Nisi temere agat
Erik Åkerlund

*Nisi temere agat*

Francisco Suárez on Final Causes and Final Causation
Abstract

The main thesis of this dissertation is that final causes are beings of reason (‘entia rationis’) in the philosophy of Francisco Suárez (1547-1617).

The rejection of final causes is often seen as one of the hallmarks of Early Modern philosophy, marking the transition from an earlier Aristotelian tradition. However, in this dissertation it is shown that final causes had a problematic position already within the Aristotelian tradition. Although other examples of this can be found, this dissertation centers around the thinking of the philosopher and theologian Francisco Suárez and his treatment of final causes in his *Disputationes Metaphysicae* from 1597.

Suárez counts final causes as one of the four kinds of causes, in line with the Aristotelian tradition. However, what these are and how they cause is, at closer inspection, not at all clear, as Suárez shapes his notion of final causation against the background of a definition of causation where efficient causation is the principal kind of causation. Due to this basic view on causes, he is faced with a host of problems when it comes to “salvaging” final causes.

Though at first sight seemingly real, in a final analysis final causes are shown to belong to the class of “beings of reason,” ‘entia rationis’, which are not real beings at all. However, it is also argued that this does not in itself preclude counting final causes as causes; something can really be a cause without being real.

Chapter one presents Suárez’ general view on causes and causation. Chapter two presents his view on final causation. Chapter three examines the close link between final causation and moral psychology. Chapter four relates the question of final causation to God’s concurrence with the world. Finally, chapter five argues for the thesis that final causes are beings of reason.

Keywords: Francisco Suárez, final causes, causality, ontology, metaphysics, intentionality

Erik Åkerlund, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics, Box 627, Uppsala University, SE-75126 Uppsala, Sweden.

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No man is an island.

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Introduction

Final causes and final causation are absolutely central for Aristotle.¹ In natural philosophy as well as in metaphysics, final causes are essential to the structuring of the world, as well as in its relation to its ultimate foundation, which “moves without being moved.”²

This is also true of the kind of Aristotelian philosophy that developed in the Latin Middle Ages, especially after the introduction of Aristotle’s full corpus in the 13th century. In the systematization of philosophy in the Scholastic era, final causes are counted among the four kinds of causes, and in many contexts as the main kind of cause.³ In Scholastic philosophy, as in Aristotle’s philosophy, final causes play an essential role in metaphysics and in natural philosophy.

The answer to the question of what final causes are has never been considered unproblematic, however, nor has the question itself, for that matter. Already in Aristotle, the notion of final causes and final causation are developed within a dialectic, vis-à-vis earlier conceptions found in Plato and pre-Socratic philosophy.⁴ When we come to the Scholastic philosophy of the 13th and 14th centuries, the whole question has been transformed by the long history of mutual influence between philosophy and theology, resulting in the addition of new vistas and aspects.

The rejection of explanations from final causes is often seen as one of the hallmarks of Early Modern philosophy and science.⁵ As has often been pointed out in more recent times, though, final causes remain in the philosophical systems of the 17th century, although in a somewhat different form, and play a different role from that which they had played in the philosophies of Aristotle and the Scholastics.⁶ Moreover, it seems that the inner tensions of the Scholastic philosophical systems had led to a transformation of the notion of final causes in later Scholastic philosophy as well, in a way that

¹ For some recent exponents of this view, see Johnson 2005 p. 1 n. 3.
² See Metaphysics XII.6 [1071b3ff.]; see also Shields 2007 pp. 68-90 and Johnson 2005.
³ For example, as the “cause of causes,” “causa causarum.” See Thomas Aquinas De Principiis Naturae §4 (Aquinas 1950 p. 94) and Duns Scotus’ Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle V.1 (Duns Scotus 1997 p. 354) where he refers to Aristotle’s Physics II.9.
⁴ See Jonson 2005 ch. 4 (pp. 94-127).
⁵ See e.g. Mackie 1995 pp. 280-1, regarding Aristotle’s notion of final causes and its influence: “An emphasis on teleological explanation (shared by Plato) characterizes most subsequent Western philosophy of science until the seventeenth century.”
makes the early modern phase best seen as a continuation of, rather than a break with, the Scholastic development. In this thesis, one piece of the puzzle regarding later Scholastic developments is put in place.

Francisco Suárez was born in Granada, Spain, in 1548.\(^7\) Son of a lawyer and from an early age destined for service in the Church, he entered the Society of Jesus – or the Jesuits – in Salamanca when he was 16 years old, in 1564. Famously, out of 50 applicants to the novitiate that year, Suárez was the only one who was rejected. This was supposedly due to lack of intellectual capacity and a frail physiology. However, Suárez still wanted to join the Jesuits, and did so as an indifferent – it was uncertain whether he would become a priest or a lay brother in the Order. Soon after entering, however, Suárez’ powers seem to have blossomed; he was put on the priest track and was soon at the top of his philosophy classes.

Having finished his theology classes in 1570, when he was 22 years old, he started to teach philosophy, first at Salamanca, then at the Jesuit college in Segovia where he was also ordained in 1572. He was to teach for the rest of his life. Apart from a sejour at the Collegium Romanum in Rome, from 1580 to 1585 he taught at universities in Spain and Portugal, in places such as Salamanca, Valladolid, and Alcalá. From 1593, by the request of Philip II of Spain – who also ruled Portugal at this time – Suárez took up the professorship at the University of Coimbra in Portugal, a post he held until he retired in 1615. Francisco Suárez died in Lisbon in 1617, 69 years old.

Outwardly, Suárez’ life was not very adventurous. However, he took part in some of the greatest intellectual battles of his time. For example, Suárez was involved in the De Auxiliis discussions, on the Jesuit side against the Dominicans – more on that in chapter 3 below – and also took the side of the papacy against both England and Venice on different occasions. Suárez was also charged with unorthodoxy on some occasions during his career. These kinds of battles are rather exceptions, however, in a life that was mostly devoted to systematic reflections on the whole of Catholic faith and life.

Despite some travels, then, Suárez’ daily life appears to have been fairly regular throughout most of his life. Here is one rendering of his daily routine during his last 20 years at Coimbra:

The time of his lecture, which lasted an hour and a half, was half-past six in the morning during the summer months, an hour later in the winter. He rose never later than half-past three in the summer, half-past four in the winter. After an hour and a half of mental prayer, followed by the recital of the Little Hours of the breviary, he went to his books. By the time most people in Eng-

\(^7\) The main sources for Suárez’ life are Scorraille 1911-12 and Fichter 1940, the latter being largely based on the former. There are also versions of Suárez’ vita in introductions to some of the translations of his works into English – e.g. Suárez 1964 and Suárez 1995 – but these are mainly based on the two former books.
land are breakfasting, Suarez was settling down to a couple of hours’ work with his secretaries. He did not breakfast till mid-day, for it was his custom to say Mass daily at eleven o’clock in the morning. After a very light breakfast, he said Vespers and Compline, recited his rosary and read some spiritual book. At two o’clock he anticipated Matins and Lauds of the following day. Then he settled down to five hours of mental toil before his second meal of the day. After that a short conversation with some of the members of his community, lengthy night prayers and bed.8

The stable routine was obviously conducive to his writing. The total œvre of Suárez has been estimated to 21 million words;9 this could be compared to the 1 million words of Aristotle or the 8.5 million words of Thomas Aquinas.10

As was noted, Suárez was mainly a teacher and writer in the field of theology. However, as he himself describes in the introduction to the Disputationes metaphysicæ (henceforth DM) from 1597, he constantly ran into fundamentally philosophical questions in his theological thinking. Therefore, he decided once and for all to treat these philosophical concepts and questions; this is how the DM came about.11

DM was published in two large volumes in 1597. It was the first complete metaphysical work that was not a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics written in the Latin west;12 its impact was to be enormous. It has been stated that the Disputations of Suárez is the primary way in which ancient philosophy in Scholastic format comes into the modern philosophy.13

The DM consists of 54 disputations. These are divided into two main parts: disputations 1 through 27 treat metaphysics and its subject matter (real being) generally, whereas the disputations from the 28th treat being as divided into finite and infinite. The last disputation, number 54, falls outside of the scheme, though; it treats beings of reason, which are not real and therefore fall outside the scope of metaphysics proper.

Causes are addressed in disputations 12 through 27. Hence, about a third of the DM is devoted to causes. These disputations have the following structure:

12: causes generally
13-14: material causes
15-16: formal causes

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8 As quoted in Fichter 1940 p. 208 (italics removed), from an account written by a Lewis Watts in 1939.
9 Fichter 1940 p. 327.
10 Kenny 1993 pp. 10-1.
11 The DM constitutes volumes 25 and 26 of the Opera omnia (see Bibliography).
13 Heidegger 1931 Einleitung ch. 2, §6 (p. 23).
17-22: efficient causes
23-24: final causes (23: generally; 24: the ultimate final cause, God)
25: exemplar causes
26-27: relations of cause and effect and between causes

The focus of this thesis will be on disputation 23.

The form of DM is quite like the form of the traditional Scholastic *Summa* – with question, objections, corpus, and then answers to objections – although Suárez uses it quite freely, sometimes deviating from it completely. Moreover, for each question, Suárez goes through an often impressing number of earlier philosophers who have treated it, and relates what they have written on it. Although some earlier thinkers have a greater weight for Suárez – Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas in particular – he is never afraid to disagree with any of them, and oftentimes explicitly does so.¹⁴ Notwithstanding this, though, Suárez’ adherence to a traditional philosophical style sometimes makes it hard to see his novelty in many areas, just on the face of it.¹⁵

Suárez treats final causes in other places than the DM as well; so why has the DM been chosen as the focus of this thesis? Indeed, much relevant content could be found regarding many questions in other works, for example in the *De ultimo fine hominis*. There are three main reasons why I will almost exclusively look at DM. First, Suárez intended this work as a whole, and – to all appearance – laid special emphasis on making it a coherent whole. This justifies our expectation from the work of constituting a coherent whole, where all the parts are meant to fit, as it is in line with the intention of the author. Second, and related to this, there is an uncertainty regarding certain other works as to from which time period they stem. Many works originate in lecture held by Suárez, but the works themselves were revised throughout his lifetime. It is thus almost impossible to draw any conclusions regarding possible developments in Suárez’ thought based on the discrepancies that exist between DM and other works.¹⁶ Third, my interest is first and foremost concentrated around the question of final causes within metaphysics, rather than, say, natural philosophy. It is therefore natural to focus on the *opus*, which Suárez wholly devotes to metaphysics.

To these three reasons comes a fourth, more practical: textual scope. Already DM is a massive work, and a deep study of this work with regard to the present question precludes a deeper look at Suárez’ other works. I have surveyed some other works, though, but have not really found anything

¹⁴ See below and Fichter 1940 p. 127.
¹⁵ As Helen Hattab has also pointed out. (Hattab 2009 p. 56)
¹⁶ For an example of such discrepancies, see Schmaltz 2008 p. 147 n. 37.
which adds to what he says in the DM concerning final causes from a meta-
physical point of view.\textsuperscript{17}

The DM is also interesting from certain other perspectives. In an earlier
tradition, Suárez was often described as the last flare on the Medieval Schol-
astic sky.\textsuperscript{18} However, as has been noted recently, Suárez can also be seen as
an instigator of a Baroque Scholastic tradition, which lasted until the middle
of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{19} This latter estimation is not least due to the fact of the
form of the DM – that one whole treatise is exclusively devoted to metaphys-
ics, thereby separating philosophy and theology in genre. Of Suárez’ writ-
ings, it was the DM which had by far the largest impact on philosophy after
Suárez.\textsuperscript{20}

The main aim of the thesis is determining what ontological status final caus-
es are accorded by Suárez in the DM. This will be treated in the final chap-
ter. However, in order to treat this topic properly, we must first cover some
ground. Thus, in chapter 1, Suárez’ general view on causes and causation
will be presented. In chapter 2, then, the more specific treatment of final
causes and final causation will be dealt with. After this, two small digres-
sions are made in two chapters in order to cover adjacent territory. First, in
chapter 3, moral psychology and the question of free choice and freedom of
will are treated; next, in chapter 4, God’s concurrence and final causes in
nature are treated. This paves the way for the treatment and exposition of the
ontological status of the final causes in chapter 5.

The topic of this thesis – the ontological status of final causes – is related in
many different ways to different areas of philosophy; I would like to point
out two in particular: substance and dualism. The first question, on sub-
stance, has been treated e.g. by Gyula Klima in his unpublished \textit{Yale Lec-
tures}.\textsuperscript{21} In this work, Klima describes how substances and essences become
problematic in Early Modern philosophy. As final causes are closely related
to the definition and essence of a thing, and thereby also to its substantial
form, in Aristotelian philosophy, modifications of the notion of final causes
will also have repercussions on these other metaphysical notions as well.

\textsuperscript{17} Suárez looks closely on the relation between ends and means in his \textit{De ultimo fine hominis},
for example, but I cannot see that this treatment adds anything to the treatment of this ques-
tion in the DM.

\textsuperscript{18} See e.g. Vollert 1947, where the Scholastic philosophy is described as being in decline
since the 14th century (p. 2) and the DM is described as “the last notable treatise on Scholas-
tic metaphysics” (p. 4).

\textsuperscript{19} See e.g. Novotný 2009.

\textsuperscript{20} Doyle 1995 pp. 12ff. Helen Hattab writes that: “The influence of Suárez’s philosophy in the
first half of the seventeenth century cannot be overestimated. The \textit{Metaphysical Disputations}
established themselves as the premier text on metaphysics, not just in Catholic countries, but
in Protestant ones as well.” (Hattab 2009 p. 11 n. 27)

\textsuperscript{21} Klima 2011.
Regarding the second question, on substance dualism, Henrik Lagerlund has argued\(^{22}\) – convincingly, to my mind – that the substance dualism found in the Early Modern period is rooted in a deeper question regarding the relation between final and efficient causation.

Besides these areas, the present topic, of course, also has bearing on the contemporary discussions about teleology and functionality, not least with respect to currents in the philosophy of biology.\(^{23}\)

A note on the form of the text: the Latin original will be given for translation from the DM (and some of the other sources which are in Latin). The initial letter in the translation has been adapted to the context – lower case initial letter in running text, capital initial letter when free standing (such as in most block quotes). Further, full stop is always inserted when the quotes end a sentence (without square bracket, also when inserted). The original form of the quote (lower case or capital initial letter, full stop or not) is given by the quote in the footnote.

Some translations are my own; they are marked by an asterisk in square brackets – \([*]\) – after the Latin original. Other translations from the DM are indicated in the following way:\(^{24}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
[AF]: \text{DM 17-22 (Alfred J. Freddoso, Suárez 1994 and 2002)} \\
[CV]: \text{DM 7 (Cyril Vollert, Suárez 1947)} \\
[JD]: \text{DM 47, 54 (John P. Doyle, Suárez 2006 and 1995)} \\
[KR]: \text{DM 15 (John Kronen & Jeremiah Reedy, Suárez 2000)} \\
[MW]: \text{DM 31 (Norman Wells, Suárez 1983)}
\end{align*}
\]

In some instances, a Latin original word or phrase is given in the translation (within parentheses). The only case for which this is done more consistently is the word ‘ratio.’ This word is also translated in different ways, depending on the context. Here is what Peter of Spain had said, in the 13\(^{th}\) century, concerning this word:

‘Ratio’ is used in many ways. In one way it is the same as a definition or a description, as in this passage, ‘Univocal things are those that share a name, and the definition (ratio) of the substance corresponding to the name is the same.’ In another way it is the same as a certain power of the soul [i.e., reason]. In another way it is the same as a discourse that proves something – e.g., the reasonings (rationes) of the participants in a disputation. In another

\(^{22}\) E.g. in Lagerlund 2011, see especially pp. 587-8.
\(^{23}\) For a good collection of articles representing the recent debate within these areas, see Buller 1999.
\(^{24}\) Besides these, Sydney Penner has started to translate DM 23 and put the text up on his homepage (www.sydneypenner.ca ). The translations came too late for me to benefit much from them. However, I have not yet detected any major discrepancies in our reading of Suárez.
way ratio is the same as the form imposed on matter – e.g., in a knife iron is the matter, and the arrangement imposed on the iron is the form. In another way ratio is the same as a common essence predicable of many things – e.g., the essence of a genus, a species, or a differentia. In another way ratio is the same as a middle implying a conclusion.25

Although some uses are more common in Suárez than others, the above-mentioned meanings give a quite good overview of Suárez’ use of the term, as well.

A note also on how the word “nature” is used in this thesis. When used, it is not a rendering of the Latin ‘natura’, but is either a translation of the word ‘ratio’ or is used to refer to the (material) created world. Context, and sometimes the Latin original – in loci where it is used as a translation for ‘ratio’ – should indicate what use is intended in the given place.

The word “teleology” will not be used in the present thesis. This is a conscious choice, as this word is not coined until the 18th century – by Christian Wolff – and was at that time used to designate a part of natural philosophy.26 Instead, the terms “final causes” and “final causation” will be used to designate phenomena in the area of teleology, albeit in a more metaphysical context than the natural philosophy context in which “teleology” was subsequently used. Notwithstanding this, though, much in the present thesis has bearing on current discussions revolving around teleology.

1. What is a Cause?

In order to thoroughly understand what Suárez thinks about final causes and final causation, and why he thinks this way, it is necessary to first look at what he writes regarding causes more generally. Consequently, it is fitting to start out by giving a general account of Suárez’ notion of a cause as the context in which his discussions of final causes take place.

In this chapter, sections 1.1 and 1.2 form a thematic unity, as they both treat causes generally (the cause as a principle and the definition of a cause, respectively). Similarly, sections 1.3 and 1.4 have a mutual connection, as they both treat the subdivisions of causes (the different kinds of causes and how they relate to each other, respectively). Section 1.5, though, stands on its own, as it briefly outlines what kinds of relations are involved in causation.

1.1 The Cause as a Principle

Suárez situates causes within the extension of principles (‘principii’). A cause is a kind of principle. Now, there are many kinds of principles, and the word ‘principium’ can be taken quite widely. Suárez gives some examples of this:

For example, a point is properly the principle (‘princípio’) of a line when no point, and consequently no part of the line, precedes it.

Only the instant which does not have any time preceding it, but [some time] immediately following, is the principle (‘princípio’) of time absolutely.

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1 The word ‘principium’ could be rendered in many different ways, from ‘point of origin’ to ‘beginning.’ The Oxford Latin Dictionary lists 10 different groups of meanings. (Oxford: OUP, 1968; p. 1459) However, we will here consistently render ‘princípio’ “principle,” unless otherwise noted.

2 In this, he follows Aristotle. See Metaphysics, bk. V, ch. 1 (1013a17); “all causes are principles” (‘panta gar ta aitia archai’).

3 DM XII.1, §8; 25:375. ‘verbi gratia, punctus tune est proprio principii lineae, quando ante illum nullus punctus, et consequenter nec pars lineae antecessit.’ [*]

4 DM XII.1, §8; 25:375. ‘absolute enim illud solum instans est princiium temporis, ante quod instans nullum tempus præcessit, sed immediate subseuenter.’ [*]
The Eternal Father is the principle (‘principium’), source and origin of the whole deity.\(^5\)

So, besides a spatio-temporal meaning of the word, it can also have the more abstract meaning of source or origin.

Having gone through many uses of the word “principle,” Suárez comes to the general definition of a principle as “holding the highest place” or “being first in eminence” (‘prius principiato’).

From this enumeration of principles it can be gathered, first, that it is common to all principles that they are in some way prior in eminence.\(^5\)

However, as this is quite a general definition, it begins rather than ends his investigation into the nature of principles. In his philosophical reflection of this subject, Suárez – as is his usual way of approaching a philosophical question – makes conceptual distinctions between different kinds of principles.\(^7\)

The most general distinction he makes is the distinction between principles of cognition and principles of things. Whereas the principles of cognition are complex, the principles of things are simple.\(^8\)

Causes are to be sought within the group of principles of things. As will be seen, these principles are other things, broadly speaking. Complex principles, on the other hand, are principles of science.\(^9\) These complex principles presumably refer to premises of demonstrative knowledge or science, such as “All humans are mammals” or “Some substances are rational.” These sentences are compounds of different universals, and are thus rendered under the label “complex.”\(^10\)

\(^5\) DM XII.1, §8; 25:375. ‘Patrem æternum esse principium, fontem et originem totius deitatis’ [*]

\(^6\) DM XII.1, §8; 25:375. ‘Ex hac principiorum enumeratione colligi potest primo, commune esse omni principio, ut sit aliquo modo prius principiato’ [*]

\(^7\) A graphic representation of the relationship between different kinds of principles – which could be helpful when reading the following sections – is found on p.24 below.

\(^8\) “First we can distinguish between two [kinds of] principles: [principles] of things on the one hand, [and principles] of cognition or science on the other. These could, in another way, be distinguished into simple (‘incomplexa’) and complex (‘complexa’) principles; for the principle of a thing is simple, whereas [the principle] of a cognition is complex.” (DM XII.1, §3; 25:373. ‘primo distinguere possimus duplex principium, aliud rei, aliud cognitionis seu scientiae; quod alio modo solut distinguui in principia incomplexa et complexa; nam principium rei incomplexum est, cognitionis autem complexum.’ [*])

\(^9\) The references are to disputations I and III. (Should that be rather disputation I.3? For in disputation III Suárez does not treat science explicitly, whereas in I.3 he is treating the question whether metaphysics consists of one science or many.)

\(^10\) Suárez gives the quote ‘Suppositiones demonstrationum vocantur principia’, which he says he has already given above and thus does not give a reference to. This seems to refer to Metaphysics V.1 where Aristotle discusses different senses of the word “origin” or “principle” (‘archê’) and lists as one meaning that “the hypotheses are the origins of demonstrations” (1013\(^a\)15). However, as to the complexity of principles, the first principles do not seem to be
However, as was stated, although the question of what the principles of
science are is an interesting topic, what will interest us here are the prin-
ciples of things, as causes are counted among these.

Is it principles of things which we generally refer to as causes? Unfortu-
nately, it is not that simple. In order to come down to causes, some further
divisions within the simple principles are needed. Thus, Suárez first makes a
distinction between different kinds of principles of things on account of how
tightly connected the principality is to the thing called a principle.

A principle of a thing could therefore be called [a principle] either solely on
account of (‘ratione’) order and whatever connection, or on account of
(‘ratione’) some intrinsic habitude.11

At this stage this distinction might appear a bit obscure. However, a few
examples might help clear up the meaning of it. Before exploring the mean-
ing of the phrase “intrinsic habitude,” though, let us look at what kind of
relations Suárez has in mind when he writes “solely by order and conne-
cction.”

From the examples Suárez gives, when speaking of what the principles
regarding things are when they pertain to order only, one gets the impression
that he understands himself as speaking of a principle in a “broad” or “loose”
sense. First, he has some examples that are similar to those we have already
seen above regarding time and space.

In the succession or order of time, dawn is called the principle of the day, be-
cause the day starts from it.12

In the order of place, the one who sits first is called the principle of the oth-
ers. And also the place from where the spring originates is usually called its
principle.13

This kind of principles of things is quite general, and spans a wide variety
of different kinds of uses of the word “principle.”

complex, according to Aristotle. Concerning the obtaining of first principles he writes that
“when one of the undifferentiated things make a stand, there is a primitive universal in the
mind” (Posterior Analytics II.19 [100b15f.]). In the next step, on the other hand – e.g. in the
composition “All humans are mammals” – we have a complex out of two (simple) universals.
For a succinct account of this problem, as well as references to some different interpretations
of it, see Smith 2011, especially section 6.

11 DM XII.1, §4; 25:374. ‘Principium igitur rei dici potest aut solum ratione ordinis, et
cujuscunque connexionis, aut ratione alicujus intrinsice habitudinis.’ [*]
12 DM XII.1, §4; 25:374. ‘in successione seu ordine temporis aurora dicitur principium diei,
quia inde incipit dies.’ [*]
13 DM XII.1, §4; 25:374. ‘in ordine loci, qui primus sedet, dicitur principium caeterorum, et
locus etiam ille, ex quo fons oritur, dici solet principium ejus.’ [*]
In everything that has extension or width, the first part or the first extreme – which is presupposed by the others – can be called a principle of the whole or of the other parts.\textsuperscript{14}

However, since this class of principles – of things which are somehow first in, or the starting point of, some order – is so wide, Suárez also views them as being unfit for strict scientific usage. When it comes to scientific usage, it is the principles that are called principles by intrinsic habitude that are looked at.

When coming to principles that are called principles “by intrinsic habitude,” Suárez has a quite general definition at the outset. He doesn’t state much beyond an assertion that these principles are principles on account of the fact that “something else arises” from them.

In another, more philosophical, way, a principle can therefore be [so] named on account of (‘ratione’) some habitude \textit{per se} between itself and that of which it is the principle, insofar as this [latter thing] in some way arises from this [principle].\textsuperscript{15}

The verb translated here as “arises” is the verb ‘orior’, which spans a whole range of meanings from “begin” through “arise” to “be born.”\textsuperscript{16} By the counter-position to a concept of a principle as referring to a looser connection (“being first in order”) Suárez wants to make here, I take it that he intends the meaning to lean rather toward the side of “being born.”

As the contrast is made to a relation of order alone, the contrast should not be understood to be contrary to a relation of order, but also to include the intrinsic habitude of the principle over and above this order.\textsuperscript{17}

The further specification of this latter meaning – a principle of a thing by intrinsic habitude – including an intrinsic habitude comes when Suárez divides this meaning into two, yet further, ones. And here, finally, we come to causes. For in a \textit{first} sense it is taken in a positive sense, referring to something from which something else arises taken positively. This, Suárez continues, is further spelled out thus: the principle is a principle on account of its \textit{positive influx and communication of its being}.

\textsuperscript{14} DM XII.1, §4; 25:374. ‘\textit{in omni re, quæ extensionem habet vel latitudinem, prima pars aut primum extremum, quod alis supponitur, dici potest principium totius vel reliquam partium.}’ [*]

\textsuperscript{15} DM XII.1, §5; 25:374. ‘\textit{Alio igitur modo, et magis philosophico, dicitur principium ratione alicujus habitudinis per se inter ipsum, et id cujus est principium, ita ut ex illo aliquo modo per se oriatur.}’ [*]


\textsuperscript{17} As I understand it, the contrast Suárez wants to make here, when he speaks of \textit{intrinsic} habitude, is paralleled by his contrast between extrinsic and intrinsic denomination. For this latter pair of concepts, and especially the contrasting extrinsic denomination, see Doyle 1984.
First, [principles by intrinsic habitude of things can be principles] by [their] positive influx and communication of their being. This way [of being a principle] always comes with dependence and causality, with respect to created things, as we will explain; wherefore this kind of principle always brings with it the nature of a cause (‘rationem causœ’), philosophically speaking.¹⁸

This stance is fundamental to Suárez’ view on causation, and will be a recurring point of reference throughout his treatment of the specific causes.

The quote above is a rich one; as we shall come back to it further on, only some brief comments will be made at this point. First, what does Suárez mean by the restriction “with respect to created things”? What things does he want to exclude? Well, the uncreated “thing” or God. For, within God, the Father is the principle of the Son. However, the Father is not the cause of the Son. This relation between the Father and the Son (as well as the relation to the Holy Spirit of the Father and the Son, respectively) is the only case in which a principle giving being is not called a cause.¹⁹

A principle with true influx and communication of proper being [but] without causality is only to be found among the divine persons.²⁰

A second thing to be said about the quote above regards the term “influx” (‘influxum’). Suárez here uses this word a bit strangely. For ‘influere’, which is the infinitive corresponding to ‘influxum’, is an intransitive verb, i.e. one cannot say that “the Seine flows water into Paris” but rather “the Seine flows into Paris.” However, Suárez uses it in the first way, as a transitive verb. Strictly speaking, he is using the word ‘influere’ grammatically incorrect here. He uses the phrase “flowing being into something” like “giving” or “communicating being to something.” However, Suárez himself notes this.

This word “influences” (‘influit’) [...] is equivalent to the word “giving” or “communicating” being to another.²¹

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¹⁸ DM XII.1, §5; 25:374. ‘Primo per positivum influxum et communicationem sui esse; qui modo respectu rerum creatarum semper est cum dependentia et causalitate, ut explicabimus; quare hujusmodi principium, philosophice loquendo, semper induit rationem causœ.’ [*]

¹⁹ One reason Suárez gives for this asymmetry of labeling is that within God one person does not produce some other thing when another person arises from it (as the three persons have one being or essence), but only another person. This kind of influx is also more eminent, according to Suárez. See DM XII.1, §16; 25:379, where Suárez expounds on this line of reasoning. This will also be treated a bit more extensively below in the context of the definition of a cause.

²⁰ DM XII.1, §5; 25:374. ‘Solum in divinis personis invenitur principium cum vero influxu, et communicacione proprii esse sine causalitate’ [*]

²¹ DM XII.2, §4; 25:384. ‘verbum illud, influit [...] æquivalet verbo dandi, vel communicandi esse alteri.’ [*] In translating ‘influxus’ and ‘influere’ I will shift, in different contexts, between forms of the words “influx,” “influence,” and “inflow.” This last word is obsolete according to Dennis Des Chene, though he notes it has also been used more recently. He
If it were taken in its basic, intransitive, way, it would seem like Suárez meant that in causality a thing (itself) "flows" into another thing, when it is rather being which flows, or is given, or is communicated to another in causation. This special use of ‘influere’ has to be kept in mind when Suárez speaks of causes.

Leibniz notes the special use Suárez makes of the word ‘influere’, and takes aim at this in a rather severe attack on Suárez’ whole notion of a cause:

> On the invention of this last word Suárez prides himself not a little. The Scholastics before him had been exerting themselves to find a general concept of a cause, but fitting words had not occurred to them. Suárez was not cleverer than they, but bolder, and introducing ingeniously the word influx, he defined the cause as *what flows being into something else*, a most barbarous and obscure expression. Even the construction is inept, since *influere* is transformed from an intransitive to a transitive verb; and this *influx* is metaphorical and more obscure than what it defines. I should think it an easier task to define the term ‘cause’ than this term *influx*, used in such an unnatural sense.22

Though the charge of obscurity of the definition might have something to it, the accusation regarding how Suárez uses the word ‘influere’ seems a bit unjust, given that Suárez *himself* specifically points out that he will use this word in a special way (i.e. transitively, rather than intransitively).23

Why then does Suárez re-shape the word ‘influere’ in this way in order for it to be used in this context? Why doesn’t he simply use either of the words “giving” or “communicating,” for example, instead? I do not have a good answer to this question. However, perhaps the word ‘influere’ or “flowing into” has the right connotations of something both changing and staying the same? Or perhaps Suárez just wanted to make a new word (kind of, at least) so that it wouldn’t have too many connotations beforehand? In this way, he could shape the transitive word ‘influere’ by whichever more specific definition of causation he deemed the best.

So, that was the positive sense of being a principle of a thing by intrinsic habitude, or a cause, the definition of which Leibniz ridiculed. However, just

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22 From a preface to a work by Marius Nizolius, published in 1670. Akademie-Ausgabe, VI.2, 418; Leibniz 1975 p. 126. ‘[...] ’influere’. Cujus postremi vocabuli inventione mire se effert Suarez. Cum enim Scholastici ante eum dudum in generali causae notione venanda sudassent, nec verba illis commodo succurrerent, Suarez non quidem ingeniosior, tamen audacior fuit, et adhibito callide influxus vocabulo, causam definivit: ”quod influet esse in aliud”, barbare satis et obscure; nam et inepta constructio est, qua influere ex neutro fit activum; et metaphoricum est istud influere, et obscurius ipso definito: faciliore enim negotio causae quam influxus vocem tam monstrose acceptam definire sperarim.’ (Thanks to Mogens Laerke for pointing me to this quotation.)

23 The suggestion that Suárez was the first to use the word ‘influere’ in connection with (physical) causes is also made, at a much later date, in O’Neill 1993 (p. 30).
to make the picture and restrictions complete, there is also a negative sense of this. For in order for something to come into existence, it is necessary that exactly this is lacking before it comes into existence – otherwise it would not come into existence.

Second, something can originate from another per se, as from a principle, not by positive influx, but only for the sake of a necessary and per se habitude to another. It is in this sense privation is enumerated by Aristotle among the principles of natural things.24

For, because generation essentially is a transition from non-being into being, it therefore presupposes privation.25

So, a necessary condition for something being generated is that it is lacking before being generated. Suárez thinks this kind of “principle” falls somewhere in between giving positive influx, as a cause, and being called “principle” only on account of a certain order. However, in the case of natural generation, this comes closer to being a cause, though falling outside of this category because there is no positive influence going on.

[This kind of principle] seems to have a kind of middle nature in-between the two modes of principles declared above. For the first is too broad, and is only founded on some order of priority, [whereas] the other mode of principle – by influx – is more perfect […] because privation, as it is not a true thing, cannot have a proper influence on a thing which comes into being, nor in its generation.26

It might be worthwhile to stress what Suárez says here. Privation is not really a principle “by intrinsic habitude,” as a principle is a principle by intrinsic habitude on account of “the habitude per se [of something,] between itself and that of which it is the principle,” as was quoted above. However, in this case we don’t have a “thing” which has a per se habitude, as it is precisely the lack that constitutes the principle in this case; we don’t have any thing which could have some inner directedness or inner structure of being toward another thing. However, neither is this kind of “negative” per se habitude

24 DM XII.1, §6; 25:374. ‘Secundo, potest aliquid ex alio per se oriri, ut ex principio, non per positivum influxum, sed solum propter necessariam et per se habitudinem ad aliud. Quo modo privatio inter principia rei naturalis numeratur ab Aristotele’ [*] Aristotle states this e.g. in the Physics 1.7 (191b13f.): “This [underlying nature] is one principle (though not one or existent in the same sense as the ‘this’); one is the form or definition; then further there is its contrary, its privation.” (Emphasis added.) See also the On Generation and Corruption 1.3 (318b15ff.).
25 DM XII.1, §6; 25:374. ‘nam, quia generatio essentialiter est transitus de non esse ad esse, ideo per se supponit privationem’ [*]
26 DM XII.1, §6; 25:374. ‘que mediam quamdam rationem habere videtur inter duos modos principiorum declaratos. Nam ille prior latissimus est, et solum fundatur in qualibet ordine prioritatis [...] Alter vero modus principii per influxum perfectior [...] quia privatio, cum non sit vera res, non potest habere proprium influxum in rem quae fit, sed ejus generationem’
merely a matter of order; there is some intrinsic link between the lack of form and the reception of this form, as the first is a prerequisite for the latter; hence the middle nature of this kind of principle.\textsuperscript{27}

To sum up, this gives the following structure of how causes are related to the class of principles in general.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{tree.png}
\caption{Tree relating principles (generally) to causes (specific kinds of principles).}
\end{figure}

However, with regard to what was written above regarding the principles by intrinsic habitude in a negative sense taking a middle ground, the principles of things (the three lower levels of the right hand side of the tree) could also be rendered in the following way:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{tree-principles.png}
\caption{Alternative, threefold partition of principles of things.\textsuperscript{28}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{27} When later, in DM 54, treating of the difference between privation and negation, one of the differences is exactly this, that privation but not negation can be a principle of something. (DM 54.4, §17; 26:1036). For the view that privation can take this place, Suárez refers his readers to Aristotle’s \textit{Physics}, bk. I, ch. 8 (191b15ff.; “For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is something which is not”) and \textit{Metaphysics} bk. XI, ch. 3 (1061a18ff.). The reason why the lack must be a privation, and not simply whichever negation, is that “the lack, which is presupposed in [the subject] must have the character of a privation, since it is \textit{a negation in a naturally apt subject}” (emphasis added; ‘carentia, quæ in illo supponitur, oportet ut habeat rationem privationis, cum sit negatio in subjecto apto nato’).
1.2 The Definition of a Cause

Above we have seen how Suárez differentiates causes from other kinds of principles. However, we have so far only seen a very broad and loose demarcation of what characterizes causes; the question remains whether there is a common, positive and strict definition of causes.29

1.2.1 Ordering the Principles

In order to answer this question, one must first look at what Suárez writes concerning the question of a common definition as it pertains to principles in general. Regarding this latter question we have already been given one above. It was said there that a principle is something that is “prior in eminence.”30 What does this common definition say about principles in general? According to Suárez, the common definition testifies to the fact that the term “principle” is not only applied equivocally to different phenomena (as “skate” may refer to a hockey skate as well as a fish); there is something linking them in a closer way than this.

Since not only the name, but also some meaning (‘ratio’) of the name, is common to [all principles], “principle” is not said merely equivocally of all elements which are contained under this [label] and which were enumerated above.31

This is, in a sense, a negative consequence of the fact of the common definition. But what does it say positively about principles? The fact that there is a common definition does not imply that all principles “simply” fall under this common definition. There are orderings within the principles, so this labeling of some kinds of principles is derivative on the labeling of some other(s).

28 Just by what he writes, Suárez does not exclude the possibility that there might be other principles of things taken negatively than privation – although it is unclear what this would be – whereas he explicitly states that principles of things taken positively are causes.

29 It could be noted, then, that Suárez does not regard the above-related categorization of causes as kinds of principles as a strict classification of causes, something which would lie close at hand for Aristotle. One reason for this is that Suárez, unlike Aristotle, allows for multiple, mutually non-related, essential definitions of the same thing. “For the genera of the same thing can be many, and the differences can also.” (DM XV.11, §18; 25:562. ‘nam et genera ejusdem rei possunt esse plura, et differentiae similiter’ [KR]) This is closely related to Suárez separation of the metaphysical form, or essence, from the physical, or substantial, form of a thing. (Cf. Hattab 2009, especially p. 59.) Suárez might, then, consider the account of causes from the point of view of principles as one definition of causes, although there are more strict definitions which are more “workable.”

30 Above p. 18.

31 DM XII.1, §13; 25:378. ‘principium non dici mere equivoce de omnibus membris quæ sub illo continentur, superiusque numerata sunt, quandoquidem non tantum nomen, sed etiam aliqua ratio nominis est illis communis.’ [*]
It is usually asked whether [“principle”] is univocal or analogous, to which I briefly answer that it cannot be univocal.\textsuperscript{32}

Hence, the notion of a “principle” is analogous. One reason Suárez gives for why this is so is that “principle” is applied analogously to causes and other principles.

When that which is called a principle is only a being of reason (‘ens ratio-nis’), the nature of the foundation of the principle-relation cannot be real. In other things, however, it is often true forthflowing\textsuperscript{33} and real procession.\textsuperscript{34}

Beings of reason which are principles differ so much from real things which are principles that they can only bear the name “principle” in analogy to these real principles.\textsuperscript{35}

So how can the ordering among the different principles be conceived? Actually, there is no one way in which all principles are linked. There are different kinds of analogies between different kinds of principles.

Someone wonders, perhaps, of what kind this analogy is, and of what out of that which is signified by the word “principle” it is said primarily. [...] I think, briefly, that this analogy is not one, but is multiplied with respect to different significations. For it is not inimical for one word which primarily signifies one thing to be transferred to some others by attribution, and to some yet others by proportionality. In this way, “health” primarily refers to animals; by attribution it [then] refers to medicine, and by proportionality to a whole and unspoiled apple.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{32} DM XII.1, §13; 25:378. ‘Dubitari vero solet an sit univoca vel analoga. Ad quod breviter dicendum est non posse esse univocam.’ [*]

\textsuperscript{33} ‘dimanatio’. I have not been able to find this word in any Latin-English dictionary. However, the word is a compound of the words ‘de’ (“from”) and ‘mano’ (“flow,” “pour”); from this I have chosen “forthflowing” as a translation. The closeness to the word ‘emanatio’, often used by Suárez, can also be noted. Actually, Alfred Freddoso consistently translates the word ‘dimanatio’ with “emanates” in his translation of DM XVII-XIX. Also, John Cronen and Jeremiah Reedy translate ‘dimanatio’ with “emanates” in their translation of DM XV. Though it seems to be understood by these translators, it is not clear that ‘emanatio’ and ‘dimanatio’ never contain different connotations. I will therefore use “forthflowing,” instead of “emanating,” for ‘dimanatio’, to keep open this possibility.

\textsuperscript{34} DM XII.1, §13; 25:378. ‘quando id, quod denominatur principium, est ens rationis tantum, ratio fundandi relationem principii non potest esse realis; in alis vero rebus saeppe est vera dimanatio et processio realis.’ [*]

\textsuperscript{35} We will come back to beings of reason below in ch. 5.

\textsuperscript{36} DM XII.1, §14; 25:378-9. ‘Quæret autem fortasse aliquis qualis sit hæc analogia, et de quibus significatis principio primario dicitur. [...] Ego tamen breviter censeo hanc analogiam non esse unam, sed multiplicem respectu diversorum significatorum: non enim repugnat idem nomen primario significans rem aliquam, ad quasdam alias transferri per attributionem, ad alias vero per proportionalitatem. Ut sanum primario significans animal, per attributionem significat medicinum, per proportionalitatem verum pomum integrum et incorruptum.’ [*]
Suárez, once again, stresses the ordering among the principles based on the sense in which “principle” is given to them.

With respect to the signified thing, this word (‘vox’) [“principle”] signifies *per se* principles more than accidental [principles]. And this [is true with respect to principles] especially which are principles by true and real influence, because in these there is a much more true and proper flowing-forth of one from another as well as a [much more true and proper] source than the word “principle” carries with it in itself.37

It is obvious from what has already been said that when Suárez is speaking of principles “by true and real influence,” he is referring to causes. Hence, among all meanings of the word “principle” which we use in the case of the natural world around us, and which were gone through above, the meaning of this word as it is applied to the causes is the primary sense of this word.

1.2.2 Cause and Causation

Before coming to the question of the definition of a cause, we must also first look at some further clarification of terminology. For, in causation there are many different parts involved. At one place, Suárez enumerates three aspects of causation that have to be kept separate.

As we spoke above of the principles, so also with respect to causes a three-fold can be considered: the thing that causes, the causation itself (as I will call it), and the relation, which either follows or is thought.38

So, when speaking of an instance of causation, we have to consider:

1. the cause,
2. the causation, and
3. the relation.

Of these, Suárez writes, he will not yet speak of the relation (it is quite unclear what a relation is at all at this point).39 Instead, what is to be discussed are the first two “items” on the list, namely, causes and causation. These have a close bond, as it is causation which “constitutes” the cause in its actuality, i.e. in its act of causing, and thus in its being a cause.

37 DM XII.1, §15; 25:379. ‘quantum ad rem significatam principaliu s significat hæc vox principia per se, quam per accidentes; et ea præsertim quæ sunt principia per verum et realem influxum, quia in his est multo verior et proprior dimanatio unius ab alio et origo, quam nomen principii præ se fert.’ [*]
38 DM XII.2, §1; 25:384. ‘sicut enim supra de principio dicebamus, ita enim in causa tria considerari possunt, scilicet, res que causat, causatio ipsa (ut sic dicam), et relatio, quæ vel consequitur, vel cogitatur.’ [*]
39 We will come back to relations at the end of the present chapter.
Of this third part [i.e. the relation] nothing is said [at this place]; for, it has its proper place below, in the [place where] relations [are discussed]. We will speak, however, of the other two; first of causation in itself, by which the cause in act is formally constituted, and from which the cause itself or the power to cause becomes known to us.\(^{40}\)

So the act of causation and the constitution of the thing as a cause are intimately connected, whereas causation as a relation (between two things being cause and effect, presumably) is dealt with separately. The important thing, though, is to keep these three aspects or parts of causation in mind when Suárez speaks of causation. Anticipating some distinctions that will be made below, one could say that in the case of a carpenter building a house, we must distinguish between (i) the carpenter (a cause), (ii) the building of the house (causation), and (iii) the relation between the carpenter and the house (a relation).

I will come back to this topic when speaking of efficient causality.

1.2.3 The Nature of a Cause

With the above distinctions between cause, causation and relation in mind, let us now turn our attention to the causes. What is the common definition of a cause?

According to Suárez, there is no one definition of a cause coming from Aristotle which we can just take over and hand on, though a definition has been sought and viewed as desirable in the later tradition.\(^{41}\) Suárez therefore first mentions two different suggestions regarding how to define a cause, as derived from Aristotle – both of which he rejects. The first suggestion is that a cause is that “for which” something is, or is made.\(^{42}\) This definition, however – which Suárez says is extracted from the *Physics*\(^{43}\) – either only refers

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\(^{40}\) DM XII.2, §1; 25:384. ‘De hoc tertio membro nihil in tota materia tractandum est; habet enim inferius suum proprium locum in materia de relatione. De aliis vero duobus dicturi sumus; primo autem de causatione ipsa, per quam formaliter constituitur causa in actu, et ex qua nobis innotescit causa ipsa, seu virtus causandi.’ [*]

\(^{41}\) ‘We have no common definition of a cause from Aristotle. Later philosophers labored to design one, in order that the explication of causes from the common [definition] to proper singular natures would fare better, and at the same time [show] how the coming together of the causes among themselves would be described.’ (DM XII.2, §1; 25:384. ‘Ex Aristotele nullam causæ in communi definitionem habemus; posteriores vero philosophi in ea assignanda laborarunt, ut a communi ad proprias rationes singularum causarum explicandas melius procedatur, simulque declaretur qualis sit convenientia causarum inter se.’ [*])

\(^{42}\) ‘A cause is that by which the inquiry, by which it is asked for what (‘propter quid’) something is or is made, is satisfied.’ (DM XII.2, §2; 25:384. ‘Causa est id, per quod satisfit interrogationi, qua inquiritur propter quid aliquid sit, seu fiat.’ [*])

\(^{43}\) *Physics*, bk. II, ch. 7 (198a14ff.). What would be the ‘propter quid?’ Is this the “why” which Aristotle refers to? Otherwise, if it would be e.g. the “for the sake of what,” Aristotle does not refer to this as a general definition, but as one possible meaning of “why.”
to the final cause, or – if taken more widely – is too obscure to serve as a
definition.\textsuperscript{44}

The second suggestion for a definition is that a cause is “that to which
something else follows.”\textsuperscript{45} According to Suárez, this definition is also attri-
buted to the Book of causes (\textit{Liber de causis}) – where it cannot, however, be
found. Rather, he says, it comes from the definition of principles in the \textit{Meta-
taphysics}.\textsuperscript{46} Suárez’ objection to this second definition is that it is too broad.
If it is only stated that something else is to “follow” in order for this some-
ting to be a cause, the lack of form would also be a cause, something he has
already rejected. As it stands, the definition is rather – as was said – a more
general definition of principles.\textsuperscript{47}

Two definitions for a cause have thus been suggested and rejected. When
presenting the third suggestion, Suárez does not totally reject it; instead, he
modifies this definition to a definition he himself accepts.

The third definition is the best, according to some modern [philosophers]: a
cause is that on which something depends in itself. This indeed proves [to be
the best] to me, because it looks to the thing. It is better expressed in the fol-
lowing way, however: a cause is a principle in itself influencing being into
another (‘\textit{per se influens esse in aliud}’).\textsuperscript{48}

It might be worthwhile to repeat Suárez’ dual definition of a cause, as it
plays such an important role in his account of the specific causes: a cause is
(a) “that on which something depends in itself” or, which is the same thing
(b) “a principle in itself influencing being into another.”\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} “This definition explains almost nothing of the thing. For it is equally obscure what these
words “for which” signify. For if it is taken strictly, it only signifies the habitue of the final
cause, and this is not enough in itself, as we will see later. And if it is taken more freely, what
is understood by “from which,” “through which,” “by which something is” one understands in
different ways.” (DM XII.2, §2; 25:384. ‘\textit{Hæc vero definitio nihil fere rem declarat; nam}
\textit{Æque obscurum est quid significet illud verbum propter quid}; nam si recte sumatur, solum
significet habitudinem causæ finalis, et illam ipsum non satis eclarat, ut postea videbimus. Si
vero sumatur fusius, comprehendit varios modos, qui illis vocibus significantur, \textit{ex quo, per
quid, a quo aliquid est’}\textsuperscript{[*]}\textsuperscript{)}

\textsuperscript{45} DM XII.2, §3; 25:384. ‘\textit{id ad quod aliud sequitur.’}\textsuperscript{[*]}

\textsuperscript{46} See \textit{Metaphysics}, bk. V, ch. 1. However, the exact wording does not seem to be present
there.

\textsuperscript{47} “This definition, however, is not so much of a cause as of a principle. Wherefore it also
includes privation, for from this follows change.” (DM XII.2, §3; 25:384. ‘\textit{illa definitio non
tam est est causæ quam principii; unde etiam conveniat privationi, nam ex illa sequitur
mutatio’}\textsuperscript{[*]})

\textsuperscript{48} DM XII.2, §4; 25:384. ‘\textit{Tertia definitio est, quam potissime afferunt aliqui moderni: \textit{Causa
est id a quo aliquid per se pendet. Quæ quidem, quod ad rem spectat, mihi probatur; libentius
tamen eam sec describerem: \textit{Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud.’} \textsuperscript{[*]}

\textsuperscript{49} How could this “influencing being into another” be understood by a modern reader? One
suggestion, for the more scientifically inclined at least, is to think about angular momentum.
When one body collides with another, and the velocities are altered, the total angular momen-
tum of the two bodies remain the same. However, for each of the two bodies their respective
momentums have changed. One way of looking at this is that momentum has been “trans-
This more succinct definition fits well with the ordering of the causes into the “tree structure” of the principles, which was given above.\textsuperscript{50} There, causes – or “principles of things, which are principles by intrinsic habitude taken positively” – were also associated with \textit{dependence} and \textit{influence} (or \textit{flowing}) of \textit{being}.

The wording “because it looks to the thing” in the definition is intriguing. What does Suárez mean by this? He says this about the part where it is said that a cause is “that on which something depends in itself.” The focus here is on that which depends, the thing that results from the cause, whereas in the earlier, rejected, suggestions of definitions the focus had been on the cause (“that for which something is made” and “that to which something else follows,” respectively). Presumably, then, taking the example of the carpenter and the house, the first two definitions focus on the carpenter, whereas this last definition focuses on the house, which “depends” on the carpenter (for its coming into being, that is). And it is, after all, this result or effect for which we seek principles; it is the phenomenon in front of us (e.g. the house) that is the start of our investigation into causes, although it is the causes that we focus on in the next step. However, it is only in relation to that of which it is a cause that something is called a cause. This is also why Suárez prefers a definition that focuses on this result.

When it comes to the influence (‘influxum’), some notes on this have already been given above;\textsuperscript{51} as was stated there, ‘influere’ is taken transitively, and is synonymous with “giving” and “communicating” \textit{being}. This part, “influencing,” is there to exclude privation as a cause. The “in itself” (‘\textit{per se}’) is there in order to exclude accidental causes from the definition of a cause.

By the part “in itself influencing,” however, privation is excluded, as well as all accidental causes, which by themselves do not confer or influence \textit{being} into another. \textsuperscript{52}

This statement is not totally clear. For what would be the answer to the question “is an accidental cause a cause or not?” given what Suárez writes here? On the one hand, he calls them “accidental \textit{causes},” thus conferring to them the status of causes; on the other hand, he says that these causes are excluded from

\textsuperscript{50} See above, p.24.
\textsuperscript{51} See p. 21.
\textsuperscript{52} DM XII.2, §4; 25:384. ‘Per illam autem particulam, \textit{per se influens}, excluditur privatio, et omnis causa per accidens, quae per se non conferunt aut influunt esse in alium.’ [*]
from the class of causes by the definition of a cause. However, it is at least clear that the word “cause” primarily refers to causes that are causes in themselves, as opposed to accidentally.53

Suárez also anticipates some objections to his preferred definition of a cause. One of them is that, by this definition – and more precisely the part about the “influencing of being” – only efficient and formal causes would be causes – to the exclusion of material and final causes.54

Some object to this part [of the definition], however, because the material cause does not give being, but the formal [cause does]; and among extrinsic causes, the final [cause] does not give being, but the efficient [cause does].55

To this, Suárez gives the following answer:

But just as these two causes [i.e. the efficient and the formal] give being in a special way – the form as completing the proper and specific being, the efficient as really influencing – so also, absolutely and under the common definition (‘ratione’), matter also gives being, in its kind, because the being of the effect56 depends on [matter], and [matter] gives the entity (‘entitas’) by which the being of the effect57 is constituted. The final cause, in the way in which it moves, also has influence on the being, as will be stated later.58

One can note here that Suárez is immediately able to give a swift answer to the charge that matter would not confer being, whereas the case of the final cause is trickier in view of this objection. The wording of the way in which the final cause “influences being” is also quite obscure. All of this points to the problematic position held by the final cause among the causes.

Before going over to treat the specific causes, I will briefly say something concerning how this definition relates to the case of God.59 For, Suárez also accounts for the objection to his definition that with this definition there would be causality within God. This would be theologically controversial, not to say heretical, for Suárez.60 However, the way in which he stays clear of this conclusion – at least according to himself – is that the word “depen-

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53 For Aristotle’s notion of accidental causes, see Frede 1992.
54 More on the different kinds of causes will follow below, in ch. 1.3 on pp. 32ff.
55 DM XII.2, §4; 25:384. ‘Objiciunt autem quidam contra hanc partem, quod causa materialis non dat esse, sed formalis; inter extrinsecas vero finalis non dat esse, sed efficiens.’ [*]
56 Or: “being effected”; ‘esse effectus’.
57 Ibid.
58 DM XII.2, §4; 25:384-5. ‘Sed, licet speciali modo attribuaturo illis duabus causis dare esse, formae ut compleunti proprium et specifcium esse, efficienti vero ut realiter influentii, tamen absolute, et sub communii ratione, etiam materia in suo genere dat esse, quia ab illa dependet esse effectus, et ipsa dat suam entitatem, qua constituitur esse effectus; causa etiam finalis, eo modo quo movet, influit etiam in esse, ut postea declarabitur.’ [*]
59 See also above, p. 21.
60 That some part of God is created, together with the premise that God is one and simple, would imply that God is created, a conclusion which would counter a fundamental doctrine of most forms of orthodox theism.
dence” presupposes that there are two different things, with two different natures, in order for this to take place. Within God, however, the Father and the Son – for example – are not two substances but only two persons. Therefore, we have real influence but no dependence, and thus no causation.

Therefore, to exclude this kind of principle giving being without causality, modern authors have used the word “depending.” For one divine person receives being from another [person] not as depending on this [other person], because that which depends on necessarily has an essence which is at least numerically distinct from that upon which it depends.61 This also points to the fact that it is both influence and dependence which is central to Suárez’ notion of causation. It also points to the fact that, in causation, the cause must be distinct from that of which it is a cause.

1.3 Different Kinds of Causes

We have now seen how Suárez differentiates the causes from other kinds of principles, thereafter making a strict definition of causes. Let us now turn our attention to the structure of this class itself. Is there any further branching of the tree under the causes?

Regarding this question, Suárez fundamentally adheres to the classical, Aristotelian, division of the causes into four classes. When introducing the causes in the “tree structure” given above, he writes that

this kind of principle – insofar as it includes the nature (‘rationem’) of a cause – can be divided into as many parts as there are causes.62

The division into four kinds of causes seems, at first sight, quite rigid.

This division of the causes into four kinds of causes, i.e. material, formal, efficient and final is famous.63

[It is doubted] first whether all these [specific kinds of causes] are truly and properly contained under the division. [...] To the first doubt it is to be answered that all these truly and properly have the nature of a cause (‘rationem

61 DM XII.2, §6; 25:385. ‘Ad excludendum ergo hujusmodi principium per sese dans esse sine causalitate, usi sunt auctores moderni verbo, dependendi, quia una persona divina ita recipit esse ab alia, ut ab alia non pendeat, quia id, quod ab alió pendet, oportet ut habeat essentiam saltem numero diversam ab eo a quo pendet.’ [*]
62 DM XII.1, §5; 25:374. ‘hoc genus principii, quatenus rationem causae includit, in tot membra dividi potest, quot causa.’ [*]
63 DM XII.3, §1; 25:388. ‘Celebris est illa divisio causae in quatuor causarum genera, scilicet, materialis, formalis, efficientis, et finalis’ [*]
causæ participare’). The causes may therefore justifiably be divided into these four kinds.

It is not so much Suárez’ response to an objection, but rather his statement regarding the four causes, which is of interest in the above quote.

However, this division – absolute though it may seem – is relativized in different ways. First of all, there are different ways in which these four causes could be divided among themselves.

For there are some principles that constitute a thing intrinsically [as the formal and the material principles, whereas] other are extrinsic, which remain outside of it and flow being into the thing, as the final and the efficient [principles].

Another division of the causes can be thought out [which is] more immediate [than the division into four causes]. For the three causes beside the final cause are alike in that they contribute by real influence to the being of the effect, and therefore require real existence for their [respective kind of] causality [whereas] the final cause influences intentionally, and can therefore influence before it exists.

It is the very alternative division itself, rather than what they themselves mean, that is of interest here. Interestingly, though, in the same paragraph Suárez calls this use of the word “really” (‘realiter’) the “strict” one, whereas when the final cause is called a real cause the word “real” is taken “in all its breadth and transcendence” (‘in tota sua latitudine et transcendentia’). We shall come back to this later.

On the other hand, though, not only can there be a more immediate division of the causes than into the four classical ones, but each of the four causes can also be divided further. The division into four causes

is not a division into ultimate kinds (‘rationem’) of causes. For under each of these kinds [of causes] there can be various divisions.

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64 Could also be rendered as “participate in the nature of a cause.”
65 DM XII.3, §§1, 2; 25:388. ‘Primum est, an omnia illa membra vere ac proprie sub divisio continentur. [...] Ad primam dubitationem dicendum est, omnia illa vere ac proprie rationem causæ participare; et ideo merito causam in illa quatuor membra divid.’ [*]
66 DM XII.1, §5; 25:374. ‘Sunt enim quædam principia intrinsece constituentes rem; alia vero sunt extrinseca, quæ esse influunt in rem, et extra illam manent, ut finis et efficiens’ [*]
67 DM XII.3, §19; 25:394. ‘posset alia division causæ immediator excogitari; nam tres alie cause præter finalem conveniunt in hoc, quod conferunt ad esse effectus per realem influxum, ideoque requirunt existentiam realem ad suas causalitas [...] causa autem finalis influit intentionaliter, ideoque causare potest antequam in se realiter existat.’ [*]
68 DM XII.3, §20; 25:394. ‘non esse divisiones in ultimas rationes causæ; nam sub quocunque illorum membrorum dari possunt variae divisiones.’ [*]
As an example of this, Suárez takes the case of a material cause, of which – he writes – some are purely potential, whereas others are potential only with respect to something else.

For some material causes are pure potency (‘pura potentia’), whereas others are only potency in a relative sense (‘potentia secundum quid’).\(^{69}\)

Again, we will not go into the question of what this specific distinction amounts to. Suffice it to establish that the class of material causes is further divisible, as is the case with the other kinds of causes as well.

On what ground, then, can there be said to exist exactly *four* kinds of causes? Actually, this is rather a division which gives a number of causes that is easy to deal with.

You say: if the causes can be divided immediately into fewer parts, and more remotely into more [parts], why did Aristotle hand on this fourfold division, rather some other? It is responded: only because this division is the medium between these extremes it has been more apt for a doctrinal division to be handed on.\(^{70}\)

Also, these four causes are the ones among which the most obvious differences are found.

These parts have natures (‘rationes’) and ways of causing [which are] the most distinct and obvious.\(^{71}\)

Hence, the *fourfoldness* of the causes does not cut too deep into the nature of causes; rather, it is related to the nature and limits of the human mind to deal with manifolds. There are divisions among the causes, truly; but the way in which to “cut” the causes in a specific situation is not given, but must be decided on the basis of what is appropriate in that particular circumstance and context.

This is not specific to Suárez, though; already Aristotle – the “inventor” of the fourfold division of causes – uses the scheme rather freely, and in this vein it had been used up until the time of Suárez. However, it is good to have in mind the “relativity” of this classification of causes when going over to dealing with the specific kinds of causes and the relation between them.

\(^{69}\) DM XII.3, §20; 25:394. ‘Causa enim materialis quædam est pura potentia, alia vero est tantum potentia secundum quid.’ [*]

\(^{70}\) DM XII.3, §21; 25:395. ‘Dices: si causa potest immediate dividi in pauciora membra, et remote in plura, cur Aristoteles potius quadrímembrem illam divisionem, quam aliam tradidit? Respondetur, hoc ipso quod illa divisio est media inter illa extrema, fuisse aptiorem ad doctrinalem divisionem tradendum.’

\(^{71}\) DM XII.3, §21; 25:395. ‘membra illa habent rationes et modos causandi magnis distinctos et notiores.’ [*]
1.4 The Causes among Themselves

Let us now turn to some specific relations among the causes themselves. This will give some ground for the treatment of final causation, and will draw up the landscape into which this is situated a bit more clearly.

We will start this out by looking at the efficient causes. This is fitting as efficient causes are the primary example of causes among created things – as will be seen – and all other causes bear the name “cause” in analogy to them. We will also make some small remarks on final causes, summarizing some features that can already be gathered from Suárez’ general treatment of causes and causation.

1.4.1 The Efficient Cause: Agent, Action, Effect

Suárez explicitly rejects Aristotle’s definition of efficient causes, just as he rejects Aristotle’s definition of causes in general. This definition of efficient causes Suárez takes to be the one found in the *Metaphysics* as well as the *Physics*, namely, that an efficient cause is “that whence there is a first beginning of change or rest.” Suárez brings up a number of problems with this definition – though he admits that it vaguely says something right about efficient causality. Instead of this definition, though, Suárez ends up with the definition of an efficient cause as being

a principle from which the effect flows forth (‘profluit’), or on which it depends, through an action.

From the definition of a cause, one can see how this fits well into the wider nature of a cause. For in that definition, it is given that a cause – first of all – is a principle. The term ‘profluerre’, found in the definition of an efficient cause, is – further – connected to ‘influere’ in the definition of a cause; causation is the flowing of being, where the efficient cause is that from which this being flows. Also, the dependency relation is found in both definitions. Indeed, the dependency and the flowing forth are closely related, as we saw was the case with causes generally as well.

That the efficient cause causes by means of an action distinguishes it from matter and form. For matter and form – according to Suárez – do not cause by some action, but rather by being that which constitutes the whole, composite thing.

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72 *Metaphysics* 5.2 [1013a29-32] and *Physics* 2.3 [194b29-32], to be precise.
73 DM XVII.1, §1; 25:580. ‘id, unde primum principium est mutationis aut quietis’ [AF]
74 One objection he has to the definition is that it encompasses other causes, as well. (DM XVII.1, §2; 25:581. ‘definitio sic exposita etiam convenit aliis causis’) [AF]
75 DM XVII.1, §6; 25:582. ‘principium a quo effectus profluit seu pendet per actionem’ [AF]
76 See above, p. 29. [AF]
For matter and form, speaking *per se*, do not cause by means of an action; instead, they cause by means of a *formal and intrinsic union*.\(^{77}\)

Furthermore, the efficient cause is, according to its definition, distinct from the final cause, because final causes, or ends, only cause by means of a metaphorical motion.\(^{78}\)

We will come back much more to the final cause further on, but just to see what Suárez basically means with these definitions, let us return to our example of the carpenter and the house and expand the picture. The carpenter is, then, not just the cause, but more precisely the efficient cause; she is that upon which the house depends, or that from which it flows forth, through the carpenter’s building of the house. Form and matter, on the other hand, do not cause in this same way, but are rather the constituents of the house. One way of describing the action of the carpenter is that she is *forming matter*; the house could thus be described as a compound of form and matter, the latter being, in a way, the “constituents” of the house. The final cause would be, in this rudimental sketch, what the carpenter is aiming at in her work – a functioning house providing shelter to human beings. But as she is building the house does not yet exist, but only a mental image of the readymade house in the mind of the carpenter. What Suárez briefly says here regarding the final cause, then, is that to say that this mental image or cognition moves the carpenter is to use the word “move” in a metaphorical sense.\(^{79}\)

In the definition of an efficient cause, Suárez speaks of the *effect* flowing forth through an *action*. But how does effect relate to action? This has succinctly been summarized in the following way by Tad Schmaltz:

[Regarding the relation between effect and action in efficient causation] Suárez offers – characteristically enough – a middle way between the views of Thomistic extreme realists and nominalists. On the one hand, he holds against the nominalists that an action is something distinct in reality from the agent, its power, and the effect in the patient. On the other, he holds against the Thomists that causality is not something over and above the action of an agent, but is identical to this action, which itself exists as a mode of the effect.\(^{80}\)

The action is really distinct from the agent, i.e., the efficient causation is really something different from the efficient cause. Further:

\(^{77}\) DM XVII.1, §6; 25:582 (emphasis added). ‘nam materia et forma, per se loquendo, non causat media actione, sed per formalem et intrinsecam unionem’ [AF]

\(^{78}\) DM XVII.1, §6; 25:582. ‘per metaphoricam motionem’ [AF]

\(^{79}\) More on metaphors below in chapter 2.5.1, pp. 69ff.

\(^{80}\) Schmaltz 2008 p. 32. Suárez treats of this mainly in DM XVIII.10, §5; 25:681.
The action is not properly and formally the very effect that is produced by the agent; rather, it is a mode of such an effect, distinct in reality from that effect.\(^{81}\)

The patient, in which this action takes place, is either matter (in cases of substantial generation) or a substance (in cases of accidental generation).\(^{82}\) Further, the action is not identical to the power – for example, the moving of the arm is not identical to the ability to move the arm – but is an actualization of this power, and hence distinct from it. However, the causality of the agent is nothing else but the action of the agent – there is nothing “over and above” the action that could be termed “causation.”

Every effect depends on its cause by the causality of this cause. Therefore, the effect of the efficient cause depends on this [cause] by efficient causality. But the causality of this cause is nothing else but the action.\(^{83}\)

Suárez sees the danger of an infinite regress lurking here; for if the causality of a cause is really distinct from the cause, and the effect depends on the causality, it would seem that this relation of the effect to causation requires yet another relation of dependence, and so on. However, it is here vitally important to remember what Suárez stressed above: that the dependence of the effect to the cause is \emph{nothing but} the causation, or action, of the cause toward the effect.

You say: the dependence arises from the action. Therefore, because the effect comes into being, it also depends. Therefore this action cannot be this dependence, but something before this [is the dependence]. I respond by denying that the dependence arises from the action; [the dependence] rather \emph{is} this same action.\(^{84}\)

So that which from the side of the cause is called causation is called dependence from the side of the effect. In other words, to say that the efficient cause causes the effect and that the effect depends on the efficient cause, is to say the same thing twice, albeit in different ways.

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\(^{81}\) DM XVIII.10, §8; 25:682. ‘actionem proprie ac formaliter non esse ipsum effectum productum ab agente, sed esse modum talis effectus ex natura rei ab illa distincto’ [AF]

\(^{82}\) See also Menn 2000 p. 135: “If the effect is a new substance, then the patient is the matter out of which that substance was generated; if the effect is an accident, then the patient is the subject of that accident.”

\(^{83}\) DM XLVIII.1, §15; 26:872. ‘omnis effectus pendet a sua causa per causalitatem ipsius causa; ergo effectus causa efficientis dependet ab illa per causalitatem efficientis; sed causalitas hujus causa non est aliud quam actio’ [*]

\(^{84}\) DM XLVIII.1, §16; 26:872 (emphasis added). ‘Dices: dependentia oritur ex actione; ideo enim effectus pendet, quia fit; ergo non potest actio esse ipsa dependentia, sed aliquid prius illa. Respondetur negando dependentiam oriri ex actione, sed potius esse ipsammet actionem.’ [*]
When Suárez claims that the action exists as a mode of the effect, he is saying that the effect could exist without the action which produces it (i.e., there could be another action producing it, and/or the effect can remain after the cause has stopped causing), whereas the action could not exist without the effect – there is some kind of necessity at work here.\(^{85}\) When treating of the action as a mode of the effect, Suárez writes that

The effect can remain in the absence of such a mode; or, what amounts to the same thing, the effect can remain even if its dependence changes. For the mode in question is the effect’s emanation from – that is, dependence upon – the acting cause. But it is possible for the effect to depend now on this cause and afterwards on another cause.\(^{86}\)

A modal distinction amounts to non-mutual separability. So if A is a mode of B, A could not exist without B, whereas B could exist without A. Hence, to say that the action is a mode of the effect is to say that the action could not exist without the effect, whereas the effect could exist without the action.

In regards to this, it is good to point out that God is the efficient cause of a thing’s being (‘causa secundum esse’), whereas a finite thing is an efficient cause in the becoming of something (‘causa in fieri’).\(^{87}\) In the example of the carpenter and the house, then, the carpenter is an efficient cause of the house’s coming into being. Once the house has come into being, however, it is God who conserves this house in its being and makes it remain. What is treated in the above quote is, presumably, the causation of finite things.

What is this effect? One suggestion would be that it is the passion of, or in the subject. However, the action and the passion is the same thing, although viewed from two different angles.

Action and passion in a thing are not modes which are distinct by nature, but the same dependence and emanation of the form from the agent. Insofar as it intrinsically pertains to the subject, it is called passion; insofar as the agency itself denominates the agency in act, it is called action. Therefore, these two are distinguished by rationalizing reason (‘ratione ratiocinata’), at the most.\(^{88}\)

So, the only possibility of the passion being identical to the effect is that the action is also identical to the effect.

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\(^{85}\) For an account of modal distinctions in Suárez, see Menn 1997, especially pp. 238-241. Modal distinction are treated in DM VII (translated, Suárez 1947).

\(^{86}\) DM XVIII.10, §8; 25:682. ‘potest manere effectus sine tali modo, aut variata dependentia, quod idem est. Est enim ille modus emanatio seu dependentia effectus a causa agente; potest autem effectus nunc dependere ab hac causa, et postea ab alia’ [AF]

\(^{87}\) See DM XXII.1, §8; 25:833.

\(^{88}\) DM XLIX.1, §8; 26:899. ‘actionem et passionem in re non esse modus ex natura rei distinctos, sed eadem dependentiam et emanationem formæ ab agente, quatenus subjectum intrinsece afficit, vocari passionem, quatenus vero agens ipsum denominat actu agens, vocari actionem; atque ita haec duo ad summum distinguui ratione ratiocinata’ [*]
Actually, the question of the relation between the action and the effect seems to be more intricate than one might first assume. As was seen above, causation is really distinct from the cause. However, it doesn’t seem to be necessary that the cause and the effect are really distinct. For, there is a distinction between transeunt and immanent efficient causation.\(^89\) The fundamental case for Suárez seems to be that of transeunt causation, i.e. where the effect is really distinct from the cause. However, the case of immanent causation is not immediately clear in view of this. Concerning this, Schmaltz notes that:

The case of transeunt efficient causation is best suited to the definition of a cause as that from which being flows into another. The case of immanent efficient action (i.e., efficient action by means of an immanent action) is more problematic insofar as the distinction of the effect of the cause is less clear.\(^90\)

If the causation were really distinct from the cause, it would be hard to see how the effect could be merely \textit{modally} distinct from the cause unless there is some other distinction between the causation and the effect. Indeed, Schmaltz’ words above that the “action exists as a mode of the effect” seem to imply that the effect could exist without the action, whereas the action could not exist without the effect. The effect follows, in some sense, “necessarily” from the action, but the effect \textit{could} also (at least \textit{prima facie}) be achieved by other means. However, does this position – that the action would be a mode of the effect – allow for the position that the effect is a mode of the cause? We will leave with this question hanging for now.\(^91\)

To go back to the question of the real distinction between the causation and the agent in efficient causation, it comes out all the more clearly when the efficient cause is contrasted with intrinsic causes. For the formal and material causes cause by means of \textit{constituting} that which they cause. The efficient cause, however, does not give its \textit{own} being in causing. Instead, it gives being, which \textit{emanates} from it.

The efficient cause, by contrast [to the material and formal cause], causes by means of a proper action that flows from it. And in this it is also included that the efficient cause does not give its own proper and formal \textit{esse} to the effect, but instead gives another \textit{esse} that emanates from it by means of an action. In this the efficient cause differs from the material and formal causes, because the latter cause their effect by giving to it their own proper being, and this is why they are called intrinsic causes.\(^92\)

\(^89\) We will come back to this pair in chapter 3.
\(^90\) Schmaltz 2008 p. 32.
\(^91\) We will return to the question of immanent causation in the treatment of final causation and human psychology below.
\(^92\) DM XVII.1, §6; 25:582. ‘at efficiens causat per propriam actionem ab illo dimanantem. Et in hoc etiam includitur, hanc causam non dare effectui suum ac proprium formale esse, sed aliud ab eo manans, media actione, in quo differt haec causa a formali et materiali, quod haec
The real distinction between agent and causation is then argued for – *inter alia*, at least – from the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic causes.

1.4.2 The Efficient Cause as the Principal Kind of Cause

What Suárez writes on efficient causes has a special weight regarding causes at large, because Suárez sees efficient causes as the *principal kind of causes* in nature. The addition “in nature” is important, because in God’s causing of the world, it is the final cause which is most prominent.\(^93\) Regarding this, the final cause refers to the *ultimate* final cause, i.e. God. Within creation, however, it is the efficient cause which is most properly called a cause.

An efficient cause seems to much surpass [a final cause] in that its influx is most proper and real by essential dependence and emanation of the effect from [the efficient cause]. Wherefore the efficient [cause] is most properly said to give being to the effect. [...] And from this place it had its origin as effect, as it is the adequate correlative of the cause. [Further, a cause] is called [a cause] by antonomasianism\(^94\) with the efficient [cause], wherefore the Stoics judged the efficient cause alone worthy of the name “cause.”\(^95\)

Hence, when it comes to causes in nature, the efficient causes hold the position of being the primary kind of causes. This is also reiterated, and reinforced, when it comes to the comparison of the efficient to the formal and material cause.\(^96\)

The efficient [cause] most properly influences being; matter and form, however, do not so much properly *influence* being as *composing* this by themselves. And therefore, for this reason, it seems that the name “cause” is primarily said of the efficient [cause]. To matter and form, it is transferred by some sort of proportionality.\(^97\)

\(^93\) DM XXVII.1, §7; 25:951. It may be added, though, that in God’s causing of the world, God as the efficient cause and God as the final cause is not really, but only rationally, distinct; see DM XXIII.9, §9; 25:884.

\(^94\) The substitution of a title for a proper name, as in calling Aristotle “The Philosopher.”

\(^95\) DM XXVII.1, §8; 25:951. ‘causæ efficientis in hoc multum videtur excedere, quod influxus ejus est maxime proprius et realis per essentialem dependantiam et emanationem effectus ab illa, unde efficientis propriissimè dictur dare esse effectui [...] Et hinc etiam ortum habit ut effectus, cum sit adequantum correlativum causæ, per antonomasiam ab efficiendo nominetur, propter quod Stoici solam causam efficientem nomine causæ dignam censuerunt’ [*] Regarding the views of the Stoics, Suárez refers his reader to Seneca’s letter 66 and to Diogenes Laertius’ *Life of Zeno*.

\(^96\) For this relation, see also above, p. 39.

\(^97\) DM XXVII.1, §10; 25:952. ‘efficiens propriissimè influit esse; materia autem et forma non tam propriissimè influunt esse quam componunt illud per seipsas, et ideo secundum hanc rationem videtur nomen cause primo dictum de efficiente; ad materiam autem vel formam esse translatum per quamdam proportionalitem.’ [*]
So, we see here how the fundamental definition of a cause leads Suárez’ analysis of the relation of the different kinds of causes to each other – the definition points to which kind of causes are the most proper, and from there conclusions are also drawn concerning how the different meanings are ordered. In the case of matter and form, they are called causes by analogy – more specifically, by analogy of proportionality – to the efficient cause.98

Is there a relation of analogy between final and efficient causes as well? When it comes to the comparison of the efficient with the final causes they are primary in different respects. According to Suárez, because there is no per se hierarchy between them, they are therefore called “causes” univocally – hence, not analogically.

[Regarding the final and the efficient cause,] there is no analogical measure (’ratio’) between them; the name [”cause”] is therefore univocal under this aspect (’ratione’).99

The respective preeminence in different areas implies the univocity of the name “cause” when applied to efficient and final causes. Here, one might ask Suárez: why doesn’t the relative preeminence of the efficient and the final causes in different fields lead to the conclusion that they are used analogically within these different fields? Why isn’t God as an efficient cause said to be just that in analogy to His being the final cause? And in nature: why isn’t the final cause said to be a cause in analogy to the efficient cause? Or does Suárez’ view allow for this, though he sums it up by saying that they are called causes univocally, when spoken of per se and without any further specifications? This seems to be the most plausible conclusion.

To sum up what has been said of the efficient cause: the efficient causes are the causes, among the created causes, which primarily bear the name “cause.” When it comes to the material and the formal causes, they do not properly “influence” being, but rather “constitute” the being of things; when it comes to final causes within the created world, they are said to cause “metaphorically.” Suárez leans heavily on his stated definition of causes and causation when charting the territory of causation; when it comes to explaining nature, this leads him to have a predilection for efficient causes.100

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98 The different kinds of analogies are treated on pp. 69 ff. below.
99 DM XXVII.1, §11; 25:952. ‘nulla est ergo ratio analogiae inter ipsas; erit ergo sub ea ratione nomen univocum.’ [*]
100 For this conclusion, see also Schmaltz, p. 29. In Carraud 2002, one chapter dealing with Suárez is entitled ‘La réduction des causes à l’efficace’ [“The reduction of the causes to the efficient”]. Now, the word “reduction” seems to be going a bit too far; Suárez does not, after all, conclude that all kinds of causes can be “reduced” to the efficient kind. Carraud does also mitigate his position in the chapter referred to. As Stephan Schmid notes, though – explicitly mentioning Carraud – it is not surprising that this strong language of “reduction” is used in this context, given Suárez’ insistence on the preeminent role of efficient causation, especially vis-à-vis final causation. (Schmid 2011 p. 127 n. 56)
1.4.3 The Final Cause: some Preliminary Remarks

As has been seen above, Suárez makes certain comments regarding the final cause when treating the causes generally. It might be good to sum up some of that which has already been said on this topic above, as well as some other remarks of Suárez’, to set the stage for the treatment of the final cause below.

First, we saw Suárez refer to final causality as involving something he calls “metaphorical motion.” As far as I can understand, this refers to ends in the created world; as in the case of God and His causing of the world, the final causality is the primary kind of causation. But what does “metaphorical” mean?

As I will come back to this later, I will just give some comments here, which open up – but won’t answer – some questions regarding this. “Metaphorical” is derived from the Greek ‘metaphora’, which literally means “transference” or “change of place” in Greek. It also, already in ancient Greek, had the meaning of “transferred meaning.” This line of interpretation opens up the possibility, hinted at above, that in the case of nature final causes may be called causes in an analogical sense relative to efficient causes. For, although Suárez does not seem to say outright that this is the case, it might be argued that this is the result when he says that ends move “metaphorically.” This interpretation would also be reinforced by the close connection upheld between the metaphysical status of causes and the order of the senses in which the word “cause” is used with respect to different kinds of causes.

Hence, the metaphorical character of final causes opens up a way in which final causes can be related to efficient causes in nature, a way which will be further explored later on.

A second aspect, which is important in what follows, is that Suárez says that ends cause intentionally whereas the other three kinds of causes cause really. Now, as was said, this is not to be taken as a claim that final causes are not real causes, tout court; however, in one sense of the word, final causes are opposed to real causes – as final causes, or ends, do not need to exist when they cause. This use of the word “real,” where final causes are said to be opposed to real causes, is called the strict use of the word “real.”

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101 Above, p. 36.
103 Especially on pp. 69 ff. below.
So, this would be further background to the following account of final causes in Suárez: in what sense are final causes real? And what does “intentional” mean when he writes that final causes cause intentionally?

As this thesis as a whole is devoted to final causes in general, and specifically their ontological status, I will neither go into the answers to these questions here, nor open up any more questions concerning final causes. What has been presented above are just some preliminary vistas for the question of the status of final causes and final causality in Suárez, coming out of his fundamental definition of causes and causality.

1.5 Causes and Relations

Above we spoke of three different components that are to be considered with respect to causes: (i) the cause itself, (ii) the causation and (iii) the relation involved in causation. In this study, we will mostly deal with the first two of these: the cause and causation, and especially how these apply to final causes and final causation. However, as a “side track,” we will also keep the question of the relation involved in view, as this completes the picture, even though this will not be our main focus. Hence, it might be appropriate, at this point, to make some preliminary remarks about Suárez’ notion of relations.104

First of all, Suárez divides relations into two broad groups: real relations, on the one hand, and rational relations, on the other.105 Of these, it is only real relations that are treated within metaphysics proper, as rational relations fall outside the scope of real beings. Real relations are treated in Disputation 47, whereas rational relations are treated in Disputation 54 – the last Disputation.

One kind of real relation is that between action and passion, or acting and suffering.106 This exact wording is a bit enigmatic in the context of Suárez, however, as action and passion are really just two sides of the same thing, as was seen above.107 However, Suárez takes it to mean that the relation holds

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104 For the medieval background to this question, see Henninger 1989.
105 DM XLVII.3, §§2-3; 26:794.
106 DM XLVII.10, §3; 26:821.
107 DM XLIX.1, §8; 26:899. ‘Dicendum ergo censeo, actionem et passionem in re non esse modos ex natura rei distinctos, sed eamdem dependentiam et emanationem formæ ab agente, quatenus subjectum intrinsecæ afficit, vocari passionem, quatenus vero agens ipsum denominat actu agens, vocari actionem; atque ita haec duo ad summum distinguant rationem ratiocinat, id est, fundata aliquo modo in rebus’ [*] See also Burns 1964 p. 467. “Insofar as the dependence and emanation of the form intrinsically affects the subject and depends upon it as a subject of inhesion, it is called a passion. As the emanation and dependence of the effect upon the agent and as denominating the agent actually acting, it is called action. Thus a rational distinction is made between action and passion.” (As can be seen, Burns’ article is little more than a translation of Suárez. He also writes that “we will present the doctrine on
between the efficient cause and its effect. So, in order to look at the fundamental causal relation among created beings – as efficient causes are the causes *par excellence* among created things – we will have to look at what Suárez says concerning real relations. More specifically, it is real, *categorical* relations that will be our focus here.  

The topic of what a categorical, real relation is has a long pre-history, and was an especially hot topic in the High Middle Ages, where it formed part of the discussions concerning the status of the relations within the Trinity. It is classically – from Aristotle onwards – counted as one of the accidents (together with quality, quantity, etc.) and is hence, from a modern point of view, to be seen as a one place – not a two place – predicate. The foundation for the question of the status of categorical, real relations in High Scholasticism has been summarized in the following way by Mark Henninger:

> The medievals often conceived of a categorical real relation, then, as existing in one relatum and ‘pointing to’ or ‘being toward’ the other. This peculiar property of being toward, its *esse-ad*, distinguishes relations from substances and other accidents.

Now, according to Suárez, there are three components in a real relation: *foundation, subject* and *terminus*. In order to understand what these are, let us take the example of a color of something that is similar to the color of some other thing. The foundation is, in this case, the color which is like another color. The subject is the thing in which this color inheres – that of which it is a color. The terminus, finally, is the color to which the first color is similar. To take another example, in the sentence “Socrates is taller than Plato,” the relation being “is taller than,” the foundation is Socrates’ height (an accident, quantity), the subject is Socrates (a substance), whereas the terminus is Plato’s height (another accident, of the same kind as the first).

The definition of a relation is to be “toward something” (‘ad aliquid’). But what is its ontological status? Suárez refers to five different opinions regarding the ontological status of the real relation – from the real relation being something independent and really distinct from foundation, subject as well as terminus, to the relation being in different ways identical or only...
modally distinct from one or some of these. The position favored by Suárez is that which “denies that a relation is in reality (‘in re’) distinguished with some actual distinction from its absolute foundation, but [says that it is distinguished] with only some distinction of reason having some basis in things.” Hence, a real relation – for example the relation of one color being similar to another color – is not separate from the foundation of this relation. A real relation is the same thing as this foundation. As Suárez points out, this is also the position of the nominalists.

A relation is some form, not simply taken in itself, but as it relates to some other form. Hence, in the example of a color being similar to another color, the relation is not some independent “thing,” or even a mode of some thing, but is just the color which is similar, taken as it relates to the other color (the terminus), to which it is similar. Another way to put this is that a relation is a foundation insofar as this also in some way includes a terminus.

From this it also follows that a real relation can only be a relation from something real to something real. For if a relation is really nothing else but its foundation, the relation is real if and only if this foundation is real. However, to be fully real, something must also exist. This means that in a real relation – for example from one color to another, or in the case of efficient causation – both the foundation and the terminus must actually exist here and now in order for the relation to merit the status of being a real relation.

First of all, it must be said that for a categorical relation some real terminus is necessary.

Finally, nothing is actually real, unless it actually exists. Therefore, neither can a relation be actually real unless it belongs to an actual existent.
Now, when speaking of cause and effect, one of three different states of affairs could be at hand: the effect could either be (a) present, (b) past or (c) future with respect to the cause. In a remark highly interesting for the case of final causation, Suárez writes that it is only in the first two cases that a real relation could be said to hold, as the future effect does not yet exist.

This relation which is founded on a potency under action is varied according to various differences of time. For one is founded in present action, for example, the relation of building, heating, etc. Another [is founded] in past action, for example, the relation of a father [to his child]. And a third [is founded] in future action [...] which contains a difficulty that will need to be treated below.\textsuperscript{119}

The relation of a cause that is about to cause to its future effect [...] cannot be a real relation because the terminus is not actually existing; for what is future does not yet exist.\textsuperscript{120}

Though, in the relation of a cause to an effect by a past action, though – as in the case of the relation between a father and a son – the relation between the father (the subject of the relation) and the son (the terminus) remains although the foundation (the act of begetting) is already past.\textsuperscript{121}

To sum up: in the case of efficient causation – the principal kind of causal relation – the foundation of the relation between cause and effect is the action, the subject of the relation is the cause and the terminus is the effect. This relation between the efficient cause and its effect is a real relation. The relation of a cause to a future effect is not real.

1.6 Summary and Conclusions

In this first chapter, we have looked at causes in general, in order to acquire a framework for the treatment of final causes. In the first two sections (1.1 and 1.2), an account of causes within the framework of principles was given, and the definition of a cause (“a principle in itself influencing being into another”) was presented.

\textsuperscript{119} DM XLVII.10, §3; 26:821. ‘hanc relationem, quae fundatur in potencia sub actione, variari juxta varias temporis differentias; alia enim fundatur in praebsenti actione, ut relatio aedificantis, calefacientis, etc.; alia in actione præterita, ut relatio patris; et alia in actione futura [...] quod habet difficultatem infra tractanda.’ [JD]

\textsuperscript{120} DM XLVII.10, §9; 26:823. ‘relationem causae effectuae ad effectum futurum [...] non posse esse relatio realis, tum quia terminus non est actu existens; nam quod futurum est, nondum est’ [JD] (Translation slightly revised.) This conclusion is reinforced in DM XLVII.12, §2; 26:831.

\textsuperscript{121} For this, see DM XLVII.12, §4; 26:832.
In the following two sections (1.3 and 1.4), the division of causes into different classes was given. It was concluded that Suárez’ division into classes is quite flexible. Efficient causes were presented quite extensively, not least because these are the principal kind of causes. Also, some preliminary remarks were made concerning final causes.

In the last section (1.5), the relation between cause and effect – the third “component” in causation – was briefly dealt with. The relation from an efficient cause to its effect is real, although it is not real if referred to a future effect. The theme of the relations involved in causation will play a subordinate role, though it will be a point of reference for the main discussion on final causes and final causation in what follows.

A note might also be made here concerning Suárez’ philosophical method as employed in the DM as a whole, based on what has been said on Suárez’ treatment of causes generally, and of the efficient causes in particular. A conclusion which can be drawn from this is that *metaphysics and conceptual analysis are closely connected in Suárez’ philosophical methodology*. At the outset, when Suárez is to find the nature of a cause, for example, he makes conceptual distinctions between different kinds of principles. In this, he comes to causes – or “principles by intrinsic habitude, taken positively” – which he finds involves some kind of reality. Thus, he also treats of causes in his metaphysical system; for, in this, he treats that which has “real,” as opposed to “mere rational,” being. When ordering these causes among themselves, the terms used concerning them parallel the structure of eminence among them. The primary application of a name to a cause points to the preeminence of the cause, also in some “hierarchy of eminence” – as well as *vice versa*. 
In the first chapter, we looked at Suárez’ notions of causes and causation. This forms the background of the further treatment of Suárez’ notions of final causes and final causation.

We shall begin this chapter by presenting Suárez’ view on the reality of the final cause, a reality he endorses (section 2.1). In the following six sections, the six objections presented by Suárez to the reality of the final cause are presented and analyzed together with Suárez’ answers to them (sections 2.2 through 2.7). Other themes will also be brought up, insofar as they shed light on the objections and Suárez’ answers to these objections. The objections could be subdivided into the following three groups:

a. objections from order (objections 1, 2 and 3; sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4);

b. objections from the end as motive or as a terminus (objections 4 and 5; sections 2.5 and 2.6); and

c. an objection from the effect of the end (objection 6; section 2.7).

In the course of this treatment, the following topics will be given special treatment:

- different kinds of ends (section 2.3.1);
- different kinds of effects of ends (section 2.3.2); and
- the relation between metaphor and analogy (section 2.5.1).

The relevance of treating these topics will hopefully become obvious in their respective contexts.

First, however, let us look at Suárez’ basic understanding of final causes and final causation.²

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¹ Order with respect to principle-ness (section 2.2), time (2.3) and circularity (2.4), respectively.
² The fundamental question, as Suárez puts it, regards final causes. However, as the two are so intertwined, he will deal interchangeably with final causes and final causation. We shall later argue, though, that this is problematic.
2.1 Basic Layout: Finality as Rational Agency

The final cause is, for Suárez, one of the “classical” four causes – material, formal, efficient and final. Suárez fundamentally argues for the inclusion of final causes among the causes from the received philosophical, as well as theological, tradition.

Nonetheless it should be stated as a certain conclusion that the end is a true, proper and real cause. This is received dogma, and like a first principle in philosophy and theology. Aristotle teaches this in Metaphysics, book 2 chapter 3 and book 11 chapter 1, as well as in the Physics, book 2 chapters 1 and following. And before him Plato taught it in the Phaedo, where he ascribes the same view to Socrates. He [Plato], however, wanted only the end to be the cause, i.e. the first and principal [cause], at least by antonomasianism. Of this we will talk below, in the comparison of the causes.

So the end is a “true, proper and real” cause, according to Suárez. He leaves no room for ambiguity there, although it is a problematic thesis given how he develops it, as will be seen.

The references to Aristotle and Plato are interesting as Suárez situates himself and his discussion of the final cause with respect to them. However,

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3 One disputation is also devoted to the exemplary cause, which is not considered a cause of its own kind, however, but rather as a kind of efficient cause (DM XXV.2, §8).
4 See above, p. 40 n. 94.
5 DM XXIII.1, §7; 25:845. ‘Nihilominus statuenda est conclusio certa finem esse veram, proprium ac realem causam. Hoc est receptum dogma et quasi primum principium in philosophia et theolog; illud docuit Aristot., II Metaph., c. 3, et lib. XI, c. 1, et II Phys., c. 1 et sequentibus; et ante illum docuerat Plato in Phaedone ubi in eamdem sententiam refert Socratem; immo ille solum finem vult esse causam, forte per antonomasiam, id est, primam et praecipuam, de quo dicemus infra in comparatione causarum.’ [*]
6 The second reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics is to the first chapter of book 11 (K). This chapter does not deal principally with the question of the final cause, but treats the question of wisdom, the science of the first principle. (A surprising context, given Suárez’ sharp distinction between principles of things and principles of science.) In the part where the final cause is treated it is asked whether wisdom treats of substances only, or also of accidents. In this context Aristotle writes that wisdom cannot deal with the final cause, “for [the final cause] is the good, and this is found in the field of action and movement; and it is the first mover – for that is the nature of the end – but in the case of things unmovable there is no first mover.” (Metaphysics XI.1; 1059b37-9.) When it comes to the first reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the invoked chapter does not at all deal with the final cause. However, the last passage of the chapter refers to a further treatment of the question “whether it belongs to one science or to more to investigate the causes and principles of things” (Metaphysics II.3; 995a18-20). Hence, it seems that the reason Suárez refers to this chapter is because it refers to the further discussion of the causes and also, indirectly, to his other reference to Aristotle. (This passage is of dubious origin, though, and is sometimes omitted from modern editions of Aristotle.) The reference to Aristotle’s Physics is, on the other hand, the standard reference when it comes to the definition and enumeration of causes. In chapter 3 of book 2, Aristotle writes on different senses of the word “cause” and writes that it can be taken “in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about” (Physics II.2; 194b33-4) The reference to Plato is wide – Suárez refers to the whole of Phaedo. However, he is presumably thinking of the locus in Phaedo, where Plato approvingly refers to Anaxagoras.
they are not that rewarding as regards the understanding of Suárez’ notion of final causes.

Another reason Suárez gives for why the final cause should be considered a real cause is the way we talk of finality and of causality7. As Suárez writes:

an end is said to be [that] for (‘propter’)8 which something is made or exists. For Aristotle describes the final cause in this way everywhere. He especially states that the part for signifies causality. For each and every thing is said to have being for (‘propter’) its cause. It is therefore a sign that the end has the nature of a cause.9

But the final cause is also needed as a complement to the efficient cause. For, as Suárez writes, without the final cause, the efficient cause would be “blind.”

Moreover, the efficient cause must act for the sake of something (‘alicujus gratia’), if it is not to act blindly. Therefore, this effect of the efficient cause is also intrinsically required to be made for the sake of something, in order for [the effect] to be able to be made from [the efficient cause]. Such an effect, therefore, in itself depends upon the efficient [cause], as upon that from which it is made – and so, in its kind, [the effect] depends upon something for the sake of which it is made. This, however, is the end. [The effect] therefore depends upon the end. Hence, reversely, the end is a true cause of this thing, which is made for (‘propter’) the end.10

This is largely the “traditional” view of the relation between efficient cause and end.

In this passage, Suárez goes from talking about “for” (‘propter’) the end to using the word “for the sake of” (‘alicujus gratia’) the end when labeling the workings of the final causality. He seems to use these expressions quite

and his view that mind (‘nous’) orders everything to its end and thereby determines the essence of things, although Socrates further on dismisses the way Anaxagoras carries out the specific explanations from this principle. (Phaedo 97C. “I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best.” [Grube-translation from Plato 1997])

7 The words “causality” and “causation” will be used interchangeably.
8 The word ‘propter’ will be translated “for,” whereas the expression ‘alicujus gratia’ will be translated “for the sake of something.”
9 DM XXIII.1, §7; 25:845. ‘finis esse dicitur propter quem aliquid fit, vel est; in hunc enim modum Aristoteles finem ubique describit; constat autem particulam illam propter causalitatem significare; unquaque enim res propter causam suam dicitur habere esse; ergo signum est finem habere rationem causae.’ [*]
10 DM XXIII.1, §7; 25:845. ‘Praeterea causa efficiens, nisi temere agat, alicius gratia agere debet; ergo et ipse effectus causae efficientis, ut per se ab illa fieri possit, intrinsecus postulat ut alicuius gratia fiat; ergo talis effectus sicut per se pendet ab efficiente, ut a quo fit, ita in suo genere per se pendet ab aliquo cuius gratia fit; ille autem est finis; ergo per se pendet a fine; ergo e contrario finis est vera causa eius rei quae propter finem fit.’ [*]
interchangeably, though, as is shown by the reintroduction of the word “for” (‘propter’) at the end of the passage.

Underlying the whole reasoning here is the precondition that efficient causes do not work “blindly,” as Suárez expresses it. The world is well ordered, and nothing happens just by coincidence.11 And in order for this to be the case, the efficient cause must work for the sake of something. This seems to be the premise of the whole argument above. But if the efficient cause works for the sake of something, and the effect depends upon the efficient cause, then – arguably – the effect of the efficient cause is also made and exists for the sake of something.12

Having declared that the final cause is “obscure,” and that we therefore need to make some distinctions when we treat it, Suárez, without further ado declares that there are three different agents who work for ends. With this declaration, Suárez is implicitly making a claim he will make explicit later on: that ends only exist when there is an agent, an efficient cause, connected to it. This is important, and a fundamental view in Suárez’ natural philosophy.13

So what agents can be distinguished? The three types are God (of whom there is only one), created intelligent creatures (human beings and angels), and natural agents, i.e. things such as animals and stones.

[W]e may distinguish three [types of] agents [who operate] for an end. The first and highest is the uncreated intellectual agent, which is God alone. Intellectual, created agents are in the second and intermediate order. Human beings are best known among these, and we therefore talk about these even though the same reason might exist concerning the created intelligences14. Natural agents, or agents lacking intellect, are in the third and lowest order.15

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11 See e.g. DM XIX.12, §§2-4, where Suárez argues for the thesis that nothing that happens does so “by chance” with regard to God.
12 This syllogism could, perhaps, be seen even clearer if one only talks about dependence:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{The effect depends upon the efficient cause} \\
\text{The efficient cause depends upon the end}
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, the effect depends upon the end.

The soundness of this inference relies on the assumption that “depends on” is a transitive relation, which is a plausible assumption to make.

13 See, also, DM XXIII.10, §6 and Schmaltz 2008 pp. 35-6.
14 I.e. angels. (For the nature of angels, see vol. 2 of Opera omnia. For the intellectual and created nature of angels, see that volume, book 1, chapters 1 and 3, respectively.)
15 DM XXIII.1, §8; 25:845. ‘distinguamus tria agentia propter finem. Primum et suprema est intellectuale agens increatum, quod est solus Deus. In secundo ac medio ordine sunt agentia intellectualia creata, inter quae nobis notiores sunt homines, et ideo de illis semper loquemur, quamvis eadem ratio sit de intelligentiis creatis. In tertio et infimo ordine sunt agentia naturalia seu intellectu carentia’ [*]

52
Human agency is most well known to us among cases of created intellectual agency. However, Suárez extends this priority to all kinds of agency.

The final causality may therefore take place in different ways in the actions of all these agents. However, final causality in created, intellectual agents is better known to us, and indeed has a more proper as well as a special mode, and we will therefore declare this final causality to take place especially in them [i.e., the human beings]. [...] Therefore, in so far as final causality occurs in created agents through intellect and will we will collect sufficient arguments from human actions.\[16\]

Further,

this causality takes place to the highest degree in intellectual agents, because they can to the highest degree cognize the end and the means, the order of the one to the other, as well as the proper nature (‘rationem’) of each.\[17\]

Human agency is not only singled out as the primary *locus* of final causation, but is also methodologically central in Suárez’ endeavor to chisel out an adequate notion of final causes, as can be seen in the following quote:

For our experience confirms that when we operate in a human way – i.e. freely and rationally – we certainly intend some end, toward which we direct our actions and for which we choose our means. We are, hence, moved by the end.\[18\]

The basis of this argument is our human experience, which Suárez seems to take to be the most basic confirmation, in the end, for final causation.\[19\]

\[16\] DM XXIII.1, §8; 25:845. ‘Causalitas ergo finis, licet suo modo locum habeat in actionibus horum omnium agentium, tamen in creatis agentibus intellectualibus nobis notior est, et maiorem quamdam proprietatem et specialem modum habet, et ideo in illis peculiariter declarabimus hanc causalitatatem finis [...] Igitur quod in agentibus creatis per intellectum et voluntatem intercedat causalitas finis, sufficiens argumentum sumitur ex humanis actionibus.’ [*]

\[17\] DM XXIII.1, §8; 25:845. ‘hanc causalitatem maxime habere locum in agentibus intellectualibus, quia illa maxime possunt cognoscere finem et media, et ordinem unius ad alterum, et propriam uniuscuiusque rationem.’ [*]

\[18\] DM XXIII.1, §8; 25:845. ‘Constat enim nobis experientia intendere nos, cum humano modo, id est, libero et rationali operamur, certum aliquem finem in quem actiones nostras dirigimus et propter quem media eligimus; movemur ergo a fine’ [*]

\[19\] This priority of the experience of human beings in their knowledge of the world around them can also be seen in the context of the substantial form. In this case, also, the most well known substantial form is our own soul, and it is from having this that we can both most securely conclude that there are substantial forms and that we can know something about this substantial form. “The first argument for the existence of substantial forms is that a human being consists of a substantial form as an intrinsic cause; therefore, all natural things also do.” (DM XV.1, §6; 25:499. ‘Prima igitur ratio sit, nam homo constat forma substantiali ut intrinseca causa; ergo et res omnes naturales.’ [KR] [Slightly revised])
This was a basic outline of Suárez view on final causality. We will now – in sections 2.2 through 2.7 – look at the objections to the reality of final causes and final causation that Suárez considers, as well as how he answers these objections, thereby also mitigating, developing and modifying his own conception of final causes.

2.2 In what Sense is the End a Principle?

As we saw above, a cause is a kind of principle (‘principium’). However, as the name “end” (‘finis’) suggests, the end does not seem to be an origin, but rather the very opposite of an origin.

It lies in the nature of a cause to be a principle, as is settled by the definition previously handed on by us. But the end is not a principle, because it rather opposes the principle, as can be settled from the very name “end.” Aristotle also notes this in the Metaphysics book 3, text 3.20

On answering this objection to the claim that the end can be a real cause, Suárez makes an initial clarification of the way in which the end is a cause. He writes that the objection given above misses the target because the end is a principle; for in a way it is first, namely in that the end is first in intention.

To the first [objection] we reject the minor, i.e. that the end is not a principle. For in the way in which it is something first, it has the nature of a principle. The end, however, is first in intention, although it is last in execution. Aristotle, however, in the place mentioned in the Metaphysics book 3 [chapter 3] does not reject that the end is a principle overall, but rather that it is the principle of movement by which he understands the efficient cause, which he distinguishes from the final cause.21

The end is that which we first reflect on when contemplating action; thereafter, the means to the end are elected. However, in the relevant sense here, it is not by this intention that the end comes about, or is made; this is done by an execution of the intention, which comes last in the chain of actions. It lies, so to say, in the nature of means and ends that the means are carried out before the end. And this making of that which is the end could rather be labeled efficient causality.

20 DM XXIII.1, §1; 25:843-4. ‘de ratione causae est ut sit principium, ut ex definitione a nobis superius tradita constat; sed finis non est principium, nam potius opponitur principio, ut ex ipso nomine finis constat, et significat Aristoteles, III Metaph., text. 3.’ [*]
21 DM XXIII.1, §10; 25:845-6. ‘Ad primum negamus minorem, scilicet, finem non esse principium: nam eo modo quo est primum quid, habet rationem principii; est autem finis primus in intentione, quamvis sit ultimus in executione. Aristoteles autem, in dicto loco III Metaph., non opponit finem omni principio, sed principio motus, per quod causam efficientem intelligit, quam distinguat a finali.’ [*]
Suárez’ answer to this objection closely follows an answer Thomas Aquinas gives to a similar objection.

Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is in this way that it is a cause.22

Overall, the result of this objection is that Suárez has agreed that the final cause is not a paradigmatic case of a cause, for which it would have to be a “principle of movement.” However, the end is a principle in the sense that it is “first in intention.” Whether this is enough for it to merit the name “cause” we shall see further on.

2.3 Finality, Time and Intellect

The next objection to the thesis that the final cause is a real cause concerns the relationship between final causality and time:

Second, it belongs to the nature of a real cause that it in itself and really has influence on the effect, as was postulated in the definition of a cause above. But the end does not really have influence on the being of the effect, and is therefore not a cause. The minor23 is proven, for the end influences [the effect] either before it exists or when it already exists. The first is not the case, for in that case it does not exist – how can it have a real influence when the foundation of all operation and also all causality is to be? Neither can the second be said, because when the end exists the action and causality of the agent has already ceased. The final causality is therefore at that time already not necessary.24

This argument centers on the temporal aspects of causation, and in particular the problematic features of final causation with respect to temporal order.25

22 Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. For loci in Aristotle’s corpus where Aristotle claims that the final cause is last in execution and first in intention, see McCord Adams 1998 p. 15.
23 The minor in the above syllogism is “the end does not really influence the being of the effect.”
24 DM XXIII.1, §2; 25:844. ‘Secundo, de ratione causa e realis est ut per se ac realiter influat in effectum, ut supra in definitione causa positis est; sed finis non influet esse realiter in effectum; ergo non est causa. Probatur minor, quia vel finis influet antequam sit vel postquam iam est; non primum, nam quod non est, quemnam realem influxum habere potest, cum fundamentum totius operationis et similibus totius causalitatis sit esse? Neque etiam dici potest secundum, quia quando finis est, iam tunc cessat actio et causalitas agentis; ergo iam non est tunc necessaria causalitas finis.’ [*]
25 This is presumably the same objection as Spinoza’s famous one, when he states that “this doctrine, concerning the end, turns Nature completely upside down. For what is really a cause, it considers as an effect, and conversely. What is by nature prior, it makes posterior” (Ethics I, Appendix [p. 112 in English edition, p. 80 in Latin edition (see Bibliography)]. ‘hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omninò everttere. Nam id, quod reverà causa est, ut effectum
For the end exerts its influence on the effect either before or after the end has come into existence. This is clear enough; the demarcation separates the time into two different “zones,” which are mutually exclusive and together cover all possible states with regards to time. Now, if it is to exert any influence on the effect, the end has to exert this in either of the two “time zones.” (It could, of course, also exert it during both.) In the first of these two time zones the end has not yet come into existence. It can therefore not exert any influence whatsoever, because in order to exert any influence it has to exist. The end can, therefore, not exert its influence in the first time zone. This would place the influence from the end to the effect in the second time zone, in which the end has come into being. But if the end would already have come into being, the influence from the end would already have ceased, for at that point the end has already been achieved. Thus, in either of the two cases the result is that the final causality of the end cannot take place, either because the end does not yet exist and therefore cannot exert any causality whatsoever, or because the change or movement which was supposed to be influenced by the end has already passed.

Answering this objection, Suárez writes that the end does not influence the effect insofar as the end exists as a thing in the world. Rather, it is as something apprehended that the end influences.

Regarding the second [objection] the minor is rejected, that is, that the end does not really have influence. For proof, the common answer is that the end influences when it does not really exist, but [when it exists] only in the apprehension or cognition.26

Note here the temporal language; it is when (‘quando’) the end does not really exist that it exerts its influence. Hence, when looking for a point of origin of the causality of the end, one must not look to the end as a real thing in the external world, but rather to the cognition in which the end is represented as an object.

In the course of specifying this answer, Suárez makes use of some distinctions that he has not yet defined. In order to understand his answer correctly, it is therefore necessary to make a small digression and present the relevant distinctions.

What is needed, then, is to look at some distinctions Suárez makes between different kinds of ends, as well as some distinctions between the different kinds of effects that an end can have.

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26 DM XXIII.1, §11; 25:846. ‘Ad secundum negatur minor, scilicet, finem non influere realiter; ad probationem autem communis responsio est finem influere quando non est in re, sed tantum in apprehensione seu cognitione.’ [*]
2.3.1 Different Kinds of Ends

Let us first look at the different kinds of ends.\(^{27}\)

First, Suárez makes a distinction between what he calls the ‘finis cuius’ and the ‘finis cui.’ This distinction goes back to Aristotle, at least. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle writes that

> the phrase ‘for the sake of which’ is ambiguous; it may either mean the end to achieve which, or the being in whose interest, the act is done.\(^{28}\)

Here, ‘finis cujus’ refers to the first use, ‘finis cui’ to the second. In the Greek original the quote says:

> to d’ hou heneka ditton, to men hou, to de hōi

The Greek original is important because, at the place where he introduces this distinction, Suárez refers to a different way of rendering this into Latin than ‘finis cujus’ and ‘finis cui’.

Argyropilus translates this ‘finis quo’ and ‘finis cui.’\(^{29}\)

Argyropilus was a 15th century translator, and Suárez had obviously read his translation of Aristotle’s *De Anima*. While the rendering of the second use (‘finis cui’) is the same, the first use (‘finis cujus’) is translated into ‘finis quo’ – “the end through which” or “the end because of which” – by Argyropilus. However, Suárez refers to the Greek original to choose the alternative rendering ‘finis cujus:’

> but the former words conform better to the Greek and render the meaning in a better way.\(^{30}\)

Suárez not only takes over the distinction from Latin translations of the works of Aristotle, he also takes the Greek original into consideration to understand what Aristotle means – although he was not the first Latin philosopher to use the name ‘finis cujus’ either, of course.\(^{31}\)

\(^{27}\) Suárez makes six different distinctions between different kinds of ends (in DM XXIII.2; 25:847-51). However, only the three distinctions which are relevant in the present context will be presented below.

\(^{28}\) Aristotle, *De Anima*, bk. II, ch. 4 (415b1-3).

\(^{29}\) DM XXIII.2, §2.

\(^{30}\) DM XXIII.2, §2. ‘sed priora verba sunt græcis conformiora, et intentionem melius declarant’ [*]

\(^{31}\) It could further be noted that Suárez also makes a distinction between ‘finis quo’ and ‘finis qui’; he thus uses the term ‘finis quo’ elsewhere, which might be a reason for his choice in this place.
With this distinction from Aristotle, Suárez explicates the difference between these different kinds of ends:

for that for the reaching of which the human being is moved or operates is called ‘finis cuius’, as is health through treatment. The one for whom another end is sought is called ‘finis cui’, as the human being is through the intention of health. For just as a human being is cured for the sake of health, so she seeks this same health for herself and to her advantage.32

These terms have been translated into English as “intended state” (for ‘finis cuius’) and “beneficiary” (for ‘finis cui’), respectively.33

The second distinction Suárez makes is that between the end as an act, on the one hand, and the end as a result, on the other. Now, this is a subdivision of ‘finis cuius’ or the intended end, so what Suárez wants to do with this distinction is to separate uses of the cases where an end is to be achieved where this end is an action from the cases where the end to be achieved is a result from an action. Suárez has the following thing to say concerning this distinction:

the end is usually divided between that which is only an operation and that which results from the operation or that toward which the action tends, as toward a produced thing. [...] Examples of each subdivision are therefore easy [to find], in works of art as well as in nature. For the end of treatment is health, of building the house, of procreation that which is born, and so on. But of the striking of a cittern, on the other hand, there is no other end than the playing of cittern, and of contemplation only this contemplation.34

In the first examples – treatment of health, building a house, procreating – the end lies in the thing produced (the health, the house and the offspring, respectively). However, in the second set of examples – the striking of a cittern (or the playing of any instrument, indeed), or contemplation – the end only lies in what one is doing at the moment.

Finally, Suárez makes a subdivision within the end as an action or operation. This distinction is made between that which he calls the formal end and the objective end. It is when the end consists in an operation only – as when one is playing an instrument or when one is contemplating – that this further
division into formal and objective end becomes relevant. Regarding this operation, Suárez calls the act itself “the formal end” (or ‘finis formalis’), whereas the object around which the operation revolves – the cittern (or perhaps the music) in the case of playing an instrument, God in the case of contemplation – is called “the objective end” (or ‘finis objectivus’).35

This leaves us with the following tree of distinctions with regards to different kinds of ends.

```
  end
 /  \
/    \  
'finis cuius'  'finis cui' (agent)
```

```
operation only  result

formal          objective
```

*Figure 3. Different kinds of ends.*

This has been a short summary of some of the different kinds of ends Suárez works with.36 Let us now return to Suárez’ answer to the second objection. It remains for him to explain the *manner* in which the end influences the agent “when it is not in a thing but in cognition” alone.

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35 "from these divisions, especially from [the division between the end as an operation and the end as the result of an operation] arises another, through which the end is divided into objective and formal. For sometimes the end is an operation, as we said. This operation, however – especially if it is immanent – requires, besides the act itself, an object around which it revolves [...]. And in this sense the theologians distinguish between the vision [of God] and God seen, when it comes to the end of the human being. The vision they call the formal end, which they also refer to as the end through which and the achieving of the end, whereas they call God the objective end, or the end which, because it is compared to the formal end.” (DM XXIII.2, §12; 25:850. ‘ex his divisionibus, praesertim ex secunda, oritur alia, qua dividitur finis in objectivum et formalem. Nam, ut diximus, interdum finis est operatio; haec autem operatio, praesertim si sit immanens, praeter actum ipsum requirit objectum circa quod versatur [...] Et in hoc sensu distinguunt theologoi, in fine hominis, visionem et Deum visum, et visionem dicunt esse finem formalem, quem etiam appellant finem Quo, et adpectionem finis; Deum autem appellant finem objectivum, seu finem Qui, quia comparatur per finem formalem.’ [*])

36 All in all, Suárez makes six different distinctions between different kinds of ends. However, only the above three distinctions are relevant in the present context.
Now, Suárez writes, when it comes to the end, the end interpreted as the \textit{beneficiary} (the ‘finis cui’) already exists when the action for the sake of something is done, because the beneficiary, the ‘finis cui’, is \textit{just the agent performing the action}. Hence, for Suárez, the beneficiary of an action is always the agent him- or herself.\textsuperscript{37} He therefore also calls this the “subjective end.” But the end we are looking for does \textit{not} exist when it exerts its influence. Hence, it is the end as a ‘finis cuijus’, as an end to be achieved or an intended end, which we are seeking.\textsuperscript{38}

The second question Suárez asks is whether the end is to be taken “formally or objectively.” Now, remember, in the act of seeing God, seen as an end, the act of seeing would be the formal end, whereas God would be the objective end. However, Suárez writes, the end as taken objectively has to exist when it exerts its influence, just as the beneficiary of the act. So, again by Suárez’ favored method of elimination, it must be the formal end – the future act – which draws us to it before it has come into existence.\textsuperscript{39}

Now, this argument does not seem to be valid. Why would an objective end \textit{need} to exist? Moreover, the case of the beatific vision is quite exceptional; isn’t the case of the beatific vision very different from other more mundane examples – say, of playing the cittern? However, notwithstanding these problematic aspects of his argumentation, what Suárez is claiming with regards to the formal end is clear enough: when a future end is intended, it is the act itself which is intended, not the object around which this future act will or would revolve.

It is noteworthy that Suárez does not explicitly mention the end as an \textit{act}, as opposed to the end as a \textit{result} of an act, when answering the second objection.\textsuperscript{40} However, it is clear that the case of a “self-contained act” is a focal case for Suárez. Further, in this case, it is the act itself, rather than that around which the act revolves, which should count as the end.

We are now in a position to assert what kind of end has the ability to draw us to itself. The end is (i) an “end to be achieved” or an “intended state,” as opposed to the end interpreted as the beneficiary, which we are dealing with. Further, the intended state is (ii) an \textit{act} that does not have a further end outside of itself, like contemplation or the playing of an instrument. Finally, it is

\textsuperscript{37} One can note that when Suárez introduces the distinction, he does not speak of a doctor seeking health “for a patient,” but rather about a person, a patient, seeking health “for himself.”

\textsuperscript{38} “The ‘finis cui’, therefore, does not cause unless when it exists. For it is this very same agent who is called the ‘finis cui’, insofar as she operates for herself or to her advantage, which she cannot do unless she exists.” (DM XXIII.1, §11; 25:846. ‘Finis ergo cui, non causat nisi quando existit; dicitur enim finis cui, ipsissum agens, quatenus propter se, vel in suum commodum operatur, quod non potest facere nisi existat.’ [*])

\textsuperscript{39} “Likewise, the objective end can also be supposed to exist when it causes as an end, as God for the vision of whom we are moved to operate in a good way.” (DM XXIII.1, §11; 25:846. ‘Item finis objectivus potest etiam supponi existens quando finaliter causat, ut Deus, propter quem videndum ad bene operandum movemur.’ [*])

\textsuperscript{40} Cf. Figure 3 above.
(iii) the *agent-aspect* of this operation – rather than that around which it revolves – that is the sought for end.

Seemingly, Suárez doesn’t put too much emphasis on the aspect that the act would have to be “self-contained,” so to say – that it is an act in itself, rather than a result from an act – as he does not mention it in the answer. Furthermore, the future act is obviously an act of the agent him- or herself, not the act of somebody else. Hence, the end that has the power to draw us to it before it has come into being is a *future act of ours*. It is this act, as thought of, which can lead us to performing it.

2.3.2 Different Kinds of Effects of Ends

So much for the end. But Suárez also specifies what kind of effect this kind of end has. In order to understand what he says regarding this, though, it is necessary that we take a look at what kind of effects are possible for a final cause to have. Or, to look at it from the side of the effects, what can have an end as at least one of its causes?

The most fundamental distinction between different kinds of effects of an end is that between those which are (a) internal to the will, on the one hand, and those which are (b) external to the will, on the other. However, the end is intrinsically linked to the will, and so the acts that are external to the will could only be said to be for an end insofar as they are commanded or governed by an act of the will. For example, a desire for talking to a friend is internal to the will. If a person walks, then this act is for an end only if it is commanded by the will; for example if the person intends to visit a friend. If a person walks without his will being involved, however, this act is not for an end. Because of this, it is primarily effects internal to the will that are said to be effects of the final cause, according to Suárez. Acts that are external to the will can only indirectly be the effects of a final cause.

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41 “And because we now consider the final cause with respect to a created will by which intellectual agents operate for an end, as I said above, we can consider two kinds of effects of this cause: some are inside this will and are acts or affects elicited by this [end]; others are outside the will and are effects which take place outside this [will] by efficaciousness or command, or the motion [of the respective faculty] itself by their proper acts.” (DM XXIII.3, §1; 25:851-2. ‘Et quoniam, ut supra dixi, nunc consideramus finalem causam respectum voluntatis creatæ, per quam agentia intellectualia operantur propter finem, duplices effectus hujus causæ considerare possimus: quidam sunt intra ipsam voluntatem, et sunt actus vel affectus ab illa elici; alii sunt extra voluntatem, et sunt effectus qui extra ipsam prodeunt et ex efficacitate vel imperio, seu motione iphis per proprios actus ejus.’ [*])

42 “All natural acts which a human being exercises without the command or movement of will are not effects of a final cause.” (DM XXIII.3, §18; 25:856. ‘actiones omnes naturales, quas homo exercet sine imperio seu motione voluntatis, non esse effectus causæ finalis’ [*])

43 “It is therefore, first of all, certain that the final cause, as we are now considering it, primarily and to the highest degree causes some act or affect in the will itself.” (DM XXIII.3, §2; 25:852. ‘Est igitur imprimis certum, causam finalem, prout nunc illam consideramus, per se primo et maxime causare aliquem actum vel affectum in voluntate ipsa.’ [*])
When it comes to the affects of the will, it is the affects that are directly concerned with the end, but precede the attainment of this end, which are most properly called effects of the end. Loving or desiring the end for itself is the primary way in which an end can influence the will. Beside this, the election and execution of means to an end are also called effects of the end, although in a derivative sense. Suárez even allows for the enjoyment of the attained end to be summed under the effects of the end, even though that which is enjoyed is no longer an end at that point, as we saw above.

This gives us the following scheme of different kinds of effects of an end.

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44 “Acts which revolve around the end itself, and which precede or can precede their resulting in the order of intention, are truly and properly effects of the end. [These acts] can most properly be said to be for the end.” (DM XXIII.3, §8; 25:853. ‘actus qui versantur circa finem ipsum, et antecedunt, vel antecedere possunt ordine intentionis consecutionem ejus, sunt vere et proprii effectus finis. [...] propriissime dicentur esse propter finem’ [*])

45 “Final causality is most properly [exercised] by the said motion [of the will directly toward the end].” (DM XXIII.3, §10; 25:854. ‘causalitas finis propriissima est per dictam motionem’ [*])

46 “Election of means is a true and proper effect of the final cause.” (DM XXIII.3, §6; 25:853. ‘electio mediorum vere ac proprii est effectus causae finalis.’ [*])

47 “The use or execution of the means is in itself and properly an effect of the final cause.” (DM XXIII.3, §5; 25:852. ‘usum seu executionem mediorum per se ac proprii esse effectum causae finalis.’ [*])

48 Regarding the relation between ends and means, Suárez’ views in DM do not seem to differ from those in his De ultimo fine hominis. For a good summary of this view, see Brachtendorf 2001.

49 “Acts of the will, which revolves around an end already achieved, could and should also be counted among the effects of a final cause.” (DM XXIII.3, §14; 25:855. ‘actus voluntatis, qui versantur circa finem jam consecutum, numerari etiam possunt et debent inter effectus finalis causae.’ [*])

50 As in many other cases, the case of the beatific vision holds a special place among the examples of loving an end that has been attained. (See DM XXIII.3, §§14-17; 25:855-6.)

51 Note that the left side in a branching is always secondary to the right side. So, for example, the effect which is external to the will is secondary to the effect which is internal to the will;
So when it comes to the effects of an end, strictly speaking, we are only put in the situation of finding out whether it is an enjoyment or a desire (lower right corner of the scheme above). A pleasure is always of something present – it is directed toward something we enjoy here and now. However, the end of which we are speaking is – as we have seen – something future. Hence – and again by the method of elimination – the effect of the end must be a desire, and more precisely, a desire for performing an action in the future.

2.3.3 A Future Act Causes a Desire for Itself

All of this is summed up in the following conclusion in his answer to the second objection:

it is therefore only concerning the formal end, or the attainment of the end, that it is true, strictly speaking, that it causes a desire for itself when it is not in a thing. And concerning this the right response is that it is enough that it is in the apprehension and judgment of the intellect, wherefore its moving is intentional or (as I will therefore say) animal, by sympathy and consonance of the powers of the soul, i.e. the intellect and the will.\[^{52}\]

That the final cause is called an “intentional” cause we have already seen. Here, though, he also gives it the name “animal,” which is surprising, especially given the stress of the distinctively human powers of intellect and will (as opposed to the powers we have in common with other animals). And indeed, Suárez also explicitly spells out that final causality does not properly take place in the case of natural agents acting. The only final causation taking place in this case is that which it has from God, but this final causation is present wherever God acts, and is not specific to animals.\[^{53}\]

Insofar as actions are from natural agents, there is properly no final causality, but only a habitu of toward a certain terminus. Insofar as they are from God

\[^{52}\] DM XXIII.1, §11; 25:846. ‘Solum ergo de fine formali seu consecutione finis verum est, per se loquendo, quod causat sui desiderium quando non est in re, et de illo recte responsum est sufficiere quod sit in apprehensione et judicio intellectus, eo quod ejus motio intentionalis sit et (ut ita dicam) animalis, per sympathiam et consonantiam potentiarum animae, intellectus scilicet et voluntatis.’ \[^{5}\]

\[^{53}\] This topic will be more closely looked at in chapter 4.
there is final causality in these [actions], in the same way as there is [final causality] in other external and transeunt actions of God.54

That an action is *transeunt* means that it is directed toward something outside the agent him- or herself, in this case “outside” of God. In the opposite case, where it is directed toward something within the agent, it would be an *immanent* action.

In order to see why he ends up in this position, let us sum up what has been said concerning the second objection: the objection directs the attention to the temporal order and the accusation that the final cause somehow does not obey the “laws” of this temporal order. For, either the end exerts its influence before it exists, which is impossible since that which does not exist cannot cause anything, or the end exerts its influence when it has already come into existence, at which point it is not needed in a causal explanation, since that which was the end ceases to be an end as soon as it has been realized. Suárez’ solution to this dilemma is that it is the end as it is in our intellectual cognition which exerts the influence. This it does before the end has been realized. Furthermore, the end that is so sought for is a future action of ours; this future action – as thought of – produces in us a desire for performing or executing this action.

I think the most important aspect of this answer is the stress it lays on the intellect. For when Suárez construes the end as something which must be pre-cognized, he also excludes those beings which cannot pre-cognize events – that is, final causes are totally withdrawn from nature outside of the realm of human beings, and more specifically, outside the realm of the rational agency of human beings.55

### 2.4 Finality, Form and Will

The third objection against final causality concerns the relationship between form and end. The objection goes like this: the form is the end of natural generation.56 However, it is by this generation itself that the form is made. Hence, insofar as the form comes into existence by this generation, it cannot at the same time be the end of this generation, because it is by the end that the form is generated.57

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54 DM XXIII.10, §6; 5:887. ‘in his actionibus, ut sunt a naturalibus agentibus, non sit propria causalitas finalis, sed solum habitudo ad certum terminum; ut vero sunt a Deo, ita sit in illis causalitas finalis sicut in aliis externis et transeuntibus actionibus Dei.’ [*]

55 We will come back to in what sense there *is* final causation in nature outside human agency below, in ch. 4.

56 For the identification of formal and final causes in natural things in Aristotle, see e.g. *Physics* II.7 (198a22ff.).

57 ‘[N]othing can be the real cause of itself. But the form is, according to Aristotle, the end of natural generation, through which the form itself comes into being, as health is the end of the
This last sentiment, that the form does not exert final causality insofar as it is an end, might just as well have been stated as “the form, insofar as it is an end, is not an end” – i.e. the form cannot be an end.

Suárez answers this objection by saying that the effect of the end is distinguished from the form of this end. For, as he writes, the end doesn’t cause itself, and therefore it doesn’t cause its own form either. What the end primarily causes is the desire for itself.

The third argument postulates what the end causes, and especially concerns the difficulty of in what way the form may be the end of natural generation. This [argument] points to a difficulty of natural agents, which will be treated below. Therefore it will only be briefly stated that the end causes the desire for itself, or some other similar affect toward itself, and therefore does not immediately cause itself, but something distinct from itself. And this is also established for confirmation, that this part does not contradict that the relationship between cause and end is real. For the distinction between itself and such an effect is sufficient, also when this end is not really (‘in re’) distinct from its effect.58

As we saw above, when distinguishing different kinds of effects of ends, the effect could be taken in the sense of the desire for some future act, or it could be taken in the sense of this end having been achieved. In a sense, then, the end is both cause and effect in an instance of final causation. This is where the interrelatedness of different kinds of effects comes in. For the end primarily causes the desire for itself, and it causes itself only derivatively. It is as having caused a desire for itself that it could also be said to cause itself.

Furthermore, as we saw above – concerning real relations – the subject and the terminus have to be distinguished in order to have a real relation. So in pointing to the desire as the primary kind of effect of the end, Suárez has also separated what could be the subject (the end) and the terminus (the desire) in the relation.

When it comes to this relation, though, it is not at all clear that it is real, even though the end and its effect are not identical. In fact, in the end, Suárez denies that there is a real relation from the end to its effect. The only real relation involved in final causation is a transcendental relation from the treatment through which it is acquired. Therefore, [the form] cannot have the true nature of a final cause insofar as it is an end.” (DM XXIII.1, §3; 25:844. ‘nihil potest esse causa realis sui ipsius; sed forma, teste Aristotele, est finis generationis naturalis qua ipsa forma fit, ut sanitas est finis curationis qua acquiritur; ergo quatenus est finis, non potest habere veram rationem causae realis.’ [*])

58 DM XXIII.1, §12; 25:846. ‘Tertium argumentum postulat quid causet finis, et specialiter attingit difficultatem quomodo forma sit finis generationis naturalis, quod spectat ad difficultatem de naturalibus agentibus infra tractandum, et ideo breviter nunc dicitur finem causare desiderium sui seu alium similem affectum erga seipsum, et ita non causare immediate seipsum, sed aliquid distinctum a se. Et hinc etiam constat ad confirmationem, ex hac parte non repugnare relationem causae in fine esse realem; est enim sufficiens distinctio inter ipsam et talem effectum, et quando ipse finis non sit in re distinctus ab effectu eius’ [*]
will to the future, desirable end. However, as this part of the answer involves discussions concerning the “objective being of the end,” we shall come back to it after having treated this in chapter 5.

Above, the first three objections to the reality of the final cause have been treated, all three concerning problems regarding some kind of order (of principle-ness, of time and of circularity, respectively). We will now look at two objections stemming from the questions of whether the end should be considered as a motive or merely as an end point of motion and change.

2.5 Moving or Terminating?

Suárez considers the fourth objection to the thesis that the final cause would be a real cause to be the most important one. This objection starts with a difference made between two possible ways of viewing the end: either it is (a) that which draws the agent to action, or (b) that toward which the action tends. But in neither case, Suárez says, can it be a real cause.

The fourth and foremost reason for doubt is that the end can be considered either in the nature (‘in ratione’) of a moving principle and that which draws the agent to agency, or in the nature of a terminus toward which the action tends. Both these natures are usually distinguished by philosophers regarding an object of some power, that is, as a motive and a terminative object. And there is the same distinction with regard to the end, which is the object of the will. But under neither nature can the end have a true nature of a cause.

Suárez divides the argumentation into two distinct parts, one for each nature the end can “assume,” that is, the end seen as a motive or as a terminative end. First he talks about the end as terminative, i.e. as that toward which our actions are directed.

And first of all, concerning the terminative nature it seems manifest [that it is not a real cause] since as such [the end] rather has the nature of an effect than [the nature] of a cause. As such [the end] is [that which is] last for the action,

59 “The end [...] is in no way ordered to the effect, but the effect is ordered to [the end].” (DM XXIII.1, §13; 25:846. ‘finis [...] nullo modo ordinatur ad effectum, sed effectum ad ipsum’ [*])

60 DM XXIII.1, §4; 25:844. ‘Quarta ac praecipu e ratio dubitandi est quia finis considerari potest aut in ratione principii moventis et allicientis agens ad agendum, vel in ratione termini ad quem tendit actio; haec enim duplex ratio distinguui solet a philosophis in objecto alicuius potentiae, scilicet, objecti motivi et terminativi; cademque distinctio locum habet in fine, qui est objectum voluntatis. Sed sub neutra ratione potest finis habere veram rationem causae.’ [*]
not its origin. Finally, as such it does not influence, but [the action] rather tends toward it by the influence of other causes.\footnote{DM XXIII.1, §4; 25:844. ‘Et imprimis de ratione termini videtur manifestum, tum quia ut sic potius habet rationem effectus quam causae; et ut sic est postremum actionis, non origo eius; denique ut sic non influit, sed potius aliarum causarum influxus in illum tendit.’ [\*]}

Here, Suárez argues in three steps for why a terminative end could not be an end. For in this case, the end, as that toward which the action is directed, as an end point, is rather the effect of this action (or these actions), and is produced by it. The end is what is there when the action is done and is not its source. Hence, other causes must be found to account for the tending of the cause toward the end, taken in this sense.

When it comes to the end as a motive or drawing toward the end, Suárez gives the following argument.

Further, [the end] cannot have the nature of a cause under the other nature, of movement. For the moving of the end is merely metaphorical, as Aristotle concludes in De Gen., book 1, text 55.\footnote{The reference is, presumably, to De Gen. book I, chapter 7 (324 b14ff.). The word used in the Greek original is the word ‘metaphora.’} It is therefore not true and real, and hence not enough for real causation.\footnote{DM XXIII.1, §4; 25:844. ‘Deinde neque sub altera ratione moventis potest habere rationem causae; nam, ut sentit Aristot., I de Gener., text. 55, motio finis tantum est metaphorica; non est ergo vera et realis; ergo non sufficit ad causalitatem realem.’ [\*]}

The fundamental argument for why the end cannot be a real cause, if the end is taken as a motive, seems to be that Aristotle labels this kind of end “metaphorical.” However, he also confirms this in two sub arguments. First, he turns to the case of God (always present in Suárez’ argumentation) and argues that in Him this movement is also metaphorical.

And it is confirmed, first, because this metaphorical motion of the end is also to be found in God. For God really communicates Himself to creatures\footnote{This rather odd formulation (“communicating oneself to”) I think Suárez finds appropriate for God first and foremost because of Christ, who is the Word (‘Verbum’, ‘Logos’). In Christ God has communicated Himself to the creation, rather than communicated with the creation, which would perhaps be a more common manner of expression.} because of [‘propter’] His goodness, by which His will is moved or drawn metaphorically, but it can nevertheless not be said that this end exerts real causality on God.\footnote{DM XXIII.1, §4; 25:844. ‘Et confirmatur primo, quia etiam in Deo reperitur haec motio metaphorica finis; nam revera Deus propter bonitatem suam, a qua eius voluntas metaphorice movetur seu allicitur, communicat se creaturis, et tamen dici non potest quod ille finis habet veram causalitatem circa Deum.’ [\*]}

So this first argument only concerns God – God is in some way moved by His goodness to communicate Himself to His creatures. But God cannot \textit{really} be influenced by final causality, as God is unchangeable. We must
therefore say that this ‘propter’, which would signal final causality, is only spoken metaphorically when it comes to God.

So what is his other argument? This second argument focuses on the other side of the spectrum, namely natural agents.

And it is confirmed, second, because if the end has the nature of a cause under this nature [of movement] only, then the end cannot be a real cause at least with respect to natural agents, because [the end] cannot move or draw them to love it.66

Love, in a proper sense, can only be exercised by the concupiscent faculty of the rational part of the soul; love is an intellectual desire. Hence, animals that are not in possession of rational faculties can neither be drawn to an end, as this drawing is the same as an act of love, which such an animal is incapable of.

It is noteworthy that neither of these two arguments talks about human beings. The first one is about God as being moved metaphorically, the second about animals being moved metaphorically. However, as can be noted, Suárez doesn’t mention human beings. Suárez also notes this in the answer to this objection.

For, in the answer, Suárez says that in the objection much was said about God and animals. However, if these are left aside, he says that the end can have real causality, namely as a motive principle. Hence, for human beings,67 the end can be a real final cause, namely, as a motive principle.

In the fourth argument much was touched upon pertaining to God and natural agents. Now, leaving those aside, we grant that the end is suitable for causality, as having the nature of a principle and, consequently, the nature of [something] moving.68

Note that Suárez once again stresses the reality of final causes in the case of human beings, almost to the point of claiming that final causation is excluded to the case of created intelligences. In the case of God and natural agents, though, final causation does take place as well, but in a different way from the way in which it takes place in human agency.

The motion [of God and natural agents] is called metaphorical, however, not because it isn’t real but because it neither happens by effective influence nor

66 DM XXIII.1, §4; 25:844. ‘Et confirmatur secundo, quia si finis sub hac ratione tantum habet rationem causae, ergo saltem respectu agentium naturalium non potest finis esse causa realis, quia non potest illa movere seu allicere ad sui amorem.’ [*]

67 And angels, but I leave them aside in this account.

68 DM XXIII.1, §14; 25:847. ‘In quarto argumento multa tanguntur pertinentia ad Deum et ad agentia naturalia; nunc, illis omissis, concedimus causalitatem convenire fini ut habet rationem principii, et consequenter ut habet rationem moventis.’ [*]
by intentional and animal motion. And therefore nothing is in the way so as to prevent this causality from being true and proper.\(^69\)

As we have seen above, the final cause is said to move “metaphorically.” Here, Suárez takes this one step further, and says that in the action of God and irrational, natural agents,\(^70\) the very final causation itself is metaphorical. Could one then say that it moves “metaphorically in a metaphorical sense” in these cases? Actually, this is exactly what Suárez does! We will come back to this below.\(^71\)

We will come back to the question of the relation between final causation in the case of human agency, and in the case of God and natural agents, in chapter 4, below.

2.5.1 Metaphor and Analogy

Above, in chapter 1, we saw how Suárez orders the causes analogically. The efficient cause is the primary analogate, of which formal and material causes are proportionate analogies. However, already there, and all the more here, we see how Suárez does not talk so much of final causes as “analogical” causes, but rather as “metaphorical” causes, or rather causes that move “metaphorically” (where efficient causes move “literally,” supposedly). Indeed, this was one of the objections to final causes being real causes which was found already in Suárez’ basic treatment of causes and causation. But how do analogy and metaphor really relate?

Suárez treats the relation between metaphor and analogy in a number of places in the Disputations.\(^72\) Above all, Suárez treats it when speaking of the relation between the being of God and the being of creatures.

First of all, Suárez distinguishes two different kinds of analogy. He refers to them by different names.

Two [types of analogies] are usually distinguished. One is called “analogy of proportionality” and the other “analogy of proportion” by many. Others call the first “analogy of proportion” and the latter “analogy of attribution.” I only point to this because of the equivocation in terms, for [the distinction] is the same.\(^73\)

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\(^{69}\) DM XXIII.1, §14; 25:847. ‘Eius autem motio dicitur metaphorica, non quia non sit realis, sed quia non fit per influxum effectivum, nec per motionem intentionalem et animalem, et ideo nihil obstat quominus vera ac propria sit eius causalitas.’ [*]

\(^{70}\) As will be seen in chapter 4, irrational agents have ends insofar as God cooperates (or concurs) with their actions.

\(^{71}\) In chapter 4. See quote in n. 19 on p. 102.

\(^{72}\) For a comprehensive list, see Doyle 1984 p. 128 n. 45.

\(^{73}\) DM XXVIII.3, §4; 26:13. ‘duplex enim communiter distinguittur: una vocatur a multis analogia proportionilatis, et alia proportionis; alii vero priorem vocant analogiam proportionis, et posteriam attributionis, quod solum adverto propter æquivocationem terminorum, res enim eadem est.’ [*]
As far as I can see, Suárez prefers the second pair of names for these different kinds of analogy\textsuperscript{74} – supposedly because it leads to less confusion. I will, in the following, refer to the first kind of analogy as “analogy of proportionality,” and the second one as “analogy of attribution.”

What are these different kinds of analogies? First, \textit{analogy of proportionality} means that the “principal analogate” is named “by its form absolutely considered,” whereas that which is named in analogy to this is named insofar as the primary analogate has some relation to (the form of) this “secondary” analogate.\textsuperscript{75} Suárez also gives an example of this:

A human being is said to smile by a proper act of smiling, absolutely taken. A meadow, however, is said to smile by its blooming, not absolutely, but inasmuch as the meadow by its blooming keeps some proportionality to the smiling human being.\textsuperscript{76}

It is the meadow, not the blooming, which is said to smile; however, it is by the blooming, and the similar relation this has to the meadow as the smiling has to a human being, that the meadow is said to smile. Hence, Suárez also seems to be taking this as an analogy between two features\textsuperscript{77} – between the blooming and the smiling in the example above.

Second, \textit{analogy of attribution} is an analogy by the relation\textsuperscript{78} of two things to the same form, where to one thing this form is “proper and intrinsic” and to the other it is “improper and extrinsic.”\textsuperscript{79} Suárez takes the classical example of health to explicate this kind of analogy:

[In this way] “health” is said of an animal, and of medicine, and of urine. These are properly considered (to be) analogues between the proper analogate and whichever of the other, as between animal and medicine or between animal and urine.\textsuperscript{80}

So, whereas the analogy of proportionality has to do with one form standing in a relation to one thing as another form does to another thing, in the analo-

\textsuperscript{74} He, for example, refers to “analogy of attribution” later in the same paragraph.

\textsuperscript{75} DM XXVIII.3, §4; 26:13. ‘Prior ergo analogia [...] consistit in hoc, quod principale analogatum denominatur tale a sua forma absolute considerata, aliud vero, licet a sua forma similem denominationem recipiat, non tamen absoluta considerata, sed quia in ordine ad illam servat quandam proportionem cum habitudine primi analogati ad suam formam’ [*]

\textsuperscript{76} DM XXVIII.3, §4; 26:13-4. ‘homo dicitur ridere a proprio actu ridendi absolute sumpto, pratum vero dicitur ridere a viriditate sua, non absolute, sed prout servat quandam proportionem pratum viride ad hominem ridentem.’ [*]

\textsuperscript{77} DM XXVIII.3, §4; 26:14. ‘hæc est proportio inter duas habitudines’ [*]

\textsuperscript{78} NB that Suárez uses ‘habitudo’, not ‘relatio’, in this context.

\textsuperscript{79} DM XXVIII.3, §4; 26: 14. ‘Posterior analogia sumitur ex habitudine ad unam formam, quæ in uno est proprie et intrinsice, in alio vero improprio et extrinsice’ [*]

\textsuperscript{80} DM XXVIII.3, §4; 26:14. ‘sanum dicitur de animali, et de medicina, et urina, quæ analogia proprie consideratur inter proprium analogatum, et quodlibet ex reliquis, ut inter animal et medicinam, vel inter animal et urinam.’ [*]
ogy of attribution one form stands in different relations ("being intrinsic to" or "being extrinsic to") to different things.

Now, Suárez claims that

All true analogy of proportionality includes something of a metaphor and impropriety.\(^81\)

He even illustrates this with the same example that he used when introducing analogy of proportionality:

To smile is said of a meadow by transference and metaphor.\(^82\)

Hence, a meadow is said to smile both by analogy and by metaphor! So, when Suárez says that formal and material causes are called causes by proportional analogy, he also says that – to some extent – these are already called causes metaphorically.

We have here at least found something by which we can place final causes in the scheme of causes at large. Though there might be positive aspects differing a metaphor from an analogy – and there surely is\(^83\) – an analogy (by proportionality) is a kind of metaphor, at least in one aspect. From this aspect, then, we can say that we can place final causes on a spectrum, starting with efficient causes – the primary analogate, which move univocally – and traversing through material and formal causes on its way to final causes, at the looser end of connection with the word “cause.”

However, the only insight being achieved by this, beside the positive achievement of being able to connect metaphor and analogy, is a “negative” one; we have only seen that a metaphor implies an “improper” use of a word, and that the jump from a proper use to an improper one is done by “translation.” The positive account of the cause-ness (so to say) of a final cause, inside as well as outside of human agency, has to be made outside of the metaphor-discourse of final causes.

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\(^{81}\) DM XXVIII.3, §11; 26:16. 'omnis vera analogia proportionalitatis includit aliquid metaphore et improprietatis' [\(^*\)]

\(^{82}\) DM XXVIII.3, §11; 26:16. 'ridere dicitur de prato per translationem metaphoricam' [\(^*\)]

\(^{83}\) In one place, Suárez writes that “the proportionally analogical word signifies that which is signified by a twofold imposition; one proper, the other by translation and metaphor.” (DM XXXII.2, §13; 26:323. 'vox analogia secundum proportionalitatem duplici impositione significat sua significata. Una propria, altera per transaltionem et metaphoram.' [\(^*\)]) From this perspective, then, the proportional analogy is a kind of metaphor, with the “properness” of its signification being its specific character separating it from other, mere metaphors.
2.6 End and Chance

From his preceding considerations, however, Suárez also raises a fifth objection to the reality of final causality – or, rather, he says that a further difficulty arises from all of this. It is also here that he raises the question of natural agents and God. For, he writes, if these are not guided by final causality in their agency, how can they then be seen as ordered? Don’t they then just act by chance?84

What Suárez seems to try to spell out is that if final causation would be ruled out in the above examples (natural agents and God), the order which was to account for the order in the cases of actions by natural agents and God would also be taken away. We would, then, have to account for this in some other way.

Suárez already has a response to the question of whether final causality is ruled out when he answers this objection. In it he refutes the view that nature would stand in opposition to final causality. A natural inclination of an agent to something also comes with a final cause which governs this efficient acting.85

84 “And from this a fifth difficulty arises, because by this [fourth objection above] the whole fundament, by reason of which this kind of cause was evidently introduced by philosophers, is overthrown. [This kind of cause was introduced] because natural agents do not operate by chance or accident, but their actions tend toward determinate ends. For from this foundation or indication alone natural things are inferred to have definite termini by their natural propensity and inclination, for this is enough to act for determinate effects not by chance but in itself, although no other kind of cause intercedes. The theologians say, thus, that the eternal Father in Himself and definitely tends (so to say) toward such a terminus (clearly toward His Son) not from final causality but from natural determination. And in nature a natural stone tends toward a lower place by a natural inclination, although this place does not have any kind of causality with respect to this motion, but only the nature of a terminus toward which the stone has a natural propensity.” (DM XXIII.1, §5; 25:844. *Atque hinc oritur quinta difficultas, quia hinc evertitur totum fundamentum ob quod a philosophis introductum est hoc genus causae, nimirum, quia agentia naturalia non operantur casu aut fortuito, sed in determinatios fines suis actionibus tendunt. Ex hoc enim fundamento seu indicio solum colligitur habere res naturales definitos terminos suarum propulsionem et inclinationum naturalium; id enim satis est ut non casu, sed per se operentur determinatos effectus, etiamsi nullum alium genus causalitatis intercedat. Sicut dicunt theologi aeternum Patrem per se ac definite tendere (ut sic loquar) per generationem in talem terminum, nempe in hunc Filium, non ex causaliitate finis, sed ex determinatione naturae. Et in naturalibus, lapis naturali inclinatione definite tendit in locum infernum, etiamsi locus ille nullum genus causalitatis habeat circa illum motum, sed solum rationem termini ad quem lapis habet naturalem propulsionem.* [*])

85 “To the fifth [objection it can be answered that] it is about whoever of the natural agents, of which it shall be answered later that the way of acting of the intellectual creatures cannot be understood without final causality, because these are really drawn and moved to action by a final cause. And although they themselves have a natural propensity to the object, or ends toward which they are moved by proper vital acts, this natural propensity cannot operate in its kind (that is, effectively) without a sufficient connection to the end, a co-cause in its kind. And the determination of the operation, or the direction within a certain scope, which is discerned in the case of intellectual agents, therefore manifestly proceeds not only from a natural inclination but [also] from a final cause.” (DM XXIII.1, §15; 25:847. *Ad quintum, quidquid sit de agentibus naturalibus, de quibus postea respondetur modum operandi intellectualium
2.7 What is the Effect of a Final Cause?

The sixth and last objection Suárez brings against the final cause is that it is unclear what the effect of a final cause is. However, Suárez says that this objection has already been answered – an answer which we have accounted for in section 2.3, above – and therefore refers his reader there. Briefly, the end causes a desire for itself when it does not yet exist; the desire, then, is the effect of the as of yet not existing end.

2.8 Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, we have seen how Suárez already in the definition of a final cause connects it closely to human agency (section 2.1). With the six objections, and his answers to them, Suárez further explicates this connection and the reasons behind it. The end is a principle, and thereby a cause, by being “first in intention” (section 2.2). The end is such that it causes when it does not yet exist. Furthermore, for the end to be such, it has to be a future action of the agent; the effect of this future action, as mediated by the thought of it, is a rational desire to perform it. (Sections 2.3 and 2.4) The end is called a final cause “metaphorically” for God and natural agents (section 2.5). Finally, acting for an end does not exclude having a natural propensity to act in a certain way (section 2.6).

Suárez raises no less than three objections to final causes and final causation on the ground of some order (sections 2.2-4): that it would really be last rather than first in a causal chain, that it does not “obey” the temporal order of causes and effects, and that the causal chain would be circular in the case of final causation. This type of objection was to be common in the Early Modern period and was seen as grounds for totally rejecting final causes. However, as we have seen, Suárez was fully aware of a number of such objections, and his chiseling out of a notion of final causes and final causation...
is done on the background of trying to avoid violation against such orders, temporal and other.

Suárez’ basic treatment of final causes exhibit certain salient features. One is the privileged place accorded to human, rational agency; Suárez takes human agency as his starting point, as well as constant point of reference, in his inquiry into final causes. Human agency becomes the paradigm case of where final causation takes place. However, the final causation in the case of God and natural agents – closely related – comes up here and there as well. In one sense, there is some kind of final causation going on in those cases as well, though of a totally different kind than in the case of human agency. Outside of human agency, we do not find final causation in the sense of something causing a desire for itself, but rather in the reduced sense of being an end point or terminus of an action. That Suárez mixes these two very different cases, and sometimes wants to include them both under the broad notion of “final causation” confuses rather than clarifies the question.

Another point of confusion is that Suárez doesn’t seem to distinguish the question of something really being a final cause from the question of whether this cause itself is real. The same goes for the question of the reality of the cause and the reality of causation. All these questions are blended into each other, though, in the background, Suárez of course has analytical tools to deal with these distinctions. One conclusion one can draw from this is that these questions are very closely related for Suárez – for something to really be a final cause it has to be real, and real final causation can only be exercised by something real that is also really a final cause. However, as neither the reality of the cause nor the reality of the causation is clear in the case of final causation, as we have seen, a clearer distinction could be called for in this case in order to facilitate the critical discussion of it. For instance, in the case of fictional characters, it seems that one can really be a detective – like Sherlock Holmes – without being real; no problem there. One has to make this distinction between being real and really being something, though, in order to even be able to ask whether Sherlock Holmes was real (as he might have been, had Sir Arthur Conan Doyle used a real life person as a model for his character). We will come back to this question in the final chapter.

Before we treat this question of the reality of the final cause, however – in chapter 5 – we will look specifically into the two “subgroups” of final causation which we have seen has opened up. First, in chapter 3, we will take a look at how Suárez deals with final causation in the case of human agency, and what role it plays there. Subsequently, in chapter 4, we will look at how final causation is involved in God’s concurrence or cooperation in the actions in the world, and thereby also how final causation – in one sense of the word – can also play a role in the agency of all natural agents.

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89 One can here think of the effect in a relation of efficient causation being called a terminus.
As we have seen, final causes and final causation are closely connected to human agency. An end can only “move” an agent who perceives the end as an end. In nature, only human beings act for ends in this sense.

In this chapter, we shall approach human agency from another direction. For one of the features of specifically human agency is that it is free, in a certain sense of the word. We shall therefore look at what Suárez lays into this word when it comes to human agency, and how he accounts for it (chapter 3.1). This will lead us to his arguments for why freedom is located in a faculty, more specifically in the will, as well as to his explication of how this freedom of will expresses itself in human agency (chapter 3.2). After a brief reflection on the connection between Suárez’ account of final causation and freedom of will, respectively, I will end this chapter with some preliminary notes on the relation between the will and the other faculties of the soul (chapter 3.3); how does the will command other faculties?

3.1 Free – from Necessity

Suárez analyzes free actions in terms of, and in contrast to, necessary actions. Why is that? Because the word ‘liber’, “free,” derives from the word ‘liberare’, “to free from” – more specifically, “to free from necessity” – according to Suárez. Hence, to understand what is meant when Suárez says that a human action is free, we must first look at different senses of necessity as pertaining to actions.

The word “necessary” (‘necessarius’) as applied to actions is, in a first sense, used as logicians and dialecticians use it. In this context, the word refers to an action, which “is not able not to exist or come into existence”

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90 “Now since the free is opposed to the necessary, ‘free’ is said in almost as many ways as ‘necessary’ itself is. For if the term ‘free’ (liber) is thought of as taken from the verb ‘to render free from’ (liberare), so that an action that is called free is one that is free from every sort of necessity, then an action that is free in all respects will be one that has none of the aforementioned kinds of necessity.” (DM XIX.2, §9; 25:695. ‘Cum autem liberum necessario opponatur, tot fere modis dicitur, quot necessarium ipsum. Si enim liberum dictum creatur a verbo libero, ita ut actio libera dicatur, quæ ab omni necessitate libera est,illa actio erit omnibus modis libera, quæ nullam habet ex prædictis necessitatis libera est [AF])
given that “all the things required for acting have been posited.” The expression “all the things required for acting” refers to some presuppositions set up by Suárez earlier. These are that the cause is (i) sufficient, (ii) proximately ready to act and (iii) accompanied by conditions for acting. These conditions are specified under six points. See DM XIX.1, §§1-3; 25:688-9.

92 DM XIX.2, §8; 25:694. *Proprie enim et dialectico more loquendo, necessarium opponitur tam impossibili quam possibili non esse, quo modo necessario actio dicitur, quæ non potest non esse aut fieri, subintelligendo semper illam hypothesim, scilicet, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum* [AF]

We will further look at what this kind of necessity entails below.

94 DM XIX.2, §8; 25:694. *Alio vero modo sumi solet necessarium prout opponitur voluntario* [AF]

95 DM XIX.2, §8; 25:694-5. *priori modo dicuntur necessariae omnes actiones rerum carentium cognitione, etiamsi naturales sint [...] Posteriori modo dicitur necessarium, quod est violentum et coactum, quia est contra propria appetitum elicitem* [AF]

96 DM XIX.2, §8; 25:695. *Et hoc modo actio bruti, si ex mero appetitu procedat, quamvis sit necessaria primo modo, non tamen his posterioribus modis; quia non est violenta, nec mere naturalis, sed spontanea* [AF]
do not, would lead us into the question of grace, and thus theology proper. The main point to state at this point is just that some actions of human beings are free in this last sense, of being free from both kinds of necessity, and that when Suárez addresses the freedom of human agency, it is this last kind of freedom that he is referring to. Hence, the specifically human kind of freedom – which sets it apart from lower animals – is freedom from both necessity\(_2\) and necessity\(_1\), the “logical” sense (‘modo dialectico’).

This gives the following scheme of the different senses of necessity and freedom.

**Table 1. Different kinds of actions by having/lacking different kinds of necessity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>necessary(_1) \ necessary(_2)</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>i) stones, flowers ii) coerced animal and human actions</td>
<td>animals(^{98})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>human beings, angels, God</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It could be noted, then, that with regards to actions, necessity\(_2\)→necessity\(_1\). That is, if an action is necessary in the sense of being non-voluntary, it is also necessary in the logical sense of the word. Equivalently, if an action is free, in a logical sense, it is also voluntary – expressed in symbolic logic, \(\neg\text{necessity}_1\rightarrow\neg\text{necessity}_2\).\(^{99}\)

According to Suárez, it is the specifically human kind of freedom\(^{100}\) (bottom right corner of the table above) that has been the subject of discussion of free will-discussions of philosophers.\(^{101}\) Let us therefore go back a bit and

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\(^{97}\) Concerning this issue, Suárez states briefly in the DM that these kinds of actions are especially found in God’s actions and in the actions of human beings done from “a desire for rectitude and justice” and that “those who are sanctified by grace or glory are said to be especially free” (DM XIX.2, §9; 25:695. ‘ex consilio et appetitur rectitudinis ac justitiae fiunt [...]sanctificati per gratiam vel gloriam, dicuntur peculiariter liberi’[AF]).

\(^{98}\) Presumably, actions by human beings performed purely from sentient desire would be subsumed under this class as well. However, as the relation between these actions and actions done totally freely is not an all clear cut, these have been left out in the present scheme.

\(^{99}\) In his *Theodicy* (288), Leibniz sets up three conditions that are necessary, and together sufficient, for freedom: *intelligence*, *spontaneity* and *contingency* (“exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity”). Furthermore, spontaneity and contingency are singled out as the “body” of freedom, whereas intelligence is labeled its “soul.” (Rutherford 2005 pp. 157-8) In comparison to Suárez, then, one can see that the members of the “body” of freedom – contingency and spontaneity – correspond to freedom from necessity\(_1\) and freedom from necessity\(_2\), respectively (although Leibniz has a different idea than Suárez of which things act “spontaneously,” of course). Furthermore, Leibniz’ singling out of intelligence as the “soul” of freedom parallels Suárez’ delimitation of freedom – in the full sense – to intelligent beings alone.

\(^{100}\) I will freely use the expression “the specifically human kind of freedom” as a shorthand for “the specifically human, angelic and divine kind of freedom” when no misunderstandings can arise from this.

\(^{101}\) “However, lastly, and in the most proper sense, an action that is called free is one that is truly free from the sort of necessity that natural and non-rational things have in acting [...] This is the sort of freedom or non-necessity that we are properly discussing in the present
look more closely at what necessity – which human actions lack, as opposed to other animal actions – amounts to.

When he introduces this sense of the word “necessary,” Suárez writes that it is opposed to both that which is impossible and to that which is possibly not the case. This is a general remark where Suárez refers to the square of opposition for modal logic. That which is necessarily the case is contrary to that which is not possibly the case, but it is contradictory to that which is possibly not the case. But a negation of necessity amounts to the contradictory statement. Accordingly, that which is free from necessity is possibly not the case.

In the case of actions, that which is necessary is spelled out in different ways by Suárez. In the first formulation of the definition, which was given above, he writes that the action “is not able not to exist or come into existence – always presupposing the hypothesis that all the things for acting have been posited.” He also writes, though, that this kind of necessity involves “a determination to one,” which could presumably be interpreted as meaning “a determination to one effect.”

Now, given that “free” is the opposite of this, this gives us two notions of what a free human action is. It could be spelled out as being an existing action which is able not to exist or come into existence. That is, it could be – even given all the presuppositions in terms of well-functioning faculties, the “right” cognitions, etc. – that this specific action had not been performed. As opposed to the second meaning given, a free action could also be spelled out

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question, and it is on this interpretation that freedom was always discussed, from the ancient philosophers onwards.” (DM XIX.2, §9; 25:695. ‘Ultimo tamen ac propriissime modo dicitur actio libera, quæ vere libera est ab ea necessitate quam in agendo habent res naturales et irrationales [...] Et de hac libertate seu non necessitate disputamus proprie in presenti questione; et in hoc sensu disputata fuit semper etiam ab antiquis philosophis’ [AF])

102 See above, p. 76 n. 92. The modal square of opposition has the structure represented by the following scheme:

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\[\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{possibly } p & & \text{necessarily not } p \\
\text{contraries} & & \text{not possibly } p \\
\text{subcontraries} & & \text{not necessarily } p \\
\end{array}\]
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103 DM XIX.2, §9; 25:695. ‘determinatio ad unum’
104 This is also the way it is translated in Suárez 1994.

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as an action that is not determined to one effect. We will look below, in treating the will, what this kind of freedom amounts to.

So, fundamentally, what constitutes specifically human kind of freedom is that there is a freedom regarding each particular act whether it is to be performed or not.\textsuperscript{105} It is also in this sense we will use the word “free” below when talking of “freedom of will.”\textsuperscript{106}

3.2 Free Choice and Free Will

Having established that human beings act freely in this eminent sense of the word,\textsuperscript{107} it remains to spell out what this freedom amounts to with regard to concrete human agency. In order to do this, Suárez must first explicate “where” or “in what” this freedom is “located.” What is the “source” of free human acts?\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{105} “For no one has ever doubted – or been able to doubt – that in many of their actions human beings operate spontaneously and by their own will, moving and applying themselves to action in light of previous cognition; instead, what has evoked disagreement is the question of whether necessity and a determination to one effect are intermingled with this very voluntariness.” (DM XIX.2, §9; 25:695. ‘nullus enim unquam dubitavit, vel dubitare potuit, an operentur homines in multis actionibus suis, spontane et propria voluntate sese moventes et applicantes ad opus prævia cognitione, sed an in hoc ipso voluntario misceatur necessitas, et determinatio ad unum, hoc est, quod in controversiam vocatum est.’ [AF])

\textsuperscript{106} How does Suárez’ account of the “logical sense of necessity” fit with earlier accounts? Does he, for example, hold the view of the “contingency of the present,” which was the most common view in the 14th and 15th centuries? (See Knuuttila 1993 p. 144 and Lagerlund 2000 p. 210.) The short answer is that, given that the scope of the investigation above is merely actions, it cannot answer this question. A tentative answer, though, would be that Suárez does hold that the present is contingent. For even though actions of irrational creatures are “necessary in a logical sense,” this necessity is still conditioned by the circumstance of all things necessary for the action have been posited. One such condition is God’s concurrence, which is at least given freely. Hence, taken \textit{simpliciter}, all actions are contingent as they depend on God’s free concurrence. See also DM XIX.10, §2 (25:735) where Suárez writes that “relative to the First Cause no effect in the universe occurs by absolute necessity, since all such effects depend on the First Cause’s concurrence, which he is able to withhold from them because of his freedom.” (‘in ordine ad primam causam nullum effectum universi ex absoluta necessitate evenire, quia omnes pendent ex concursu ejus, quem ipsa pro sua libertate negare potest’ [AF]) Hence, when Suárez calls the actions of irrational beings “necessary in a logical sense,” they are still contingent in the sense that they possibly could have \textit{not} taken place, absolutely speaking. Suárez would thus – without going further into the earlier philosophers – still hold to the contingency of the present; the “logical necessity” of certain actions does not constitute an objection to this, at least.

\textsuperscript{107} I will henceforth use the phrase “free in the eminent sense of the word” when referring to actions that are free from both necessity\textsubscript{1} and necessity\textsubscript{2}, i.e., actions which are free in the specifically human, angelic and divine way.

\textsuperscript{108} The quotation marks are used so as to underscore the metaphorical sense – transferred from talk of locality – of these terms in this context.
3.2.1 A Free Faculty

Suárez’ first conclusion is that freedom resides formally in a faculty. Given that Suárez is committed to faculty psychology, what would be the alternative? As the main alternative, Suárez proposes the view that freedom would fundamentally be inherent in acts, i.e., in acts of faculties rather than in the faculties themselves. In refuting the view that freedom would formally reside in an act, Suárez simultaneously argues for his own position. In three paragraphs, Suárez argues that

[i] a human being has free choice even when he is not acting. Otherwise, he would lose free choice just by ceasing to act – which is absurd. Therefore, free choice cannot consist in an act.

[ii] Likewise, a human being has free choice by reason of the fact that he is able to act or not to act, once all the things required for acting have been posited. But it is proximately through some faculty that he is able to act. Therefore, it is proximately through some faculty of the soul that he has freedom. Therefore, free choice will be a faculty of this sort.

[iii] Finally, if freedom of choice consists in an act, then I ask whether or not that act is elicited from a free faculty. If the answer is yes, then the freedom already exists prior to the act; therefore, it is in the faculty itself prior to the act. On the other hand, if the answer is no, then the act is necessary; in that case, how can the freedom of choice consist in that act?

In the first argument, Suárez points to the fact that we are also said to have freedom when we do not act freely – just as we can have the ability to speak a language when we are not presently speaking it. Already this connection points to freedom, or free choice (‘liberum arbitrium’), being something like an ability.

In the second argument, the fundamental structure of human freedom is reiterated – that it consists in being able “to act or not to act,” with the important addition that this presupposes a situation where “all the things required for acting have been posited.” Suárez then directs the attention of the reader to the notion of “being able” (‘potens’). This ability is present on account of some faculty or power (‘potentia’). So it is by way of this faculty – by which s/he is able to perform a certain act – that the person is also able to abstain from doing the action. In other words, as ability generally is referred

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110 DM XIX.5, §4; 25:712. ‘Homo enim liberum arbitrium habet, etiam quando nihil operaretur, alias amitteret liberum arbitrium per solam cessationem ab actu, quod absurdum est; non ergo potest liberum arbitrium in actu consistere. Item, homo est liberi arbitrii, quia potest operari et non operari, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum; est autem potens proxime ad operandum per aliquam potentiam; ergo libertatem habet proxime per aliquam potentiam animae; talis ergo potentia erit liberum arbitrium. Deinde, si libertas arbitrii consistit in aliquo actu, inquiro an ille actus sit elicitus a potentia libera, necne. Si primum dicatur, jam libertas antecedit illum actum; est ergo in ipsa potentia ante actum. Si vero dicatur secundum, ille actus necessarius est; quomodo ergo in illo potest consistere arbitrii libertas?’ [AF]
to a faculty, this “freedom of choice” – which consists in being able to act or not to act – is also referred to a faculty.

This argument could be taken in at least two different ways. First, Suárez could intend to make an argument by analogy to other actions. Hence, if I am able to raise a glass, this ability stems from a faculty (involving faculties of bodily motions, etc.). In like manner, my ability to make free choices stems from a free faculty. Or, second, Suárez could mean that, as the positive act stems from a faculty, so also does – in a sense – the negative abstention from performing the act (namely, the same act). It is not obvious which of the two Suárez intends. However, it does not much matter as they are both quite weak. In the first version, the argument hinges on an analogy; it is not at all obvious, though, that the freedom of an act is like a case where one of the properties of an act is that it involves, say, raising a glass. In the second version, the argument would involve ascribing properties to the abstention of an act; it is not at all clear that he can do this.

The third argument, finally, has the form of a reductio. For given that freedom consists in an act, we can further ask whether this act stems from a free faculty. If it does, freedom is, rather, in the faculty. (In claiming this, Suárez is addressing a natural rather than a temporal order.) If the act does not stem from a free faculty, the act itself must be necessary.

This last argument points to a certain notion in Suárez of what is required of that which is in the final analysis found to be free. This takes us to the question of what “formally” means in Suárez’ claim that “freedom formally resides in a faculty.” For, given that free actions stem from some free faculty, there must be some faculty which “in itself” is free. This seems rather commonsensical, given that all the presuppositions – that we sometimes perform free actions, that freedom “resides” in a faculty, etc. – have been postulated. This freedom must “come” from somewhere.

This “somewhere” must, further, be an active faculty. That is, when or insofar as the faculty acts freely, it must not be passive with respect to that which “gives” freedom. The freedom must come from itself. Freedom involves self-determination.

A passion qua passion cannot be free with respect to the patient as such but instead can be free only insofar as the action from which that passion derives is free with respect to the patient; therefore, freedom does not reside formally and precisely within a passive faculty as such but instead resides within an active faculty.

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111 "The will’s freedom is properly exercised at the very instance in question and with respect to the very same act that it is eliciting or exercising at present.” (DM XIX.9, §3; 25:733. ‘voluntatis libertatem proprie exerceri in eomet instante, et circa eumdem actum quem presentem elicit, seu exercet.’ [AF])

112 DM XIX.2, §18; 25:699. ‘nam passio ut passio non potest esse libera patienti ut sic, sed solum quatenus actio a qua talis passio provenit est libera; ergo libertas formaliter ac praecise non est in potentia patiente ut sic, sed in potentia agente.’ [AF]
As can be seen, Suárez here relies heavily on reasoning in terms of activity and passivity. If we have come to a faculty which is free passively, we have not yet come to the end of the search for the inherently free faculty. Indeed, if a faculty is “only” free as acted on, it cannot be called free in itself.

Indeed, something can be free in the sense of being “indifferent” toward two determinations. For example, a wall can have a kind of “indifference” with regard to being painted yellow or red. However, as long as it does not have the active power itself to determine what color it should have, the freedom – insofar as it is there – of what color it should have is in the painter rather than in the wall.

For indifference with respect to various acts or with respect to the absence of those acts is not sufficient for freedom. Rather, what is necessary is an internal power whereby a faculty of the sort in question is able to resolve that indifference into one or the other part.\(^{113}\)

It is noteworthy how Suárez “anthropomorphizes” or, perhaps rather, “substantiates” the situation, treating faculties as persons or things in and of themselves. This is natural, as the language of passivity and activity is carried over to the question of the faculties. Not only can different things be active with respect to other things, but faculties can also stand in this relation to one another within one and the same substance. However, this raises the question of how general the language of activity and passivity really is, and how far it can be carried to contexts for which it was not originally intended.

### 3.2.2 Freedom of Will

So, what we have arrived at is that human beings sometimes perform free actions, where free is taken in an eminent sense, transgressing mere freedom of volition. Further, we have seen how Suárez “locates” this freedom “formally” in a faculty. It remains to see in what faculty Suárez “places” this ability.

First of all, as it is a specifically human kind of freedom that we are inquiring into, it is also to specifically human faculties – i.e., faculties human beings have but other animals do not – that we must look.\(^{114}\)

The argumentation for why freedom must specifically be in the will, or the rational, appetitive faculty, is quite complex.\(^{115}\) However, one crucial and interesting part of Suárez’ argumentation involves his distinction between extrinsically and intrinsically voluntary (‘volentarius’) acts. For if a faculty

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\(^{113}\) DM XIX.2, §19; 25:699 (emphasis added). ‘ad libertatem non sufficit indifferentia ad varios actus et carentiam eorum, sed necessaria est interna vis qua talis facultas possit eam indifferentiam ad alterutram partem determinare’ [AF]

\(^{114}\) DM XIX.5, §1; 25:711.

\(^{115}\) It is in DM XIX.5, §§11-25; 25:714-9.
is formally free with respect to performing an action or not, then that action – if performed – also has to be intrinsically voluntary. However, Suárez claims that as no act of the intellect is intrinsically voluntary, the intellect cannot be formally free.\footnote{DM XIX.5, §17; 25:716. ‘nulla potentia, cujus actus non sit intrinsece voluntarius, potest esse formaliter libera quaod exercitum; sed actus intellectus non est intrinsece voluntarius; ergo intellectus non est potentia formaliter libera.’ [AF]} Why is that?

Voluntariness has to do with spontaneity; acts of animals can be voluntary and spontaneous, as opposed to the actions of plants and of inanimate things (stones, etc.). Thus, what Suárez is thus saying is that in order for a faculty to be \textit{formally free}, its \textit{actions} must be \textit{intrinsically voluntary}. Intrinsic voluntariness of actions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a faculty to be formally free. Hence, if it could be shown that acts of the intellect are \textit{not} intrinsically voluntary, then neither can the intellect be free in itself.

Suárez describes the difference between an extrinsically and an intrinsically voluntary act in the following way:

There are two ways in which an act can be voluntary. The first is \textit{extrinsically}, through a denomination taken from the act of a different faculty that moves or applies another faculty to its act, in the way that walking is voluntary when someone spontaneously moves himself. In the second way, an act is voluntary \textit{intrinsically} and through itself in the way that an act of loving is voluntary. For what is more spontaneous than an act of loving? [...] For in order for someone to love, it is not necessary that by a prior and distinct act he should will to love.\footnote{DM XIX.5, §17; 25:716. ‘duobud modis posse ac tum esse voluntarium: primo extrinsece, per denominationem ab actu alterius potentiae moventis seu applicantis aliam potentiam ad opus; quomodo deambulatio est voluntaria, quando quis sponte sua se movet. Secundo modo, est aliquid actus voluntarius intrinsece et per seipsum, ut actus amoris voluntarius est; quid enim magis spontaneum quam amare? [...] Non enim est necesse ut qui amat, priori et distinctu actu velit amare’ [AF]}

The remaining step is to establish that the intellectual faculty corresponding to this spontaneity is the will.\footnote{DM XIX.5, §18; 25:716-7. ‘actus elicitus a voluntate est per modum intrinsece et spontaneae tendentiae in objectum, et ideo talis tendentia seipsa etiam est spontanea’ [AF]}

We revisit here, from another angle, the topic of activity and passivity. For, is it not so that an act which is only extrinsically voluntary is voluntary as passive relative to an active voluntary action? One can also note Suárez’ constant drive to come to the \textit{source} of freedom/voluntariness by exactly this method.

On this picture, then, then intellect – the rational, cognitive faculty – is merely the “root,” “presupposition” or “necessary condition” for freedom.\footnote{DM XIX.5, §21; 25:717. ‘Quo sensudictum est, liberum arbitrium esse facultatem voluntatis et rationis. Est enim voluntate formaliter, rationis autem presuppositive seu radicaliter. Neque oportet cum Scoto, Henrico, et aliis disputare, qui negant rationem esse}
It is the will – the rational, appetitive faculty – which is the faculty in which all freedom resides, and from which all agency of human beings which can be called “free” in the eminent sense – free in the sense of possibly not being performed – stems, in the final analysis.

3.2.3 Different Kinds of Human Freedom

We have now arrived at what the source of freedom is in the human person – his or her will. However, we as human beings are free in many different senses of the word. What we have looked at above is the freedom to will or not to will something. This is the basic kind of freedom.

However, as we have this freedom before each and every object proposed to us, we also have the freedom to choose that which is less good in a “line-up.” This is how Suárez reasons around this case:

By the very fact that neither of the objects is proposed as necessary, the will is able not to love either of them; therefore, it is also indifferently able to love either one of them while dismissing the other.

So if we are placed in a position to will to go to mass or to go to a bar on any given Sunday – a common kind of example in Scholastic philosophy – we have the freedom to will or not will to go to mass, and we have the freedom to will or not will to go to a bar. Hence, even though we should judge one better than the other – to go to mass, presumably – we are always free to choose the less good because we are free not to will that which is better.

This free deliberation concerns ends as well as means.

So we have the freedom to choose that which is less good. However, what has been presented so far is the freedom either to perform or withhold an action with regards to an object – this is also the only kind of freedom needed when explicating how we can be free to choose the less good. This kind of freedom Suárez calls freedom of exercise, namely, the freedom to exercise or not to exercise a particular action. Over and above this – though still building on it – there are two other kinds of freedom. One is freedom of specification. This is the freedom to adopt different attitudes toward one and the same object – to love or to hate, to strive for or to counteract, etc.

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dicendum radicem libertatis, sed solum conditionem necessariam ad libertatem; nam hi auctores videntur de modo loquendi magis quam de re contendere.’ [AF]

That is, all within the sense of specifically human freedom.

DM XIX.6, §13; 25:723. ‘hoc ipso quod neutrum proponitur ut necessarium, potest voluntas utrumque non amare; ergo etiam potest indifferenter amare quodlibet illorum, praetermissa alio.’ [AF]

See DM XIX.5, §7; 25:713.

DM XIX.5, §7; 25:713. See extensive quote below, p. 88 n. 133.

Note that this action might only involve an act of will, such as love of someone or something present.
other is *freedom of reflexive specification*. This involves the freedom of the will to direct itself toward itself, and more specifically, to will against a certain act or to will its *absence*. The object of the will is, in this case, the absence of an act of will.\(^{125}\)

A free faculty’s indifference is preserved in a satisfactory way primarily and precisely through the faculty’s relation to the act or to the absence of the act. This is usually called freedom with respect to *exercise*, since it is by virtue of this freedom that the very exercise of the act is indifferent.

However, since the free faculty in question is a vital faculty, and since it is perfect and spiritual in such a way that it can reflect upon itself and upon its own movements, it follows that as often as it is able freely not to exercise a given act, it is also able, by means of some other positive act, to will that absence – that is, to will against exercising such an act. [...]

In addition, another sort [of indifference] can be found in relation to contrary acts regarding the same object, since the object is able either to be loved freely or to be held in contempt.\(^{126}\)

A free act of will falls within one of the three groups presented in the quote above. As can be seen, however, Suárez holds freedom of exercise as the primary kind of human freedom.

Are there, then, no limitations to human freedom? One could say that Suárez postulates three such limits. *First*, there is the limit of what can be rationally cognized or conceptualized by us. In order to have something as an object of will we must also – by the very nature of it – be able to have it as an object of our intellect. Thus, the ability of our intellect – the rational, cognitive faculty – sets a limit. Connected to this is also the “inability” to want something *qua* bad or evil. *Second*, it is always only with respect to particular goods that we have freedom of will. Before a universal good – such as in the beatific vision – we do have freedom of exercise, but not freedom of specification. In the presence of God, in all His infinite goodness, we cannot hate God.\(^{127}\) However, as this moves over to the purely theological

\(^{125}\)Suárez actually calls the last of these merely “freedom of specification.” However, I have adopted the terminology Alfred Freddoso proposes in his notes to the translation (p. 320 n. 15).

\(^{126}\)DM XIX.4, §9; 25:708-9. ‘indifferentiam facultatis libere primo ac precise satis salvari per habitudinem ad actum vel carentiam actus, quæ solet dici libertas quoad exercitum, quia per eam, ipsum exercitum actus indifferentis est. Cum tamen haec facultas libera vitalis sit, atque ipsis faciunt et spiritualis, ut in seipsam, et in suos motus reflectere possit, quotiescunque potest non exercere libere aliquem actum, potest etiam per alium positivum actum velle illam carentiam seu nolle exercere talem actum. [...] Praeter quum potest alia intercedere in ordine ad contrarios actus respectu ejusdem objecti, quatenus potest vel libere amari, vel etiam oderi haberi.’ [AF]

\(^{127}\)See DM XIX.8, §§15-8; 25:730-1. In this life, however, we have freedom of specification with respect to God, as God can be taken as a particular good, not a universal good. (DM XIX.8, §16; 25:731 ‘Quin potius sub hac ratione etiam ipsius Dei amor liber est, non solum quoad specificationem, quia, licet Deus secundum se sit universale bonum, apprehendi tamen
area, Suárez does not say much more on it in the DM. *Third*, we are never free with respect to the free will itself.

A created will’s movement is never free and contingent with respect to the created will itself.\(^{128}\)

To choose not to choose is also a choice.

3.2.4 Comparison to some Predecessors

How does Suárez’ account of the freedom of will stand compared to his predecessors? The area opened up by this question is of course immense. However, I will just make some points of comparisons to earlier philosophers.

In his 1998 article “Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice,” Calvin Normore sets up two broad models of freedom and choice which were around in Medieval philosophy. One was the Aristotelian/Thomist model, which was characterized by the following features:

- **a)** Everything that changes is changed by another.
- **b)** Deliberation is always with respect to means rather than with respect to ends.
- **c)** Everything sought is sought under the aspect of (that is, because it is perceived to be) good.\(^{129}\)

As a contrast to this model, Normore outlines the shapes of the voluntarist model of freedom and choice by the following features:

- **not-a)** The will is a self-mover.
- **not-b)** There is deliberation with respect to ends as well as means.
- **not-c)** The will has no necessary orientation toward the good.\(^{130}\)

Normore points to William Ockham as the main proponent of a view such as this.

Henrik Lagerlund, in his 2001 article “Buridan’s Theory of Free Choice and its Influence,” picks up on Normore’s classificatory scheme in his assessment of Buridan. Lagerlund argues that Buridan does not fall easily into either of these camps; instead, he falls into a middle position. Buridan’s theory of free choice is characterized by not-a, b, and c (i.e., the will is a

\(^{128}\) DM XIX.4, §1; 25:706. ‘motus illius [i.e. voluntatis] respectu eiusdem nunquam est liber et contingens.’ [AF]


\(^{130}\) Normore 1998 p. 31.
self-mover, deliberation only concerns means, and everything is sought under the aspect of good).\textsuperscript{131}

Where would Suárez fall in the scheme above? As we have seen, according to, Suárez the will is a self-mover (as opposed to being moved by the intellect), deliberation concerns means as well as ends, and whatever is willed is willed as something good. Suárez thus holds the positions not-a, not-b and c. This would put Suárez as well in between the Aristotelian/Thomist and the voluntarist models, although with a heavier leaning toward the voluntarist camp that Buridan.

The models as presented above, as well as the further assessments of individual philosophers in relation to them, are of course heavily simplified. However, they do capture something important concerning some points of disagreements that point to larger, structural differences in different philosophical systems.

In the framework of these models Suárez comes quite far from Thomas’ stance on will. Now, a comparison to Thomas would involve an assessment of Thomas’ philosophy on this point as well, which goes well beyond the scope of the present thesis.\textsuperscript{132} However, at some places, Suárez explicitly rejects views held by Thomas, whether Suárez mentions Thomas’ name or not. We shall look at two such places.

First, a place where Suárez does mention Thomas – along with Aristotle – and distances himself from Thomas’ view is in the process of reaching the conclusion that freedom resides in a faculty. As a form of the view that freedom is in an act, Suárez mentions the view of Thomas and Aristotle that we first intend an end and then deliberate about the means to that end. As the important aspect here is how Suárez relates himself to earlier philosophers, the passage deserves to be quoted more at length:

> Alternatively, one could object as follows. It is always the case that an act of intending the end precedes the choice of a means [to that end]. But an act of intending the end is necessary, since, as Aristotle and St. Thomas affirm, there is freedom only in the choice of the means. This, then, is the reason why a free act is always preceded by some necessary act that is the proximate principle and ground of free choice. Therefore, free choice must be posited first and foremost in that [necessary] act.

> I reply both that something false is being assumed here and that the inference is invalid. For not every act of intending an end is necessary, since there are many particular ends that we will freely, not only with respect to

\textsuperscript{131} Lagerlund 2001 p. 173.

\textsuperscript{132} For some different assessments, see e.g. Pasnau 2002 ch. 7.4 (pp. 221-33; Pasnau questions the whole division into intellectualists and voluntarists [p. 229], but makes a rather intellectualist reading of Thomas himself [see also 2008, p. 181 n. 5]), Stump 1997 (who makes an interpretation of Aquinas along more “voluntarist” lines), and Kenny 1993 (ch. 6, where he problematizes the question of labeling Aquinas, but also calls him a “compatibilist” and a “soft determinist” [pp. 77-8], i.e., he judges Aquinas to hold that human beings are both free and determined in their specifically human acts).
exercise but also with respect to specification. It is only the ultimate or highest end that we love necessarily, and this only with respect to specification and not, at least in this life, with respect to exercise.\textsuperscript{133}

As this quotation shows, Suárez sometimes does explicitly reject Aristotle’s and Thomas’ views. In other cases he treads more carefully. Consider, as a case in point, the following lines of reasoning from Suárez, where he is arguing around the question of the freedom of the will \textit{vis-à-vis} judgments of the intellect:

Finally, there are some who claim that this practical judgment is free because of the will’s loving the object, that the will itself loves the object because of a judgment of this sort, and that these two acts are causes of one another within diverse genera of causality, since the will determines the intellect to judge practically in the way in question and the intellect determines the will to will the relevant thing. And (they say) it is not impossible that these two acts should mutually precede and follow one another, since this happens within different genera of causality. \textit{For, the will determines the intellect as an efficient cause, whereas the intellect determines the will as a final cause.}

\textit{However, to my mind this doctrine is unconvincing.} For, first of all, it is wholly groundless and unnecessary for anything. And, from another angle, the mind can scarcely conceive of this sort of mutual priority between the two acts in question.\textsuperscript{134}

The main point in this quote is that Suárez rejects the view that the intellect moves the will as a final cause, and that the will moves the intellect as an efficient cause. Now, consider the following quote from Aquinas:

A thing is said to move in two ways: \textit{First}, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. \textit{In this way the intellect moves the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what al-
ters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul.\textsuperscript{135}

It is obvious that Suárez is targeting Thomas’ opinion;\textsuperscript{136} Suárez’ account is almost \textit{verbatim} from the Summa passage above.

As I wrote above, comparing Suárez and Thomas also involves interpreting Thomas. Furthermore, Suárez quotes Thomas to different effects in different places, sometimes letting him oppose Suárez’ view, sometimes complying with it, and often regarding the same issue. However, as the two quotes above show, Suárez out-rightly opposes Thomas on two crucial issues regarding freedom of will. This reinforces the assessment made above, on the background of Calvin Normore’s classificatory scheme, that Suárez does lean toward voluntarism rather than an Aristotelian/Thomist position.\textsuperscript{137}

3.2.5 Freedom of Will and Ends

What is the relation between the freedom of will, on the one hand, and end-directed agency, on the other?

First of all, \textit{end-directed behavior} – in the sense, which was spelled out in the preceding chapters, of being directed toward some future state or act of ours – \textit{is a sub-class of free acts of will}. For us to direct ourselves to an end, we need to have this end in mind in order for the will to be directed toward it. End-directedness thus \textit{presupposes} freedom, rather than free acts being a sub-class of end-directed behavior. However, there are acts of will which are not end-directed – for example, the act of loving something present. That something is present – that we are presently loving something which is before us – cannot lead to any further actions to achieve anything, as we already love this thing here and now. Of course, the prime example would be the love of God in the beatific vision – we love God, but God is not an end in the proper sense in this case as He is not something to which we have not yet

\textsuperscript{135} ST Ia, q. 82, a. 4c. ‘aliqui dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum finis; sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsam. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires’

\textsuperscript{136} Alfred Freddoso writes, as a comment on the Suárez passage above, that “[i]ncidentally, there is some reason to believe that the position Suárez here outlines and rejects is St. Thomas’s position” (Suárez 1994 p. 350 n. 8).

\textsuperscript{137} Regarding the comparison between Suárez and Thomas in general, though, what Helen Hattab writes concerning comparing them in the field of substantial form holds true in the present subject area as well: “This mode of presentation [in the DM] makes it hard for the contemporary reader of philosophical texts to appreciate its novelty, for we tend not to know Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ texts well enough to detect the subtle reinterpretations involved, and we tend to assume, rather naïvely, that the rhetoric of novelty is an adequate measure of the true extent of a philosopher’s originality. Notwithstanding our shortcomings as readers, we are now in a position to see that the view Suárez advances represents a very different way of thinking from that of Aristotle and Aquinas.” (Hattab 2009 p. 56)
attained\textsuperscript{138} – but also enjoying a painting or taking delight in music could be a case in point.

It is the restriction that an end is something which has not yet been achieved which makes directedness toward or striving for an end a sub-class of the free acts of will.

A further question to ask is what relation the two areas have within the grander scheme of Suárez’ thinking. Without becoming too speculative, it is safe to say that the discussions concerning grace and freedom of will takes a central place in Suárez’ thinking and life. This was one of the major issues of the time, reaching its climax during the Reformation era, but spilling over into the \textit{De Auxiliis}-controversy between Jesuits and Dominicans at the end of the 16\textsuperscript{th} and the beginning of the 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries.\textsuperscript{139} The matter revolved, in short terms, around the question of God’s helping grace (‘auxilium’ is Latin for help or assistance) and the nature of His special concursus with regard to human actions.\textsuperscript{140} The Jesuits accused the Dominicans of being Calvinists – putting too much stress on predestination to the detriment of free will – while the Dominicans accused the Jesuits of being Pelagians – to stress human free will to the detriment of the necessity of God’s grace for salvation.\textsuperscript{141} Suárez was highly involved in these controversies, being after Luis de Molina one of the most prominent advocates on the Jesuit side. In fact, five volumes out of 26 of his \textit{Opera omnia} are devoted to the question of grace.\textsuperscript{142} Given this background, it is obvious that the question of the freedom of will is central to Suárez’ thinking as a whole.

With this in mind, together with the evidence within the DM\textsuperscript{143}, it is reasonable to say that Suárez’ thoughts on grace and free will are also reflected in his stress of the freedom of will in the DM. Furthermore, as end-directed acts of will is a sub-class of acts of will, it is also reasonable to say that Suárez’ concern for these questions is also reflected in his treatment of final causes and final causation. I do not claim that Suárez’ treatment of final causes could be exhaustively “explained” by this connection – far from it. However, it is also important to situate his reflection regarding final causes within his broader philosophical and theological thinking.

\textsuperscript{138} God could be called an end, however, in a derived sense – as someone having been an end, but an end that has now been attained.
\textsuperscript{139} The dispute ended in 1607 by a decree from the pope, not settling the matter once and for all, but forbidding each of the two sides to call the other side heretical. The decree stated that the matter should later be resolved at “an opportune time,” a time which has not yet (2011) come. (See Schmaltz 2008 p. 184.)
\textsuperscript{140} Special as opposed to the general concursus, which we treated above. God’s special concursus is treated within theology \textit{proper}, rather than within philosophy, the scope of the DM.
\textsuperscript{141} The Jesuit school has been dubbed “liberal Jesuit Scholasticism” in Menne 1997 (p. 227).
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Opera omnia} vols. 7-11. At the outset of his treatment of grace, he states that “a free nature is the foundation of grace” (\textit{De gratia}, Prolegomenon 1, Caput 1, §1; 7:1. ‘libera natura gratiae fundamentum est’).
\textsuperscript{143} Many places where Suárez considers the beatific vision within the framework of the DM have been pointed to above.
The aspect of Suárez’ philosophical reflection concerning final causes which supposedly is most shaped by his concern for free will is his stress on the point that the end moves the will only metaphorically and that there is a transcendental relation from will to end144 (rather than a real relation from end to will, such as would be the analogue to efficient causation) in final causation. It is plausible that it is in order to exclude final causation from the kind of necessitation involved in efficient causation that Suárez repeatedly stresses these points so heavily.

However, it is also noteworthy that the reason why Suárez withdraws ends from nature (with the caveats to this claim given above), and connects it so closely to rational agency, is not connected in the same direct way to this stress on freedom. This has rather to do with the close connection between rationality and ends, as well as with the basic view that ends are essentially something not yet attained. However, the close connection between final causes and human agency, together with the importance of freedom of will for Suárez, adds up to the fact that the question of final causes and their status becomes such an important issue for Suárez.

3.3 Will and End-Directedness of Bodily Faculties

As we have seen, Suárez divides acts that are performed freely into two classes: (i) acts that are free in themselves, or intrinsically, and (ii) acts that are free extrinsically. Only acts of will fall into (i), whereas only acts that are somehow commanded by the will fall into (ii). Above we have looked at acts of will in themselves and what kind of freedom these have. But how does the will “command” acts of other faculties? And how is the freedom “transmitted” to these acts?

The basic structure of this has already been given above. When Suárez searches for the faculty that is free in itself, i.e., the faculty whose acts can be free in themselves, he has also said that acts stemming from other faculties can only acquire their freedom from the will. This says two things about these other faculties:

1. They are properly acts of another faculty than of the will;
2. They are in some way performed on the will’s command.

What remains to look at, then, is what this commanding amounts to.

In his article “Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory,” Thomas Pink maps some of the territory covered by Suárez on this topic. On Pink’s picture, Suárez worked on the background of a quite unified and traditional faculty psychology, not least finding its classical expression

144 See above p. 66, especially n. 59.
in Thomas Aquinas. However, he combines this view with the assessment that Suárez develops a quite voluntaristic view within this Thomist framework.\textsuperscript{145}

Pink paints the standard background picture of faculty psychology with respect to the will. The will and the intellect are immaterial faculties, whereas our other faculties – the locomotive faculty, the outer and inner senses, etc. – are material or bodily.\textsuperscript{146} According to Pink, acts of will have acts of the bodily faculties as their primary objects. This leads him to calling acts of the will second order acts, whereas he calls acts of the bodily faculties first order acts.\textsuperscript{147}

At this point, however, I disagree with Pink’s account. Now, this disagreement might come from the fact that Pink bases his account on Suárez’ comments on the \textit{prima secundae} of Thomas’ \textit{Summa theologiae}; it is hard to say, then, whether my disagreement stems from different readings, or from the fact that Suárez changed his mind between the different writings. Notwithstanding this, though, Pink does not quote Suárez as saying that acts of will are second order in relation to bodily acts. As we have seen, the will \textit{does} perform what could be called second order acts, i.e. acts which are directed toward the will itself. To label acts of will second order with relation to acts of bodily faculties might be confusing.\textsuperscript{148}

There are several reasons for this. The first is that there is an analogue to non-rational animals and their voluntary acts. For here we have a similar case: an appetitive faculty – in this case the sensorial appetitive – making an act of another faculty – the locomotive, for example – come into being. Pink also states this himself:

\begin{quote}
If the intrinsically voluntary in humans is the exercise of a capacity to be moved by practically rational cognitions, there is going to be an obvious ana-
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[145] Pink 2004. “The much discussed division between intellectualism and voluntarism in medieval action theory should not be allowed to obscure a far more fundamental consensus – a consensus about the essential nature of action itself. The practical reason-based conception was a property common both to a philosopher customarily classed as intellectualist such as Aquinas and to one customarily classed as voluntarist such as Scotus.” (p. 127) “Suárez worked within a generally agreed Thomist framework. However, he used that framework to express a view of freedom and agency that is far more voluntarist in tendency than Aquinas.” (p. 130) “Thus Suárez uses his view to buttress his own form of voluntarism[.]” (p. 133)
\item[146] Pink 2004. “Rational cognition and motivational responses to rational cognition took place in special rational faculties – those of intellect and will. And these faculties, as befitted the dignity of reason that placed it above matter, were immaterial. They lacked a bodily organ[.]” (p. 131)
\item[147] Pink 2004. “Whenever I give alms, the following occurs: first, there is an intrinsically voluntary or active event of my willing that I give alms [...]. This is an elicited act of the will – elicited in relation to the will because the act of the very faculty of will itself. This elicited act of the will has as its object the first order action of giving alms.” (pp. 131-2)
\item[148] At least in the sense in which Harry Frankfurt uses it when he introduces it into the contemporary debate, higher order volitions can only be directed toward other volitions. (Frankfurt 1971 and below n. 153.)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
logue of that to that of non-rational. [...] For non-rational agents will still possess some capacity to cognize, on the basis of which they can be motivated.\textsuperscript{149}

The act of will, though special in some ways, is \textit{not} different from all other faculties in its ability to extrinsically denominate the act of another faculty – whether this denomination is “free” or “voluntary.”

A second reason why it could be confusing to call acts of will second order \textit{vis-à-vis} acts of bodily faculties, is that the will is fundamentally directed toward (external) objects. Indeed, in the most paradigmatic case for Suárez – the love of God in the beatific vision – the object of the will is God, not some first order act. Here, as well, Pink and I are in agreement:

But the object to which we are moved need not be a first order action. It could be another human person, or a supernatural being.\textsuperscript{150}

Suárez’ point is that the object of the love of God is God – not some first order action with a given moral worth that is the function of this inner act to the cause.\textsuperscript{151}

From this perspective, it is perplexing why Pink sticks with terming the acts of will second order.\textsuperscript{152}

On the other hand, it is correct to say that acts of will in which bodily acts are involved do figure prominently in Suárez. As we saw above, when we intend an end, it is primarily a future act that we are intending or willing. Certainly, this act also involves an object around which it revolves – for example, when we intend to play an instrument, or have the will to see God in the beatific vision. The special kind of cognition involved in intellectual cognition also facilitates the special structure of human willing, \textit{vis-à-vis} the sensible appetites of non-rational animals and the lower parts of the human soul. Notwithstanding this, it is not as though the bodily faculties can “will” these things by themselves, and then only be ordered by the will\textsuperscript{153}; instead, it

\textsuperscript{149} Pink 2004 p. 135.
\textsuperscript{150} Pink 2004 p. 138.
\textsuperscript{151} Pink 2004 p. 143.
\textsuperscript{152} Supposedly it has to do with the kind of contrast he wants to make with the later tradition in action theory, represented in his paper by Hobbes.
\textsuperscript{153} Pink (2004) invites this kind of reading when he writes: “Voluntariness flows from the higher rational motivational faculty into other faculties of the soul, and thereby helps order the psyche.” This would make better sense within the framework of Harry Frankfurt’s philosophy of free will, where first order wills are ordered by second order acts of will, thereby deciding “who we are” or what first order acts we identify with. “Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. They share these things with the members of certain other species, some of whom even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I shall call ‘second-order desires’ or ‘desires of the second order.’ / Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives.” (Frankfurt 1971 pp. 6-7) Pink’s account is too
is by being commanded by the will that, for example, an act by the locomotive faculty even has end-directedness, in the sense that human actions have this.

Another way to approach the question of how the bodily faculties are activated by the will is to contrast the case of how the human soul moves its body (i.e. the body to which it is united) to the case of how an angel moves a body. Now, every human being has one substantial form, the soul. This is an immaterial “quasi substance,” i.e. it is like a substance, but it is naturally united to a body. The human soul is immaterial. An angel, on the other hand, is an immaterial substance, which is not naturally united to a body.56

A human being only has one soul. All its faculties are rooted in this soul, the intellectual faculties (intellect and will) as well as the bodily faculties (sight, locomotion, etc.). An angel, on the other hand, only has rational faculties. Hence, when or if an angel moves a body – and this is the only influence an angel can have on a material body – this is always a transeunt action, whereas the moving of the body from the intellectual faculties of a human being is an immanent action, it takes place “within” one and the same substance. The human soul also facilitates vital actions (seeing, sensing, etc.) of that body, unlike the “presence” of an angel to some body. In short words, the human soul informs a human body, something an angel can never do.

This is important for the present question regarding how the will is related to the faculties it commands because fundamentally, as this account gives at hand, this moving or commanding is not done “from without.” Rather, all the

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154 This approach is inspired by Schmaltz 2008 ch. 4.3.1 (pp. 163-7).
155 Suárez treats the human soul in DM XV, especially DM XV.10 (25:536-57).
156 Angels are treated in DM XXXV (26:424-77). However, the whole of Opera omnia vol. 2 is also devoted to the subject.
157 “The strongest arguments by which substantial form is proven rely on the fact that for the complete constitution of a natural being it is necessary that all the faculties and operations of the same being be rooted in one essential principle.” (DM XV.10, §64; 25:555. ‘potissimæ enim rationes, quibus osteditur substantia forma, in hoc nituntur, quod ad perfectam constitutionem naturalis entis necessarium est facultates omnes et operationes ejusdem entis in uno essentiali principio radicari’)
158 DM XXXV.6, §23; 26:475. ‘in re intellectuali nulla sit potentia activa actione immanente praeter intellectum et voluntatem’
159 DM XXXV.6, §15; 26:472. ‘intelligentiae creatae vim habent et efficaciam, ut moveant corpora locali motu, et non alio motionis genere.’
160 ‘Again, that [human] soul is the true form of the body, as faith teaches, and as is also evident by the natural light of reason. For it cannot be an attendant substance or moving the body from without; otherwise, it would not cause the body to live, nor would the functions of life depend essentially on its union with and presence to the body.’ (DM XV.1, §6; 25:499. ‘Rursus illa anima est vera forma corporis, ut docet fides, et est etiam evidens lumine naturali; non enim potest esse substantia assistens, aut extrinscece movens corpus, alias non vivificaret illud, neque ex presentia et conjunctione ejus essentialiter penderent opera vitae’ [KR])
faculties of the soul – be they immaterial or bodily – are rooted in one and the same soul. It is in and through this common root that they are also coordinated.\textsuperscript{162} It might also be good to remind ourselves at this point that it is the human person \textit{as a whole} – a soul-body unity – that is the free agent whose actions Suárez is here trying to account for.

One last angle from which we shall look at this question of how the will actualizes other faculties is through the distinction Suárez makes between vital actions and actions which are not vital when he approaches the question of how a substance is involved in accidental actions. Fundamentally, a substance is a “principal principle” of action, whereas an accident – including accidental actions – is a “proximate principle.”\textsuperscript{163} For, Suárez writes, in the case of vital actions

\begin{quote}

it is not only an accidental power but also the soul itself, through its own substance, that has within its own order a proximate influence on these actions.

Experience seems to support this thesis. For these vital actions are effected in so intimate a way that they seem to proceed in actuality from the first principle of life itself: namely, the soul. Thus it happens that even if the eye has an image present to itself and receives a [sensible] species from it, it does not see unless the soul is attentive.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

Once again, and even more clearly than above, Suárez takes recourse to the rootedness in the soul in explaining phenomena in relation to acts of specifically living agents.

We are now approaching the very boundaries of the DM, as these questions border on and even enter into areas rather covered in Suárez’ commentary on the \textit{De Anima} and his lectures on the last part of the \textit{prima} of Thomas’ \textit{Summa theologiae}. We cannot, therefore, expect a full answer here concerning the question of the interaction between will and the bodily powers. However, we have seen some partial answers to the question. The actions of the will can be free in themselves, whereas acts of other faculties can only be

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{One of the arguments for why we only have one substantial form is that if we act intensely by way of one faculty, the power of the other faculties to act is diminished. “We experience that, if a thing which has many faculties of operation acts intensely though one faulty, it is impeded so that it cannot act though another faculty or so that it cannot act through another with such great force. This is, therefore, a sign that these faculties are subordinate to the same form which operates through them as a principle.” (DM XV.1, §15; 25:502. ‘experimur enim rem aliquam habentem plures operandi facultates, dum intense per unam operatur, impediri ne per aliam operari possit, aut ne cum tanto conatu; ergo est signum illas facultates esse subordinatas eidem formae, quae per eas principaliter operatur’ [KR])}
\footnote{DM XVIII.5, §1; 25:627. ‘principium principale’, ‘principium proximum’
}\footnote{DM XVIII.5, §2; 25:628. ‘non solam facultatem accidentalem, sed etiam ipsam animam per substantiam suam, in illas proxime in suo ordine influeru. Hanc conclusionem videtur suadere experiencia; nam hae actiones vitales tam intimo modo fiunt, ut ab ipso primo principio vitae, quod est anima, actualiter procedere videantur; unde fit ut, licet oculus presentem habeat imaginem, et ab illa recipiat speciem, si anima non attendat, non videat.’ [AF]}
\end{footnotes}
free insofar as they are commanded by an act of will. In contrast to Thomas Pink, I would be reluctant to name the acts of will “second order,” as acts of will are not primarily directed to present acts, but rather to something present externally or to a future state, which characteristically involves an action from the side of the human being. Besides, it is not as though the will merely “orders” the willing of some “first order” act, but it is from acts of will that acts of bodily faculties even acquire an end-directedness in the first place.

However, what Suárez does take recourse too, in accounting for the will moving other faculties seems rather to be the common grounding of all the faculties in the one substantial soul, the immaterial soul. All the acts of a human being are grounded in the soul, and the soul is present in a special way in each of the actions proper to a living being. Hence, Suárez’ account in the DM rather points toward an account of how the will moves bodily faculties, which emphasizes the harmony and internal order between the faculties, and which in its turn is accounted for by the one substantial, immaterial form – the soul.¹⁶⁵

### 3.4 Summary and Conclusions

Some actions of human beings are free in a special sense of the word; these actions are such that they could have not taken place, though everything required for the operation was in place. This kind of freedom sets specifically human actions apart from animal actions, which can be free only in the sense of being spontaneous.

To account for these free actions, a free faculty is required. Suárez reaches the conclusion that this faculty is the will – the appetitive faculty of the rational part of the soul. Acts of other faculties can be labeled “free” extrinsically as having been commanded by the will, but only acts of the will are free intrinsically, or in themselves.

This specifically human freedom – which we share, though, with the angels and with God – comes to a number of different expressions. For example, in choosing between two different things or courses of actions judged by the intellect to be unequally good, we can choose the less good. This follows from the fact that we have the freedom to choose or not choose each of the two things, or courses of action, thus enabling us to not choose the better and to choose the less good. Furthermore, before each and every thing we have the freedom to will or not will it (freedom of exercise), to will or to will against (freedom of specification) as well as the freedom to will or to will not to will (freedom or reflexive specification), the only exception being God in the beatific vision before whom we have freedom of exercise but not of

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¹⁶⁵ For a more general treatment of these questions, not just in the case of human beings and the human soul, see Knuuttila (forthcoming).
specification (we can abstain from loving God, but we cannot hate Him). Freedom of exercise is the most basic kind of freedom.

The treatment of final causation, on the one hand, and of freedom of will and free choice, on the other, touch on and enter into each other in Suárez. Intending an end is a special kind of free, human willing. Although a bit speculative, the conclusion can still be drawn that the question of free will takes a central place in Suárez’ thinking as a whole, as it is the philosophical “forecourt” to the question of grace, the most important theological topic for Suárez. From these premises, one can also draw the conclusion that Suárez’ reflection around the status of the final cause is also shaped by his concern for the question of grace, though it is by no means wholly determined by it. That Suárez stresses that the end moves the will only in a metaphorical sense has supposedly to do with this point, whereas the close connection between rational agency and final causation in Suárez hinges on arguments largely unrelated to these concerns.

Finally, some lines regarding the kind of command the will has over other faculties were drawn up in this chapter. Note must be taken that free acts of, e.g., the locomotive faculty are actions of this faculty, at the same time as they are commanded by the will. Some concerns were raised regarding Thomas Pink’s labeling of the acts of will “second order” vis-à-vis acts of bodily faculties. Via a comparison with how angels can move a body, as well as Suárez’ discussions of how the faculties are rooted in one soul and how this soul itself expresses itself in vital acts (i.e. acts proper of living beings), a suggestion was made that Suárez stresses the inner, harmonious ordering of the soul when explicating just how the will can command other faculties.

Thus final causation in the case of human agency has been dealt with. It remains, however, to look at the role of final causation with respect to God and natural agents.
4. Excursus on *Concursus*

In his book *Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought*, Dennis Des Chene writes that, for Suárez,

> natural things, regarded as divine instruments [...] have their ends only extrinsically, and are caused by them only *per accidens*.

However, in a review of this book, Stephen Menn has leveled some quite serious criticism against this particular interpretation of Suárez. According to Menn, it is incorrect to say that ends are only extrinsic and accidental to acts of natural agents. He goes on to say that his biggest difference with Des Chene regards Suárez’ view on God’s *concursus*. Thus, in order to understand Menn’s objection to Des Chene, and the argument for why ends are intrinsic to actions of natural agents, we must turn to Suárez’ view on this *concursus* of God.

What does God’s *concursus* – or God’s concurrence, as it is also called – denote? God is the efficient cause of everything that is created in three different ways: he has created everything, he conserves everything, and he concurs with every act of created things. Now, regarding the first two, God’s creation and conservation, they are really one and the same act, according to Suárez; the act of concurrence, on the other hand, is an act which is separate from these. Furthermore, the act of creation and conservation pertain to created things themselves. God’s concurrence, on the other hand, pertains to the actions of created things. God’s concurrence is God’s co-operation in the actions – the efficient causations – of things.

Regarding this concurrence, Suárez writes that

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1 Des Chene 1996 p. 197.
2 Actually, the passage quoted from Des Chene above does not directly refer to Suárez. However, Des Chene seems to include Suárez among those who held this view. Menn also argues that this is Des Chene’s final stance on Suárez in the book. See Menn 2000 p. 123, especially n. 3.
4 Menn 2000 p. 124.
5 In a response to Menn’s article, Des Chene writes that he is “inclined to agree” with Menn on the issue at hand, though with some qualifications. (Des Chene 2000 pp. 154ff.)
6 Each of these types of actions of God is treated in DM 20, 21 and 22, respectively.
7 DM 22, on God’s concurrence, is translated into English (see Bibliography). For a discussion on concurrence, see also Freddoso 1991 (where Suárez’ treatment is compared to that of earlier philosophers) and 2002 pp. xcv-cxxi as well as Schmaltz 2008 pp. 40-4.
God’s concurrence with respect to outside things is nothing other than the secondary cause’s action itself.\(^8\)

So, whereas Suárez holds that a concurrence from the side of God is necessary for an action to take place and be efficacious, he also holds that this concurrence is identical to the secondary cause’s action itself.\(^9\)

This prompts Menn to write that

> although Suárez thinks that only the actions of cognizing agents can be properly effects of a final cause, he thinks that the actions of natural agents are effects of a final cause, because these actions are also God’s actions: they are not merely commanded by God’s actions, they are identical with God’s actions.\(^10\)

Menn further comments that the idea that two efficient causes – God and the secondary cause – can produce one effect by one and the same action “initially seems a bit paradoxical.”\(^11\) However, our focus will not be so much on how this is possible\(^12\) as on what the final cause or end amounts to in this context, and how it is related to the kind of end we have encountered above, in the context of human agency.

First of all, though, we have used “end” and “final cause” interchangeably above. Are these really the same thing? Might it be so that an action of a natural agent has an end but is not the products of a final cause? Indeed, Suárez quotes Gabriel Biel to this effect. As Menn writes, Des Chene also seems to rely heavily on this distinction in his reading of Suárez.\(^13\) However, just after he has quoted Gabriel Biel on this point, Suárez writes that “this

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\(^8\) DM XXII.3, §5; 25:827. ‘concursus Dei ad extra nihil alius sit quam ipsamet actio causae secundae’ [AF]

\(^9\) That God’s concursus is identical to the action of the secondary cause also seems absent from the discussion of teleology in Schmid 2011 (in chapter 2, on Suárez, pp. 107-161). Schmid states that “[i]n the actions of God there are no final causes at play, but exemplary causes” (Schmid 2011 p. 141; ‘Bei Gottes Handlungen sind keine Finalursachen im Spiel, sondern Exemplarursachen.’). This gives him problems regarding certain quotes from Suárez, where Suárez writes that there are final causes at play in actions of God; Schmid admits this and tries to solve it in different ways (Schmid 2011 pp. 146ff.). However, for Schmid, the end-directedness remains extrinsic in the final analysis (p. 159). Taking note of the difference between God’s creation, conservation and concursus shows a way out of this textual dilemma.

\(^10\) Menn 2000 p. 124 (Menn’s emphasis).

\(^11\) Menn 2000 p. 129.

\(^12\) Suárez argues that it is possible partly from the fact that the two principles are of “different orders” (DM XXII.3, §5; 25:827. ‘diversi ordinis’). However, the main argument for God’s action not being something other than the secondary cause’s is that it would lead to an infinite regress. (DM XXII.3, §5; 25:827) Stephen Menn has summarized Suárez’ argument in the following way: “When God creates an action A, his action of creating A is either the same action as A, or a different action from A. If it is a different action, B, then B is also a creature, so God also has an action of creating B; and there will be an absurd infinite regress. The only reasonable conclusion is that God’s action of creating A is identical with A itself.” (Menn 2000 p. 129)

\(^13\) Menn 2000 p. 123.
way of speaking is not totally satisfying,” thereby indicating that he does not himself adopt this way of differentiating final cause from end. Indeed, Suárez does seem to use the terms “end” (‘finis’) and “final cause” (‘causa finalis’) interchangeably. The difference between final causation in human agency and in God/nature must be spelled out in a different way.

In order to do this, we will instead look at two other distinctions that Suárez makes. The first distinction is that between the **immanent** and **transeunt** actions of God. The second distinction is between the **proximate** and **ultimate** end of an action.

So, first, what does the distinction between God’s immanent and transeunt actions amount to? Fundamentally, God’s immanent acts are God’s acts within himself, whereas God’s transeunt acts refer to the acts which are from God, but which take place outside of God. God’s act of loving himself, for example, is an immanent act. However, the act where this act of self-love is extended to created things – i.e., when God loves creatures for the sake of his own goodness – is also an immanent act. As we have seen above, however, there is no efficient causality coming into play within God. As final causality is always somehow related to efficient causality according to Suárez, there is no final causality in these immanent acts either.

In the divine will there is no true efficiency around an immanent act within himself, also as freely terminating toward an external object. Therefore, neither can any true final causality take place around such an act. The consequent holds from what has been said above; for, final causality does not take place except in an ordering toward efficient causality.15

So an act internal to God cannot have a final cause. This also seems to **prima facie** preclude that a transeunt action of God could have a final cause. For, in human agency, an external action could only have an end if it is directed by the will.16 However, as the will of God cannot be moved by an end – as we have seen – it seems impossible for there to be any final cause for an external action of God, as well.17

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14 DM XXIII.9, §9; 25:884. ‘hic modus dicendi non omnino satisficit’ [*]

15 DM XXIII.9, §4; 25:883. ‘in divina voluntate nulla est vera efficacitatis circa actum immanentem in ipsa, etiam ut libere terminatum ad objecta externa; ergo nec vera causalitas finis habere potest locum circa talem actum. Consequentia patet ex superius dictis; nam causalitas finis non habet locum nisi in ordine ad causalitatem efficientem.’ [*]

16 As was seen in chapter 3, above.

17 “A reason for doubting [whether final causation could take place in God’s external actions] is gathered from what has thus far been gathered from the created intellectual agents. For in these, final causality does not take place in the external action unless by means of (‘media’) causality in the very will of the agent cause. But the end cannot exert (‘habere’) its causality in the will of God, [and] therefore neither in the effects or external actions which proceed from this will.” (DM XXIII.9, §1; 25:882. ‘Ratio dubitandi sumitur ex hactenus dictis de agentibus intellectualibus creatis; nam in his non habet locum causalitas finis quoad actiones externas, nisi media causalitate in ipsam voluntatem causæ agentis; sed finis non potest
The solution to this dilemma is that the final causality that takes place on account of God’s transeunt actions is different from the final causality we find in human agency. For, whereas the end exerts its causality on the human will by “moving” it, the end in God’s external actions is an end on account of God “applying” or “freely determining himself” toward this end. According, God could not even metaphorically be said to be moved by an end in his transeunt actions.

The question still remains, though, whether a transeunt action of God is different from an immanent action. If this were not the case, the affirmation of final causation with respect to God’s transeunt actions would still seem to conflict with the denial of final causation concerning God’s immanent actions. However, as we have seen, God’s act of concurrence is the action of the creature. Therefore, this act cannot be said to be in God, but within the world. Hence, concurrence is an example of a transeunt action of God, an act of God which is external to God himself. Nothing therefore hinders that this act has a final cause, as opposed to an internal act of God having one. And so Suárez spells it out that an act of a natural agent has an end, not insofar as it is of the natural agent, but insofar as it is of God.

But here we come to the other distinction, the one between the proximate and the ultimate end. Because this conclusion – that an end, and therefore final causation, is involved in the acts of natural agents – is first drawn regarding the proximate or immediate effects of these acts. And it is these effects – these termini of the actions – that are final causes, from the point of view that they are also transeunt actions of God.

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habere causalitatem suam in voluntatem Dei; ergo neque in effectus, vel actiones externas, qua ab illa voluntate procedunt.’ [*])

18 The uncreated intellectual agent, or God, “applies (as I say) or freely determines himself to freely love and operate” (DM XXIII.9, §9; 25:884. ‘esse applicat (ut ita dicam) seu determinat ad libere amandum et operandum’[*]).

19 At one place, Suárez says that the end in nature could be said to move God metaphorically in a metaphorical sense (sic!), as it is compared to the human case. (DM XXIII.9, §5; 25:883. ‘Atque ita com dicitur se amare, metaphorice motus vel illectus a bonitate sua, locutio est metaphorica, sumpta ex modo quo nos concipimus res divinas ad modum humanorum.’)

20 Given, that is, that God and the created world are not identical, which Suárez (of course) holds they are not.

21 “For a transeunt act of God is not God, nor is it in God, but in the creature. And therefore it can have a final cause and be ordered to an end.” (DM XXIII.9, §12; 25:885. ‘nam actio Dei transiens non est Deus, nec in Deo, sed in creatura; et ideo habere potest causam finalem, et ordinari in finem.’ [*])

22 “The actions of these natural agents are for an end and are effects of a final cause. Not, however, as precisely going out from these natural agents, but as they simultaneously are from the first agent, who operates in and through everything.” (DM XXIII.10, §5; 25:887. ‘actiones horum agentium naturalium esse propter finem, et esse effecta causa finalis. Non tamen ut praecise egrediuntur ab ipsis naturalibus agentibus, sed ut simul sunt a primo agente, quod in omnia et per omnia operatur.’ [*])
Although God does not have an end of his being, his transeunt actions have an end, which can be something outside of God if it is a proximate end.\(^{23}\)

So with respect to the immediate effect, every action of a natural agent has a final cause – the final cause being this immediate effect or terminus.\(^{24}\)

But once this is established, we can also say that there are chains of such final causes. Every such chain has a “last” final cause.\(^{25}\) However, there must also be an ultimate end of all such particular last ends; and this ultimate end is God.\(^{26}\) So all created things have God as the ultimate end.

One important problem with this account comes with the agency of human beings.\(^{27}\) For it seems problematic to say that immoral actions of human beings are directed at God as the highest good and ultimate end.\(^{28}\) To understand how this could be the case, we should now go back to look at concurrence. For concurrence is given to the actions of different things in accordance with how these things act.\(^{29}\) So, when concurrence to an action of a natural agent is given, this concurrence regards only one act. Hence, in a sense, the concurrence necessitates this specific action. When it comes to human beings, on the other hand, and their actions, God’s concurrence allows for the possibility of several different actions.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{23}\) DM XXIII.9, 12; 25:885. ‘licet Deus non habeat finem sui esse, habet tamen finem suae actionis transeuntis, qui si sit finis proximis, esse potest aliquid extra Deum’ [*]

\(^{24}\) “[T]he action could be said to be ordered to its terminus as to its end.” (DM XXIII.9, §12; 25:885. ‘actio dici potest ordinar in termunm, ut in suum finem’ [*])

\(^{25}\) “In every series, or intention, and action for an end there is necessarily an ultimate end, either negatively – that is, [an end] which is not ordered to another end in this series or by force of intention – or also positively [and] relatively (‘secundum quid’). (DM XXIV.1, §2; 25:890. ‘in omni serie, seu intentione, et actione propter finem, necessario dandus est aliquid finis ultimus, vel negative, id est, qui ad alium finem in illa serie seu ex vi illius intentionis non ordinetur, vel etiam positive secundum quid’ [*]) If there is only the proximate final cause, then this is presumably the last final cause of its “chain” of final causes.

\(^{26}\) “There is also some ultimate end simply taken (‘simpliciter’) with respect to all things, both of particular ends and of their coordination. This [ultimate end] is the selfsame God.” (DM XXIV.1, §9; 25:892. ‘etiam datur aliquid finis ultimus simpliciter respectu omnium rerum, et particularium finium, et coordinationum eorum, qui est ipsamet Deus.’ [*])

\(^{27}\) According to Suárez, the question of the ultimate end is actually best treated in the context of moral philosophy. The case of human beings is therefore pivotal with regards to the question of the ultimate end. (DM XXIV.[Prooemium]; 25:890. ‘Quanquam disputatio de ultimo fine propria sit philosophorum moralium, tamen non potest metaphysica, quae suprema sapientia naturalis est, illam omnino prætermittere’ [*])

\(^{28}\) “You say that this[i.e. that God is the ultimate end] cannot be true generally. For although this seems possible and in lack of inconvenience regarding merely natural as well as free and honest actions, regarding free and sinful actions this seems both indecent and impossible.” (DM XXIV.2, §13; 25:897. ‘Dices, non posset hoc in universum verum esse; nam, licet in actionibus mere naturalibus et in liberis honestis videatur possibile et in sine inconvenienti, tamen in actionibus liberis et peccaminosis videtur hoc et indecens et impossible’ [*])

\(^{29}\) “God offers concurrence to each secondary cause in a mode accommodated to its nature.” (DM XXII.4, §21; 25:834. ‘Deus praebet unicumque causae secundae concursum modo accommodate naturae ejus.’ [*])

\(^{30}\) “For to natural agents the divine will offers concurrence only with respect to a single act, whereas to free agents it offers a concurrence which, insofar as it concerns itself, is sufficient
And it is here that a solution to the question regarding immoral acts suggests itself. For, these acts are immoral only insofar as they lack something – i.e., insofar as a human being him- or her-self intends an ultimate end that is not God. However, insofar as these acts are, they are good, God concurs with them, and they also have God as an ultimate end. This also nicely shows the double structure of human actions: they are for an end insofar as God concurs with them, but they also have an end insofar as they are from human beings, rational agents. That is, human beings can freely determine their own ends; in this matter, human beings differ from natural agents.

As Stephen Menn rightly points out in his argument against Dennis Des Chene, all acts in nature are directed toward an end, both proximately and ultimately. However, as we have also seen, the structure of how the final cause exerts its influence is quite different in the case of human beings – the case Suárez has in mind when he speaks of final causes generally – compared to the case of acts by natural agents. For, in the case of human beings, the end exerts its influence by being an end for the human agent or for the human will, “moving” this human will. Through this, external acts of human beings can also be end-directed, as when a limb is voluntarily moved with respect to a certain end. In the case of natural agents, the end-directedness also comes about by a rational agent, which in this case is God. However, in this case, the final cause does not exert its influence by “moving” the rational agent, in this case God – not even metaphorically. On the contrary, the end comes about by God acting toward the terminus of the action of the natural

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31 “The whole argument could and should be conceded regarding sinful actions, insofar as they are sinful. For the objection proceeds, strictly speaking, only concerning these as such. For as such they are repugnant to God’s goodness, and concerning these we confess that they are, as such, not from God as from an ultimate end. Neither is this inconvenient, because as such they are neither from God as from a first agent, because as such they are not actions but defects of actions. Wherefore it should be further added [that] these actions, although they are sinful with respect to the secondary cause, are also actions of God, insofar as they are actions, and as such they are in themselves and immediately of and for the ultimate end.” (DM XXII.4, §21; 25:834 [translation modified]. ‘Est ergo aliud discrimen inter modum quo divina voluntas offert concursum naturalibus et libris agentibus, quia illis solum ad unum actum præbet concursum; his autem ad plures actus offert sufficientem concursum, quantum est de se’ [*])

32 This can also be spelled out with regard to what kind of end the secondary causes have. As we have seen, for human beings, an end is a formal end. In contrast to this, Suárez settles that God is the ultimate end objectively from the side of the creatures, and that he is the ‘finis cui’ or beneficiary (“the end for whom”) with respect to himself. See DM XXIV.1, §§16-17.
The terminus of the agent is the final cause. It is not so much that the secondary agent “intends” the end, as it is that it is “led” toward the end in its action by the fact that the action is also an action of God. This structure is first given in the case of the proximate end, but is also carried through with respect to the ultimate end, or God himself.

In a final analysis, one could ask how big a difference there really is in the two cases. Surely, God cannot be moved by an end, not even metaphorically, but rather moves the secondary cause by intending the end, the terminus, of the action of the secondary cause (which, at the same time, is identical with God’s concurrence). On the other hand, as we have seen, the sense in which the human will could be said to be “moved” by the end is very loose; it is not so much that the end moves the human will as that the human will directs itself to the end freely.

Disregarding the fact that God is unlimited and the human person limited, the biggest difference between the setting of an end in the case of God and of human beings seems to be the ways in which this end is carried over to acts “outside” their will. For in the case of God, the transeunt act of concurrence is identical to the act with which it concurs. The end is, thus, intrinsic to this act, although in a complicated way. In the case of the human will, on the other hand, the end it sets for itself is carried over by way of a command to powers extrinsic to it.

Another difference could lie in the sense in which the human will is moved metaphorically, whereas the will of God is moved metaphorically metaphorically. For the metaphorical part of the moving of the human will lies in the way the end “moves” the will; this is because the human will is rather a self-mover. However, the human will is moved, in the sense that it is

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33 “As has often been said, final causality is best understood with respect to an agent, as an agent, or to an act of an agent.” (DM XXIV.2, §7; 25:896. ‘ut sæpe dictum est, causalitas finis optime intelligitur per respectum ad agens, ut agens est, seu ad actionem agentis.’ [*])
34 Here, I think, is one good reason why it is better to focus on God’s concurrence when dealing with final causation with respect to God than, for example, on exemplary causes and the creation, as Schmid does. (Schmid 2011 pp. 145-57) For, the end of agent is constituted in and by God’s concurrence in its action; hence, the end of the thing “itself” is secondary with respect to the primary constitution of this end in action. It could also be said, with respect to this topic, that Suárez only once mentions final causation when dealing with creation – and this very briefly, in a discussion on other philosophers – and not at all with respect to conservation, whereas it is treated extensively in the context of concurrence. Further, exemplary causation is only a kind of efficient causation for Suárez – see above p. 50 n. 3 – and so what goes for God’s efficient causation (creation, conservation, concurrence) also goes for this. However, there might be some point to Schmid’s focus on creation and exemplary causation that I have missed.
35 “When God acts for an end, this is not an act for his end, but for the end toward which he orders the thing which he effects.” (DM XXIV.2, §10; 25:896. ‘cum Deum agere propter finem, non sit agere propter finem suum, sed propter finem ad quem ordinat eam rem quam efficit’ [*])
36 Hence, God is directed toward Himself with His will in two different ways: by an immanent act and by transeunt acts. In the immanent act of willing – or loving – Himself, God is not His own final cause; in the transeunt acts, however, He is His own final cause.
changed, although this change rather comes from within itself. In the case of God’s will, on the other hand, we do not even have this change; God’s will is eternal and immutable, as we saw above. Hence, God’s will is unlike the human will in that it cannot change; and it is in this sense that it can only be said to be moved metaphorically in a metaphorical sense, as it can only be said to be moved in a sense transposed from the human case (which is itself only a movement in a metaphorical sense).

I am not here suggesting that the human person becomes a god in Suárez’ philosophy; there are countless differences between them. However, in the case of final causes, which are the focus of the present study, one can note that the modus operandi of the end with respect to God’s (transeunt) actions and with respect to the actions of the human being seems to collapse insofar as the human being also sets an end rather than is led by this end. When the human will is said to be “moved,” it rather freely sets its own end – just as God freely chooses ends. Thereafter, though, the other powers of the human being – the locative power, etc. – could truly be said to be moved by the will. What rather differentiates the human act of will toward an end from that of God is that the human act of will is, first, limited with regards to which end could be thought of, second, dependent on the concurrence of God to even be possible, and third, changeable, as opposed to God’s immutable will.
5. The Ontological Status of the End

Having looked at Suárez’ notion of a cause in general (chapter 1), and his treatment of final causes more specifically (chapter 2), we have established that final causation is limited to rational agency, i.e. agency of rational agents, with a certain preeminence accorded to human agency on the grounds that final causation is primarily known to us from this case. We have also looked at what role final causation plays in the field of human psychology (chapter 3), as well as in the action of nature and/or God (chapter 4). What remains, therefore, from what we set out to do is to look at the ontological status of the final cause, or end, when it is involved in human agency. What status does the end have with respect to the human intellect and the human will when it causes?

As will be seen, the reason why different philosophers have given different answers to this question, according to Suárez, is that the question has been interpreted in different ways. We shall see that in order for us to find the ends, we will have to follow Suárez to the very outskirts of being. Ends as objects for human beings – this is the thesis of the present chapter – are beings of reason, and thus outside the territory of metaphysics proper.¹

In the first part of this chapter, we shall look at some precursors to Suárez in the treatment of the present question.² This account should not be taken as an attempt to give an exhaustive overview of the question up until Suárez’ times, but rather to relate some pieces of the puzzle particularly relevant in contextualizing Suárez. After this account, Suárez’ basic take on the question will be examined. This will then lead us to three small special studies in the area of metaphysics. First, we will have to look at the relation between real being, essence and existence. Second, we will look at what relation – if any – obtains between the end and its effect. Third and last, we will take a sneak-peek into the “beings of reason,” the antipode of real beings, where our search for the ends will have led us.

¹ We deal with questions of ontology rather than moral psychology in this chapter. Moral psychology has already been treated, in chapter 3.
² A full treatment of the precursors Suárez himself mentions on the central question of whether we are moved by the real or by the cognized being of the end is given in the Appendix.
5.1 Background in the History of Philosophy

The question of the status of the end with respect to agency was a topic already in Aristotle. However, in the more immediate background of the discussion of the topic in the Latin Middle Ages stand Avicenna (~980-1037) and Averroes (1126-1198); two archetypical representatives of two different answers to the question. Their respective stances on the question were to shape the discussion right up to Suárez’ time.

5.1.1 Avicenna and Averroes

Avicenna’s and Averroes’ respective treatment of the question regarding the status of the end vis-à-vis the rational faculties were driven by two different sets of philosophical intuitions.

On the one hand, it seems that when humans intend an end, the person is moved by something mental. It is not something really existing “out there” which is the end; indeed, the intended end needs never be realized. The only ground for the end “moving” us, for being able to be an object of our will, is whatever reality it may have in our mind. This is the line taken by Avicenna, as exemplified by the following quotes:

As for [the final cause’s being prior to the other causes] in the agent’s soul, this is because it [the final cause] comes to exist first and then the agency, seeking out a receptive patient, and the quality of the form come to be represented as images. [...]

Therefore, in terms of THINGNESS and in terms of existence in the intellect, there is no cause prior to the final cause. [...]
The final cause is a cause not insofar it is an existent, but insofar as it is a thing.\(^8\)

On the other hand, it isn’t something mental that we have in mind when we strive to achieve an end. We do not want the thought of food; we want food! This and similar intuitions are stressed by Averroes in his working out of the ontological status of the end.\(^9\) Averroes thus claims that the end as it is in the mind is but an efficient cause, whereas what I really strive for is something external to my mind – for example food or a bath.\(^10\)

This is distinct and multiple only in us, I mean that which moves us locally as efficient cause and that which moves us as a final cause, because it has two modes of existence, one in the soul and one outside the soul. Insofar as it exists in the soul it is the efficient cause of motion, and insofar as it exists outside the soul, it is mover as end. For instance, the form of the baths is on the one hand in the soul and on the other outside the soul. When the form which is in the soul arises in us, we desire it and it moves us toward it, I mean toward the form which is outside the soul, it impels us to enter it. The form of the baths, insofar as it is in the soul is the efficient cause of the desire and of the motion, and insofar as it is outside the soul it is the end of the motion, not its agent.\(^11\)

The archetypical positions are thus described by Anneliese Maier:

[According to Avicenna] the end does not function as a cause ut est extra, but ut est in anima. In other words, it is not the as of yet not realized external end which is to be regarded as the final cause, but rather the representation of this end. [...] Against this opinion Averroes had objected that the representation of the desirable end as it is in the soul is to be regarded as an efficient cause, not as a final cause. He explicates this objection by an example which was to be much quoted: were I to want to take a bath then the form of the bath inquantum est in anima is the cause of the form of the bath which is outside the soul being desired; the first is thus the efficient, the latter the final cause.\(^12\)

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\(^8\) Theology (al-Ilāhiyyat) (being volume I, book 5, of Healing [al-Shifa’]) VI.5, quoted in Wisnovsky 2003 p. 162.

\(^9\) It is relevant to remind ourselves, at this point, of the fact that Averroes lived and worked around 150 years later than Avicenna; Averroes thus has the advantage of being able to explicitly respond to Avicenna in his argumentation.

\(^10\) Later, in the Latin Middle Ages, this was to be specified so that what we strive for is rather eating food or taking a bath – the end is an act rather than an object. See Maier 1955 pp. 282-3.

\(^11\) Quoted from Genequand 1984 p. 149 (commentary on book XII, ch. 7/text 36 [1072a26ff.]).

\(^12\) Maier 1955 p. 282. “das finis wirkt nicht als Ursache ut est extra, sondern ut est in anima. Mit andern Worten: es ist nicht das noch nicht realisierte äussere Ziel, das als causa finalis anzusehen ist, sondern die Vorstellung dieses Ziels. [...] Dieser Auffassung hatte Averroes entgegengehalten, dass die Vorstellung des angestrebten Ziels ut est in anima als causa efficiens anzusehen ist, aber nicht als causa finalis. Er erläutert diesen Einwand an einem später viel zitierten Beispiel: wenn ich ein Bad nehmten will, dann ist die forma balnei inquantum est in anima die Ursache dafür, dass die forma balnei, quae est extra animam angestrebt wird; jene ist also die Wirk-, diese die Zweckursache.”
According to Maier, the Averroist line was generally taken in the 13th century, whereas an Avicennian line was taken in the 14th century.¹³

5.1.2 Duns Scotus

In his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) – a generally important thinker to take into account when trying to understand Suárez – distinguishes between the end as a cause and the end as an effect.¹⁴ As a cause, the end is a final cause, drawing the agent to it, thus moving the agent “metaphorically.”¹⁵ The end as a final cause exists in the mind of an agent.¹⁶ As an effect, on the other hand, the end exists extra-mentally.¹⁷ However, the end as extra-mental is not a cause at all, but only an effect.

Fundamentally, then, Scotus tries to take a mediating *via media* between Avicenna and Averroes. He basically agrees with both; the end is in the agent’s mind, but it is also extra-mental. However, the really interesting part – at least from our perspective – comes when Scotus tries to work out the ontological status the end has as the final cause. Scotus here relies on his distinction between objective and formal being. In the very last passage of the question of his commentary of the *Metaphysics* where he deals with the question of whether the end is a principle and a cause, Scotus writes that

> [b]y holding the first way, therefore, that the end is a cause insofar as it is in the mind of the agent, we must note that it is there as objective and formal being. Objective being is real being. Formal being is that, by which it is now something intended, and this is being in intention. For example, if I understand a rose to be existing, and the object understood is a thing; objectively there is a species or likeness formally in the understanding or intellect.¹⁸

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¹³ Maier 1955 p. 284. Avicenna’s views on final causality are described as “enormously influential” in Pasnau 2001 p. 303.
¹⁴ Scotus *In Metaphysicam* V, q. 1. In § 4 (the paragraphs in this work referring to numbering in translation used; see Bibliography), Scotus objects to the reality of the final cause on the ground that if it were a cause of the efficient cause, and the efficient cause a cause of the end, the natural hierarchy of prior and posterior, cause and caused, breaks down. In answering this (in §§ 31-32), he writes that “priority is equivocal, just as causality is equivocal” and that the “efficient [cause] is the cause of the end qua effecting, whereas the end is the cause of the efficient [cause] insofar as it is desirable.”
¹⁵ *In Metaphysicam* V, q. 1, § 39. “note that the Philosopher when he speaks of end, says that it moves metaphorically.” Scotus seems to concur with Aristotle here.
¹⁶ *In Metaphysicam* V, q. 1, § 77. “the [end] is a cause insofar as it is in the mind of the agent”
¹⁷ *In Metaphysicam* V, q. 1, § 29. “[the end] is first according to the being it has in the mind of the agent, and last according to the being it has in matter”
¹⁸ *In Metaphysicam* V, q. 1, § 77 (translation slightly modified). ‘Tenendo ergo primam uiam, quod est causa in quantum est in intentione agentis, notandum quod est ibi quasi esse objectiuum et esse formale. Esse objectiuum est esse reale; formale est illud quo nunc illud intentum est, et hoc est esse in intentione. Exemplum: si intelligo rosam existentem, et objectum intellectus est res, objectiue formaliter in intellectu est species.’
The end does not exist in itself, but in the mind, so it has *objective* reality. However, this objective reality – the status of being an object to the mind, a mental object – is *formally* in the mind. The end is thus “formally objectively” (‘objective formaliter’) in the mind.\(^{19}\)

In his paper on the precursors to Descartes’ concept of objective being, Calvin Normore draws from other sources to elucidate what Scotus means by ‘esse objectivum.’\(^{20}\) As Normore presents it, Scotus takes as his starting point the question of God’s understanding of knowable things.\(^{21}\) As God is unchangeable, it would be problematic if a change in the created world – e.g. the destruction of something – would involve change in God. Hence, the relation of understanding from God to created things is of the kind that does not involve a change in the subject of the relation if the relation ceases to be. God understands his own essence under a non-relational concept, but He understands other things so that there is a real relation from the thing understood to God, but not the other way around. So, if God understands a stone – the example Scotus takes – the relation “God understands the stone” really has the form “the stone is understood by God.” The thing understood Scotus also calls “idea.”\(^{22}\)

According to Normore, this discussion is also carried over to the human understanding; for, as understood, a thing only has “cognized being” or “diminished being.” According to Scotus,

> if it were supposed that I had been from eternity and that from eternity I had understood a rose then from eternity I understood a rose according to its *esse essentiae* and according to its *esse existentiae* and however it had no *esse* except *esse cognitum*. [...] Hence the terminus of understanding is *esse essentiae* or *esse existentiae* – and however that which is the object of the understanding has only *esse diminutum* in the understanding.\(^{23}\)

Notice here how *esse existentiae* and *esse essentiae* go hand in hand, in accordance with Scotus rejection of the real distinction between essence and existence. This, I think, has bearing on the question of the end. For one could be inclined to say that the end, before it exists extra-mentally, has “essential being” but not “existential being,” whereas the latter is “added” if or when the end is created. This road, however, is not – as was noted – open for Scotus. Instead he has to say that that which is the object of the intellect and the will has “objective being” (or “cognized being” or “diminished being”).

\(^{19}\) What kind of distinction obtains, then, between the objective and the formal concept? In an article on mental content in Scotus, Peter King has argued that they are *formally* distinct. (King 2004 pp. 82-3n.35) However, he adds that this “does seem to be a case of *obscurum per obscurius,*” i.e., of explaining the obscure by what is (yet) more obscure.

\(^{20}\) Normore 1986.

\(^{21}\) Normore is here referring to Scotus’ *Commentary on the Sentences*.

\(^{22}\) Normore 1986 p. 232.

\(^{23}\) Quote from Scotus’ *Lectura* from Normore 1986 p. 232.
Returning to the first quote above, Scotus writes that it is the objective being which is the “real being.” The objective being is that which is intended by our minds, whereas the formal being is just that by which this object is intended. When Scotus writes that the end has “objective and formal being” in the mind, it seems to fit well with what he writes in the latter quote, that it has “diminished being” in the mind.24 It is “as if” the end is in the mind – the end is comprehended as if it were existing (esse existentiae), and as if it were like this or this (esse essentiae) – though it really only has being in a diminished sense.25

Anneliese Maier describes the medieval discussion of final causes as a navigation between the Schylla of Avicenna and the Charybdis of Averroes. Tying together Scotus’ treatment of the intellect with that of the will – and succinctly summarizing some of what has been presented above – she writes that:

the end functions [...] in accordance with the objective being it has in the soul. But the final cause always effects metaphorically and never in the sense of a real influence which the idea in the intellect would somehow have on the human decision-making of the will. Such an opinion was totally out of the question for Scotus. The end or, in other words, the appetibile is in no way the adequate cause which brings the appetitus about, but it is aliquid ibi faciens, in that it moves metaphorically, in a transferred sense, while the appetite moved in this way on its side effective et realiter set the limbs in motion in order to reach or realize this appetible.26

24 It thus seems that Marilyn McCord Adams is wrong in her article on Scotus on final causation when she writes that “on Scotus’s account, the end does not have to be real in order to function as a final cause” (Adams 2000 p. 165) as the end is accorded some reality, although diminished, just by being an object of the mind. However, if Adams is referring to something like “existing extra-mentally” when referring to “real,” this seems quite right, as the end only needs “potential, intentional or intelligible being” (Adams 2000 p. 166) in order to cause.

25 One could ask how the extra-mentally existing end can come about from something with “diminished being.” This seems to counter some metaphysical laws on the hierarchy between cause and effect, as well as between causes. (I.e., that the cause is nobler than its effect, and that the final cause is nobler than the efficient cause. See King 2003 pp. 38-42.) However, Scotus solves this by referring to the existence that the end has in the divine mind before it comes into existence in the created world. “I say therefore that the effect does have a truer sort of being in the cause than it does extra-mentally, because it has divine existence in its cause, which [divine] existence is indeed the cause of its existence [extra-mentally].” (In Metaphysicam V, q. 1, § 28 [slightly revised].) Thus, when it comes to the creation or coming-about of the end, reference is made to God and His creative power in order to abide by the metaphysical laws, e.g. that that cause must have more reality than the effect.

26 Maier 1955 p. 284 with references to Scotus’ In Metaphysicam V, q. 1 (which was referenced above) and In Sententiam II, d. 25, q. 1. ‘das Ziel wirkt [...] secundum esse objective quod habet in anima. Aber die Zweckursache wirkt immer nur metaphorice, und niemals im Sinn eines realen Einflusses, den etwa die Vorstellung im Intellekt auf die menschliche Willensentscheidung hätte. Eine derartige Auffassung wäre für Duns völlig ausgeschlossen. Das Ziel, oder anders gesagt: das appetibile ist keinesfalls die hinreichende Ursache um den appetitus zum Wirken anzuregen, aber es ist aliquid ibi faciens, indem es in übertragener Bedeutung, metaphorice, bewegt, während der so bewegte appetitus dann seinerseits effective et realiter die Glieder in Bewegung setzt, um jenes appetibile zu erlangen oder zu realisieren.’
She ends with the statement that this is, all in all,

the Aristotelian opinion of final causation and the specification lies only in
this, that it is basically the finis ut est in anima, and not the finis ut est extra,
which is supposed to work in this way as a cause.27

If by “Aristotelian opinion” she means Aristotle’s opinion, I take it that this
claim is highly controversial. In any case, the “end insofar as it is in the
soul” would be the “objective being which is in the intellect formally,”
which Scotus referred to in the first quote above. Hence – and here I inten-
tionally avoid addressing the many problematic aspects of Scotus’ account –
the end that we intend is the end as an object that is in our intellect through a
species.28 However, when the end is realized, this diminished being that is in
our mind is not enough; it is the end as it exists in God’s mind which carries
with it the sufficient causal power to bring this end into reality outside our
mind.

5.1.3 Some Further Developments – Ockham, Buridan and
Javellus

Scotus’ treatment of the question of the status of the end reflects the increa-
singly tight connection made between final causation and rational agency in
the 13th and the first half of the 14th century.29 The two names most con-
ected to this trend are William Ockham and John Buridan.

In a paper from 1998, Marilyn McCord Adams has shown how different,
mutually inconsistent, interpretations of Ockham’s view on final causes stem
from a development over time in Ockham’s thinking.30 However, though
there is “persistent pressure” to recognize ends in nature, the end-
directedness of human, rational agency is the paradigmatic case of final cau-
sation throughout his writings.31

Buridan’s solution to the problem of the status of the end consists in his
distinction between ‘finis quo’ (“the end by which”) and ‘finis cujus’ (“the
end of which”). The first is that by which something is reached, the second
that which is reached, in Buridan’s terminology. In German, one can make
the distinction between ‘Zweck’ and ‘Ziel’ (roughly “purpose” and “end

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27 Maier 1955 pp. 284-5. “Es ist durchaus die aristotelische Auffassung der Finalkausalität
und die Präzisierung besteht lediglich darin, dass es eben das finis ut est in anima sein soll,
das in dieser Weise als Ursache wirkt, und nicht das finis ut est extra.”
28 For an interesting account of how the reflection concerning intentional objects developed in
some early Scotists, see Perler 2001, especially pp. 211-21.
30 Adams 1998. The article is an evaluation of what has been written on the subject from the
1950’s onwards. I find her reasoning and conclusions generally convincing.
31 Adams 1998 pp. 40-41, 43-4. “Rational agency is a given, not just a heuristic device, but
the norm for teleology (in the language of others, the ‘primary analogate’).” (p. 44)
point,” respectively). This pair could also be termed “first intention” and “second intention,” respectively. It is only the former term in the pairs – the ‘finis quo’, or the ‘Zweck’, or the “first intention,” respectively – which is a cause. And here we have found the final cause. By this, Buridan has laid the stress on the act of willing, rather than on that toward which the will is directed, when it comes to pointing to what constitutes the final cause. Indeed, he unapologetically takes a hard Avicennian line. The final cause is the act of willing; only the act of willing has any explanatory power as an answer to the question “for what purpose?”. So, if I am to answer why I ate a sandwich, the answer “in order to still my hunger” could lead one astray, whereas “because I wanted to still my hunger” would be more adequate. The first kind of answer – only pointing to the end point, so to say – is to be considered an elliptic expression, according to Buridan.

Chrysostom Javellus (1470-1543) is not a standard figure in the history of philosophy. He was an important source for Suárez, however, not least concerning the present question. He is an interesting figure in the transition from Medieval Scholasticism to Baroque or Renaissance Scholasticism when it comes to the question of the status of the end vis-à-vis the agent. In terms of time, he stands in-between Buridan and Suárez, and helps span the bridge between the Scholasticism of the 14th century and that of the Baroque period.

One of the questions in his commentary on the Metaphysics is “whether the end is a cause insofar as it has being in the soul or outside the soul.” In his answer, two aspects are especially worth mentioning. First, he basically adheres to an Averroist solution to the problem. As was related above, Avicenna and Averroes were seen as archetypical representatives of two different kinds of answers to this question by the Scholastics. As was also seen, Averroes’ line was usually taken in the 13th century, whereas Avicenna was favored in the 14th. Here – in the shift from the 15th to 16th century – we see at least one influential philosopher taking the Averroist line.

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33 Anneliese Maier calls Buridan’s stance “Avicennian with an Occamist twist.” Maier 1955 p. 305. ‘Es ist die alte avicennistische These, aber in der besonderen Prägung, die ihr Wilhelm Ockham in seinen Summulae zur Physik gegeben hatte.’
34 Maier 1955 p. 311. See also Lagerlund 2011 p. 598.
35 Javellus is the 13th most cited author in the Disputationes. See Doyle 1995 p. 11 n. 65. (Javellus is listed on place 14, but that list includes Suárez – his references to himself – on place 3.) Suárez’ list of authors and loci for the present question is almost identical to that of Javellus.
36 Javellus 1555 book V, question 6; nn. 82-83. ‘si finis est causa ut habeat esse in anima vel extra animam’ (n. 82a) All quotes from Javellus are transliterated by me.
37 For a full account of the present question, see Appendix.
38 See Javellus 1555 n. 83a, where he approvingly cites Averroes’ bath-example. “[I]t is clearly shown and verified by what Averroes says in his commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. XII, comm. 36, where he talks of the external form of the bath.” (‘clare exponitur et verificatur dictum Commentatorem in 12 metaphysicam comm. 36, ubi inquit forma Balnei ad extra’)
Second – and this is the last point I would like to make with regard to this aspect – Javellus makes something quite different with the Averroist line of thought by introducing a potentiality/actuality-distinction into the question. For, what he says is that it is the outside thing that is the end. However, it is this outside thing *insofar as it potentially exists*. It is *qua* potentially existing “out there” that something is a cause. Whatever reality it has in the intellect is only a precondition for realizing or achieving this end. Javellus likens the final cause to the material, as neither of them has any reality on its own, but only with respect to something else – the formal and the efficient cause, respectively. It is as being perceived as something attainable that the end can move the agent and thus be called a cause.

Above, we have looked at how the question of the relation between the end and the agent evolved during the Middle Ages. Apart from Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes are the two most important figures in shaping the Scholastic debate on the question. They phrased the debate so as to be about whether the end is external or internal to the intellect.

In the 13th and the 14th centuries, the connection between final causation and rational agency is strengthened; ends in nature become increasingly redundant. This is most clearly seen in philosophers such as Ockham and Buridan. Specifically, the question of the relation between end and intellect becomes all the more acute. Scotus tries to solve the question by fundamentally taking Avicenna’s side, that it is the end as it is in the mind which is a

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39 “It is laid out thus: the form of the bath externally producible or attainable by some action of ours, moves as an end. It has the nature of a final cause, which is to move an agent. Insofar as it is in the intellect, however, it rouses the desire. And that which cannot cause desire in the agent is neither apprehended. Therefore, insofar as it has being in the intellect it rouses desire. Therefore, from being potentially externally producible or attainable, it has that which makes an end. From the apprehension, however, it has that by which it is actually sought after, wherefore the apprehension is called a necessarily required condition.” (Javellus 1555 n. 83a. ‘Sic exponitur, forma Balnei productibilis ad extra, vel attingibilis aliqua actione nostra, movet ut finis. Habet rationem cause finalis, cuius est movere agens. Ut autem est in intellectu agit desiderium. Et quam non potest causare desiderium in agente, nisi apprehendatur, ideo ut habet esse in intellectu agit desiderium. Ex esse ergo potentiali productibili vel attingabili ad extra, habet quod fit finis, ex apprehensione autem habet quod actu appetatur propertia dicitur apprehensio conditio necessario requisita.’)

40 “Not as much being is required in a material or final cause as in a formal or efficient cause. For in [the formal and the efficient cause] actual being is needed, for a form which does not exist cannot give being. Similarly, everything acts insofar as it is actual. With regard to the material [cause], however, potential being is enough, since matter is a cause insofar as it receives form. Similarly as receiving insofar as it is in potency, however, the end is a cause insofar as it moves the agent to its own production or acquisition. For this, however, it is enough that it is apprehended as possibly producible.” (Javellus 1555 n. 83b. ‘non tanta entitas requiritur in causa materiali et finali, quanta in causa formali et effectiva. Quam in his requiritur esse actu, eo quod forma quae [?] non est, non potest dare esse, similiter [?] unumquodque agit inquantum est actu. In materiali autem sufficit esse potentielle, eo quod materia est causa inquantum recipit formam. Recipit autem inquantum est in potentia similiter finis est causa inquantum movet agens ad sui productionem vel acquisitionem, ad hoc autem sufficit quod sit apprehensus possibilis produci.’)
cause. However, he modifies it by adding that it is the end as existing objectively in the mind which is the final cause.

As a final example, the not so well known, but quite influential, philosopher Chrysostom Javellus was brought up. Javellus fundamentally adheres to Averroes with regard to the present question. However, Javellus also stresses that it is the end as potentially existing extra-mentally which is the end. Whereas the apprehension of the end in our intellect is only a precondition for striving for this end, it is still the end as apprehensibly potentially existing that can draw us to it.

The result is that the debate is already quite complex when we come to Suárez, though Averroes and Avicenna still represent the two basic kinds of approaches to answering the question. The development of the question within Latin Scholasticism, only partially accounted for above, is of course well known to Suárez when he takes it on.

5.2 Suárez and the Ambiguity of the Question

As we have seen, the question of the status of the end had received many different answers before Suárez. What does Suárez do with the question?

Fundamentally, Suárez’ view is that the prior disagreements over this question is to a great extent due to an equivocation or ambiguity. The answer to the question, then, depends on how the question interpreted. In one sense, the question could be about that which is to be achieved or reached. In this sense, that which moves us is the end taken in itself. However, the question could also concern that by which this end is approached, in which case we are talking of the end as cognized by us. Having accounted for the views of Avicenna and Averroes, as well as their respective followers on the question, Suárez writes that

the whole thing appears so clearly, that there could hardly be any reason for disagreement, were there not mingled some equivocation into the words themselves. This will be easily seen if we distinguish that concerning which the authors of the respective opinions agree, or which is so manifest that they are necessarily obliged to agree on it.

Hence, according to Suárez, there is a greater degree of consensus among the great philosophers than it may appear at first glance.

41 It should be noted, though, that according to Suárez, Scotus was on the side of Averroes on the present issue. See DM XXIII.8, §5; 25:880.
42 DM XXIII.8, §6; 25:880. *res tota tam clara apparat ut vix possit dissentienti ratio, nisi in vocibus ipsis aliqua æquivocatio miscetur. Quod patebit facile, si ea in quibus auctores utriusque opinionis conveniunt, vel tam manifesta sunt, ut in eis convenire necessario debeant, distinxerimus.* [*]
Notwithstanding this, Suárez also chooses sides as to which of the two opinions is the correct one – which seems a bit odd, given that he deems the question ambiguous. Suárez thus agrees with Averroes and his followers\(^\text{43}\) that it is the (future) end as real that moves us to agency\(^\text{44}\) – though “moves” is taken metaphorically, as we have seen. In Suárez’ words, it is the “real being” (‘esse reale’), as opposed to the “cognized being” or “being cognized” (‘esse cognitum’), of the end which moves us.

The equivocation relates to two fundamental philosophical intuitions, which must both be taken into account, according to Suárez. The first intuition is that the end does not need to exist in order to cause – indeed, as we have seen above, it does not exist in the paradigmatic case. Suárez makes the point even stronger, though, by affirming that the end doesn’t even have to possibly exist in order for it to cause.

First, therefore, everybody agrees [that] the end does not need real or exercised (as they say) existence in order to cause finally. By the sense of which it is clear that existential being is not the foundation of final causation, or even a necessary condition. I also add [that] with respect to the thing neither a true being of the essence of the thing itself, nor a possible being of its existence is necessary in order to cause finally. For apprehension alone is enough, and this the arguments of the first opinion largely prove.\(^\text{45}\)

Hence, neither “true essence” nor “possible existence” is necessary, but apprehension alone is enough for final causation.\(^\text{46}\)

But in what way, then, is the real being – as opposed to the cognized being – the end which moves us? The fundamental argument for this opinion – and here comes the second intuition – is that when we strive for something, it is not the thing in cognition that we strive for, but rather the thing itself. What we try to achieve, then, when we direct our will toward an end, is not for this end to come about in the intellect or in cognition, but for it – that which our intellect or cognition is directed toward – to come about.

\(^{43}\) As philosophers on the same “side” as Averroes on the present issue Suárez enumerates Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Ockham, Gabriel Biel, Chrysostom Javellus, Silvester of Ferarra and Cajetan. (DM XXIII.8, §5; 25:879-80) On Avicenna’s side, Suárez only enumerates Paul Soncinas, as well as saying that it has been attributed to Thomas Aquinas. (DM XXIII.8, §1; 25:878-9)

\(^{44}\) "Among these opinions, this latter [of Averroes] seems to me to be true simply.” (DM XXIII.8, §6; 25:880. ‘Inter has sententias hæc posterior mihi videtur simpliciter vera’ [*])

\(^{45}\) DM XXIII.8, §7; 25:880. ‘Primo itaque conveniunt omnes, finem non indigere existentia reali, seu exercita (ut vocant) ad causandum finaliter, quo sensu clarum est esse existentiae non esse rationem causandi finaliter, immo nec conditionem necessarium. Addo etiam neque esse essentiae verum, aut esse existentiae possible reipsa esse necessarium ad causandum finaliter; nam apprehensionem sufficit, et hoc tantum magna ex parte probant rationes prima opinionis.’ [*]

\(^{46}\) Regarding essence, existence and real being, we shall come back to the meaning of these terms below, as well as the relation between them.
Second, it is certain that the will does not tend toward the end in order to attain it in its cognized being as such, but in order to attain it in its proper, real being, which [the will] apprehends in it along with its condition. And in this sense it is most certain that being-in-cognition is not the foundation (‘rationem’) of finalization, but is only a necessary condition (‘conditio-nem’).47

When Suárez here presents the way in which real being is the foundation of final causation, he points to the striving of our will. We do not, generally, want to achieve something in our mind, but something over and above this—the realisation of this thing of which we have a cognition or conceptualization. When arguing for this position, Suárez appeals to quite common sense examples, which are also found in earlier philosophers: when we strive for health, it is not the apprehension of health that we strive for, but rather health itself.48 Suárez also argues for this from the fact that without the attainment of the end, an appetite has to be considered “frustrated”49; the mere apprehension of the end is not enough.50

At the end of the quote above, Suárez refers to the cognition of the end as a “necessary condition” for being able to direct the will toward an end. In an interesting parallel, Suárez compares the “approximation” or “nearing” to the local closeness that is a prerequisite in efficient causation. In an argument—which is, admittedly, not en-

47 DM XXIII.8, §§8; 25:880. ‘Secundo certum est, voluntatem non tendere in finem, ut illum in esse cognito, ut sic, assequatur, sed ut in proprio esse reali, quod in eo apprehendit juxta ejus conditionem, illud assequatur, atque hoc sensu certissimum est esse in cognitione non esse rationem finalisandi, sed solum conditionem necessariam.’ [*]

48 “For [the one] who intends health or riches does not intend to cognize these or to think of these, but for the thing itself to be achieved in accordance with the true real existence.” (DM XXIII.8, §§8; 25:880. ‘Nam qui intendit sanitatem aut divitias, non intendit illas cognoscere, aut de illis cogitare, sed reipsa consequi secundum veram existentiam’ [*])

49 “The soul is not silenced by the apprehension of the end unless this [end] has been achieved in the thing itself, and without such an achieving the intention of the agent is considered [to be] frustrated.” (DM XXIII.8, §8. ‘non quiescit animus apprehensione finis, nisi illum in re ipsa consequatur, et absque hujusmodi consecutione frustrari censetur intentio agentis.’ [*])

50 There are, however also cases where the end itself involves cognition. Indeed, as we have seen above, Suárez takes this as a fundamental case. This is above all the case of the desire for God. For when we desire God, we also desire to see Him. This seeing is, so to say, intrinsic to the desired end itself. “I said, however, that the will tends toward the end in accordance with the real being beside its condition, because sometimes [the will] borders on the very end of the operation of the will [and] is nothing else but the object of some cognition, as when we intend or desire to see God. In that case, however, this being seen pertains to the formal ground of such a final cause. And it is similar when a human desires only contemplation or speculation of some truth as an end.” (DM XXIII.8, §9. ‘Dixi autem voluntatem tendere in finem, secundum esse reale juxta ejus conditionem, quia interdum contingit ipsum finem voluntatis operantis non esse alium, quam objecti aliquius cognitionem, ut cum intendimus seu desideramus videre Deum; tum enim illud esse visum pertinet ad rationem formalem talis cause formalis; et simile est quando homo appetit ut finem solam contemplationem, vel speculationem aliquius veritas.’ [*])
tirely clear to me – Suárez also connects the special kind of prerequisites for final causation with the point that final causes move “metaphorically.”

As a local approximation is a requisite condition for an efficient cause, so something like a vital or animal approximation is a requisite condition for a final cause, for such a kind of causation. Because, as the moving of such a cause is metaphorical, it needs to come about through natural consent of the cognitive and appetitive powers, as has often been said. 51

Here Suárez seems to connect his point that final causes move metaphorically with the non-necessitating nature of a final cause; a final cause, being an object of the will, does not “bend” or “force,” so to say, the will to itself. Rather, it needs to acquire a “natural consent” of the will in order to be an end.

So where does all this leave us with respect to the question at hand? 
First, it is important to take note of Suárez’ contention that the question hinges on an equivocation. If the question seems somehow “fishy” to many people reflecting on it, this is something Suárez also fundamentally agrees with – on the surface of it, at least.

Second, Suárez opts for the opinion that it is the “real being” of the end that moves us – an opinion he ascribes to most, if not all, philosophers.

Third and finally, it is noteworthy that Suárez connects the “cognized being” and the “real being” to two different powers. When he talks of the cognized being, he connects this to the intellect – our rational cognitive faculty. When he talks of real being, on the other hand, he talks of the will – the rational appetitive faculty. In this way he incorporates the two fundamental insights concerning the end. The cognition of an end is the only thing needed to be moved by an end. However, what we strive for is not this thought of the end, but the end “itself,” or as having “real being.”

Fundamentally, the question of whether we are moved by the real or by the cognized being of the end is not harder than this.

There are some threads, though, which we will explore a bit further. Now that it has been established that it is the end as having “real being” which “moves” us to it, one might ask how this real being is related to the “real essence” and the “possible existence” of a thing, none of which are necessary on the part of the end. 52 A further question is what kind of relation obtains between the end and its effect – the moving of the will. Finally we shall

51 DM XXIII.8, §10. ‘sicut in causa efficiente approximatio localis est conditio requisita, ita in causa finalis approximatio quasi animalis, seu vitalis, est requisita conditio ad talem causandi modum, quia cum motio hujus causæ metaphorica sit, debet fieri per naturalem consensionem potentiarum cognoscitivæ et appetitivæ, ut sæpe dictum est.’ [*]
52 See above, p. 117.
take a small peek into the abyss of non-being, where we will by then have been led.

5.3 Essence, Existence and Real Being

The question of what real being is and how it relates to essence and existence is a huge area to explore, as it goes to the heart of Suárez’ philosophy. There is a simple version of the answer, though, which is: there is no difference between a thing’s real being, its essence and its existence.

Suárez is quite famous for his rejection of a real distinction between essence and existence. However, this conflation of essence and existence also includes the whole being of a thing. Essence and existence dissolve into each other and into the total being of a thing. The essence, then, comes to be together with the creation of the thing. There is no essence without existence, nor vice-versa; and they both convene in the thing.

But here there seems to be a tension. Suárez confirms that the object of the will – which is the same as “that which moves us” – is the “real being,” as opposed to the “cognized being.” However, Suárez also denies that any “real essence” or “potential existence” is needed on the part of this end. Together with Suárez’ conflation of real being, essence and existence, it seems incoherent to assign object-hood to real being while at the same time denying real essence and real existence to this being.

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53 See e.g. Brentano 1874 pp. 300-2 (book II, ch. 7, §14) where he writes that Scotus, Ockham and Suárez all conflate essence and existence. See also Gilson 1952 p. 102 and Heidegger 1975 p. 126. Cardinal Mercier counted the conflation of essence and existence one of the three main points on which Suárez disagreed with Thomas Aquinas (the other two being the possibility of separate existence of prime matter and the power of intellect to form direct concepts of individuals). (In his A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy from 1917, as quoted in Fichter 1940 p. 195.)

54 As evidenced by the following quotes: “By a unique and identical action an existing thing and its existence is produced.” (DM XXXI.9, §18; 26:264. ’unica et eadem actione fit res existens et existentia ejus’ [NW]) “The essence of a creature, or the creature of itself, and before it is made by God, has in itself no true real being and in this precise sense of existential being, the essence is not some reality, but it is absolutely nothing.” (DM XXXI.2, §1; 26:229. ‘essentiam creaturæ, sed creaturam de se, et priusquam a Deo fiat, nullum habere in se verum esse reale, et in hoc sensu, præcisco esse existentiae, essentiam non esse rem aliquam, sed omnino esse nihil.’ [NW]) “An essence, which is a being in act, formally and intrinsically includes existence.” (DM XXXI.3, §5; 26:234 [emphasis added]. ‘essentia, quæ est ens actu, formaliter et intrinsece includit existentiam’ [NW]) “That being by which the essence of a creature is formally constituted in essential actuality is the true existential being.” (DM XXXI.4, §4; 26:235. ‘illum esse, quo essentia creaturæ formaliter constituitor in actualitate essentiae, est verum esse existentiae.’ [NW])

55 “A being in act and existing signify the same thing and the same formal aspect.” (DM XXXI.5, §11; 26:240. ‘ens actu, et existens, eamdem rem et rationem formalem significare’ [NW]) “A being in potency [...] is simply a non being.” (DM XXXI.6, §22; 26:249. ‘ens in potentia [...] simpliciter est non ens.’ [NW])
This speaks all the more for a reading where the “real being” of the end, which is the object of the will, is understood as “the end qua real.” The stress here is on the “qua.” The point Suárez wants to make is not that the end would have to have the status of “real” in some ontological sense; for this reality would, as we have seen, necessarily involve some kind of existence, and as Suárez writes, not even possible existence is needed on the part of the end.56

What he does want to say is that when we strive for the end, it is the end as something real, as something obtaining in the real world, as a future state of the matter, that we strive for. And this is all he wants to say with the contrast to cognized being.

This will also become clearer when we look at the relation between the end and its effect.

56 Admittedly, though, the evidence here is ambiguous in Suárez. For at one place he writes that “essential being, as distinguished from existential being, is said to be eternal” (DM XXXI.4, §5; 26:236. ‘esse essentiæ, prout distinguetur ab esse existentiarum, dicitur esse æternum’ [NW]). Furthermore, he writes that “the essence of a creature still unproduced is in some way a real essence” (DM XXXI.2, §10; 26:232. ‘essentia creaturæ, etiam non productam, esse aliquo modo essentiam realem.’ [NW]) and that “the sciences which consider things by abstracting from existence are not concerned with beings of reason but with real beings because they consider real essences, not in terms of the status they have objectively in an intellect, but in themselves or insofar as they are apt for existing with such natures and properties” (DM XXXI.2, §10; 26:232. ‘scientiae, quae considerant res abstrahendo ab existentia, non sunt de entibus rationis, sed de realibus, quia considerant essentias reales, non secundum statum quem habent objective in intellectu, sed secundum se, vel quatenus aptae sunt ad existendum cum talibus naturis vel proprietatibus.’ [NW]). Furthermore, objective being could mean “being creatable” (DM XXXI.7, §7; 26:253), and in some places Suárez—as against what has been related above—seems to hold that this kind of objective being is necessary in order to cause finally. For example, in explicitly referring to final causes, he writes that “the end truly would not cause except toward its own existence, and for that reason final causality could be ascribed to the existence of a known good; to the existence (I say) not now exercised, but known in the good itself, which has the character of an end; and this because the good moves only as it is in reality, whether it is known to be or about to be or able to be apprehended” (DM XXXI.10, §4; 26:267. ‘finis revera causet nisi in ordine ad suam existentiam, et ea ratione posset attribui existentiae boni apprehensih causaliatias finalis; existentiae (inquam) non jam exercitæ, sed apprehensœ in ipso bono, quod habet rationem finis, quia bonum non movet, nisi prout est in re, aut esse vel futurum esse vel posse esse apprehenditur’ [NW] [translation slightly modified and emphasis added]). However, as “apprehended” is added, he seems to not lay stress on the possible existence. Furthermore, the inclusion of talk of goodness suggests that we have here moved from purely ontological question and toward moral psychology. Hence, above I have chosen the most tenable reading, and the one with the most textual support, making different loci cohere; an alternative reading would have to face the difficulties pointed out here. In the end, though, the question of whether Suárez is inconsistent on this point of essence and existence remains open. Inconsistencies have been pointed out regarding a closely adjacent area, that of God’s knowledge and His knowledge of what is possible: “Suárez’ whole discussion is flawed by his failure to acknowledge the tensions which obtain between potentia logica, on the one hand, and potentia objectiva on the other, when dealing with the essences of creatures prior to their creation. Indeed, the very reason why he can initially agree with Aquinas against Capreolus et al. that the eternal truths are only eternal by enjoying existence in the eternal mind of the deity, and then turn around and later on disagree with the position of Aquinas, is because he has switched from the context of potentia objectiva to the area of potentia logica.” (Wells 1983 p. 25)
5.4 The Relation between the End and Its Effect

In the context of answering the third objection to the reality of final causation\(^{57}\), Suárez makes a small digression into the question of the relation between the final cause and its effect. He writes there that the question of whether there is a real relation between the two is controversial because “the end does not have real being when it causes.”\(^{58}\) Suárez does not reject this basic assumption. Instead, he denies that a real relation would necessarily follow upon real causation; in other words, we can have real causation without this real relation.

Those respond better, therefore, who deny that a real relation in the cause would follow upon all real causality. For it is not necessary from the power of the causality, [namely] if other conditions do not concur.\(^{59}\)

In the final analysis, then, there is no real relation from the cause to the effect in the case of final causation. Indeed, given Suárez’ denial of the reality of the end when it causes, together with his insistence that the foundation in a real relation must be real, this would have been an untenable position for him. Instead, what we find is a real relation from the effect – the order or direction of the will – to the cause.

For the effect [of the end] can be referred to the end, insofar as [the effect] depends upon [the end]. Wherefore, just as it is enough for this dependence that the end preexists in the mind (‘præexistat in mente’), so also this is enough for a real transcendental habitue, though a categorical [habitude] perchance does not exist but toward an actually existing end. Because the end causes as altogether immobile, and not [as] ordered to its effect, it is not proper that the relation is real from its side.\(^{60}\)

In the case of efficient causation, if A causes B there is a real (and categorical) relation from A to B. In the case of final causation, however, things are very different; if A is the final cause of B, there is a real (and transcendental) relation \textit{from B to A}, that is, a real relation in the opposite direction.\(^{61}\)

\(^{57}\) See above, pp. 64ff.
\(^{58}\) DM XXIII.1, §13; 25:846.
\(^{59}\) DM XXIII.1, §13; 25:846. ‘Melius ergo respondent qui negant ad omnen causalitatem, sequi relationem realem in causa; non est enim necesse ex vi causalitatis, si aliae conditiones non concurrant’ [*]
\(^{60}\) DM XXIII.1, §13; 25:846. ‘effectus enim referri potest ad finem, quatenus ab eo pendet; unde, sicut ad hanc dependentiam satis est quod finis præexistat in mente, ita etiam sufficit ad realem habitudinem transcendentalem, licet praedicamentalis forte non sit nisi ad finem actu existentem; tamen, quia finis causat ut omnino immotus et non ordinatus ad suum effectum, ideo non oportet ut ex parte eius relatio sit realis.’ [*]
\(^{61}\) “[The end] is in no way ordered to the effect, but the effect [is ordered] to [end].” (DM XXIII.1, §13; 25:846. ‘finis [...] nullo modo ordinatur ad effectum, sed effectum ad ipsum.’ [*])
We can see here that the status of the end as involving “real being” when it is an object for the will does not entail mind-independence. Suárez talks here of the end “preexisting” in the mind, thus involving some form of dependence upon the mind. Real being does not mean extra-mental being. We can therefore once again conclude that the difference between cognized and real being does not have anything to do with mind-dependence or mind-independence, as we can have the real being of a thing “in mind,” i.e., we can think of it.

In the above quote we can also see that the relation from the effect to the end is not categorical but transcendental. In a transcendental relation, the terminus does not have to exist, as is the case in a categorical relation. And so a transcendental relation obtains between the direction of the will and the future, though not yet (if ever) achieved, end. This relation Suárez likens to the relation between the knower and the known, in imitation of Aristotle. Just as that which is known doesn’t “do” anything in the act of knowing it, so neither does the end “do” anything in final causation.

We have now seen how Suárez, given his basic metaphysical assumptions, has to stress the unreality of the end. Indeed, the relation between the end and its effect goes from the effect to the end, rather than the other way around, as the end cannot found a real relation. As a last step, we will now look at some features of “beings of reason” – treated in the last part of the

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62 For the point that it is the real being of the end that moves the will, see above chapter 5.2.

63 Indeed, the temporal relation of something to some future thing is merely a rational relation, as the terminus – the future thing – does not exist. “[Among relations of reason] those relations can be placed which are attributed to an existing thing with regard to a non-existing terminus, whether this last be a possible being or a fictitious being. For example, take a relation of priority of an existing Peter to a future Antichrist, or a relation of diversity of an existing Peter to a chimera.” (DM LIV.6, §4; 26:1040. “constitui possunt relationes illæ, quæ tribuuntur rei existenti respectu termini non existentis, sive illd sit ens possibile, sive fictum, ut relatio prioritatis Petri existentis ad Antichristum futurum, vel diversitatis Petri existentis a chymera.’ [JD]) This underscores the mind-dependent nature of the real being talked of in the context of final causation and ends.

64 “Again, a transcendental respect does not always require a real terminus, but sometimes it can be toward a fictitious being or a being of reason, or toward some extrinsic denomination.” (DM XLVII.4, §2; 26:799. ‘Rursum transcendentalis respectum non semper requirit realem terminum, sed interdum esse potest ad rem fictum, seu rationis, vel ad extrinsecam aliquam denominationem.’ [*])

65 Even impossibles are counted among beings of reason, for Suárez. “Likewise many things are thought which are impossible, and are fashioned in the manner of possible beings, for example, a chimera, which does not have any other being besides being thought.” (DM LIV.1, §7; 26:1017. ‘Item multa cogitantur quæ sunt impossibilia, et modo possibilium entium finguntur, ut chymæra, quæ non habent aliud esse quam cogitari.’ [JD])

66 “For just as Aristotle said that knowledge is really related to what is knowable, and not the other way around, so we can say about desire and the desirable. For it is the same relation, and it is similar concerning the desirable and the end.” (DM XXIII.1, §13; 25:846. ‘Sicut enim Aristoteles dixit scientiam referri realiter ad scibile, non e contrario, ita nos dicere possimus de appetitione et appetibili; est enim eadem ratio, et similiter est eadem de appetibili et de fine.’ [*])
DM and thus outside of metaphysics proper. Might the end then belong to the class of beings of reason, the “‘shadows’ of being?”

5.5 On the Outskirts of Being

What is a being of reason? A being of reason is fundamentally contrasted to a real being. As opposed to real beings, beings of reason do not have any existence independently of the mind.

Beings of reason are not a major concern for Suárez, as they fall outside of the scope of metaphysics proper. Indeed, when he divides beings of reason exhaustively into negations, privations and relations of reason, and asks whether this division is univocal or analogous, he writes that “these matters, which are of little importance, I leave to the discussion and thinking of the reader.” A being of reason does not have what it takes to be counted among real beings.

But “to be” (‘esse’), from which something is called a being (‘ens’), cannot be intrinsically shared by beings of reason. For to be only objectively in reason is not to be, but to be thought or to be imagined.

Therefore, what is normally and rightly defined as a being of reason is that which has being only objectively in the intellect or is that which is thought by reason as being, even though it has no entity in itself.

To be a being of reason is to be only thought by the intellect. Things that are real and thought of are also “beings of reason,” in a sense, but not in this proper sense. As the end needs neither “real essence” nor “possible existence,” it could only be a rational being.

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67 DM LIV.[Proœmium], §1; 26:1015. ‘umbræ entium’
68 For beings of reason in Suárez, see Shields (forthcoming) and Novotný 2008. The following account of beings of reason is largely consonant with Shields’, as far as I can see. Novotný, in his dissertation, argues that Suárez’ notion of ‘entia rationis’ is incoherent (p. 20).
69 DM LIV.3, §9; 26:1028 (emphasis added). ‘hæc, quæ parvi momenti sunt, legentis disputationi et cogitationi relinquo’ [JD]
70 DM LIV.1, §10; 26:1018. ‘esse autem, a quo ens dictum est, non potest intrinsecè participari ab entibus rationis, quia esse objective tantum in ratione non est esse, sed est cogitari aut fingi.’ [JD]
71 DM LIV.1, §6; 26:1016. ‘Et ideo recte definiri solet, ens rationis, esse illud, quod habet esse objective tantum in intellectu, seu esse id, quod a ratione cogitatur ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non habet.’ [JD]
72 ‘But that which is in this way objectively in the mind sometimes has in itself, or can have, true real being, in line with which it is an object for reason. Absolutely and without qualification, this is not a genuine being of reason but rather a real being, for this [true and real] being is what simply and essentially belongs to it; whereas, to be an object for reason is extrinsic and accidental to it.” (DM LIV.1, §6; 26:1016. ‘Id autem, quod sic est objective in mente, interdum habet, vel potest habere in se verum esse reale, secundum quod ratione objectitur, et hoc absolute et simpliciter non est verum ens rationis, sed reale, quia hoc esse est quod
The quotes above explain something else concerning ends. Above we have seen how they are thought of along the lines of “real being” rather than “cognized being.” But a rational being is also thought of as being, i.e., a being of reason is thought of as though being real. Suárez seems also to point toward this when he writes that beings of reason “are not intelligible through themselves, but by some analogy and conjunction with true being.” So that a being of reason would be described with some reference to “true” or “real” being is not at all surprising, nor should it confuse us regarding the status of the being of reason.

Thus, when Suárez denies that the end needs any “real essence” or “possible existence,” it is the status as a being of reason that is left. And even though he sometime hints at that the end might have some status as being real, this need not confuse us since, first, a being of reason is always compared to and talked of “as if” it were a real being and, second, even though the end might have some kind of status as real, this does not alter the basic case; nor does Suárez anywhere make a special case out of this. For as we have seen, the direction in final causation does not go so much from the end to its effect, as it does from the effect – which is real, as it is the ordering of the will – to the end, which “moves” as being an object of the will.

What, then, causes this being of reason? Fundamentally, the cause of a being of reason is the mind. The manner of this causing is by efficient causation.
object. Thus, it is fundamentally to the power of the intellect that we can ascribe the creative power of conjuring up ends for us to strive for.

5.6 Summary and Conclusions

We have now seen where the question of the ontological status of the end has taken us. The final cause causes, not as it is cognized but according to its “real being.” However, that we are directed toward the end as a real being does not mean that the end needs to exist when it causes – actually, the end cannot exist when it causes. As essence, existence and real being coincide in Suárez, and as the end needs neither real essence nor even potential existence, the “real being” of the end must be interpreted as having a qua preceding it – it is the end qua real being which causes finally. This also coheres well with the kind of dichotomy between real and cognized being which Suárez sets up.

Final causation comes with a relation. However, this relation is based in the will – the effect of the end – rather than in the end itself. Moreover, the relation is transcendental rather than categorical, enabling the terminus – the end – to be a being of reason.

And so we finally come to beings of reason, or “non-beings” as they are also called. Even though Suárez sometimes seems to ascribe reality to future contingents, this does not seem essential to him. Instead, he emphasizes time and again that the end need never come into existence, nor be able to do so. In the basic case, then, an end is a being of reason, solely an object of the mind, with no intrinsic reality on its own. Though not a paradigmatic example of a being of reason, ends belong to this class. Though beings of reason appear real to us, by a reflective act we can become aware of their nonreality. So it is also with ends.

How does Suárez relate to the earlier philosophers? Fundamentally, according to Suárez, all notable earlier philosophers have agreed on the question

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78 "But all that causation is terminated, as at a term or real production, at the formal concept of the mind itself, and it stops there. From that point, however, it follows that this same formal concept terminates in some way, as at an object, at the very reason of being which is thought or fashioned. Thus, finally, this being of reason itself has objective being in the intellect.” (DM LIV.2, §3; 26:1019. ‘tota vero illa efficientia, ut ad terminum realis productionis terminatur ad formalem conceptum ipsius mentis, et ibi sistit; inde tamen fit, ut ille conceptus formalis terminetur aliquo modo, ut ad objectum, ad ipsum ens rationis, quod cogitatur aut fingitur. Atque ita tandem ipsum ens rationis habet esse objectivum in intellectu.’ [JD])

79 On the mind as an efficient cause in Suárez, see e.g. Renemann 2010. ‘[...] so ist doch bei der Produktion von Gedankendingen der Intellekt als Wirkursache anzusehen [...]’ (p. 107)

80 See above, chapter 2.

81 Indeed, even in the case where a future contingent would have some reality, this reality does not lie in itself, but rather in those things which can create it. See above, p. 121 n. 56.
about in which way ends move us. As the question is ambiguous due to an
equivocation of words, though, they have given different answers to it. In
good Scholastic tradition, he orders the answers into two groups, with Aver-
roes and Avicenna as paradigmatic examples of the two stances. Suárez
takes the Averroist side, though trying to incorporate the Avicennian in-
sights. Like Scotus – who also, in a way, tried to reconcile the two sides –
Suárez treats the question by working out the status of objectivity in the
mind. Also like Scotus, Suárez locates the basis or subject of the causal rela-
tion in final causation in the effect rather than in the cause (i.e. in the agent
rather than on that toward which this agent acts). On the other hand, in con-
trast to Scotus, and based on his sharp distinction between being and non-
being, Suárez explicitly rejects Scotus’ solution with “diminished being,”
thus not availing himself of one possible way of answering the question of
the status of the end.

Like Buridan, Suárez emphasizes will in the context of final causation.
However, it is in Chrysostom Javellus we can really find a close parallel to
Suárez. Here, both the question and the canonical list of loci in earlier philo-
sophers are very similar to those of Suárez. Also, in Javellus we find the
interesting idea that the end is the thing as it potentially exists, an idea with
which Suárez is therefore familiar. In some places, Suárez seems to lean
toward this idea. However, in the final analysis he rejects it; the end needs
never even possibly be able to come into existence.

It is against the background of the earlier development that we can appre-
ciate the complexity of Suárez’ treatment of the question. The question has a
history – a history of answers, but also of different formulations. Indeed, the
very form of the question is unique to Suárez, as it acquires its precise for-
mulation within a specific philosophic system and project. The history ap-
ppears as different strata in Suárez’ treatment of the question. Suárez’ wish to
take everybody into account makes it hard to see through to his own final
position and makes his treatment vulnerable to accusations of incoherence as
well as open to different readings. Above, we have tried one way through the
terrain, following a reading consistent with most loci as well as aspiring to
be internally consistent.

In evaluating the reading above, it is important to remember that the cog-
nition of the end is, in a way, like a mirror image of the process of how we
come to understanding and knowledge through the intellect.\textsuperscript{82} For the “cogni-
tion” of an end is not a cognition of anything at all. Actually, this is a totally
different use of the intellect; one that is creative rather than receptive, where

\textsuperscript{82} The description of the creative process of an artist is called a mirror image of the cognitive
process in Renemann 2010 p. 1. (‘Dieser Prozess wird als Kunstproduktion bezeichnet, und
wir werden diesen Prozess als Spiegelbild für den so ausführlich erforschten Erkenntnispro-
zahl versteht.’)
the conceptualization is not meant to be of something “existing” or “real,”
but rather of something which might become an object of the will. From this
perspective, the strange status of the object of will in desiring an end comes
as no surprise at all.

However, the fact remains that Suárez never explicitly states that ends are
beings of reason. As a last step, we must therefore try to give a reasonable
explanation as to why he never does this so as to lend our reading some fur-
ther credibility. We will briefly look at three suggestions.

First, ends are, in a way, on the “outskirts” of the beings of reason. At the
core are things like blindness and relations of reason. Ends are not paradigm-
atic to the class of beings of reason and are therefore not mentioned in
connection to them.

Second, to explicitly state that ends are beings of reason does not, on the
face of it, sit well with his contention that ends really are causes – one of the
four. As we have seen, it takes quite some explaining to come from the end
as really a cause to the end as an object of the will. To state the two flat out
could, as was said, incur charges of incoherence.

Third, and related to this, is Suárez’ writing together of something really
being a cause with it being a real cause (as was also pointed out earlier) – of
being ‘causa realiter’ and ‘causa realis.’ Suárez seems reluctant to draw the
conclusion that something which is really a cause (an end) is not, fundamen-
tally, real. It is, thus, his tenet of keeping the end as one of the four funda-
mental causes that refrains him from denying the reality of the end. As
should be clear from what I have written above, however, I think this is the
position Suárez ultimately takes – and I do not think it is intrinsically incohe-
rent. For why would something really having a property – say, of being a
final cause – presuppose that it is real?
Summary and Conclusions

The main focus of this thesis is on final causes and final causation. Above all, the question of the ontological status of the final cause or end is the driving question throughout the thesis, though certain digressions in surrounding areas are also undertaken (in chapters 3 and 4).

The thesis starts out, in the first chapter, with an account of Suárez’ fundamental handling of causes. Causes take up an exceptionally central place in Suárez’ metaphysical edifice in the DM as a whole, and are of course essential as a background for his treatment of specifically final causes. Suárez’ definition of a cause as “a being influencing being into another” shapes his whole treatment of final causes as well. Efficient causes – defined as “that on which something else depends” or, equivalently, “that from which something else flows forth” – are the paradigmatic kind of causes within the created world, according to Suárez. The other causes are called “causes” in analogy to the efficient cause. All causes are causes in and of themselves, but there are also internal structures within the class of causes between the different subclasses. Further, there is a real, categorical relation between cause and effect in efficient causation. This tenet of Suárez’ was revisited in the last chapter.

In the second chapter, final causes are introduced. Final causation is closely linked to human agency, inter alia, because this is the case of final causation we know best. In response to six different objections to his thesis that final causes are real causes, Suárez molds his view on final causation so as to, for example, handle the difficulty of different kinds of backward causation (that is, final causation is not to involve this, if he is successful). Suárez’ view on final causation is informed, if one will, by these objections to its reality.

However, some problematic features of Suárez’ account are also pointed to in this context. For example, Suárez does not clearly distinguish the question of the final cause being real from the question of really being a cause. Further, it is argued that final causation in the case of human nature is so different in Suárez’ metaphysics from the case of final causation with regard to God and nature that it would have been better to just use two different words for them.

The final treatment of these questions, however, is deferred to the final chapter. For in the third chapter, Suárez’ view on final causation is related to the field of moral psychology. Human beings are free – spelled out as “free
from necessity” – in a special sense of this word. Human beings not only act spontaneously, as plants and animals, but can also refrain from acting even in a situation where everything necessary for acting is in place (except the consent of the person in question). This special kind of freedom is more specifically inherent in our faculty of will – our capacity to rationally desire something – and Suárez time and again points out that a free action stemming from the will cannot be necessitated by any other power or act.

Some remarks are also made in this place about Suárez’ philosophical project as a whole. Questions of freedom of will are central for Suárez primarily because they are closely related to questions of grace and predestination. And here one important piece of the framework for Suárez’ insistence on the freedom of will was put into place: Suárez, in theology, stresses the freedom of the human person vis-à-vis God’s grace, against Protestants as well as Dominicans. Generally, one can also point out that Suárez’ theological drive is evident throughout the DM, even though it is specifically not a theological treatise, not least by the example of the Beatific vision which comes up repeatedly.

In the fourth chapter, then, the question of God and final causation is approached. Final causation with respect to God is primarily found in God’s concurrence with actions in nature; indeed, God’s concurrence is identical to these actions. Though Suárez calls this final causation, there are a number of differences between final causation with respect to human beings and final causation as found in nature (insofar as actions are from God). One difference is that whereas final causes cause by “moving” (metaphorically) the human will, the final cause as found in the actions of God cause by moving the created agent to an end (i.e., the end does not “move” God even metaphorically). On the other hand, given the weak sense in which the end “moves” the human will, it was also asked – disregarding other differences – how big a difference there really is between the two cases.

In the fifth and final chapter, then, the main thread of the thesis – the ontological status of the end in human agency – is taken up once again, now against the background of the accounts of moral psychology and final causation in God or nature. Before entering into Suárez’ treatment of the question, a short account of the history of the question is given. It is shown how the answer, as well as the question, regarding the status of the end had developed in certain thinkers in the Middle Ages on the background of the paradigmatic treatment of Avicenna and Averroes.

According to Suárez, there is an equivocation at the heart of the question of what status the end has. On the one hand, cognition of the end is necessary for willing or intending it; on the other hand, it is typically not the cognition or thought itself we will when we will an end, but rather that of which we are thinking. When we want a sandwich, we do not desire the thought of us eating it, but rather the eating itself.
However, when this is spelled out, it is hard to come to any other conclusion than that this end, which we will, has the status of a being of reason – i.e., it is no being at all – when it causes. The argument for this is done in a number of steps. First, Suárez rejects the real distinction between essence and existence; both come into being with the thing (or, expressed broader, situation) in question. Hence, the end cannot exist “a little bit” when it causes (as with Scotus’ “diminished being”). Second – and this is more of a purely exegetical point than the first point – there is a transcendental relation between the final cause and its effect; this relation goes from the effect (the directedness of the will) to the final cause. As was seen in the first chapter, there is a real, categorical relation between an efficient cause and its effect, going from cause to effect. The very different relational structure thus brings out the “queer” form of causation taking place in final causation. Also, in a transcendental relation, the terminus – the final cause in final causation – does not need to be real (as opposed to what is the case in a categorical relation). This strongly indicates the “unreality” of the final cause at the instant of causing.

Finally, then, beings of reason are treated. Suárez treats beings of reason in DM 54, and they thus fall outside the area of metaphysics proper, as they are not real. While not being paradigmatic examples of beings of reason, ends fit in as being “that which is thought by reason as being, even though it has no entity in itself.” Final causes are not real when they cause. They need never to be realized, and Suárez even indicates that they do not have to be able to be realized.

Why, then, does Suárez not explicitly state that final causes are not real? Well, first of all, he actually states that they are not real “in the strict sense of the word” and contrasts them with efficient, formal and efficient causes which are real. However, it seems that Suárez wants to retain final causes as real because he wants to retain final causation. Briefly, he should separate more clearly the questions of whether the end is really a cause and whether it is real. A being of reason can have properties – for example, being a being of reason, being self-contradictory (a square circle), being a property of a person (blindness), being a final cause, etc. – without being real. By making this distinction, Suárez could have been clearer on a question of much obscurity.

- TERMINUS -
Appendix: Suárez’s References in DM XXIII.8

In DM XXIII.8, where Suárez treats the question of whether the final cause causes as something real or as something cognized, Suárez has a list of advocates for the two respective views. As the question is central for the treatment of the whole question of the status of the final cause and final causation as treated of above, a more extensive treatment of Suárez’ references on this specific question is called for.

Below, the authors invoked by Suárez will be divided into two groups; in the first group, the philosophers invoked for the view that the end moved according to its cognized being are presented, whereas the philosophers invoked for the second view – that the end moves in accordance with its real being – are presented thereafter. In the case of Thomas Aquinas, he is invoked for both views, albeit different passages are referred to in the two cases; thus, Thomas is counted among both groups, being here named “the first Thomas” and “the second Thomas,” respectively.

The End Moves in Accordance with Its Cognized Being

First, then, the philosophers invoked for the view that the end moves in accordance with its cognized being – the view which Suárez rejects – are presented.

Avicenna (ibn Sīnā)

Suárez refers to Avicenna (980-1037) as holding the position that “the end moves in accordance with the being which it has in cognition, not in accordance with real being.”1 As evidence, he refers his reader to Avicenna’s Metaphysics, book 6 chapter 5. However, Suárez might be considered to distance himself from the opinion that Avicenna holds this view; for Suárez writes that “[t]his is considered to be [the view of] Avicenna,”2 thus making

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1 DM XXIII.8, §1; 25:878. ‘finem movere secundum esse quod habet in cognitione, non secundum esse reale’ [*]
2 DM XXIII.8, §1 (emphasis added). ‘Hæc censetur esse Avicen[na] [...]’ [*]
room for himself to align his own stance with a more accurate interpretation of Avicenna.³

Now, the chapter referred to in Avicenna deals primarily with the question of how an efficient and a final cause can mutually cause each other, a “problem” handed down from Aristotle via the Neoplatonic tradition.⁴ In connection with this overarching question, it is also asked how the end could at all be a cause, when in reality it is the effect of (efficient) causes.

One could say: let us grant that an end exists for every act. But why have you treated it as a prior cause, when in reality it is the effect of all the causes?⁵

The way Avicenna goes about to solve this is to make distinctions between different concepts. First, Avicenna distinguishes between a thing and an existent.

[The above] objection will be solved by knowing that the end may be taken to be a thing as well as taken to be an existent. Although a thing cannot be other than an existent, the difference between thing and existent is just like the difference between some entity and its concomitant.⁶

Then, Avicenna introduces the notion of essence (‘māhiyya’), corresponding to an “inner” reality.

Consider, once again, the case of man: man has an inner reality, consisting of his definition and his essence, which is not conditioned upon [his] existence’s being particular or general, concrete or in a soul, or potential or actual.⁷

In a third step, this inner reality is then related to the “thingness” (‘shay’iyya’) of a thing. And it is in this thingness, finally, where the causality of the final cause, so to say, is to be found.

Each cause, insofar as it is that [particular] cause, has an inner reality and a thingness. In its thingness the final cause is the reason why the other causes actually exist as causes. In its existence the final cause is the effect of the other causes’ actually [existing] as causes.⁸

Avicenna here refers to the view stemming from Aristotle (at least) that, in a sense, the final causes is the “cause of causes.” However, he qualifies this by

³ Although it seems unclear whether he does this with Avicenna, he certainly does it with Thomas; see below pp. 137ff..
⁴ See, e.g., Wisnovsky 2003 p. 9.
⁵ Quoted from Pasnau p. 303.
⁶ Quoted from Wisnovsky 2003 p. 160.
⁷ Quoted from Wisnovsky 2003 p. 160.
⁸ Quoted from Wisnovsky 2003 p. 160. (Wisnovsky writes “thingness” with small capitals; I have revised this, and write ”thingness” with minuscules in this and the following quotes.)
adding that it is in the “thingness” of the end that this is the cause of the other causes. He then distinguishes this thingness from the existence of the final cause. While it is true to say that the end is the cause of the other causes regarding its thingness, this is not true when it comes to its existence. This would reverse the order between cause and effect (the question Avicenna is dealing with at this point). From this Avicenna draws some seemingly prima facie false – though actually coherent on a closer inspection – statements on the relation between the thingness and the existence of the final cause:

It is as if the thingness of the final cause were the cause of the cause of its [own] existence; conversely it is as if its existence were the effect of the effect of its [own] thingness.9

For if the thingness of the final cause is the cause of the efficient cause, which causes its existence, then “the thingness of the final cause” actually is “the cause of the cause of its own existence.” And similarly, albeit “conversely,” for the second statement.

It is at this place that cognition enters the picture. For, as Avicenna next states, it is only in the soul that this “thingness” of something is brought forth.

However its thingness does not become a cause unless it occurs as an image formed in the soul, or as something analogous to that.10

Here, it seems, is where one might do the interpretation of Avicenna as claiming that the formal ground of final causality is to be found in cognition. For if the thingness can only be a final cause if it “occurs” in the soul, and this occurring is taken to mean that the thingness is “actually” – in some sense – “in” the soul, then the end (at least the relevant aspects of it, namely the thingness) would have to be said to be in cognition.

As is obvious, whether this is actually so hinges on the understanding of the concept of “thingness” as well as Avicenna’s view on intentionality, among other things. It would be to go outside the scope of this Appendix to discuss these topics in full. However, it might be fruitful to just briefly connect these passages with what Avicenna writes on some aspects of cognition in his *De Anima*. In it, on the one hand, he rejects Aristotle’s view that the soul, in a way, becomes the thing which it cognizes:

This is impossible on my view, because I don’t understand what it says, that one thing becomes another, nor do I understand how this could occur. For whatever loses one form and takes on another is one thing with the first form

9 Quoted from Wisnovsky 2003 p. 160.
10 Quoted from Wisnovsky 2003 p. 160.
and another with the second, and the first is not truly made the second unless the first is destroyed.\textsuperscript{11}

That the soul would be in a sense identical with what is cognized would, hence, mean that the soul is destroyed and again created for each new cognition, according to Avicenna, as well as the cognised thing being destroyed in this process – an obviously absurd position.

On the other hand, though, Avicenna still maintains that “the forms of things subsist in the soul.”\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, with regard to final causality, an end is a cause “only if it has been represented within a soul or something like a soul.”\textsuperscript{13} These passages point to an interpretation of Avicenna along the lines of Suárez – that cognition is a necessary precondition, but not the formal ground, of final causation. This conclusion would strengthen the reading that Suárez only \textit{reports} that Avicenna is said to have the view that the end has final causality as it exists in cognition, though – of course – it would only be an indication of this.\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{Thomas Aquinas I}

In Suárez’ account of final causation as relating to cognized and real being there are “two Thomases,” one could say: first, the one who is claimed to hold the first opinion (that \textit{cognized} being is the formal ground of final causation), and second, the one holding the second opinion (that \textit{real} being is the formal ground of final causation).

When it comes to the “first” Thomas, Suárez refers to passages in two different contexts of the \textit{Summa theologiae}. The first context is the so called \textit{Treatise on Man} (questions 75 through 89 of the first part), and more specifically, the two articles of question 80 in the first part. Thomas here talks of appetites in general. Thomas asks, for example, the question how cognitive powers can be separated from appetitive powers. For that which is known is the same as that which is desired. However – Thomas responds – although that which is apprehended is the same as that which is desired, it is apprehended and desired under different \textit{aspects} – under the aspect of being something \textit{true} or \textit{sensible} and under the aspect of being something \textit{good}, respectively.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{De Anima} V, 6 quoted in Pasnau p. 304.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{De Anima} V, 6 quoted in Pasnau p. 304.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{De Anima} V, 6 quoted in Pasnau p. 304.
\textsuperscript{14} Pasnau leaves the question open as to what position Avicenna “really” holds. Pasnau refers to Suárez as relating Avicenna and Aquinas to the first view (that the cognized being is the formal ground of final causation), in the sections of the DM dealt with above. Pasnau seems to think that Suárez takes Aquinas as “really” holding the second view (that the real being is the formal ground of final causation); implicitly he seems to mean that this is the view Suárez attributes to Avicenna, as well. (Pasnau p. 304 n. 8)
What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspects in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.¹⁵

Suárez also refers to this place when he – indirectly – argues that a difference in apprehension is enough to posit a difference of objects for appetites.

[T]he appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences in the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects.¹⁶

Now, Thomas is here not writing on individuation of different objects of one and the same power, but of a differentiation of the different powers themselves. To argue from these passages to the question Suárez is dealing with (how different appetites are distinguished) would need some kind of transferring of argumentation from one context to another, a hard manoeuvre to succeed with – especially with Thomas.

However, Thomas also writes of these questions more explicitly. For in the other context Suárez refers his readers to when it comes to painting the picture of the “first” Thomas - questions 30 and 31 of the first part of the second part, i.e. in Thomas’ treatment of human acts – the topics are concupiscence (‘concupiscentia’) and delight (‘delectatione’); and here, Thomas really asks the question of differentiation of differentiation within one power.

Hence, when Thomists attribute the position to Thomas, that the formal ground of final causation is to be found in cognition, they refer to the following lines, according to Suárez:

Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity of the object.¹⁷

So when different apprehensions lie at the root of different appetites, these appetites are also different. Here, it seems, a stronger case can be made for the view that Thomas holds the opinion Suárez wants to refute.

This argument – which is based on a reading of the Summa theologiae Ia-IIæ question 31 where delight is treated – seems also to be stronger than the

¹⁵ ST Ia, q. 80, a. 1, ad 2. ‘id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in objectis requiritur ad diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas.’
¹⁶ ST Ia, q. 81, a. 2, ad 1. ‘appetibile non movet appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum. Unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propra objecta.’
¹⁷ ST Ia-IIæ, q. 31, a. 3, ad 1. ‘cum objectum appetitus animalis sit bonum apprehensum, diversitas apprehensionis pertinet quodammodo ad diversitatem objecti.’
arguments from question 30 of the same part. For whereas delight can be attributed to the intellectual parts of the soul, concupiscence – which is the topic of question 30 – only pertains to the sensible parts of the soul.

[1]n the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.18

[1]Properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite.19

Hence, insofar as Suárez only attributes being moved by an end to the intellectual appetite, it seems that it is the discussions concerning delight – rather than those concerning concupiscence – which would be most relevant for him.

All in all, then, the passages which – from this brief walk-through – seem to be of highest interest in this regard is the ones pertaining to delight in ST Ia-IIae, q. 31. These passages would also be the once from which one could make the strongest case for the “first Thomas” being the “real” Thomas.

Paul Soncinas

According to Suárez, many “modern” Thomists (i.e., Thomists of the 15th and 16th centuries, primarily) follow this “first” reading of Thomas. The only philosopher specifically mentioned among these, though, is the Dominican Paul Soncinas (died 1494).

The locus Suárez refers to is Soncinas’ commentary on the Metaphysics, book 5, q. 3.20 In this, Soncinas writes that

final causality incorporates (‘convenit’) a thing which is called an end, not with respect to the being which it has outside, but which it has in the soul.21

Soncinas draws the distinction between the being “outside the soul” (‘extra anima’) and the being “in the soul” (‘in anima’) and states that it is with respect to the latter that a thing can be an end. Right after this passage, Soncinas then allows for this end to either exist or not exist presently.

But I state in advance that the end for which the agent acts can be twofold. For some [end] is an already existing end, for whose sake and by love the agent operates, not – certainly – as producing this end, for it already is, but because [the agent] loves [the end], for itself and by a friendly love. And

18 ST Ia-IIae, q. 31, a. 4c. ‘in appetitu intellectivo, sive in voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem delectatio corporalis.’
19 ST Ia-IIae, q. 30, a. 1c. ‘concupiscencia, proprie loquendo, est in appetitu sensitivo’
20 This question takes up pp. 61-63 in Soncinas 1498.
21 Soncinas 1498 p. 62. ‘causalitas finis convenit rei quae dicitur finis non quantum ad esse quod habet extra sed quod habet in anima.’
therefore [the agent] operates much for [the end], that is, from its love [of the end]. Another [end] is an end not existing actually (‘actu’), but only potentially, for the production of which the agent acts, as the natural agents act for the sake of (‘propter’) producing forms and the doctor heals in order to cause health. An end said in the first way can incorporate efficient causality and final causality, whereas [the end said] in the second way only incorporates final causality.\(^{22}\)

Here, Soncinas seems to allow for the possibility that the end exists while the action for the end takes place – the thing which is the end both exerting efficient and final causation, although it is unclear just from this place what the efficient causation would consist in. However, in the following statements concerning the end, Soncinas seems to lean toward the view that it is the end in the second sense – an end which does not exist – which is an end in the real sense of the word.\(^{23}\)

First, the final causality is never actual (‘in actu’) except when the causality of the agent is actual, that is, except when the agent is actually causing. But when the end is produced into being the agent does not actually cause. Therefore, at that time, the end does not actually have its causality. The major is proven, for because a cause in act and an effect in act are simultaneous. [...] But the efficient causality is the effect of the final causality. [...] Therefore, etc. The minor also holds in itself, because by the presence of the terminus of motion the action ceases, as is said in *De generatione II*.\(^{24}\)

Hence, the end – at least in one sense, the sense intended in the above quote – does not exist while the action takes place. When the end has been achieved, the action ceases, and with it both the efficient and the final causation.

Soncinas also reinforces this point when answering objections to his position. Here he writes that


\(^{23}\) Soncinas does not treat how the two notions are related in the present *locus*. However, one can remind oneself of Suárez’ treatment of different kinds of ends, and different ways of using the word “end,” of which some are more proper than other. Perhaps this is what Soncinas presumes here, as well?

\(^{24}\) Soncinas 1498 p. 62. ‘Primo causalitas finis nunquam est in actu nisi dum causalitas agens actu est: idest nisi dum agens actu causat: Sed quando finis est productus in esse: agens non causat actu: ergo tunc finis non habet actu suam causalitatem. maior probatur: quia causa in actu et effectus in actu sunt simul [...] sed causalitas efficientis est effectus causalitas finis [...] ergo et cetera minor etiam patet de se: quia praesente termino motus cessat actio: ut dicitur secundo de generatione.’
This is fundamentally just a reiteration of his fundamental point, but in the language of reality (‘realiter’). The reality which the end has when it causes is a reality of the soul not a reality in and of itself.

Although this is not intended as a full-blown treatment of this passage, it is still noteworthy that Soncinas seems to slide a bit in his reasoning. On the one hand, he allows for the end to exist when it causes. However, it is the end as existing in the soul, not as real, which causes finally. On the other hand, then, the motion stops when the end has been achieved, and the end is not real when it causes. There seems to be a tension in Soncinas here, which could depend on different uses of the word “end” which are not accounted for in the present context.

Another noteworthy point, in relation to Suárez, is that Soncinas also treats relations in this context. However, his position differs from Suárez’; because the end has real being in the soul, it can also found a real relation according to Soncinas (whereas the end can not found a real relation because it is not real when it causes, according to Suárez).

A thing can incorporate (‘convenire’) a real relation insofar as it has real being in the soul. And if it is asked in what this relation is founded, I answer that it is founded in this being which the end has in the soul. This being does not found this relation for itself, however, but for the end which is produced. And therefore this [relation] is not called the end, but that which is produced is called the end.

So it is the end as it is in the soul which is the end that can exert final causality. So is this “being in the soul” an ‘ens rationis’, as it is argued that Suárez has it in the present thesis? No. Soncinas out rightly rejects this and offers another answer.

The being which the not yet produced end has in the intellect and the will is neither diminished nor intentional, that is, rational being, but it is real and spiritual being, which is being of a noble kind. And therefore the end, insofar as it has such being, can incorporate causality.

Soncinas out-rightly rejects Scotus’ solution to the problem, that it has diminished being. He also seems to equate this view with the view that it has

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25 Soncinas 1498 p. 62. ‘finis dum causat est realiter non quidem in se: sed in anima’
26 Soncinas 1498 p. 62. ‘rei ut habet esse reale in anima convenire potest relatio realis: et si dicitur in quo fundatur hec relatio, dico quod fundatur in illo esse quod finis habet in anima: istud autem esse non fundat hanc relationem pro se: sed pro fine qui producetur: et ideo ipsum non dicitur finis: sed id quod producetur dicitur finis’
27 Soncinas 1498 p. 62. ‘esse quod habet finis nondum productus in intellectu et voluntate: non est esse diminutum et intentionale idest esse rationis: sed est esse reale et spirituale quod est esse nobili modo: et ideo fini ut habet tale esse potest convenire causalitas.’
“intentional” or “rational” being. Instead, the end has “spiritual” being, as it exists in the soul of the human being, which is spiritual – furthermore, in the immaterial parts of the soul, in the intellect and the will. Hence, the mode of existence of the end is even higher than that of material things. In Soncinas, then, it seems highly plausible that the end is the highest of all causes, also on the level of human beings.

The End Moves in Accordance with Its Real Being

These were the philosophers invoked for the view that the end moves in accordance with its cognized being. It remains to present the more numerous philosophers which Suárez invokes for his own view – that the end moves in accordance with its real being.

Aristotle

As in almost all questions, Aristotle’s view on the present opinion is presented. Suárez chooses a passage from the *Metaphysics*, book 6, paragraph 4\(^{28}\). He refers to Aristotle as writing that

\[
\text{good and bad, which are objects of the will, are in things.}\quad \text{29}
\]

Now, the passage is not to be spelled out in this way, according to modern translations. Ross’ translation goes like this:

\[
\text{for falsity and truth are not in things – it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false.}\quad \text{30}
\]

Here, only falsity and truth are spoken of, are said not to be “in things” and then contrasted to good and bad. However, what in *Aristoteles Latinus* seems to be explicit is only implicit in the original text. One can see how the text has relevance to the question; goodness, which is that sought after by the will, is in the thing, interpreted – then – as the real thing or being. However, the quote is so vague as to have not too much more philosophical content than this to the present question, even when seen in its context, although it is of course an important quote insofar as it is important to be able to invoke Aristotle for one’s own view.

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\(28\) Suárez writes “8”.

\(29\) DM XXIII.8, §5; 25:880. ‘bonum et malum, quæ sunt objecta voluntatis, esse in rebus.’ [*]

This exact passage is quoted, with the same wording, in ST I, q. 82, a. 3c.

\(30\) Aristotle 1984 p. 1623 [1027\(\text{b}\)25].
Averroes (ibn Rushd)

The second opinion – that the formal ground of final causation is real being – is judged to be that of Averroes. As support for this claim, Suárez refers his reader to Averroes’ commentary on book XII of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. The commented passage goes as follows:

> And the object of desire and the object of thought move [like the first mover]; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the thinking is the starting point.31

Suárez writes that in commenting on this passage, Averroes makes the following point:

> Health which is in a thing causes finally, although insofar as [health] is in the soul it causes [efficiently] the desire for itself.32

I cannot find this exact point about health in referred passage in Averroes commentary on the *Metaphysics*; however, he does write things to this effect.

With regard to what Aristotle writes on the comparison between the first mover and us humans, Averroes writes

> that this [First] mover is an intellect and that it is a mover insofar as it is the agent of motion and the end of motion. This is distinct and multiple only in us, I mean that which moves us locally as efficient cause and that which moves us as final cause, because it has two modes of existence, one in the soul and one outside the soul. Insofar as it exists in the soul it is the efficient cause of motion, and insofar as it exists outside the soul, it is mover as end.33

With regard to the First mover – for Suárez the same as God – the agent of the motion and the end of the motion is one and the same: God himself. However, with regard to human beings, the path of efficacy and the path of finality run in contrary directions. There is a path of efficacy from the thought in our minds to the end which is achieved. In the other direction, there is a path from the end to the thought, a “drawing” of us – through our mental activity – toward this end. However, in Averroes there seems to still be a quite far reaching identity between these, just as in Aristotle; we have not yet encountered a full blown “problem of intentionality.” This can be seen in Averroes talk here of the “two modes of existence” of the one thing.

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31 *Metaphysics* XII.7; 1072a26ff. Translation from Ross 1984.
32 DM XXIII.8, §5; 25:880. ‘sanitatem, quæ est in re, causare finaliter, licet prout est in anima, efficiat desiderium sui.’ [*]
That which effects our movement or change and that which draws us to it is one and the same thing, though it has two different “modes of existence” – one mental, another extra-mental. Still, one can see the friction: we are unlike the first mover in that the efficient and the final causes are not identical; and yet, they turn out to be identical, but with different “modes of existence.” What question of what kind of distinction there is between the thought and its object seems to become an inevitable one, in this light, in the history of philosophy.

The complexities Averroes encounters when he tries to speak of this comes out nicely in the following quote:

When the form which is in the soul arises in us, we desire it and it moves us toward it, I mean toward the form which is outside the soul, it impels us to enter it.34

Given Averroes (in)famous view that our active intellect is identical to that of God, the Creator of all things around us, and that all human beings share a single material intellect, this should not be an unsolvable problem for him.35 As the form in our mind is the same as the form of the form “out there,” there is no gap to breach between the efficient and the final cause; the problem rather becomes how we are different from the first mover, after all.

However, there is still an order between the form in our mind and the form “out there.” The extra-mental form is, in one way, the actualization of the form in mind. In another way, and linked to this, the form in mind is the cause of the form in its material, extra-mental mode.

It seems that these forms have two modes of being, a mode of being in actuality which is their material being, and a mode of being in potentiality which is their mode of being in these forms. By potentiality, I mean here the same as when we say that manufactured forms have an actual mode of being in matter and a potential mode of being in the soul of the craftsman. This is why it is thought these forms have two modes of being: a separate mode of being and a material mode of being and that the separate is the cause of the material.36

Thus, for Averroes it is the same form which is in our mind and in the thing which we produce (as is the case in this example). The form as it exists in mind is potential with respect to the form as it exists in the material thing. However, it is this potential kind of form which causes the form in the thing.

I think the problem of the relation between end and thought as it is encountered in Averroes holds many similarities to the problem Suárez encounters. However, as the relation between the thought and its object is wi-

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ounded in Suárez, it is also harder for him to bridge the gap between thought and end.

Thomas Aquinas II

I will now just briefly look at the *locus* Suárez refers to for evidence of the “second” Thomas. The reference is to article 3 of question 82 of the first part – i.e., in the so called *Treatise of Man* (consisting of questions 75 to 89). Here we find ourselves in a discussion of the will – the appetitive faculty of the intellectual part of the soul – which is fitting, considering Suárez’ limiting of ends to intellective appetites. However, just as in the other discussion Suárez refers to in the *Treatise of Man*, Thomas is here not really talking about differentiation of different occurrences of the same kind of act within one power, but rather of the differentiation of two different *powers* – in this case, between will and intellect.

Hence, it seems rather to be in the first group of quotes that we can find better evidence for Thomas’ own view. This would also, then, reinforce the “modern Thomists” who go along with the interpretation of the “first” Thomas.

Duns Scotus

When it comes to Scotus, Suárez refers to “1, d. 1, q. 4.” Of which work, however, he does not say.

The most natural choice would be the *Ordinatio*. However, this is ordered into books, distinctions, parts, and questions; hence, the reference to a part is missing (given the not too farfetched assumption that “d” refers to “distinctio” and “q” to “quæstio,” respectively).

First, could the “q” really refer to “part”? Suárez might have mistaken “p” for “q”. However, the first distinction does not have four parts (only three), so this alternative is not good.

How do the respective questions of the parts of the first distinction come out? The first part is, generally, on the object of enjoyment (‘De objecto fruïtione’). The first and second parts only have two sub-questions each; the third part (“On the one enjoying”; ‘De fruente’), however, has 5 questions. Of these, the fourth question has the title “Whether animals may enjoy” (‘Utrum bruta fruantur’).

Fourth it is asked whether animals may enjoy.

And it seems so, by Augustine, *On 83 questions* q. 30, where he says that “animals also are judged, not absurdly, to enjoy something by bodily pleasure.”

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37 See above, p. 137.
On the other hand:
“To enjoy is to hold on to something by love for its own sake.” But animals do not have love, because neither do they have will, neither do they hold on to some thing for its own sake, but rather for the good of themselves. Therefore they do not enjoy.38

Could this be the question Suárez is thinking of?
Truly, the question is within the area of that which Suárez is treating of. However, there should be better places to insert this reference, as Suárez directly addresses the question of animals and their emotions. Hence, I take this to be a mistaken reference by Suárez.

Ockham
Suárez also refers to William of Ockham (c. 1287-1347) as one holding that the end moves in accordance with its real being. His reference is to “in 2, q. 3, art. 2.” It could not be to Ockham’s commentary on the Sentences, as the questions here do not have articles, and question 3 of the second part - furthermore – deals with the question of whether God is the first and immediate cause of everything.39

I have not been able to find any plausible candidate for what passages Suárez might have had in mind.

Gabriel Biel
For Gabriel Biel (before 1425-1495), the reference is to “2, d. 1, q. 1, art. 3.” The form of the reference fits perfectly with the structure of his commentary on the Sentences. However, the article referred to does not seem to directly deal with the question of the status of the end vis-à-vis the human faculties. Instead, it deals with the questions of whether the relation can be separated from its foundation (‘Dubium 1’), whether active and passive creation can be separated (‘Dubium 2’), and whether every effect is created by God (‘Dubium 3’).40 Surely, each of these questions has some relation to the question of the status of the end; but none of them could be said to address it directly. Hence, the reference seems to be misdirected.

Biel does treat final causes under the heading of the first distinction of the second part, however, namely under question 5. This is quite an extensive

38 Scotus Ordinatio 1, d. 1, p. 3, q. 4 (Opera omnia II [1950], p. 112). ‘Quarto quæritur utrum bruta fruantur. Et videtur quod sic, per Augustinum, ubi prius, 83 Quæstionum quæstione 30, ubi dicit quod “frui qualibet corporali voluptate, non absurde aestimantur et bestiæ”. Contra: “Frui est amore inhaerere alicui propter se”; sed bruta non habent amorem, quia nec voluntatem, nec inhaerent alicui rei propter se, sed propter bonum eorum; ergo non fruuntur.’
40 Biel 1984 pp. 11-17.
question	extsuperscript{41}, and I have not been able to locate any specific place which would indicate Biel’s stance on the question at hand.

Thomas Cajetan

Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469-1534) is mentioned first among those philosophers who judge the final cause to move according to its real being. Actually, it is from Cajetan that Suárez gets the reference to Averroes.

The reference to Cajetan is to “1 2, q. 1, a. 1, circa ad 1,” which refers to Cajetan’s commentary on the ST.	extsuperscript{42} In the commentary to this article, Cajetan writes that

Concerning these words: “the end has the nature (‘ratio’) of a cause insofar as it is first in intention,” there occurs a doubt whether the thing is the end in accordance with it as it is in intention, or in accordance with it as it is in the nature of things.

“In the nature of things” (‘in rerum natura’) is a rather strange expression; one could have expected “in the things of nature” (‘in rebus naturae’), or something similar. However, he obviously denotes the thing which is independent of mind with these words, as it is contrasted to that which is “in intention” (‘in intentione’). The basic meaning of the distinction is also given by his quotation of Averroes at this point.

With this distinction in the background, Cajetan wants to prove three things. The third of these is that “to be in the nature of things is the foundation (‘ratio’) of the end.”

Hence, just in line with Suárez’ categorization of him, Cajetan opposes himself to the view that the end moves as an end as it is in intention, and subscribes to the view – following Averroes – that it is the “real thing,” so to say, which moves as an end.

Furthermore, just as Suárez, Cajetan – who, by the way, Suárez rarely agrees with, but does so much at this specific point – calls being in intention a “condition” for the final cause (exerting its final causation, presumably).

The foundation (‘ratio’) for finalization is to be a thing which is called an end; the condition for finalization is, on the other hand, to be in intention.

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\textsuperscript{41} Biel 1984 pp. 61-80.
\textsuperscript{42} This commentary is printed together with Thomas’ text in the Leonine edition, wherefore the references will be to Aquinas 1891.
\textsuperscript{43} Aquinas 1891 p. 7, §8. ‘circa illa verba, Finis ut est primus in intentione, habet rationem causae, dubius occurrat an res sit finis secundum secundum quod est in intentione, an secundum quod est in rerum natura.’
\textsuperscript{44} Aquinas 1891 p. 7, §9. ‘Esse in rerum natura est ratio finis.’
\textsuperscript{45} Aquinas 1891 p. 8, §9. ‘ratio autem finalizandi est esse rei quae finis dicitur, conditio vero finalizandis est esse in intentione’
Referring to Thomas’ words of the end as being “first in intention but last in execution,” Cajetan wants to stress that the end – the thing in nature – and that which is last in execution are not two different things. Rather, as evinced by the following quote, that a thing is in nature is a necessary condition for it being executed.

To be in nature may not be distinguished from being in execution as one being from another. [Being in nature] is distinguished from [being in execution] insofar as being in execution as such signifies being as depending on the agent. Being in the nature of things, on the other hand, neither includes nor excludes this, but can rather found (‘fundare’) causality from which the agent and its execution depends.\textsuperscript{46}

The very last remark reminds one of Suárez’ view that the action is a mode of the effect (here: that the agent and its execution depends on the thing, although the thing also – in another sense – depends on the agent and the execution).

There is, finally, another sentiment by Cajetan which is echoed almost verbatim by Suárez, namely an argument against why the thing in intention would be the end:

The reason (‘ratio’) why health is desired, is not being in the soul (for the sick person does not desire health in the soul), but in the nature of things.\textsuperscript{47}

To summarize, Suárez later echoes many of the sentiments on the present issue which are stated by Cajetan; it is, in this way, an interesting exception from general distancing from Cajetan that Suárez usually makes.

\textbf{Chrysostom Javellus}

When we come to the Dominican Chrysostom Javellus (1470-1543), the question of whether we are moved by what is real or by what is perceived has really started to become recognizable in the texts Suárez refers to. For in the referred to text of Javellus – his commentary on the \textit{Metaphysics}, book 5, question 6\textsuperscript{48} – he asks “whether the end is a cause insofar as it has being in the soul or outside the soul.”\textsuperscript{49}

Javellus enumerates three different positions, of which he will side with the third. Javellus labels the position that the end “is the cause insofar as it

\textsuperscript{46} Aquinas 1891 p. 8, §9. ‘esse in natura ab esse in executione licet non distinguatur sicut unum esse ab alio esse, distinguetur tamen adeo ab eo, ut esse in executione, ut sic, significet esse ut pendens ab agente; esse vero in rerum natura hoc nec includit nec excludit, immo fundare potest causalitatem ex qua dependet egans et eius executione.’

\textsuperscript{47} Aquinas 1891 p. 8, §10. ‘ratio quod sanitas appetatur, est esse non in anima (nam non appetit infirmus sanitatem in anima), sed in rerum natura.’

\textsuperscript{48} Javellus 1555, n. 82-3.

\textsuperscript{49} Javellus 1555 n. 82a. ‘si finis est causa ut habet esse in anima vel extra animam’
has being in the soul as the first position. As philosophers holding to this position, he refers to Avicenna – his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, book 6, chapter 5 – and Soncinas’ commentary on the *Metaphysics* – book 5, question 3 – as well as “other modern Thomists.” This is, pace some passages from Thomas, exactly the philosophers and even passages Suárez refers to as representatives of this position! Obviously, we can here see an important link in how the treatment of the relation between final and efficient causes in Avicenna was taken into account when dealing with the present question. Here we can also see a canonical list of *loci* in formation, as pertaining to the present question.

Javellus lists two different grounds for this first opinion, that we are moved by what is in the soul rather than what is outside of it. First, insofar as the end is in act outside of the soul, it is caused. Javellus takes the case of health; the health in a patient is an effect of a working toward an end, rather than a cause itself. Second – and this is a similar argument – the end is a cause which causes other causes. But it does this as that for which the agent acts. When the end has been achieved, however, it is no longer an end – for it has then already functioned as an end, and has already caused what it was to cause. Javellus ends his account of this position by pointing out that Socinus’ reasons coincide with those of Avicenna.

The second position related by Javellus is a bit more elaborate. According to this, there are two aspects or conditions of an end: the end (i) moves the agent toward operation or action in accordance with the end, and (ii) stills the desire of the agent. As to the first aspect, the one of the end moving, it is the end as it is in the soul which is referred to, as Avicenna says. As to the other, the end as fulfilling the wishes of the agent, it is the end as it actually exists which is referred to. For, as Javellus writes, unless that which is the end is produced and actualized, it won’t silence the desires. The example here is of the merchant, who is not satisfied until he gets a profit. However, Javellus writes, this position does not differ from the first one. And as for the aspect of the end as silencing desires, when it silences desires, it is no longer an end. He ends, though, by writing that this position differs from the first in what it takes to be the formal foundation for final causation – that of silencing the desires, presumably.

After this, then Javellus comes to the position he himself favors. He writes, first, that this is also the position favored by Thomas and Averroes. These hold the view that the end comprises two aspects: the end is that which (i) is a cause and that which moves the agent, and also that which (ii) does not move the agent, but is a necessary prerequisite for this. The end can

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50 Javellus 1555 n. 82a. ‘est causa ut habet esse in anima’
51 The manuscript could here either read “5” or “15”. However, as book six only has five chapters, it must be “5”.
52 Javellus 1555 n. 82a-b.
53 Javellus 1555 n. 82b.
be producible and achievable in the first sense, its real being, that being it has outside of mind. For example, the health potentially really present in a human being is what moves a doctor. Hence, a person is made healthy as that potentiality goes over into actuality; and this is achieved insofar as the end is in the soul, in accordance with the second meaning above. Hence, Javellus here speaks of a potentiality – which is not real outside the soul – which transforms into, or “is reduced to” as he puts it, actuality. This apprehension by our mind is thus a necessary condition for the end being achieved in this case; without the idea of health – the potentiality – the health in the person – the actuality – could not be achieved. (Of course, it could be realized in another way.) When the end has been realized, it no longer moves.54

This stance Javellus considers being the correct one, at the same time as it embodies the insights of the first two opinions. He also ascribes this view to Averroes, and points to his commentary on the Metaphysics, book 12, commentary 36. This is, once again, exactly the locus Suárez points to when referring to his second opinion! Javellus actually has the reference right, and refers to Averroes as having the view that a real bath may act as an end, whereas the bath in mind elicits (“agit”) the desire. And therefore, the apprehension is called a “necessary condition” for being moved.55

Javellus also brings up three objections to his preferred opinion. The first is that there must be a real relation between a cause and its effect. For this to pertain, though, it is necessary that cause as well as effect is real. However, in Javellus’ favored opinion, the end is not unambiguously real. This is, by the way, also exactly the kind of problem Suárez faces for his position. Javellus’ answer is that the end, in one sense, is actual and real; in the sense of being in the mind, it need only be potentially real in order to function as one relatum in a relation.56

The second objection is directed to the fact that before the end has been made, it is not real, and can thus not cause; but since it can only cause as real, it cannot cause before it has come into existence, and can therefore not cause at all. As an answer, Javellus draws an interesting parallel between different kinds of causes. He groups the final cause together with the material cause, and the efficient cause together with the formal. Then he writes of the material cause, that it causes only in that an insofar as it is being or becomes informed or actualized, whereas the formal cause must be actual in order to inform. It is similar, then, with the relation between the efficient and the final cause; the efficient cause must be actual in order for it to cause (as the formal cause). However, the causal power of the final cause lies exactly in its potentiality, just as the material cause. The end is a cause insofar as it

54 Javellus 1555 nn. 82b-3a.
55 Javellus 1555 n. 83a.
56 Javellus 1555 n. 83a-b.
moves the agent to “its production or acquisition.” And insofar as this producing or acquiring takes place, it is a perfecting of the desiring.

As the foundation for the third and last objection, Javellus takes a passage from the *Physics*, book 2, paragraph 3, where Aristotle enumerates the different kinds of causes. Javellus says that Aristotle there writes that the end is not a cause before it has been produced, as it only has potential being at that point. The end thus has an optimal structure (‘optime raione’) as it has been produced, but does not have this before it has come into existence. Javellus’ answer is, briefly, that the final cause has an optimal structure, not because it is as good as it can be once it has come into existence, but because it is the “cause of causes.” Hence, the status of the final cause as the “highest” kind of cause – at least in one sense – does not stem from that thing or state of affairs which has come into being from it, but from the way in which the final causation works.

I think there are great similarities between Suárez and Javellus. Indeed, Suárez refers to Javellus as a philosopher holding the position Suárez himself is holding. Further, though, Javellus proves an important figure for the canon of *loci* for this particular question, as he enumerates many *loci* Suárez will later reiterate. And as Suárez refers to this passage in Javellus, he has clearly read it.

Suárez follows closely in the footsteps of Javellus in his handling of the present question. However, if a difference is to be pointed out, Javellus uses a potentiality-actuality structure much more heavily than does Suárez. In this, Javellus comes closer to a classical Aristotelian pattern of reasoning than does Suárez. In this difference, Suárez’ personal contribution or take on this question stands out all the more clearly.

**Francis Sylvester of Ferrara**

Suárez refers to “Ferrariensis,” or Francis Sylvester (Francesco Silvestri) of Ferrara (1474-1528), as saying that “to be in mind is only a required condition for finalization.” This is supposedly stated in his commentary on the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. However, as will be seen, this does not adequately represent Francis of Ferrara’s position.

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57 *sui productionem vel acquisitionem*
58 Javellus 1555 n. 83b.
59 *causa causarum*
60 Javellus 1555 n. 83b.
61 DM XXIII.8, §5; 25:880. ‘ubi dicit, esse in mente, tantum esse conditionem requisitam ad finalisandum’
62 Book I, ch. 44.
63 The commentary is in Aquinas 1918, pp. 130-135, wherefore the references will be to this work.
Let us first look at some background Francis of Ferrara himself draws up in the present question. First of all, Francis of Ferrara draws a distinction between the exercise and the specification of an act of will, just as Suárez does. Second, Francis of Ferrara separates between two situations regarding the question of how the end is related to the will: when the wants the end, on the one hand, and when the will wants the means to an end. This is how he treats them, respectively:

For the appetible, or the end, can be related (‘comparari’) to the will in two ways: in one way with respect to the actions by which it wills the end, in another way with respect to its the actions by which it will that which is ordered (‘ordinatur’) to the end. I therefore say two things:

The first is that if the will is related (‘comparetur’) to the will with respect to the actions by which it wills the end, it does not move the will effectively, properly [speaking], as it is clearly the form which is the elicitive principle of the will; but this [form] moves only formally, by way of form specifying the operation, [the form] existing outside the operating power.

The other is that if the will is related (‘comparetur’) to the will with respect to its volitions which are [ordered] to the end, the end moves the will by way of efficiency, as the reason for acting.64

In these paragraphs, the two distinctions mentioned above come together. When the will wills the end itself, the end does not move the will effectively or, equivalently, as an efficient cause. Instead, the end is or acts like a form, and exerts formal causality. Further, this influence only regards the specification, not the exercise, of the act. On the other hand, when the will wills the means to an end, the end acts like an efficient cause.

To look at the first situation, when the will wills the end itself, how could this formal influence of the end on the will be further specified? In this specification, Francis of Ferrara stresses the active role of the will and the limited influence of the end – limited as it is to the specification, not the exercise, of the acts of will. Indeed, in line with an earlier tradition from Scotus and all the way back to Aristotle, Francis of Ferrara calls the end’s moving of the will “metaphorical,” just as Suárez.

Wherefore the end is said to move metaphorically and by similitude, because as the agent draws (‘trahit’) the effect to its similitude, so the appetible draws the will, just as this takes place in efficient [causation] by the impression of some form or movement. In [the case of] the appetible and the end, however,

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64 Aquinas 1918 p. 131, §4. ‘Nam appetibile, sive finis, dupliciter comparari potest ad voluntatem: uno modo, respectu illius actus quo vult finem; alio modo, respectu illius actus quo vult ea quae ordinatur ad finem. Dico igitur duo: / Primum est quod, si finis comparetur ad voluntatem respectu illius actus quo vult finem, non movet voluntatem effective proprie, tantum videlicet forma quae sit principium elicitivum volitionis: sed movet tantum formaliter, per modum formae specificanis operationem extra potentiam operantem existentis. / Alterum est quod, si finis comparetur ad voluntatem respectu volitionis eorum quae sunt ad finem, finis movet voluntatem per modum efficientis, tantum ration agendi.’
this does not take place by some impression in the will, but only by determin-
ination and specification (‘specificationem’) of the act of this will. [...] Where-
from it can also be settled that, according to this consideration, this power of
will is called passive metaphorically, and the appetible is called active meta-
phorically. [The will] is called passive because it is indifferent to this or that
object, and it can be drawn by a such; and [the appetible is called] active be-
cause it draws the will to itself, as that which formally specifies its voli-
tions.65

Once again, we see the stress on the fact that the end does not elicit an act of
will – an act of willing an end, that is – but only specifies it, and that this is
compared to a formal influence – it gives the form of the act. A certain dif-
ference from Suárez in the notion of efficient causation is also evident in the
above quote, as the agent (i.e., the efficient cause) “draws the effect to its
similitude,” according to Francis of Ferrara’s view.

However, we also have here a consideration of the will as passive. This is
a common view in the Aristotelian tradition. However, here Francis of Ferra-
ra calls this designation “metaphorical,” and views this designation only as
referring to the indifference to different objects. The will, then, acquires a
more active role than might at first be obvious.

We are now in a position to adequately evaluate what Francis of Ferrara
writes on the status of the end. As we have seen, the end is compared to a
form. Further, the end – in the willing of this end – only influences the speci-
fication of an act, not the very taking place of this act. With this in the back-
ground, then, and by the following quote, it seems that Francis of Ferrara
wants to say the exact opposite of what Suárez has him saying:

However, the nature of acting ought to be in the agent: it is necessary that the
appetible be in the appetizing, not according to its natural being, but rather
according to its intentional being. Therefore, intentional being is a condition
of the end insofar as it is the moving reason, and insofar as it is the formal
specification of the act of willing. Wherefore it is said that the end moves the
agent according as it is in intention. Because its intentional being is obvious-
ly a condition in itself required for it as it moves, formally as well as the rea-
son for acting (‘ratio agendi’). Just as heat (‘calor’) is the reason why a flame
heats (‘califaciendi’), and this insofar as it itself formally makes heat (‘faciat
calidum’), it is proper (‘oportet’) that it be in the flame.”66

65 Aquinas 1918 p. 131, §5. ‘Unde dicitur finis metaphorice movere et per similitudinem, quia,
sicut agens effectum ad sui similitudinem trahit, ita appetibile ad se trahit voluntatem: livet in
efficiente illud sit per impressionem alicuius formae aut motus; in appetibili autem et fine non
sit per impressionem alicuius in voluntate, sed tantum per determinationem et specificationem
actus ipsius voluntatis [...] Ex quo etiam requitur quod metaphoricum, secundum hanc
considerationem, ipsa potentia voluntatis dicitur passiva, et ipsum appetibile dicitur activum,
metaphoricum: ut illa dicitur passiva, quia est indifferentem ad hoc vel illud obiectum, et ab illo
potest aliquo modo trahii; et illud activum, quia voluntatem ad se trahit, tanquam ipsius
volitionis formale specificativum.’

66 Aquinas 1918 p. 131, §5. ‘rationem autem agendi oportet esse in agente: necesse est [...] 
quod appetibile sit in appetente, non quidem secundum esse naturale, sed secundum esse
Indeed, Francis of Ferrara does claim that being in intention is “a required condition” – or, verbatim, “a condition in itself required” – for the end to move. However, he does this in a context where he also claims more than this. For he says that the appetible, the end, is in the one appetizing “not according to its natural being, but rather according to its intentional being.” This looks awfully a lot like claiming that the end does not move according to its real being, but rather in accordance with its cognized – or intentional – being.

It is also interesting that Francis of Ferrara once again, this time by example, likens this drawing of the end to a formal causation, this time a flame which heats. It is, then, in a way the form of the end which already exists in the intention of the agent and “draws” him to itself. This picture, one must say, is quite Thomistic, although it is interestingly combined with a heavy stress on the activity of the will.

This stress on the formal aspect, so to say, of the end also allows for a greater continuity between human beings and natural agents than what is the case in Suárez. Quite like in Thomas, the fundamental structure of being drawn or moved by an end is the same in all created things, although this also comes to very different expressions in different beings.

All operation (‘operatio’) is specified by the form which is the principle of the operation. But that the form is the principle of operation is not understood in the same way regarding all agents. For in natural agents, the form is the principle by way of eliciting the operation. In agents [operating] by cognition of and appetite for the end, on the other hand, this cognized end is the principle of those actions which are volitions for an end. Not as eliciting the operation [however], wherefore it is not in the will, which is the immediate eliciting principle of a volition, but in the intellect [of the agent], as a form existing under the authority of willing (‘in supposito volente’) before the volition, from which existence in the intellect it goes over to volition. Wherefore it is said that the cognized end is the principle of a volition; [and] hence, every form which preexists in the agent before the operation according to its nature, and by the positing of which the operating proceeds to action, could be called the principle of operation. However, this [form] does not formally elicit this operation, but only specifies it.67

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intentionale; ita quod esse intentionale sit conditio finis ut est movendi ratio, et ut est formale specificativum actus voluntatis. Propter quod dicitur quod finis movet agentem secundum quod est in intentione: quia videlicet esse intentionale eius est conditio ipsius requisita ad hoc ut moveat, tam formali quam sicut ratio agendi; sicut ad hoc ut calorsit igni ratio calefaciendi, et ad hoc ut ipsum faciat formaliter calidum, oportet ut sit in igne.’ 67 Aquinas 1918 p. 133, §8. ‘omnis operatio per formam quae est operatio principium specificatur: sed non eodem modo intelligitur in omnibus agentibus formam esse operationis principium. In agentibus enim naturalibus forma est principium per modum eliciens operationem. In agentibus autem per cognitionem et appetitu finis, ipse finis cognitus est principium illius operationis quae est volitio finis, non ut eliciens operationem, unde non est in voluntate, quae est immediatum principium elicivitumvolitionis, sed in eius intellectu, ut forma ante volitionem in supposito volente existens, ex qua existente in ipsius intellectu ad volitionem egreditur. Unde dicitur finis cognitus esse volitionis principium, prout omnis
The end preexists as a form in the mind, making the volition possible as well as giving it its specification.

We thus, at the end, have seen yet another variant on the answer to the status of the end vis-à-vis the agent and his will, although our judgment of this particular answer differs from that of Suárez.

Some Concluding Words

Suárez’ references to different authors on the present question has proven of a varied quality: some he seems to have misapprehended or even mis-referenced, whereas he is strongly influenced by others, in the untangling and answering of the question as well as in the use of further sources. A lot more could be said on the above authors, but I will limit myself here to some reflections on what can be learned from this tracing of references with regard to what Suárez writes.

A first lesson is that Suárez could quite knowingly navigate between different possible answers to the question. This means that his leaving out of an answer is also significant. As these answers are in his sources, he ought to be aware of them, and thus chose to not answer in a certain way for a reason.

A second lesson to be drawn is that this question had already been treated in many different ways. Indeed, the question had a kind of pre-history, where Suárez’ formulation of it follows a long development in its formulation, and where the canonical loci in Averroes and Avicenna – and others – where to look for an answer is more stable than the question itself.

The tracing of the threads back has, briefly, shown the enormous complexity of the questions and answers connected with it up until Suárez’ times. It is on this background that he points out the equivocation to the question (something others before him had already done) and that he carefully zigzags his way through it, giving due weight to the different sides of a fair answer to the question.

\[\text{forma quae in agente ante operationem preexistat secundum naturam, et qua posita ipsum operans ad actionem procedit, operationis principium dici potest; licet ipsam operationem non formaliter elicitat, sed tantum specificet.}\]
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