also the case with ‘Ignatian Universality’, where the local Catholic Church participates within a larger ecumenical community. Afanassiev points out that through history we can see that the councils change. The meeting of the Apostles is not even remotely similar to the extended diocesan conferences at the time of Cyprian, and certainly we can see a difference when we compare the latter with the imperial councils of the Roman Empire. There was no particular conciliar form inherent in the councils as such. If that had been the case, how is one to explain the great differences between the councils? By looking at how they were brought about, it emerges that they were randomly convoked: the first, if it can truly be considered as such, by the church in Jerusalem; secondly by extending a local diocesan synod; and finally, by the will of the emperor. In each case the councils were brought about by some form of primacy. In the latter case it was the head of the Church-in-the-Empire that summoned the Ecumenical Councils between 325 and 787. Therefore conciliarity cannot be set against primacy; it presupposes it. Afanassiev contends that the council is not in itself an institution, but that an institution is required to bring it about and for it to be effective.\(^{206}\)

\(^{204}\) See O’Leary 1982, *The Triune Church*, p. 89.
Afanassiev’s view of the Universal Church has to be understood from a non-institutional perspective. The conciliar form is not fixed in time, or in place, but governs the whole of the Church as a process towards fulfillment. From this perspective it would be wrong to speak of three, seven or twenty one Ecumenical Councils, since all councils participate in the one Catholic Church, transcending both time and place. Each council has to be understood both in relation to what comes before as well as what comes after, thus uniting the one council with the others, forging the traditions of the Church into a unified Tradition.\footnote{Cf. Afanassiev 1934, ‘Dve idei vselenskoï Tserkvi’.
The article was originally published in St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 1960, but translated into French when it was published with a collection of articles on the Primacy of Peter. See Schmemann 1960, ‘La notion de primauté dans l’ecclesiologie orthodoxe’.
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In line with this understanding, conciliarity cannot be limited by a primacy without being dependent on a certain place and a particular time. The primacy in itself has to be transcended by the conciliar nature of the Church. This means that the Church can never be subordinated to any primacy. Since primacy in some sense implies subordination, Afanassiev prefers to speak of the one as having priority among the many.\footnote{Afanassiev 1992, ‘The Church which Presides in Love’.
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This is not a retrieval of Universal Ecclesiology. Instead it is the last defense of the independence of the Church. His emphasis lies on the importance of one of the local churches summoning the other local churches, challenging those who argue that the Universal Church is necessary for the Ecumenical Church to exist. Not so, according to Afanassiev. All that is necessary is for a local Church to take the responsibility of a priority, consequently, we do not need a Universal Church or a Mystical Body of Christ parceled out in the Ecumenical world, and we certainly do not need an Empire.

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In the same volume, La primauté de Pierre dans l’Eglise Orthodoxe, where Afanassiev published his article, Schmemann presents a slightly different view of the conciliar principle, anchored in the local Church through the liturgy, with a different approach to hierarchy.\footnote{The article was originally published in St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 1960, but translated into French when it was published with a collection of articles on the Primacy of Peter. See Schmemann 1960, ‘La notion de primauté dans l’ecclesiologie orthodoxe’.
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relation between the imperial idea and the independence of the Church. Schmemann is more interested in the precise nature of the local Church, but with the liturgy as a point of departure, instead of the structure.

In his article “The Idea of Primacy in Orthodox Ecclesiology” Schmemann understands the unity of the Church as a hierarchical unity. During the Middle Ages, and still common, hierarchy was understood as an order whereby one could only access a higher tier through a superior. Consequently humanity had to communicate with Powers, connected to God, through the subordinate angels, but not directly. Schmemann challenged this understanding of hierarchy. Instead of communicating through the higher levels of hierarchy, Schmemann argues, everything below is recapitulated, transcending the hierarchy into a transcended togetherness, with equal participation in relation to the next level.210

Figure 3: Recapitulating Hierarchy

This transcended togetherness is attested to by the Great Entrance when the bishop acts as the proestos, the one presiding over the liturgy. If a priest celebrates the liturgy as proestos then he carries the eucharistic gifts of bread and wine to the sanctuary, but if the bishop is the proestos, when he receives the gifts standing in the royal door of the iconostasis. This is an act of recapitulation, according to Schmemann. The priest together with the deacon and/or the hypodeacon represents the entire populus, participating equally in relation to the bishop. After receiving the gifts the bishop delivers them to Christ, now in equal participation with the populace.\footnote{Cf. Schmemann 1960, ‘The Idea of Primacy in Orthodox Ecclesiology’; and Taft 1978, A History of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, Volume II. The Great Entrance.} The idea of recapitulation is similar to Khomiakov’s theory of obschinnost’, and what later was to be called sobornost’, but in Schmemann’s article he has unified the hierarchical principle with the sobornal principle into recapitulation. The article had its antecedent in the debate initiated by Mr. Ralph M. Arkush, then the legal advisor to the Metropolia in America, in 1959.\footnote{Schmemann 1959, ‘The Church is Hierarchical’.}

Arkush makes an unjust division, according to Schmemann, between the sobornal character of the Church and the hierarchical character, when he states that the Church in the U.S. is no longer hierarchical but sobornal. Schmemann deals with the issue not by defending the subordination of the laity to the hierarchy. Instead he emphasizes a holistic understanding of the Church, where the “spiritual” and “material” aspect of the Church cannot be separated. Furthermore, Schmemann continues, “[t]he Church is not a secular society”. It is guided by its own principles where the voice of the laity is a necessary part of the Church’s hierarchy, but not sufficient without the hierarchical order of bishops.\footnote{Schmemann 1959, ‘The Church is Hierarchical’.}

In his answer to Mr. Arkush Schmemann argues for the necessary unity between the laity and the hierarchical order as well as the unity between the hierarchical principle and the sobornal principle, but he has not yet developed the theory of recapitulation and the article therefore lacks stringency and depth. Schmemann’s argument at the time, in 1959, was simply not convincing enough. One year later, with the theory of recapitulation, he achieves the argumentative strength to conclude his reasoning.

211 Cf. Schmemann 1960, ‘The Idea of Primacy in Orthodox Ecclesiology’; and Taft 1978, A History of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, Volume II. The Great Entrance. The way Schmemann understands hierarchy is further attested to in Irenaeus of Lyon in the second century A.D., who remarks that everything will in the end be summoned in Christ (anakatastasis/recapitulatio), as He is the head of the Church. Christ is the One that recapitulates all that the Father has given Him. Irenaeus finds the locus of this recapitulation in the Eucharist. Cf. PG, Adversus Haereses III, 19:1, 1V, 36:7, 38:4.

212 Schmemann 1959, ‘The Church is Hierarchical’.

213 Schmemann 1959, ‘The Church is Hierarchical’.
Through the theory of recapitulation Schmemann makes the same argument as Afanassiev but with a different approach. According to Schmemann it is not the Ecumenical Church that makes the Catholic Church, rather it is the Catholic Church that makes the Ecumenical Church, through and in the life of the liturgy. There everything is connected, revealing the essence and experience of the Church. Once again Schmemann differs from Afanassiev in the sense that the latter focuses on structure whereas Schmemann focuses on the experience of the Church and the disclosure of the Church in and through this experience.

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The principle of sobornost dominated the Russian Orthodox mind, with its emphasis on communities being gathered into new communities, but these new communities carry the same identity as the previous ones. This is also an important aspect in Khomiakov’s thinking and that of the slavophiles.214

According to Khomiakov, the Church is the creation of the Trinity, founded on Pentecost when the Spirit internalized the exterior truth of Christ, so He could be the bond of mutual love, and through this love Christians are led back to the Father.215 For Khomiakov this internalization meant that truth could only reside within the Church. Truth could have no external guarantee, whether biblical, papal or conciliar.216 Mutual love alone is ‘le dépositaire et le gardien de la foi’.217 Regarding the appeal from Pope Pius IX for the reunion of the Catholic West and the Orthodox East, Khomiakov saw the answer from the Eastern Patriarchs in 1848, as indicating that indefectibility resides in the common witness of mutual love and faith by all the members of the Church.218 Truth therefore can have no external guarantee than truth itself, residing in the Christian community. In Khomiakov’s writing truth and indefectibility are therefore also a consequence of freedom and mutual love. If Christ is the Truth then it has been incorporated in the Body of Christ through the Holy Spirit as the bond of mutual love.219

217 Khomiakov 1872, L’Eglise latine et le protestantisme au point de vue de l’Eglise d’Orient, p. 381.
218 Christoff 1961, An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Slavophilism, p. 94.
The impact of Khomiakov on the Russian intelligentsia is clearly attested to by Bulgakov, who was the one who introduced Afanassiev to Khomiakov’s ideas. Bulgakov adopted Khomiakov’s notion of Sobornost’, but preferred other terms to give it more of a qualitative touch; ‘unity’, edinstvo, ‘generality’, vseobshchnost’, ‘wholeness’, kolichestvennoe.220 He agreed that the Church ‘gathers’, sobirat, all nations and all peoples,221 but for him catholicity was above all ‘self-identity of the life of grace’, samotozhestvennost’ blagodatnoi zhizni. This self-identity, Bulgakov argues, is the bond between the visible, empirical church, and the invisible church. It is the ‘mystical and metaphysical depth of the church’.

[The church] is the divine ground of the world and the real meaning of human history in which the Church takes possession of the creation until God be all in all.222

The hermeneutical principle Bulgakov applies for explaining this is the idea of Sophia, which he refers to the uncreated divine Wisdom, i.e. the Logos, and simultaneously to the eternal and heavenly Man.223 As the Church is the Body of Christ he identifies it with Sophia in relation to the humanity of God, and by this identification he argues that the Church could be said to be both pre-existent and invisible.224 The pre-existent Church undergoes its realization in creation, whose ultimate meaning she is.225 The effect is a dynamic cosmic process that Bulgakov calls ‘ecclesialisation’, otserkovlenie.226 Here we clearly see Khomiakov’s ideas surfacing, ‘otserkovlenie’ being similar to ‘obschinnost’ but in a cosmic perspective.

Afanassiev inherited Bulgakov’s qualitative understanding of catholicity, present in his view of ‘Ignatian universality’, and Khomiakov’s communal understanding of the interdependence of ‘freedom’ and ‘love’. In Afanassiev, however, Bulgakov’s idea of Sophia and the invisible church of Khomiakov virtually disappears. Afanassiev opposes any meta-local concept not immediately inherent in the local Church.227 Behind this opposition is his unwillingness to let the ideas exist independently of the

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221 See Bulgakov 1930, ‘Das Selbstbewusstsein der Kirche’.
223 His sophianic theology drew on him the condemnation of the Moscow patriachate. For the debate see Bulgakov 1936, ‘Zur Frage nach der Weisheit Gottes’; Lialine 1936, ‘Le débat sophiologique’; Schulzle 1940, ‘Der Gegenwärtige Streit um die Sophia, die Göttliche Weisheit, in der Orthodoxie’; Dumont 1937, ‘En marge du premier congrès de théologie orthodoxe Athènes 29 novembre - 3 décembre 1936’.
224 Bulgakov 1965, Pravoslavie, p. 38
227 Plank 1980, Die Eucharistieversammlung als Kirche, p. 110.
empirical universe; that is the originality of Afanassiev in relation to his contemporaries. Consequently his emphasis is on the Eucharist, because it is the empirical reality of the Church, as the source and locus of the principle of sobornost’ and the ecclesialisation of the community.

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Schmemann inherit the principle of sobornost’ as well as the principle of samotozhestvennost’, albeit with Afanassiev’s empirical and local touch, that is to say, the Eucharistic Ecclesiology. The Eucharist, according to Schmemann, is the sacrament of the Assembly, and instead of an invisible cosmic ecclesialisation, otserkovlenie, as proposed by Bulgakov, it is connected to the Eucharistic Assembly. On the one hand Schmemann shares the basic understanding of Truth as residing within the Church, and, like Khomiakov, he therefore claims that the Church carries its own logic. On the other hand he rejects the simple “liturgism” the contemporary Eastern Orthodox Church is so attached to.

Our Church remains a liturgical Church par excellence not only in the sense of the uninterruptedness of her ancient tradition of worship, but also because of the place which worship occupies in the life of the faithful, because of the special love the faithful have for the church building and its services. It can be said that in our time the life of the Church has become almost exclusively liturgical, has been reduced to worship and worship alone. ‘Love for the Church’ (tserkovnost) has become a synonym for love of the church building and its worship. The church building, the care of the church and the maintenance of the services, love of worship, of its beauty and reverence … such is the main content of tserkovnost.230

This ‘liturgism’ has caused a discrepancy between the understanding of worship and its purpose, which in itself has affected the entire life of the Church. Worship has become, according to Schmemann, the sole content of the ecclesial life and an object of love for the faithful.231

The liturgical crisis consists, first of all, in the mistaken concept of the function and place of worship in the Church, in the profound metamorphosis in the understanding of worship in the mind of the Church … We are speaking here about the whole approach to worship and its ‘experience’.232

228 Karl Rahner has a similar understanding of the Eucharist and therefore speaks about ‘the sacrament of our ecclesiality’. Rahner 1963, Kirche und Sakramente.
Instead of being a function of the Church, worship has been turned into an object of love, tserkovnost'. The faithful, whose worship it is, has been alienated from their own work, as they are the object of this worship. They have become a "‘cultic society,’ existing in and for the sake of the cult”. Therefore Schmemann envisage a liturgical revival, but not in its outer form but a revival from within, a renewed understanding of the purpose and meaning of worship, a return to the fathers. This revival needs to employ the rational senses of the faithful, using scholarly methods in order to uncover the real meaning and the real purpose of worship, beginning in the concrete liturgical structure as it has been handed down in history.\textsuperscript{233}

Through a renewed understanding tserkovnost can acquire a different connotation, which transforms the understanding of worship. This is the core of the theological calling within the Church — to recover the true meaning of loving the Church. This clearly implies a rationalization of the faithful community, toward a renewed understanding of the liturgy, making them subjects again, and through this subjectification the independence of the Church will be secured. The source has to come from within, following the principle of sobornost', evolving from below instead of from above. The precise content of this liturgical renewal will be the subject for the next chapter.

2. Liturgical Theology

[L]et us consider equally the rites of the priestly supplications which, transmitted by the apostles, are celebrated in the same manner in the entire world and in the whole catholic Church, in such a way that the order of supplication determines the rule of faith [ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi].

Prosper of Aquitaine, Capitula coelestini, fourth century

Prosper of Aquitaine, in the fourth century, coined the expression that “the order of supplication determines the rule of faith”, which motivated the latin expression lex orandi est lex credendi (the order of prayer is the order of faith) used frequently by Alexander Schmemann and those working within the paradigm of Liturgical Theology. In this chapter I will first (A) determine the roots of this paradigm and how it evolved in the works of Schmemann. From this I will continue by arguing (B) that Liturgical Theology in Schmemann’s work functions as a vehicle for the emancipation of the Church as well as those participating in the Church. This is accomplished (C) by achieving a common vision of the Church by internalizing the shared experience individually. This vision in itself (D) is a consequence of Schmemann’s shift from private piety to common participation in the Kingdom. This, in turn, is accomplished through partaking in the leitourgia, i.e. sharing the liturgical experience, which is the living experience of the Church transmitted through the Ordo and the movement of the participants, expressed in a language of concepts and rites adequate to the leitourgia.

A. The Paradigm of Liturgical Theology

As a notion Liturgical Theology was introduced, as Job Getcha points out, by Kiprian Kern already 1925 in an article in the journal for theological students in Belgrade. Kern further developed this article in 1928 in a publication entitled “Lily of Prayers. Collection of Articles on Liturgical Theology.” The significance of this work, according to Job Getcha, was that Kern added a third approach to liturgical studies, the theological. Getcha quotes Kern:

The third approach, theological, considers liturgical science not only to be a historical subject or an archeological study, and not only as a series of rules for the celebration of service according to the mind and letter of the ecclesiastical Typikon (ordo), but mainly as a theological discipline, as a source of the knowledge of God and as a means that can help in the development of an Orthodox theological system.236

In this collection, “Lily of Prayers”, Kern identifies a double challenge for Liturgical Theology. First there is a didactic aspect in helping the people to understand the liturgy, and secondly there is a scientific endeavor toward systematizing the teaching that we find in the different liturgical books.237

This double challenge reappears in the works of Schmemann, who describes the liturgical crisis238 in terms of a distorted understanding of the liturgy. The Eucharist, according to Schmemann, has ceased to be understood as the manifestation of the Church. Instead the Eucharist is understood as one means among many for the spiritual benefit of the individual, and there is a need to regain the Eucharist as the common entrance into the Kingdom.239 On the other hand Schmemann in his doctoral dissertation elaborates the idea of the Ordo as a scientific venture. By examining the historical sources of the liturgy he provides elucidation on the liturgy which reveals the general philosophy of a ‘reasonable service’.240

David W. Fagerberg also identifies this double challenge but argues that, in his work, Schmemann searches for an ortho rather than an ordo. He is more interested in discovering what makes worship orthodox rather than seeking out a particular historical ordo. West, according to Fagerberg, expresses the task presented by Schmemann in different terms. Schmemann’s lex orandi is understood as an ancient and universal practice, something to be resolved through historical methods.

238 There was a tacit agreement on the existence of a liturgical crisis in the aftermath of World War II, but this is hard to ground empirically since the argument of a liturgical crisis depends on a normative perspective of the liturgy, i.e. how it ‘ought to be’.
Schmemann desires, however, to elucidate the faith of the Church as it is expressed and communicated in the liturgy.241

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The emphasis on seeking out an ortho is further supported if we take into consideration Schmemann’s two major contributions to the liturgical movement in the second half of the twentieth century. The first contribution is his formulation of ‘liturgical theology’ where he makes a distinction between liturgical theology and theology of liturgy. The second is the presentation of the essential meaning of worship. I will begin with the first.

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In his doctoral dissertation Schmemann presents his understanding of liturgical theology. The purpose of liturgical theology, he proposes, is to investigate ‘what is done in worship’. Liturgical theology, Schmemann continues, is the elucidation of the meaning of worship, by employing a system of concepts corresponding to the faith and experience of the Church. The meaning of worship is not dependent on a certain historical type, since the Church has never adopted a universal or uniform style of worship. Instead we find a multitude of types. Nevertheless, according to Schmemann, liturgical theology has to begin with the historical study, but after an historical analysis there must come a theological synthesis transcending the different styles of worship, which is the elucidation of the rule of prayer as the rule of faith.242

Today, Schmemann continues, the rule of prayer has been divorced from the rule of faith, with the evolutionary effect of reducing the life of the Church to worship alone. This in turn means that ‘love of the Church (tserkovnost)’ today has become synonymous with love of the Church building and the solemnity of the liturgy. Theology has faded away from the life of the Church and with it the meaning of worship, paving the way for ‘liturgism’, a piety occupied with maintaining the beauty and reverence of worship, but devoid of any real meaning.243

In the debate with Bernhard Botte and W Jardin Grisbrooke 1968 and 1969 Schmemann further unfolds the understanding of Liturgical Theology. Botte initiated the discussion by making a thorough distinction between the vital value of liturgy and the historical development of the liturgy.244

Historical study is not capable of restoring by its explanations the vital value of the liturgy.245

Botte’s intention is the well-known distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. Botte is especially concerned with how subjective piety relates to the more objective cult. What Botte is actually suggesting is the need for a distinction between the subjective evaluation of the liturgy and the historically transmitted order of liturgy. If this distinction is not made there is a danger of ending up in a relativistic dilemma, where the “objectivity of cult” becomes relative by the subjective apprehension. Botte then concludes his article by cautiously asking whether it is possible to recover a proper understanding of liturgy without connecting it to the liturgical order, through a “cleaning up” of unnecessary elements that fosters misunderstanding.

Schmemann comments briefly on Botte’s article stating that liturgical piety is by no means only a subjective phenomenon.246 Schmemann argues that there is a real objective shift in liturgical piety. He substantiates this claim by way of example: the reduction of the corporate understanding of communion into an individual act in the second millennium resulting in the loss of the essential meaning of the liturgy. Without the essential meaning, Schmemann argues, any reform will be unsuccessful, but if we recoup the essential meaning of the liturgy, reform will be achieved organically.

Unsatisfied with Schmemann’s answers, Grisbrooke continues the discussion, arguing that the question still goes unanswered as to who will enlighten the Church in attaining a proper understanding of worship.247 Presumably, Grisbrooke argues, it has to involve the whole body of faithful, following Schmemann’s arguments, but how will it be achieved? That is to say, whether these instructions are merely external to the *lex orandi*, or whether they are imbedded in the order of prayer

244 Botte 1968, ‘On Liturgical Theology’.
itself. If they are imbedded in the order itself then why would a renewed understanding of the liturgy be necessary? Could it be that the essential elements of the liturgy are overshadowed by unnecessary accessories, which are likely to disappear anyway but foster a misunderstanding of the liturgy today?

Schmemann, in his answer to Grisbrooke, contrasts “theology of liturgy” with “liturgical theology”. The first concept has liturgy as its object, in working out a theology relevant for the liturgy, but “liturgical theology” instead understands theology to be revealed in and through the liturgy itself, the epiphany of the life of the Church. Schmemann's answer to Grisbrooke is that the task of liturgical theology is not to restore the essence of liturgy. The real challenge, according to Schmemann, is not to relegate the accessories from the essential elements of the liturgy, but to change the whole approach to liturgy as such. The real challenge is to overcome the divorce between liturgy, theology and piety and to instead reconcile them into one fundamental vision of the Church and the Eucharist.

This reconciliation cannot be accomplished by merely returning to the texts of the fathers, but has to be consummated through an understanding of the mind of the fathers. Theology in the mind of the fathers is not distinct from the liturgy. Instead the liturgy is the locus theologicus par excellence. This does not mean that there is a confusion of faith and liturgy as with liturgical piety in which the experience of the “sacred” replaces faith, nor does it mean that faith is reduced to liturgy or cult as with the ancient mystery cults. Instead, Schmemann continues, faith shapes liturgy, but it is liturgy that bears a testimony to this faith. Faith cannot exist without this testimony since faith is revealed in and through the liturgy.

The liturgy, Schmemann argues, cannot be understood separately from ecclesiology. The liturgy is more than “worship” or “cult”. It is the complete manifestation of the Church and fulfillment of the Church's faith. Schmemann makes this explicit by using the concept leitourgia in order to capture the interdependence between faith as source and cause of the liturgy while also pointing out the necessity of the liturgy for the self-understanding and self-fulfillment of faith. The leitourgia is therefore both the source and condition of the Church as well as the Truth accepted and “lived” in the Church.

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What it means is that the Church’s leitourgia, a term incidentally much more comprehensive and adequate than “worship” or “cult”, is the full and adequate “epiphany” — expression, manifestation, fulfillment of that in which the church believes, or what constitutes her faith. It implies an organic and essential interdependence in which one element, the faith, although source and cause of the other, the liturgy, essentially needs the other as its own self-understanding and self-fulfillment. It is, to be sure, faith that gives birth to, and “shapes,” liturgy, but it is liturgy, that by fulfilling and expressing faith, “bears testimony” to faith and becomes thus its true and adequate expression and norm: lex orandi est lex credendi.  

Schmemann’s second major contribution to the liturgical movement is his presentation of the fundamental meaning of the liturgy. In his 1960 article on *The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church*, Schmemann begins his enterprise of searching for the essential meaning of worship. According to Schmemann, the various liturgical explanations in the Eastern Orthodox Church are almost entirely made up by symbolical explanations, the liturgy being a symbolical story, revealing the life of Christ – his birth, crucifixion and resurrection. Even so, almost everyone agrees that at a certain point the symbolism disappears and is replaced by realism. In the West this precise moment was to be found in the transformation of the elements into the Body and Blood of Christ.

Two opposite schools have emerged through the centuries, according to Schmemann. One, the symbolical, is occupied with the symbolical interpretations of the liturgy and the other, the more realistic, wants to isolate the *quid* of the Eucharist from its liturgical framework. Both schools use the liturgy as a source for constructing a theology, understanding the liturgy as unfulfilled without this theological framework. Instead Schmemann proposes that the time has come for a liturgical theology aimed not at the construction of a theology external to the liturgy, but rather at using the liturgy as a source for understanding the faith of the Church as it is handed down in tradition.

Using the liturgy as a primary source of theology makes it evident, Schmemann continues, that the primary question is not ‘What happens to the elements?’, but ‘What happens to the Church in the liturgy?’. If we look at the precise order of the liturgy, Schmemann argues, we can view the liturgy as a journey or procession. The first step in this procession occurs already when we leave our homes in order to constitute the

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250 Schmemann 1960, ‘The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church’.
251 Schmemann 1960, ‘The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church’.
Church in a particular place and at a particular time. As soon as we are gathered the destination of our journey is proclaimed when the priest says:

Blessed is the Kingdom of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

When the bishop celebrates the liturgy he stands in the centre of the Church, remaining with his flock, according to Russian tradition, waiting for the entrance to the sanctuary. The so called Little Entrance, or the carrying of the Gospel, is a real entrance where the bishop as head of the Church enters the sanctuary through the royal doors of the iconostasis together with the Gospel of Christ, entering the Kingdom, and as he is the head of the Church we all participate in this entrance, according to Schmemann. The entrance makes the Kingdom present and immediately follows the angelic Trisagion, “Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal”, which is the sign of the presence of the Kingdom.

According to Schmemann, the manifestation of the Kingdom is the real meaning of the liturgy, where we participate in the Ascension of Christ, His passage to the Father. The content of the Eucharist is Christ, who is the End, the Eschaton, and transcends the past, the present and the future. Therefore it is not a new Eucharist that the assembly participates in but the one and same eternal Eucharist. In yet another article, Theology and Eucharist, 1961, Schmemann concludes his reasoning by stating that the Church does not precede the Eucharist. It is not the Church which generates the Eucharist, but quite the contrary it is the Eucharist which generates the Church. It is the Eschaton which is revealed in the Eucharist which manifests the Kingdom and thus makes the Church.

Some years later in Theology and liturgical tradition 1963, he furthers the discussion by presenting the Church as belonging to the age to come, but “dwelling” in this world. The mission of the Church is to witness of the coming Kingdom, the Eschaton, and as such the Church makes present the “otherness” of this world. This “otherness” can only be expressed as cult, using the forms and language of the cult, since there is a gap between “this world” and the world to come. This gap is

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252 Schmemann 1960, ‘The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church’.
254 The Little Entrance follows the first three antiphons. In the Early Church the three antiphons were stationary hymns intended to be sung on the way towards the Church. Cf. Taft 1997, Beyond East and West, pp. 210-215.
256 Schmemann 1960, ‘The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church’.
257 Schmemann 1961, ‘The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church’.
transcended through our entrance into the Kingdom, which abolishes the cult as such, because the border between this world and the world to come disappears. Without this journey or procession the Eucharist would be reduced to “cult” in the narrow sense as a means of Grace to be received by the individual. Therefore the witness of the Kingdom is a real witness from those participating in the Kingdom.258

At the end of his life Schmemann was working through the meaning of the liturgy by connecting the symbols present in the liturgy with eschatology arguing that the symbols make present the coming Kingdom. Schmemann argues in his article Symbols and Symbolism in the Byzantine Liturgy 1981, that in a number of Byzantine commentaries, the symbolical representations in the liturgy are understood as signifying something else. For example, the proskomedia, the preparation of the gifts prior to the liturgy, is interpreted as representing the birth of Christ. Another example is the Little Entrance, the introit of the Gospel, that represents the manifestation of Christ in the world, and a final example is the Great Entrance, the procession of the gifts to the altar, representing the burial of Christ and his triumphant entrance into Jerusalem.259

The problem, Schmemann continues, is that there are no references to these symbols or symbolical meanings in the liturgy itself. These interpretations are external to the lex orandi. Furthermore, because of this external relation to the lex orandi different epochs have provided different symbolical interpretations and there is an obvious discontinuity between these epochs. Schmemann compares the mystagogical commentaries, such as those by Maximos the Confessor in the seventh century which focus on the theological interpretation, with the elaborate and detailed interpretations of Symeon of Thessalonica in the fifteenth century, almost devoid of any theological meaning.260

This does not mean that the symbols have no meaning. On the contrary, Schmemann continues, there is a symbolism inherent in the lex orandi and that is the experience maintaining and preserving the fundamental Ordo of Byzantine worship, “eschatological symbolism”. The liturgy is not something external to those assembled to worship. Instead it involves them. Those gathered do not represent the angels as some commentaries propose, but through the ‘eschatological symbols’

258 Schmemann 1963, For the Life of the World..
they become aware that they have joined them in the unceasing glorification of God.\textsuperscript{261}

In \textit{The First Nicholas Zernov Memorial Lecture 1982} Schmemann substitutes the different symbolical interpretations for the different contemporary theologies and argues that there exist two general types of theologies in modernity. On the one hand we have those who make a radical affirmation of the world, letting the world set the agenda for the Church, with a theology that follows the discourse of the world. Schmemann provides two examples, Liberation Theology and Therapeutic Theology. The former needs no further explanation, but the second theology is described by Schmemann as an idea that the Church or synagogue is reduced to an institution that \textit{helps}. On the other hand we have those who make a radical denial of the world abandoning every attempt to find a common discourse between theology and the world, thereby establishing a spirituality of escape.\textsuperscript{262}

Schmemann proposes a third way, one which neither denies the world nor makes simplistic affirmations. Instead the third way must transcend this world and this is accomplished through the eschatological dimension of the Church. Christians, according to Schmemann, believe in the coming Kingdom, but through the Holy Spirit they already possess what they believe in. The coming Kingdom is already present and this enables them to witness about the joy of the Kingdom. This martyrria or witness carries with it a real transformation, a real passage into this world. Therefore Christians can neither escape nor surrender to the world, but instead they have to reveal the Kingdom through the remembrance, the \textit{anamnesis}, of the coming Kingdom.\textsuperscript{263}

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Fagerberg’s initial proposal that Schmemann is more interested in finding the \textit{ortho} (that which makes worship orthodox) than finding a certain ordo (a liturgical structure), seems to be related to principal contributions ascribed to Schmemann above. If by \textit{ortho} we refer to the meaning of worship, then Schmemann clearly emphasizes this, but at the same time he is eager to emphasize the importance of the elucidation of a reasonable service from the historically transmitted order of the

\textsuperscript{261} Schmemann 1981, ‘Symbols and Symbolism in the Byzantine Liturgy’.
\textsuperscript{262} Schmemann 1985, ‘Liturgy and Eschatology’.
\textsuperscript{263} Schmemann 1985, ‘Liturgy and Eschatology’.
liturgy. That elucidation has to begin, according to Schmemann, with the scientific methods available. The combination of a scientific study of the theology inherent in the historically transmitted sources, revealing the reasonable service as *ordo*, and from this explaining the meaning of service, the ortho, using the concept from Fagerberg, is something Schmemann has inherited from Kiprian Kern, in accordance with the findings of Job Getcha.\footnote{Getcha 2009, ‘From Master to Disciple’ pp. 253-254.} Therefore it is fairly reasonable to argue that Schmemann both employ the idea of an *ordo* as well as an *ortho*, but he never makes explicit the difference between them, and uses the concept *ordo* as implying both, though it seems that the idea of an *ortho* could be identified with Schmemann’s idea of a *synthesis*.\footnote{Schmemann [1966] 1975, *Introduction to Liturgical theology*, pp. 16-21.}

… after historical analysis there must come a theological synthesis … Historical liturgics establishes the structures and their development, liturgical theology discovers their meaning: such is the general methodological principle of the task. The significance of these basic structures is that only in them is there any full expression of the general design of worship, both as a whole, and taken in its separate elements. They fix the ‘liturgical coefficient’ of each element and point to its significance in the whole, giving to worship a consistent theological interpretation and freeing it from arbitrary symbolic interpretations.\footnote{Schmemann [1966] 1975, *Introduction to Liturgical theology*, pp. 17-18.}

B. LITURGICAL THEOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR EMANCIPATION.

At the St. Xavier symposium in 1966 Schmemann presented his view of *Freedom in the Church* with, as his point of departure, Khomiakov’s understanding of Christ as not exterior to the Church. He quotes Khomiakov:

> The Church is an authority—said Guizot in one of his remarkable works, while one of his adversaries, attacking him, simply repeated these words. Speaking in this way, neither one suspected how much untruth and blasphemy lay in the statement … No—the Church is not an authority, just as God is not an authority and Christ is not an authority, since authority is something external to us.\footnote{Schmemann 1966, ‘Freedom in the Church’, p. 124. The quotation is originally published in Schmemann 1965, *Ultimate Questions: An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought*, p. 50.}
Christ, Schmemann argues, in line with Khomiakov, is not exterior to us and since authority demands exteriority Christ is simply not an authority either. Instead, Schmemann continues, authority is the principle of the fallen world, where God has become exterior to us. Through the incarnation and the resurrection of Christ, and the coming of the Holy Spirit, God has become interior to us, and the principle of the fallen world has faded away. The Church is therefore not a combination of authority and freedom as some would argue, and we should not separate Church and freedom. If the Church were not in communion with God, Schmemann continues, it might be permissible to speak about freedom as external to the Church and authority would be the guiding principle of the Church.268 Given, however, that the Church is in communion with God the Church is therefore the very expression of freedom.

Through the vision and experience of the Holy Spirit we gain an understanding of freedom interior to the Church, where the externality of God is abolished and with it the cultic expressions understood as the separation between the Kingdom of God and our world. Schmemann contends that the vision of the Holy Spirit makes Christians aware of belonging to the Kingdom of God, and in this experience the human being as an object is transformed into a subject, but not from the outside as something external. The transformation comes from the inside effected by the fragrance and uniqueness of God, because freedom is free from the very outset.269

In order to explain this Schmemann uses the distinction between the essence of God, incomprehensible, and the energies of God, working on the human being from the inside. The one who has no spirit, Schmemann continues, know no truth and is condemned to replace it with authority and guarantee.270 This echoes Khomiakov’s claims that truth can have no external guarantee other than truth itself, coming from within. The victory of Christ in the Church is the victory of communion over alienation and externality, releasing the freedom of the human being.

When alienation and externality is abolished obedience becomes the fulfillment of freedom, because we are in possession of Christ, or more correctly, we are possessed by Christ but from within. Schmemann insists that it is Christ’s obedience fulfilled in us that perfects freedom; the perfection of life.271 Here truth becomes central to Schmemann and

268 Schmemann 1966, ‘Freedom in the Church’.
269 Schmemann 1966, ‘Freedom in the Church’.
270 Schmemann 1966, ‘Freedom in the Church’.
271 Schmemann 1966, ‘Freedom in the Church’.
in another article, *The Task of Orthodox Theology Today* 1966, he argues that the obedience is to the Truth and not to any external authority.\(^{272}\)

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In his major work *For the Life of the World* 1963, Schmemann points out that during the Great Entrance\(^{273}\) we remember the world: “May the Lord God remember in his Kingdom …”.\(^{274}\) Remembrance is an act of love and the Eucharist is the sacrament of cosmic remembrance. The foundation of the world rests on this remembrance since it is the remembrance of Christ, which is the all-embracing love of God. This love constitutes the Church as it is proclaimed in the Eucharist, according to Schmemann. Since we all partake of the same remembrance, we are all transformed and at the same time transforming all of creation. In this transformation there is no division between the clergy and the people. Instead the baptized are equally in possession of Christ; they all constitute the Church, each and everyone being the celebrant of the one and eternal Eucharist in the Kingdom of God.\(^{275}\)

The people of God, the Church, share the same experience, the presence of the eschatological dimension, and the common ascension through the liturgy towards the Kingdom. The daily mission of the Christian life is to be a witness to this experience. According to Schmemann, the sacraments are not powerful gifts of an external authority. The sacraments make present the eschatological dimension of the Kingdom. In this dimension the human being fulfils herself, embracing the joy of the Kingdom, opening up to the wholeness of divine creation, sharing with one another the *catholicity* of life.\(^{276}\)

Schmemann sees the sacraments as a passage or journey into the Kingdom, as participation in the eschatological dimension rather than the receiving of an external gift from God. What Schmemann wants to emphasize is the transformation of man through this procession to the Kingdom, from being an object in cultic categories to a real subject in full participation with the Kingdom of God. Schmemann points to the sacrament of penance as an example and argues that it is not to be

\(^{272}\) Schmemann 1966, *The Task of Orthodox Theology In America Today*.

\(^{273}\) The Great Entrance was originally the transfer of the prepared gifts of bread and wine to be used in the Eucharist, which were brought in a Great Procession from a different facility called Skeuophylacion. Cf. Taft 1978, *A History of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom. Volume II. The Great Entrance*.

\(^{274}\) Schmemann 1963 *For the Life of the World*.


\(^{276}\) Schmemann 1973, *For the Life of the World*, pp. 75-76.
understood as a sacred and juridical power given by God to the clergy but rather it should be understood in relation to the power of baptism living within the Church. Schmemann contends that in Christ all sins are forgiven but when we depart from Christ we need to return to Him and the absolution is the sign that this return has taken place and has been fulfilled in our baptism, in our belonging to Christ.277

The emancipation of the human being is central to Schmemann's theology. This emancipation is defined by freedom and love in accordance with the ideas of Khomiakov. Schmemann wants to liberate the Christian from being merely an object for the clergy, promoting instead the subjectification of man by emphasizing his full participation in the eschatological dimension through the Holy Spirit. Liturgical Theology upholds this emancipation by altering the perspective of the participants in the liturgy, from objects receiving Grace to subjects participating in the Kingdom.

C. Emancipation as Understanding

In order to understand how emancipation is realized in the Church we need to go back to the initial questions of Botte and Grisbrooke, the major question being: ‘who will make this subjectification possible?’ The second question follows: ‘how will it be possible?’

As we have seen above the foundation of this subjectification is the common experience of the Kingdom shared by all the baptized through the Eucharist and the sacraments. Freedom, as we also have observed in Schmemann's work, is not imposed from without, rather it evolves from within. Imposed from without, freedom is not given freely. Similarly emancipation or subjectification of the human being has to be understood from within the Church. Emancipation has to be interiorized and thus freely given. Here Schmemann makes a crucial point when he speaks about the liturgy in terms of an organic life, in the sense of an interior life. This means that participating in the liturgy as such is an interior participation, the theological calling within the Church.

This is why Schmemann speaks of liturgical teaching. If the teaching of the Church is rooted in the liturgy it is equally rooted in the experience of participating in the Kingdom of God, and as such it comes from within instead of being imposed from outside.

The beginning of all Christian work is always in teaching. And we must realize that we have no liturgical teaching, if by liturgical teaching one means precisely the consistent explanation of the liturgical language of the Church, the initiation of man into the mystery of the Church’s worship. Such teaching may have not been necessary as long as the Church and the world spoke the same language, i.e. referred themselves to the same values, had the same vision of the ultimate meaning of things, as long, in other terms, as the world, in spite of all its “worldliness,” was not secularistic. Today, however, such initiation is an absolute necessity, the very condition of any liturgical restoration or, rather, of the restoration of liturgy to its proper function and meaning in the Church. But the real liturgical teaching – and it is here that we approach the heart of the whole matter – is precisely the explanation of the liturgy in its connection to life, revelation of its “existential” power. As such, this liturgical teaching is almost diametrically opposed to the popular and extremely superficial “symbolical” interpretation of rites, interpretation which “fits” very well the secularistic mentality because it does not challenge, judge or question anything in it.278

Schmemann professes the liturgy to be the interior life of the Church, initiating us into the mystery of the Kingdom and thus manifesting itself as the language of the Church. Without it the vision of the Church and the entire Christian life would be incomprehensible. The object of liturgical teaching is to acquire the interior life of the Church, the language necessary to express the experience common to the people of God.279

For on the one hand, if it is secularism—i.e. the alienation of the way of life from the Church’s vision of life— that conditions our liturgical crisis, by depriving the liturgy from its relevance and, therefore, power, no translation, no restoration of the “right practices” will by themselves cure the disease. It is the language of the Church in the deep all-embracing, and not only linguistic, meaning of the word that man and society do not hear or understand, the language which includes the texts and the rites, the whole rhythm and the whole structure of worship. For man had adopted, without even knowing it, another way of looking at himself and at his life and this makes him truly blind and deaf to the liturgy which he dutifully attends. Yet, on the other hand, only liturgy can—and we have explained why—break through this all-pervading secularism, for it has always been the proper function of worship to communicate and to convey to man that vision which alone can instill in him the desire for change, the nostalgia for the ineffable glory of his vocation, that true repentance (metanoia—change of mind) which alone can judge, redeem and transform.280

278 Schmemann 1964, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America. II. The Liturgical Problem’.
It is through the language and experience of the liturgy, Schmemann argues, that we once again can embrace the Church's vision of life. This vision entails more than merely being knowledgeable. It is a way of living that fuses our entire life to the liturgical experience. What Schmemann is trying to articulate is the idea that the liturgical experience instills a kind of ethos which goes beyond a detailed order or framework. A liturgical ethos conveys a vision for life which leads to repentance, enhancing the ability to change and to be transformed. The liturgy is therefore not an isolated space in time where one can escape the world, it is in and for the world as a transformation emerging from within the world, but nevertheless belonging to the otherness of this world. The striving to develop a liturgical ethos comes close to what Fagerberg argues for in the concept of ortho.

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An ortho, however, is dependent upon an ordo. In order to share the liturgical experience that experience has to be externalized. Experience has to be transformed into existence; has to materialize. The materialization of the liturgical experience is channeled through symbols, what Schmemann calls “eschatological symbolism”, which in turn constitutes the Byzantine Ordo. Botte and Grisbrooke are not concerned with externalization, rather they wish to know how to internalize the Ordo in the human being, a crucial issue which Schmemann addresses.

For Schmemann the internalization of the Ordo occurs through understanding, but it is an understanding rooted in the liturgical experience. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that understanding comes through participation, which is why Schmemann does not make a distinction between the faith of the Church and the experience of the Church, or a distinction between an external and an internal interpretation. This in turn leads to a second conclusion, that reform cannot be a question of authority since authority, in Schmemann's thinking, is inevitably external. Instead it has to be through sharing in the community of the Church. This means therefore that reform cannot

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be instigated from without, but must evolve from within, through reciprocal understanding in the same way that we share a language. Such an understanding requires that the whole Church be considered the subject of reformation as opposed to only an enlightened elite.284

D. SHIFTING FROM PRIVATE PIETY TO COMMON PARTICIPATION IN THE KINGDOM

From the beginning the Eschatology of Schmemann was tuned down and instead spirituality was much more tuned up. Consequently, according to Vassa Larin, this is why Schmemann was able to offer a proper apologia for monasticism in one of his earliest works The Historical Road of Orthodoxy.285 In this work, the ascetic life is seen as a struggle against the evil that still reigns in the world. It is a struggle in solitude, even though Schmemann stresses the fact that the ascetics still convened on the Lord’s Day. As Larin points out, however, it is a solitary and ascetical preparation for the Holy Communion, distinct from Schmemann’s later thinking.286

When Schmemann eventually begins to focus more on eschatology he levels critique against a private piety that is based on the struggle against evil. We find instead that his works, from his doctoral dissertation in 1959 onwards, focus on the idea of the Church illuminating the world with the fullness of the coming Kingdom. From this perspective there is hardly any place for struggle, according to Larin.287 It seems to me that the real reason for this shift is the change in his position on mission. In the beginning Schmemann understood the mission of the Church to be the struggle against evil. Later in life, he began to understand mission in terms of illumination instead of struggle, shifting from the power of the saints to the power of the Church as reflecting the light of the Kingdom.288

The mission of the Church, as expressed in Schmemann’s later works, consists in spreading of the fullness of the Kingdom, the eschaton, as a theological calling from within the Church. It begins as a secret from within but extends beyond the borders of the Church and in the end the

fullness will be revealed to all. As a ‘dwelling place’ for the Kingdom the Church appears as the otherness of this world. Schmemann also sees this as the true meaning of monasticism. The monk or nun personifies the eschatological nature of the Church, impossible to reduce to anything in this world, thereby revealing its otherness. At the same time Schmemann is eager to emphasize that this otherness can easily slip into escapism. In his daily journals Schmemann later identifies this escapism with a shallow monasticism with an outward appearance of being something different, by wearing the monastic habit, or by living in the solitude of a monastery, or even living in the past as if it were the present.

Instead Schmemann understands this otherness as coming from within, a different tonality so to speak, connecting Freedom and Love with the Kingdom, rather than being based on outward appearances. Shifting from the power of the saints to the power of the Church has the evolutionary effect of shifting from private piety to exercising communication from within the Church in constant relation to those sharing the experience of the leitourgia. Even though Schmemann does not really make this assumption explicit this is probably the main reason why he becomes skeptical of many forms of monastic life with a liturgical piety devoid of any communication.

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It is the falsified otherness which I perceive as one of the main problems for Schmemann. It comes in different forms, either as a kind of ethnic club, where the Church preserves an ethnicity different from that of the surrounding world, or a spirituality which contradicts the surrounding culture by its outward appearance, or a monasticism denying the world its true existence, escaping to a different time, with clothes and artifacts taken from another era in history. For Schmemann, escapism is a struggle against the world, while true otherness is a struggle with the world, illuminating the world. The idea of escaping the world has, according to Schmemann, exerted a strong influence on orthodoxy, in many ways connected with asceticism and monasticism, where individual piety can evolve even as an escape from the community of the Church, where

290 Schmemann 1977, The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy, pp. 78-79.
solitude is a goal in itself, despite even being disconnected from the Church.\textsuperscript{291} This falsified otherness, presented by Schmemann, seems to be an otherness exempt from communication, instead being sacrificial to its character.

The other main problem is the development of a secularized eschatology, which, according to Schmemann, means an absolute belief in “history, “justice” and “freedom” as being fulfilled by distinguishing between this world and the world to come. That is to say, that by fulfilling our duties in this world to justice and freedom we will be rewarded in the coming Kingdom. This implies a Kingdom developed through the victories of justice and freedom, but progressively deprived of its King. By abandoning the essential world-view of the Church, that of the coming Kingdom, the western Church, according to Schmemann, created a well defined universe with a fixed and closed horizon, with immovable and absolute norms, and with stability and order, assigning humanity the power to uphold its “secular” and “religious” obligations without transgressing the borders between them.\textsuperscript{292}

Here the critique of Schmemann does not mean the exempt of language, but that the language of the Church must follow the discourse and pattern of the world in order to be real. Schmemann emphasizes the importance of the Church as belonging to the coming Kingdom, even while dwelling in this world. This also affects the language and symbols inherent in the experience of the Church. The Church possesses a new language with new symbols vivified through the \textit{leitourgia}.

In both the falsified otherness as well as a secularized eschatology there is a loss of a shared eschatological language to connect the people of God to the Kingdom. A falsified otherness deprives us of the illumination that the divine language offers. The secularized eschatology is yet another language alien to the Church. Struggling against the world implies rupture with the world. Struggling with the world, on the other hand, implies a relation to the world as God intended it.

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Orthodoxy should be able to counteract these major problems, but theology, Schmemann continues, is in a state of crisis in the Orthodox Church. Theology is no longer the conscience or consciousness of

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\item[\textsuperscript{292}] Schmemann 1979, \textit{Church, World, Mission}, pp. 60-63.
\end{itemize}
the Church, but has instead become alienated from the Church. It has become an intellectual abstraction failing to relate to the life of the Church. Moreover, Schmemann contends dolefully, professional theologians seem to be reconciled to this status, constituting a kind of lumpen proletariat. In Schmemann’s opinion, theology has become the rejection of faith as experience, and as such it has been reduced to philosophy. What Schmemann appears to be arguing for is the understanding that philosophy is not a living language connected to the life of the Church, but an abstraction of ecclesial life disconnected from the living experience of the leitourgia.

In order to overcome this crisis Schmemann proposes that we regain the understanding that the lex credendi of the Church is revealed in the life of the Church and not through an abstraction of theology. We need to resume eschaton as the ultimate goal of the Church and our lives. Schmemann echoes the words of Florovsky concerning orthodoxy’s being subjected to a western ‘captivity’. The West has been occupied with building an objective and scientific theology within the borders of this universe, bound by the immovable and absolute norms of the universe, identifying theology with ‘propositions’ instead of experience.

Theology, Schmemann posits, concerns the finding of words adequate to the experience of the Church, and since eschatology is the fundamental experience of the Church the proper understanding of theology comes down to the relation between this world and the coming Kingdom, revealing the nature of their relation. In this search for its relational nature, language is fundamental, connecting this world with the otherness of the Kingdom. Language reveals to us that this world does not stand alone, but stands in relation to the coming Kingdom and is fulfilled by it, but from within the world and not imposed from without.

This relational understanding of the world and eschatology transforms liturgical teaching from the ‘master and disciple’ paradigm, with its dependence on authority, into a paradigm of ‘freedom and love’, dependent instead on the identity of those sharing the experience of the Kingdom. This sharing takes place through the mutual commitment and reflective understanding between those constituting the Church in the liturgy. Schmemann declares that one cannot simply use the Fathers

and the Mothers of the Church as “authorities”, grounding theology on their propositions. The ultimate foundation for theology does not lie in propositions, but the experience of the Church, which we share with those same Mothers and Fathers.297 This experience is impossible without concepts and words adequate to this experience, that is to say, a language exposed in the leitourgia. The experience of the Church begins with the proclamation and communication of the eschaton as the soteriological content of the Church. Our understanding of mission depends on this. Furthermore, the mission comes from within the Church, which is seen as the presence of the coming Kingdom in this world. Eschaton constitutes the fundamental tonality of the Church; it is the source and the content of the Christian experience and the total experience of the Church.298

According to Schmemann, the Gospel reveals the language of the Church foremost as the expression of Great Joy. It is a joy that draws Christians to itself, that they may embrace it, instilling gratitude in their lives. However it is not a haphazard kind of joy, but rather, in a profound way it is the joy of the Kingdom. As such it is a joy that cannot be defined according to any theological definition. Instead Schmemann credits this deep joy as being the solid foundation whereby Christians are defined.299 Schmemann develops his argument by questioning any definition of the Church which turns the Church into an object, pointing out that the Fathers of the Church did not make an explicit definition of the Church since no definition can adequately capture the essential mystery of the Church as the experience of the Kingdom of God. The Church is the epiphany of the Kingdom in this world, and as such it is not a proposition but a living reality conducted as a kind of language. Schmemann asserts that on the one hand the Church is sent to the world as on a pilgrimage through it, in statu viae, but as such it reveals not only the coming Kingdom but also the very meaning of this world. On the other hand the Church participates in the Ascension of Christ, bringing with it the whole of creation, to the place where she belongs, in statu patriae.300

The Eucharistic celebration is not something performed by the clergy for the benefit of the laity who “attend”. Rather it is the ascension of the

Church to the place where she belongs in statu patriae. It is also her subsequent return to this world: her return with power to preach the Kingdom of God in the way that it is preached by Christ himself.301

In Schmemann’s view the fundamental insight of eschatology as the experience of the Church transforms the understanding of theology and the duty of the theologian. An able theologian must master the intellectual discipline of a scholar and be genuinely rational in this endeavor but this, in itself, is insufficient if he or she wants to be a theologian of the Church. A theologian of the Church also has to learn how to immerse himself in the joy of the Kingdom, to rediscover the language of the Church, the treasure hidden from the world but revealed through the leitourgia.302 Immersing oneself in the joy of the Kingdom suggests an internalization of an external experience. This external experience is given and received in the leitourgia, according to Schmemann. This external experience is internalized through the language it produces which in itself testifies to the same experience.

From the arguments above we can conclude that Schmemann makes several shifts. The first shift is from private piety to a community sharing in the Kingdom. When shifting from a private piety to a communal understanding of the Kingdom there is also a shift from mere existence to a shared experience, which in turn is a shift from definitions to a language appropriate to this experience. In Schmemann’s work we can discern a pattern of transformation from an existing spiritual struggle against evil to a living community embraced by the Kingdom, sharing a common liturgical language.

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In order to preserve this experience the liturgy is conducted according to an ordo, according to definite regulations of an order or rite, the so-called ‘rubrics’. In the Byzantine tradition these regulations are preserved in the Typikon and other books of rites. Schmemann enumerates two misunderstandings in relation to the Ordo. One belongs to those who claim that everything printed in the Typikon or in any ‘rubric’ is an immutable law to be followed according to its letter.303

For such people everything that has at any time or for any chance reason fallen into our liturgical books constitutes, by this fact alone, an unchangeable part of the Tradition, and must be preserved at all costs. The question of a review of the Ordo or of the immense amount of liturgical material contained in the Monthly Service Book (Menaion) and the Oktoichos is denounced as heresy and modernism by the partisans of this view.304

In Schmemann’s view such an approach results in an ordo which is impossible conduct in full, which is subsequently reduced arbitrary, on account of such factors as taste or local traditions. According to the adherents of this view, one should read or chant as much of the Ordo as possible, but this has the devolutionary effect of a loss of intelligibility in relation to the service.

The second misunderstanding concerns those who are more or less indifferent to the Ordo or the structure of worship. Even though they do not deny it in principle the only thing that remains of the Ordo is a kind of background allowing the simplicity of the popular moments of the service to stand out, but once again loosing their connection with the reasonable order of the service.305

In order to avoid these two misunderstandings we must find the Ordo behind the ‘rubrics’, according to Schmemann. We must discern the general philosophy beyond the temporary and local, and find the logos of worship, the essential principle behind the liturgy. According to Schmemann, this search is founded on the premise that the written Ordo does not determine the lex orandi, but reflects the actual adaptation through time and space of this law. This means that the Ordo presupposes this law preserved through different ‘rubrics’ and structures.306 The Ordo functions like a grammar helping us to communicate and to be in communion with the perennial Catholic Church.

Schmemann believes that in order to attain a correct reading of Tradition we need to rediscover lex orandi as the fundamental criterion of theology. This implies that the different disciplines of theology are authenticated by the leitourgia, which is both the Ordo and the movement of the liturgy, i.e. the liturgical experience. The central theme in this experience is the eschatological experience of the coming Kingdom. In order to unfold this experience, however, we need to overcome on the one hand the western fixation with particular themes

at the expense of the whole, and on the other hand with the fixation on a reduction of liturgiology to history, devoid of relevance for theology.\footnote{Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’, pp. 95-100.}

On this point Schmemann once again talks about a living experience, one not delineated by definitions but rather one revealed though language with concepts corresponding to the experience of the Church. Although Schmemann is certainly aware of the fundamental importance of language, he seems to lack a robust theoretical foundation with which to explore how language reveals the experience of the leitourgia. Instead Schmemann chooses a different strategy in pursuit of a correct reading of Tradition.

Schmemann’s first course of action is to clear up the misunderstanding of the beauty of liturgy as merely accidental and not essential. Beauty reveals the fundamental theme of the liturgy and of our entrance into the Kingdom. The second step Schmemann takes is to convert the liturgiologist into a theologian again by rediscovering the lex credendi in the lex orandi. Schmemann believes that by connecting beauty with the order of the liturgy, and history with the theological meaning of the rite, we acquire an understanding of theology that stems from the liturgical experience. Theology in this sense is not autonomous or self-sufficient; instead it is born of, and authenticated by, the leitourgia, as the ultimate term of reference, which is accomplished through language.\footnote{Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’, pp. 98-100.}

This has the evolutionary consequence of liberating the Church as well as the participants as they are transformed into subjects enumerating the Church.
3. The Ambiguity of Liturgical Theology

On this note we may suspend rather than terminate our analysis of the problem of the Ordo. The view presented here of the theological problem of the Ordo and its development can find its application and 'justification' only in a liturgical theology in the true meaning of this term, i.e., in a theological apprehension of worship itself.\textsuperscript{309}

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Alexander Schmemann, The very end of \textit{Introduction to Liturgical Theology}, 1959
\end{flushright}

Liturgical Theology evolves in the second half of the twentieth century as an ecumenical theology present in almost every denomination. In this chapter I will look more closely at how the dichotomy between theory and practice has been perceived by prominent scholars of Liturgical Theology. I will begin with a more critical analysis (A) of Liturgical Theology in Schmemann's work arguing that there is an ambiguity between finding an eternal \textit{ordo} and his persistence on truth as pertaining to the release of the participants. Then I will conduct an analysis (B) of the scholarly work of Gordon Lathrop where I argue that he solves Schmemann's ambiguity but ends up with another problem: that of deviating from what could be regarded as Liturgical Theology. Thereafter I continue (C) by looking at the liturgical perspective of Robert F. Taft who refrains from identifying an eternal Ordo, but also from developing an emancipatory perspective. Subsequently I will analyze (D) one of Aidan Kavanagh's works, \textit{On Liturgical Theology}, where he combines the scholarly work of Taft with the Schmemann's emancipatory outlook. Finally, I will conduct a comparative analysis of these perspectives (E) arguing that there is a double ambiguity in the paradigm of Liturgical Theology.

A. The Theological Calling from within the Church

The theological calling from within the Church reveals the emancipatory perspective of Schmemann's work, a perspective that questions the perception of Christ as an external authority, arguing instead that truth resides within the Church, as revealed in the Church assembled for the liturgy, the \textit{ecclesia}. This makes the liturgical experience the

most important “datum” of theology, whatever the particulars of the theological discipline in question. The liturgical experience, according to Schmemann, is the totality of the Church’s leitourgia which is the loci of the Church where the Church becomes what she is. The experience of the Church is given and received in the leitourgia making it the source of ecclesiology. In the leitourgia the Church is informed of her cosmic and eschatological vocation but also receives the power to fulfill the vision. Theology in this sense is always an invitation “to taste and see” and not merely a reflection upon experience, but rather theology is experience in itself. Theological scrutiny and investigation, Schmemann argues, has to be grounded in this experience and therefore theological investigation is description more than definition.\(^{310}\)

The leitourgia necessarily involves every member of the ecclesia since they are all connected to each other, inter-acting with one another, constituting the Church by sharing the experience of being Church. This makes all of the participants indelibly bound to each other so that everyone is significant. The authority of the Church is therefore not an external authority – outside this community – but it comes from within by sharing the language necessary for the realization of the Church. The Church becomes what she is through the subjectification of those assembled in the leitourgia. It is through their prayers that the Church is manifested in the world, revealing the coming Kingdom. This makes the leitourgia a primary disclosure.

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According to Schmemann, the perspective of theology as being revealed within the life of the Church and emancipating the people from an external authority contrasts with the western perspective, where theology becomes detached from experience, and faith is identified with propositions instead of descriptions. The foundation of theology in the West, Schmemann argues, is the establishment of clear and objective definitions, aimed at constructing an objective and scientific theology, which brings about an external authority independent of those constituting the Church in the leitourgia. Schmemann identifies the evolutionary consequence of this “scientific” organization of theology as the progressive atomization of theology into “a number of uncoordinated and independent ‘disciplines’” while still lacking the ability to establish

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methods and criteria for the integration of these disciplines into a living expression of the Church's faith itself. Even more alarming, according to Schmemann, is the reduction of the liturgy to cult, which is the most striking effect of the new coefficient of theology, obstructing the potential for a living communication between liturgy and theology.\footnote{Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’.}

This does not mean that theology should not be an object of scientific evaluation. On the contrary, Schmemann argues, this is precisely what is needed in the aftermath of this new coefficient of theology albeit with a new appreciation of the lex orandi, which establishes a liturgical critique of theology. Theology therefore is eligible as an object for research and study, as is the case with the liturgy, in trying to understand the connection between liturgy and theology, which was foundational for the early Church. Schmemann contends that, in this striving to overcome the divorce between liturgy and theology it is necessary on the one hand to undo the western obsession with particular themes, trying instead to establish methods for the integration with the experience of the Church. On the other hand it is necessary to overcome the dead-ends of “historicism” and instead focus on the restoration of the liturgical dimension of theology where the liturgy is understood as theology in motion.\footnote{Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’, pp. 99-100.} Even though theology has to begin with the scholarly achievement of restoring theology to its proper place, it has to settle in the experience of the Church. In a lecture given in 1970\footnote{Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’, p. 98.} Schmemann states that while the classroom is the beginning, a theologian who wishes to be in service of the Church ends up by immersing himself in the joy of the Church. This makes the perspective of theory and practice reversed. Instead of a theory that creates a practice Schmemann argues for a theory that is a reflection on the primary disclosure in the leitourgia, which is a result of the practice of the Church.

Since objectification is a progressive atomization, according to Schmemann, the emancipatory outlook must involve the reintegration of the all embracing vision of the Church, the complete reconciliation of theology, liturgy and piety, which finds its locus in the leitourgia. All disciplines of theology therefore need to be grounded in the leitourgia. Here there is no master and disciple, only a sharing community living in and through the leitourgia as one experience common to all. The evolutionary effect of this complete emphasis on the common experience

\footnotesize{311 Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’.}
\footnotesize{312 Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’, pp. 99-100.}
\footnotesize{313 Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’, p. 98.}
of the *leitourgia*, is the organic development of the liturgy coming from within. Consequently, Schmemann was very conservative when it came to any alteration of the liturgy.\(^\text{314}\)

This affects his understanding of the Ordo, which he perceives as originating from a diachronic understanding of the liturgy, synchronically received by those assembled in the *leitourgia*. This means that the Ordo has to be understood in light of its historical development integrated with the liturgical practice revealing the meaning of the Ordo. Liturgical teaching thus implies the uncovering of the historical background of the Ordo, not as a kind of “historicism”, but rather as understood from within the *leitourgia* by those constituting the Church synchronically.\(^\text{315}\)

This, I believe, created a misunderstanding in the dialogue between Schmemann, Botte and Grisbrooke. The latter two did not appreciate or understand the idea of theology finding its fulfillment in the *leitourgia*, albeit dependent on the historical evolution, a paradigm whereby the theologian immerses himself in the joy of the Church thereby making history into present reality.

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A closer look at the all embracing vision of Schmemann’s work reveals that the vision entails more than understanding; it entails a complete transformation of man in relation to the world and as such it discloses the life of the Church.\(^\text{316}\)

\[\text{The totality of the Church’s *leitourgia*, an all embracing vision of life, a power meant to judge, inform and transform the whole of existence, a “philosophy of life” shaping and challenging all our ideas, attitudes and actions.}\(^\text{317}\)

The totality of the Church’s *leitourgia* transforms all of existence, according to Schmemann.\(^\text{318}\) On the one hand Liturgical Theology begins with historical study but the history of worship is not an end in itself; after an historical analysis there has to be a theological synthesis aimed at revealing the meaning of worship. As such the explanation of worship is the search for words adequate to the faith and experience

\(^{318}\) Schmemann 1972, ‘Liturgy and Theology’.
of the Church. On the other side Liturgical Theology, in its aim of providing an appropriate description of the experience of the Church, reveals the mystery and gift of freedom. Captivated by this gift the Christian anticipates the fulfillment of freedom in the coming Kingdom, an anticipation stemming from the relation between the Holy Spirit and the Church, thereby making the authority of God interior instead of exterior, manifesting man as a subject in relation to God.

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Now we are ready to analyze the really interesting question of how Schmemann understands the relationship between theory and practice. There is a fundamental, recurring dichotomy in Schmemann’s work. One aspect involves the relationship between faith and liturgy. Faith, Schmemann argues in his response to Grisbrooke, cannot be reduced to liturgy, but neither can it be separated from liturgy since liturgy authenticates and reveals the faith of the Church. Another dichotomy involves the Ordo and the movement in the liturgy through language and rite. Service, Schmemann claims, is conducted according to Ordo, meaning that language and rite are shaped by the Ordo. At the same time the Ordo is authenticated by an already presupposed praxis.

In the first case it seems that faith acts as a kind of theory shaping praxis but is equally determined by the liturgical experience. In the second case we have a structure that shapes the language and the rite of the liturgy but with a structure which, in itself is authenticated by the liturgical experience, revealing the lex orandi of the Church. Experience is thus clearly foundational for Schmemann and Liturgical Theology revolves around the search for concepts adequate to this experience. This means that there is a reversed perspective in Schmemann’s work, in the sense of reversing the order of thinking and letting the theory emanate from praxis rather than the other way around. At the same time there is a dialectical relation between theory and practice but the real question is what this dialectical relationship implies in the overall curriculum of the Church.

The first observation to be made is Schmemann’s insistence that faith is more than theory. Since Christ is not exterior to us he is not an authority. Instead we find that Christ, according to Schmemann, is

320 Schmemann 1966 ‘Freedom in the Church’.
revealed to us through the experience of the Church. This experience consists both of the written Ordo as well as the movement of the liturgy. Schmemann conceptualizes the reciprocal experience of being Church by regarding the Assembly as *leitourgia*, that is, as the combined result of both the Ordo as well as the movement in the liturgy. As such the *leitourgia* is the expression of the dialectical relation between theory and practice, where theory and practice are both encapsulated in the liturgical and ecclesial experience.

This has the evolutionary consequence of making the *leitourgia* the source of theology while ensuring that theology can never depart from the *leitourgia* as its ultimate criterion. Theology, according to Schmemann, has to be immersed in the joy of the Kingdom, reflecting the experience of the *leitourgia*, and must avoid evolving into an abstraction. This in turn makes theological theories relational or reflexive in such that they need to be in constant relation with the experience of the Church. Therefore theology never leaves praxis but instead remains connected to the *leitourgia*. This makes faith relational instead of propositional. Definitions or propositions are external to the Church, claiming an authority over the Church. Faith is not exterior or authoritative but interior, born of a reciprocal recognition from within the Church as the Body of Christ.

The second observation is perhaps even more interesting. If theory and practice constitutes a dichotomy, then Schmemann believes that it is possible to overcome this separation by connecting theory and practice to the experience of the Church. The most striking proof of this is Schmemann's persistent effort to reconcile, at least in theory, *liturgy, theology* and *piety*. He even believes that the separation between them is a deviation from Orthodox tradition. The reconciliation is possible by making the *leitourgia* the ultimate reference for piety and theology as well as liturgy, where liturgy is the realization of the *leitourgia*.

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As we continue on our path in understanding the relation between theory and practice we have to reflect on the disclosure of the *leitourgia*. Disclosure is more than understanding. In Schmemann's work disclosure implies a holistic and all embracing situation where man is relieved of all those circumstances that imply the reduction of freedom. Understanding does not necessarily entail any practical implication, but
Schmemann presumes that when the Church is informed of her cosmic and eschatological vocation she simultaneously receives the power to fulfill it and thus immediately becomes what she is, a realm of Grace, of communion with God, of new knowledge and new life. Disclosure is not just a theoretical outline that helps us to understand but also the potential realization of what is disclosed where emancipation is the primary potentiality.

The Church is informed of her cosmical and eschatological vocation, receives the power to fulfill it and thus truly becomes “what she is”: the sacrament, in Christ, of the new creation; the sacrament, in Christ, of the Kingdom … in the all-embracing sense of always making the Church what she is, a realm of Grace, of communion with God, of new knowledge and new life.

This in turn has an evolutionary consequence for how we interpret the dialectical relation between theory and practice. It seems that understanding necessarily implies emancipation if it is successful, which means that the vision of the Kingdom is both cognitive and practical, but both reside in the perception of experience as a kind of disclosure, and therefore it is hard to separate them in Schmemann’s work. It means that the reflection on disclosure, the theory, is hard to distinguish from practice. This in turn makes the interpretation internal, dependent on those participating in the disclosure. On the one hand interpretation and understanding is the practice of freedom and emancipation. On the other hand those interpreting and making use of their freedom interpret something already predetermined, identified as Ordo, without virtually any possibility for alteration, or even for different interpretation.

Now we reach the crucial point. Through his understanding of the liturgy as a language shared by those participating in the leitourgia no one from outside can deduce a new language or a new Ordo without making it incomprehensible. Instead Schmemann argues eagerly that “[t]he worship of the Orthodox Church is conducted according to Ordo, that is, according to definite regulations, according to an order or rite established once and for all.” At the same time this reduces the freedom of the participants, objectifying them with an Ordo, established once and for all. This is the ambiguity of Schmemann’s work; an Ordo intended to safeguard the identity of the Church, but at the same time concealing the freedom of the participants. In the end we find that there is an ambiguity

between identity and freedom, one that has to be resolved in order to fulfill the paradigm of Liturgical Theology.

B. THE ORDO LOCALIZED

Gordon Lathrop, a Lutheran scholar, makes a differentiation between primary liturgical theology, which is what the actual experience of worship says about God, and secondary liturgical theology, which is the reflection on what liturgy says, and finally pastoral liturgical theology as the continuing reform in order to once again make the liturgy into a life-giving source.323 Liturgical Theology as such is the general idea that the liturgy is consonant with the faith of the Church, and Lathrop makes the connection with Irenaeus of the second century who claims that “our judgment is consonant with the Eucharist, and, in turn, the Eucharist establishes our judgment.”324

The assembly is the most basic symbol of the Church where people are gathered in order to be the Church, ekklesia.325 The assembly involves people longing to be a genuine community, Lathrop argues.326 At the heart of the assembly, Lathrop continues, we find the Word of God. Through the Biblical Word the assembly was able to mirror themselves and to interpret their own meetings, and the practice of reading and interpreting the Scriptures became central to the early assembly.327 The meaning of the assembly is declared to the whole beloved earth, according to Lathrop, which instills a whole network of assemblies united through the same declaration.328

The whole assembly, therefore, gathers each local place into its meaning. Coming into the assembly is not about going away to distant Jerusalem, nor to a distant God. The meaning of the assembly is declared to the whole beloved earth by local gatherings of those who are both local citizens and sojourners … The network of assemblies is beginning to hold the whole earth before God, as if the earth itself were Jerusalem, the place of assembly to hear the life-giving Word.329

325 Lathrop 1999, Holy People, p. 32.
326 Lathrop 1999, Holy People, p. 28.
328 Lathrop 1999, Holy People, pp. 52-53.
The *ekklesia* or the Assembly of God, according to Lathrop, is the assembly of Isaiah 25 and therefore an anticipation of the coming Kingdom. Because of this anticipation the assembly is always local but never merely local.\(^{330}\) The anticipated local assembly is foundational to Lathrop’s ecclesiology, and in order to safeguard the identity of this assembly he stipulates seven basic criteria for this identification. First of all the assembly needs to meet regularly; secondly their meetings are a matter of life and death; the assembly has to be marked by participation; the gathering should have a cherished centre or heart in which the community participates; leadership should be focused on serving the participation of the assembly; further more the assembly should have an open door to the outer world, a boundary permeable to the outside; and finally the assembly should have lines of meaning that re-describe and re-imagine the world.\(^{331}\)

These criteria are apparently not factual but rather values that ought to be there in a relevant and morally consistent assembly. The orientation towards values reappears in the way Lathrop understands the Ordo. Lathrop describes “the great outline of the *ordo*” as a passage from an initial remembrance of the baptism that joins the assembly, to a common singing of the assembly, and then to an opening greeting joining us to the Triune God, to the opening of the communal book, to sharing the communal meal, and then ending in a common dismissal. After establishing the great outline of the Ordo from an historical point of view Lathrop adds an evaluation of the assembly, insisting on a number of moral standards for a good assembly. The community needs to treasure the persons making up the assembly by honoring their individuality but joined in their common work. The one who presides should not preside for his own sake but for the honor of the assembly. The assisting ministers should have the responsibility of connecting the assembly to the world and of not allowing the assembly to exist for its own sake. Further more the *ekklesia*, or the anticipated assembly, should be the interpreting key to understanding the inter-action between text and action.\(^{332}\)

\(^{330}\) Lathrop 1999, *Holy People*, pp. 34, 64.


The juxtaposition of the historical Ordo and the moral Ordo is one of several juxtapositions, consciously or unconsciously undertaken in the works of Lathrop. Another juxtaposition is that between the central elements of the Ordo, essential to Christian worship, and local traditions creating a great diversity of catholic assemblies. The central elements are those things that unite us, Lathrop continues, “the deep pattern we share”, but these things are localized when the liturgy places the local event of the assembly around the word and sacrament, thereby establishing a dialogue between the local wisdom and the essential Ordo. 333

The ongoing localization of the liturgy places the local event of assembly around word and sacrament in dialogue with this local wisdom. It sets the politics of Baptism in dialogue with local politics, the story of the scriptural Word, its judgment and its forgiveness, in dialogue with local economy. The liturgy must do this of course, in order to be locally understood.334

In his book Holy People Lathrop fully develops the method of juxtaposition. The Ordo in itself, according to Lathrop, is a remnant of a juxtaposition of the biblical Word and a human history of meetings. The method begins in history helping us to acquire a necessary distance from our cultural point in time and its influence. Thereafter we have to realize that the structure of the assembly belongs first of all to the structure of this sinful world and only secondly to the structure of Grace. Therefore the assembly must take responsibility for the sake of the world, opening up to the world and allowing the Ordo to be localized.335 What Lathrop argues for is a responsibility to act and not only an idealized assembly, feeding from an eschatology that runs away from its responsibility in the world, one that waits for its completion. This critique is leveled against an idealized ecclesiology, which Schmemann could be said to espouse, one that elaborates on an ideal without proper consideration for the reality of a fallen world.

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The idea of juxtaposition creates both a diachronic as well as a synchronic ordo and this makes it possible for Lathrop to be fully open towards accepting the different denominational traditions as a localization of

335 Lathrop 1999, Holy People, pp. 47-54.
the central ordo.336 This is very different from Schmemann’s perspective. Even though he shares an interest in discerning central elements, “[t]o find the Ordo behind the ‘rubrics’, regulations and rules—to find the unchanging principle, the living norm or ‘logos’ of worship as a whole, within what is accidental and temporary”, he nevertheless denies the possibility of separating the ordo from its local setting.337 Instead Schmemann understands the ordo behind the rubrics as a grammar for understanding the lex orandi.338 Therefore Schmemann would not participate in a process of establishing an ecumenical ordo such as the Ditchingham Ordo.339

Lathrop seems to suggest that the central elements of the Ordo could be separated from its local settings. This means that Lathrop is able to deduce a theory from practice and then relate it to another context, creating a new practice. On the one hand the separation between the local praxis and the central elements of the Ordo avoids Schmemann’s dilemma being unable to separate practice from theory, and can thus only be understood from within like a language. On the other hand, even though there are similarities to a liturgical theology it is nevertheless a theology from liturgy, if we follow the standard set by Fagerberg. This carries with it the understanding of the Ordo as in some sense imposed from without by an elite of scholars. It would be similar to arguing that there is an eternal grammar applicable to every language. Lathrop has not produced any real evidence that suggests the existence of such an eternal Ordo, neither has Schmemann. Instead it seems that they both have a personal agenda. In the case of Schmemann it is the emancipation of the people in a clericalized Church, and in the case of Lathrop it is the ecumenical agenda of forging a post-Reformational Tradition, thereby uniting the different denominations of the West.

Schmemann’s idea is to create a Tradition that is decentralized in the sense of releasing the people of God as objects of a clerical elite. The problem here is that his perception of the liturgy is similar to a language, which means that it evolves internally, but at the same time he emphasises an Ordo that is given once and for all, which makes the language of the liturgy dependent on an Ordo that diminishes the synchronic perspective of the liturgy and the responsibility to act. This

339 The Ditchingham Ordo was a result of the WCC’s exploration of the possibility of a common Ordo. Lathrop was active in the compilation of the Ditchingham Ordo.
has the evolutionary effect of reducing the people of God as subjects and instead relegating them to the role of objects of a de-personalized tradition.

Lathrop’s idea, the creation of an Ecumenical Ordo, implies the separation between the once and for all given Ordo and the local settings so that we can step back from the temporary conditions of a sinful disarray and move towards a unifying vision of the Church. The problem here is different from that of Schmemann. Lathrop acquires a vision of unity, but it is an arbitrary vision dependent on an Ordo that could function in relation to a multitude of confessions but not in relation to each and to every one, and it is hard or maybe even impossible to prove this Ordo. On what grounds could we objectively state the facts of the Ordo? Is it a deduction of the Early Church, and if so how does it square with the fact that the Ordo varies from tradition to tradition? Is it a deduction from one particular place and one particular time, and if so, what about the others? In the end it seems that Lathrop’s theory insists on an enlightened elite making this deduction not only historically but also as a kind of personal responsibility, also establishing the moral Ordo alongside the historical Ordo, but either with the loss of the emancipation of the populace or with a loss of a truly ecumenical and catholic Ordo in order to empower the local assembly to make an arbitrary choice.

C. A Genetic Vision of the Present

Another perspective is that of an ascetic academic: Robert F. Taft shares, with Schmemann, the basic assumption of trying to understand the present based on the historical development of the liturgy we use today. Liturgy, according to Taft, is therefore an object of theological investigation, because liturgy in itself is theology. The liturgy reveals Christ as the ursakrament and liturgy in itself becomes an activity of God in Christ, revealing the present reality of our lives in him.340 Reflecting on the paschal mystery Taft understands the liturgy as the passage to the final completion, but not to eschaton but to eschatosthē, not to a thing but to a person. This means that the liturgy makes present the finality

of everything in Christ. As such it is an activity of men and women in union with their head, where God acts and his people respond.

Taft has a much more positive approach to academic theology than Schmemann. First of all he perceives liturgy as theology in as much as all theology has to be doxological. Secondly, Taft also understands the study of liturgy as theology since it contributes to the understanding of liturgical theology. In order to achieve an understanding the study of liturgy must bring many skills to bear on the object of study, such as historical, philological and conceptual skills. Furthermore, Taft argues, liturgical studies are no different from other disciplines. It has to be directed towards intelligibility in the pursuit of understanding. Finally, Taft concludes, the study of liturgy has to be conducted from as many vantage points as possible. Only thus do we reach a fuller understanding of what liturgical theology is all about. The liturgical scholar must develop a dialogue of methodologies.

The aim of liturgical studies is neither to recover the past, which is impossible, nor to imitate it, which would be fatuous. Instead it is all about producing a genetic vision of the present. This is accomplished through a structural analysis that attempts to reconstruct the historical order and connect it to the present order of liturgy. Taft is eager to differentiate between being structural and being a structuralist. The latter wants to discover the meaning of the structure but the liturgical scholar directs his attention to the structure itself. Structure, Taft argues, outlives meaning. Structural analysis is not the finding of meaning but rather the undertaking of an historical reconstruction. Here Taft differentiates between surface structure and deep structure. Following Lévi-Strauss Taft argues that the “surface structure” varies from language to language but that the “deep structure” is common to them all.

Uncovering the “deep structure” of the liturgical order cannot be accomplished simply by the accumulation of data. Instead we have to look into the perception of relationships that organize the data into intelligible patterns. The liturgical scholar must therefore develop unified systems creating what Taft calls intelligibility frameworks. In these frameworks the economy of explanation becomes apparent alongside the unity of a solution. History is essential for the liturgical scholar.

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346 Taft 1997, *Beyond East and West*, p. 188.
History, according to Taft, is a science of present understanding with a genetic vision of the present.347

The major difference between Taft and Schmemann is the aim of their studies. Taft is focused on understanding the liturgy by uncovering the “deep structure” but refrains from any emancipatory outlook. Taft therefore makes a difference between understanding and meaning and argues that any scholar has to limit himself to understanding, lending the meaning to the Church. Schmemann instead argues that any theologian of the Church must immerse himself in the joy of the Kingdom in order to achieve the full integration of theology, liturgy and piety. Schmemann therefore wants to find the meaning of the liturgy through a combination of historical analysis and a theological synthesis. The reason is that Schmemann makes emancipation foundational from which emanates the striving towards meaning which I will argue for later on.

Taft simply refrains from establishing this integration but shares the basic insight with Schmemann in referring to the liturgical event, the leitourgia, and is equally unwilling to separate the central elements from the local setting. His differentiation between surface structure and deep structure is not achieved by deducing a Great Ordo or by inventing a new language but by uncovering the grammar of the liturgy so that we are able to understand the genetic vision of the present. Taft could be described as a linguistic scholar who tries to describe the grammar of the particular language by making use of the experience of other languages.

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So there is a difference between Lathrop and Taft in that he is not interested in establishing a new, localized Ordo. Instead Taft insists that every liturgical order is local in the way a language is always local. By uncovering the deep structure of the liturgy we become aware of how the liturgical order functions, in the same way as a grammar book explains the internal functions of a language, but in a way that makes it possible to transcend the borders between different traditions, creating new grammars. The big difference here is that Taft does not use the grammar to create a new language but instead to understand the existing language allowing others to make use of it and to deepen their understanding of it. In relation to Schmemann Taft takes an intercultural perspective that seeks to understand the different traditions

while Schmemann is immersed in his own tradition, interpreting it from within and striving towards an emancipation of the Assembly. The perspective of emancipation is absent from Taft’s work, with his ardent view on understanding based on an objective stance, without denying the perspective of emancipation.

D. PROLETARIAN, COMMUNITARIAN AND QUOTIDIAN

A last example of Liturgical Theology would be Kavanagh who tries to mould Taft and Schmemann together; Taft’s more advanced method of understanding with Schmemann’s emancipatory outlook. Aidan Kavanagh in his book *On Liturgical Theology* proceeds along the same path as Schmemann but with an academic approach. Kavanagh eagerly emphasizes that the liturgy is not just an expression or repertoire of the Church’s faith. The worship of the Church is the very transaction of “the church’s faith in God under the condition of God’s real presence in both church and world.” According to Kavanagh, it is not possible to perform this transaction in the academe. If so, how are we then to understand academic theology without this transaction? There are three ways of approaching the academe, Kavanagh continues. First of all one could leave the academe and commit oneself to prayer and contemplation. Secondly one could stay in the academe and risk being worn down by it and dissimulating belief. This is more common, according to Kavanagh, than the ascetical praxis, but there is also a third option. A third possibility would be to stay in the academe while maintaining vocation at its center. This would imply an ascetical study with an ardent disciplined methodology, often entailing a courageous witness among those worn down by a dissimulated belief.348 The third option would not in the end be lesser than the first, and Kavanagh recollects what Thomas Aquinas points out when he says that it is better to illuminate than to glow.349 Kavanagh states that

What the ascetic contemplates, the Christian academic communicates.350

Staying in the academe while maintaining a vocational center brings with it at least three problems according to Kavanagh. The first problem concerns objectivity. Being objective about something that concerns

your entire life is not easy. It almost presumes that believing Christians in the academe have to be at odds with the official Church. This brings with it a second problem. Today, Kavanagh continues, there seems to be a clash between pastoral theology and academic theology. Pastoral theology conducts its outreach in the parishes with the liturgy and the spiritual life as its general setting. Academic theology, however, has tended to withdraw from that life, from the pulpits and liturgy and to be focused on the classroom and study, which has its own methodologies. While almost all great theologians of the first five or six centuries were Episcopal pastors we have today a bifurcation between being pastoral and being academic. This in turn brings with it a third and final problem. Discoursing professionally about the world and the Church has to involve the priorities we assign to data in the discourse. Herein lies a difference between the priorities we assign to data in the academic discourse and the priorities we assign to data in the pastoral life. In the academe most schools assign the highest priority to study of the Bible and to systematic theology, while important pastoral features such as anthropology, pastoral crafts and arts are given lesser priority.351

According to Kavanagh, the separation between the academe and ecclesial life has caused a need to redefine the Church. In the early Church the Church was as given as water for fish, but theology drawn out from that water has brought with it the need to define the water, which was so obvious to the early fathers. This in turn has made the Church an object instead of the living condition for theology. The earlier theologians presumed the Church with one foot in the scriptures and the other in apostolic teaching and communion. The Church was a holistic enterprise whose faith embraced all of life and not only propositions and definitions.352

How then do we return to a living relation between the ecclesial life and the academe? To begin with, Kavanagh argues, we have to understand that Judaism and Christianity have expressed their belief for thousands of years “not in books but by participation in assemblies which have met regularly, at least once a week, for worship of the living God.”353 Worship in these assemblies, Kavanagh concludes, was not a kind of withdrawal from the world but rather the opposite. It was the

Church doing the world, where the assembly could be described as the

After achieving this basic insight, Kavanagh argues, one has to realize
that it is not sufficient merely to state that the assembly is fundamental.
Those participating in the assembly have to be agents in the liturgical
act of assembling. Otherwise the corporate identity of the Church will
be lost and individuals in the assembly would feel estranged from each
other, Kavanagh continues, analogous to a breakdown in the nervous
system where the sensation of the different limbs of the body seems to
be unconnected with the rest of the body.\footnote{Kavanagh [1981] 1992, On Liturgical Theology, pp. 62-63.}

True participation in a liturgical assembly, according to Kavanagh,
implies a deep change in the very lives of those participating. Liturgies,
Kavanagh continues, grow as a result of an adjustment to this deep
change “caused in the assembly by its being brought regularly to the
brink of chaos in the presence of the living God. It is the \textit{adjustment}
which is theological in all this.”\footnote{Kavanagh [1981] 1992, On Liturgical Theology, p. 74.} \textit{Theologia prima} thus is the theology
born from this adjustment. Kavanagh interprets Schmemann in the
same way stating that this is probably why Schmemann did not consider
the liturgy as an authority, or even a \textit{locus theologicus}, but instead as
the ontological condition of theology. Liturgy understood in this way is
the foundational experience that theological reflection builds upon, the
experience of the encounter with God.\footnote{Kavanagh [1981] 1992, On Liturgical Theology, pp. 79-81.} Kavanagh also relies on Taft’s
differentiation between the surface structure and the deep structure
of liturgy. Finding the deep structure of liturgy entails discovering
commonality, which is the foundation of all generalization, which in
turn is the prerequisite of establishing an intelligible system.\footnote{Kavanagh [1981] 1992, On Liturgical Theology, pp. 84-85.}

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So Kavanagh is much more open to the idea of the academic scholar
being a witness of the Christian faith in the academe than is Schmemann.
At the same time there is an ambiguity in the works of Kavanagh that
unravels itself when we consider his approach to the Christian faith as
a manifestation of the people being drawn out from anonymity into the
light of the liturgical life.\footnote{Kavanagh [1981] 1992, On Liturgical Theology, pp. 79-81.} This way of understanding the Christian faith
comes very close to Schmemann’s emancipatory perspective and could be viewed as a sequel to his work.

Kavanagh begins with the perception of liturgy as a language. In the same manner as philologists do not set the laws of language liturgists do not establish the laws of the liturgy. The different historical liturgies have been enacted from a spiritual experience communicated through generations. Liturgy therefore changes in the same way as a language changes but from within instead of being imposed by an external authority.\textsuperscript{360} Liturgy, Kavanagh continues, is a living experience of the encounter with the divine and cannot therefore be controlled by certainty.\textsuperscript{361}

This has far reaching consequences for the emancipatory perspective in Kavanagh’s thinking as presented in his work \textit{On Liturgical Theology}. There is a latent anonymity in the liturgical order that we have received through history. We do not know, according to Kavanagh, who presided at the first Eucharist after the Last Supper, nor do we know who composed the first order of the liturgy. Resolving this anonymity and determining the intention and precise order of the liturgy is frustrating but according to Kavanagh this is precisely why we are engaged in the process of academical work at all.\textsuperscript{362} Through scholarly achievement, Kavanagh argues, we could resolve the anonymity of what we have received and be committed to incorporating the liturgical order in our own life and thinking.

The commitment as participants in the liturgy is not so much an intellectual ascent as it is a way of living the Christian life in an actual assembly of worship. The patristic maxim \textit{ut legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi} does not mean, according to Kavanagh, that our belief is one thing and our worship another. Instead the source of our belief is worship as it is enlivened in the assembly of believers. Worship in this sense is always more than any doctrine could establish. It is the very condition of the ecclesial life flowing from the true encounter with the divine.

The taxonomy of the liturgy, Kavanagh continues, is therefore \textit{proletarian} since it involves each and everyone as a language shared by the whole community of believers in the assembly instead of being isolated to a certain class or elite. It is \textit{communitarian} rather than

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
individualistic in view of the fact that it is the assembly that constitutes the ekklesia and not an individual. Further more it is *quotidien* since the liturgy is not random or infrequent. The liturgy is the basic stratum of a sharing community in all these aspects. The communal aspect of the liturgy carries with it two basic insights, according to Kavanagh. First of all the people’s liturgy cannot wait for certainty. Instead there is an inherent risk in standing in front of the living God. It does not mean that the liturgy is irrational but rather that it depends on taking a leap into the unknown. Secondly, since the liturgy is of God rather than about God it does not depend on an “extraordinary magisterium” outside the liturgy. The liturgy does not explain, define or pronounce doctrinal statement, but engages people in the gathering as the people of God, celebrating the living presence of God. Therefore, Kavanagh continues, the liturgy lies closer to God than the product of any conciliar or papal decrees.\(^{363}\)

According to Kavanagh, this amounts to the basic understanding of the liturgy as a social occasion depending on a relationship of a third type. In the first we have a *one-to-one* relationship which is common between a mother and a child for example. In the second kind we have *one-to-many*, the relationship common between a teacher and the student body, but in the liturgy we find instead a third type, according to Kavanagh, *many-to-many*, common in most of our social events, such as feasts and colloquial events. The structure produced by the social relationships of the liturgy is repetitious and rhythmic so many people can be involved together through identification of a common rhythm and ritual. A social occasion of the third order cannot survive without a deep structure beneath the surface structure. Liturgy has survived because of the eschatological dimension inherent in the understanding of the One beyond time and time’s end, which is the beginning of the assembly.\(^{364}\)

The liturgiologist engaged in the study of liturgics has to establish the **what** of the liturgy, according to Kavanagh, in order to help others to interpret the **why** and **how** of the liturgy.

The liturgiologist must be a master student of liturgical structures and their comparative relationship from one Rite to another. Only thus can he or she establish the **what** which others may interpret as to **why** and **how**. The liturgiologist helps others read a score of rite for what it really is. Liturgics, which is the discipline a liturgiologist practices, is thus not


a performing art, nor is it a species of something seminary catalogues often call “practical theology.” It is a major discipline, similar to biblical exegesis or church history or doctrinal theology, particularly in those institutions which devote themselves to preparing people for ministry to assemblies of faith.365

Kavanagh thus makes a distinction between academic theology as establishing the what of liturgy, reconstructing an intelligibility framework of the liturgical order, thereby revealing the deep structure of liturgy, but without interfering in the why and how, which is something done by the Church itself. The real power of the sacraments, Kavanagh continues, lies in the how and why, which academical theology only serves, but still is a duty to perform.366 Kavanagh shares this perspective with Taft. Separating the what from the why and how is similar to what Botte does when arguing for a separation between ‘by what’ and ‘by whom.’ Schmemann is not really able to make this distinction without diminishing the quid of academic theology.

The separation between the what from the why and the how seems to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the works of Schmemann. This was nevertheless already accomplished in 1928 by Kiprian Kern, and is also Schmemann’s goal, but the real problem concerns the reconciliation between theory and practice, of reconciling the what of the liturgy with the how and why of the liturgy. If this were not possible, then those working on the quid of the liturgy would in the end either be detached from the how and why, as a separate entity, or they would be an elite ruling over the understanding of the liturgy which is so precious for those working with the how and why.

E. The Double Ambiguity of Liturgical Theology

Since the publication of Kiprian Kern’s “Lily of Prayers. Collection of Articles on Liturgical Theology” there has been a differentiation between the what of liturgy and the how and why of the liturgy, but also an effort towards a reconciliation between them. Schmemann argues for the complete reconciliation of liturgy, theology and piety, and criticizes the scientific objectification of theology as an atomization. This reconciliation is necessary for Schmemann in order to emancipate those

constituting the Church and transform them into subjects instead of objects. This transformation is made possible by acquiring the language inherent in the *leitourgia*, where the reconciliation unfolds itself as a theological calling coming from within. In order to acquire this language there has to be a liturgical teaching focused on understanding the meaning of the liturgy, first through an historical analysis and then through a theological synthesis. The latter seems to be connected with the immersion of the language in the *leitourgia* thereby acquiring concepts and words adequate to this experience. Through an historical analysis it would be possible to discern the deep structure, as Taft and Kavanagh argue, or the Ordo, as Schmemann argues.

According to Schmemann, the experience of the *leitourgia* constitutes the primary theology. A historical analysis would then entail the establishing of an intelligibility framework such that we could discover the grammar of the precise liturgical order and establish a genetic vision of the present, using Taft's concept. From this vision Schmemann is convinced that we could reconcile liturgy, theology and piety, which he believes has been disconnected through the centuries, especially in the West. The question that we have to address to Schmemann is how we are to attain this reconciliation. Schmemann's first answer would be that the reconciliation has to take place by making the experience of the *leitourgia* the ultimate criterion for liturgy, theology and piety. Then follows the question of how this could be achieved. Here Schmemann would say that it has to be achieved through a renewed understanding of those participating in the *leitourgia*. The third question naturally follows: how a renewed understanding is to be achieved. Schmemann would emphasize the need for a liturgical teaching where the participants of the *leitourgia* share a language finding words and concepts adequate to this experience. The final question would then be why we need a renewed understanding in a sharing community at all. Schmemann's answer would be that the participants have become objects to their own Church, and have begun to use the Church as an instrument for their own concerns and well-being. The participants therefore begin to appreciate the solemnity of the liturgy as an outward appearance.

The solution to all this develops throughout Schmemann's work as a reminiscence of the centrality of eschatology for understanding the Church as well as transforming the participants from objects to subjects in the *leitourgia*. Schmemann realizes that understanding is not sufficient
for the emancipation of those constituting the Church. The problem with such a stance is Schmemann's idea that a renewed understanding of the Ordo of the liturgy, as essentially expressing the Church as the coming Kingdom dwelling in this world, would naturally lead to the emancipation of the participants. This is directly criticized by Lathrop who explicitly denies this idealized reality of a natural process towards emancipation without considering the structures of sin that encumbers this process. Less explicitly Kavanagh speaks about a real change in the lives of those participating in the liturgy. Without such a change the liturgical assembly would not be a real encounter with the divine. This aspect is lacking in the works of Schmemann when he transforms his ecclesiology from the power of the saints to the power of the Church.

Taft seems to refrain from discussing this aspect, seeing it as something that lies outside of his scholarly mission and instead refers it to those participating in the Church. Instead he devotes himself to understanding the deep structure of the liturgical order and there seems to be a divide between his mission of understanding and the realization of the Church. In a similar way Kavanagh limits himself in his scholarly endeavor to the what and suggests that a scholar should not interfere in the how and why. Schmemann instead lets himself be immersed in the why and how searching for the deeper roots of meaning in the Church, but this seems to lead to an idealized eschatology already realized. Lathrop on the other hand completely focuses on the realization of the moral and liturgical Assembly, taking charge of the liturgy, but then loosing the basics of what liturgical theology is all about – sharing a common language evolving through generations with a transformation coming from within.

In the end we have a double ambiguity in Liturgical Theology. On the scholarly and theoretical side it seems that the complete reconciliation between theory and practice does not seem to be possible. On the practical side it seems that we are caught either in an idealized view of reality or bound to loose the essential characteristics of Liturgical Theology, where people are sharing the life of the Church as a community, and instead becoming dependent on the scholarly achievement of liturgical and theological scholars such as Lathrop, or an extraordinary magisterium outside the leitourgia.

The question to be dealt with in Part II will concern the resolution of this ambiguity. Could we understand the deeper structure of this
ambiguity? Is it possible to resolve this ambiguity and if so how could it be achieved? How could we combine understanding with the realization of the Church, i.e. theory and practice?
PART TWO

Rationalization of the Ecclesia

In Part II, *Rationalization of the Ecclesia*, I will examine the ambiguity of Liturgical Theology more closely by comparing Schmemann's work with a contemporary discussion on theory and practice, as well as theology and philosophy. I will argue that emancipation is a common feature of both the discussion among orthodox scholars and of western scholars subsequent to the experience of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. By way of an emancipatory interest they share a critique of the classical self-enclosed subject.

In the first chapter I will begin my comparison with a more recent trend in orthodox theology, the so-called Neo-Palamist movement. The core of this movement lies in the understanding of the ontological difference established by Martin Heidegger in the middle of the twentieth century in relation to the spiritual tradition of the hesychasts in the fifteenth century. I will dwell on the relation between creation and the Creator arguing for a need to make an unambiguous differentiation, beginning not in the Divine reality but in the human condition.

In the second chapter I will examine Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action. His philosophy gravitates on the human condition arguing for a shift from a philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of language, the Habermasian shift. His understanding of the human being is inter-subjective in the sense that humans establish their understanding of reality through dialogue with other human beings and not through a monologue as the classical theory of the subject proposes. Humans in their effort to establish a common reality rely on a cultural background that is not created by their own effort, but rather inherited as cultural knowledge accumulated by previous generations. In relation to this cultural background participants create a situation revealing a common lifeworld, as Habermas puts it.

In the third chapter I will argue that the Church is a lifeworld with a body of cultural knowledge, which Schmemann makes use of in his
attempt to establish a consensus about the Church and its mission. One of the problems that reveal themselves through such an analysis is the difficulty Schmemann has in shifting from existence to experience, which would greatly improve his theory of Liturgical Theology.

Therefore, in the fourth chapter, I dwell on the problem of not fulfilling the shift from existence to experience through an analysis of reification, beginning with a theoretical analysis and finishing in Schmemann's work. Finally I argue that Schmemann, in his effort to emancipate, is critical of reified structures in the Church, yet is unable to liberate himself of these structures because of his dependence on structuralism, hence the ambiguity in Liturgical Theology.
4. Beyond the Classical Subject

One can say that in Christian theology the age of Enlightenment and Modern Time was the time of the forgetting of Man. This trend was common to theology of all Christian confessions, and so we could say that the unity of Christians was achieved in this particular aspect, only it was unity of a somewhat negative kind. 367

Sergei S. Khoružij, Chicago 1992

The death of the self-centered subject characterizes the trend of theology at the end of the 20th century. The classical metaphysical subject, who was born from the Christian appropriation of Greek philosophy, had been in focus ever since Boethius and Descartes. The human being was believed to be a definite system of substances. Boethius developed the idea further in the sixth century stating that man is ‘individual substance of rational nature’.368 Descartes, during the seventeenth century, gives the idea a final twist describing man as a thinking subject, cogito ergo sum, ‘I think therefore I am’. The human being in the Cartesian understanding is identified as a subject according to its substance.369

The Cartesian subject was considered status quo for centuries, even in the time of the enlightenment and of modernity, but in the twentieth century the identity of the subject as substance evolved into a philosophical crisis in the West. It began with the dismantling of the classical subject by Heidegger and was developed by post-modern thinkers who tried to reach ‘beyond the subject’.370 The critique of the classical subject was not limited to the Occident. Instead several Orthodox thinkers considered the search ‘beyond the subject’ in the West to be a point of convergence between Western philosophy and Eastern thought.

The description by the Orthodox of a West returning to the East is overly simplistic, as Kristina Stöckl demonstrates in her doctoral dissertation.371 Even though famous Orthodox thinkers like Dumitru Staniloae and Christos Yannaras dichotomize East and West there are also other voices to consider.372 One of them is the Russian thinker Sergei

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367 Stöckl 2007, Community after Totalitarianism, not 336.
368 “Naturæ rationalis individual substantia”, in De persona et duabus naturis, c. II.
369 First stated in French by Descartes, “Je pense donc je suis”, in Discours de la méthode 1637.
370 E.g. Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jürgen Habermas and Jean-Luc Nancy.
371 Stöckl 2007, Community after Totalitarianism.
Khoružij. Stöckl presents Khoružij as thinking beyond the East-West divide. When Khoružij presents his anthropology, drawing on a number of Byzantine sources, he is still aware that this is something that has appeared only recently in the East. The East has also been captivated by a self-enclosed subject with a substance, but, according to Khoružij, this has not always been the case.\footnote{Stöckl 2007, Community after Totalitarianism, pp. 116-117.}

In an historical reconstruction Stöckl proves that the so called Neo-Palamist theologians of the East make use of old sources from the Byzantine heritage, but from within a strictly modern context, confronted with the totalitarian experience of the 20th century.\footnote{Stöckl 2007, Community after Totalitarianism, pp. 115-116.} Khoružij, according to Stöckl, elaborates a similar reconstruction. Khoružij ascribes the crisis to the West, but he does not believe that East is ‘superior’ to West, nor does he produce an argument of a cultural divide between the West and the Orthodox East. He is certainly aware, as Stöckl argues, that the Hesychast movement – which many of the Eastern Orthodox scholars use as their primary source for their critique of the self-enclosed subject – has been marginal and precarious in Orthodoxy for many centuries. \footnote{Stöckl 2007, Community after Totalitarianism, p. 117.}

 Regardless of where the crisis originates and the reasons behind it, many scholars of both East and West agree that we have reached the end of the classical subject and now need to move on from there. This implies a shift from focusing exclusively on the human subject itself, and instead comprehending man in relation to others or the ‘Other’.

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In the following chapter I will begin (A) by describing the reason for this crisis, beginning with the dismantling of the classical subject by Heidegger. Then (B) I continue with the Eastern response to the end of the classical subject, the Neo-Palamist movement, providing an outline of Stöckl’s two main sources, Sergei Khoružij and Christos Yannaras. I will argue that their arguments are valid on a metaphysical level, as a profound reflection on the emancipation of the human being as the ‘image of God’, but that they are unable to provide an analytic of the full practical implications for life or in the Church. Therefore (C) I will study John D. Zizioulas who has built his Eucharistic Ecclesiology on Neo-Palamist theology. By using different scholarly sources I will insist that
Zizioulas has not been attentive enough in differentiating between the Creator and creation. Such a differentiation renders a different reading of the Fathers and a reversed perspective beginning not in the Godhead but in the revelation and the human condition. In the final section (D) I will argue that Liturgical Theology, even though sharing the basic convictions of Eucharistic Ecclesiology with Zizioulas, has a reversed perspective and makes a sharper distinction between the Creator and creation. Therefore, for a continued analysis of theory and practice in Liturgical Theology, I suggest a sociological instead of a philosophical approach, by using Jürgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (TCA).

A. THE END OF THE CLASSICAL SUBJECT AND THE WAY FORWARD

Kristina Stöckl begins her cross reading of Western philosophy and Orthodox theology in Martin Heidegger’s Letter on ‘Humanism’.376 There Heidegger gives an address on the limitations and achievements in his opus Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). In Being and Time the question of Being is reopened. The major achievement in his work is the decentralization of the human being. Previously the human being was understood as an essence with a centre, but in Being and Time Heidegger recognizes a being as essentially a presence in time. Substance does not depend on time but with beings this is precisely the case. This is evident, Heidegger argues, since we do not only relate to other beings as presence but also as absence in the continuum of time. This makes it obvious, according to Heidegger, that beings exist in time and not merely as essence.377

The time continuum of beings, according to Heidegger, reveals yet another decisive element in our understanding of being, the ontological difference. It is the appearance of beings and not Being in itself which brings into effect our awareness of Being. Classical metaphysics, according to Heidegger, is caught in a forgottenness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit), because it does not consider the difference between the appearance of being in time and Being itself, since even the absence of being reveals the being.378 The difference between Being and the beings in time is reiterated

in the Letter. Heidegger differentiates between beings (das Seiende) and Being (das Sein), which he perceives as an ontological difference, which brings with it, according to Heidegger, the end of the classical subject.\textsuperscript{379}

This ontological difference makes it possible for Heidegger to move from a self-enclosed subject to a human being endowed with a relation to existence as such. The human being (Dasein) ‘takes place’ in an ecstatic relatedness to Being (das Sein), Heidegger continues, using the term Ek-sistenz. This existential relatedness to Being makes the human being different from the ‘animal rationale’, because humans, through their relatedness, are able to transcend themselves.\textsuperscript{380} The idea of ecstatic relatedness was fundamental to the existential understanding of the human being by the end of the 20th century. Heidegger, however, did not manage to connect the idea on a practical level, and therefore the theory was not developed further in Being and Time, which Heidegger himself identifies as a limitation of his magnum opus. What is missing is a thorough analysis of being-in-the-world founded on the awareness of being as an ecstatic relatedness to Being. Heidegger comments upon this and his reasons for failing in such an analysis. The final step (Kehre), according to Heidegger, lacks the language necessary for such a study, because of the limits imposed by classical metaphysics.\textsuperscript{381}

According to Stöckl this is the point where Orthodox interpreters of Heidegger step in to complete the task he set. They do it by using a different language, one without the burden of classical metaphysics.\textsuperscript{382}

B. Neo-Palamist Tradition

In her dissertation Stöckl identifies an experience, played out during the 20th century, common to both East and West: the experience of totalitarianism.

This means that it shares the recognition that after this experience, Being as the transcendent must never be thought as an essence, as one meaning once and for all, or as the theologico-political. Put differently, ontology after totalitarianism must address man’s existential relatedness to Being without jeopardizing man’s existential freedom.\textsuperscript{383}

\textsuperscript{382} Stöckl 2007, Community after Totalitarianism, pp. 125-126.
\textsuperscript{383} Stöckl 2007, Community after Totalitarianism, p. 126.
Totalitarianism draped out as Nazism or Communism during the 20th century has been the indictment of the classical metaphysical approach as a spirit of totality. Heidegger's ontological difference, with its separation of being in time and Being, has led to the insight that freedom as a given character of the human being is incomprehensible without the ontic perspective of freedom in time. Any kind of totalitarian understanding of freedom outside the ontic perspective jeopardizes man's existential freedom.

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Sergei Khoružij, a Russian theologian, takes hold of the ontological difference, but develops it by drawing on a number of Byzantine sources, especially the Hesychast movement. Instead of focusing on the anthropological centre of the human being, which he describes as a fiction, he eagerly demonstrates that man has to be understood from its periphery, or border. It is in the borderland between the human being in itself and in their relation to the other-being that humans become accessible in time, approachable not only by others but also for the individual's self comprehension. In the continuum of time the human being is conceptualized in two ways, according to Khoružij, either in terms of Being or in terms of consciousness. In the first case man is a specific mode of being and the 'Other' is a different mode of being. In the latter case man represents consciousness and the 'Other' represents the Unconscious. The first case describes the ontological perspective of an anthropology of periphery. It is in the ontological border of the human being mystical experiences have an existential reality, transcending the human nature and its psychological and sociological faculties. The second case describes the ontic perspective of this anthropology, where mystical experiences are referred to as neuroses, mania or psychoses, as an ecstatic relatedness to the Unconscious. Khoružij adds a third perspective, the virtual, which is the manifestation of the human being with no inter-action with any 'other'. These manifestations are mostly within the realm of contemporary popular mass-culture.

From this peripheral understanding of the human being Khoružij develops a 'polyphone being' and instead of the singular centre typical of

385 I am not convinced by Khoružij’s arguments that the virtual perspective is really a manifestation of the human being, but this is beyond the scope of this study. Cf. Stöckl 2007, *Community after Totalitarianism*, p. 120, Khoružij 2005, *Ocherki Sinergijnogo Antropologii*, pp. 40-44, and Khoružij 2000, *O Storom i Novom*, pp. 311-352.
the Cartesian understanding, he proposes that man is both ontological as well as ontic and virtual. The three perspectives of man, Khoružij continues, constitute the being of man in time, but, according Khoružij, they are differentiated in the sense that they are neither complementary nor hierarchical. The only thing that keeps them together is the relationship to the ‘Other’. Without the ‘Other’ the human being would be reduced to a thing or an animal. In the first two perspectives there is a positive affirmation of the ‘Other’, i.e. they depend on an ecstatic relatedness to the Other. In the third perspective man withdraws from the Other. All three perspectives, according to Khoružij, are manifestations (proàvlenie) of an ecstatic relatedness to the Other, a theory he draws from the mystical-ascetic tradition of Hesychasm.\footnote{Khoružij 2004, ‘Chelovek Kartezija’ .} This tradition understands the ecstatic relatedness as energies (energeía). Man, in Khoružij’s thinking, could therefore be described as consisting of three energies, the ontological, the ontic and the virtual, what Khoružij describes with the term ‘polyphone being’.\footnote{Khoružij 2005, Ocherki Sinergijnoj Antropologii, p. 23.}

The Hesychast tradition makes a sharp distinction between essence and energies. The energies, according to Gregory Palamas, are the manifestations of the essence, but not as mere representations. The energies are in the full sense part of the same reality, similar to the relation of being to Being.\footnote{Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) was Archbishop of Thessalonika and is connected with the Hesychast controversy. By the request of the monks of Mount Athos he defended them against the charges made by Barlaam of Calabria, who accused the monks of superstitious belief, such as being able to see the same light as on the Mount of Transfiguration through simple practices. Gregory defended them by making a distinction between the essence of God, which is incomprehensible, and the Divine energies accessible through spiritual practices and the senses of human nature. See De Hesychastis in Migne’s Patrologia Cursus Completus Graeca PG 150: 1101-1118, and Meyendorff 1959, ‘St Grégoire Palamas et la mystique orthodoxe’.} The essence is not available to us except through the energies; this is why Khoružij uses the term ‘energetic ontology’.\footnote{Cf. Khoružij 2005, Ocherki Sinergijnoj Antropologii, p. 23 and Stöckl 2007, Community after Totalitarianism, p. 118.} Through, or more precisely in, these energetic manifestations the human being has a religious experience. In Hesychast tradition spiritual and ascetic practices lead the human being to establish an energetic formation, an ecstatic relatedness with the Triune God, effecting an existential transformation, theosis, Divinization.\footnote{Khoružij 2005, Ocherki Sinergijnoj Antropologii, p. 25.} Without the ‘Other’, the Triune God, not only is this transformation impossible but the very formation in itself is impossible. This implies that Grace (Blagodat’) is
implicit from the very beginning, in the energetic formation, and not only for salvation.\footnote{Cf. Khoružij 2005, \textit{Ocherki Sinergijnoj Antropologii}, pp. 40-44 and Khoružij 2000, \textit{O Storom i Novom}, pp. 311-352. This is why the western debate on whether Grace implies faith and good works, or if Grace creates good works, seems trivial since Grace is present in the very existence of the human being, as a definition of what it means to be human.}

These energies are not closed in relation to the Other. Instead they need to be open in order to effect a transformation of the human being. Khoružij portrays this openness by using the concept of \textit{synergeía}, taken from the Hesychast tradition, where the manifestations of the human being interact with the Other, the Triune God. Furthermore, the manifestations are realized, or unlocked (\textit{razmykanie}, using Khoružij’s own terminology) when they open up towards the Other in a synergetic relation. This process of ‘unlocking’ takes place as an existential reality on the ontological border, what Khoružij designates as ‘synergetic ontology’.\footnote{Khoružij 2005, \textit{Ocherki Sinergijnoj Antropologii}.}

The comparison of Khoružij’s anthropology with Cartesian anthropology is eloquently expressed by Kristina Stöckl:

Where before we would have man as an essence and a centre, and where the post-metaphysical philosophers of the twentieth century identified a lack, Horužij puts man as an energetic constellation and as a pluralistic being endowed with a triple border. The main point is that the borders are not closed, but that they are realms in which processes of interaction with the respective ‘Other’ can take place.\footnote{Stöckl 2007, \textit{Community after Totalitarianism}, p. 121.}

The understanding of ‘synergetic ontology’ in Khoružij’s work reveals the potential for emancipation. The relation to the ‘Other’ is not given, as would be the case in a Cartesian anthropology, where the identity of man is situated in the centre of an essence. In a Cartesian anthropology the Triune God transcends the human nature regardless of the human being, but in a ‘synergetic anthropology’ the human being is involved in this transcendence as a subject transcending its own human nature in an ecstatic relatedness with the Triune God. Therefore we are justified in talking of an emancipatory understanding of reality in Khoružij’s works, which is effected by the totalitarian experience of the twentieth century.

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Khoružij’s insistence on the ontological border as the transcendent manifestation of human nature is consequential with a Neo-Palamist understanding of the human being, since they do not share the conviction of post-modern thinkers like Jean-Luc Nancy who argues that being escapes any determinacy. According to Neo-Palamist thinking this would endanger the existential freedom of the human being. With an indeterminate understanding of being, man would be subordinate to his own being and any relation to the ‘Other’ would be a given, which is precisely what Jean-Luc Nancy argues. This is the point of departure for Christos Yannaras when he argues for the necessity of a determinacy of the human being.

The determinacy of the human being in Yannaras’ works depends not on substance but on the person, which he relates to the Greek concept of hypostasis, which is a mode of existence. Even though Yannaras states that no person could exist without substance or nature, substance in itself cannot constitute the cause of the person. Instead it is the hypostasis which is the ‘ontological principle’ of the human being, in the same way as the Father is the ‘ontological principle’ of the Triune God in Orthodox thinking. This is similar to what Khoružij means by the ‘ontological border’. Both of them understand the human being in terms of a manifestation in time, similarly to the existentialist philosophers, e.g. Viktor Frankl and Jean Paul Sartre, who perceive being as a phenomena in time, while they transfer the existentialist understanding of the person to the Hesychast understanding of hypostasis or the ‘ontological border’, and thereby create a Neo-Patristic synthesis.

By identifying the ‘ontological principle’ with the person, substance is transcended by the human being and not inferior to the human nature. Therefore being is rooted not in substance but in person, thereby safeguarding the ontological principle of freedom. Yet, according to Yannaras, freedom in the Christian sense has a precise content as compared to many post-modern understandings where the practice of freedom is indeterminate. Christians have to either accept or reject that we are created in the image of God. If we accept it we also accept the practice of freedom as freely exercising relationship, which is entrenched not by human beings alone, but takes place always in the light of man’s...
ecstatic relatedness to the Divine, with a transcendent telos defined as freedom and relatedness.\textsuperscript{398}

This relationship breathes freedom and relatedness from the outset, because being is identified with relatedness, where the human being freely relates to the Divine as a subject and not as an object. Here Yannaras picks up on Heidegger’s concept of \textit{Ek-sistenz} but relates it to the idea of \textit{ekstasis}, which is frequently used by some Church fathers, and the Christian concept of love. \textit{Ekstasis}, according to Yannaras, denotes the human self-transcendence, as ecstatic personality, realizing the human \textit{eros}.\textsuperscript{399}

\begin{quote}
Human beings correspond to their creation ‘in the image of God’ to the extent that they realize their existence as erotic self-transcendence in the personal mode of existence.\textsuperscript{400}
\end{quote}

If freedom depends on the ‘ontological principle’ of the person then human love, \textit{eros}, is the realization of this freedom, as ecstatic relatedness, because a human being is only truly person when exercising freely relationship with others and extending that freedom to others.\textsuperscript{401}

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Now we are ready to return to the task presented by Heidegger in the \textit{Letter} which he himself was unable to fulfill – to produce an existential analytic of the human being-in-the-world as ecstatic relatedness to the transcendent Being. Heidegger believed that he failed in this instance because he was restrained by the limitations of classical metaphysics. Classical metaphysics always describes reality from the centre. Earth has always been understood as the centre of universe and in the same way man has been understood as the centre of reality, though transcended by God. The Neo-Palamist theology instead takes their departure from the periphery of reality beginning at the border of man, even the border of reality, which means that Neo-Palamist anthropology is founded not in ‘I’ but in ‘Thou’. Neo-Palamist theology therefore reveals itself as a dyad – individual practice has to be combined with collective tradition, and personal freedom with shared practice, from the very beginning, as the

\textsuperscript{398} Yannaras 1984, \textit{The Freedom of Morality}.
first step of philosophy and not as the second step after the definition of ‘I’ as with Descartes.\textsuperscript{402}

This is common to both Khoružij and Yannaras, even though Khoružij describes it differently. Stöckl defines them both clearly.

It is this double-constellation of personal freedom and shared practices which makes synergetic anthropology neither entirely atomist nor entirely holist ... Community is that which manifests tradition, the stability and continuity of practices over time. Community, in short, takes place in view of a \textit{telos}.\textsuperscript{403}

It is precisely this reversed order of reality, beginning with the ‘Other’ instead of the \textit{ego} that effects the possibility of fulfilling the task laid out by Heidegger, according to Stöckl.\textsuperscript{404} An existential analytic of being-in-the-world begins with the question of the relation between the individual subject and the world. In the Cartesian universe the individual is the primary substance of the world. In Neo-Palamist theology there is a reversed understanding and instead the world comes first, with the Triune God as the manifestation of the world, i.e. bringing everything into relationship. Differently described I would claim that even before God creates the world the foundations of the world rest on the Divine \textit{kenosis}, meaning that God establishes a relation outside himself, thereby defining reality as relation. The human being, as the ‘image of God’, creates the same \textit{kenosis}, establishing a relation with God as the ‘Other’.\textsuperscript{405}

The reversed order between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ also brings with it a reversed order of the individual and the community. The human being carries the possibility of positive freedom, which is realized when the person partakes in the practices of the community which gain stability and continuity with the \textit{telos} of \textit{theosis}. This Divinization concerns the restoration of the ‘image of God’ in each person, participating in the communal practices. From the very beginning this ‘image’ carries the qualities of freedom and relatedness, which are restored in the process of \textit{theosis}.\textsuperscript{406}

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\textsuperscript{403} Stöckl 2007, \textit{Community after Totalitarianism}, p. 123.


\textsuperscript{405} K\textit{enosis} means outpouring, which is used by the Church Fathers to describe what happens when God creates the world out of nothing, \textit{ex nihilo}. Cf. Yannaras 2005, \textit{On the Absence and Unknowability of God}; and Williams 2004, ‘\textit{Kenōsis} and the nature of the Persons in the Trinity’.

\textsuperscript{406} Yannaras 1984, \textit{The Freedom of Morality}. 

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This leads us to the analytic of being-in-the-world as ecstatic relatedness. The Church, in Yannaras thinking, has to avoid becoming an institution that dictates an objective way of life or an ‘objective ethics’. Instead the Church ought to be the taking-place of relationships where human beings can freely partake of tradition. In Yannaras’ work the life of the Church opens up as an existential choice between communion and non-communion, in the sense of partaking in shared practices. The Eucharistic community or the monastic community creates a form of being-together in the ‘image of God’ where personal freedom and relatedness is continually restored in the process of Divinization.407

If by the term ‘social ethics’ we mean a theory, a program or a code which aims at an ‘objective’ improvement in people’s corporate life, an ‘objective’ change in the structures and preconditions for their coexistence, and better regulation of the ‘objective’ relationships which form people into organized groups – if these aims are pursued independently of personal distinctiveness and freedom, the sphere in which they are dynamically and existentially realized – then certainly so long as the Church remains faithful to her ontological truth she has no such ethics to display, nor could she come to terms with such an ethic.408

Therefore the Church, according to Yannaras, cannot be an institution existing independently from those exercising the shared practices of being-together in freedom and love. Such an understanding of the Church carries with it a potential for totalitarianism. Consequently Yannaras would not share in the recent efforts by some Orthodox Churches to produce a communal ethics. Instead Yannaras is eager to emphasize the difference between a collective ethics and a personal ethos.409

Personal distinctiveness forms the image of God in man. It is the mode of existence shared by God and man, the ethos of Trinitarian life imprinted upon the human being.410

Ethos denotes a way of being and not just of adapting oneself to a fixed set of rules. A way of being involves the freedom of human being in relation to others. An ethos understands freedom as relations where the human being is realized as the ‘image of God’. Ethics without freedom does not

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409 Yannaras 1984, The Freedom of Morality. An example a far reaching communal ethics could be the Social Constitution established by the Jubilee Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1999.
allow for the human being as a subject, but would rather transform the
human being into an ‘object’ with an ‘objective ethics’.411

The task of laying out an existential analytic of man’s being-in-the-
world, as ecstatic relatedness to Being, was postponed because of the
lack of a language adapted to the task. The Neo-Palamist has a way of
responding to this task of Heidegger’s. The transformation of the human
being in the process of Divinization entails, as I understand Neo-
Palamist theology, a transformation from being merely an ‘object’ into
becoming ever more a subject, accepting the ‘image of God’ as bestowed
with freedom and relatedness. In this ecstatic relatedness the human
being is capable of producing an ethos, which is more than a fixed set of
rules; it is the extension through human love, eros, of this freedom to the
‘other’, as God extends this freedom to humans in his kenosis.

C. Neo-Palamist Ecclesiology.

In Neo-Palamist theology, the transformation of the human being as
an object among other things in nature to a subject in relation with
the ‘Other’ through human eros as an ‘outpouring’, kenosis, reveals
emancipation as foundational for the human being. This emancipatory
understanding of reality is not easily accessible in Heidegger’s work,
and it is precisely on this point that Neo-Palamist theology has been a
contribution in modern Orthodox theology.412

Having said this I am still not convinced that Neo-Palamist theology
really has fulfilled the task laid out by Heidegger. It is not sufficient to
state that emancipation, as freedom and relatedness, is primary or even
first philosophy. Heidegger’s task demands more focusing on potentiality
as well as on realization in the spatio-temporal realm of being. Yannaras
and Khoružij dwell on the level of first philosophy, but what does it
imply for the realization of the Church and the spiritual life shared by
those involved.413 Yannaras comes close to this, but what are the positive
implications of his emphasis on ethos instead of ‘objective ethics’, other
than the denial of the latter, or the positive implications of Khoružij’s
‘synergetic ontology’?

412 Hannah Arendt was probably the first one to point out the lack of a positive approach in the works of Heidegger.
See Arendt, H., Heidegger, M. 1998, Briefe, 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse, pp. 93-95; and Arendt 1958, The
Human Condition, pp. 144-153.
413 Metaphysics was not the original concept used by Aristotle concerning ontology. It was Andronicus of Rhodes
who referred to the collection of treatises by Aristotle that came after, ‘meta’, physics. Aristotle himself calls it
“first philosophy” as the discipline that studies “being qua being”. Cf. Ta Meta Physica 1026a18-19.
John Zizioulas has attempted to answer this question, having produced an extensive number of articles and lectures about being-in-the-world. His theology begins not so much in anthropology as with the Trinitarian revelation. Being-in-the-world has to be understood in the context of the relation between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit in Orthodox tradition. By analogy he understands communion in the life of the Church as depending on the Holy Trinity.

His ecclesiology depends very much on the contrast between our biological existence and our ecclesial existence. The hypostasis of the individual, according to Zizioulas, owes its existence to the biological birth. According to its biological hypostasis man is fallen and therefore always fails to sustain the necessary relations with the ‘Other’ and ‘others’. The hypostasis of the ecclesial being, those belonging to the Body of Christ, the Church, owes its existence to the Spiritual birth in baptism, where the human being participates, *kata metochēn*, in the hypostasis of Christ which naturally, by nature, *kata physin*, has communion with the Father and the Holy Spirit.

The differentiation between the individual and the ecclesial being is necessary for Zizioulas in order to safeguard the absolute freedom of the human being. Only God is absolutely free, according to Zizioulas, and that freedom is proclaimed by the fathers when they defended the Father as the cause and the principle of the Holy Trinity. It is not a divine and impersonal substance which causes or unifies the Divine nature, but instead it is caused and unified by the person of the Father.

This also has anthropological and ecclesiological implications. In the same way as the Father is the cause, *aitia*, of Divinity, the human hypostasis is the cause of the human being. Precisely in the same fashion it is the hypostasis of Christ which is the cause of the Church, bringing it to existence, and in which the ecclesial being participates. Zizioulas does not stop there but takes the analogy one step further. As Christ is the ‘ontological principle’ of the Church as such, the bishop is the ‘ontological principle’ of the local Church. On all levels, according to Zizioulas, the ‘One’ constitutes the many; the Father constitutes the Son and the Holy Spirit; Christ constitutes the multitude of ecclesial beings, the Christians; the bishop constitutes the priests and the deacons and the multitude of Christians participating in the mysteries. Likewise the

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‘many’ constitutes the ‘One’; the Son and the Holy Spirit constitutes the Father; the multitude of ecclesial beings constitutes Christ as the Head of the Church; the multitude of participating Christians, deacons and priests constitutes the bishop in the local Church.\(^{417}\)

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Zizioulas has been criticized on many occasions both in writing and in lectures. One of the more frequent critiques has been the charge of being too influenced by Western philosophy, especially by existentialism.\(^{418}\) Here I am in full agreement with Aristotle Papanikolaou.

He is no more superimposing a philosophical system on the Eastern patristic writers than did these same writers Hellenize the teachings of Jesus. His attempt to give further expression to the realism of the divine-human communion through twentieth-century notions of person is analogous to the patristic co-opting of Greek philosophical categories to express the same principle. Zizioulas is doing exactly what these writers did insofar as he is thinking about the authoritative texts of the tradition in light of the questions, challenges, and prevailing philosophical currents of his time.\(^{419}\)

The same critique could be addressed to most of the Church fathers who used contemporary Greek philosophy as tools in answering different questions contemporary to their time. Even though I agree with Papanikolaou in this particular instance I am more hesitant towards his support of Zizioulas’s claim that what is really the issue “is the relation between philosophy and theology.”\(^{420}\) This is maybe the issue concerning the critique mentioned above, but what is really at stake is the relation between theory and practice. Philosophy and theology is still very much a question of first philosophy and not practical philosophy.

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The problem of first philosophy in relation to practical philosophy has been touched upon by Paul Cumin who has made a critical assessment of Zizioulas on three areas of his theology; his doctrine of God, his soteriology and his Christology.\footnote{Cumin 2006, ‘Looking for Personal Space in the Theology of John Zizioulas’.}

a. *The Doctrine of God.* The difference between ‘freedom’ and ‘necessity’ is central in Zizioulas doctrine of God, according to Cumin, and Zizioulas himself is quoted as saying:

> If God’s existence is determined by the necessity of his *ousia* … then all existence is bound by necessity.\footnote{Zizioulas 1989, ‘The Doctrine of God the Trinity Today: Suggestions for an Ecumenical Study’ p. 25; and Cumin 2006, ‘Looking for Personal Space in the Theology of John Zizioulas’, p. 357.}

In order for God to be free, the being of God has to be caused and cannot be accepted merely as a ‘dead ousianic tautology’. Therefore Zizioulas stresses the importance of the Father as the cause (*aitia*) of the being of God through the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Spirit. Otherwise the being of God would spring forth from an impersonal substance and would be caused by necessity.\footnote{Cumin 2006, ‘Looking for Personal Space in the Theology of John Zizioulas’, p. 357.} Instead the causation by the Father is absolutely free, something that Zizioulas states clearly in the following:

> If God's being is not caused by a Person, it is not a free being. And if this Person is not the Father alone, it is impossible to maintain the divine unity or oneness without [sic] into the ultimacy of substance in ontology, i.e. subjecting freedom to necessity and Person to substance.\footnote{Zizioulas 1982, ‘The Teaching of the 2nd Ecumenical Council on the Holy Spirit in Historical and Ecumenical Perspective’, p. 45; and Cumin 2006, ‘Looking for Personal Space in the Theology of John Zizioulas’, p. 358.}

Zizioulas first movement against necessity, according to Cumin, is precisely equating freedom with causation.\footnote{Cumin 2006, ‘Looking for Personal Space in the Theology of John Zizioulas’, p. 357.} The second movement begins with the question stated by Zizioulas himself:

> It is the question of knowing whether otherness can make sense in ontology, whether ontology can do anything more than rest on the idea of totality.\footnote{Zizioulas 1985, *Being as Communion*, p. 86; and Cumin 2006, ‘Looking for Personal Space in the Theology of John Zizioulas’, pp. 358-359.}

According to Cumin the question of totality is just the other side of the same coin. If ontology only rests on the idea of totality then the being of God would once again be of necessity, where the unity of God would
turn out to be caused by the impersonal idea of totality. Therefore Zizioulas emphasizes the Father not only as the cause of God’s being but also as the principle (archē). So the freedom of God’s being rests on two basic ideas in Zizioulas’ work, according to Cumin, the Father as cause and the Father as principle. 427

Reflecting on these two movements against ‘necessity’ Cumin poses a cumbersome question:

Which is more personal, a particular person or persons-in-communion? 428

and Zizioulas’ answer, quoted by Cumin, is

communion is a dimension of personhood, not personhood itself. Without communion there is no Person, but Person does not mean communion. If we wish to attribute God’s personal existence to a Person we can not attribute it to communion, for communion is not a Person. 429

According to Cumin, the problem remains unsolved. Firstly Zizioulas gives priority to freedom over communion in his definition of personhood. Secondly he gives priority to particularity over relation in his definition of the unity of God. Together they press the issue at risk of identifying the freedom of the Father as freedom from the Son and the Spirit. If we quickly categorize the Divine nature as impersonal this is an apparent risk, according to Cumin. 430

b. Soteriology. Yet another risk appears when we are studying the soteriology of Zizioulas, according to Cumin, and that is the integrity of Creation. Firstly, since created existence, according to Zizioulas, has a beginning the human being is a ‘given datum’, and receiving the human being as given implies that the human being is restricted by necessity, and any being restricted by necessity would not be an authentic person. This would in fact imply, according to Cumin, that the human being is not a real person. Furthermore this also implies that ‘person’ and ‘created’ becomes incommensurable to each other. 431

Secondly, according to Zizioulas, humanity suffers from an ontological disorder of nature and personhood, and he argues that the ‘priority of nature over person’ is the main problem of humanity.

Here we have another incommensurability, between given nature and relationality. Authentic personhood and authentic relationality are defined in terms of absolute freedom while ‘created being’ and ‘given nature’ are defined on terms of their ontological limitations. Salvation in the thinking of Zizioulas is the transformation of these given realities in order to acquire true personhood.432

… there is hope also for the creature which by definition is faced by the priority of substance, of "given realities", to be free from these "givens"; to acquire God's way of being in what the Greek Fathers called theosis.433

Now, these oppositions, Cumin continues, between created being and authentic person, between given nature and authentic relationality, are they dependent on the fall or are they intrinsic to creation? Zizioulas is not entirely consistent, according to Cumin. Sometimes Zizioulas does refer to the fall as the source of the priority of substance over communion and even makes it the ontological definition of the fall. On other occasions, according to Cumin, he simply drops the distinction between creation and the fall entirely. Cumin quotes Zizioulas:434

For the Greek Fathers the fall of man – and for that matter sin – is not to be understood as bringing about something new (there is no creative power in evil), but as revealing and actualizing the limitations and potential dangers inherent in creaturehood, if creation is left to itself.435

This makes it evident, according to Cumin, that not only is creation dependent on God for its sustenance but also on the Father as the primordial Person, or as Cumin himself writes:

If theosis is the process by which we become authentic persons, and the Father is the authentic Person, what begins to emerge is a suspiciously absorptive connection between Zizioulas's doctrine of God and his doctrine about creation. Once freedom is located in the particular Person of the Father and necessity presides as the defining characteristic of creation, any construal of salvation in terms of freedom from necessity seems to suggest – if I may – that one is bound on a long walk off a short dock into the great sea of being.436

Creation, according to Cumin, seems simply to be absorbed into the great sea of Divine being without any real existence. Zizioulas is conscious of this and therefore states that the idea of hypostasis must be completed by the idea of substance, but, according to Cumin, one can question if there is anything left of the idea of substance after Zizioulas has had his way.437

**c. Christology.** First of all Zizioulas identifies the very being of Christ in the hypostasis of the Son and this is precisely why Christ is an authentic Person with authentic relationality. Christ has assumed the human nature and thus incorporated it with the authentic personality of the Son that is free from the restrictions of its biological existence, with its tragedy of death and individualism. The two natures are therefore united hypostatically, in the real hypostasis of the Son, which lays the ultimate foundation of Christ’s being, and this is how Zizioulas also interprets Cyril of Alexandria.438

The patristic idea of hypostatic union, such as developed principally by Cyril of Alexandria, makes the person (hypostasis), and not the natures, the ultimate ground for Christ’s being.439

The hypostatic union of the two natures in one hypostasis is of course the Chalcedonian definition of the unity in Christ, but what of the necessity of locating the ultimate being of Christ, Cumin argues? Is this really concomitant with the Fathers and the Gospel, but even more importantly, Cumin argues, we are back at the same dilemma as with soteriology: Does the human nature really have a real existence without the ultimate being of the Son? This becomes even more apparent in how Zizioulas interprets the resurrection, where Zizioulas suggests:

The real hypostasis of Christ was proved to be not the biological one, but the eschatological or Trinitarian hypostasis.440

Here we reach the climax of Zizioulas’ theology, according to Cumin. The ascension is the real ontological difference in Zizioulas’ ecclesial understanding. The ascension of Christ inevitably means that he is no longer an individual, but he has triumphed over the restrictions of creation, being now fully person and a co-terminus with the Church. Christ is now the communion of saints in the world. Christ has become

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de-individualized, and we are back at the dilemma of creation being absorbed by Divinity with createdness lacking the ability of *true being*.\textsuperscript{441}

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Cumin ends his article with some conclusions. Two points are worth mentioning. The first is the problem with how Zizioulas, by developing his ontology of Christ from within the Trinitarian relations of origin with little or no reference to the divine economy, has hardly anything to say about what value the ontological relations have within creation. The second is the comparison between the Creator and creation. Here Cumin suggests that we have a duality of relations. From the perspective of the creation the Creator has to be identified as the ‘idea of totality’, since God can not be separated in any way, apart from revelation, comprehensible for creation. The inner Trinitarian relations can only be accessed through revelation and not through “first philosophy”.\textsuperscript{442}

If we reflect upon Zizioulas’s theology I would suggest that we could agree with Edward Russel’s positive appreciation, in his article ‘Reconsidering Relational Anthropology’,\textsuperscript{443} where Russel states of Zizioulas.

Perhaps the greatest strength of Zizioulas’s understanding of the person is his radically open-ended definition of the self as irreducibly uncontainable, and uncircumscribable, or rather, ecstatic and unique.\textsuperscript{444}

What Russel acknowledges in Zizioulas’ work is the emancipatory understanding of the human being in relation to the Triune God, similar to what Khoružij describes by the concept of ‘synergetic ontology’. There is a genuine touch of emancipation in everything Zizioulas produces which concerns everyone, but I have to admit that I share some of the points made by Cumin and I think they can all be summed up in a single point: Zizioulas does not take the differentiation between Creator and creation seriously enough, nor so Heidegger’s ontological difference, and this is something that threatens the entire Neo-Palamist tradition.

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\textsuperscript{443} Russel 2003, ‘Reconsidering Relational Anthropology’.
\textsuperscript{444} Russel 2003, ‘Reconsidering Relational Anthropology’, p. 177.
Without a clear differentiation between the Creator and creation there is a risk of also loosing the sharp distinction between the essence of God and the energies of God. The distinction between essence and energy is foundational for the Hesychast tradition, constituting the ‘energetic formation’, which in turn, following Khoružij, makes it possible for the human being to transcend herself in an ecstatic relatedness with the Triune God, but loosing the distinction between the Creator and creation threatens the entire paradigm of the Neo-Palamists. In this ecstatic relatedness the initiative is given back to the human being who is capable of unlocking the relation with God.

The strength of Hesychast tradition is precisely in the human being freely exercising the relation with God, with the understanding of Grace as the liberation of the human being transcending the givenness of that relation. This is also the mystery of the incarnation, according to Hesychast tradition, where God takes part in the human condition so that the human being is once again given the initiative to freely partake in an energetic formation with God. The evolutionary consequence of the Hesychast position is a reversed perspective beginning not in the Godhead, but instead beginning their exodus in the human condition with the indwelling of the Divine energies.

When Zizioulas persists in beginning in the Godhead the perspective of an energetic formation dissolves and this has the evolutionary effect of reducing the freedom of the human being, diminishing the ecstatic relatedness with the Triune God, safeguarding the freedom of God but loosing the freedom of the human being. Instead the relation with the Triune God from a human perspective is once again brought into the paradigm of the given. Theology in this sense gets divorced from the basics of an energetic formation, and theology becomes disentangled from human life. Therefore making the inner Trinitarian relations the foundation of theology means that Hesychast tradition looses its strength. This traps Zizioulas’ Ecclesiology in ‘first philosophy’ with almost no consequences for the spatio-temporal life.

This runs counter to Zizioulas’ intentions and those of the entire Neo-Palamist school. Therefore I suggest that Zizioulas’ Ecclesiology would be more consistent if we take as our point of departure not in the Godhead but in the human condition. This would imply a different interpretation of the Ecclesial Being. Instead of developing an understanding of the Ecclesial Being from ‘first philosophy’ we begin with the understanding
of Grace as bringing forth an energetic formation that constitutes the Ecclesial Being, where the human being is capable of unlocking the ecstatic relatedness through the human ecstasis. Otherwise we would be caught in the incommensurability between the Creator, who is perfect, and creation as imperfect. Beginning in the Godhead inevitably leads to the conclusion that the Creator becomes the negation of creation in the sense of creation being ultimately different from God. This is conclusive because the human being is able to transcend herself but not able to transcend the Godhead. Working out a theology from the outset of the inner Trinitarian relations makes it impossible to reach to the depth of the human condition, since it is bound to stay on the level of First philosophy, working within the same paradigm as ‘apophatic theology’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“First Philosophy”</th>
<th>Being</th>
<th>Being-in-the-world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authentic Personhood Ecclesial Being</td>
<td>Given Nature Biological Existence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentic Relationality Grace</td>
<td>The Fall Individualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: The Ontological Difference of Zizioulas

Above I have attempted to visualize Zizioulas’ theology by using four quadrants: In the top left we have Authentic Personhood and Ecclesial Being, both dependent on the understanding of God as ultimately free. These belong to the realm of what Heidegger describes as Being itself, and since they are grounded in the Triune being of God they are incommensurable with creation and therefore become the otherness of being-in-the-world, with the primordial Father as the cause. Bottom left we have Authentic Relationality and Grace. These are the revelations of true Being, defined as absolute freedom, where Grace is freedom from necessity. Grace in this sense reveals the human condition as lacking true personhood, and the impossibility of the human nature as an authentic person, with the exception of Christ. Top right we have Given Nature and Biological Existence referring to what Heidegger would identify as being-in-the-world as a manifestation of Being itself, but since the Divine Being is incommensurable with creation being-in-the-world seems to evolve into a negation of Being in Zizioulas’ theology. Bottom right we have the revelations of being-in-the-world: Individualism and
the Fall. They answer the question of why human nature cannot acquire true personhood but with hardly any practical implications.

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A clear distinction between the Creator and creation reveals the incommensurability between the Divine Being and being-in-the-world, disclosing the need of reversing the perspective beginning in the human condition. Otherwise being-in-the-world threatens to be reduced to a negation of Being, simply because one is perfect and the other imperfect. Such a comparison would endanger the good of creation. This is precisely what I believe actually happens with Zizioulas’ theology. The Fall and Individualism become revelations of being-in-the-world and the whole of creation evolves into a negation of Being. If we make a clear distinction between Being as the ultimately ‘Other’ and being-in-the-world as reflecting the human condition, which Cumin actually seems to suggest, we have to move the idea of Ecclesial Being from the realm of the Divine to the realm of creation, and if we make the same move with Grace we have the Ecclesial Being situated in our existence with the revelation of Grace as the foundation of the human condition. Thereby the visual conception would be more affirmative towards creation.

Figure 5: The Ontological Difference Reconstructed

If we then proceed by accepting the Neo-Palamist idea that Grace is the energetic transformation of the human being into a subject, as the ‘image of God’, whenever she encounters the Triune God, we acquire a positive analytic of being-in-the-world. The interpretation would then suggest that the Ecclesial Being is basically authentic relations stemming from an ultimate freedom in relation with the ‘Other’ but understood from the perspective of the human condition as ecstatic relatedness. This would imply that the human being, and with it the human nature as the
‘image of God’, is created for relatedness with the ability of transcending herself, of ecstatic relatedness, but afflicted by the fall by way of being trapped in individualism. Through Grace the human being once again opens up towards transcendence where God enables the human being to reach out beyond herself, fulfilling herself as the ‘image of God’, which reveals the process of Divinization. This process, however, begins not in the Godhead but in the human condition, with the assistance of the paraclete. In this way the paradigm of the Neo-Palamists gains a more positive approach to creation and the human being without loosing its essential attributes or substantially altering Zizioulas’ ecclesiology.

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This has two basic effects. The first is that we need to recover the apophatic understanding of social trinitarianism. The second is the need to reverse our theological understanding as beginning in the human condition and reaching for the revelation of the Godhead instead of going in the opposite direction. We cannot and should not describe the characteristics of the authentic relatedness of the Trinitarian being in any other way than apophatically.445 Authentic relatedness is beyond the scope of our comprehension, but we can come to the conclusion that it is not limited by our finitude and the same counts with freedom.

Stipulating a more thorough ontological difference between the Creator and creation renders a slightly different reading of the fathers, and the primordiality of the Father is not as simple as Zizioulas suggests with regard to the doctrine of the fathers. This is also what John R. Meyer finds in his comparative study of Athanasius and the Cappadocian fathers,446 where he questions an overemphasized separation between the Father as origin and the Divine nature as caused. Instead he suggests that it has to be understood from a more apophatic perspective, which is also very much the case with Gregory of Nazianzus. He sees the two Cappadocian brothers, Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, as deviating in this sense, depending too much, perhaps, on Greek philosophy.447

445 Apophatic theology differs from kataphatic theology in the sense that apophatic theology makes no assumptions about the essence of God since the essence is incomprehensible and inaccessible for our understanding of God. The only way to speak correctly about God in this sense is to speak in a negative way, as to what God is not. The positive approach towards God, kataphatic theology, takes as its point of departure the self-manifestations of God, especially the incarnation, where God reveals himself.

446 Meyer 2006, ‘God’s Trinitarian substance in Athanasian theology’.

The context of Athanasius’ activity in working out a consistent theology is the preparation for the first Ecumenical council in Nicaea when Arius attacked the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. Arius understood the generation of the Son from the Father as the Son being inferior to the Father and therefore not of the same substance. This compelled Athanasius to readdress the understanding of the generation of the Son in a new way. Against the Arians Athanasius made the primordial Father less monarchical through two movements.

First, according to Meyer, he argued that calling God Father was not just convenient for Christ but reveals the true identity of the Son with the Father. The Son was not a subordinate God taking flesh just to teach us about God (the teaching of Asterius) nor was he a mere human being rewarded divine sonship (the teaching of Eusebius). Instead the Son is generated eternally from the Father, but not in the sense of being subordinate to the Father. To safeguard the equality between the Father and the Son Athanasius makes a distinction between ontological priority and relational priority. The Father has a relational priority but not an ontological priority. The latter priority would make the Son subordinate, but a relational priority reveals the Son as identical with the Father according to his Substance (ousia).

This brings us to the second movement against the Arians, the consubstantiality (homousios) between the Father and the Son. Athanasius insists that the priority of the Father to the Son only is logical. They are equal in being divine and uncreated. Here Athanasius differs from the Cappadocian fathers, especially Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa. While the Cappadocians emphasize that the father is principle (archê) of the Trinity, Athanasius is reluctant to use the concept for the inner Trinitarian relations. Instead he makes a sharp distinction between the Son as the pre-existent and Only-Begotten (monogenês) and the saving and creative activity of the Son as Firstborn (prōtotokos) and incarnate. Since the concept archê, according to Aristotle, belongs very much to the saving and creative activity he is reluctant to use the concept

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452 Meyer 2006, ‘God’s Trinitarian substance in Athanasian theology’, p. 82-83.
for the relations within the Trinity.\textsuperscript{453} We can see a similar reluctance with Gregory of Nazianzus, but not with Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, according to Meyer.\textsuperscript{454} This leads Athanasius to develop a much more apophatic understanding of what Father means in the Trinity. While the Cappadocians stress the difference between the Son and the Spirit as having a \textit{derived} Deity, and the Father as having an \textit{underived} Deity, Athanasius has a much more cautious understanding, according to Meyer. For him the only thing we can know from God’s fatherhood is that the Son is described as the essential self-expression of God in the Son, and simultaneously in the Spirit, and this self-expression Athanasius describes with the concept \textit{perichōrēsis} (mutual interpenetration). This, according to Meyer, means that all that the Father is shares the Son.\textsuperscript{455}

The difference between the Cappadocians and Athanasius in both of these movements is the sharp distinction that Athanasius presents to us, between the pre-existent and eternal relations of the Trinity and the salvific and creative economy of God. Without this distinction Athanasius fears, according to Meyer, that the doctrine of the Trinity falls back into the idea of the Son emanating from the Father. This is the reason why the fathers of Nicaea used the concept \textit{homoousios}, according to Meyer, to safeguard the self-expression of the Deity in the Son.\textsuperscript{456} Athanasius nevertheless realizes that the apophatic reading of Nicaea is necessary to gain a correct understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, as he states:

\begin{quote}
God is not as man, nor the generation of the Son as a human issue.\textsuperscript{457}
\end{quote}

The generation of the Son, according to Meyer, should not be understood in the works of Athanasius as the Son could be separated as a human son could be separated from the father. Instead each person in the Trinity should be understood as ‘a whole of a whole’, the whole deity is in the Son and in the Spirit.\textsuperscript{458} This understanding is not all too clear with Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa,\textsuperscript{459} which Thomas Weinandy expresses in his article \textit{The Father’s Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity}:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[457] See Meyer 2006, ‘God’s Trinitarian substance in Athanasian theology’, p. 90; and Athanasius \textit{De Synodis} 41.
\item[458] See Meyer 2006, ‘God’s Trinitarian substance in Athanasian theology’, p. 94; and Athanasius \textit{Epistel ad Serapionem} 1.6.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The Cappadocians never captured the true metaphysical significance of Nicaea’s *homoousion* doctrine. For them the Father alone still embodied the Godhead and the Son was *begotten out of him* and the Holy Spirit *proceeded out of him*. While the Cappadocians were great terminological and conceptual innovators in regard to the Trinity and wished to ensure the monarchy of the Father and true individuality of the Son and the Holy Spirit, yet because they did not possess the metaphysical acumen of Athanasius, Platonic emanationism became firmly grafted into Orthodox Trinitarian thought, and is present to this day.\(^{460}\)

The Cappadocians, according to Meyer, are at risk of repeating the same blunder as Arius, if taken too far, by arguing that the Son is God only in a derivative sense.\(^{461}\) Emanationism is a real threat for Neo-Palamist theology if there is no clear distinction between Creator and creation, as well as taking the ontological difference by Heidegger seriously.

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The theology of being is nothing more than metaphysics according to Heidegger, which he understands as a kind of Onto-theology, and as such it contributes to the *Seinsvergessenheit* of Being. Heidegger’s critique of Onto-theology, is analyzed by Wayne J. Hankey in his article *Theoria versus Poiesis*.\(^{462}\) There he argues for two necessary theological differences to avoid Heidegger’s critique of Onto-theology. The root of the problem, according to Hankey, is that philosophical theology confuses Being with beings, in as much as God is turned into a super being. God is understood from the divine perspective and as Christians we are related to being from the side of the Creator’s will, which reduces being to a manipulable thing.\(^{463}\)

Therefore it is necessary for theology to follow the ontological difference through and for that reason to make two theological differences. The first, according to Hankey, is the difference between ontology and revelation. Ontology belongs to the realm of what ‘is’ and revelation belongs to the realm of what ‘ought to be’. Revelation resides in the community of those sharing the revelation and as such it belongs to the communicative capacity that human beings have of reaching mutual understanding.\(^{464}\) This makes being-in-the-world linguistic and


\(^{462}\) Hankey 1999, ‘Theoria versus Poiesis’.


John Milbank therefore uses the word *logontic* to describe being-in-the-world.\(^{465}\)

The second is the difference between Being and thought. Thinking about Being is not Being. Metaphysical constructions do not reveal the authenticity of the God whom we worship and direct our prayers to. Instead we need to move beyond not just philosophy but also *theoria* towards *poesis* and *praxis*, where praxis are the shared practices of the Church and poesis are the creative experiences of charity.\(^{466}\) Otherwise we would still be entangled in the confusion of beings with Being, and only through poesis and praxis can the love of God be manifested in the world, and dialogue lead to doxology, as Catherine Pickstock puts it.\(^{467}\)

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Taking the ontological difference seriously also renders a second difference in how to deal with theology apart from the apophatic perspective. Andrew Louth’s reading of Maximos the Confessor could serve as an example of this in his presentation of *The Ecclesiology of Saint Maximos the Confessor*.\(^{468}\) The Church, according to Maximos, should be ‘an image and type of God’, but by imitating and representing God’s activity in the world (*energeia*). In this way Maximos makes a clear distinction between the Creator and creation. It is the energies and not the inner Trinitarian relations that are the foundation of the image and type of the Church. Still there is more in how Maximos pursues this strand of being-in-the-world.\(^{469}\)

God creates beings in wonderful extraordinary diversity, but also brings all beings together in a wonderful harmony. According to Louth Maximos presents this bringing together as a *recapitulation* where diversity and unity are simultaneous. The idea of recapitulation rests on the vision of the Church as profoundly hierarchical, according to Louth, but not in the sense of the contemporary misinterpretation of Maximos implying subordination. Instead the vision of hierarchy has to be combined with the apparition of the Church as community.\(^{470}\) Everyone, according to Maximos, is born into the Church and through it they are

\(^{468}\) Louth 2004, ‘The Ecclesiology of Saint Maximos the Confessor’.
reborn, where each receives Grace in a unique way. In this community of Grace everyone counts and contributes to a rich and wonderful diversity, but together they are raised up and brought together to the Godhead in a process of recapitulation (*caput* means head).\(^{471}\) This makes it possible to talk about diversity as foundational for unity.

The idea of recapitulation also gives us a renewed understanding of apophatic theology. Maximos has a reversed perspective on God's activity in the world. It begins in the divine economy, in the activity of God's creative and salvific work, in the manifestations or *energies* of God. In these manifestations the diversity of creation is brought together through Grace where those who are reborn share the knowledge of God. In this sharing the community of Christians is able to transcend this world and pass beyond *eschaton* to the promised Kingdom of God. The dividing line in the works of Maximos is between the divine Godhead in itself and the manifestations of the Godhead. The manifestations are only accessible to us in the spatio-temporal existence, as an ecstatic transcendence of our complete existence, but it cannot transcend the existence of God. This is why the salvific and creative activity, *poesis*, begins in the diversity and multitude of creation and does not emanate from the Godhead, which would transgress the dividing line between the Creator and creation. The Creator can manifest himself in creation thereby drawing us to the Godhead, but the opposite is ontologically impossible.\(^{472}\)

This reversed understanding of the divine economy also makes the eschatological understanding of Maximos a reality and not just a vision. The Church enters into the paschal mystery and through Grace it passes beyond eschaton, but, according to Louth’s reading of Maximos, *eschaton* also breaks into history and reveals the reality in a specific form. It begins in the Church as belonging to eschaton which makes the Church a sovereign body, with its own institutions, but still residing in this world with the effect of revealing the brokenness of this world. In Maximos’ own life, according to Louth, this lead to his defending the autonomy of the Church in relation to the emperor at the cost of his own life.\(^{473}\)

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D. Liturgical Theology and Neo-Palamist Ecclesiology

The Eucharistic Ecclesiology first developed by Nicholas Afanassiev is fundamental for Liturgical Theology as well as Neo-Palamist ecclesiology, but there is a difference between the Eucharistic Ecclesiology of the Russian school and the Eucharistic Ecclesiology of the Neo-Palamist school. They both share the conviction that the Church dwells in its fullness in the local Church, but differ in how this is possible as well as how to describe it. In the Russian school the emphasis lies in the local and empirical conditions, and in the latter school the philosophy of being is central. In the works of Afanassiev and Schmemann, the Assembly is fundamental for Eucharistic Ecclesiology, but in the works of Zizioulas it is the understanding of the Ecclesial being that is primary.

Reaching beyond theoria towards poesis and praxis is precisely what Empirical Ecclesiology is all about. Afanassiev never really made the argument of an ontological difference, or distinction between the Creator and creation, and he nevertheless grounded his theology on the local and human conditions of the Church with its epic centre in the Eucharist. Afanassiev developed an attitude to ecclesiology which resided in an awareness that God took flesh and became human, and therefore history and the human condition have to be the primary point of departure for both theology as well as ecclesiology.

This is further emphasized in the discussion on the primacy of Rome, where Affanasiev suggests priority instead of primacy given that unity cannot be an abstraction but must to be achieved between the local Churches, and in this process the bishop of Rome has a priority. The perspective is emancipatory, releasing the local Churches from an ontological unity resting in Rome without the participation of the Ecumenical Church. This is further supported by Schmemann in the same discussion, as we have seen above, when Schmemann develops an understanding of unity from below, through a recapitulation of the local churches to a unified Body of Christ. Both argue for a practical perspective of unity that needs to involve communication in order to reach a consensus in the Ecumenical Church. The initiative resides in the local Church and not in the universal Church since unity cannot be imposed, but has to emerge from within, as a result of freedom and love, according to Khomiakov.
Schmemann develops this further by initiating an ontological
difference grounded in an intuitive awareness of the difference between
God as Being and the manifestations of the liturgical life as being –
lex orandi est lex credendi – similar to what Milbank proposes in his
description of theology as logontic. With the theory of Liturgical
Theology, language becomes constitutive for theology as I have argued
previously. This theory is not a kind of meta-theory but a practical
ecclesiology intended to emancipate those belonging to the Church. In
his doctoral dissertation Liturgical Theology focuses on how we pray,
but in his final book, The Eucharist, the complete manifestation of
the Church depends on the human subjects assembling and reaching
consensus through language and rituals. Here the difference between the
Eucharistic Ecclesiology of Zizioulas and Liturgical Theology becomes
apparent. While Schmemann increasingly focuses on the practical
realization of the Church, Zizioulas works out his ecclesiology at a
philosophical level.

By establishing an empirical ecclesiology bereft of much of the
metaphysical content, Afanassiev and Schmemann differentiate between
the Creator and creation, Being and being-in-the-world. At the same
time, as with the Neo-Palamists, they attempt to establish emancipation
as the foundation of their mission. Liturgical Theology does not begin in
the inner-Trinitarian relations, which are beyond reach, rather it begins
in the manifestations of Being, the revelations and human conditions
where we begin to grasp the unfathomable. Basically this implies that
we have to combine our understanding of the human condition, which
is offered by science, with a genuine understanding and knowledge of
the Church as revelation in order to establish a practical ecclesiology of
being-in-the-world. While the Neo-Palamists focus on the philosophy
of being, creating a neo-patristic analysis by combing existentialism and
the teachings of the fathers, Afanassiev and Schmemann gravitate on
the existential and ecclesial experience without rising to the level of an
existential philosophy.

Schmemann makes use of the concept of hypostasis but in a very
apophatic way, stating that the Church has its foundation not of this
world but in this world. Schmemann is reluctant to use metaphysical
language in a descriptive way in relation to ecclesiology. Empirical
ecclesiology entails staying grounded in the human condition of the
Church while using metaphysical statements cautiously.
Still there is an ambiguity in Liturgical Theology as I have described above. On the one hand Liturgical Theology produces emancipation but on the other hand Schmemann, by employing the concept of the *ordo*, tries to maintain a tradition *given once and for all*, thereby effecting a sedition of the synchronic perspective, which risks objectifying the participants in the Eucharist as servants of the order itself. As I argued previously Schmemann is aware of the problem but lacks a clear understanding of the relation between theory and practice. Schmemann realizes that mere understanding is insufficient; there is also the need for the transformation of the cosmos to begin as a calling from within the Church. Even though Schmemann, in the dialogue with Botte and Grisbrooke, seems to be aware of the dialectical relation between faith and liturgy, and of theory and practice, he nevertheless appears to believe that understanding more or less automatically leads to transformation. This is criticized by Lathrop as an idealized view of the Church, which disregards the sinful disarray of this world. In order to resolve this ambiguity we need a deeper awareness of how the human condition establishes the theory of Liturgical Theology. We need an action-theoretic analysis of rituals and language as communicative instruments in the Church, as well as a deeper understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. Thereafter we may gain an understanding of the relation between theory and practice, and a deeper awareness of the ambiguity of Liturgical Theology.

In the next chapter I will therefore present a perspective on the human condition as Jürgen Habermas describes it in his Theory of Communicative Action, where he addresses both the relation between communication and language, ritual action and communicative action, philosophy and theology, and the relation between theory and practice. Later, in the third part of my dissertation, I will present a synthesis of Habermas's communicative theory and the Neo-Palamist's understanding, but from the perspective of a distinction between Being and being-in-the-world, using the synthesis as a tool for improving Liturgical Theology.
5. Communicative Action and Inter-subjective Theory

The deeper I penetrated into the theories of action, meaning, speech acts, and other similar domains of analytic philosophy, the more I lost sight in the details of the aim of the whole endeavour. The more I sought to satisfy the explicative claims of the philosopher, the further I moved from the interests of the sociologist, who has to ask what purpose such conceptual analysis should serve. 474

Jürgen Habermas, Authors preface, Theory of Communicative Action, 1981

Habermas often returns to the overall purpose of his studies, and shares the same experience of totalitarianism as the Neo-Palamists. The overall purpose of his work is the emancipation of the human being, and in the same manner as the Neo-Palamists he directs his focus against the self-enclosed subject, by developing a polyphone understanding of reality. Still he differs from the Neo-Palamists in the sense that his theory does not depend on the otherness of God or the philosophy of being. Instead his inter-subjective theory has its foundation in the linguistic and sociological understanding of the human condition.

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In this chapter I will investigate Jürgen Habermas’ inter-subjective theory of communicative action. I will begin (A) by presenting his emancipation oriented understanding of reality and then (B) by studying his theory of ritual action, arguing that the main purpose of ritual action is the production of social solidarity and that it has to be differentiated from rationalization, but not in the sense of abandoning ritual action as Habermas argues. In the third part (C) I will produce an outline of Habermas’s reflection upon religion as presented in his later works after receiving Friedenspreis des Buchhandelns, which culminates in his dialogue with Joseph Ratzinger. I will argue that Habermas did not substantially alter his understanding of the difference between theology and philosophy at the beginning of the 21st century. Instead the foundation was already there at the beginning of the 1990’s. After that (D) I will relate his vision of the Lifeworld to his perception of

the difference between lifeworld and system, and finally connect the theory of communicative action with Schmemann’s theory of Liturgical Theology.

A. HABERMAS’S INTER-SUBJECTIVE THEORY AND EMANCIPATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF REALITY

The overall purpose of Habermas’ effort is the emancipation of individuals from exploitation and domination in an increasingly commodified and reified world. This is a world where human beings are easily instrumentalized and transformed into objects, but for Habermas the emancipated subject is a higher form of existence and the realization of what it means to be human.475

According to Habermas the problem of emancipation can only be resolved discursively, through communication between responsible subjects. The goal is to establish a discursive space free enough from distortions so that debate can be conducted without domination in order to solve disputes and to reach consensus.476 This implies that language is the main media of the process of empowerment and emancipation in Habermas’ work.

From this foundational insight Habermas creates a Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) not as a meta-theory, but as a social theory aimed at the emancipation of individuals. Habermas makes use of different sources in the establishment of his social theory. From Hannah Arendt, one of Heidegger’s students, he gained an understanding of the participatory theory of politics where the public space has to be constructed in such a way that citizens acting and speaking together may call “something into being which did not exist before.”477 He also made use of the method of Critical Theory developed by the adherents of the Frankfurt school. Critique in this sense does not entail disproving other theories but rather establishing the limits of their validity, by exposing the social reality reflected in these theories, which are themselves distorted, as an alienated and impoverished version of what it could become. Habermas also made use of Marx’s core insight

that emancipation has to be rooted in the processes that sustain social relations among individuals.\textsuperscript{478}

Habermas nevertheless also differed from most of his sources, developing his own interpretation of their major achievements, which is the particular characteristic of the way he conducts his work. Even though he shared the critique by Marxism-Leninism against the abstract division between objectivistic science and subjectivist freedom he nevertheless argued that they failed since they were unable to make the necessary difference between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, theory and practice, as well as science and ethics, on account of their reliance on the metaphysics of history.\textsuperscript{479} Habermas was also hesitant towards Max Weber’s pessimism and the retreat into negativity by the thinkers of the Frankfurt school, such as Georg Lukács, Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno.\textsuperscript{480}

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It is language, according to Habermas, and not philosophy that is the primary means towards discovering truth that was previously unknown. The human being has a symbolic relation to the world, a relation that is mediated through words and other symbols. Through these symbols we recreate the world, thereby transcending the temporal streams of consciousness,\textsuperscript{481} or as Habermas himself formulates it:

In creating meanings which remain self-identical, symbolization creates a medium for thoughts which can transcend the temporal stream of consciousness.\textsuperscript{482}

Habermas shares Ernst Cassirer’s basic theory of language. Cassirer argues that language has three functions. Language ‘in the phase of sensuous expression’ appears in gestures, different corporeal expressions, excited sounds and demonstrative movements, signifying the designated objects. The second function is analogical language, which relates to things in an objectifying sense, not dependent on a determinate context, but connected to a specific situation. The third function is propositionally differentiated language, embedded in the lifeworld, with

\textsuperscript{478} Dews 1999, \textit{Habermas, A Critical Reader}, pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{480} Habermas has a much more positive approach to the ability of human beings to engage themselves in communicative action. Reconciliation and freedom is ingrained into the very condition of communicative interaction between individuals. See Habermas 1971, \textit{Knowledge and Human Interests}.
the purpose of orienting us in everyday practice, thereby establishing meaning. These three functions of language correspond to a progressive decontextualization and objectification, but this striving towards abstraction does not only count for language but for all symbolic worlds, which, according to Cassirer, are the four worlds of myth, language, art and science.483

Myth, language, art and science all create their own form-specific object domain, and therefore suggest a plurality of symbolic worlds. In Cassirer's case this creates a problem for him since he conceives of the symbolic worlds as all originating from the common ground of myth. This perspective has been criticized by Konrad Marc Wogau who claims that this is only possible if one can deduce the 'thing-in-itself' from the spatio-temporal existence of things, which would run up against the ontological difference between Being and beings.484

Instead of supporting Cassirer, Habermas states that the different symbolic worlds are incommensurable and that there is no reference point for an objective world. This means that reality in, Habermas' thinking, is not a singular but rather a polyphone reality dependent on the mediation through the different symbolic worlds. However this does not mean that reality is relative, or unattainable for the human being. This is Habermas' primary point of departure for his emancipational theory; the polyphone reality is mastered by the human subjects who create the symbolic worlds. This is achieved inter-subjectively, language having a central position, mediating between the symbolic worlds.485

Habermas argues that this also does away with a transcendent subject beyond the empirical world and instead suggests a detranscendentalization. Such a process would result in a multiplicity of contexts, fragmented into a pluralism of languages and cultures.486 The process of detranscendentalization in Habermas' work liberates language from the constraints of objectivity, as if one could control language like private property. Instead languages empower subjects with powers of free subjectivity.487 If one let go of the demands to an objective world, the primary reference point would be the subject, engaged in communication with other subjects. Together they recreate the world

turning it into a common awareness, what Habermas designates as the lifeworld.488

Moving the reference point from the objective world to the subject, engaged in communication achieved by the pragmatics of language, involves a paradigm shift from the paradigm of consciousness, with the self-enclosed Cartesian subject, to mutual understanding achieved inter-subjectively. This shift also implies moving from a subject-centered conception to a communicative conception of reason and rationality. Meaning, according a communicative conception, is created between people, in a dialogic, self-reflective and inter-subjective process. Collective learning is foundational for a communicative conception of rationality. Furthermore people's actions have to be understood in terms of the meaning it implies for them inter-subjectively, and not defined as individual intentions.489

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Realizing the full impact of the paradigm shift we have to adopt the performative attitude of a communicative participant, according to Habermas, realizing that both actor and interpreter belong to the same universe of discourse. This is parallel to Marxism-Leninism which contests the division between objectivistic science and subjectivistic freedom. The illusion of the interpreter or the scientist as belonging to an objective world outside the realm of the actors deludes the sciences with an image of a self-subsistent world of facts structured in a law-like manner. Nevertheless, according to Habermas, the Marxist-Leninist approach was unsuccessful, because they did not succeed in differentiating ‘is’ and ‘ought’ thoroughly enough. The ideal society, in the Marxist-Leninist thought, was not only something that ought to be but was almost inevitable provided there was enough freedom of progression, as an event almost without the need of a subject.490

Instead Habermas is eager to differentiate between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. Without this distinction communication and inter-subjectivity is suppressed by the ontology of the factual, of those facts that seem to bestow an appearance of immediacy on what is really mediated in a symbolical reproduction. These facts of immediacy foster an abstraction,

which in turn creates an indifference towards what is other and in the end neutralizes the relation to the other. Instead of being contested validity claims they are presented as irrefutable facts.\textsuperscript{491} This is why Habermas states that

\ldots the intention of the good and true life can be preserved today only on the ruins of ontology.\textsuperscript{492}

Through the differentiation between ‘ought’ and ‘is’, reciprocal recognition of difference and otherness is possible, which fosters communicative freedom. Habermas explains this phenomenon by making another differentiation, between knowledge and interest. Knowledge, according to Habermas, is guided by interests, which are deeply embedded in the social existence of human beings. Different ways of knowing are shaped qualitatively by different interests. Habermas makes a distinction between the interest of the ‘empirical-analytical sciences’, aimed at acquiring technical control of their objects, and the hermeneutic sciences, aimed at “the preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action-orienting mutual understanding”.\textsuperscript{493}

This does not mean that knowledge serves interest, but rather, according to Habermas, they are in a dialectical relation, but through this inter-action between knowledge and interests the self-reflective being stands forth guided by the more foundational interest of emancipation. Self-reflection in this sense is emancipatory, according to Peter Dews, in two ways. First it enables us to access the world as definite for us but not of us. Secondly this enables us to use explanation and understanding in order to free ourselves. Habermas is eager to emphasize the importance of the primacy of the emancipatory interest. Even though it is possible to predict and control human behavior we have to be careful so that we don’t suppress the role of its object as a potential partner in a dialogue through such knowledge.\textsuperscript{494}

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The reflection model whereby the potential partner is reduced to an object enforces unity and totalization, whereas communicative freedom cultivates reciprocal recognition of difference and otherness, reassessing its object as a potential partner. When we observe the other as a potential partner we become aware of the importance of maintaining communication instead of order.\textsuperscript{495} From this communicative attitude human beings employ a communicative rationality

... oriented to achieving, sustaining and renewing consensus – and indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims.\textsuperscript{496}

A communicatively achieved agreement, according to Habermas, must in the end be based on reason. Habermas employs two fundamental conceptions in his description of communicative reason. One is argumentation and the other is learning. The first concept relates to those processes whereby participants thematize contested validity claims and vindicate them as well as criticize them through arguments. The latter concept is associated with how we ground our rationality through the process of adjusting our arguments from our mistakes and refuted hypotheses.\textsuperscript{497}

Thus we call a person rational who, in the cognitive-instrumental sphere, expresses reasonable opinions and acts efficiently; but this rationality remains accidental if it is not coupled with the ability to learn from mistakes, from the refutation of hypotheses and from the failure of interventions.\textsuperscript{498}

By employing communicative reason, grounded in the emancipatory interest, participants seek a justified consensus, which cannot be reached without reciprocal recognition of the other and of difference.

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Since language, and not philosophy, is the foundation for emancipation of being, Habermas makes a distinction between philosophy-as-critique and the tradition of metaphysics in his article Wozu noch Philosophie?\textsuperscript{499}

\textsuperscript{499} In Habermas 1971 Philosophisch-politische Profile.
He does so by stressing four aspects which distinguish philosophy from metaphysics. (1) Philosophy has to retreat from the illusion of providing the ultimate foundations for knowledge. (2) Philosophy has to understand itself as part of the social praxis, thereby beginning in praxis and not in theory. (3) Philosophy has to adopt a critical attitude towards the claims of metaphysical and religious worldviews, thereby releasing their contents towards emancipation and the future. (4) Philosophy has to be aware of its own elitist understanding and socially restricted basis.

All in all these four aspects reveal the first basis of Habermas’ understanding of philosophy as a provider of critique and not as an end in itself. In fact philosophy in this sense comes last, reflecting on the historical consciousness and social practice. The primary question is no longer “Why is there being rather than nothing?”, but “Why is this particular historical and social situation so and not otherwise?” The primary concern is no longer what ‘is’, but what ‘ought’ to be. The focus is no longer on ontology but on the ontic. According to Habermas, there has previously been too much ontology which neglects the ontic.

In Habermas’ work, metaphysics is a concept as complex as the concept lifeworld. He refrains from giving it a precise definition. Instead metaphysics is in itself a symbol for an entire tradition more or less in opposition of his understanding of the inter-subjective consciousness. As such metaphysics represents the entire paradigm and is part of a language game where the term is defined by its usefulness. This often creates a misunderstanding in relation to Habermas’ thinking, where scholars try to define his concept without relating it to the paradigmatic precursor before the paradigmatic change to inter-subjectivity. Therefore metaphysics is characterized from the more negative perspective. In comparison with his own perception of philosophy, metaphysics is presented in his book Nachmetaphysisches Denken as being dependent on the idea that everything could be connected to a totality. This in turn exists on a theoretical level, more real than life itself, and from this level practice is deduced. Trying to deduce a simplistic definition of metaphysics would be nothing more than metaphysics, since the very conception of metaphysics is holistic, idealistic and solely theoretical.


501 Ontology, as Habermas understands it, is something that merely exists, which does not have any implications for the practical affirmation of life or for the improvement of the human condition of life. Ontology therefore threatens to objectify the human condition since it merely states what exists regardless of whether it ‘ought to be’ or not.
Instead it seems that Habermas avoids such a precise definition, being weary of falling into the metaphysical fallacy.

The second basis is the transformed claim of totality. Previously first philosophy was aimed at a disinterested contemplation of knowledge in itself. Habermas criticizes this attitude of pure theory as an ontological illusion. It produces a vision of the world as self-subsistent without the knowing subject. Instead Habermas makes use of his theory of knowledge and interest. Since these two have a dialectical relationship the world and the knowing subject exist equally in a dialectical relationship. This makes it impossible to reach a complete transcendence of totality since it depends on the interests of the knowing subject. Instead Habermas suggests that philosophy has to accept the limit of totality as dependent on the knowing subject. The noblest function of philosophy is therefore not the contemplation of totality, but to break down reifications and objectifications, through a process of reflection. As such philosophy acts as a discloser of possibilities, instead of solidifying worldviews.\textsuperscript{502}

The primary concern of what ‘ought’ to be and the transformed claim of totality both depend on the differentiation between meaning and mere fact. Understanding meaning, according to Habermas, is a mode of experience and not existence. It is a communicative experience made possible through the performative attitude of a participant in interaction. Further more, Habermas argues, understanding meaning in this sense is the way we use our common sense, and philosophy in the metaphysical sense is therefore completely opposed to common sense. So the shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language also implies a shift from existence to experience, entering the spatio-temporal realm of human condition.

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If we compare the inter-subjective theory with the Neo-Palamists we find that they share the basic conviction of emancipation as being primary for the human being. Both criticize the Cartesian self-enclosed subject, but whereas the Neo-Palamists are engaged in the philosophy of being Habermas employs a different kind of rationality. Even though they both criticize Cartesian rationality and subjectivism as being ‘monological’, Habermas establishes the paradigm shift from the philosophy of

consciousness, *cogito ergo sum*, to the more practical philosophy of language, moving from a subject-centered conception of reason and rationality to a communicative.\(^{503}\) The transfer towards a communicative conception begins with the denunciation of the possibility of knowledge in the self-certainty of subjectivity. The individual subject cannot establish knowledge through a monologue, but instead has to be engaged in dialogue with other subjects in order to acquire knowledge and make use of reason and rationality.\(^{504}\) This is the foundation for the theory of inter-subjectivity in Habermas’ work.

Consequently, while the Neo-Palamists remain within the philosophy of being for their emancipatory understanding, Habermas instead develops the understanding of communicative freedom as the natural consequence of a communicative conception of reason and rationality. Otherwise emancipation remains an ontological contemplation without being realized ontically. It is by permitting and discussion rather than control and decisionism that emancipation can be realized among human beings in a communicative process. Still Habermas comes close to Yannaras’ intention in using the concept *ethos*. While Yannaras argues for ‘a way of life’ instead of a communal ethics fixed from the start, Habermas argues for a decentralized understanding of ethics. There is no possibility, Habermas argues, of identifying a fixed superlative mode of life for the human being. Consequently Habermas is more inclined to identify the good society as one where a certain process, embedded in the interest of emancipation, is guaranteed rather than predicting certain outcomes.\(^{505}\)

The main difference between Habermas and the Neo-Palamists reveals itself in the understanding of the multicultural existence. The processes of a good society, according to Habermas, depend on the inter-subjective appropriation of ‘who we are’, but since knowledge and interest stand in dialectical relation to each other, ‘who we are’ can never claim an ultimate totality. Instead, Habermas argues, subjects acting communicatively participate in a common lifeworld, which is formed from more or less diffuse and unproblematic background convictions. For those participating in a lifeworld it is not only a world but the world. Still, there are a multitude of lifeworlds, dependent on different cultures. The notion of the whole is nevertheless restricted to the lifeworld or a

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culture, and any transcendence of the lifeworld arises from within the lifeworld and cannot be imported from without. If that were the case then we would find our selves once again caught up in the illusion of an objective world, independent from the knowing subject. The lifeworld is simply the background for communicative interaction. The Neo-Palamists seem instead to be more interested in finding a holistic way of life, which transcends the different lifeworlds, and which Habermas deems impossible.

Participation in the lifeworld, according to Habermas, is basically the sharing of a common sense of who we are, and who we value being. Collective identity initially emerges in the lifeworld in the form of normative consensus, but not as an achieved consensus since the individual identities of the group members are established equiprimordially with the identity of the group. The identity of the person, according to Habermas, begins by simply mirroring the collective identity of those participating in the same lifeworld.

Worldviews, according to Habermas, function as identity-securing knowledge for the participants of the lifeworld. In order to understand how these worldviews functions in the lifeworld we have to replace our understanding of the concept “objective mind”, in the sense of a one-sided cognitivistic interpretation of the world, with a concept of cultural knowledge, with the differentiation according to several validity claims. On the one hand we have cultural values, whose claims, according to Habermas

... [do] not transcend local boundaries in the same way as truth and rightness claims. Cultural values do not count as universal; they are as the name indicates, located within the horizon of the lifeworld of a specific group or culture. And values can be made plausible only in the context of a particular form of life.

From the outset the participants of the lifeworld depend on ritual practice and a symbolically prestructured reality as well as on a culturally ingrained preunderstanding, but with an increased rationalization of the lifeworld they pass over to communicative action, where participants reach mutual understanding through evaluation and by contesting
validity claims.\textsuperscript{510} I distinguish five basic features in Habermas’ reasoning on the theory of communicative action in relation to the notion of the lifeworld.

a) First of all the theory of communicative action is founded on the structure of linguistic expressions rather than speaker’s intention. The theory is from the very outset inter-subjective in the sense that there have to be at least two participants who together establish the symbolical reproduction. Furthermore communicative action is dependent on these preunderstandings forming the background of the lifeworld. A situational context representing a segment of the lifeworld of the participants in interaction opens up when the participants act communicatively using the storage of these preunderstandings.\textsuperscript{511}

b) These preunderstandings are linked with the ability and competence to follow a rule. Rules cannot be applied unless there is a degree of compliance. In line with Wittgenstein, Habermas argues that merely believing one’s self to be obeying a rule is not the same as actually obeying it. Instead it has to be part of an interaction between communicative participants. The identity or sameness of meaning is therefore based on mutual compliance with valid rules between at least two subjects, who have the same competence for ruled-governed behavior, with both participants being open to critique. This turns the lifeworld into a kind of game, which means that the lifeworld cannot merely exist as an abstraction, but is ever manifested in the horizon, forming the context of an action situation [\textit{Verweisungszusammenhänge}].\textsuperscript{512}

c) Communicative action is furthermore dependent on illocutionary acts; those acts that aspire to understanding, which has to be differentiated from perlocutionary acts, actions that aspire to success. The latter Habermas designates as mainly strategic actions. The importance of making a distinction between these two orientations rests on the emancipatory interest of the participants. Since communicative action strives towards a justified consensus, a communicatively agreed achievement cannot be imposed by either party, which is not the case with strategic actions. This emancipatory interest is foundational also for Habermas’s understanding of the lifeworld. If the members of a lifeworld feel as if the lifeworld has been imposed upon them, the lifeworld becomes colonized and pathological disturbances appear in the


\(d\) Not all illocutionary acts are constitutive for communicative action, only those connected to criticisable validity claims, because reaching understanding [Verständigung] is a process of reaching an agreement [Einigung] among speaking and acting participants. Not all illocutionary acts are constitutive for communicative action, since a group can also feel at one in a mood of understanding [Gleichgestimmtheit], which is so diffuse that it is difficult to derive any propositional content from it that would satisfy any determinate understanding [Einverständniss]. Cultural values which are fundamental to the lifeworld must also be connected to criticisable validity claims, and therefore the lifeworld is regenerated by reason and is not merely a feel-good community.\footnote{Cf. Habermas [1981] 1984, The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One, pp. 286-287; and Habermas [1981] 1995, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 1, pp. 385-387.}

\(e\) Habermas makes another distinction, between language as a medium for reaching understanding and language as a medium for coordinating action and socializing individuals. Reaching understanding involves self-presentation and as such reveals the internal world in communication with the other where there are moments of common insight. Coordinating action and socialization of the individuals, on the contrary, belongs to the external world, which has consolidated into an institutional reality.\footnote{Habermas [1985] 1989, The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two, pp. 22-42.} Therefore Habermas states that

\(\ldots\) [only] when these worlds have been constituted, or at least have begun to be differentiated, does language function as a mechanism of coordination.\footnote{Habermas [1985] 1989, The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two, pp. 27.}

According to Habermas, when there is sufficient differentiation, culturally shared values can be internalized in personality and institutionalized in society. Beneath the social order then, a tripartite structure crystallizes, consisting of culture, personality and society.\footnote{Habermas [1981] 1984, The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One, pp. 69-70, 278.}

Communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge through mutual understanding, and through coordinating action, it serves social integration and social solidarity equally, and finally through socialization, communicative action serves the formation of personal identities. In so doing communicative action, if it functions
accordingly, serves the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld which leads to a continuation of valid knowledge, stabilization of group solidarity and socialization of responsible actors.\footnote{Habermas [1985] 1989, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two}, p. 63}

This in turn reveals the three worlds that constitute the lifeworld; the objective, the social and the subjective, each having its distinct validity claim; truth, rightness and authenticity. In the objective world we are dealing with facts and scientific endeavors. In the social world we are dealing with normative regulations and morality, and finally, in the subjective world we are dealing with the authentic expression of subjectivity, such as art.\footnote{Cf. Habermas [1981] 1984, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One}, pp. 69-70; and Habermas [1980] 1996, ‘Modernity: An Unfinished Project’, pp. 44-53.}

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These five basic elements of communicative action reveal the necessity of the lifeworld as an inter-subjectively shared totality of interpretations that constitute a common background of knowledge, which are experienced as life-relations. The lifeworld is at once the world and at the same time there is a boundary; beyond that boundary the presupposed interpretations are not shared in the same way as they are within the lifeworld. Communicative action presupposes a shared lifeworld. Without it there can be no inter-subjective communicative experience. In Habermas’ understanding of the lifeworld there is a need to secure the freedom of communication of those participating in the lifeworld, since the lifeworld can not be imposed on the members, but can only be internalized individually through social integration.

B. Ritual Action

On the one hand Habermas agrees with Émile Durkheim\footnote{Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) is one of the founding fathers of modern social science. He distinguished psychology from social science and introduced the hypothetical-deductive model and promoted epistemological realism. Durkheim was a strong adherent of structural functionalism, which also affected his understanding of ritual practice. For further reading see Emirbayer 2003, \textit{Emile Durkheim. Sociologist of Modernity}.} that there is a prelinguistic root in ritual practice, which creates a collective consciousness, a kind of religious symbolism, symbolically mediated by interaction. On the other hand Habermas argues that Durkheim does not differentiate enough between ritual practice established through
religious symbolism and communicative practice established through language.\footnote{521}

Many of those who adhere to Durkheim’s understanding of ritual practice believe that Habermas is right when he identifies the necessity of differentiating between communicative practice and ritual practice, but they nevertheless find ritual practice to be a permanent feature of human existence. Habermas challenges this view, inspired by Weber’s narrative of modernity, in which ritual practice is superseded by long running cultural processes of rationalization.\footnote{522}

Instead Habermas argues that ritual practice declines in social significance as the rationalization of communicative action evolves. This is in fact at the core of Habermas’ theory of secularization, whereby society develops with a heightened capacity of reaching agreement through rational discourse, instead of relying on the meta-narrative of ritual practice.\footnote{523}

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Habermas follows in the footsteps of the great Enlightenment thinkers, who believed in the necessity of demystifying religion. Social improvement was seen as almost impossible without a critique of illusory religious worldviews.\footnote{524} According to Habermas ritual action carries with it an irrational understanding of the world which

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\text{… confuses internal relations of meaning with external relations among things [and] validity with empirical efficacy.} \footnote{525}
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Habermas identifies ritual action with mythical thinking, and argues that the traditional mythical representations of reality fade away with the progressive differentiation and systematization of reality, which leads to rituals loosing their plausibility. In fact, Habermas continues, rituals are not of much importance today and have been replaced to a

\footnote{524} Bell 1990, ‘Resolving the contradictions of modernity and modernism’.
great extent by rational practices. Ritual action has been superseded by communicative action.\[^{526}\]

The reason for this is that rational communication through ritual is limited since it depends on behavioral gestures and not on language. It is through language and language alone that rationalization develops, along with the ability of contesting validity claims.\[^{527}\] Sociocultural development, according to Habermas, emerges with the linguistification of the sacred, releasing the worldviews from their congealed meta-narrative preunderstanding, so that

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\text{... the rationality potential ingrained in communicative action is released, the archaic core of the normative dissolves and gives way to the rationalization of worldviews, to the universalization of law and morality, and an acceleration of processes of individuation.}\[^{528}\]
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According to Habermas, this also has an evolutionary consequence for the social significance of ritual in the sense that social solidarity also becomes increasingly dependent on communicative action instead of ritual action, which in turn decreases the structure-forming significance of ritual practice.\[^{529}\]

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David Cheal challenges Habermas’ arguments.\[^{530}\] Contrary to Habermas, Cheal claims that rituals continue to be important. Cheal argues along three lines. Firstly, rituals of many kinds continue to play a vital role in the life of millions of people, and he mentions several studies.\[^{531}\] Secondly, contemporary rituals emerge after intense periods of cultural change, as a kind of reritualization, which Habermas seems to neglect. Thirdly, even though rituals in many ways have abandoned the public sphere they continue in private settings, which do not necessarily make them less important.\[^{532}\]

Further more, Cheal argues, it seems that Habermas has only a partial understanding of dramaturgical action, and that he believes

\[^{526}\] Habermas's perspective on the decline of ritual action are further analysed in van den Berg 1990, ‘Habermas and modernity: a critique of the theory of communicative action’.
that the main significance of dramaturgical action is manipulative in the sense of individuals producing false impressions of themselves by selecting some information about themselves and suppressing other information. Habermas, according to Cheal, ignores other important features of dramaturgical action, such as the construction of social worlds.\footnote{Cheal 1992, 'Ritual: Communication in Action', p. 366.} Rituals, Cheal continues, also signify social structures

\ldots that is to say patterns of relationships and the cognitive categories and emotional commitments upon which they depend. In the latter case, ritualized expressive utterances externalize individuals’ unobservable, internal states of being. They therefore make possible shared perceptions of meaning, including the meaning that one person has for another. In this way rituals often play a crucial role in the construction of inter-subjective social worlds.\footnote{Cheal 1992, 'Ritual: Communication in Action', p. 367.}

Rituals, according to Cheal, articulate inter-subjective frames in the way that objects are socially defined. These objects then express the subjective experience of being in the same lifeworld.\footnote{Cheal 1992, 'Ritual: Communication in Action', pp. 367, 369.}

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I do agree with Habermas that rational communication through ritual is limited, but I do not perceive it as a problem. Instead I support Cheal’s argument that Habermas overemphasizes rational discourse, arguing that even derationalization is an important feature of being in the same lifeworld, and contrasting the ideologies of love with dominant instrumental cultures.\footnote{Cheal 1992, 'Ritual: Communication in Action', p. 368.} Being in the same lifeworld implies more than just rational discourse and valid arguments. Participants who share an identity in the lifeworld are involved in the curriculum of life, which brings with it feelings and emotions as well as rational thoughts. Among those feelings and emotions social solidarity is central to the appropriation of a common identity. Without social solidarity rational discourse is distorted by the feelings of insecurity. Social solidarity has to be part of the background of the lifeworld, coming ahead of rational discourse, and as such it has to go beyond truth and falsity.

Applying ritual practice as if it lay beyond truth and falsity enables us to transcend Habermas’ arguments against ritual action as counterproductive to social development. Instead I would suggest a

different understanding of the evolution of society. In a pre-modern society communicative action and ritual action are inter-meshed, resulting, as Habermas argues, in the confusing of internal relations of meaning with external relations among things, and between validity and empirical efficacy. With social evolution, communicative action and ritual action become differentiated in the sense that ritual action produces the background of communicative action in the lifeworld, and communicative action produces rational discourse between the participants. Otherwise rational discourse may overtly produce an instrumental discourse and thus turn potential partners into objects, on account of a diffused common identity and/or social insecurity. Ritual action therefore produces social solidarity beyond rational discourse; this does not mean that communicative action is incapable of producing social solidarity but that would be of a different order. I therefore suggest that Habermas is correct when he states that

... mythical worldviews blur the categorical distinctions between the objective, social, and subjective worlds, and how they do not even draw a clear line between interpretations and the interpreted reality.537

If we agree with Habermas on his understanding of mythical worldviews, then it would also be reasonable to agree with Habermas on the necessity of the demythologization of these worldviews. This would imply, according to Habermas, the desocialization of nature and denaturalization of society.538 Furthermore this would also imply disenchantment, where analysis from “above” is replaced with an analysis from “below” and where a “structuralist” perspective would require causal relations.539

I also agree with Habermas that the rationalization of worldviews implies a differentiation between descriptive and evaluative statements, which also lead to two kinds of attitudes. One is representation in the sense of representing objects as they are, and the other is the action of producing them as they should be.540 Collective representations, according to Habermas and Durkheim, are imbedded in material objects, things, figures, movements, sounds, words, or in being of every sort, symbolizing them in outward appearance. Religious representations are a kind of collective representation that creates a collective reality, or a collective consciousness, with the purpose of recreating or maintaining

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certain mental states in the group.\textsuperscript{541} Here I believe is the heart of the problem concerning ritual action. Things or objects are brought from the material world but are transferred to the collective world with another meaning. This creates the problem of differentiating between the mere representations of objects from what they ought to be.

As an example we could mention the cross, which was an instrument of torture but for Christians has been transformed into a symbol of liberation. To perceive the cross as just an instrument of torture would today almost be considered blasphemy by many Christians. We could enumerate other objects such as the color green in Islamic tradition, or the Sabbath in Jewish tradition. There is an implicit evaluative address in collective representations and not merely a description of the symbol. Habermas makes use of this in his analysis of collective identity when he contrasts collective identity on one side as

\begin{quote}
\ldots the form of a normative consensus built up in the medium of religious symbols and interpreted in the semantics of the sacred. The religious consciousness that secures identity is regenerated and maintained through ritual practice.\textsuperscript{542}
\end{quote}

On the other side, according to Habermas, we have a collective identity connected to linguistic communication, established through communicative action in the form of grammatical speech. When communicative action penetrates all components of interaction there is a linguistification of the sacred that replaces ritual action, and tradition is set communicatively aflow, making possible evaluation and improvement, which is not possible through collective representations and behavioral gestures in ritual.\textsuperscript{543}

Communicative action, according to Habermas, is like a switching station. It transfers the steering of interaction from a genetic program, anchored in the individual, to an inter-subjectively shared cultural program, and switches the energies of social solidarity to linguistic communication. This brings about the liberation of the individual in a process of individuation, according to Habermas.\textsuperscript{544}

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\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
Here Habermas is clearly mixing descriptive statements and evaluative statements. When he describes the process of switching the energies of social solidarity to linguistic communication it follows a causal line of argument.\footnote{Habermas [1985] 1989, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two}, pp. 53-62.}

When communicative acts take the shape of grammatical speech, the symbolic structure has penetrated \textit{all} components of interaction; the cognitive-instrumental grasp of reality and the steering mechanism that attunes behavior of different interaction partners to one another, as well as the actors and their behavior dispositions, get connected to linguistic communication and are symbolically restructured.\footnote{Habermas [1985] 1989, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two}, p. 63.}

Habermas does not produce any real empirical evidence that such a switch of energies really occurs in the mechanical sense, as he perceives it. Instead there is a normative dimension in his description of ritual, which passes over to communicative action. When he states that \textit{ritual practice passes over to communicative action} he omits an ‘ought’; \textit{ritual practice [ought] to pass over to communicative action}.\footnote{Habermas [1985] 1989, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two}, p. 77.}

The socially integrative and expressive functions that were at first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action; the authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus.\footnote{Habermas [1985] 1989, \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two}, p. 77.}


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The argument in favor of abandoning ritual practice is connected with Habermas’ interest in emancipation. According to Habermas, emancipation, as described above, can only be resolved discursively, through linguistic communication in rational discourse. This is not the case with ritual action since it depends on behavioral gestures and
collective representations instead of language. 550 Below I will argue that emancipation also involves the sense of belonging and social solidarity, by sharing a common identity, not dependent on achieving mutual understanding, but instead displaying social solidarity in the transcendental form of love and charity.

Habermas makes use of the distinction between a “closed” worldview and an “open” worldview. In the first instance there is an immunization against alternative interpretations and in the latter there is a readiness to learn and to criticize. According to Habermas it is only through an “open” worldview that emancipation is possible. An “open” worldview is linguistically oriented and detached from assumed world-order itself. Detachment, in Habermas’ view, is a necessary step in the process of the rationalization of worldviews. 551

The identity of the person, Habermas contends, is initially only a mirror image of collective identity. Social solidarity is secured more or less “mechanically”, without necessitating individual appropriation. Collective identity, before switching over to communicative action has the form of a normative consensus, mediated through religious symbols and interpreted in the semantics of the sacred, which is regenerated and maintained through ritual practice. 552

Here a second differentiation surfaces in Habermas’ work, between the authority of the holy and the authority of an achieved consensus. In the first case, before switching over to communicative action, we have a normatively ascribed agreement and in the second case, after the switch has taken place, we have a communicatively achieved agreement. When social integration and expressive functions, once fulfilled by ritual practice, pass over to communicative action two things happen. First of all, what was previously a shared cultural tradition, already interpreted, is differentiated into individual elements of the cultural tradition, which are thematized and become available for critique and evaluation. Secondly, in relation to an inter-subjectively shared lifeworld, which forms the background for communicative action, participants adopt a reflective attitude after passing over to communicative action. Through these two effects ritual action is replaced by communicative action and the authority of the sacred is substituted for the authority of an achieved consensus. 553

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When the symbolical reproduction of the lifeworld is permeated by communicative action, through language, there are certain structural constraints, such as the structural transformation of worldviews, the universalization of law and morality, and increased individuation in the process of socializing subjects. These constraints release the congealed morality, preunderstood from the beginning, setting it communicatively aflow which in turn develops the morality into a discourse ethics, according to Habermas. The archaic structure of the sacred thereby turns into a rational meaning of normative validity.554

The more the archaic structure of the sacred is turned into rational meaning the more communicative action takes over the burdens of social integration from religion, according to Habermas. This has the effect, Habermas continues, of realizing empirically the ideals of an unlimited and undistorted communication community.555

Previously I argued that the normative aspect of the Ordo is juxtaposed with the historical Ordo, in the reasoning of Gordon Lathrop, in such a way that everything becomes a question of rationalization and improvement. The overall interpretative scheme for this is a critique leveled against an excessive idealization of the Church, one which neglects to consider the structures of sin in this world. Siobhán Garrigan556 builds on Habermas by trying to interpret the liturgy as communicative action. As well Garrigan as Lathrop share in Habermas’ basic purpose by insisting on the need for improvement and not only a preservation of the past. They nevertheless end up in a similar dilemma, the need for an unchanged past, one which preserves some kind of identity, but with an openness for improvement that combats the structures of sin. In Lathrop he tries to find a solution by differentiating between the Great Ordo and the local settings. Garrigan tries instead to differentiate between the ‘sacrament’ and the ‘liturgy’.

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An alternative way of understanding the rationalization of the lifeworld would be to argue for a differentiation between ritual action and communicative action. In a pre-modern environment these actions are not differentiated clearly enough, effectively confusing internal relations of meaning with external relations among things, and validity

556 Garrigan 2004, Beyond Ritual.
with empirical efficacy. In a pre-modern setting, descriptive statements are also hard to differentiate from evaluative statements. Above all, the consequence of Habermas' theory is that the distinction between interest and knowledge becomes unclear without a differentiation between evaluation and description.

With the rationalization of the lifeworld, knowledge and interest become distinct in the sense that the knowing subject stands forth through individuation. This makes it easier to differentiate between descriptive and evaluative statements, which in turn make ritual action distinct from communicative action. Instead of being superseded, or even becoming insignificant, ritual action is relieved from the burden of rational discourse. Instead ritual action becomes derationalized in that it brings forth the meta-narrative that exists before rational discourse. The meta-narrative tells a story that has been developed and preserved over the course of generations. The derationalized meta-narrative tells the story of 'who we are', passed down by our ancestors, leaving us with a sense of belonging to the story regardless of whether it is true or false. It is our inheritance, which we keep as a mark of identification. Later, when it is internalized through social integration it becomes true or false, but the meta-narrative can also be reinterpreted into a new story, like the Old Testament in relation to the New Testament.

With this differentiation we have two orders of action that preserve and develop collective identity. On one side we have ritual action whose main purpose is to retell a story and shape cultural heritage, telling us which story we belong to. On the other side we have communicative action whose main purpose is the internalization of that story through rational discourse, where it becomes true or false, or gets reinterpreted into something new. The first instance is concerned with belonging, and the second with mutual understanding. Both of them regenerate social solidarity but in different ways. Through ritual action social solidarity unites the participants by identification with an ancient story, diachronically, one inherited from previous generations and lying beyond the scope of truth or falsity. Through communicative action these ancient stories are set communicatively aflow, and becomes thematized, vindicated and interpreted through the individual or collective setting synchronically.

The meta-narrative produced by ritual action as opposed to communicative action is not an ascribed agreement, as Habermas
describes it. Instead it lies beyond any agreement between participants, revealing the cultural background that is not synchronically produced by any agreement, but a diachronically transmitted cultural knowledge that exposes the cultural roots of the lifeworld. In this sense ritual action does not produce cultural identity, rather it reveals an already given identity. Communicative action internalizes this meta-narrative and turns it into a personal narrative, which sets the meta-narrative communicatively aflow with an active contemporary interpretation connected to criticisable validity claims. The meta-narrative, however, is often kept intact in many societies as a cultural background, in the sense of revealing a common identity, a common heritage, regardless of whether it is true or false. This is an aspect that Habermas neglects to consider on account of an overemphasis on rational discourse connected with the identity of the lifeworld.

C. Theology and Philosophy

Habermas seems to have had a disinterested relation to religion by and large, during the years leading up to the end of the 1980’s. Beginning with his publication Nachmetaphysisches Denken (1988) there is a renewed interest in religion, which continues in his article on Michael Theunissen, Kommunikative Freiheit und negative Theologie (1992), and which surfaces again in his lecture on the occasion of the retirement of Johann Baptist Metz (1993). By the beginning of the 21st century, his interest in religion continued to develop. In 2001 Habermas gave a lecture at the reception of the Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels, followed in 2004 by his famous dialogue with Joseph Ratzinger.

In his work Nachmetaphysisches Denken, Habermas develops his critique of metaphysics in relation to the philosophy of consciousness, but at the same time he makes a commitment to the Judeo-Christian tradition by stating that:

I do not think that we as Europeans could understand concepts like morality, decency, person, individuality, freedom or emancipation …

557 Habermas 1992, ’Kommunikative Freiheit und negative Theologie‘; and Habermas 1994, ’Israel oder Athen‘.
without acquiring the substance of thoughts in the history of salvation in Jewish-Christian tradition.559

This is further developed in 2005 with the publication of Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion,560 where Habermas argues that religion is part of the history of reason and that the post-metaphysic epoch does not imply the reduction of religion, but that religion does lose its claim to totality. Instead he suggests a dialectical relationship between the secular claims on society and religious claims on society, where ‘translation’ is required between these two social spheres.

In the 21st century, shortly after the terrorist attacks in New York, he begins to engage in the question of religion in the public space, beginning with his acceptance speech at the German Peace Award. There and in the debate with Joseph Ratzinger he argues against relativism but also states that we have to abandon the metaphysical claim to totality. Instead he argues that there is a plurality of lifeworlds in post secular society each claiming to be the lifeworld. Therefore we have to make a distinction between the secular state and a post-secular society. This implies that religion reclaims its role in society on the one hand, but on the other remains subordinated to secular enlightenment, which must continue to influence the secular state and its corresponding laws, since no religion can claim totality. Habermas still envisages the need for religion as a motivating factor for people in engaging them in the formation of a good and prosperous society. Furthermore, he argues that religion in this sense is a source of meaning on which secular reason depends in everyday life. At the same time the secular state cannot simply assume these meaningful values without falling into the fallacy of a singular totality. Instead Habermas argues for rescuing translations where religious meanings are transferred to the realm of the secular public space, whereupon different religions can co-exist in cognitive dissonance.561

His acceptance speech in Frankfurt am Main struck many as surprising in that he credited religion with a supportive role in post-secular society. Habermas did not, however, change his philosophical

conviction. He still held on to the idea that philosophy has to keep an agnostic and critical distance to religion. He also withheld his critique of subject-centered metaphysical philosophy, but gradually abandoned the idea of the need for a complete reconciliation between theory and practice, which in the end meant that he also abandoned the idea of a single absolute truth. Instead truth is dependent on different cultural backgrounds. There is, however, at the same time a deep structure underlying these truths that makes them accessible to reason and therefore truth cannot simply be relative. The later Habermas did not develop the discussion on the relation between communicative action and ritual action. Instead it seems that Habermas did not discern any connection between his changed understanding on absolute truth and a possible changed perception of ritual action. His basic understanding of the relation between religion and philosophy is expressed in his response to Michael Theunissen and Johan Baptist Metz.

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In his article on the communicative freedom and negative theology of Michael Theunissen, and in his lecture on the occasion of the retirement of Metz, Habermas perceives a basic understanding of the difference between theology and philosophy. In Theunissen he finds a creative mixture of Kierkegaard and Marx, which leads to a transformation of the usual subject-object relation into a theory of communication with the renewed relevance of the second person ‘thou’ instead of a third person object. Theunissen’s rendering of Luke 17:21, “the Kingdom of God is among you”, would therefore be understood to imply that the Kingdom of God exists between human beings as a present future, revealed through the will towards dialogical self-becoming.562

This is the foundational origin for Theunissen’s theory of communicative freedom. The striving towards undistorted dialogue, according to Theunissen, is just as much a striving towards the manifestation of the coming Kingdom. Theunissen believes that this theological motif could also be grounded philosophically, by making Kierkegaard compatible with Marx. First, however, Theunissen has to retrieve original Christianity from its Hellenistic shell. This Theunissen attempts to achieve through the deconstruction of the history of metaphysics, arguing that the ontologization of theology has meant

a ‘forgetting of time’. Time is crucial with regard to a pre-Hellenistic understanding of the Christian faith, focused on the awareness of the presence of the future Kingdom, its eschatological message.\textsuperscript{563}

Theunissen’s theology develops into a post-metaphysical and Jewish paradigm. There the spatio-temporal conditions are moved to the forefront of theology, in place of the paradigm of being. Communication and language, according to Theunissen, is the kernel of the apparition of the Kingdom and salvation. Communicative freedom and love are closely related in Theunissen’s work, according to Habermas; the former as being-with-\textit{oneself-in-the-other} and the latter as being-with-\textit{oneself-in-the-other}. In both cases it depends on the recognition of otherness and difference through the experience of dialogue.\textsuperscript{564}

Habermas has a close affinity to the reasoning of Theunissen, but differs from Theunissen regarding his appeal to the absolute freedom of God as the unconditional reality of the freedom of the human being. A human being, according to Theunissen, can only be truly free when she frees herself from the narcissistically self-enclosed being, through the recognition of the absolute freedom of God. Habermas, on the contrary, denies this argument from a position similar to the perspective of the ontological difference. Even if we recognize that the human being possesses a finite freedom, and that absolute freedom belongs to God alone, we still cannot transfer transcendental categories from the realm of divinity to the realm of anthropological conditions. Communicative freedom and love must nevertheless be realized among human beings in a human way, with transcendence coming from within the community.\textsuperscript{565}

Habermas simply cannot accept the idea that a de-Hellenized \textit{eschaton} could be grounded philosophically aside from a theological endeavor, and makes a comparison between the Kirkegaardian ‘leap of faith’ and Dostoevsky’s statement to Natalya Vonwisin:

\begin{quote}
If someone could prove to me that Christ is outside the truth, and if the truth really did exclude Christ, then I should prefer to stay with Christ and not truth.\textsuperscript{566}
\end{quote}

There are no \textit{philosophical reasons}, according to Habermas, that justify or that can strengthen a commitment to \textit{eschaton}. There are, however, rational motives for such conviction, and this is crucial for Habermas’

\textsuperscript{563} Habermas 2001, ‘Communicative Freedom and Negative Theology’, pp. 91-95
\textsuperscript{564} Habermas 2001, ‘Communicative Freedom and Negative Theology’, pp. 95-98.
\textsuperscript{566} Habermas 2001, ‘Communicative Freedom and Negative Theology’, p. 105.
understanding of theology. For fear that inter-subjectivity would become merely an extension of subjectivity, Theunissen is unable to relinquish the claim of an absolute authority, one that guarantees objectivity. Habermas on the other hand locates the rational reason for a de-Hellenized eschaton in inter-subjective communication, but rejects the idea of pure inter-subjectivity because it neglects what communication is all about.\footnote{Habermas 2001, ‘Communicative Freedom and Negative Theology’, pp. 105-107.}

For the sake of pure intersubjectivity, it overlooks the relation to the objective world built into the structure of reaching-agreement-concerning-something. It neglects what communication is all about. As a result, the dimension of the validity of truth-claims is closed off in favor of the dimension of authenticity.\footnote{Habermas 2001, ‘Communicative Freedom and Negative Theology’, p. 107.}

Habermas is clearly skeptical to such a pure inter-subjectivity, since it renders the participants devoid of responsibility in relation to the objective world. Instead Habermas proposes that the inter-subjective relation of ‘I’ and ‘thou’ integrates a stance towards the objective world. That would entail entrusting a responsibility to communicatively acting subjects, making authenticity the mark not only of subjective experience, but also of inter-subjective experience, which includes both the social and the objective world. If the participants embrace such a responsibility they become aware of the domination of the past over the future as a mark of wounded history and attached societies.\footnote{Habermas 2001, ‘Communicative Freedom and Negative Theology’, pp. 107-108.}

Habermas never once reflects on the possibility that ritual action can convey the authenticity of an inter-subjectively shared lifeworld. He seems to be caught in the all-important priority of rational discourse through communicative action. Maybe Habermas would have had a more positive attitude towards ritual action if he had appropriated it as an instrument of inter-subjective authenticity instead of persistently delimiting it to the realm of mythical thinking.

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Habermas continues the discussion on theology in his lecture on the occasion of the retirement of Johann Baptist Metz. Here he describes himself as a philosopher informed by methodological atheism. This position is not directed against religion, but discloses the practical attitude

\footnote{Habermas 2001, ‘Communicative Freedom and Negative Theology’, pp. 105-107.}
of the philosopher, from the perspective of Critical Theory. The task of
the philosopher, according to Habermas, is not to give an alternative
theory or ideology, but rather to improve and criticize current theories
and ideologies by stating their limitations and unearthing unconscious
presumptions. This is also where Habermas takes his stand in relation to
theology. His task is not to disprove theology, but to establish the limits
of its propositions. His lecture is an example of this method.570

He begins his analysis by affirming the view of the contemporary
worldview as multicultural, differentiated and decentred, but argues that
Christianity is still caught in the particularistic origin of its European
origin, which assimilates alien cultures and forgets its own traditions.
From this critical standpoint he takes up Metz’ diagnosis. Metz argues
that the philosophical conception appropriated from a Hellenistic
heritage has alienated the Christian tradition from its original spirit of
Israel, and today the Hellenized Eurocentric Church needs to transcend
its own monocultural self-conception by retrieving and remembering
its Jewish origins. This would allow for a culturally polycentric global
Church.571

Metz is tireless in defending the heritage of Israel in Christianity
and Habermas supports his defense. Without the subversion of Greek
metaphysics, according to Habermas, emancipation in the form of
subjective freedom and equal respect for all would not be possible. By
this subversion we can differentiate between profane reason and what
Metz calls ‘anamnestic reason’. Profane reason, according to Habermas,
must remain skeptical about the ‘mystical causality’ derived from the
history of salvation, and leave the ‘anamnestic reason’ entirely to the
theologians.572

The non-Greek motifs that permeate Metz’ work are focused on
the idea of remembrance. Through anamnesis there is a recollection of
those things that we want to preserve as indispensable despite the decay
of historical consciousness. Through storytelling we preserve religious
motifs and experiences, which were preserved even before the Greek
mind turned them into a philosophical contemplation of the Cosmos.
Philosophical thought in a Hellenized world differs from the spirit of
Israel, according to Habermas, by transforming the anamnesis into an
impersonal philosophical reason. ‘Anamnestic reason’ in the works of

78-89.
572 Habermas 2001, ‘Israel or Athens’, p. 82.
Metz holds on to the subjective character of belief within the believing community. Habermas exemplifies this by way of two examples: the problem of theodicy and the polycentric world Church.573

Philosophy, according to Habermas, cannot provide assurance. Its task is to break the spell of the past and disclose what is lacking in present conditions for solidarity and justice. It takes charge of those validity-claims that transcends social space and historical time. Philosophy well performed opens up the possibility of a future devoid of the kind of distorted solidarity and justice that has made possible the tragedies that confronted humanity in the past.574

However, such a philosophy cannot offer consolation or assurance of past events, and it becomes apparent in relation to the problem of theodicy, of those suffering unjustly, which confronts Christians especially in the aftermath of Auschwitz, according to Habermas. Such an assurance cannot be imposed from without. It is a transcendence coming from within those who hold on to a common anamnesis, within the particular culture or religion. This is why Metz, according to Habermas, opposes any idealistic or Platonized dilution of suffering. Instead he employs a ‘culture of loss’.575

Against this idealistic dilution of suffering, Metz invokes a ‘culture of loss’, a culture of remembrance which could keep open, without false consolation, the existential restlessness of a passionate questioning of God. An eschatologically driven anticipation, a sensitivity towards a suspended future, one which nevertheless already reaches into the present, would thereby be encouraged.576

In this ‘culture of loss’, this remembrance, Habermas acknowledges the task of the theologian as bringing forth the innermost religious experience beyond the philosophical paradigm of true and false.577 For Habermas, this is the heart of the matter, an idea that resurfaces in his later work. Religion is important in that it provides assurance and meaning in times of distress. Without religion, philosophy suffers a material loss that makes the task of philosophy impossible.

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A similar differentiation between theology and philosophy appears from the perspective of a polycentric world Church. Habermas begins with a small appraisal of the achievement of Vatican II in trying to open itself up from within to the multiplicity of cultures. However, Habermas continues, even though there are sincere efforts to transcend the limitations of a Eurocentric Church and decentralize its cultural appearance, the polycentric Church in Catholic Christianity is still dependent on the European Enlightenment. Therefore the Church, according to Habermas, is still caught up in the dilemma of colonialism.\footnote{Habermas 2001, ‘Israel or Athens’, pp. 85-88.} Habermas implicitly insists on the assertion that any transcendence of a culture has to emerge from within and cannot be imposed from outside. Despite all good intentions, there is still an outside imposition inherent in the dissemination of ideals that stem from the European Enlightenment. Applying Habermas’ theory we could state with certainty that the world needs religion, but in a post secular society religion has to withdraw from the explicative claim of universal recognition.

The way Habermas exposes the limitations of the polycentric effort in the Catholic Church, without criticizing the Church as such, is the task of the philosopher, according to the Critical Theory applied by Habermas. At the same time Christianity, Habermas continues, can not expect universal recognition of the history of salvation or the created order of the universe in the same way as procedurally formulated theories of law and morality can gain universal recognition. This is why Metz, according to Habermas, understands the universality of salvation as an invitation that has to be tested practically, without any claim of rational acceptability. Here we once again see how Habermas views the difference between the philosopher and the theologian. The philosopher cannot claim a particular worldview. Instead he or she must establish a fairly critical attitude towards any worldview without dismissing them as such. The theologian, on the other hand, represents a worldview in such a way that he or she can invite people to embrace it in a practical effort.\footnote{Habermas 2001, ‘Israel or Athens’, pp. 86-88.}

Such an invitation must avoid any assimilationist tendencies or any use of force and therefore Habermas recognizes Metz’ appeal to the contemporary Church as necessary when he says that the Church must
The difference between philosophy and theology, according to Habermas, has to do with the theologian's dependence on and representation of a worldview that extends an invitation and consolation from within. The philosopher, on the other hand, is not dependent on any worldview but instead serves them all through a process of deconstruction and reconstruction. While the theologian claims authenticity for hers or his extended invitation the philosopher can only assist the theologian without any claim of authenticity.

The claim of authenticity is practically the same as the claim of beauty among the church fathers. When Simeon the New Theologian describes the praying man as the one who receives the impossible beauty of Christ, it is an appeal for authenticity, the beauty of theology. Only the one who is truly at one with the Christian faith can make an authentic invitation to humanity. This is probably why beauty is the highest aspiration of theology among the church fathers.

**D. ECCLESIA AND LIFEWORLD. COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND LITURGICAL THEOLOGY**

Habermas' idea of a multicultural existence in post-secular society develops alongside a more differentiated understanding of society, which is based on the theories of Talcott Parsons. This also affects his understanding of the role of religion in the society. The development follows two lines of reasoning. On the one hand it follows his changed perception on the reconciliation between theory and practice, which also shapes his understanding of truth claims. On the other hand his changed understanding of religion also develops when he switches from a Lukácsian view of cultural modernity to a Weberian view of societal rationalization. In this chapter I will analyze his switch to societal

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581 Habermas 2001, ‘Israel or Athens’.
582 “O Merciful One, send the Comforter even to me, so that He may teach me the things concerning You; and, O God of all, declare what is yours to me. Illuminate me with the true light, O Compassionate One, so that I may see the glory which You had with Your Father before the world was made. Abide even in me, as You have said, so that I, too, may become worthy of abiding in You, and may then consciously enter into You and consciously possess You within myself. O Invisible One, take form in me so that, beholding Your impossible beauty, I may be clothed, O Heavenly One, with Your image and forget all things visible … that I may, as all of your servants, become god by grace and be ever with You, now and always and for ages without end. Amen.”
rationalization and in chapter II.4 I will analyze his changed perception of the reconciliation between theory and practice.

The traditional Marxist analysis of crisis tendencies was still popular in the 70’s when Jürgen Habermas published his first major work *Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus*. In his work he criticizes the Marxist theory as being redundant, given the relative success of the capitalist system, but he retains a crisis orientation. The English translation was in fact entitled *Legitimation Crisis*. Below I will argue that Habermas changed his orientation in later works from crisis orientation to a comprehensive model of society, focusing more on the possibility of improving society than on predicting possible crises. This is more or less achieved in four steps: first he develops a critique of the Marxist theory as stated above; then he switches to a Weberian understanding; thereafter he progressively develops a dialectical relationship between the lifeworld and secular society, developing a multicultural understanding of society as post-secular; at the end of his life he develops a positive rhetoric of religion, especially after the 9/11 event. I will conclude this analysis by relating Habermas’ social theory with Eucharistic Ecclesiology and Liturgical Theology.

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There is a popular understanding among scholars of social science that the social theory of Habermas and the theory of Talcott Parsons are fundamentally in opposition to each other. In reality Habermas’ is heavily indebted to Parsons’.

Parsons’ system theory refers to four fundamental units to be realized: (A) adaptation, (G) goal-attainment, (I) integration and (L) pattern maintenance or legitimation. The first unit to be realized in a social system is to maintain the integrity of the value system (L) in order to produce legitimation, labor and solidarity for the entire social system. The second unit is to maintain social integration (I) through a system of shared norms. The third is goal-attainment (G) that activates the social system by giving it direction. Fourthly we have adaptation (A) that requires the social system to be receptive to external changes so that the maintenance of the social system can be upheld against austerely exogenous factors.583

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Habermas uses Parsons’ social system in his work *Legitimationsprobleme*, but interprets the (L) and (I) subsystems differently in relation to the (A) and (G) subsystems. In each subsystem, according to Parsons, there is a generalized media in order to mediate interchange relations. In (L) we have influence, in (I) commitments, in (A) money, and finally in (G) power.\(^{584}\)

Parsons also differentiates between the media channels used and the sanctions intended. Each medium provides some form of sanction, either positive or negative, but the way these sanctions are conveyed can either be situational or intentional. (L) and (I) are intentional, using natural language with a propositional attitude, but (A) and (G) are situational and are therefore not dependent on natural language and are not propositionally oriented.\(^{585}\)

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**Figure 6: Parsons’ social system.**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive subsystem (the economy)</td>
<td>Goal-attainment subsystem (the polity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern-maintenance subsystem (locus of cultural and motivational commitments)</td>
<td>Integrative subsystem (law, norms and social control)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure 7: Channels used for positive or negative sanctions.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive sanctions</th>
<th>Negative sanctions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Commitments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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From this observation Habermas discerns a significant disanalogy between steering-media proper in (A) and (G) and a generalized form of communication in (L) and (I). This discernment led him to make a distinction between system integration, through steering media, and social integration, through generalized forms of communication. Furthermore, he views social integration holistically describing domains of social integration as lifeworlds that cannot be functionally differentiated as is the case with the domains of system integration.  

Therefore Habermas retains the differentiation between the Economic system and the Political system, viewing both of them as media-integrated, but he refrains from differentiating between Pattern-maintenance and Social integration, as Parsons does, understanding both as having the same purpose of producing meaning, the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld.  

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586 Habermas 1975, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 3; cf. Lockwood 1964, 'Social Integration and System Integration.'  

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Figure 8: Habermas’ Social system in Legitimationsprobleme

Habermas constructs his social theory by drawing on a number of philosophical traditions and even paradigms. In *Legitimationsprobleme* he uses Parsons’ social theory, but by reinterpretation he views Pattern-maintenance and Social integration as one. In relation to Georg Lukács he adopts the view of cultural modernity. He thereby preserves a crisis orientated focus whereby all change in the lifeworld is understood as an
effect of exogenously displaced economic crises.\textsuperscript{588} This understanding of society hardly allows for religion since Habermas understands the media-integrated system as the main impetus for social crisis.

The lifeworld in \textit{Legitimationsprobleme} is more or less immune to endogenous processes of social change, and any one of the subsystems (economic, political or socio-cultural) can be understood by the sub-system output that they generate.\textsuperscript{589} This results in the viewing of religion as a challenge to be overcome in order to stabilize the social system. This understanding changed as he moved from a Lukácsian understanding of cultural modernity to a Weberian understanding of societal rationalization.

\section{§}

In \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA)} Habermas understands the lifeworld not as the output of a sub-system, but as a comprehensive model of society. He approaches the lifeworld from the perspective of an action-theoretic analysis. Social integration is achieved from this perspective when culturally shared values are internalized in personality (socialization) and institutionalized in society (social control). This gives us a tripartite structure consisting of culture, personality and society. These three components together comprise the symbolical meaning of the lifeworld.\textsuperscript{590}

Under the functional aspect of \textit{mutual understanding}, communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of \textit{coordinating action}, it serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity; finally, under the aspect of \textit{socialization}, communicative action serves the formation of personal identities. The symbolic structures of the lifeworld are reproduced by way of the continuation of valid knowledge, stabilization of group solidarity, and socialization of responsible actors.\textsuperscript{591}

The action-theoretic model in TCA replaces the system-theoretic model in \textit{Legitimationsprobleme}. This tripartite structure is the backbone of the lifeworld and each one of the structural components is reproduced by what he calls communicative action. All forms of communicative action have natural language, or the speech act, as their fundamental

\textsuperscript{588} Habermas 1975, \textit{Legitimation Crisis}, p. 72; cf. Lukács 1971, History and Class Consciousness.

\textsuperscript{589} Habermas 1975, \textit{Legitimation Crisis}.


strata. Through natural language the participants or agents strive towards reaching mutual agreement and/or a mutual understanding. This endogenous rationalization process carries with it a permanent risk of dissensus. The risk of dissensus is greater, according to Habermas, under conditions of cultural modernity, with an amplified unwillingness to take received cultural traditions for granted.\footnote{Cf. Habermas [1981] 1995, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 2, pp. 182-228; and Habermas [1985] 1989, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two, pp. 195-197.}

This creates organizational problems and disturbances in the lifeworld, and in order to solve these problems there is a persistent tendency in modern societies to transform communicatively integrated domains of social interaction into structured subsystems of instrumental action.\footnote{Cf. Habermas [1981] 1995, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 2, pp. 182-228; and Habermas [1985] 1989, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two, pp. 195-197.} This instrumental orientation is not made possible simply by abandoning normative control, which would make social order impossible, so a switch-over to a system of instrumental action needs to be channeled through a media of situational character, steering media. On a general level the most common steering media is money and power. Mediatisation, Habermas argues, occurs when communicative interaction through natural language is switched over to steering media.\footnote{Cf. Habermas [1981] 1995, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 2, pp. 182-228; and Habermas [1985] 1989, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two, pp. 195-197.}

Mediatisation on a very basic level would not be deemed as a problem, but, according to Habermas, interactions through steering-media have a tendency to expand, and this process is what he calls colonization of the lifeworld. When essential areas of social interaction, necessary for the reproduction of the lifeworld, are switched over to steering-media, thereby becoming instrumentalized, lifeworld pathologies occurs.\footnote{Cf. Habermas [1981] 1995, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Band 2, pp. 212-223, 291-293, 521-525; and Habermas [1985] 1989, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two, pp. 140-148, 195-197, 355-358.}
In *Legitimationsprobleme* Habermas retains the idea that in class societies, which have a fundamental material interest, social order cannot be based solely on normative integration, because different groups are in opposition. In order to keep these underlying conflicts latent force or coercion is required, and an official value-consensus can be obtained once these conflicts are resolved or sufficiently repressed. The central weakness of class societies, according to Habermas, is simply that class divisions are reproduced in the economic system, and when this system fails to produce enough sub-system output there is no back-up in the social sphere, and economic crises are immediately transformed into social crises.\(^{596}\)

In TCA Habermas is reluctant to look for crisis tendencies in the economic sphere, and instead takes a positive approach looking at the artifacts of communicative action. When Habermas switches from a Lukácsian view of cultural modernity to a Weberian view of societal rationalization he inverts the focus from external crisis tendencies outside the lifeworld to the comprehensiveness of the lifeworld itself.\(^{597}\) The reproduction of meaning, *the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld*, Habermas argues, follows an independent, non-functional, logic and depends on certain standards of validation imposed by natural language. It is these standards that make the lifeworld independent and autonomous in the sense of its reproduction in an endogenous rationalization process.

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596 Habermas 1975, *Legitimation Crisis*.
In TCA it is this same autonomy that creates the potential for crises in society. According to Habermas these standards of validation cannot be instrumentalized without undermining the autonomy and the validity of the lifeworld itself, resulting in disturbances in the lifeworld. It is interesting to see that even though Habermas change his understanding of the social system he does not alter his understanding of religion. This is due to two major issues, as we shall see later. First of all Habermas retains an opposition between ritual action and communicative action. Secondly Habermas is still caught up in the aftermath of World War II and the totalitarian regimes, and fears that religion falls into a fallacy similar to the Heideggerian understanding of world disclosure, which he perceived was the offspring of Heidegger’s totalitarian understanding of ideology.

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In TCA the distinction between system and lifeworld is enhanced, which in turn gives rise to other problems. The main problem concerns the understanding of how an endogenous rationalization in the lifeworld which reproduces legitimation, through ordinary language, can be related to administrative decisions articulated through steering-media. In his work Between Facts and Norms (BFN) Habermas introduces law as an interface between the lifeworld and the systemically integrated subsystem of goal-attainment.

According to Habermas, any legal institutionalization of steering media is intended to anchor the system in the lifeworld, thereby gaining legitimation, reproduced in the lifeworld, for the entire sub-system. This is understandable if we look at the concept of power in BFN. Habermas makes a distinction between two types of channels for power, conceived as a social phenomenon with a complex internal structure. On the one hand we have the ability to control the elements of the situation where agents act, and on the other hand we have the ability to change the intentions of the agents.

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600 Habermas 1996, Between Facts and Norms.
In elaborating this differentiation Habermas draws on three conceptions of power: social power, administrative power and communicative power. Social power involves both of the previously mentioned channels, using a normative authority, based on social status or position, but also backed by the force of possible punitive sanctions. Administrative power and communicative power are limited cases; the former lacking the ability to reach a discursively achieved consensus and the latter lacking the possibility of punitive sanctions.603

Social power and communicative power in the form of an individual’s will do not meet the requirements for social order, according to Habermas. Instead he argues that there is a need to divorce the power from the individual, even a sovereign, in order to establish a common social order, and this is achieved by the interface of law. The legal system translates communicative power into administrative power, providing a set of rules and prescriptions for social order as well as legitimizing the employment of administrative power.604

In BFN the lifeworld is considered as primary. The lifeworld is the world in which people engage in inter-subjective communication, developing their worldview alongside their perception of reality. Any society that fails to anchor the secular institutions in the lifeworld will suffer severe consequences. Since modern society contains a multitude of lifeworlds this understanding will pose a major challenge for post-secular society, but it is not until 9/11 that this challenge was taken seriously

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After 9/11 Habermas changed his rhetoric, becoming more urgent in his message of encouraging religion to take responsibility for the different lifeworlds. At the same time he criticizes any worldview that tries to enforce universalistic claims outside their own lifeworld. Habermas does not change his opinion concerning the duty of the philosopher nor does he alter his view of the lifeworld, but he gradually perceives religion as the major force of the different lifeworlds. This is why it is so important for Habermas to identify the Catholic Church as a lifeworld, encouraging the polycentric approach after Vatican II, but criticizing the effort for its lack of success. In the same manner the Orthodox Church

603 Habermas 1996, Between Facts and Norms.
is a lifeworld with a body of cultural knowledge, which Schmemann makes use of in his theological endeavor. As a representative of this lifeworld Schmemann invites humanity to embrace that lifeworld and the Christian history of salvation. In the next chapter I will analyze how this lifeworld is elaborated in Schmemann's work.
6. Ecclesia as Lifeworld

For I desire mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings.

Hos. 6: 6

In the previous chapter I outlined the theory of communicative action. There we could see that Habermas argues that social integration of the lifeworld is achieved when culturally shared values are internalized in personality and institutionalized in society. Beneath social order we find, according to Habermas, a tripartite symbolic structure consisting of culture, personality and society. These in turn are reproduced through communicative action.

Through mutual understanding communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge, and through coordinating action it serves both social integration and social solidarity, and finally through socialization communicative action serves the formation of personal identities. In so doing communicative action, if it functions accordingly, serves the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld, propagating valid knowledge, stabilizing group solidarity and socializing responsible actors.

Modernity brought about an increase of the rationalization of the lifeworld, which in turn places strenuous pressure on responsible actors, and therefore increases the risk of dissensus with a progression of communicative action. This can lead to the downfall of symbolic reproduction in the lifeworld. In order to safeguard social interaction, communicatively integrated domains of social interaction are transformed into appropriately structured subsystems of instrumental interaction, with the intention of unburdening the responsible actors of the demanding requirements of communicative interaction.

These subsystems are regulated by steering media, such as money and power, and as the impact of steering media is heightened interactions that were once coordinated through language are switched over to steering media, a process which Habermas calls mediatisation. As long as necessary institutions for constraining and guiding the system brought forward by steering media is kept socially integrated,
steering media remains anchored in the lifeworld. However if spheres of action that are essential for normative integration are switched over to instrumental action colonization of the lifeworld occurs, with certain pathological disturbances, which create legitimation problems within the lifeworld.

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In the following chapter I will (A) argue for the conception of the Ecclesia as a lifeworld, together with a conceptual definition of what I mean by Ecclesia. From this characterization I will investigate the rationalization of the Ecclesia based on the works presented by Alexander Schmemann, first (B) by looking at the passage from ritual action to communicative action and then (C) by analyzing the effort towards a switch from existence to experience. The rationalization of the Ecclesia carries the same risk of dissensus as any lifeworld and therefore the Ecclesia could be equally endangered by colonization and pathologies. I will make a proviso (D) for how colonization comes about in the Ecclesia. In the end I will return to the works of Schmemann and (E) analyze how Schmemann handles or interprets what we could identify as colonization. Lastly (F) I will make some concluding remarks regarding the process of rationalization of the Ecclesia.

A. ECCLESIA AS LIFEWORLD

As a first supposition I will postulate the following: If communicative action is an action reaching for understanding then the framework of liturgical theology is intended to support communicative action, in as much as mere symbolism is rejected for a renewed understanding of liturgy. Alexander Schmemann himself is very eager to point this out by making a distinction between following prescriptions and understanding the meaning of the actions prescribed:

As its name indicates, liturgical theology is the elucidation of the meaning of worship\textsuperscript{605}

Furthermore, any explanation of worship

ought to be the elucidation of its theological meaning. Theology is above all explanation, 'the search for words appropriate to the nature of God' (θεοπρεηεῖ λόγοι), i.e. for a system of concepts corresponding as much as possible to the faith and experience of the Church. Therefore the task of liturgical theology consists in giving a theological basis to the explanation of worship and the whole liturgical tradition of the Church … If liturgical theology stems from an understanding of worship as the public act of the Church, then its final goal will be to clarify and explain the connection between this act and the Church, i.e. to explain how the Church expresses and fulfils herself in this act.606

Here Schmemann is trying to articulate a theology that is ‘appropriate’ and in correspondence to the faith and experience of the Church. Schmemann is reluctant to define the concept ‘Church’ by any singular understanding. In his works the Church escapes any exhaustive explanation, as we have noted above (part I), even though it has its epicenter in the Eucharist. Previously I left this unexplained, but with the theory of communicative action I will pick up where I left the discussion earlier. In his article “Liturgy and Theology” Schmemann delineates the understanding of theology as a reasonable discourse about the experience of the Church, as

"description" more than "definition" for it is, above all, a search for words and concepts adequate to and expressive of the living experience of the Church; for a reality and not ‘propositions.’607

It is no accident that the concept ‘Church’ eludes a clear-cut definition. According to Schmemann, the ‘Church’ can only be fully understood from within, among the participants who gather at the Eucharist to realize the Church again and again. The Church is therefore the reality experienced by the individuals in the Eucharistic gathering, and, if we agree with Habermas, through the medium of the speech acts the participants in the gathering

(a) … establish and renew interpersonal relations, whereby the speaker takes up a relation to something in the world of legitimate (social) orders;
(b) … represent (or presuppose) states and events, whereby the speaker takes up a relation to something in the world of existing states of affairs;
(c) … manifest experiences – that is, to represent oneself – whereby the speaker takes up a relation to something in the subjective world to which he has privileged access.608

Another way of explaining this would be to say that the linguistic symbol ‘Church’ represents three experienced realities – the social, the objective and the subjective – and if we would try to exhaust a definition it would have to be a tripartite definition. This three-biased reality is reproduced by communicative action, and as such it depends on the inter-subjective experience of being in the same lifeworld. Communicative action, again based on Habermas’ theory, serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge. Under the aspect of mutual understanding, here defined by Schmemann as the theological basis, communicative action establishes the relation to the world of existing states of affairs. Schmemann, as we have seen previously, is greatly inclined in this direction in working out the Ordo, but if we continue to pursue the theory of communicative action, Schmemann’s inclination covers only one aspect of the tripartite reality of the Church.

This is possibly why Schmemann differentiates between theology, liturgy and piety in the article Liturgy and Theology. Theology would thereby correspond to culture and the world of existing states of affairs, and liturgy would correspond to society, which under the aspect of coordinating action serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity. Piety would correspond to personality, which under the aspect of socialization serves the formation of personal identities.

So in Schmemann’s writings the ‘Church’ is simply the place or, if we prefer to use Habermas’ conceptual framework, “the horizon within which communicative actions are ‘always already’ moving”. This horizon is what Habermas identifies as lifeworld. It would be confusing to use lifeworld and Church interchangeably since the latter has been heavily scrutinized during the centuries and hence carries a multitude of meanings. Therefore I will use the concept Ecclesia whenever I refer to the precise lifeworld with its epicenter in the Eucharist.

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The reproduction of the Ecclesia through communicative action, in correspondence with the reasoning of Habermas, ensures the continuity of ecclesial tradition, i.e. what is transmitted from previous generations in the Ecclesia, and the coherence of the knowledge required in that sense for everyday life. It ensures that actions are coordinated through

legitimate interpersonal expectations and group identities, i.e. through hierarchical orders, such as bishops and other members of the clergy and associated communities such as dioceses and parishes; and that each new generation of individuals acquires the generalized competencies and life-histories that are in harmony with ecclesial forms of life, i.e. that which makes the formation of Christians possible.

The Ecclesia therefore functions as the storage of the interpretative work of preceding generations, and through communicative action subjects always come to an understanding in the horizon of the Ecclesia, which is formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background convictions. The three worlds together, which constitute the tripartite reality of the Ecclesia, form a reference system which makes mutual understanding possible where speakers and hearers come to an understanding which emerges from their common lifeworld [the Ecclesia] about something in the objective, social, or subjective worlds.

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The Eucharistic event is clearly not to be identified with the Ecclesia in its entirety, if we continue residing in Habermas' theory. The Ecclesia is already presupposed before the actual gathering for the Eucharist takes place; it is the background that makes the Eucharist relevant and, so to say, necessary. The Eucharist is a segment of the Ecclesia, what Habermas calls a situation.

A situation is a segment of lifeworld contexts of relevance [verweisungszusammenhänge] that is thrown into relief by themes and articulated through goals and plans of action; these contexts of relevance are concentrically ordered and become increasingly anonymous and diffused as the spatiotemporal and social distance grows.611

This description of a segment is concomitant with understanding the Eucharist. If any participant feels a particular kind of social distance in relation to the Eucharistic gathering he or she does not feel impelled to participate, and the same goes for those who have not participated for a period of time, or if the participants are unable to gather, separated by space.

At the back of this segment [the Eucharist], the theme, using Habermas' terminology, is what makes the Eucharist relevant. According

to Schmemann the main motive [theme] is the objective of realizing the Church. Out of this theme a situation is established carrying the horizon-forming context of an action situation, the everyday concept of the lifeworld [Ecclesia].

It is not possible to deduce the Ecclesia from this ‘horizon-forming’ situation, according to Habermas’ theory. On the contrary, the Ecclesia is concomitant with the situation, always given from the perspective of participants as the horizon-forming situation. Therefore one could say that any elucidation of the Ecclesia which is not anchored in a situation would be devoid of reality, and unable to establish a mutual understanding among the participants. This would in effect be a substantial endorsement of the theory of liturgical theology, viewed from the perspective of the theory of communicative action. It is precisely what Schmemann argues for when he states that

[t]he leitourgia – being the unique expression of the Church, of its faith and of its life – must become the basic source of theological thinking, a kind of locus theologicus par excellence. There are those, on the other hand, who, while admitting the importance of liturgical experience for theology, would rather consider it as a necessary object of theology – an object requiring, first of all, a theological clarification of its nature and function.

In the quotation above, the theory of communicative action has explanatory potency. ‘Church’ can be substituted for Ecclesia, and leitourgia would thereby be its segment or action situation. The participants experience the Ecclesia as leitourgia, and outside of this segment the lifeworld falls short, at risk of becoming an abstraction with no thematical stress for realizing anything. The Ecclesia becomes an idea with no real purpose, harbored only in the academic curriculum as a reflection upon reality.

There is an unclear difference between liturgy and leitourgia in Schmemann’s work, but whenever he uses the concept leitourgia his intent is to differentiate it from the liturgical order as an object of study and instead referring to the Church as subject, revealing itself as the service of the People of God. Liturgy is, however, sometimes used as a synonym for leitourgia, but never the other way around.

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The liturgy or more precisely the *leitourgia* is obviously more than a random segment, it is seen in Schmemann’s work as the segment. It harbors the basic content of theological thinking, the ‘*locus theologicus* par excellence’.616 This kind of segment is strongly permeated by a narrative practice, according to Habermas, that serves the “needs for mutual understanding among members trying to coordinate their common tasks”, but it also serves “the selfunderstanding of persons”.617 As such it is relevant not only for the singular segment, but for the whole of the Ecclesia.

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In conclusion: The tripartite structure of the Ecclesia; theology, liturgy and piety, from the outset of the theory of communicative action and grounded in the works of Schmemann, is reproduced by communicative action. This ensures the continuity of ecclesial tradition, the coherence of the knowledge required for everyday life, and that each new generation of individuals acquires the generalized competencies and life-histories that are in harmony with ecclesial forms of life.

B. PASSING FROM RITUAL ACTION TO COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

In chapter five I argued that Habermas view of ritual action is highly questionable in light of Cheal’s work, and others. Instead of understanding rationalization as an act of abandoning ritual I proposed that rationalization is a dialectical act of passing from ritual action to communicative action, reaching a consensus that is built up by the medium of religious symbols, which confirm the achieved mutual understanding of the lifeworld. In conclusion I outlined my thesis that ritual action passes over to communicative action, but not in the sense of abandoning ritual action as Habermas concludes.

In order to understand the process of rationalization, there is a need to develop this discussion further. Habermas makes two assertions that interest me. The first is (a) that ritual action does not take into account the preferences of the other, and the second one is (b) the idea that ritual

has been superseded by communicative action for establishing social solidarity.

(ad a and b) Ritual is a composite of mythical patterns of thought, according to Habermas, and mythical thinking carries with it an illogical nature. This is evident, he argues, if we take into account that there is confusion between “internal relations of meaning with external relations among things [and] validity with empirical efficacy”. How we relate different utterances to each other is not to be identified with how objects are related to each other. The differentiation of these two realities or worlds, the objective and the social, is the necessary condition for any rationalization, according to Habermas, which in turn will lead to the downfall of ritual with the loss of plausibility.618

Once this differentiation is established in the communicative interaction between actors, he continues, we will make value judgments through linguistic expressions since these are constantly revised in the intercourse between agents who possess different interests or preferences. This kind of revision cannot be achieved through behavioral gestures and collective representations, and since these are the basic media of ritual, a revision through ritual is similarly nonviable. Therefore ritual offers a morality that is fixed in traditional formulae, without the possibility for change according to the different interests of the participants, and by the same token this morality is unable to take into account the need of the other.619

David Cheal has challenged Habermas on this issue, as we have seen in the previous chapter, and he argues that “rational communication through ritual is limited”. Instead Cheal argues that “real significance of ritual lies in the production of social solidarity necessary for the existence for the speech community.”620

According to David Cheal, Sally Moore and Barbara Myerhoff, rituals that define personal and social identities are necessary for the construction of social worlds, and as such they are “separate from standards of truth [or] falsity.” On one hand identity involves a narrative process that links the Ecclesia to the past and on the other hand it involves the network of responsible actors to be engaged in communication.621 As such, ritual action expresses a solidarity which Cheal outlines as follows:

Ritualized solidarity is simply the necessary narrative situation whereby actors displace their collective identity and move to a responsible position in forming, or refraining from forming, a valid opinion or value judgment as a community. Furthermore ritual action is not as easy to alter and change as communicative action, therefore superior to communicative action in preserving long running cultural processes.

In this sense Habermas is correct when he states that the rationalization of the lifeworld [Ecclesia] is a process of passing from meta-narrative to mutual understanding. Any narrative on a meta-level can exist without an accountable subject in the Ecclesia, while a narrative towards mutual understanding has to involve responsible actors, thereby establishing communicative action. When Habermas argues for the decline of ritual he is correct if he refers to ritual in the sense of staying on a meta-level without accountable subjects. If there is a congealed interpretation of ritual action then individual subjects are referred to an external authority, either another subject or an abstract tradition with a congealed interpretation, with the effect of bringing into existence a set of actions that are not purposive on behalf of the individual acting subject.

When the rationalization of the lifeworld increases, the subject of the Ecclesia is released from the bondage of congealed tradition or external authority, according to Habermas. Instead the subject is increasingly engaged in articulating her own opinions and values, which is accomplished when a subject passes from ritual action to communicative action. Contrary to Habermas, based on the ideas of Cheal and others, I argued that this does not necessarily mean that the subject abandons ritual when it passes from ritual action to communicative action. Instead I argued that this process is repeated again and again. Through ritual action the subjects reveals their commitment of belonging to a community with a certain identity. By drawing near to the community and its cultural stock through ritual action the probability that the community will engage in communicative action increases, when trying

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to resolve a problem or articulate a value commitment together with others of the same cultural stock.\textsuperscript{624}

Therefore it is reasonable to claim that ritual action reveals the common identity of those involved in communicative action, necessary for establishing the required conditions for the speech community to (a) take in the interests of the other, and uphold (b) the social solidarity of the Ecclesia. At the same time rituals by and of themselves cannot establish social solidarity in the long run if they do not lead to communicative action, even from Cheal’s perspective. In Schmemann’s work the progression from ritual action to communicative action entails the process of rationalization.

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In his essay ‘For the Life of the World’ Schmemann posed the fundamental question ‘What is the life of life itself?’ There exist today, according to Schmemann, two general patterns of reply. On the one hand we have those for whom the answer is contained in the religious life. The goal of these religious people is to restore the peace of mind in a world that is moving at an increasing pace.\textsuperscript{625}

Lost and confused in the noise, the rush and the frustrations of “life”, man easily accepts the invitation to enter into the inner sanctuary of his soul and to discover there another life, to enjoy a “spiritual banquet” amply supplied with spiritual food. This spiritual food will help him. It will help him restore the peace of mind, to endure the other – the secular life, to accept its tribulations, to lead a wholesome and more dedicated life, to “keep smiling” in a deep, religious way.\textsuperscript{626}

On the other hand we have those to whom “life of life itself” implies the better life of the world. As Schmemann was active during the emergence of the Life and Peace movement he distinguished between the simple optimism and euphoria of the “Social Gospel” and the more moderate activists. Never the less, according to Schmemann, the fundamental belief that Christianity is primarily action continued and had acquired new strength.\textsuperscript{627}


From this point of view Christianity has simply lost the world. And the world must be recovered. The Christian mission, therefore, is to catch up with the life that has gone astray. The “eating” and “drinking” man is taken quite seriously, almost too seriously. He constitutes the virtually exclusive object of Christian action, and we are constantly called to repent for having spent too much time in contemplation and adoration, in silence and liturgy, for having not dealt sufficiently with the social, political, economic, racial and all other issues of real life.\footnote{Schmemann 1973, For the Life of the World, p. 13}

For Schmemann neither of these alternatives offers enough reason in answering the question of ‘life of life itself’. Whether one fights for justice and freedom or for inner peace in order to acquire the fullness of life, we still have to question ourselves ‘What is life?’.

When all committees have fulfilled their task, all papers have been distributed and all practical goals achieved, there must come a perfect joy.\footnote{Schmemann 1973, For the Life of the World, p. 13.}

In the end, according to Schmemann, we realize that action in itself has no meaning. Real life in the sense of perfect joy remains hopelessly beyond our grasp, yet we are confronted with the Christian narrative continually telling us about how perfect joy came into the world and how light entered our world. Though ungraspable it is Christ, or more precisely the presence of Christ, who is for Christians the perfect joy and the light of the world.\footnote{Schmemann 1973, For the Life of the World, pp. 13-14.} This is theology in the sense described by Johann Baptist Metz. Schmemann extends an invitation to one and all, and does so as a representative of the Church. He does it in the form of a narrative, telling the story of creation and salvation, inviting the listener to embrace the cosmic presence of Christ, as well as the history of salvation, consummated in the recapitulation of eschaton.

This presence of Christ has been inherent in creation since the dawn of cosmic existence and it awaits its finalization in the coming Kingdom of God at the Second Advent of Christ. Therefore, Schmemann continues, the perfect joy and the light of the world have not left the world. It still dwells in its midst. At the same time it is a joy of expectation, awaiting the return of the Lord of Light.\footnote{Schmemann 1973, For the Life of the World, pp. 24-28.}

The Bible, according to Schmemann, leaves man hungering for God, and is, in the Gospels, focused on the beloved Son of God, Christ our Lord. This hunger then develops in the apostolic and post apostolic age
into a hunger for the return of Christ, with his Kingdom. Perfect joy, then, is connected to this hungering for the coming Kingdom. But since perfect joy has not left the world we have to ask ourselves in what way this world is related to the world to come.632

Well aware of resorting to oversimplification, Schmemann begins by laying out two approaches to speaking about the world, both firmly rooted in the Gospel and in the Church Tradition. On the one hand the Gospel contains the affirmation of the world “God so loved the world that He gave his only-begotten Son”. This reveals the understanding that this world is “the object of divine love, divine creation, divine care; that is to be saved, transfigured, transformed.” On the other hand we have a more negative world-view that urges us to leave, or even escape, this world on the charge that it imprison us.633

Schmemann sees no incoherence in speaking about this world both in terms of leaving and in terms of entering. Heresy, according to Schmemann, in line with the original sense of the Greek word, is a false choice, a mistaken selectivity, and in that sense it would be a heresy not to see the synthesis of this negative and positive Christian world-view.634

For Schmemann synthesis comes into play in the World seen as sacrament. Today, Schmemann continues, we have been taught that the sacraments are of a fixed number; isolated acts in the midst of this world. That would, however, diminish the incarnation and reduce the work of Christ to a set number of magical acts, and the creative work of God would be merely a fixed point in time. Instead we have to realize that the purpose of creation was the gift of communion out of the love of God. Creation was intended to be in constant communion with God, and through his only-begotten Son God restored this broken communion and creation once again became bearer of Divine grace.635

The presence of the Divine grace means that this world partakes of the Divine nature by participation. The sacraments are signs of this elevating of creation in its entirety through participation, according to Schmemann, bringing it into communion with God. The world in itself

635 Schmemann [1965] 1979, The World as Sacrament. The Cosmic vision of Schmemann strongly resembles the Cosmic sacramentalization in the works of Sergei Bulgakov.
has become a sacrament ever being transformed to receive the coming Kingdom.636

But the signs of the coming Kingdom have been reduced to mere “symbols” as illustrations in the modern world. This symbolism leads to an understanding that this world and the Kingdom are separate from each other in sense that implies that we partake in the Kingdom only through them. The original understanding of symbol, however, derives from the Greek word \textit{symballein}, which means \textit{throwing together}. The sign or the symbol of the Kingdom is not a substitute for the Kingdom; it unifies this world with the coming Kingdom so that we can partake directly in the Kingdom.637

In this sacramental world man is the priest. Man was created to \textit{name} things thereby revealing the very essence of things created, its creator and its place in cosmos, simply revealing the gift of God. Man unifies in himself all of creation, by blessing God, of both receiving creation and offering it back to God.638 The locus of this symbolical attachment to the Kingdom is the Eucharist where man fulfils himself as priest. This does not mean, according to Schmemann, that this offering is a cultic act, not even a religious one.

\begin{quote}
[R]eligion is needed where there is a wall of separation between God and man. But Christ who is both God and man has broken down the wall between man and God. He has inaugurated a new life, not a new religion.639
\end{quote}

For Schmemann Christianity is simply the end of all religion. To bless God is not a cultic or religious act it is the \textit{way of life}, the natural existence of man, intended by creation and restored in \textit{Christ}.640 The dichotomies between sacred and profane, spiritual and material, supernatural and natural are now the object of overcoming. This is the true mission of the Church and the true theological calling within the Church, according to Schmemann, a reoccurring theme in his work.

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How are we to understand the idea of the world as sacrament, and ritual not as cult but as a way of life? Habermas might articulate this dilemma as a discourse that continues to confuse the internal relations of meaning with external relations among things. If we consider the works of Cheal and others we gain a different interpretation.

Both Cheal and Smith-Rosenberg consider rituals to be a necessary part of the lifeworld. Ritualized solidarity externalizes subjective and inter-subjective experiences which belong to the realm of a common identity. This in turn heightens cultural differences and sub-cultural values, differentiating the lifeworld from the totality of the Universe. Without such a process the lifeworld would be ‘invisible’ or unattainable for its participants.

This is crucial for our understanding of any rationalization of the Ecclesia. If ritualized solidarity reveals the lifeworld [Ecclesia], what of the themes of the Ecclesia? In Habermas’ reasoning, themes are closely related to the horizon of the lifeworld, imbedded in the segments of the lifeworld, which we have seen in the previous chapter. Habermas never really reflects on how the themes emerge in the Ecclesia however. Instead he begins the process of rationalization from at the point where the themes crystallize. He never really explores what underlies themes. Schmemann, however, takes on this challenge, developing a discourse centered on the differentiation between cult and sacrament, especially the Eucharist.

According to thinkers of Cheal’s persuasion, ritualized solidarity does not derive its existence from the paradigm of “truth and falsity” but from the common identity of the lifeworld. It seems to me that the same case could be made for the way in which themes emerge, which brings about the process of thematization. The theme of realizing the Church, which Schmemann emphasizes in his work, would thereby not be derived from a binary understanding of truthfulness or falseness, but from the inter-subjective experience of being in the same lifeworld. This would explain the trivial descriptions of leaving our homes to enter the time of eschaton in the liturgy. Similarly to what Metz would argue, it extends as an invitation. Schmemann writes:

The Church is the home each of us leaves to go to work and to which one returns with joy in order to find life, happiness and joy, to which
everyone brings back the fruits of his labour and where everything is transformed into a feast, into freedom and fulfillment, the presence, the experience of this “home” already out of time, unchanging, filled with eternity, revealing eternity.\textsuperscript{641}

These life stories are almost poetical and according to Merleau-Ponty they offer a latent alterity, with an ambiguous meaning but one which is not endlessly deferred.\textsuperscript{644} They also substantiate a kind of reflexive learning, if we take into account that they describe phenomena that participators internalize as their own experience, what Cheal identifies as inter-subjective experience. Ritual action externalizes this experience, which, according to Schmemann, reveals a common way of life instead of bridging a presumed gap between Man and God.

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Now we are approaching my major argument, which for now will suffice as a point of departure to be more fully explored in Part III: As soon as the participants of the Ecclesia connect ritual action with meaning and identity instead of external power(s) there is a switch from objective mind to cultural knowledge, and as soon as this is accomplished, ritual action will continue to be connected to the inter-subjective experience of being in the Ecclesia. Nevertheless it looses its magical character, but in line with Cheal’s understanding it would still be counted as ritual action.

C. RATIONALIZATION: PASSING FROM EXISTENCE TO EXPERIENCE

Already in his book \textit{For the Life of the World} Schmemann charts the course of his theological mission. He emphasizes the freedom we have been given and the need to make use of it in order to fulfill what was to be undertaken already from the beginning, before the fall of man.\textsuperscript{643}

He created man “after his own heart” and for Himself, and man has struggled in his freedom to find the answer to the mysterious hunger in him. In this scene of radical unfulfillment God acted decisively: into the darkness where man was groping toward Paradise, He sent light. He did so not as a rescue operation, to recover lost man: it was rather for the completing of what He had undertaken from the beginning. God acted

\textsuperscript{642} Merleau-Ponty 1964, \textit{Le Visible et l’invisible}.
so that man might understand who He really was and where his hunger had been driving him.644

There is a radical change of mode in Schmemann's understanding of theology. Instead of obedience to an ecclesial authority he directs the interest of the Christian towards the hunger of man, to the inner truth inherent in man ever since the beginning of creation. Man has the capability for running towards the truth on his own, because truth is always connected to Christ.645

We believe as well that Christ is present in any seeker after the truth. Simone Weil has said that though a person may run as fast as he can away from Christ, if it is toward what he considers true, he runs in fact straight into the arms of Christ.646

Schmemann is eager to set man free in his pursuit of understanding this hunger that entreats man and makes man eager to find the meaning of life itself. The raison d'etre of Schmemann's mission is the emancipation of man in his search, unbound but directed through the Church towards Christ; man is capable and free, neither helpless nor fettered. To realize this emancipation theology needs to be rationalized in the sense of being liberated from the institutionalized explanations of theology and instead being connected to the ecclesial experience.

This is not a treatise of systematic theology ... The purpose of this book is a humble one. It is to remind its readers that in Christ, life – life in all its totality – was returned to man, given again as sacrament and communion, made Eucharist ... The Western Christian is ... accustomed to consider the sacrament as perhaps an essential and clearly defined part or institution or act of the Church and within the Church, but not of the Church as being the sacrament of Christ's presence and action.647

This is the foundational point of departure for Schmemanns ecclesiology. In his work there is an effort to move from the existence of the Church to the experience of the Church as the basis for ecclesiology. Instead of an institutionalized Church where the participants become objects of Divine love, Schmemann emphasizes the experience of being together, sharing in the presence and actions of Christ. Still Schmemann has no clear-cut understanding of how this participation is to be realized in the spatio-temporal existence. Despite his strong critique of the

contemporary Church, there is no practical difference between the Church of Schmemann and an institutionalized Church where members are mere objects. In both cases they assemble, they pray and they return home.

The ambiguity of Liturgical Theology rests in the unclear realization of his vision, of grounding practice in relation to his theory. Schmemann’s striving towards a rationalization of theology suffers from the same lack of clarity and needs to be more thoroughly worked through in order to produce the necessary outcome that Schmemann eagerly envisioned.

Through the meta-narrative of Eschaton people are encouraged to assemble, participate in the liturgy and even to take communion. As such it invokes the solidarity necessary for the community. However, even though solidarity is a necessary condition for the process of rationalization, assembling is not in itself a process of rationalization. Assembling is related to the meta-narrative of Eschaton which brings about a pre-conceived story, dictating to the community what the Church is and why we need to assemble. As long as we remain on a meta-level there is no opportunity for change or improvement; we simply do as we are told.

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The rationalization of the Ecclesia is a process of passing from meta-narrative to mutual understanding, according to the theory of communicative action. In this process there is a distinction between language as a medium for coordinating action and language as a medium for reaching understanding.648

In his interpretation of Mead and Durkheim, Habermas outlines three perspectives for systematizing this rationalization:649
   a. Structural differentiation of the lifeworld [Ecclesia]
   b. Separation of form and content
   c. Growing reflexivity of symbolic reproduction

a) Habermas gives a brief explanation of this structural differentiation:

In the relation of culture to society, structural differentiation is to be found in the gradual uncoupling of the institutional system from worldviews; in the relation of personality to society, it is evinced in the extension of the

In his works Schmemann makes a distinction between theology, liturgy and piety, where theology is the storage of the tradition passed on from previous generations and hidden beneath the temporary with the method of liturgical theology as constituting one way of reaching a propositional truth; liturgy would then be the realization of the Church, of fulfilling the purpose of the network of people committed to this realization. It would be the reiteration of the Christian message, with a normative value commitment; finally piety would be the subjective assessment of the storage of tradition, with a subjective truthfulness in being authentically internalized in the acting subject.

Applying Habermas’ theory of structural differentiation would entail the following:

In relation of theology to liturgy, there is a gradual uncoupling of congealed symbols, mere ritual, and other residual elements pertaining to an institutional system, from theological propositions or worldviews;

In relation of piety to liturgy, the Ecclesia is structurally differentiated through the extension of the contingency for establishing interpersonal relationships. As an example, consider the individuals’ ability to participate directly, instead of indirectly, in a wider network of people committed to the realization of the Church.

Finally, in relation of theology to piety the differentiation is evinced in the fact that the renewal of traditions depends increasingly on the readiness of individuals to criticize and innovate.

In the end, structural differentiation of theology, liturgy, and piety leads to the following three states: for theology, a state in which traditions that have become reflective, and then set aslant, undergo continuous revision; for liturgy, a state in which ecclesial orders are dependent upon formal procedures for positing and justifying norms; for piety, a state in which a highly abstract ego-identity is continuously stabilized through self-steering.

Together these three structures free the participants of the Ecclesia allowing them to be responsible actors, which occurs when Tradition is set communicatively aslant. Instead of serving authority the intent is

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to serve the Ecclesia, as a sharing community, on its own. This means that the participants of the Ecclesia are in some sense empowered to be subjects, where they together constitute the acting Church and not the object of the Church.

This is precisely Schmemann's intention in making use of liturgical theology, as we saw in Part I where I describe how he questions the congealed interpretation of ritual action by adopting a reflective attitude in relation to the entire liturgical act in itself. Instead of uncritically adopting the interpretation of previous generations, the subjects of the Ecclesia reflect on ritual action as their own action, re-enacting themselves as subjects in the Ecclesia. This is the core of the principle *lex orandi lex est credendi*. How we act in prayer goes hand in hand with what we believe, and if the act does not carry our belief then the act is not really ours, or at least it is not intentional and therefore not rational.

Liturgical Theology is the tool whereby Schmemann intends to set man free to be a responsible Christian. This is accomplished in the community based context that I previously described as the *Ecclesia*. Through liturgical theology Schmemann rationalizes the Ecclesia so that the entire Ecclesia embraces the emancipation necessary for the existence of responsible actors. In so doing liturgical theology is utilized in the transition from ritual practice to communicative action, establishing an Ecclesia where responsible actors are able to achieve consensus.

b) “Corresponding to the differentiation of culture, society and personality, there is a differentiation of form and content”, Habermas continues.

> On the *cultural level*, the core, identity-securing traditions separate off from the concrete contents with which they are still tightly interwoven in mythical worldviews. … At the *level of society*, general principles and procedures crystallize out of the particular contexts to which they are tied in primitive societies. … On the *level of the personality system*, the cognitive structures acquired in the socialization process are increasingly detached from the content of cultural knowledge with which they were at first integrated in ‘concrete thinking’.

Through the method of Liturgical Theology Schmemann tries to establish a feedback relation so that the learning process entailed in understanding the liturgy can be socially institutionalized. The effect of this institutionalization is the presumed Ordo, from which he draws the propositional truths necessary for the purification of tradition. *On*

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the level of theology the basic structure of the liturgy is separated from the concrete liturgical tradition, transcending the different traditions. The detailed interpretation of the liturgy fades and the overall meaning of the liturgy is revealed through the basic structure, the Ordo. On the level of the liturgical community the concrete parish is transcended by the overall principle of the Assembly, the realization of the Church, with its procedures and guidelines. On the level of piety social integration in the parish becomes more variable with regard to formal competences. Instead of following some prescriptions and rituals, Schmemann turns his attention instead to the mutual understanding of what it means to be Church, addressing the entire community of the Ecclesia. Here we can see a clear similarity to the idea of ethos in Yannaras work.

The differentiation between form and content provides a context-independent standard for the Theological Tradition, and, using Habermas’ theory, this has the effect of highlighting the main theme of the Ecclesia, which, in Schmemann’s work, is the realization of the Church. The realization of the Church is what crystallizes in the rationalization process where form and content are differentiated. This is the basic structure of the Ordo; the characteristic of realizing the coming Kingdom, as well as the normative purpose of assembling; and the foundational point of departure for ecclesiology: the mutual understanding of what it means to be Church.

c) “To the structural differentiation of the lifeworld, there corresponds finally a functional specification of various reproduction processes”, Habermas argues in his interpretation of Mead and Durkheim. What Habermas refers to is the switch from objective mind to cultural knowledge with several validity claims for different cultural systems, such as science, morality and art.652

This switch in itself depends on a prior switch, from existence to experience. As we have seen previously in Part I Schmemann interprets liturgical theology in a way that emphasizes this shift, when he states that

[t]heology is above all … a system of concepts corresponding as much as possible to the faith and experience of the Church.653

In order to accomplish this switch there is a set of actions that must correspond to the transition from existence to experience, according to Habermas. First of all there is a need to consider external factors and developmental dynamics when considering cultural knowledge; there is a need for analysis that emerges from “below” instead of from “above”. Secondly there is a need for a partial turn from structuralism to a greater awareness of causal relations. Without it the processes of cultural systems freeze and they become attached to each other in a way that makes the differentiation of separate cultural systems problematic.\(^{654}\)

There is clearly an effort to switch from existence to experience in Schmemann’s work, but without any real success. This results in an inability to fully follow through the transition from objective mind to cultural knowledge with several validity claims.\(^{655}\) The reason for this seems to be a structural density in Schmemann’s work, given his focus on revealing the presupposed Ordo, the suprastructure of the liturgy, as we have seen in Part I. This is quite understandable from an historical point of view. Structuralism had began in France after the Second World War. It affected almost every field of study, including theology. This was the background of the patristic renaissance and the Ecumenical Movement, which was the theological nurturing ground for Schmemann in his youth. In Europe, structuralism was already fading by the 60’s, but in America it persisted and became highly influential from the 60’s onwards.\(^{656}\) Since Schmemann moved to America in the end of the 50’s he never experienced the decline of structuralism in Europe.

The effect of Schmemann’s propensity towards structure is that even though he wants to liberate the participants of the Ecclesia and turn them into responsible actors, with the intention of revealing the main theme of the Ecclesia, he will be unable to follow through. This inability is in turn linked to his inability to make the switch from existence to experience. It is through the experience of the acting subjects that the move from objective mind to cultural knowledge is made possible. As long as the liturgical tradition has at its foundation the conception of an objective mind, as something existing in the Ecclesia, the liturgical tradition will continue to be external to the Ecclesia. This in turn makes it hard for Schmemann as well as for the entire Ecclesia to separate the

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\(^{655}\) Cf. Schmemann [1966] 1975, *Introduction to Liturgical theology*; and Schmemann 1969 ‘Liturgical Theology, Theology of Liturgy, and Liturgical Reform’. Even though Schmemann is eager to release man in his pursuit of truth, he nevertheless neglects to address the question of the relation between the liturgy and morality, or the question of different layers of the liturgical structure.

\(^{656}\) For the history of structuralism see Barry 2002, *Structuralism*. 
necessary actions of the liturgy from secondary order structures, since
the liturgical tradition merely resides in the Ecclesia.\(^{657}\) This may be why
Schmemann in effect denounce any change of the liturgical order, even
in details, related to rubrics and prayers.\(^{658}\) The Method of Liturgical
Theology therefore becomes a way of understanding the liturgy, but
without any real possibility for change. This puts the Ecclesia at risk of
colonization, as we shall see below.

D. Colonization of the Ecclesia

Through the process of recapitulation Schmemann tries to liberate
the participants of the Ecclesia, allowing them to increasingly become
subjects instead of objects by reversing the perspective from \textit{above} to
\textit{below}. With the process of recapitulation, however, the demands of
communicative action also increase. Through communicative action
there is a progression of individuation. Individual participation becomes
more important. This in turn heightens the need of reproducing the
tripartite symbolic structure. Under the aspect of mutual understanding,
this renews the theory of recapitulation as well as the principle of
\textit{sobornost’}. Under the aspect of coordinating action, social integration
and social solidarity is achieved by assembling, and finally through
socialization the life-histories needed for the formation of personal
identities are thematized.

The thematization of the Ecclesia occurs when the structures of the
Ecclesia are experienced as constraints. A situation of context relevance
[\textit{Verweisungszusammenhänge}] is thrown into relief, and knowledge
tacitly taken for granted previously now becomes reflective and
rendered problematic. This brings the process of rationalization to the
fore and consequently increases the demands of reaching consensus in
the Ecclesia. This in turn results in a heightened risk of dissensus. In the
end there is a need to unburden responsible actors from the demanding
task of communicative action, according to Habermas’ theory. This is
achieved by transforming communicatively integrated domains of social
interaction into appropriately structured subsystems of instrumental

\(^{657}\) Cf. Schmemann 1969, ‘Liturgical Theology, Theology of Liturgy, and Liturgical Reform’. In the discussion with
Dom Bernhard Botte, Schmemann is reluctant to speak about an active change in the liturgical structure. Instead
he talks about an organic change, but without a real subject.


210
interaction. These subsystems are then regulated by steering medias; what Habermas calls mediatisation.

By reversing the recapitulating hierarchy and turning it into an order of delegation, through the top to the bottom, responsible actors are relieved from the communicative process of reaching consensus; reversing the hierarchy would substantiate as a kind of mediatisation of the Ecclesia, if we continue to follow Habermas’ reasoning. Schmemann is attentive to this aspect and in his answer to Ralph Montgomery Arkush, published 1959 in St. Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly, he vehemently defends the Church as hierarchical, saying that

[tl]he “early” practice was restored by the Moscow Sobor of 1917-18, and constitutes the basis for the Church in America. First, on the election of bishops: It is true that the bishops were elected by the local church. The consecration, however, which alone made them bishops was performed by the bishops – and this order expresses the ontological order of the Church. Election, i.e. suggestion, proposal, etc., comes from the people of the Church, the Sanction comes from the hierarchy, and this principle is to be applied to the whole life of the Church, in which, according to St. Ignatius of Antioch, “nothing can be done without the bishop” (i.e. without the hierarchal sanction).

In his answer to Arkush hierarchy emerges as the order of sanction, instead of recapitulation, which gives the Church the necessary strength to preserve the culture handed down from previous generations. Safeguarding the culture would be a burdensome task for the entire Ecclesia, following Habermas, if this would be solely an effect of the consensus process.

In yet another article he reverts to an understanding of the hierarchy or clergy as part of a consensus process giving the initiative back to the Ecclesia in its entirety.

A false idea of clericalism as absolute power for which the priest has no account to give. In fact, the priest in the Orthodox Church must be ready to explain his every opinion, decision or statement, to justify them not only “formally” by a reference to a canon or rule, but spiritually as and according to the will of God. For again, if all of us, laity and clergy, are obedient to God, this obedience is free and requires our free acceptance: “I call you not slaves, for a slave knows not what his Lord does; but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard, I have made known to you” (John 15:15) and “ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free” (John 8:32). In the Orthodox Church, the preservation of truth, the welfare of the Church, mission, philanthropy, etc.— are all a

659 Schmemann 1959, ‘The Church is Hierarchical’.
660 Schmemann 1959, ‘The Church is Hierarchical’.

211
common concern of the whole Church, and all Christians are corporately responsible for the life of the Church. Neither blind obedience nor democracy, but a free and joyful acceptance of what is true, noble, constructive and conducive of the Divine love and salvation.661

Here there is no relief from the demands of consensus and communicative action. On the contrary, Schmemann intensifies the need of mutual understanding, through the process of unifying clergy and laity. There is clearly a tension between these two aspects of the hierarchical order of the Church. On the one hand there is a need to defend the ontological understanding of the hierarchy as the foundation for the unity of the Church, arguing for obedience to the hierarchy. On the other hand Schmemann presents the theory of obedience as being dependent on mutual understanding to be free.662

If we consider Habermas’ theory, the power of the hierarchy is defended because of its function of relieving the participants of the Ecclesia from communicative action. We can deduce from Schmemann's work that, as such, hierarchy is understood to be an appropriate subsystem of the Ecclesia, but this subsystem has to be constrained by proper institutions like the sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church 1917-1918, in order to be anchored in the Ecclesia. This is done through the canons of the Church, the unbiased regulations, similar to Habermas’ understanding of the function of the civil laws, which in themselves are rooted in the communicative action of the Ecclesia. With these canonical regulations as an interface there is a dialectical relation between the emancipational and recapitulating hierarchy of the Church and the systematic order of delegation. Without this interface the institutionalized Church is not anchored in the Ecclesia and the effect is the colonization of the Ecclesia, which results in certain pathological disturbances.

In 1964, 1965 and 1966 Schmemann ventured to deal with the dissensus between the orthodox churches of the American continent, i.e. the problem of the uncanonical diaspora.663 The ancient rule of the Church, stipulating that there should be only one bishop in each city, became more or less obsolete on the American continent. This affected all levels of the church. Schmemann deals with the issue by describing

661 Schmemann 1959, ‘The Church is Hierarchical’.  
662 Schmemann 1959, ‘The Church is Hierarchical’.  
the disorder emanating from the situation of having multiple orthodox churches in the same geographical area.

Everyone simply claims the fullness of canonicity for his own position and, in the name of it, condemns and denounces as uncanonical the ecclesiastical status of others. And one is amazed by the low level and cynicism of these “canonical” fights in which any insinuation, any distortion is permitted as long as it harms the “enemy.” The concern here is not for truth, but for victories in the form of parishes, bishops, priests “shifting” jurisdictions and joining the “canonical” one. It does not matter that the same bishop or priest was condemning yesterday what today he praises as canonical, that the real motivations behind all these transfers have seldom anything to do with canonical convictions; what matters is victory. We live in the poisoned atmosphere of anathemas and excommunications, court cases and litigations, dubious consecrations of dubious bishops, hatred, calumny, lies! But do we think about the irreparable moral damage all this inflicts to our people? How can they respect the Hierarchy and its decisions? What meaning can the very concept of canonicity have for them? Are we not encouraging them to consider all norms, all regulations, all rules as purely relative?664

The disturbances described by Schmemann are what Habermas would exemplify as pathological effects of colonization. The Diaspora has meant an increase of the rationalization of the Ecclesia, with a differentiation between normative values and facts discerned by scholars of different disciplines. At St Vladimir’s, where Schmemann was active as dean, this process reached a turning point when George Florovsky was dean. He overtly changed the curriculum of the studies at the seminary in the 50’s, differentiating the scholarly studies from the spiritual and normative formation of the candidates for the priesthood. This provoked a minor storm not only at the seminary but at large in the Orthodox Church in America.

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The consequence of rationalizing the Ecclesia is the increased strenuous pressure on responsible actors, which in turn amplifies the risk of dissensus, with a progression of communicative action. This threatens the symbolic reproduction of the Ecclesia. In order to safeguard the social interaction of the Ecclesia, communicatively integrated domains of social interaction are transformed into appropriately structured subsystems of instrumental interaction. Here these communicatively

integrated domains are transformed into the power invested in the bishops, with the intention of unburdening the responsible actors of the demanding requirements of communicative interaction.

The more the power of the bishops is increased, interactions that were once coordinated through language are switched over to the institutionalized decision of a legitimate bishop, a process which Habermas calls mediatisation. As long as the hierarchical institutions for constraining and guiding the Church, brought forward by the process of mediatisation, are kept socially integrated they remain anchored in the Ecclesia. However if spheres of action that are essential for normative integration, i.e. dependent on the free acquisition of belonging to a community, are switched over to instrumental action colonization of the Ecclesia occurs, with certain pathological disturbances emerging that create legitimation problems within the Ecclesia.

It is precisely these difficulties that Schmemann stresses in his article, and that weaken the legitimacy of the hierarchical institutions. Instead of forging the unity of the Church these institutions become the instrument of division and competition. Communicative action basically serves the symbolic reproduction of the Ecclesia through the speech act, which under the aspect of mutual understanding, coordinating action, and socialization, brings about unity and consensus. The switch from communicative action to instrumental action shares in the purpose of supporting unity, but by relieving responsible actors of the burdensome duty of a fully elaborated consensus.

When the instrumental action no longer serves the purpose of upholding the unity, the actions of hierarchical institutions are no longer anchored in the Ecclesia and, in the long run, loose their ability of relieving responsible actors. Instead the hierarchical institutions become a threat to reaching mutual agreement and the transmission and renewal of cultural tradition, to coordinate communal actions, necessary for social integrity and solidarity or for the socialization and formation of personal identities. This is precisely what Habermas identifies as colonization of the lifeworld.

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E. Actions for Reversing the Colonization of the Ecclesia

The uncanonical problem, as Schmemann tends to describe the colonization of the Ecclesia in America, is felt on all levels of the Church. First of all there is a clear misunderstanding of the meaning of canonicity, Schmemann argues. Canonicity has been "reduced to subordination which is declared to constitute the fundamental principle of church organization." "Canonical subordinationism" stems not from a sincere appreciation of the true or the good or the beautiful, but from the need for security.668

This aspect is also understandable from Habermas’ perspective. When rationalization increases in the Ecclesia there is a need of holding on to unbending truths, of remaining on a narrative meta-level, and securing the ancient order, often perceived as immutable. At the same time this has the unavoidable consequence of surrendering the responsibility as Ecclesial subjects, and instead of engaging them in a process directed towards mutual understanding, reducing them to objects in relation to the hierarchical institution, the institutionalized subsystem.669

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On the level of the Synod of Bishops there is a “dormant” condition, according to Schmemann, when subordinationism affects the Church. Instead of being an active sign of the unity of the episcopate – Episcopatus unus est – there are no official meetings and therefore there is no consensus between the bishops. The relations between the local churches are reduced to governance instead of communication.

[T]he difference between a ‘central administration,’ even if it is called ‘Synod,’ and the true ecclesiological nature of an episcopal Synod is diminished. Instead of confirming the unity of the Church its main purpose is to “supply the Church with a 'high power' not only not derived from the unity of bishops, but meant to be a power above them.670

This is precisely what Habermas identifies as colonization. The communicative action between the bishops cannot simply be transformed into governance, since communicative action is a central part of the

668 Schmemann 1964, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America: I. The Canonical Problem’
670 Schmemann 1964, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America: I. The Canonical Problem’
symbolic reproduction of the Ecclesia. The unity of the bishops rests on communicative action. It is in this aspect that it is a visible sign of ecclesial unity, which in turn manifests the solidarity of those involved at the level of the Synod of Bishops.

At the level of the Diocese, Schmemann continues, the quantity of subordinationism is immediately apparent. In the state of Ohio there were 86 Orthodox parishes divided into 14 jurisdictions, but without any local bishop. These communities were rather small and could not fulfill their obligations of being truly catholic. If there had been a bishop “with a living center of unity and leadership in Ohio” the hierarchy would have been a “principle of unity and common life” instead of division.\(^\text{671}\)

The third level seems to be untouched by subordinationism, according to Schmemann’s argument. In the parish the Church fulfills the ecclesiastical function and it is here that ecclesial life is reproduced. This way of reasoning is understandable if we remind ourselves that the cornerstone of the Church for Schmemann is the empirical Assembly. It is here that the Church is visualized, manifested and realized. For Schmemann, it is the local parish that possesses the primary initiative and this initiative has to be secured by the hierarchy, according to the principle of recapitulation. In order, however, to avoid conflicts between the parishes an order of delegation has to be established, anchored in the Ecclesia through the canonical regulations of the Church.\(^\text{672}\)

### F. The Unfulfilled Process of Rationalization

Through the structural differentiation of theology, liturgy and piety, Schmemann establishes a foundational point of departure for the rationalization of the Ecclesia. Theology is the storage of ecclesial tradition received from previous generations in community with the Holy Spirit. Liturgy or more precisely the leitourgia is the horizon whereby the community fulfills itself and the main theme of the Ecclesia. Finally piety is the personal acquisition of the tradition.

The Ordo continues the process of rationalization by establishing a feedback relation with the learning process in the Ecclesia, separating form and content. Through the Ordo the main theme of assembling becomes accessible to the community in their effort of attaining mutual understanding as well as the process of coordinating action. The

\(^{671}\) Schmemann 1964, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America: I. The Canonical Problem’

\(^{672}\) Schmemann 1964, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America: I. The Canonical Problem’
community of believers coordinates their task of realizing the Church at the same time as they are engaged in reaching a common understanding of what it means to be Church.

All this is then coupled with the understanding of the individual as part of a community, and through the process of rationalization the individual is empowered to be a responsible actor and not a “slave”. By this liberation the community of believers establishes the bond of mutual love, which in itself causes the community to be unified with other communities, the ecclesial process of sobornost, within Russian tradition. It is on the level of the parish that the unification of the Church begins, but without the liberation of the believers there is simply not enough freedom to establish the bond of mutual love necessary for this unification, according to Schmemann and Khomiakov. Using Habermas’ theory we identify this liberation with the rationalization of the Ecclesia [lifeworld].

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At the same time the Ordo seems to have a double purpose in Schmemann’s work. On the one hand, it is part of a differentiation between form and content, as part of rationalization, thereby liberating the participants of the Ecclesia from external authorities, increasing their potential to become responsible actors. On the other hand it is part of the process of relieving the participants in the Ecclesia of the burden of communicative action, referring the identity of the Church to the Ordo. Here there is a contradiction in Schmemann’s work, if we continue to adhere to the theory of communicative action. The switch from existence to experience is crucial for the process of rationalization in the lifeworld, according to Habermas. Regarding the Ordo, the fact of its being a particular way does not mean that it ought to be that way. Without a clear difference between how things are and how things ought to be the participants of the lifeworld are restrained from carrying out the rationalization of the lifeworld.673

On the one hand Schmemann wants to establish a feedback relation for learning by explaining the connection between what we experience and what we do in the liturgy and how it has been handed down through centuries. He tries to do this by the scholarly establishment of the Ordo.674

On the other hand Schmemann wants to set up the one *ordo* established “once and for all” in the life of the Church.\(^675\) The first assignment is part of the rationalization of the Ecclesia, but the second part is of another order. In the latter case there is an attempt to secure the revelation of the Church, but this does not mean that everything in the liturgy is part of the revelation and therefore immutable. On the contrary, Schmemann is eager to differentiate between what is temporal and local vis-à-vis what is universal. Furthermore, his mission is not to content himself with a historical survey but to instigate a theological synthesis issuing from an historical analysis.\(^676\)

If the theological analysis entails a feedback relation to what has been handed down in history with an instrument towards improvement then the participators in the Ecclesia retrieve their place in the Ecclesia as responsible actors. This is not the case in Schmemann's work. Instead theological analysis is reduced to an understanding, but not through an achieved consensus rather through the enlightenment of the scholarly achievements of an elite.\(^677\) Now we can return to Fagerberg’s conceptual differentiation between *ordo* and *ortho*. The Ordo is the work of scholars trying to establish a feedback relation, but not as a “once and for all given” Ordo, but as an aid in working out an Ortho, which is something accomplished in the Ecclesia while reaching for consensus. Schmemann seems to have severe difficulties in differentiating between an *ordo* and an *ortho*. We will look at why this is in the next chapter.

\(^{677}\) Schmemann [1966] 1975, *Introduction to Liturgical theology*, His thesis on Liturgical Theology rests on the idea that this constitutes an independent discipline in the academy, with its own methods.
7. The Reification of the Ecclesia

It was this freedom of the early church from “religion” in the usual, traditional sense of this word that led the pagans to accuse Christians of atheism. Christians had no concern for any sacred geography, no temples, no cult that could be recognized as such by the generations fed with the solemnities of the mystery cults. 678

Alexander Schmemann, *For the Life of the World*, 1963

In the following chapter I will investigate the ambiguity of Liturgical Theology in Schmemann’s works by looking at Habermas’ theory of reification. I will begin (A) by comparing György Lukács’ mediation between theory and practice with Habermas’ understanding of this mediation. My argument is that reification is necessary for rationalization. I will then continue (B) by stipulating that, in Habermas’ reasoning, giving up the claim of reconciling theory and practice resulted in a more comprehensive understanding of emancipation, and enabled religion to play a part in this. Subsequently (C) I will analyze the relation between reification and colonization by claiming that the necessary reification also constitutes the basis for an unwanted colonization. Then I will (D) investigate the theory of reification focusing on the Ecclesia, and argue that reification evolves into colonization of the entire Ecclesia resulting in the loss of the subject. Finally, (E) I will describe the ambiguity of Liturgical Theology from the point of view of the Theory of Communicative Action (TCA).

A. Theory and Practice

As a primary premise I would claim the following: Reification is the transformation of social relations and subjective experiences into things, through the assimilation of the social and subjective worlds into the objective world, that is, into things that can be manipulated and controlled.

Based on this premise I will argue that reification constitutes the foundation for a possible colonization of the lifeworld, both for Habermas and for Lukács. What differentiates them is how they perceive

the development of colonization from reification. Behind their theories there is a difference in the perception of the mediation between theory and practice, i.e. how the progress of rationalization is realized. Lukács laid the foundation for what later became known as Weberian Marxism in his collection *History and Class Consciousness* 1923. In his work he combines Marx’s category of *alienation* with Marx’s later theory of *reification*, and then links these to Weber’s theory of *rationalization*. As a result there is a reconstructed theory of reification and a new mediation of theory and practice adapted to a more advanced society.

Reification or *Verdinglichung* in Marxist theory is the process which conditions individuals to view each other, and their social and natural environment, as “things” for instrumental reasons. In the capital economy, as a prime example, individuals are treated as labor work craft with the purpose of accumulate a profit.

Lukács developed Marx’s theory of reification, and, according to Habermas, Lukács theory has three elements:

1. In line with Dilthey’s reasoning, the totality in a certain stage of a developed society expresses itself in a specific form of objectivity corresponding to a specific form of existence or thought.
2. Society evolves by continually transforming these “forms of objectivity” thereby shaping the existence of human beings.
3. Stemming from Hegel, Lukács maintains that the social relationships of human beings, and between human beings and nature, embody objectified reason, but not necessarily in reasonable form.

The prevailing form of objectivity, which, according to Lukács, in capitalist society is the commodity form, then prejudices the world-relations, the ways in which speaking and acting subjects can relate to things in the objective, the social, and their own subjective worlds.

Reification, as the result of the prevalence of the mode of capitalist production, in Lukács’ reasoning, is the main objective to be overcome, since it limits the possibility for a truly human society. Weberian Marxism is characterized by these two constituents: the theoretical integration of Weber and Marx, together with a need to understand reification, but these two result in a third constituent, the mediation between theory and

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679 Lukács 1971, *History and Class Consciousness*.
practice with the objective of overcoming reification. Lukács’ originality lies in the understanding of organization as “the form of mediation between theory and practice.”

This mediation, according to Habermas, involves three steps in Lukács’ work. First of all theory can only be criticized from the point of view of organizational praxis, and with it theory itself can be criticized with regard to its own internal contradictions. ‘Pure theory’, Lukács continues, can only present diverse views of reality, but through organizational direction theory presents itself in the sharpest manner, pushing theory into practice, where theoretical indecisions must be sanctioned by practice. Through organizational praxis ‘pure theory’ becomes practical and actualized.

Secondly, to achieve enlightenment, the populace has to be subordinated to an already enlightened leadership, since the populace has been conditioned by a “false consciousness”, and has to be guided into the struggle for emancipation. This results in the third step, where theory is withdrawn from confirmation and agreement among those whom it is supposed to aid in the struggle of emancipation. Organization is therefore an instrument for the realization of theory aimed at the emancipation of the populace, but organization in itself does not necessarily entail emancipation, since it is merely instrumental in realizing the theory that will lead to emancipation. Organizational direction can therefore even be temporarily suppressive.

I would add two major points to this description of Habermas’. Firstly, that organization, in Lukács’ work, is not only an instrument for realization, but it embodies also the possible refutation of the theory. Through organizational direction, theory becomes actual and in this state of being actual the potential flaws of the theory are revealed by the impossibility or the potential defects in the realization of the theory. Secondly that organizational direction offers a teleological awareness of the theory, transforming the theory into intentions for the three worlds; the objective, the social and the subjective.

The meditation between theory and practice, in Lukács’ reasoning, according to my own perception, therefore resides in the understanding that any theory of society outside this actualization is only potentially

682 Lukács 1971, History and Class Consciousness, p. 299.
685 Lukács 1971, History and Class Consciousness.
true. Consequently social theory has to have an organizational direction to be an actual part of reality, and it is only through this direction that the theory can be considered true. Lukács’ organizational direction actualizes the objective of overcoming reification, as a “false consciousness”, through the guidance of an elite towards emancipation, but organizational direction in itself is only potentially emancipatory. The very reality of emancipation can only be at hand with the realization of the theory. Truth, in Lukács view, is the practical realization of theory, evolving into an understanding of truth as praxis.

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Habermas criticizes Lukács’ theory of reification for only considering a particular instance of rationalization. Weber, Habermas argues, perceived economic rationalization as a moment of rationalization at large, but Lukács traces Western rationalization as such to the reifying economic process.686 Furthermore, and much more importantly, Habermas criticizes Lukács’ revival of Hegel’s concept of totality, with its presupposed conceptual unity between theoretical and practical reason at the level of absolute spirit.687 The latter critique evolves from an effort to differentiate between theory and practice, even though Habermas was much more lenient towards this mediation in his early works.

According to Harry F. Dahms one can detect three stages in the development of Habermas’ understanding of the mediation between theory and practice.688 Habermas already dealt with the issue in 1957 in his “Report on the Literature Concerning the Philosophical Discussion of Marx and Marxism”.689 The early Habermas concurred with Lukács in the overall objective of the mediation of theory and practice towards overcoming alienation rooted in reification, but, Habermas argues, even though it might be possible there has to be a clear distinction between philosophy in the sense of practical theory, and social sciences based on empirical refutation.

According to Dahms, towards the middle of his career, as exemplified in the “New Introduction to Theory and Practice”,690 the middle Habermas upheld that the mediation of theory and practice

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689 Habermas 1957, ‘Literaturbericht zur philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus’.
690 Habermas 1971, Theorie und Praxis.
is not directly tied to the objective of overcoming reification. Instead Habermas took the differentiation between theory and practice one step further. He differentiated between three functions in the process of overcoming reification: the function of producing theories, the function of enlightening the addressees, and finally the function of developing effective strategies. These three functions resemble the structural differentiation or the three worlds of the lifeworld in TCA. At this intermediate point in Habermas’ career, the differentiation leads him to the conclusion that these three functions have their own internal logic as well as their own institutional setting. This leads Habermas to gradually withdraw from Lukács simplistic and comprehensive hypothesis of the mediation between theory and practice. By the time Habermas’ reasoning reached maturity the mature Habermas no longer struggled with the issue of reaching a comprehensive mediation of theory and practice in order to overcome the reifying effects of formal rationality in institutionalized systems, something he finally considers to be impossible.

Habermas’ most decisive critique of Lukács in the end presents itself as a severe attack against the error stemming from Lukács’ attempt to turn “becoming practical” into “a theoretical plane and [represent] it as a philosophical actualization of philosophy”. Instead, Habermas argues, practice does not determine the nature of theory, as for example accomplishing a revolutionary emancipation, but rather that theory informs us of the viable forms of practice, which could enable us to address the type of practice to be employed, given specific conditions, for a likely success.691 In the mature phase of Habermas’ reasoning there is therefore a dialectical relationship between theory and practice with mediation staunched by a distinct differentiation, which clearly differs from Lukács.

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In the mature phase of Habermas’ reasoning there is simply no single path to mediating theory and practice. By renouncing the possibility of a single comprehensive theory of mediation Habermas also renounces Hegel’s idea of an absolute spirit. Instead Habermas fully accepts the complex understanding of modern society that Weber achieved with the

complete separation of cultural value spheres, which according to Weber are separated once and for all.692

Following the path of renouncing the whole, Habermas employs a post-foundationalist theory. There is simply no underlying metaphysical reality beneath existence which can claim an absolute truth; no universal claim that transcends the variety of cultures and human existence as such. Habermas instead distinguishes between a moral universalism that postulates “an exclusive truth claim for a certain doctrine and for an exemplary way of life” from a more complex understanding of universal claims, *procedural universalism*, whose objective is the validity of outcomes.693

Procedural universalism, according to Habermas, must be open to particularity and difference. A dialectical understanding between theory and practice reveals the stubborn reality of the differentiation of the three worlds. As soon as we engage in a deliberative mode of existence, based on a dialectical understanding of theory and practice, we also have to be engaged in communicative action, where we adjust practice as we come across new theories or accept the failure of previous ones. There is simply no preconceived practice or any preconceived theory without the communicative practice of responsible subjects.694

This does not mean, according to Habermas, that no universal claims assessed by reason can exist. Even though we cannot give a universal account of most of our normative values, Habermas continues, we can give a reasonable account of how we proceed in our reasoning.695 This means for example that procedural universalism does not rule on whether it is right or wrong to commit suicide, or if it is a sin to engage in homosexual relationships, nor does it offer any method for determining such judgments. Instead, it can only assess whether or not processes of deliberation include the self and others in self-reflection. Procedural universalism is therefore open to particularity and difference, but within established procedural limits. Another example would be the issue of feminism. Procedural universalism does not rule on what would be a correct description of feminism, but judges whether the description, in being authentic for a particular community without being enforced by domination, involves both the self and others.

Procedural universalism has to meet certain conditions and these are formulated by Habermas as three principles:\textsuperscript{696}

1. The principle of impartial judgment intended to constrain “all affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balancing of interests.”
2. “Only those [moral] norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.”
3. The principle of consensus cannot be applied to all participants if they do not participate freely and “can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual.”

These conditions, Habermas is eager to emphasize, are of universal character, expelling a purely relativistic attitude towards reason, but at the same time establishing a legitimacy of pluralism.\textsuperscript{697} In the end, Habermas’ theory of procedural universalism defends the freedom of the subject, therefore making emancipation foundational for reason.

In the later period of his career where his reasoning matures, Habermas is eager to follow Theodor Adorno’s understanding that philosophy needs to learn “to renounce the question of totality” and the idea of the particular representing the universal.\textsuperscript{698} In line with this Habermas distinguishes between two attitudes of mind. One is directed towards the representation of objects while the other is directed towards producing them as they should be. Coming to an understanding, according to Habermas, is not an empirical event, as merely representing one’s view, but a process of mutually convincing one another on the basis of motivation by reasons in coordinating their actions.\textsuperscript{699} Understanding therefore requires the freedom of participants, and without sufficient freedom the participants experience communication as dysfunctional, presenting pathological disturbances.\textsuperscript{700}

Sameness of meaning, Habermas concludes, comprises the praxis of collective learning, forging the ability between responsible actors to coordinate their actions from the basis of a shared understanding of

normative prescriptions and the competence of critically judging these prescriptions. This ability, however, does not depend on a prerequisite meaning. Instead it depends on a procedural outcome between actors, from the basis of an inter-subjective consciousness. Sameness of meaning, according to Habermas, can only be the result from fairly independent and free actors, and not as a result of coercion or domination. If meaning is totally preconditioned the participators would in fact not be free.

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Giving up the claim of totality does not mean that we abandon reason, or the potential for a holistic understanding. Instead we have to change our way of thinking. Totality, in the objective world, reflects an interpretation of the universe in categories of causal explanations. If, for example, we come across an acorn lying on the path in front of us, and someone asks us how the acorn came to be lying there, we may say, using causal explanations that it has fallen down from an oak tree or a bird has dropped it. If we instead use teleological explanations we may instead say that it has fallen from the oak tree in order for there to be a new oak.

The difference may seem meager but has a revolutionary effect when we consider the multiplicity of possible teleological explanations. Causal explanations on a macro-level are reasonable attempts to claim the totality by connecting different phenomena in the universe into a wider reality. Teleological interpretation instead concerns responsible actors involved in communication with the aim of coordinating their actions, forging the universe into a future reality. If causal explanations are foremost limited by the physical universe, teleological interpretations are limited by the interests of the subjects involved.

Causal explanations depend on a prerequisite reality, more or less independent from active agents, which is revealed through explanatory theories. Teleological explanations are not immediately dependent on a prerequisite reality. The acorn lying on the path, according to our knowledge, carries the potential of becoming a new oak tree, but it also carries the possibility of feeding a squirrel. Even more, the acorn can also symbolize the beauty and immense richness of creation. The


possible interpretations are therefore almost endless but within the limits of shared interests between participants.

Teleological interpretations, according to Habermas’ reasoning, have to correspond to all three worlds. In the objective world any future predictions have to be reasonable in relation to possible explanations of cause and effect (the acorn is known, from causal explanations, to produce new trees), in the social world any teleological interpretations requires communication between responsible actors to establish a normative value (releasing the life-giving capacity of the acorn is something good), finally in the subjective world expectations for the future have to be sincere, conveying the authenticity of the interpreter (the beauty of the acorn is in the end an individual evaluation). Teleological interpretations consequently do not reveal a preconditioned reality, but instead disclose the interests of responsible actors, involved in communicative action, and their life-world. Together they are engaged in shaping reality, but within certain procedural limits.

The “mature” Habermas therefore recognizes a dialectical relationship between theory and practice in the process of communicative action. Organizational direction in Lukács’ reasoning, Habermas argues, carries with it a certain misunderstanding. He sees Lukács as failing to understand that organizational direction depends not on causality but on the interests of those involved. Organizational direction cannot be determined before interaction between agents without loosing its authentic character of an inter-subjective reality, as if it were a mere fact. The goal of achieving a revolutionary consciousness, as an objective interest, independent of the participants is a lucid example of this misunderstanding.

### B. Discourse and Practice in Habermas’ Later Reasoning

Giving up any single path of mediating between theory and practice continues to evolve after TCA, but unlike Dahms, I don’t discern a clear dividing line between the “middle” Habermas and the “mature” Habermas in the development of his thinking. The lucid dividing line
in Habermas’ thinking comes with the new introduction to *Theory and Practice* 1971, between his early period and his intermediate one, according to my own understanding. Here Habermas entered on a new path in his reasoning, which evolved into the mature reasoning of his later work.\footnote{Habermas 1971, *Theorie und Praxis*.} In a sense it began already in 1968 when he wrote his thesis on *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, which he reworked in 1973 in a new edition with a new ending.\footnote{Cf. Habermas 1968, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*; and Habermas 1973, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*.} There he differentiates between ‘knowledge’ and ‘interest’, in many ways substituting the former dichotomy of theory and practice. Knowledge, Habermas argues, is guided by interest, which in turn is something that brings people together and motivates them towards practice.

The differentiation between knowledge and interest pushes Habermas’ reasoning further and in 1972 he writes an article entitled *Wahrheitstheorien* where he continues the differentiation between theory and practice, arguing for a differentiated understanding of truth, between practical truths and theoretical truths.\footnote{Habermas [1972] 1984, *Wahrheitstheorien*.} The former depends, according to Habermas, on the realization of consensus in a given community and the latter instead depends on the discursive process of reaching different propositions. The practical truths depend in turn on the interests that are necessary for any community, while the discursive truths are dependent on achieving knowledge. Even though these truth claims are differentiated they remain in dialectical relation to each other.

Habermas continues the discussion in his later work *Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit* 1985 where he seems to be retrieving the practical conception of truth from Lukács arguing that discursive truths can only be understood as plausible truths since it is impossible to achieve the ideal situation needed for an absolute theoretical truth.\footnote{Habermas 1985, *Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit*.} Therefore discursive truths have to remain open to alterations since new facts and new possibilities can come to light in a future situation. Practical truths on the other hand continue to carry a certain understanding of being absolute since they are guiding our actions in everyday life. The certainty of practical truths becomes abundantly clear if we consider, for example, the conviction that we should not cross bridges of questionable stability. Whenever we abandon such practical certainty we deliver these convictions to a discursive process that will remain open to adjustments and therefore remain plausible but not absolute.
By the end of the 20th century, Habermas completely abandons the idea of truth as absolute on a theoretical level, which would demand the complete reconciliation between theory and practice. This occurs with the writing of his response to Richard Rorty and others, *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung* in 1999. From there on Habermas seems more or less to share Lukács’ conviction that any theoretical truth has to be practically realized or otherwise it will remain only plausible. He differs from Lukács however, in the sense of abandoning the need for reconciliation between theory and practice, with the idea of an organizational direction. All in all, in his later work, this forces him also to abandon consensual truths. Habermas argues that truth claims are considered true by a community communicating with each other not because they achieve consensus. On the contrary, they are able to achieve consensus because they are true, and if they fail in achieving consensus the potential flaws of the theory comes to light.

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Giving up the claim of universal truth claims does not mean that Habermas, in his later period, also gives up the claim for their rationality. On the contrary every truth claim opening up from inside a community implicitly demands universal acceptance and if given the necessary requirements in a different context they have to be considered true also in that context. In fact, Habermas argues, the nature of truth claims always demands a kind of universal acceptance and therefore they always become available to critique. He therefore questions the relativistic understanding of culture by some philosophers, e.g. Richard Rorty. This is why, in his later period, Habermas interferes in the sphere of religion. Here Habermas identifies a certain claim of universal acceptance, and as such religion becomes accessible to critique, which is precisely the duty of Critical Theory, to aid those claiming universal acceptance.

Habermas, in his pursuit of giving assistance to different religious communities or proponents of theological propositions, begins already in the early 90’s as I have already mentioned with regard to the lecture on Johann Baptist Metz, and to his article on Michael Theunissen. In the beginning of the 21st century he also begins to address the question of

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religion on a larger scale, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 event. In his publication *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion* he considers religion as part of the history of reason and discards the secularistic idea of rejecting religion on grounds of being unreasonable. Instead he is convinced that any practical philosophy has to be attentive towards religious belief in post-secular society but also agnostic towards any religious belief in order to be of assistance in the progression of society. In fact, Habermas argues, there is a need for religious citizens and non-religious citizens alike to assist each other and complement each other in a common learning by translating to each other their own convictions making them understandable.

This does not mean that Habermas gave up on his critique of metaphysical thinking. On the contrary, in later life Habermas gave it a final twist. By giving up the reconciliation between theory and practice at the same time retrieving Lukács idea, that theoretical truths need to become practical in order to be considered true, he gave the metaphysical truths a final blow, since his conception of metaphysical truths are those that cannot find any practical implications in the spatio-temporal realm of reality. Therefore Habermas saw it necessary to alter the understanding of truths concerning religious belief in order to remain consistently rational. The result of this enterprise was the differentiation between Faith and Knowledge, beginning in the lecture he held in a symposium in 2004, *Die Grenze zwischen Glaube und Wissen*. Faith, Habermas argues, is beyond discursive evaluation. Instead faith belongs to the realm of establishing meaning with the purpose of giving confidence and solidarity to everyday life. The following year he continues the discussion and differentiates between *Glaube und Wissen* [Faith and Knowledge], during a symposium in Vienna in 2005, as two different ‘epistemic modalities’, and consistently argues against posing the same arguments concerning religious propositions, e.g. the existence of God, as one would with propositions concerning physical entities. In line with this reasoning Habermas also criticizes the explicative claims of universal acceptance made in Christianity concerning religious belief because of this mixture of different epistemic modalities.

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709 Giovanna Borradori provides an excellent discussion between Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida concerning the 9/11 event. See Borradori 2003, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror*.
712 For the lecture and other texts of the symposium see Langthaler – Nagl-Docekal 2006, *Glauben und Wissen*. 
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Habermas’s critique against Christianity’s mixing of different epistemic modalities did not mean that he was critical towards religion as such but on the contrary, in later years Habermas was aware that the society was in need of religion, and in this need the post-secular society emerged from the ruins of a purely secular society. Habermas presents the need as a need for a new totality, and by this course of argument he comes close to arguing for a kind of new Weltanschauung [world disclosure]. However, instead of grounding it in reason he delimits it to the realm of the aesthetic and thereby argues that the new Totality is of another order, which fits very well with his distinction between Faith and Knowledge. Faith is similar to the practical truths that we take for granted, and therefore not eligible for discursive rationality, but furthermore, meaning in a religious sense is not understandable outside the realm of religious belief. In the end it seems that we are back at the understanding of religious truths as proposed by Khomiakov: that these truths can have no external guarantee outside a community sharing a certain religious interest or interests, but in Habermas’ later reasoning, these are truths of a different modality.713

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The idea of a community sharing common interests through communicative action becomes the basic strata of the lifeworld in Habermas later reasoning. These interests, Habermas argues, are essential for the survival of society. Without them secular society lacks the necessary motivational force which gives it comfort and brings about solidarity. Religious belief is one of the basic motivational interests of the lifeworld which is a mentality that the secular state could not provide without the existence of unique lifeworlds in society. Religion, Habermas continues, is capable of transcending society, taking a stand from without, viewing the totality of existence from the perspective of revelation. As such religion becomes the otherness of society disclosing the limits of reason and discursive rationality, but this does not mean that religious belief has the final say concerning moral action. Instead Habermas continues to argue for a discursive ethics built on discursive

713 The discussion concerning the need for a new Totality could be seen in Lüning 2007, ‘Glaube, Vernunft und Willen’; Reder – Schmidt 2008, Ein Bewusstsein von dem, was fehlt; and Jonsson 2009, Habermas, påven och iron.
rationality. Religious belief, according to Habermas, answers not primarily to the question of how we should act morally, but that we should act morally, and considers the decline of religion as a threat to the whole civil order of the modern society.714

At the same time, Habermas argues, these lifeworlds are unique in relation to each other and neither of them could be the ultimate provider of motivational interests. Therefore, Habermas continues, we need rescuing translations of these unique values so that we can transfer these same values to the public space that exists between these lifeworlds. This means that the secular state rescues these motivational interests by transforming them from religious interests to secular interests, which in turn Habermas believes is possible because there is a semantic potential inherit in these religious interests which makes the transfer possible.715

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Even though Habermas finds religious belief more or less necessary for the continuation of a moral society he nevertheless considers religious belief to be subsumed by secular enlightenment with secular science dominating knowledge, and instead delimiting religious belief to the sphere of interests. This meant that Habermas challenged religious believers to accept the cognitive dissonance necessary for a multicultural society, and in and through this challenge Habermas, in his later reasoning, came forth as the ultimate defender of the multicultural society after the clash of ideas surrounding the notion of a purely secular society.716

Because Habermas in effect identifies Faith with those practical truths that are taken for granted, there is no room for doubt in Habermas’ understanding of Faith.717 Either you are a believer or you are not. The problem with such an understanding is that most believers would not recognize this description and further more this description of belief seems to be metaphysical in the sense of not being open to verification in the spatio-temporal realm. There is quite simply an implicit ‘ought’ hidden in the differentiation between Faith and Knowledge in Habermas’ later reasoning. Faith and Knowledge ought to be differentiated so that

716 Habermas 2005 Glauben und Wissen.
717 Habermas 2005, Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion.
different Faith-communities can co-exist in a common society. Doubt makes such a differentiation problematic since it blurs the categorization of these two realms. Doubt reveals Faith as moving between facts to be verified from an historical point of view, and moral truths established through consensus, and the claim of authenticity revealed through subjectivity. Instead of delimiting Faith to the realm of motivational interests, we would derive more explanatory power from viewing Faith as a transcendental category that needs to be structurally differentiated in order to be transferred to the realm of the secular society. This would lead to an understanding of Faith as belonging to the tripartite structural differentiation of the lifeworld. Without a structural differentiation religious belief will confuse internal relations of meaning with external relations among things [and] validity with empirical efficacy.\textsuperscript{718}

The differentiation between Faith and Knowledge as two epistemic modalities solves the problem of the incommensurable lifeworlds but it creates other problems. Habermas, in his effort of organizing different religious beliefs in a common society, seems to create a dividing line between the secular world and the religious world, but religious people are religious all the time. Religious belief is not only something contained in a particular lifeworld as if it could be separated from the individual. Instead the public space is the focal point of different lifeworlds clashing with each other and in this clash those participating in the scene of the public arena make up rules for co-existing with each other. Habermas’ dividing line between Faith and Knowledge seems to me as a suggestion for how we ought to behave in the public space of society, opening up for a secular state but not necessarily for a secular society. Delimiting Faith to the sphere of interests, however, seems to be a kind of reification that claims an ontological status. If Faith is reduced to mere interests we are entering on the path to a new version of secularized society which is relieved of those subjects who carry religious beliefs. This would threaten to decrease the same motivational force that Habermas wishes to defend.

Faith, I would claim, belongs to all three worlds and as such transcends the dividing line between the two epistemic modalities;

faith belongs both to the realm of facts, delivered through history and revealed through the different sources connected to that history, and to the realm of bringing forth the motivational interests attached to the lifeworld. Still I share Habermas' opinion of a differentiation between Knowledge and Interests but Faith belongs to both of these realms and it seems that we are back at the same dilemma as with ritual action and communicative action. Habermas seems to still be caught in the understanding that religious belief has to be replaced by secular belief in the public space in the same way as ritual action has to be replaced by communicative action. There is no reason why secular interests and religious interests could not co-exist making up a society where ritual actions continuously line communicative actions. There is simply no single path in avoiding the clash between different lifeworlds, ideologies or beliefs. The dividing line between the secular state and multicultural society will inevitably be transgressed as long as we are dealing with humans in the full sense, and presumably has to be transgressed on many occasions if we want to uphold the motivational force needed for a secular state. Else we risk ending up with Universal Pragmatics without any life or meaning. According to Habermas, the only way of handling these clashes comes with the structural differentiation of the lifeworld and not by a metaphysical rule of different modalities, even though there are reasons for a differentiation between Knowledge and Interests.

C. REIFICATION AND COLONIZATION

In Habermas' reasoning, the dialectical relation between theory and practice pushes the interpretation of reification in a different direction than in Lukács' works. The problem of reification, according to Habermas in TCA, is not that it fosters a “false consciousness” but that reification impedes the ability of responsible actors to fully engage in undistorted communication. The structural and institutional restrictions of an advanced capitalist society confines the subjects to the functional system directed towards goal attainment instead of mutual understanding.719

Habermas therefore suggests the practical philosophy of decolonization. It begins by philosophy abandoning the very idea of an ultimate foundation for knowledge. Secondly, that philosophy has to understand itself “as a dimension of social praxis”, thereby inverting

the relation between theory and practice produced by traditional
metaphysics. Thirdly, to fully acknowledge the ability to criticize
traditional claims of metaphysical and religious world-views, and instead
release their contents for emancipation oriented towards the future.
Finally philosophy can gain an awareness of its own social restrictions
and elitist self-understanding.

Further more, Habermas argues, instead of limiting the theory of
reification to the commodity form in capitalist society, as with Lukács,
the structural differentiation of the lifeworld implies different types of
reification derived from different value spheres. Reification as such is
therefore not necessarily a result of negative outcomes. The theory of
procedural reason makes reason dependent in such an extent on the
situation that “reification” might be the result of “solutions” to social
problems. Therefore when Habermas employs the term “decolonization”
he understands reification as natural to certain processes of
rationalization, but the aim is to confine reification within limits by
responsible subjects. This is why Habermas does not immediately aim
at overcoming reification, rather that decolonizing the lifeworld has to
imply the full recognition of the reifying effects in the lifeworld, and
the acting subjects have to assume full responsibility for these effects.
Without such a responsibility colonization will lead to pathological
disturbances of the lifeworld.

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Reification generated by the capitalist society is just one of several
types of reification. This way of reasoning Habermas inherits from
Weber, but there is also a major difference between them. Habermas
does not perceive processes of reification as mere reflexes emanating
from an authoritarian state nor an oligopolistic economy. When
communicative action is replaced by media-steered action this does not
eo ipso give rise to undisciplined reifying effects, according to Habermas.
Instead colonization, as pathological deformation of the communicative

721 On a more thorough analysis of Habermas use of “decolonization” see Ahn 2009, ‘Decolonization of the
Lifeworld by Reconstructing the System’.
722 For a more thorough analysis of the differences between Weber and Lukács see Breuer 1982, “The Illusion of
Politics: Politics and Rationalization in Max Weber and Georg Lukács”.
infra-structure of the life-world, occurs when there is a methodological objectification of the lifeworld which cannot be easily altered.\textsuperscript{724}

Reification in this narrow sense brings about a shift of perspective from being a participant into becoming an observer, and any one trying to break free from this objectification will encounter severe difficulties. Instead of making use of the learning potential culturally available in the lifeworld, developed societies deliver themselves over to an uncontrolled growing system complexity. The life-world therefore suffers a loss of responsible agents, and reifying effects objectify the lifeworld with a distortion of everyday communication.\textsuperscript{725}

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Pondering Marx's theory of alienation, Habermas makes another important contribution to his understanding of reification. Marx, according to Habermas, makes a decisive error when he fails to sufficiently distinguish between reification and structural differentiation. If one admits with Marx that reification leads to alienation in the sense of responsible actors being ousted from the horizon of the lifeworld, structural differentiation leads to individuation and not necessarily to alienation. Internal colonization of the lifeworld, Habermas continues, plays into the process when the traditional forms of life are torn so far apart that the structural components of the lifeworld (culture, society and personality) have been differentiated to such an extent that it continues as a process of uncoupling collective identity that forces the complete disintegration of the structural components. From this disintegration, reifying effects occur as a substitution for communicative action, disturbing the communicative practice of everyday-life.\textsuperscript{726}

In conclusion, Habermas, in TCA, does not produce a critique of reification as such, but of the limitations it produces vis-à-vis the responsible subject. Critical Theory in Habermas' later works, aims at liberating the activity of subjects, to reveal the deformations of particular identities produced by these reifying effects, and above all, at turning attention towards emancipation of the human being. As we shall see, however, in the next part of this dissertation, neither he nor

Schmemann dare to take the leap, in the full sense of their emancipatory understanding of reality.

D. Reification in the Works of Schmemann

If we compare the continuous progress in Habermas’ thinking, concerning theory and practice, with Schmemann’s, we find that there is comparatively little change in Schmemann’s work. Instead it seems that his mind is made up almost from the outset, at least from his doctoral dissertation (1959) onwards, even though the perspective changes somewhat. Still, there is a change beginning already in his famous book *For the Life of the World* which slowly develops. From the very outset of his career Schmemann was focused on finding the Original and fundamental structure of the liturgy, but by the end he is more attentive to the fullness of the Church, with the Eucharist as the center of this fullness.

In his dissertation Schmemann outlines the liturgical crisis as well as a proposed method for overcoming it. He divides this method into three steps, which he reiterates in his paper for the 28th conference of Saint-Serge in 1981. First, according to Schmemann, we have to define the concepts and categories necessary for grasping the essential nature of the liturgical experience. The second step is to connect these concepts with the overall system of theology, which defines the doctrine and the faith of the Church. Finally in the third step there has to be an analysis connecting the separate data of the liturgical experience as a connected whole.

This triadic analysis reappears several times in his dissertation, and could best be described as the definition of the form, the connection of the form with a precise content which brings forth the final analysis of connecting the form–content with the meaning. In relation to the Ordo, Schmemann identifies these three steps with 1) finding the typos, form or structure, presupposed of the Ordo, and 2) reconstructing the origin and development of the typos, which finally brings forth 3) the

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meaning of the Ordo, as “its theological content as the *lex orandi* of the Church.”

The form and content of the liturgical experience connected with the Ordo is primarily concerned with theory, following Habermas’ understanding. It is concerned with finding certain concepts adequate to the description of experience. The differentiation between form and content fits in well with the theory of structural differentiation in TCA, which I laid out in the previous chapter. It is quite another thing when we touch upon the issue of the meaning. His dissertation is divided into four parts: “The problem of the Ordo”, “The problem of the origin of the Ordo”, “The problem of the development of the Ordo” and finally “The byzantine synthesis”. “The problem of the Ordo” represents the first step, that of finding the *form*, or the *typos* of the Ordo. The second and third chapter present the *content* of the Ordo, and finally, “The byzantine synthesis” presents the search for the meaning of the Ordo.

The last chapter begins with a chronological partition of the Ordo; first the Judeo-Christian foundations of the Ordo, secondly, the effects on the Ordo of the new relationships of the Church and the world after the conversion of Constantine, and thirdly the monastic impact on the Ordo. In the Judeo-Christian period two strands were connected, the sanctity of time, essential to the Jewish tradition, and the *eschatological* character which give the Christian tradition its precise content, which in itself is the consummation of time, connecting the different cycles of time to the time of the Lord, the Lord’s Day, the Eucharist.

In the era after the conversion of Constantine there is a transition, according to Schmemann, from an eschatological concept of the Church year to a more complex historical and mysteriological understanding. The reason for this, according to Schmemann, was the clash between pagan worship and early Christian worship. The latter would then be characterized by an eschatological awareness, where the saints are venerated as witnesses of the new life and therefore images of Christ. The clash meant that the veneration of the saints was colored more and more by the ‘liturgical piety’ of the pagan cult. Instead of representing the coming Kingdom and the witness of the Church as belonging to this Kingdom, the veneration assumed the character of sanctification and intercession of the individual. Christian worship also assumed the

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public arena, representing the earthly kingdom as well as the heavenly. Christianity became the official cult clothed in imperial vestiges.\textsuperscript{732}

The last ‘stratum’, according to Schmemann, followed upon the ‘anchorite’ withdrawal from the Church’s community, in some sense as a reaction towards the official character that the Church assumed after the conversion of Constantine. Still, according to Schmemann, we find the same trace of ‘liturgical piety’ but in a form that differs from the official cult. One of the more striking effects was the transformation of communion as an integral part of participating in the common rhythm of the Church into a private cycle of the individual’s life. Communion was detached from the \textit{lex orandi} of the Church and was instead connected with the spiritual state of the individual or even the decision of a spiritual director.\textsuperscript{733}

The ‘secular’ ordo, which developed from the official cult, and the ‘monastic’ soon came into conflict, according to Schmemann. The singing of \textit{troparia} and \textit{kontakia} was considered inappropriate by some monastics, but on the other hand Simeon of Thessalonica regarded the ‘simple’ monastic worship as a decline. The conflict did not however prevent the two ‘strata’ from merging into one, what Schmemann entitles the Byzantine synthesis. This was made possible, Schmemann continues, by the grafting of ‘ascetical’ piety into ‘mysteriological’ piety. Asceticism became indispensable in the mystical interpretation of monasticism. So ‘liturgical piety’ in the end became a synthesis between ‘ascetical piety’ and ‘mysteriological piety’.\textsuperscript{734}

After a lengthy historical journey presenting the Byzantine synthesis Schmemann finally arrives at the issue of the meaning of the Ordo, by asking what the creative and determining significance is for the future of this ‘synthesis’. The answer is rather short considering the lengthy historical outline. Despite a strong influence upon the Ordo by mysteriological psychology and ascetic-individual psychology, the synthesis, Schmemann argues, has continuously been connected with the theology of time, though obscured by these secondary layers. The theology of time with the Eucharist as the consummation of time remains the inner logic of the Ordo, the essential and eternal logic of the liturgy. This is what the ‘synthesis’ reveals, according to Schmemann.\textsuperscript{735}

According to Schmemann’s reasoning, the creative and determining significance for the future of the Ordo, understood as a synthesis, seems to be an evolutionary consequence of his analysis of the form and content of the Ordo. This has the effect that the meaning of the Ordo becomes dependent on the origin and development of the Ordo. Concerning the origin Schmemann argues for a theology of time whereby the Eucharist is understood as the consummation of time by participation in the coming Kingdom, which is then preserved in the development of the Ordo.

Already at the beginning of his dissertation Schmemann presents his view on finding the meaning.

In our liturgical practice there are things which to many people seem to be the age-old tradition of the Church, but which in fact distort this tradition. It is impossible to discern them outside their historical perspective, without comparing facts, just as it is impossible to define the basic path of liturgical development and its general meaning outside a similar perspective.

Schmemann understands the pursuit of meaning as beginning with the search for the basic structure of worship, similar to what Gregory Dix indicates by the use of “shape”, but he differentiates between historical liturgics and liturgical theology. If historical liturgics establishes the structure and historical development of worship liturgical theology discovers the meaning of worship.

In order to begin his search for the basic structure of worship Schmemann makes some introductory remarks before envisaging a plan of action for his search. First of all Schmemann discards the division between ‘private’ and ‘corporate’ worship, since the general purpose, or motive, to use Habermas’ terminology, is to constitute the Church, which is to bring the ‘private’ into the ‘corporate’. Secondly Schmemann rejects the division of the sacraments into separate liturgical departments, and instead argues that they all are connected to the Eucharist as the Sacrament of the Church.
After discarding the divisions mentioned above, Schmemann explains the overall purpose of finding the meaning of worship. He begins by describing the unfortunate process of reducing the Church to an object that can be manipulated and controlled, which makes it possible to transform the ‘corporate’ worship of the Church into a ‘private’ worship of the individual.

It can be said that in our time the life of the Church has become almost exclusively liturgical, has been reduced to worship and worship alone. ‘Love for the Church’ (tserkovnost) has become a synonym for love of the church building and its worship. The church building, the care of the church and the maintenance of the services, love of worship, of its beauty and reverence … such is the main content of tserkovnost.739

Habermas would characterize this reduction as reification, where social relations and subjective experiences have been assimilated into the objective world of things. This has the consequence, Schmemann continues, of also reducing the entire act of worship to an object of love, which in turn objectifies the Church, where worship has ceased to be a function of the Church and instead the Church becomes a function of worship.740 In the categories of the previous chapter we could say that the Ecclesia consisting of the three worlds – the objective, the social and the subjective – has been assimilated into the objective.

The reification of the entire Ecclesia, following Habermas’ reasoning, would be the main objective to be overcome, in Schmemann’s scheme. Rendered in terms of the Theory of Communicative Action, this is what constitutes the crisis that Schmemann describes in his dissertation:

The liturgical crisis consists, first of all, in the mistaken concept of the function and place of worship in the Church, in the profound metamorphosis in the understanding of worship in the mind of the Church. Let us emphasize the fact that we are speaking here about something much more important than the misunderstanding of the texts, ceremonies and language of divine service. We are speaking here about the whole approach to worship and its ‘experience’.741

There is however a risk that the contested reified structures are challenged with recourse to new reified structures. This is also what occurs in Schmemann’s dissertation. In his attempt to reconstruct a new understanding of the Church he introduces the concept of the rdo,

which is supposed to capture the essential nature of the liturgy and what
it means to be Church. Following Habermas’ reasoning, the symbolical
reproduction of the Ecclesia has to correspond to all three worlds –
the objective, the social and subjective. The objective character of the
liturgy does not represent the Ecclesia in its entirety, but it is apparent in
Schmemann’s work that the Ordo is draped as the very action situation,
or horizon, of the Ecclesia.

The worship of the Orthodox Church is conducted according to Ordo,
that is, according to definite regulations, according to an order or rite
established once and for all. Our Church knows no worship which is not
according to Ordo.742

Here Schmemann makes the bold statement that the Ordo is established
once and for all.743 Never the less he admits that the Ordo is vague.

And finally it would not be difficult to show, and in fact it will be shown
in the treatment of the history of the development of the Ordo, that our
present Typicon represents an amalgam of local rules not infrequently
marked by contradictions and obscurities. We come to the conclusion,
therefore, that the Ordo is problematical both in scope and content, and
that selectivity and judgment are required in its use; i.e., the application
of criteria and premises which are not found within it in explicit form.744

Despite admitting to the fact that the Ordo cannot be found within an
explicit form, and that selectivity and judgment is needed, Schmemann
nevertheless identifies the Ordo with a set of definite regulations,
established “once and for all”. Such a description does not reflect upon
the nature of the Ordo in a linguistic sense or in action-theoretic terms.
The social or subjective aspects of the Ordo are therefore not considered
in his treatise. Schmemann does not reflect upon the possibility that the
Ordo has to be vague if it is an act of the Church and not merely in the
Church. If it is to involve responsible actors it has to consider all three
worlds; the objective, the social and the subjective, in accordance with
Habermas’ theory.

Instead the consequence of Schmemann’s line of argumentation is
that the Ordo becomes a collection of rules and prescriptions which are
inconsistent, and therefore constitutes a problem, the problem of the
Ordo. Schmemann nevertheless draws the conclusion that the Ordo

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“determines the whole liturgical and devotional life of the Church.” This is clearly a reification, according to Habermas’ theory, because it is grounded on the premise that there is an objective structure, determining what the Church really is, without the participation of responsible actors. The subjective and social worlds are assimilated in the objective world with the result of fully congealing the Tradition in its historical moments. This I believe is the real problem with the Ordo.

This creates an ambiguity in Schmemann’s dissertation. On the one hand, Schmemann tries to overcome a reified understanding of the liturgy, where the Eucharist has become an object of love instead of constituting the Church. On the other hand, however, his understanding of the Ordo as a fixed set of rules, established once and for all, also becomes a reified understanding of the liturgy. Here the Church and the liturgy become an object of historical study, despite the fact that Schmemann still admits to the impossibility of avoiding value judgments.

E. The Ambiguity of Liturgical Theology

In Lukaćs’ reasoning, overcoming reification has to do with the mediation of theory and practice, and begins with an organizational praxis. In a similar way Schmemann employs an organizational praxis when he introduces the foundational theory of the Ordo. From this basic structure Schmemann’s eschatological understanding of the Church becomes actual in the sense of shaping the common understanding of the Church and releasing the participants of the Ecclesia from a false consciousness.

Through the organizational praxis of the Ordo Schmemann intends to relate the entire act of worship to the essence of the Church, and by this relation revealing the Logos and Meaning of worship (logike latreia). If we continue our comparison with Lukaćs the next step would be the enlightenment of the populace through the temporary subordination to an already enlightened group of intellectuals. This is also what Bernhard Botte expects when he addresses Schmemann in a debate held in 1968 and 1969.

Botte is basically in agreement with Schmemann about the task of liturgical theology, but has some reservations concerning Schmemann’s

\[\text{747} \text{ Botte 1968, ‘On Liturgical Theology’}.\]
treatment of the development of the liturgy. First of all Botte has doubts concerning Schmemann's simplified understanding of the first Judeo-Christian period before the conversion of Constantine as a “Golden age”. Secondly Botte is hesitant in regard to Schmemann's argument that the pagan mystery cults would have had such an impact on the liturgy. Still the formal questions are not the real reason for Botte's inaugurating of the debate with Schmemann. Botte is concerned about the method employed by Schmemann. In the beginning of the article Botte makes a primary statement:

Historical study is not capable of restoring by its explanations the vital value of the liturgy. It can, however, help the theologian in another way: by distinguishing the essential from the secondary. Rites have developed during some ten centuries and under various influences. What is essential is that which remains from the beginning and persists in spite of subsequent additions.748

Botte interprets Schmemann in his own way of thinking, but by doing so he also challenges Schmemann in two ways. First he criticizes Schmemann's perception of piety as an objective record when Schmemann argues that the mystery cults affected liturgical piety but without any affinity to the Christian cult itself.749 Secondly Botte reiterates the distinction between history and competent value judgments.

History is not enough, for it supplies data but is not competent to issue value judgments. It is not enough to look to the past in order to find there an ideal age and suppress all that followed.750

On the one hand Botte is in agreement with Schmemann as regards the task of liturgical theology, that is, of revealing the essential meaning of liturgy by using historical data.751 On the other hand, Botte is not in agreement with regard to the unclear distinction, in Schmemann's work, between historical facts and value judgments by competent actors in the Church.752 To emphasize this ambiguity even more he pushes the question one step further by asking whether or not liturgical theology has to produce a liturgical reform since the liturgy is overburden by unnecessary weight that obscures that which is essential.753

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In his brief response to Botte, Schmemann disregards the subjective understanding of liturgical piety in Botte's article. Instead he vehemently maintains that liturgical piety is as much an objective datum as the cultic forms themselves.\textsuperscript{754} Even though we would agree with Schmemann concerning the possibility of deducing the objective data of liturgical piety, by rereading the corpus of hagiography, sermons and spirituality, this is not the question at stake here. The basic question Botte poses is not concerned with the data revealed by a study of liturgical piety, but how this data should be evaluated. We could agree, given the precise arguments in his dissertation, that the shift from ‘corporate’ to ‘individual’ can be deduced historically, but by these precise arguments Schmemann reveals his neglect of the structural differentiation between theology, liturgy and piety. The question is not how to find proof of this, even though Botte is in some sense skeptical towards Schmemann's findings, but how these proofs should be evaluated.

From Schmemann's perspective, such an evaluation would be natural given a correct understanding of the ‘essence’ of the liturgy. Such an understanding would organically lead to the necessary purifications and changes.\textsuperscript{755} If we compare this with Lukács we could say that as soon as a “false consciousness” is transformed into a new consciousness, the Church would purify itself, and the people will experience the liberation of the Ecclesia. Still Schmemann has not really solved the initial question; in what way will a false consciousness be transformed into a new consciousness?

This is exactly the question that W Jardine Grisbrooke dispatches in his analysis of Schmemann's response to Botte's initial article.\textsuperscript{756} He is also in agreement with Schmemann concerning a renewed understanding of the liturgy. However, Grisbrooke questions the rejection of reform and the unclear perception concerning the way forward to a practical realization of this renewed understanding. Without reform, Grisbrooke argues in line with Botte, the liturgy may be reduced to a protocol of public relations with God. He then takes an example from the parish life.

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To take a simple example: suppose a parish priest is concerned to give his people a real understanding of the significance of the so-called "little
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\textsuperscript{754} Schmemann 1968, ‘A Brief Response’.
\textsuperscript{755} Schmemann 1968, ‘A Brief Response’.
\textsuperscript{756} Grisbrooke 1969, ‘Liturgical Theology and Liturgical Reform’.
entrance” — a subject on which Father Schmemann has elsewhere written perceptively and illuminatingly. How can he do so without pointing out the deficiencies of the present form of it — “denouncing them in the name of liturgical piety”? How can he do that without realizing, and leading others to realize, that the historical development here has served to obscure the lex orandi to such an extent that it is almost invisible? And having acquired a real, and spiritually valuable, understanding of it, are he and his people to be satisfied, when actually worshipping, with the meaningless decadent form of it?\textsuperscript{757}

Both Botte and Grisbrooke share Schmemann’s basic conviction that there is a need for a new consciousness, but they are also critical towards his perception of an organic reform with no identifiable subjects.

In his final response to Botte and Grisbrooke Schmemann reveals the purpose underpinning Liturgical Theology.\textsuperscript{758} Here Schmemann makes a distinction between “faith” and “liturgy”. It is faith, Schmemann argues, that gives birth to liturgy, but it is liturgy that fulfils and expresses that faith. He then takes a leap into the structural differentiation of the Ecclesia by arguing for a differentiation between the faith of the Church and the liturgy of the Church. The liturgy is a living experience of the Church, the \textit{locus theologicus par excellence}, but it is a real manifestation and not merely a realization of a preconceived doctrine of faith. Nor is it instrumental for producing any doctrine.

Here we can draw a clear comparison to the reasoning of Habermas’ intermediate period. Just as Habermas differentiates between theory and practice, Schmemann differentiates between faith and liturgy. This becomes even more apparent when Schmemann takes the differentiation a step further. The real tragedy, Schmemann continues, is the divorce between \textit{liturgy, theology and piety} – these three categories, as I argued in the previous chapter, relate to the structural differentiation of the lifeworld in the works of Habermas – and precisely in the same manner as in the reasoning of his intermediate period, the structural differentiation makes the mediation between theory and practice, faith and liturgy, much more complicated.\textsuperscript{759} There is simply no single mediation between faith and liturgy. Following Schmemann’s line of reasoning we cannot simply deduce a faith from the liturgy nor can we produce a liturgy out of a preexistent posture of faith.

Continuing our comparison with Habermas at his intermediate period, Schmemann, in the same manner, still did not give up on the

\textsuperscript{757} Grisbrooke 1969, "Liturgical Theology and Liturgical Reform", p. 214.
\textsuperscript{758} Schmemann 1969 ‘Liturgical Theology, Theology of Liturgy, and Liturgical Reform’
\textsuperscript{759} Schmemann 1969 ‘Liturgical Theology, Theology of Liturgy, and Liturgical Reform’
perspective of mediating faith and liturgy. When he describes the divorce between liturgy, theology and piety he does not explicitly state that they have their own internal logic, but he realizes that they are separated in the post-patristic period, or to use Habermas’ concept, they are separated in modernity. Similarly to Habermas he perceives the separation but fears that the complete separation will annihilate the Church. He realizes that a liturgical reform will not undo this separation since the three structures in fact have their own logic, or in his own words:

But then one may ask: what liturgical, i.e., external, reform could possibly restore that experience, return its original meaning to that "connection"? It is still here, with us. It is still the norm and yet we do not see it. It resounds in every word of eucharistic celebration — yet we do not hear it. It is as if someone imposed on our ears glasses which makes us blind to the obvious, and on our ears hearing aids that make us deaf to the most explicit … The real problem then is not that of "liturgical reforms" but, first of all, of the much needed "reconciliation" and mutual reintegration of liturgy, theology and piety.

At the end of the article Schmemann adopts an explicit posture for Liturgical Theology as bringing together liturgy, theology and piety in one “fundamental vision”. This can only be done by rediscovering “the genuine lex orandi”. So ultimately Schmemann draws the same conclusion as Habermas at his intermediate stage. He perceives a structural differentiation of the Ecclesia, but is nevertheless convinced of bringing these structures together through the genuine lex orandi, which is the once-and-for-all established Ordo. At the point in his career when his reasoning reaches maturity, Habermas eventually gives up the effort of bringing together these structures, and instead makes it explicit that reason has to deal with the structural differentiation, but only in terms of the freedom of those engaged in the same lifeworld. Schmemann never makes this explicit acceptance, but he comes closer to recognizing this by the end of his life, and gradually relocates the gravity of Liturgical Theology from the Ordo to the Assembly itself as the active subject in constituting the Church.

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A further comparison of Schmemann with Lukács reveals that the first step in the realization of theory is the organizational direction offered by Schmemann through the Ordo and the second step is the enlightenment of the people stemming from this organizational direction. The third step would then be the reform initiated by those who are already enlightened, which is precisely what Botte expects as a consequence of Schmemann’s work. Instead Schmemann virtually declines any effort towards reform initiated by an enlightened elite. Contrary to Lukács Schmemann is persistent in the belief that confirmation is needed from those whom the organizational direction is supposed to help. Here, however, Schmemann is rather idealistic, believing that a purification will occur almost automatically, as the consequence of a transformed understanding of the Church and its worship.762 Lukács on the contrary is not at all idealistic in this respect. Instead he is convinced that the belief in a necessary confirmation by the populace would endanger the process of emancipation.763 The reason why Schmemann considers confirmation necessary is based on a different understanding of truth as compared to that of Lukács, but similar to that of Habermas. Instead of considering the realization of theory as truth, Schmemann regards the realization of theory as possible if the theory is true and therefore confirmable.

Nevertheless Lukaćs and Schmemann share the basic conviction concerning the complete mediation between theory and practice. In Schmemann’s view, practice changes with renewed understanding, and therefore it is sufficient to focus on the understanding of the liturgy in order to overcome the liturgical crisis. Habermas as he expresses himself later in life, does not share the conviction of the complete mediation between theory and practice. Understanding, according to Habermas, does not produce any change automatically simply because they are differentiated in their internal logic.764 Habermas, in accordance with Botte, makes the distinction between data and its evaluation. Data in itself is not capable of evaluation. It has to be received by the community or the individual in order to be evaluated. Our relation to tradition, in this sense, is not so much a matter of being knowledgeable as it is interiorizing the knowledge in the life and thinking of the community and the individuals belonging to the community.

763 Lukács 1971, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 295-342.
This interiorization is what happens through the symbolical reproduction of the Ecclesia, resulting in the continuation of valid knowledge, stabilization of group solidarity and socialization of responsible actors. The structural differentiation of the Ecclesia makes the data distinct from its evaluation. In Schmemann's brief response we find another line of reasoning. Instead of differentiating the historical data from the evaluative processes, the social and subjective worlds seem to be assimilated into the objective world, and evaluative processes are considered as merely historical data. This produces a reified structure, according to Habermas' reasoning, which in turn threatens to objectify the entire Ecclesia making it an object, at least theoretically.

This leaves us with an ambiguity in our analysis of Liturgical Theology in Schmemann's work. On the one hand, the whole purpose of his project is an attempt to overcome reification but on the other hand he ends up with a new reified structure of the Ecclesia, with the assimilation of the social and subjective worlds. This ambiguity becomes even more accentuated if we consider the continuous effort to overcome the reified structures of the Ecclesia as presented in his most famous work, For the Life of the World. Here we get a change of perspective. Instead of employing a historical survey he moves directly towards the concluding question of his dissertation, that of finding the creative and determining significance of the liturgy at large. In the book he unfolds the critique of the reification of life itself in terms of religious life.

There are those among us for whom life, when discussed in religious terms, means religious life. And this religious life is a world in itself, existing apart from the secular world and its life. It is the world of “spirituality,” and in our days it seems to gain more and more popularity.

Schmemann questions the dichotomy that religious life stands for and the mission of converting people to this “spiritual life” from the realm of “secular life.” In fact, Schmemann continues, “real life … remains hopelessly beyond our religious grasp.” From Habermas’ perspective

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this would count as a simple way of criticizing the objectification of life, as an entity that can be separated from another entity, and to make such a distinction would be “to steal the world away from God”, according to Schmemann.770 God cannot be reduced to the sacred, and therefore Christianity has to be understood as the end of religion.771

Instead Schmemann understands Christianity as the proclamation of joy, and as such it belongs to the realm of the social world, in the midst of believing people, of those committed to the realization of the Church.772 This is far away from claiming a primary structure or first principle from which scholars can deduce the Church. Instead it is a vivid expression of an emancipation inviting the reader to embrace the full responsibility of being a Christian. This responsibility becomes manifest when Schmemann writes:

This is not a treatise of systematic theology. It does not attempt to explore all the aspects and implications of this Answer. Nor does it pretend to add anything – in this small scope – to the wisdom accumulated in innumerable volumes of “theologies” and “dogmatics”. The purpose of this book is a humble one. It is to remind its readers that in Christ, life – life in all its totality – was returned to man, given again as sacrament and communion, made Eucharist. And it is to show – be it only partially and superficially – the meaning of this for our mission in the world.773

The meaning of our mission in this context is not so much an exegesis as an endorsement for Christian responsibility. From this endorsement Schmemann builds an awareness of what the Church is by linking the mission in the world with the Church as the sacrament of Christ’s presence and action. What Christ has done in the past is the very end of all natural joy, of all satisfaction and even life itself, but in the Church this is transformed into the beginning, rendering all possible joy impossible, but from this impossibility there is a proclamation of the only possible joy on earth. It is only through the personal apparition of this joy that the Christian witness is made credible.

Joy in this sense belongs to the subjective world as a witness of the authenticity of faith. For the Life of the World is as much a theoretical exegesis about this joy as it is Schmemann’s personal and authentic witness of his experience of the joy of celebrating the Eucharist and participating in the mystery of the Church. In his witness of the Eucharistic experience

Schmemann reveals the main theme of the Ecclesia, the constitution of the Church, and in this sense he exemplifies the theory of Johann Baptist Metz, seeing theology as an invitation. The Eucharist, according to Schmemann, is the entrance of the Church into the joy of its Lord, which is the announcement of our ultimate destination, calling forth the Church as ecclesia, the gathering as a response to this call. Together the ecclesia receives the ultimate end and the beginning as the theological heritage and background of the Church expressed in the leitourgia.

Here we have a stronger structural differentiation of the Ecclesia, or lifeworld, than in his dissertation, with the subjective world or the authenticity of the Christian joy, the social world with the coordination of constituting the Church, and finally the objective world with the theological heritage expressed through the leitourgia.

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This explains why Schmemann criticizes the dichotomy between “symbolism” and “realism” in the interpretation of the liturgy in the article The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church.774 There he claims that instead of asking how and when concerning the elements, the real question ought to be ‘what happens to the Church in the Eucharist?’ Schmemann then argues that there are basically two ways of looking at the Eucharist. One is the liturgical perspective where author after author, according to Schmemann, make the same affirmation of the Divine Liturgy as the symbolical representation of the earthly life of Christ. The other is the theological approach of viewing the quid of the liturgy and deals exclusively with the question of the validity.

Schmemann instead proposes a third way, liturgical theology, and instead of asking what happens with the elements in the Eucharist, we have to ask ourselves what happens with the Church in the Eucharist, thereby considering the whole liturgy, which is more than just the liturgical order. It begins already when people leave their homes in order to assemble as Church, and it continues as the very content of life, of being Eucharistic, which is the transcendence of the created order. Creation was conditioned by absolute dependence, but dependence is slavery if it is not accepted freely. Through the Eucharist this dependence is received as thanksgiving, eucharistia, and is therefore transcended by an attitude of freedom.

774 Schmemann 1990, "The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church".
Let me stress once more that the very spirit of liturgy, as the Eastern Church understands it, excluded the distinction between the ‘important’ and the ‘unimportant’ moments or acts. To Orthodox young people who often ask me, ‘Father, what is the most important moment of the liturgy?’, I always give the same answer: ‘The whole liturgy.’

Any attempt to divide the liturgy in “essential” and “non-essential” stems from an objectification of the entire liturgical act, as if it could exist without responsible subjects realizing the Church. Therefore Schmemann ends the article by stating the reality of the Eucharist as dependent on a clearly identifiable subject, “we”:

“We have seen, we have touched, we have been there …” … We partake of the Eschaton and to it we can witness in our life in this world. If we realize this, the Liturgical Movement acquires a real sense of purpose.

In capturing a clearly identifiable subject Schmemann in the end subscribes to a structural differentiation not only of the Ecclesia but also in direct relation to the Ordo. The Eucharist, according to Schmemann, has three aspects, described as sacraments; the Sacrament of the Church, the Sacrament of the real Sacrifice, the Sacrament of the Parousia. The Sacrament of the Church then represents the social world with the theme of coordinating actions for the constitution of the Church, the Sacrament of the real Sacrifice represents the subjective world with the authentic joy and in the end the Sacrament of the Parousia represents the objective world with the transmission of the theological heritage through the liturgical order.

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The structural differentiation is most fully developed in his final epos, *The Eucharist*, published posthumously. Here the ‘Sacrament of the Church’ has turned into the ‘Sacrament of the Assembly’, thereby stating that the first and primary order of the Eucharist is the *synaxis*, the Assembly. In the early Church, Schmemann continues, the *synaxis* preceded the entrance of the celebrant, and the so-called ‘Little entrance’ in the Byzantine Liturgy was the arrival of the celebrants. Today, according to Schmemann, the arrival of the celebrants and the ‘Little Entrance’ has

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775 Schmemann 1990, ‘The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church’, p. 121.
777 Schmemann 1990, ‘The Liturgical Revival and the Orthodox Church’.
778 Schmemann 1987, *The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom*. 
been separated. The arrival of the celebrants and the preparation of the gifts is a separate service with its own dismissal before the people arrive.

Today the ‘Little Entrance’ is more or less viewed as the part of the liturgy where we carry the Gospel. This diminishes the real significance of the ‘Little Entrance’ as symbolizing the Sacrament of the Assembly, where the people have gathered with the purpose of realizing the Church as the Body of Christ, and with the ‘Little Entrance’ the Body receives its Head Christ, the celebrant. This event has been diminished in the present order, when a priest celebrates the liturgy, but is still kept when a bishop is the celebrant. In a hierarchical liturgy the bishop does not enter the sanctuary until the ‘Little Entrance’, and the bishop is also vested when he arrives at the Church, outside the sanctuary. The clothes of the bishop symbolize how he puts on Christ. The white garment, the stikharion, symbolizes the common baptism that we all share, and is therefore the garment of all baptized and manifests his oneness with the Assembly. The epitrakhilion (stole) then symbolizes how Christ puts on our nature for its salvation and divinization, the sign of his priesthood. 779 Here we have a clear perception of the subject, in Schmemann’s thinking, as constituted by both the head of the assembly as well as the body, the people.

In the previous chapter I argued that the objective of realizing the Church is the main theme of the Ecclesia in Schmemann’s works. This theme is embodied in the Sacrament of the Assembly. Without it there can be no Church. Further more, the theme exists prior to the Assembly; it is part of the cultural heritage, what Schmemann describes as theology, and the world of existing states of affairs. Through the Assembly, the Ecclesia becomes tangible in the universe. The Sacrament of the Assembly is therefore the main motive of the Ecclesia that brings about the Church through coordination in the social world. In chapter two, three and four the main theme is further elaborated, and in the beginning of chapter two, The Sacrament of the Kingdom, Schmemann asserts:

If assembling as the Church is, in the most profound sense of the term, the beginning of the Eucharistic celebration, its first and fundamental condition, then its end and completion is the Church’s entrance into heaven, her fulfillment at the table of Christ, in his kingdom. It is imperative to indicate and to confess this as the sacrament’s end, purpose and fulfillment immediately after confessing the “assembly as the Church” as its beginning because this “end” also reveals the unity of the eucharist, its order and essence as movement and ascent – as, above

all and before all, the sacrament of the kingdom of God. And it is no accident, of course, that in its present form the liturgy begins with the solemn blessing of the kingdom.780

In the second chapter Schmemann is eager to explain that the Assembly as such is the realization of the Church, and not merely an “illustriative symbolism” of what Christ has accomplished in the past. Instead, Schmemann continues, the Assembly and the coming Kingdom are thrown together, symballein, as one cosmic and eschatological event, which indeed, according to Schmemann, is the very description of what a sacrament is. This is evident, Schmemann argues, if we take note of how the liturgy begins by the solemn proclamation: “Blessed is the Kingdom of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, now and ever and unto ages of ages.”

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Alongside a much more apparent structural differentiation in his final opus, Schmemann also becomes more aware of the ambiguity of his project, which he describes as a crisis constituted by the lack of cohesion between what is accomplished in the Eucharist and how it is understood and lived. This constitutes a kind of schizophrenia in the life of the Church.781 This reveals quite aptly Schmemann’s general idea of mediating between theory and practice, or theology and liturgy.

In line with this mediation Schmemann is eager to reenact the Church as subject, and therefore he states that Holy Scripture can neither be an authority over the Church or the Church an authority over the Scripture. Instead the Scripture has to be brought into the very curriculum of the Church, where the sacraments give credibility to the word and the word to the sacraments. This is also revealed in the order of the liturgy where the people are gathered around the word in the first part and then in the second part around the altar. It is only the Church that has been given custody of the scriptures and their interpretations. Scripture can therefore not be reduced to a method of exegetics or a fixed set of interpretations. In the same manner the teaching of tradition belongs to whole Church given as a charisma filling the assembly with grace. The preaching of the priest is the fulfillment of this charisma and cannot be

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780 Schmemann 1987, The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom, p. 27.
reduced to a mere rhetorical practice removed from the participation of the assembly, instead it has to be received and incorporated by the same assembly. Without the participation by the assembly the laity becomes an object for the clergy, with the aim of satisfying the personal needs of the people.\footnote{Schmemann 1987, The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom.}

In the end Schmemann presents love as a transcendence of the three structures of the Ecclesia. From an objective perspective love is presented as a category dependent on the actual stories describing the love of Christ; from a social perspective it is presented as a motive for coordinating and unifying the Church, the principle of sobornost'; and finally as a subjective category it reveals the authenticity of the person.\footnote{Schmemann 1987, The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom, pp. 207-211.}

Still, even though Schmemann is more open towards a structural differentiation of the Ecclesia in his later works, he nevertheless maintains the perception of the mediation between theory and practice, with the Ordo draped as the very action situation, the reification of the Ecclesia. The question is what happens if the process of reification continues to develop.

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The rationalization of the Ecclesia, according to Habermas, depends on the structural differentiation between the objective world, that is, theology as historically and culturally transmitted; the social world, the liturgical community with the main motive of realizing the Church; and the subjective world, the authentic expression of the pious and believing subject of the Ecclesia. The structural differentiation has the effect of highlighting different validity claims for the three worlds, separating them from each other, but through responsible subjects these worlds are kept together, constituting the Ecclesia. This results in the participants becoming ever more aware that the concept ‘Church’ has a threefold meaning, carrying three different sets of validity claims. As long as there are sufficient conditions for establishing mutual understanding the process of rationalization brings about the emancipation of the Ecclesia, but if not, the need for mediatisation occurs.

Without the requisite consensus, the participants need some relief from the burdensome communicative action. This happens when the interpretation of tradition is congealed, which takes place when the
social and subjective worlds are assimilated into the objective world, what we now may call reification. During this time the participants of the Ecclesia are able to enhance the social solidarity in the Ecclesia through ritual action, according to my previous arguments, but if the congealed interpretation is understood as part of the structural differentiation of the Ecclesia then a methodological objectification takes place.

Reification, according to Habermas, occurs when there is a prejudicing of the world into facts and things, and he shares the opinion of Lukács who characterizes this prejudice simply as reification.\(^ {784}\) This prejudice characterizes certain entities as belonging to the objective world even though they are elements from an individual subjective world or from a common social world. This prejudice generates an understanding of the world as a world constituted of simple facts and things and fails to connect the transformation of the world into facts with the social process.\(^ {786}\) In the end Habermas shares Max Horkheimer’s view that facts are “often surface phenomena that obscure rather than disclose the underlying reality”.\(^ {786}\)

A continued reification objectifies the Ecclesia and at a certain stage also affects the communicative practice of everyday life. The Ecclesia begins to be transformed into observers and observables. This in turn carries with it alienation and the unsettling of collective identity, which are signs of the lifeworld being colonized by an objectifying attitude which reduces the subjects to objects in an encompassing system. Continuing his analysis of the colonization of the lifeworld, Habermas draws the conclusion that system media are necessary, but have to equal the level of rationalization. If the three worlds are not sufficiently differentiated then the lifeworld runs a higher risk of colonization through employing system media.\(^ {787}\) In relation to the Ecclesia this means that without sufficient differentiation between theology, liturgy and piety, the Ecclesia runs the risk of responsible actors being alienated in relation to the Ecclesia, provoking a troublesome collective identity.

The Ordo takes on the form as belonging solely to the objective world, but it is as manifold as the concept Church, and carries with it not only the objective world but also the social and subjective worlds. In the objective world the Ordo generates the cultural background, the

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\(^ {786}\) Cf. Horkheimer 1947, p. 82.
theological nurturing ground of the Ecclesia, the mutual understanding among participants. In the social world it produces the main motive of coordinating action, the realization of the Church as Kingdom in the liturgy. Finally, as belonging to the subjective world the Ordo reveals the authentic intentions of responsible actors in the Ecclesia. It is the reduction of the social and subjective aspects of the Ordo, according to Habermas’ reasoning, which actually produces the ambiguity of the Ordo.

In Schmemann’s work, the Ordo seems to be an effect of a methodological objectification. This objectification justifies the shift in perspective from the participant to that of an observer. When Schmemann has thoroughly completed this shift he is unable to retrieve the social and subjective aspects of the Ordo. As Schmemann switches to the objectified ordo as his self-evident first principle, the entire Ecclesia shrinks to the format of the objective world, and interactions of responsible agents are guided by ordo instead of mutual understanding. The entire Ecclesia then comes under the threat of being transformed into a matter of observer and observables.

This had a double effect in Schmemann’s life. Firstly, despite his elaboration of the ordo he was unable to differentiate between the necessary and the temporary in the liturgical act, and eagerly defended an unaltered liturgy, in every part, without virtually any possibility for change. Secondly he fully identified the liturgical act with the Kingdom of God, saying, “Let’s go to the Kingdom”, with the intention of celebrating the liturgy. All in all this reveals the full impact of how the structure of the liturgy is draped out as the horizon of the Ecclesia, while the three worlds of the Ecclesia are threatened to be assimilated into the objectivated ordo. At the same time, as we have seen previously, the scientific objectification of the Ecclesia through the Ordo runs parallel with his striving towards emancipation by acting against the reification of the Ecclesia. These two forces created an ambiguity and a personal struggle in Schmemann’s work.

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788 Interview with John H. Erickson, Dean of St Vladimir’s Seminary 2002-2007, and Paul Meyendorff, Alexander Schmemann Professor of Liturgical Theology at St Vladimir’s Seminary 1997-present. Notes from these interviews are at the possession of the author, given in May 2002.
On the one hand Schmemann reverts to an objective apparition of the Ecclesia, draped out as the Ecclesia as such, beginning in his early works as a once-and-for-all given Ordo. In this methodological objectification we can identify the threat of reification of the Ecclesia in Schmemann's scholarly works, leading to a loss of participators if the process persists, and with it follows the signs of a colonization of the Ecclesia. The effect would be a provincial Ecclesia reverting to impersonal power systems, such as congealed traditions or the power of the bishops.

The more the impersonal forces or domination increases the more provincial the Ecclesia becomes. In the long run reification leads to a carceral Ecclesia where the recapitulating hierarchical and sobornal understanding of the Church is substituted for a unilateral and impersonal control by Tradition. Responsible agents assume an objectifying attitude in regard to themselves and others, transforming themselves into objects to be “handled” by other agents. This has the effect of isolating individuals from each other, but with the positive effect of enhancing the possibility of goal achievement, since the need of consensus is reduced.

On the other hand Schmemann dedicated his whole life to the struggle against the reified structures of the Ecclesia. In line with this effort he gradually developed a structural differentiation of the Ecclesia, and a persistent endeavor to release the participants as subjects in the Ecclesia. Still, even though the structural differentiation develops in his later works, Schmemann nevertheless persisted in his struggle of mediating between theory and practice.

Every attempt by Schmemann to structure the liturgy is guided by the intent to preserve the aspect of the responsible subject, the one who will realize the Assembly, the main situation of the Church. Schmemann realized that without the subject the “believing” community will find belief itself to be unnecessary, and without the community the Ecclesia will turn out to be norm-free. The double effort in Schmemann's work has resulted in an ambiguity in his thinking. In the following chapters (Part III) I will suggest a solution to this ambiguity.
PART THREE
Reconstruction of Liturgical Theology

In this part, Reconstruction of Liturgical Theology, I will make some propositions that will resolve the ambiguity described above. The overall argument will be that the ambiguity at hand is resolved by differentiating between meaning and learning in the project of Liturgical Theology, and that the active mediation between theology, liturgy and piety should be understood and processed by a subjective internalization in the Ecclesia and not through an objectifying ground, outside the Ecclesia.

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In chapter one I will follow the same course as Nikolas Kompridis in his reconstruction of Habermas’ thinking, by arguing that we must reject Habermas’ opposition between reason and disclosure. Habermas’ understanding of disclosure as an independent sphere is incoherent, bringing with it the rejection of transcendental and dialectical arguments as well as hermeneutic arguments. Instead I will argue along Kompridis’ line, for a more comprehensive understanding of meaning, differentiating meaning from learning. Habermas’ critique of Heidegger is equally incoherent being too dependent on Habermas’ aversion to Heidegger’s affiliation with the totalitarian regime of the Third Reich.

Habermas does not realize that the asymmetry between meaning and validity is not an impediment to learning but rather its very prerequisite. There is simply no learning without disclosure and there is no disclosure without learning. At the same time there is a need for a more comprehensive theory of disclosure than Heidegger offers us. Here Kompridis develops Heidegger’s theory with a differentiation between a primary disclosure and a reflective co-disclosure. Heidegger makes two egregious errors. First he failed to connect the normativity of disclosure with the normativity of intersubjectivity. Secondly he mistakenly
identified disclosure with self-regulating and self-constituting truth-events. Kompridis therefore proposes a different interpretation of receptivity to that of Heidegger. He argues that any discourse about how we receive our understanding of being also necessarily implies a discourse about how we become more receptive to one another. In this dialectical relation between being and one another, Kompridis develops his understanding of a reflective co-disclosure that enables us to reconstruct the paradigm of Liturgical Theology.

In the end I integrate Kompridis’ theory of disclosure and Habermas’ theory of inter-subjective communication with Hanna Arendt’s theory of similarity and dissimilarity, arguing that identity depends on otherness in its striving towards the unique. I argue, however, that uniqueness is only accessible through a reified remembrance that transforms the unique into the general. When the general then is received by the subject the general once again becomes unique.

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In the second chapter I use Kompridis’ findings to forward the argument that the leitourgia is better understood as a primary disclosure dependent on a reflective co-disclosure, which gives birth to the Church and, so to say, lets the Church be thrown into the world. As such it is a call of conscience activating the agents of the Ecclesia drawing on the cultural background. In the course of reflection, understanding and evaluation is distinguished, but are then brought together again in the everyday life through the subjective apprehension of Tradition. The subjective apprehension of Tradition makes it palpable that philosophy and art are interdependent activities operating on the same cognitive continuum. As a consequence of this, our relation to the academe is transformed. With a more comprehensive understanding of meaning and disclosure the need for differentiating between the what, and the how and why decreases and instead the need to reconcile them becomes more important. This becomes an important endorsement for Schmemann’s reasoning and his emphasis on the complete reconciliation between liturgy, theology and piety.

At the same time Schmemann makes the same mistake as Heidegger. He mistakenly identifies the Ordo with the being of the Church and neglects the transformative agency of the participants and the inter-subjective character of the Church. This is nevertheless something he
becomes increasingly aware of and therefore he develops the idea of liturgical teaching but never makes explicit what it really means. Because Schmemann does not make the same distinction as Kompridis between a pre-reflective disclosure and a reflective co-disclosure he is not able to connect liturgical teaching with the leitourgia. Separating them precludes the possibility of a nonviolent and noncoercive transformation, but also makes sharing in the leitourgia voiceless and the disclosing event becomes devoid of any transformative agency reducing the participants to objects and with it come the reified structure of the Ordo.

A differentiated view of disclosure comes close to what we find in Ignatius of Antioch at the beginning of the second century. He differentiates between faith and love; “All things are good when we believe with love.” Love, on one hand, residing in the leitourgia, fulfils faith in the same way as aletheia in Heidegger’s work fulfils the transformative agency of a reflective co-disclosure, according to Kompridis. On the other hand, in line with Kompridis, the experience in the leitourgia is fulfilled in the transformative agency expressed through a liturgical teaching. Such a teaching is not external to the leitourgia but co-existent. This means that liturgical teaching is the very act whereby the experience of the leitourgia is internalized in those participating in the Ecclesia. This has an evolutionary consequence for our understanding of the relation between the what and the how and why. Instead of separating them from each other as Kavanagh proposes, or a one sided-focus as with Taft, we have to keep them together. Otherwise we end up with an objectification of the participants of the Ecclesia, but even more worryingly we end up with a truncated conception of the experience in the leitourgia which suffers from a severe reification, as well as a truncated conception of what it means to be a sharing community. At the end of the second chapter I suggest a different understanding of academical theology, contending that it replicates the humanities instead of science.
8. Disclosure and Intersubjectivity

For all of its problems, Heidegger’s way of formulating one’s relationship to oneself illuminates a dimension of our moral lives that moral theory’s customary concern with the question of justice has underestimated or misconstrued: the very problem of making oneself intelligible.  

Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure, 2006

Habermas criticized Heidegger’s theory of disclosure arguing that it creates a Dionysian escape from the world without taking responsibility. Habermas saw the consequence of this escape in Heidegger’s affiliation with National Socialism. In this chapter I will first (A) look more closely at Habermas’ understanding of disclosure, beginning with Bohman’s article where he argues that Habermas delimits disclosure to art. After that I will (B) continue by using Kompridis’ research wherein he rejects Habermas’ opposition between reason and disclosure. Thereafter I will proceed by (C) taking recourse to Kompridis’ idea of a more comprehensive view of disclosure where he differentiates between pre-reflective disclosure and co-reflective disclosure. A more comprehensive disclosure than Heidegger’ has the advantage of creating a different understanding of the relation between problem solving and world disclosure. Finally (D) I will propose a different perception of the relation between disclosure and intersubjectivity by using Hanna Arendt’s theory of natality.

A. Habermas and World Disclosure

James Bohman has studied Habermas’ arguments against the poststructuralists in his article Two Versions of the Linguistic Turn: Habermas and Poststructuralism. The main strategy for separating Humboldt from Heidegger depends on two basic convictions. The first is that it is completely reasonable to argue on the one hand that world-disclosure is a constituent feature of language while on the other hand holding on to an entirely different theory of truth. Secondly, that in modern culture world-disclosure is only explicit in the aesthetic sphere, and therefore Habermas delimits world-disclosure to art. Thereby Habermas finds an argument against the omnipresent and

789 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure, p. 53.
790 Bohman 1996, 'Two Versions of the Linguistic Turn: Habermas and Poststructuralism'.
overwhelming understanding of world-disclosure inherent in language, which he accuses Derrida and Foucault to be guilty of.\textsuperscript{791}

Humboldt developed a theory of language as disclosing the world, which implies that language is not just one of many human possessions in the world; rather, it is the condition for having a world at all. Language reveals culture and culture reveals the world at large and this world exists prior to us into which we are socialized.\textsuperscript{792} This nevertheless gives rise to a problem which Heidegger deals with in his works.\textsuperscript{793} If world-disclosure is a feature of language whereby we are socialized into an already existent world, how is it possible to change the world, and how are new interpretations possible, along with facts, values or innovations?

Heidegger therefore develops his conception of truth as a disclosure, aletheia. He understands truth as an event that reveals new entities so profound that they can transform the linguistic world which establishes the culture. According to this conception art becomes more profound, Heidegger continues, since language discloses what is already known in the socialization process. Art instead reveals a being never revealed before, that transforms the linguistic world. Habermas’ critique targets the alleged identification between truth and disclosure, which he implicates as the premise of post-structural arguments.

The problem with this view, according to Habermas, is simply that there is no possibility of proving these disclosures or truths to be right or wrong since they are self-verifying in a very strong sense. Heidegger, Habermas continues, has confused the conditions of possibility of truth, which by themselves are neither true nor false, with truth itself. This so called transcendental fallacy requires a validity of an extraordinary kind, according to Habermas, which goes beyond an ordinary truth, a kind of ‘paravality’. However, this kind of validity does not follow any regular standards for justification, but becomes relativized to the horizon of disclosure, in the sense that meaning determines validity in a strong sense.\textsuperscript{794}

Bohman levels even heavier critique against Heidegger by observing that post-structuralists, as well as Heidegger, persist in their belief that disclosure not only enables truth but also limits truth claims. The question, however, is how this could be possible, except through

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\textsuperscript{791} Habermas 1987, \textit{The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity}.
\textsuperscript{793} Heidegger 2003, \textit{Holzwege}.
\textsuperscript{794} Habermas 1987, \textit{The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity}, p. 255.
a mysterious third person.\footnote{Bohman 1996, ‘Two Versions of the Linguistic Turn: Habermas and Poststructuralism’, pp. 201-202.} Habermas himself argues that these limits would imply that the understanding of meaning from the first-person perspective becomes inevitable, which in turn would lead to the inevitability of a hermeneutic circle.\footnote{Habermas 1987, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 319.}

In order to break this spell of a hermeneutic circle Habermas insists and argues that world-disclosure needs to interact with learning processes. First he needs to separate world-disclosure from truth, which is done by delimiting world-disclosure to a specific type of linguistic function and its role in learning to art. World-disclosure, Habermas continues, belongs to the poetic function of language, which is not limited to poetry alone. Since Habermas’ theory of language depends on the idea that all linguistic functions are simultaneously present, the pure case of any speech act would be a fiction, devoid of any real relation to the world and the need to coordinate social action. Therefore Habermas argues that world-disclosure in this sense belongs to art and the learning process in that domain, and as such it has a fictional discourse.\footnote{Cf. Bohman 1996, ‘Two Versions of the Linguistic Turn: Habermas and Poststructuralism’, p. 203 and Habermas 1987, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 200-207.}

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Bohman criticizes Habermas’ view of world-disclosure on several points. First he thinks it is inconsistent with Habermas’ critique of Heidegger. Habermas’ theory of world-disclosure insists on making a separation between world-disclosure and the illocutionary action that coordinates functions of language inherent in social action. Such a differentiation is inconsistent with his criticism of Heidegger’s ontological difference, where he makes explicit that world-disclosure as a purely fictional speech act would be preposterous and highly exceptional since all functions of language are simultaneously operative. Secondly, Bohman continues, it is unclear how such a disclosure released from any relation to the world would once again be connected to ‘inner-worldly learning’.\footnote{Bohman 1996, ‘Two Versions of the Linguistic Turn: Habermas and Poststructuralism’, p. 203.}

Even though Habermas makes an analogy between art and other culturally differentiated spheres of knowledge, Bohman continues, he fails in his effort since there are no forms of argumentation in art that corresponds to the ‘function’ of disclosure. If Habermas tries to discredit any extraordinary events as with Heidegger’s \textit{aletheia} trying to make
world-disclosure ordinary again, then he certainly fails, according to Bohman, giving art and literature the role of ‘administer[ing]’ capacities for world-disclosure’ similar to the capacity of morality and science to administer ‘problem-solving capacities’. This would certainly give art an extraordinary character. It would be better to view art as a sphere interacting with the other capacities.799

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Instead of limiting world-disclosure to art, Bohman suggests that world-disclosure has to do with meaning, i.e. with the conditions for making statements about truth rather than truth itself. In this way, Bohman continues, we could acquire a clearer differentiation between validity and disclosure, the difference between truth itself and the possibilities of truth. This would also enable Habermas to level even stronger arguments against the philosophically oriented conception of world-disclosure fortifying the poststructuralist perspective.800

Viewing world-disclosure as setting the conditions for making meaningful statements about truth claims transforms the understanding of Habermas’ world-disclosure as a type of speech, and instead sees world-disclosure as a level of reflection, in line with Bohman.801 Still there is more to it than just delimiting world-disclosure as setting the conditions of truth claims, as Bohman argues. World-disclosure is not just about the process of disclosing but about disclosing a world. Linking world-disclosure to meaning does not solve the problem, in my opinion; it just transfers the problem from the domestication of world-disclosure by linking it to art, as with Habermas, to the taming of meaning by delimiting it to the conditions of truth possibilities. The very need of bringing world-disclosure under control gives credence to the fact that world-disclosure means more than what delimitation implies.

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An alternative path is offered by Nikolas Kompridis who argues for two different conceptions of world-disclosure. One is the initial disclosure of the ontological world, which is similar to what Heidegger argues for.

This is a disclosure of “first-order” which is pre-reflective with almost an unconscious relation to meaning, and it cannot be fixed by time or space, but varies over time and through different cultural space. A second order of world-disclosure, which Kompridis refers to as reflective co-disclosure, is a re-working of the meaning inherent in the first-order disclosure. As such it invokes the very possibility of intelligibility, what counts as true or false, and what we mean by different conceptions.\(^{802}\)

By differentiating between world-disclosure as first-order and reflective co-disclosure as second-order, Kompridis differs from Heidegger, but in contrast to Habermas Kompridis takes reflective co-disclosure a step further. Reflective co-disclosure differs from Habermas’ procedural conception of reason, where he restricts himself to clarifying the procedures by which we arrive at an agreement, by uncovering new possibilities that were previously suppressed or untried. Reflective co-disclosure in this sense does not limit itself to clarifying, but also to offering new ways of regenerating hope and confidence, that is, regenerating new meaning. Reflective co-disclosure therefore denotes actions and practices whereby we can imagine and articulate meaningful alternatives to the present situation or political conditions. Contemporary Critical Theory, Kompridis argues, has lost the utopian vision which previously animated the tradition of Critical Theory, and this is why he introduces a new vision of Critical Theory with reflective co-disclosure at its center. The general idea inherent to his vision is a method of self-critically expanding the normative and logical horizon of a first-order disclosure.\(^{803}\)

B. OVERCOMING THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN WORLD DISCLOSURE AND REASON

Critical Theory evolved as a “diagnosis of the times” in the wake of the totalitarian regimes and a transformed Europe. According to Max Horkheimer the difference between traditional theories and Critical Theory is how we use our self-understanding. Instead of simply acknowledging present conditions, Critical Theory strives toward establishing conditions that are free from domination and violence. This in turn brings with it a different kind of knowing. Critical Theory is a practically oriented inquiry that attempts to see new possibilities in

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802 Kompridis 2006, *Critique and Disclosure.*
803 Kompridis 2006, *Critique and Disclosure.*
what is already familiar to us.\textsuperscript{804} The challenge is therefore to integrate the familiar with the unfamiliar, the juxtaposition of continuity and discontinuity. In viewing new possibilities in the objective context of present conditions, Critical Theory invokes a subjective dimension in taking a position outside the objective context, introducing a normative aspect into the inquiry. Critical Theory therefore becomes vulnerable to unanticipated social challenges as well as historical change. The normative element challenges the entire paradigm of Critical Theory to adapt itself in the wake of these challenges.

This in turn, according to Kompridis, exposes Critical Theory to what Alasdair McIntyre has called “epistemological crisis”. It was in the wake of such a crisis that Habermas developed the paradigm of intersubjectivity, creating the Habermasian shift. The result was a different kind of knowledge, having moved from a paradigm where knowledge of objects is primary to a paradigm where mutual understanding between subjects, through language, becomes primary. The background of this crisis lies in the normative attempt by Habermas, according to Kompridis, to ensure and develop the Enlightenment ideals of freedom, democracy and autonomy. These ideals had been disclosed from Hegel to Foucault as compromised by an objectifying practice constituting modernity. Even though Habermas admits that these ideals had been ensnared in the net of objectifying practices he nevertheless makes it clear that they can be retrieved and reconstituted. This is why Habermas develops the paradigm of inter-subjectivity and mutual understanding.\textsuperscript{805}

The problem with Habermas’ conception of Critical Theory subsequent to this shift is the radical reformulation he makes of the theory, according to Kompridis, in the sense that it solves the dilemmas of the philosophy of the subject and the problem of modernity’s self-reassurance too well. The solutions are so convincing that they create an illusion that the problems have been dissolved, but instead they become corrosive elements undermining the paradigm from within. One major problem is his ardent pursuit in making his paradigm “objectless”, but there are problems that still cling on to their objects.\textsuperscript{806} This in turn makes him highly critical towards the theme of world-disclosure, which he perceives as an idea that returns to the philosophy of the subject, and consequently to an objectifying practice, thereby loosing the subjects.\textsuperscript{807}

Heidegger’s analyses of the phenomenon of world-disclosure also challenges the epistemology and ontology of modern philosophy. Instead of understanding the world as a super-object, as it would be identical with nature, Heidegger conceives of the world as a human confrontation with a pre-reflective, but yet, holistically structured, grammatically conceived, understanding (Verständigung) of the world, prior to our epistemic relations. The being of the world is not constituted by us but we are thrown into the world, and in this juxtaposition of the being of the world and our being, a world-disclosure emerges. This world-disclosure depends on Heidegger’s idea that the being of the world cannot be identified with those thrown into the world (Dasein). This makes it possible for Heidegger to conceive the world as pre-reflectively disclosed to us at the same time as it is disclosed through us. This makes it possible to divide disclosure into a pre-reflective disclosure to us and a co-reflective disclosure through us, according to Kompridis. In the beginning Heidegger had an unclear perception of the difference between pre-reflective and a co-reflective disclosure because he had an unclear perception of language.808 It is on this point that Habermas could contribute to the development of world-disclosure, but then we have to resolve the opposition between world-disclosure and reason in Habermas’ thinking.

Habermas has a strong aversion to the idea of a collectivistic subject, which he recognizes in the works of Heidegger in the idea of ‘the people’, das Volk. The transition, Habermas argues, between Heidegger’s earlier and later reasoning, from essentially an individualistic orientation to a collectivistic one, has to be understood from the perspective of Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism later in his life. At the same time, Habermas continues, this is not something Heidegger invents but rather something that uncovers the fatalism and submissiveness of his theory.809 There is certainly a problem in Heidegger’s understanding of the ethical relation between self and other, something that Kompridis also acknowledges, but Habermas is so preoccupied with Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism that he fails to see the benefits of

809 Habermas’ critique of Heidegger’s alignment with National Socialism can be found mainly in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas 1985, and in his essay “Work and Weltanschaung”, Habermas 1989.
Heidegger's theory and the possibility of developing it further in order to avoid the dilemmas that Habermas fears. Heidegger's engagement and his ideology of das Volk overshadow Heidegger's earlier work and his efforts to develop his view of world-disclosure.

Still there is a problem in Heidegger's transition, not primarily in what he actually did but what he neglected to do. Heidegger fails to develop the connection between the “being of one self” (Dasein) and “being-for-another” (Miteinandersein). He never manages to combine world-disclosure with inter-subjective accountability. Kompridis argues that it is because Heidegger paid too little attention to the ethical relation between self and other, but whether this is what led him to his engagement in National Socialism is not self-evident, and Kompridis therefore seems to avoid Habermas' analysis. At the same time Kompridis makes a blunt comment that Habermas rightly understood that Heidegger’s failure is intrinsically moral. Heidegger preferred to investigate how we could be a “neighbor of being” not how to be a “neighbor to one another”, and that this failure shows up in life as well as in the work is surely no coincidence, for the failure is not merely philosophical in nature, it is moral in a much wider sense. What I mean is this: Heidegger’s moral failure is a failure not only in relation to others but also in relation to himself. His efforts to make intelligible to himself his involvement with the Nazis fail by the standards of his own ethics of authenticity. They fail because assuming responsibility for one’s mistake, assuming responsibility, self-consciously and self-critically, for the whole of one’s life history is a necessary condition of becoming intelligible to oneself.

The problem with Heidegger, Kompridis continues, is an internal one but not between his philosophy and his politics but between intelligibility and accountability.

Habermas’ critique is nevertheless not delimited to his aversion to Heidegger’s political engagement. World-disclosure, Habermas argues, is robbing human agents of their critical and reflective capacity, making them submissive and confining them to a depersonalized fate. This simplistic critique of Heidegger is questioned by Charles Taylor who instead argues that Habermas fails to take into account the world-disclosing dimension of language. Mutual understanding, Taylor

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812 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure, p. 70.
813 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure, p. 70.
argues, presupposes a linguistically disclosed world as a background against which communicative action takes place. Habermas in turn argues that Taylor totalizes the world-disclosing function of language in a way that diminishes responsibility and accountability of the agents involved. Furthermore, Habermas claims that disclosure theories entail a reversion of the philosophy of the subject by going back to the self-referential dilemma of a transcendental subject.

Habermas does not deny the existence of world-disclosure instead he delimits world-disclosure to aesthetics, but with an interpretation of the aesthetic experience that almost turns it into the otherness of reason. First of all, Habermas claims, the aesthetic experience is a noncognitive experience decentralizing the subject by its ecstatic character. Even though it can have cognitive implications, the ecstatic experience takes us out of the ordinary transcending the humdrum of everyday practice and breaking the spell of everyday learning. This is why aesthetic experiences, Habermas continues, make us see new perspectives, but are inadequate in solving genuine problems in the world. Habermas does not deny the importance of aesthetics. However, without a differentiation between science, morality and art the latter causes us to escape our responsibility in the world. Art, Habermas continues, constitutes another world, as is the case with world-disclosure, relieving us from the duties of everyday life. Habermas therefore identifies world-disclosure with “negative metaphysics”, “aestheticism” and “irrationalism”.

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Even though Kompridis appreciates some aspects of Habermas’ critique of disclosure theorists he thinks Habermas too easily ignores the normative and conceptual achievements of these thinkers to be accepted without question. Furthermore, Kompridis argues, the paradigmatic change to linguistic intersubjectivity has also meant a dramatic change in the self-understanding of Critical Theory. One can track this change in Habermas’ work as a shift in emphasis from a Hegelian to a Kantian conception of Critical Theory beginning in Knowledge and Human Interest with a culmination in Between Facts and Norms. By shifting emphasis to Kant’s moral universalism and universal categories, Habermas is convinced of transcending the provincial and irrational

815 Habermas’ critique of Heidegger's alignment with National Socialism can be found mainly in Habermas 1985, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, and in his essay ‘Work and Weltanschauung’, Habermas 1989.
character of Critical Theory and German philosophy. But this also results in a weakening of the identity of Critical Theory, according to Kompridis. Furthermore, he argues that every cultural tradition is in some sense provincial. It is difficult just to imagine a total transcendence of what is provincial, Kompridis continues, but even harder to see how any philosophy could survive without being provincial. It is equally hard to see how Critical Theory could be transcended without losing its essential identity.816

Kompridis does not stop there but argues that the erasure of the identity of Critical Theory has accelerated on account of Habermas’ procedural conception of philosophy. This conception has constrained philosophy to the design of procedures for determining the validity of generalizable norms. Instead of taking a position concerning different cultural traditions philosophy restricts itself to determining the procedural outcome of these traditions. This has the consequence of focusing on issues of justice and legitimacy while downplaying the loss of meaning, fragmentation and the general ignominy of life. So Critical Theory, according to Habermas, refrains from evaluating forms of life and cultures as a whole, which can only be accomplished from within, and not from without. At the same time, Kompridis argues, this is precisely what Habermas does when he defends modernity and the Enlightenment. The very idea of assimilating a liberal position of neutrality towards what is good in any form of life or culture depends on a false assumption, according to Kompridis, of taking a “view from nowhere”. Once Critical Theory adopts such a position it slowly dissolves since one of the basic principals of Habermas’ reasoning is responsibility in the world; a reality where inter-subjectivity is unrestrained and undamaged, taking a position from nowhere, untainted by the faults we carry with us, would make intersubjectivity similar to the otherness of this world.817

The next issue that Kompridis raises is the paradigm shift from the philosophy of the subject to inter-subjective philosophy. Kompridis uses the theory of Thomas Kuhn concerning paradigm change in science, and questions if it is justified to speak about a paradigm shift in the full sense. A complete change would imply complete incommensurability between the present paradigm and previous ones. This is something that Habermas has yet to provide stronger justification for. Instead,

816 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure, p. 25.
following Kompridis line of reasoning, the paradigm of intersubjectivity is not really a paradigm it is more of a re-interpretation of previous ones. Habermas’ intention is nevertheless to see it as a new paradigm, which solves previous problems by making them “objectless”, i.e. they dissolve through a change in perspective. Here Kompridis touches on an important issue that is central to re-interpreting Habermas. Not all problems are rendered “objectless”. Habermas solves problems connected to social systems but not in relation to social actors. The problems addressed from Hegel to Heidegger and Adorno do not merely concern the social systems and social learning taking place in the background of the life-world, whereupon social actors engage themselves. 818 It is not only the system of intersubjectivity that is damaged but we also have to question how this brokenness can be handled by the social actors, themselves being afflicted by it. So Habermas’ paradigm only addresses parts of the problems concerned. I consider this to be the crucial point of departure in Kompridis’ reconstruction of Habermas’ paradigmatic understanding of intersubjectivity. If we are to reconstruct Liturgical Theology we need a more comprehensive conception of reason that not only addresses the problems connected to social systems but also problems that afflict social actors in a broken and damaged world.

C. A Comprehensive Conception of Reason and World Disclosure

Habermas’ model of intersubjectivity depends on the idea that once we have fully rationalized our intersubjective communication with a higher level of differentiation between the three value spheres, everyday communication will stand on its own. There is a strong commitment to emancipation in this vision and we have a similar perception in Schmemann’s works, where he argues for an organic transformation, a theological calling coming from within and stemming from a liturgical teaching. In the works of Habermas from Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus to Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns there is a construction that resembles that of Schmemann, but with social learning in lieu of liturgical teaching, and emancipation through rationalization instead of a calling from within. Still, there is a difference that triggers the discussion. Previously I have argued that there is a

supposed rationalization in Schmemann’s work but there is also a kind of primary disclosure coming from within the Church, which is beyond all control. Habermas instead delimits the calling from within strictly to the transcendence of the provincial through the rationalization of the lifeworld. There is a leap of faith inherent to both perspectives. Schmemann never reflects upon the possibility that the primary disclosure, the calling coming from within, in itself could be damaged, but instead makes the untainted disclosure without further consideration the basis of his theology. Instead of having a magisterium, following Schmemann, which handles the disclosure, he considers the primary disclosure to be available not only to scholars and an elite but available in everyday life. Habermas considers such a disclosure to be a Dionysian escape but nevertheless takes a similar leap of faith in considering the process of rationalization to be autonomous and untainted, in a way similar to Schmemann in his understanding of the leitourgia. I will consider this leap of faith, as it manifests itself in Habermas’ work, by using Kompridis’ critique and in the next chapter reconstruct Habermas’ inter-subjectivity and Liturgical Theology.

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Kompridis identifies two leaps of faith in Habermas’ work, but I see them as one and the same. It is the belief that the process of rationalization will replenish the same semantic and cultural resources spent in the process, but without compromising the life-world or endangering the potential of reason inherent in everyday communicative action, or as Kompridis himself writes:

as though the reason latent in communicative action is impervious to the semantic degradation and cultural impoverishment of the lifeworld – as though it were in the lifeworld but not of it.819

Habermas is able to take this leap of faith on account of his strict separation between what is right and what is good, according to Kompridis, between questions of justice and questions of meaning.820 Here we have a clear cut difference between Habermas and Schmemann, who instead wants to reconcile what is good with what is right. They

819 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure, p. 79.
differ, however, on the possible meanings they ascribe to justice and meaning.

Kompridis challenges this strict separation, first on the ground that issues of justice and rightness are often dependent on issues of meaning, and what is good, in order to be relevant and meaningful. Reason has to be couched in a vocabulary, Kompridis continues, and the same vocabulary reveals the possibilities inherent in a given language. When new possibilities emerge these are disclosed through a new vocabulary and without such a disclosure in language these possibilities would be incomprehensible. The same goes for new social realities that will need to be disclosed again and again in everyday practice. Without these disclosures reason would be incomprehensible. At the same time we could answer in a Habermasian fashion that public reason must certainly consider alternative ways of speaking and acting in order to determine the validity of the procedural outcome. Either way a strict separation makes activities of meaning and possibilities external to reason, and the initiative taken by social actors in expanding the horizon in everyday practice, in order to incorporate new possibilities, is not taken by reason.

If we expand our conception of reason as such we gain a different understanding of the relationship between meaning and problem solving. The public use of reason then seems to be a necessary aspect of everyday practice, but is insufficient if we intend to capture and rescue the freedom and integrity of the social actor.821 If we are truly to release the social actor from the bonds of objectifying practice we have to reject the opposition between reason and disclosure as argued for by Habermas, and the first step in such an approach is to lend a more humble ear to the voices of reason, realizing that the procedural unity of reason is but one of these voices. Another voice is that of the continual disclosure of the world, as it creates new possibilities for reason. Disclosing the world anew, Kompridis continues, is necessary if we consider reason as being compromised of the same actors involved in intersubjective activities. In order to understand this one needs to realize that Kompridis shares Habermas’ perspective that subject-centered reason has a tendency of being repressive, but this repression, according to Kompridis, is always in danger of compromising reason considering even inter-subjective reason. Kompridis therefore rejects the idea that reason could be completely purified of all traces of violence and repression.822

instead seems to neglect this aspect of reason, even though he admits that reason cannot be purified from all that is empirical and historical. Repression and violence is certainly part of the empirical and historical reality.

Subject-centered reason is not just a matter of theory but also a consequence of a practice that has gone asunder, which in turn objectifies the subject, which becomes an object in relation to its own practice. If we compare Habermas and Schmemann, they share the struggle against this objectification but they follow different paths. Schmemann tries to make the disclosure in the Ecclesia the ultimate criterion, reconciling the different practices. Habermas is unable to establish such a reference since he considers any disclosure to be delimited to just one sphere of everyday practice, the aesthetic. Habermas therefore uses procedural reason as a transcendental category, in trying to secure the integrity of the subject. Habermas’ perception of an emancipatory reason is quite different from what Schmemann would be comfortable embracing. It is the fear of a new emergence of a subject-centered reason that makes Habermas critical toward disclosure theories, such as the idea of the leitourgia in the works of Schmemann, who instead fear the disintegration of an holistic vision with the loss of identity, if disclosure vanishes.

Habermas’ primary objection against disclosure, according to Kompridis, concerns ontology with the assumption that any understanding of the world as disclosed by language means that ontology possesses a transcendental power of dictating history which in turn means that we can not resist or transcend it but only passively undergo it through an ecstatic experience. The second objection follows from the first where Habermas argues that since the world is already disclosed in everyday practice and language the world is already dictated in advance and therefore world disclosure precludes any learning practice not already preconceived in the disclosure. The third objection summarizes all of his objections. All disclosure theorists make the same mistake, according to Habermas, in forgetting that world-disclosure is not prior to but subordinate to questions of truth or validity.

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823 Habermas does not claim that communicative reason per se is devoid of violence, but rather that communicative reason is able to counteract violence in a way that subject-centered reason cannot.
824 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure, p. 98.
Kompridis offers us a possibility of dealing with world-disclosure in two ways. In the first-order disclosure we have a pre-reflective disclosure, something that Hanna Arendt connects to primordial identity.\textsuperscript{825} In the second order disclosure we instead have a reflective disclosure that is discursive, attempting to articulate an alternative meaning, but unlike Habermas Kompridis does not limit reflective disclosure to clarifying the process of reaching an agreement. Instead Kompridis invokes hope and confidence drawn from the primordial identity but developed by self-critically expanding the normative and logical space of the first-order disclosure.\textsuperscript{826}

Identity in the primordial sense implies a rough disclosure with everything in it. It is pre-discursive and pre-reflective in the sense of disclosing not only the logical and coherent identity, but also revealing illogical and incoherent aspects as distinctive to this primordial disclosure. From this rough identity a reflective co-disclosure opens up a discourse working on the primordial disclosure and revealing inconsistencies, offering an alternative way of reasoning, but also airing the subjective authenticity inherent in the lifeworld connected to the primordial disclosure. Revealing authenticity fits well with what Habermas understands to be aesthetic validity. Art would then be an event, a disclosure of authenticity, and reflective co-disclosure would be a disclosure of new entities offering new alternatives.

Invoking the authenticity of a subject involves more than just the discursive aspects of disclosure; it also entails aspects of freedom and love.\textsuperscript{827} Consequently, reflective co-disclosure necessitates self-verifying aspects, dependent on primordial disclosure.\textsuperscript{828} This in turn means that there is a given horizon, which could be expanded but not transgressed without a new primordial disclosure. This should not be taken as it necessitates an intrinsic relation between meaning and validity in any strong sense.

The self-verifying aspects of reflective co-disclosure secures the autonomy of an agent, enabling him to take a position in the first place, but how an agent takes a position is an entirely different matter. Basically, there is a distinction between an evaluation of a disclosure and an interpretation of a disclosure. This is why Kompridis differentiates between a primordial world-disclosure and a second order reflective

\textsuperscript{825} Cf. Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure; and Arendt 1958, The Human Condition, pp. 17-21, 181-188.
\textsuperscript{826} Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure.
disclosure, but the latter continues the primordial disclosure, using it as a background for reflection and forging the possibilities for establishing meaning at all.829 If we use Kompridis’ framework in interpreting Habermas we could state that he wants to disconnect the primordial disclosure from reflective co-disclosure in such a way that reflective disclosure is cleansed from any self-verifying aspects, but in so doing he also disentangles learning from meaning. Continuing on the path of Kompridis’ reasoning we find that learning almost always invokes meaning since it provides us with not only the possibility for truth-candidacy but also the relevance of any truth.830

What Kompridis is actually offering us is a way of keeping to Heidegger’s insight of an ecstatic experience which reveals the primordial truth, what I identify as a horizon given identity, but at the same time using the abilities inherent in Critical Theory, expanding the horizon by self-critically using reason to make the initial disclosure more coherent. These processes of reason are universal but need the primordial experience in order to function. Unlike mathematics, universal reason in social actions can only be applied to the reality of the life-world, using the cultural reproduction initiated by the primordial identity. According to Habermas, this primordial experience of revealing authentic identity is an aesthetic experience of first-order, but according to Kompridis’ arguments, this aesthetic experience should not be disentangled from meaning in order to be connected to learning. Instead meaning is foundational for learning. Following Kompridis we need to understand the basic interests inherent to the primordial disclosure and thereby become responsible for the articulation of meaningful alternatives in relation to a given primordial horizon. It is not sufficient to focus on clarifying the processes in reaching consensus.831

This does not gainsay Habermas’ general idea that theory and practice should be understood as being in a dialectical relation to each other, a dichotomy in no need of reconciliation. With the differentiation between primordial world disclosure and reflective co-disclosure it becomes much clearer that they are operative at once; the one can not exist without the other and the other can not exist without the one. In Habermas’ terminology we could say that knowledge and interest are always simultaneously operative. Without an interest, knowledge

829 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure.
830 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure.
831 Kompridis 2006, Critique and Disclosure.
becomes irrelevant and meaningless in the first sense, but without knowledge interests becomes incomprehensible in the long run and therefore meaningless in a second sense.

Both Habermas and Kompridis are especially interested in improving Critical Theory, but I am more interested in finding a way of explaining the relation between the deep structure and the surface structure in the paradigm of Liturgical Theology. As a working hypothesis I propose that world disclosure in the first-order has to do with establishing the horizon of the Life-world and reflective disclosure in the second-order has to do with the intelligibility of the Life-world, making the Life-world accessible for the universal world and equitable for critique. From this working hypothesis I will introduce a deeper understanding of identity using the theory of Hanna Arendt.

D. Identity as similarity and dissimilarity

Hanna Arendt in her critique of Heidegger gives remembrance a central place instead of forgetfulness. Where Heidegger gives priority to the ontological forgetfulness of memory, and the idea that the only possibility of overcoming this forgetfulness lies in the light of the future being toward-death, Arendt instead argues that it is only through reification in works that action can pass into historical remembrance and thereby become a source for a common identity for future generations. In Arendt’s work, reified remembrance is connected to natality, which is unpredictable and possesses a unique quality, but at the same time offering stability within the context of a world, and as such it has a political significance giving immortality to the life of man, as an ‘organized remembrance’ in society.

Through words and actions, Arendt continues, we are socialized into the world of humans, which existed prior to our birth. Our entrance into the social world is described by Arendt as a second birth, where we confirm our physical birth and take responsibility for the fact that we were born. This is the process which Arendt describes as natality and, connected to this process is the ‘organized remembrance’ inherent in the social order of human life through generations.

Identity is connected to the revelation of individuality where humans actively and purposefully disclose their unique character against the background of this preconceived social world. It is a disclosure of something that is not previously known as a revelation of the unknown; it is an offering to the world of something of their own effort or creation, drawing on the cultural background of the social world. In this process of identification, human beings are incomparable to each other. What differentiates the human being from other living creatures, the differentia specifica, is the fact that we all share the experience of being someone, each one being unique in their existence, and therefore it is impossible to compare one person’s existence with another’s.\textsuperscript{835}

Even though we offer an almost endless list of characteristics in our description of someone, it will fall short because the one we wish to describe is always more than that description. Therefore identity is the disclosure of the unique and incomparable existence of someone. The disclosure of identity is a social phenomenon, Arendt continues, dependent on the weave of human relations constituting the social world. Through these relations a space opens up inter est human beings where actions and words occur, where we satisfy our objective-worldly interests.\textsuperscript{836}

Our weave of social relations enables us to take control of the objective world, but a person’s identity is beyond our control, and transcends even the network of social relations, according to Arendt. Only God (presumably) could make statements about a whom, which also immediately implies what. Consequently this implies that identity is attached to alteritas, the utterly other. This is obvious, Arendt argues, if we reflect upon the manifestation of who-someone-is is impossible to capture in words in any exhaustive way.\textsuperscript{837}

It is alterity, Arendt continues, which makes the existence of every individual specific, but together-with-others identity also becomes general. These two aspects make identity specific and general, similar and dissimilar. It is in connection to these aspects that the idea of natality contributes to the understanding of both identity and disclosure. Identity is born of the inter-action between human beings, not only in the general sense but also in the specific sense. In the specific sense it is a disclosure that is transcendent and prediscursive; it is a naked identity

\textsuperscript{835} Arendt 1958, \textit{The Human Condition}, p. 181-182.
\textsuperscript{836} Arendt 1958, \textit{The Human Condition}, pp. 182-185.
\textsuperscript{837} Arendt 1958, \textit{The Human Condition}, pp. 181-182.
incomparable and unique, and in this sense the individual is an agent revealing herself in the weave of social interactions. From this unmasked appearance identity is exposed to the social relations, described and generalized. The individual is therefore both a subject and an object in the human network of social relations.838

Identity in this sense is at once both a disclosure in the first-order and a disclosure in the second-order. In the first-order it comes close to what Habermas identifies with aesthetics and the validity of authenticity, and in the second-order Arendt deals with the general, similar to what Kompridis terms reflective disclosure. Arendt, however, is eager to emphasize the importance of separating these two. In contrast to Habermas Arendt makes it clear that authenticity in the first-order escapes any exhaustive description in words. Language attaches itself to what instead of who, since the latter escapes any extensive description in words.839

The who is present in pure actuality, corresponding to energéia in Aristotle’s works, which is without purpose (atelis) and does not leave anything behind (par autas erga). The actions and words of this actuality does not have any outward purpose but an inner purpose, Arendt continues, in the sense of both being self-verifying and self-fulfilling, both of these aspects are covered by the greek word entelecheia, and what Aristotle denotes as the ‘human work as humans’. It is by this actuality that meaning becomes relevant and gives credence to history. Through the subjective apparition of history ‘organized remembrance’ is attached to the unique and therefore part of the ‘human work as humans’. Without it, history is just a flow of events without any real identity. Arendt makes a comparison between Homer, Pindar and Sophocles in the Greek poetry. The deepest meaning of these stories is not dependent on success, such as victories or fortunes won, but on the uniqueness of their heroes. The hidden meaning revealed in the Greek sagas is that they break through the ordinary and reveal what is unique.840

Meaning, then, in Arendt’s works, is attached to the unique and self-verifying ‘human work as humans’. As such it has no outer purpose or telos, and is therefore impossible to catch by generalization, but even though the unique identity cannot be captured entirely in words the story about the unique identity of a person can be captured through

reified remembrance, where we use the generalized competencies that we acquire through learning. Still there is always a difference between the meaning revealed in the unique, and the general competencies revealed in the process of learning. The latter is concerned with what are we to use in order to capture the story, while the former is concerned with who our hero is, in whose unique and incomparable story we identify our own uniqueness. The heroic story always points beyond itself since the unique is always attached to the utterly other.

Since only God (presumably) can reconcile what with whom in Arendt's theory; and since meaning is in need of a subjective apparition, it follows that meaning and learning have to be differentiated, but at the same time they need each other. In order to communicate meaning it has to run through a process of reification where remembrance, and with it history, have to be organized. This means that the unique has to be transformed into the familiar and general. When the narrative is received by the subject, however, it is once again transformed into the unique.

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Arguing against the deconstruction of Western reason as logocentric in Derrida's works, Habermas shows that Derrida employs the same impersonal and anti-hermeneutical world-disclosure as Heidegger.841 Habermas is eager to show that world-disclosure has to be emancipatory from the very outset, revealing the autonomy of the agent instead of an impersonal event taking place without any responsible subject. Therefore Habermas contends that disclosure still has to be connected to an agent or agents even though it cannot be measured according to the problem-solving capacities connected to scientific truth claims or normative rightness. Instead Habermas perceives disclosure as a rhetorical effect aimed at introducing new perspectives or new suppositions into the background of what is common knowledge. The outcome is a new interpretative framework that can modify a previous rigid framework.

As such disclosure is not a level of communicative practice, Habermas argues, but a type of communication. It is not a matter of truth but of relevant meanings and interpretations. Disclosure is all about the reflective capacities of agents to change their cultural context instead of the problem-solving capacities inherent in normative rightness and

scientific truth claims. At the same time, however, Habermas discharges Foucault's arguments of disclosure as an epochal experience that we submit ourselves passively to in history. Habermas does not reject disclosure altogether but he interprets it differently.

Habermas denounces the strong impact of otherness in Arendt's work, since he himself defends the emancipatory perspective of the agent. He fears that a strong emphasis on otherness would make disclosure an impersonal event outside the boundaries of an agent. To safeguard the autonomy of the agent Habermas also makes a strong connection between evaluation and interpretation. It is the agent who both evaluates and interprets the disclosure giving it the primordial touch that we have seen both with Arendt and Heidegger, but without Heidegger's impersonal stroke.

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Bohman has forceful arguments against the strong connection between evaluation and interpretation in Habermas' understanding of disclosure. I do not think, however, that this actually solves the problem with Habermas' reasoning. For Habermas, the strong bonds between evaluation and interpretation are not at the core of the issue. They are, however, instrumental to him in explaining why world-disclosure is primordial and avoids critique. The next step in his delimitation of world-disclosure to the realm of aesthetics is not so much to destabilize world-disclosure as to manifest the basic schema taken from the ancient Greeks: the triad of the true, the good and the beautiful. This triad underpins his understanding of the three value-spheres, the scientific, the moral and the aesthetic, as well as the three worlds: the objective, the social and the subjective.

World-disclosure is not concerned with the objective world, according to Habermas, since it is self-verifying; and it does not concern the social world, at least not directly, since it is not intended to reach a consensus; but it is connected to disclosing the subject which is precisely what the subjective world, with its authenticity and beauty, is all about. If Bohman and Kompridis want to improve Habermas' theory, they first need to reflect on this basic structure constituting reality.

Disclosure in Habermas' later work is not presented as unimportant, but as a constituent for revealing the subjective world, either individually or collectively. In the next chapter I will take a more positive approach, reconstruction Liturgical Theology at the same time as I suggest a re-interpretation of Habermas.
9. Liturgical Theology, World Disclosure and Intersubjectivity

But this is not an “other” world, different from the one God has created and given to us. It is our same world, already perfected in Christ, but not yet in us. 843

Alexander Schmemann, *For the Life of the World*, 1973

In this chapter I will reconstruct Liturgical Theology in order to overcome the ambiguity I have previously outlined. I will begin (A) by using the findings of Kompridis, arguing that the *leitourgia* is better understood as a primary disclosure dependent on a reflective co-disclosure which gives birth to the Church. The birth of the Church evolves as a separation between meaning and learning, as well as a structural differentiation between the true, the good and the beautiful. The dichotomy between meaning and learning (B) constitutes a call of conscience, activating the agents of the Ecclesia by drawing on the cultural background. I will argue that this calling from within constitutes the basis for a subjective internalization and a reflective co-disclosure. The calling from within is a convocation in identity where meaning and learning is kept together. The problem with Schmemann as I argue in (C) is that he makes the same egregious mistake as Heidegger by neglecting the transformative agency in the Ecclesia, and instead becoming too occupied with the relation to the Church’s being. Therefore (D) I will propose a new understanding of the relation between the *what* and the *how and why* of the liturgy. In the end (E) I suggest a renewed understanding of the inter-subjective dimension of the Ecclesia, making it possible to connect liturgical teaching with the *leitourgia*.

A. The Birth of the Church

Previously I argued that social integration of the Ecclesia is achieved when the shared values of theology, liturgy and piety are internalized in personality and institutionalized in the community of the Church. These values in turn depend on the cultural background of the Ecclesia, i.e. the Tradition of the Church. The question that emerges from this explanation

concerns the birth of this cultural background, of the meaning-horizon of the life-world. A similar reflection could be found in Heidegger’s early works, where he claims that there is a reciprocal relation between Dasein (human being) and the world. The theory of communicative action answers the question of how the Ecclesia is structured and reproduced, but does not answer to the question of how the Ecclesia is given birth nor how the Ecclesia could adapt to a crisis situation.

Kompridis suggests a reinterpretation of Heidegger’s theory of world-disclosure that originates from Heidegger’s understanding of the ontological difference between the world and Dasein. This means that the world is disclosed to us and at the same time disclosed through us. This is interpreted by Kompridis as a differentiated world-disclosure, between a pre-reflective disclosure and a co-reflective disclosure. Habermas agrees with Durkheim that there is a prelinguistic root in ritual practice, but accuses Durkheim of not differentiating enough between ritual practice and communicative practice, between religious symbolism and language. Schmemann interprets the religious symbolism of the liturgy as an eschatological symbolism, making us aware of participating in the coming Kingdom. In this way Schmemann connects ritual practice to the ultimate other, and as such ritual practice goes beyond reflection or more correctly it is pre-reflective. The coming Kingdom reveals itself in the liturgy not as a reflection but as the presence of otherness. Interpreting it in accordance with Kompridis’ theory it becomes a pre-reflective disclosure that discloses the Kingdom to us. Interpreting it in this way we gain an understanding of ritual action as connected to a pre-reflective disclosure not immediately explainable but establishing solidarity and awareness.

At the same time, following Kompridis’ reasoning, this solidarity and awareness is co-dependent on the reflection of the community on the disclosure of the Kingdom. This reflection cannot have the otherness of the Kingdom as its object, but is rather a reflection on the community in responding to otherness. As such a dichotomy emerges, in the form of a co-reflective disclosure, which makes us aware of the otherness disclosed in the liturgy. At the same time, however, the community assumes a position in relation to this otherness, creating solidarity and giving birth to a simultaneous response. If we compare this with Habermas, the outcome of his reasoning is that a primary disclosure

does not evoke a response but rather it suppresses the freedom of intersubjective communication. From Schmemann’s point of view instead the disclosure of the Kingdom relieves the participants, making them free in their response.

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Habermas’ strong connection between validity and meaning may be the reason why he has such a negative understanding of otherness and world-disclosure.845 Habermas understands validity as constituting meaning. By weakening the connection between meaning and validity, meaning also becomes connected to identity and communal life. In life, solidarity and communion also constitute meaning. That we attach meaning to more than validity when we use sentences attests to this. The dichotomy between a pre-reflective disclosure and a co-reflective disclosure depends on reciprocity, whereby a primary disclosure initiates a response, which in turn is made available to us through language and adequate descriptions. This co-dependence casts light on Schmemann’s emphasis on theology as a search for words adequate to the experience in the leitourgia.

Habermas’ belief that ritual practice carries with it an irrational understanding of the world depends on an excessive connection between meaning and validity. With a looser connection validity, instead, becomes one of many strings connected to meaning. We should not, however, satisfy ourselves with the argument of a plurality of reasonable meanings. I would even go so far as to argue that identity involves both a pre-discursive disclosure as well as a reflective co-disclosure. Arendt in her discourse on identity connects identity to otherness as well as to reflection. Identity, Arendt argues, escapes any definition or final description. The identity of a person eludes any description based on an enumeration of attributes.846 At the same time we make generalizations in order to capture the identity of the heroes or characters of life. In this way we make use of our capacity for a reified remembrance, an organized remembrance that establishes the narrative of our lifeworld.

If we merge Arendt’s theory of identity with Habermas’ intersubjective theory and Kompridis’ reinterpretation of world-disclosure we

845 James Bohman challenges the strong connection between validity and meaning in his article Two Versions of the Linguistic Turn: Habermas and Poststructuralism. Bohman 1996.
can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the Ecclesia. Thereby we are in a better position to explain the intention behind Schmemann's vision of the theological calling from within. First of all we find that the otherness of the Kingdom is a primary disclosure of the Ecclesia which is incomprehensible without a secondary co-disclosure. Secondly we find that the internalization of the experience of the leitourgia constitutes the foundation for the secondary co-disclosure. By internalization of the experience we mean the liturgical teaching where participants share the experience by finding words and concepts adequate to this experience. Finally we find that the leitourgia is the place for both the primary as well as the secondary disclosure, each depending on the other, giving birth to what Habermas identifies as the “lifeworld contexts of relevance [Verweisungszusammenhänge]” that is thrown into the relief of the Ecclesia.847

According to Arendt, as long as the otherness is maintained, the self-identity of the Ecclesia is preserved. In order to incorporate previous generations, however, an organized remembrance develops as a reification. This is common to any community. The reified structures of remembrance generalize the participants of the Ecclesia, but as long as this reification does not constitute an impediment to the otherness of the Ecclesia, the identity of the participants is not threatened. This way of interpreting reification and identity enables us to reinterpret the colonization of the Ecclesia. Habermas identifies the colonization of the lifeworld with the instrumentalization of the participants where actions of achieving mutual understanding are replaced by instrumental actions that reify the lifeworld. Taking into account Arendt's understanding of identity we can instead identify the colonization of the lifeworld or the Ecclesia with a loss of the otherness necessary for the establishment of the particularity of the Ecclesia which is given in the pre-reflective disclosure of the Ecclesia along the co-reflective disclosure.

Habermas' effort to limit disclosure to art is in itself a super-reification which affects the entire lifeworld if taken literally. This limitation to art has the effect of depersonalizing reason and of disconnecting it from the particular identity of the person, instead generalizing everything in the spirit of Kantian universalism. This runs counter to the intentions of the entire project of inter-subjectivity. Habermas wants to release the individual and empower the subject with accountability and

responsibility. In the end the individual becomes universalized, but the universalized individual is unable to take responsibility or to be accountable. Only a real and unique person can be accountable and responsible. This is precisely what Schmemann fears when he questions the understanding of the human being as merely a microcosm. It is a fear that is shared by the Neo-Palamists.

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Habermas’ rejection of post-structuralism depends on his understanding that it is an appeal to the Other, and Habermas denies any emancipatory role to alterity, in fact his theory of communicative reason depends on the exclusion of alterity. Compared with Arendt it is quite the opposite. The exclusion of alterity means the exclusion of the particular causing the individual to loose herself in the universal. This in turn depends on the understanding of disclosure as entirely pre-reflective, but with Kompridis’ interpretation we acquire a different understanding of alterity as being co-existent with reflectivity. This is similar to what Merleau-Ponty claims when he argues that non-reason continuously lines all meaning and is patterned, therefore offering up a latent, if ambiguous, meaning which is not endlessly deferred. Derrida also identifies this pattern when he states that language always retains a poetic function. With the understanding of a reflective co-disclosure alterity constitutes a crucial supplement to communicative reason. This does not mean that we should loose the inter-subjective dimension of the lifeworld when we reconstruct Habermas in light of Arendt and Kompridis. Rather, we can thus supplement Habermas’ theory without risking that world-disclosure opens up for a depersonalized alterity. On the contrary, alterity is necessary for particularity.

Our aim is that of combining Heidegger’s striving towards becoming a “neighbor of being” with Habermas’ striving towards becoming a “neighbor of one another”; of combining the idea of Heidegger’s world-disclosure with Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Habermas himself realized that otherness is irrepressible regardless of historical development, but interpreted it in a negative way. Instead, otherness is irrepressible regardless of historical development, but interpreted it in a negative way. Instead, otherness is

848 Habermas criticizes both Heidegger and Derrida, as well as Bataille for appealing to the Other as a Dionysian escape of reason. See Habermas [1985] 1988, Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, pp. 158-178.
852 Derrida 1967, De la grammatologie.
always associated to the particular identity that continuously lines all meaning. This explains why linguistic and discursive forms bear within themselves opaque and ambiguous dimensions of alterity.

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Here we have a potential key to unlocking the ambiguity of Liturgical Theology. Radical otherness is prediscursive, and otherness is irreducibly associated with God and thus ecclesial. As such, otherness reveals the particularity of the Church, which bursts open in the Eucharist blowing “everything up from inside by referring it not only to the transcendent, but to Christ and His Kingdom.” 853 Habermas fails to appreciate this dimension. To satisfy oneself merely with this dimension of the Ecclesia would reduce both the accountability as well as the responsibility of the participants. Therefore we have to add the dimension of inter-subjectivity, and this is precisely what Heidegger underestimates.

The juxtaposition of inter-subjectivity and world-disclosure is instrumental in explaining the vision of Schmemann. Before writing his doctoral dissertation, Schmemann saw the power of the saints as foundational in the struggle against evil. In line with what Bulgakov argued for at the beginning of the twentieth century, Schmemann’s vision later changes, coming to focus on the idea of the coming Kingdom that illuminates the world. Later in life, Schmemann therefore connected the being of the Church with otherness, and the Ordo was seen as an image of this otherness. Later on he developed his understanding of the Ordo realizing that the Ordo is basically dependent on an eschatological symbolism and he continues to focus on the otherness of the Church. Parallel to the alterity of the Church Schmemann develops his understanding of liturgical teaching where the participants of the Ecclesia share the experience of the leitourgia through language. 854

The ambiguity of Schmemann’s theology depends on two factors. Firstly Schmemann underestimates the need of an inter-subjective dimension of the Ecclesia. This becomes clear given his inability to further develop the aspect of liturgical teaching, which in turn makes his critique of a misplaced tserkovnost solely negative without any positive revenues. Secondly Schmemann is unable to connect the inter-subjective aspect of liturgical teaching to the illumination of the

world, the eschatological aspect of the Church’s being in the world. The Liturgical Theology in Schmemann’s work has to be supplemented by the inter-subjective aspect that Habermas offers us in his theory of communicative action. Ritual action in this sense supports the identity and the solidarity of the Ecclesia but cannot suffice for inter-subjective communication in the Ecclesia. Therefore, as I have argued previously, ritual action has to pass over to communicative action. It is on this point that Schmemann fails, which explains why he is unable to develop the aspect of liturgical teaching.

As I have argued previously, passing over from ritual action to communicative action depends on shifting from existence to experience, and moving from language for coordinating action to language for achieving mutual understanding. I also argued that Schmemann is caught up in structuralism, which makes it hard for him to shift from existence to experience. Furthermore, concerning Habermas, I noted that ritual action does pass over to communicative action but not in the sense of abandoning ritual action. Grounded in the theory of a reflective co-disclosure we now have an intelligible framework in which to elaborate these issues. Ritual action, as connected to the primordial disclosure of Eschaton, is co-dependent on the reflective disclosure stemming from communicative action, identified by Schmemann as liturgical teaching.

The intention of Liturgical teaching, according to Schmemann, is to explain the liturgical language in order to initiate the participants in the Ecclesia into the mystery of the Church’s worship. The outcome of this initiation is the transformation of cult into a way of life. Habermas considers such a transformation to be a discourse that confuses internal relations of meaning with external relations among things. With the more comprehensive understanding of disclosure, stemming from Kompridis, this transformation is consistent with the reflective co-disclosure of the Ecclesia. If ritual action is the manifestation of otherness, giving voice to the primordial nature of the Ecclesia, then it is immediately received by the participants as a secondary reflection, using words and concepts drawn from the cultural background of the Ecclesia. The cultural reproduction of the Ecclesia occurs through a reified remembrance where the unique experience is transformed into a meta-narrative of a generalized discourse. The liturgical teaching functions like a grammar of organized remembrance where we make use of the

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855 Schmemann 1964, ‘Problems of Orthodoxy in America. II. The Liturgical Problem.’
deep structure of the liturgical language. In the liturgy, however, the
generalized competencies of the Ecclesia are connected to the uniquely other making the meta-narrative once again ultimately unique.

Therefore, the use of Kompridis’ theory in relation to Liturgical Theology reveals the Ecclesia to be both general and unique at the same time. The generalized organized remembrance makes up the cultural background of the Ecclesia from which the participants draw their understanding of the liturgy. Out of the liturgy, the unique identity of the Church emerges and with it the unique identity of the Christians. This identity escapes any exhaustive explanations, with the participators simply being thrown into the mystery of the Church. At the same time the Christians are brought into the reflective co-disclosure through the action of constituting the Church, where they coordinate their action of reaching for mutual understanding that thematizes the claim to be a Church. Without the mystery, the Church looses its unique identity making belief unnecessary. However, without the thematization of the Ecclesia, whereby the Christians constitute the Church as they are gathering in the Assembly, the liturgy becomes incomprehensible and almost magical. The implication of using Kompridis’ theory of a reflective co-disclosure and Arendt’s understanding of the relation between the unique and the general, is the defense of the simultaneous uniqueness in the mystery through ritual action and comprehensiveness through communicative action in the Ecclesia.

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As stated previously, the rationalization of the Ecclesia depends on the structural differentiation between the true, the good and the beautiful; the separation between the general and the unique; and finally the switch from objective mind to cultural knowledge. With the theory of the reflective co-disclosure, the rationalization of the Ecclesia lends itself even more to explanation when we reflect upon the separation between the primordial disclosure and the reflective co-disclosure. If otherness contains the uniqueness of the Church, which in turn is born of the primordial disclosure, any reflective co-disclosure necessarily means a progressive differentiation between the unique and the general. Interpreting ritual action as conveying the otherness of the primordial disclosure of the Ecclesia implies that ritual action reveals the uniqueness of the Ecclesia. Passing from ritual action to communicative action in
the reflective co-disclosure therefore implies passing from uniqueness to the general. This is accomplished through structural differentiation, and by switching from a holistic ontological disclosure to a functionally differentiated experience in communicative action.

Rationalization of the Ecclesia is necessary for the preservation of the Ecclesia through organized remembrance, which is accomplished by making the unique general. Uniqueness is the holistic unity of identity while generality is the gradual separation from the unique into different value spheres; the scientifically true, the morally good and the authenticity of beauty. It is the separation between who and what. The former transcends every aspect of life in the sense of being connected to the ontologically other while the latter is connected to the diverse experience of life. Organized remembrance reifies our experiences and in this process experience is transformed from subjective experience into a common awareness between subjects established inter est human beings. As such truth claims become accessible through scientific methods, the question of good becomes an issue between human subjects established through dialogue in the Ecclesia, and finally the authenticity of the subject and the Ecclesia becomes the ultimate standard of emancipation.

Without the rationalization of the Ecclesia inter-subjective communication is impossible to maintain since rationalization, in the combined sense of Habermas and Arendt, opens up the space between human beings which, according to Arendt, is a reified remembrance. If we add Taft’s theory of the differentiation between understanding and meaning, it is possible to argue that understanding and/or learning is the necessary outcome for establishing inter-subjective communication. Taft’s description of Liturgical Theology as a genetic vision of the present comes close to Arendt’s reified remembrance. Similarly, we have the idea of the ordo in Schmemann’s work, which, in turn, is similar to Taft’s genetic vision and Arendt’s reified remembrance. The Ordo not only makes the liturgy accessible, but the entire Ecclesia becomes accessible for inter-subjective communication.

Meaning in this sense is differentiated from understanding or learning because meaning implies identity and not only validity as with Habermas. This means that learning comes from the structural differentiation of the Ecclesia while meaning stems from identity as the unique and holistic aspect of the Ecclesia.
B. The Calling of Conscience from Within

Schmemann's critique of the atomization of theology is in one respect rather misplaced when we consider the theories of Kompridis and Arendt, since it is a necessary outcome of the rationalization of the Ecclesia. At the same time, if we interpret the critique by Schmemann differently, not as an attack against the atomization but as a critique of the denial of otherness as a holistic aspect of the Ecclesia, we can regard Schmemann's critique more positively. Otherness must continuously line all meaning. By reinterpreting Schmemann's critique in this sense it becomes a critique of the separation between meaning and learning. These have to be kept together since they constitute each other. If they are separated the Church looses its unique identity and ultimately becomes reified in the sense of evolving as something different from the Ecclesia.

If the Ecclesia is constituted by the objective world of truths, the social world of the good and the subjective world of beauty, then the reification of the Church constitutes an objectified artifact of the Ecclesia which is utterly different from the Ecclesia constituted by the three worlds. The objectification of the Church is what Schmemann implies by his critique of an erroneous understanding of tserkovnost. At the same time, objectification in the sense of a reified remembrance is necessary for the internalization of a living consciousness of the Ecclesia. Without it the Church becomes incomprehensible for the participants since it makes inter-subjective communication impossible. Therefore, instead of criticizing the reification of the Ecclesia we need a more comprehensive critique where we can appreciate the artifacts of the scientific endeavor without loosing the unique identity of the Church.

Here the Neo-Palamists come into play. The unique identity of the subject, according to the Neo-Palamists, depends not on the subject-centered individual but on the relation to the other.857 Considering ecclesiology in line with this reasoning the unique identity of the Church is equally dependent on the otherness of the Church, i.e. the eschatological Kingdom. It is through the diaphora (difference) between the coming Kingdom, as otherness, and the reified Church that the Ecclesia is born into the world with its unique identity.858 A more comprehensive understanding of meaning implies that validity has to be

857 According to Khoružij it is in relation to the other-being that humans become accessible in time, approachable not only for others but also for the individual’s self comprehension. Cf. Khoružij 2005, Ocherki Sinergijnoj Antropologii, pp. 40-44; and Khoružij 2000, O Storom i Novom, pp. 311-352.
858 Cf. Zizioulas 2006, Communion and Otherness.
supplemented by identity, which is dependent on otherness. This in turn suggests that without the eschatological aspect of the Church it becomes merely an artifact devoid of meaning. The differentiation between learning and meaning in Taft's work is consequential with a more comprehensive understanding of meaning, but there is a discrepancy between differentiation and separation of meaning and learning. The isolation of learning from meaning is a strategy that follows the same line of thinking as the idea of a subject-centered reason. If we describe knowledge as a reified remembrance of the unique, then knowledge turns into meaning when it is received by the subject connected to this otherness.

The internalization of knowledge and its connection to the subjective identity, regardless of whether it is collective or individual, is what is implied in the Russian word *obrazovanie*. The person's unique identity in this sense is revealed as an image, or in the Christian sense in the face of Christ (*obraz*) attached to each and every one of those participating in the Ecclesia. Obraz in this sense has a threefold meaning; the literal sense of cheek, the moral sense of having a character, and finally the iconic sense of carrying the image of Christ. The latter aspect transcends the differentiated meaning connecting the unique identity of the human being with the generalized other in Christ. This is similar to the German concept of *Bildung*, literally ‘imaging’, where knowledge is internalized with the identity of the subject.

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The three worlds of the true, the good and the beautiful could all be internalized into a subjective awareness of the individual. *Obrazovanie* in this sense is not primarily a matter of being knowledgeable but of internalizing knowledge in one’s own life and thinking. Facts are internalized by acquiring data from scientific or other means through remembrance. Moral values are obtained through dialogue with members of the same lifeworld, and internalized in the course of taking

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859 Robin Alexander (Alexander 2001, *Culture and Pedagogy*) cross-references culture and pedagogy, inquiring into the Russian understanding of education. A similar cross reference between health and education has been undertaken by Andy Byford (Byford 2006, ‘Professional Cross-Dressing: Doctors in Education in Late Imperial Russia (1881–1917)’) in the final decades of the imperial Russia. Obrazovanie has recently provoked interest in Russia in relation to Pedology, the psychology of Education, and the concern for inclusive Education. Lev Vygotsky has received special attention. See Vygotsky 1928, ‘Problema kulturnogo razvitija ribjonka’; and Zaitsev 2004, ‘Integrirovannoje obrazovanie detej s ograničennymi vozmožnostjami’.

860 The word *obraz* is found on the Slavic icons of Christ. In Serbian dictionaries obraz is given three meanings; cheek, honor and image. Similar meanings can be found in other Slavic countries.

a personal stand. Finally, authenticity is attained when the individual is relieved of suppression or other restraints, enabling her to reveal herself as a subject. It is the final aspect of beauty that connects obrazovanie to the identity of the human being. Beauty conveys the authenticity of the subject in her uniqueness. Beauty in this sense is more than just the validity of authenticity; it also has the transcendent character of connecting facts and moral values with otherness. This is what Bulgakov has in mind when he speaks of objectivistic nature becoming humanized or subjectified. When the human being is alienated from his own work, with the result of becoming objectified, man is once again subjectified through the internalization of the three worlds, following Habermas. Bulgakov follows a similar course of reasoning in his understanding of human labor.

Human labor, according to Bulgakov, leaves a certain mark on objectified nature transforming it into subjectified nature but maintaining its essential attributes as an object. Bulgakov views art in this manner, as revealing human labor as subjectification, but through material objects or words. The art of subjectification transcends both scientific facts as well as moral values, transforming them into something personal and important for a given individual, i.e. being subjectified. This makes it possible to merge Habermas' basic argument for rationalization as a differentiation of the three worlds, with Schmemann's theory of the complete reconciliation of the same worlds. Through the differentiation between a pre-reflective disclosure and a reflective co-disclosure we acquire a framework of intelligibility. In the primary disclosure, the world is one and unique, parallel to what a child experiences before any rationalization occurs. In the secondary disclosure, however, the world becomes differentiated and at the same time loosing its subjective character and becomes objectified. Through the unique identity of the human being the three worlds become attached to otherness. Through this attachment the differentiated worlds once again becomes united, but retains the essential differentiation.

Considering Schmemann's reasoning, theology, constituting the objective world, is internalized by the human being through the mutual understanding of concepts and words adequate to theology; and liturgy as constituting the social world, becomes internalized through the coordinating action of realizing the Church. Finally,
piety as constituting the subjective world is internalized through the socialization of Christian identities. All three worlds are internalized by the human being and become one with the identity of the participants, but once the three worlds have been differentiated they retain their different attributes, while at the same time being subjectified. By way of illustration let us consider the local Ecclesia. Even though the local Ecclesia acquires a mutual understanding together with coordinating their action of realizing the Church, everything would be in vain if it were not connected to the uniqueness of personal identities. Without a personal acquisition of faith, belief becomes impossible since belief in the usual sense implies someone believing. The mere stating of facts about belief and the forming of consensus concerning moral values is insufficient without someone actually believing in them, or without someone being capable of internalizing them into their personal identity.

In conclusion I have argued that the pre-reflective disclosure reveals the unique identity of the world, which continuously lines the reflective co-disclosure, connecting *otherness* and uniqueness with the differentiated worlds and generalized meta-understanding. The identity of the human being, *Dasein*, is always connected to the pre-reflective disclosure and through the internalization of the differentiated worlds there is a reconciliation of the worlds, once again making the human being unique, but keeping the worlds differentiated. In the Ecclesia this implies that eschatology continuously lines the differentiated Ecclesia of theology, liturgy and piety. Internalizing theology, liturgy and piety makes reconciliation possible by connecting them to the unique identity of the Ecclesia through the radical otherness of the coming Kingdom. Being thrown into the world, the Ecclesia immediately becomes rationalized in order to be comprehensible for the participants. At the same time, however, in danger of loosing its unique identity, the Ecclesia is continuously lined by the primary disclosure identified as the eschatological Kingdom. The rationalization of the Ecclesia depends on reified remembrance which is necessary for the comprehensiveness of the Ecclesia, but, in accordance with Habermas, if the Ecclesia shrinks to the format of the objective world the Ecclesia becomes colonized. Contrary to Habermas I have argued that the objectification of the Ecclesia depends on the separation between the uniqueness of the Ecclesia in the primary disclosure and the differentiated Ecclesia in the secondary disclosure. Habermas is unable to make this connection on
account of his inability to consider the differentiation between a primary and secondary disclosure.

C. The Transformative Agency of the Ecclesia

Schmemann\textsuperscript{863} in his response to Bernhard Botte claims that there is a real objective shift in liturgical piety, especially concerning the understanding of communion. Schmemann in answering Grisbrooke argues for a Liturgical Theology whose task is not to restore the essence of liturgy, but instead he believes the real challenge is to restore the reconciliation between liturgy, theology and piety. Schmemann is not really successful in convincing Grisbrooke and Botte, and I would add that he is not sufficiently convincing in my opinion either. Botte fears that Schmemann does not differentiate enough between what \textit{ought to be} and \textit{what is}. This distinction is also emphasized in Taft’s works. Grisbrooke is more anxious about \textit{how} such a transformed understanding should be accomplished.

Schmemann does not really encompass Grisbrooke’s questions. Instead he is more concerned with connecting the entire project of the reconciliation between liturgy, theology and piety to the \textit{leitourgia} and, as we have seen, subsequently connecting the \textit{leitourgia} with the eschatological Kingdom. Schmemann is also occupied with making the Church a “neighbor of being, and the question of making the Church a “neighbor to one another” seems to be overshadowed by the \textit{otherness} of the Church. Therefore it seems that Schmemann makes the same egregious mistake as Heidegger in neglecting the inter-subjective dimension of the Ecclesia. When Vassa Larin\textsuperscript{864} identifies a shift between Schmemann’s early work and the struggle against evil to the eschatological understanding of the Church, as enlightenment the world, she also highlights a certain anxiety in this shift. This anxiety is concomitant with the Heideggerian mistake. By this shift Schmemann gains the unique identity of the Church in the aftermath of the totalitarian regimes in the same sense as the Neo-Palamists, who tried to recover the unique character of the person. However, just as the Neo-Palamists were caught in a sea of Being, Schmemann is caught in the sea of the overwhelming \textit{eschaton}.


\textsuperscript{864} Larin 2009, ‘Fr Alexander Schmemann and Monasticism’.
Subsequent to this shift, Schmemann becomes more and more committed to preaching the gospel of the liberating eschaton, rightly convinced that this is what makes the liturgy orthodox and thereby establishing the ortho, leaving the initial idea of the liturgical ordo behind. This is an excessive simplification in the understanding of the ortho as I have argued in the previous chapters. Grounded in the theories of Kompridis and Arendt, we can appreciate Schmemann’s critique of an isolated atomization of theology but at the same time the atomization is necessary for the comprehensiveness of the Ecclesia in the world. The effect of Schmemann’s simplification of the ortho is that the idea of the coming Kingdom is turned into one thing among others. The eschaton becomes confined to the liturgy instead of continuously lining the liturgy as well as theology and piety. Eschaton necessarily escapes our reflection since it is pre-reflective, but it is continuously lined with a reflective differentiation of reality, according to Kompridis.

Schmemann is, in this sense, correct then when he describes the crisis of theology as loosing its connection to the leitourgia and ultimately to eschaton but he fails to see that the crisis is equally a question of how to accomplish a differentiation between theology, liturgy and piety. He is unable to understand the distinction between separation and differentiation, and therefore pits differentiation against reconciliation. The effect of such a choice is a return of clericalism and an escalating reification. Without the differentiation between theology, liturgy and piety the internalization of knowledge in the life and thinking of the participants becomes impossible. The differentiation is needed in order for the individual apprehension of the three worlds, which in turn makes the reconciliation possible. Without a differentiation the participants are destined on a long walk in the great sea of being. This transforms the participators in the Ecclesia to recipients; they become listeners taking part by listening to the clergy. This is further perpetuated when clerics describe the life of orthodoxy as a self-sufficient liturgical life, containing all things necessary, as if the reflections of the church fathers were unnecessary.

If the critique by Schmemann and Habermas was a blow against the reification of the Ecclesia in the shadow of totalitarian regimes, then today we have a reduction of the Ecclesia to liturgy, unable to retract the necessary rationalization of the Ecclesia without handing it over to the academe and an elite of theologians. Liturgical teaching involves
more than just participating in the liturgy. It also involves lining ritual action with communicative action. This is not accomplished by making “being” our neighbor, but by making “one another” such. This implies methods different from ritual action. Without communicative action the transformative agency of the participants is diminished and virtually disappears. This is something lacking in Schmemann’s work.

D. A Renewed Understanding of the Inter-Subjective Dimension of the Ecclesia

Both Taft and Kavanagh make a thorough distinction between the what and the how and why of tradition. Taft limits himself to the task of understanding the liturgy by acquiring a genetic vision of the present, while Kavanagh tries to overcome the division between ecclesial life and the academe by staying in the academe, with a vocational centre. Even though Kavanagh tries to reconcile the academe with ecclesial life, the differentiation of world disclosure in a primary and secondary disclosure takes us one step further. I will begin, however, in Habermas’ theory of the inter-dependence between knowledge and interest and then reconstruct his theory in light of Kompridis’ theory of a differentiated disclosure. Subsequently, I will propose a new understanding of the relation between the what and the how and why.

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In 1965, in his article Erkenntnis und Interesse, Habermas presented a critique of the illusion of objectivism inherent in positivism arguing that there is a genuine connection between the positivistic self-understanding of science and traditional ontology.865 In this connection there has been an illusive separation between pure theory and human interests, according to Habermas. This in turn has led to a crisis, according to Husserl, in the early twentieth century, where science has become devoid of meaning for our vital needs. Habermas basically supports Husserl’s analysis but draws a different conclusion than does Husserl.866

865 The article was originally published in Merkur in 1965 and then reprinted in 1968 in Technik und Wissenschaft als “ideologie”. Later on it was translated into English as an appendix to Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests. See Habermas 1965, ‘Erkenntnis und Interesse’; and Habermas [1971], Knowledge and Human Interests.

Husserl criticizes the objectivist illusion that images science as a reality-in-itself and conceals the understanding that science is still dependent on the interests of the meaning-generative subjectivity of the lifeworld. This basic understanding of the objectivist fallacy of positivism is supported by Habermas, but where Husserl argues that his own theory of phenonomenology is free from any such interests Habermas argues that he falls into the same trap as the positivists. The only way to get rid of human interests is the argument of a self-subsistant ontology. The identity of pure Being, Habermas continues, is simply another objectivist illusion. The attitude behind this position depends on the idea that empirical variables of theoretical propositions are self-existent, and as such they suppress the transcendental framework giving rise to these variables. As soon as we uncover these frameworks the objectivist illusion dissolves. Through a method of inquiry Habermas claims that there are three types of knowledge-constitutive interests. One is the cognitive interest in technical control over objectified processes, which is constitutive for empirical-analytic sciences. The second one is the practical cognitive interest of achieving mutual understanding, which is constitutive of historical-hermeneutic sciences. The third one is the emancipatory cognitive interest, which is constitutive of systematic sciences of social action.\footnote{Habermas [1971] 2002, Knowledge and Human Interests.}

The emancipatory interest, according to Habermas, is fundamental for scientific progress. The power of self-reflection depends on this general interest of emancipation because the cognitive interest of emancipation aims at the pursuit of reflection as such. From this interest, sciences are born. If the illusion of pure theory remains unbatled, Habermas continues, history becomes locked up in a museum and sterilizes knowledge against the reflective appropriation of active traditions. Still, Habermas argues, the false consciousness of science has a protective function of comprising the practical efficacy of theory in the sense of an ecstatic discipline of dismantling interests.\footnote{Habermas [1971] 2002, Knowledge and Human Interests.} At the same time Habermas is convinced of the need in criticizing the objectivist illusion stating that the praise of objectivism has its limits. Husserl’s critique was right to attack it, if not with the right means. As soon as the objectivist illusion is turned into an affirmative Weltanschauung, methodologically unconscious necessity is perverted to the dubious virtue of a scientific
profession of faith. Objectivism in no way prevents the sciences from intervening in the conduct of life, as Husserl thought it did.869

In the quotation above we can see that Habermas reacts strongly against World disclosure, arguing that it is a dubious virtue of a scientific profession. His reaction is conditioned by his perception of how disclosure theorists tend to argue in a way similar to that of Husserl, by contending that their theory is free from any interests. On the contrary Habermas argues that there is no pure theory. Every theory depends on a previous interest. Habermas makes a distinction between three basic questions to elucidate this. The first question is merely speculative; What can I know? The second question is practical; What ought I do? The third question is different. It is both practical and theoretical at the same time; What may I hope? The third question supports Habermas’ thesis that in the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest is one. Knowledge in this sense Habermas designates as Erkenntnisinteresse (Knowledge-interest).870

Habermas is correct in affirming the unity of knowledge and interest. Through the individual, apparition, knowledge and interest can be kept together, to be reconciled without loosing their distinctiveness. Still Habermas neglects one issue in his personal interest of dismissing disclosure. There is one common issue in all three questions that Habermas avoids dealing with because of his aversion to disclosure, and that is the “I” in all of the questions. The ego behind the questions precedes both knowledge as well as interests, and as such it is pre-reflective. The identity of the subject therefore escapes any exhaustive definitions. It is in this open-ended understanding of identity that the emancipatory interest emerges avoiding any determinacy of the human being. The human being is simply constantly thrown into the world as a pre-reflective disclosure but saved through knowledge and interests as a co-reflective disclosure. Habermas fears that this would result in a return to the subject-centered reason. This fear rests on the understanding that a primary disclosure does not require a secondary disclosure. With a reflective co-disclosure this fear dissolves and instead we are able to

capture the indeterminacy of the human being, which is necessary for safeguarding the uniqueness of the subject.

This makes it possible to reformulate the understanding of the relation between the what and the how and why of the Ecclesia. They are interdependent, constituting each other, not in the sense of mixing them but in same sense as Schmemann explained concerning the relation between faith and liturgy. The how and why of the Ecclesia are dependent on the interests of those participating in the Ecclesia, while the what is dependent on knowledge in the Ecclesia. These are then reconciled in the power of self-reflection, which is accomplished in the leitourgia. In this self-reflection the uniqueness of the Ecclesia bursts open since it is connected to the pre-reflective disclosure of eschaton, which in turn is connected to ritual action where the Church is thrown into the world again and again.

It is the uniqueness of the Ecclesia which gives rise to the emancipation of the participants with the call of conscience from within, a theological calling, pushing the process of rationalization further in a reflective co-disclosure. Without the theological calling from within the emancipatory interest stemming from the unique identity diminishes and is replaced by another interest, either the interest of reaching mutual understanding or the interest of taking control of objectifying processes. In the former case, the unique identity of the Church is transformed into an average society, in the latter case the Church becomes an object to be handled and controlled by establishing scientific processes. On the other hand, without rationalization in the reflective co-disclosure reified remembrance becomes impossible, and without any reified remembrance the Ecclesia simply disappears into the great sea of being from whence it came.

The relation between the academe and ecclesial life in the end turns out to be co-dependent. Without the scientific and procedural development in the Ecclesia the necessary reified remembrance or, using Taft’s expression, the genetic vision of the present dissolves, but the emancipatory interest stemming from the unique Ecclesia shapes the work and the effort of those scientists. Without that interest theology becomes attached to the more instrumental interest of scientific advancement internal to the academical world, either in the sense of taking control of one’s own career or taking control of the scientific processes, disconnecting them from any external communication. At the same time the illusion of theology as a disinterested science is protective in the sense of avoiding conflicts. Kavanagh rightly states that
it is not easy to be objective about something that concerns your entire life. This is a concession that runs deep in the history of the academe. Maintaining the illusion enables people to continue in their aspiration for knowledge, avoiding unnecessary conflicts of interests, but this is possible only as long as the surrounding world more or less shares the basic interests of the academe. In a multicultural environment this is not the case and avoiding conflicts of interest by referring to the objectivist illusion of science fails the more we become aware of gliding interests.

This was probably what Schmemann experienced being confronted by a secular, non-orthodox world. In this clash of interests the Church has to consolidate itself by giving voice to its unique interest of emancipation residing in the unique identity of those sharing the same lifeworld. In a similar sense this is probably the same problem that we today experience in the Ecumenical Movement which paradoxically is the result of its own success. As long as inter-Christian relations were more or less dependent on one lifeworld or Ecclesia, knowledge and interests could be kept together, but when the involvement of Churches connected to another lifeworld increased, knowledge and interests separated and the Ecumenical Movement was gradually transferred to the illusion of the objective science of theology. The Ecumenical Movement has been successful in the sense of increasing the rationalization of the different Ecclesias, but this has also caused an increased risk of dissensus. In line with this theory it is of no surprise that the success of the Ecumenical Movement has caused a conflict in the World Council of Churches resulting in the Special Commission, but with the Faith and Order Commission almost unaffected.871 The reason behind this is the withdrawal of questions of faith and order into the objectivist illusion, as a protective move, but this move is not applicable to issues of life and work or social ethics. At the same time we can hear the echo of Schmemann and Afanassiev who state that unity cannot come solely from academics, but also has to be established in the ecclesial life of the Church. They were certainly right. Unity is not achieved through knowledge alone but also has to incorporate the common interests of the Ecclesia, but what they did not consider was the difficulty in reaching for a common identity, which is not something that can be achieved solely

871 The conflict in the World Council of Churches arose as a conflict between the Orthodox Churches and the Protestant Churches concerning social ethics and the agenda in the WCC, but evolved into a discussion about influence and the need of consensus. The WCC established a Special Commission on Orthodox Participation in the WCC. The Final Report of the Special Commission was delivered in February 14th 2006
through reflection but something that is pre-reflective. This aspect of the Ecumenical Movement necessarily escapes our control.

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The paradigm of Liturgical Theology was established in the wake of the fall of the totalitarian regimes, in the search for Christian Unity. Liturgy was seen as a primary source connecting and unifying Churches and communities scattered and separated through history. They shared the common interest of reaching for mutual understanding of the Christian faith, going back to the most ancient source, the Liturgy. Taft and others have been working patiently to uncover the genetic vision of the present, but the more subtle work of reaching for common interests has been largely neglected in the course of the twentieth century in relation to this paradigm, with the exception of scholars like Gordon Lathrop.

There are strong reasons for arguing that this is due to the development of the paradigm in an ecumenical context. The primary interest of emancipation, as I have been arguing, depends on the unique identity of the particular lifeworld, which in turn depends on the pre-reflective disclosure. This interest is crucial for ritual action, which transcends the particular Ordo, but cannot exist without a common identity of those sharing the same Ecclesia. The ecumenical context does not seem to share one and the same lifeworld and therefore it is not possible to share the same emancipatory interest, which is connected to the emancipation of those sharing an identity. If the Ecumenical Movement could be viewed as a dialogue between different Ecclesias then it is not based on sharing a common interest. Instead it is based on the protective illusion of objective sciences, or Habermas’ idea of a procedural rationality. Therefore the Ecumenical Movement cannot reconcile theology, liturgy and piety. This has to be done in the particular Ecclesia. In the same sense Liturgical Theology cannot fulfill its task of reconciling theology, liturgy and piety without keeping together knowledge and interest, through the power of self-reflection, established through the primary interest of emancipation in itself, residing in the unique identity of the Ecclesia. From this perspective I will end my dissertation by reconstructing a liturgical teaching which is capable of reconciliation.
E. OVERCOMING THE DICHOTOMY

The separation of knowledge and interest has been the focal point of philosophy and science ever since the dawn of German Idealism in the beginning of the nineteenth century. By holding on to the belief that the only true knowledge that can guide our actions is knowledge that frees itself from mere human interests, science has kept a protective interest of escaping the inter-subjective aspect of human life. This separation is also present in the paradigm of Liturgical Theology. Uncovering the basic Ordo of the liturgy, in Schmemann’s work, or as Taft proposes, uncovering the genetic vision of the present, is basically the work of a single scholar, or the work of a team oriented towards reaching a common goal of knowledge, using scientific and hermeneutical methods of scholarly research, but the vision of Liturgical Theology in Schmemann’s work is different.

The vision of Liturgical Theology is a theological calling from within which is not dependent on an external authority. Instead truth and indefectibility is a consequence of freedom and mutual love, and can have no external guarantee. Catholcity is thus connected to the self-identity of the life of Grace. The vision thus depends on a pre-reflective disclosure and this in turn is expressed through ritual action, which is the solid foundation of Liturgical Theology and captures the mind and vision laid out by Schmemann.

If we return to the concepts delivered by Fagerberg we could say that the ordo represents the scholarly work of uncovering the genetic vision of the present, and ortho represents the self-identity of the Ecclesia. The Ordo is established through methods connected to accumulating knowledge and the Ortho is connected to actions for reaching mutual understanding and ultimately consensus, which is not something accomplished by a single scholar, but something done by the entire Ecclesia through the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. Furthermore, the Ordo as well as the Ortho belongs to co-reflective disclosure, but the latter is connected to the emancipatory interest of the unique Ecclesia, which in turn is connected to ritual action as revealing the primary disclosure of the Ecclesia. The consequence of this is that of reconciling knowledge with interest, according to Habermas’ theory, which enables us to identify ortho as an Erkenntnisinteresse. The ortho is the power of self-reflection where knowledge and interest are one,
but contrary to Habermas the primary interest of emancipation does not follow from reflection *per se* but from the pre-reflective disclosure that makes the Ecclesia unique. This is instrumental in explaining why the liturgy is so foundational for Schmemann and why he is so eager to reconcile theology, liturgy and piety.

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The relation between *ordo* and *ortho* is present already in the seven letters of Ignatius of Antioch at the beginning of the second century. Here faith and love constitute a dichotomy to overcome. The context of the discussion in the second century is the beginning of the break-up of the Christian Church with its mother religion, that of ancient Israel. The intention is to separate law from morality with the purpose of identifying the latter with the human act of doing good, which is an act of free will as something we desire to do instead of being forced into doing. Faith in this context comes close to the understanding of the *ordo* and love comes close to the *ortho* in the sense that the Ordo is united to the interests of the Ecclesia, established through pre-reflective disclosure, and revealed in the ritual action of the Eucharist, together constituting the Ortho.

This is also instrumental in explaining why Ignatius differentiates between the Bishop and the Eucharist. The ministry of the Bishop is intimately connected to the unique identity of the Ecclesia, but only through the connection with the Eucharist and ritual action. Without this connection the ministry of the Bishop is reduced to mere order. The Eucharistic Ministry is charismatic in the sense that the Bishop connected to the Eucharist is not primarily dependent on inter-subjective communication but on ritual action. This means that his ministry in the Eucharist does not expand the horizon of the Ecclesia, by enhancing inter-subjective communication, instead it makes the Church unique and one in the world. Through its uniqueness the Church deepens its identity and the solidarity of the Ecclesia is enhanced. This is what the Neo-Palamists identify with the ontology of the Church. This establishes the first axis of the Ecclesia.

The second axis of the Ecclesia then is the inter-subjective dimension, which is reproduced through communicative action. It is possible by differentiating between the Eucharistic Ministry of the Bishop and the Communicative Ministry of the Bishop. In the latter case we have a communicative ministry which coordinates actions for reaching mutual
understanding and consensus. The dimension of a communicative ministry is virtually lost in most of the works of the Neo-Palamists in the same way as it is absent in the works of Heidegger. This perspective of the Ecclesia is lacking also in Schmemann's works, who instead is too occupied with the ontology of the Church. Nevertheless, Schmemann tries to argue for a liturgical teaching but fails since he is unable to differentiate between ritual action and communicative action. He tries to refer everything to the leitourgia, and this is correct if we consider the need of connecting the Ordo to ritual action for establishing the Ortho, but we have to differentiate between ritual action and communicative action. The former refers to the pre-reflective disclosure while the latter refers to the reflective co-disclosure. If we reduce the Ecclesia only to ritual action then the symbolical reproduction of the Ecclesia would cease, actions for reaching consensus would submerge and in the end the participants would be reduced to spectators. On the other hand if we reduce the Ecclesia to mere communicative action the Ecclesia would lose its unique identity and in this process the primary emancipatory interest would be lost, and instead the generalized aspect of the Ecclesia bursts open through the atomization of theology. Knowledge and interests are thus united in the ministry of the Bishop, connecting ritual action with communicative action.

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From the above we can develop an understanding of Liturgical teaching. Ritual action has to pass over to communicative action and this is accomplished by shifting from existence to experience, which is something we share with each other through language. This is only possible through inter-subjective communication in the Ecclesia, by using the cultural background. This is not something that can be accomplished merely by celebrating the liturgy. Instead it has to be established through the rationalization of the Ecclesia. Liturgical Theology therefore evolves as a rationalization of the Ecclesia, but has to be connected to ritual action in order to reconcile theology, liturgy and piety through the primary interest inherent in ritual action. Liturgical teaching is therefore the process of bringing knowledge in connection with the interests of the Ecclesia through the unique identity of the Church, and this is what Schmemann would identify with a theological synthesis.
Liturgical teaching thus constitutes a different understanding of theology where knowledge and interests are kept together in the power of self-reflection focused on the primary interest of emancipation, connected to the pre-reflective disclosure through ritual action. It is theology animated by the unique identity of the Ecclesia, but it has to be established by differentiating between existence and experience. The Church is thrown into the world again and again through ritual action as a pre-reflective disclosure to us and this establishes a theological calling from within, emancipating the participants from within the Ecclesia, and evoking an inter-subjective disclosure through us. These two aspects of reality are kept together in the leitourgia where ritual action and communicative action are merged together. Liturgical teaching in this sense becomes the animation of reified remembrance by making ordinary teaching in the seminary or faculty unique in bringing it home to the leitourgia, making knowledge and interest one; reconciling theology, liturgy and piety.

The didactic aspect in the liturgy, through preaching and the reading of excerpts from the Scripture, is the fulfillment of a long process which begins in ordinary teaching about the Church and culminates in a liturgical teaching in the Church. It is faith fulfilled in love. It is inter-subjective teaching done in classrooms and in parish councils but animated through the unique identity of the Church. A liturgical teaching worthy of its name has to involve methods of participation as well as methods for acquiring an intelligibility framework, but all this is recapitulated in the context of ritual action where the sermon and scriptures transform ordinary teaching and connect it with the unique identity of the Church.

Theological studies in this sense become vivified in the same way as a fish is thrown into the water. Theological study receives its meaning when it is connected to the unique sea of Being in the leitourgia where the Church is born again and again, which bursts open an ever renewed interest. Liturgical Theology is certainly not a mere disinterested pursuit of an ordo. It is the transformation of the Ordo into an ortho which is possible through a re-interesting process, whereby the Ordo is internalized into our own life and thinking and given back to the leitourgia where it came from, recapitulated in sermons and in the reading of the scriptures.
Returning to the initial question of the relation between theory and practice in Schmemann's work, we can conclude that they are in a dialectical relation to each other, and that Schmemann believed in the complete reconciliation between theory and practice, which reduced the structural differentiation in the Ecclesia. This resulted in Schmemann's being caught between the objectifying attitude inherent in the Ordo and his struggle for emancipation. This, in turn, created an ambiguity that could be solved by integrating ritual action with communicative action, and otherness with a reified remembrance.
I set out to find a solution to the ambiguity between theory and practice in the works of Alexander Schmemann, and in my effort I have found that the question of the relation between theory and practice corresponds to the relation between ritual action and communicative action. The former concerns the identity founded on the unavoidable alterity immanent in life, but also transcending life through a holistic encounter with life, which enables us to express a holistic attitude to life and to the entire world. The latter concerns the equally unavoidable rationalization of life which gives rise to a continuous atomization of life through science and the process of acquiring facts and data.

Schmemann tries to reconcile theory and practice through a general reconciliation between theology, liturgy and piety, which correspond to the three worlds in Jürgen Habermas’ work– the objective, the social and the subjective. In the beginning, Schmemann was convinced of being able to reconcile these three worlds through an Ordo established “once and for all”, but this threatens to reify the entire Ecclesia (the Church as lifeworld), where the social and subjective worlds are subsumed into the objective world.

Aidan Kavanagh seems to be aware of this risk and is eager to distinguish between the academe and the church, separating what from why and how, and separating knowledge from interest. At the same time he is eager to keep them together and make the academe relevant for the Church by establishing vocation at the center of the academe. On the one hand Kavanagh is not really able to reconcile these aspects and does not even seem to be interested in a complete reconciliation of the kind found in Schmemann’s work. The same concerns Robert F. Taft who virtually refrains from any effort connected to the issues of why and how. On the other hand the image of reconciliation is present in Kavanagh’s work in his use of the image of the fish drawn from the water illustrating the isolation of the academe from the life of the Church. Both Kavanagh and Taft refrain from developing a reconciliation between theory and practice on a theoretical level, and they also avoid establishing an Ordo that could reconcile these aspects. On the contrary, this seems to be
the outcome of Schmemann’s early reasoning, as well that of Gordon Lathrop, seeing as they both strive towards a theological synthesis, which ought to bring together the particular with the general. Schmemann nevertheless gradually seems to abandon this line of reasoning, leaving the ordo behind and focusing instead on the ortho (that which makes worship orthodox), using the concept taken from David W. Fagerberg.

In the end it seems that Schmemann, Taft and Kavanagh share the perception of the theoetricizing theologian being immersed in the living water (Kavanagh) or in the joy of the leitourgia (Schmemann), or as Taft would probably formulate it ‘in the presence of Christ (eschatos)’. In Schmemann’s work the leitourgia (the horizon of the Ecclesia) is almost identical with the living water described in Kavanagh’s work. Consequently this perception emerges as a reconciliation between theory and practice, not on a theoretical level but on a practical level. In the leitourgia reason is constantly lined with otherness. This is possible, according to Habermas’ arguments, if the leitourgia is connected to the foundational emancipatory interest which guides knowledge. Since the leitourgia is based on ritual action this would not be possible, according to Habermas, since ritual action differs from communicative action where the former is not intended to be a reaching for agreement. Instead I have followed a line of reasoning taken from Hannah Arendt and David Cheal, connecting ritual action with otherness, there Arendt’s understanding of the necessity of otherness for establishing the particular identity makes otherness foundational for emancipation. Habermas, on the other hand, does not understand otherness as having any emancipatory role. This is because he perceives otherness as a suppression of the freedom of inter-subjective communication, and instead he retreats to a subject-centered reason. With Nikolas Kompridis’ re-interpretation of disclosure we gain a different understanding of the relation between otherness and inter-subjective communication as co-dependent.

Ritual action is intended to reveal the identity of the Ecclesia. Without identity, we are left with a never-ending debate and a continuous atomization where every answer exponentially provokes more questions. Communicative action is intended for the reaching of mutual understanding, making subjects accountable and responsible. Without communicative action we are bound on a long walk into the never ending sea of being. Ritual action and communicative action are therefore co-dependent, but in a dialectical relation. If they are confused
there is a risk that being-in-the-world becomes a negation of true Being, which I argued is a constant risk with the Neo-Palamatic scheme. The missionary imperative in the Ecclesia is dependent on the co-existence of ritual action and communicative action. Without the former the Church looses its particularity and identity and does not reveal itself in the world as a subject, and without the latter the message becomes a negation, stating what the Church is not, but without any positive outcomes.

In this study I have proposed a new understanding of the relation between theory and practice for the paradigm of Liturgical Theology. I have reconstructed Habermas' reasoning by integrating the intersubjective dimension of communicative action with the disclosing dimension of ritual action, and in the end suggested a new understanding of Liturgical Theology where both of these dimensions are present. With this conclusion I end this study, but the issues discussed herein open a new discussion beyond the purpose of this dissertation, the question of developing methods for transforming ordinary teaching into liturgical teaching. That is a future undertaking, however.

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