Introduction

Since the early 1990s the international community has been increasingly adopting liberal state-building as part of a wider liberal peacebuilding strategy for addressing the plethora of problems facing post-conflict societies (Chandler 2006; Chesterman 2005; Kostić 2007; MacGinty 2006; Paris 2004). In that sense, liberal state-building is viewed as a peacebuilding measure with the aim to construct or reconstruct the institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security (cf. Paris 2004; Richmond 2006). One of the guiding assumptions has been that the presence of strong state institutions would facilitate macro-economic growth and provide economic and societal security of its citizens (Paris 2004). Such measures, in combinations with strong state institutions and functioning infrastructure, are supposed to bring economic well-being that would in return strengthen the legitimacy of the state among its citizens by means of democratic elections, thus bringing about political moderation and societal integration in previously fragmented societies (Paris 2004).

However, while it has been shown that this type of liberal state- and nation-building fails short of bringing societal integration in multiethnic societies (Kostić 2007, 2008), it does not include in its framework of analysis the environmental problems of post-conflict societies. Economic development
projects such as large hydro projects or opencast mining for lignite – as an element of a broader state-building exercise – lead to environmental stress for the communities, and can further exacerbate inter-communal incompatibilities (Swain and Krampe 2011). Thus, it has been argued that a ‘failure to respond to the environmental needs of war-torn societies can greatly complicate the already difficult tasks of peace, reconciliation, political institutionalization and economic reconstruction’ (Conca 2006, 1).

While environmental factors are unlikely a direct cause of conflicts, it is indisputable that the destruction of the environment has severe consequences for societies. Several studies (Gleditsch 1998; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Lee 2009; Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998; Swain 1993) show that environmental stress is increasing societal insecurity. Recently, the debate on climate change and its effects on conflicts has extended the argumentation further (Barnett and Adger 2007; Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007; Detraz and Betsill 2009; Lee 2009; Nordas and Gleditsch 2007; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Trombetta 2008), thus moving focus away from the study of the effects of environmental factors on society. However, to understand the specific effects of climate change on society, one first needs to understand the general effects of environmental stress on society. We understand the interaction between environment and society as reflexive. In the specific context of armed conflict, Wallensteen and Swain (1997) identify (a) environmental destruction as the repercussion of conflict and (b) environmental destruction as the cause of conflict itself. In this chapter we first highlight the relationship between environmental stress and peacebuilding processes in post-conflict societies and introduce a theoretical model explaining the reflexivity of these two causal directions, i.e., how they are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Subsequently the theoretical model is applied to examine the suitability and sustainability of the external state-building project in Kosovo. We are particularly interested at the strategies that are adopted in the field of energy production within a wider framework of liberal state-building in Kosovo. The guiding question for this investigation is whether the actors participating in the peacebuilding process have the capacity to address and provide environmental security as well as to resolve the issues of societal security for communities in Kosovo. The case study of state-building in Kosovo is used to highlight the complexities of sustaining a peaceful post-conflict situation within the framework of the existing peacebuilding model. Moreover, it emphasizes that environmental and societal security requirements have to be addressed simultaneously to reduce the risk of recurring conflicts. The expectation is that through a better understanding of the interaction between societal and environmental security, further valuable conclusions can be drawn about the capacity and
limitations of the prevailing models for building peace in the aftermath of civil wars.⁴

**Peacebuilding in Times of Liberal State-Building**

Liberal state-building is the dominant Western-centric approach to the resolution of contemporary intra-state conflicts and focuses particularly on the re-creation of the state’s capacity to govern, the democratization of societies and the generation of macro-economic growth in post-conflict societies (Chandler 2006; Chesterman 2005; Kaldor 2006; Kostić 2007; MacIntyre 2006; Paris 2004; Richmond 2007). As many authors argue, it was the post–Cold War confidence in the Western liberal model as the ultimate form of human government that has led to its adoption as the optimal way of reconstructing societies that have fallen victim to the perils of internal strife and intolerance (Atwood 1994; MacIntyre 2006; Mandelbaum 2002). Accordingly, attempts to create durable peace⁵ include measures to create a particular type of government based on the liberal norms of democracy, market economy and the Western concept of the civic nation-state.

However, these state-building projects commonly fail to take into account aspects of the environment and the sustainable use of natural resources in the reconstruction phase of post-conflict societies. Many have raised their own concerns about this lack of attention to environmental issues in state-building strategies (Conca 2006; Conca and Dabelko 2002; Matthew, Brown and Jensen 2008; UN Peacebuilding Commission 2008; Wallensteen and Swain 1997). For peace to endure, it is vital to balance social, economic and environmental factors in development policies, with particular focus on sustainable development (Adams 2006; Ott 2003; UN General Assembly 2005).⁶

Unquestionably, following the end of the Cold War the number of conflicts has been in decline, and researchers have observed an increase in the number of peace settlements since 1995 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). At the same time, durable outcomes of many state-building initiatives launched by external parties at the onset of peace settlements remain highly uncertain. Part of the reason lies in the focus of external parties on resolving the immediate ‘situational stability’, while less emphasis is being placed on long-term peacebuilding strategies and their outcomes. The urgency of the identity, economic and social issues facing post-conflict societies and a confidence in the liberal peace model among the key actors engaging in peacebuilding projects leads to the promotion – often unilaterally – of specific policies to remedy these problems. In the field of economics, the policies are best summarized in terms of a mixture of modernization and neo-liberal market policies consisting of (a) the privatization of the industrial sector, (b) the creation of conditions for
external investments, and (c) urbanization. These measures, in combination with the creation of strong state institutions and a functioning infrastructure, are supposed to bring economic well-being that would in return, through elections, generate legitimacy of the state with its citizens, thus eventually bringing political stability and societal integration (Paris 2004).

Liberal peacebuilders reproduce the same logic of the liberal theory which dominated the thinking of American academics and policy makers regarding state- and nation-building in the 1960s (Jahn 2007a, 2007b; Kostić 2007), and which predicted that modernization, in the form of increased urbanization, industrialization, education, communication and transport would lead to an increased social mobilization and assimilation of local communities (Deutsch 1966, 150). The argument was that the assimilation of different ethnic groups is a ‘simple’ matter of social engineering (Deutsch 1966, 164), which ‘the states could consciously direct or at least influence and which will determine what they are to become’ (Rivkin 1969, 11). The approach generously borrows from a simplified model of the civic nation-building experience of parts of Western Europe and United States, whereby nationalism comes before nations; nations do not make states and nationalism, but the other way around (Gellner 1983, 55; Hobsbawm 1990, 10). This approach is flawed, as it clearly ignores the existence of an alternative model of nation-building whereby, as Hroch (1993) explains, ethno-national communities organized themselves into national movements in order to achieve all the attributes of fully fledged nations. As a result, liberal peacebuilders fail to account for the effects of the external

**Figure 3.1** The reflexive relationship between environmental and societal security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental threat (Degredation, destruction etc.)</th>
<th>Societal security dilemma</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative environmental effect (Pollution, exploitation of resources etc.)</td>
<td>Environmental security dilemma</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal threat (Migration flows, poverty etc.)</th>
<th>Societal security dilemma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative societal effect (Competition over scarce resources etc.)</td>
<td>Environmental threat (Degredation, destruction etc.)</td>
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</table>
impositions on the securitization of existing ethno-national identities among recipient communities, i.e., their societal security. Secondly, they do not take into account the interactions between societal security and environmental stress caused by the economic policies of liberal state-building.

**The Model of Societal and Environmental Security**

Environmental and societal security exist in a reflexive relationship (see Figure 3.1). The model illustrates how environmental insecurity is leading to societal insecurity, and societal insecurity is causing environmental insecurity. The following section describes the theoretical model, starting off with the link from societal to environmental insecurity before describing the upper part of the model, i.e., the effect of environmental insecurity on societal insecurity.

**Societal Security**

The Copenhagen School developed the concepts of societal security and the societal security dilemma in order to take into account the concerns of a group experiencing a threat to its identity. One of the key notions of the approach is that group identity can be securitized. In general terms, a society is defined as a collective of people who have a clear sense of common identity and a common tradition, culture, collective memory, belief system and social structures (Bar-Tal 2000, xvi). Based on this understanding of society, societal security is defined as a ‘security of the community to sustain traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom, albeit within an acceptable framework of evolution’ (Wæver 1993, 43). Conceptually, the societal security dilemma is based on the notion that if a group loses its identity – that is, if the group identity cannot be internalized and externalized by its members and passed on to future generations – it ceases to exist (Roe 1999, 193; 2005, 43). The main units of analysis for societal security are ‘politically significant ethnonational and religious entities’. Hence, societal security primarily concerns the maintenance of significant ethno-national groups. As Roe puts it, a threat to an ethno-national or religious group exists when a group is convinced that the group’s identity is put in danger, regardless of whether this is objectively established or not (Roe 2005, 48). The threats to a community can range from the suppression of its rights of expression to interference with its ability to reproduce itself across generations. In other words, the threat may include a range of measures such as ‘forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through to the closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community’ (Wæver 1993, 43). At the non-violent end of
the scale, threats to the reproduction of an ethno-national community can occur through the application of repressive measures against the expression of communal identity, that is, if the institutions that reproduce language and culture are prohibited to operate, and as a consequence, the identity cannot be transmitted effectively from one generation to another (Wæver 1993, 43). As a result, without a sense of collective identity, the ethnic group as a self-conscious body may cease to exist.

**Environmental Security**

Environmental security has been defined as ‘freedom from environmental danger/conflicts’ (Swain 1997, 32). Increasing environmental insecurity in recent times emphasizes the need for a broader view on security, and confirms that state-centred security policies are not sufficient. The ‘transnational element’ (Graeger 1996) of environmental threats is a main foundation of environmental security analysis today (Beck 1987, 2007; Detraz and Betsill 2009). While the devastating effects of environmental disasters are unquestioned, there is a debate over whether environmental threats should be included on the security agenda of states. Two perspectives were discussed in the 1990s: (1) including the environment on the security agenda will reduce political space for action through militarizing it (Graeger 1996, 111); and to the contrary, (2) including environment will widen political space and demilitarize the security agenda (Ullman 1983, 133–4). Today the term environmental security has reached the international security debate. Thus, the elaborations by Detraz and Betsill (2009) give guidance in making an important distinction in the environmental discourse: environmental conflict versus environmental security. The authors differ between environmental conflict, which they argue addresses mainly traditional ‘hard’ security concerns and is consequently state centred, and environmental security, which, on the other side, is associated with the broad human security aspect and thus lies beyond state borders.

**Societal Security as a Result of Environmental Elements and Scarcity**

The relationship between environmental threats and societal security is frequently addressed in debates on how climate change will cause conflict; however, it needs further clarification. While we do not believe that environmental degradation itself can cause war, we find that environmental threats, following environmental degradation and destruction, have severe negative societal effects which create situations that can promote the salience
of disputes. In combination with institutional mismanagement and the political will for conflict, these conditions might culminate in armed conflict.

For example, natural resource scarcity due to droughts, etc. causes resource competition and/or leads to population migration, enhancing resource stress in other areas. This has been seen in the Sahel region of Africa, where the weakness of governments prevented the good governance of scarce resources, indirectly supporting migration and the salience of conflicts all over the region. Natural disasters as well can destroy natural resources or make them unusable, which can have a severe impact on society, creating opportunities for political actions. Resource depletion limits development and leads to a loss of livelihood. Thus, economic factors like poverty are major concerns that decrease security and increase the likelihood of conflict (Ohlsson 2000).

Theoretically one can say that negative environmental development and emerging environmental stress can play an important role in the appearance of a societal security dilemma. Environmental degradation – leading to scarce resources, causing migration and further leading to resource competition and economic stress – poses a direct threat to the individuals’ and groups’ identity. This becomes evident when looking at environmentally induced migrations. The loss of living space and livelihood due to environmental stress could lead to the migration of affected people (Swain 1996). All through human history, people have been forced to flee their homes because the land on which they live could no longer sustain them. Deforestation, desertification and drought significantly affected the populations of the past. However, severe destruction of the environment is becoming a potential problem that could cause new mass migrations, and has already become a major issue of concern for the international community. Though major research attention and media coverage can be attributed to the visibility of South/North migration and East/West migration, most of the ongoing movements occur from rural to urban areas within developing countries, or from one developing country to another. The world’s largest trans-border migration is taking place in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In South Asia alone, about thirty-five to forty million people have crossed international borders within the region in recent years.

The cities in less developed regions are swelling every year: 914 million of the world’s poorest people moved from rural areas into urban zones alone between 2000 and 2010 – more than 91 million per year in this time frame. By 2010, 45 per cent of the population (2.5 billion people) of the less and least developed regions will be living in urban areas. Cities in these regions are already surrounded by shanty suburbs which contain millions of inhabitants, a high proportion of whom are without jobs (UN DESA – Population Division 2009).
Today the crisis of environmentally forced population migration ranks as one of the foremost security problems. These migrants have, however, been viewed as a peripheral concern. Yet their sheer size has brought them as one of the most important items on the global political agenda today, and climate change is likely to increase environmentally induced forced migration. Transnational migrants pose a structural threat to the host country by increasing demands on its scarce natural resources, but could also be framed as a possible societal threat to the receiving societies. Migrants taking advantage of their location and engaging in opposition against the home state government, as in the Chad-Darfur region, potentially strains the relations between host and home countries. But environmental migration not only generates conflict among states; it further induces a situation of latent violent conflict among domestic communities. Their change of residence brings an increased demand for food and other basic necessities of life, which put new burdens on the host society. The resulting scarcity encourages the ‘sons of the soil’ to organize against the migrants to protect their interests.

Environmental Insecurity as Result of Armed Conflict

The effects of armed conflict are multiple, from social, political, economic as well as environmental perspectives. Studies show that conflicts create severe ecological damage to the environment through direct impact: for example, detonated bombs and unexploded explosives may make fields and water unusable; military vehicles compress the soil severely and make cultivating the land difficult; and the use of chemical weapons directly affects the health of the environment in the conflict zones. But armed conflict has further, indirect effects on the environment: conflict-induced migration results in displaced people in refugee camps leading to social stress, and also to ecological stress.

When armed conflicts lead to severe negative environmental effects, environmental insecurity is the logical consequence. In the face of such environmental threats, members of securitized communities get trapped in a ‘first strike situation’: they start securing the scarce resource before members of other competing communities in order to secure the survival and reproduction of their own community. In that regard, the community could be described as facing an environmental security dilemma. The environmental security dilemma occurs when the actions a community – who seeks to secure its own environmental resources and survival – securitizes the resources and thus securitizes the existence of other groups, which, consequently, may put all parties into a situation where they face an environmental security dilemma due to environmental stress and a shortage of resources. This insecurity is mutually reinforcing for all affected groups and can spur ethnic mobilization.
and adversarial political actions and, in the worst case scenario of conflict escalation, even military actions. The above theoretical and empirical evidence reflects the complexity of the challenges at hand, particularly when considering durable peacebuilding in the aftermath of such conflicts. Reconciling the priorities of energy production, sustainable development and environmental security within the existing state- and nation-building models presents a particular puzzle to international interveners. This study explores the sustainability of energy projects in Kosovo, which are being promoted by the international community as a part of a durable state-building strategy. The main aim is to examine whether the solutions regarding energy production are sustainable in terms of long-term development and state-building, particularly when considering their connections to environmental and societal security. To that end, the links between environmental and societal security are being explored in the case of post-war Kosovo. Two questions guide the investigation: (a) What kinds of energy solutions are being promoted as a part of comprehensive state-building? (b) What are the impacts of the adopted energy policies on environmental and societal security?

**Peacebuilding and the Environment: A Case Study of Kosovo**

**Background of the Kosovo Conflict and Building Peace Thereafter**

Although the region of Kosovo has been traditionally one of the economically less developed areas in the Balkans, it has a symbolic significance for both the Albanian and Serbian populace. The roots of the Serbian Orthodox Church have their origins in the province; and the monastery in Peć was the first residency of the Serb patriarch. Furthermore, the Battle of Kosovo between the Christian armies of the Balkans lead by Serbian nobility and the Ottoman Empire in 1389 has a prominent place in the Serbian national narrative (Bakic-Hayden 2004).

After the Balkan war in 1912, Serbia was given sovereignty over Kosovo, which had been the part of the Ottoman Empire since the fifteenth century. After World War II, Kosovo, although formally a part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, was one of two autonomous provinces within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which included six republics. After the political struggles in the 1960s, the Albanian majority in Kosovo was granted extensive autonomy in 1974 and became a de facto equal member of the federation. Slobodan Milošević, president of the Republic of Serbia, limited Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 (O’Neill 2002).

Ibrahim Rugova, one of the 1989 founders of the Lidhjes Demokratike të Kosovës (Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK), was elected president of...
the self-declared Republic of Kosovo in 1992, and proclaimed a peaceful separation from Serbia.\textsuperscript{10} The Albanian paramilitary forces (Kosovo Liberation Army, UÇK), believed to be founded in 1994, started the first violent attacks on the Croatian Serb refugee camps and police forces in 1996 (Kaufman 2002; O’Neill 2002). The escalation occurred with the background of the EU-US failure to include the question of Kosovo in the Dayton peace negotiations, and the subsequent lifting of international sanctions and international recognition of FR Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{11} In 1998, the conflict escalated into a war between the police forces of Serbia and the UÇK, who by then received the US support as Albanian freedom fighters, despite their previous appearance on the US list of terrorist organizations (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2010).

By 1998, the West increased its involvement as the violence escalated and thousands of internally displaced civilians sought shelter in the hills of Kosovo. The Serbian authorities were compelled to sign a ceasefire and agreed to a partial retreat, monitored by observers from the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) according to an agreement negotiated by the US mediator, Richard Holbrooke. As soon as the Serb troops retreated, the UÇK assumed the control of the roads and key junctions, which eventually provoked the military re-deployment of the Serbian government’s troops. The ceasefire did not hold as the fighting resumed in December 1998. The Račak massacre in January 1999 in particular brought fresh international attention to the Kosovo conflict. Within weeks, an international conference was convened, and by March had prepared a draft agreement of the Rambouillet Accords. The accords, based on the principle ‘take it or leave it’, called for the restoration of a broad autonomy of Kosovo and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, along with their right to enter Serbian territory, use resources without due compensation, and freedom from prosecution for the crimes committed on the territory of Serbia during their deployment (Magnusson 1999). The Serbian party found the terms unacceptable, refused to sign the draft, and tried to negotiate certain revisions that were not accepted by the US.

In response to the failure of the Rambouillet conferences, NATO unilaterally conducted its military operation, ‘Allied Force’, between 24 March and 10 June 1999. By bombing Yugoslavia, the operation aimed to force Milošević to withdraw his forces from Kosovo, but also to undermine his regime in Belgrade. The NATO military action was not authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations and was therefore contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Despite being branded a humanitarian intervention with the goal of preventing human rights abuses, the NATO attacks elicited major retaliatory actions by the Serbian forces and paramilitaries, and resulted in a further massive population displacement in Kosovo. During the conflict, some eight hundred thousand ethnic Albanians fled or were forcefully driven...
from Kosovo. After three months of attacks the Serbian government and NATO signed the Kumanovo ceasefire, and NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops were deployed in the province with the backing of the newly passed UN resolution 1244. As KFOR was deploying, the returning Albanians retaliated against Kosovo Serbs and Roma causing an exodus of some two hundred thousand from the province.\textsuperscript{12} The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) estimates the number of battle-related deaths to be between two and seven thousand for the years 1998 and 1999.\textsuperscript{13} The formal status of Kosovo was left undecided until it met the basic international standards of governance, and in the mean time, the province was put under the administrated of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was supposed to assist it in the task.

\textit{United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo}

On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council passed UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which placed Kosovo under transitional UN administration (UNMIK) and authorized KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping force. Resolution 1244 provided that Kosovo would have autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and affirmed the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, which has been legally succeeded by the Republic of Serbia. Among other things, Resolution 1244 called upon UNMIK to perform basic civilian administrative functions; promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status; coordinate the humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; support the reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo (UNSC 1999).\textsuperscript{14} In the early stages, the international community called for the creation of democratic institutions in Kosovo, which would have to fulfill the standards of democratic governance, respect human rights, ensure the safe return of displaced Serbs, as well as facilitate the safety and freedom of movement of the remaining Serbs in Kosovo before the discussion on the province’s final status was to be opened.

Despite the ample assistance of the international administration, the elected Kosovo authorities struggled on a number of issues. Faltering infrastructure, donor-dependency, corruption, the trafficking of drugs and humans, unemployment rates of some 45 per cent and occasional attacks on Serb minorities constantly reminded Kosovo’s politicians and population about the difficulty of fulfilling the standard criteria for the discussion on the future status of the province. The slow pace and shortcomings only added to
the frustration of Kosovo’s Albanian leaders and Albanian population, which culminated in the orchestrated attacks of Kosovo Albanian groups on the remaining Kosovo Serb enclaves in March 2004. The fighting resulted in 19 dead and 900 injured, while 300 houses and churches were burned and 3,500 Serbs were internally displaced. However, even more significantly, the events came to show that KFOR and UNMIK did not control the situation and were unable to enforce law and order in Kosovo.

As a result, the West abandoned its insistence on standards and in early 2006 commenced the international negotiations on the final status of the province. The UN-backed talks, led by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, began in February 2006. Whilst some progress was made on technical matters, throughout the talks both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians remained diametrically opposed on the question of the status itself. In February 2007, Ahtisaari, acting more in the role of arbiter than mediator, delivered a draft status settlement proposal to leaders in Belgrade and Pristina, which was the basis for a draft UN Security Council Resolution which proposed ‘supervised independence’ for the province. Ahtisaari clearly copied the protectorate model of Bosnia and Herzegovina when calling for the establishment of an International Steering Group (ISG) comprising key international stakeholders who were to appoint an International Civilian Representative (ICR) and seek UN Security Council endorsement of the appointment. The ICR and the EU Special Representative (EUSR), appointed by the Council of the European Union, were to be the same person. The ICR was entrusted to exercise certain powers to ensure and supervise the full implementation of this settlement, including the power to take measures, as necessary, to prevent and remedy breaches of this settlement. The mandate of the ICR was envisaged to continue until the ISG determined that Kosovo had implemented the terms of the settlement. Finally, the ISG was to eventually provide direction on the ultimate phasing-out of the ICR.

A draft resolution, backed by the US, UK and other European members of the Security Council was presented and rewritten in an attempt to accommodate Russia, which was concerned that such a resolution would undermine the principle of state sovereignty. Russia, one of five permanent members of the Security Council, insisted that it would not support a resolution that was not the product of an agreement between Belgrade and Kosovo Albanians. After weeks of discussions at the UN, the US, UK and other European members of the Security Council formally ‘discarded’ a draft resolution backing Ahtisaari’s proposal on 20 July 2007.

In August 2007, a ‘Troika’ consisting of negotiators from the EU, US and Russia launched a new effort to reach a status outcome acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina. The attempt expectedly failed and led to unilateral
proclamation of independence by the Assembly of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. At the time of writing in autumn 2009, 62 mainly Western and West-allied countries have recognized the independence of the Republic of Kosovo. Yet Serbia continues to claim sovereignty over Kosovo in accordance with the existing UNSC Resolution 1244. Recently, the UN General Assembly has given support for the Serbian initiative to seek an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on the recognition of Kosovo. Furthermore, Belgrade has given its full political and economic support to the three Serb-dominated municipalities in Northern Kosovo. The municipalities refused to acknowledge the unilaterally proclaimed independence of the province and in 2009 continue to apply the laws of Serbia. Internationally, China and Russia continue to threaten the use of their veto powers in the UN Security Council, while even in the General Assembly there is little support for the independence, thus leaving Kosovo in something of an international legal limbo.

The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was to start its deployment in February 2008, initially with the idea of supporting the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. It is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the central aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas. It is a technical mission made up of some two thousand judges, prosecutors and riot police that will monitor, mentor and advise whilst retaining limited executive powers. However, due to the lack of a new UN resolution, it was considered illegal by Serbia and Russia. Eventually, after many turns, in December 2009 EULEX adopted status-neutral mission, that is, it accepted that it was no longer implementing the Kosovo independence or Ahtisaari plan, and recognized UNSC 1244 and their work under the framework of the UNMIK which was initially supposed to be phased out (Jeremić 2008). In other words, EULEX de facto accepted the legal status of Kosovo as prior to the proclamation of independence, much to Albanian disapproval (Jeremić 2008). While this type of compromise provided EULEX with Serbian support and access to Serb-dominated areas in the north, it also resulted in the attacks on EULEX staff by Kosovo Albanians (Phillips 2009).

**Focus on Economic Development**

One of the main challenges facing the international community since its assumption of responsibility over Kosovo in 1999 has been the development of an overarching strategy for the sustainable economic development of Kosovo. Growth rates in Kosovo remain moderate (13 per cent in 2001, 2 per cent in 2004, –1 per cent in 2005, 3.1 per cent in 2006, 3.5 per cent...
in 2007, and 5.4 per cent in 2008 (Reuters 2008)), and Kosovo’s economy is still far from being sustainable. This is particularly reflected in an extremely high trade deficit, in which imports (1.2 billion euros in 2005 and 1.3 billion in 2006) outnumber exports (0.005 billion euros in 2005 and 0.008 billion in 2006) by a factor of ten. Growth has been significantly driven by foreign aid inflows and remittances from abroad.\textsuperscript{16} The GDP per capita is estimated at 1,100 euros (Reuters 2008), and unemployment remains pervasive at around 45 per cent of the labour force (European Commission 2010).

Expert analyses conclude that Kosovo does not have particular competitive comparative advantages (Wittkowsky 2003). It is rich primarily in labour force and minerals, particularly lignite. Labour, however, is relatively expensive given that the international presence and introduction of the euro have pushed the costs of living and wages upwards. Furthermore, labour skills only partly meet the needs of modern Western enterprises (Wittkowsky 2003). In addition, the infrastructure is outdated and insufficient; for example, Kosovo suffers from frequent power outages as it does not produce enough electricity and the power grid is poorly equipped to deal with the daily demands of the population and industry.

Moreover, the situation of the fresh water supply is highly problematic. The issues are numerous; many fresh water sources are contaminated by industry and are considered a serious health risk to the population. Furthermore, water supplies dropped drastically due to drier winters in recent years,\textsuperscript{17} while much of the water infrastructure is in bad condition. It has also been observed that water shortages in urban areas are often connected to a lack of electricity (UNMIK 2008).

International experts have suggested that Kosovo’s deposits of minerals and lignite could be the foundation of a resource-based industry (i.e., ore concentration and energy production for export), especially since Kosovo possesses the second-largest deposits of lignite in Europe and the fifth-largest in the world. However, the problem is that this type of industry is capital intensive – that is, it needs external investments – while having only limited linkages with the rest of the economy, thus impacting unemployment in a very limited way (Wittkowsky 2003). However, there are numerous other issues that raise questions about the sustainability of such strategies.

\textbf{Lignite as a Bad Example}

At 14,700 megatonnes, Kosovo has the world’s fifth-largest proven reserves of lignite, one of the lowest-quality coals. The lignite is distributed across the Kosovo, Dukagjin and Drenica basins, although mining has so far been restricted to the Kosovo basin (World Bank 2008). Lignite reserves are found...
in two main basins and are currently being mined in Bardh and Mirash opencast mines covering some 9 km². The annual lignite production is (as of 2009) around 7 million tonnes. Bardh and Mirash mines supply the thermal power plant ‘Kosovo B’, and Mirash alone supplies power plant ‘Kosovo A’. Lignite is excavated by bucket-wheel excavators and transported by two belt conveyor lines (with a transport capacity per belt of 1,400 tonnes per hour or 33,000 tonnes per day) to the separation plants. The lignite is deposited close to the power plants, in open yards.

The main domestic and independent sources of power are the power plants Kosovo A and B. Both are lignite-fired power plants and have a capacity to produce 800 megawatt hours and 2 times 290 megawatt hours, respectively (World Bank 2008, 100–4). The power plants and the disposal sites are located in the municipality of Obilić some 3 km from the capital city of Pristina. Kosovo A has five units that were built in two phases (from 1962 to 1964 and from 1970 to 1975). Kosovo B has two units built between 1983 and 1984. It is important to note that the two power plants differ in terms of environmental impact given their differences in age and technology. Namely, the Western-designed Kosovo B is 15 years old and is considered cleaner than the older, Russian-designed Kosovo A, which has one or two units (out of five) operating intermittently and at reduced capacity (REC Field office in Kosovo and Sida 2000).

One big problem is that Kosovo A and B (both thermal power plants) suffer mainly from a lack of maintenance and are not continuously working; for example unit A1 is rarely put into operation; unit A2 has been out of service for a long time because of the failure of the main transformer; unit A3 is presently working up to 125 megawatts because of damages in the boiler that do not allow pressure to reach the optimum level; unit A4 was repaired and is capable of producing 125 megawatts; and unit A5 is no longer in operation because part of its machinery has been used to repair units A2 and A3. During 2006 and 2007 the emergency repair of boilers and capital overhauls of units A3 and A4 was carried out. Works are still ongoing in 2009 with unit A5; they were started in 2007 and were to be completed in 2008. Commercial operation resumed at the beginning of April 2008. Capital overhauls have also been carried out in both units of Kosovo B during 2007. The power generation efficiency is estimated at between 16 and 25 per cent at Kosovo A and at 30 per cent at Kosovo B (World Bank 2008). As a result, most of the country, and particularly Pristina, does not always have enough electricity to supply its growing population and outages are regular. In order to deal with the energy problem, the international community has supported the project to build a larger 2,100 megawatt lignite-fired power plant, ‘Kosovo C’, which is expected to be completed in 2012 (World Bank 2008).
The plan to continue with the use of lignite-powered thermal power plants has a number of environmental and political shortcomings that ought to be taken into consideration. Uncontrolled gas emissions from power plants consist of a high level of carbon dioxide and dust (Krasniqi 2009). Lignite is transported by open belt conveyer from the mines to the separation plant and is then distributed by internal belt conveyer systems which produce a substantial amount of dust, affecting populated areas in the vicinity of the mine. According to the Wold Bank assessment, a substantial amount of bottom ash and fly ash are produced during the combustion process. Bottom ash and fly ash from Kosovo A (units 1 and 2) are transported to the disposal sites as slurry without re-circulation of the water, leading to water pollution. Fly ash from other units is dry-transported by air to a temporary storage facility at the plants, where it is mixed with water and transported by belt conveyers to the disposal site close to the power plants. Kosovo A has five stacks 100 m high, while Kosovo B has only one stack 182 m high. Dust capture is provided by electrostatic precipitators in all units. There is neither desulphurization nor denitrification in Kosovo A or Kosovo B. The power plants are not provided with wastewater treatment plants. The water necessary for the plant to prepare processed water is taken from the Llapi River flowing near the power plant; when the river flow rate is too low (particularly during summer seasons) water is taken from the Iber-Lepenc canal. The solid residuals from the water treatment are disposed together with the ashes. The installations are badly maintained. At the Kosovo A site, there is a drying plant in which a minor part of lignite is transported and treated to be sold to industrial customers; the drying plant is working at 1 to 2 per cent of its installed capacity.

It has been noted that the heavy industry of Kosovo traditionally paid no attention to its environmental impact. Industry was energy intensive, not very efficient and characterized by air, water and soil contamination because of ‘dirty’ production (i.e., no filters, untreated waste, leakages, etc.). For example, the total area covered by industrial waste dumps and/or transformed due to opencast mining extends to over 10,000 hectares. So far, no rehabilitation or re-vegetation of the waste dumps has been carried out (REC Field office in Kosovo and Sida 2000). According to the World Bank’s recent study, residents of the surrounding settlements of Dardhishte, Hade, Palaj and Grabovac in Poshtem are particularly concerned about health issues that they associate with the mines and power plants. Respiratory diseases are prevalent health complaints in these communities. During project community consultations undertaken by the World Bank, residents have complained about the poor air quality and effects of pollution. During the winter, the smoke combined with the micro-climate conditions generates a dense fog, which causes visibility problems (World Bank 2008).
The Five main health issues affecting communities are respiratory diseases, heart and lung disease, cancer, mental health problems and diabetes. Respiratory diseases are the most prevalent health issue in Hade, Palaj and Grabovac, all of which are in close proximity to the existing Kosovo A and B sites. Cancer was cited as being the most common cause of death for residents of Dardhishtë and Sibovac. Twenty-six per cent of all respondents stated that they or members of their household had experienced serious health problems in the last five years (World Bank 2008, 210–30).

Another significant issue to be considered is that the area of the planned new mining field is mainly inhabited by large families who work in agricultural enterprises or independently as subsistence farmers. The production and sale of agricultural products is cited as an important source of income support by local residents. The new mine will acquire approximately 13 per cent of the territory of the municipality of Obilić. This area, planned for mining development, is largely composed of fertile land, while the remaining parts are settlements are roads or forests. Thus, a number of villages in the area will have to resettle prior to the mining in connection with Kosovo C.

According to existing surveys, respondents who saw the possible need to move away from the area due to the project as a problem, were most numerous in Hamidi (43 per cent) and Obilić (39 per cent), and least numerous in Dardhishtë (16 per cent). Also, Palaj/Crkvena Vodica and Hade had the greatest number of respondents who said that the introduction of significant limitations on the construction of new or reconstruction of old buildings related to the building of Kosovo C would be a problem (54 and 49 per cent, respectively) (World Bank 2008, 215). However, focus groups, workshops and surveys indicate that most respondents from the villages experience negative impacts from the current power plant on their lives. According to the World Bank, the explicit request coming from the majority of focus group respondents in two settlements, Hade and the Serb community living in Crkvena Vodica, was immediate relocation of all households living in these two villages. Their request comes as a result of current pollution levels, extensive noise coming from current activities at the power plant and insecurity about the future progress of the new mine (World Bank 2008). Yet, as the plans are being made for future resettlements, the authorities will need to find ways to secure alternative sources of income for the displaced population, a very difficult task in a country with persisting unemployment figures of around 40 per cent.

Another complicating issue concerns the use of water as a cooling medium for the turbines in the power plants. As the World Bank has noted, there is the potential for conflicting demands from various water users, i.e., one needs
to assess the growing needs for fresh water vis-à-vis the industrial needs. This is an issue of urgency as water stress already occurs, demonstrated by the frequent shortages in summer in the potable water supply to Pristina and other municipalities supplied by the Pristina Water Supply Company (World Bank 2008, 220). In addition, some 30 per cent of water for Obilić and Pristina is supplied from the artificial lake of Gazivoda which is situated in Serb-controlled Northern Kosovo. The Gazivoda’s water is used both for drinking and as a coolant in the Kosovo B power station. During the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence, Albanian politicians called upon NATO to assume control over Gazivoda as Serb authorities in Northern Kosovo threatened to cut off water supply in response to the Kosovo Albanian proclamation of independence (Quetteville 2007). According to UNMIK officials, the Gazivoda complex is critically important for Kosovo, but the people running the installation are all Serbs from the local area. Yet, without Gazivoda it is questionable whether Kosovo could survive – not just in terms of drinking water, but also in terms of electricity. Nevertheless, all suggestions to put KFOR troops around Gazivoda were strongly rejected by Russia (Quetteville 2007). And while the Serb authorities, under great diplomatic pressure, restrained themselves from cutting off the supply in 2008, the political issue remains unresolved in autumn 2009.

The Kosovo Serb authorities in Northern Kosovo refuse to recognize the authorities of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo and continue to operate according to the laws of Republic of Serbia. In that vein, they do not recognize the Kosovo Energy Company (KEK) and refuse to pay electricity bills to it. In an attempt to rebuff the challenge from the Serb provinces, the KEK decided to cut off all electricity to Northern Kosovo on 17 October 2009. This was done despite the calls from UNMIK for them to restrain themselves from irresponsible behaviour (Beta/B92 News 2009). In a response, the authorities of the Republic of Serbia connected Northern Kosovo to its grid in central Serbia. Also, the Kosovo Serbs continue to rely heavily on the electricity supply from the hydro power plant on Gazivoda. Also, it has been reported that from November 2009 all citizens of Northern Kosovo will be paying electricity bills to Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) (Beta/B92 News 2009). According to Kosovo Serb representatives, the issue of the power supply to the north of Kosovo has been politicized, and that the KEK had given an ultimatum to Kosovo Serbs in an attempt to integrate the north into Kosovo’s institutions (Beta/B92 News 2009). As the situation stands at the time of writing, KEK employees attempted a takeover of the main transformer station in the village of Valač, but failed as local Serbs put up resistance. The Serb authorities have also threatened to consider countermeasures, and the situation remains tense and unresolved (Beta/B92 News 2009).
Concluding Remarks

This chapter investigates whether contemporary liberal peacebuilding projects have the capacity to address and provide environmental security to the same extent that they offer societal security. There is a theoretical circle describing a dilemma between environmental and societal insecurity, based on their reciprocal negative effects on each other. Thus, attempting to address the security dilemma can cause a new security problem on the other side of the circle. Environmental and societal security need to be addressed simultaneously to reduce the danger of recurring conflicts. This seems best possible by emphasizing sustainable development through the actors involved in the peacebuilding project. The case study of Kosovo and the present peacebuilding projects clearly demonstrate how environmental and societal security issues intertwine in an international attempt to secure durable peace in the province.

One of the key problems for sustainable peacebuilding is the lack of economic alternatives in Kosovo. This leads international and local actors into the dilemma of abandoning environmental issues and preferring options like opencast lignite mines and thermal power plants. Yet, these have a negative impact on the environment, fresh water supply and health of the local population. Furthermore, they go against international efforts to cut carbon emissions in an effort to curb global warming.

Another major problem is that the technology chosen for the economic and energy development of Kosovo depends on the supply of water, which is generally scarce in the region. This increases competition as other demands, like the supply of drinking water, have to be addressed as well. This is particularly problematic as it ties in the unresolved political and legal status of the province. Much of the water supply for both the electric plants and human consumption comes from the Serb-controlled Northern Kosovo. Kosovo Serbs feel threatened by both external and Kosovo Albanian attempts to impose a new Kosovo Albanian state on them, while Kosovo Albanians feel threatened by the prospect that Kosovo Serbs could threaten the water supply for the rest of Kosovo, affecting the availability of fresh water and electricity.

In this regard, the case illustrates how the interplay of the environmental and security dilemmas can lead to new tensions in Kosovo, because the exiting liberal peacebuilding frameworks are unable to address both environmental and societal issues simultaneously. It remains, however, questionable whether and how the energy problems of Kosovo could be solved in a sustainable manner. The easiest way, lignite mining and thermal power plants, has to be questioned as a feasible long-term solution for bringing a sustainable peace. Perhaps a job-creating, longer-term, cleaner energy solution would have to
rely on alternative sources. Taking global environmental concern and the regional intentions of the European member states into consideration, such a focus would be more appropriate as a durable solution, and could perhaps provide a more sustainable alternative for building peace in the region.

Notes

1 It is necessary to distinguish between state-building and nation-building: while the first is focusing on the reconstruction of institutions, the latter is driven by the creation or establishment of a common identity. Both processes might follow one another or happen simultaneously, or be in conflict with one another. See Kostić (2007) and Swain and Krampe (2011).

2 Considering the urgency of economic and social problems faced by post-conflict societies, the type of economic policies which are frequently promoted include (a) privatization of the industrial sector, (b) creation of conditions for external investments and (c) urbanization.

3 In contemporary post-conflict settings international and regional organizations and actors; national and local governmental and civil society organizations; and international and local businesses, to just mention a few, are all playing a role in determining the future of the affected societies, actors and institutions.

4 For an comprehensive overview of critical reflections regarding of the liberal peacebuilding model, see Chandler (2009).

5 Both Paris (2004) and Doyle (2002) tend to define durable peace in terms of a peace that lasts long after the departure of external administrators.

6 Sustainable development can be defined as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987).

7 One of the strongest migration flows is from rural to urban areas. While in 1950 about 29 per cent of the world’s population was living in cities, it was projected that in 2010 for the first time, more than half of the world’s population will live in urban areas (3,494,607,000, that is, 50.6 per cent), see UN DESA - Population Division (2009).

8 The war was fought by Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece against Albania which was allied with the Ottoman Empire (Jansen 2008).

9 While in the republics Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro were defined as the constituent Yugoslav nations, the provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo had demographic majorities which were made up of the national minorities, Hungarians and Albanians, i.e., the groups whose motherlands were outside Yugoslavia. Thus, Vojvodina and Kosovo were defined as provinces which although part of the Yugoslav federation were formally under the SR Serbia.

10 The declaration of independence of Kosovo is a continuation of the separation of many Yugoslavian Republics, but compared to Bosnia and Croatia, which received international attention and recognition, the situation in Kosovo was mainly unrecognized. See Jansen (2008).


12 In other words, as KFOR failed in its task to guarantee the security of Kosovo Serbs, most of its population left Kosovo.
13 There are still no exact numbers about battle-related death. For detailed information about battle-related death during the Kosovo War, see Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2010).
14 For more, see UNSC (1999).
15 The alleged pretext was the drowning of an Albanian boy who was supposedly chased into the River Ibar by a Serbian mob.
16 Remittances from Kosovo Albanians living abroad account for an estimated 13 per cent of GDP, and foreign assistance for around 34 per cent of GDP; see European Commission (2010).
17 About 80 per cent of all Kosovo municipalities have suffered from water shortages in the last five years, in 70 per cent of which, the situation has become more severe in recent years; see UNMIK (2008).
18 For the broader analysis, see World Bank (2008).
19 However, one should note that 38 per cent of all respondents are smokers.
20 Approximately 60 per cent of the population living in the region are farmers (World Bank 2008).

References


